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FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss’ intention to “record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . . [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance.” The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army’s role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today’s military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army’s historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army’s months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of “the war to end all wars.” Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C.
1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
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Note: Documents herein are reproduced as found without editorial correction of spellings or other grammatical errors in text.
Reports of the
Commander-in-Chief, Staff Sections and Services
ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2, GHQ, AEF

C-in-C: Fldr. 76: Report

Final Report of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

2d Section, General Staff

From: A. C. of S., G-2, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

To: The Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. The following report on the activities of the Intelligence Service of the American Expeditionary Forces from June, 1917, to date is submitted. * * *  
2. Prior to departure from the United States in May, 1917, the undersigned was designated to organize the Intelligence Service in the American Expeditionary Forces.
3. Colonel A. L. Conger, G. S., Colonel R. G. Alexander, G. S., and Lieutenant Colonel W. O. Reed, G. S., were selected as assistants, in charge of the Military Information, Topographic and Secret Service Divisions, respectively. Colonel W. C. Sweeney, G. S., upon his arrival, took over the Press and Censorship Division.
4. Prior to arriving overseas a tentative intelligence organization, based on that of the British, was decided upon, subject, however, to further study and investigation. Upon arrival in France steps were taken to get in touch with the French and British Intelligence authorities, with the result that a great deal of additional data was placed at our disposal for investigation and study. After their theories of intelligence had been carefully gone over and the organization of their intelligence systems had been studied, facilities were afforded for observing the practical working of the systems in the field. Accordingly, the period between July 12 and July 17, 1917, was consumed in visiting and observing the operation of intelligence at French General Headquarters and at the headquarters of the French Third Army, XI Corps, and 35th Infantry Division. This was followed by an inspection trip of similar nature to British units, which was made during the particularly interesting period from July 28 to August 5, 1917, and which afforded an opportunity to witness the operation of the intelligence system during the third battle of Ypres. The British Second Army had very recently revised its intelligence regulations to include the experience gained in the battle of Messines Ridge on July 9, 1917, a battle which was considered by the British to be the most successful, from the standpoint of intelligence, that had been fought up until that time. An advance copy of these revised intelligence regulations was put at our disposal and was studied and analyzed.
5. After this comparative study of both the theory and practice of intelligence in the French and British armies, it was observed that the results obtained by each were excellent, that each was thoroughly familiar with the procedure of the other, and that information and progressive ideas were constantly exchanged, with the result that there was little to choose in efficiency between the two services.
6. The problem that the British had had to solve was similar to our own in that they had had to organize the intelligence service of their expeditionary force during the war, that they were operating in an Allied country, albeit but one day's travel from their own capital, and that they were subject to the same language difficulties that we were. Since the two Allied intelligence systems seemed to accomplish the same results in very much the same manner, and since the British problem had been so similar to the one now confronting us, it was decided to recommend the confirmation of the previous tentative decision to
adopt the British system, and a set of intelligence regulations, based on their most
recent intelligence documents which included the latest experience gained by them, was
submitted to the Commander-in-Chief and received his approval.

7. The Regulations for the Intelligence Section, General Staff, and the Instruc-
tions for Regimental Intelligence Service were prepared, published under dates of August
31, 1917 and December 14, 1917, respectively, and issued to staffs and troops at once.
The Instructions for Regimental Intelligence Service were adopted practically as they had
been drawn up by the War College Division of the General Staff, modified at these Head-
quarters only to increase very materially the intelligence personnel of the regiment,
having it correspond very closely with the proportion in the British Service. The prin-
cipal reason for increasing this personnel was to insure efficient patrolling.

8. The Intelligence Section, General Staff, at General Headquarters, was organized
in accordance with the provisions of General Orders No. 8, July 5, 1917, Headquarters,
American Expeditionary Forces. General Orders No. 31, February 16, 1918, General Head-
quarters, American Expeditionary Forces, effected a change in designation but did not
modify this general organization.

9. For the important positions, such as chiefs of divisions and subsections at Gen-
eral Headquarters and chiefs and assistant chiefs of sections at lower headquarters, it
was the aim to obtain officers of the Regular Army who were graduates of the Army Staff
College at Fort Leavenworth or the Army Staff College of the American Expeditionary
Forces, men who had military experience, basic technical training and the necessary
knowledge of staff work. Such officers could more quickly master the technique of in-
telligence, and their fundamental military education would enable them properly to in-
terpret the information received. It was not always possible to obtain such officers and,
in these cases, carefully considered regular officers of experience, though not graduates
of these institutions, were selected. As armies, army corps, and divisions increased,
even this second source could not supply the demand. It was necessary to put into some
of the more important positions officers who were not professionals but who had by this
time obtained considerable experience in intelligence or who were graduates of the Army
Staff College, American Expeditionary Forces.

10. The number of regular officers available was naturally inadequate to provide
personnel for subordinate positions and office assistants. Temporary officers of special
qualifications were therefore selected, in general for the purpose of becoming specialists, in
addition to learning the technique of intelligence as a whole.

11. When our active participation in the war began, officers who had done well in
front line intelligence were detailed as assistants at the several higher headquarters.
In addition, officers who had been wounded or otherwise physically incapacitated for field
service were drawn upon for training in intelligence and were used as office assistants
whenever possible.

12. When intelligence sections for the earlier divisions and army corps were created,
upon the request of their commanders, they were provided with intelligence personnel from
General Headquarters. The headquarters created later were provided with intelligence
personnel trained at General Headquarters or personnel transferred from subordinate head-
quarters already in existence, where they had received training under officers themselves
trained at General Headquarters. The personnel of intelligence sections at all echelons
had, then, to a large extent become familiar with the theory of intelligence under the
immediate supervision of General Headquarters and was familiar with the objects aimed at
and the best general practice. These officers were familiar with the use that was made
of information at General Headquarters and realized that they were part of a large organi-
zation. There was thus achieved a team work and unity which has proven very valuable.

13. The general theory of intelligence as adopted provided that all organizations,
beginning with the battalion, should have sufficient intelligence personnel and material
to render them independent in matters pertaining to this subject along their own fronts.
14. Intelligence sections at the various headquarters were interdependent. After they had given their own commanders, staffs, and troops any information of the enemy that was received, they transmitted this information to the next higher headquarters and to adjacent units if they were concerned. In this manner a flow of information was maintained to the rear.

15. At each headquarters the intelligence section studied and made immediate use of the information that was pertinent to the front of its own unit, bringing it, together with any conclusions that could be drawn from it, to the attention of the commanders, staffs, and troops. The same information was made use of by the intelligence sections at higher headquarters, where it was coordinated and studied. The lower units were then furnished the broader conclusions that could thus be drawn and so had an opportunity to verify the correctness of their own conclusions.

16. The basis of combat intelligence was the intelligence personnel with the line troops, that is to say, the regimental intelligence and battalion scout sections. These units were responsible, not only for obtaining information of the enemy on their own front, but a more important consideration, also for gaining the cooperation of the other members of their units to the end that all troops on duty in positions favorable for observation of the enemy might contribute to the amount of information gained and start this back through proper channels.

17. A full realization and performance of their duties and responsibilities by the front line intelligence detachments and a cheerful acceptance of the hardships that were entailed were vital to the success of the entire system of intelligence. These conditions uniformly existed and it was everywhere found that the men composing the front line intelligence detachments carried out their work to the fullest under all conditions, unaffected by the casualties that they suffered.

18. At the headquarters of regiments there were provided a regimental intelligence officer and eight observers. In addition, each battalion had a detachment commanded by an officer and composed of twenty-eight enlisted men, including fifteen scouts, eleven observers, and two chief snipers. The scouts were represented on all patrols and raids into the enemy's lines, for the definite purpose of obtaining all possible information of the enemy that could be gained in such cases. The observers, as indicated by their designation, established observation posts, and, in mobile warfare, advanced these observation posts to favorable points as the troops moved forward. This means of gaining information of the enemy, and particularly of his movements, was a most important one and frequently succeeded in operations when all other means had failed. It was maintained in stabilized warfare and in war of movement.

19. Listening-in sets were another intelligence agency which furnished information to regimental headquarters. They were of value, however, mainly in stabilized and trench warfare, where it was possible to devote considerable time and materiel to their organization. They were valuable also in obtaining a check on indiscreet conversations over our own lines.

20. The artillery liaison officers who were maintained at infantry regimental headquarters scrutinized all information gathered by the intelligence agencies and transmitted to the artillery such as was of value. In addition, they obtained from the artillery information officer of their own units any non-technical data that would contribute to the work of the intelligence service.

21. The original organization did not contemplate that brigade headquarters should constitute a link in the chain of intelligence. In practice, many brigade commanders found it necessary to detail an officer and some assistants to constitute a temporary brigade intelligence section. Experience has thus shown that the original organization was faulty and steps have been taken in the form of a proposed tables of organization and new intelligence regulations to remedy this defect.

22. At the headquarters of a division there was provided an Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, who was a General Staff officer and a member of the division commander's tactical
In addition to the information that came to this officer from the regimental intelligence officers, he obtained information from observation posts, established by his divisional personnel, from artillery balloons and observation posts through the artillery information officer of the divisional artillery brigade, from neighboring divisions, and from higher headquarters.

23. Prisoners and documents, taken from the enemy, were collected at the divisional collecting center for the first time after their capture. They were classified and a limited number were detained long enough so that all possible tactical information of the enemy of immediate value to the division could be obtained.

24. The duties of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of a division included: First, military information and conduct of combat intelligence, which constituted the greater part of the work; second, map reproduction and distribution; third, counter-espionage. This work was done with the aid of one assistant for military information, one topographical officer, and one commissioned interpreter, with a corresponding amount of clerical and enlisted personnel.

25. The duties of an intelligence section at the headquarters of an army corps were in the main similar to those in the division but with increased scope and application. Prisoners and documents were forwarded by divisions to the corps prisoner of war enclosure with the minimum delay. They were there given a more detailed examination for the purpose of discovering tactical information of immediate value along the corps front. Within twenty-four hours they were forwarded to the army prisoner of war enclosure where a still more detailed examination took place.

26. Here additional means of obtaining information were available in the form of aero squadrons for visual and photographic reconnaissance, corps observation posts, the corps artillery information service, balloons and sound and flash ranging sections. The multiplication of sources of information and details handled required a considerable increase of personnel over that necessary for a division.

27. The principal new element met with in this echelon was aerial reconnaissance. The services of several officers and men were required almost exclusively for the interpretation, restitution, in the form of maps, and distribution of photographs and the study of the results of visual observation missions.

28. The duties of the intelligence section at the headquarters of an army took on a somewhat different character. In addition to military information, map reproduction and distribution, and counter-espionage, this section was charged with the restitution of airplane photographs and the compilation of data for large scale battle maps Plans directeurs. It also directed the activities of the field surveying parties which were always in operation when new territory was occupied and whose work was necessary to the artillery for working out firing data, especially when firing had to be done without direct observation or airplane adjustment.

29. Radio intelligence personnel for the immediate solution of intercepted messages was included in the army intelligence section.

30. The Press and Censorship Division was represented at these headquarters by permanent personnel, whose duties included caring for press representatives and visitors, sending periodic reports covering the day's operations to press field headquarters for the use of correspondents in making up their despatches covering portions of the battle front they had been unable personally to visit.

31. The scope of aerial reconnaissance conducted by the army was somewhat greater than that conducted by the corps in that it included night reconnaissance.

32. Although the army intelligence section maintained observation posts and conducted aerial reconnaissance, both photographic and visual, its duties were primarily, not the direct gathering of information, but rather the study, coordination, and interpretation of the mass of information gathered and transmitted by the lower intelligence echelons. If the lower intelligence sections are efficient in the performance of their duties and maintain a flow to the rear of information carefully selected from the mass that comes into their hands, accompanied by such opinions or deductions as may have been
made, the army intelligence section will never be uniformed on the location, activities, and probable intentions of the enemy and there will be disseminated as intelligence complete information accompanied by the conclusions arrived at in the light of a full knowledge of all matters affecting the situation.

33. At the armies there began to be obtained information bearing on the enemy's economic status, political conditions, morale, and kindred subjects. This was possible because prisoners and documents were here examined at length, in detail, and in such numbers as to permit reasonable deductions to be made.

34. At the army, as at the corps, close touch was maintained with the artillery information service.

35. Each intelligence detachment was a part of the command of the unit to which it belonged and was, as such, responsible in the fullest to this commander, who had also the responsibility of transmitting information immediately to the next higher echelon. Also, although the commanders of all units were responsible for the conduct of intelligence within their units, the army and corps intelligence sections were in a measure also responsible for the proper technical conduct of intelligence.

36. As a general principle, each intelligence section and detachment was responsible for intelligence on its own front and to a depth within the enemy's lines proportionate to that front. Thus the depth of the area kept under surveillance by the army was limited only by the radius of action of its reconnaissance squadrons, the limits of the terrain visible from its observation posts, and the amount and kind of information that could be obtained from prisoners and documents. It left to subordinate units a stretch of some five miles in depth. The division kept minute watch over the first two miles of this stretch and the corps over the remaining three. These limits of action were not hard and fast but overlapped to an extent sufficient to preclude the possibility of leaving any part of the terrain unobserved.

37. The Intelligence Section at General Headquarters was concerned with watching the enemy, not only along the whole western front, but on the Russian, Macedonian, and Italian fronts as well, as success or failure by the enemy on these fronts of course affected his operations on the western front, our immediate concern.

38. Upon the creation of the Intelligence Section at General Headquarters, it was realized that, owing in part to the distance separating the American Expeditionary Forces from the Headquarters of the Army in Washington and the limited means of communication by cable and the slowness of communication by steamer, there would be an unusually great demand for information dealing with the economic and political situation of the enemy powers. Owing to their proximity and to the fact that telephonic communications with the headquarters of the armies in the field was possible, the French and British War Ministers performed the work connected with obtaining and preparing information of this kind and furnished it to the field headquarters, through the intelligence sections daily. This work, necessarily done at our General Headquarters under the circumstances, called for the services of a number of officers and men familiar with international politics. The result of their labors found its expression in the Press Review and, when it covered subjects not treated of in the press, in the Summary of Intelligence. This information, gathered from all sources, although it did not deal directly with troops, still had a direct influence on many decisions that were made.

39. The 2d Section, General Staff, at General Headquarters was divided into four main divisions:

1. Military Information Division.
2. Secret Service Division.
3. Topographical, Map Supply, and Sound and Flash Ranging Division.

All information obtained, no matter from what source, reached General Headquarters with the least practicable delay, where it was studied and made use of in one of these divisions.
40. The Military Information Division was organized by Colonel A. L. Conger, G. S., and Colonel J. R. Thomas, Jr., became its chief in November, 1918. The division was divided into subsections, each of which handled a group of closely related subjects.

41. One subsection was concerned with the state of the enemy's military establishment, the location of his units together with their strength and fighting value, developments in tactics and combat methods, and changes in organization. Graphs, charts, and maps were used in connection with written data for the purpose of recording and disseminating information on these subjects. Histories of the enemy divisions were kept up and sent to units whenever these divisions appeared opposite them, and, in general, our forces were kept fully apprised of developments in the enemy's armies.

42. Another subsection was constantly scrutinizing all information that was collected with a view to discovering the enemy's defensive organization, the state of his supply system, including dumps, narrow and standard gauge railroads, roads and hospitals, and any indications as to his military plans which might be deducible from the activity in, increase or decrease of the same. All towns within the enemy's area and in the line of possible advance on our part were listed and described as to accommodations, water supply, factories, supplies, equipment, and other pertinent data. Careful study and interpretation of airplane photographs contributed largely to the success of this work.

43. A third subsection was concerned solely with artillery and artillery tactics as employed by the enemy.

44. Much important information was gained by intercepting the enemy's wireless messages, decoding and deciphering them, and considering the data so obtained. The radio intelligence subsection was charged with this duty and was also concerned with the use of the goniometric stations for localizing the enemy's radio nets, which frequently gave important indications of his plans.

45. The task of following all phases of the enemy's aviation, its organization, activities, materiel, personnel, and the location of its units, was assigned to one subsection, and the results of its labors were added to the sum total of information.

46. It was obviously necessary that the most accurate and complete knowledge possible must be had of the enemy's manpower status, his equipment in both kind and quantity, his armament, and the number of reserves at his disposal other than those in the immediate theater of operations. Information on these subjects was obtained from prisoners and the study of documents. The personnel of the subsection therefore included a number of German translators. To this number were added men qualified to do general translation work for the whole staff. The data on the enemy's manpower and the status of his equipment came from the same sources and, since they both concerned the enemy's resources, were usually considered together. They were therefore assigned to a single subsection.

47. In the manner above outlined, all of the information was scanned, classified, and studied by the subsections and put into the hands of the Chief of the Information Division. He was thus able to take the results, coordinate, compare, and weigh them, and arrive at a logical conclusion or estimate of the enemy's situation and intentions.

48. The greater part of the work had been done when this stage was reached but it became necessary to put the final conclusions into convenient form and disseminate them so that they could reach the commanders and staffs concerned with the least possible delay. A subsection was created to do this. This subsection published daily four intelligence documents:

(a) The Summary of Intelligence, a secret document, contained information of the broadest scope, covering subjects which concerned only General Headquarters. This Summary enabled the General Staff to keep in touch with political and military events on all fronts and in all parts of the world as well as with economic conditions in all countries.

(b) The Summary of Information, a confidential document, was printed for use at General Headquarters and for distribution to units down to divisions. This summary confined itself to the western front. It gave information designed to keep subordinate
commanders and staffs fully informed on all subjects and parts of the front with which they might have to deal. In it were printed translations of captured enemy documents describing tactics and material that our troops would be confronted with in battle. There was also printed in this summary a tabulated statement of the enemy's order of battle and the changes that took place each twenty-four hours. As much information as possible was conveyed on maps and charts.

(c) The Press Review, a secret and later a confidential document distributed only to the General Headquarters Staff, was intended to fill a need for a means of following the trend of opinion on vital questions affecting the war as reflected by the press comments that appeared in the newspapers of the enemy, the allies, and neutral countries. A careful consideration of this press comment and the knowledge of the political leanings of the papers and their sources of information frequently gave an excellent guide to official opinion in the country in which they were published.

(d) The Summary of Air Intelligence was published for the purpose of keeping air units fully informed of the situation of the enemy's air forces and developments of all kinds in his aviation service. The system of disseminating information by means of summaries was practiced by intelligence sections at all headquarters. At army and lower headquarters they were given the name of Summary of Intelligence and were, in effect, the formal report of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, for the day.

49. The subsection that was charged with these publications also prepared the Official Communique and the daily cablegram to the War Department, which was sent for the purpose of elaborating on the communique and giving a more detailed account of the events of the day.

50. The Secret Service Division, organized under Lieut. Col. W. O. Reed, G. S., and taken over by Col. A. B. Coxe, G. S. in October, 1918, was assigned two main functions, espionage and counterespionage. The latter, under the direction of Col. A. Moreno, G. S., was again subdivided into military and civilian counterespionage.

51. The civilian subsection has as its main duty the discovery of enemy agents and their suppression. This was effected in large part by the use of intelligence police, liaison with French and British authorities, and utilization of information from various other sources, including units in the field. In addition, the Services of Supply Intelligence Service, Lt. Col. Cabot Ward, G. S., Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, S. O. S., was established, with control of the base ports and American areas not included in the Zone of the Armies. In army areas civilian travel was controlled through the enforcement of circulation regulations adopted by all of the Allies.

52. The military counterespionage subsection fulfilled a function similar in the main to that of the civilian subsection. Its purpose was the discovery and suppression of any hostile espionage within military units or areas within the Zone of the Armies. The organization adopted in the United States for military units was modified to suit conditions in France and established in those units in which it did not already exist.

53. The espionage subsection under Lt. Col. N. W. Campanole, G. S., was engaged in the collection of military and political information concerning the enemy. This was done by the establishment in neutral countries of information centers which acted in cooperation with the Allied services.

54. The Topographic, Map Supply, and Sound and Flash Ranging Division was organized and conducted throughout by Col. R. G. Alexander, G. S. The principal duties performed by this division were:

1. The supervision and coordination of topographic surveying.
2. The preparation, reproduction, and distribution of maps.
3. The reproduction of intelligence information.
4. The establishment of artillery firing data.
5. Sound and Flash Ranging.

55. The development of aerial photography had made it possible to carry on detailed mapping of territory held by the enemy and to plot on maps the greater part of the
enemy's trenches and artillery positions.

56. The requirements of modern staff work demanded an increased amount of graphic representation for simplification and of type printing for which it became necessary to establish large plants. In all of this work time was a vital element, since information, to be of value, must be published promptly. So that time might be saved and printing and reproducing done on the spot, mobile printing trains, with presses and processes mounted on trucks, were organized to accompany our army corps and armies in their movements.

57. Drafting and printing of base maps showing the natural topographical features was done at General Headquarters at Chaumont and the Base Printing Plant at Langres. The Base Printing Plant, established and operated by the 29th Engineers, was one of the best equipped plants of its kind in existence, as it had the most modern reproduction machinery and methods, and it was able to reproduce a large majority of the maps with which the American armies were always supplied. The total number reproduced and used between July 1 and November 11, 1918, was in excess of five million. The study, restitution from aerial photographs, and overprinting of the enemy's defensive organization on these maps to make the Battle Map, or Plan Directeur, and the establishment of artillery firing data, were performed by the several army topographical divisions. All topographical units reproduced intelligence information for the headquarters to which they belonged.

58. In the Second Army, at the close of hostilities, there were thirty-three periodic maps produced; the time of publication ranging from daily to monthly; the edition from fifty copies to four thousand. Actual surveys made after the conclusion of the Armistice showed a gratifying degree of accuracy in the study and mapping of the enemy's defensive organization.

59. A liberal policy of map distribution was carried out, since the map is the most convenient and certain means of conveying intelligence information to company and platoon commanders before and during an attack.

60. The Topographic, Map Supply, and Sound and Flash Ranging Division was responsible for the organization, training, administration, and technical supervision of the sound and flash-ranging troops, while their employment in the field was under the tactical control of the artillery.

61. The training of sound and flash-ranging personnel was conducted at a school which had a capacity of about 200 officers and men. The course, modeled closely after that of the British, normally lasted one month.

62. The original installation at the front took place in the Toul sector in March, 1918, and was maintained there continuously until the Armistice. When ranging was required on other fronts for active operations, experienced sections were withdrawn from the Toul sector for this purpose and replaced by new sections from the school.

63. The manufacture of French sound and flash-ranging equipment had been started in the United States before our investigation of the subject in France. This investigation showed that there was little to choose between the French and British flash-ranging equipment and methods, but that the British sound-ranging apparatus was superior in the field to that of the French. As a consequence of these findings, French methods and material were adopted for flash ranging, and British methods and material for sound-ranging, both with the approval of the War Department.

64. The work of our ranging sections in the St-Mihiel salient was proven by a check that was made of the German batteries after our troops had advanced. The results of this check were surprisingly good and indicated that the service had attained a high degree of efficiency. The artillery had recognized this and there was a constant demand for American ranging sections wherever American artillery was engaged.

65. The Censorship and Press Division was taken over by Col. W. C. Sweeney, G. S., in August, 1917, and he remained its chief until June, 1918. The division was then successively headed by Col. E. R. W. McCabe, G. S., Major A. L. James, Jr. G. S. (relieved on account of ill health), and, finally, by Major D. L. Stone, Inf. This division was in charge of postal, telegraphic, and press censorship, the general control of
accredited and visiting press correspondents, propaganda, and visitors. After the con-clusion of the Armistice, visitors became more numerous and it was foreseen that their number would continue to increase. The responsibility of caring for them was then re-

moved from the Censorship and Press Division and a new division was organized under Brig. Gen. Francis Le J. Parker, with its office in Paris. This division was most successful in its work.

66. It was found by experience that the policy and mechanism which it was necessary to adopt for the censorship of mail could be decentralized by providing that the bulk of the work of censoring soldiers' letters should be done by the immediate commanders of their organizations. In order to check the manner in which this censorship was being carried out all of the mail from single units, such as a regiment, was sent through the office of the Base Censor at irregular intervals. The local censorship was fair and adequate. A number of violations of censorship regulations naturally occurred but this was mainly in the cases of troops which had but recently arrived overseas. When the spirit of the regulations was understood and the censorship mechanism in operation, although the men wrote quite freely, it was evident that they had conceived an appreciation of what should and what should not be written and wrote accordingly.

67. There was maintained in Paris the office of the Base Censor. In this office was censored all mail written in foreign languages. It is interesting to note that there were there censored letters written in fifty languages. This office also examined letters which had been written in organizations but which the writer did not desire to have censored by the officers immediately over him. He could thus write about intimate matters and feel that the base censor who read his letters knew him only as a name.

68. Military propaganda was conducted by the Censorship and Press Division. A leaflet found to have been effective was one on which were quoted the provisions of our general order prescribing the treatment of German prisoners, that they should be given the same rations as American soldiers and be accorded fair and humane treatment.

69. The propaganda that was distributed was intended merely to inform the private soldier in the ranks of our enemies of the ideal for which the United States was fighting and that no individual from among their number need suffer at our hands from any treatment not in accordance with these ideals. Great care was taken to use nothing but the truth for propaganda in presenting the American point of view.

70. The general policy of press censorship was, to a great extent, the result of the work of Lt. Col. Frederick Palmer. This officer was peculiarly fitted for the formulation of such a policy by his long experience as a war correspondent and his recent experience in reporting the war with the British armies in France. The policy of press censorship which was adopted aimed to accomplish three broad results:

(1) To prevent the enemy from obtaining information of our forces which would help him.

(2) To give to the people of the United States with the least possible delay the maximum of information consistent with the limitations imposed by the first object.

(3) To cause to be presented to the American people the facts as they were known at the time of writing without distortion of any kind, optimistic or otherwise.

71. In the application of this policy the aim of censorship was to exert a direct influence for saving American lives by keeping from the enemy information which could be used to advantage in operation against our troops. The information that the Allies were able to gain from the careless or ill-considered statements of the enemy's press, casualty lists and death notices, and other sources served as a guide in determining what could and what could not be made use of by the enemy should he read it in our press.

72. Owing to our very liberal policy and the hearty cooperation of the correspondents the very best relations were maintained with the press as a whole. The correspondents, who were the representatives of the press on the ground, had the status of officers and members of the American Expeditionary Forces.
73. At the headquarters of armies and army corps there were on duty commissioned officers who had been journalists before the war. These officers facilitated the work of the correspondents in every way possible. Each evening they sent by telephone or telegraph to press field headquarters a resume of the activities of the day on the front with which they were concerned. These resumes were consolidated at press headquarters and held at the disposal of all correspondents so that they might consider the particular part that they had seen in its relation to the whole.

74. There were with our forces thirty-six regularly accredited correspondents and, at different times, visiting correspondents to the total of four hundred and eleven. These correspondents were present for the official purpose of observing the operations and had full liberty to visit any part of the Expeditionary Forces unaccompanied. In addition to these men there were at least nine hundred writers or former writers who were regularly enlisted or commissioned members of the American Expeditionary Forces. Since the Armistice, it has been found practicable to give five hundred and forty-four of these men facilities for studying the actual conditions from the base ports to the Army of Occupation on the Rhine, including an opportunity to visit the battle fields. It will thus be seen that there were nearly one thousand American writers who, by reason of the opportunities that have been afforded them to obtain first hand information, are qualified to write authoritatively on matters concerning the American Expeditionary Forces and the results obtained by the American effort.

75. The Stars and Stripes, the official newspaper of the American Expeditionary Forces, appeared for the first time on February 8, 1918, in Paris. It was edited by Major Guy T. Viskniskki until November, 1918, when he was succeeded by Major Mark S. Watson. Its success was immediate and its circulation increased from thirty-five thousand in February, 1918, to five hundred and thirty-three thousand in February, 1919. On March 31, 1919, the net surplus over all expenses was 2,477,898.07 francs. The final number of the paper appeared on June 13, 1919. The Stars and Stripes at all times reflected the spirit of the troops and greatly assisted in bringing about a sound understanding and appreciation of each corps and service in relation to the others. It maintained a high standard, and its editorial and news staff, by their devotion to the task set for them to create and sustain morale, have realized a high ideal in journalism and have been of signal service to the army.

76. On November 23, 1918, an Advance General Headquarters was established in the city of Luxembourg. Colonel A. L. Conger, G. S., was placed in charge of the Intelligence Section. On December 1, coincident with the advance of the Third Army into Germany, this intelligence section accompanied Advance General Headquarters to Treves, Germany, where it remained until the closing of the headquarters on June 7, 1919.

77. The mission of G-2 at Advance General Headquarters has been considered to be:
   (a) To keep the Assistant Chief of Staff, Advance G. H. Q., the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, G. H. Q., fully informed on all matters of importance pertaining to German territory under American occupation and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
   (b) To assist in keeping the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, informed on matters concerning unoccupied enemy territory.
   (c) To transmit to the Third Army information on all matters of intelligence of interest or importance for their headquarters.
   (d) To render such assistance to the intelligence sections of subordinate units as could be given.

78. It has been the constant aim to transmit to the several services such information gathered by the Intelligence Section as it was thought would prove useful to them. This was in particular true of the First Army during the Meuse-Argonne and St-Mihiel Offensives. The Air Service, Signal Corps, and Engineers, particularly, were able to make good use of information gained by G-2.
79. As the nature of the information that could be furnished by the Intelligence Section became known to the other General Staff sections and services, the relations of the Intelligence Section with these grew closer and mutually helpful to an increasing degree.

80. The artillery information service and G-2 have always cooperated and, as experience was gained, this cooperation became increasingly beneficial.

81. Relations with the intelligence services of the Allies were always cordial and were maintained by means of liaison officers at their General Headquarters in France and through the Bureau Interallié. This Bureau consisted of the military missions of the principal Allied countries attached to the Second Bureau (Intelligence) of the Ministry of War at Paris. The American mission, with Major Royall Tyler as Chief, was appointed on August 30, 1917, and has been maintained continuously since that date. The immediate object of the Bureau Interallié was to provide for a rapid and regular exchange of information on trade, political, economic, and industrial conditions in enemy and neutral countries, and the activity of enemy agents in Allied and neutral countries (counter-espionage).

82. Cooperation has been maintained with the French and British Intelligence Service by means of liaison officers and by direct contact. These intelligence services have always been most helpful and cooperative in all respects.

83. Since, at the time of the initial organization of the Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, almost no American personnel was familiar with the technique of intelligence in any of its phases, it became necessary to provide means of remedying this defect as soon as possible.

84. The initial personnel had to learn by experience. The French and British authorities facilitated this training by offering the opportunity of sending officers to observe the workings of their intelligence system in all echelons. Advantage was taken of these offers and officers who were detailed for this duty, not only observed, but actually performed intelligence duties. A number of officers, too, were sent to the British Intelligence School in England. When our first divisions went into the line for training purposes intelligence personnel in addition to that prescribed was attached for the purpose of gaining front line experience.

85. Notwithstanding the results so obtained, the demand for trained intelligence officers began to exceed the supply. When, in July, 1918, there were available at General Headquarters officers whose experience and training in intelligence fitted them for the task of instructing others, there was established at Langres the Army Intelligence School. Besides the Director, there were six American, two French, and one British instructors.

86. The course covered three main fields: First, the detailed study of the German army, its organization, recruiting system, strength, and location of its units, and all matters that would help an intelligence officer to visualize the enemy's forces; second, the examination of prisoners and documents, theoretically, by means of lectures and books, and practically, by means of the actual examination of German prisoners and documents; third, topography, and the study, interpretation, and restitution of airplane photographs. Such objects as the organization of the Austrian, Turkish and Bulgarian armies, the organization of our own and Allied armies, principles of tactics, and the development of tactical methods, were covered in lectures with a view to giving the students a well-balanced, though necessarily superficial, military knowledge.

87. The initial capacity of this school was fifty students, and it was later expanded to accommodate twice that number. Prospective students were selected from all sources but only after a rigid inquiry into the qualifications of each man. Upon their graduation from the school the students became highly trained assistants and eventually a number of them rose to occupy important positions.

88. Experience in the American Expeditionary Forces has amply borne out the axiom that military operations can be carried out successfully and without unnecessary losses.
only in the light of the most complete and reliable information of the enemy. Experience has also proven that this object can be attained only by means of a carefully organized system for obtaining, coordinating, studying and disseminating such information, and for assisting in the preparation of military plans by applying the information on hand to the operation under consideration.

89. The difficulties of building up a system like that which has been described have shown beyond all doubt that great attention must in the future be paid to training in this important phase of General Staff work. It has been amply demonstrated, not only that the General Staff officers concerned with intelligence must be well-trained, but also that the whole group of General Staff officers must have an adequate conception of this particular staff function. This is equally and especially true of the commanders of all units. When a proper appreciation of the importance of this work has been generally inculcated the consequent demand for officers capable of carrying it out will require that there also exist a means of educating a sufficient number of officers in its technique.

90. For the three American armies the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-2, and the first assistants were detailed from General Headquarters, as was as much of the other personnel as possible. Colonel Willey Howell, G. S., was detailed as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the First Army, with Colonel C. F. Thompson, G. S., as assistant. At the time of the creation of the Second Army, Colonel Thompson was detailed as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, being replaced at the First Army by Lieutenant Colonel Thom Catron, G. S.; Major P. C. Kalloch, G. S., was detailed as assistant to Colonel Thompson. Colonel R. H. Williams, G. S., who had been Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the I Corps, was detailed to that position in the Third Army.

91. A board was convened for the purpose of drawing up new American Intelligence Regulations based, not only on the former regulations, but particularly on the experience of our most successful intelligence officers. These regulations represent the best opinion and practices of the Intelligence Service in the American Expeditionary Forces and contain the application of the lessons derived from the war.

92. The information that our Intelligence Service gained enabled it at all times, and especially at critical moments, to make diagnoses and estimates of enemy's situation that subsequent information has shown were correct in their essentials and, to a large extent, in their details.

93. The Intelligence Services of the French, British, Italian, Belgian, and our own forces were based on the same principles and operated, in the main, in the same manner. None of them could, even for its own troops and front, operate efficiently without the aid and cooperation of all of the intelligence services. Individually, their accomplishments could have but limited scope and value; together, working in close touch and harmony and with pooled resources, they formed a combination which at all times supplied their commanders, staffs, and troops with the information that was necessary for the intelligent decision of military questions, great or small.

94. During the winter of 1917, while our divisions were receiving their preliminary training in the line, and before our own sources of information had been definitely established, the machinery of the intelligence service was being perfected by studying and utilizing the large amount of information obtained from the French and the British, and the increasing amount that was received from our own troops as more divisions were put into the line.

95. Intelligence officers at all headquarters were studying previous information concerning the enemy, for the purpose of becoming thoroughly familiar with his organizations, tactics, habits, and modes of thought. They were thus perfecting themselves in their work and preparing to be able, on any staff, to present the point of view of the enemy opposite them. Their tactical training and course at the Staff College had given them a knowledge of the activities that normally result from the issuance of tactical field orders. They were now learning to apply this knowledge; that is, from activities
of the enemy that they studied, to deduce the general tenor of the tactical field orders issued by the enemy which had brought about these activities. This amounted, in fact, to determining the enemy's intentions as indicated by information gained through intelligence agencies. They were further preparing themselves to be able to assist in the preparation of plans for operations by their ability to point out the effect that the enemy's dispositions, defensive organizations, or intentions would have on them. At the daily staff meetings held at corps, army, and higher headquarters, they presented an informal oral review of the enemy's activities of the previous 24 hours, and answered any specific questions asked, this orienting the entire staff.

96. The aim of intelligence was to describe the enemy's forces, to determine the location of his units, discover his intentions, and where and when he would carry them out. In addition to this, intelligence warned our own troops of how the enemy would act and, when it was possible, why.

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98. The study on the German Operations in Picardy, which appears in this Summary of Intelligence, was written on the tenth day of the offensive, while the enemy appeared still to be realizing his plans and gave a remarkably clear and correct estimate of the German intentions and the manner in which it was expected to carry them out, and a conclusion which correctly forecasted the events of the summer and fall of 1918.

99. The information that was in the possession of the staff of the French Fourth Army concerning the offensive that the Germans were planning to undertake in Champagne on July 15, 1918, affords one of the most striking and successful instances of the application of intelligence to defensive warfare. In this case there was known, not only that the enemy would attack and where, but also how, with what forces, and exactly when. Naturally, this was one of the primary factors in bringing about the complete repulse of the attack. A study of the work done by the French Fourth Army Intelligence Section reveals that complete information from every intelligence source, including agents, had been obtained, and that it all corresponded and fitted in so closely that the conclusion was inevitable and could be stated with complete certainty.

100. As the time approached for the St-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne offensive operations, our intelligence service which had had such a long and excellent practice, especially in the higher staffs, was prepared to take over a sector of the front. It was most important to the Allies, as a whole, as well as to ourselves, that our work in this respect should be good, as, if it were not, it would greatly prejudice the success of the work of their own intelligence sections.

101. The Intelligence Section at General Headquarters studied the defensive organization of the St-Mihiel salient for months prior to the issuing of the orders by the operations section for that offensive. This information was sent to our First Army, which, having been recently organized at another part of the front, had not its own data. The information was there carefully analyzed and applied to the preparation of the operations plans of that army. Each corps and division staff assigned to the attack, as it took its place in line, was furnished with the information pertinent to its front, and the study and analysis was continued down to the lowest unit.

102. Where information of the manner occupying the sector was insufficient, the necessary steps were taken to complete it, such as, for instance, the ordering of a raid at the request of the Army Intelligence Section for the identification of certain units whose presence and disposition had not recently been verified.

103. The Army Intelligence Section issued studies describing the terrain, the enemy's defensive organization, the detailed method of occupation of sectors, histories of the enemy's divisions that would be engaged, studies on the length of time that would be required by the enemy to bring up reserves, and such other data as appeared suitable or were specifically requested. Large and small scale maps and vertical and oblique aerial
photographs of the terrain that it would cross were issued to each organization down to platoons. When the attack was launched, every officer and soldier participating in it knew, so far as could be known exactly, what he would encounter during the advance.

104. The procedure above described is typical of that done before any operation is undertaken and, prior to the Meuse-Argonne offensive, equally careful preparation along the same lines was naturally carried out.

105. As the time for the St-Mihiel attack to take place drew near, there were observed an increasing number of small signs which pointed to the evacuation of the salient. Rumors to this effect had been current for some time, and finally, a prisoner, on September 8 (the attack having been tentatively set for the 12th) stated definitely that narrow gauge tracks had been torn up and taken to the rear and that he believed a withdrawal to be under way. There was no further corroboration of these indications until the afternoon of September 11, the day before the attack, when Allied aviators reported that they had flown over the trenches at low altitudes and had not been shot at, and reported it to be their belief that the enemy's lines had been evacuated. The Intelligence Section did not accept the hypothesis that the enemy had withdrawn. The question was one of importance, and involved the possible abandonment of the artillery preparation for the attack which was to take place the following morning. While the matter was being carefully considered for presentation to the army commander and chief of staff, the Radio Intelligence subsection of the army, late in the afternoon, made the following report:

Up until four p.m. the enemy's wireless stations in the various divisional sectors of the salient were still operating normally with a line of stations close to the front trenches, a second line about four kilometers to the rear, and a third line, which corresponded to the divisional command posts, further to the rear. These stations were linked up with one another in the so-called divisional nets (indicated by determining the stations which communicated with one another).

This evidence had been obtained by means of goniometric measurements, which were known to be sufficiently correct to preclude serious mistakes. The enemy had never previously kept his complete radio nets in operation as late as one day before a contemplated withdrawal. This evidence was considered corroborative of the enemy's presence in his former positions, although it was not taken to mean that the evacuation of supplies and heavy material might not have commenced. This conclusion was then presented to the army commander.

106. On the day of the attack the conclusion was borne out by the facts. On this day there was captured a secret order dated September 11, 1918, which gave in detail the program for the withdrawal from the St-Mihiel salient. This settled the question of the scale of the planned withdrawal (which was interrupted), of the time that it was to take place, and the probable position to which the enemy would fall back before our attack.

107. The instances that have just been described serve to illustrate the work that is done by the intelligence service before an operation is undertaken. The work cannot stop at this point, however, and must continue, despite all difficulties, throughout the operation. At such a time, all agencies for gathering information continue their work with increased intensity and there is a constant flow to the rear of data in the form of reports, prisoners, documents, and aerial photographs.

108. The following document, selected from among those captured during the St-Mihiel offensive, was published in Summary of Intelligence No. 19, Headquarters, First Army, September 17, 1918. It is typical of the more useful documents captured and has significance and interest to all units. It is not known exactly on what date the document was found, but it had reached Army Headquarters, had been translated, published and put into the hands of troops six days after the initial assault.
Major General, Chief of Staff, Army in the Field,

Ia/II No. 9757 - secret - op.

According to the reports of officers sent by the G. H. Q. to the combat zone of the Second Army, the defeat of the latter is to be imputed to the following facts:

(Note: The German Second Army was engaged in the Somme Battle of August 8, 1918.)

1. The troops allowed themselves to be surprised by the attack of tanks en masse and in particular they lost all cohesion when suddenly some tanks appeared behind them, which had succeeded in getting through under cover of a natural and artificial fog.

2. In the advance combat zone, as well as in the villages and sectors of the rear, there existed no remarkable defensive positions or organization which made possible a defense according to our plans.

3. Total insufficiency and scarcity of the artillery assigned to the battalions at rest and to the reserve of the Higher Command to make it possible to oppose a new artillery resistance to an enemy that had broken through and to the tanks.

From this we deduce:

1. As I have already said in my secret order Ia 9718, op, of August 8, we must, in order to obtain more precise information upon the enemy situation capture a greater number of prisoners, have the terrain watched by special observation posts, advanced observation posts, aerial reconnaissance, listening posts, etc., since we must in the present situation expect further surprise attacks on other sectors of the front. The greatest vigilance is necessary at dawn and in the cool hours of the morning because surprise attacks are generally launched at this time, and also because the men whose nerves and strength have been exhausted during the night, relax to a certain degree. As a result of recent experiences, a very particular supervision of the troops is necessary at this hour of the day. As to the echeloning of the infantry and artillery in depth, a sufficient number of detailed orders have already been sent from here.

2. Now more than ever we must, in the construction of posts and field work, accord a larger part to antitank defense and by all possible means overcome the aversion of the troops to digging. Even if at advanced points of the combat zones of an active sector and under the eye of a vigilant enemy, the construction of trenches and obstacles advanced very slowly, it is important that all commanders should see to it that the infantry disappears under the ground, that it is protected by obstacles and that under cover of small works defiladed from the view of the enemy, it connects little by little the trench elements which will finally form lines. But it is equally indispensable under hostile artillery fire, the defensive organizations should prevent a rapid advance. Before all things it is in this case necessary by means of villages, farms, groves, fields and roads defensively organized and surrounded by wire, to create strong points with reciprocal flanking and to establish the antitank defenses. (See par. 4.). In these rear lines also we must endeavor to obtain a certain cohesion (protection of artillery, liaison). It must be absolutely impossible for tanks which have succeeded in getting through the first line to advance for miles, over and alongside of roads, without meeting any obstacles or resistance until they get to the divisional headquarters.

3. The principle that a unit, even if surrounded, must, until further orders, defend its combat sector for days to the last cartridge and to the last man, seems to have been forgotten. The adversary that surrounds is himself surrounded. The points where he has been broken through must be closed up. The fact that isolated tanks and cavalry detachments have broken through is no reason for falling back; by operating with a certain skill the reserves can easily succeed in stopping them.
4. Many troops are unskilled in resisting tanks. There we have something to learn.

(a) The tank is an easy mark for artillery of all calibers, as far as possible with steel caps or field artillery fuses. The first condition, therefore, is that part of the field artillery should not be in a fortified position, which makes it impossible to use each gun in every direction. Rather it must arrange the best conditions so that it will be able to repel a tank attack like a cavalry attack, that is, from an open emplacement on the edge of a wood with a ground observer near. The other elements of the artillery must also take this mobile formation, which allows their guns to defend themselves against tanks. Furthermore, it is necessary that the isolated guns be placed several kilometers behind the principal line of resistance at particularly important points of terrain, entrances to villages, etc.; the mission of these guns will be to annihilate suddenly and at a short distance the tanks that may have broken through. If the fire is started prematurely, it will warn the tanks. The cavalry detachments charged with reconnoitering and protecting the roads for the tanks must be exterminated by machine guns. Moreover, the infantry of the battalions in enemy reserve will have to have isolated guns or platoons charged with antitank counterbatteries. For the same purpose, and with the aid of the infantry, horse batteries will be attached to the reserve battalions (battalions at rest). The horse batteries belong as a rule to the reserves of the High Command.

(b) The minenwerfer give the same result but their lack of precision requires fire at a shorter range.

(c) Tanks are not dangerous to the infantry except at a very short distance (less than 100-meters) for their fire is very inaccurate. At such distances one can obtain good results even against strongly armored tanks without antitank rifle, with a machine gun and concentrated charges. Moreover, the infantry will get out of the way to leave an open field of fire to the guns and minenwerfers and will resume combat against hostile infantry which usually follows it at fairly long distance. The use of machine guns to combat the tanks at a distance must be forbidden: it is useless and uses the ammunition prematurely.

(d) Finally we must not forget defense by obstacles such as barricades, trenches, destruction of bridges and roads, and the laying of fougasses and automatic mines. If these means of defense are sometimes annihilated or overcome by the tanks, they will certainly hinder them and facilitate our defense. We must leave the greatest liberty to the activity and inventive genius of the subaltern noncommissioned officers in the installation of these works.

3. While decreasing the number of clerks and draftsmen in the upper staff, the life and activity of the camp troops must be known by the commanders. The most perfect agreement will exist between troops and the command if the commander allows his subordinates to propose works on the defensive organization and the conduct of the battle. And if he, himself, understands the progress of the field work, this must not lead to the High Command to concern itself in minor details. The relations between the troops and the staffs can never be too intimate and a mutual understanding and confidence will result and surprises will be avoided.

I require that orders given to the above effect be verified, and that where necessary they be repeated. On its part the General Headquarters will send to the Army and Army Corps Staffs and combat troops officers who will help to bring these orders into the traditions of the army;

B. O.
LUENDORFF.
109. It can readily be seen that this document contained information which, if carefully studied and made use of, gave an insight into what was to be expected of the enemy, and could be made useful in the prevention of useless casualties.

110. The following quotation from First Army Summary of Intelligence No. 24, September 22, 1918, illustrates information obtained from prisoners and repatriated French civilians.

**Enemy Intentions:**

Escaped French civilians, interrogated by the French, report that the enemy is anticipating an attack in the Argonne region. However, they commented upon the small number of troops they saw occupying the Varennes sector.

On the Woevre Front prisoners generally speak of continued enemy preparations for an American attack. Prisoners of the 166th Regiment, 31st Division, captured September 21-22, state that they had been given the alarm five nights in succession. Prisoners of the 6th Jaeger Regiment, 195th Division, state that they were expecting an attack September 20. They reported a rumor that American aviators dropped pamphlets predicting that Americans would be in Metz by September 26. The prisoners generally agreed that an American attack on Metz from the west was expected.

111. This was but one bit of evidence that the Germans expected an American attack in the latter part of September on the right instead of the left bank of the Meuse. This belief on the part of the enemy has been confirmed since the Armistice by the statement of a high German Staff Officer.

112. The following extract from Summary of Intelligence No. 26, September 24, 1918, Headquarters, First Army, is quoted for the purpose of showing how information concerning the enemy's order of battle was obtained. It was of use principally to the Army Staff, but was of interest also to lower staffs.

**Comment on Enemy Units:**

Examination of all the evidence concerning the recent and present occupation of the Varennes sector leads to the belief that the 53d Reserve Division relieved the 201st Division September 1, and in turn was relieved by the 1st Guard Division about September 16, and is to be considered in reserve.

The prisoner of the 157th Regiment, 117th Division, states his division came into line September 12-13 and that the 1st Foot Guard Regiment appeared on their right four or five nights later. The 201st Division was identified in the line on the British front September 7 and prisoners said it had been relieved September 1 by the 53d Reserve Division in the Varennes sector. The captured letter dated September 4 from a man of the brigade staff of the 53d Reserve Division said his division had entered a sector in the Argonne on September 1. The 1st Guard Division was withdrawn from line on the Laon front subsequent to August 31, as prisoners were captured on that day, and it was reported by prisoners as in rear areas on September 4. It is unlikely that the 1st Guard Division entered Varennes sector as an additional division in line for escaped French civilians report that on September 19 this sector was occupied by rather few troops.

113. The 1st Guard Division was actually found to be in line and was reported on the day following the publication of this quotation. On September 30, fraction of the 53d Reserve Division, which, it will be noted, was thought to have been in reserve, were identified in the front line.

114. Information of the terrain and of the enemy's defensive organization is of the greatest importance to officers engaged in troop leading. This information is gotten from a variety of sources, not infrequently including prisoners who know the terrain and can be induced to describe it. Such descriptions as the one that follows are not accepted unless there is on hand conformatory evidence from other sources. The extract is from Summary of Intelligence No. 38, First Army, October 6, 1918, and describes terrain over which our troops had yet to advance.
Line of withdrawal on the left bank of the Meuse:

From Brieulles and to the Bois de Fays, there are shallow trenches, to a large extent only traced, and a belt of wire fairly thick, of five meters depth.

The Bois de Malaumont has no defensive organization:
The trenches are traced as far as the edges of the wood but do not traverse it (the prisoner was located in this wood up to July and returned there September 20).

Between the Bois de Fays and the Bois de Cunel, there is a strong organization, thick and deep belts of saw-tooth wire, and several concrete dugouts. Furthermore, the exercise field, with numerous trenches, which is found between the two woods, forms a serious obstacle. A frontal attack at this point would surely encounter a strong resistance.

In the Bois de Cunel, east of the Cunel-Nantillois Road, there are several concrete dugouts and strong belts of wire. At the town of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, there are no important works. There are, however, a few shallow dugouts.

In the Bois de Gesnes and Bois de Romagne, the works of the Kriemhilde Line are completed. In the region west of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon the line is stronger than between Romagne and Brieulles, where there is only the one place between the Bois de Cunel and the Bois de Fays, which could resist a powerful attack.

The prisoner has seen the plan of another line which commences in the region to the north of Dun-sur-Meuse. He does not believe that work on this line is at all far advanced.

In addition to this written description, this and like information was put on maps and distributed as soon as possible after it was obtained.

When information of the terrain or the defense organization can be obtained from photographs, it is more correct, can be accepted without reservation, and can also be taken as an indication of the enemy’s intentions. The following extract from Summary of Intelligence No. 39, First Army, October 7, 1918, is an example of this:

**Enemy Works:**

Photos of October 6 show the following new works:


Southeast of Romagne, what appears to be a new support position runs in a west to east direction from 307.7-284.4 to the road at 308.1-284.4. At this latter point is a machine-gun emplacement.

East of Romagne, machine-gun emplacements appear at 308.4-285.5 and 308.2-284.75. Northeast of Romagne, a new narrow gauge spur runs in a northeast direction from the Romagne-Cunel line at 310.6-285.5, into the Bois de la Putriere, which is known to be a billeting area. Aerial lines run east and south from a junction point at 311.0-285.25. There is a battery position, apparently occupied, along the narrow gauge at 310.75-285.5. What appears to be an occupied battery position is found at 309.05-286.6. Aerial lines run southwest and southeast from a junction point at 310.35-288.0.

Although the past two weeks have been most unfavorable for photography, rendering impossible a complete study of the new defensive works of the enemy, it may be said that the outstanding feature of the study of photos of the sector has been the small amount of new construction and activity disclosed within the area of his withdrawal position. While recognizing that the latest German doctrine of defense calls for the skillful organization of the terrain and the echelonment in depth of machine-gun emplacements and dugouts, rather than the building of continuous trench lines, still the photos do not indicate that even this later and less conspicuous type of organization is being largely developed. The shortage of manpower betrayed in captured German documents and in the recent use in the line of all sorts of technical workmen hitherto reserved from combat, is probably the best explanation of this
lack of new work. At all events, our conclusion is that the photographic evidence, while far from being satisfactory, tends to show that the enemy defensive works from the Meuse to the Argonne, and including those within the Kriemhilde Stellung, have not been materially strengthened in the past two weeks.

117. When enemy's documents are analyzed and studied partly for the purpose of writing descriptions of his tactical methods. When time presses, however, as in the case of an offensive battle, it may be better to publish the document as it stands for the immediate information of all concerned. Such was the procedure with the following document, which had been captured by the French, published by them in the army summary, and republished in Summary No. 5, of our Second Army.

September 4, 1918

Chief of General Staff of the Army in the Field II No. 10162

The following principles governing our method of warfare are, from what I learn, not yet understood by all concerned:

1. Infantry fights in close liaison with artillery. Each regiment of infantry should have its accompanying artillery.

2. The decisive battle is fought for the main line of resistance, not for the outpost zone. If one cannot yield much ground, then the outpost zone must be correspondingly limited.

3. The garrison of the outpost zone acts as outposts. If a decisive battle is fought in the outpost zone, there will be scattered through that zone elements too important in consideration of our weakness in effectives, especially if the outpost zone is extended, and nowhere will there be an effective resistance.

4. It is on the main line of resistance, and behind that line that we must hold. There is the place we must aim straight without wasting ammunition, and prepare resolutely for the hand-to-hand fight.

5. No counterattacks will be made except when there is probability of success. It is often better to lay down a barrage and maintain fire on the enemy. What is to be done in each case cannot be determined in detail by higher command, but must be determined on the spot.

6. A breach of the line on either flank is no reason for withdrawal. Salients must be held, flanks must be protected. The enemy who outflanks is himself outflanked.

7. Interference in detail on the part of higher command does more harm than good. Higher commands have to set the tasks, as we have learned in peace time, not to lead the operation.

8. The important thing is the result of the battle, not the report. Therefore, all effort is to be expanded on the battle. Higher headquarters must limit their justifiable efforts to keep close touch with operations and be patient. They cannot learn all details at once. On the other hand, reports must be absolutely reliable.

9. It must be stressed over and over that good troops, whom their leader has well in hand, have shown themselves unquestionably superior to our enemy, in spite of the new means of warfare. Strict discipline, therefore, and a firm will must be required of all troops.

LUDENDORFF.
118. Naturally enough, the intelligence service did not always work without mistakes. This was especially true in the heat of battle when inexperienced intelligence officers, or officers who were not intelligence officers at all, sent back messages concerning the enemy. During the Argonne-Meuse operation a number of enemy divisions which actually were never on this front were reported by such officers, but, during this period, all but one of these errors were detected. On November 1 one erroneous identification was reported and accepted, but was corrected on the following day. A regimental intelligence officer, for example, reported prisoners of the 31st, 85th, and 86th Regiments of the 18th Division, when actually no prisoners were taken from any of them. Such erroneous reports were often made from noting insignia of men recently transferred from other divisions but who had not yet removed their former distinctive markings. In the Army intelligence sections, where there was on hand information regarding the whole western front, it was easy to see that most of these reports were incorrect, but when there was any doubt, orders were given to verify the identification.

119. All of the documents captured naturally did not refer to tactics. Among those of special importance are code books and lists of code names of places and units. These radically helped the work of the Radio Intelligence subsections. A message in code was intercepted at 9:05 p.m. on April 28. This message ordered an attack for 1 a.m. on American troops. It went through routine intelligence channels, was decoded and warning of the impending attack reached the troops thirty minutes before it was actually delivered. Without a well-organized system for copying, transmitting, and decoding these messages, the information would have been too late to be useful. It is to be noted that in this case, as in all others, the Signal Corps operator who intercepted the message had no knowledge of the important nature of its contents.

120. The following extract from a letter written to the Chief Signal Officer of the American Expeditionary Forces is quoted for the purpose of showing the excellent work of the Radio Section of the Signal Corps, and the results that were accomplished by their close cooperation with the Radio Intelligence personnel.

On March 11, 1918, an entirely new code was placed in service by the Germans. This was considered of great importance as indicating that the long expected German attack would soon take place. All available men were assigned for its solution. On March 13, a message in an old solved code was intercepted by the Signal Corps. It was from a station which had received a message in the new code. It reported that the addressee was unable to read the message and asked that it be repeated in the old code. From the call letters given in this message it was possible to find both the original message in the new code and the repetition in the old code. Comparison of the two gave a number of solutions which were at once communicated to British and French code men. With this as a start rapid solution was assured, so that before the Germans themselves were really familiar with their new code it was being read by the Allies. The importance of this solution can hardly be overestimated. Failure to get all three of these messages correctly would have indefinitely delayed such solution. When it is considered that the messages copied appear to the Signal Corps operator as simply a series of letters without meaning, that these are the hardest kind of messages to copy, that in order to be sure of getting the valuable messages it has been necessary to copy several hundred useless ones per day over long periods of time, and that copying is done under difficult conditions and through interference which confuses all but the best operators, it is possible to appreciate the fine work which has been done. In this one case a few minutes’ inattention, a single mistake in call letters or the missing of a few groups in one of the messages would have made the others useless. The American operators are the only ones who copied all three messages with sufficient accuracy to be useful.
121. The above concrete examples of the work accomplished by the intelligence sections with combat units are taken almost at random from the mass available. For a complete study of this subject, reference should be made to the series of General Headquarters Summaries of Information and Intelligence, Press Reviews, and Summaries of Air Information, *** which are on file in the Military Information Division of the General Staff, at Washington.

122. I desire to acknowledge and record the invaluable assistance given to the Intelligence Section of the A. E. F. by the Military Information Division of the General Staff, War Department. The heartiest cooperation and desire to help were evidenced in the fact that this Division furnished, not only the results of its own work done in Washington, but also created direct channels through which important and timely information was received from Military Attaches and other agencies under its control throughout the world.

123. The detailed reports of the four chiefs of Division, with their appendices, give in very complete detail the work of each division, and should be carefully studied by General Staff officers.

124. The wide range of subjects covered by the General Headquarters Intelligence Section was such as to make a high degree of decentralization of responsibility essential to success. For this reason, the Chiefs of Division exercised a great deal of initiative and responsibility in carrying out approved policies affecting their divisions. These officers, Col. A. L. Conger and Col. J. R. Thomas, Jr., who succeeded him after the Armistice, Col. R. G. Alexander, Col. A. B. Coxe, Col. W. C. Sweeney and Col. Bruce Magruder, the Executive Officer of the Section, rendered efficient and distinguished services in the performance of their responsible duties.

125. The success of the Intelligence Section at General Headquarters, as indicated in the preceding pages of this report, depended largely on the excellent work done in the Intelligence Sections of the armies, army corps, divisions, regiments, and battalions, and of the Services of Supplies, General Staff.

126. In closing this report, I wish to commend and make of record the faithful, intelligent, and never-ceasing efforts of the officers, soldiers, and clerks who composed the Intelligence Service in the American Expeditionary Forces in all units, and, further, to record my conviction that by their devotion to duty they contributed their full share to the great successes gained by our troops in battle.

D. E. NOLAN,
Brigadier General,
General Staff.
Operations of G-2-A

ADVANCED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Treves, Germany, June 8, 1919.

[Extract]

FROM: Chief of G-2-A.
TO: A. C. of S., G-2, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Report of the operations of this subsection of G-2 will be made in four parts:
  a. Organization of Section
  b. Description of the subsections as finally organized with a statement of the functions of each.
  c. General Recommendations.
  d. Especial Personnel References.

a-1. The inevitable consequence of the fact that the Commander-in-Chief came to France with a skeletonized staff was that the members of the staff were used to meet needs of the moment without regard to the ultimate duties expected of them. Hence the undersigned, the only representative of G-2 a, on the original staff, was assigned to numerous boards relating to the selections of automatic small arms for the army, organizations of the staff, etc., having no direct relation to intelligence work. However, the Commander-in-Chief and other members of the staff soon began to appreciate the urgent need for accurate and quick information on military, political and economic questions concerning not only Germany and other enemy countries, but France, England, Italy and other Allied countries.

A close liaison was established in Paris with the Intelligence Section of the French War Department, and maintained throughout the war. For information on the enemies' armies and military establishment, we were naturally compelled at the start to depend largely, if not wholly, on information furnished by the French Intelligence. Political and economic information, however, was of a more delicate nature, especially that pertaining to France - the situation and future of which was so vitally connected with the success of our own army. It was found, therefore, that the first problem of G-2 a was to investigate and keep the Commander-in-Chief informed regarding the political and economic situation of France, England, and Italy, as well as Holland, Switzerland and other allied neutral and enemy countries of Europe. As the first step in pursuance of this study, it became essential to organize a Press Section for the study of the French and British Press. The information gleaned from the press was supplemented by personal investigations, interviews with well informed persons, and researches in libraries and in the archives of the various French Bureaus, which were accessible.

a-2. In meeting the first requirements of the situation, there was not lost to view the necessity for creating a competent and instructed personnel to meet the ultimate needs of the army for strictly military information. Before undertaking this organization the Chief of Intelligence, with the undersigned, made a visit of inspection of six days to the Intelligence Sections of the French G. Q. G. and Third Army, spending one day each with the intelligence sections of a corps and of a division. Following this a corresponding visit of inspection, lasting 11 days, was made to British G. H. Q., Second Army and subordinate units.

Very unusual opportunities for gaining a real appreciation of the work being done was given through the courtesy of General Charteris, British Chief of Intelligence, and of his subordinates. As the Ypres 1917 offensive was begun by the British Army during this visit, an opportunity was given of witnessing the handling of prisoners inactive operations, as well as other phases of intelligence work in the course of an offensive.
a-3. Following these visits, the task of forming an organization and writing Intelligence Regulations was undertaken. Since the American Army had never had any formulated Intelligence Regulations, and had no experience of its own in modern warfare to aid it, the organization and regulations had to be based on the experience of the French and British Armies. As the practice in these armies differed widely it was necessary to choose basically one or the other as a model. As a result of visit of inspection to both armies, it was decided to model our own organization and regulations generally as the British Intelligence, both because it seemed to us the better organization, and because, the British Army and Staff, being more like our own, the British Intelligence methods appeared to be better adapted to our army than those of the French.

British H. & Q. having no formulated regulations, British Second Army Intelligence Regulations were chosen as the model for the A. E. F. Intelligence Regulations. These were not followed literally, however, but seemingly good ideas were incorporated from French regulations, as well as certain modifications based on our own observation and information received from all sources. The rough draft of the proposed regulations was submitted to the Operations Section, General Staff, and to an Artillery Representative, the Chief of Aviation, and the Chief Signal Officer, for their approval, before being submitted to the Commander-in-Chief for his approval.

The organization of G-2 a, for similar reasons, was also modelled after the British Intelligence, as it existed at that time. It is interesting to note in this connection that the further evolution of the British and American Intelligence Sections went along parallel lines so closely that similar changes to meet new requirements were made in each, independently, without knowledge that a corresponding change was being made in the organization of the other.

a-4. Upon the removal of G. H. Q. from Paris to Chaumont September 1, 1917, the real organization of G-2 a was begun. The Battle Order Section which had been begun in Paris, July 1, under the charge of Captain S. T. Hubbard, Jr., on information supplied by the French War Department, from this date began to function independently.

The next sub-section to be organized was A-4, Dissemination, under Major R. H. Williams, which was subsequently divided into two sections, A-4 Publications, and A-8, Dissemination.

A-3, dealing with the enemy activity and works was organized by Major Kerr T. Riggs, and it may be stated here that his basic study of the St-Mihiel sector during the ensuing six months formed the groundwork for the Intelligence subsequently utilized for the St-Mihiel attack, a year later.

A-6, Wireless Intelligence, Enemy Cipher and Code, was organized by Major Frank Moorman, and proved one of the largest, best organized, efficient and most important of the subsections.

A-7, Aviation Intelligence was first organized by Lieutenant Prentiss M. Terry, later succeeded by Major C. F. Thompson.

A-5, Artillery Intelligence, was never satisfactorily organized until the last few months of the war, as no officer possessing sufficient knowledge and experience could be found to handle it satisfactorily, and it was finally combined as a part of the function of A-1 Battle Order.

A-2, General Political and Economic Information, Prisoners and Documents, was ably organized by Major F. L. Dengler and at once developed into one of the largest and most important of the subsections.

Soon after the arrival of the Headquarters at Chaumont, the personnel for Commissioned and Clerical assistants for the various subsections began to arrive from the United States, the officers being selected from the best qualified reserve officers found in the United States Training Camps. Other qualified officers were detailed from the A. E. F. to complete the organization. None of the original subsection chiefs mentioned remained at G. H. Q. throughout the war, except Major Moorman, but each left
his imprint upon the organization, and the functioning of each section was satisfactory throughout.

Major R. H. Williams became Chief of Intelligence, of the First Corps and afterwards of the Third Army; Captain S. T. Hubbard, Jr., became Director of the Army Intelligence School, and Colonel Willey Howell, who succeeded him, became Chief of Intelligence of the First Army. Major F. L. Dengler went as Liaison Officer to the War Department. Major Riggs became Chief Intelligence of the Second Corps, and Major C. F. Thompson became Chief of Intelligence of the Second Army.

A-5. The Chief of the Section gave his personal attention to organizing the publications department for the dissemination of information. The first publication undertaken was the Summary of Information for Divisional Headquarters which was begun in October 1917, and continued until April 1, 1918, when it became replaced by the Summary of Information which was continued daily until the end of active operations, and intermittently thereafter. In addition to this the publication of a daily Summary of Intelligence intended for the General Staff of G. H. Q. only, was begun in January 1918 and continued until the close of operations. The publication of the Press Review daily, covering American, Allied and neutral and enemy press, and was begun in November 1917 and continued until June 6, 1919. Under the conditions surrounding the American Army in Europe, this proved one of the most valuable and important publications undertaken by the section. In addition to the above numerous pamphlets, news bulletins, weekly bulletins for Field Officers, etc., were issued as occasion demanded. The Publications Section also subsequently undertook the preparation of the Daily Official Communiques and the Daily Cable to the War Department, upon the entry of American troops into the battle line, although, it is proper to add, the communiques were always scrutinized and often completely revised by the Chief of the Sub-Section and the Chief of Intelligence.

A-6. Upon for the formation of the First American Army the necessity for coordination of the Intelligence work of the divisions and corps became apparent and the Commander-in-Chief personally directed the undersigned to inspect the work of the Intelligence Sections in the divisions and corps expected to take part in the St-Mihiel offensive. The principal difficulty found in this inspection was a lack of the coordination of the second and third sections of the General Staff and the lack of utilization by a number of the division and corps commanders and the chiefs of staffs of the information and facilities for obtaining information afforded them by their Intelligence Sections. These defects were remedied in some cases by suggestions to the officers concerned and in other cases by changes in personnel, so that upon the conclusion of hostilities the general staff sections were generally working efficiently and in harmony.

A-7. Before the St-Mihiel operations the Commander-in-Chief desired to employ all possible means to deceive the enemy regarding the time and place of the offensive in the course of preparation. The preparation and execution of these measures was intrusted to G-2 a, acting for this purpose directly under, and assisted by, the Third Section, General Staff. The success of these measures in serving their purpose led to more extensive preparations being made to deceive the enemy regarding the time and place of the projected Argonne-Meuse attack. These were carried out in the same manner as indicated above.

A-8. One of the most striking features of the G-2 a subsection was the education within the section of officers for important posts on the intelligence staffs of subordinate units. In the early days of the section it was the general rule that all officers upon joining were given a two weeks course on Intelligence and on the general work of the Intelligence Section at H. & Q. and in subordinate units. This was followed by practical work in one or more of the subsections in which the officer's capacity was tried out and his fitness determined for this future work either at G. H. Q. or in a subordinate unit. Officers found to be not up to the high standard required were not unloaded on other staffs at lower units, but summarily relieved from intelligence work. The rule was adopted that when a call came from a subordinate unit for a trained intelligence officer the best officer for the purpose, available at G. H. Q., was sent if his services could
possibly be dispensed with by G. H. Q. The carrying out of this policy created many difficulties for the Chief of Section and also interfered seriously with the continuity of the work carried on at G. H. Q. But is is believed to have justified itself by the uniform excellence of the work done by intelligence staffs of lower units, particularly those of armies and army corps, the principle personnel of which were all trained at G. H. Q.

A-9. The officers required for the examining of prisoners and enemy documents during the first period of the war were sent, by the courtesy of the British Chief of Intelligence, to the British Intelligence School at Harrow, England. The training of officers in the reading of airplane photographs was, however, undertaken from the start by a special school established at Langres for that purpose by G-2 c. In August, 1918, as soon as we had experienced intelligence officers available as instructors, our own Intelligence School was established as a part of the group of professional schools at Langres. The instructors for this school were drawn partly from G. H. Q., and the rest from officers who had had front line experience. A two months course was given and the graduates were found to be everywhere in demand and of great use in the lower staffs, particularly in those of divisions. The school for the interpretation of airplane photographs was later incorporated as a part of the Intelligence School. The work of this school was continued until January 1919; it graduated in all three classes.

The Intelligence Section of the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Force is divided into five lettered subdivisions, as follows: Information, A; Espionage, B; Topography, Map Supply, Flash and Sound Ranging, C; Censorship, D; Visitors' Bureau, E.

ORGANIZATION: The personnel authorized for the performance of the duties of the Second Section of the General Staff are set forth in the official Tables of Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces.

INFORMATION-A: The subdivision known as Information, or G-2-A, was divided into nine numbered subsections, each of which was in charge of a trained officer assisted by the necessary personnel of officers, field clerks, enlisted men and clerks, as follows:

Subsection A-1---Battle Order: By battle order is understood the location of all of the enemy's units, in line and in reserve.

This subsection collected, classified, scrutinized, appreciated and collated all information of the enemy army which would assist in determining what the enemy's intentions were, his capacity for battle, the time and place of his projected operations and the means available with which to carry them out. The facts thus obtained were supplied in readily appreciable form to those sections of the General Staff, headquarters, and so on, to whom they might be of interest.

The activities of this subsection were carried on under the following subheads, for which regularly detailed assistants to the officer in charge were directly responsible:

Manpower: The study of enemy manpower is divided into two parts; first, that gathered in time of peace, including information relating to military organizations; strength of units; their grouping and control; a classified total of the number of available men of military age and fitness; the number who have had military training; the number which must be kept in essential industries and the proportion which will be held out of service for other reasons; the total population and its normal increase; time allotted for training and the results obtained therefrom.

The second class concerns itself with the number of men actually mobilized in time of war; the relation between rifle, combat, and ration strength; the number of men required in the services of the rear; the losses; replacements, and moral. Detailed tabulations and summaries of the latest information on these subjects were issued frequently.

It is obvious that, if the information gathered in time of peace is accurate and in readily available form, the enemy manpower at the beginning of hostilities must be a perfectly definitely known quantity, and the deductions regarding his probable plans and the dispositions ordered to meet them will be based on a sound foundation. On the
other hand, comparatively slight inaccuracies in the collected data, or any failure to insufce its being tabulated and filed in the most convenient possible form, will impose a distinct handicap on both the Intelligence and Operations branches of the staff so long as hostilities continue. In fact this disadvantage will be a constantly increasing detriment, as it will necessarily throw out of true, more and more, even the most careful and intelligently made estimates, and may well, therefore, be the cause of discarding methods of calculation which, although sound and accurate in themselves, will inevitably lead, in the course to time, to manifestly ridiculous conclusions because of their being applied to a false hypothesis.

Once hostilities have commenced it is absolutely impossible for any one to know exactly the strength of the enemy at a given moment. The efforts of a manpower section should, however, be directed to approximating this as nearly as possible, and, if successful, should result in producing pretty accurate estimates of his strength, with all that that implies in the way of foretelling probable courses of action on his part in future to maintain the efficiency of his fighting machines.

The information acquired regarding enemy manpower during the time of hostilities is much less definite in character than that gathered beforehand. It is of necessity more or less fragmentary and inaccurate, and should therefore, always be checked up in every possible way.

Because of the limited number of facts obtainable at any one time, a large amount of estimating has to be resorted to. Here again the importance is apparent of most complete and accurate peacetime information, and of the use of the greatest effort and care in getting and checking the information gathered in the field, as calculations based on such meager facts must, to be of any use at all, at least be based on definite and accurate previous knowledge.

The principal sources of information of this kind in the field are captured documents, the examination of prisoners, agents, and deserters, but advantage should always be taken of any other source of any kind which may promise results. Of these, the first mentioned is perhaps the most dependable, although, unfortunately, not always the most available. It includes captured orders, casualty lists, letters, post cards, diaries, etc., from any of which important indications regarding enemy manpower may often be gained. Accordingly care should be exercised to see that all articles of this kind reach the examining authorities promptly, and that they do not fall into the hands of souvenir hunters en route.

In the case of the German army, the pay books were a valuable source of manpower information, especially in the earlier part of the war. They showed the field unit, regiment and company of the owner as well as his company roll number, date of birth, date called up for military service, military category, training unit, previous service, and supposedly, the date of posting to the field unit, although this latter date was often (in fact later in the war almost invariably) omitted. Theoretically the men in all infantry companies at the outbreak of the war, or when the unit was formed, were numbered from 1 to 250, and men drafted to the companies to replace losses were given consecutive numbers from 250 upwards. Thus, by comparing the roll numbers above 250 with the dates they were given, it was possible to arrive at the losses suffered during a given period when a sufficient number of prisoners had been captured from any one company. It was also possible to ascertain from these pay books the source of drafts to the front line units.

Letters often supplied useful information by mentioning the fact that a boy of a certain age had been called into the service; that men employed in a certain factory had been "combed"; that men previously rejected had been re-examined and accepted; or that certain units had been dissolved. From any such facts, valuable deductions could be made. The usefulness of enemy casualty lists and captured orders or other documents referring to manpower is too apparent to require comment.
The information gained from prisoners is most valuable providing skill is used in their examination. It is more dependable in general regarding replacements or strengths at some past time, such as when they entered the line or after some former battle, then it is in connection with the losses sustained in the fight in which they were captured, since there is always a tendency to exaggerate losses, if the fighting has been severe; and besides, no individual in the line can possibly know much of the condition of units other than his own immediate small one. Furthermore, a prisoner is usually torn between two conflicting emotions; his desire to get into the good graces of his captors, and his anxiety not to do anything which might be detrimental to comrades.

Agents' reports are valuable in direct proportion to the dependability of the agent, but in general they are more useful regarding morale and the broader aspects of manpower, such as the "combing" of certain industries, the calling of certain classes, etc., than they are as to the specific strengths of individual units.

Almost as important as the gathering of data on manpower was its tabulation. A form such as the attached, marked Annex I, was used for this purpose, and all incoming information from every source was entered the moment it was received, so that these tables always contained all available data. By being careful to note the source from which each item of information came, it was possible always to judge its relative dependability, and the authority could be referred to at any time. A folder was kept for each division and all the sheets of data concerning each unit of that division were placed in it so that any information regarding it was always readily available. Furthermore, in case of the transfer of a regiment or other unit from one division to another, it was only necessary to transfer the sheets of that unit to the other folder to have the records in proper shape. The data having been tabulated in this way, it was summarized each week.

A system of estimating enemy manpower which proved unusually accurate in this war was that employed by the French. After long experience in the war, they found that, by assuming a loss of 3,000 for each enemy division taken out of line after or during active operations, a very dependable result was reached. Therefore, by multiplying the number of divisions withdrawn from line in any month by 3,000, and by allowing a normal wastage of 11 men per day for each division in quiet sectors of the line, they arrived at the gross enemy losses for the month.

They estimated that 40% of these gross losses were prisoners, and that the dead were to the wounded and sick as 1 is to 4. So in estimating the unrecoverable losses, they subtracted from the total losses the prisoners taken, and added to this figure to cover the dead 20% of the remainder, the other 80% representing the wounded. Of the wounded, experience showed that 10% could be taken as total losses also; and of the other 90%, 30% were not available to return to the front, according to a statement of the Chief of the Health Department made in April 1918 before the High Commission of the Reichstag. It should be added that in determining when the recoverable wounded would again become effective, it was found in this war that 10% were fit for duty in 30 days; 20% in the next 30; 30% at the end of 90 days; and the remaining 40% after four months.

This method of calculating had to be based on prewar information and on continuously kept-up estimates to produce dependable results, and in adopting it for our own purposes it was necessary therefore to assume the accuracy of the French records up to October 1918 when we first put it into use. It might be added, however, that it was found to check surprisingly closely with such documentary evidence as was found, and that it enabled the French to foretell several months in advance the big German offensive which began in March, 1918, and its approximate date; the calling of the 1920 class; and dissolution of enemy divisions which was begun in August.

Enemy movements and Circulation: The observation and analysis of enemy railroad circulation was important as a means of determining the enemy's intentions. As these intentions were controlled by the means at hand, a movement of means of offense or defense, from or to any part of the front or from one part of the front to another was presumably
indicative of enemy intentions, while the character and extent of such movements constituted an important indication of the character and extent of the enemy's intentions. Reports from agents showing movement, direction and character of the enemy's lines were tabulated day by day so as to indicate the number and direction of trains passing a given point and constituting part of a troop movement as distinguished from ordinary traffic.

This information was tabulated on a chart. In the left-hand column appeared the designations of the sectors and posts reported upon. Opposite each of these and in the next column appeared all possible directions towards or from which movements were observable from these sectors or posts respectively. Then followed columns for the daily entries one for each day; and lastly a column for remarks. The sectors and posts were listed in logical sequence from east to west and north to south or vice versa, depending upon the railroad system concerned -- with a view to preserving the continuity of movements and of easily permitting of deductions from the chart.

The movements reported were entered in the column for the appropriate day and opposite the appropriate direction and under the proper sector and post caption. The number of artillery units concerned in an entry was shown in parenthesis just below the entry.

From the entries on this chart the movement of one or more divisions or other units over a certain route between certain dates was deduced and this fact was entered in another chart, and the determination of the general trend of all movements for the period thereby simplified. To avoid confusion, it was customary to show all movements as though to the right of the line of movement and to indicate all movements in one direction east and south, for instance in red, and in the other direction west and north, for instance in black.

The next essential step was to establish with the least practicable delay the identity of the units comprised in the movements recorded: for without this check it was impossible to know how much of any recorded movement had been actually accounted for by the appearance in line of new units and how much of it was still probably in reserve and available for reinforcing that part of the line.

The evidence as to identity was generally secured from prisoners and deserters. As soon as a prisoner or deserter from a unit newly arrived in line was brought before an examining officer it was the duty of the latter to endeavor to secure from him information as to the following points:

(a) When and where the unit last left line and by what unit relieved.
(b) To what rest area if any it went.
(c) When and where it entrained.
(d) The route followed.
(e) When and where it detrained.
(f) When and where it entered line, and what unit it relieved.
(g) Similar information as to any other units associated in the movement.

Care was taken to deduce complete information as to all movements and routings since the unit last left line; for a unit might have moved several times between engagements and all these movements had to be carried in suspense until properly checked.

A record of divisional movements was kept. The information contained in this record was usually supplied by prisoners and deserters, and the recording of the information in this form facilitated the checking of reported movements.

A movement corresponding to the one developed by examination was checked off in the last column of the chart, and the unidentified or suspense element reduced accordingly. A notation as to the unit concerned was then also made alongside the appropriate arrows.

Divisional Histories: A continuous study was made of enemy divisions as fighting units, including their strength, their past records, their ability to take punishment and a daily record kept of their location and activity. Concise histories of those
enemy organizations with which our forces might come in contact were published and furnished to our troops.

A daily enemy order of battle map was published upon which was shown the approximate battle line and approximate location of all enemy forces.

A Tabular Statement, German Reserves, Western Front, was issued daily and consisted of a tabulation of the enemy's divisions, their whereabouts, their quality and physical condition, their grouping and approximate combat value as thus grouped.

A divisional activity record in graphic form was maintained which showed a daily record of the nature of service each division had been engaged in.

The Divisional Activity Record was a large wall chart consisting of sheets of cross-section paper. Each space between vertical lines was used to represent a day. On the horizontal lines, three lines to a division, were kept a daily record of the nature of service each division had been engaged in. Two horizontal lines were left blank between divisional record lines in order to make the sheet more legible. The recording was accomplished by filling in the cross-section squares with symbols to represent the nature of the service; as: diagonal lines, occupancy of a quiet sector, crossed diagonals, active sector, (raids, artillery fire, etc.); the squares solidly blackened, battle service; while squares left blank indicated that the division was at rest. A photostat reproduction of this record, as kept in this office, but reduced about two-thirds in size, is attached herewith, reference to which will make clear its significance. The data which went into this Activity Record was supplied by the identifications made at the front, from prisoners' statements and from any other source. Frequently the places where divisions had been resting, and usually the places where they were in line, were reported. These localizations were written on the chart above the space used for the service symbols and below the record of the division next above, that is, in the blank spaces between divisional record lines. This space was entirely inadequate for this purpose and many localizations had to be necessarily omitted from the record for lack of recording space. The chart arrangement had the additional disadvantage that making entries on it was inconvenient and slow and often difficult; that it took much wall space which sooner or later would be required for maps, and that it was not portable. Finally -- and this was its great disadvantage -- this record could not be indexed or cross-indexed.

Divisional Histories were intended to furnish to the combatants information on as many of the following subjects as the data on file, or available, would permit:

1. COMPOSITION, ENCADREMENT:
   (A tabulated list of the component organizations, to and including companies with the names of commanding officers where known.)
2. PRESENT STRENGTH:
   Previous losses, (usually this could be given only of sample suborganizations.)
   Replacements.
   Total effectives; Ration strength, rifle strength.
3. MORALE:
   Rating of this organization as a combatant.
   Spirit. Is this influenced by differences of race in the ranks or by propaganda, etc.
   Desertion, rate, numbers, if any.
   Health, sanitary conditions, rations; quality, sufficiency.
   Adequacy of clothing of the men. Classes.
   Relations between Officers and Men.
(4) TACTICS AND ARMAMENT: (usually this could be given only of sample sub-
organizations.)

Order of Battle:
In line.
Location of reserves: When there was enough fresh information to
Location of P. C. and O. P.'s. be of value; not otherwise.
Condition of roads and other means of communication.
Enemy intentions.
Special training, if any.
Armament.
Artillery.
Interior tactical dispositions.
Assault troops, Patrols, Machine Gun arrangements.
Minenwerfer and one-pounder detachments.
Occupation of sector, reliefs. : When there was enough fresh information
Antitank arrangements. : to be of value; not otherwise.

(5) OFFICERS:
Qualifications.
Ages.
Whether the organization was fully officered.

(6) PREVIOUS SERVICE OF THE DIVISION DURING THE PAST 6 MONTHS OR YEAR.
(This was supplied by the divisional Activity Record.)

(7) HISTORICAL SUMMARY:
The information necessary to draw up divisional histories was gathered as
occasion permitted, and sent to the Battle Order Room by Intelligence Officers with our
front line troops and from other sources. As it reached the office the information was
examined and filed in legal size folders in a vertical file, under the name of the divi-
sion to which it related.

It is apparent that the adequacy of the outgoing information depended entirely
upon what had first come in; and that there had to be close cooperation between the
gatherer and distributor of it in order that all available information on the various
topics of interest to our combatants, everywhere, might be furnished them. All the topics
had to be covered by the examiner of prisoners with equal thoroughness, not merely the
ones of immediate interest to the troops which he accompanied. This is referred to here
because some prisoner examination reports came in which were very full on some subjects
and silent on others, although the prisoner was evidently willing to talk and apparently
had more information to impart than had been gotten from him. This was especially notice-
able in regard to artillery.

Carbon copies, or mimeograph copies, were retained of each history sent out.
These were filed with the other information on that division in the appropriate folder.
Usually a history became obsolete in some particular after it was two or three
months old. If called for then, it had to be rewritten or brought up to date.

Closely related to the Divisional Histories were the Brown and Yellow year books
of the German Army, or similar books which should be prepared on all the armies of the
world with whom we may come in contact. These books on the German Army have in the past
been published every year by the British War Office and have given as complete informa-
tion as available at the time upon the tactical and individual organization of corps and
divisions together with the locality from which recruited, names of commanders, and so
forth. As changes in the above organizations were from time to time obtained they were
furnished to the organizations which had received copies of the original books in order
that the information therein contained might be as complete and up to date as possible.
The Tabular Statements, German Reserves, Western Front, were compiled in the late afternoon daily, and embodied all the information on the subject received up to that time. What these reports showed is best explained by setting forth a recapitulation of one of them. This particular one is for October 16, 1918, and is as follows:

RECAPITULATION:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divisions in line</th>
<th>143</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions in reserve</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of Divisions in reserve:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First class</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second class</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third class</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth class</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Divisions in reserve rested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Days</th>
<th>1-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>36-40</th>
<th>41-45</th>
<th>more than 45</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As will be seen, this arrangement threw considerable light upon the enemy's purposes.

Identifications: The record of enemy units and their commanders was tabulated and kept in book form. Changes occurred so frequently that it was necessary to continually maintain a live record. The most frequently employed and one of the most important means of identifying units was the statements of prisoners and deserters. This method was supplemented by the capture of documents which verified the statements of prisoners and gave positive information as to the commanders and their respective units. Enemy newspapers constituted a third source of identifications which was sometimes of very considerable importance. These papers published the death notices of officers, thereby making it possible to keep the record of enemy commanders up to date. They also sometimes revealed the approximate location of a unit by giving such a statement as: "Regiment band played on such an occasion at such a place."

The method of recording this information is shown in Annex XI.

Besides keeping these records up to date, it was made sure that our own divisions, corps and armies were supplied with the same information. To do this, weekly lists were sent out.

The purpose of keeping these records was:
(a) To be able to locate enemy divisions in reserve by an identification of some smaller unit within the division; thus being able at all times to anticipate enemy movements.
(b) To be able to furnish at any time accurate information as to the composition and organization of enemy units.
(c) To be able to verify and check the statements made by prisoners.

The records kept in this branch included the identifications of all enemy units with the exception of the heavy artillery units.
Heavy Artillery: German heavy artillery in this war was practically a new arm organized during the war, and bore little relation to the siege and fortification "Fuss Artillerie" existing previously. Until the last few months, none of it was permanently attached to divisions, and then but a small proportion. It went through several stages of development. A study of it was, therefore, particularly difficult. The conditions will not probably be the same for heavy artillery in any future war, but may be for some new arm.

As the number, composition, and method of employment of the units were all unknown, the only method of recording information found, after experiment, to be workable was a card index, containing a card for each battery reported, arranged by number of unit. When, only in the Spring of 1918, heavy artillery came to be organized and moved in battalions, an additional card was found necessary for information that related to a battalion, but specified no battery.

Heavy artillery being so far behind the line, prisoners or deserters from that arm were rare. The only real source of information was the dates, addresses, unit stamps, and postmarks of letters written by men in the heavy artillery and taken from the pockets of infantry prisoners or deserters. Sometimes, sentences in the text of such letters were of value. Occasionally an official document was picked up or some officer or observer had some information in his notebook.

There resulted a vast number of tiny scraps of information all old, and of varying, and often doubtful reliability. If a man gave his address as a certain battery and the letter was stamped by the same battery and postmarked by an office whose location at the date of the letter was known, one could tell where the battery was at that date. If the battery stamp contained a battalion number of a designation of calibre of gun, it was no real proof, because many batteries had changed battalion and guns since the stamp was made. Two-thirds of the batteries changed their numbers during the war. Some used the old stamp long after the change. To avoid hopeless conflicts it was found necessary to indicate all these factors and the authority. Practically every entry had to be compared with other entries on the same card, and on the other cards relating to that battalion of regiment. One address list of captured letters sometimes meant 500 entries distributed on 150 cards and compared with 500 other cards. The resulting clerical labor was immense and abbreviations and even some conventional signs had to be adopted. The final number of cards was about 3,000, nearly a third of which represented the old number of batteries that were renumbered or, in a few cases, dissolved.

As soon as it became evident that many batteries were changing from independent batteries to parts of battalions, and, more confusing still, hundreds had so changed, but were still carried on British and French lists under both the old and new numbers, two change lists were made out; a list of independent batteries in which changes to battalions were entered and a list of battalions in which to enter batteries they had received.

Information as to organization, equipment, and strength of individual units was entered on the card of that unit, a list of the cards bearing good material of this sort being kept, for use when studying these features of the subject.

For the location of the batteries a second index of smaller cards, practically unit tags, was kept. It was arranged by German army sectors, but groupings had to be added for refitting depots, home stations, Balkans, Russia, and such regions as Champagne and Alsace, as the last clue to a unit might be simply a statement that it was in Champagne or Picardy. At first this tag index had to be by battery. In the last few months it could be mostly kept by battalion, and in fact had to be, the heavy artillery having come to be moved in battalions. This, however, involved another difficult study. One hundred and twenty-five battalions were in regiments. Most of them had regrouped twice, so a 1st Bn. containing batteries 1, 4 and 11 was quite possible.

As an indication of location for current use, the system was a failure. It was the best that could be done, but the information was hopelessly old when it reached this office. Many attempts were made to make a list of locations from the tag index.
methods of indication were experimented with. Draft maps were made. They were torn up. In every case they showed a distribution that would have been quite plausible a month or six weeks before, but was plainly impossible at the date of making the draft. The sectors of the front that had long been quiet showed up reasonably enough, but some active sector was sure to appear to have an absurdly small number of guns.

As to the organization, amount and development of heavy artillery the card index, was a success -- but only after several thousand entries had been made on 2,000 cards, and all clues had been tried in a large number of possible combinations, and compared with what was known of German army organization methods and the growth of other arms.

During the Summer of 1918 a few battalions were rather permanently attached to divisions. Many were reported to be that were not. A table of battalions reported attached, and a complementary table of divisions which were reported to have battalions of heavy artillery attached, were made and frequently revised. Lists of units that had been so long unidentified that it was probable that they had passed through the same reorganization as other similar units were found of use.

It is doubtful whether the same system would succeed so well in a future war. It was based on a knowledge of the German love of system and of army routine and on an error that sprang from that same quality -- the giving of too much information in battery stamps and postmarks.

Publications: This subsection was responsible for the following publications:

- Daily Summary of Intelligence, daily battle order map, daily identification of enemy units, daily statement of enemy divisions thought to be in reserve and their condition in regard to rest, weekly list of changes in organization of enemy units and their commanders, monthly estimate of enemy manpower, histories of divisions and corps, estimates of enemy intentions, reserves, etc., special studies on enemy troops employed in certain actions, a rest chart and strength book, and the composition of various armies, all of which were daily kept up to date. Copies of all the work of this subsection were collected and prepared for shipment to the War College Section of the General Staff at Washington.

Sources of Information: The primary sources of information may be summarized as follows:

SOURCES

A. Persons--prisoners, deserters, killed and wounded, repatriates, agents, spies, military attaches:

- Interrogation of prisoners, deserters and repatriates; examination and identification of killed and wounded; reports of agents, spies and military attaches.

B. Documents, newspapers, telegrams, letters, diaries, photographs, maps and enemy and neutral press:

- Translations from enemy and neutral press, documents, letters and diaries; examination of photographs, maps, etc.

C. Ground observation:

- Ground observation posts.

D. Airplane reconnaissance:

- The day and night reconnaissance groups of the army and corps observation groups.

E. Aerial photographs:

- Airplane photography handled by the day reconnaissance group of the army and the corps observation groups.

F. Radio Intelligence:

- Wireless intercepts, goniometric stations and listening insets, operated by the Signal Corps.

G. Materiel, clothes, equipment, arms, munitions.

- Captures of troops.

H. Espionage:

- Reports of spies and agents.

I. Location of enemy, batteries:

- Especially close liaison has been maintained with the French and British General Headquarters through specially designated liaison officers.
Recommendations: Though it deals with a wide range of material, A-1 does not require a large personnel. On the contrary, in order to achieve its higher function of creative coordination of data from divers sources the personnel should be limited to a small group of carefully selected officers whose tenure should be permanent. Only in this way will the opinions and interpretations of A-1 attain authority throughout G-2 and with the Operations Sections.

Wherever possible the responsibility for the collection and organization of data should be placed upon other sections of G-2. A-1 should reserve itself strictly for the battle order of the day and the subject of enemy intentions which is really battle order of the future. Otherwise the A-1 staff will become immersed in gathering and publishing facts, with no time or capacity to appreciate the significance of the whole. The organization of the enemy’s armies has been covered in this war by various handbooks issued for the most part by the war offices of governments associated with us in this war. In another war in which no assistance was thus rendered by allied war offices a fairly large personnel would be required to take care of this work. The basic work on these publications should be prepared in time of peace by an agency similar to that engaged in a study of manpower.

The study of enemy artillery has been conducted outside the scope of G-2-A-1 in Subsection G-2A-5; this section carrying on its work directly under charge of the officer at the head of G-2-A and not in connection with battle order study. Inasmuch as the Battle Order Section G-2-A-1 maintains a careful study of the heavy artillery of all enemy armies, it is considered advisable that the above-mentioned artillery sub-section function as a part of the Battle Order Section, operating under one man for both divisional and heavy artillery, and at the same time maintain close liaison with the Chief of Artillery. (See Report on G-2-A-5).

Decoded wireless interceptions formed one of the most important and in many cases the quickest means by which enemy intentions were estimated. The enemy’s use of his wireless stations, in connection with the exact location of these stations by goniometric or compass reading stations, invariably gave very important advance information as to enemy intentions, especially in cases of withdrawal. Furthermore, through the excellent work of the Cipher Section at these Headquarters actual operation orders were picked up by the Wireless Intercept Stations and decoded in time to give advance information of the exact order under which enemy forces were operating.

Subsection A-2--Artillery Materiel, Economics, and Translations: The work of this subsection was divided among four subdivisions designated respectively as A-2-a, A-2-c, A-2-d, and A-2-e.

G-2-A-2a--Enemy Ordnance and Artillery Materiel: This subdivision was charged with the study of enemy ordnance and artillery materiel, both that turned in by our own troops and by the governments with whom we were associated. The information furnished by the governments with whom we were associated came in the form of army and general headquarters bulletins and summaries and technical publications issued by the British, French and Italian ministries corresponding to our Ordnance Department.

The information from our own troops came in the form of summaries, letters, or specimens. This information was worked up and translations made where necessary. Such information as was considered proper for general circulation was published in the summaries of information. Other information was sent to the departments concerned. Information thus secured which might be of interest in laying out field fortifications, such as ranges of enemy pieces and weight and explosive contents of enemy projectiles, was furnished to the Corps of Engineers.

Studies dealing with enemy materiel were published in pamphlet form in a series entitled "Notes on Enemy Materiel." Volume 1 was entitled "Divisional Artillery;" Volume 2, "Trench Artillery." A second edition of "Divisional Artillery" containing a considerable amount of new information was published on November 1, 1918.
A considerable amount of information on Australian materiel and German heavy materiel was filed but never worked up.

G-2-A-2-c--Press and translations: A corps of translators was constantly employed in this subdivision doing miscellaneous translation work, primarily for all of the G-2 subdivisions and secondarily for the other offices of General Headquarters. About fifty per cent of the entire work of this subsection consisted in making translations from the press for publication in the daily Press Review. This part of the work was supervised by the editor of the Press Review who belonged to subsection G-2-A-4. From eight to forty newspapers were received daily from each of the principal European powers and from America. Articles of interest to G-2 were clipped and indexed and such as were found of interest to the Publications Section (G-2-A-4) were turned over to that section for inclusion in its publications. Much economic data was secured from the enemy and neutral press.

Beginning March 1, 1919, this subsection published a Daily News Bulletin. Material for this publication was received from the Radio Intercept Station at these Headquarters through G-2-A-6 and in the form of news items from G-2-A-4. These bulletins were edited, then stenciled and mimeographed in this subsection and distributed each morning through G-2-A-8.

It is not practicable to make recommendations regarding the number of translators required in a future war. This will depend upon who our enemies are, who our allies or associates are, and the theater of operations. It is necessary to have men who are highly educated, who know well the language from which they are translating, and the language into which they are translating.

G-2-A-2-d--Economic Conditions: This subdivision collected, filed and studied information relating to the economic conditions in enemy countries, its data being based on two main sources of information: 1. Basic informations consisting of statistics compiled and studies made prior to the war, to be found in public libraries and those of technical societies; 2. A great mass of scraps of information and detailed evidence gathered since the beginning of the war from letters, newspapers, technical journals and reports of agents, etc., pieced together so as to permit reasonably reliable conclusions when checked up by and compared with information of a more accurate character previously obtained. Information on special economic subjects was collated into studies and reports. Information of a special nature was furnished in reply to requests from various organizations and headquarters.

G-2-A-2-e--Enemy Documents: This subdivision received, filed and indexed all enemy documents sent to this section so that they might be readily referred to by any persons or departments interested in their contents. A catalog of the titles and index numbers of these documents was prepared and issued throughout these Headquarters and down to and including division headquarters. A large number of the more important documents were translated and some of them were published.

Subsection A-3--Enemy Works: This subdivision concerned itself in general with the observation and study of hostile intentions as deduced from changes in defensive organization and activity. The work was organized into the following subdivisions: first, Defensive Organizations; second, Enemy Activity; third, Enemy Rear; fourth, Study of Airplane Photographs, the object of the subdivision being to be able to present to the Commander-in-Chief up-to-date information upon the American front.

Defensive Organizations: Defensive organizations included both the enemy’s front and rear lines and also the railroads, narrow gauge railroads and dumps in the front zone.

The sources of information available were army, corps and division summaries army and corps maps, army, corps and division studies, bulletins from the French and British General Headquarters, air photographs, French notices, etc. The purpose of the subdivision was to prepare a general study of the entire front, separate studies of the
enemy’s front and rear lines on the American front, with special reference to their organization and occupation, and the study of railroads in the front zone. Besides these studies, which were very general in character, an attempt was made to prepare and keep up-to-date sector dossiers, covering the entire American front, each of these including a history of the sector, a description of the manner of defense, and a plan directeur on a large scale with all the details of organization and occupation and photographs of the area covered. Each sector covered a front that was normally held by one division. Studies on special phases of the defense and on the front zone railroads were prepared from time to time.

Enemy Works and Enemy Railroads: Intentions of the enemy were partially determined by a study of rear or forward areas; new enemy works--new battery emplacements, new roads and bridges, new camps, billets and dumps, new railroads, both normal and narrow gauge, new camouflage, new aerial construction, hangars, etc., and identified works as evidenced by noises, blasting, hammering, etc.; and, statements of prisoners. Studies were also made of existing railroads with view to determining their value to the enemy.

Enemy Rear: The work of this subdivision was divided into three parts, first, the preparation and printing of bridge, road and railroad maps, combined with area books or monographs on roads, railroads, bridges, canals and waterways; secondly, town files--the gathering of all available data of permanent value including maps, photographs, both ground and aerial, and factory information concerning enemy countries, especially western Germany, the preparation of lists of towns and places with location coordinates, the compilation and description of important cities and towns, based upon the above, the printing and forwarding of this material to the armies; thirdly, systems of transportation, with a study of German troops movements as governed by roads, railroads, canals and waterways.

Study of Airplane Photographs: Considerable valuable information was obtained from the study of airplane photographs. All airplane photographs received by G-2 were sent to this subsection where they were examined, filed and indexed. The sources of these photographs were: French armies and corps; French and British General Headquarters; British Independent Air Force; and our own Corps and Army Squadrons. An effort was made to secure from these photographs information concerning the enemy showing new means or methods of defense, important transport lines, railway stations, airdromes, hospitals and important bombing objectives. The detection of minor enemy works was the function of army headquarters or lower units. Information thus obtained by this subsection was shown on maps, in so far as possible, or in typewritten reports. It was then submitted to the Chief of the Section who saw to it that it was coordinated with the work of the other subsections. Photographs showing new methods of defense or other subjects which had not previously appeared on photographs were reproduced and sent through A-8 to the troops interested.

After the Armistice photographs were taken, for historical purposes, of the battlefields over which American troops had fought. These pictures were made into album histories illustrating the sectors and activities of each of the several divisions. These albums contain a map of the divisional sector or sectors, oblique and ground photographs of the same; these are arranged according to dates and localities so as to form a complete pictorial history. The actual sectors were verified with divisional officers and a copy of each photograph was given to the division concerned.

Recommendations: This subsection should be placed in charge of an officer who has had experience in civil or military engineering and is familiar with office work and the writing of reports. The tenure of office of the chief should be permanent in order that interest be kept up.

Closer liaison should be maintained with the corresponding French and British Sections and with those of our own Armies in order to prevent duplication of efforts and to promote a better acquaintance with the work of the subsection on the part of the
corresponding subsections in the Armies, etc. A closer liaison with G-3 would also be desirable in the future in order that the theater of operations be determined as soon as possible. This would allow more time for the preparation of essential data. Speaking generally, it would be better to contemplate the widest possible theater of operations and then concentrate on special areas than to do the opposite as in this war.

Subsection A-4 -- Publication Section: This subdivision was primarily the publication division for the A section of G-2 and to some extent for G-2 in general. It works was divided as follows: 1. Publications; 2. Miscellaneous work.


1. The regular periodical publications were: (a) Summary of Information; (b) Press Review; (c) Summary of Intelligence; (d) Summary of Air Information.

(a) Summary of Information: This publication was commenced on October 11, 1917, after which time it was issued daily until December 1, 1918, inclusive. This summary habitually contained the following information: (a) Translated enemy documents of interest to troops; (b) Identifications of enemy units engaged in battle on the western front; (c) Communiques. From October 31 until the armistice there was included the following additional information regarding the enemy's position opposite the front held by the American forces: enemy order of battle; enemy activity; enemy defenses; and circulation within the enemy lines.

The sources of information of the Summary of Information were captured documents obtained from summaries issued by the French armies and French General Headquarters, the Summary of Information from British General Headquarters, summaries of intelligence from American armies, army corps and divisions, and documents captured by our own armies.

Identifications of enemy units were received from G-2-A-1; communiques were telegraphed or telephoned to General Headquarters by the British and French; German communiques were received from our wireless intercept station; Italian communiques were either telegraphed in or received by the General Headquarters wireless intercept station. Information regarding the enemy's order of battle and enemy movements was furnished by G-2-A-1; information regarding enemy activity in the air was furnished by G-2-A-7; information regarding the enemy's artillery activity by G-2-A-5; and information regarding enemy defenses by G-2-A-3. The various subdivisions of G-2 were responsible for the dissemination to the Armies of information pertaining to their subdivisions. In practice the information pertaining to the subdivision published in the Summary of Information was furnished G-2-A-4 for publication. The Publications subdivision also included articles of general interest to troops which did not fall definitely within the provinces of the other subsections. Most of the articles of interest published in the Summary of Information were received in the French or German language and had to be translated. This translation work involved a large amount of labor and demanded men of unusual ability as translators. Such translators had to be men of good education with the following qualifications: ability to place the translated article into clear, grammatical English; ability to thoroughly understand French and German; and a general knowledge of military-technical phraseology in French, German and English.

The Summary of Information was habitually printed, although in a few cases, when the printing capacity of the section was otherwise occupied, it was mimeographed. The Summary was printed during the night and issued early the next morning. As a rule most of the copy was sent to the printer in the afternoon, except late communiques and late identifications, which were received during the night. One officer was always on duty at night in A-4 to include late information and to proof-read the Summary.

Press Review: The Press Review, prepared and published daily by this subdivision, was a printed document of about 4,000 words, containing articles summarizing and explaining the current journalistic opinion of particular nations, Allied, enemy and neutral, with reference to important issues or events. It attempted to furnish data,
so far as they were obtainable from the press, necessary for the proper estimation of political conditions and developments in the nation or nations concerned. While the events or issues reviewed in certain of its articles might be military, economic or social rather than in the narrow sense political, they were discussed in the Press Review only because of their bearing through the press and public opinion upon national policy. Each number of the Press Review generally contained three or four articles each of which was a resume complete in itself of press opinion, verified by quotation and explained by such brief elucidation of the facts or the issues involved and by such reference to the complexion and influence of the journal cited as was necessary to give the reader a proper grasp of the real situation under discussion. The Press Review was not a mere patchwork clipped from editorial articles; it was on the contrary in the nature of a cold-blooded analysis. The nature and style of the articles in the Press Review and the methods followed in their preparation are best explained by following the instructions given to its contributors: It is absolutely necessary that every contribution be reduced to the briefest form compatible with a comprehensive treatment of the subject in hand.

In the majority of cases this will be most easily accomplished if the writer commences the article with a general summary of the facts or opinions which are to be set forth. The summary should also explain any differences in attitude which are observable between different groups of papers. It is usually best to group the papers on political lines. When generalizations concerning the attitude of any group of papers are thus given, the names of papers belonging to this group which have been laid under consideration should be stated. Following the summary should come a list of quotations illustrating all the statements made in the Summary. It is obvious that quotations must be made as brief as possible and will represent those papers only which express different points of view or related facts not given elsewhere. In some cases a concluding paragraph summarizing points which could not be comprehensible until the quotations themselves had been read, may be added.

Sources of Press Review Articles: The Press Review aimed to cover the important journalistic opinion of the principal European countries, belligerent and neutral. The American press was also included, although the delay in the receipt of the necessary papers and the fact that important American press comment was frequently reproduced in the Paris edition of the American and British newspapers made both impossible and unnecessary such close and continuous reviewing as was demanded by the principal presses of Europe. In addition to America the nations whose journals were covered by the Press Review were the following: Allied--France, Great Britain and Italy; enemy--Germany, Austria and Hungary; neutral--Denmark, Holland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Belgium and Switzerland. Copies of all the important daily, weekly and monthly newspapers and periodicals representing all important shades of opinion in the above countries were reviewed by the contributors to the Press Review.

(c) Summary of Intelligence: This publication was a secret document distributed at G. H. Q. only. It was commenced on January 6, 1918, and continued daily until November 24, 1918. Up until March 31, 1918, inclusive, it contained general intelligence information of all kinds, much of which was later relegated to the Summary of Information. From March 18, to July 23, there was included political and economic notes on both enemy and neutral countries and having a direct bearing on the military situation. After August 11 all the material contained in the Summary of Intelligence was compiled by G-2-A-1 and turned over to A-4 for printing. At frequent intervals maps showing enemy works, operations, sector organization, etc., and graphic charts showing condition of enemy's reserves, etc., were issued with this Summary. The Summary of Intelligence was printed under the same conditions as the Summary of Information.

(d) Summary of Air Information: This summary was published daily form May 1, 1918, to November 16, 1918, inclusive. The material for this publication was prepared by G-2-A-7 and consisted of general intelligence information relating to the enemy's air forces. A report of the activities of our own air forces was eventually added. (See Report on G-2-A-7)
2. Miscellaneous Publications:
(a) Bulletin for Field Officers: This bulletin was printed from time to time until December 1, 1918, as a rule each second week. It was in pamphlet form containing from 12 to 24 pages and arranged as follows: Captured documents of interest to field officers on duty with our fighting forces, such as documents relating to patrol activities, minor tactics, etc., a historical comment on some phase of the operations of this war, and a treatise entitled "Notes on Intelligence." The material for this bulletin was gathered and compiled in A-4, except that the historical comment was written by the Historical Section, and Notes on Intelligence generally by the Chief of the G-2-A Section.
(b) Area Books: These books were compiled and copy prepared by G-2-A-3; A-4 was charged only with editing and printing them.
(c) Water Supply Books: These books were compiled in the office of the Chief Engineer, A. E. F., Geological Section. A-4 looked after their editing and printing.
(e) Bulletin of Information: These Bulletins were in the form of pamphlets of from 20 to 40 pages. The material was prepared by various sections of G-2-A and was edited and printed by A-4. Number 1, which appeared on February 5, 1919, was entitled: "The Military Situation in Greater Russia," Number 2, March 5, 1919: "German Army Order for Demobilization;" Number 3, April 1, 1919: "The Military Situation in Poland;" Number 4, April 15, 1919: "The American Official Communiques."
(d) Pamphlets giving lists of places in certain areas with their location, and other pamphlets of interest to troops were prepared by other G-2 subsections and turned over to this subsection (A-4) for editing and printing.

II. Miscellaneous Work: This work may be divided into: preparation of the American Official Communique; preparation of a daily cable to Washington for the Chief of Staff; general work.
(1) The American Official Communique.
Definition: The American Official Communique was a public official statement of the activities of American troops engaged in operations on the Western Front; from the time of its inception, May 15, 1918, until October 26 the Communique was issued from General Headquarters once daily, in the evening, and the report which it contained covered the activities of our troops during the preceding twenty-four hours; from October 26 to November 11 two communiques were issued daily, once in the morning and once in the evening, each covering the period elapsed since the issuance of the last preceding communique; after November 11 the regular issuance of a communique ceased, and such communiques only appearing as were required by the advance of our troops into the territory evacuated by the enemy.

History and Sources: The communique was described as follows in a cable sent to the War Department on May 10: Considering the size of our forces now in France and the increasingly important part being begun by these forces in the operations now in progress on the western front and the necessity on that account of issuing an authoritative official statement from these Headquarters regarding these activities, it is deemed advisable to begin issuing an official communique from these Headquarters following in general the lines of the official communiques issued from the Headquarters of the Allied Armies in France.

Following upon this announcement the first communique was issued on May 15, 1918. The communique was based on daily telephonic or telegraphic reports which the American divisions and corps concerned were instructed to transmit to General Headquarters not later than 3:45 p. m. daily, such reports to contain a complete statement of the activities of the preceding twenty-four hours. During the early days of its history it was possible to prepare the communique from these reports at the close of each day and to issue it approximately at the intended and official hour--9 p. m. In the course of the summer, however, as the activities of our forces increased, this became more and more difficult, because of the impossibility of obtaining adequate and prompt reports. During the counteroffensive of the Allied armies, between the AISNE and the MARNE, July 18 to
August 4, it was found necessary to send a special liaison officer to our troops operating in that region, to secure the latest information himself and to prepare a draft of the communique and to telephone it to General Headquarters from a point close to the scene of the fighting. While it was often exceedingly difficult to obtain the necessary reports from our troops operating under our own corps, it was practically impossible to secure from troops operating actively in British or French Corps evening reports covering their activities of the day; from necessity and for reasons of policy the activities of such troops were not generally mentioned in the American communique until after reference had been made to their operations in the British or French communiques.

History, continued: The most important periods in the history of the American communique were those from September 12 to 15 (The battle of St-MIHIEL) and from September 26 to November 11 (The MEUSE-ARGONNE Battle). During these operations the communique was prepared at the Headquarters of the First Army, with the exception of the period from October 18 to November 1 during which it was written at General Headquarters, or Advanced P. C., General Headquarters. On October 26, owing to the great importance of the operations of our forces, the policy was adopted of issuing two communiques daily, one in the morning and one in the evening. It was originally intended that the morning communique should be a well-balanced, complete and somewhat detailed report of the events of the preceding day and night, while the evening communique was to be merely a very brief statement of the salient features of the operations of the preceding twelve hours and was to be issued in no case later than 9:00 p. m. This plan was abandoned with the commencement of the attack of November 1, and thereafter both communiques attempted to furnish a report of progress up to the very latest moment possible. The communique was discontinued at the time of the armistice, November 11, but was resumed again during the advance of our troops from the Meuse to the Rhine. The last communique was published on December 13, 1918.

Preparation: The final draft of the communique was generally decided upon by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters; during various important periods it was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief or to the Chief of Staff.

Distribution: After final approval, the communique was transmitted to the War Department as the first section of the Daily Cable, and by the War Department it was issued to the American press. Its issuance to the French press was in the hands of the American Censor at Paris, to whom it was immediately telephoned. The communique was telegraphed to all American Armies, Corps and Divisions and to all American Military Missions in Europe. After September 9, the American communique was sent by wireless, in English, from the Eiffel Tower in Paris.

2. Daily cable to the Chief of Staff, War Department, for the information of the Secretary of War.

Description: Contemporaneously with the communique there was begun the sending of a regular daily cable of information to the Chief of Staff at the War Department. The first section, marked A, of this cable was constituted by the American communique itself. The nature of the material contained in the remaining sections was as follows: The Second section, marked B, contained information of general interest, relative to the activities of our troops, which could properly be made public; until October 1 this section contained the names of American officers and men who had been decorated for heroism, after that date this material was handled by the Adjutant General, A. E. F.; the third section of the cable, marked C, dealt with the operations of the Armies of our Allies on the western front and contained information as to the line held by those troops, additional to the matter contained in British and French and Belgian official communiques; this section also contained a paragraph covering the changes in the enemy order of battle on the western front, and any important facts relating thereto: this section of the cable was sent in a code and marked Confidential; the fourth section, marked D, contained confidential information regarding the activities of American troops, this information being of such nature as to prevent its being made public at the time, and elaborating, if
necessary, the information contained in other sections of the cable; this section was also sent in code.

Sources of Information contained: The sources of information used in the preparation of the cable included:

(a) Telephonic and telegraphic reports from American Armies, Corps and Divisions.
(b) Summaries of Intelligence, issued by American Armies, Corps and Divisions.
(c) Telephonic and telegraphic reports from American Missions with the Headquarters of the French, British and Belgian Armies, and from American liaison officers attached to particular French Armies under which American units were operating.
(d) Situation reports, issued by British General Headquarters.
(e) Information as to the progress on enemy order of battle was obtained from subsection A-I of G-2.

Noon Cable: As the importance of the information required, a special noon cable was sent to the Chief of Staff, War Department, containing confidential information as to the situation on the western front. From September 26 to November 11 a noon cable was sent practically every day, and during the latter part of this period it contained the morning official communiqué.

Distribution: The cable, being a highly confidential document, was distributed only to the following:

(a) Commander in Chief.
(b) Chief of Staff.
(c) Adjutant General (to the code office for transmission).
(d) Assistant Chief of Staff G-2.
(e) Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.
(f) Personnel office.
(g) Chief of G-2-D (Press Section).
(h) Cable officer (for file).

(3) General Work: This general work consisted mainly of translating communiques of Allied or enemy countries received during the day and night; translation or wireless interceptions received from the G. H. Q. wireless station, and preparing copies of these to be forwarded to various offices of G. H. Q.

Recommendations for organization of G-2-A-4 for a future war of the character of the present one: One experienced regular army officer who has had some practice in editorial work and who can speak the language of the country we are at war with to be head of the Section.

One assistant not necessarily a regular officer, who has otherwise the same qualifications to act as editor of the Summary of Information.

Three officers who know well the language of the country we are at war with, can translate with facility from it into English and vice-versa, do proofreading and miscellaneous work.

One officer to draft the Official Communiqué and prepare cable to be forwarded to the Chief of Staff in Washington for his information and that of the Secretary of War.

Three stenographers, one filing clerk and one orderly.

Personnel required for Press Review:  In addition to the above there would be required for the work of the Press Review one officer who can speak and translate the language of the country we are at war with, and it would be desirable to have him know one or two other languages, who has made a study of political science and preferably been a professor of political science, history or law at one of the leading colleges or universities.

One officer to review the Press of each of the powers whose press it is desired to review. Each such officer should be able to translate rapidly and accurately from the language of the country from whose press he reviews into English, should have a college
education and have done post-graduate work in law, history or political science and must in any case have done some work in political science.

Each of the officers referred to in the preceding paragraph should have one or more assistants who can translate rapidly from the press of the country they are employed upon into clear and grammatical English. These assistants need not be commissioned.

Two stenographers and one orderly are necessary in addition to the above.

Subsection G-2-A-5--Artillery Intelligence: This subsection was charged with studying and filing all available information concerning the enemy's artillery and publishing that of importance and interest to our troops, such as changes in enemy artillery tactics, methods of laying and adjustment, use of accompanying guns, echelonnement in depth, use of gas, shortage of materiel and horses. All available German range tables were collected, translated and distributed. Artillery activity reports were received from our armies, summarized and published in the Summary of Information. For some time this subsection published a daily Activity Chart, a weekly report of hostile artillery activity on the fronts held by our troops, and a semi-monthly resume of artillery activity of the whole front. These last-mentioned reports were found to be of little value and were eventually discontinued.

This subsection concerned itself but slightly with enemy heavy artillery, as that subject was studied under A-1 (Battle Order). This is properly an A-5 subject and should constitute a part of this subsection.

Inasmuch as A-1 is responsible for the enemy's organization, battle order and manpower and inasmuch as it forecasts the enemy's intentions from information received from all sources, the artillery subsection should be made subordinate to this section A-1. Most of the sources of artillery information are the same as those of A-1. By subordinating A-5 to A-1 not only is A-5 assured of all of A-1's sources, but the Chief of A-1 can see to it that any estimate of enemy intentions based on artillery information is made with due consideration to such other information of his larger units as may be available.

The artillery intelligence section of G-2 should be in charge of an officer of considerable military and artillery experience. It is obvious that the liaison between this section and the office of the Chief of Artillery should be direct and complete in order to prevent duplication of work and to assure a mutual exchange of intelligence.

G-2-A-6--Radio Intelligence Section: The function of this section was to gain information regarding the enemy by the surveillance of his radio and ground telegraph and telephone traffic. This involved the solution of enemy codes and ciphers and the decoding of intercepted messages. The work of solving the codes and ciphers, which involved a large personnel, was done mainly at these Headquarters. The work of intercepting messages and decoding them, so far as the keys were known, was mainly a function of the Army code officers. A daily report was made giving all information obtained from decoded messages. In addition special reports were made whenever information of importance was obtained in time to be of tactical value.

In addition to the work of high power and field intercept stations much valuable information was obtained through the goniometric and airplane sections.

(a) Goniometric Service: This service had for its object the location of enemy radio stations and their grouping so as to show organization limits. A daily list of enemy field stations and a weekly report on activity with a map showing the location and grouping of stations was made by the goniometric section.

(b) Airplane Service: The function of this service was to locate enemy airplanes carrying out artillery adjustment and to intercept the signals sent. The air service was immediately notified by telephone whenever a hostile plane was located. Information regarding the amount and success of enemy artillery adjustment was also obtained by the study of the intercepted signals. This service was successful only in stabilized warfare.
Surveillance was maintained over our own signal traffic through an organization known as the Security Service. Messages sent by our troops by radio and telephone were intercepted and examined to see whether they might be giving information to the enemy. It was an important part of the work of this section not only to report on the infraction of regulations in the use of wireless and the telephone, but also to educate our own troops in regard to the necessity for these regulations. The latter was done by means of lectures, general orders, and printed instructions for the use of code which were furnished with each book.

Supervision of the policy regarding the preparation and use of trench codes and the distribution of these codes was in the hands of this subsection.

Recommendations: There should be an office at General Headquarters with especially trained personnel for the solution of enemy codes and ciphers and an office at the headquarters of each army for the immediate exploitation of information gained from radio intercepts. Adequate facilities should be provided for telegraphic communication between General Headquarters and army headquarters and between the latter and the field intercept and goniometric stations. For the security service there should be an officer at each headquarters from the company up, who, in addition to his other duties, is responsible for guarding against the giving of information to the enemy. This sub-section should not be charged with the distribution of our trench codes.

There should be organized and maintained at all times a complete radio intelligence unit which should serve as a training school for officers and men and permit of experiment for improvement of this service. The necessary Signal Corps personnel should be provided and work actually conducted on a small scale along the lines contemplated during a state of war. Signal Corps apparatus should be studied, tested and improved. Code books should be published, studied, revised and republished at frequent intervals, always having in mind the construction of a scientific code easy to use, difficult to solve, and containing words and phrases actually to be used in the event of war.

Subsection G-2-A-7--Air Intelligence: The work of this subsection fell into two parts: (1) that connected with the office at these Headquarters; and (2) branch intelligence work.

I. Work of office at these Headquarters: The work of this office was apportioned among five departments, as follows:

1. Interrogation of Prisoners: One officer interrogated all captured enemy aviators brought down in the area occupied by our forces. He had a thorough knowledge of and all available records on the enemy's air service, which enabled him to check up the statements of prisoners. All information obtained by him was telephoned to this office and later forwarded in the form of a written report.

2. Air Order of Battle: The Air Order of Battle Department was held responsible for information on enemy air and balloon units, enemy airdromes and the organization of the enemy's air service. In addition to the information published in the daily Summary of Air Information, this department published: (a) a monthly airdrome map and list, showing the location of the airdromes, their size in hangars, sheds and estimated machine capacity, and (b) special airdrome bomb target information which was used by our bombing squadrons in raids on German airdromes, and which included a photograph of the airdrome, its map location, its size in hangars, sheds and estimated capacity, and the units occupying the airdrome.

3. Bomb Targets: This department was responsible for: (1) Obtaining and assembling complete information on important centers which might be used as bombing targets; (2) Submitting bombing programs to G-3 for selection and forwarding the necessary information on the targets chosen to our bombing squadrons; (3) Keeping records of results obtained by Allied bombing squadrons; (4) Keeping records of the locations of enemy balloon barrages, antiaircraft batteries, searchlights and lighted areas.
4. Technical: The function of this department was to obtain, assemble and distribute information on: (1) Material used in the production of airplanes; (2) production of airplanes; (3) Means of supplying air units with airplanes, spare parts, etc.; (4) Technical information of interest to our air units flying over the line.

The officer in charge of this department examined all enemy airplanes brought down in the areas occupied by American troops. He made no attempt to obtain information which might aid in the manufacture of airplanes but directed his attention towards obtaining such information as the speed of the airplane, its climbing power, its means of defense, etc., which would enable our airmen to be in a better position to cope with enemy fliers.

5. Air Activity: This department was responsible for obtaining, assembling and distributing information on: (1) Enemy air activity; (2) Strategy and tactics; (3) Effects of Allied air operations; (4) Enemy system of training aviators.

The information obtained by the above named departments was published in the daily Summary of Air Information (See Report on G-2-A-4), which was distributed to Intelligence offices, Air Service offices, antiaircraft organizations and Air Service training schools, and which included information on: (1) Enemy airdromes; (2) Enemy air order of battle; (3) Enemy air service personnel; (4) Organization of the enemy's air service; (5) Enemy air activity, strategy and tactics; (6) Our own air activity; (7) Enemy airplanes (photographs and description); (8) Production of enemy airplanes.

II. Branch Intelligence Work: A number of officers were given a course in branch intelligence work at the Army Intelligence School and upon completion of this course were assigned to our observation and bombing squadrons. The Branch Intelligence officer did not confine himself to obtaining and distributing information on the enemy's air service but acted as the Intelligence representative with the squadron or group to which he was assigned. He was the medium through which G-2 received the information concerning the enemy gathered by his squadron and group. He interpreted and distributed the photographs taken by the squadron and published a daily intelligence bulletin which, in the case of an observation unit, included the following information:

(a) Concerning the missions of our own units: (1) Mission; (2) Territory covered; (3) Number of machines participating; (4) Time of flight; (5) Number of plates exposed; (6) Visibility.

(b) Concerning the enemy: (1) Railroads; (2) Roads; (3) Dumps; (4) Airdromes; (5) Artillery; (6) Fires; (7) Balloons; (8) Enemy aircraft; (9) Enemy antiaircraft fire; (10) New works.

In the case of a bombing unit the report also included the following information: (1) Number and size of bombs dropped; (2) Results obtained as seen by observer or as shown by photographs.

Subsection G-2-A-8--Dissemination and Filing: The duties of this subsection fell under two general heads: dissemination and filing.

1. Dissemination: It was the duty of this subsection to disseminate Intelligence information, that is, to make prompt distribution to all those concerned (including the other subsections of this division, the other divisions of this section, all sections of the General Staff, the troops and schools, and all arms and branches of the service as well as the War Department) of any information concerning the enemy which was received from any source whatsoever. This included the distribution of publications prepared by the various subsections of this division and also those prepared by the received from the governments associated with us. Furthermore, all documents of an official nature were forwarded through this subsection to or from the other subsections of this division.

Distribution within the section G-2 was accomplished as follows: if a piece of information was of interest to but one division or subsection it was sent there for file; if of interest to several, it was sent to each to note and return or a sufficient number of copies was made to cover the entire distribution; if of general interest, it was put in the Day Book.
The Day Book consisted of a number of dossiers classified as follows and displayed on a table in this office where they might be readily consulted:

- Secretary's notices.
- British Summary of Information and Summary of Intelligence.
- French Bulletins de Renseignements, Compte-Rendus and Interrogations of Prisoners.

There were instructions that every officer on duty at these Headquarters with the Intelligence Section should consult the Day Book at least once each day. All documents remained in the Day Book for two days and then were filed in this subsection.

Distribution outside of the section was made either by sending the original to note and return, or by sending a copy.

The arrival of new units in France was carefully noted and they were promptly furnished with such Intelligence publications as were available and in proper numbers to suit their requirements. Instructions as to what distribution was to be made within the unit were sent out with the publications.

2. Filing: The general files of all of G-2-A were maintained by this subsection. These files included all of the publications prepared by G-2 and all of the publications received by G-2-A, all reports (including secret and confidential) by and to G-2-A, and all records pertaining to G-2-A. These files were fully indexed.

All of the incoming and outgoing mail of G-2-A passed through this subsection. Considerable mimeographing work done for the entire section.

The Chief of G-2-A-8 acted as Secretary for G-2-A.

This subsection, to function properly, required a considerable amount of space in order to take care of the Day Book, the large number of filing cabinets, storage space for Intelligence publications in bulk, and for the considerable number of stenographers, filing clerks and orderlies which the work requires.

Attached is a copy of the distribution lists for G-2 publications.

Subsection G-2-A-9 - Personnel: The duties of this subsection were as follows:

(a) To keep a list of all officers engaged on Intelligence work, with the duties, nature of Intelligence on which they had been engaged, and, as far as could be determined, the manner in which they had performed them.

(b) To keep a list of the names of officers proposed for Intelligence duty, with their language and other qualifications.

(c) The maintenance of a live chart or table showing the actual Intelligence organization of each headquarters in the A. E. F., down to and including regiments.

(d) To make recommendations for promotions of officers engaged in Intelligence work, based upon efficiency and length of service.

C. General Recommendations.

1. It is considered very important that the officers assigned to Military Intelligence work be thorough masters of the subject of tactics, have the necessary linguistic qualifications to deal with officers and documents of Allied Armies and in Prisoners and Documents in the enemies' armies. The higher the professional qualifications of the officers assigned to this duty the fewer will be the number required and the better will be the result obtained.

2. In this war the United States declared war without having an army ready to fight. When the army was ready to begin offensive operations, on a small scale, a year after the declaration of war, the Intelligence Section of the General Staff was ready to function for it. This was only possible by strenuous and careful work and by the personal fostering of the preparations by the Commander-in-Chief. If the United States is to have an army ready to undertake operations in less than a year after the outbreak of hostilities, it must also have, to insure success, a trained General Staff, including a trained Intelligence Section, and Intelligence Officers of subordinate units, furnished at the start with...
the initial data and means for performing their functions. To secure this we must first have a careful study of Intelligence data of all countries with whom and in which the United States may find itself at war. We must also have carefully trained staff officers with a thorough understanding of Intelligence work, so that they will be able either to do Intelligence work, or make use of Intelligence work performed by others.

D. Special Personnel References.

In addition to the officers mentioned in Section A of this report, the undersigned desires to bring to the attention of the Chief of Intelligence, the conspicuously fine work done by Captain Wm. H. Dearden, Captain Frank, and Captain E. B. Stackpole, and during the latter part of the operations, by Lieutenant Colonel Dorrance Reynolds in the Battle Order (A-1). This section under its three chiefs, Captain S. T. Hubbard, Jr., Colonel Willey Howell and Colonel Wait C. Johnson attained a maximum of efficiency in accuracy and completeness of information.

In A-2, Major Newbold Morris who succeeded Colonel Dengler as Chief of the Subsection, proved an able administrator and accomplished splendid work, in spite of the fact that his section was time after time drained of its best officers to supply the pressing needs of lower units.

In A-3, Major John Galloway and Captain R. S. Owen performed distinguished service and the armies at the front owe to their untiring efforts many a valuable aid in their operations.

In A-4, Captain H. S. Bell, both as Editor of the Press Review and in charge of the preparation of Communiques and daily cables for the War Department, performed valuable service. Captain Frederick Delschaft, who prepared and edited The Summary of Information for Divisional Headquarters as well as the Summary of Information later published, filled a post of especial importance and responsibility.

In A-6, Major Moorman’s first assistant, Captain Berthold as well as Lt. Matz, who subsequently became Wireless Intelligence Officer of the First Army, made a brilliant record for wireless intelligence not equalled by that of any other army.

Captain Harold Tappin, Chief of A-8 from the time of its organization as a separate section, bore the brunt of the dissemination of Intelligence, and distribution of documents within the section, as well as to other sections at G. H. Q., to subordinate units, and to other armies. He was also in charge of the office of the Chief of Section and acted as his executive. To his unerring and tireless efforts much of the success of the section is due.

The maxim of the section has always been that Intelligence is not Intelligence until the information has been disseminated and reached every person concerned in knowing it. Captain Tappin faithfully lived up to this maxim.

Colonel John R. Thomas, Jr., Chief of the Aviation Intelligence (A-7) as well as in charge of Intelligence Personnel (A-9) was the second in rank to the undersigned during the latter part of the operations, and took charge of the section during the many and sometimes, protracted absences of the undersigned from G. H. Q. Much credit is due Colonel Thomas for his able conscientious and efficient work.

A. L. CONGER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of G-2-A.
INTELLIGENCE

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Report of G-2-B

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES OF G-2-B

After the organization of this subsection under the provision of S. O. 8, Headquarters, A. E. F., July 5, 1917, a study was made of the corresponding subsection in the French and English armies and, as a result of this examination, a chart defining the duties of the subsection was prepared on October 31, 1917. On the basis of further experience, on April 12, 1918 this chart was expanded and the outline of duties as there indicated has remained as the basis for the subsection with the modifications required by the cessation of hostilities as indicated below.

The subsection was organized as follows:

Subsection I
(a) Administration
(b) Finance

Subsection 2
(a) Positive Intelligence
(b) Translations

Subsection 3
(a) Counterespionage in Military Units

Subsection 4
(a) Civilian Suspects
(b) Bolshevik Activities
(c) Corps of Interpreters
(d) Circulation

Subsection 1
(a) Administration: This section coordinates the work of the other subsections and conducts the correspondence for the section. An important duty of this subsection is the employment of agents for the purpose of securing military, political and economic information of the enemy and the enemy's country.
(b) Finance. Allotments from the following appropriations are disbursed by this section:

1. Contingencies Military Information Section, General Staff Corps: This fund is used for the payment of expenses necessary in the collection of information in connection with military intelligence work, in making investigations authorized by the Secretary of War and in the purchase of books, periodicals and newspapers.
2. Contingencies of the Army: This fund is used for the payment of the necessary expenses of official visitors.
3. National Security and Defense: This fund is used for such purposes as may be directed by the President.

Allotments from these funds have been made from time to time to the intelligence of officers of armies, divisions, base ports, control stations of the S. O. S., and to the Military Attaches in Holland, Switzerland and Italy. The money accounts of thirty-four disbursing officers are audited by this subsection before being forwarded to the Military Intelligence Division at Washington.
Subsection 2
(a) Positive Intelligence: Prior to the Armistice this subsection concerned itself with the collection and dissemination of information received from enemy countries. For this purpose the reports of agents, military attaches, and enemy and neutral press were used. Information of a political and military nature was collected and was communicated by means of: 1. A daily summary of information. 2. A daily resume of information, forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. 3. Special compilations of all information relating to enemy propaganda, which were sent to the propaganda section.

After the Armistice this section was utilized for the communication of information to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, the Supreme War Council and the Permanent International Armistice Commission.

The sources of information were reports of agents, Allied neutral and enemy press, reports of military attaches, intelligence service of our armies in the field and reports from the intelligence sections of the Allied armies. All information which was considered to be of importance to the Commander-in-Chief and to the peace conference was digested and included in the daily resume of information. Military facts were reported only when they affected the political or economic situation.

This information was disseminated by means of the daily resume of information, first issued by this section on November 24, 1918. The resume consists of memoranda which are limited as to subject matter to facts of immediate political or economic import. The memoranda are brief and concise. In addition to the daily resume, a weekly estimate of the situation is prepared by the chief of the subsection, in which the tendencies of political and economic facts are shown and any notable changes in the general situation pointed out.

Special reports and monographs have been prepared by this section from time to time.

(b) Translations: Translations of reports and newspaper articles in French, German, Italian and Spanish have been made by this subsection.

Subsection 3
(a) Counterespionage in Military Units: This subsection concerned itself with the discovery of enemy activity within our forces and with the proper disposal of specific cases of this activity. While a counterespionage system had been organized in many units in the United States, there remained a considerable number where no system had been installed. Measures were taken to initiate activity in these latter organizations, but such a procedure was impossible in divisions engaged in active fighting. In organizations in the S. O. S. the system was introduced. Replacement depots, base ports and detached units were covered.

After the signing of the Armistice, attention was directed toward all divisions lacking the system. The cessation of hostilities necessitated a change in object, and emphasis was laid on the discovery and elimination of elements that tended to the lowering of morale.

It was found necessary to send officer inspectors to the divisions in order to inform the divisional G-2’s of what was desired. In this manner a close liaison and esprit de corps was attained in a majority of the units. In order to inform and instruct the lower echelons, the secret weekly counterespionage bulletin was issued, and by this means all counterespionage heads, together with division commanders and officers engaged in general staff duty were kept informed upon conditions which had bearing on the morale question.

A weekly analysis of the status of the troops as regards morale was prepared. Extracts from this analysis were forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, and the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 for their information.
Liaison has been maintained through this subsection with the director of military intelligence and with the Allied Missions. A complete file of military suspects has been kept.

Subsection 4

(a) Civilian Suspects: Prior to the signing of the Armistice, this division cooperated with the Allied services for the discovery and suppression of enemy civilian activity. Information was supplied to the French who possessed the required executive authority for proper action. By the terms of the Armistice, however, the American forces occupied territory in which they possessed the power to deal with civilian suspects, through the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and G-2, Advance G. H. Q.

The circulation regulations were utilized for the purpose of detecting and apprehending enemy civilians who had acted as agents previous to the Armistice. Access to new sources of information made it possible to obtain important data concerning the organization of enemy intelligence services.

Liaison has been maintained with the Allied services regarding activities in the occupied area.

(b) A branch of civilian suspects, those suspected of Bolshevik sympathies, has been dealt with apart. A special file has been maintained and the Allied services and the army of occupation are kept informed as to the movements of Bolsheviks who may attempt to enter their area through Switzerland, Holland or unoccupied territory.

(c) The corps of interpreters is directed by this division

(d) Circulation: Prior to the Armistice, stringent regulations of civilian circulation were exercised by the French authorities, and the direction of the regulations as they concerned the A. E. F., was supervised by this division. After the Armistice, these regulations were practically abolished. Circulation within the Third Army is now handled by headquarters of that Army.

G-2-B Library: A library of pamphlets, books and periodicals has been maintained. Originally, this library was located at Chaumont, but on December 10, 1918, it was moved to Paris. It increased its scope from 2900 books and pamphlets on August 1, 1918, to 8800 on May 16, 1919.


Topography

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 1, 1919.

[Extract]

1. INTRODUCTION: This report is submitted to cover the work of G-2-C, (topography), American Expeditionary Forces, meaning thereby the third subdivision of the Second, or Intelligence, Section of the General Staff of the American Expeditionary Forces.

G-2-C included staff officers who performed staff duties and who at the same time directed the work of specialist map and ranging troops. The work performed was, therefore, what would have been done by a topographic and ranging service had there been one in the American army. No attempt will be made to discriminate between the staff and troop duties. For convenience, the body of the report will be limited in length and general in character. To it will be added numerous appendices containing all the technical details deemed advisable to record for use in future operations or in training therefor.

2. HISTORICAL: The Commander-in-Chief and staff of the American Expeditionary Forces arrived in England June 9, 1917. During the voyage over from the United States a
decision had been made to tentatively adopt the British organization for the intelligence section, general staff, which decision was later confirmed upon the adoption of definite tables of organization.

In the British Expeditionary Forces the supply of maps and execution of topographic and ranging works were under the intelligence section, general staff, the necessary personnel being drawn from the engineers. Accordingly the writer was ordered to report to the Chief of the Intelligence Section, General Staff, for duty. During the four days the American Headquarters remained in London a visit was made to the war office and a conference held with the general staff officer in charge of maps, resulting in the securing of catalogues and samples of maps used by the British Expeditionary Forces. A visit was also made to the Royal Engineer School at Chatham where there were certain photographic and printing stores similar to those in use by British troops in France.

The Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, arrived in France June 13, 1917, and took up quarters at 29 rue Constantine, Paris, where it remained until September of that year. Officers were assigned the various sections and work begun on studying the organization and operation of the various staff and administrative departments of the British and French armies, with a view to organizing a staff for the American army and training personnel for it.

General Order No. 8, A. E. F., July 1917, assigned to the third subsection of intelligence, later known as G-2-C, the duties of map supply, topographic surveying, map reproduction, and flash and sound ranging. The personnel available at the time consisted of one officer of the corps of engineers and ten engineer soldiers of the regular army who had been brought over with the headquarters. For equipment there had been brought over the surveying and lithographing equipment pertaining to the headquarters of an engineer regiment. One small sheet of paper with the typewritten notes of a hasty visit made by an American officer to the front comprised all the information available as to the future duties.

On June 30, 1917, a cable was sent to the United States asking that fifteen reserve officers of special technical qualifications be sent over at once for work in G-2-C. The cable was not answered and it was not known for several months that the request was not to be complied with, nor was it known for sometime that in the United States tables of equipment for survey and printing work were being prepared and that experiments were being conducted to select types of instruments for sound ranging.

The routine duties of G-2-C were carried on at 29 rue Constantine and also at 54 rue de la Boitie. There were numerous charts, diagrams, and sketches to be made for the staff in connection with studies and reports prepared by it. There was also a limited amount of drafting connected with the compilation of intelligence information of the military operations then in progress. Reproduction was limited to the mimeograph, cyclostyle, hectograph and dorel. For lack of suitable room the lithograph equipment was not unpacked.

Maps of various kinds, but in limited numbers, were needed for the studies of the stuff and for the use of American officers traveling throughout France. A limited stock was kept on hand at rue Constantine and issued as needed. Good automobile maps were purchased from commercial firms in Paris, principally A. Taride. Relations with the French Service Geographique, 140 rue de Grenelle, were established and any necessary maps drawn directly. Bills for maps and small supplies were submitted to the Chief Engineer, American Expeditionary Forces, for payment.

On August 13, 1917 three civilian clerks, engineer department, reported for duty, and on August 14, Major Glenn S. Smith, Engineer Reserve Corps, reported. The latter was an engineer reserve officer with years of service in the United States Geological Survey and had been on duty at Washington in the office of the Chief engineer. He brought news of progress in the United States and was personally acquainted with many officers and men of topographical experience who later came over with the survey and printing battalion. He later became assistant in charge of field work and director of the base printing plant.
During July and August a study was made of the subject of flash and sound ranging, including visits to the French Ranging School at St-Cloud, near Paris, and to the front of the French Third Army. Seven engineer soldiers were sent to the school at St-Cloud, two of whom completed the course, visited both French and British fronts and proved of great use in the ranging service later on. At this same time, through correspondence with Dr. Richardson, of the University of London, Mr. Charles B. Bazzoni, a young American physicist, on research work in London, was brought to Paris and commissioned as a reserve engineer officer, and put to work studying the subject of sound and flash ranging. During this period an American committee on organization submitted its report and recommended for the work of topography one battalion of engineers, survey and printing, per army, and one company, flash and sound ranging, per corps. Further discussion of organization will be treated under that heading.

On September 1, 1917 the headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces moved to Chaumont, France, and took up quarters in two buildings of a set of permanent barracks there. All rooms assigned were not at once available, as some had to be used as sleeping quarters for orderlies and for storage of quartermaster supplies. G-2-C gradually secured rooms until finally it occupied approximately 8,000 square feet of floor space as offices and workshops, having in addition barracks space for 120 men. • • •

As it was apparent that but little additional personnel and no equipment could be expected from the United States in the immediate future, it was necessary to obtain officers and men by transfer from organizations in France, and to place orders for both equipment and supplies in France and England. Between September 1 and December 3, ten soldiers were obtained from 1st Engineers; four from the 2d Engineers and one civilian clerk from the engineer department. One officer was obtained from the 13th Engineers, railroad; four from casuals; four from a party sent over to make a survey for the ordnance department; and seven from the United States.

Among the officers referred to in the above paragraph were Major C. L. Hall, Corps of Engineers, Major Augustus Trowbridge, Engineer Reserve Corps, and Captain Theodore Lyman, Engineer Reserve Corps. Major Hall, by virtue of his natural ability and training as a regular engineer officer, became assistant to the chief G-2-C, with special supervision over flash and sound ranging work, until the formation of the American First Army.

Major Trowbridge and Captain Lyman had been commissioned in the signal corps and put to work in the United States on experimental development of sound ranging apparatus. Upon arrival in France they were transferred to engineers, experimental work on instruments was discontinued, the type of sound ranging equipment in the British service adopted, and all efforts made to train officers and men to satisfactorily operate this equipment.

From this point the subject of sound and flash ranging will be covered in Appendix XXVI [not printed], prepared in the office of chief, G-2-C, by Lieutenant Colonel Augustus Trowbridge, Engineers [not printed].

The first American survey instruments obtained were received from the four officers of the United States Geological Survey, who constituted the party which was sent over to make the survey for an ordnance depot. These instruments were sorely needed, inasmuch as French transits are graduated in grads instead of degrees and French plane tables have open sight alidades instead of telescopic. Even at this time requests were being received for instrumental surveys for artillery and machine-gun ranges, for aviation and hospital sites, and for urgent reasons in regions where no large scale maps existed. The total number of surveys of this kind made between September 1, 1917 and June 1, 1919 was 74 and covered 1,860 square kilometers of territory. See Appendix XVII [not printed].

All officers on duty in the section were sent to the front for instruction whenever possible. They also prepared plans and estimates for future work, and at the same time performed much routine work necessary to supply maps to the troops already
arriving in France, and to meet the drafting, lithographic, photographic and type printing needs of the general staff and administrative sections at the headquarters.

Except for the printing plant of the A. G. O., used for the printing of general orders, reproduction work could be obtained only from French firms, where poor equipment and inadequate personnel rendered service, after three years of war, extremely uncertain and unsatisfactory. To meet the very evident need, lithographic, photographic, and type printing equipment was bought in France and England and installed in the main headquarters building by G-2-C. This little plant did all the work until the establishment later of the the base printing plant at LANGRES when a portion of the equipment was transferred there. Appendix I [not printed] gives a detailed description of this general headquarters plant.

To handle map supply, it was necessary to secure permission to requisition maps directly from the French Service Geographique and from maps British General Headquarters. Careful receipts were kept for future use in making payments. Requisitions for commercial maps were sent to the engineer purchasing office, in Paris. Maps in quantity were sent from Paris by train in charge of soldier couriers.

Incidentally, increasing storage space had to be provided for maps at General Headquarters. The stock became very extensive in range, although the number of copies of any particular map was seldom large. An officer was placed in charge and a thorough system of stock records, requisitions and issues established. For detailed information see Appendix III.

A collection was also made of file copies of all maps obtainable not only of France but of all countries. This collection had to be very extensive in order to anticipate military operations on widely scattered fronts, or incidents of political significance which might suddenly make widely varying portions of the world a matter of temporary interest.

As nothing had been received from the United States in the way of supplies and equipment, it was necessary to detail a supply officer to prepare requisitions and estimates and to handle purchases, receipts, issues, etc. For obtaining technical material, it was necessary to submit requisitions on the engineer supply officer in Paris and then to furnish an officer to locate the material desired. This was due to the very special character of the supplies and equipment needed and to the demoralized condition of the European markets. With the cessation of practically all commercial manufacturing, technical material and equipment had to be bought second-hand or hunted out from small stocks remaining on hand in obscure places.

Conditions ultimately led to the placing of an officer of G-2-C in the office of the engineer purchasing officer in Paris and giving him a clerk and Ford truck. Upon receipt of requisitions from G-2-C he would go all over Paris and suburbs hunting the materials or arranging, if possible, for their manufacture, and then calling on the engineer purchasing officer to authorize his transactions and pay the bills. In this connection, it is desired to say that a requisition was never disapproved if the material could be found and that the statement of the requisitioning officer that the purchase was necessary was final.

During this period a board of officers was convened at General Headquarters to decide on types and scales of maps for the American Expeditionary Forces. After studying the situation, this board decided:

1. To employ the metric system.
2. To adhere to the types and scales of maps in use by the French.
3. To use the French system of designating the location of points by coordinates.

These decisions were based principally on the fact that American troops were to be quartered in French areas and to be trained with the French and that practically all artillery material for a long time to come would have to be French.

The wisdom of this decision was evident at the time, but became very much more apparent later when American troops were hurriedly thrown into the fighting on widely
varying portions of the French front. Our troops experienced no difficulty in using
maps with metric scales or in using the French system of coordinates. The whole question
was further simplified when in 1918 an interallied conference of map specialists adopted
the metric system, Lambert Projection and French system of coordinates for all battle maps
on the western front.

G-2-C had to prepare its plans to receive and utilize topographic troops being
formed in the United States and due to arrive in accordance with adopted priority
schedules. It was evident that with American divisions and corps formed in advance of an
American army there must be arranged facilities for map reproduction for these troops to
supplement the already overburdened French service geographique and to do for our troops
the work that was done in the English service by the ordnance survey and for the French
by the service geographique.

It was therefore decided to establish a permanent base map plant to supplement the
work of the army plants and to do work for General Headquarters, for troops in rear areas,
and for troops in the S. O. S. In selecting a location it was necessary to consider:
First. accessibility to the future American front; second. communication with Paris and
the base ports; third, accessibility to General Headquarters; fourth, local facilities
such as buildings, water supply, electric light and power, and barracks accommodations.
It was felt that the future American front would be between Verdun and the Swiss border,
and therefore the American lines of communication were planned for that front. With
General Headquarters at Chaumont, the decision was made to put the base printing plant at
Langres, a town on the American line of communication having large stone barracks build­
lings and only twenty-five miles from Chaumont. Later these twenty-five miles proved a
long distance from which to control the activities of the plant, considering bad weather,
uncertain telephone communication, and lack of motor transportation, but, on the whole the
decision was very satisfactory.

On December 3, 1917, Company A, 29th Engineers arrived in Langres and was put
to work at installing the base printing plant in certain buildings of the Turenne Barracks
allotted for the purpose. In addition to installing the machinery it was necessary to
build a power plant and install eight 25KW gasoline generating sets. All buildings had to
be wired for both lighting and power, water and sewer connection had to be established and
the existing buildings had to be altered to fit the new conditions and new buildings built
to provide additional work for and furnish living quarters for the troops. As no other
labor was available the men of Company A, assisted later by Companies B and H, performed
the necessary duty in a very satisfactory manner. * * *

This plant, when it was finally completed, was remarkable for its size and com­
pleteness. It included facilities for type and lithographic printing, wet and dry plate
photography, for the making of zinc cuts and half tones, and to a limited extent for
stitching and binding pamphlets. It also had a large and complete drafting room, school
of instruction, map storage and supply department, relief model department, machine shop,
garage and motor repair shop, and depot for technical equipment and supplies. In addition
it was headquarters for the surveying and computing forces which sent out parties to
many different portions of France.

With the entry into the line of the 1st Division in the Toul sector in January,
1918 came a call for a small detachment of trained men to accompany division headquarters.
This division was under a French corps and had to conform to the practice of a French divi­
sion in sector. There was need at division headquarters of a topographic officer and
draftsmen to make hasty drawings, sketches, and diagrams for the general staff of the
division, study aeroplane photographs of enemy territory, to keep up to date the sector
maps showing both intelligence and operations information, to distribute maps, and to
collect and forward to the corps at prescribed intervals the corrections in trenches and
other military features for incorporation in new editions of the battle map at army
headquarters.
The above work could not well be done by the division engineer inasmuch as it concerned largely territory within enemy lines for which he had no information. The work also had to be done directly in division headquarters under the immediate supervision of the staff officers responsible for it. Furthermore, the division engineer needed his topographic officer and section for his own purposes.

Accordingly an officer from the 29th Engineers was attached to G-2 of the 1st Division after a course of training in the study of the interpretation and restitution of photographs and was provided with equipment and supplies. The same thing was later done for other divisions and in some cases, notably the 42d Division, trained soldiers were also supplied. But when divisions began coming faster and additional companies of the 29th Engineers were taken off the priority schedule and held back in the United States, it became impossible to supply all the personnel. An officer and four trained soldiers were then sent around in turn to new divisions to instruct personnel secured in the divisions in the topographic staff work of the division headquarters preparatory to the division's training in the line under the French. For divisions on the British front or joining an American army without previous experience under a French army nothing could be done by G-2-C. American General Headquarters.

A further drain on the personnel of the 29th Engineers came with the formation of American corps. Tables of organization provided a force of one officer and twenty-three engineer soldiers as a topographic section for G-2, corps headquarters but did not provide any source for obtaining trained men. For the first two American corps to be organized complete sections of trained men were furnished from the 29th Engineers. For the other corps it was possible to furnish only an officer and four soldier specialists who formed a nucleus, additional men being secured in the corps themselves by transfer from various units.

It greatly handicapped the work of the 29th Engineers at the base plant and in preparation for later work with the American armies to let so many specialist draftsmen, lithographers and topographers go with divisions and corps, especially as specialists to replace them could not be secured from replacements in France. However, the divisions and corps had to function in advance of the American armies and personnel so furnished did very excellent and valuable work. Particular instances were that of the 2d Division at Chateau-Thierry and the I Corps from Chateau-Thierry to the Vesle. The corps sections by virtue of the superior personnel and experience were able later to materially assist in performing the work normally thrown upon the army plant and this at a time when the army plant was weak in personnel and handicapped by long distance from the front and insufficient time for installation.

In all there were supplied 19 officers and 72 soldiers to corps and divisions. It was also necessary at this time to send one officer and 36 soldiers to the service geographique in Paris for duty there. After three years of war the service geographique was compelled to depend upon workmen not fit for front line service. The additional burden of supplying maps to American troops, especially in consideration of the large numbers demanded by the Americans could only be borne with the assistance of American personnel. Similarly a detail of eight men was put to work at the studio of M. Chedanne for making relief maps for American needs. These details had to be kept in Paris until after the signing of the Armistice, although the numbers were reduced as the American Base Plant increased in capacity and efficiency. It should be remembered, however, that owing to the wide theatre of operations and sudden changes in plans it remained necessary until the end to call on the service geographique for maps to meet unexpected needs.

In February 1918, Company B, 29th Engineers arrived at Langres and proved to have personnel for survey and printing and also for sound and flash ranging mixed in the same company. A separation was made, the former men ultimately being transferred to survey and printing companies. The same was true of Company C, which arrived July 1918.
Company D, which arrived August 1918, Company E, which arrived August 1918 and Co. F, which arrived October 1918. Company G, which arrived October 1918, was composed entirely of survey and printing troops.

* * * * *

In March 1918, the existing priority schedule was suspended and no more specialist troops arrived until July 1918. To meet this emergency, Company H was raised in France April, 1918, from replacements and from attached soldiers and such specialists as could be found in various organizations throughout the American E. F., and whose transfer could be secured. For similar reasons and in a similar manner Company I was raised in August 1918, and Company M in October 1918.

During the period from March 21 to August 1, 1918, the lithographic and photographic equipment at Chaumont was transferred to the Base Printing Plant at Langres. Additional machinery was delivered on long-standing requisitions placed in France and Europe and American equipment began to arrive at irregular intervals and in small quantities. There was no way of telling when American equipment might be expected. The supply depots were very much congested and lacked personnel to sort out and reship property to units for which marked. Rail transportation was also very slow and uncertain. As an example of the difficulties encountered, one of the special Mack lithographic trucks was first discovered in the woods near Orleans hauling logs for the forestry service.

Work for the American troops at the front was done during this period through the divisions and corps topographic sections and by printing at the base printing plant as it grew in capacity and efficiency. Two extensive surveys were made for the French, to help them cover their back areas with plans directeurs in anticipation of a further German advance. The field work for the northern half of the Breteuil sheet, 1:20,000 was done in June and July 1918, and immediately thereafter the entire sheet of St-Auld west of Chateau-Thierry. The former covered 135 square kilometers and the latter 270 square kilometers. This work was of material assistance to the French and proved to be excellent training for the American survey parties in the preparation of battle maps according to French standards. The plane table field sheets turned in were extremely good and reflected much credit on the officers and men engaged on the work.

With the formation of the First Army August 10, it became necessary to supply personnel and equipment for an army plant. The 1st Battalion could not leave the base plant and no additional troops had arrived from the United States. Colonel C. L. Hall, with four officers and 66 soldiers from the 19th Engineers and a small mobile printing train, reported to the First Army at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre in time to move with the army headquarters to Neufchateau in preparation for the battle of St-Mihiel.

On August 13, 1918, the first instructions were received by G-2-C G. H. Q., to prepare an initial issue of maps for 16 divisions for the St-Mihiel attack about September 1. The First Army was en route to Neufchateau and could not expect to get established in time to assist in printing the maps. It was therefore necessary to handle the order at the base printing plant at Langres.

Tracings for some of the battle maps in the Toul sector had been previously secured from the French and plates made at Langres in anticipation of an American offensive at some future date in the St-Mihiel region. But the number of such plates was small as in the meantime the scene of operations had changed to Chateau-Thierry and energies had been diverted to establishing plates for that sector. Accordingly it was necessary to send to the French Eighth Army at Flavigny and to the French Second Army at Laheycourt to obtain such tracings as were not in use and establish plates. The French armies occupying the sector also agreed to bring up to date their overprints on the battle maps for the study of the first line positions and for the artillery bombardment objectives.

Courier passed almost daily between Flavigny, Laheycourt and Langres by automobile. A lieutenant was placed at the headquarters of the French Eighth Army as liaison officer and another at the headquarters of the French Second Army for the same purpose.
The V Corps on the west of the St-Mihiel salient was given a mobile printing train and it, together with the I Corps at Saizerais, already supplied with a train, assisted in preparing the necessary maps.

This initial supply embraced the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Copies</th>
<th>Scale</th>
<th>Colors</th>
<th>Sheets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>83,038 copies plan directors</td>
<td>1/20,000</td>
<td>4 colors</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35,330 copies plan directors</td>
<td>1/10,000</td>
<td>4 colors</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,735 copies art. bomb.obj.</td>
<td>1/20,000</td>
<td>7 colors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,850 copies (Hachured, with Lambert Grid)</td>
<td>1/50,000</td>
<td>2 colors</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54,820 copies contoured</td>
<td>1/50,000</td>
<td>3 colors</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78,845 copies hachured</td>
<td>1/80,000</td>
<td>1 color</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39,104 copies (contoured maps type 1912)</td>
<td>1/200,000</td>
<td>8 colors</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,050 copies French type G</td>
<td>1/200,000</td>
<td>3 colors</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,594 copies base maps</td>
<td>1/200,000</td>
<td>1 color</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>different sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>628 copies base maps</td>
<td>1/100,000</td>
<td>1 color</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>sheet</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the above initial supply, reserves had to be printed for corps and army troops to replace maps ruined in the trenches by bad weather and to meet various emergencies.

All these maps were printed at the base printing plant at Langres and delivered to the First Army at Neufchateau in time for distribution to divisions in suitable time for the attack of September 12. The initial issue of fifteen tons of maps was a difficult task inasmuch as the divisions were moved up to the front at the last moment and with great secrecy. It was necessary to give each division the correct sheets at the latest moment and still allow it time for distribution to units within divisions. The question of division, corps and army reserve for unexpected contingencies has also to be provided for. However, the task was successfully accomplished as evidenced by the report of a special inspection made for the purpose just preceding the attack. The details of distribution were handled by G-2-C, First Army ***

In addition to maps it was also necessary to furnish attacking troops with large numbers of oblique aeroplane photographs showing the ground over which the attack was to be made. Copies of photos to the number of 2320 were made by G-2-C, G. H. Q., and sent to the army. G-2-C of the army also made a large number of copies as did also the air service. This work was later assigned as a duty to the air service.

Before the St-Mihiel battle was finished instructions were received to prepare a similar set of maps for the Argonne-Meuse offensive to take place September 26 and to include twelve divisions at the start. The work was successfully accomplished by the joint work of the Base Printing Plant at Langres, G-2-C, First Army and the Groupe de Canevas de TIR of the French Second Army at Laheycourt. The latter remained in position during the Argonne-Meuse battle and rendered the American forces invaluable assistance in restitution of aeroplane photographs, preparation of plans directeurs in advance of the line and in preparation of data for intelligence overprints. It also carried on the extension of geodetic points for artillery fire with the assistance of an American survey party.

As the battle progressed it was hard work to keep the supply of maps printed ahead of the advance of the troops. At one stage the line passed completely over the 1:20,000 sheet in one day. On the final advance to Sedan the maps were delivered to the attacking troops about 3 a. m. on the morning of the advance. The G-2-C plant of the First Army was greatly handicapped by its position at Neufchateau so far in the rear of army headquarters. It had not been moved forward for lack of building space in which to work. A mobile army printing outfit at this time would have been invaluable. That the map supply for the American attack was adequate and reached the troops in time is largely due to the energy, initiative and resourcefulness of the Chief, G-2-C, First Army.
Meanwhile on October 12, 1918 the Second Army was formed at Toul and had to be supplied with personnel and equipment for its G-2-C. Major J. P. Hogan with 15 officers and 138 soldiers of the 29th Engineers was sent to Toul and there installed a very complete army plant including a mobile and stationary echelon. G-2-C in this army was more fortunate in securing suitable buildings at army headquarters and near the front. Also this army was in a quiet sector and there was every opportunity for a careful organization and installation. This army took complete possession of its sector and therefore G-2-C took over the responsibility for all the battle maps of the sector numbering fifteen 1:20,000 and twenty-two 1:10,000 scale.

A force of restituteurs was organized and work carried on systematically to keep the battle maps up to date and to get out new editions at frequent intervals. Also the establishment of artillery triangulation and traverse points was systematically taken up and much field work done. This sector was covered by American sound and flash sections and data secured by them was at once received and made use of. Graphical summaries of information and many special intelligence maps were reproduced and all type printing for the A. G. O. and other army needs performed.

This army plant was well established and in smooth working order when the Armistice was signed. It performed all routine work for the army in quiet sector and at the same time had completed at the time of the Armistice much important work toward extending geodetic points forward and preparing special maps for contemplated offensives. The coordination of work between divisions and corps topographic sections and army G-2-C had been accomplished and was affording good results. However, had not the Armistice been signed it would have been necessary at once to greatly increase the personnel of this army G-2-C to meet the needs during an offensive.

With the signing of the Armistice it became necessary at once to drop the making of battle maps and to provide small scale maps from the Meuse to the Rhine for the use of the troops advancing into enemy territory. The task for the American army was unusually difficult as the route for our troops crossed portions of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, thus involving four map systems. Limited numbers of maps were received from the French covering the small portions of France and Belgium necessary. For Germany and Luxembourg sheets of the German 1:100,000 were photographed at the base plant and enlarged to scale 1:50,000. Plates for the French 1:200,000 were already at the plant. Each American division of the Army of Occupation was issued 1,000 copies of each sheet of the French 1:200,000 to the Rhine and 250 copies of each sheet of the enlargement to 1:50,000 of the German 1:100,000. These maps sufficed for marching and billeting purposes and would have sufficed for mobile operations had they developed.

In addition the American Third Army, or Army of Occupation was provided with a G-2-C, Major H. R. Richards, engineers in charge, and including the mobile echelon taken from the Second Army. This mobile echelon printed and supplied all special maps needed by the army en route to the Rhine. On arrival in Coblenz it was reenforced with additional personnel and equipment for a complete army plant.

G-2-C, Third Army, aided by the base printing plant at Langres immediately began the work of establishing 1:20,000 battle maps for the area covered by the American bridgehead at Coblenz and for certain training areas in the rear but in the occupied zone. These were photographic enlargements of the German 1:25,000 with the addition of a kilometre quadrillage and with all marginal notations in English. Also work was begun to establish plates for the German 1:100,000 from Coblenz to Berlin and Dresden in order to be prepared to furnish maps in quantity in case of a further advance into Germany. On June 1, 1919, this work was nearly completed.
The plants at the First and Second Armies were gradually reduced, the personnel and equipment being sent to the Third Army or back to the Base Plant at Langres. Detachments remained with the armies until the end and performed much useful work in printing, photographic and lithographic reproduction in connection with the work of training troops and in preparation of final reports and records of army, corps and division headquarters.

The base plant after the Armistice continued to print maps for training areas and for the Third Army and a few for the embarkation camps in the S. O. S. In addition it did a great deal of reproduction for G. H. Q. for armies, corps and divisions to illustrate the final reports and records. It also did reproduction work for the American section of the commission to negotiate peace.

Inasmuch as it was impossible to demobilize the base plant and the 29th Engineers before the conclusion of peace advantage was taken of the opportunity and of the surplus motor transportation to organize and equip at LANGRES a complete mobile army printing train, such as had been contemplated in the United States but which could never before be accomplished in France for lack of motor trucks and personnel. The train was complete and ready for test in the field about March 15, 1919.

Authority was obtained for a month's field test over the area embraced in the St-MIHIEL and ARGONNE-MEUSE battlefields. The problem was a combined surveying and printing problem covering the same kind of work that had been done during operations by the plant at army headquarters. Full details are contained in Appendix XIV [not printed]. It is desired here to merely state that the month's trial was a success in every way. In spite of very bad roads and extremely bad weather the printing equipment worked without accident or trouble of any kind and the feasibility and advisability of such a train with an army were thoroughly established. Complete and accurate data were also secured upon which to base tables of organization and equipment for such a train.

With regard to the survey part of the problem the test was not so useful nor so conclusive. The map was a progressive one on a scale 1:50,000 without contours, based on control furnished by plane table triangulation and traverse. The scale and type were adopted arbitrarily to fit in with the conditions under which the test was made and not as being a model for future use. As a test it was satisfactory and furnished each day data for the printers to publish as their part of the problem. The map was accurate and compared very favorably with the existing map of the territory. The survey officers and men worked with commendable enthusiasm and energy under extremely trying weather conditions and set a standard that can be maintained in an army only by careful recruiting and training of a special survey unit.

After the return of the experimental printing train a section of it was sent to Le Mans and used there for printing the daily lists and bulletins at the A. E. F. rifle and pistol competition. From Le Mans it proceeded to Paris for similar duty in connection with the American and interallied games to be held there under G-5, G. H. Q. For such work the mobile printing train, in time of peace, can be most useful.

In November 1918, Major James W. Bagley and three other officers arrived from the United States with an experimental three-lens camera for aeroplane photography. These officers were attached to G-2-C for the purpose of carrying out experiments to test the special apparatus under actual war conditions. Unfortunately they arrived too late to participate in actual operations but were sent to the Second Army and for several months after the Armistice conducted experiments over the battlefields of St-Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne. The tests were thorough and exhaustive. ***

In March 1919, six officers and two hundred men of the 29th Engineers were ordered of temporary duty under the graves registration service. They did valuable work in surveying American cemeteries and in locating and marking isolated graves of American soldiers on the American battlefields and in preparing graphical records of graves and cemeteries for future reference. On June 1, this detail was still on duty in the field.
June 1, the date of completing this report, finds G-2-C, G. H. Q., closing up its records and preparing them for return to the United States. The 29th Engineers, except Company M at the Third Army and a small detachment on temporary detached service, are at Langres completing work on hand for G. H. Q., and preparing the base plant for shipment to the United States.

3. ORGANIZATION: The first organization tables for the A. E. F. authorized one, three company, battalion of engineers (surveying and printing) per army, and one company (surveying and ranging) per corps, this last company being a part of the corps engineer regiment. The organization was bad and was never in actual operations in the A. E. F., though special troops for the first army were raised in the United States in accordance therewith. Various changes in organization were made, until at the close of hostilities there were, for topographic and ranging work:

At G. H. Q., Staff Officer, G-2-C, and assistants (all engineers).
1 - 3 company battalion, engineers (surveying and printing), base printing plant.

At Army Headquarters - Staff Officer, G-2-C, and assistants (All engrs.)
1 - 3 company battalion, engineers (surveying and printing).
(Only 1 company was ever available at each army).
1 - 5 company battalion, engineers (sound and flash ranging).
(Only one battalion in France).

At Corps Headquarters - Staff Officer, G-2-C (engineer).
23 engineer soldiers, G-2-C, carried in headquarters troop.

At division headquarters - 4 soldiers, draughtsmen, G-2, carried in headquarters troop.

It should be noted that in the above organization there was no unit higher than a battalion. At the time of the Armistice there were in France two complete battalions of the 29th Engineers, and companies belonging to two additional battalions. In the absence of any regimental organization, G-2-C, in addition to planning, directing and supervising the work of these troops, had also to organize them, or reorganize them, upon arrival from the United States; had to train, equip and supply them and had to look out for all the administrative details common to a regimental headquarters. For example, to transfer a man from one battalion to another required and order from the Adjutant General at G. H. Q., and transfers were a matter of daily occurrence.

It should also be noted that the personnel of G-2-C in the corps was listed as engineer, without stating where it was to be obtained or who was to be responsible that trained specialists were provided for the work. Furthermore, a corps in active operations needs a much larger and differently equipped topographic section than one in a quiet sector or in repose. By making the section an integral part of the army survey and printing battalion detached for duty with the corps, the responsibility for furnishing the personnel would be fixed, and a way provided for giving the corps extra help in time of great activity, and for reducing the section below normal in quiet times, in order to secure personnel needed for duty elsewhere. Under this plan personnel would be better trained and more efficient, and topographic work throughout the various corps be better coordinated and more uniform.

For future needs there should be an engineer topographic service, consisting of a regiment of survey and printing troops. The number of battalions in the regiment should vary, there being one for the base printing plant and general headquarters and one for each field army. Corps topographic sections should be integral parts of the army battalion, detached for duty with corps. Regimental headquarters should be at general headquarters, together with the base printing plant, and a special depot for replacements, training and special technical supplies. In war this service should work under the direction and supervision of the general staff. In time of peace one battalion should be maintained in the United States under the chief of engineers. It should be stationed at
the base printing plant to operate that plant, to provide a technical training school in lithography, map photography, draughting, photo restitution, etc., in order that a force of trained experts be ready at all times for duty with an expeditionary force or field army. In addition this battalion, or detachments of it, could do much useful work for the general staff, service schools, artillery instruction centers, etc.

Each corps should have two topographic officers with the section, as one is not sufficient to handle the work including distribution of maps, and to exercise the necessary supervision over divisions.

Each division should have a topographic officer also. The draftsmen should be carried in division headquarters as at present. This section is necessary as a part of the staff, and should not be taken from the division engineer regiment, as the latter has separate need of its topographic officer and section. There is no real conflict between the duties of these two sections. The division engineer is primarily concerned in the friendly side of the line and construction work. He can supply all information needed for friendly works, except what has to be obtained by study of air photos. In an active sector the photos must be depended upon for all information of the front line. The G-2 Section is primarily concerned with the enemy side of the line, and has access to all available sources of information as such as air photos, prisoners statements, and captured documents, etc. G-2 is the proper place to coordinate the whole information for sending back to army for inclusion in new editions of battle map.

Also, for future needs there should be a sound and flash ranging service, comprising a sound ranging regiment and a flash ranging regiment, the number of battalions in each regiment to be the same as the number of field armies. It is considered that the engineer ranging sections organized, trained and supervised by G-2-C, A. E. F., were not only very efficient and energetic, but also worked for the artillery with the fullest loyalty and spirit of cooperation. However, as a principle of organization, the question may be expected to arise as to whether these sections should be handled directly by the artillery or by another branch of the service. This question should be settled by a representative board of officers; but, in any event a battalion of flash ranging troops and one of sound ranging troops should be maintained in time of peace, and take part in firing tests at artillery ranges and in maneuvers. Only thus can the lessons on ranging learned in this war be made familiar to all our artillery, and studies and experiments in the methods and apparatus be carried on to keep artillery ranging in close touch with the latest discoveries and developments in physical science. In deciding on future organization, relative facilities for study, research, experiments and for obtaining technical personnel should largely determine the branch of the service to carry on the work.

The need of a regimental organization cannot be too strongly emphasized. G-2-C, G. H. Q., was always burdened with administrative duties to the detriment of the proper performance of its staff functions.

4. TECHNICAL WORK AND METHODS (TOPOGRAPHICAL): Conditions confronting the American army in France were in many ways widely different from anything previously experienced by it. It is therefore deemed advisable to fully discuss the various features of topographic and map reproduction work encountered. In general, the American methods in both surveying and printing were equal to or in advance of practice in the Allied armies. It was only necessary to modify them to suit the conditions.

In general, American equipment was considerably in advance of European, but work for the first year had to be largely done with the latter. In the summer of 1918 American equipment began to arrive and was at once put to use.

G-2-C was extremely fortunate in having expert geodesists, surveyors, printers, and photographers among its reserve officers. The same was also true with respect to the
soldier personnel of the 29th Engineers. Without these skilled and already trained specialists very little could have been accomplished within the time available. The quantity and quality of the work absolutely required experts in all lines of work and on all kinds of machines.

A. Maps

1. Projection and Grid: On the prewar maps of France, 1:80,000 and smaller scales, the Bonne projection was used. It was also used on the enlargement of the 1:80,000 to 1:50,000, which was the first attempt to prepare a battle map. There existed also, prior to the war, 1:20,000 scale maps of certain disconnected fortresses. These were, for the greater part, prepared by polyhedral projection. This latter, while avoiding distortion within the area covered by the map, has the distinct disadvantage that adjacent sheets cannot be joined together without distortion.

The plan director, or battle map, scale 1:20,000, with its enlargement to 1:10,000 and 1:5,000 was prepared by the French on the Lambert projection, overprinted with a rectangular grid. To avoid the distortion which occurs when a single Lambert projection is extended over too wide a range of latitude, France was divided into a northern Lambert system, between Latitude 50 and 54, and a southern Lambert system south of Latitude 50. The use of the Lambert system in the present war was facilitated by the fact that the battle line extended mostly in an easterly and westerly direction, and that the entire theatre of operations was included within the northern Lambert system. The rectangular kilometric grid was also overprinted on the 1:50,000 enlargement of the 1:80,000 map wherever the 1:20,000 reduction of the plan director did not exist.

The British used for their battle map a 1:20,000 plan director on the Bonne projection, with a rectangular grid of 1,000 yard squares. They found this very unsatisfactory, and at the close of the war were on the point of changing to the Lambert projection, although this would have involved the redrafting of all their maps.

The Germans used a 1:25,000 plan director prepared on the Polyhedral projection, overprinted with a rectangular kilometric grid. The origin of the projection and the grid system for each group of armies was different, and they undoubtedly experienced great difficulty at the points of junctions of the different systems.

It is not intended to discuss at length the proper projection, or systems of projection, for military maps of the United States. This should be made the subject of an exhaustive study by an engineer board, upon which the artillery and the geological and coast and geodetic surveys should be represented.

Military considerations should be paramount.

Of the officers who saw service in France, Lieut. Col. C. H. Birdseye, Artillery, formerly of the geological survey, and 1st Lieut. Earl Church, Engineers, of the coast and geodetic survey, have made a most thorough study of these matters, are familiar with the military problems involved, and should be consulted.

The rectangular grid is absolutely necessary for maps intended for artillery fire, which included the 1:20,000 and smaller scale, and the 1:40,000 or 1:50,000 where the 1:20,000 does not exist. Further requirements on 1:20,000 maps for artillery fire are that there should be no distortion greater than ten meters; that the adjacent sheets should be capable of being joined together; that the grid system should be continuous between adjacent sheets, and that the theatre of operations should be covered by one system. The fulfillment of these provisions over a territory as large as the United States is impossible, and a compromise of some sort is therefore necessary. It is conceivable that it may be necessary to prepare separate editions for military purposes by redrafting existing maps, or even to make entirely new surveys for military purposes. The inconvenience or expense should not be allowed to interfere with the preparation of a proper military map on a scale or scales which experience has determined will be useful for military purposes.

2. Scales: The scales to be used by the American Expeditionary Forces were fixed by G. O. No. 60, Headquarters, A. E. F., November 13, 1917. The following table shows a comparison of these scales with those actually used by the French, British and German armies:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>American</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>German</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1:5,000 *</td>
<td>1:5,000 *</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>1:2,500 and 1:5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1:10,000 x</td>
<td>1:10,000 x</td>
<td>1:10,000 x</td>
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<td>1:40,000 xx</td>
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<tr>
<td>1:600,000</td>
<td>1:600,000</td>
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**NOTE:**

- Existing maps of special areas with scale of 1:50,000 will be replaced by maps with scale of 1:40,000. The use of the 1:50,000 scale maps is authorized until replacement is completed.

- Suppressed by French and Americans in August 1918, and used only for plans of villages by the British.

- Practically discontinued at close of war.

The scales actually used by the American army were, for obvious reasons, those used by the French, since plates for these maps were in existence and could be obtained, and time was not available for the work of redrafting.

It is recommended, however, that the scales shown in G. O. No. 60 be adopted for the United States, substituting, however, the 1:100,000 for the 1:80,000 and that the preparation of no maps of smaller scale than 1:20,000 be attempted at present except for fortified districts.

The 1:50,000 map, while satisfactory as a general map, was slightly too small a scale for open warfare or for offensives, and the British 1:40,000 was much more serviceable. The use of a 1:40,000 instead of 1:50,000 would, in many cases, obviate the necessity of using the 1:20,000.

The 1:100,000 furnishes a satisfactory map for a war of movement and for operations incidental to the first shock, for which it is the ideal map. It is used for these purposes by both British and Germans. The 1:80,000 will serve for this purpose, but it is of an unnecessarily large scale and a sufficient area is not covered on a single sheet. There was a constant demand from American armies and staffs for 1:100,000 maps, and many skeleton or outline maps of this kind were prepared (particularly for the overprinting of army information) although time did not permit the redrafting of an accurate detailed map on this scale.

The 1:200,000 map is a satisfactory map for marches, concentrations, billeting, etc. It is in addition an excellent map for automobile travel and for airplane flight. The present U. S. geological map on a scale of 1:62,500 is too large a scale for open warfare and too small a scale for sector warfare. Its adoption as a compromise would necessitate the preparation of 1:20,000 scale maps, for which the 1:40,000 would in many cases be an efficient substitute. For a war of movement and for general staff purposes, it is unnecessarily large, resulting in waste in issue to troops, and unnecessary bulk and dispersion of staff information.

In general terms it may be stated that the 1:20,000 map is a map for the division; the 1:40,000 a map for the corps and the 1:100,000 a map for the army. The 1:600,000 map is designed as a general staff map, giving a general view of the theatre of operations. The 1:1,000,000 map of the world now in the course of preparation by international agreement is on too small a scale for this purpose.
3. Types: Of the maps used in Europe, both the French and British 1:20,000 and smaller scales formed satisfactory types. The German 1:25,000 maps of France are very much poorer in every way. The 1:25,000 maps of Germany itself are fine productions but are not clear, as they are overloaded with detail, and the practice of printing in only one color makes the map almost illegible. The German practice of using several contour intervals on the same sheet makes it extremely difficult, without close study, to grasp the topographical features. The principle of placing the contour elevations only on the margin of the sheet and not at reasonable intervals in the body also makes it very much more difficult to read.

The 1:50,000 French and 1:40,000 British are satisfactory types for these maps, although the hurriedly prepared American 1:50,000 scale maps of the Rhine, of which Bonn (No. 457) is an example, are preferred for color, type, and size, although lacking in technique and careful draftsmanship, the execution of which was prevented by lack of time.

The French 1:80,000 hachured general staff map is somewhat illegible. It is almost useless for American troops, due to their inability to visualize topography from the hachures. Its great advantage is that it shows topography, including ground forms with the use of only one color. One color printing is a very important consideration in war.

The British 1:100,000, however, is a very satisfactory type for a map of this kind.

The French 1:200,000 is an ideal map, and it is not believed that it can be improved in any detail.

In printing a military map it should always be remembered that it serves only as a base for the overprinting of military information, which is the vital information thereon. For this purpose, the tone of the topographical map should be kept down, so that the military information will stand out clearly. This should not be effected by means of weak colors, giving the impression of poor or faint printing, as was done by the Germans, but by the proper selection of firm colors, light in tone, for the base or topographical features. That this may be successfully done has been shown on the Bonn 1:50,000 and on the plan directeur Chambley 1:20,000.

The scale of a map should always be indicated by a representative fraction, and the term "1 inch to the mile, etc." should be abolished from military phraseology.

The contour interval will vary for different types of country, but normally it is recommended that the military map should have a 5 meter contour interval for the 1:20,000 scale and proportionate intervals for the other scales. This will be satisfactory to the artillery, and will in general not overload the map. Different contour intervals should not be used on the same map where they will destroy the picture value of the contour information. Woods should be accurately outlined and on the smaller scale maps should be printed in a different color.

Attention is directed to the fact that, since a great number of officers are not expert in map reading, the military map must be very clear and legible, so that it is a good picture. Overloading the map with detail will only render it confusing and difficult to read. It is therefore almost imperative to redraw the maps on different scales instead of reducing them photographically. Also the battle map must be so drawn that it can be reproduced by simple lithographic processes, and if the fineness of detail is such that it can be reproduced only by the engraving processes, the map will have lost much of usefulness. This is particularly true of the large scale maps, since it is frequently necessary to produce in the field "compares" or single sheet maps of certain areas, which will not agree with the original index or assemblage. The lack of competent map draughtsmen was always a serious handicap in the A. E. F., and a sufficient number should be trained in the military standards in time of peace to serve as instructors in case of expansion.

The British military maps were printed mostly on linen-backed paper, while the French used the cheapest grade of paper upon which it was possible to execute lithographic
work. The Americans followed French practice perforce, as little linen-backed paper was available.

The advantage of linen-backed paper of course is its durability, even under exposure to bad weather. The disadvantages are cost, bulk, greater difficulty in getting good impressions, and impossibility of printing again on reverse side. The greater part of the military maps are either periodic or subject to change at more or less frequent intervals. During an active operation a large number of maps change from day to day. In a large operation the number of maps issued is so great that the bulk and weight become a decided factor in the distribution.

The opinion gained from the recent operations is that the general use of linen-backed paper is neither necessary nor economical, but that the grade of paper generally used by the French and American armies is too poor, lacking both in durability and in the properties of keeping its shape and size in the presses. The quality of paper used by the U. S. Geological Survey is satisfactory. The experience of the British army and of G-2-C, A. E. F., with units that were accustomed to British maps shows that it is very difficult to discontinue the use of linen-backed paper once started.

4. Size: The proper size, shape and consequent index for assemblage of the maps of various scales had been the subject of great controversy. The limiting considerations are the size of the press to be employed, and the size which can be conveniently handled in a single sheet. The French Plan Directeur, on the scale of 1:20,000, covering about 13 1/2 x 20 kilometers, is the largest map produced by the Allies, and is the largest which can be printed on any press used by the service geographique. This size was adopted for three reasons:

1. On account of the desire of the artillery to have both gun positions and target on the map, or at least on two maps.

2. Because the 1:20,000 plan directeur being a periodic map it was considered that it should be made as large as possible so as to save on the number of sheets to be edited monthly.

3. Because it was considered that there would be a saving in paper consumption, and a saving in the number of impressions to be made by the presses.

It is not believed that any of these considerations are of sufficient weight to warrant publication of so large and unwieldy a map especially, since if mobile printing trains are to be used (as seems probable), there is a distinct advantage in cutting down the size of the sheet. It is also believed that there is a great waste of these maps, due to their clumsiness and the difficulty in handling them. There is also waste in paper in the issue of sheets of this size, when frequently sheets covering a smaller area would serve. The early demand of the artillery for a map containing both battery positions and target is no longer of as much weight, as generally the firing data is replotted on an artillery board, or, if the map is used, it is cut into small sections and then pasted on a specially prepared grid.

It is therefore recommended that the size and shape of the sheet be similar to that of the "Bonn" map, attached, with such slight alteration in size or shape as would permit its being printed or overprinted on the presses of the mobile printing trains.

B. Surveying:

1. Topographic: The problems confronting the A. E. F. in surveying were totally different from what had been anticipated, and the ordinary training in the reconnaissance and military topography was insufficient for map making, though of great service to line officers at the front. France had been completely surveyed on a scale of 1:80,000 and the wealth of permanent monuments permitted thorough triangulation, with points so frequent that they could be readily picked up on ordinary plane table resection. In addition the French and British armies, during the previous years of the war, had completely covered the theatre of operations with a belt of large scale surveys, thoroughly tied into the original triangulation. In the preparation of these maps they had been assisted not only by small scale township maps covering almost the entire country, but also by the use of airplane photography, which has in a great measure replaced reconnaissance map making
for military purposes. There were times when, through offensive operations, one side or
the other broke through the band of large scale maps along the battle line, and actual
surveying on the ground was resumed. In general, however, the actual amount of surveys
performed by the topographical service of the A. E. F. was relatively small.

As airplanes have revolutionized warfare, so the airplane photograph has
revolutionized map making. Provided that sufficient control points are known, or can be
established, a satisfactory large scale map without contours can be made by the use of
aerial photography alone. For making large scale maps of territory held by the enemy,
the Allies were dependent on maps compiled in this way with the aid of existing data.

The method used was as follows:
From the 1:80,000 hachured staff map a skeleton of roads and streams was
redrawn on a scale of 1:20,000, and readjusted to the triangulation. This readjustment
was necessary as the 1:80,000 is prepared on the Bonne projection, whereas the French
1:20,000 was prepared on the Lambert projection. By means of airplane photographs, errors
in the 1:80,000 were corrected, the culture was brought up to date and additional details
were added. Further detail was obtained from cadastral or land surveys of various towns
and villages. These were on varying scales between 1:2,500 and 1:10,000. They furnished
a number of details not clearly visible or distinguishable on the photographs, but as
some of them dated back 100 years they required careful checking from the photographs.
The contouring was obtained either from the 1:40,000 original contour map (from which the
1:80,000 hachured had been prepared) or in the absence of this by sketching in the con­tours from the hachures and elevations on the 1:80,000. In back areas contours were
filled in by plane table topographers who also made corrections in the culture wherever
found. It is believed that this method could be employed in the surveys of new areas in
the United States with a distinct saving of time and cost, and with the additional ad­
vantage that it would train a large force in time of peace for work they would be called
upon to do in war time. The following is a brief outline of the method proposed.
1. Cover the area to be surveyed with a control consisting of triangulation of
lower orders in agreement with our present primary system. Any additional control points
needed could be established by resections or by transit traverses.
2. The entire country surveyed should then be covered by airplane flights:
   (a) At a high altitude with a camera of long focal length for control and
   general features.
   (b) At a low altitude with a camera of short focal length for detail.
   In very thinly settled country the second may be omitted. While the photographs
   are being taken the triangulation and control points should be suitably marked by panels,
   so that they can be seen on the photograph.
3. Then cover the entire area with a level control, after which a sheet should be
   prepared for the topographer, on which all culture has been restituted and all B. M's,
   located.
4. A plane table party should then establish the contours, roughly check the culture
   and determine doubtful points. It is recommended that the plane table survey be made on
   twice the scale of the finished map, and reduced by photography.
   There is no doubt that in thickly settled country and in cities this method would be
   more economical than any of our present survey methods.
In organizing surveys for this method a further investigation of the Bagley tri-lens
camera and methods should be made. Experimental work with this camera was conducted in
France under the supervision of G-2-C, and a complete report, on file in the Engineer
Department, Washington, D. C. is contained in Appendix XII [not printed] of this report.
With its present lens of 6" focal length sufficient detail cannot be obtained while flying
at a high enough altitude for safety. It is also subject to the present disadvantage of
all film cameras in requiring more favorable weather conditions than plate cameras. Its
usefulness for military work over the enemies lines is therefore limited, although it is
believed to have great possibilities in commercial surveying. Experiments should be con-
tinued, with a view to its development for military purposes.

If the preparation of military maps of the U. S. is under military control, as seems advisable, it is important that too great reliance should not be placed during peacetime in apparatus and methods that will not be useful in time of war.

While the greater part of the work done by the A. E. F. in France was adaptation of existing maps (involving more the compilation of data and redrafting) and while the amount of surveying was relatively small in comparison with expectations, the work which was done was sufficient to enable comparison of methods and equipment to be made.

In addition to 390 square kilometers of plane table survey on a scale of 1:10,000 made for the French after the German drives of March 21 and May 28, plan directors of American divisional training areas were prepared (partly by assemblage of existing data and partly by plane table survey); numerous surveys were made on a scale of one to ten and one to twenty thousand for school and training areas; and detail surveys were made on a large scale for many different institutions, such as hospital sites, railroad yards, etc. In addition, a large amount of transit traverse and triangulation of lower orders was performed by survey parties in the armies for the purpose of furnishing artillery firing data.

This latter work, which had not been anticipated, proved one of the largest survey problems in G-2-C, and is covered in detail later.

In topographical surveying the methods and instruments of the U. S. Geological Survey are in advance of European practice. The following are marked advantages:

The general use of the plan table.

The use of the telescopic alidade permitting stadia measurements and traversing with the plan table.

The use of the Beaman attachment permitting direct reading of stadia distances and of differences in elevation.

The greater accuracy due to making the map in the field.

The details of topographic surveying in the A. E. F. are contained in report of Major H. H. Hodgeson, Engineers, Appendix XV to this report. [Not printed].

(C) Triangulation: France has been covered twice by a primary triangulation system. The second triangulation which was intended as a revision of the first, was not completed, nor have the varying results of the two systems in all cases been coordinated. From the first primary system the control has been effected either by triangulations of a lower order or by resections on church towers and other permanent points. A considerable part of this work is old and somewhat unreliable. In addition some of the points have been moved since the original determination and have not been redetermined. A certain amount of checking is therefore necessary before using these control points.

In the establishment of artillery firing data immediately behind the front line, it is advisable to have the points somewhat closer than the natural monuments exist. It is also necessary to establish artificial points, when the permanent points have been destroyed by artillery fire as frequently happens. In the preparation for an advance it is advisable to cut in as many natural objects on the enemy side of the line as can be seen, and to check up and tie in all previously determined points in the original system of triangulation. This is not only for the purpose of making it easier for the field parties to establish their traverse lines, but also, before the establishment of these traverse lines, to provide the artillery with numerous points by which they can determine their position by resection. Naturally in carrying on this work, as some of the primary points are in the possession of the enemy and as some of the primary points on the friendly side of the line do not have the necessary outlook over the terrain, it is sometimes necessary to establish subsidiary points with the same degree of accuracy as the primary triangulation. Thus in the case of the St-Mihiel advance it was necessary for the American Second Army, which took over this territory, to establish, either by primary triangulation, or primary traverse, a number of additional points of primary accuracy, and from the points thus established to cut in by intersection every prominent object within the range of
vision. It will always be necessary under similar conditions to establish more primary points than exist, since location in the enemy territory (due to inability to occupy the point) is always dependent upon intersection.

In all this work the methods and apparatus of the U. S. Coast and Geodetic survey were used and found to be equal, and often superior, to French methods. On the primary work the 8 inch standard theodolite of the coast and geodetic survey was used, and on the secondary triangulation and traverse the "Berger" transit reading to thirty seconds.

While some short cuts in computations were copied from the French, the coast and geodetic survey methods were capable of solving any of the problems.

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D. Artillery Firing Data: This subject has been covered in detail by a report of Captain (now Major) H. H. Hodgeson, Engineers, of the U. S. Geological survey. ** In three-point resection and running of traverse lines a 30 second transit was used, and toward the end stadia measurements were substituted for chaining. The French used the chain, and determined the bearings of the various lines of the traverses by recomputation from the coordinates of points on the traverses.

It is sufficient for artillery purposes if the location of any point by coordinate is within five meters. Errors in bearing, however, are very serious since they lead to divergent fire. An error of five meters in the location of any one point in a short traverse may make a considerable variation in its computed direction or bearing.

In the American army the practice was followed of computing the bearing of each line from the adjusted angles of the traverse, and furnishing a record of this bearing with the artillery firing data. This involved no additional labor in the computations in the office, and eliminated a great deal of computation by the artillery in the field. It also permitted running all traverses by stadia instead of chain. In wooded areas where traverses must be run a long distance without checking, azimuth observations were taken at intermediate points to check the bearings.

On a stabilized front survey parties for determination of artillery firing data were attached to armies. While time is not available for running traverses in case of a rapid advance, these parties can materially assist the artillery, as follows:

1. Be establishing true north by azimuth observations, or by careful magnetic readings if the weather conditions are unfavorable for the former.
2. If more time is available by establishing numerous locations and direction lines by resection.
3. Finally, when the line begins to crystallize, by connecting these points with traverse.

To accomplish this work, it is necessary to decentralize. Accordingly, plans had been worked out in the Second Army for dividing this survey force among the different corps, attaching two or more parties to each corps artillery headquarters. On stabilization they would return to the control of the army topographical section. While there was no opportunity for trying this out, it is believed that it would have worked successfully.

In the German army these troops are habitually attached to corps or division artillery. It is believed that they should be under the control of the army topographical section because it is only in this way that a uniform plan of triangulation control can be worked up and that the various detail work can be guided in conformance to the sound general control of an experienced geodesist. Experienced geodesists and computers are very scarce, and they can be supplied only for army headquarters, and it is only in an army headquarters that the necessary data can be collected and compiled.

In the event of a sudden outbreak of war and the establishment of a new front, the first and most important thing, both from point of view of the artillery and of the topographical services, is the establishment of a uniform scheme of control. This is clearly shown in a report of British maps, which never recovered, even after four years
of war from initial mistakes, and instead of having a comprehensive and complete geodetic system were compelled up to the end of the war to submit to the annoyance, confusion and error of a patch work system devised by various irresponsible surveyors for their immediate needs. The geodetic systems of the different German groups of armies also were different and unrelated, which must have been a source of trouble and confusion. During the period when a unified system of geodetic control is being established, the artillery has in its own hands rough means of sufficient accuracy for bridging over the gap. In order to aid them in this work American artillery orienter officers should be provided, and should be instructed in the use of the sun chart prepared by the U. S. Geological Survey. Due to long spells of continued bad weather this did not prove as useful in France as had been expected, but it is believed that it would be of greatest use in the United States.

In the military mapping of the United States as many permanent control points should be established as possible, without too great expense. Otherwise the establishment of proper geodetic control for artillery firing data will be greatly delayed.

(C) Restitution of Air Photos: The development of airplane photography has led to the addition to topographical methods of the art of interpretation and restitution. Interpretation consists in determining the character of the object seen on the photo and restitution in determining its accurate location on the map. Naturally these two cannot be separated, but in the American armies the responsibility for interpretation rested with the Intelligence Section G-2, and for restitution with the Topographic Division, G-2-C. In practice, except in the preparation of battle maps showing enemy organizations, the interpretation is relatively easy.

The combined operations of G-2 and G-2-C of an army in compiling and keeping up to date the plan directeur or battle map and information maps is completely described in Intelligence Studies, American Second Army, by Major J. P. Hogan, G. S., Appendix XI to this report [not printed], copies of which are on file in the M. I. D., and in the Engineer Department, Washington, D. C. Since the control for the restitution depends entirely on the culture on base map, it is necessary that the details of the base map be accurate and up to date, and that changes and errors in same be revised immediately. Too little attention is paid to this point. * * *

Restitution at present has not progressed beyond the accurate representation of plane topography or culture, although it can be applied to determining in a general way the relief of the terrain. A certain amount of this work has been accomplished by means of snow pictures and oblique photos, and a certain amount of work has also been done both in the U. S. and in Europe with horizontal ground photos for the purpose of establishing contours. This entire matter should be made the subject of careful investigation and continued experiment.

The restitution of plane topography is subject to constant errors due to the perspective effect of the camera and to the transferral of a spherical surface to a plane. It is subject to accidental errors due to tilting of the airplane and camera, and to the relief of the terrain. The following instruments are used by the French for correcting accidental errors and for changing the scale:

1. The Camera Lucida or Chambre Clair.
2. The Appareil "Rousshile."

With the Bagley camera where two of the 3 lenses are at an angle a transformer has been designed for horizontalization of the air photo.

American restitutors use by choice a system of proportional triangles and captured German documents indicate use by them of trapezoidal figures for the same purpose. There is room for experiment with a view to the development of suitable apparatus for mechanical restitution and for improvement of present methods of graphical restitution.

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Restitution being an outgrowth of this war is still in its infancy, and there has been no time in the heat of the struggle for careful investigation and experiment. There is probably no field in topography in which more progress can be made by experiment and mathematical analysis.

(D) Lithography: American lithographic equipment is in advance of European practice, especially in simplicity and compactness and in the development of rapid methods and labor saving devices and machinery. The most important advantages realized in army work from this superiority were as follows:

The rotary lithographic press with zinc plates was much more compact than the flat bed zinc presses of the British and the flat bed stone presses of the Germans. The reduction in the number of ink distributing rollers to 8 other improvements in a special press designed for war purposes made this press so much lighter and more compact than the French rotary presses that it could be mounted and operated in a five ton truck.

The use of a new direct process, permitting printing from tracings on to zinc plates, not only effected a great saving in time, but greatly decreased the amount and bulk of accessory apparatus so as to permit its being included in two three ton trucks.

The use of powerful and reliable artificial light permitted continuous work.

These combined improvements permitted the development of the mobile lithographic printing train contained in four trucks, which operated so successfully with the I and V Corps, and permitted the nightly publication and distribution of the information of the enemy collected during the day. The mobile lithographic printing train also forms the nucleus of the mobile army printing train which has been assembled and operated experimentally since the Armistice. The number and type of such mobile printing trains will be discussed later, but as army equipment should be either mobile or semi mobile it is certain that there is no room in any army printing plant for any other lithographic press except the type which has been so successfully developed and used during the present war, regardless of whether this press is to be permanently mounted in a truck or not.

The size of press to be used is determined by the size of the standard field map, and the size of sheet adopted should not be so large as to make the army press unwieldy or difficult to mount in a truck. In discussion in regard to the size of maps the opinion has already been expressed that the full size plan director is too large and unwieldy as a map, and though it is possible to mount on a truck a press capable of printing a sheet of this size, it is considered of doubtful advisability. All considerations therefore point to the advisability of using a smaller sheet.

A feature of the zinc plate prepared by the direct process for the rotary lithographic press is the fact that it is a surface impression very lightly etched. In field work, where a plate is usually used for a limited run on a periodic map which changes frequently, this is a distinct advantage, since the plate may be regrained for another impression with very little loss of metal. The life of a plate is therefore indefinitely prolonged. Where it is desired, however, to prepare maps with a great deal of fine detail there is a distinct loss of fineness in the direct process zinc plate. This may occur to a limited extent in the original transfer, and is sure to occur after the plate has been run for a certain length of time. the impression, which is only on the surface of the zinc plate, gradually wears off and the plate breaks down. This trouble was experienced in printing both the French 1/200,000 and the French 1/80,000, usually after about twenty thousand impressions on a well made plate, and much sooner if the technique of the plate was poor.

In the American and British Expeditionary Forces the base maps were in general printed at base printing plant, and overprints were made in the armies. It is apparent, therefore, that there should be, in the base printing plant, presses especially suitable for long runs. This calls for an off-set press, in which the plate does not come into contact with the paper, transfer of the impression from the plate to the paper being made by means of a rubber blanket. There should only be enough of these presses in the base plant to take care of long steady runs, and the main reliance of the base printing plant should still be placed on rotary lithographic presses of the same type used in
the army. The personnel for armies may then be trained on the presses on which they will be called upon to operate, and replacements and provisions for unforeseen expansion will exist in the base printing plant.

In all the processes of reproduction there is necessity for an abundance of fixed lights of known intensity available at all times, which are at the same time simple and reliable. The most successful light used by G-2-C, A. E. F., is the Macbeth arc, which should be adopted as a standard until something better develops. The Cooper Hewitt lamp gives satisfactory results, but it is too fragile and too difficult to replace or repair. Other arcs used were not so satisfactory.

Wet Plate Camera: An important adjunct to the lithographic plant of armies and higher units is the wet plate camera, which enables the direct reproduction, enlargement or reduction, by lithography of any map or document of which a copy can be obtained, without the necessity of redrafting. When it is considered that the redrafting of a single sheet of any standard map may require from four to six weeks time, and that the same results may be accomplished by the wet plate camera in from two to four hours, the military advantage of the wet plate camera may be appreciated. A very large and complete collection of the engraved German 1/100,000 was collected by G-2-C, Second Army from a mass of captured maps after the St-Mihiel offensive. At the conclusion of hostilities there were no other maps of German territory in stock in the Second Army, and so great was the demand for these maps that only limited numbers could be obtained from the service geographique of a photographic reproduction of these maps. With a wet plate camera the Second Army was in position to copy the German maps and produce them in quantities, limited only by the capacity of the printing plant. It could also have reproduced them, by enlargement, to any scale needed for military operations. With a single wet plate camera it would have been possible to produce about eight plates per day, or more than sufficient to cover any possible advance of the army. The wet plate camera should be large enough to take, on a single plate, the largest field sheet published. As the process is extremely technical and delicate it is essential that trained and experienced operators should be available.

E. Other processes of reproduction: Of the other reproduction processes in use in the American E. F., the following are the most common:

- Blue Print
- Dorel
- Cyclostyle
- Hektograph
- Jelly Roll
- Mimeograph

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These processes are all substitutes for lithography and are preferred to the hand lithographic outfit because they are simpler and speedier for a limited number of copies. They are therefore eminently suited for field operations in time of war.

The Dorel employing the blue print process for making its jelly plates is superior to the blue print in the following respects:

It enables the product of one blue printing outfit to be multiplied about 20 fold without additional lighting facilities and by the addition of simple equipment in the form of tables and melting pots. It gives impressions of any desired color on a white background, and therefore (at the expense of making separate tracings for the additional colors) permits multi-colored work. It is very much cheaper in personnel and material. It is speedier.

It has the following objections:

It requires the use of special blue print paper, jelly and ink, the formulae for which are secret and at present the monopoly of one concern in Paris, though some
imitations are on the market. The percentage of unsatisfactory material is still high and both paper and jelly often spoil very quickly. The process is very subject to weather conditions, and only expert operators can be relied on for uniformly good results unless it should come into commercial use in the United States. Its present adoption for use could be safely based only on the purchase of the formulae on a royalty or other basis, and manufacture in the United States.

The Clay Hektograph has the advantages of producing a multi-colored job by a single impression. Its disadvantage is that it is not adaptable to very fine work and that the tracing is useless after being laid once on the hektograph. As the hektograph will produce only from 20 to 50 prints from a single impression of the tracing, it would then be necessary to make an entirely new tracing if more copies are needed. A superior type of clay was found near Chaumont which almost doubled the capacity.

The Jelly Roll is similar to the hektograph and has the same advantages and disadvantages. It is less bulky and slightly more convenient than the hektograph, but is more expensive since after about half a dozen impressions the jelly has absorbed so much ink that it will no longer work well. As both hektograph and jelly roll require no particular skill in preparation and use they are favorites for issue to lower units.

The Cyclostyle using a wax sheet and stylus is found in several forms, of which the Neo Cyclostyle seems the best. It is capable of producing very fine work second only to the lithograph or Dorel. As it requires a good draughtsman experienced in its use it has never come into great favor in the American army. It is capable of producing over 200 copies from a single wax sheet or plate, but requires separate plates for each color. It should be used as a relief to the lithographic plant on small jobs requiring from 50 to 200 copies. It was used by the French often where we used the mimeograph, or in preparation of documents requiring both tabular and graphic information such as lists of active hostile batteries by Corps A. I. S.

The Mimeograph may be used for the preparation of simple diagrams of sketches, especially when combined with tables or other typewritten matter. The methods of drafting are the same as for the cyclostyle. Either cyclostyle or mimeograph are particularly useful for independent topographic parties engaged in preparation of artillery firing data which have to issue traverse data directly to artillery units.

F. Photography

Dry Plate: The best facilities are demanded in army and headquarters printing plants for photography and for either copying, enlarging or reducing photographic plates, prints or documents. Some of the most important daily demands are as follows:
2. Making of enlargement or reduction of airphotos to certain scales for restitution or for mosaics.
3. Photographing mosaics when assembled.
4. Copies of air photographs, ground photos or panoramas after annotation.
5. Copies of Plans or Designs.
8. Photographs of structures of military importance especially of captured organizations.

The necessary equipment consists of ordinary field cameras of various sizes, for use with both films and plates, and panoramic circuit cameras with short focus wide angle lens and long focus long distance lenses. The laboratory equipment should include automatic printing machines, copying cameras and enlarging cameras.

Photostat: The photostat printing directly on paper without film or plates is the most speedy means of turning out a limited number of copies of any map, drawing, design or of any typewritten or printed document, within the limit of its size. It can enlarge
or reduce, and is very useful for map work if the lens and prism are good. In an army plant it is in constant operation and is essential. As an example of its use 3 sets of plans of 20 important bridges over the Meuse were reproduced from the original drawings in less than two hours, in one of the army plants, on an urgent demand.

Panoramic Photography and Sketching: In position warfare this is essential for observation posts of all units and for artillery and ranging O. P.'s. It assists observers in orienting themselves, becoming familiar with the principal points in the terrain under observation and spotting. It is particularly useful during relief of units or in reliefs of observers within units.

In a prepared attack if issued down to troops it assists them in orientation and in keeping direction.

The process used is as follows. The panoramic photo is taken from a fixed zero on some prominent point near the middle of the circuit. It is then developed and printed, and a mil or degree scale is placed on the print. It is then annotated to bring out important points within view, and the scale and annotation are either transferred to the negative or the annotated print is recopied. A simplified sketch is then prepared from the negative, the vertical scale being generally slightly exaggerated, and all unimportant detail suppressed. Both photograph and sketch are checked in the field before issue. This is a standard method when time is available.

In some cases no sketch is prepared, and in others the sketching is done directly in the field without any photograph. The latter requires special training and special apparatus for rapid work to scale. During offensives and war of movement time is not available for the standard method, but good work can be done in a less detailed way.

Both photos and sketches were used largely by all European armies and while lack of personnel did not permit the proper expansion of this art in the American army a small force was kept constantly engaged and the technique was at least as good as that of other armies. Complete detail will be found in report on panoramic photographs, Appendix XIII of this report [not printed], copies of which are on file in the Military Intelligence Department and Engineer Department, Washington, D. C.

G. Photo Engraving:

Half-Tone Process: In offensive operations there is a demand for the reproduction in quantity of vertical and oblique airplane photos and ground panoramas for distribution to troops, to enable them to orient their advance. A demand also grew up in the American army for similar reproduction of shadow photographs of relief maps. The cost in time and material of supplying these demands by photographic printing is prohibitive, and the partial satisfying of this demand was a heavy burden on the photographic plants of both G-2-C and the air service. The presence of a wet plate camera and processes permits the preparation of half-tone plates, from which an unlimited number of copies can be quickly and cheaply printed in ordinary type presses. The technique of the air photo reproduced by the half-tone process is sufficient for use by troops, though not clear enough for detailed examination by interpreters and restorators.

Zinc Etching: There is also a demand for the reprinting of captured documents containing cuts and illustrations, and for the printing of various training and instruction pamphlets and diagrams. By aid of wet plate photography this can be done most economically by zinc etching. Most of the latter work comes in headquarters, and zinc etching should certainly be provided for the base printing plant. The half-tone process is needed in armies and the supplementary machinery and personnel for zinc etching is so little that it seems that the latter should be provided for armies too, as it would tend to lighten the burden on the lithographic plant and leave it free for its primary duty of printing maps. Both half-tone and zinc etching were successfully carried on in the field in the experimental army mobile printing train.
H. Relief Maps and Visibility Studies: Relief maps were demanded during position warfare by staff and by artillery and machine-gun units. The British attempted to meet this demand by producing layer maps, but these were at best a makeshift. The methods used in the A. E. F., were copied from the French.

The first method used was the Chedanne, which consisted of cutting out the contours in bristol board of the proper thickness, and building up the relief by superimposing the successive contours. This method was used by the Germans. The French produced a more finished article by smoothing off the terraces left between contours with plaster of paris, and preparing a cast from which duplicates could be obtained. On each replica a plan director printed on special Japanese paper was pasted over the relief. Due to the limits to which the paper could be stretched the exaggeration of the relief was limited to twice the horizontal scale. This furnished a satisfactory staff relief map, giving the same detail as the original map, with a moderate relief.

A second method known as the Arnold was invented during the war. It consisted of modeling a clay relief in place by means of a special apparatus. Negatives were then made and the plaster of paris replicas from these were hand painted. The relief could be exaggerated as much as desired, and the usual vertical scale was 4 times the horizontal. This seems to be about the proper scale for giving the proper metal picture of the relief, and also has the advantage of minimizing errors of workmanship, which is important in visibility studies. The work of preparing the initial model is much less laborious than the Chedanne method, consumes less time and is less liable to error. The work of hand painting is somewhat more laborious than pasting on the paper in the Chedanne system, but, since the time of production of the original copy is less, this is immaterial, especially since the initial issue of a relief map never exceeded 10 copies.

The Arnold maps were used exclusively for the study of visibility by the shadow method, since the greater exaggeration permitted a clearer and more definite determination of the edge of the shadow. They were also preferred by the artillery. The staffs which were interested only in the picture of the relief preferred the Chedanne on account of the greater detail of culture shown, and on account of their greater durability and portability. The Arnold, however, would have served their purposes equally well, though not quite so convenient.

The scale of relief maps was almost universally 1/20,000, though the machine gunners demanded and occasionally got 1/10,000. The 1/10,000 are not worth the labor, and their excessive number and bulk is prohibitory. A relief map larger than 1/20,000 is of little or no military value. It fails to show the details, which are its principal purpose, is of necessity very inaccurate due to small scale and furnishes only a general idea or picture of the topography. This result can be obtained equally well at much less expense by one of the following methods:

1. By photographing to a suitable scale (say 1/50,000) an assemblage of 1/20,000 relief maps which have been lighted so as to bring out the relief by shadow. These photographs can then be reproduced by the half-tone process for extensive distribution to troops. This was coming into extensive use by the American army at the close of hostilities.

2. Where relief maps do not exist by the production of a layer map in which successive contour intervals are shaded darker toward the higher elevations. This is used by the British and results in a map which is too expensive and too laborious for field processes.

3. By stumpage on a contour map simulating the effects obtained in No. 1. This is used by the French on the 1/200,000 map and is also practiced to a certain extent by the U. S. Geological Survey.

Visibility: The ordinary methods of determining visibility by means of profiles is slow and laborious. It can be very much expedited by use of the profilograph on the relief maps. However, the system of lights and shadows on the Arnold relief models is at present far superior and is capable of great development. As used by the French Second Army and G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F., it consisted of small tripods containing a small electric lamp, located at the bottom, which could be placed in any position on the relief.
The shadow cast on the relief, indicating the invisible areas from the point at which the lamp was placed, were then outlined in black on the relief and transferred from the relief to the map. The time spent in making an individual study for record was not much less, but innumerable trials could be made very quickly and only favorable results recorded. Experiments were being undertaken by G-2-C at the close of hostilities.

1. With a view to improving the apparatus, and
2. With a view to making a photographic record of the results.

These experiments were unfortunately never brought to conclusion, but should be continued during peacetime.

The following suggestions are offered:
1. To use a stronger and brighter light than the incandescent lamp.
2. To use a prism or prisms, for concentrating the light to a point as close to the actual position possible. These two would have the effect of making the shadows darker and more definite at the edges.
3. To use photography for recording the outline of the shadows on the relief, and to project these shadows back on to the maps, eliminating the time lost in transfer.
4. To make a photograph of the shadows and relief and to issue these photographs to units for points occupied or about to be occupied in an attack.

The visibility study is undoubtedly of great use in position warfare, sieges, struggles for positions and in limited objectives. It is of use in intelligence studies for determining probable locations of enemy reserves and artillery, where time is not available for their accurate location, and in attack for locating assembly points for friendly reserves free from enemy observation. It is of great value in the location of a fortified line. While its exploitation is largely an operations affair, its technical development and use should be a duty of the topographical troops.

I. Type Printing: At G. H. Q., the Adjutant General maintained a large and efficient type printing plant for the printing of general orders, bulletins, pamphlets, etc. G-2-C maintained a small type printing plant for the publication of the four intelligence dailies; summary of intelligence, summary of information, summary of air information and press review. A certain amount of job work for G-2 and G-2-C and occasionally for other staff sections was carried on when time was available. At the Base Printing Plant at Langres G-2-C maintained a large type printing plant, which printed pamphlets and booklets for G-2 and for the engineer corps, and did miscellaneous type printing for G-2-C. Due to its location at the army school center it also did a considerable amount of job printing for them. In the armies G-2-C did all the printing, including the A. G. O. work. The question arises whether there was not a certain amount of duplication of effort, and whether all the type printing at G. H. Q., A. G. O., G. H. Q., G-2-C and at the base printing plant would not profitably have been combined in one plant under one direction, as was done in the army. The entire question is somewhat complicated by the fact that G.H.Q. A. E. F., combined, in a measure, the functions of the War Department in the U. S., and the headquarters of an army or group of armies in the field. The G-2-C type printing plant, G. H. Q., was in no way similar to the A. G. O. printing establishment. It was practically a small newspaper plant, engaged in producing 4 dailies. Due to the limited circulation, the amount or printing was relatively small, but the amount of matter to be set up on a time schedule was large. The A. G. O. printing plant was engaged in printing large runs of standard copy. Had the work of the G-2-C plant been done by the A. G. O. a special department would have been required. If an advanced G. H. Q., had been established, as seemed likely, the G-2-C plant would have had to accompany it. The A. G. O. plant might have been equally well located at Langres as far as its efficiency was concerned, but the G-2-C plant would have had to accompany the G. H. Q., wherever it went. It was only accident, therefore, which located these two plants in the same place, and even in the same building, and there is need for a separate and independent existence.

The question of the base printing plant and A. G. O., printing plant is somewhat different. Accident placed these two establishments in different places. Lithographic
printing of maps is the main business of the G-2-C base plant, but the type printing is a necessary auxiliary in the printing of maps themselves. The type printing press is necessary for the production of half-tones and there are a large number of charts, diagrams and literature (such as engineer field notes) which require combination of type printing and either lithography, zinc etching or half tones. A consolidation would naturally lead to the absorption of the A. G. O. printing plant by the G-2-C base printing plant.

This is what actually occurs in the field armies where the volume of A. G. O. business is not sufficient to warrant its separate existence, and the consequent duplication. However, the volume of business was sufficient at G. H. Q. A. E. F. (which combined the functions of headquarters of an expeditionary force and those of a headquarters in the field) to warrant the separate establishment, and the character and purpose of work done was so different that no great duplication resulted. The addition of the A. G. O. printing plant would have necessitated the organization of a separate department at the base printing plant, and might have been a considerable diversion from other important work.

Had G. H. Q., A. E. F., at any time assumed the unique character of a headquarters in the field, the combination of both organizations under G-2-C would have been advisable.

Types of Equipment: American methods and equipment in type printing are in advance of European practice. The advantage over other Allied armies from this fact were accentuated by the fact that the latter employed methods and apparatus which were antiquated even to their own commercial practice.

By the use of mechanical type setting devices such as the linotype and monotype, and of automatic high speed presses not only was it possible to perform several times the same amount of work with a given personnel, but also the time element was greatly reduced.

Linotype and Monotype: The linotype casts a full line in a single slug; the monotype casts only a single character. In the linotype the automatic setting and casting are performed by the same machine; in the monotype the two are separate. The linotype is a newspaper machine and is speedier on long straight runs of reading matter. The monotype is better for complicated work on tables, diagrams, mixed copy, etc., and has the additional advantage that it may be used as a machine for casting ordinary type for hand setting. Considering the character of the work to be done and their relative mobility and durability, the linotype belongs in the armies, advanced headquarters and mobile printing trains, and in the base plant, while the monotype is needed only in the base plant.

Multigraph: The multigraph is a new device only now coming into general use. It is a small portable rotary printing machine, about the size and weight of the rotary mimeograph. It is power driven and is capable of turning out 5,000 copies per hour of letter size. The type setting by hand is tedious and it is therefore limited to fairly simple work. For letter heads, forms, circulars, etc., it is admirable. One of its uses in an army is the turning out of propaganda leaflets for distribution over the enemy lines by airplane. It is almost essential to an army or mobile printing train and is a useful adjunct to any type printing plant.

Job Press: The job press is needed in all plants and the type used in the A. E. F., was satisfactory. It is suited to short runs of miscellaneous matter. Its maximum speed with power operation is 800 copies per hour and normal average about 500 copies per hour.

Kelly Automatic Press: For long runs some kind of high speed press is necessary. The Kelly automatic, self feeding press which has a capacity of about 3,500 sheets per hour, was used in the A. E. F., both in the plant and on a truck. It has the advantage of being compact, semi-portable and reliable. It is needed in field armies, on mobile printing trains and in the base printing plant. It is particularly useful in the rapid reproduction in quantity of the half-tones of airphotos, etc.

The linotype and Kelly Press together make possible the mobile type printing train, which is a part of the mobile army train. These two machines alone mounted in two trucks with 5 operatives will accomplish the work of 40 men working by hand.
Stereotype: The addition of the stereotype process to army and base plants is recommended. The stereotype is a mat upon which an impression is made of a page of type. If a reprint is needed of a page for which a stereotype mat has been made the entire page can be recast from the mat without the labor of resetting and proof reading. As the amount of type and furniture which can be carried in the field is limited and the pressure of work is great it is not possible to keep type and furniture locked up even though it is known that a reprint will be required at some future date. In the course of 6 months operation a great deal of time and labor would be saved by the use of the stereotype.

J. Considerations governing equipment for various units: Data for tables of equipment for army and G. H. Q. topographical battalions have been compiled, and some of the questions involved should be discussed briefly.

The army printing plant should be entirely mobile in order to accompany headquarters. In time of mobile operations speed in reproduction is vital since situations are continually changing. At the same time communications and liaison are more difficult. If the army printing plant is left in the rear it will be out of action until conditions become normal and it can be moved up. The railroad printing plant, used by both French and Germans was the best attempt they could make to meet this difficulty since their machinery could not be mounted in trucks. The railroad train is unsatisfactory since it must await the restoration of rail communications and occupies valuable siding space which is often not available.

The mobile printing train on trucks, as used by the American army, is a complete success in field operations. The units which worked with the I and V Corps were invaluable to the operations of those corps. The complete army train, organized after the Armistice, underwent successfully a months test under field conditions. A complete report of its operations will be found in Appendix XIV [not printed] of this report.

This train contained, in 32 trucks, the following:

1. Lithographic Process Room.
2. Lithographic Transfer Room.
3. Lithographic Presses (2).
4. Wet Plate Camera.
5. Wet Plate Dark Room.
6. Photographic Laboratory and Dark Room.
7. Restitution Drafting Room.
8. Power Trucks (2).
9. Gas and Water Tanks (3).
10. Zinc Etching Plant.
11. Half-Tone Etching Plant.
12. Linotype.
13. Kelly Type Press.
15. Telephone and Telegraph Exchange.
17. Paper and other Supplies (12).

Of these the first 8 are absolutely essential to the operations of G-2-C of an army, and there should be added to them Photostat, Multigraph and Dorel. The addition of the last 9 makes the plant complete and is considered advisable.

The army should be provided with additional lithographic and photographic facilities in a stationary plant which should also contain drafting rooms, power plant, visibility apparatus, additional type printing facilities, graining machines and blue printing, as well as room for installing a considerable amount of the apparatus on the train and storage room for maps, relief maps and supplies. In case of an advance of displacement, the mobile plant would accompany G. H. G., and the stationary plant would be moved up as soon as stabilization took place. G-2-C, Second Army was actually divided into a mobile lithographic and restitution echelon and a rear echelon for the stationary plant. Owing to the
cessation of hostilities the expected move did not take place, but the mobile echelon was
turned over to the Third Army and accompanied it on its march to the Rhine.

The number of mobile topographical units to be maintained for a group of armies or
expeditionary force is open to discussion. The ideal would be to have a complete army
printing train for each army, and a mobile lithographic outfit for each corps. If per-
sionel or material were lacking the minimum would be to have 50 per cent of the units so
equipped. If less than complete equipment is available all suitable trucks should be
arranged to operate lithographic presses, if necessary, so that in a general move the
lithographic equipment which is the most necessary could be mounted and redistributed.
With the flexibility so provided combinations could be effected to meet any emergency.

The base printing plant should be provided with the following equipment:
1. Lithographic Presses.
2. Lithographic Process and Transfer.
5. Photographic Laboratories and Dark Room.
6. Power Plant.
8. Gas Generating Plant.
9. Photo-engraving Plant including Zinc Etching and Half-Tone process.
10. Linotypes, Monotypes and Multigraphs.
13. Map and Restitution Drafting Departments.
15. Relief Map Studio and Visibility Room.
16. Map Storage and Distributing Departments.
17. Large Supply Storehouses for itself and Armies.
18. All other methods of Reproduction employed in corps and armies, including Blue
Printing, Dorel, Hektograph, Jelly Roll, Cyclostyle and Mimeograph.

The G. H. Q., plant should be provided with:
1. Linotypes.
2. Job and Kelly Type Printing Presses.
3. Photographic Laboratories and Dark Rooms.
4. Blue Printing and Photostat.
5. All quick methods of Reproduction employed in Corps and Armies.
6. Drafting Room.
7. Map Distributing Department.

The corps should be provided with:
1. Quick methods of Reproduction such as Dorel, Blue Printing, Cyclostyle,
Hektograph, Jelly Roll and Mimeograph.
2. Drafting Room with 2 or more restitutions.
3. Map Distributing Department.

In case of active operations it should have in addition a mobile printing train of
5 trucks, including:
1. Lithographic Press Truck.
2. Process Truck.
3. Transfer Truck.
4. Power Truck and Miscellaneous.
5. Supply Truck.

The division needs only Cyclostyle, Hektograph, and Jelly Roll, with small map depot
and drafting equipment.
K. Map supply distribution: For the general staff maps of all fields of operations were required, and these were obtained in most cases from excellent French or British reproductions of the maps of the countries involved. In some cases maps of belligerent or neutral countries were obtained through American observers or military attaches. Copies of excellent German maps useful for reproduction in case of an advance were obtained from the Department of Military Intelligence, War Department, Washington, D. C. Complete sets of German maps of various scales were sorted out of the mass of material captured during offensive operations, and were kept on file for the same purpose. The policy was followed of keeping on file at least one copy, and five if available, of every map received. In this way one of the most complete war map files was accumulated for immediate work and for future use.

The procurement and distribution of maps was controlled from G. H. Q., by a special map supply department. Maps were obtained at first from Allied topographical services, and later were printed at the base printing plant. From G. H. Q., the distribution was controlled to the staff, armies and independent units, though in many cases the delivery was made directly from the source of supply. The armies in turn distributed to corps, the corps to divisions and the divisions to the various units under their command. Use was made of the topographical sections of all these units operating under the supervision of the G-2 officers of their staffs. In many cases, due to locality of certain units or to lack of time, distribution was made direct from the base printing plant to lower units, on the request or advice of the army. In the St-Mihiel operation in particular a certain number of maps were sent directly from the base printing plant to the isolated V Corps, at the request of the First Army, and the First Army distributed directly to divisions with the consent of the corps.

Map supply and distribution in time of war is a very serious problem, and is rendered much more serious because it is generally under-estimated. The variety, numbers and physical bulk of maps required for an active operation is never realized. The original staff order for maps for the St-Mihiel offensive was 45,000; the actual number printed was nearly 500,000, and the number distributed 350,000. The first notification was received by G-2-C August 13 on the basis of the operation starting September 1. As a matter of fact the operation started September 12 and was concluded September 15. Meanwhile notification had been received about September 4 of the larger and more important Meuse-Argonne operation, and it was necessary to start work immediately for it, before the printing for the St-Mihiel had been completed. The Meuse-Argonne offensive began September 26 and over 500,000 maps were needed. Due to the large and well equipped base plant the preparation of these maps was accomplished in record time, but the time left for distribution was very short considering the newness of the machinery, the hurriedness of the concentration and the scattered condition of the troops prior to concentration. The St-Mihiel particularly was complicated by the change of plan incidental to the Meuse-Argonne after the distribution for the former was well under way, and by the short time available. It was for this reason that in the St-Mihiel operation the division bundles were made up in the Army G-2-C and were in some cases issued direct to divisions on corps order.

The distribution, in general, functioned successfully down as far as corps. From that point on there was a tendency to retain or use more than the allotted proportion in the various staffs, and a tendency on the part of some organizations to establish a reserve at the expense of the troops in the field. The net result was that in a few cases maps did not get down to the company and battery commanders who had the greatest need for them. The remedy lies in education and supervision. There should be one or more map inspectors for each army, who would visit lower units in the line to see whether they are getting their maps. Tables or distribution should be made out for units of the division, and division map sections should be held responsible for distribution in accordance with these tables.

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The possibility of the breakdown of the army and corps distribution systems, due to a long continued war of movement, had been foreseen, and the possible need of direct distribution to troops through mobile advance map depots had been considered, but up to the close of hostilities no such measures had arisen.

The numbers of maps of various types and scales allotted to each organization was determined by G-3, G. H. Q., and published in a pamphlet “Instructions Concerning Maps” in which G-2-C collaborated; • • • In practice a somewhat more liberal policy was adopted since the map is the only intelligence information which can reach the company and platoon commanders preceding and during an attack. The 1/20,000 Plan Directeur was accordingly issued down to company commanders and when a sufficient supply was available two per battery and company were furnished. This seemed especially advisable when the issue of the 1/10,000 Plan Directeur was suspended. Toward the close of hostilities, however, as the warfare developed into one of movement, 1/20,000 Plan Directeurs were of less use, and the 1/50,000 began to take their place. It is not physically possible to supply rapidly advancing troops with large scale maps, even if they exist, but these periods of transition are always trying since troops once accustomed to the large scale map demand them for all purposes, even for marches or concentration, for which the 1/200,000 is sufficient. While a liberal policy should be followed of replacement of wastage in all scales of maps, the scales of maps determined and published in instructions for given purposes should be adhered to.

L. Metric System: The adoption of the metric system for military maps is recommended. Apart from its manifest advantages from a logical and mathematical point of view, it has been used by our army during the present war and all our personnel is familiar with it. Our artillery is equipped with instruments calibrated in the metric system. It is used by the majority of civilized nations both in commercial and military life, and the greater part of the military documents and maps published are in it. The British army was on the point of adopting it at the close of the war, and had only been deterred up to that time by the necessity of recalibrating their artillery range instruments and redrafting their maps. Military topographic instruction should be in the metric system.

It would be a distinct backward step if our army were to return to the former system. The determination in regard to this will rest mainly with the artillery, but it would be well to have this question considered by the same board which has been suggested to consider the question of projections and grids. In the event of a reversion to the former system a metric scale should be placed on every military and commercial map, and if the scale be always indicated by a representative fraction the map can then be used for either system.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE: Organization and skeleton equipment tables embodying the results of the experience of operations in France have been prepared and forwarded through proper channels. In preparing these an attempt has been made to provide an organization which will serve the needs of the army in time of peace in both production and training, and will serve as a well balanced nucleus for a wartime expansion. Consideration has also been given to the possibilities of very different methods of warfare, and under different conditions. The equipment and organization proposed is the minimum considered advisable.

Briefly, there is proposed an engineer topographical battalion of three special companies of 250 men each, i.e.:

1. Surveying Company.
2. Mobile Printing Train Company.

In time of war this is to be expanded into a regiment, with an additional battalion of the same composition for each army. In time of war the headquarters of one company of each
army battalion would probably be kept at the base plant to serve as a training and replacement unit for the army battalion, and the corps sections would be drawn from it. Provision is made for a regimental organization to furnish the necessary overhead for directing and administering the service, and to permit of transfer between battalions by regimental order.

Provision has been made in the companies and in the regimental organization for the necessary technical officers of appropriate rank. In the recent war these men, as well as the overhead, were by authority carried as attached or in some G-2 organization. Their status was always uncertain and they were barred from promotion. The latter prevented the rearrangement necessary with new officers.

The technical report contains recommendation in regard to future policies and improvements in methods, and a brief discussion of the basis upon which the recommendations for equipment were prepared. A mass of information, suggestion and recommendation is contained in the various reports attached as appendices to this report. Due to lack of time it has not been possible to review and criticize each of these in detail, but they are reasonably free from error and in general the deductions are sound. In some cases the desire to make them full and complete coupled with enthusiasm, has tended to overemphasize the importance of the particular phase of the work with which they deal. They have all been considered in the preparation of this report, and in case of difference and discrepancy this report will govern.

Particular attention is directed to the discussion and recommendations concerning future military maps of the United States, contained in the chapter on maps in the technical part of this report, and to the recommendation for the appointment of a military board to consider the matter. This or another board should also consider changes in “Instructions Concerning Maps”

Recommendation has also been made in the chapter on maps for military control of the military maps of the United States, and for the use in this work of methods which would be useful in time of war and would serve to train personnel for war work. It is believed that mapping by aerial photography can be made commercially successful, but that it can probably be started only with military aid and assistance on account of the great initial outlay.

It is strongly recommended that the apparatus and equipment used in the base plant and armies in France be held intact, that it be suitably installed at the headquarters of the topographical engineer battalion and that in addition to such useful work it may be called on to do, it be used as a training center for the topographical troops.

6. COMMENDATIONS: At this time it is fitting to make a matter of record the excellent work of the 29th Engineers as a body and especially note the work of certain officers and others, by name. The following is quoted from a letter from the Commander-in-Chief under date of April 28, 1919, regarding the work of the 29th Engineers.

In considering the work of the various special troops in the American Expeditionary Forces there is none that has been of more vital importance to successful operations than the work of the 29th Engineers, Survey and Printing. The adequate supply of accurate maps was a vital necessity. The field survey and reproduction work necessary for such maps under war conditions called for technical ability of the highest order, for foresight, resourcefulness and good organization.

That our map supply was entirely adequate is due to the efforts of the officers and men of the 29th Engineers, at General Headquarters, at the Base Printing Plant, and with the armies, corps and divisions. They gave to their work at all times their best efforts, with the same zeal and self-sacrificing devotion to duty that has characterized the American fighting man at the front. For myself,
personally, and in the name of their comrades in the forces, it gives me the utmost pleasure to express to you, and through you to them, our heartiest congratulations and thanks.

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7. CONCLUSION: In closing the undersigned desires to express his sincere appreciation of the assistance and support rendered at all times by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, G. H. Q., and the Chief Engineer, American Expeditionary Forces. Their spirit of cooperation for the common end regardless of technicalities contributed most materially to the accomplishment of the results attained.

R. G. ALEXANDER
Colonel, General Staff, A. E. F.,
Chief, G-2-C, G.H.Q.

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Censorship

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 1, 1919.

INTRODUCTION

[Extract]

The fourth subsection of the intelligence section of the General Staff of the A. E. F. (G-2-D, G. H. Q.) was charged, during the war, with the executive direction of postal, telegraphic and telephonic censorship of the American Expeditionary Forces; with the handling of press correspondents, accredited and visiting, and the censorship of their telegrams and mail articles; with liaison press censorship with the French authorities; with propaganda of the American army, which included direct propaganda over the enemy lines, liaison with the committee on public information (which was charged with propaganda in neutral countries) and the organization and supervision of "The Stars and Stripes," the official paper of the American Expeditionary Forces. To this subsection was also assigned a photographic subdivision, whose duties were the taking of photographs and films for historical purposes, the censorship of official photographs and photographs taken by newspaper correspondents, and the titling of official photographs and films; to the fourth subsection was also assigned the care and the incidental supervision of the work of the eight official artists of the American Expeditionary Forces.

During the war, G-2-D, through its field press headquarters and press conducting officers, was largely responsible for the transportation and entertainment of official visitors to the American army in France. After the signing of the Armistice, the visitors' bureau was made a separate subsection of the intelligence section (G-2-E), and its work became more important and on a greater scale. No attempt is made in this report to cover the activities of G-2-D in the entertainment of official visitors, that feature being fully covered in the final report of G-2-E.

The formal organization of G-2-D began shortly after the installation of American Headquarters at Chaumont (Haute-Marne), France on September 1, 1917. "

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I. CENSORSHIP

A. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THE CENSORSHIP POLICY OF THE A. E. F.

   (a) The first censorship regulations were formulated in a note to correspondents by the chief press officer, in Paris, on June 25, 1917, as follows:

   The American Expeditionary Force depends more upon the correspondents' patriotism and discretion than upon censorship in the safe-guarding of military secrets. Information given confidentially to their friends by persons, official or civilian, who have had opportunities at first hand observation is one of the most dependable sources of the enemy spy system. Therefore, correspondents are asked to make it a rule never to relate to any person, however, intimate, any fact or impression which is not conveyed in their copy as censored. Correspondents will not be permitted to mention:
   1. The name or location of the port of disembarkation or indicate it by any descriptive reference.
   2. Names of any officers except commanders of divisions or of the Commander-in-Chief, or the names of any units.
   3. Anything which will in any way indicate to the enemy the route of transports or the methods of the navy in safe-guarding their passage.

   (b) The following complementary regulations of censorship were issued by the instructions of the Chief Press Officer, Paris, France, July 4, 1917:

   The following items are not to be published concerning the American forces in France, unless they appear in the official communiques of the Commander-in-Chief:
   1. Anything which will in any way indicate to the enemy the route of transports or the methods of the navy in safeguarding their passage.
   2. The name or location of any ports of disembarkation or of any training camps or other localities in which American troops may be stationed. Descriptive references which would give to the reader anything more than a very vague idea of the geographical position of such locality.
   3. The names of any officers or men connected with the forces in France, excepting the following: General Pershing, General Sibert, Admiral Gleaves.
   4. The name, number or location of any unit of the forces; the number of men in any unit; the location of any headquarters outside of Paris.
   5. Future plans, whether known or fictitious, detailed descriptions of the systems of defense, tactical proceeding, details of batteries, post of observation, construction of railroads, bridges and mines or methods of construction, etc.

   (c) The following complementary censorship regulations were issued in a note by the chief press officer on July 11, 1917:

   Correspondents must not mention: Aerial photographic methods, new types of guns, new types of shells, any reference to ranging, especially to ranging mechanism, new types of aeroplanes or their armament.

   (d) The following censorship instructions were received from the State Department, Washington, on July 28, 1917 and immediately put into effect:

   There will be eliminated:
   1. Information which might directly or indirectly indicate the identity or number of troops in the United States Expeditionary Forces.
   2. Reference to individual units and names of line officers. In news despatches names of staff officers only are permissible.
   3. Information leading to disclosure of location of permanent base or bases of United States forces.
   4. Information tending to disclose eventual position of United States forces on the firing line.
5. Information regarding arrival at European ports of American transports, war vessels, or expeditionary force detachments until announcement is authorized by the Secretary of Navy or the Secretary of War:

6. Information disclosing departure of transports to Europe from the United States.

7. Information identifying American armed merchant vessels, also identities of crews and captains.

8. Information of departure from port of American merchantmen.

e) The following censorship instructions was issued in a note to censors by the chief officer on August 4, 1917:

By order of the commanding general you are instructed to prevent the publication of any news concerning the landing of future American contingents on this continent.

f) The following censorship regulations were issued in a note to censors by the chief press officer on September 13, 1917:

1. Nothing should ever be published regarding casualties of the American Expeditionary Forces unless definitely authorized by general headquarters.

2. The following generals may now be mentioned: Namely, Generals Pershing, Sibert, March, Bundy, Bullard, Biddle, Blatchford. This, of course, with the understanding that such mention in no way indicates the number of troops under their command.

g) The censorship rules were revised and codified by the chief press officer on October 12, 1917, as follows:

I. The present basis of censorship is the following list of rules transmitted from the Secretary of State, July 23, 1917:

   1. Information which might directly or indirectly indicate the identity or numbers of troops in the United States Expeditionary Forces.

   2. References to individual units and names of line officers. In news dispatches names of staff officers only are permissible.

   3. Information leading to disclosure of location of permanent base or bases of United States forces.

   4. Information tending to disclose eventual position of the United States forces on the firing line.

   5. Information regarding arrival at European ports of American transports, war vessels, or expeditionary force detachments, until announcement is authorized by the Secretary of the Navy or the Secretary of War.

   6. Information disclosing departure of transports for Europe from the United States.

   7. Information identifying American armed merchant vessels, also identities of crews and captains.

   8. Information of departure from port of American merchantmen.

And on August 25, 1917:

9. The French censorship is asked to suppress in telegrams and in cables news of a violent description regarding calamities and conspiracies, which are based on rumor, and also not to allow such matter to appear in the French press.

II. Upon further instructions from Washington, the following was sent by the Adjutant General of the Expeditionary Forces, in answer to an inquiry from the British authorities, to the American Military Attache in London as a censorship ruling:

Casualties occurring in this command will be reported from these headquarters to the War Department, Washington, by which alone official announcement of the same will be made. It is desired that no reference be made to casualties, outside
of the official announcement by the War Department.

III. In the same communication to the American Military Attache in London, the Adjutant General wrote:

1. All cable dispatches which leave Paris, France, referring in any way to the American army, will be submitted to the American army censorship and require no further censorship for the American press.

2. Over verbal reports which are carried to England by travelers, or over any dispatches which may be carried to England by couriers or placed in the French mail uncensored, the American censorship has no control.

3. It is requested that the British censorship allow to pass without second censorship all cable dispatches through Paris, whether from the American Field Headquarters or from Paris, which refer to the American army.

4. It is requested that any articles for publication in the American or British press referring to the American troops in France or in transit to France which do not bear the American censorship stamp, certified as passed by a press officer, be submitted to the regular rules of British censorship unless they contain debatable matter on which the British censorship cannot decide; in which case it is requested that they be returned to the American censorship section of the Bureau de la Presse, Paris, for censorship.

IV. By the common consent of the accredited correspondents, and by the desire of staff officers, the ruling of no. 2 about the mention of staff officers was not applied, inasmuch as line officers were not to be mentioned.

V. On August 25, 1917, the chief of intelligence issued the following:

My attention has been called to the fact that there is considerable adverse comment by various papers in the states on dispatches from here which indicate that the French people have shown their cordiality and hospitality by bestowing gifts of wine on our soldiers. As it has occurred to a limited extent only, and will be officially discouraged, and as reference to these isolated cases appears to have given an entirely erroneous impression and unnecessary worry to the people at home, where the French idea of hospitality in this respect is not understood, please censor from future dispatches all notices of this character.

With the French law prohibiting the sale of alcoholic drinks to officers and soldiers in uniform, and our own rigid law on the subject, which will be as rigidly enforced, we should have very little trouble in controlling the liquor problem regarding our troops in France, and the people should have no worry on that score.

VI. Other rulings and directions are as follows:

1. Censors should submit the report of any interview, quoted or inferential, and any dispatch stating information as derived immediately from officers, to the officer in question for his corroboration; and if the matter be of an extremely controversial nature it should, though corroborated, be shown to the chief of intelligence.

2. Officers may not be quoted in any matter of army policy, of technical or other controversy, either in quotation marks or inferentially. Such expressions as “many officers think,” or “the opinion of army experts is,” are not allowed if they are on controversial themes. This does not exclude remarks of generic human interest, and characteristic of army life and army situations, on the part of officers or enlisted men.

3. Any reports which appear untrue, unless their triviality or extravagance make them immaterial, should be investigated through the proper authority, in order to ascertain if they are founded on fact. Anything giving the effect of
boasting on the part of our army should be avoided. We do not necessarily censor for the truth; extravagant and bizarre reports, which do not impart military information and may confuse the enemy, may be passed in the judgment of the censor.

4. Until we occupy a sector of the line, nothing is to be passed which indicates that the troops are ready for the trenches, or the time when we shall enter the line.

5. Under date of September 13, 1917, the Adjutant General of the army gave by cable an order to issue instructions confining the taking of photographs, moving pictures, or any pictorial records, to the official photographers of the signal corps for transmission to the signal corps, Washington, for sole distribution there. This order prohibits the accredited correspondents from taking any further photographs from that date, and, until it is amended, prevents the dispatch of photographs for propaganda purposes to Allied and neutral countries.

6. Censorship at the accredited correspondents' camp is final, and American censors in Paris are not to make any deletions there from dispatches which have been censored in the field.

7. At any time that new censorship rulings are made, the changes should immediately be transmitted by telephone to the American section of the Bureau de la Presse at Paris.

8. All matter censored should bear on the outside of the envelope the censor's stamp, with censoring officer's name and rank written across the impression. Copy should have the censor's stamp on the first and last page, with censoring officer's name and rank written across the impression and the censor's stamp, without the name of the censor, on all other pages.

9. The Paris office, and every conducting officer, should give the visitors or visiting correspondents copies of the Washington regulations; particularly impress upon them that they are not to mention numbers or names of units, or in any way indicate locations; inform them of any other important cautions; and also indicate where matter is to be sent for censorship.

10. From the landing of the expeditionary forces until September 13, it was not permitted to mention any names except those of Major General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, and of Major General Sibert. On September 13, permission was given to mention the names of all major generals, which included Generals Pershing, Sibert, March, Bullard, Blatchford, Biddle, Bundy, and Bartlett; with the understanding that no dispatches were to pass in which the mention of the names would indicate the numbers or locations of troops or of any units.

11. The presence of new bodies of troops in the training region may not be mentioned except by special permission.

12. There is to be reference to plans, and no surmises as to future action.

13. No mention of the intelligence section or of any other department may be made as authority for information or opinion.

14. No reference may be made to any new type of gun. All descriptions of armament, except of well-known types, must be avoided.

15. It is not permitted to mention the location of any aviation station, or any aviation plans or new types of planes; or any new roads or concentration of war material of any kind.

16. The French censorship does not permit the mention of air raids or bomb attacks in the army zone, except of those given out in official communiques; nor does it permit the mention of German prisoners as being in the vicinity of camps in the army zone.

17. All cable dispatches, both from the correspondents' camp and from Paris, referring to the American army in France, are to include the words Controle Americain' in the original copy.
18. Descriptions of details in army life, and particularly incidents which may falsely characterize the whole, should not be permitted. While cheer and healthy humor ease the strain of war, flippant and vulgar accounts prejudicial to morale, or profane and obscene quotations should not be permitted. Equally unwarrantable is the exaggeration of the grievance of the type of soldier who expects the comforts of home in time of war. War means sacrifice and hardship. That men must submit to inconveniences; and language which has not proper respect for the dignity of the cause and the responsibility of the men who fight and their leaders should be avoided.

19. Any dispatches which come to the Paris censorship from any part of France except from the correspondents' camp must be censored in Paris if not already censored at the correspondents' camp.

20. All matters concerning the French army which appear in dispatches about the American army must be shown to the French censorship.

21. Nothing indicating even inferentially any information or opinion as coming from the Commander-in-Chief of the expeditionary forces may be passed without his consent or that of the chief of the press division or the chief of intelligence.

22. Any reference to the French people which would injure their susceptibilities or weaken their faith in our cooperation, or show a lack of consideration for differences of language and customs must be avoided.

23. Any questionable dispatch which may not be decided by the rules should be held up, unless the correspondent is satisfied to elide the debatable portions, pending a decision by the chief of the press division.

24. It is not permitted, in order to identify an officer without mentioning his name, to refer to him as the "son of an ex-president", as a "former mayor of Chicago", or by any similar allusion.

25. Editions of American papers published in France are not under any circumstances to be made exceptions to any rules. As anything they may print may reach Germany through Switzerland in twelve hours, and matter published in the United States may not reach Germany for two weeks, great care should be exercised in the censorship of their proofs.

26. Anything that may serve for cross-references should be carefully watched. The combination of a number of dispatches may give information to the enemy, when each by itself would be harmless. The old example of one dispatch saying that 100 trains left the station, and of another that there were 1,000 men on board each train, can be applied in many details. Care should be taken about landmarks which may reveal locations. Landscape and architectural and town descriptions should be kept generic. If one description says that a headquarters is on a large lake; another of its proximity to a great main road with certain characteristics: The combination of lake, forest, and road might reveal location.

(h) The following rules of censorship were issued by the Chief of G-2-D on April 2, 1918:

PRINCIPLE OF CENSORSHIP. All information which is not helpful to the enemy may be given to the public.

A. GENERAL CONDITIONS: Under the foregoing basic principle, all articles must meet four conditions:

1. They must be accurate in statement and implication.
2. They must not supply military information to the enemy.
3. They must not injure morale in our forces here, or at home, or among our Allies.
4. They must not embarrass the United States or her Allies in neutral countries.
The foregoing conditions apply to every article which is written. The specific rules which follow are intended to explain them but never to be considered as permitting the publication of anything which conflicts with these four conditions.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL: There will never be identification by numbers or organization.

1. Concerning troops in the line identification will be only as announced in the official communique.

2. Concerning troops in training. There will be no identification by sections, i.e., New York Troops, Ohio Troops, etc. in cable dispatches. When it is obvious to the censor that in consideration of the time element no military information will be given to the enemy by articles which will be sent by mail, there can be identification of small groups, as “New England Troops,” “New York Troops,” etc.

3. With reference to magazine articles or copy for books. Time element becomes a still stronger factor in lessening the value of the eventual publication to the enemy’s information service and is to be taken cognizance of by the censor.

4. Reference cannot be made to troops, as National Guard, or National Army, or Regular organizations. During this war we have only one army, the United States army.

5. As to individuals, a name can be used whenever the story is materially, and obviously helped by using the name. The determination of this is in the hands of the censor and not the writer.

6. Officers of the A. E. F. cannot be quoted directly or indirectly, nor anonymously, on military matters (tactics, strategy, etc.) except as specifically authorized.

C. IDENTIFICATION OF PLACES. Places can be mentioned only to a limited extent.

1. Within the advance zone, no sector shall be said to have any American troops in it until the enemy has established this as a fact by taking prisoners.

2. No town in the advance zone shall be identified as holding troops of the A. E. F. or Allied forces except as an essential part of a story of an engagement and after the fact.

3. No base port shall be mentioned by name or description as having anything to do with Allied forces activities of any character.

4. No point in the intermediate zone shall be mentioned so as to form by inference a link between a specific base port and any part of the front line.

5. There is no objection to stating the location of schools, in the intermediate zone, except for special reasons, which will arise under special conditions. There is, however, a prohibition of identifying the location of the main regulating station and large supply depots.

D. SHIP MOVEMENTS, real or possible, will not be discussed.

E. PLANS OF THE ARMY, real or possible, will not be discussed.

F. NUMBERS OF TROOPS, as a total or as classes, will not be discussed, except by special authority from G. H. Q.

G. TROOP MOVEMENTS will not be discussed except by communique.

H. EFFECTS OF ENEMY FIRE will not be discussed except by communique.

I. ARTICLES FOR PUBLICATION IN EUROPE will be scrutinized carefully to make sure that they do not hold possibilities of dangers which the same stories printed in the United States would not hold. This applies not only to military information which would thus be in the hands of the enemy within a day after writing, but also to an emphasis on small exploits which it may be extremely desirable to print in the United States but quite undesirable to print in Europe.

J. EXAGGERATION of our activities, accomplished or contemplated will be studiously avoided, because of the bad effect that this will have on the respect which our Allies have for our promises.

K. CASUALTIES as to numbers will be passed only as indicated in communiqus.
1. INDIVIDUAL dead or wounded will be mentioned by name only when it is reasonable manifest to the censor that the facts are correct and that some definite good end, such as offering examples of heroism, etc., will be served by printing them.

2. In the main, it is desirable to print no names of dead or wounded until the department has had time to notify the families and as this notification comes only through the hospital report, it is apparent that there will be delays.

3. Under no circumstances are there to be reports as for example “that a major general was killed while, etc.” Either the man’s name should be given or this event should not be mentioned at all, whether for military reasons or because such a vague statement would uselessly alarm the families of all other major generals in France.

L. DECORATIONS: A board at G. H. Q., A. E. F. considers all recommendations for the Medal of Honor, the Distinguished Service Medal and the Distinguished Service Cross. In cases of the first two, the honor is given at Washington on recommendation from G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. The fact that this recommendation is given will be considered as news, exactly as is the actual granting of the Distinguished Service Cross, which is within the power of the Commander-in-Chief of the A. E. F. These will be announced through the Press Section at G. H. Q., through the field headquarters of the Press Section at G. H. Q., without awaiting final action in Washington.

2. The recommendations for such honors by brigades or division commanders, will not be considered as constituting news, inasmuch as in the event that such recommendations are not approved, premature publication would do an injury to the man recommended but not by higher authority deemed worthy of the honor.

3. In the case of Allied army decorations, a different rule applies, where citation alone is considered as news. Such a citation can be published by the American correspondents as long as they observe strictly the rules of the Allied authorities with reference to such cases. This news will not originate officially with the American G. H. Q., but if it comes to the attention of the Press Officer at G. H. Q., will be promptly communicated to the field Headquarters of the press section.

M. AMERICAN CENSORSHIP is final on articles concerning American troops. Three cases present themselves and are disposed of as follows:

(a) If American troops are operating in a strictly American sector, news of them will be submitted only at American G. H. Q.

(b) If Allied troops are operating in a strictly Allied sector news of them will be submitted only at the G. H. Q. of the Allied army concerned.

(c) If American troops are operating in conjunction with an Allied force, news of these joint operations will be submitted to censorship at either the field headquarters of the A. E. F. or the field headquarters of the Allied army concerned. In such a case the American officer designated as field censor with the Allied army G. H. Q. will examine every mention of American troops in such a story and his written O. K. and addition of Controle Americaine will be essential to the passage of that portion of such a story. In the same way the officer of the Allied army concerned designated as field censor with the American troops G. H. Q. will examine every mention of Allied forces in such a story and his O. K. will be essential to the passage of that portion of such a story.

N. The American censor at the Bourse, in Paris, is not authorized to censor stories concerning the field operations of American troops in France. He is, as
always, authorized to examine such stories and in the event that he finds a story concerning American troops which contain no notation that the passage concerning American troops has been censored by the competent field censor of the A. E. F. he is authorized to hold up such a cable or mail story until he can communicate with the competent field censor and ascertain why the story did not include a notation of his having examined the article.

(1) The following emendation of Par. K-1 of the censorship regulations of April 2, 1918 was made by direction of the A. C. of S., G-2 on May 25, 1918:

STORIES BASED ON CASUALTIES
1. When a correspondent wishes to use a name in the story of a casualty he will write the story as if for immediate release and file it with the censor.
2. At the same time he will furnish separately the number of the unit to which the man belonged.
3. The censor will at once communicate with the Statistical Division, A. G. O., which has agreed to make special efforts in running down these reports and rushing through cables to the next of kin so as to release the information for the press.
4. The statistical division will notify the censor of the hour of transmission of the news to relatives. Twenty-four hours later the censor will release the story, putting on the cable, in the order in which were filed, the dispatches left with him in advance.

(j) The censorship rules were revised by the A. C. of S., G-2, G. H. Q. on November 18, 1918, as follows, and remain in force at the time of writing of this report:

A. GENERAL CONDITIONS: As a result of the Armistice, the rules of press censorship hitherto in force, are temporarily suspended subject to being put back into force automatically in case of the resumption of hostilities. During the life of this temporary suspension of the old rules of censorship, the following regulations will be in force:
1. All articles must be accurate in statements and implication.
2. Articles must not supply military information of value to enemy.
3. Articles must not tend to injure the morale of our Force; or the forces of our Allies.
4. Articles must not embarrass the United States or the Allies.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONNEL:
1. Units and individuals may be mentioned freely unless special conditions necessitate the suspension of this rule. In such a case the judgment of the chief press censor will govern.
2. All dispatches containing mention of casualties by name will be routed via The Bourse, Paris. As hitherto, The Bourse will attend to the verification of the fact that the casualty concerned has been cabled to the War Department and upon that verification will pass the press dispatch.
3. Officers of the American E. F. cannot be quoted directly nor indirectly, nor anonymously, on military matters, except as specifically authorized.
4. Locations of organizations of the American E. F. can be stated freely except in the event that it is necessary to maintain secrecy about certain movements of the Army of Occupation. Such prohibition will be communicated to the correspondents with the Army of Occupation by the field press censor.

C. DECORATIONS:
1. There is no change in the regulation which provides that the granting of American decorations will be released from G. H. Q.

D. DISPATCHES ON ATROCITIES:
1. There will be no publication of articles on atrocities unless the facts have been investigated with the greatest care and would be able to stand the same test as would be applied to them in a court proceeding.
E. RETURN OF AMERICAN TROOPS:
   1. There will be no complaint about the continued maintenance of American troops in Europe, nor will there be statements implying that these troops should be withdrawn at a time earlier than the Government of the United States decides will be the case.
   2. There will be no predictions as to the date of the withdrawal, except as specifically authorized by G. H. Q.
F. PLANS OF THE ARMY, real or possible will not be discussed except as authorized by G. H. Q.
G. ARTICLES FOR PUBLICATION IN EUROPE: will be scrutinized carefully to make sure that they do not hold possibilities of dangers which the same stories printed in the United States do not hold.
H. IN THE PORTRAYAL OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS, extreme care will be exercised. Correspondents will keep in mind the vital need of maintaining friendly relations among the Allied nations. They will of course recognize that the future relations of America with European nations must not be jeopardized.
I. IN BRIEF nothing whatever will be printed which tends to injure the position of the United States in the congress of nations or the position of the American soldiers in Europe.

DONALD L. STONE,
Captain, U. S. A.,
Acting Chief, G-2-D.

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I. CENSORSHIP

A. HISTORICAL STATEMENT OF THE CENSORSHIP POLICY OF THE A. E. F.
   3. Rules for the censorship of prisoners of war mail as outlined in prisoners of war regulations of the Provost Marshal General, A. E. F., 1918.

* * * * *

PRISONERS OF WAR CORRESPONDENCE

56. A prisoner of war, upon being assigned a number and included in a prisoner of war company, will be required, before leaving the Central P. W. E., to despatch a card to his home address advising of the capture, and that he may be addressed in the following form:
   (Serial) No. . . . . Name. . . . . . . Prisoners of War
   Company No. . . . . . . . . . in France, care of the Prisoners of
   War Information Bureau, A. G. O., American E. F.

57. Prisoners of war will be permitted to send two letters or postcards each week, but not more than one on any one day. Only the paper, envelopes and cards officially supplied to the prisoners may be used. All correspondence must be clearly written in English, French or German (except with the permission of the officer commanding), and must be confined to the lines of the paper. The contents must relate to the private and domestic affairs only. There must be no intimation of the place where the prisoners are quartered or working, or the nature of the work on which they are employed. Letters or cards must be addressed specifically to an individual by name, and not to a post office or accommodation address or for redirection. All writing will be in black ink or with soft black lead pencil.
58. The flap of an envelope, or the face of a card, must bear the prisoners name and number and the official designation of the P. W. Company to which he belongs. The place of internment is never to be mentioned. Company and enclosure commanders will ensure that the requirements as to form in which letters and cards are written and addressed are strictly complied with, but they will not be responsible for censoring the matter contained therein.

59. All cards and all letters, the envelopes of which must be unsealed, will be forwarded in packages to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, Central Records Office, A. G. D., A. E. F.

60. Letters and cards found to contain complaints as to food, living conditions or treatment, will be referred to the officer commanding for investigation. If satisfied that the complaint is not justified, or that it conveys a false impression, the commanding officer will inform the writer that the letter or card cannot be forwarded. Repeated and aggravated attempts to send forward false and misleading information will be dealt with by disciplinary action. In case, however, the commanding officer finds the complaint to be justified by the facts, the letter will be forwarded to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau with a statement to that effect.

61. Prisoners of war will be permitted to ask that food be sent to them, provided that they do not make a false statement that they are not supplied with sufficient food by the United States.

62. Prisoners of war will be permitted to receive letters, cards and packages sent through the Prisoners of War Information Bureau. Letters which show that they have been censored will be given to the prisoners without further examination.

63. Parcels sent to prisoners of war must not contain spirits, liquors, nor any of the articles which prisoners are forbidden by these regulations to have in their possession. They must not contain civilian clothes, nor written communications of any kind. All parcels will be opened in the presence of the addressee and the contents carefully scrutinized. Great care will be taken to see that no message is concealed in the contents of the parcels. Such concealed messages may be upon simple rolls of brown paper, mixed with tobacco, or concealed in soft substances, such as soap, and between the glued sheets of photographs. After scrutiny, the contents only will be delivered to the prisoner, whose receipt will be taken therefore. The container will be examined for a false bottom and removed.

64. Prisoners of war may receive books of a harmless character, in limited quantities, through post. They will not be permitted to receive newspapers or periodicals.

65. In case of the receipt of packages addressed to a prisoner who has died or escaped, or where it is for any reason impractical to deliver the package to the addressee, the contents of such parcel will be distributed to the needy prisoners of the same camp, with the exception of money or strictly personal articles which will be returned to the Prisoners of War Information Bureau. This distribution will be made under the supervision of the senior noncommissioned officer prisoner of war. Wherever possible, however, as where a prisoner has been transferred from one company or enclosure to another, packages received in the absence of the addressee will be forwarded to the proper destination. When the contents are of a perishable nature, and cannot be issued to the prisoner on account of illness or for any other reason, the distribution will be made, as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the addressee. A monthly report will be made of all parcels undelivered to the addressee, showing the name and address of the sender and of the addressee, the reason for nondelivery and the date and manner of distribution.

66. All inquiries concerning prisoners of war received by officers commanding companies, or others, will be forwarded to the Prisoner of War Information Bureau for reply.

67. The same facilities of correspondence will be allowed to prisoners of war under sentence or in confinement as is allowed to other prisoners.

68. No limitation will be placed upon the receipt of parcels by prisoners of war, but they will not be allowed to send any parcels whatever.
69. The distribution of collective packages for prisoners of war from or by relief societies or others will be conducted under special directions of the P. M. G.

70. All visits of members of a neutral legation or embassy to prisoner of war companies or enclosures will be made under authority of permits granted by the Adjutant General. In such cases the neutral visitor will be permitted free intercourse with prisoners of war out of hearing of any member of the company staff. Company commanders will not, however, produce for neutral inspection any rules or instructions which have been or may be issued.

71. Visits of the accredited agents of relief societies for the distribution of supplies or the carrying on of relief work among the prisoners of war will be permitted only upon express authorization issued by the Adjutant General, and defining the privileges to be accorded. In such cases no private communications will be permitted with the prisoners.

72. No other persons will be allowed to communicate with prisoners of war excepting only officers and soldiers whose military duty requires it.

I. CENSORSHIP

B. HISTORY OF THE CENSORSHIP SUBSECTIONS OF G-2-D.

1. PRESS CENSORSHIP
   (a) Field Press Headquarters.

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CORRESPONDENTS WITH THE ARMY

The following is a list of the newspaper correspondents accredited to the American army, arranged according to their length of service. The dates in each case are the dates of their accreditation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ACCREDITATION</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raymond G. Carroll</td>
<td>July 9, 1917</td>
<td>Philadelphia Public Ledger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junius B. Wood</td>
<td>July 9, 1917</td>
<td>Chicago Daily News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert Corey</td>
<td>July 24, 1917</td>
<td>Associated Newspapers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Floyd Gibbons</td>
<td>October 9, 1917</td>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas M. Johnson</td>
<td>October 9, 1917</td>
<td>New York Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lincoln Eyre</td>
<td>October 14, 1917</td>
<td>New York World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. Lyon</td>
<td>October 15, 1917</td>
<td>Newspaper Enterprise Assn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwin L. James</td>
<td>March 11, 1918</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naboth Hedin</td>
<td>March 1918</td>
<td>Brooklyn Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilbur S. Forrest</td>
<td>March 22, 1918</td>
<td>New York Tribune</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dennis B. Ford</td>
<td>March 31, 1918</td>
<td>International News Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fred S. Ferguson</td>
<td>April 8, 1918</td>
<td>United Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>Newton C. Parke</td>
<td>April 8, 1918</td>
<td>International News Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Hopper</td>
<td>April 11, 1918</td>
<td>Collier's Weekly</td>
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<tr>
<td>George H. Seldes</td>
<td>May 12, 1918</td>
<td>Marshall Syndicate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Frank G. Taylor</td>
<td>May 12, 1918</td>
<td>United Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles S. Kloebel</td>
<td>July 27, 1918</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bernard J. O'Donnell</td>
<td>August 23, 1918</td>
<td>Cincinnati Enquirer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guy C. Hickok</td>
<td>September 1918</td>
<td>Brooklyn Eagle</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burr Price</td>
<td>October 19, 1918</td>
<td>New York Herald</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George S. Applegarth</td>
<td>October 14, 1918</td>
<td>Pittsburg Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles J. Doyle</td>
<td>October 1918</td>
<td>Pittsburg Gazette Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damon Runyon</td>
<td>October 1918</td>
<td>Universal Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Edwin A. Roberts</td>
<td>Nov. 11, 1918</td>
<td>Cleveland Plain Dealer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Webb Miller</td>
<td>Nov. 19, 1918</td>
<td>United Press</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ACCREDITATION</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John T. McCutcheon</td>
<td>Nov. 19, 1918</td>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maximilian Foster</td>
<td>November 1918</td>
<td>Committee on Public Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ward Greene</td>
<td>December 1918</td>
<td>Atlanta Journal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyril Brown</td>
<td>December 1918</td>
<td>New York World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parke Brown</td>
<td>December 1918</td>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don Martín (Deceased)</td>
<td>May 1918</td>
<td>New York Herald</td>
</tr>
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</table>

CORRESPONDENTS SERVING AS ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clair Kenamore</td>
<td>St. Louis Post-Dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>James P. Howe</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burge McFall</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philip M. Powers</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowell Mellett</td>
<td>United Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry G. Wales</td>
<td>International News Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fred A. Smith</td>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameron Mackenzie</td>
<td>London Chronicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herbert R. Bailey</td>
<td>London Daily Mail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Noble Hall</td>
<td>London Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Warner Allen</td>
<td>London Morning Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Prevost Battersby</td>
<td>Reuters Agency</td>
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VISITING CORRESPONDENTS OF LONGEST SERVICE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Newspaper</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frank P. Sibley</td>
<td>Boston Globe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles H. Grasty</td>
<td>New York Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter S. Ball</td>
<td>Providence Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Pattullo</td>
<td>Saturday Evening Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. S. McNutt</td>
<td>Colliers Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arthur Ruhl</td>
<td>Colliers Weekly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otto P. Higgins</td>
<td>Kansas City Star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frazier Hunt</td>
<td>Chicago Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raymond S. Tompkins</td>
<td>Baltimore Sun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casper Whitney</td>
<td>New York Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adam Breede</td>
<td>Hastings Daily Tribune</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elizabeth Frazier</td>
<td>Saturday Evening Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miss Cecile Dorian</td>
<td>Newark Evening News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry A. Williams</td>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Timmons</td>
<td>Los Angeles Examiner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David W. Hazen</td>
<td>Portland Oregonian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Wythe Williams, New York Times and Colliers Weekly, accredited July 10, 1917; suspended February 26, 1918

Heywood Broun, New York Tribune, accredited July 10, 1917; suspended February 27, 1918

Reginald Wright Kauffman, Phila. North American, accredited September 21, 1917; suspended April 28, 1918

Norman Draper, Associated Press, accredited October 28, 1917; departed July 1918

John T. Parkerson, Associated Press, accredited March 30, 1918; departed in July 1918

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NEUFCHATEAU PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press field headquarters was originally established at Neufchateau in August 1917 and remained the principal field headquarters until April 1, 1918, after which it was continued as a branch headquarters until Sept. 12, 1918. The original organization was effected by Major (Lt. Col.) Frederick Palmer.

The rules of censorship in force at that date, as previously stated, had been written with a view to the censorship of news regarding ports of debarkation. As no news of this kind being covered at Neufchateau, the original censorship rules were already largely a dead letter as far as field headquarters was concerned. The principles insisting on accuracy, prohibiting the sending of military information of use to the enemy and prohibiting news which would unfavorably affect our own or our Allies morale or embarrass us with neutrals were, though not codified, already in force. Field censorship was still at that date in a purely formative stage.

It had always been Major (Lt. Col.) Palmer's intention to allow American correspondents full freedom of circulation in American areas without conducting officers, but the realization of this plan was still completely obstructed by French rules.

Despatches were being sent over French wires from Neufchateau to Paris, where they were nominally recensored by the French. The time of transmission was fair. The delay in Paris was about two hours.

The principle of censorship prohibiting military information of use to the enemy was construed to prohibit identification of both units and individuals. The morale principle was construed strictly with regard to exaggeration. The correspondents were complaining slightly of these two rulings.

In the month of October 1917 the 1st Division entered the Arracourt training sector. This story was not well handled. The French insisted upon their own rules regarding the circulation of correspondents. The result of this was to prevent the correspondents from making any but occasional visits to the front. Of course the story could not be covered under such conditions.

The difference between our method of handling the press and that of the French should here be noted. Our press division was from the first organized with a view to the most unhampered circulation of correspondents combined with entire absence of propaganda. Our aim was to let the correspondents get all the facts, and then to let the facts speak for themselves.

The aim of the French Press Division was exactly the opposite. In the first place, the French army is convinced that lack of control over correspondents at the beginning of the war of 1870 had much to do with the early defeats of the French forces at that time. For that reason they never allowed correspondents to circulate without conducting officers, a method quite foreign to our principles with correspondents. In the second place France was in the fourth year of a desperate struggle; it was French policy to present statements of facts to correspondents for publication which were prepared and colored to suit the shifting needs of French morale and to obtain propaganda results in Allied and neutral countries. This policy was of course quite the contrary of ours.

It may also be mentioned here that we provided more transportation to correspondents, and a lower cost, than the French did. Correspondent's papers were charged $257.14 per 30 day month, for the use of these automobiles, this being a mere nominal price which hardly paid for gasoline or supplies.

The 1st Division entered the Toul sector on January 19, 1918. On interposition by G. H. Q., free circulation among our troops was permitted by the French authorities. This was one of the most important events if not the most important, which took place in the
whole history of the press division. From this time on the press division was able actually to realize its original ideal of unhampered circulation of correspondents. Of course the effect of this among the correspondents was an immensely improved morale.

Toward the end of March the German offensive began and it was decided to send the 1st Division to Picardy. It was evident that a branch of the censorship would have to be established in that region. In the absence of information as to exact location of the sector to be assigned to our troops, no particular town in France could at once be selected for press field headquarters. Most of the correspondents wished to go but as some wished to remain at Neufchâteau, the censorship had to be split. It was decided that (1) a censor should be attached to British G. H. Q., for censorship of American activities in British area (2) a censor should accompany the 1st Division (3) a censor should remain at Neufchâteau.

(In accordance with 2) During the month of April a branch press headquarters was established successively at the villages of Chaumont-en-Vexin, Maisoncelles, and Chepoix, and during the month of May at the city of Beauvais.

It was also decided at this time that principle two be so construed as to allow identification of individuals in the censor's discretion. This ruling greatly pleased all correspondents.

The vast majority of correspondents decided to accompany the 1st Division to Picardy. It was therefore arranged that one censor (Lt. (Capt.) Gerald Morgan) and the three agency correspondents accompany division headquarters while the other correspondents were assigned two to a regiment.

For about one month the greatest secrecy was maintained regarding this operation, the correspondents being allowed to send no cables at all. When early in May the presence of American troops in the Montdidier sector was released, correspondents went away somewhat disappointed by their experience. They had expected a battle which never materialized, and felt that several very uncomfortable weeks had been practically wasted. Of course this was due to the general military situation over which we had no control, as the Germans still held the initiative.

Shortly afterwards the Cantigny attack occurred. It was a well handled story told without exaggeration. Press headquarters had meanwhile moved to Beauvais.

PARIS PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established in Paris from June 1, 1918, to June 7, 1918. When the Germans broke through the Chemin-des-Dames all the way to Chateau-Thierry there were six correspondents at Beauvais. Two others had followed the 2d Division from Gisors to Montreuil-aux-Lions. Still others had gone to Chateau-Thierry from Neufchâteau. Telephonic permission was received from G. H. Q., to take the six from Beauvais to 2d Division headquarters.

Correspondents and censor motored all night to Montreuil-aux-Lions, covered the story of the 2d and 3d Divisions and returned to Paris the next afternoon. The story was released by the French afternoon official communique. Unfortunately Neufchâteau did not get news of the release as promptly as Paris did, which resulted in despatches of correspondents at Neufchâteau suffering several hours delay. This was one of the natural results of censorship decentralization.

The next day all correspondents arrived in Paris. It had already become evident that some one central point must be selected to cover the active Franco-American fronts as distinguished from the quiet front in Lorraine. Paris was at that time the logical choice, equidistant as it was from Montdidier and Chateau-Thierry, and of course unequalled as regards transmission facilities.

The Beauvais office was therefore completely discontinued, and field headquarters established in Paris. By arrangement with the French, conducting officers were sent to the front in each press car.
After about a week, orders were received on Sunday afternoon June 7, 1919, to move press headquarters to Meaux. The correspondents were dissatisfied as they had perfect transmission facilities in Paris and did not know what situation they would find at Meaux. The change was made because the French felt it indiscreet for correspondents to maintain a headquarters in Paris and reach the city daily while covering battle conditions.

Press headquarters was moved on Monday and by Tuesday everything was completely fixed at Meaux, transmission, transportation, food and billets. The arrangements of sending conducting officers in press cars was discontinued.

The Chateau-Thierry and Belleau Woods stories were very well covered by correspondents in spite of one mistake.

The mistake was identification of the Marines. From Beauvais the question had been asked of G. H. Q., whether the expression Marines could be used after the Marines had been identified by the enemy. An affirmative answer was received in Paris, given on the ground that there was no military information for the enemy in mentioning the presence of Marines, and because of the desire to cooperate with correspondents in letting them put as much color and detail in their stories as military discretion warranted. But other groups could not be so identified. The result was that the Marines, gallant as they were, got undue publicity, while the regular infantry, equally gallant, got none at all. This created discord and affected morale. For sometime thereafter no further identifications were permitted.

MEAUX PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established in Meaux from June 7, 1918 to September 12, 1918.

The headquarters at Meaux was the first real headquarters established for the purpose of covering an active field campaign.

Transportation problems at Meaux were successfully adjusted. Transmission, by courier to Paris was well handled.

On July 15, the Germans attacked on a front from Champagne to just east of Chateau-Thierry. The story of the excellent fighting put up by elements of the 3d and 28th Divisions was well covered by correspondents although a detailed account of our operations was impossible to get until later.

On July 18, Foch counterattacked with the 1st and 2d Divisions and the Moroccans. This story was well covered.

On July 19, French policy towards publicity regarding American operations suddenly about faced. Up to July 19, their policy was to emphasize all American operations for the sake of their own morale and to attempt to injure that of the Germans. They had even gone so far as to encourage publication of the news of a repulse of a German attack upon the 1st Division, just prior to Cantigny, which never took place at all. But on and after July 19, feeling that the danger was over and victory approaching, it was their own operations upon which they wished to lay the greatest stress. Correspondents while they realized the strain under which the gallant French people had been laboring for four years, and while they also realized the needs and temptations arising from that strain, nevertheless felt it incumbent upon them to maintain the same attitude after July 19, as before that date and to stick to an uncolored presentation of facts straight through from the beginning to the end of the war.

In spite of the transportation difficulties caused by crowded roads and considerable distances, the whole Chateau-Thierry campaign from June 7, 1918 to September 11, 1918, was efficiently reported by correspondents, and a fair balance maintained between the respective achievements of our armies and those of the French.

NANCY PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established in Nancy from September 12, 1918 to September 26, 1918.
Correspondents were kept at Meaux until the evening before our attack on St-Mihiel. The reason for this was that if a move had been made sooner to Neufchateau or Nancy the Germans would have guessed why. Correspondents remained willingly at Meaux and kept on writing about the Vesle just as though they expected big operations there.

Two days before the St-Mihiel attack the usual preliminary arrangements for quarters, transportation, and transmission including the installation of two American telegraphers in the French telegraph office, were made at Nancy. Nancy was at that time intended to serve as the seat of press headquarters during the coming winter.

Meanwhile the problems of the press officers on duty at Neufchateau had been quite the opposite of those at Meaux. At Meaux there had been twenty-five correspondents covering a narrow and active front. At Neufchateau there had been only three correspondents to cover a broad and quiet front. It was therefore arranged at Neufchateau to have the news telephoned there from all corps. During the St-Mihiel offensive this arrangement was continued. Officers of newspaper experience were assigned to the press division and placed at each corps and army headquarters as information officers. The work of the press liaison officers was a success at St-Mihiel, and from then on to the Armistice. The object sought and achieved was the collection of accurate news for the use of the correspondents. Each press liaison officer transmitted the news of his unit to field press headquarters, being held responsible for its accuracy but not for its censorship. In this way correspondents who were physically unable to visit all news centers could report each days activities as a whole and with a proper sense of proportion. Information from the liaison press officers was largely sent to press headquarters by motorcycle, it being impossible to use army telephones to a considerable extent for press purposes during a major engagement.

Another successful innovation made at this time was the inauguration of the principle of explaining to the correspondents the meaning of a given military operation before its inception. These explanations were always made by officers of such rank and known ability as to convince the correspondents beyond the shadow of a doubt. This innovation was really of incalculable value in the whole matter of war publicity.

At this time a much needed revision and recodification of the special orders governing the press division, and of the division of duties among the officers of the press division was also made.

The St-Mihiel story was well covered. The use of the word Metz had to be completely avoided, as otherwise people at home might have wrongly thought that Metz was our objective. Of course on the other hand it was impossible to tell the Germans openly that Metz was not our objective.

Otherwise this was an easy story to handle.

Beginning with the St-Mihiel operation, it was arranged that correspondents dispatches would no longer have to be submitted to the Paris French censorship. While this censorship had long since become absolutely nominal, a saving of two hours was affected thereby in the mechanical operation of forwarding despatches.

BAR-le-DUC PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established in Bar-le-Duc from September 26, 1918, to November 16, 1918.

The usual preliminary arrangements just prior to the Meuse-Argonne offensive were made at the town of Bar-le-Duc.

The Meuse-Argonne story was a very hard one to write, and the correspondents wrote it remarkably well. At a time when unfriendly critics were sharpening their knives and getting ready to call the A. E. F., a failure, the twenty-five accredited correspondents were pounding away at the facts. They pointed out day by day that the American army was up against the principle hinge of the German line, which the Germans had to hold at all costs, with the most and the best troops, no matter what defeats they suffered elsewhere.
The correspondents pointed out over and over again why the Germans had to fight to the death in this sector. They pointed out that the terrain was more difficult than anywhere else on the whole front and described that terrain first hand. They pointed out the difficulties of communication over only two north and south roads. They kept pounding away at facts, facts, facts. They did a good American piece of work and had the United States Forces not broken through before the Armistice and silenced detractors that way, they would have been the principal witnesses in a not too easy defense. Between September 26, and November 11, they justified all the confidence which had heretofore been placed in them, and their work was worthy of all praise.

At Bar-le-Duc it was arranged for correspondents despatches to pass through England without the nominal British censorship, thus saving two hours time on news sent by Anglo Cables.

Transmission was excellent at Bar-le-Duc. One reason for this, curiously enough, was the spirit of competition engendered in the French operators by the American operators. The French kept up with the American experts and greatly cut down the time of transmission over the French cable.

Bar-le-Duc remained the seat of press headquarters during the entire period of the Meuse-Argonne offensive (Sept. 26, 1918, to November 11, 1918) and until November 16, 1918, five days after the declaration of the Armistice.

VERDUN PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established at Verdun from November 16, to November 21.

In order to make the press unit capable of accompanying the army of occupation on its northward march, a mobile mess was inaugurated and added to the press organization. The mess was successfully conducted from its inception.

LUXEMBOURG PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established at Luxembourg from November 21 to December 3, 1918. During this period censorship principles were greatly relaxed. A censorship was still maintained upon news destined for Europe of a proportionately more serious nature than upon news destined for America.

TREVES PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established at Treves from December 3 to December 8, 1918. During this time, five correspondents, Seldes, Corey, Eyre, Smith and Lyon, who had gone to Berlin through the lines, without permission, were returned to Treves by the German authorities, upon request of American G. H. Q. The despatches which they wrote while they were absent and after their return, concerning their trip to Germany, were suspended by our censorship. These stories were not released for publication until the papers represented by these correspondents recalled them as accredited correspondents.

The escapade of Messrs, Lyon, Corey, Eyre, Seldes and Smith should not be taken too seriously, nor should it be argued therefrom for a single second that correspondents are untrustworthy.

The work of all correspondents during the war was creditable, both to the correspondents themselves and to the policy of confidence adopted toward the correspondents by the army.

COBLENZ PRESS HEADQUARTERS

Press headquarters was established at Coblenz on December 8, where it still remains.

Transmission of despatches by signal corps wire was inaugurated in the month of January, thus saving the long courier journeys, heretofore necessary, to the commercial telegraph office at Nancy
All principles of censorship continue to be more liberally construed from month to
month and from week to week.

NOTES ON THE AMERICAN PRESS HEADQUARTERS ON THE BRITISH FRONT,
April 1918-January 1, 1919

At about the same time in April 1918, that a censor was detached from the Neufchateau
Press Headquarters to accompany the 1st Division into Picardy, an American censor was also
attached to British G. H. Q. to facilitate the transmission of news regarding the 10
American divisions which were at that time stationed, or being debarked behind the British
front. It was arranged that this officer should be attached to the British Press Section,
and should carry on the censoring according to American rules, while at the same time a
British officer carried on the censorship and control of correspondents according to
British rules. A chateau and cars were provided by the British at a cost of about
$200.00 a week. From three to five American correspondents only could be accommodated.

The 10 divisions, however, which were stationed behind the British lines, did not,
as many correspondents expected, enter any battle in the British area. The correspond­
ents, therefore, finding the expenses very high, in comparison with the comparative un­
importance of the news originating in the British area, did not as a rule remain at this
chateau. Only the associated press and the United Press maintained correspondents, ex­
cept at rare intervals, and even these agencies were not continuously represented at the
American chateau on the British front. It was also arranged that correspondents, both
accredited and visiting, who were with the American armies in other parts of France,
might, after due warning and after applying for and receiving passes from the British
Provost Marshal in Paris, proceed with their own cars and conducting officers on visits
to the American chateau on the British front. Owing, however, to the almost continuous
activities of the American troops in other parts of France, the correspondents with the
A. E. F. only availed themselves of this privilege at very rare intervals. On two separate
occasions, and upon invitation of British commanding officers, certain American corre­
spondents entered the British area. This, however, when called to the attention of the
British authorities was stopped by them.

The basis of the arrangements made with the British for handling purely American
news from the British area, was made completely in accordance with British procedure, and
entirely not in accordance with the procedure toward our correspondents in the A. E. F.
in other parts of France. It is also to be noted that certain representatives of the
American press had been allowed a place with the British accredited correspondents before
America's entry into the war, and were still allowed such a place during the campaigns of
the year 1918. Moreover, the activities of American divisions on the British front were
never on so large a scale as the activities of the American forces alone, or with the
French; indeed the only operation of any real importance carried on by troops in the Brit­
ish area was the operation of the 27th and 30th Divisions. It can therefore be readily
seen that the system which the British adopted toward their operations on their own front
was hardly suitable for the American correspondents, who were after all, only covering a
minor phase of the whole battle. It was not to be expected that the news agencies and
special newspapers of the United States would accept such an expensive and rather binding
system, unless, as at one time was expected, a force of at least 10 divisions was to take
part in the campaigns in cooperation with the British. It is true that toward the end of
July 1918, the expenses of these American correspondents were reduced to a nominal figure,
and that the correspondents who had previously been living with the British accredited
 corresponde"nts were moved to the American Press Headquarters with the British, but by this
time the activities of the American forces were so much greater in central and eastern
France than in the British area, that the American Press Headquarters with the British had
become of entirely secondary importance, and remained so until the end of the war.
The average number of correspondents at the American chateau in the British area from the beginning of the campaign of the year 1918 until the Armistice, was not more than two. The methods of transportation, transmission and general living conditions, were up to the excellent standard always maintained by the British in their treatment of correspondents. The cooperation between the American and British officials was always cordial and without the slightest friction, from the beginning to the end.

The American Press Officer in charge of the American correspondents on the British front from the time of the establishment of the press headquarters there until the Armistice was Captain E. G. Lowry, S. C. After the Armistice the American Press Headquarters on the British front was removed to Lille, France, from Hesdin, France, where it had been formerly maintained. Captain Lowry was assigned to other work in November 1918 and during the last weeks of its existence, the headquarters was in charge of 2d Lt. Wm. D. Maynard, Inf., formerly at the Bureau de la Presse, Paris.

Press headquarters went out of existence on January 1, 1919.

I. CENSORSHIP

B. HISTORY OF THE CENSORSHIP SUBSECTIONS OF G-2-D

1. PRESS CENSORSHIP

(b) PRESS CENSORSHIP AT THE BUREAU DE LA PRESSE


I. Early history of this censorship: The placing of an American press censorship at the Bureau de la Presse, Paris, in liaison with the French press censors, was practically coincident with the beginning of the A. E. F. Major (Lt. Col.) Frederick Palmer was the first press officer under the General Staff, A. E. F. He landed with General Pershing on June 13, 1917, and was given the duty of handling press correspondents and censoring their dispatches. In that capacity he went to St-Nazaire to be present at the landing of the first contingent of American troops on June 26, 1917. He had with him on that occasion the first three correspondents of the American expedition, Mr. Philip Powers of the Associated Press, Mr. C. C. Lyon, at that time representing the United Press, and Mr. Daniel Dillon, representing the International News Service. These correspondents filed dispatches in the French telegraph office in St-Nazaire, after censorship. By an unfortunate error, the French telegraphic employees at the landing port permitted one or more of these dispatches to go through to the United States with the date line, "St-Nazaire, June 26, 1917."

The effect of this incident was unfortunate and immediate. It spread broadcast, to the world at large, the information that the first contingent of American troops used St-Nazaire as a landing port. A cable of protest was at once received by American Headquarters in France, and it became immediately evident that some sort of liaison must be established and maintained with the French censorship and telegraphic authorities. Mr. (later Captain) Joseph C. Green, formerly a member of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, had volunteered his services as a civilian interpreter to the staff of General Pershing, and had been assigned to Major Palmer as an assistant. Having a command of French, and knowing something of the working of the French press censorship, Mr. Green went to the office of Capt. Riboulet, French Press Censor in Paris, 110 Rue de Grenelle, and requested permission for the American army to install a desk at the press censorship, where a liaison service would be maintained for the censorship of news affecting the American Expeditionary effort. This permission was cheerfully granted, and the American press censorship liaison service so established continued until April 1, 1919.
Mr. Green, for several days, was on duty practically all of his waking hours, until competent assistants could be obtained for him. The first assistants were Mr. Sanford Griffith, (later Captain, Interpreter Corps) Mr. Francis C. Wickes, (later Captain Infantry) Mr. Winthrop Chanler, (later Captain Cavalry) and shortly thereafter Mr. Donald L. Stone (later Captain U. S. A.). The office was organized on a basis of one man's being on duty at a time in turn. A practically continuous service was maintained, the only gap in the 24 hours being between five and eight in the morning.

II. The organization of the French Press Censorship: Press censorship in France during the war was conducted by zones. Censorship policy was determined by the office of the Premier. The Chief Press Censor in Paris was in attendance daily at a meeting of the Premier's Council, at which time instructions with regard to censorship were communicated to him. Upon receipt of these instructions all regional censorships in France were notified by the Press Censorship in Paris (Bureau de la Presse). In theory, the censorships at say Marseille or Bordeaux, were quite independent of the Paris censorship, but the Paris censorship was easily the most important, and its advice was continuously asked by the provincial censors.

The censorship of the press in France during the war was military, political, diplomatic and economic in character. The theory of the French with regard to censorship was not only to prohibit the publication of information which would be helpful to the enemy, but positively to prohibit the publication of news which would, in the opinion of governmental authorities, adversely affect the morale of the French civilian population, or mar the harmony of relations between the French Government and its Allies, or neutral nations.

Under French law there can be no censorship of the press. There was, however, a French statute which provided a heavy fine and prison sentence for any publisher who printed material of a nature calculated to harm the country in time of war. It was to relieve this dilemma of French publishers that the Bureau de la Presse was established as a working arrangement between the French Government and newspaper editors and publishers. In theory there was no censorship. An editor submitted the proofs of his paper, or magazine, or book, to the Bureau de la Presse, which thereupon expressed an opinion as to the advisability of its publication. If the publisher decided to disregard the opinion of the Bureau de la Presse, he might do so at his own risk. The risk run was of course the tangible disapproval of the government, which might be expressed in ways differing in degree from a letter of reproof by the Office of the Premier, or calling the editor of the paper before the Military Governor of Paris for reprimand, to suspension of the paper for a few days, or for an indefinite period, or even to its suppression. In practice the press censorship was singularly patient. Suspensions were most infrequent, and the newspaper editors as a whole cooperated pleasantly and whole-heartedly with the censors.

As to the physical organization of the Bureau de la Presse, it was in the general charge of a chief censor, who had executive oversight of policy, and full responsibility to the officer of the Premier. The actual censorship was divided into the censorship of books and periodicals and the censorship of newspapers and news telegrams. With the censorship of periodicals, the American liaison censors had very little contact, beyond occasional reference to them of a passage in a book or magazine touching upon the American war effort.

The censorship of newspapers and news telegrams was conducted in one large room. Three shifts of employees were on duty in turn, each under the control of a commissioned officer known as the Chef d'Equipe. In the case of telegrams, they were received, given a file number and examined by a telegraph censor. If the matter contained in them was of a routine nature, it was stamped as passed at once and returned to the telegraph office. If the telegram was one requiring special consideration of a technical nature it was referred to one of a group of technical experts, who had desks in the room. These were the diplomatic, financial and economic, aviation and naval censors, respectively. Large questions of policy were referred directly to the officer in general charge, who in turn took them up with higher governmental authority. The subordinate chiefs were of course
in frequent communication with their chiefs on matters affecting them. For example, the diplomatic censors frequently consulted their chiefs at the Quai d'Orsay. It was into this scheme that the American liaison censorship naturally fitted. All press telegrams inbound or outbound having reference to the work of the American nation in the war, were referred to the American Press Censor on duty. His judgment, where French interests were not also involved, was taken as final. A parallel system obtained with regard to the censorship of newspapers printed in Paris. These newspapers presented page-proof before going to press. There were about 12 papers printed every afternoon in Paris and approximately 25 every night. Newspaper proof was read in the first instance by a reader who had charge of that particular paper, and who carried to the diplomatic, or economic, or American censor, as the case might be, matter in his particular technical department. As each page was censored it was taken to the Chef d'Equipe, who informed the newspaper publisher by telephone whether the page was all right from a censorship standpoint, or whether certain deletions were indicated or demanded. In the interests of uniform policy, only the Chef d'Equipe was authorized to deal with the newspaper editor or proprietor.

Deletions might be suggested as on the whole advisable, or requested, or vigorously demanded as the case seemed to require. In the rare case of an article which would be highly dangerous, and which the Chef d'Equipe feared might be published, despite the wishes of the Bureau de la Presse, the Prefecture of Police was also advised of the deletion, and his representatives immediately went to the newspaper office and watched the edition as it came off the press, setting it in the name of the government before distribution, if the dangerous article still appeared in the paper.

The large news agencies of France, Havas, Radio, Fournier and Information (corresponding to our own Associated and United Press) sent out news bulletins over their special wires for the provincial press, which were treated like other telegraphic dispatches.

III. The work of the American press censor: The work of the American Press Censor, Bureau de la Presse, was divided into censorship of dispatches and mail articles by American correspondents, bound for America, and the advisory censorship relative to news concerning the American war effort, appearing in the French and European press. Between these two classes of work there was a sharp line of demarcation. The censorship of the telegrams and articles of American correspondents bound for America was a matter in which the American censor had almost final jurisdiction, unless French interests were also involved. The same rules were applied to the censorship of these articles as to the articles written by the American correspondents accredited to the army and serving in the field with it. With regard to information appearing in the French press, or telegrams in transit to countries other than the United States, the American censor's duties were advisory. The French censor was supreme, and while the opinion of the American censor was consulted, it was always understood at the censorship and every effort was made to make newspaper proprietors and correspondents realize that the actual decision and the actual responsibility lay with the French censorship. For example, there were published throughout the American participation in the war, in Paris, the New York Herald and Chicago Tribune (Paris Edition) which although published for American readers were legally French newspapers.

The Stars and Stripes, the official newspaper of the A. E. F., always sent its proof to the Bureau de la Presse for censorship. Whether it was necessary for The Stars and Stripes, as an official newspaper, to do this, would have been a nice question for discussion, but in practice it was felt that The Stars and Stripes should be treated exactly as any other newspaper, in order that there might be no color for any charge of favoritism in the publication of army news.

The American censor read telegrams outbound from American army accredited correspondents who happened to be in Paris, from visiting correspondents to the army who had signed correspondents agreements to submit their articles to American censorship, and from the Paris correspondents of American newspapers. In the first two cases his jurisdiction was original, and in the latter secondary and advisory. As stated, in practice
the American censor was given practically full control of news bound for America, American in character.

The same is true of mail articles. The censors at the Bureau de la Presse read articles by accredited correspondents, visiting correspondents and correspondents who were in neither class. A request was made by Major Palmer, on August 23, 1917 to all American correspondents in Paris, to submit their mail articles to the American censor at the Bureau de la Presse, for censorship. Only the accredited and visiting correspondents, who had signed a "Visitor's Agreement," were under any obligation to submit their mail articles for censorship. Consequently a correspondent in neither of the above classes who remained in Paris, or visited only such American camps as he could visit without applying for a pass for himself, signing a Visitor's Agreement, was under no positive obligation to submit his articles to American army censorship. The French were requested, by means of the postal censorship, to refer mail articles bound for American newspapers or magazines to the American censor at the Bureau de la Presse, but undoubtedly, because of the above circumstances, many articles reached the American press during the war through the French mail, without having been seen by American censors, or indeed any censor, for the French postal censorship on mail bound for the United States was by no means thorough.

A large part of the duties of the American censors at the Bourse were to examine the publicity matter for the auxiliary organizations of the A. E. F. The Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. maintained in Paris a large force of professional writers, who sent a large quantity of material to the United States for publication. This material, by agreement with the Red Cross and Y. M. C. A., was always submitted to the American censor in Paris.

Telegrams by accredited and visiting correspondents, and their mail articles, and the publicity articles of the Red Cross and Y. M. C. A. were always submitted in duplicate. A file copy showing the deletions made by the censor, if any, and bearing time, date and initials of the censor, went to the archives of the press division. This arrangement was to the mutual advantage of correspondents and the censor, as it gave an exact record of action, in case of future questions of any sort.

The French censorship did not undertake to notify correspondents of deletions, that they left to the telegraphic authorities. The American censors, realizing the importance of the pleasant cooperation with correspondents, always notified correspondents if a telegram was stopped or deleted, either by themselves or insofar as they knew by the French censors. This was done by telephone or mail. The word was conveyed to correspondents repeatedly that the American censors would welcome personal conferences with correspondents from time to time.

It should be noted, that many times dispatches to American newspapers were deleted by the French Press Censors without the knowledge of the American censors, when they did not bear on the American war effort. The French censors were under no agreement to show dispatches to the American censors, unless they referred to America's part in the war.

The American censors, from the beginning of the Paris Press Censorship, kept an order book in which were placed all censorship instructions, and a series of journals, in which were noted the transactions of the censorship from day to day. These documents have been preserved and will be filed with the archives of the press division.

IV

Notes on the history of the American Press Censorship in Paris and of its relations with the Paris office of the Press Section, G.2.D.

The Paris Press Censorship was throughout the greater part of the war intimately connected with the Paris office of the Press Division, G.2.D. American General Headquarters were in Paris until September 1, 1917. In August 1917, Major (Lieut. Col.) Frederick Palmer started the Field Press Headquarters at Neufchateau and from that time on was only
in Paris on occasional visits. However he maintained in Paris a press section office which was a part of the American Headquarters organization until the removal of headquarters to Chaumont and which continued to exist as the Paris office of the press division after the removal of general headquarters from the city.

After the American Headquarters moved to the field, Major Palmer's office removed from 31 rue de Constantine to 10 rue Ste-Anne, a building which at that time, was the Headquarters of the Commanding General, District of Paris, of the Assistant Provost Marshal, Medical Officer, and other offices demanding central location whose needs were unfulfilled by the principal Paris Headquarters of the A. E. F., removed to the Hotel Mediterranée.

The office of the press division at 10 rue Ste-Anne was the place at which newly arrived accredited and visiting correspondents reported, where correspondents temporarily in Paris received mail and instructions and where trips were planned and passes obtained for official visitors, American, Allied and neutral to the American army in the field. With the establishment of a headquarters for American correspondents at Neuilly and the practically simultaneous formal organization of G.2.D. at Chaumont, G.2.D. became charged with the entertainment of official visitors and the office at 10 rue Ste-Anne was maintained jointly in the interests of correspondents and visitors. Passes were obtained and trips arranged for correspondents, accredited and visiting, as well as visitors by this office.

The first assistant press officers in Paris under the direction of Major Palmer were Mr. Green and Mr. Wickes. Mr. Green and Mr. Wickes received commissions in September 1917 as Lieutenants, Reserve Corps. Mr. Green was shortly removed to field press headquarters as an assistant there. Lieut. Wickes remained in charge of this office until after the signing of the Armistice. He received a commission as captain in June 1918. The office was well managed throughout its existence. Captain Wickes' courtesy, tact and executive ability making a very favorable impression on correspondents and official visitors.

The Paris Press Censorship was under the immediate direction of Capt. Wickes as the ranking Paris officer of G.2.D. until June 1918 when Mr. Stone, Chief Paris Press Censor, received a commission as captain. After that time orders to the Paris Press Censorship were transmitted to it directly from G.2.D., G. H. Q. Prior to June 1918 the office at 10 Rue Ste-Anne did occasional censoring of telegrams and mail articles of correspondents who happened to be in Paris as an accommodation to them.

Of the original press censors at the Bureau de la Presse, Mr. Green and Mr. Wickes were soon removed to Paris Press Headquarters; Mr. Griffith to the Intelligence Section at G. H. Q. and Mr. Chanler to the Field Press Hq. In July 1917, Mr. Daniel L. Blount, Mr. W. A. Kincaid and Mr. Donald L. Stone were engaged as civilian press censors. They were employed in that capacity through the war. Mr. Stone became Chief Press Censor in Paris, August 15, 1917. He was commissioned captain in June 1918.

The Bureau de la Presse removed from 110 rue de Grenelle to the top floor of the Paris Bourse (stock exchange), September 8, 1917. It remained there through the war. In September 1917, Captain Riboulet was replaced as Chief French Press Censor at the Bureau de la Presse by Captain (Commandant) E. G. Nussillard. Commandant Nussillard has remained in this position from his employment to the present time (April 1919). His relations with the American censorship throughout its history were marked by extreme cordiality and through sympathetic understanding. Owing to the fact that the war was being fought in France and the French were in control of the telegraph lines and of newspapers published at the seat of war, his position with regard to news of the American Expeditionary Force was one of great importance. He was tireless in his efforts to protect the American army from indiscretions in the French press. Whatever success the Paris Press Censorship achieved was due in large measure to his uniform sympathetic handling of Americans and American censorship problems.

The personnel of the press censorship in Paris changed from time to time. In addition to the censors above-named, mention should be made of the following civilian press...
censors who were employed from time to time all of whom did good work: Mr. C. H. Hunkins, Mr. William T. Black, Mr. C. E. Blake, Mr. C. C. Read, Mr. Milton M. Brown, Mr. (Lieut.) W. D. Maynard, Mr. Edward Schuler and Sergt. Major Sheldon J. Howe.

A British liaison censorship was established at the Bourse in March 1918. The British had never felt the necessity of having press censors in liaison with the French prior to that time. The British had their own area of the front and controlled news coming from it at the source. Their censorship was installed at the Bourse largely to advise the French censors with regard to French newspaper comment on the British reverse at the time of the German offensive of March 1918 in the interests of interallied morale. The experiment was a decided success and the British maintained this liaison censorship for the remainder of the war. Its presence was a decided help to the American Press Censorship because the American censors were able to get immediate action on matters involving British as well as American censorship without reference of the telegram or article in question to British Press Censorship in the field.

The American Press Censorship at the Bourse was abandoned on April 1, 1919. Since the signing of the Armistice it had existed only as a convenience to accredited and visiting correspondents under obligation to submit their articles to press censorship. For sometime it had become increasingly difficult to explain to correspondents that this censorship was not cooperating with the French censorship in the censorship of material by correspondents other than accredited and visiting correspondents of the United States army.

Beginning with April 1, 1919, one press censor, Mr. Edward Schuler, has been on duty at the Visitors Bureau, 37 rue Bassano, Paris, as an accommodation to accredited and visiting correspondents who happen to be in Paris and are under agreement to submit their material to army press censorship. Under present conditions the American censor censors only material voluntarily submitted to him in accordance with their agreements by correspondents of this class.

V. Notes on French Censorship of American news after the Armistice

With the signing of the Armistice the American Press Censorship at the Bourse ceased to examine telegrams and mail articles bound for the United States by correspondents other than accredited and visiting correspondents of the United States army and limited its examination of dispatches and articles by correspondents of this class to military censorship as laid down in the Rules of Press Censorship of November 18, 1918. In other words, the American Press Censors ceased to advise the French on request on any matter except that of a military nature in the dispatches of any correspondent and disclaimed all censorship of articles by correspondents having no official connection with the United States army. This was upon formal order from General Nolan, A. C. of S., G.2., G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Until January 10, 1919, the Military Postal Censorship at the Headquarters of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace routed manuscript of all newspaper correspondents, deposited in the army post office at the Hotel Crillon, through the Bourse censorship. This was because the base censor's office had never occupied itself with the censorship of press matter and did not know what rules of press censorship should be applied. The American Press Censors censor-stamped this material and forwarded it to its destination. This practice was brought to the attention of General Nolan by the reference to him of an article so forwarded. This article, written by Mr. Mark Sullivan, Colliers Weekly, did not square with the rules of press censorship as applied to accredited and visiting correspondents and the press censor desired a ruling by superior authority on the extent to which, if at all, the Paris Press Censors should apply the military censorship rules of November 18, 1918 to the correspondents reporting the peace conference. General Nolan again brought to the attention of the Bourse Censors that under conditions obtaining during the Armistice, the censorship at the Bourse had no jurisdiction over articles of
any nature written by American correspondents other than accredited and visiting correspondents. The practice of referring mail copy by peace conference correspondents to Paris Army Press Censorship was immediately ordered discontinued.

At the beginning of the peace conference, Colonel House expressed to the office of the French Premier, a desire upon the part of the American Government that the dispatches of American correspondents reporting the peace conference, be allowed to pass freely to the United States without French censorship control. The French authorities acquiesced in this request. To the best knowledge of G.2.D. this promise had been kept by the French Government. There have been cases of delay in transmission of messages due chiefly, no doubt, to the burdened condition of telegraph and cable lines but undoubtedly in some cases the French have held messages bound for the United States long enough to make copies therefrom for the information of their own government. In the opinion of the writer such procedure is justifiable as an intelligence measure in time of war. So far as is known to the writer, there have been no cases of complaint of deletion or suppression of messages by the French Government under the terms of this agreement. Many dispatches go daily by telegraph and by radio to the United States which the French Government would not authorize for publication in the French press.

Complaint was made April 19 by the New York World that the British Press Censorship held the text of the Reparations Agreement as cabled to that paper from Paris by their correspondent until Mr. Lloyd George had made his speech upon the subject before Parliament. Of this matter the writer has no knowledge. Most news dispatches sent by cable to the United States pass through England and, therefore, such procedure by the British Censorship authorities would have been physically possible.

As stated above in the account of the working of the French Press Censorship in Paris, the French Press Censorship is not only military but is diplomatic, political and economic in character on the theory that the protection of the morale of the French people and the relations of the French nation with other nations justifies such conduct. Accordingly the French censors have deleted and suppressed dispatches arriving in France from America and articles appearing in American owned newspapers in Paris (The Chicago Tribune and the New York Herald) on diplomatic and similar questions during the period of the Armistice. That they have done so is a matter with which, in the opinion of the writer, the military censorship of the A. E. F. is not concerned. In view, however, of the protests appearing in the American Press against French tampering with dispatches concerning President Wilson and the opposition in the United States to the League of Nations, it may be interesting to note that the reason why the French censors have suppressed attacks upon President Wilson appears to be that they consider him as the guest of the French nation and consequently do not desire attacks upon him to be printed in the French press. With regard to their deleting and suppressing dispatches concerning opposition to President Wilson's plans for a league of nations, the above motive appears to have been in part the cause. Also failure on the part of the French to realize that President Wilson, unlike his colleagues at the heads of other Allied Commissions to Negotiate Peace, is not clothed with full powers but is dependent upon the will of the American people as embodied in the ratifying power over treaties vested in the United States Senate. With the growing tendency to criticize the proposed League of Nations upon the part of European statesmen the tendency of the French Press Censors to modify or suppress dispatches from America expressing opposition to the League of Nations had decreased.

VI
General Observations

There are two methods by which a censorship of the press in time of war may be exercised other than control at the source by censorship of dispatches written by correspondents with the army in the field. The first is to do as the United States and Great
Britain did in the present war: Give to the publishers of newspapers and magazines a list of rules which in the interests of national security they are expected to observe under penalty of legal prosecution for disobedience. The other is to do as the French did, examine newspaper, magazine and book proofs before printing. There are advantages and disadvantages in both systems. The intense love of freedom of the press in America is such as to make the French system unacceptable and inadvisable except under pressure of extreme necessity. However, if the United States were ever to find itself as France was in the position of fighting a great war on its own soil with the involved increased vital interest of newspaper and magazine publishers and increased ability of those publishers to get military news immediately and previously uncensored by military censors in the field, it might be necessary to adopt the French system as a military necessity.

Despite the irksomeness of being forced to submit page proof of newspaper or book the French system has the undeniable advantage of relieving the publisher from all anxiety as to his discretion or his criminal liability after censorship examination. Someone must take the responsibility for determining the line beyond which the legitimate interest of the public in war news becomes military indiscretion. Under the American and English systems it is the publisher; under the French it is the censor.

The dangers of abuse of press censorship in time of war lie largely in a tendency, one, to withhold news of legitimate interest to the public at large through over-zealous desire for military discretion and, two, through tampering with general news by application of political, diplomatic and economic censorship in the attempted interest of public morale and national prestige. Censorship of this letter type should be reduced to a rigid minimum. There has been much criticism of the French Press Censorship during the war which will find open expression after the signature of peace. The criticism is based almost wholly upon resentment by newspaper writers and by the French public against what they feel to have been an over-zealous and unnecessary preoccupation of the press censorship in the fostering of public morale.

I. CENSORSHIP

B. HISTORY OF THE CENSORSHIP SUBSECTIONS OF G-2-D

2. POSTAL CENSORSHIP
   (a) History of the base censorship of the mail of the A. E. F.
   (b) Censorship of Prisoner of War Mail

OPERATIONS OF BASE CENSOR'S OFFICE

The base censor's office was established in August 1917 at St-Nazaire, France, in the building occupied by the American army post office. Its personnel, numbering four enlisted men and one officer, confined its work to the examining of a small portion of the mail received at the post office. Later, when it was seen that a very small portion of the out-going mail would pass through St-Nazaire, and when the importance of the location of Paris in relation to the transportation system of France and the probable location of American troops was realized, the office and personnel were removed to Paris, located in the Hotel Mediterranee, where it still remains. Within a few days of the establishment of the office in Paris, several officers were added to the force and the number of the enlisted personnel increased.

The amount of mail handled by the office began to increase very rapidly during the month of December 1917; that increase continued until November 1918, when the peak was reached and the receipts began to decrease. The appended table will show the amount of mail received and examined per month and the character of the mail.

During this month, December 1917, the work of the office was systematized by dividing it into departments, roughly as follows: Foreign language mail; mail destined for Allied and Neutral countries; mail from and to points in the A. E. F., including mail originating
around Paris; the regimental or recensoring section; the blue envelope section; and the recording section, which includes the administrative force of the office and the receiving sorting and despatch of mails.

Starting with one officer and four enlisted men at St-Nazaire, the office force has increased, fluctuating from time to time, until at the present writing there are thirty-three officers, one hundred and eighty-three enlisted men, and twenty-seven civilian employees.

The foreign language section is that part of the office devoted to censoring mail written in languages other than English. The personnel capable of reading the various languages found in the American Expeditionary Forces was drawn from the A. E. F., and, excluding Chinese and Japanese, forty-nine languages have been found and handled in the base censor's office. Such Japanese mail as has come through has been read for us by the British authorities at the War Office in London, and the Chinese letters have been read by Y. M. C. A., secretaries attached to the Chinese labor camps.

The Allied and Neutral Department handles mail written in English addressed to Allied or Neutral countries; the mail of this character in foreign languages being handled by the foreign language section. It was realized that letters addressed to these points, especially on the continent of Europe, gave the widest opportunity for the prompt forwarding of dangerous information which might be availed of by the enemy, and this class of mail has received very close attention.

The local department has handled mail from and to points in the American E. F., and this mail also has received very close attention because of the fact that information written in this class of mail, which might be entirely harmless if allowed to go to the United States, may be exceedingly dangerous if it were found on the person of prisoners or dead in the front lines.

The regimental department is devoted entirely to the recensoring of mail which has already been censored once in the organization and has been sacked for transport direct to the U. S. This mail has been intercepted without previous warning to the organization, and a check has thereby been obtained on the manner in which censorship by company officers had been performed. Also in the recensoring of this mail, the mail of officers, which otherwise would be forwarded under the countersignature, has been read and information obtained as to the conscientiousness in which they have censored their own mail.

The blue envelope section has dealt with the mail of soldiers which has been enclosed in the so-called blue envelope furnished the troops in specified quantities in order to afford the enlisted man an opportunity to send letters of a private or personal character without subjecting same to the supervision of officers of his own immediate unit with whom he is in close personal relation.

During the month of March 1918 the issue of censor stamps became a function of the base censor's office, it being found that it was absolutely necessary to centralize the issue of stamps to one agency that was centrally located, and also it was found to be absolutely essential that the base censor's office be informed at all times in regard to the holder of any given stamp in order that communications needing attention could be immediately traced.

Shortly after the arrival of American troops in France in any considerable number, the army postal service was instituted and troops were forbidden, in localities served by the American army postal service to use the French civil post. In such localities in France not reached by the American post, the mail of American units there was transported by the French, through the French Bureau Central Militaire, to the American post office in Paris. This mail being censored either by the organization censors before transported by the French, or by the base censor after being turned over by the French was not handled for censorship at all by the French authorities, and we have at no time been dependent on the French authorities for the censorship of any A. E. F., mail.

Certain units of our army, however, were located in the area of the British Expeditionary Forces, and as this area was entirely served by the British army postal service,
It was more feasible to have them take over the mail service of these units than to attempt to do it independently ourselves. To obviate the necessity of throwing the work of censorship on the British authorities, and also to meet any possible objections of our people to having the British censor the mail of our units, officers from this office were detailed to the chief censor's office, British E. F., at Boulogne to handle American mail. This mail, although it bore the British censor stamp, was censored entirely by American personnel, but the actual handling of the mail was largely done by the British.

In Great Britain the mail of organizations stationed there was at first handled by the civil postal service, and handled for censorship by the British authorities at their civil establishments in London and Liverpool. At their urgent request officers were sent from this office to Liverpool in the latter part of August 1918 to take charge of this work and to relieve the British both for the responsibility and the work itself. This work was carried on by these officers by the opening of an office at present located at No. 30 James Street, Liverpool, in which the work is done under their supervision by civilian personnel hired by the American Government. At the present writing the American units have been entirely removed from the B. E. F., area in France, and the American personnel of the British censor office has returned to the Paris office. The office at Liverpool still continues to function although the amount of mail handled has decreased by over 50% and is rapidly decreasing.

The principle on which our entire system of censorship is founded is that of making the smallest military unit responsible for the censorship of all its mail, with the exception of the blue envelope mail, which is only handled by the base censor. The carrying out of this censorship requires the reading of the mail by the detachment or platoon commander; his counter-signature on the face of the envelope and at the foot of the letter to indicate that he has censored same and found it O. K.; the application of the censor stamp by the stamp holder after he is satisfied as to the correctness of the commissioned officer's signature; and then the recensoring of such mail as is deemed necessary by the trained personnel of the base censor's office, in order that a check may be kept on the character of the work done by the local or organization censor.

This system is very largely that followed by the B. E. F. and developed by their experience of nearly four years before the United States entered the war. The advice and assistance which was most willingly and generously offered by the British authorities was a great help in establishing our system. In the main this system has worked well, and in the main the organization censorship has been well and conscientiously performed, but the censorship as a whole has suffered through several causes. The principal one, perhaps, being the abnormally rapid growth of the A. E. F., in France during the spring and summer of 1918, and the lack of opportunity for proper instruction of newly arriving units as to the correct way of exercising censorship. If it had been possible to establish a school in the United States where at least one officer for every troop transport had received before sailing instruction in the censorship regulations and the proper method of applying them, a great deal of difficulty and a great deal of improper letter writing could have been avoided. A second difficulty has been the shortage of personnel in the base censor's office to adequately supervise and examine the mail that was passed through the office.

During the latter part of August and the month of September 1918 the physical handling alone of the mail received at the office was a severe task for the entire personnel, to say nothing of subjecting it to any adequate censorship. Conditions became better in the last half of October, and on November 14, three days after the signing of the Armistice, seventy-nine limited service and two officers arrived from the United States for work in the office, which gave us adequate personnel for the first time since the month of June 1918. Pursuant to the policy adopted at the first establishment of the office, the personnel has been drawn from the officers and enlisted men of the army.

The base censor's office has three main functions: (a) Original censoring of mail, which is principally confined to that written in foreign language and that contained in the blue envelopes. (b) Recensoring of mail in order that supervision may be had over the
character of work done by local or organization censors, and in order also that for the
more important mail special precautions may be taken by trained men who are in close touch
with the general staff. (c) The gathering from all mail of information concerning the
morale of troops; the feeling of the troops towards public questions; the detection of
irregularities and abuses that should receive the attention of inspectors; and close co-
operation with the intelligence section in the supervision of individuals of uncertain
character or standing. As a part of this third function, there was established in the
Paris office during the month of July 1918, a chemical laboratory with facilities for ex-
perimenting in the development and detection of secret writing, and for experimentation
in new developments along that line.

In the month of September 1918 the office took over from the Prisoner of War Informa-
tion Bureau of the Adjutant General's Office, the censorship of mail to and from German
prisoners of war in American custody, and of mail destined for American prisoners of war
in Germany. This work is at present being carried on at the central records office at
Bourges, France, by my personnel of five officers and twenty-six enlisted men, and the
information found in these letters is proving to be of value in affording an insight into
present conditions in Germany and of the feeling of the German prisoners themselves to-
wards the American army and Americans.

As has already been stated, the phenomenally rapid growth of the American army in
France during the summer of 1918 made the task of the base censor's office, in keeping
up with the growth of its work, an exceedingly difficult one, and certain features of the
work, which should have been emphasized, had to be neglected. As for example the re-
censoring of mail already censoring in the organizations. The system of censoring regi-
mentally can only be successfully when it is thoroughly and adequately supervised by an
authority specially trained in censoring, for the average regimental officer has his hands
more than full with other work of his organization, and the work of censoring is often
only the addition of a most disagreeable and time-consuming duty, which he often feels he
would take any method to escape. It is a self-evident truth that censorship could be
better performed, both from the standpoint of thoroughness and also with less objection-
able features to the individual letter writer, if it could be done entirely by an im-
personal organization such as the base censor's office. The difficulty, of course, is
the supplying of adequate personnel, particularly when the war is fought at such a great
distance from the army's base, as has been the case in Europe. Even so it would not be
impossible nor impractical to employ personnel enlisted for this purpose and no other at
strategic centers back of the advance zone where the mail could be routed without neces-
sarily delaying it. A rough outline of this scheme would be a central office having con-
trol over all censor personnel, being responsible for its instruction and discipline; the
issuance of censor's stamps and bulletins on censorship which it would get through direct
and frequent touch with G. H. Q.; suboffices stratgetically located according to centers
of transportation, and local offices at each large training area or cantonement. With
this system the necessity for the use of the blue envelope would be obviated and the work
would be more espediously performed, as well as much more efficiently.

There have been complaints in regard to the delay of mail by the censor, but there
has been little ground for these complaints so far as the present base censor's office is
concerned, for it has been a rule of the office, except in the case of letters requiring
disciplinary action, to forward all mail within twenty-four hours after its receipt at
the office. In the case of foreign language mail this twenty-four hour limit is sometime
increased to forty-eight, but as a rule the shorter time prevails even here also. The
office has often noted, however, a considerable difference between the written date on
letters and the postmark on same occasionally amounting to two weeks or more, apparently
indicating that the time required for local censorship, plus the time required to trans-
port same to the nearest army post office, has been the cause of great delay.
It has been observed that the privilege of the blue envelope has been highly appreciated by the troops, but it has been subject to severe abuses. The first, which perhaps should not be classed as abuse, had been the interpretation of the definition of the kind of mail that can properly be enclosed, as the average soldier thinks that any letters which he writes to his family or friends are personal and private, and they often enclose postcards, etc., which never meet that definition. There have been relatively few attempts at including in the blue envelope letters of a sort which are definitely prohibited by censorship regulations and a sort which the soldier would not attempt to write in letters subject to ordinary censorship. There have been enough of these, however, to make it necessary for this office to examine as large a percentage of the blue envelope mail as possible. There have been instances where the organization officers have attempted to have all the mail written by the members of their units sent to the base censor in the blue envelope, thereby relieving them of the duty of censoring it. This is a very difficult matter to prove usually, but enough flagrant cases of this sort were detected to act as a deterrent to others who might attempt it, but there have undoubtedly been many cases that have been let go because of inability to prove the case.

No serious objection to censorship of mail had been detected in letters provided the censoring was done impersonally, but there is a most decided objection on the part of the enlisted men to having the censorship done by their own officers, and they bitterly resent having it done by noncommissioned officers, as has been attempted from time to time. There have been many attempts to improvise blue envelopes so as to take advantage of the facilities of the base censor's office while unable to secure the authorized envelope. In one instance an engineer outfit which had access to a printing plant, prepared a large supply of counterfeit envelopes for its own use. Unfortunately however, from their standpoint, the sergeant in charge of the printing, printed a few envelopes for his private use with his own countersignature and the name of his correspondent thereon. This, of course, gave away the whole story the first time the envelopes came into the office.

II

REPORT FROM LABORATORY, BASE CENSOR'S OFFICE

Relatively few attempts at conveying military information for use of the enemy have been found but many attempts on the part of soldiers to convey forbidden information for the satisfaction of their friends and relatives at home have been discovered. This information is usually in the form of the location of the writer; the troops near him; and where he is to go and ordinarily is in some form of an easily detected code. In some instances this information has been conveyed by the use of invisible inks. In these cases and in all others involving violations of censorship regulations, disciplinary action has been instituted by the base censor. The matter in question being taken up with the soldier's immediate or higher commander, or through the Adjutant General's Office if the seriousness of the case seemed to warrant it.

Plans for establishing a chemical laboratory at the base censor's office in Paris for the purpose of examining mail for secret writing materialized July 11, 1918 when Lucien J. Desha, Captain, Sanitary Corps reported to establish such a laboratory and take charge of the work. The laboratory began to function on September 23, 1918, the time previous to this having been spent in gathering equipment and experimental work. The first work was done by Captain Desha and four enlisted men.

In August 1918 a request was sent to Washington for four trained chemists to do experimental work. First Lieutenants G. C. Chandlee, last in charge of the work, and D. F. J. Lynch were trained in the ink laboratory in Washington and after spending a week in the British laboratory in London, reported for duty at the base censor's office November 4, 1918. Second Lieutenants P. S. Danner and Edward F. Snyder reported direct from the Washington laboratory to the base censor November 13, 1918.
The chemical methods employed for the testing of mail for secret writing are those given in the British secret report on this subject. A close relation was early established between the military intelligence division of the United States army and the branches of the British Postal Censorship doing similar work.

The mail examined at the American laboratory in Paris for secret writing was that going from members of the A. E. F. chiefly to neutral countries. When the Army of occupation entered Luxemburg and Germany, a number of letters coming from the different divisions in the army were tested each day. From September 23, 1918 to February 8, 1919 the date of the tentative closing of the laboratory, a total of 53,658 letters was examined for secret writing. Of this number 428 reacted in such manner as to require further examination but only two letters were found to contain secret writing. These were from a private in the U. S. army to relatives in Italy.

The examination of mail for secret writing was discontinued February 8, 1919.

The statistical tables of the amount of work handled each month are on file in the monthly reports sent to G. H. Q. The appended table gives only the total number of pieces of each class of mail handled up to March 1, 1919. It should be borne in mind in considering these figures that the base censor’s office has confined itself entirely to the examination of mail originating in the A. E. F., and has at no time examined the mail coming to the A. E. F. The amount of regimental mail recensored is not included in the totals therein, although it has been noted on the table.

The office, when established at St-Nazaire, was under the command of Major (afterwards Colonel) W. F. Creary. He was relieved on November 17, 1917 by Lieutenant Colonel (afterwards Colonel) Homer B. Grant, who, in turn, was relieved in May 1918 by Major A. L. James, Jr. who was succeeded the following month by Major Burton A. Adams, who is base censor at the present time.

The following fifty languages, besides English, have been handled by the base censor’s office.

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American Indian  - -  Sioux  
Cree  
Chippewa  
Cherokee

HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE PRISONER OF WAR MAIL CENSORSHIP

In the month of October 1918, pursuant to an agreement with the Adjutant General's office, G. H. Q., the base censor took over the censoring of the prisoner of war mail both incoming and outgoing. This arrangement was affected by having two officers and a few enlisted men detailed from base censor’s office to the central records office at Bourges. Bourges was selected as the place for censoring prisoner of war mail because it was at that place that the prisoner of war information bureau was located. This bureau kept a record of changes of addresses of all German prisoners in American custody, and
all prisoner of war mail went through the readdressing section of the information bureau. Shortly after the detail of the two officers from the base censors office to the duty of censoring the prisoners of war mail, it was found necessary to increase the personnel, and accordingly three additional officers were added and the enlisted personnel was increased to twenty-six. **

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In March 1919, the readdressing section of the prisoners of war information bureau was moved from Bourges to St-Pierre-des-Corps. This caused considerable confusion in the censoring of the prisoner of war mail for the reason that it necessitated the rerouting of mail, it having to go to the censor office for censorship and then to the readdressing section for forwarding. For a while thereafter, the prisoner of war mail section censored only letter mail, package mail being handled at the different prisoner of war enclosure although both letter mail and packages had to go through the readdressing section. To meet the new situation in the handling of this mail, the post office employees made a division of the full sacks at the Bourges railroad station, sending the letter mail to the censor office, and forwarding packages direct to St-Pierre-des-Corps. It was found that occasionally in these sacks of packages small bundles of letter mail were found and these had to be returned to the censor office for examination before being forwarded to the addressees. The commanding officer of a prisoner of war labor company (Company number 38 to be exact) made a complaint that some of the letters were uncensored and an investigation revealed that the above situation was the cause. It, therefore, became necessary to have some new arrangement whereby this very important office could be made to function with precision. It became apparent that the location of this office should be governed by the facility with which the postal express service could handle the mail as well as by the location of the readdressing section of the prisoner of war information bureau. It was finally decided to move this branch to Tours. This was done largely upon the advice of the postal express service. At the time of writing this report the office is still located at Tours and is functioning with no apparent delay or difficulty. The work of this branch office has been of great value to the intelligence section for the reason that it has given an insight into the conditions existing behind the enemy's line.

In February 1919, it was decided that certain changes should be made in the regulations governing correspondence of prisoners of war and accordingly the Provost Marshal General was notified as follows:

In view of the present conditions, and with a view to relieving the natural anxiety of prisoners' families, the following modifications of the present censorship regulations are authorized, effective immediately:

a. There will be no limitation on the number of letters or post cards to be sent.

b. Permission is granted for the use of any writing paper, envelopes or cards which may be available.

c. Prisoners will be permitted to state in their letters the place where they are located and the nature of the work on which they are employed.

All other regulations relative to censorship will be enforced as heretofore.

The A. C. of S., G-2, G. H. Q., states that he has been advised by the office of the base censor that the mail censorship division of G-2 is prepared to handle the additional quantity of mail which will result from the above modification of the censorship regulations.

The reports indicate that this was a wise move especially in view of the turbulent political conditions that exist in Germany. Letters from the various parts of Germany to prisoners of war in American custody gave in some cases important information on conditions in Germany after the fall of her arms.
I. CENSORSHIP

C. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO FUTURE CENSORSHIP POLICY OF THE ARMY IN THE EVENT OF WAR

1. MANAGEMENT OF FIELD PRESS HEADQUARTERS AND CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS IN THE FIELD

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF FIELD PRESS HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD PRESS CENSORSHIP IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER WAR.

I

ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESS DIVISION:

General principles only for the organization of the press division can be laid down. All recommendations are of a character so general as to fit a possible future war against any country.

1. The press division should be a subdivision of the intelligence section of the general headquarters staff in the field.

2. The press division should have a commanding officer (known as the chief press officer) a chief field censor, a transportation and mess officer, and such other additional officers, enlisted personnel, and materiel as circumstances demand. The appointment of competent officers in the three positions above named is absolutely essential to the success of the press division.

3. When necessary, officers should be detached from the press division to the particular center, or larger centers, of military news.

The function of these officers should be to gather and transmit news for the use of the press division and to ensure its accuracy. They should not be held in any way accountable for the censorship of news except as to accuracy. When intelligently performed, the work of these officers will serve, by gathering all available news, to relieve busy staff officer; from the burden of interviews with correspondents which would otherwise be certainly necessary.

II

PRINCIPLES OF CENSORSHIP:

1. The following are the basic principles of press censorship in the European war as adopted on April 2, 1918:

   All information which is not helpful to the enemy may be given to the public.

   All articles must meet four conditions:
   1. They must be accurate in statement and by implication
   2. They must not supply military information to the enemy
   3. They must not injure morale in our forces here or at home or among our Allies.
   4. They must not embarrass the United States or her Allies in neutral countries.

   These principles are all inclusive. They would have covered all the problems of past wars; they are likely to cover all the problems of wars to come.

   In my opinion these principles are in themselves well-nigh sufficient for the guidance of a competent field censor. The responsibility of the censor is the proper application of these principles. A minimum of special rules should be imposed on the censor. The effect of special rules is to oblige the censor to make decisions which may appear to be, and often are, indefensible and ridiculous, and thus to force the army itself into an untenable position before the public. When the censor makes mistakes,
these mistakes should be called to his attention. If he makes too many mistakes he should be relieved.

4. Principle 1. Articles must be accurate in statement and by implication. There has been little criticism of the censorship on that score. Correspondents are likely in the future as in the past to cooperate in the direction of accuracy.

There is, however, a certain type of mind to which real accuracy is foreign. Among all writers the imaginative faculty is intentionally, and rightly, developed; and an occasional correspondent will always be found whose imagination has become so strong that he cannot stick to the truth no matter how honestly he tries. In extreme cases of this sort, the only cure is to request his employer to relieve the correspondent in question, giving persistent inaccuracy as a reason for the request.

5. Principle 2. Articles must not supply military information to the enemy. The military information most necessary to be suppresses is that regarding all military activities behind the lines. Correspondents can seldom give technical information of any value to the enemy, as they seldom have sufficient technical knowledge to do so. Exact numbers of any kind should of course be avoided. As a general rule exact information of any kind should be avoided, and all news regarding troops in reserve or activities behind the lines, should, if not wholly suppressed, be regarded as containing very dangerous possibilities of information to the enemy. Future plans of the army, or conjectures as to future plans, should of course be barred.

6. Articles must not injure morale in our forces here or at home or among our Allies. Just as the application of principle (2) demands military experience of the censor, so does the application of principle (3) demand common sense, for it is in dealing with this principle that most of the disagreements between the censor and correspondents arise. As a general rule whatever causes discord in our forces, or at home, or among our Allies, also weakens morale; so it is discord which must be avoided. Where there exists a grave state of affairs in any army or between Allied armies, or between an expeditionary force and its home government, the high command alone should authorize publication of the facts, frankly accepting the responsibility for temporary injury to morale, and in the conviction that morale will thereby be permanently improved.

There is little likelihood of intentional violation of principles (1) and (2) by censors or correspondents; but a danger in the past and in past wars has always been present in the application of principle (3). No intentional violation of this principle should for any reason ever be permitted by a subordinate officer.

7. Principle (4) Articles must not embarrass the United States or her Allies in neutral countries.

This principle, while it has been a dead letter in the immediate past, has usually been of the very highest importance to belligerents, and will very likely be equally important in the future. Indeed, since this principle chiefly involves national interests, no army should consent to its violation except by direction from the proper authorities of the national government.

III

QUALIFICATIONS OF OFFICERS OF THE PRESS DIVISION

1. The chief press officer should possess:
   (a) Military experience
   (b) Newspaper experience
   (c) The qualities expected of a competent judge
   (d) Executive ability

The chief press officer in addition to his ordinary duties as commanding officer should act as first court for appeals by correspondents against censorship and other rulings. The chief press officer should never himself act as censor. Only in this way can a necessary buffer be placed between the correspondents and general headquarters. The chief
press officer must have military experience, newspaper experience, and a firm judicial temperament in order to pass judgment justly upon appeals. He must have executive ability in order properly to direct the press division. It makes no difference whether he is a regular army or reserve officer provided on the one hand that he does not appear in the eyes of the correspondents to place the interests of the regular army ahead of any other national interests, and on the other hand that he conducts himself in a strict and proper military manner, and according to the highest military ethics.

2. The chief field censor should possess:
   (a) Military experience
   (b) Newspaper experience
   (c) The qualities expected of a competent judge
   (d) Executive ability

   The chief field censor should possess all the qualities expected of the chief press officer. If he lacks military experience, newspaper experience or a judicial temperament appeals will become so frequent that the duties of the chief field censor will practically devolve upon the chief press officer. As second in command of the press division, he should possess executive ability in order properly to direct the press division in the chief officer’s absence, occasionally necessary. The chief field censor should possess military experience sufficient to distinguish all matters in despatches which might supply military information of service to the enemy. The chief field censor should possess thorough newspaper experience and be in sympathy with the objects of a free and loyal press. Above all, the chief field censor should possess the qualities expected of a competent judge. He must be firm, absolutely impartial and he must never on any account or for any reason lose his temper with individuals.

3. The mess and transportation officer should possess executive ability, good temper, and experience in the particular means of transportation which are to be employed.

IV

CERTIFICATES OF EXPERIENCE AND CHARACTER

The personal character and newspaper experience of correspondents should be certified by their employers before correspondents are accredited and permitted to join the army in the field. Employers should in principle be held responsible for the conduct of their representatives.

V

NUMBER AND PRIVILEGES OF ACCREDITED CORRESPONDENTS:

The number of accredited correspondents should be limited in the discretion of the commander-in-chief in the field.

Accredited correspondents should be accorded the social rank and privileges of commissioned officers. All possible facilities for the gathering of news and for its transmission should be afforded them.

In other words, correspondents should be treated as staff officers. In principle no information should be withheld from them, whether or not it can be published, and orders to that effect should be issued. Correspondents should be free to travel wherever they please without conducting officers. Almost all American correspondents can be fully trusted.

After despatches are censored official assistance if necessary, should be given for their transmission.

A strict examination of the qualifications and trustworthiness of correspondents should be made before they are permitted to join the army in the field. After that, it is impossible to get good results other than by trusting them. Obviously all must be treated and trusted, alike.
VI

CORRESPONDENTS AGREEMENT:

Correspondents when accredited should agree (1) to obey all lawful orders of the chief press officer and of his superior officers. (2) to serve if required for the duration of the war. (3) this agreement should be countersigned by correspondents employers.

1. A correspondent should in sighting his agreement place himself in the position of a commissioned officer when he signs the oath of allegiance.

2. In insisting that correspondents agree to serve for the duration of the war the army protects itself in the only way it can protect itself. If correspondents know that they cannot resign any time they feel like it, they will regard their responsibilities more seriously than has been the case hitherto.

3. It will also have a sobering effect on employers if they know that they cannot square themselves with the army by simply substituting for a man who has broken the rules, another man who has not. The principle of employers responsibility should be rigidly established and maintained.

4. Correspondents when accredited should be obliged to deposit a substantial amount of money with the War Department. This deposit should be used to defray those expenses incurred by correspondents which cannot be conveniently disposed of by cash payment to the army in the field. This deposit should not be subject to forfeit as a disciplinary measure, but required by the War Department merely as a financial precaution.

VII

DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

1. These measures should consist of (1) suppression of filing privileges. (2) Cancellation of credentials. (3) Court martial.

From the point of view of a correspondent or of his employers the most serious penalty which can be incurred for the breaking of agreement is loss of filing privileges. It should be understood before the agreement is signed that that is the very penalty which will be inflicted. In addition both correspondents and employers should understand that if a correspondent breaks the rules, he may be held idle even for the duration of the war. Employers should also understand that they cannot substitute another correspondent for one who has broken the rules. In that case rules will indeed be rarely broken.

2. The credentials of a correspondent should only be cancelled for gross disobedience of orders as a disciplinary measure alternative to detention with permanent suppression of filing privileges or where such detention with the army is impracticable.

This penalty should be inflicted upon a correspondent only by legal processes equivalent to those whereby a commissioned officer is discharged from the service, and serve to convey and equivalent stigma.

3. Court martial of correspondents should only take place in case of actual crime. Resignation of correspondents, by request, is not included as a disciplinary measure. This should merely be a request from the army which it will no doubt be politic from time to time to make in particular cases. Such requests will no doubt be acceded to in the future as they have been in the past, as it is not to the interests of employers to keep correspondents with the army who are not wanted there.
ORDER OF TRANSMISSION OF DISPATCHES:

1. In principle, correspondents should themselves transmit their dispatches as soon as each dispatch is censored.

2. When by reason of distance from the office of transmission of or any other reason this becomes impossible, dispatches should be numbered by the censor in the order of filing. The order of filing is thus certified as the order of transmission also.

3. When for military reasons dispatches must be temporarily held for release, lots should be drawn for the order of transmission, dispatches of recognized news agencies being limited in quantity but given precedence over those of special newspapers.

In principle, dispatches of all correspondents, whether representing news agencies or special newspapers, should be transmitted in the actual order of filing. From time to time, however, it will be found necessary temporarily to withhold the publication of news, for military reasons. Correspondents will then naturally file dispatches in advance for release by the censor. In that case the only just method of adjusting the order of transmission is by lot. But bearing in mind the ultimate object of the press organization, which is to supply to the entire public all information not helpful to the enemy, precedence over special newspaper should be given to those agencies which serve the whole press of the United States and Europe. On the other hand, the dispatches of these recognized news agencies should in number of words be strictly limited to that amount which in the judgment of the chief field censor and the chief press officer meets the news exigencies of the event released. In point of fact it is priority of transmission, though strictly limited in quantity, which is required of and should be granted to, the news agencies.

They should be permitted to file for prior transmission to no greater extent than is necessary to cover the principal outstanding facts of any released event.

APPEALS:

1. Oral appeals to the chief press officer on all rulings should be permitted. Written appeals through military channels, only, to the superior officers of the chief press officer should be permitted. This rule should not be so construed as to preclude interviews by appointment with those officers. Correspondents should be obliged to make all appeals to general headquarters except in the case of personal interviews, through military channels. Otherwise general headquarters will allow the influence of the chief press officer to be undermined and soon find themselves obliged to do his work themselves. On the other hand it is a good thing for general headquarters to receive the correspondents personally just as much as possible, to keep in touch with them, and to see that no injustice is being done.

RELATIONS OF PRESS OFFICERS AND CORRESPONDENTS

The press officers and correspondents should live and mess together. Only so can such an atmosphere for cooperation be maintained as is necessary for the achievement of the object of the press organization. This object is to send out the most news and the best news possible. Given the right kind of officers there is no danger that familiarity will breed contempt. The press division must be an organization in which correspondents and officers meet and work not from day to day but from hour to hour in a common patriotic cause.
I. CENSORSHIP

C. RECOMMENDATIONS WITH REGARD TO FUTURE CENSORSHIP POLICY OF THE ARMY IN THE EVENT OF WAR

2. POSTAL CENSORSHIP

3. PRISONER OF WAR MAIL

II. POSTAL CENSORSHIP: The system as employed in the present war, being largely a development from the British system, contemplated the theory and policy of unit control. There are obvious difficulties in this system of censorship control, which have been pointed out in other portions of this report.

Another method of censorship control, namely, original jurisdiction of censorship vested in a base censor, with branches at railheads and various training areas or other isolated stations, would, under certain conditions, adapt itself either to an expeditionary force or to a war of defense on home territory, but circumstances must control the method to be employed. For instance, in a war of defense on home territory, where a postal service is organized and established and rail lines are thoroughly known, the problem would be far more simple and original base censorship more easy than in the case presented by the present war in which ours was an expeditionary force within a foreign country whose rail and postal control were heavily burdened by its own necessities. It is obvious that the factor of difficult liaison between the American Expeditionary Force in France and the French postal and rail system was a considerable handicap in the matter of censorship control.

In view of the chapters of this report which refer to postal censorship, without attempting to prescribe specifically a method for future emergency, one is led to recommend a policy which it is hoped would develop a nucleus of personnel and a fundamental principle of censorship that would render it a comparatively easy matter to establish a method of administration of censorship under whatever conditions we may find ourselves, whether in defensive or expeditionary warfare.

First, there should be a base censor. A base censor is necessary, regardless of whether unit control or censorship solely by a specialized personnel is employed. The base censor should be an officer of the regular establishment who has special qualifications and has had special training in the army intelligence schools, training in the intelligence schools being necessary that this officer may coordinate his department with the intelligence section in all its parts. There should also be trained junior officers, who, in the event that a zone or railhead system be adopted, may take over and train the necessary personnel for the several stations with the least possible delay and with a clear understanding of the policy and method adopted for the emergency. Such junior officers are necessary under either system, for, in the event that unit control is employed, they will be valuable as assistants to the revising base censor, and for the training of officers of the various units for original censorship.

It is thought advisable that, in the event unit control of censorship is employed, a special course of instruction be given to representatives of the various larger units in order that they may in turn instruct officers of subordinate units on the policy and methods to be used. Most of the violations of censorship rules which have occurred in the present war could have been avoided had the censoring officer been fully cognizant of the policy of censorship and in sympathy with the methods by which the censorship was imposed. If properly instructed, a platoon commander is in a position in turn to advise his men what they may or may not write in their letters and quite as important, the reasons for the rules. With a more thorough understanding of the rules of censorship and the reasons therefor, men become less sensitive in submitting their letters for censorship, and officers, by being trained in the subject, find it less difficult to deal with censorship problems.

The base censor must be responsible, mediately or immediately, to the chief of intelligence and must have an organization under him so coordinated as to be able to reach
the lowest private in the ranks. Viewing the matter in this light, the prime necessity is that of providing a nucleus of personnel. This nucleus must be composed of officers, and perhaps enlisted men, of the regular establishment, for the reason that the permanency of such a nucleus of informed men is vitally necessary. Such a nucleus of personnel having been established and a policy of censorship having been adopted to cover a given emergency, there remains only the expansion of the system to meet the requirements of the emergency of adding to the personnel and by training it in accordance with the policy established.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

In the event of another war, the base censor should be charged with the examining and censoring of the prisoner of war mail. In order to do this properly, an officer of military experience, enemy language qualifications, and special intelligence training should be detailed from the base censor's office, with sufficient commissioned and enlisted personnel, to the office or bureau which shall have as its function the keeping of records of all prisoners, information concerning them, their addresses and changes thereof. It is apparent that a prisoner of war mail censorship should be located at a point where both the incoming and outgoing prisoner of war mail must necessarily pass. For example, the mail coming from any territory is forwarded by the neutral government which undertakes the forwarding of mail between the two belligerents, and this mail should go direct to the prisoners of war bureau, and there be sorted and distributed to the various prisoners' camps. Outgoing mail should be collected from the various prison camps at this bureau and forwarded direct to the neutral country. That, in effect is the system that was employed in this war, and so far as it concerns the censorship; it is an excellent system, for at the point of concentration the censorship can be very effectively applied with the least possible disturbance of the transmission of the mail, and with the additional advantage of having access to files on information, which is a great help in the censoring of letters and compiling data for the intelligence section.

II. PROPAGANDA

A. HISTORY OF DIRECT PROPAGANDA OVER THE ENEMY'S LINES AS CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF G-2-D

HISTORY OF DIRECT PROPAGANDA OVER THE ENEMY LINES AS CONDUCTED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF G-2-D, FROM AUGUST 28 to NOVEMBER 11, 1918

PRELUDE: The A. E. F. dropped over the German lines, in the last three months of the war, approximately 3,000,000 propaganda leaflets. These 3,000,000 leaflets were simply statements of fact, written with the most scrupulous regard for truth and simply pointing out the hopelessness of the German cause. They were showered, by airplane generally, on the Argonne front, the Meuse and Thiaucourt fronts (these by patrol and plane to a depth of eight kilometers), and the Vosges (scatteringly, by patrol). Back areas, such as Conflans, Longuyon, Stenay, Sedan and the neighborhood of Metz, were reached by airplane and balloon. The distribution by airplane was often extremely hazardous.

This sketch of the use of propaganda as a military weapon by the A. E. F. includes the following:
1. Origin of propaganda, and A. E. F. propaganda, against the enemy.
2. The approved aims.
3. Organization and personnel.
4. Actual workings.
ORIGIN: The purpose of propaganda, directed against military forces, was to contribute to the general demoralization of enemy morale, and in specific sectors to break the fighting spirit of particular units and to bring about desertions from particular units at critical times.

The Germans developed propaganda, both against military forces and civilian populations, into effective weapons of offense but in so notorious a fashion and with such a disregard of truth that the work propaganda fell into disrepute; for the Allied armies it came to mean simply the dropping upon German lines and concentration areas of plain statements of fact to show, or attempt to show, the hopelessness of his case. For example, the main arguments of Allied propaganda in the closing weeks of the war was the story of the tremendous forces America was throwing into the conflict and thereby sealing the fate of Germany.

The discovery of how effective the German propaganda was or how effective propaganda could be -- resulted, in the Allied countries, in its being given the importance it deserved. The Russian reverse and the crushing defeat of the Italian armies in September 1917, in both of which propaganda figured prominently, were perhaps the final proofs.

An interallied propaganda board was established in London, to discuss policies and for the interchange of ideas, and James Keeley sat on it as the American representative. England, for herself, greatly increased its propaganda board, put Lord Northcliffe at the head of it, and began to send millions of leaflets over the German lines. France increased its propaganda work and, by August 1918, had dropped 25,000,000 pamphlets over the lines.

On July 15, seven officers sailed for the A. E. F., in charge of Capt. Heber Blankenhorn. They reported at G. H. Q. on July 25, and were sent to study propaganda methods of foreign countries.

Some of the officers sat first in Paris with the French committee for propaganda against the enemy and later in London, and afterward visited British G. H. Q. near Arras and studied distribution methods.

These investigations disclosed the following conditions:

The French army was distributing leaflets over enemy lines by means of airplane, paper balloon, rifle grenade and even by shells from 75's. The leaflets consisted of announcements of the increase of the American army, statements of prisoner conditions in French prison camps, copies of revolutionary periodicals, booklets by exiled German radicals, and onslaughts on Ludendorff and the Hohenzollerns.

The British army was distributing propaganda by balloon alone, having begun late in the Spring of 1918. At first the leaflets were appeals to desert and reproductions of prisoners' letters, and were prepared by the War Office. Later the work was taken over by Lord Northcliffe's board, and the most emphasis laid on America's help and on progress maps. The chief activity of the board, however, was a series of diplomatic moves to cause the submerged nationalities of Austro-Hungary to become discontented. At that time, the summer of 1918, the British board had not been able to get its flying corps to distribute pamphlets, its policy being that propaganda is not worth casualties.

Both the British and French propaganda boards gave all assistance in their power. The A. E. F. campaign conducted its campaign independently; its total distributions were about proportionate to its percentage of strictly military participation.

THE APPROVED AIMS: Report was made in the last week of August, presenting two plans:

(a) A tentative plan, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, for the establishment propaganda over the lines on all fronts.
(b) A plan for immediate propaganda over the front of the American First Army, to meet the necessities of the day.

The complete plan provided for three departments:

1) Political Intelligence: Effective work could be founded only on the most accurate current intelligence of German civilian and military morale and the influence to which it was most sensitive.
Emergency Publication: This department to be made up of experts in editing and the presentation of arguments, supplemented by translators and printers, was to have charge of the actual production of leaflets in Europe, and was to supervise the impromptu printing of leaflets on army presses and in the field.

Distribution: This department was to assure immediate distribution by airplane and balloon, and to investigate other possible methods adaptable to our front.

In principle, parts 2 and 3 of this organization were approved. In practice, the immediate need of the A. E. F. was the production and distribution of a special sort of propaganda. To effect this, the following principles were laid down by authorities at G. H. Q.:

First, leaflets were to be edited and distributed for strictly military purposes, chiefly, inducing desertion and surrender in enemy units on special sectors of our front. These leaflets were to combat the common German rumor that Americans killed all prisoners and that the American army was weak in numbers and equipment. The arguments were to be simple, plain soldier, accurate statements of fact, adapted to the mentality of the average, or below average, private.

Second, leaflets were to be prepared for the strictly military but less immediate purpose of undermining morale by the presentation of the larger political aspects of the war, whenever these American arguments were formulated in addresses of the President. These were to be distributed also over civilian populations, as they would indirectly affect military morale.

A strategic factor was Allied policy, which had come to favor (Fall of 1918) a sustained offensive to end the war that year. This change of policy resulted in more emphasis being laid on the strictly technical purpose of inducing surrender then on the larger political arguments.

Organization and Personnel: An organization was improvised out of the officers immediately available. The A. C. of S., G-2, G. H. Q., assumed personal responsibility for the character of the leaflets and himself scrutinized the first ones issued. Under him the Chief, G-2-D, G. H. Q., Major A. L. James, Jr., subdivided the work as follows:

(a) Distribution was put in charge of Capt. Heber Blankenhorn, assisted by Lieuts. George N. Ifft, Ludlow Griscom and W. F. Miltenberger, stationed at G. H. Q.
(b) Editing was put in charge of Capt. Walter Lippman, assisted by Mr. Arthur Page and Lieut. E. M. Woolley stationed in Paris. Lieut. Charles Merz was stationed in London.

In later practice, the planning and editing (and sometimes the actual printing) of leaflets was carried on largely by the officers stationed at G. H. Q. At one stage almost all the propaganda was written in Washington, by President Wilson, in the Armistice notes addressed to Germany.

Actual Working: The first step was to find out the actual state of enemy morale, principally by questioning prisoners. Capt. Lippmann, Lieut. Ifft and Sergt. E. A. Hicker, after studying the current intelligence at G. H. Q., would go to the war cages near Toul and Souilly and talk with enemy officers and privates. In this way, accurate acknowledge was obtained of their conception of war conditions and especially of America's part in the war.

The second step was to draw up leaflets which, after approval, were printed in Paris and sent to G. H. Q., or, later, to Bar-le-Duc and Toul, where field stations were established.

Through liaison with the air service, leaflets were allotted to air fields covering certain prescribed areas, together with report blanks for record of actual distribution.

From questionnaires sent to G-2's of armies and corps, a checkup of results was attempted through the questioning of prisoners, especially those on whose person was found American leaflets.

Nearly every branch of the service assisted in every way it could. The meteorological section of the signal corps made experiments to determine the ascensional rate of
the balloons to be used. The G-2's of many organizations furnished suggestions and sent in calls for propaganda. The organizations furnished suggestions and sent in calls for propaganda. The aviators distributed the leaflets in an admirable spirit of cooperation, even under hazardous conditions.

Room 65, in B Building, G. H. Q. was fitted up at this time as propaganda headquarters. On one wall was a graphic record of the propaganda situation; on another the military use of propaganda by Great Britain; on another all specimens of German propaganda; on another all French propaganda and on another the American leaflets. There were also specimens of propaganda balloons and maps showing the distribution of all American propaganda.

In Paris the editors and printing directors had desk room at the office of the military attache and at the headquarters of the French commission for propaganda against the enemy.

At Bar-le-Duc was the field workshop for the First Army, where propaganda was stored, balloon releases made and the field unit housed. At Toul was a similar office for the Second Army. Three lieutenants and seventeen enlisted men operated the distributing outfit consisting of two three ton trucks and two light trucks. Their business was to get the leaflets to air fields and to arrange for reports of distribution. The two trucks also acted as balloon sending stations near Verdun.

The balloons used were the standard British paper propaganda balloon, known as the ninety foot balloon, about 9' long and carrying four pounds of leaflets hung on a slow burning fuse, twelve inches long. Lieut. Ift, in charge, began his day's work by obtaining from meteorological headquarters the wind rates for the day, so as to regulate the length of fuse to be burned before the balloon could drift to the enemy lines. Bad weather, the shortage of hydrogen gas, the rapidly moving battle line, the difficulties of gas tube transport, combined to reduce the number of balloons actually sent.

The chief credit for actual distribution should go to the aviators. who were tireless in trying to reach enemy troop concentrations with the leaflets. The greatest quantities were distributed by the III Corps observers at Souilly, the day bombers at Maulin, the IV Corps observers at Toul, the army observers at Vavincourt, and the different corps observers at Rarecourt, Fouracourt, Remicourt, Beauzee and Rumont (the last two French). Despite threatening enemy orders promising imprisonment or hanging for aviators carrying propaganda, these flyers took the leaflets along on most of their trips for observation or bombing. Some flew as low as 50 meters over Montfaucon with the propaganda.

In all, 9 to 12 aviation fields handled the material, averaging 5,000 to 10,000 pamphlets a day. Some fields handled 30,000 a day. Low clouds and miserable weather hindered the distribution to a great extent.

LEAFLETS PRODUCED: Following is a record of the leaflets actually produced or distributed by the Propaganda Section, G-2-D, G. H. Q.

1. Prisoner Leaflet: This leaflet was a translation of an extract from General Order 106, prescribing the treatment to be accorded by the A. E. F. to prisoners of war. Appended to it was a list of rations issued to the American soldier, and prescribed for the enemy prisoner.
2. Prisoner Leaflet: Same as #1 but gave the ration in detail and was printed in Gothic.
3. Prisoner Post Card: A postcard, a variation of 1, done up in the likeness of the German Feldpostkarte, and based on the idea that the enemy soldier's natural interest, after being assured of mercy and food, was solicited for his family. A number came back on prisoners.
4. St-Mihiel Progress Map: This was worked up by General Nolan and Capt. Blankenhorn, a simple dignified statement by map and statistics of the results of the St-Mihiel smash.
5. Way to Peace and Justice: An extract from the League of Nations speech of President Wilson on Sept. 27. Many of these were later found on prisoners.
10. Official Figures. A tiny dodger, borrowed from the French, giving the official statements of Allied captures from Sept. 1 to Sept. 30 and from July 1 to Sept. 30.

11. The German Request for an Armistice of October 4 and the President's Reply of October 8: Used because of the belief that the import of these messages were delayed in reaching the German soldier.


X. Special Leaflet from the Commander-in-Chief: A combined statement of the hopelessness of the situation (military) for Germany and of the opportunity open to the German soldier of surrendering to exceptionally kind captors.

14. Official Figures: The name of 10 brought up to the date of October 10, supplemented by a map of the front and by a graphic diagram of troop shipments.

15. The President's reply to Germany of October 14, edited by Capt. Lippmann.

16. The President's reply to Austria printed in Czecho-Slovak and dropped over an Austro-Hungarian division containing many Czechs.

18. Progress map of the western front brought up to October 21 with a statement of captures and graphic representation of American troop shipments. A revision of 14.

19. The President's note of October 23.

20. The Austrian request for a separate peace, printed in German and scattered over German troops on the western front.

21. A Polish pamphlet, supplied by the French, for an Austro-Hungarian division.

No. Y and Z. Austria is Out of the War: A leaflet with the announcement of the Austrian Armistice, pointed out that Germany was then alone, quoted Vorwaerts to the effect that Austria's action virtually ended the war, and closed with statements directly inducing desertion and surrender.

In addition to the above, the distribution section edited and printed a leaflet especially designed for Alsace-Lorrainers in German units on the front of the Second Army. Copies of all leaflets were also printed in English so that units would know what they were distributing.

A newspaper, The International Bulletin, with parallel columns in German and English, was in course of preparation at the time of the Armistice.

ESTIMATE OF SUCCESS: The evidence of the value of propaganda - propaganda as a whole, rather than the A. E. F. propaganda alone - is of two kinds, first orders and proclamations of the German High Command, and replies of prisoners and captured letters.

1. The German command issued and reissued (see Hindenburg manifesto in appendix) stringent orders against reading our propaganda leaflets and all propaganda leaflets, ordering them to be turned in to commanding officers and offering pay for each leaflet so given up. In the Koelnisiche Zeitung, at the end of October, a letter from an officer on the western front said: "What caused most damage was the paper war waged by our enemies, who daily flooded us with some hundred thousand leaflets, extraordinarily well arranged and edited." The Germans worked hard in their endeavor to reply to the propaganda with propaganda.

2. The answers of German prisoners when interrogated on propaganda may be classified, roughly, as follows: Of officers, 75% laughed at the value of the leaflets and said the troops did not believe them and obediently turned them in, and 25% attributed the weakening of German morale to the leaflets. Of the men, 75% expressed belief in the leaflets, especially the American leaflets, and 25% declared they paid no attention to them.

Letters captured with prisoners gave strong evidence of the men being impressed with the propaganda.

To summarize: It appears that propaganda, American and Allied, helped materially to create an atmosphere of defeat, which helped to lower the enemy morale.
The following is the manifesto Marshal Hindenburg issued against propaganda, about September 5, 1918.

We are engaged in a hard struggle with our enemies. If numerical superiority alone guaranteed victory, Germany would long since have lain shattered on the ground. The enemy knows, however, that Germany and her Allies cannot be conquered by arms alone. The enemy knows that the spirit which dwells within our troops and our people makes us unconquerable. Therefore, together with the struggle against German arms, he has undertaken a struggle against the German spirit; he seeks to poison our spirit and believes that German arms will also become blunted if the German spirit is eaten away.

We should not take this plan of the enemy too lightly. The enemy conducts his campaign against our spirit by various means. He bombards our front, not only with a drum-fire of artillery, but also with a drumfire of printed matter. Besides bombs which kill the body, his airmen throw down leaflets which are intended to kill the soul.

Of these enemy leaflets our field-gray men delivered up:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>85,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A gigantic increase. Ten thousand poisoned arrows daily in July; 10,000 times daily the attempt to deprive the individual and the whole body of belief in the justice of our cause, and of the strength and confidence for ultimate victory! We can reckon in addition that a great part of the enemy leaflets will not have been found by us.

But the enemy is not merely satisfied in attacking the spirit of our front, he wishes above all else to poison the spirit of our home. He knows what sources of strength for the front rest in the home. True, his aeroplanes and balloons do not carry these leaflets far into our homeland; they lie far from it in the lines in which the enemy vainly struggles for victory by arms. But the enemy hopes that many a field-gray soldier will send home the leaflet which has innocently fluttered down from the air. At home it will pass from hand to hand and be discussed at the beer table, in families, in the sewing room, in factories, and in the street. Unsuspectingly many thousands consume the poison. For thousands the burden the war in any case imposes upon them is increased, and the will and hope for a victorious issue of the war is taken from them. All these again then write their doubts to the front, and Wilson, Lloyd-George and Clemenceau rub their hands.

The enemy attacks the spirit of the home in another way besides. The silliest rumors designed to break our inner power of resistance are put into circulation. We find them simultaneously in Switzerland, in Holland and in Denmark; thence they spread like a wave over the whole of Germany. Or they emerge simultaneously, agreeing in silly details in the remotest regions of our country, in Silesia, in East Prussia, in the Rhineland, and wend their way thence over the remainder of the home territory. This poison works on the man on leave and flows in letters to the front. Again the enemy rubs his hands.

The enemy is ingenious. He knows how to mix the little powder for everyone. He decoys the fighters at the front. One leaflet runs:

German soldiers. It is shameful lie that the French ill treat German prisoners. We are not brutes; only come over to us without fear; here you will find a most considerate reception, good food and a peaceful refuge.

Ask brave men who have succeeded with unspeakable difficulty in escaping from enemy captivity about this. Plundered to the utmost in wire compounds, roofless, goaded by hunger and thirst into treasonable utterances, forced by blows and threats of death to betray their comrades, spat upon, pelted with filth by the French populace while being driven to hard labor, that is what the paradise that the enemy conjures up really looks like.

Reproductions of original letters written by prisoners are also thrown down, in which these men describe how well it goes with them. God be praised, there are still
also decent and humane commandments of prisoners' camps in England and France, but these
are the exception, and the letters the enemy throws down are only three or four different
kinds. But he sends these multiplied by many thousands of copies. The enemy intimidates
the fainthearted by saying:

Your struggle is hopeless; America will settle you; your submarines are
no good; we are building more ships than they can sink; after the war we shall
dear you from getting raw materials; then Germany's industry must starve. This is
the tone of the leaflets; now enticement, now threat.
This is the tone of the leaflets; now enticement, now threat.

What is the real situation? We have enforced peace in the east and are strong
enough to do it in the west, notwithstanding the Americans; but we must be strong and
united; that is what the enemy is fighting against with his leaflets and rumors. He
wishes to deprive us of faith and confidence, will and force.

Why is the enemy continually seeking new Allies in the struggle against us? Why
does he try to press nations still neutral into the struggle against us? Because in
strength we are his equals.

Why does he incite black and other colored men against German soldiers? Because his
will is to destroy us.

Again the enemy says another thing:

You Germans, your form of government is wrong. Fight against the
Hohenzollerns, against capitalism; help us, the Entente, to give you a
better form of state.

The enemy knows perfectly what strength resides in our state and empire; but that is
precisely why he combats it. The enemy also seeks to tear open old wounds in the German
body politic. With his leaflets and by rumors he attempts to sow division and distrust
among the federal state. At Lake Constance we confiscated many thousands of leaflets con-
veyed to Bavaria and intended to excite anger against the north Germans. They wish to
destroy the German Empire, which for centuries was the dream of Germans, and which our
fathers won for us, and to condemn Germany to the impotence of the Thirty Years War also
wishes to shake our loyalty to our Allies. He does not know the German way, and the word
of a German man. He himself sacrifices his Allies; he who is England's ally dies of it.

And finally the enemy sends not the least dangerous of his poisoned arrows dipped
in printers' ink when he throws down the utterances of German men and German newspapers.
The utterances of German newspapers are torn from their contexts. Regarding the utter-
ances of Germans who are reproduced remember that at every time there have been conscious
and unconscious traitors to the fatherland. Most of them reside abroad in neutral coun-
tries, in order not to be obliged to share our struggle and our privations or to be
condemned by our judges as guilty of high treason. Nor have champions of extreme party
tendencies any right to claim to speak for the generality of the German people.

It is our strength, but also our weakness, that even in war we allow unrestricted
utterances to every opinion. We still tolerate in our newspapers the reproduction of
enemy army reports and the speeches of many statesmen, which are weapons of attack di-
rected against the spirit of the German army and people. This is a sign of strength, be-
cause it proves a consciousness of might. But it is a weakness because it allows the
enemy's poison to find an entrance among us.

Therefore, German army, German homeland, if one of these thrown-out pieces of poison
in the form of leaflet or rumor comes before your eyes or ears, remember that it origi-
nates with the enemy. Remember that nothing comes from the enemy which is not harmful
to Germany. Everyone must be mindful of this, whatever his position or party. If you
meet anyone whose name and origin indeed are German, but who by nature stands in the
enemy's camp, keep him at a distance, despise him, put him publicly in the pillory in
order that every other true German may despise him.

Defend yourself, Germany, army, German homeland.
II. PROPAGANDA

B. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE USES OF PROPAGANDA IN THE EVENT OF A FUTURE EMERGENCY

1. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MILITARY AND CIVIL PROPAGANDA
   (a) Propaganda toward the United States civil population, toward neutrals or Allies (if any) and against enemy civil population should not be a function of the army.
   (b) Propaganda against the military forces of the enemy should be directed by the general staff in the field.
   Propaganda directed for or against a civil population is obviously a civil function and naturally falls within the domain of other than military departments of the national government.
   Propaganda for or against a military organization is, on the other hand, obviously a military function.

2. PROPAGANDA FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE FIELD
   The functions of the intelligence section in this regard should be the preparation and distribution of suitable propaganda among enemy front line units.

3. PREPARATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF PROPAGANDA AMONG ENEMY FIRST LINE TROOPS.
   Leaflets should be prepared by a propaganda subdivision organized for that purpose in the intelligence section and distributed by it, by balloons or other available means, among the enemy troops.
   Leaflets should be:
   (a) Simple, plain soldier, accurate statements of fact, adapted to the mentality of the average or below average private.
   (b) Calculated to induce, or at least suggest the thought of, surrender.
   (c) Adapted to the character of the enemy unit aimed at, to the supposed condition of his morale, and to the general condition of the military situation.

4. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROPAGANDA SUBDIVISION OF THE INTELLIGENCE SECTION OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE FIELD.
   (a) An officer in charge of propaganda subdivision.
   (b) An officer in charge of preparation and printing of leaflets.
   (c) An officer in charge of distribution of leaflets and such additional commissioned and noncommissioned personnel as circumstances demand.

5. CONCLUSION: It is pointed out that the present value of propaganda is the direct result not of the magnitude of the forces engaged in this war but of its long and trying character. The organization of a propaganda service will not be necessary in any way, no matter how great, which is settled by sudden force of arms, as, for instance, the War of 1870. The organization of a propaganda service is one which can safely be delayed, and which should be delayed, until the intelligence section functions of more immediate military importance are first fulfilled.

III. THE OFFICIAL ARTISTS OF THE A. E. F.

A. HISTORY OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH G-2-D AND NOTES ON THEIR WORK.
   REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE EIGHT OFFICIAL ARTISTS IN THE A. E. F. COMMISSIONED AS CAPTAINS IN THE ENGINEER RESERVE CORPS
   In the plans outlined by the general staff for the making of a pictorial history of the war, no provision was included for artists in colors or in black and white. The initiative in this line of work was taken by Major General Black, Chief of Engineers, in December 1917. After conference with engineer officers engaged in camouflage work and with Mr. Charles Dana Gibson and other well known artists, General Black gave commissions, with the rank of captain, to eight artists, well known in civil life as illustrators and painters. These officers were Captains Andre J. Smith, Harry E. Townsend, Ernest Peixotto, Wallace Morgan, George M. Harding, Harvey Dunn, W. J. Duncan and W. J. Aylward.
All of these officers were ordered overseas as soon as commissioned and reported at G. H. Q., A. E. F. in the months of March and April 1918. Some confusion resulted because no definite instructions had been issued to these officers and no information had been furnished to G. H. Q., A. E. F. as regards their assignment or the functions they were to perform. It was difficult to formulate military regulations with much degree of definiteness to direct the activities of these artists. They were given station at Neufchateau and at first largely left to their own discretion as regards what lines of activities they should pursue.

Within a few weeks, however, certain demands for finished products for publicity and propaganda purposes began to arrive from various quarters in the United States, notably from the committee on public information. These demands came in the form of personal letters from an officer in the pictorial section of the Historical Branch of the General Staff. Certain demands and criticisms, however, were made through military channels, and, in an effort to comply with such demands, an order was issued by the Chief of G-2-D, to which section the eight official artists were attached, that monthly shipments of drawings and paintings should be made. The artists complained that the necessity of producing a quantity of pictures on a specified date placed them under a pressure which interfered with the proper pursuit of their artistic studies and work.

Because of the constant demand from American for action pictures, orders were issued in September 1918, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, confining the activities of the eight official artists to the advanced areas. As the artists grew more familiar with army life and enlarged their military knowledge, through service with troops in the field, the quality of their pictures steadily improved and their own complaints of restraints and criticisms grew noticeably fewer.

In January 1919 an exhibition of 196 drawings and paintings made by these artists was held in New York and drew from the press of that city extremely favorable criticism. After the exhibition in New York, the pictures were circulated through other important cities in the United States under the direction of the American Federation of Arts.

During the three months of combat activities during which the artists were restricted by orders, to the advanced areas, they made a series of pictures that will constitute a very valuable addition to the pictorial history of the A. E. F. In these pictures there are portrayed most of the activities of troops in the field and excellent sketches of scenes in the destroyed areas over which our troops were advancing.

The latest reports available show that the eight official artists produced pictures in the following quantities:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captain</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andre Smith</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harry E. Townsend</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earnest Peixotto</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wallace Morgan</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George M. Harding</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvey Dunn</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. J. Duncan</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. J. Aylward</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of these artists, however, have completed and forwarded pictures in addition to those noted above, but the exact number is not available.

In January 1919, the eight official artists were ordered from Neufchateau to Paris, there to take station and complete drawings and paintings from sketches they already had made in the field, both in the advanced areas and in the S. O. S. Captains Duncan, Townsend, Peixotto and Aylward are still continuing their work in Paris. The other four have returned to the United States either to continue their work there or to be discharged from the military service. Captain Peixott is at present detailed as an instructor at the Fine Arts Training Center at Bellevue under the army educational commission.
In view of certain official and unofficial criticisms of the works of these artists during the early months of their activities in the A. E. F., it should be stated that, since then, on several occasions Colonel C. W. Weeks, Chief, Historical Branch General Staff, Army War College, has expressed in writing high appreciation of the products of these artists' brushes and pencils, and that each of them received, January 4, 1919, the following letter from the Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.:

January 4, 1919.

From: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.
To: (Name of Artist)
Subject: Service in the A. E. F.

1. I take great pleasure in expressing to you my appreciation, as well as that of the A. E. F., for the valuable services which you have rendered during your stay in France. You have accomplished excellent work, under conditions which at times have been most trying.

2. The drawings and paintings already in the hands of the War College and those now in course of completion will form an important part of the permanent records of the war. Recent comments on your work that have come to my attention from the United States have been most favorable.

By direction of the Commander-in-Chief:

D. E. NOLAN,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The work of an artist is of such an intangible nature that it is difficult to outline, in any very specific manner, how their work in war times should be directed. In a broad way, however, it may be said that officers assigned to the work of drawing or painting pictures with an army in the field should be men accustomed to rapid work under conditions where all the implements and accommodations of a studio are not available. They should be chosen also with a view to their ability to care for themselves under trying conditions, men used to accommodating themselves to conditions as they find them.

May 10, 1918

From: Chief, G-2-D
To: Capt. Wallace Morgan, Engrs., U. S. R.
Capt. Ernest Peixott, Engrs., U. S. R.
Capt. J. Andre Smith, Engrs., U. S. R.
Capt. Harry E. Townswnd, Engrs., U. S. R.
Capt. Harvey Dunn, Engrs., N. A.
Capt. W. J. Aylward, Engrs., U. S. R.
Capt. George M. Harding, Engrs., U. S. R.

Subject: Duty as Official Artists of A. E. F.

1. In carrying our your work as official artists of the American Expeditionary Forces, you will keep in mind the need of supplying sketches and paintings both for historical purposes and for current use in American publications to which these sketches will be distributed through the War Department.

2. You will individually decide which of your sketches you should retain for future treatment of a more permanent nature and which can to good advantage be forwarded to this office for immediate release through Washington.
3. These which are intended for current use, are to be sent to this office on or about the 1st of each month.

4. Here they will be turned over to the signal corps for photostatic treatment. One positive will be retained for delivery to the artist who made the sketch; one positive, and if practicable the negative, will be retained in the office of the Chief, G-2-D for record. The original will then be forwarded to Washington. All will bear the title on the back showing the name of the artist, the date, the place and a brief description of the subject.

5. On the first of each month, each of you will prepare a brief summary of his work during the preceding thirty days, the work pending, and the work contemplated for the succeeding thirty days. These reports will be assembled and forwarded with a brief general report of your activities and plans as a unit.

By direction:

W. C. SWEENEY,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
Chief, G-2-D.

June 7, 1918.

MEMORANDUM

GENERAL POLICY REFERENCE THE WORK OF OFFICIAL ARTISTS

1. There have been assigned to the A. E. F., eight official artists, Captains, E. R. C. who are at present working under the direction of the Asst. Chief of the Censorship Division, at A. P. O. 731.

2. The following general scheme of systematizing the work of these artists has been adopted:
   (a) It is proposed to cover, troops in the trenches.
   (b) Troops in training area and in reserve.
   (c) Lines of Communication.

3. As long as the field is covered, the artists are to be allowed considerable latitude. The sketches and paintings are to be submitted to this office at the end of each month, also a full report of their activities for the preceding thirty days.

4. It is proposed to keep in close touch with the work of these artists in order that the army may derive greatest benefit from the talent of these officers and for the reason that any inefficient member may be known.

5. It is also proposed to make the schedule of work of these artists as elastic as possible in order that they may be used at whatever places which present the greatest opportunities.

6. We have thus far been able to cover the scheme as outlined in the first part of this memorandum and the only obstacle met this far has been the lack of materiel and suitable places to be used as studios. However, these obstacles will certainly be overcome within a very short time.

7. During the past ten days, the artists have done considerable work in the rear of the Marne battle front, drawing sketches of the French refugees, which it is believed will prove of considerable value for use as propaganda at home and abroad.

8. These officers travel under written instructions and their whereabouts is at all times known to the officers under whose direction they are at present working.

E. A. W. McCABE,
Lt., Col, N. A.
IV. PHOTOGRAPHIC SUBSECTION OF G-2-D

A. REPORT OF ITS ACTIVITIES.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO HISTORICAL PHOTOGRAPHY IN A FUTURE WAR.

REPORT OF THE PHOTOGRAPHIC SUBSECTION

G-2-D  G. H. Q.  A. E. F.

May 1, 1919.

The work of the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, has passed through three phases since the present officer in charge first was placed on duty with the A. E. F. in connection with historical pictures of the A. E. F. The first phase largely was concerned with efforts to learn how this subsection properly should function to obtain the results desired. In the second phase, the office of photographic censor was joined to the photographic subsection, and all relations with the committee on public information, as regards pictures, and with newspaper correspondents was placed under the direction of the Officer in Charge, Photographic Subsection, G-2-D. Within two months following the Armistice of November 11, 1918, censorship of pictures was found unnecessary and therefore discontinued, and the committee on public information ceased to function insofar as its activities was concerned with army pictures. Consequently the last phase of the work of this subsection has comprised work solely in connection with pictures for the historical archives of the Army War College [later turned in as a complete collection to National Archives, Washington, D. C., for permanent disposal].

The Officer in Charge of the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, was sent to France in May 1918 by the Chief of the Historical Branch, General Staff, with orders to supervise the production of pictures for historical purposes by signal corps photographers. Upon reporting for duty at G. H. Q., A. E. F., June 8, 1918, he was relieved from duty with the Historical Branch and attached to the Press Section of G-2, G. H. Q., being ordered to PARIS with instructions to report to Major A. L. James, Jr., Cavalry, then Chief Press Officer in PARIS. At that time all signal corps photographs and motion pictures were being handled by the Chief Photographic Censor; Capt. Joe T. Marshall, Cavalry, who forwarded them through his office to the Army War College, Washington. Relations with newspaper correspondents in France were maintained through the channel of the committee on public information, which at that time had no one directly in charge of pictures, and consequently issued the latter in a casual and haphazard manner. By direction of Major James, the officer in charge, Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, was placed in charge of supervising the production of pictures for historical purposes and of handling the relations between the signal corps photographic division and the committee on public information. In October 1918, the Photographic Subsection of G-2-D was created by direction of the Chief, G-2-D. The office of photographic censor under this order was attached to the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D. In the same month, October 1918, the officer in charge, photographic subsection was enabled to create an editing section, to be stationed at the signal corps photographic division laboratory, Vincennes, for the purpose of correcting, revising, writing and otherwise editing all captions attached to photographs and motion pictures. The division of pictures of the committee on public information was discontinued January 10, 1919. Censorship of photographic and motion pictures in the A.E.F. was suspended for the period of the Armistice by a general order, January 11, 1919.

In the period of its greatest activities, this subsection comprised nine officers, one field clerk and seven enlisted men. There are now on duty, four officers and seven enlisted men.
Official relations have been maintained with a large number of civilian or auxiliary organizations, the principal ones of which were the committee on public information, Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., Y. W. C. A., Knights of Columbus, etc.

Close relations, and the most important, were with the committee on public information, which by an order of the Adjutant General was created the channel for issuing pictures to the press and public. As stated above, when the officer in charge, Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, was placed on duty in Paris in June 1918, the committee on public information had no definite plans for handling signal corps photographs and motion pictures. Sometimes they were sold and at other times they were given away. At that time there was an existing order in America that all A. E. F. pictures should be censored at the Army War College before being turned over to the committee on public information for the public. The fact that pictures were being given by the committee on public information in France to correspondents with the A. E. F., created difficulties and elicited protests from officers on duty in Washington. On the other hand, the main office of the committee on public information in Washington made protest that their operations were being hampered through the slowness of A. E. F. pictures in reaching the committee's office. In order to systematize and facilitate the flow of A. E. F. pictures through the press to the American public, the officer in charge, photographic subsection submitted to Mr. James Kerney, director of the C. P. I. in France, a plan, which he approved and later put into operation. This was to establish a branch distributing office of the committee in New York, the natural news centre of America. Censorship of A. E. F. pictures in the War College was abolished; photographs and motion pictures, after censorship by the A. E. F. censor, were turned over directly to the committee in Paris, and shipped by it to the New York office. In accordance with this plan Mr. Kerney also created a division of pictures in the committee which took over charge of all photographs and motion pictures, and the relations with newspaper and magazine correspondents, and other American and foreign agencies desiring pictures. This arrangement proved satisfactory, both to the army and the committee in France. Apparently, however, there was lack of coordination between the main office of the committee in Washington and the branch in Paris. There was in America considerable complaint on the part of the press, that it was impossible to obtain a desirable picture service from the committee in Washington.

Pictures taken by representatives of the Red Cross, Y. M. C. A., K. C., newspaper correspondents and other organizations and individuals, were in accordance with regulations, sent to the signal corps photographic laboratory for development and printing. They were censored by the A. E. F. Photographic Censor, and one print was retained by the army for the historical records. In July 1918, it was discovered that many representatives of the Red Cross, Y. M. C. A. and other organizations were carrying cameras and taking photographs without military authorization. At a conference between representatives of these organizations and the officer in charge of the photographic subsection, it was arranged that all cameras would be recalled by these organizations, except those in the hands of their agents holding properly authorized photographic permits from the A. E. F. Photographic Censor. The Y. M. C. A., in September 1918, assumed the work, as part of its entertainment program, of showing signal corps motion pictures, through the camps of the A. E. F., and are continuing in this work at the present time. Beginning in a small way with nine projecting machines, they have now reached a point, according to the report of the director of the Y. M. C. A. Department of Films, where 1500 motion picture showings are made each week in the A. E. F.

During the summer of 1918 the quartermaster corps, the ordnance department, the medical corps, and some other branches of the service, appointed historians. These latter were not connected with the historical branch of the general staff. They required still photographs in their work, and this subsection has aided them in various ways in obtaining pictures desired. On the other hand these historians, through their intimate knowledge of the work in their departments, corps or other units, have been of
invaluable aid to this subsection, in furnishing information for historical titles, and in suggesting features for photography, which otherwise might have been overlooked. The number of these historians has increased with each passing month, until at present practically every unit in the army down to companies has its official historian.

After the Armistice of November 11, 1918 put an end to the fighting activities of the army, 16 signal corps photographic units that previously had been attached to combat units, immediately were detached and sent to the S. O. S., in order to complete photographic records in that area. During the period of the Armistice attention has been directed toward covering certain features of the work which necessarily had been more or less slighted during the period of combat activities. With the arrival of President Wilson in France, December 13, 1918, this subsection had been devoting a large part of its activities towards directing photographic work in connection with the Peace Conference. One signal corps photographic unit under the direction of a conducting officer of the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D was attached to the President's suite upon his arrival at Brest, and continued with him throughout the period of his first visit. Another signal corps photographic unit had accompanied the President from the United States and returned to the states with him. When the President returned to France on his second visit, a similar photographic unit accompanied him and still is attached to his suite. For the purposes of photographing the various activities of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, and the Allied Missions in attendance at the conference, two signal corps photographic units were placed under the direction of a conducting officer from this subsection. The G-2-D conducting officers directing the work of the signal corps photographic units covering the President and the peace conference, are charged with the duty of arranging for the taking of pictures, and with providing the proper historical titles to accompany the photographs and motion pictures thus taken. It is the experience of the officer in charge of the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, that the best way adequately to cover any given field of activity photographically, is to place the photographers in charge of a conducting officer, who lays out the work day by day, and personally assumes the responsibility of providing the proper descriptive titles for each picture taken.

In an effort to supplement the photographs and motion pictures taken by the U. S. Signal Corps photographers, arrangements were made between the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D and the photographic sections of the French and British armies, by which pictures were exchanged between the service. In this manner we have obtained for the historical archives at the Army War College, 2500 still photographs from the British army, largely concerned with the activities of A. E. F. units in Great Britain and the British area in France; approximately 3,000 still photographs and 3,000 metres of motion picture film have been obtained from the French Photographic Section, covering American activities in French army areas, as well as in purely American areas, during the early months of the A. E. F.'s presence in France, when American photographic activities were small.

On account of the similarity of the work, the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, performed certain supervisory functions in connection with the work of the eight official artists, commissioned as captains in the engineer reserve corps. These eight artists however, never were connected officially with the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D. In the month of January 1919, these artists were ordered to take station in Paris and moved thither from Neufchateau, where previously they had been stationed since March 1918. The activities of this group of official artists will be treated in a separate report.

RECOMMENDATIONS: At the beginning of the war, photography as a function of the army for providing not only historical pictures, but pictures also for news and propaganda purposes, was little understood either by the officers of the regular army or those civilians called into the army service because of their experience in private life. Many false starts were made, and time unquestionably was lost in empirical efforts which later proved valueless. By the month of July 1918, however, photography in the A. E. F. was functioning fairly well, and from the time of the Allied counteroffensive, July 18, 1918, the work steadily improved. In this connection it is desired to call attention to the
able work of Major E. H. Hardy, Officer in Charge, Signal Corps Photographic Division. In large part the excellent results obtained are due to his executive ability and earnest devotion to duty in connection with photography in the A. E. F. In no spirit of criticism, but with a view to avoiding similar hampering conditions in the future, it would be well to enumerate here some of the chief defects and drawbacks that attended photographic work in the A. E. F. The officer in charge, Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, found that the principal handicaps during the period of fighting, were lack of transportation, lack of information upon which to direct the efforts of photographers and lack of sufficient military training on the part of photographers to enable them intelligently to pursue their duties in the army. All these conditions continued to improve as the war progressed, until at the close of hostilities army photography was progressing smoothly and producing excellent results. As a result of his comparison of the finished products of the American army as compared with that of the French and British photographic sections, it is the opinion of the officer in charge of the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D that the work of the U. S. Signal Corps photographers is on the whole, superior to that of either that of the French or British. After a year's experience in directing, for historical purposes, the photographic work of the A. E. F., it is the opinion of the officer in charge, Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, that the most essential provision in any future operations of a similar nature, is that the work of each photographic unit should be under the direction of a conducting officer from the intelligence branch, and that the conducting officers in the field should be under the supervision of a chief stationed at G. H. Q., where he would have at hand information on all phases of the army's operations. It is necessary that this chief and the conducting officers under him be men of thorough military training. Unfortunately in this war, few of the photographers called into the service from civil life had any military knowledge, and since there were no conducting officers to supply proper information, the descriptive title accompanying their pictures were deplorably lacking in the proper information, while in many cases they are absolutely wrong and misleading. It was to overcome the latter defect that the officer in charge of the Photographic Subsection, G-2-D, placed an editing section at the Signal Corps Laboratory, Vincennes. Through information obtainable at G. H. Q., from commanding officers of units in the field, and from the photographers themselves, it has been possible to re-edit all of the title since the beginning of operations in June 1917. This work has demanded an enormous amount of investigation, and while attended with good results has not produced that exactness of information which is desired. Had it been possible to have conducting officers with each unit from the first, this work would have been unnecessary.

In round numbers, 35,000 still photographs and 20,000 motion picture scenes have been made in the A. E. F. and sent to the Army War College with accompanying descriptive titles for recording and filing. From army and civilian sources in the United States, it is understood, approximately 400,000 still photographs have been obtained and filed in the Army War College. In order that these historical documents of inestimable value to the American public should be available henceforth, attention is invited to the necessity of maintaining an adequate military or civilian force at the War College, properly to handle these pictures.

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V. THE STARS AND STRIPES
ITS PURPOSES, HISTORY AND ACHIEVEMENTS
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The Stars and Stripes - established in spite of a lack of precedent in the United States army, and in spite of failures in other armies, and in the face of inconceivable

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difficulties - grew from nothing, in February of 1918 to a circulation of more than 500,000 in less than a year, and when it is finally closed up it will have more than paid for itself. Incidentally, the A. E. F. contributed through The Stars and Stripes, more than 2,000,000 francs for French war orphans, a service that has done much to bind together the French and American peoples.

THE PURPOSE - THE NEED

The maintenance of morale of the American troops in France was the principal object of The Stars and Stripes, but it had to obtain this objective without the use of propaganda.

The justification of this policy was demonstrated by the implicit confidence in the paper exhibited by all ranks throughout the war.

In the beginning of the paper - the spring of 1918 - one important phase of keeping up morale was to supply a unifying force for the scattered troops, serving all along the western front and on other fronts, something to show the men that whatever the diversity of their commands, they were all Americans, bound together in purpose however apparently scattered geographically. Announcements could not well do this, first because of their formal character, and because during hostilities plans of no sort could be made public.

Later there appeared the need of demonstrating another unity - that of combat troops and of supply troops, many of whom felt unreasonable, yet natural, shame that they too could not be in line duty. The Stars and Stripes was the prime factor in developing, by its publicity concerning construction and maintenance men, quartermasters and stevedores, the complicated and stupendous program of the Commanding General of the S. O. S. and also in building up an S. O. S. esprit de corps which accomplished amazing results.

Still later, after the hostilities, there came the need of keeping up the morale of men longing to go home and unable to go home. This was achieved by increasing the humorous material, making the men laugh at their troubles, and by maintaining the series of accounts of what had been done during the war by divisions, by services and the like. The historical series thus developed was the first reasonably accurate and consecutive account printed in detail of the A. E. F. combat activities. It is believed to have accomplished a great deal for divisional spirit, and to have educated the men generally as to exactly what was accomplished.

Still later, with the development of army athletics, entertainments and the educational program, the paper had additional mission to perform.

The purpose of the paper, as described in its own words, in the anniversary number, February 7, 1919, follows:

The Stars and Stripes had and has but one purpose - to give the Army a voice and thereby to stimulate the morale of the American Expeditionary Forces. Here, at its start, was a green and none too self-confident army, scattered to the winds of Europe, and in serious danger of losing all sense of belonging to a single army. To write for the Yanks training with the British, the Yanks brigaded with the French, the Yanks loaned to Italy, and the Yanks venturing a bit on their own northwest of Toul - to tell each separate part and group that the others were helping - that was the idea.

And, as Yanks are all skeptics who can smell bunk a mile off, it was decided that the truth must and should serve. What we should have done if the A. E. F. had failed, just how we should have extricated ourselves from our policy if the American troops had gone in for strategic retreating, we don't know.

But thanks to the combat divisions, the problem never arose. From that electric day in May, when the breathless squads from the 7th Machine Gun Battalion jumped into the fighting in the streets of Chateau-Thierry, the task of The Stars and Stripes became easy. The editorial staff just hung on to the coat-tails of the irresistible doughboys and was carried to glory.
ITS HISTORY

Soon after the arrival in France (December 1917) of 2d Lt. Guy T. Viskniskki, Inf. with G-2, G. H. Q., he proposed to the Chief of G-2-D, Lt. Col. W. C. Sweeney, G. S., an American Army Weekly, patterned after the weekly of the 80th Division training camp (The Bayonet) of which he had been the organizer and manager. A publication of some sort had previously been discussed in general terms at G. H. Q. and the Commander-in-Chief was known to be in favor of the principle. Lt. Viskniskki convinced Lt. Col. Sweeney of his ability to handle it, as well as the need for a paper. On authority obtained from Lt. Col. D. E. Nolan, G. S., Chief of G-2, G. H. Q., Lt. Viskniskki was ordered to Paris to make arrangements which should be approved before publication was started.

This was in January. Within a week Lt. Viskniskki had reported back that he had made arrangements for the setting of type, the stereotyping, the paper supply and the press work. He had also learned of four capable enlisted men with whose help he would be able to start the editorial and business office work. He asked for immediate authority, which was granted by Bulletin 10, Series 1918, G. H. Q. A. E. F. (see appendix) and on February 8, 1918, appeared No. 1, Volume I.

The instructions to Lt. Viskniskki were, in effect, a confirmation of his own recommendations. That the principles of The Stars and Stripes might be a matter of record they were subsequently put in writing, "a statement of policy." (See Appendix 2.)

Back of this program was the reasoning that the A. E. F. needed a newspaper, modeled in every way, including advertising, after an American newspaper, reaching the men at regular intervals. Distribution of the Paris papers printed in English was irregular, and these papers themselves did not attain the standards which it was felt the men wished. The printing of local papers was next to impossible owing not only to mechanical difficulties but the problem of censorship of a great many divisional papers, many of which would find their way into enemy hands. Censorship of one paper, of course, was simple.

EDITORIAL POLICY - in Operation

From the very beginning, it was a rule that all news matter must be of general interest, and that it had to be so written to bind it in some way to the interest of the American soldier. If news was not of concern to him, it was not used. French and British and other propaganda was offered to the paper in enormous volume, but was culled over and only that which contained genuine news of interest to the A. E. F. was printed. Everything else - which meant most of it - was rejected. So, incidentally, was American propaganda unless it was news.

The paper did not suppress disagreeable things. Rather, it admitted them, prepared in humorous form. The constant effort was to make a joke of the mud, of the cootie, of the other infinite woes, with the knowledge that if the American soldier ever could be started laughing at his troubles the troubles would either disappear or become negligible. G-2 supported this policy, even when an occasional letter was printed that looked as if it meant trouble, convinced that the soldier's reaction to that letter would be exactly what was desired. The result, again, was a feeling on the part of the soldiers that it was their paper, and that it was not controlled by that intangible but always suspect creation known vaguely as G. H. Q.

To cite specific examples, The Stars and Stripes never pretended that our losses were lighter than they were; it never pretended that transportation and supplies were better than they were; it never pretended the men were paid on time, but on the contrary stated flatly that they were not, but did it as humorously as such a mournful subject would permit. In brief, the paper actually assailed the things and institutions it was most anxious to defend, assailing them where everyone knew anyway that they were weak, thus gaining the full confidence of the readers in the paper's independence and fairness, and thus endowing itself with a confidence which brought respect and credence without bounds to the vitally important defense of these same institutions which it was later to take up.

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News stories were supplemented by campaigns of a news nature, such as the Mothers’ Day letters campaign, which sent a record number of letters for one day. The Dad’s Day letters after the Armistice reached another gratifying total.

The most signal campaign was that for the adoption for one-year period of French children whose fathers had been killed in the war. Started with the hope of having 500 children adopted, the campaign was brought to a close with 3,444 adoptions, and was intentionally brought to a close as the adoptions had outstripped the ability of the small Red Cross bureau to supply children. Additional funds were turned over for carrying on the education of the one-year adoptees for several years, in arts and trades and sciences. In April, 1919 was turned over 1,000,000 francs for this extension work, supplementing the 1,250,000 previously turned over. Aside from the actual fighting of the Americans in France, it would be difficult to find anything that has more endeared the Americans to France.

This plan, incidentally, was devised and executed by a private, Harold W. Ross, of the editorial staff.

Although the creation and inspiration of the paper were definitely those of Major Viskniskki, the pursuit of the ideals he established and secured, and the incomparable pages of the paper were the work of the enlisted men of the editorial staff.

The force of the newspaper was intentionally selected from enlisted personnel. Of these men many did work which in responsibility and value alike richly merited the granting of commissions. It was felt, however, that if the staff were commissioned its influence on the ranks of its readers would be lessened. The staff cordially accepted this situation, and was so heartily in sympathy with it that several privates - including the managing editor and chief editorial writer - declined even the proffered advancement to sergeantcies.

From New York, J. W. Mueller, a correspondent, sent to the paper, without any charge or recognition, news articles until his help was no longer required.

The policy pursued by G. H. Q. of informing the officer in charge what was expected, and leaving him to attain the stated object in his own way and without interfering with the technique of his profession, meant results of incalculable value, and that could not otherwise have been obtained. He was supplied with materiel and personnel to the extent of G. H. Q.’s ability, and told to go ahead.

THE BUSINESS OFFICE

The scarcity and price of print paper was one of the first difficulties the paper had to overcome.

At that day, and up to the present time, there was a grave shortage of print paper, and the French government was rationing the paper available to the newspapers of France, at prices three to six times as high as the same grades of paper cost in the United States.

Going upon the principle that every ounce of tonnage coming from America was to be devoted to men and munitions it was not deemed advisable to endeavor to have paper shipped from America, so arrangements were made with the National de la Presse of France, to have a certain amount of French-made paper rationed to the Stars and Stripes each week, as was being done to all French papers. This amount was necessarily small and by no means as large as was generally desired. Consequently it was at that time necessary to ration the paper itself to the army, and a bulletin was issued from G. H. Q. stating that no unit would be permitted to subscribe for a greater number of copies than one-third its actual enlisted and official personnel. Incidentally, this served only to stimulate subscriptions, but the rule was rigidly held to until the shipping problem became much less acute and the War Department at Washington started to send paper direct to the Star and Stripes.

Print paper is one of the chief items of expense of a newspaper, and the high prices paid for the French paper meant much larger costs than the paper would naturally have had.

The distribution of the paper, as quickly, thoroughly and economically as possible, was another of the difficulties the business management had to overcome.

While the average newspaper simply turns most of its papers into the mails to
distribute, and is relieved of all worry therefore, the Circulation Department of The Stars and Stripes has to devise a system of distribution over an army scattered over all of France and, incidentally, a ledger system in which the location of units would not be centralized in any way.

The price of the paper was purposely kept low, in spite of high costs. Even the advertising rates were not as high as they could have been, based on circulation and comparative prices of similar publications in America and France. On the theory that anything given away is not highly valued and is always suspected of being propaganda The Stars and Stripes was always sold, never given away, except to sick and wounded in hospitals, the cost here being divided between the paper and the Red Cross.

In the work of distribution automobiles were essential, not only for distributing the papers one day a week, but for getting subscriptions, straightening out tangles with company funds, and supervision generally over the area covered by a local field agent. These cars were not available in adequate number until after hostilities, but in spite of this circulation mounted steadily until it ran over half a million copies weekly. (See appendix). Subscription accounts were handled with difficulty owing to the constant changes of address, not only of organizations but of shifting personnel within these organizations.

There was devised, accordingly, after the organization of a corps of field agents, a coupon arrangement, each coupon bearing 26 tickets, good for six months, and cashable for the price paid for it. These tickets were carried by individuals who turned them in for copies of the paper to the nearest field agent. In the spring of 1919, when troops began going home in large numbers, no more tickets were issued, and those outstanding were accepted for cash. It was proven that this coupon arrangement is the best for needs during hostilities, but it must always be supplemented by cash sales. It also has the advantage of giving a cash working capital, as would a mail subscription, but has virtues of easy delivery which the mail subscription does not have.

The original plan for dividing profits among the companies was partially carried out currently as subscriptions came from the organizations. The anticipated cost of production having been figured it was found that the paper could be delivered to men for six months (26 weeks) for 6.50 francs, leaving thereafter a proper working margin for safety’s sake and for unforeseen expenses that might arise. The coupons were therefore sold to the men at 8 francs, the balance of 1.50 francs reverting immediately to the unit fund. This served as an inducement for the units to take their proper quota of papers, as well as giving a substantial amount in cash to the funds, many of which at that time had been sadly depleted. The Stars and Stripes, in this way paid an initial dividend, if such it can be called, amounting to approximately 78,000 francs. The division of final surplus could not be carried out, however, as organizations were demobilized at different times and the weekly division of profits was, of course, impracticable.

Experience now shows it would have been better to create a government owned organization to give the directing board of The Stars and Stripes absolute authority over its financial and administrative affairs. This would have permitted the carrying out of any plan which the Commander-in-Chief should approve, without worry over the government's finance regulations.

For the entire period of the paper, the advertising interest of the paper was represented in New York by the A. W. Erickson Co. without any remuneration.

And, incidentally, Major Viskii, though directly in charge of the editorial department of the paper, formulated and directed the important policies of the advertising and circulation departments. Captain Watson did the same, also.

FINANCES

Of all the expenses of the paper, from the beginning, they have been paid as follows:

Out of Stars and Stripes funds - Composition, engraving, printing, printing paper, miscellaneous supplies, advertising costs, circulation and distribution costs (except motor transportation), mailing and forwarding charges and civilian labor.
Out of Government funds - Army pay of enlisted and commissioned personnel, clothing and quarters of enlisted personnel, office equipment, motor transportation, and rent light and heat at 32 Rue Taitbout, Paris.

(An exception to this is that print paper sent from the United States was paid for by the War Department. Whether The Stars and Stripes will have to pay this bill is not known now, but probably not as the surplus of the paper is to be turned into the United States Treasury, anyway.)

At the close of business, March 31, the approximate surplus of the Stars and Stripe was 2,500,000 francs, and this will have considerably increased by the time the paper closes up.

The amount of money paid out on account of The Stars and Stripes by the Quartermaster Corps had not been tabulated at this time, but rough estimates show that the surplus of the paper will more than cover the money paid out by the Q. M. C.

In this case the paper will have paid for itself, including salaries of enlisted and commissioned personnel.

Of the motor cars issued a large number will be returned in fairly good condition, and the paper will be credited with this amount, of course.

It is estimated that the surplus of the paper, at its close, will be more than 3,000,000 francs.

The Future of The Stars and Stripes
It has been definitely decided that The Stars and Stripes will terminate when most of the A. E. F. has returned home, probably in July.

However, this decision was based to some extent on the recommendation Major Viskniskki made, in a letter of October 20, 1918, to the Chief, G-2-D. It was an answer to many suggestions that the paper be continued indefinitely.

The Stars and Stripes was conceived with the idea that it would hearten and cheer, by the spokesman, the common medium of expression of the enlisted American, that was and is its sole reason for being. It has no other purpose. It could have no other purpose and be what it has been and will be so long as it serves whole-heartedly, devotedly, this single cause. For anyone to think of it now or in the future serving any other purpose is to weaken it; for anyone to think of it as an after-the-war vehicle is to arouse self-interest, self-ambition, in connection with it, and that would be fatal to a paper whose fixed and unflinching purpose had ever been from the start to work for morale, not money, for patriotism, not profit, the serve the God of the heart and soul of the American Expeditionary Forces.

I wish to go on record with this firm and fixed conviction regarding the future of The Stars and Stripes; the American E. F. gave it birth. When the American E. F. is mustered out, when we American soldiers in France as an organization have become simply a memory through our return home, The Stars and Stripes should suspend publication forever, no matter if at that time its circulation is a million or more, and its influence as wide as the spread of the American people and the American flag.

Any other ending for The Stars and Stripes would be the grossest prostitution, the grossest commercialization, of the spirit of services which gave it birth and keeps its being.

APPENDIX I

Memorandum from the Chief of the Censorship Division (W. C. Sweeney, Lt. Col., G. S.) February 23, 1918.

1. There is hereby created a board to direct the policy of the Stars and Stripes, the official newspaper of the A. E. F. The members are Lt. Col. W. C. Sweeney, Major Bruce Magruder, Capt. Earl H. Smith, 2d Lt. Guy T. Viskniskki and 2d Lt. Mark S. Watson.
2. The Paris members of the board, Capt. Smith and Lieut. Viskniskki, will carefully edit all copy and send by courier every Monday morning three proof sheets of all copy intended for publication the following Friday to the three members at G. H. Q. The only exception to this standing rule will be the cabled news received Wednesdays or Thursdays.

3. The board will meet every Tuesday at 2 p.m., at which meetings one or both of the Paris members will be present. The approved proof sheets will be returned to Paris on the Tuesday afternoon train.

4. The board must always keep the following basic essentials in mind:
   A. Constant maintenance of a high morale among the entire personnel of the A. E. F.
   B. Publication of news which will make the widest possible appeal, consistent with military exigencies and good judgment, to the people and publications of the United States, as well as to our army in the field.
   C. Every issue of The Stars and Stripes should interpret the spirit of a great democracy at war for a just cause, in the encouragement of individually of expression consistent with tolerance and sanity of view.

Note: In practice, the custom of sending the proof sheets to the members of the board of The Stars and Stripes at G. H. Q. was soon abandoned. The officer in charge was permitted to assume full responsibility for the contents of the paper. Proof of the paper was, however, sent to the office of the French Press Censorship each week in order to place it upon the same basis as all other newspapers published in Paris.

APPENDIX 2

A meeting of the board of The Stars and Stripes was held in the office of Chief, G-2-D, April 19, 1918. The entire board was present consisting of Lt. Col. Sweeney, Major McCabe, Major Magruder, Capt. Viskniskki and Capt. Watson. Capt. Viskniskki outlined the following policies:

I. EDITORIAL POLICY TO BUILD UP MORALE
   (a) Through giving news of army.
   (b) Through giving news from home, including general news and specialties, such as punishment of profiteers, speeding up of preparations, etc. for showing the support the United States is giving the A. E. F.
   (c) Through furnishing men an outlet to express their own thoughts.
   (d) Through serving as a paper of their own, telling what they are interested in, to read and to send home. In the latter way to develop morale in the United States which will be evidenced in letters from home to the A. E. F.

2. No distinction of classes; no special departments for college associations, fraternal societies and the like.

3. Plenty of light, humorous contributions, sketches and articles alike.

ADVERTISING POLICY:
(a) No liquor advertisements.
(b) No patent medicines or fakes.
(c) Nothing obscene.
(d) No advertisements given special position.
(e) No advertisement keyed.
(f) No advertisements with free reading notices.

FREE LIST:
(a) Sent in packets of:
   5 to 20 to Military Attaches of American Embassies.
   100 to Military Intelligence, Washington.
   100 to War Department, Washington.
   100 to Committee on Public Information, Washington.
25 to representative papers and magazines.
3 to each advertiser.
100 to advertising agencies in United States and England.

FINANCE: Financial statement to be sent to G-2-D on 1st and 15th of each month. Explanation of financial statement attached.

The outline as given was approved.

APPENDIX 3

Circulation of The Stars and Stripes

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American Official Communiques

and

Daily Cablegrams To The War Department

for

The Secretary of War

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C-in-C: Fldr. 76

[Extract from the final report of G-2, G. H. Q., A. E. F.]

1) The American Official Communique.

Definition: The American Official Communique was a public official statement of the activities of American troops engaged in operations on the Western Front; from the time of its inception, May 15, 1918, until October 26 the communique was issued from General Headquarters once daily, in the evening, and the report which it contained covered the activities of our troops during the preceding twenty-four hours; from October 26 to November 11 two communiques were issued daily, once in the morning and once in the evening, each covering the period elapsed since the issuance of the last preceding communique; after November 11 the regular issuance of a communique ceased, and such communiques only appeared as were required by the advance of our troops into the territory evacuated by the enemy.

History and Sources: The communique was described as follows in a cable sent to the War Department on May 10:

Considering the size of our forces now in France and the increasingly important part being begun by these forces in the operations now in progress on the western front and the necessity on that account of issuing an authoritative official statement from these headquarters regarding these activities, it is deemed advisable to begin issuing an official communique from these headquarters following in general the lines of the official communiques issued from the headquarters of the Allied Armies in France.

Following upon this announcement the first communique was issued on May 15, 1918. The communique was based on daily telegraphic or telephonic reports which the American divisions and corps concerned were instructed to transmit to General Headquarters not later than 3:45 p.m. daily, such reports to contain a complete statement of the activities of the preceding twenty-four hours. During the early days of its history it was possible to prepare the communique from these reports at the close of each day and to issue it approximately at the intended and official hour - 9 p.m. In the course of the summer, however, as the activities of our forces increased, this became more and more difficult, because of the impossibility of obtaining adequate and prompt reports. During the counteroffensive of the Allied armies, between the AISNE and the MARNE, July 18 to August 4, it was found necessary to send a special liaison officer to our troops operating in that region, to secure the latest information himself and to prepare a draft of the communique and to telephone it to General Headquarters from a point close to the scene of the fighting. While it was often exceedingly difficult to obtain the necessary reports from our troops operating under our own corps, it was practically impossible to secure from troops operating actively in British or French corps evening reports covering their activities of the day; from necessity and for reasons of policy the activities of such troops were not generally mentioned in the American communique until after reference had been made to their operations in the British or French communiques.

The most important periods in the history of the American communiques were those from September 12 to 15 (the battle of St-MIHIEL) and from September 26 to November 11 (the
MEUSE-ARGONNE battle. During these operations the communique was prepared at the headquarters of the First Army, with the exception of the period from October 18 to November 1 during which it was written at General Headquarters, or Advanced P. C., General Headquarters. On October 26, owing to the great importance of the operations of our forces, the policy was adopted of issuing two communiques daily, one in the morning and one in the evening. It was originally intended that the morning communique should be a well balanced, complete and somewhat detailed report of the events of the preceding day and night, while the evening communique was to be merely a very brief statement of the salient features of the operations of the preceding twelve hours and was to be issued in no case later than 9 p. m. This plan was abandoned with the commencement of the attack of November 1, and thereafter both communiques attempted to furnish a report of progress up to the very latest moment possible. The communique was discontinued at the time of the Armistice, November 11, but was resumed again during the advance of our troops from the MEUSE to the RHINE. The last communique was published on December 13, 1918.

Preparation: The final draft of the communique was generally decided upon by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters; during various important periods it was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief or to the Chief of Staff.

Distribution: After final approval, the communique was transmitted to the War Department as the first section of the daily cable, and by the War Department it was issued to the American press. Its issuance to the French press was in the hands of the American censor at PARIS, to whom it was immediately telephoned. The communique was telegraphed to all American armies, corps and divisions and to all American military missions in Europe. After September 9 the American communique was sent out by wireless, in English, from the Eiffel Tower in PARIS.

2. Daily cable to the Chief of Staff, War Department, for the information of the Secretary of War.

Description: Contemporaneously with the communique there was begun the sending of a regular daily cable of information to the Chief of Staff at the War Department. The first section, marked A, of this cable was constituted by the American communique itself. The nature of the material contained in the remaining section was as follows: The second section, marked B, contained information of general interest, relative to the activities of our troops, which could properly be made public; until October 1 this section contained the names of American officers and men who had been decorated for heroism, after that date this material was handled by the Adjutant General, A. E. F.; the third section of the cable, marked C, dealt with the operations of the armies of our Allies on the western front and contained information as to the line held by those troops, additional to the matter contained in British and French and Belgian official communiques; this section also contained a paragraph covering the changes in the enemy order of battle on the western front, and any important facts relating thereto; this section of the cable was sent in a code and marked confidential; the fourth section, marked D, contained confidential information regarding the activities of the American troops, this information being of such nature as to prevent its being made public at the time, and elaborating, if necessary, the information contained in other sections of the cable; this section was also sent in code.

Sources of Information contained: The sources of information used in the preparation of the cable include:

(a) Telephonic and telegraphic reports from American armies, corps and divisions.
(b) Summaries of intelligence, issued by American armies, corps and divisions.
(c) Telephonic and telegraphic reports from American missions with the headquarters of the French, British and Belgian armies, and from American liaison officers attached to particular French armies under which American units were operating.
(d) Situation reports, issued by British General Headquarters.
(e) Information as to the progress on enemy order of battle was obtained from Subsection A-1 of G-2.
May, 1918*

15  (1)  A.  North of TOUL and in LORRAINE there was marked increase of artillery activity on both sides. Today two of our aviators brought down three German machines. There is nothing else of importance to report.

B.  In LORRAINE May 12 three snipers, scouts of intelligence service, sent out in camouflage sniping suits to find German sniper and encountered 18 enemy at strong point near dugout. They shot four of whom one appeared to be an officer, secured valuable papers and retired under heavy fire. One failed to reach our lines and major commanding sector sent three officers and four men to find him. This patrol also penetrated enemy's line and reached strong point attacked by first patrol. Here enemy was now in force and our patrol was driven back by hot rifle and grenade fire. On reaching lines one man of this patrol also found missing. Two officers who went out to find him, killed enemy scout and brought back body for identification purposes. The man missing from second patrol has not been found but third intelligence scout of first party has returned.

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North of TOUL our aviators today brought down three German two-seated machines, one of our aviators bringing down two and another bringing down one.

C.  Only local actions have taken place. There is no change in the line.

The following are changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 37th from Eighteenth Army enters line south of 21st Reserve. It may have relieved the 21st Reserve. Eighteenth Army, 37th Reserve to Second Army.

Estimate of enemy's intentions. Since April 15, the enemy has realized that the offensive begun March 21 could not be carried out to a decision with his worn troops and the number of remaining of fresh reserves. Since that date only local attacks have occurred such as that on KEMMEL Hill which the enemy was compelled to take in order to maintain himself in the ARMENTIERS Salient. Since that date the enemy's policy has been one of resting and reconstituting his exhausted divisions 14 of which have now been out of the line more than one month and 28 additional of which have been out of the line more than two weeks. The majority of those longest out of the line are to be found in the Eighteenth Army. In addition to the above the enemy has 11 fresh divisions in reserve not yet engaged which can be used in an attack and 28 divisions in line outside the battle area suitable for attack purposes which can be transferred for employment in the battle zone. It will be seen from this that an attack now can be made with a maximum of only 53 divisions whereas if it be postponed until the first part of June, 28 additional divisions will become available.

A number of prisoners captured recently have reported the arrival of General Mackenson with part of his army which was in Roumania, north of NOYON. The movement of a number of divisions from Roumania through Austria to the battle zone has also been reported through Switzerland. Four army corps staffs have been identified in rear of the St-QUENTIN Salient and two others are suspected of being there.

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* Throughout this compilation this key will be used. Its interpretation is as follows: Underscoring indicates date within month; () indicate number of communiqué; upper case letters indicate paragraph of communiqué. Thus, e.g., under any particular month, "17 (68) B" would indicate the 17th of the month, Communiqué No. 68, and Par. B thereof.
Allied Headquarters are agreed in anticipating that the next main effort by the enemy will be a drive to break the line between ARRAS and ALBERT possibly accompanied by a supplementary attempt south of the SOMME and possibly accompanied by a third effort between CALONNE and LENS but it is doubtful whether the state of the German army is at present such as to admit of the execution of such a project on a sufficient length of front to give it a seriously threatening character.

On the other hand the longer it is deferred the better prepared we shall be to counter it.

D. British War Office reports May 13, casualties incurred by British Infantry exclusive colonial troops March 21 to May 4 were 225,000. Colonial infantry casualties 21,000. During same period 136,000 British infantry drafts sent out. Total casualties of all arms British and Colonial 303,000.

The following report was submitted May 12 by the general commanding our troops in PICARDY: Coming in contact with the enemy April 25 the division has been in practically a continuous engagement. The infantry has been aggressive and successful. The engineers have done very effective work. The artillery has been active day and night. Total result is German prisoners report that life is very hard for them upon their front, that they no longer can have cooked or hot meals in their two front positions, that they are obliged to keep very close to shelter even far to the rear, the reliefs and evacuation of the wounded are extremely dangerous. Our officers and men are undergoing hardships and losses but sustain them in fine spirits.

16 (2) A. In LORRAINE patrolling was active and there was again increase of artillery fire. Otherwise the day was quiet at points occupied by our troops.

B. Particulars concerning bringing down hostile airplanes reported yesterday: At about noon, May 15, aviators were waiting for French general who was coming to confer decorations. While waiting, Captain Peterson made an ascent and encountered two German planes and shot down both within one minute, firing 60 shots at first and 15 at second. First plane burst into flames before hitting ground and wings of second were seen to crumple up when nearing earth. No definite information concerning third hostile plane reported brought down.

Now determined that our airplane reported yesterday as having accidently fallen within our lines north of TOUL was shot down, probably by hostile antiaircraft guns.

In the course of debat in the British House of Lords May 8, British Minister of Information discussing measures for home propaganda, expressed the hope that moving pictures designed for propaganda will soon be witnessed by 12 million persons weekly. Four million copies of Lichnowsky's memorandum already sold. Official attitude towards Pacifists defined by taking action only in cases of flagrant violation of law, since unnecessary interference with freedom of speech tendered to strengthen Pacifist propaganda.

C. Aside from local actions and artillery activity by both sides there is nothing of importance to report.

Following are the changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army. 56th relieves 13 Reserve. The identification of the Bavarian 6th Reserve at GHENT on May 5, appears to be in error. Bavarian 6th Reserve is in Eighteenth Army. Sixth Army, 235th withdrawn from front. Sector taken over by extension of the front of 36th Reserve. 239th from reserve to Army Detachment A. Seventeenth Army, 16th Reserve from Second Army, in reserve. Second Army, 16th Reserve from reserve to Seventeenth Army. 37th reported as in line at THIEPVAL, does not now appear to be there, and is to be considered as still in reserve in Eighteenth Army. 109th in line in sector credited to 19th. The relief of the 109th by the 19th reported May 8 did not take place. Eighteenth Army, 50th from line to Third Army. Its sector is taken by Bavarian 3d. 37th erroneously reported in Second Army, presumed to be still in reserve. Bavarian 6th Reserve relieves 222d.

The following is distribution by flights of German air force on western front: FLANDERS, pursuit 9, bombing 6, protective 2, reconnaissance 9, total 26; ARMENTIERES
battle region. pursuit 13, bombing 3, protective 8, reconnaissance 16, total 40; ARRAS Salient, pursuit 7, bombing none, protective 7, reconnaissance 20, total 34; BAPAUME MOREUIL region, pursuit 10, bombing none, protective 3, reconnaissance 18, total 31; MOREUIL NOYON region, pursuit 12, bombing 12, protective 11, reconnaissance 25, total 60; LAON region, pursuit 8, bombing 3, protective 3, reconnaissance 20, total 34; RHEIMS region, pursuit 2, bombing none, protective none, reconnaissance 6, total 8; CHAMPAGNE, pursuit 4, bombing none, protective none, reconnaissance 7, total 11; VERDUN region, pursuit 2, bombing none, protective none, reconnaissance 9, total 11; WOEVRE, pursuit 3, bombing none, protective 1, reconnaissance 7, total 11; LORRAINE, pursuit 2, bombing none, protective none, reconnaissance 6, total 8; ALSACE, pursuit 1, bombing none, protective none, reconnaissance 9, total 10. The most noteworthy points of the distribution are the presence of 9 protective or battle flights within 25 kilometers of MONT KEMMEL, and 12 bombing flights near the SOMME. The authorized strength of flights now is, 18 for pursuit, 12 for bombing, 12 for protective, and 9 for reconnaissance with divisions, 6 for others. Including flights not definitely located and those on other fronts, the German air forces are credited with the following strength in airplanes: Pursuit 1,400; bombing 280; protective 450; and reconnaissance 1,800.

Latest information indicates restriction of bombing units to night work, special importance being attached to operations against billets, transportation centers, and supply depots. Protective flights are now commonly known as battle flights, and are used mainly for low flying operations against troops by day. One reconnaissance flight is assigned to each division on the battle line. Its duties consist mainly of observation, regulation of artillery, and infantry liaison. It only does photography of special objectives which are of immediate importance. Special flights known as Mosaic sections are assigned to each German army to do photography along its front. Reconnaissance units equipped with special machines are assigned to each army and General Headquarters for long distance missions. From statements of agents and prisoners it appears that Germans are paying considerable attention to development of giant airplanes, having a large fuel and bomb capacity and capable of operating against LONDON, PARIS, and ports of embarkation and debarkation, also of small armored machines for use against ground troops in battle. In recent battles low flying British airplanes have been used with great success against enemy ground troops. The Germans have lost many of their leading aviators in the recent offensive. Statements of prisoners indicate a lowering in morale of enemy's flying service.

We now have on the front three pursuit and two observation squadrons. Plans provide for a further increase of four pursuit, seven observation, and one bombing within a month. Our squadrons are composed of eighteen machines each.

D. British War Office reports publication by Chilean Government of telegram sent to Germany by Count Luxburg. In this orders given that Chilean Military Attache at BERLIN who was returning to Chili via BUENOS AIRES should be helped in every way to carry out propaganda in military circles in Argentine and Chili. German Minister has published denial of the receipt of the telegram and suggests falsification or mistranslation. British War Office remarks on great extent of German intrigue and influence in Chili and believes pro-German sympathies or fear of Germany prevents Chilean foreign office from publishing other Luxburg cables probably in their possession.

17 (3) A. Today fighting was limited to reconnaissances and intermittently active artillery fire. There was increased aerial activity north of TOUL and in LORRAINE.

B.

* * * * *

In LORRAINE May 13 to 14, hostile patrol attacked small machine-gun position held by uf from both front and rear. They were driven off by pistol and grenade fire. No casualties to our men.

C. Situation remains unchanged.
Changes in German order of Battle. Fourth Army, 1st Naval relieves 38th Landwehr which moves one sector south and takes sector north of 83d. Sixth Army, 235th still in line north of 36th Reserve and not relieved as reported. Second Army, 5th Cavalry from Nineteenth Army in reserve. 16th Reserve enters line south of 41st. Eighteenth Army, 76th Reserve withdrawn. 223d from Seventh Army in reserve. 222d still in line west of Bavarian 3d. Reported relief by Bavarian 6th Reserve did not take place. Seventh Army, 5th Guard from Eighteenth Army in reserve. Bavarian 6th Reserve is in line between 241st and 13th Landwehr. Prisoners of 5th Reserve state an order issued at end of March when the division was in billets at SISSONNE stated that each German division was to receive three companies of Austrian laborers, and the prisoners saw one of these companies, at SISSONNE.

During the winter an unusual concentration of artillery in VERDUN sector was reported, artillery being brought there from Italy and the east. This concentration is now reported broken up to meet requirements elsewhere and artillery activity correspondingly reduced. Batteries reported in action in this sector averaged 50 daily for month of April, dropped to 20 daily beginning of May and for past week has averaged two. Number of shells fired daily averaged 10,000 in April for past week has averaged few hundred.

D. Reliable advices show 85,000 workmen on strike in more than 30 establishments working for French army, mainly in PARIS district. Strikes broke out Sunday and Monday. Stated reasons are need for increase of wages, decision of Prime Minister to withdraw from munition factories and send to front 30,000 mobilized workmen of military classes of 1910 to 1912, and report that government intended to substitute American for French workmen. Last mentioned report has been officially denied by government. Also believed by some informed persons that strikes are connected with activities of American Labor Mission in PARIS. The American Labor Mission is supporting majority socialists in refusal to meet German socialists added strength to present French Cabinet thus greatly irritating French pacifists and minority socialists. Two groups just mentioned supposed therefore to be engineering strike in hope of weakening government counteracting influence of American Labor Mission and French majority socialists. Situation somewhat more serious than that produced by similar movements a year ago but reliable observers believe government has sufficient courage and strength to deal with it. Cavalry has been massed around big munition factories and court martial appointed to deal with prominent offenders.

German press gives much attention, to friction between Bulgaria and Turkey concerning territorial settlement in Balkan Peninsula. Dispute arises concerning territory ceded by Turkey to Bulgaria March 1915. On account of Bulgaria's gains in DOBRUDJA, in MACEDONIA, and possibly in Greece, Turkey demands not only restitution cessions of March 1915 but further alteration of frontier in her favor. Bulgaria opposes basing position upon increased strength of Turkey in CAUCASUS. Germany attempting to arrange settlement but favoring Turkish contentions and blaming Bulgaria for extravagant demands. Germany wishes to secure to Turkey unrestricted communication between ADRIANOPLE and CONSTANTINOPLE. Bulgaria resents this and tends to lean on Austria for support. Feeling between Bulgaria and Turkey such that all negotiations carried on through Austrian representative at SOFIA. Reported that Austria prevents Germany from bringing pressure to bear on Bulgaria. Reported that Germany shows anxiety for quick settlement and wishes to have Helfferrich accepted as mediator. Bulgaria offers settlement on terms of receiving all of DOBRUDJA which Germany and Austria desire to partition. Pershing.

18 (4) A. In PICARDY and in LORRAINE hostile raids were repulsed with loss to the enemy in killed and wounded. In the WOEVRE there was continued aerial activity, our planes engaging successfully in several encounters.

B. Early this morning in LORRAINE sector strong enemy patrol of twenty to twenty-five men attempted raid on one of our advanced positions. Raid was complete failure and enemy in retreating left one of their number dead in our trench.

* * * * *
German Wireless Press May 17, announces that in view of uncertainty concerning supplies from Ukraine bread ration will be reduced from two hundred to one hundred sixty grams from June 16.

C. There has been no change in the situation.

Changes in German Order of Battle: Seventeenth Army, 185th from Sixth Army relieves 26th Reserve, 26th withdrawn from front and sector taken by extension 16th Reserve, Eighteenth Army, 28th is still in reserve and not in line of Fifth Army as was reported. Seventh Army, Sixth from Eighteenth Army in reserve. Fifth Army former sector of 15th Reserve is covered by extension of 53d Reserve and Bavarian Ersatz.

Enemy Order of Battle on Italian front, all Austro-Hungarian divisions, as follows: Swiss frontier to Lake GARDA in line 3, in reserve none. Lake GARDA to ADIGE in line 3, in reserve 2. ADIGE to BRENTA in line 4, in reserve 8. BRENTA to PIAVE in line 4, reserve 10. PIAVE to ADRIWTIC in line 12, reserve 3.

Reports continue to be received of coming Italian offensive May 20 being date mentioned most frequently. Location of reserves as well as preparations observed by air reconnaissances point to this being undertaken between Lake GARDS and the upper PIAVE. Increase of train movements to Italian front has been reported also transfer of artillery from ALSACE to Italy.

D. Serious difficulties of Austrian Government evidenced in postponement of meeting of Parliament from May 7 to June 18. Government fears discussion of Czernin's resignation and Emporor Charles' letter. Also desires to avoid discussion of critical food situation until improvement can be announced, Underlying difficulty lies in fact that majority to carry measures deemed necessary by government very hard to secure. Government in trying to conciliate Poles and southern Slavs has partially alienated German party which was sole reliable support. This evident since resignation of Czernin. Attempts now being made to recover support of Germans by such measures as division of Bohemia into administrative districts. Government must also have support of Poles, who avoid complete break in hope of autonomous Polish State, under Austrian suzerainty. Attitude of Poles consequently of highest importance. Early solution essential. Socialists, Czechs and Poles showing strong resentment concerning adjournment and budget must be renewed in July.

Discussion in German press of visit of Emporer Charles to German Headquarters is notable in following instances: Muenchner Neueste Nachrichten claims to have learned that treaty of alliance between Central Empires has been renewed for 25 years, that military convention has been concluded, and that customs union of all the territories of middle Europe will be made object of early and close study. Frankfurter Zeitung points out on contrary that final arrangements without sanction of parliamentary chambers in both empires would be impossible. In Austria government would find it difficult to secure ratification if Poles joined with other Slavs. Consequently Polish question must have been discussed and unless decision reached was favorable to Austrian desire for Polish Union under her suzerainty no final results to be expected. Other papers draw from presence at conference of Kings of Saxony and Bavaria, conclusion that assignment of Baltic Provinces to Prussia, Lithuania to Saxony and Alsace to Bavaria was discussed. No allusion to military discussions found.

19 (5) A. Aside from the activity of the air forces on both sides the day was quiet at all points occupied by our troops. Our aviators brought down 2 hostile machines.
Last night one of our aviators engaged two German planes and brought one down in vicinity of APREMONT.

* * * * *

"On May 18, a descendant of one of the French officers who served with the American Revolutionary Forces presented, in the name of the descendants of all such officers, a stand of national and regimental colors to two regiments of a newly arrived American division. These flags bore the inscription 'From the Sons of the French Champions for American Liberty to the American Champions for France and Humanity.'"

C. Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 207th reenters line north of 42d. Second Army, 107th relieves 199th, unidentified division occupies former sector of 107th north of 3d Naval, 15th relieves 13th, 77th Reserve reenters line north of Jaeger. Eighteenth Army, 223d relieves 105th, 6th from Seventh Army in reserve.

British War Office from classification of 2,250 prisoners captured during April show that 60 per cent was contributed by classes of 1912 to 1919. Of this 60 per cent, 17 per cent from class of 1918 and 43 per cent of classes 1916 to 1918 inclusive. 3 per cent came from class of 1919, 4 per cent from classes belonging to reserve, 4 per cent from classes of Landwehr, 6 percent from Ersatz reserve and nearly 26 per cent from Landsturm.

Statistics concerning composition of drafts based on percentages derived from about 750 of these prisoners who were drafted in the first 4 months of 1918, give following results: Wounded and transferred gave more than 70 per cent in January and less than 54 per cent in April, while recruits of 1919 class gave less than one per cent in January and 35 per cent in April.

War Office summary calls particular attention to fact that among prisoners taken percentage belonging to 1919 class though still inconsiderable has increased; and also that 1919 class although not drafted in large numbers to units on western from until after offensive began, is now rapidly taking its place there.

D. Attention called to article printed in London Observer of May 12, attributed to Editor, J. L. Garvin, and dealing with activities of Colonel Repington. Article purports to contain disclosure of plot to upset British Cabinet and present Chief of British Imperial Staff by "Deliberate attempt to breed rivalry and dissension between M. Clemenceau and the British Premier as well as by supporting covert mutiny in the exploited name of General Robertson and by such means of General Maurice's letter." Remark of Colonel Repington's writing that "No American newspaper which wished to help the Allies should produce it." Attention called to fact that in spite of pronounced gifts and exceptional training in military affairs and diplomacy Colonel Repington has held no office military or diplomatic since commencement of war; and that activities are given largely to writing for National News, which is characterized by Garvin as a subsidized paper of recent and obscure origin edited by a naturalized Austrian, financed by naturalized Dutchman and devoted to attacks upon government. Copious quotations establish that Colonel Repington has referred with open contempt to Italian army, has regretted that Englishmen should help Italy against their ancient ally Austria, has steadily opposed unity of command and has referred in terms of studied insult to present Chief of British General Staff. Observer's article further quotes from Cheradame from Current Number of National Review that Repington has been "instrumental in leading Allies to commit errors in strategy which have cost millions of men and endangered the issue of war."

Noted here that Colonel Repington's articles are copyrighted in America by New York World.

20 (6) A. Except for activity by the artillery on both sides in various sectors there is nothing to report.

* * * * *
C. There is no change to report.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 243d from reserve relieves 183d, 183d reenters line between 54th Reserve and 107th. Army Detachment B, 6th Cavalry from Army Detachment A in reserve.

D. The commanding general of our troops in PICARDY submits the following report: "During the past week infantry has maintained aggressive spirit by active patrolling up to the enemy front lines which are often found empty at night. Artillery has day and night harried the enemy artillery and infantry organizations on our front. Our troops have better organized their positions and are becoming accustomed to hard warfare. About 40 per cent of gas casualties have returned to duty and all but a small remainder are expected to follow soon."

German representatives who have been negotiating with representatives of Swiss Government concerning new economic agreement between the two countries have left BERNE. Terms of proposed agreement settled and Swiss given until May 22 to sign. Germany will guarantee delivery 200,000 tons coal per month of which 140,000 tons at 173 francs and 60,000 for domestic consumption at 133 francs per ton. Provision made that no German coal may be used in manufacture for Entente countries of specified list of articles directly or indirectly useful in war. Germany also guarantees delivery 19,000 tons steel and iron monthly. Each country agrees to grant licenses for export to other of greatest amounts of certain commodities that can be spared. Germany furnishes especially fertilizer, potatoes, benzine, zinc, copper sulphate, drugs and sugar. Switzerland furnishes chocolate, condensed milk, preserved fruits, and 15,000 to 17,000 head of cattle.

Switzerland appears anxious to accept both this German offer and the French offer of 85,000 tons of coal per month of 150 francs made on May 6. French coal offered without restriction and would be used for manufacture of articles for Entente countries. France supposed to have threatened withdrawal of her offer in case of acceptance of German offer but no exact information obtainable here.

French Ambassador to Switzerland has visited PARIS and returned to BERNE. Swiss manufacturers state that 8,000 to 10,000 tons Entente coal per month in addition to similar amounts of non-German coal already imported would enable manufacturers for Entente to continue. Germans offer to withdraw restrictions concerning use of their coal on condition of importation of at least 68,000 tons Entente coal per month. French press reproaches Switzerland for yielding to German menace and failing to accept economic liberty offered her by France. Wolff Bureau accuses France of threatening economic war on Switzerland and thus preventing acceptance of German offer very favorable to Switzerland.

21 (7) A. In the course of reconnaissance combats in LORRAINE we captured prisoners. Here and in the WOEVRE artillery of both sides showed considerable activity.

B. Last night in LORRAINE patrolling was very active especially from our side. One patrol consisting of officer and 20 men exploring a hostile position gained contact and opened fire on German patrol of approximately same size. German patrol took cover and returned fire. Our patrol rushed position put enemy to flight and captured two prisoners. One prisoner died of wounds after reaching our lines. Our patrol suffered no casualties. Later in the night small hostile patrol attempted to rush one of our outposts but was driven off by rifle fire. One German killed and his body brought into our lines.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, unidentified division relieves 58th, 58th relieves 31st, 8th from Sixth Army relieves 29th. Sixth Army, 81st Reserve enters line at northern limit of army, 11th Reserve relieves 12th, 16th relieves 15th Reserve. Second Army, 192d from Fifth Army relieves 200th.

D. Germans continue to persist in propaganda that American aviators arrive in France by hospital ships as members of American ambulance field service. Recent wireless states that the American Corporal K. N. Vyler of the 96th French Escadro de Combat. Number 1, had a passport signed by Lansing which said that he was going to France to
serve in the French hospital service.

Prisoners report that Germans are worried over air situation in sector north of TOUL and have ordered up new squadrons to check activity of our aviators. Also stated that bombing squadrons are to arrive.

Reliable advice that striking French ammunition workers returned to factories on Sunday morning. Settlement apparently due to firmness of Prime Minister and underlying patriotism of workers. During negotiations three subjects in particular discussed. Concerning law sending to front mobilized French workmen Prime Minister refused to yield and insisted that strike must terminate at once. Regarding list of grievances presented by union leaders, Prime Minister pleaded previous ignorance and promised immediate inquiry providing men conceded necessity of obedience to government and returned to work. Representatives of workmen also demanded public statement of war aims. Prime Minister reported to have replied that war aims must depend on military developments but while refusing demand promised to make reply to labor and Socialist representatives in chamber of deputies after close of German offensive now expected. Opinion held in some reliable quarters that final result has been to strengthen government and incidentally to dispel any possible impression that result of visit of American Labor Mission was unfortunate.

22 (8) A. Artillery activity has decreased. There are no new developments to report.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 49th Reserve from reserve takes sector between 83d and 1st Landwehr, 216th relieves 117th. Seventeenth Army, 214th from Fourth Army relieves Bavarian 16th. Second Army, 18th withdrawn from line.

D. Since German offensive began German wireless press particularly persistent in propaganda regarding our troops. Specimens quoted below:

German Wireless Press, May 8. Insubordination and sabotage in American training camps. CHRISTIANIA. Norwegians who have just returned from America report that in the American training camps there occur every day cases of insubordination. In the beginning, this offense against discipline was punished by death, but this had to be abandoned as the cases were far too numerous. Many cases of sabotage are connected with this lack of discipline. Incendiary and destruction of war material and food are daily occurrences. Recently from 48 guns which were ready to be shipped, all the breech locks had been stolen.

German Wireless Press, May 12. American repulsed in SEICHEPREY, area. Between the MEUSE and the MOSELLE, in the SEICHEPREY, American assault troops were repulsed; they suffered heavy losses in personnel and material.

German Wireless Press, May 12. Results of raid against Americans in LORRAINE. Good results of our bombing on the American front in LORRAINE are confirmed; the day after the raid, May 11, it is reported that killed and wounded were removed from the APREMONT Wood and transported to the cemetery of St-AGNAT.

The two messages regarding actions against our troops are pure fiction, as is also alleged information about insubordination in training camps, and they are quoted as fair examples of the character of the propaganda which is being spread broadcast through Europe. These messages are picked up by wireless all over Europe and particularly by the wireless stations of German divisions and this kind of news is then circulated through these intercept stations to the German troops.
A. The day has been quiet at all points occupied by our troops.

C. There is no change in situation.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 225th from Army Detachment C enters line between Bavarian 14th and 21st. Army Detachment C, it is not known what division relieved 225th, Bavarian 8th reserve from Sixth Army relieves 78th Reserve.

D. Attempts being made in German press to place on United States blame for continuance of war. Germania, semi-official and especially representative of Hertling's views, quoted by wireless says "The world should know that the financial interests of America are a greater obstacle to peace than ALSACE-LORRAINE and Belgium have ever been." Germania claims there is every reason for thinking that Papal peace note was prepared with British approval and that President Wilson in hastening to answer before other Allies deliberately stifled English inclination to make peace, acting in interested of great American financiers. This explains why English did not answer Papal note.

German wireless quotes Kuhlmann as declaring that negotiations between Germany and Austria will soon produce favorable results and that the revision and strengthening of alliance between the two empires would constitute basis for durable peace between all nations. German Ambassador at VIENNA quoted to same effect, and as saying that events of war have already deepened and strengthened bonds between the two powers. Actual terms of agreement arrived at still unknown.

It is reported by French that "In Russia the Germans have assembled all their forces in two masses; one mass with the Finns to march on PETROGRAD. The other mass to march on MOSCOW. Movement will begin soon. There are about fifty Austro-German divisions on eastern front."

Following paragraph added April 29 to German Prize Regulations: "Neutral vessel is further regarded as trading in the interest of an enemy belligerent (insofar as circumstances do not contradict this) when the country whose flag the vessel is entitled to fly has made an agreement with an enemy country for the cession of tonnage or when the bulk of neutral country's merchant fleet is employed in enemy trade." Presumption that neutral vessels under neutral flags will be regarded as enemy vessels if neutral country in question has surrendered greater part of its tonnage to Allies. Norway asking clearer statement. British Minister to Norway regards paragraph as aimed chiefly at Swedish, Dutch and possibly Danish shipping in event of these countries entering into shipping agreements with Allies.

24 (10) A. There are no new developments to report. It is established that our aviators show down two hostile machines on May 21.

C. There is no change in situation.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 35th from Sixth Army relieves 32d. Sixth, 79th Reserve from Second Army in reserve. Second Army, 21st withdrawn from line, sector taken by 225th. Eighteenth Army, 46th Reserve from Nineteenth Army in reserve. First Army, 19th Reserve from Fourth Army relieves 232d. Third Army, 228th from Second Army relieves 28th Reserve.

Information received indicates that in later attacks on the SOMME German divisions suffered severe moral checks as well as physical losses and that policy of withdrawing German divisions of best fighting records for reconstitution and training was forced on the enemy by necessity. Present battle order shows very few first class
divisions in enemy's front line, that line north of the SOMME being held mainly by second class divisions and south of the SOMME, in the battle sector, by third class divisions. Main mass of the enemy's reserves now undergoing reconstitution and training are not definitely located but are mainly in the St-QUENTIN area.

Most striking feature of enemy's activity during past week has been continuous work in rear areas improving communications and expanding dumps. Main increase in ammunition dumps has been between the LYS and La BASSEE, in the BAPAUME area and south of the SOMME especially around ROYE. Work on communications was most actively pushed between the SCARPE and ALBERT. Enemy's infantry activity has been confined to local attacks near MERVILLE and LOCRE and minor raids between ARRAS and the SOMME. Between YPRES and BAILLEUL, enemy's field batteries are being withdrawn to positions farther in rear. For the past two weeks gas shelling has been continuous near HAZEBROUCK. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE there are few indications of an offensive this being the only sector on which the enemy is constructing defensive works on a large scale. From the OISE to the Swiss border all activity has been subnormal.

From ROME our attache reports "Increasing indications of enemy's offensive Italian front. Troops move from PIAVE and from behind line towards TRENTINO. Greater density of troops eastern ASIAGO Plateau and LAGARINA Valley. Increase of forces GUIDICARIE and at Mount TONALE."

25 (11) A. Yesterday in PICARDY our troops executed a successful silent raid inflicted on the enemy a number of losses in killed and prisoners. There is nothing else of importance to report.

C. There is no change in the situation.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 38th withdrawn from line. Seventeenth Army, army boundary moves south to MARTINSART so that army now includes 21st Reserve. Second Army, 54th relieves 183d, 3d Naval extended north to cover sector formerly occupied by 107th. Eighteenth Army, 202d relieves 11th, it was relieved in Nineteenth Army by unidentified division.

The following changes in location of German air units have been confirmed since the report in the cable of May 16: FLANDERS plus one pursuit flight; ARMENTIERES region minus two pursuit flights, plus one bombing squadron of three flights and two reconnaissance flights; VIMY-BAPAUME region plus one pursuit flight; MOREUIL-NOYON region plus two pursuit flights; minus one bombing squadron of three flights, minus two reconnaissance flights; LOAN region minus one pursuit flight; CHAMPAGNE region minus one pursuit flight; VERDUN region minus one pursuit flight; WOEVRE region plus one pursuit flight; LORRAINE plus one reconnaissance flight. New shelters for accommodation of about 200 machines have been confirmed in ARMENTIERES region. Concentration of air forces continues to indicate a coming offensive in ARMENTIERES and SOMME regions.

The favorable weather of the past week has afforded opportunity for general aerial activity. This has been most pronounced in FLANDERS and the SOMME region. The enemy has made an unusual number of air reconnaissances in the vicinity of BELFORT. Bombing has been carried out against LONDON, PARIS, ABBEVILLE and concentration points in rear between the sea and REIMS.

Interrogation of an officer observer made prisoner near LUNEVILLE indicates that the work of our pursuit squadrons is becoming recognized. Hostile aviators consider the front between St-MIHIEL and PONTA-MOUSSON to be hazardous. A machine brought down near LUNEVILLE belonged to the MOSAIC Section of Army Department C., and was fitted with an electrically regulated moving picture camera.

In connection with ratification by Switzerland of economic accord with Germany as reported by cable May 20, announced that France will supply 20,000 tons of coal per
month to insure continuance of manufactures for Allies. French press claims France well satisfied since without incurring difficulties incidental to supply of 85,000 tons per month she has safeguarded manufactures for Allies, forced Germany to abate terms, and rescued Switzerland from economic subjection. German wireless press on other hand claims that France failed in attempt to break off German Swiss negotiations, and that Germany has preserved the economic independence of Switzerland.

Great importance attached by European press to demonstrations at PRAGUE on May 16, 17 and 18. Occurrence ascribed both to fiftieth anniversary of founding of Czech National Theatre and recent decree dividing Bohemia into administrative districts, but movement shown to have much greater significance by presence of delegations representing Poles and various branches of south Slavs. Meeting consequently took form of combined protests against Teutonic oppression by representatives of Czech, Polish, and south Slav branches of Slav race. Not ascertained how far delegates, especially Polish, entitled to speak for those whom they claim to represent, but presumption strong that Czechs and south Slavs as whole are behind movement. In PRAGUE demonstrations led to riots, and outbreaks reported in other Bohemian centers. Reported that name of President Wilson coupled with Czech leaders in popular demonstrations. Stern repressive measures used and state of siege proclaimed in some and possibly all parts of Bohemia. Many arrests made and all meetings forbidden. Hostile press claims order now restored but openly expresses anxiety concerning possible continuation and extension of movement.

D. It is purposed to include in this section more detailed information of a confidential nature concerning activities of divisions actively engaged. This information will necessarily in most cases relate to events of preceding days.

Last night troops of the 42d Division threw 1,000 propaganda tracts into the German lines by means of rifle grenades.

32d Division, midnight May 21 to midnight May 22: Conditions very quiet, except for activity of hostile aviators.

32d Division, midnight May 21 to midnight May 22: Conditions generally quiet. Enemy aviators rather active and persistent in spite of our heavy antiaircraft fire. Attempt made by hostile artillery to silence our antiaircraft batteries.

26th Division, noon May 22 to noon May 23: Generally quiet, artillery sub-normal. Hostile aircraft active but driven off on several occasions by antiaircraft guns and by our own planes. Unusual movements of men behind German lines on roads and railroads. Little activity in our lines on account of a number of reliefs successfully executed.

42d Division, noon May 22, noon May 23: Patrols very active, 9 belonging to ourselves and the French operating during the night and early morning. There were no encounters. Artillery showed little activity on either side, our own however in conjunction with the French throwing about 50 per cent more shells than the Germans. Our antiaircraft batteries successful in driving back many hostile planes. Hostile trench cannons registered some hits on our trenches. Enemy by rifle and grenade fire showed much nervousness during night as he has been doing in this sector for some time.

26 (12) A. In the course of patrol encounters our troops drove back the enemy and inflicted a number of casualties.

B. Last night in LORRAINE one of our patrols consisting of an officer and twenty men gained contact with an enemy patrol of about equal strength which was supplied with light machine guns and assisted by machine-gun fire from its own lines. In the fighting which ensued our patrol drove back the enemy killing several of them.

Above not given to press in compliance with Paragraph 4 your Cablegram 1389.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 52d Reserve withdrawn, sector is taken by extension southwards of 1st Landwehr and 56th. Sixth Army, 25th from reserve relieves 36th Reserve, 119th withdrawn. Seventh Army, Bavarian 9th Reserve from
Second Army relieves 34th. Fifth Army, Bavarian 6th from Fourth Army relieves 19th Ersatz.

Captured orders confirm reports that the boundary between the German Seventeenth and Second Armies has been moved south to the northern edge of village of MARTINSART so that the sector now held by the 21st Reserve Division is in the Seventeenth Army.

Nine German divisions have been identified in the CHIMAY---HIRSON---GUISE---AVESNES---CHARLESVILLE area in the early part of May. Of these, seven are first class divisions, and two are second class divisions. All nine are attack divisions. Airplane observations about May 18 to May 22 report sufficient activity in this area to indicate that there are other divisions there also. This area accordingly appears to be the principal training area for the second offensive as it was for the first offensive. From this area divisions may be moved to CHAMPAGNE, the SOMME or ARRAS with about equal facility, in night marches of 4 to 7 days.

German Surgeon General made following announcement on April 22: "The percentage of soldiers released from the hospitals as fit for field service is very high. Excepting those killed in action fatal cases constitute only 1 to 1.2 per cent. Approximately 2,750,000 wounded and sick have been returned to the front as fit for service, since the war broke out. About 629,000 men have been released from the hospitals as unfit for service, of which 70,000 were crippled. The total number of cripples at present is about 98,000. The number of suicides has decreased considerably during the war."

German wireless press announces that German Italian agreement concerning exchange of prisoners of war and civilians was signed May 15 at BERNE. Prisoners seriously wounded or ill and members of medical corps to be exchanged without further discussion. Prisoners of 45 years of age with large families and those more than 18 months in captivity will also be exchanged.

D. Summary of artillery activity in American sector since May 1. 1st Division: Daily average hostile fire May 5 to May 21, exclusive of gas attack of May 3, was 3,450 rounds. The smallest number for one day was 1,000 rounds, and the highest 5,800. This maximum of 5,800 was reached on May 14. In gas attack on May 3, 15,000 gas shells were used.

42d Division; hostile fire as follows: Daily average May 1 to May 22 was 450 rounds. Smallest number for one day 100, largest number for one day 1,500. Maximum of 1,500 reached on May 2. Our own fire for same division and same period averaged 800 rounds, excluding two exceptional days May 1 and May 2. 20,000 were used on May 1 and 33,000 on May 2. The minimum of our fire for one day during this period was 300.

26th Division: Daily average of hostile fire 230 rounds. Largest number in one day 500.

2d Division: Daily average of hostile fire May 1 to May 10, 400. Smallest number for one day 100, largest for one day 600.

1st Division, noon May 22 to noon, May 23: Very quiet in all respects. Enemy using no gas and little shrapnel. During evening hostile airplanes, balloons, searchlights, antiaircraft guns and artillery seen to be working in close liaison.

26th Division: Noon May 24 to noon, May 25. No unusual activity apart from some increase of hostile machine-gun fire. Artillery very inactive.


42d Division, noon May 25 to May 26: Aside from patrol action referred to in Section B day quiet. Artillery activity submornal, machine-gun activity slight except against patrols, aviation normal. Front line battalion machine gun company reliefs successfully executed during night. German deserter of Landwehr class came into the lines this morning.
27 (13) A. In PICARDY after violent artillery preparation hostile infantry detachments succeeded in penetrating our advanced positions at two points. Our troops counter-attacked, completely expelling the enemy and entering his lines.

In the WOEVRE a strong hostile raiding party was repulsed with heavy losses in killed and wounded.

In LORRAINE hostile gas shell bombardments of some intensity occurred. The day was quiet in the other sectors occupied by our troops.

In the course of air combats this morning our aviators shot down a hostile machine.

This has not been given to the press. Rest of cable follows:

B. In PICARDY before daylight this morning the enemy after a violent bombardment with high explosives and gas attacked our advanced positions in three detachments. In two places he penetrated small portions of our front lines. Shortly after our troops counterattacked, expelled the Germans at all points, and occupied parts of the German trenches. Heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy and some prisoners taken. Our casualties are light. In one case American taken prisoner was rescued by counterattacks and all of his captors killed. Troops displayed fine offensive spirit at all times, and have achieved notable success.

During the early hours of the morning in the WOEVRE a hostile force supported by violent artillery fire attempted a raid upon our lines. This force which was composed of 3 officers and about 100 men well equipped with light machine guns blew up our wires and attempted to capture portions of our trenches. They were completely repulsed by our infantry and artillery leaving one officer and 4 men dead in our trenches and one wounded prisoner in our hands. 15 or 20 dead were observed near our wire and 10 stretchers were seen being carried from this point. Here also our losses appear to have been relatively slight.

Yesterday in LORRAINE the enemy was unusually active in bombarding our trenches with gas and in patrolling. On one occasion a patrolling party approached our lines with cries of “Kamerad.” Our troops replied with rifle fire. One of the hostile detachment was killed and his body secured.

C. British General Headquarters reported this morning at 10:40 a. m.: “At about 3:30 a. m. this morning the enemy attacked on a wide front between REIMS and SOISSONS after an intense bombardment of the French and British positions. He is reported to have penetrated our forward positions on the IX Corps front and on the front of the French formations on either flank. Heavy fighting is taking place. The enemy attacked with tanks. The enemy also attacked the French early this morning on the LOCRES-VOORMEZEEL front and is reported to have made small progress in places. There has been considerable hostile artillery and trench mortar activity on the greater part of the British front. Gas shells being used freely.”

It is reported from French Headquarters that bombardment around REIMS began at one o’clock and lasted about 3 hours. The infantry attacked at 4 o’clock on a front of about 30 kilometers. The Allies are on their second line the River AISNE. Tanks were used against the British. The principal characteristic of the preparation was gas. This went as far back as 12 to 15 kilometers. The attack continues. Apparently the left of the German attack does not extend beyond the British flank.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 38th from Fourth Army relieves 1st Guard Reserve, 119th withdrawn from line sector taken over by adjacent units, 10th Ersatz from Fourth Army in reserve, 195th from Seventeenth Army in reserve. Seventeenth Army, 208th from Second Army in reserve, 24th from Nineteenth Army in reserve, 187th withdrawn from line sector being taken by unidentified division. Eighteenth Army, 84th from Fifth Army relieves Bavarian 3d, 50th from Third Army in reserve.

D. 26th Division, noon, May 25 to noon, May 26: Very quiet with exception of antiaircraft activity in which about 200 shells were used.
Bulletin of French General Headquarters, May 24, reports that American aviation squadron on patrolling duty attacked hostile trenches and cantonment near BAILLEUL on May 23 or May 24. Two hostile airplanes thought to have been brought down. Raid on 26th Division reported this cable concerned 101st Regiment.

32d Division, noon, May 22 to May, noon, 23: Generally very quiet. Noted that French balloon dropped propaganda papers in French along German lines. Two others apparently engaged in same activity. Artillery patrolling machine guns and antiaircraft batteries normal.

32d Division, May 26: Increased activity of hostile artillery and machine guns on both sides. Patrolling and reliefs successfully executed without incident. Private J. W. Guyton, 126th Infantry, killed May 25, has been awarded the Croix de Guerre as the first American soldier killed on German soil. No publication concerning this division can be made since it has not yet been identified by the enemy. Information will be forwarded as soon as identification is received and incidents such as that concerning Private Guyton can then be released for information.

42d Division, noon, May 23 to noon, May 24: In spite of slight increase in hostile artillery fire French and American batteries maintained superiority of 2 shells to 1. Slight use of gas by enemy. There was also increase of small arms fire. Patrols active on both sides. Hostile patrol attempting to approach our lines in early morning driven back by rifle fire automatic rifle and grenade fire. Considerable movement behind German lines in working parties and on roads. Our antiaircraft batteries active against hostile machine.

42d Division, noon, May 24 to noon, May 25: Almost complete cessation of hostile artillery fire. Our own normally active. Hostile rifle fire also very light. Machine-gun fire normal. Large bodies of men and convoys of transportation observed in addition to the normal active movements on the enemy roads. In one case ten companies of infantry with mounted officers and followed by wagons and trucks observed. At same time two more companies seen drilling near by. Surveying and working parties very busy. Hostile machine-gun practice and signals for projector attack also observed. Skirmish maneuvers held behind German lines during afternoon. Our own troops aside from artillery were active mainly in patrols. Our patrols executed successful reconnaissance but had no encounters.

26th Division, noon, May 24 to noon, May 25: Considerable machine-gun fire and activity of hostile working parties. Otherwise quiet.

28 (14) A. This morning in PICARDY our troops attacking on a front of one and one-fourth miles, advanced our lines and captured the village of CANTIGNY. We took two hundred prisoners and inflicted on the enemy severe losses in killed and wounded. Our casualties were relatively small. Hostile counterattacks broke down under our fire. In LORRAINE and in the WOEVRE artillery of both sides continued active. Early in the day our aviators shot down a hostile machine.

B. Yesterday morning three of our planes encountered four hostile planes flying at three thousand meters in the region of MONTSEE. In the fighting which ensued Lieutenant Douglas Campbell successively attacked two of the German machines. Of these one lost both wings and fell. This was referred to in yesterday's communique. In same encounter one of our aviators was wounded but succeeded in making normal landing within our lines.

Yesterday morning in a sector recently taken over by our troops an American sergeant encountered German patrol of four men who had entered one of our trenches during night. In fighting which ensued our sergeant although receiving three wounds succeeded in driving out hostile patrol which left grenades and wire cutter behind.

In LORRAINE on the evening of May 26, hostile patrol attempted to penetrate our lines. It was driven off with loss to the enemy of five killed. Of these one was brought into our lines. One of our men was wounded.
This morning Lieutenant Rickenbacker and Lieutenant Campbell attacked a group of six enemy planes and brought one down out of control.

C. British General Headquarters reported 11:30 a. m. today: “The enemy developed his attacks on the AISNE front yesterday rapidly and in great strength. The left of the British IX Corps has been pushed back in a southeasterly direction and was reported last night to be holding a line on the high ground between the AISNE and VESLE River. At that time the 8th Division was still holding their 2d line positions about BOUFFIGNEREUX and the 21st Division was holding their battle positions intact about CORMICY. FISMES is held by French troops. On the LYS front French and British troops counterattacked this morning to clear up the situation east of DICKEBUSCH Lake. No details yet available. We captured prisoners in raids near AYETTE and BOISLEUX St-MARC.”

British Headquarters reported this afternoon: “On the AISNE battle front there is believed to be no change in the position held by the British IX Corps. On the left of the IX Corps the French report that the enemy has crossed the AISNE, and has reached LONGUEVAL DHIUZEL---St-MARD and CYS. There has been heavy hostile gas shelling in the VILLERS BRETONNEUX sector today, and considerable hostile artillery activity between ALBERT and ADINDER Wood. Hostile artillery also active from HULLUCH to LAWE River. Considerable shelling of back areas in the YPRES sector. A hostile raid was repulsed early this morning near MERCATEL. Enemy carried out silent raids early this morning northeast of BETHUNE and on the night of the 25th/26th instant, in FLETRE sector. A few of our men missing.”

Allied counterattack this morning in DICKEBUSCH Lake sector restored our former line, except that enemy still holds about 150 yards of east edge of SCOTTISH Wood. French captured several prisoners.

French report that Allied line on the AISNE front runs LEULLY Plateau, south of PONT ROUGE---CONDE-sur-AISNE---valley of VESLE River to VASSENAY AUGY---CERSEUIL---LHUYS---FISMES---BREUIL---PROUILLY---VILLERS FRANQUEUX--COURCY.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: Bavarian 16th from Seventeenth Army relieves 121st. Sixth Army, 16th relieved 4th and not 15th Reserve, 15th Reserve is therefore still in line. Seventeenth Army, 17th relieves 234th. Second Army, 21st enters line, 15th withdrawn, divisions rearranged so order north to south is 109th, 225th, 21st, Bavarian 14th, 192d. Eighteenth Army, 82d Reserve relieves 30th. Seventh Army, 5th, 6th, 37th, 36th, 113th, 10th, all from Eighteenth Army enter line, battle order west to east now appears to be 241st, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 6th, 5th, 13th Landwehr 37th, 197th, 113th, 36th, 10th, 231st, 103d. First Army, 213th enters line between 33d Reserve and 242d.

D. Following are additional and confidential details regarding attack on 1st Division reported yesterday’s cable. Violent hostile bombardment of high explosives and gas from 3:30 to 6:30 a. m. Infantry attack took place between 6:30 and 7:30 a. m. and our lines were entered at two points. At 7:30 the troops forming the right of our division made counterattack throwing enemy entirely out of our trenches and occupying parts of theirs. Two wounded prisoners were left in our hands and many German dead are said to lie between the lines. Affair regarded by 1st Division as trench raid on large scale. Known that one of our men was taken prisoner and others are not yet accounted for.

The general commanding our troops in PICARDY sends the following report: “Reinforced by French artillery, a part of our troops in PICARDY at 5:45 a. m. today, successfully attacked the enemy over a front of about 2,200 yards and took the village of CANTIGNY, advancing our line from 300 to 1,600 yards, capturing some 200 prisoners and killing and wounding many more of the enemy, exact numbers undetermined. One enemy counterattack repulsed. Other efforts broken up under our fire. We are holding the position gained. Our casualties relatively slight. Operation executed by our troops with great dash and exactness as planned.”
Following are additional and confidential details regarding attack on 26th Division reported yesterday’s cable. Raids all along the front probably from APREMONT to the MOSELLE took place during night, probably with object of securing identifications. Raids along our sector shortly after 1 a.m. From 2 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. violent hostile barrage on our trenches with use of gas. At 2 a.m. attack as previously described, made apparently by men of 104th Regiment, 40th Division which left Russia 8 weeks ago. Attack was on sector taken over a half hour previously by 101st Regiment. Apparent object to secure identifications. Was repulsed by our 101st Regiment. Corrected enemy’s losses show 1 officer and 3 men dead on our hands, and ten wounded, or dead, carried off on litters. Our own casualties very light.

Following are additional and confidential details concerning attack on 42d Division reported yesterday’s cable. Between 5:30 and 9 p.m., May 26, 1,000 shells of which 90% gas thrown on our batteries. Practically no damage done. After this regular artillery fire was resumed and continued until morning with about 55% gas. At 1 a.m. gas projector attack, comprising about 800 shells in 2 bursts and consisting mainly of phosgene with some mustard. Our casualties were mainly in the 168th Regiment. Patrol action which took place in this sector during same night reported this cable, Section B.

Attack of American sergeant on hostile patrol mentioned Section B, this cable concerned 32d Division which is still unidentified by enemy.

42d Division, May 28: Patrolling active, hostile party being driven back from our lines by rifle fire. Hostile artillery has continued during day and night with harassing and neutralizing fire, but some diminution noted. Strong destructive and harassing fire executed by our own batteries.

32d Division, May 28: Conditions very quiet. Some activity of airplanes and machine guns. Reliefs effected without incident.

26th Division, noon, May 25 to noon, May 26: Conditions very quiet, some activity of hostile machine guns and minenwerfer. Enemy released small paper balloons carrying propaganda.

42d Division, noon, May 25 to noon, May 26: Generally quiet. In afternoon, enemy fired 15 winged bombs from trench cannon. Hostile artillery very inactive, ours and French using six times as many shells. Much patrolling activity besides raid described Section B.

32d Division, May 5, midnight to midnight: Increased artillery activity and intermittent machine-gun activity. Hostile aircraft also active. American and French patrol consisting of officer and 33 men succeeded in throwing propaganda tract into German trenches.

29 (15) A. In the CANTIGNY Salient we have consolidated our positions in spite of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. Renewed counterattacks broke down under our fire. In LORRAINE we repulsed three raids during the night, taking several prisoners and killing a number of the enemy. There and in the WOEVRE the artillery of both sides had been continuously active. It is established that on May 27 our aviators shot down two hostile machines instead of one as reported.

B. Last night in LORRAINE the enemy was again very active against our troops. There was again considerable shelling with gas, but the results obtained were very small. Protected by an artillery barrage a raiding party of about fifty men attempted to surround one of our advanced posts. The attempt was complete failure the enemy losing ten dead and four wounded. Of these some were killed in bayonet fighting. In this case also our casualties were very light. During the night two other attacks on our lines were prevented by our barrage and machine-gun fire, the enemy failing to penetrate our wire.
C. Enemy has continued his advance in CHAMPAGNE today. Line reported from French Headquarters at 4 p. m. today as follows from east to west: From old line north of REIMS ---MUIZON---COURCELLES---SAPIECOURT---SAVIGNY-sur-ARDRE---DAVIGNY---LEUPEigne---NAMPTueil---BILLY-sur-AISNE---CUFFIES---CHAVIGNY---CRECY-au-MONT---thence old line.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 13th Reserve from Fourth Army relieves 81st Reserve. Seventeenth Army, Bavarian 5th relieves 221st, 187th still in line between 23d Reserve and 214th. Seventh Army, 7 additional divisions from Eighteenth Army enter line, order of battle west to east now is 14th Reserve, 241st, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 6th, 5th, 13th Landwehr, 2d Guard, 113th, 197th, 37th, 33d, 10th Reserve, 36th, 10th, 5th Guard, 28th, 231st, 50th, 52d, 103d, 28th Reserve from Third Army in reserve. Army Detachment B, Bavarian 30th Reserve relieved by unidentified division.

D. Concerning attack of our troops in PICARDY on CANTIGNY Salient the commanding general reported at 5:45 evening 28th: "Our infantry rapidly consolidated its newly captured positions north and east of CANTIGNY despite heavy enfilading machine-gun fire and moderate bombardment by high-explosive shells. Enemy losses in killed very heavy. We have 175 prisoners including three officers. Small enemy counterattack of Bots FONTAINE repulsed this morning. Enemy counterattack now in progress north of CANTIGNY 5:45 afternoon."

The commanding general further reported at 9:38 evening of May 28: "Operation against CANTIGNY executed as planned this morning. 28th Infantry advanced at 6:45 morning on front of two and one-fourth kilometers with twelve tanks and detachment of flame throwers captured CANTIGNY and progressed 800 meters east of village to final objective in forty minutes. Movement executed with dash and precision. About 200 prisoners coming to rear now. Hostile reaction slight so far. Troops digging newly organized positions.

Additional and confidential details concerning attacks on 42d Division reported this cable Section B: Gas attack was made with projectors but was much lighter than that of two months before. Some 250 to 300 drums mainly of phosgene were used. Our casualties were very light even in comparison with extent of attack. The raiding party of 50 men belonged to the 1st Battalion of 20th Landwehr Regiment. There were 10 men from each company of each battalion and 10 men from the battalion patrol detachment. They attempted to surround one of our outposts attacking from three directions. Some of the enemy entered our trenches but after fierce hand-to-hand fight were expelled. We took prisoners number not yet reported. One of them said that division had divisional order stating that they must take American prisoners at any cost. The gas attack and the three infantry attacks referred to took place about 12:30 a. m. Our trenches were bombarded with high explosive and gas during the remainder of the night.

32d Division, May 29: "Usual intermittent machine-gun fire on both sides. Enemy artillery very active. Considerable enemy airplane and balloon activity. General impression of the day enemy activity greater than usual."

30 (16) A. The enemy has been again completely repulsed by artillery fire and infantry action in attacks against our new positions near CANTIGNY. Artillery fighting continues actively there and in LORRAINE where it includes the use of gas shells. There is nothing else of importance to report. Balance of cable to follow.

B. Attention drawn to fact that German Official Communiqué May 29 afternoon, in reporting capture of CANTIGNY avoids mention of fact that operation was conducted by American troops. Recent marked endeavors of Germans to discount fighting qualities of our forces indicate that enemy feared moral effect of admission in Germany.

In renewed counterattack on our new positions in CANTIGNY region made by German on morning, May 29, tanks were used. Our lines firmly held. Hostile losses appear to have been very heavy. At conclusion of this counterattack our prisoners had increased to two hundred forty.
C. It was reported from French Headquarters at 1:15 on May 30 that in the evening the enemy was within four kilometers of the MARNE in the northern part of the forest of HIN, N. W. DORMANS. The line appeared to form a great V, SOISSONS---HARTENNES---FOREST RIS (N. W. of DORMANS) at the lower point---MUIZON---REIMS. Reports received 6 p. m., May 30, indicate that the enemy has reached the line of the MARNE between CHATILLON-sur-MARNE and DORMANS, and is approaching CHATEAU-THIERRY.

German offensive conducted after manner recently found effective on the SOMME. 12 of the identified divisions are rated as first class for attack. Before this attack began, the front was held by 11 divisions of which 2 were fourth class, 6 were third class, 2 were second class and one was first class. There was a second class division in reserve not far from the front.

Only 2 of the attacking divisions on the AISNE front have had less than six weeks rest. These 2 have more than 4 weeks rest.

Yesterday in the vicinity of REIMS 4 divisions (1 of second class, 3 of the third class) belonging to the First Army joined in the attack pivoting about on COURCY. On the extreme right of the Seventh Army, 2 second class divisions pertaining thereto have not been identified as taking part in this attack.

Indications point to participation in present offensive of following German corps staffs: 1st, already in Seventh Army; 3d; 9th; 15th, on the right of First Army; 17th; 65th, which was a cavalry corps staff in Russia; 8th Reserve, already in Seventh Army; 4th Reserve, from the left of Eighteenth Army. Most of these corps staffs are of first class quality and have been previously employed in offensives.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth and Sixth Armies placing 35th in Sixth Army. 115th from Fourth Army in reserve. Second Army, Jaeger withdrawn from front. Eighteenth Army, Bavarian 9th Reserve from Seventh Army in reserve sector taken by extension fronts neighboring divisions. Seventh Army, 1st Guard from Eighteenth Army W. of 37th, 86th from First Army enters line between 50th and 52d unidentified division takes old sector 202d. Army detachment B, 14th Landwehr from Russia and elements 4th Cavalry relieve 7th Cavalry.

D. 42d Division: Summarizing the events of the two weeks May 14 to May 28, noon to noon, the chief of staff reports: "The enemy has manifested greater activity of all sorts during this period than before and has made vigorous but unsuccessful attempts to capture prisoners. It is probable that the enemy has been reinforced as his fire has been reinforced as his fire has been much heavier without specific provocation than during the preceding period in reaction to our very heavy fire. It is probable that new or additional troops have come into sector in the enemy's rear areas, possibly being retired divisions from the SOMME.

Our patrols have continued to be very numerous and enterprising and have reconnoitered "No Man's Land" and penetrated the enemy's lines not only every night but in some cases by day. Prisoners have been captured, casualties inflicted and the bodies of enemy killed in combat have been brought into our lines so that previous identifications have been possible. Our artillery has fired upon enemy working parties and movements, destroyed enemy machine-gun emplacements and inflicted sharp reprisals for the fire of enemy batteries. In addition the Chief of Staff reports that the 21st Landwehr Division and the 96th Division are still opposite the sector. Hostile snipers have increased in number and activity but their fire continued to be ineffective. The enemy has shown frequent signs of nervousness along his front line firing with rifles and automatic rifles and throwing grenades in his own wire when none of our patrols were near. Hostile machine guns have been active, firing on our lines and communications day and night as well as on our patrols. Trench cannon have been little used. Hostile artillery has been very irregular firing from 35 rounds on May 25 to nearly 6,000 rounds on May 27. The daily average has been 850 shells as compared with 500, 550, and 455, for the 3 preceding periods. Besides the gas attack of May 27, mustard gas shells have occasionally been used on our batteries and on our infantry. Enemy airplanes have also in general been
active. "It appears there are less enemy planes available for use in this sector than formerly, though those in observation have shown great daring in flying low over our lines and circling back and forth in spite of violent bombardment by our antiaircraft guns."

Considerable activity behind the hostile lines both in movements of troops and in working parties have been observed.

42d Div.: The increased activity of artillery on both sides after the hostile attack of May 26, May 27 is shown in fact that from noon, May 27 to noon, May 28, our troops used 3,577 shells to 1,395 firing by enemy. The Germans used 200 gas shells to our 153.

32d Division, May 28, midnight to midnight: Unusual activity of hostile artillery shown in use of 1,340 shells.

On May 30, the general commanding our troops in PICARDY sent the following report received at G. H. Q., A. E. F., 5 p.m., May 30: "Hostile counterattack against CANTIGNY from northeast repulsed by artillery fire and infantry action at 16:30 o'clock. Tanks reported to have participated in attack but full confirmation lacking. Enemy artillery and machine guns active over CANTIGNY and CASABLANCA quarter during day causing losses. Our airplane and enemy very active. 240 German prisoners to date. No change in our lines."

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31 (17) A. In the course of a raid executed this morning by our troops in the WOEVRE, our technical detachments destroyed the enemy's advanced positions. At the same time our raiding party inflicted losses in killed, wounded and prisoners. In LORRAINE artillery fighting has diminished. There is nothing to report from the other sector occupied by our troops. Early in the day our aviators shot down a hostile machine.

B. German fear of moral effect in Germany of admission of American success further shown in fact now established that at least four distinct counterattacks on our new positions near CANTIGNY were made before noon, May 30.

*****

In the WOEVRE in the early morning of May 31 a raid on the German lines was carried out by volunteers and technical detachments. The raiding party blew up thirty-two dugouts and a bridge, killed and wounded more than twenty of the enemy, and brought back a captured machine gun.

C. On May 30 at 11:30, evening it was reported from French Headquarters: "The line seems to be as follows: MONT-de-CHOISY (S. E. of NOYON)--TARTIERS (ours)--POMMIERS--CHAUDUN--VIERY--the railroad to VERDILLY--MONT-ST-PERE retaken by us late tonight--the MARNE to TRELOUP, we have detachments on the north, fighting still going on in VINCENNES from there to REIMS no change."

"The withdrawal to the line MONT-de-CHOISY--TARTIERS was partly voluntary. An attack was in progress near PONTOISE late in the evening."

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 18th Reserve relieves 25th.

Seventeenth Army, Bavarian 5th Reserve withdrawn sector taken by extension of neighboring divisions. Seventh Army, 9th and 51st Reserve from Eighteenth Army enter line between 5th and 13th Landwehr. 26th withdrawn being relieved by 231st. Fifth Army, Bavarian 6th relieves 22d instead of 19th Ersatz as previously reported.

D. A staff officer from these headquarters who is with our troops in PICARDY reported on May 29 (hour not given): "Fight came off practically exactly as planned. At 4:45 a.m. our artillery with the additional batteries put at the disposal of the division commander for the fight, started its neutralization fire on the hostile artillery. There was no sudden increase in the artillery fire at 4:45 but the volume of artillery increased. At 4:45 our artillery commenced its preparation and diversion fire. At this
hour the increase in volume of fire was marked. At 6:40 the rolling barrage started. The infantry promptly moved out. I saw one company distinctly. It moved in 2 lines of 2 waves which went forward as if it were at inspection, really splendid, line straight et cetera. Objectives were taken and our men proceeded to dig in. Prisoners then commenced to come back. Germans in small groups commenced to filter from MONTDIDIER and COURTMANCHE in the FONTAINE-sous-MONTDIDIER. These small filtering parties led to the belief that the Germans were going to counterattack later in the day, either that, or that their losses had been so severe as to demand the reestablishment of their front line in this way. The artillery was kept in touch with reports received as to movements of the enemy and took the necessary steps to fire on the critical targets. At 9:30 p. m. things were quieting down. No indication of our having lost any prisoners. Tanks all came back safely. Captured German officer estimates German dead at 200. Liaison worked well. French officer commented on its excellence."

At 10:35 a. m. May 30, same American staff officer reported: "German casualties higher than ours based on dead Germans reported to have been seen and our artillery fire on troops being assembled for counterattack. Two counterattacks were reported as having been repulsed this morning. Our artillerymen put down a counterpreparation fire at 3 a. m. Everything O. K. They got a few more prisoners every little while in dugouts in CANTIGNY."

In the official summary of the 1st division covering from noon, May 28 to noon, May 29 the following report is given: "At 16:26 h., enemy commenced a heavy bombardment of CANTIGNY and our old front line to the west of this town, and at 17:10 h., launched a counterattack, preceded by a barrage on our newly captured position. The enemy caught by our barrage and counterpreparation before reaching our line and was completely repulsed. The attack was over at 17:45 h. Following this attack the enemy again attacked at 18:14 h., our line to the east of CANTIGNY. Our barrage caught all of the enemy except the first line which was repulsed by our infantry fire before they reached our positions; and at 18:40 h., single groups of men were seen retreating towards the Bois de FRAMICOURT. This morning about 6 h., the enemy counterattacked in two waves our new positions but were a third time repulsed with heavy losses without having regained any of the ground lost yesterday. In addition to the attack above reported two small counterattacks were made on our line to the east of CANTIGNY, one at 19:45 h., and one between 6 and 7 h. They were both repulsed by the combined fire of our artillery and infantry."

Enemy severely bombarded our new positions in CANTIGNY from 10 h., May 28 to 22 h., May 28. About 4,000 shells, calibre: 77, 88, 105, 150, 210 fell in this vicinity. From 22 h. to 7 h., the bombardment was continuous with slight decrease in volume, about 2,000 shells during this period, of the same calibre as above. The VILLERS TOURNELLE sector was bombarded intermittently with 5,000 shells of small, medium and large calibre, including sneezing gas phosgene, yperite, and high explosive."

The raid executed by our troops in the WOEVRE May 31, referred to Sections A and B this cable was executed by 350 volunteers of the 101st Infantry and technical detachments. Identifications of the 22d Regiment, Bavarian 8th Reserve Division were obtained. Divisional report also shows that airplanes were very active during the day.

26th Division, May 28 to 29, noon to noon: Hostile machine-gun fire intermittent and rather violent. Hostile artillery active and using some gas. German airplanes driven off on numerous occasions by our own machines and by antiaircraft guns. Supposed that the enemy is using banks of smoke to conceal some kind of work or operations behind his lines. Patrolling active along entire sector. Part of German first line trenches apparently unoccupied.

32d Division, May 27, midnight to midnight: Continued activity of hostile artillery shown by use of 1,340 shells. "Hostile propaganda consisting of French papers and illustrated anti-English papers dropped on three of our four sectors." Otherwise quiet.
32d Division, May 29, midnight to midnight: Hostile raid at midnight May 28 to May 29 stopped by French barrage. No prisoners taken. Hostile artillery very active and using some gas shells. Airplane activity also continues. German propaganda balloon has come into our lines.

42d Division, May 28 to 29, noon to noon: Corrected enemy losses sustained in raid of early morning May 29 give 9 dead and 5 wounded prisoners. Two of the wounded prisoners have since died. American and French artillery used 2,500 shells during day enemy only used 1,500 not including box barrage in connection with raid on our trenches.

June, 1918

A. The day was quiet at all points occupied by our troops. Our aviators shot down a hostile machine. Balance of cable follows.

B. Later report concerning bringing down hostile machine by Lieutenant Douglas Campbell, May 31, reported yesterday's cable: "Lieutenant Campbell flew over the enemy lines and while there saw a German two seater about to take off from an airdrome. He lay up in the sun and waited until the German machine got over our lines, then he closed in but remained at a fairly safe distance and allowed the German to fire at him until he observed that the German had no more ammunition. He then closed in and brought the machine down. Machine fell inside our lines but very near the front line."

C. Reports received at noon, June 1, indicate that the Aisne battle line from west to east ran morning, June 1 as follows: Sempigny---Lombray---Nouvron---Chaudon---Neuilly St-Front---Brales---thence River Marne to Verneuil---Olizy---Sarcy---Champigny---thence to old line north of Reims.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army. 24th relieves 3d Naval, owing to change in army boundaries former sector of 3d Naval is now in Seventeenth Army front. Second Army. 50th Reserve relieves 54th Reserve. Seventh Army. 105th from Eighteenth Army enters line. 14th from Second Army enters line. 47th Reserve from Seventh Army in reserve. 13th from Second Army in reserve.

The changes in distribution of German air forces, May 24 to May 30 have been as follows: Flanders, decrease of one reconnaissance flight; River Lys-Vimy, decrease of one pursuit flight, increase of 2 reconnaissance flights; Vimy-Bapaume, decrease of one pursuit flight; Bapaume-Moreuil, increase of one reconnaissance flight: Verdun, decrease of 2 reconnaissance flights: Exterior fronts, one reconnaissance flight moved to western front.

The main changes in accommodations at airdromes have been in the Moreuil-Noyon region where 7 additional sheds and 56 additional hangars have been confirmed.

The greatest activity of the German air forces during the week were in the Moreuil-Noyon sector, between Noyon and Chalons, and vicinity of Belfort. An increase in air activity has been marked between Verdun and Belfort. American squadrons have been successful in preventing reconnaissances and destroying hostile airplanes. The air activity of the past week indicates that the German air service has received orders to make determined effort to keep touch with what is going on behind our lines.

D.

Hostile machine referred to as brought down communique of June 1, was shot down in Picardy. Further details not as yet available.

26th Division, May 29 to May 30, noon to noon: General impression, hostile artillery activity decreasing, but still fairly active. On one occasion box barrage put down on a subsector of our front. Total hostile shells reported 800. Movement behind German lines apparently about normal.

32d Division, May 30, midnight to midnight: General impression, quiet with less artillery fire than on previous days. Nothing further beyond occasional bursts of machine-gun fire.
42d Division, May 29 to May 30, noon to noon: General impression reduced hostile artillery fire and infantry activity but continued lively movement behind enemy lines. American and French batteries used 3,000 shells of which 1,600 gas and hostile batteries 325 shells of which 55 gas. Thought that the fire of our artillery struck an ammunition dump as large cloud of smoke followed by sound of explosion noted.

2 (19) A. There is nothing to report from the sectors occupied by our troops. Balance of cable follows.

B. German Official Communique, June 2, afternoon states: "Franco-American depots of numerous extent entered into our possession at FERE-en-TARDENOIS." This statement is absolutely untrue, there being no American depot in that region.

C. Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 18th Reserve relieved 235th and not 25th, 25th is still in line. Seventh Army, 28th Reserve from reserve to line, 13th Landwehr withdrawn from line, 28th reenters line. First Army, 232d from reserve enters line, Bavarian 12th from Roumania enters line. Army Detachment C, 235th from Sixth Army relieves 20th. Boundary between Seventh and First Armies is near VERNEUIL. Order of battle on AISNE front west to east is as follows; Seventh Army, 211th, 105th, 14th, 241st, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 6th, 5th, 51st Reserve, 9th, 14th Reserve, 2d Guard, 113th, 28th Reserve, 1st Guard, 37th, 33d, 197th, 10th Reserve, 231st, 36th, 28th, 10th, 5th Guard, 50th. First Army, 52d, 103d, 12th Bav., 7th Reserve, 232d, 86th, 33d Reserve, 213th, 242d.

D. Official report concerning operations of our troops in PICARDY covering period May 29 to May 30, noon to noon, includes following: "The enemy made counterattacks against our positions in front of CANTIGNY at 16:31 o'clock, 17:45 o'clock, and 3:45 o'clock, accompanied by intense bombardment. They were repulsed by the combined fire of our infantry and artillery. At 19:40 o'clock the enemy was reported assembling in the vicinity of CHATEAU JENLIS for a counterattack. Our artillery fired on this point at once and no attack resulted. Our lines remain the same as yesterday. It has been reported but not confirmed that four enemy tanks took part in the counterattack at 16:31 o'clock. Yesterday afternoon strong concentrations of 77. 105. 210, were placed on CANTIGNY at 16:30, 18:30, and 19:30 o'clock. Intermittent fire of the same caliber throughout the period covered by this report. At 3:30 o'clock this morning the enemy placed a strong concentration on CANTIGNY of the same kind as those mentioned above."

The General Headquarters of the French Armies of the North and Northeast issued on May 27 a secret report concerning the impression created on French troops by the American Expeditionary Forces. The conclusions given in this statement are based on letters of French soldiers which have been read by the French military censors during the month of May. The statement commenced as follows: "The taking over by American troops of an increasing number of sectors and the realization by a growing number of our own units of the military activities of the United States contribute to the morale of our troops in a manner which is already useful in the highest degree and which becomes increasingly so as time goes on. The letters written by our soldiers who have been in contact with our Allies evidence this in the clearest manner. It is indeed true that carefully formulated opinions concerning the Americans are not found in more than about one per cent of the letters read; but praise and criticism are frequently found, and praise six times more often than criticism. What criticism there is seems moreover to come from men who are peevish and exhausted by the long duration of the war and is not based on reported facts."

After giving a table of letters actually read and classified as critical or eulogistic to demonstrate the conclusions set forth above, the statement proceeds to summarize the French estimate of the American character and disposition. The Americans are referred to as good fellows, as good natured, as fine chaps, as full of good will and as being enthusiastic in their regard for the French. It is said that they are willing to fraternize in spite of conversational difficulties, and that they inspire
confidence in those whom they meet. The main objection to them in this connection seems
to be that they have too much money and that their desire to pay for everything is some­
times troublesome. "We could not knock around with them because it costs too much; they
think nothing of spending a dollar."

German Wireless Press June 1: "According to a wireless message from LYONS,
America has sent 5 ships, loaded with meat and navigating under the Swiss flag, to a
French harbor; they are to give the Swiss Republic her daily bread. This is a new arti­
fice to embarrass Switzerland. It is well known that ships transporting goods for
Switzerland must go to CETTE, if they want to avoid the German restricted zone. According
to an official report from America, these ships have not touched CETTE yet, which means
that they have to cross the German restricted zone; should they, on this account, come
to grief, the Americans would make use of this opportunity to lay the blame of the loss
of one or other ship on Germany. Besides, it is very doubtful whether the French railways
which, according to the latest reports, are in great confusion, could assure transporta­
tion from the French coast to Switzerland."

A. Patrolling was active in PICARDY and in LORRAINE. Artillery fighting oc­
curred in LORRAINE and in the WOEVRE. At a number of points there were air combats in
which our aviators shot down a hostile machine. One of our planes is missing.

C. Report from British Headquarters at 11, morning, June 3: French line on
AISNE reported to be as follows at 11 p. m., June 2. BLIGNY-CIUSLES---west edge of Bois
de TROTTE---west of VERNEUIL---MARNE---AULNOIS---BELLEAU---TORY---VEUILLY la POTERIE
---CHEZY---FAVEROLLES---LONGPORT---CHAVIGNY Farm---CHAUDUN---west of LEPORTE­
AUTRECHES---thence no change.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 32d from Fourth Army in re­
serve, 36th Reserve from reserve to line between 18th Reserve and 25th. Seventh Army,
45th Reserve from Eighteenth Army in reserve, 20th from Army Detachment C relieves 5th,
47th Reserve from reserve relieves 113th, 237th from Fifth Army enters line between 33d
and 197th, revised battle order Seventh Army places 1st Guard west of 28th Reserve and
10th between 231st and 36th. Fifth Army, unidentified division relieves 237th. Army
Detachment C, 4th Ersatz from Nineteenth Army in line between 10th Landwehr and 235th.
Army Detachment B, Bav. 30th Reserve in line in its old sector.

The arrival of the enemy's troops on the MARNE and their establishment from the
vicinity of CHATEAU-THIERRY to VERNEUIL, on the night of May 29 to 30, definitely marks
the end of the first phase of the AISNE Offensive. The enemy had secured, by the one
stroke, a tactically important objective, a defensive flank on the MARNE, and a strate­
gically important objective, the control of our main line of lateral communication with
VERDUN. Thus, in about three and one-half days from the time of the original attack the
reason for directing the axis of the attack straight south ceased to exist.

Since the night of May 29 to 30, the direction of the attack has changed
pronouncedly to the southwest. To this must be added the operations to the northwest of
SOISSONS which began on the night of May 30 to 31, the general direction of which is also
southwest. It seems clearly established that so long as the enemy is allowed to retain
the initiative his future operations will be directed on PARIS. The situation in the
sallet, NOYON to REIMS, is important.

The keys to the transportation system of the salient are the rail and road
centers, SOISSONS and REIMS. Without these the enemy will be confronted with difficult
transportation problems involving the use of motor trucks on the 16 roads, for the most
part cross country roads, now available to him. The possession of SOISSONS had proved an
enormous relief to the enemy, since, by means of it, from RETHEL and LAON, he can reach
every sector of his new line. Nevertheless, the enemy's transportation situation cannot
be satisfactorily adjusted until he has taken REIMS; hence the recent heavy attacks on this important center.

D. Our 3d Division (less artillery): 7th and 9th Machine Gun Battalions are engaged in holding important positions commanding MARNE crossings east of CHATEAU-THIERRY. Some casualties in 7th. Remainder of division in area south of MARNE under French XXXVIII Corps.

Our 2d Division is engaged in line northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY.
Our 32d Division (less artillery) is in sector of French Seventh Army near BELFORT. Our 5th Division (less artillery) has moved to sector of French Seventh Army near BELFORT. Will enter sector after short preliminary period of training.
This information must not be given out until released here.

The army bulletin of the French First Army, May 30, describes the attack made May 28 by our troops at CANTIGNY. The description is drawn from statements made by prisoners.

The attack of the American 1st Division on the village of CANTIGNY fell on two regiments of the 82d Reserve Division, the 272d Reserve Regiment on the northern edge of CANTIGNY and to the north of this point and the 271st Reserve Regiment in the village itself and more to the southeast.

Each of these regiments had in line one battalion less one company which was posted in support, in the rear. The attack fell principally on six companies, the 9th and 12th of the 272d Reserve Regiment, the 1st, 2d, 3d and 4th of the 271st Reserve Regiment. These companies lost very heavily. The 1st Battalion of the 271st Reserve Regiment had been in line for six days but the 3d Battalion of 272d Reserve Regiment has just gone into position relieving the 1st Battalion of this regiment. The relief had ended about midnight. The night had been calm and at daybreak toward four o’clock the advanced elements on duty as night outpost west of CANTIGNY had fallen back on the village and had rejoined the rest of the garrison in the dugouts. At 4:45 our artillery preparation began. At the end of an hour the fire increased in violence. It was impossible for their occupants to think of leaving. The caving in of some of their dugouts made it impossible for them to use their arms. Also as the American infantry appeared at the entrance of the dugouts they were promptly made prisoner.

The two light trench mortars posted near the church were immediately put out of action by our bombardment. Two other light trench mortars on the northern outskirts of the village tried to fire during the artillery preparation, but these were rapidly neutralized. Four medium trench mortars on the southern outskirts of the village which had taken part in the preparation of the German raid the night before were partially destroyed and did not participate in the action.

The surrounding and capture of the village was facilitated by tanks which kept the German machine guns from going into action. The prisoners also mention the deadly and demoralizing fire of an infantry airplane.

A center of resistance had apparently been built north of CANTIGNY where some elements of one company of the 272d Reserve Regiment made use of their machine guns and rifles. The trenches where this defense was organized were carried by assault by the American infantry which made a brilliant bayonet charge and engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with the occupants.

This means of communication at the disposal of the companies in the line (runners and courier dogs) could not be used. The German barrage was put down very late.

Official report 1st Division covering period May 30 to May 31, noon to noon, includes following: A heavy concentration of 77, 88, 105, 150, 210 caliber on CANTIGNY from 18:21 to 18:24 h. About 2,000 shells in all. Intermittent fire throughout the day and night by guns of the same caliber. About 4,000 shells fell on the divisional sector during the day. An enemy photographic plane was brought down near VILLERS TOURNELLE by our antiaircraft guns at 14 h. The pilot was killed and the observer severely injured.
We saved from this machine 2 machine guns, a large photographic camera, a magneto and several documents. One of the documents was a map of our line which showed the supposed positions of our batteries. About 7 of these positions were correctly marked and the old position of five others appeared to be known to the enemy. One lieutenant and 3 soldiers belonging to the 271st Reserve Regiment were evacuated from CANTIGNY early this morning. They had been in hiding since our attack.

26th Division, May 30 to 31, noon to noon: General impression, quiet with very feeble reaction on raid made by 101st Infantry as reported cable May 31. Total of hostile shells 700. Some of these reported as combination of shrapnel and gas, giving very heavy black smoke above and yellow smoke beneath.

26th Division, May 31 to June 1, noon to noon: General impression quiet. Total of hostile shells, 1,060. Enemy apparently using a 15-centimeter heavy field howitzer.

32d Division, May 31, midnight to midnight: General impression, quiet, with diminished artillery activity. Some intermittent machine-gun fire.

Report from 32d Division, June 2, evening: Two officers and ten noncommissioned officers accompanied French raiding detachment which captured two German prisoners. Active hostile artillery further diminished. Enemy airplanes active.

42d Division, May 30 to 31, noon to noon: General impression, light fire of hostile artillery and reduced activity of hostile infantry. Continued movement behind enemy line and sounds of work and movements at various points. Hostile artillery used 365 shells as compares with 654 used by American and French. Little gas on either side. On roads back of hostile line many trucks, wagons, horsemen and small infantry detachments observed. Our own patrols active and apparently wounded some of the enemy but had no encounters. Very little hostile patrolling.

42d Division, May 31 to June 1, noon to noon: General impression, feeble activity of enemy artillery and enemy machine guns rather active. Continued lively movement behind the enemy lines including some troops on the march, marked sounds of work along the enemy lines at various points. French and American batteries used nearly 700 shells to less than 200 fired by enemy. Movements on roads behind enemy front similar to those of preceding day. Smoke and sound of trains on several occasions. Our patrols fairly active and came more than once under fire but had no encounters.

During night, June 2 to June 3, American patrol of officer and 39 men operating in LORRAINE encountered hostile patrol and attempted to surround it. While doing so found themselves being surrounded by hostile force estimated at 80 men. Our patrol retired after fight which lasted more than half an hour. Our casualties very light. German losses unknown.

4 (21) A. In the fighting northwest of CHATEAU-ThIERRY our troops broke up an attempt of the enemy to advance to the south through NEUILLY Woods and by a counterattack drove him back to the north of these woods. On the MARNE front a German battalion which had crossed the river at JAULGONNE was counterattacked by French and American troops and forced to retreat to the right bank. It sustained severe losses in killed and prisoners. Patrolling was active in PICARDY and LORRAINE. In the WOEVRE we shelled the enemy's positions using gas.

B. On the night of June 3 and 4, one of our patrols operating in LORRAINE destroyed a concrete observation post in the enemy's lines. During the same night and in the same district an encounter took place between an American and a hostile patrol in which 3 Germans are reported to have been killed.

C. It was reported from British Headquarters on evening of June 3: On AISNE front enemy holds FAVEROLLES, CORCY, LONGPONT and CHAUDUN, and the great part of MONT-de-CHOISY. Otherwise little change.

Reported from British Headquarters at 11 morning, June 4: Line now given as follows (French) east of GERNANT---west of LEPORt---AUTRECHES.
Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 25th withdrawn, 44th Reserve relieves 39th, 218th from Roumania in reserve. Seventeenth Army, 22d Reserve from Fourth Army in line south of 24th. Second Army, Bavarian 2d relieves Bavarian 14th. Seventh Army, 45th Reserve from reserve to line south of 9th, 115th from Sixth Army in line north of 47th Reserve, 76th Reserve from Eighteenth Army in reserve, 30th from Eighteenth in reserve. First Army, 78th Reserve from Army Detachment C in reserve.

Summary of activity and distribution of hostile artillery on western front during second half of May.

Activity: In general somewhat lighter than during first half of May. On British front active throughout this period with considerable increase at the beginning of the attack of May 27. Long range guns very active on the rear areas since May 27. On the rest of the front (excluding British) activity steadily declined during period and was very weak just before attack of May 27. On May 27 and May 28 great activity on the entire front, decreasing to normal on May 29/30.

Distribution: In general very little change. Very heavy concentration south of YPRES and around MONTDIDIER still maintained. Some evidence of increasing density from LASSIGNY to NOYON since May 27. Slight increase in southern ALSACE.

D. No details have been received of attack on 2d Division.

3d Division, report of June 2, time not given, includes following: On June 1, after a violent bombardment the enemy attacked the bridgehead at CHATEAU-THIERRY causing our withdrawal to the left bank. On June 2 at 12:30 morning the enemy attempted to cross the MARNE at MEZY but was repulsed. The 7th Machine Gun Battalion has been in action at CHATEAU-THIERRY continuously since the evening of May 31. Report from 3d Division, sent at 23:15 o'clock June 2, includes following: The 7th Machine Gun Battalion, which went into action at CHATEAU-THIERRY immediately after arrival and has been in action for the last 48 hours will be relieved tonight. The French corps commander has spoken most enthusiastically to our division commander about the conduct of this battalion and has stated that he is going to cite the battalion in orders.

1st Division, May 31 to June 1, noon to noon: The enemy infantry was quiet yesterday and today. His snipers showed activity at intervals, firing on our lines around CANTIGNY. There was intermittent machine-gun fire throughout the day and night on our front lines. Trench mortars of large caliber fired shells on CANTIGNY this morning. The enemy artillery was less active than usual. During our intense bombardment of his lines from 13:05 o'clock, and from 19:30 o'clock to 19:30 o'clock he reacted strongly on CANTIGNY, the RAVINE des GLANDS, VILLERS TOURNELLE and the support positions in Quarters C and D with shells of larger caliber, about 1,300 shells in all. Intermittent firing during the rest of the day with 77's and 105's about 3,000 shells in all. General impression of enemy activity: Infantry quiet, artillery decrease in activity. Aviation active.

1st Division, June 1 to 2, noon to noon: General impression. "The enemy artillery has shown less activity than normal but it has shown slight increase in fire for adjustment by high bursts and other means. Enemy infantry quiet. Aviation active."

Total number of shells falling on a sector about 2,500. These were shells of medium caliber fired intermittently. Enemy patrol of 10 men seen early on morning June 2 and fired upon. One man killed and his body recovered. He belonged to 272d Reserve Regiment.

26th Division, June 1 to June 2, noon to noon: General impression quiet. Hostile batteries fired 515 shells, of which about 150 gas. Patrol encounter took place near our lines without result. Airplane activity less than normal. Enemy apparently strengthening his defensive positions. Several propaganda balloons came down without our lines.

32d Division June 1, midnight to midnight: General impression less artillery activity and greater airplane observation throughout the day. Hostile artillery fired 300 shells. Some intermittent machine-gun fire. About 15 reconnaissance airplanes over our lines from time to time.
Activity of hostile artillery in sectors occupied by American troops for week ending June 1. Sector of 1st Division: Very weak during attack on CANTIGNY May 28 on account of our heavy neutralizing fire. Daily average of shells on sector 5,600. Maximum for one day 12,000. This maximum on May 29 during counterattacks on CANTIGNY. Minimum for one day about 700. This minimum on May 28.

Sector of 26th Division: In general increased activity. Daily average 1,300. Maximum for one day about 5,000. This maximum on May 27.

Sector of 42d Division: Daily average 1,500. Maximum for one day 5,300. This maximum on May 27. Note: For comparison information added that daily average of shells used by our own batteries 1,800. Maximum for our own batteries 3,600. This maximum on May 27.

32d Division: Daily average 800. Maximum 1,600. This maximum on May 27.

A. Patrolling activity continued in PICARDY and in LORRAINE where our troops penetrated the enemy's positions and inflicted losses in killed and wounded. In the WOEVRE artillery fighting has diminished.

B.

During the night of June 2 to June 3 one of our patrols operating in LORRAINE and consisting of about 40 men encountered hostile patrol of double its size drawn up in skirmish formation along line parallel to that of our own patrol. Both patrols opened fire with rifles, pistols, grenades and automatic rifles and each tried to outflank the other. Our patrol in spite of being greatly outnumbered held its ground for three quarters of an hour, inflicted losses on the enemy, and retired only when its ammunition was almost exhausted. Our casualties were very light.

During the night of June 4 to June 5 one of our patrols operating in LORRAINE penetrated the enemy's positions and advanced behind his second line trenches. It inflicted on the enemy losses in killed and wounded and withdrew successfully under cover of barrage from our Stokes mortars.

A French report of the work of an American machine gun battalion which has recently been in action at CHATEAU-THIERRY includes the following: "On May 31 the enemy threatened to take CHATEAU-THIERRY, attempting to flank the town on our left, and a breach was produced. The blank machine gun battalion, U. S. A., was immediately thrown into CHATEAU-THIERRY at the same time as a colonial infantry battalion. Immediately the Americans reinforced the entire defense, especially at the ends of the bridge. Their courage and ability as marksmen evoked the admiration of all. Crushed by our fire, the enemy hesitated and, as a result of counterattacks, vigorously supported by the American machine guns, they were thrown beyond the edges of the town. CHATEAU-THIERRY remained entirely in our hands. On June 1, towards 9, evening, taking advantage of the darkness, the Germans stole towards the large bridge, in which direction they penetrated through the western suburbs to the banks of the MARNE. In order to mask their movements, they made use of smoke bombs which made the aim of the machine guns very difficult. At the same time the town underwent an extremely violent bombardment. At the moment when the Germans arrived on the large bridge and believed themselves to be in possession of the same a terrific explosion destroyed the entire central pier. Some Germans who had already crossed were taken on the south bank. The American machine guns held the south bank and gave protection for the withdrawal of the troops retiring from the northern section for the purpose of crossing the bridge prior to its destruction. Here again the courage of the Americans was beyond all praise. The colonials themselves, though accustomed to acts of bravery were struck by the wonderful morale in the face of fire, the coolness and the extraordinary steadiness of their Allies. The watchfulness of the Americans never failed them, and, with their machine guns playing upon the approaches of the destroyed bridges.
and foot bridges, they prevented any reattack by the enemy. They will be relieved at the same time as the French troops at the side of whom they fought. The French command knowing their just pride, fear that they would have humiliated these valiant troops, if they had offered them rest sooner than their French companions in the fight. The episode of CHATEAU-THIERRY will remain one of the most memorable deeds of this war. It is a pleasure for all of us to know that our valiant Allies have shared with us there.

C. It was reported from British Headquarters at 10, morning, June 5: “There was local fighting yesterday between the MARNE and the OISE without material change in the situation.”

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 121st from Fourth Army in reserve, 32d from reserve relieves 48th Reserve. Seventh Army, 20th is not in line and is considered still in reserve of Army Detachment C, 5th reenters line south of 6th, 113th reenters line north of 47th Reserve, 78th Reserve from First Army enters line south of 33d.

D. Reports concerning action of our troops in NEUILLY Woods not yet received.

Further details concerning action of American machine gun battalion at CHATEAU-THIERRY referred to Section B this cable: Battalion referred to was the 7th which arrived south of CHATEAU-THIERRY on May 31 and was at once thrown into the fight.

It was reported from headquarters of our 3d Division at 12 noon, June 4: “On the front of this sector the night was calm. No attempt was made to cross the MARNE. On our left the enemy made slight progress during the afternoon of June 3 with considerable losses. The Allied line at this point runs (see map scale 1 to 80,000) as follows: Left bank of the MARNE---ESSOMES---west edge of Bois du LOUP---CROGIS---N. E. edge of Bois de la MARETTE---E. edge of Bois de CLEREMBAUTS---LUCY le BOCAGE.

The hostile line is as follows: Right bank of the MARNE---Bois-des-COURTEAU---MONNEAUX---VAUX---western edge of Bois de BELLEAU.”

Report also mentions that certain of our positions were shelled on June 4 and that the destruction of the CHATEAU-THIERRY Bridge has been completed.

Report sent from headquarters of our 3d Division at 10 o'clock evening, June 4, includes following: “This has been a quiet day except for an increase of artillery activity on both sides. A German plane which had attacked our balloons was brought down within our lines. It was attacked by antiaircraft guns and airplanes. This afternoon the French corps commander and general commanding this division reviewed the 4th Infantry in the GRAND FORET. The march past in the rough woods in column of platoons was very impressive and the corps commander expressed himself as most pleased with the excellent showing made by the regiment. The medical department reports very light sick reports everywhere and adequate facilities for handling wounded.”

42d Division, June 2 to June 3, noon to noon: General impression hostile artillery still inactive but enemy machine guns showed considerable activity. There were continued evidences of work in the hostile lines. German activity of infantry was more than normal and patrolling was active on both sides. Shortly before midnight two of our scouts penetrated the hostile posts and discovered 200 of the enemy engaged in defensive works. A German outpost forced our scouts back to our lines with hand grenade fire. During the 24 hours American and French batteries fired 2,000 rounds and the hostile batteries 250 rounds. No gas was used.

26th Division, June 2 to June 3, noon to noon: Most marked feature was activity of hostile artillery which shelled our lines with high explosive and gas especially between 8 o'clock evening and midnight. Enemy used over 1,000 shells during the 24 hours. It is reported that the gas used during the evening had no smell and was detected only by the irritation of throat, nose and eyes which it affected.

Report of operations of first American pursuit group of airplanes cover period April 14 to June 6 shows 18 hostile planes brought down of which destruction is confirmed and 19 others concerning which confirmation has been requested but not yet received. The total number of planes believed to have been brought down by this pursuit group is, therefore 37.
A. In an attack N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY this morning our troops in conjunction with the French advanced our line S. of TORCY about a mile, capturing prisoners and inflicting severe losses in killed and wounded.

There was lively artillery fighting in LORRAINE last night, our batteries executing effective reprisal and neutralization fire. There is nothing else of importance to report.

B. In PICARDY during the night of June 2 to June 3 a hostile patrol of 1 officer and about 30 men attempted to raid one of our listening posts. The men in our post opened fire, killed the German officer, and retired to our line without suffering any casualties.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 199th from Second Army in reserve. Eighteenth Army, Bavarian 9th Reserve from reserve enters line east of 202d. Seventh Army, 33d withdrawn. First Army, owing to army boundary moving west to DORMANS 50th is now in First Army line. Third Army, Guard Cavalry from Russia relieves 23d. Army Detachment A, 7th Cavalry from Army Detachment B relieves 4th Cavalry. Army Detachment B, 4th Cavalry from Army Detachment A has elements in line in sector of 14th Landwehr.

D. Report just received, afternoon of June 6 from general in command our troops N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY: "In conjunction with the French we advanced our lines south of TORCY this morning about one mile, 65 prisoners, a large part of whom are unwounded, have been brought in and the enemy’s losses are reported heavy. Our casualties are light and our men, including the wounded, are in the best of spirits."

1st Division, June 2 to June 3, noon to noon: In general the day was quiet. Enemy artillery showed marked decrease in activity firing only 1,500 rounds. Much circulation on hostile roads was observed. Patrol encounter reported in this division and at this time.

32d Division reports from June 2 and June 3, midnight to midnight, show that these days were exceptionally quiet in all respects.

26th Division, June 3 to June 4, noon to noon: Distinct increase in activity of hostile artillery noticed, the enemy firing 1,637 rounds including some gas shells and some shrapnel. Propaganda was dropped at intervals from a hostile propaganda balloon.

42d Division, June 3 to June 4, noon to noon: Hostile artillery quite inactive, firing only 170 rounds to which our own batteries and the French replied with 950. There were continued indications of work in the German front lines and heavily loaded trains were heard arriving on four different occasions. There are indications that the German front lines are now more strongly held than formerly. The rifle and grenade fire directed from them on our patrols is distinctly heavier. During the night one of our patrols blew up hostile observation post as reported in cable, June 4. Another patrol met and attacked a German patrolling party of 17 men. After a fight in which 3 of the enemy were seen to fall our patrol was obliged to retire. The hostile patrol seemed to consist of pioneer troops and to have been sent out to prevent our reconnaissance of ground on which German works are being constructed. In disputed territory outside our wire has been placed a row of silhouette targets which show the outline of a German soldier's head and shoulders. These are used by the enemy for target practice.

The following affords an example of the extraordinary efforts being put forth by German propagandists to create distrust of the United States in the minds of the French people. The German wireless press of June 4, intercepted at G. H. Q., A. E. F., includes the following: 'What Roumania thinks of the Entente’s sympathy, and especially of America's is shown by an article of the present government recently elected by a large majority. The Roumanian governmental newspaper writes: “Should one read Wilson's speeches which ought to give the impression of coming from a quiet conscience and to be consistent with duty, honor, right and humanity, one has the impression that the orator is probably, and knowingly, a tool in the hands of the American steel trusts, the leaders of which pushed America into war. America knows that Europe's weakness is
America's opportunity. The Americanization of Europe is the real aim of American policy. This is already the case in France, where Americans have settled down in most shameless ways in French industry, administration and railway traffic. French workmen are sent to the front and replaced by Americans; this is the way adopted by the country of trusts and dollars to make war pay. On the one hand, the Americans have made enormous sums in advances in money and material to support the Allies, and on the other hand they want to take direct possession of the wealth of western Europe and Russia, and have a strong influence on the domestic affairs of these countries."

A. West and northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY we made minor readjustments of our line, involving several advances, in the course of which we inflicted severe losses and took prisoners, among them being one officer and twenty-five unwounded men. Our advance was made in conjunction with French troops on our left.

Artillery of both sides was active at points held by our troops in PICARDY, on the MARNE front, in the WOEVRE and in LORRAINE.

In PICARDY we took prisoners in the course of a raid.

C. There is no change in the situation.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, boundary of army shifts to south of MERRIS which places 35th, 11th Reserve and 13th Reserve in Fourth Army line and 79th Reserve in Fourth Army Reserves. Second Army, relief of Bavarian 14th by Bavarian 2d did not take place as reported. Eighteenth Army, eastern boundary moves to PONTOISE exclusive thus placing 223d in Seventh Army line. Army Detachment C, 208th from Seventeenth Army relieves 201st.

Of German divisions now in reserve, exclusive of the 6 divisions behind the AISNE front, there are 2 which have not been actively engaged since March 21, and 25 of which each has rested for 28 days or more. Of these 27 divisions 9 are rated as first class, 8 as second class, and 10 as third class.

This may be compared with the conditions preceding the recent AISNE Offensive as follows. In the AISNE Offensive the divisions brought up for the attack consisted of 12 first class divisions which had rested 41 days or more, and 2 second class which had rested 28 days or more, giving a total of 14 divisions. If, therefore, another surprise attack is to be made, the enemy now has available more rested divisions than he used on May 27. As to quality, there are fewer first class divisions by 3 but more second class divisions by 6. Consequently there is little difference in the attacking ability of these troops as compared with those which attacked on the AISNE.

There are now 5 German cavalry divisions on the western front and prisoners state that elements of an additional one are on the AISNE. It is not established that any of these divisions have all their mounts, and most of the units are considered to be dismounted. Several of these divisions, however, appear to be in process of reorganization, but whether for the purpose of resuming operations as mounted troops, or for taking a more active part as dismounted cavalry is not yet established.

D. Report from our 3d Division giving situation at noon June 5 includes the following: "Line held by Allied troops unchanged. Hostile aviation active. Reports indicate that the enemy is preparing bridge material at different points along the MARNE notably GLAND and MONT ST-PERE. The most notable feature of the day is the great increase in aerial activity and the particular pains that the enemy is taking to prevent Allied observation."
On May 27, day preceding attack of our troops on CANTIGNY, Germans made strong and carefully prepared raid on these troops as reported cable of that day. Their objective was to capture prisoners and gain information concerning our forces. Arrangements for raid shown in orders found on body of German officer in command of raiding party.

Attacking party consisted of commissioned officer, 3 noncommissioned officers and 5 squads taken from troops especially trained for such work. They moved in 3 sections. Support furnished by artillery fire, 4 light trench mortars, 4 heavy machine guns, and 3 light machine guns. Of the latter, one furnished special protection for each section of attacking party. Equipment of attacking troops included 8 stick grenades and 4 egg grenades on average per man. Double rations carried.

The plan was briefly as follows: From 4:15 a. m. to 7:20 a. m. artillery fire commencing with neutralization fire of gas shells on our batteries and continuing with fire of destruction on our positions, box barrage, and trench mortar fire on and about positions to be attacked. Infantry were to leave trenches at 7 a. m., advance rapidly, seize prisoners and materiel, and return to their own trenches by 7:20. The orders indicate that 3 squads besides those of the attacking party gave some aid in the operation but as their instructions have not been captured the part which they played is not known.

26th Division, June 4 to June 5, noon to noon: Activity of hostile artillery greatly diminished, comprising use of about 800 shells of which less than 200 gas. Enemy still constructing works behind his lines, for most part under camouflage. Poor camouflage permitted discovery of large German dump.

32d Division, June 4 and June 5 midnight to midnight: Inactivity of the 2 preceding days continued. In early morning of June 4, German raiding party estimated at 100 men started for our trenches but was stopped by our barrage. German prisoners captured by the French show the Bavarian 30th Reserve Division still in position opposite our lines.

42d Division, June 4 to June 5, noon to noon: Enemy's artillery fire showed increase, comprising the firing of nearly 800 rounds. American and French batteries fired about 1,200 rounds. There were continued indications of work in the German lines. Sounds of digging, hammering and blasting from hostile positions very noticeable. One of our patrols found new trenches under construction and old one undergoing improvements. This same patrol was strongly assailed by rifle and machine-gun fire but succeeded in retreating with slight casualties as reported cable June 5.

Reported from British sources that German tanks of new type recently sent to the west front are equipped each with two flame projectors. Range of flame projectors said to be 65 yards.

8 (25) A. Northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY hostile attacks were made on a front of 2 miles during the night, after artillery preparation. These were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy and without having reached our lines at any point. There is nothing to report from the other points occupied by our troops.

B. Nothing to report.

C. There is no change in situation.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 81st Reserve from Sixth Army relieves 11th Reserve. Eighteenth Army, 30th from Seventh Army in reserve. Owing to further change in boundary line 223d and 105th are in line of Eighteenth Army, boundary between Eighteenth and Seventh Armies is near NAMPCEL. Seventh Army, 6th, 9th, and 14th reserve withdrawn to reserve. Bavarian 10th from Army Detachment A relieves 1st Guard.

Documentary evidence established the fact that the boundary between the Seventh and First Armies is farther west than was presumed, so that von Schmettow's Corps (45) in the First Army now includes the 50th Division. This places the boundary well west of VERNEUIL, probably near DORMANS. It is possible that von Schmettow's Group also includes the sector of the 5th Guard Division, still more to the west.

The western boundary of the Seventh Army now appears to include PONTOISE, which places the sector of the 223d Division within the area of the Seventh Army.
An army boundary change in FLANDERS has been indicated by captured documents. The boundary between the Fourth and Sixth Armies now appears to be where the HAZELBROUCK-BAILLEUL Railroad crosses the trenches, west of MERRIS, which would include the 35th, 11th Reserve and 13th Reserve Divisions in the line of the Fourth Army and place the 79th Reserve Division in the reserve of the Fourth Army.

The composition of the German Seventeenth Army (occupying the ARRAS sector) has remained practically unchanged since March 21. Every division now in the front line of this army belonged to it on March 21 with the exception of two. Seven of the divisions now in reserve have also long been in the Seventeenth Army. The quality of these divisions averages high, 4 being first class, 11 second class and only 4 third class. Although nearly the whole of the army front was involved in the offensive of March 21 and parts of the front have been active since, the rotation of divisions from the front line to the reserve appears to have been so conducted that at the present time their condition is good. Most of them are probably in condition for offensive operations. Several, presumably those which suffered most heavily, have had long rests.

Many of these divisions are now in line, holding approximately the same sector which they occupied in March.

At the offensive of the SOMME and the AISNE, the enemy attacked by passing good divisions through the sectors of the poorer ones already occupying the front, so that the composition of the front line is no longer always to be taken as indicative of enemy intentions. Nevertheless, the Seventeenth Army attacked on March 21 with the divisions it already had in line.

Changes in distribution of German Air Forces, May 30 to June 5 have been as follows: 3 pursuit flights to BAPAUME-MOREUIL sector, 1 each from ARMENTIERES, MOREUIL-NOYON and REIMS regions; 1 protective flight from River LYS-VIMY region to REIMS region; 3 reconnaissance flights to MOREUIL-NOYON region, 1 each from River LYS-VIMY, BAPAUME-MOREUIL, and VERDUN regions; one pursuit flight from LORRAINE to ALSACE. Many flights are thought to have been withdrawn temporarily from the front for refitting and rest. All fronts are now being watched for appearance of these units to indicate area of next offensive.

Changes in capacity of airdromes during the week were as follows: FLANDERS, plus 10 sheds and 12 hangars; LYS-VIMY, plus 26 sheds and 24 hangars; VIMY-BAPAUME, plus 2 sheds, minus 5 hangars; BAPAUME-MOREUIL, plus 3 sheds, minus 99 hangars; MOREUIL-NOYON, plus 6 sheds and 49 hangars. French do not compile information on airdromes opposite their front.

The most noticeable activity of hostile air forces during the week has been that of bombing units. These have operated in rear of both the French and British fronts, apparently against transportation centers for the purpose of delaying the supporting troops sent to the AISNE region. Though the weather has generally been favorable for flying there has not been a very pronounced activity except in the AISNE region. This may be accounted for by the fact that units are resting. In the AISNE region activity has mostly consisted in the use of strong combat patrols as a barrage for protection against observation.

D. No details received concerning operations of our troops northwest of CHATEAU-TIERRY and on the MARNE front.

1st Division, June 3 to June 4, noon to noon: Most marked feature the unusual activity of hostile aircraft, 40 planes being observed over our lines. German infantry working very hard to consolidate positions. Shell holes linked up by trenches and barbed wire entanglements constructed. German artillery confined mainly to harassing and regulating fire with occasional concentrations. Total number of shells used was 2,100. In rear of hostile lines circulation was above normal, several companies and sections of infantry and numerous vehicles being observed on the roads. Our troops located 5 German machine guns during the day and our artillery apparently struck an ammunition dump.
1st Division, June 4 to June 5, noon to noon: Report called particular attention to fact that during several days enemy had shown great activity in fire for adjustment both on American trenches and American artillery. Enemy's fire for adjustment carried out by high bursts from shells of relatively small caliber on scattered area. Total number of shells 2,500. Work of consolidating German positions vigorously continued. Airplane activity and circulation in rear of German lines once more normal.

26th Division, June 5 to June 6, noon to noon: Conditions generally quiet. Hostile artillery moderately active using 1,300 shells mainly of small calibre. Considerable activity on railroads and field railroads in rear of enemy's lines noted.

32d Division, June 6, midnight to midnight: Generally quiet except for very marked airplane activity. Hostile planes made about 50 reconnaissance flights during the day. Hostile artillery fire notably light.

42d Division, June 5 to June 6, noon to noon: Great artillery activity as reported cable June 6, especially in violent bombardment of our front lines and our batteries with high explosive and gas shells during the night. This was accompanied by steady harassing fire of machine guns. The bombardments occurred between 1 and 3 o'clock morning, and comprised the use of 4,000 rounds of small and moderate calibre. In part this bombardment consisted of fire of diversion to accompany gas projector attack made on the French division adjoining our troops on the east. Our batteries replied vigorously. Total shells used by the enemy during the 24 hours 4,500. Shells used by American and French batteries 6,000. Our batteries appear to have struck and ignited an ammunition dump and a dump of rockets and flares. Hostile aerial activity was also above normal, comprising 20 flights over our lines. There was much patrolling during the night, one enemy patrol being dispersed by our machine-gun fire and another driven back by one of our patrols after a brief combat. Movements in rear of German lines were still very pronounced. An almost constant movement of wagons with frequent movements and switching of trains was noted. Small detachments of the enemy were seen marching and drilling in the back areas. Altogether the enemy is showing a more aggressive spirit than before.

Following received at 10:45 p.m. from our liaison officer at French General Headquarters. "The enemy attacked in force at 12:15 a.m. on the region of TRIANGLE CLERAMBAUTS Woods and on Le THIOLET and at 1:15 o'clock this morning on our positions at BOURESCHES. Both attacks were completely repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. Also between 6 and 7 o'clock this morning the Germans made a rather strong attack on BOURESCHES and CLERAMBAUTS Woods. The Germans were not able to reach our positions. They were stopped at about 200 meters from our lines by the fire of the American infantry."

9 (26) A. N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY the enemy made a fresh attack during the night of our positions in the vicinity of BOURESCHES. The attack, which was preceded by artillery preparation and accompanied by heavy machine-gun fire, broke down with severe losses to the assailants. In this region and in PICARDY there was lively artillery fighting. On the MARNE sector the day was marked by decreased artillery activity.

B. There is nothing to report.

C. At 6:15 evening June 9, American Staff officer with the French X Corps reported as follows: "The Germans attacked this morning about 3:30 between MONTDIDIER and NOYON. The farthest advance was to RESSONS-sur-MATZ. The 1st Division was not involved in the attack. It was involved in the artillery bombardments I do not think that the losses were very heavy. The line up to the present time (about 6:15 o'clock) is as follows: East to west: VILLE-CANNECOURT---Les BOCAGES---RESSONS-sur-MATZ---CUVILLY ---COURCELLES---EPAYELLES---Le FRETOY---DOMFRONT-le-MONCHEL.

Everything is pretty quiet right now but they seem to be massing troops in the vicinity of MONTDIDIER, a little east of the town. We cannot tell if they are going to attack or not. The 1st Division is all ready to receive an attack but does not know when. The division on the right of the 1st Division was slightly involved in the attack but the infantry part of the attack has not yet reached the 1st Division."
Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 117th relieves 56th. Sixth Army, 27th from Second Army in reserve. Seventh Army, 5th Guard withdrawn from DORMANS sector being relieved by extension of adjacent units and 5th Guard then relieves 197th near VEUILLY la POTERIE.

Disposition of German battle divisions, meaning those divisions which are rated as first class, to June 8:

On March 21, Germany had 45 divisions on the western front rated as first class battle divisions. The plan, more or less closely followed, has been to make large use of such divisions for offensive operations. When the objective of a given operation is reasonably well attained these divisions are withdrawn, rested, reconstituted and prepared for further use.

Attack from CHERISEY, S. E. of ARRAS, to the OISE, March 21 was made with 14 first class divisions, 16 second class divisions, 11 third class divisions, and 1 fourth class division making a total of 42 divisions.

Attack from COUCY-le-CHATEAU to COURCY, N. W. of REIMS, May 27 was made with 12 first class divisions, 5 second class divisions, 8 third class divisions, and 1 fourth class division making a total of 26 divisions.

It appears that on the first day of the SOMME Offensive, 42 divisions, of which 14 were first class, made the attack; and that on the first day of the AISNE Offensive 26 divisions, of which 12 were first class, made the attack.

No account is here taken of the fact that there was large number of other divisions a short distance in rear which entered the SOMME attack on the second and succeeding days, a factor which, so far as is now known, probably did not exist in connection with the AISNE Offensive.

The important circumstance seems to be that these figures indicate, within fairly reasonable limits, an enemy disposition to attack on any front with a proportion of from 12 to 14 first class divisions.

The approximate location of all German first class divisions, as determined by the latest identifications, is expressed in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Front Line</th>
<th>Close Support</th>
<th>Located in Rear Areas</th>
<th>Unlocated in Rear Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fourth Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sixth Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventeenth Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eighteenth Army</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seventh Army (NOYON to DORMANS)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Army (DORMANS to REIMS)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detachment C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nineteenth Army</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attachment A none.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above it appears that in the rear areas of the northern group of armies (Crown Prince Rupprecht) the enemy has in hand a mass of 12 first class divisions which is approximately the number he seems to consider essential for a large scale offensive. These divisions have had an average rest of 33 days.

A new phase seems to have been recently reached in conduct of enemy operations on the line from NOYON to CHATEAU-THIERRY. The evidence at hand indicates the withdrawal from that line of 4 divisions, 3 first class and 1 second class. A new division, the Bavarian 10th Reserve (second class), from LORRAINE, was identified on June 7 southeast of VILLERS CotTERETS.

D. 2d Division, report dated June 6 and covering period June 5 to June 6, 6 morning to 6 morning: "This morning, June 6, our troops attacked on the line station BOURESCHES---CHATEAU BELLEAU---TORCY---Hill 126, as contemplated. The attack was highly successful, all objectives being reached. The exact number of enemy prisoners taken by us
is not yet accurately known. A patrol from MARES Farm put to rout an enemy machine-gun post of twice its strength bringing back 2 prisoners and killing 6. Reconnaissance patrols from the right of our lines."

"Enemy artillery particularly feeble during our attack, practically no counter-barrage. Increased greatly during the day chiefly registration and harassing fire. Harassing fire throughout the night on our support position on the right of our lines. About 2,000 shells on our position on the right of our line in and near Bois de MARETTE chiefly high explosive with some mustard gas, intermittent bombardment of TAFOURNAY Farm and heavy shelling of MARIGNY. Bombardment of roads throughout the day in forward zone of the sector."

"Infantry offered unavailing resistance with machine guns to our attack on the left of our line and were forced to withdraw to the north." Enemy aircraft very active. 59 reconnaissance planes being over our sector during the day.

Order of battle confirmed by prisoners from 462d Reserve Regiment and 460th Reserve Regiment of 237th Division, and of 26th Jaeger Battalion, and 7th (Saxon) Jaeger Regiment, 197th Division.

Information obtained from interrogation of prisoners taken in operations of our 2d Division S. and S. W. of TORCY on morning of June 6: The 462d Regiment recently arrived in the sector from the north and took part in the attack of June 2 when the enemy captured the town of TORCY. The regiment did not expect to remain in position held at the time of our attack for more than a few days. The losses of the battalion to which the prisoners belonged had been very severe. The men belonging to it had been greatly upset by the increase of rifle and machine-gun fire during the last 3 days, especially as they could not tell what troops were opposed to them. The majority of the wounds in the front line were from rifle bullets. The battalion in support had suffered heavily from our artillery fire.

2d Division, June 6 to June 7, 6 morning to 6 morning: "The right of our line succeeded in repulsing a strong enemy attack at TRIANGLE Farm S. of BOURESCHES. We took prisoners and inflicted heavy losses on the attacking troops in killed and wounded and materiel."

The same report further states: "Two enemy counterattacks were repulsed by our fire severe losses to the attacking troops. A strong enemy counterattack on the right half of our line delivered at 11 o'clock evening succeeded in regaining some of the ground that had been lost in our attack. The enemy machine-gun fire along our whole front was excessively heavy and formed the chief resistance to our attack. At 2 morning there was heavy machine-gun fire from the vicinity of VAUX."

Hostile artillery very active on eastern edge of Bois-de-MARETTE, Hill 142, Hill 211, MONT-de-BONNEIL, MARES Farm, LUCY-TORCY Road, and in vicinity of La VOIE du CHATEL. Considerable mustard and lachrymatory gas shells were employed. In general German artillery fire continuous though under the circumstances not abnormal. Their resistance to our attack almost wholly by machine-gun fire and well placed machine-gun nests.

2d Division, report issued by Intelligence Section of French Sixth Army on June 7 includes following: "During the night an enemy attack by means of small detachments on a post in the wood of CLEREMBAUTS was repulsed with ease. The combined attacks of the French and American infantry continued during the night of June 6 to June 7 and a portion of the day of June 7. Some terrain was won from the enemy in the section included in VINLY-BOURESCHES. These localities were captured and we occupied Hill 204 west of CHATEAU-THIERRY. The front reached by us is: Eastern edge of CHEZY-en-ORXOIS---narrow-gauge railway stop---the two woods north of VEUILLY la POTERIE---eastern triangular corner of the small wood 300 meters southeast of ELOUP---triangular road southwest of BUSSIARES---little wood east of 165---dirt road one kilometer north of 144---roadway shrine 600 meters south of TORCY---TORCY Road---LUCY-le-BOCAGE---Hill 192---northeastern corner of the wood of La MARETTE---a point halfway between VAUX and MONNEAU---Hill 204 ---ESSOMMES."
The general in command of our troops N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY sends the following report of operations for the period 10 morning June 8 to 10 morning, June 9: "Enemy active with rifle and machine-gun fire and sniping. At 1:25 morning an attack accompanied by machine-gun and rifle fire was made against our troops in BOURESCHES. The town and the roads leading into it from our lines had previously been shelled. Our troops had been reinforced early in the evening with machine guns and the attack was repulsed with considerable losses to the enemy. Our losses not accurately known but were not heavy. The Bois-de-BELLEAU was shelled by our artillery intermittently during the night. Our troops advanced some distance into the southern edge of the Bois-de-BELLEAU but were again held up by machine-gun fire from nests in the woods and rocks. Heavy enemy shelling along the front of the right of our line with 75's, 105's, 150's, 210's. Retaliation fire delivered by our artillery. Enemy airplane and balloon activity below normal. Our activity normal. No change in the location of our lines.

10 (27) A. Northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY our troops, cooperating with the French, again improved their positions and inflicted upon the enemy losses in killed, prisoners and materiel. There was moderate artillery activity in the WOEVRE and on the MARNE front. Our patrols crossed the MARNE and successfully reconnoitered the hostile positions.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Line on MONTDIDIER-NOYON front shown in report issued from British General Headquarters at 3 o'clock afternoon, June 10, shows no change from that given in cable from these headquarters, 1 o'clock afternoon, June 10.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 79th Reserve enters line north of 35th, 216th withdrawn, Bavarian 16th withdrawn, 58th withdrawn. Seventeenth Army, 2d Guard Reserve relieves 187th. Eighteenth Army, 4th Guard, Jaeger and 19th all from Second Army enter line Bavarian 11th and 3d enter line, order of battle west to east on new offensive line is 2d, 222d, 84th, 3d Reserve, 5th Reserve, 19th, 75th Reserve, 4th Guard, Jaeger, Bavarian 3d, 11th, 202d, Bavarian 9th Reserve. Seventh Army 6th relieves 5th Bavarian 11th from Fourth Army in reserve. Fifth Army, 240th from Sixth Army in line west of Bavarian Ersatz in sector formerly occupied by 237th.

D. 3d Division. Report from division headquarters at 10:30, evening June 9, includes following: "The day has been very quiet along the whole division front. A marked increase in artillery and airplane activity on both sides. Our troops are organizing the positions along the MARNE."

3d Division report for June 9 to June 10 (time not given): "French and German artillery intermittently active on our front throughout the night. Frequent rifle fire along front line, and occasional machine-gun fire by our troops. Small patrols from each of our front line battalions between BLESMES and MEZY crossed river last night and some of them driven back by rifle fire. No detailed reports yet, but it is known that enemy has entrenched at points along north bank of river. Aerial activity still shows enemy in control."

1st Division, June 5 to June 6, noon to noon: The day was marked only by great aerial activity on the part of the enemy and fire for adjustment by the German batteries. Hostile artillery fired 1,700 shells, adjustment being made by high bursts and airplanes. Report from which above is taken contains the following: "The army on our right has notified us that prisoners taken have stated that extra cartridges for the gas mask and 3 days' rations have been issued German troops. The army believes that an attack on a 40 kilometer front is imminent."

1st Division, June 6 to June 7, noon to noon: Principal features of the day were increased activity of hostile artillery and increased amount of hostile air reconnaissance. Artillery fire consisted of strong concentrations on various points in our advanced positions, bombardment of some of our batteries, and of fire of adjustment by high bursts. 34 German planes came over our lines, some of them dropping bombs during the night. There was some patrolling activity. A German patrol which attempted to raid
one of our outposts at 2 o'clock morning was driven off with rifle and hand grenade fire. One of our raiding parties discovered 2 light machine guns, destroyed one, and brought the other back to our lines.

26th Division, June 6 to June 7, noon to noon: Only marked feature was activity of hostile artillery in early morning. This consisted of box barrage in vicinity of FLIREY. Our barrage was promptly dropped in reply and no infantry action occurred. Exclusive of barrage mentioned enemy used about 900 shells during the day, of which 250 gas.

26th Division, June 7 to 8, noon to noon: There was some increase in German artillery fire, 1,250 shells, of which about 350 contained gas, being used. Aside from this, and considerable circulation behind the German lines, there is nothing to report.

32d Division, June 8, midnight to midnight: The day in general very quiet. German airplanes were active, making 34 reconnaissance flights.

42d Division, June 6 to June 7, noon to noon: Notable features were abnormal activity of German aviators and abnormal movement of vehicles and troops in the areas behind the German lines. 20 planes and 7 balloons were in observation during the day and 2 planes during the night. Movements behind the hostile lines were made by considerable numbers of trucks, and a few convoys and detachments of infantry. Railroad trains were busy during the night, many radio messages were sent, and plentiful indications of construction of works noted. American and French batteries used 1,150 shells including 500 containing gas, as compared with 350 employed by the enemy. Our patrols were very active but had no encounters.

11 (28) A. Northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY we were again successful in advancing our positions in the BELLEAU Wood. We captured 250 prisoners, of whom 3 were officers, and considerable materiel, including a number of machine guns and trench mortars.

In the WOEVRE our batteries executed effective neutralization and harassing fire.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported from French General Headquarters at 2:45 o'clock afternoon, June 11: “Following line reported held by French on VOYON front this morning. MOULINOUSS-TOUVENT---TRACY-le-VAL---CAMBRONNE---MAREST-sur-MATZ---ANTHEUIL---south of MERY ---COURCELLES. French withdrew to TRACY-le-VAL line last night without interference as result of hostile penetration about RIBECOURT. There has been heavy fighting in this latter area and also in the ANTHEUIL-MERY sector. French are reported to have retaken MERY last night by counterattack.

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, 227th enters line between 75th Reserve and 4th Guard, 46th Reserve enters line between 4th Guard and Jaeger. Seventh Army, 204th from Eighteenth Army enters line southeast of 14th, 37th and 14th Reserve withdrawn from front, 10th Reserve relieves 28th Reserve.

D. The general commanding our troops northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY forwarded the following report at 1 o'clock afternoon, June 11: “After a heavy artillery preparation in the northern half of Bois de BELLEAU this morning attack was delivered. Reports indicate that attack has reached the northern and eastern limits of the woods and that our troops have occupied the eastern edge. Approximately 250 prisoners, including 3 officers, have been taken, and a number of machine guns and two 7-inch minenwerfer. One or two machine-gun nests remain in the woods which will have to be reduced. Our casualties comparatively light considering the nature of the operation.”

Report of 2d Division covering operations to 8 o'clock evening June 8 to 8 o'clock evening June 9, includes following: “Between 11:30 evening and midnight hostile attack on BOURESCHES repulsed with loss. Intermittent shelling throughout the day and night. Between 3 and 4 morning heavy artillery barrage was laid on the extreme right of our sector. Caliber of shells ranged from 77's to 210's. Enemy air activity somewhat decreased; 21 reconnaissance planes observed over our lines during day.”
Report from 3d Division at 10 o'clock evening, June 10, included the following statements: In the early morning of June 10 the enemy shelled CHATEAU-TIILIERRY and his airplanes flying low delivered machine-gun fire. Our 7th Machine Gun Battalion which is holding the river bank in the town had suffered no casualties from either source, was in excellent spirits and in a strong position. They had 24 guns in position on the bank ready to open up if the Germans attempted a crossing.

The Germans were shelling Hill 204 in the morning and the outposts in CHATEAU-TIILIERRY reported that our troops held the whole hill down to the village on the lower edge of the northeast slope. This makes it practically impossible for the enemy to concentrate troops in the northern part of CHATEAU-TIILIERRY.

1st Division, June 7 to June 8, noon to noon: The day was quiet and marked by decrease in hostile artillery fire and in the activity of the German airplanes. The enemy used over 2,000 rounds, mostly in intermittent shelling of our advanced positions and of the areas in rear.

26th Division, June 8 to June 9, noon to noon: Conditions were normal. The enemy fired 700 rounds of which 250 were gas.

32d Division, June 9, midnight to midnight: Nothing occurred beyond the usual artillery and aerial activity. Only about 450 rounds were fired by the hostile batteries.

42d Division, June 7 to June 8, noon to noon: The German artillery fire was more than usually heavy on our batteries. There was continued lively movement behind enemy lines accompanied by constant sounds of work. The German batteries used 600 rounds and the French and American batteries double that number. Hostile patrol appeared in front of our trenches early in the morning. It replied to the fire of our troops with rifles and a light machine gun but was dispersed by our rifle fire and barrage. Our patrols reconnoitered the hostile posts without incident.

42d Division, June 8 to June 9, noon to noon: Aside from the increase of German aerial activity the day was unusually quiet. 26 hostile planes flew along our front lines and of these 6 penetrated to our rear areas. German artillery fired about 200 rounds and ours about 500. Our patrols very active during the night and early morning. While one of our patrols was advancing one of our men fell into a shell hole and the enemy, sending up three flares, opened fire with 3 machine guns. Patrol returned safely to our lines.

Report on activity hostile artillery in sectors occupied by 4 American divisions for week ending June 8.

1st Division: Daily average 2,260 rounds. Maximum for one day 3,500. This on June 6. Minimum 1,500. This on June 2.

26th Division: Daily average 1,230. Maximum 1,870. This on June 6. Minimum 720. This on June 8.

42d Division: Daily average 980. Maximum 4,500. This on June 5. Minimum 170. This on June 3.

32d Division: Daily average 270. Maximum 640. This on June 8. Minimum 150. This on June 6.

12 (29) A. Aside from continued artillery fighting in the WOEVRE and the taking of prisoners by our patrols in PICARDY, there is nothing to report.

B. In PICARDY on the afternoon of June 9 one of our patrols entered the German trenches and encountered several of the enemy. In the fight which followed three of the enemy were killed. Our patrol returned without having suffered any casualties.

A recent French communique contains the following references to the American troops northwest of CHATEAU-TIILIERRY: "With their firm resolution to conquer and their tireless activity, the American troops continue to hold a distinct ascendancy over the forces opposed to them. Thanks to the cooperation of the French and American troops and the close liaison between them the local operations in progress northwest of CHATEAU-TIILIERRY, are of the utmost tactical importance as results have already shown. The operations of June 6, in advancing our lines, give us points of observation on the enemy's
positions which will enable us to make further progress very soon. On the evening of the same day the American troops in continuation of their earlier operations advanced towards BUSSIARES and TORCY. At the same time they continued to clean up the BELLEAU Wood pushing forward their line in this region more than a kilometer. Finally on the same evening at about seven o'clock some of their detachments entered BOURESCHES which was strongly defended. In the course of these operations the American infantry showed itself skilled in maneuvering. The courage of officers and men approached recklessness. One of their lieutenants hindered in his advance by machine gun rushed almost alone into the woods where it was situated and after having put it to flight the men who were operating it returned carrying it on his shoulder. The courage of the combatant troops is equalled only by the superb coolness of some of their medical corps who, in a perfect hail of bullets, gave first aid to the wounded. Cooperating with the American in these actions we increased our earlier gains."

C. No reports received indicating change in line as given by French communique 11 o'clock morning June 12.

C. No reports received indicating change in line as given by French communique 11 o'clock morning June 12.

Changes in German order of battle: 216th from reserve is in line south of 8th. Second Army, 107th withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 30th relieves 84th, 204th erroneously reported in Seventh Army enters line west of Bavarian 9th Reserve, 19th changes position in line to west of 3d Reserve. Seventh Army, 28th relieved on MARNE by extension of adjacent units and later relieves 237th. First Army, 52d withdrawn from line.

Summary of hostile artillery activity on sectors occupied by American troops on the west front, June 1 to June 8.

In the PICARDY sector the enemy's artillery was less active than last week. One point in the trench system being apparently taken for an observation post, was heavily bombarded with 150's and 210's. There were some fairly heavy concentrations on our front lines; also great activity in adjustment, mostly by small and medium calibers, with a fair proportion of 150's. The extensive use of the high burst system of adjustment was notable. This activity was probably connected with the attack of June 9 on the MONTDIDIER-NOYON front.

In the WOEVRE sector activity has remained greatly above that of the period previous to the May 27 offensive. It has been directed mainly against the southern part of the sector and was characterized by a very large use of gas shell not only on the battery areas, but also on areas in rear of the front lines and on roads. Small and medium calibers were in the preponderance, but some 150's were used. No large calibers were reported.

In LORRAINE the fire averaged slightly lower than last week, with a heavy bombardment of front lines and battery areas on June 5, in connection with a gas projector attack on the troops on our right. On this occasion a considerable number of gas shell was used. Aside from this, the fire was scattering during the week and there was little use of gas shell. There was a considerable proportion of 150's fired; 210's were identified on one occasion.

In ALSACE activity decreased considerably, with the heavier part in the south and south center. There were no heavy concentrations. The proportion of 150's was small, and no larger calibers and no gas shells were reported.

D. 1st Division, June 8 to June 9, noon to noon: While infantry and aviation were both quiet, hostile artillery was unusually active between midnight and 3 o'clock morning. At this time there was an intense bombardment of our old sector which now includes some of our positions in rear. Much gas, comprising chiefly chlorine and bromine with some mustard was used. There was neutralization fire on the batteries with phosgene and mustard gas. Along the roads shrapnel was used and the front positions were shelled intermittently with gas and high explosive. New German trenches are under construction.
Further details concerning raid executed by our troops in PICARDY night of June 6 to 7 and reported cable June 7. Our raiding party consisted of 5 groups each under the command of an officer. The raid was executed in the Bois ALLONGE, the raiding party entering from the west and penetrating to the eastern edge. The first party moving in a northeasterly direction located a lighted and occupied dugout. On the occupants' refusal to come out it was destroyed by the use of phosphorous and other bombs. The second party encountered fire from an automatic rifle as they entered the woods. The gun was rushed, 3 of the gun crew killed and the gun captured. The party then moved to the eastern edge of the wood where 3 men were found in a light shelter. One was killed and the other two taken prisoners. The third party was also fired upon with a machine gun and was also bombed. This machine gun was rushed and its crew killed but the gun was chained to a tree and could not be brought back. The fourth party encountered a group of the enemy and opened fire with rifles. 4 of the enemy were seen to fall. The fifth party reached the eastern edge of the woods and then moved along the edge in a southerly direction. Several shelters and dugouts were located and destroyed by incendiary bombs. It withdrew on the signal of the raid commander who ordered retirement as soon as he had assured himself that prisoners had been captured. As a result of the raid much information was gained concerning the enemy's defensive works, which include quarries and connected shell holes besides trenches.

1st Division. June 9 to June 10, noon to noon: The day in general was quiet. Enemy's artillery fire diminished, only 1,500 shells being used. Of these some were mustard gas shells directed against our batteries. More than 25 enemy planes were observed over our lines and rear areas. Account of patrol encounter given Section B this cable.

26th Division. June 9 to June 10, noon to noon: Day very quiet, except for moderate artillery activity. Enemy fired 1,150 rounds, including some gas shells. One of our patrols entered and successfully examined part of German front line trenches.

32d Division. June 10, midnight to midnight: Very quiet day. Enemy artillery firing only 70 rounds of small calibre.

42d Division. June 9 to June 10, noon to noon: Day remarkable in being extra-ordinarily quiet. Enemy artillery fire decreased to 90 rounds for the day, our batteries and the French using about 500. Only 7 hostile planes were observed, and there was no rifle or grenade fire from the German lines. In the rear areas movement was much less than usual. In the morning our artillery fire dispersed and inflicted casualties upon a German working party which was constructing new wire belts between their first and second lines. A troop of about 100 German cavalry seen drilling in rear areas.

13 (30) A. Yesterday afternoon our troops northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY captured the last of the German positions in the BELLEAU Wood, taking 50 prisoners and a number of machine guns and trench mortars in addition to those taken on the preceding day. Early this morning the enemy launched heavy attacks on a front of more than 1 1/2 miles on the line BELLEAU-BOURESCHES. The attacks, which were preceded by intense artillery preparation and accompanied by a heavy barrage, broke down completely, leaving our positions intact. The losses of the enemy were very severe.

Last night our aviators bombed with good effect the station of DOMMERY-BARONCOURT, northwest of METZ. All our machine have returned.

B. Bombing expedition reported communiqué June 13, was executed by 5 of our planes. 80 bombs were dropped. One was observed to strike a warehouse at the station. Poor visibility prevented effect of others being ascertained, but our aviators believe that all dropped in area where they are likely to have produced useful effects. Our planes were attacked by 3 German pursuit machines but all returned safely.

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C. Concerning battles on MONTDIDIER-NOYON front and in vicinity of VILLERS-COTTERETS no reports received which indicate changes further than those given in French communiqué 11 o'clock morning, June 13.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, Bavarian 4th relieves 13th Reserve. Seventeenth Army, 43d Reserve from Sixth Army in reserve, 22d Reserve withdrawn from front. Eighteenth Army, 206th enters line east of 19th, 84th enters line west of 4th Guard. Seventh Army, 34th enters line southeast of Bavarian 6th Reserve, 5th enters line north of 6th, 11th Bavarian enters line south of 51st Reserve. Fifth Army, 20th from Army Detachment C in reserve.

On May 16, the 82d Reserve Division appeared in the line near MONTDIDIER opposite the American 1st Division. It has recently come from the WOEVRE sector where it had been in line for 3 1/2 months, also facing an American division.

Similarly on June 4, the 78th Reserve Division coming from the WOEVRE sector, where it had been in line facing an American div. for 4 months, appeared in the line of the Seventh Army opposite the American division.

This policy may probably be expected to continue. There are 5 divisions, exhausted by the SOMME and ARMENTIERES Offensives, now in the WOEVRE sector undergoing reconstitution.

D. 2d Division report sent June 12 (time not given): "There was considerable activity by our infantry, particularly on the left of the western half of the division sector, including up to the Bois be BELLEAU. In the attack of June 11, small enemy groups managed to conceal themselves in the thick wood and rocky formations. These small groups had apparently been concealed on the western edge of the Bois de BELLEAU, on the slope of HILL 169. On the afternoon of June 12, this part of the wood was attacked with complete success. A number of machine guns and trench mortars were taken, many of the men were killed, and 1 officer and 50 men were taken prisoners. Some of the prisoners surrendered under a flag of truce. It is now believed that the Bois de BELLEAU has been completely cleared of enemy detachments.

At 5:50 o'clock on the afternoon of June 12, a group of about 40 machine guns were observed in and near the wood south of ETREPILLY by a battalion of American artillery. Fire was immediately brought to bear upon this group with the result of breaking up and completely dispersing the detachment.

The region of LUCY-de-BOCAGE, the Bois de BELLEAU, and the PARIS Road were heavily bombarded by German artillery. The shots ranged in caliber from 77's to 210's. Part of our front was also intermittently shelled with shrapnel during the afternoon.

During the night (apparently the night of June 11 to June 12) our artillery heavily shelled the enemy's back areas in order to prevent and break up reported concentrations in the vicinity of TORCY, MONTIERS, Hill 128, and La GONETRIE Farm. Considerable increase of hostile aviation in this vicinity was also noted, many German planes and balloons being in observation."

2d Division report sent June 13, covering operations June 12 to June 13, noon to noon, continues above account as follows: "At 2:30 o'clock morning after an intense artillery barrage including artillery gas the enemy launched a heavy attack on the line BOURESCHES-BELLEAU aiming particularly at the village of BOURESCHES and the eastern edge of the Bois de BELLEAU. Our artillery put down a heavy barrage in the enemy's rear. The struggle lasted until 5:30 o'clock morning when the attack was thoroughly broken up with very severe losses to the attacking troops. The attack was not successful at any point and our lines remained intact. The village of BOURESCHES was repeatedly reported as being in German possession, but a message at 5:45 o'clock morning from the commanding officer states 'Have not given up one inch of ground. No report of prisoners taken.'"

3d Division, report received at General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces June 13: "Day and night calm. Very little artillery fire. Patrols driven back in attempts to cross MARNE about midnight. Considerable enemy airplane activity."
1st Division, June 10 to June 11, noon to noon: “There was increase in the activity of the German artillery and aviation. During the day the enemy used about 5,000 shells in bombardment of our front line, in a barrage, in fire of interdiction and in fire for adjustment. High explosive, shrapnel and gas were all used. Enemy aircraft on two occasions dropped bombs and on one occasion opened fire with machine guns on our troops. A total of 29 planes were observed over the sector. Report expresses the belief (as does report from 3d Division) that some German airmen are using planes with Allied marking. German balloons made 14 ascents, between 5 and 7 o’clock evening.”

The same report includes the following: “At 12:30 o’clock morning the enemy commenced a bombardment of our front lines and support positions in the zone of VILLERS-TOURNELLE, and at 12:50 o’clock morning the barrage on the front lines in the northern portion, lifted from left to right. The enemy, following closely his barrage, entered our trenches. One group of the enemy proceeded southward and another northward in our trenches protected by covering parties between the trenches and our barbed wire. Our men retired slowly in both directions, throwing hand grenades. Our automatic rifle posts opened fire on the enemy outside of the trenches but they were bombed out by those who had succeeded in entering our front lines. One man was taken prisoner from our post at the point of entry, and two others are missing. The total number of the enemy taking part in this encounter is estimated at about 40. Our men inflicted several casualties on their assailants but no identifications were secured, the enemy removing their dead and wounded.”

26th Division, June 10 to June 11, noon to noon: Conditions generally quiet. Hostile artillery used less than 600 shells, of which some contained gas. Last night one of our patrols had a brisk encounter with a larger party of Germans. Our patrol consisted of an officer, 2 noncommissioned officers, and 2 privates. There was also a covering party of an officer, 3 noncommissioned officers, and 18 men. Patrol entered the German trench and was proceeding along the line when it encountered a lighted dugout. From this dugout a prisoner was taken but before our patrol could get away it was attacked in force. One member of the patrol was killed and in the fight the prisoner was lost. The patrol reports having killed 6 Germans. In a dugout in this region our men recently found a German trap consisting of a bomb with a roll of paper attached to it and stuck into a crevice in the wall in such a way that the bomb exploded when the paper was pulled out. 14 (31) A. Northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY the day was marked by heavy shelling, executed by the batteries of both sides and including the use of gas. There is nothing to report from the other points occupied by our troops.

Yesterday our aviators shot down 2 hostile machines. 

B. In the WOEVRE on the night of June 11 to June 12 a German patrol captured an American sentry at a listening post. The sentry had 2 grenades from one of which he managed to remove the cap while he was being taken away. By striking this grenade against the other, then dropping them and making a sudden dash, he succeeded in escaping.

C. It was reported from British headquarters at 10:20 o’clock morning June 14: “French line south of AISNE runs approximately, LAGRILLE Farm (west of LONGPONT)---one kilometer west of VERTEFEUILLE---west of St-AGNAN Farm---west of COEUVRES along valley to Le PORT. Enemy made strong attacks in this area yesterday morning. Hostile attack at MERY yesterday afternoon was repulsed.”

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 195th from Sixth Army in reserve. Eighteenth Army, 17th Reserve from Fourth Army enters line east of 19th, revised battle order west to east is 2d, 222d, 3d Reserve, 30th, 5th Reserve, 206th, 19th, 17th Reserve, 75th Reserve, 46th Reserve, 227th, 84th, 4th Guard, Jaeger, Bavarian 3d, 11th, 202d, 204th. Seventh Army, 237th reenters line between 5th Guard and 28th, revised battle order west of SOISSONS north to south is, 6th Bavarian Reserve, 6th, 34th, 5th, 51st Reserve.
Airdromes occupied, unoccupied, and under construction in ALSACE and LORRAINE: The 8th Brigade British Royal Air Forces had recently photographed the region from MEUSE to Swiss boundary for airdromes. Following is the result:

Between MEUSE and MOSELLE: 11 occupied; 2 unoccupied; 13 under construction; 11 reported but not yet photographed.

Between MOSELLE and BADONVILLER: 9 occupied; none unoccupied; 8 under construction; 18 reported but not yet photographed.

Between BADONVILLER and Swiss boundary: 11 occupied; none unoccupied; 7 under construction; 9 reported but not yet photographed.

In the above outline consideration has only been given to airdromes which are near enough to the present battle line to permit of their use during tactical operations. More than half of the new constructions are nearer to the present front line than those occupied by units operating in the same sector. British bombing units have been meeting with augmented opposition during the course of their raids. Some of the above increase is doubtless due to the necessity of providing for units to combat bombing raids.

D. 2d Division, June 9 to June 10, noon to noon: In connection with our attack in the Bois de BELLEAU morning June 10 it is definitely reported that we advanced our line nearly 900 yards on a front of about 1 1/4 miles. The two 7-inch minenwerfer which were taken were mounted on wheels. Apart from our attack the day was marked by continued harassing fire from German batteries, by intense circulation behind the German lines and by the apparent concentration of troops north of Bois de BELLEAU, connected either with the relief which is now known to have taken place or with the preparation for an offensive movement. Nearly 6,000 shells were fired by the hostile batteries. Guns of small and medium calibres and shells of gas and high explosives were used.

2d Division operations June 13 to June 14, noon to noon: "Infantry and machine-gun activity of both our own and enemy troops away below normal. Heavy activity of the enemy artillery with gass shells on our front lines and rear areas. 8,500 shells were dropped on the Bois de BELLEAU alone. Our artillery active with harassing fire. Increased activity of the enemy aviation. A total of 37 planes were observed, 7 balloons were in observation at various times. Enemy infantry on the road south of ETREPILLY moving towards the front. Considerable troop movement was observed moving S. W.

Prisoners numbering 5 officers and 508 men have been taken since June 6. No change in position of our lines."

This paragraph and the two following are taken from the French Sixth Army bulletin of June 11. It consists of a summary of the statements of German prisoners from the 28th Division: "American assistance, which was underestimated in Germany because there were doubts as to its value and timeliness, is alarming the German High Command more than it cares to admit. The officers themselves acknowledge that among other causes this is the principal reason for Germany's haste to being the matter to an end and force peace upon us. They believe that if we succeed in holding out this year, 'Germany will have lost the game.' But they say that until the end of the year they will not cease in their efforts to break our morale and our will to conquer. They hope that the effect upon PARIS of terror and fear of devastation, as well as the perpetual attacks of the German army, determined to bring the issue to an end will get the better of our resistance before American assistance can become really effective. All admit that this is the supreme effort. All declare that in view of this decision the present offensive will be prolonged and renewed until the German forces are exhausted. Moreover, the prisoners do not conceal their wonder and astonishment at the spirit and flexibility which the Americans showed in front of them this morning nor the good work done by the French artillery which for three days boxed them in preventing the arrival of all supplies and reinforcements and causing extremely heavy losses. In one infantry company almost all the officers were killed and 25 men were killed or wounded. A heavy machine gun section lost 12 out of 17 men."
Prisoners from the 5th Guard and the 28th, both attack divisions, state that their divisions had been relieved on the MARNE and were on their way to the rear to have four weeks of rest when the orders were suddenly changed and they returned to the line northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY with instructions "At all costs to prevent the American troops from gaining any success."

Note: These divisions had in fact been relieved and the 28th Division has reached BRUYERE near FERE-en-TARDENOIS. They returned to the line and are now facing one of our divisions where they have not succeeded in accomplishing their mission.

15 (32) A. There was no marked activity, except that of patrols, at points occupied by our troops.

Last night our aviators bombed the station and railroad tracks at CONFLANS. A number of direct hits were made. All of our machines returned.

* * * * *

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 16th Bavarian in line south of 8th. Seventh Army, 14th relieved by extension of 211th and 241st, 14th then relieves 51st Reserve, 113th withdrawn. First Army, 7th Reserve withdrawn.

D. 2d Division, June 10 to June 11, noon to noon: Fourth details of successful attack in BELLEAU Wood are given. Number of prisoners now placed at 300. We also took 30 machine guns and 4 minenwerfer together with a large amount of equipment, ammunition and small arms. Our attack was made on the northern half of the wood and preceded by a rolling barrage. The hostile batteries were very active using about 8,000 rounds in shelling our front line batteries rear areas and roads. There was also much machine-gun fire from the region of Hill 204.

The same report supplies further details regarding attack made by enemy on BOURESCHES at 5 o'clock morning. The enemy's forces were massed N. E. of the railroad station and the attack was supported by heavy machine-gun fire. It was broken up by direct hits from our artillery supplemented by our infantry fire.

42d Division, June 12 to June 13, noon to noon: Most marked feature was great increase in hostile aviation, 27 planes being observed in the sector. Artillery fire on both sides has returned to about normal conditions. Hostile batteries used 550 rounds during time covered by this report, while American and French batteries used 750. There were again indications of an unusual amount of work in the enemy lines.

16 (33) A. This morning in the WOEVRE the enemy executed a local attack against the left of our position. During the attack there was brisk artillery fighting. The assailants not only failed to penetrate our lines but were thrown back with severe losses and left several prisoners, of whom one was an officer in our hands. In the region of the CHATEAU-THIERRY two local attacks made by the enemy during the night on the line BOURESCHES-Bois de BELLEAU were easily broken up. Artillery on both sides continued very active in this region and in PICARDY.

B. Nothing to report.

C. On the western front the situation is unchanged.

Chief of the American Mission with the Italian army reported on June 15 (time not given) as follows: "Austrian offensive started at 7:05 o'clock morning today over entire front from VAL ASTICO to the sea. No surprise. Austrian progress at CESUNA, MOUNT VAL BELLA, MOUNT DELLO ROSSO, VALDELL ORSO. Repulsed elsewhere. No report has been received from PIAVE."

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 29th relieves 49th Reserve, Seventeenth Army, 107th from Second Army in reserve. Eighteenth Army, 27th from Sixth Army in reserve.

Summary of the information gained concerning German air forces for the period June 6 to June 12:
Changes in location: The following additional flights have been located in the LAON region: 6 pursuit, 4 reconnaissance, and 5 protective. These were sent to the AISNE previous to the offensive of May 27. The pursuit flights were all drawn from the BAPAUME-MOREUIL region, and the other flights uniformly from northern armies.

Airdromes: Reports indicate that construction is mainly in River LYS, VIMY, REIMS, and CHAMPAGNE regions. Many structures have been removed from FLANDERS and the MOREUIL-NOYON region.

Activity: During the first part of the week the enemy seemed most concerned in shielding his back areas from aerial reconnaissance, and used strong defensive tactics on all active fronts. At night he continued heavy bombing of lines of communication between PARIS and the battlefront. In the latter part of the week infantry planes and strong combat patrols were active between FLANDERS and REIMS. Activity on the WOEVRE and LORRAINE fronts against our air units had been conspicuously small. This might be attributed to poor visibility, but there are indications that pursuit flights have been transferred north, although confirmation has not been received.

D. Report from 2d Division covering operations June 14 to June 15, noon to noon: "Infantry and machine-gun activity both our own and enemy below normal. Our infantry active in patrol work without incident. Enemy artillery activity continued gassing both our front lines and rear areas. Our artillery active in harassing fire, including some gas. Enemy air service very active with over 30 reconnaissance planes and numerous balloons up during the afternoon and evening. Much reduced during forenoon."

Report from 2d Division covering operations June 15 to June 16, noon to noon: "Infantry and machine-gun activity both our own and enemy below normal. One of our patrols in front of right of our sector killed enemy outguard of 2 men. A half hearted attack against front BOURESCHES---Bois de BELLEAU was easily broken up and repulsed at 11 o'clock evening. Also another one at 4:45 o'clock morning against the northern side of the Bois de BELLEAU. Enemy artillery continued its harassing fire on our front line and back area using much gas. Our artillery replied with harassing fire using some gas. Enemy airplanes continued their activity with numerous reconnaissance flights, at one time 10 planes being in the air. Marked increase in balloon activity. Our air service less active. 2 internal reliefs of our troops without incident. General impression of the day normal. No change in position of our lines."

3d Division, June 14 to June 15: In general conditions have been very quiet. There has been a certain amount of shelling on both sides. On June 14, one of our patrols crossed the MARNE and reconnoitered in hostile territory for about two hours, but found no trace of the enemy. Even the aerial activity of the enemy has decreased. On June 15, our antiaircraft guns shot down one of a group of 7 hostile planes which had come over our lines.

1st Division, June 11 to June 12, noon to noon: The day was marked chiefly by the activity of the hostile artillery, which reacted against our fire yesterday placing concentrations on CANTIGNY and other places. There was also considerable fire for adjustment, interdiction fire and reprisal fire. In all about 3,000 German shells fell within our sector. The hostile airplanes were also active, 18 photographing and observing over our lines.

26th Division, June 13 to June 14, noon to noon: There was little activity of any description. The hostile batteries used about 1,000 shells of which about 250 contained gas. The enemy planes were fairly active a total of 21 being seen. Of these 13 were within our territory. Our patrols were very active and on several occasions drew rifle and grenade fire from the hostile trenches.

Reference to attack on our 26th Division reported official communiqué June 16, intelligence report of Division gives following: "The enemy made a raid on XIVRAY at about 3:30 this morning with a total of 500 to 600 men most of whom belonged to the 36th Landwehr Regiment. There were also some of the Bavarian 22d Reserve Regiment presumably about 100. About 80 of the 14th Sturm Battalion, 30 to 40 of the guard pioneer regiment,
20 flammenwerfers, specialists brought in from the outside. No artillery preparation. Prisoners state that they were to proceed to within 200 or 300 yards of XIVRAY at which time they were to send up a white rocket whereupon the artillery would form a box barrage around XIVRAY. One party was to go straight into XIVRAY, one around the west and into XIVRAY from the south and another around the west and south of XIVRAY and enter from the east. Our sentry discovered the enemy, before the artillery signal was sent up and our machine guns opened at once immediately the German artillery began. Only a very few of the enemy got into XIVRAY, our line holding and driving the enemy off with heavy losses. Numerous dead were left on the field and up to date we have captured 8 prisoners. The hostile artillery continued active on the entire regimental zone throughout the forenoon; his infantry was active trying to carry back the dead.

Artillery activity: About normal during the afternoon and evening. From 3:30 morning until noon there was general activity. Our left regimental zone being shelled especially heavily. At about 4:15 o'clock morning the enemy began to shell BOUCQ landing about 25 to 30 shells in and near the village. A little later about same number of shells were dropped on CORNIEVILLE and also on JOUY-sous-les-COTE. All of these shells 150's. Beginning at about 8 o'clock morning shells began to fall on ROYAUMEIX. At about 9 o'clock a few on MENIL-la-TOUR. About noon, 20 shells sent into BOUCQ and from 4 to 4:20 o'clock evening on the 16th, BOUCQ was again shelled."

A. There have been no important developments at any of the points occupied by our troops. In PICARDY, in the CHATEAU-TI-IIERRY region, and in the WOEVRE artillery fighting of moderate intensity has occurred. Patrols have been active in PICARDY, in LORRAINE, and in the VOSGES, where a hostile raid was broken up by our fire during the night.

B. On the night of June 13 to June 14 an American patrol of thirteen men operating on the front occupied by our troops in PICARDY ran into an ambush patrol of forty Germans. In spite of its inferiority in numbers, the greater part of our patrol cut its way through the enemy and returned to our lines. The fierceness of the fighting may be judged from the fact that nearly all of our men who returned had been wounded.

Particulars concerning destruction of hostile planes on June 13 as reported in American official communique June 14: Destruction of one German plane occurred during course of fight between American patrol and a group of twelve to fifteen German Albatross Scouts. It has not as yet been definitely stated to whom the destruction of the plane officially confirmed by the French army corps is due. The second hostile plane was destroyed at 8:15 o'clock morning near St-MIHIEL. Here an enemy bi-plane of the Hanover type was attacked by Lieutenants Meissner, Winslow and Taylor. During the course of the fight the German plane turned over burst into flames and was seen to crash.

C. On the western front the situation is unchanged.

Chief of the American Mission with the Italian army sends report received at G. H. Q., A. E. F., June 17 as follows: "Strong Austrian attacks continued all day of the 15th and through night of the 15th to 16th between VAL ASTICO and the sea. Heavy pressure on the front of all 4 Italian armies in this sector. Between ASTICO and BRENTA, Italians lost MOUNT VAL BELLA and MOUNT DELLO ROSSO. Line now running CIMA ECCHER---MOUNT MELAGO---Col d'ECHELE. Between BRENTA and PIAVE, Italians lost Col MOSCHIN, MONT ASOLE, MOUNT PERICA and Col DELL ORSO; counterattacks today completely restored Italian lines between the BRENTA and PIAVE except Col DELL ORSO and in addition took former Austrian lines on MOUNT ASOLE. On the PIAVE enemy succeeded in penetrating the MONTELLO for 5 kilometers W. of NERVESA but counterattacks in progress today drove them back about 1 1/2 kilometers. Enemy likewise succeeded in crossing over PIAVE River at SALETTO, PONTE Di PIAVE, FOSSALTA and MUSILE. I consider the Allies have the situation well in hand."

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 26th Reserve relieves 41st. Second Army, 233d from Fourth Army enters line south of 54th. Eighteenth Army, 75th Reserve withdrawn from front. Seventh Army, 10th withdrawn from front. First Army, 28th Reserve from Seventh Army relieves 50th, 1st Guard from Seventh Army in reserve.
D. 2d Division, June 16 to 17, noon to noon: Infantry and machine-gun activity both our own and enemy below normal. Enemy active with scattered rifle fire and intermittent machine-gun fire. Our troops replied in kind and were active in ambush and reconnaissance patrols without incident. Enemy artillery continued intermittent bombardment of our front lines and back area. Our artillery replied with counterbattery and demolition fire. Our troops accomplished an internal relief without serious event. Activity of enemy air service very marked, maintaining practically continuous reconnaissance over our forward zone. A number of large patrols came over. Enemy balloons being in observation at one time. General impression of the day normal except for marked increase in enemy air activity.

1st Division, June 13 to June 14, noon to noon: There was increased activity of the hostile artillery. About 3,000 rounds in all, including a considerable proportion of shells of large calibre were used. CANTIGNY and our frontlines to the N. of the village were included among the areas shelled. Our own artillery was also active and is known to have destroyed several wagons in the enemy's rear areas. 15 German planes did photographing and reconnaissance work over our lines and 8 hostile planes made ascents. The only infantry activity of interest consisted of patrol encounter referred to in Section B this cable. Our patrol consisted of 1 officer and 12 men and the enemy of 40 men. Our officer and 6 of his men returned, although 5 of them had been wounded.

1st Division, June 14 to June 15, noon to noon: The only marked feature was the increased activity of the German artillery which bombarded our front lines on June 14 and on the morning of June 15 at several points, the bombardment was intermittent but intense. In one case at least it seems to have been checked by our counterbattery fire. The Germans used at least 4,500 shells. Our batteries also succeeded in disburssing a train composed of 11 4-horse caissons.

18 (35) A. There was continued artillery fighting in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region and on the MARNE front. Last night our patrols crossed the MARNE and captured several prisoners.

B. Nothing to report.

C. There is no change in the situation on the western front.

Chief of American Mission with Italian army reports situation on Italian front at 12 o'clock noon, June 17 as follows: "On PIAVE total advance of 5 kilometers in the MONTELLO and of 6 kilometers between FOSSALTA and MUSILE. Small advance between SALETTO and FAGARE. Italians reestablishing their line in sector between PIAVE and ASTICO."

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 18th from Second Army in reserve. Sixth Army, 18th Reserve withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 5th Reserve and 202d withdrawn from line. Third Army, 87th withdrawn from front, sector taken by extension of guard cavalry. Fifth Army, 22d Reserve from Seventeenth Army relieves 53d Reserve.

Report of enemy artillery activity at 5 points held by American troops for week ending June 15.

1st Division: Daily average 3,300 rounds. Maximum for one day 4,500 rounds, fired on June 14. Minimum for one day 1,500 rounds, fired on June 9.

2d Division: Daily average 6,400 rounds. Maximum for one day 8,100 rounds, fired on June 10. Minimum for one day 4,000 rounds, fired on June 11.

26th Division: Daily average 930 rounds. Maximum for one day 1,630 rounds, fired on June 11. Minimum for one day 580 rounds, fired on June 10.

42d Division: Daily average 200 rounds. Maximum for one day 550 rounds, fired on June 12. Minimum for one day 90 rounds, fired on June 9.


D. 2d Division, June 15 to June 16, noon to noon: The feature of the day consisted of 2 hostile attacks on our lines as reported cable June 16, intense artillery activity, very marked increase in German air reconnaissance and unusual balloon activity.
The first hostile attack on our lines came between 10:30 and 11 o'clock evening when the enemy attacked on the northern and northwestern edges of the Bois de BELLEAU and also attempted to break our lines between the Bois de BELLEAU and BOURESCHES. He was driven back with considerable losses by our rifle and machine-gun fire. The 2d attempt was made on the Bois de BELLEAU at 4:45 o'clock morning and was stopped by our artillery. The hostile artillery was active in connection with the attack and also in a bombardment of our positions which, around BOURESCHES and other points, was continuous day and night. In some areas much gas was used. In all the hostile batteries fired about 6,500 rounds. No less than 57 hostile airplanes, including several large patrols flew over our sector, many of them being apparently used to screen movements behind the enemy's lines. 15 balloons were in the air at one time, seemingly engaged for the most part in artillery adjustment. Our own troops were active in executing counterbattery and destructive fire and in sending out ambush and reconnaissance patrols. The German 10th Division has been completely withdrawn from this sector.

3d Division, June 15 to June 17, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: On the evening of June 15, 3 of our patrols crossed the MARNE but failed to gain any contact with the enemy. On June 16, there was some artillery activity in the front areas and very noticeable activity of the German airplanes but no infantry action. On the evening of that day a patrol crossed the MARNE to a point west of GLAND to secure prisoners. It was fired upon by the enemy and returned the fire, but was unable to secure information. All returned. On June 17, German working parties were heard in operation across the river and a normal amount of artillery fighting occurred. The enemy's airplanes were again active.

The general commanding our troops south of the MARNE sent on June 18 the following message: "Patrol last night crossed MARNE at CHARTEVES and brought back 5 prisoners of 378th Regiment, 10th Landwehr Division."

26th Division, June 14 to June 15, noon to noon: The enemy's infantry was on the alert against our patrols but did little patrolling of its own. His artillery used about 1,000 rounds, including some gas shells. His airplanes were quiet, only 6 being seen. On the single track railroad running through enemy's positions there was considerable activity. At one point 300 men were seen to alight from a train which stopped behind a smoke screen. Two other trains were discovered behind smoke screens and the going and coming of still several others was heard. Besides the smoke screens mentioned smoke clouds of considerable length arose from the German front lines on three different occasions.

26th Division, June 15 to June 16, noon to noon: Further particulars concerning hostile raid on XIVRAY. "According to one of the prisoners the raid was rehearsed for five days beginning last Monday, the troops having been assembled in the training area on that day. The prisoners stated that the last rehearsal occurred Friday night behind a smoke screen. This explains the presence of the screen and the troops which we observed in that vicinity on the evening of Friday, June 14."

32d Division: Intelligence reports of this division are now received in 2 series: The first covering the sector N. of the RHINE to RHONE Canal which is held by units of the division with French units attached; and the other covering the sector extending from the canal S. to a line drawn E. from HINDLINGEN which is held by French units with units of our 32d Division attached. The command of the northern sector was taken over by the Commanding General of the 32d Division at 8 o'clock morning, June 14. The southern sector is under French command.

Report from the northern sector, June 13 to June 14, 7 o'clock evening to 7 o'clock evening: Nothing of note except that a hostile party of 75 men which attempted a raid against our positions between midnight and 1 o'clock morning June 14 was repulsed by rifle, grenade, and machine-gun fire. From the southern sector nothing to report.
Artillery fighting and patrolling activity were again marked at several points. Gas was extensively used in the WOEVRE and in LORRAINE. On the MARNE front our patrols brought back from across the river prisoners taken in the course of encounters with hostile patrols. Four of our men are missing. In the WOEVRE a raid attempted by the enemy was repulsed with losses.

Last night our aviators were again successful in bombing the railroad yards and tracks at CONFLANS.

B. Nothing to report.

C. The situation on the west front is unchanged.

Chief of American Mission with Italian army reported situation at 6 o’clock evening June 18 as follows: “Slight gains for the Italians in the MONTELLO today. Otherwise situation remains unchanged. Enemy pressure continuing on the lower PIAVE between CANDELU and CAPO SILE.”

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 52d Reserve from reserve enters line south if 8th, 81st Reserve relieved by unidentified division, 79th Reserve is in line southwest of 35th and not north. Eighteenth Army, 202d in line east of 11th, 4th from Sixth Army in reserve. Seventh Army, 40th from Army Detachment C relieves 2d Guard, 10th Landwehr from Army Detachment C in line east of 36th. Army Detachment C, unidentified divisions relieved 10th Landwehr and 40th, 76th Reserve from Seventh Army relieves 123d.

General character of German artillery activity at 5 points occupied by American troops, June 8 to June 15, inclusive.

PICARDY sector (1st Division): Activity was more pronounced than in the previous week. Adjustment was somewhat less frequent, the greater part of the fire being concentrations on towns and rear areas, at times very heavy. GRIVESNES was heavily bombarded by all calibers, including 210. Front lines were shelled scatteringly, with several heavy concentrations, particularly around CANTIGNY. Little interdiction fire was reported. Gas was used freely for battery neutralizations and a small amount, together with shrapnel, on front lines.

CHATEAU-TILLY and MARNE sector (2d and 3d Divisions): Artillery was very active on the left, but comparatively light on the right. The fire consisted mainly of scattering fire along front lines and concentrations on points just in rear, particularly in BOURESCHEES and BELLEAU Woods. Gas was largely used with several heavy concentrations. A small number of 210’s reported.

WOEVRE sector (26th Division): A slight decrease in activity was noticeable, but the character of the fire remained the same as last week. There was a great deal of night harassing and extensive use of gas, extending to open roads and rear areas. Most of the activity remained in the southern part of the sector, the woods in this area being constantly gassed. Very few 150’s were reported. On June 16, BOUCQ, JOUY-sous-les-CATES, MESNIL le TOUR and other towns in rear were bombarded by 150 millimeter high powered guns at range of 16 to 18 kilometers.

LORRAINE sector (42d Division): There has been a very marked decline in activity in this sector. The fire was merely scattering, harassing with small calibers. A very few 150’s were used and no 210’s. No gas was reported.

ALSACE sector (32d Division): Activity, slightly heavier than last week, was of the same character as in LORRAINE. Only 77’s and 105’s were reported in action.

D. 2d Division, June 16 to June 17, noon to noon: The great activity of the German aviators continued. Between noon, June 16 and 10 o’clock evening June 16, 46 reconnaissance planes were over our lines; and between 4:40 o’clock morning and noon, June 17, 28 others were observed over our lines. In addition many were over the German lines near “No Man’s Land.” German balloons showed the same activity. Between noon and 9:30 evening, June 16, 22 ascents were made, 14 distinct balloons being observed. Between 4:30 o’clock, morning, June 17 and noon, June 17, 15 ascents were made, 11
distinct balloons being observed. The hostile batteries used over 8,000 shells, comprising high explosives, shrapnel, and gas. In particular there was continuous harassing fire on the left half of our sector, and a barrage on our lines in the Bois de BELLEAU. This barrage was accompanied by a machine-gun barrage and lasted from 9:40 o'clock, evening, June 16 to 10:05 o'clock, evening, June 16. A number of other areas were heavily shelled at various times during the 24 hours. Our own troops were active in patrolling. Our batteries were seen to register some direct hits and are thought to have struck 1 of the German ammunition dumps.

3d Division, June 17 to June 18, 8 o'clock, evening to 8 o'clock evening: "A patrol from the 30th Infantry crossed the MARNE (after midnight) and at about 2:25 o'clock morning entered a house in CHARTEVES, which our observation posts had noted as being occupied, and found five of the enemy sleeping in the cellar. These men were brought across as prisoners, and the patrol itself returned without casualties.

Very little hostile aerial activity today. Our balloons remained up in observation without molestation. Hostile artillery shelled balloons, but shooting was very wide.

Hostile artillery normally active today."

1st Division, June 16 to June 17, noon to noon: The German artillery was active, using about 4,000 rounds of which a small part contained gas while a few are reported to have been incendiary shells. On 2 occasions there were short concentrations on our front lines but most of the shelling consisted of interdiction fire on our roads and intermittent bombardment of posts in rear. German aviation was more active still, a total of 30 planes being seen. A few bombs were dropped on our positions. 19 German balloons were seen, of which 11 were properly in front of our sector. 34 ascents were counted. The German infantry was quiet. One of their patrols, consisting of about 15 men tried unsuccessfully to surround 1 of ours, consisting of an officer and 5 men.

1st Division, June 15 to June 16, noon to noon: The only pronounced activity on the enemy's side was in aviation. During the time covered 40 separate planes were reported. A few bombs were dropped on our positions. 12 distinct German balloons were seen, and 18 ascents counted. The German artillery was relatively quiet, using about 3,600 shells in fire for adjustment and some slight concentrations on a number of points in our front and support lines at the center of our sector.

26th Division, June 16 to June 17, noon to noon: Now ascertained that 10 German prisoners were taken during German attack on XIVRAY. 7 of them were wounded. The day was quiet except for the bombing by the artillery on both sides of the areas in rear of opposing lines even this however was slight.

Particulars concerning bombing raid by our aviators reported American Official Communique, June 19: "One of our aero squadrons executed a bombing raid from 8:15 o'clock, evening to 8:30 o'clock, evening, June 18, its objective being the station at CONFLANS. 6 planes started; 1 fell out before reaching our lines. The other 5 reached the objective, where 38 bombs of 20 kilos were dropped at 8 o'clock, evening. The planes started over the lines N. E. of VERDUN. Bombs were dropped from an altitude of 4,200 meters. Bursts were observed on tanks and in the railroad yards. Several enemy planes were encountered in the course of this mission."

20 (37) A. Patrolling has again been especially active. Northwest of CHATEAU-THIERRY and in the WOEVRE hostile patrols suffered considerable losses in patrol encounters and from our machine-gun fire. Artillery fighting continues in these regions and in LORRAINE.

B. Nothing to report.

C. There is no change in the situation on the western front.

No reports other than those contained in official communiques received concerning operations on Italian front.

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, 84th withdrawn from line, sector taken by adjacent units, 25th from Sixth Army in reserve, 13th from Seventh Army in reserve. Seventh Army, 5th withdrawn from line, sector taken by adjacent units.
First Army, there is no unidentified division in line north of REIMS in former sector of 86th, sector was covered by extension of adjacent 242d and 238th.

D. 2d Division, June 17 to June 18, noon to noon: The German artillery fire was again heavy and included the use of considerable gas and shrapnel. The MARETTE and CLEREMBAUTS Woods, TRIANGLE Farm and others of our positions were heavily shelled in the afternoon and evening. The fire in fact was distributed over nearly the whole sector, the entire left half being subjected to a continuous harassing fire. The gas bombardment was particularly heavy at MARIGNY. Altogether 6,300 rounds were fired. German machine guns were very active on the extreme N. part of the Bois de BELLEAU shortly after midnight and in the early morning.

There was a noticeable increase in the enemy's air activity. From 12 o'clock noon until 8:30 o'clock evening 14 enemy planes, in patrols of 3 or 4, were seen over our sector. From 5:30 o'clock morning to noon, 48 planes were over our right sector, including 1 patrol of 11 planes. During the day there were 25 reconnaissance planes over the left half of our sector. Total flight over our lines 87 planes for the day. 18 different balloons were visible during the afternoon and 9 during the morning.

2d Division, June 19 to June 20, noon to noon: "In a patrol encounter to the N. end of the Bois de BELLEAU 12 Germans were killed. A German patrol approaching our lines at BOURESHES was caught under our machine-gun fire, a number were killed and one wounded German was captured. While the enemy shelling of our lines and back area continued there was a noticeable decrease in the number of shells thrown. Our artillery bombarded VAUX during the afternoon and evening with 155's and with interdiction fire a number of points in the enemy back area during the night. Noticeable decrease in enemy airplane and balloon activity due to poor visibility. Constant stream of men in groups of 10 and 12 observed moving southwest into the valley at BUSSIARES during several hours. This point is approximately opposite the left or west boundary line of the division sector. Circulation in other parts of enemy back area normal. An internal relief by battalion was accomplished without serious event. General impression of the day very quiet."

3d Division, June 18 to June 19, 8 o'clock, evening to 8 o'clock evening: "Night quiet, no artillery activity beyond the usual amount of harassing fire on enemy communications. One of our patrols crossed the MARNE just east of GLAND and encountered a hostile patrol. They report 12 enemy killed. One prisoner secured. Another patrol, crossed the MARNE near BRASLES and encountered 2 hostile patrols which had just met. A bomb was thrown at them and a wounded prisoner was secured and brought back. One officer and 3 of our men are missing. Believed to have been drowned while returning across the river. No aerial activity of consequence in our sector today. Little artillery activity."

26th Division, June 18 to June 19, noon to noon: 2 main features consisted of gas projector attack made by us on hostile positions and attempt of Germans to raid center of our positions. Our projector attack was made at 2:30 o'clock morning on the Bois de MORT MARE and involved the use of 900 shells. No results so far reported. The German attack was made at 3:15 o'clock morning by a force estimated at 60 men and directed against the center of our positions at Bois de REMIERES and the trenches to the S. E. From 3 o'clock morning to 8 o'clock morning the German artillery bombarded our center. There was also intermittent rifle fire on our center throughout the night. The attack on the Bois de REMIERES was repulsed by rifle fire and by our machine guns and artillery which opened fire on the assailants in response to a barrage signal. A large number of the enemy were killed and 1 prisoner was taken. According to the prisoner's statement the German raiding party had been on the point of starting when our gas projector attack was made. The day was otherwise marked by abnormal balloon activity, and abnormal movements of trains and wagons. The enemy artillery fired 2,500 rounds during the time referred to. The German communique of 1:45 o'clock afternoon, June 20 appears to deal with this affair
but its writer shows no acquaintance with facts of the case.

32d Division, northern sector, June 16, midnight to midnight: The hostile artillery was more active than at any time since our troops entered the sector. This activity however consisted largely of barrage put down in connection with attempted trench raid. Raid attempted by large German patrol which passed through our wire and entered an unoccupied portion of our front line trenches. The patrol was unobserved by us and seems to have retreated in considerable confusion when 2 set grenades exploded in the trench. They left behind a large amount of materiel and equipment. During the day there was unusual activity on the railroad lines, a number of large trains passing on both directions between MUHLHAUSEN and HARTWALD.

32d Division, southern sector, June 15, midnight to midnight: The day was quiet and marked only by fact that German patrol of about 10 men entered our trenches round midnight. They were easily put to flight by the fire of our sentries.

42d Division, June 15 to June 17, noon to noon: June 15 to June 16 was another abnormally quiet day. The German artillery used only 40 rounds of small caliber, while ours and the French replied with 200. A few men were seen drilling in the German rear areas. Only 2 hostile airplanes were observed. Practically the same conditions existed on June 16 to June 17. The artillery of both sides showed only a slight increase of activity, although the number of hostile planes observed has risen to 10. Our patrols were very active. A member of 1 patrol of 3 men was killed and repeated efforts made by other patrols to recover his body were frustrated by hostile fire. The enemy failed however in an attempt to surround and capture the other 2 members. Still another of our patrols, composed of 4 snipers, killed 1 German sentinel and wounded another but the alarm was raised and they were prevented from securing identifications. 9 of our patrols were in action during the day.

42d Division, June 17 to June 18, noon to noon: The same unusual quiet existed during the day extending to the German infantry, and broken only by an unusual amount of hostile reconnaissance.

1st Division, June 17 to June 18, noon to noon: The activity of the German artillery continued. On the late afternoon of June 17, CANTIGNY and the front lines N. and E. of the village were bombardred with shells of all calibers. A similar bombardment occurred on the morning of June 18 further S. Between 1 o'clock morning and 4 o'clock morning there were concentrations of mustard gas shells. Interdiction, harassing and neutralization fire was executed by the German batteries at various points. Approximately 5,000 rounds were used. The German aviators continued greatly in evidence, 34 planes being reported over our front lines on afternoon of June 17 and several others on morning of June 18. One was brought down by our antiaircraft guns. Nineteen balloon ascents were made on morning of June 18. No infantry actions occurred.

21 (38) A. N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY we advanced our line and improved our positions. There, in the WOEVRE, and in the VOSGES there was brisk artillery fighting.
B. Nothing to report.
C. On the western front the situation is unchanged.

It was reported from British General Headquarters on June 20 that: "The Italians now hold the line running from CASA SERNEA to San ANDREA in the MONTELLO. The enemy now hold the N. E. corner of MONTELLO, but only to a maximum depth of 2 miles, but then the brigade behind them has been swept away by the floods yesterday, and they have not been able to restore it.

On the PIAVE the Italians now hold river bank between ZENSON and FOSSALTA, and the enemy is now restricted to an area 5 miles long and 2 miles in depth between FOSSALTA and CAPO SILE (exclusive). Between PONT di PIAVE and San DONA the Austrians have thrown 7 temporary bridges across the PIAVE River. Out of the 56 1/2 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions in Italy, 32 infantry and 2 dismounted cavalry divisions have been identified in the battle and the mass of the enemy's reserves still remain in sector between the PIAVE and ASTICO. The Italians consider situation very satisfactory."

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Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 121st from Sixth Army relieved Bavarian 16th, 81st Reserve from reserve returns to line between 79th Reserve and Bavarian 4th. Seventeenth Army, 3d Naval relieves 24th. Second Army, 54th withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 204th is relieved by extension of adjacent units and returns to line farther west relieving Jaeger. Seventh Army, 105th which has been relieved in Eighteenth Army by extension of adjacent units enters line between 211th and 241st, 23d from Third Army relieves 45th Reserve.

D. 2d Division, June 18 to June 19, noon to noon: The enemy order of battle was confirmed by a prisoner from the enemy's 28th division. The enemy was active in sending out patrols. One composed of 4 men was seen during the night moving N. towards woods just S. of BOURESCHES but the enemy's machine-gun fire prevented our patrol from gaining contact. Another small enemy patrol of about 12 men was seen and repulsed by one of our patrols in the field just S. E. of BOURESCHES. A part of this same patrol ran into our machine guns. One of the enemy was killed, 1 (severely wounded) was captured and 2 were carried back by the remainder of the patrol. There was considerable sniping by the enemy in the town of BOURESCHES. The enemy's infantry and machine-gun fire was intermittent.

The artillery fire of the enemy, including some gas shells, was normal, about 900 shells being used on right half of sector and 1,200 on left half of sector. The PARIS Road between PARIS Ferme and BOURBELIN was intermittently shelled during the day and night. There was also slight adjustment fire on MONTGIVRAULT. The shelling of La VOIE-du-CHATEL and LUCY-le-BOCAGE was heavy during the afternoon and night but slight during the morning.

The enemy's planes were again active. 33 were over the right half of our sector during the day, 1 patrol of 9 planes was observed. 10 different balloons were observed during the afternoon.

There was considerable movement in the enemy's rear area, including what was reported to be a body of galloping cavalry, a body of about 600 men moving S. over the hill toward GIVRY, 50 men going S. on western road between MONTHERIERS and GIVRY, a long column of troops on road Le CHARME-EPAUX, direction unknown. There was slight activity on new works, including new wiring, camouflage extension and construction during the night of another screen.

For the most part the enemy was quiet today, with the exception of his patrolling in which he was particularly active. We sent out reconnaissance and ambush patrols from all our troops. One of our patrols reported killing 12 Germans in the northern end of Bois de BELLEAU.

42d Division, June 18 to June 19, noon to noon: The day was marked by violent fire of high explosive and gas shells by German batteries on our lines of approach and communication. During the day the enemy used 2,700 shells of which about 1/3 contained gas. The gasses used seemed to have been mustard and phosgene. Our own batteries and the French fired 1,800 rounds of which 200 contained gas. The hostile aviation was normal. Circulation was active in the German rear areas, 3 platoons of infantry and 4 platoons of cavalry being seen in movement at different times. Owing to the activity of the artillery patrolling was impossible.

26th Division, June 18 to June 19, noon to noon: Particulars given concerning attempted raid on Bois de REMIERES cable June 21 confirmed. The hostile artillery was active, using 3,500 shells including a considerable number which contained gas. Our positions both in front and in the rear areas were shelled over the width of the sector. Behind the enemy's lines movements of trains, trucks and wagons were unusually noticeable.

2d Division, June 20 to June 21, noon to noon: "Infantry and machine-gun activity both our own and enemy normal, intermittent fire with occasional short sharp bursts of machine-gun fire. Our infantry was active with reconnaissance and ambush patrols but without incident. An attempt to take a German machine-gun nest in the northern part of the Bois de BELLEAU was without success. On the extreme left of our division
sector, west of the Bois de BELLEAU, our lines were advanced and position entrenched without opposition. Enemy artillery continued intermittent shooting on our front lines and on sensitive points on our back area but with much less intensity than in preceding days. Our artillery shelled enemy front lines and back area with harassing and interdiction fire, with a concentration of 75's on the northern part of the Bois de BELLEAU for 1 hour during the night. Enemy air activity much below normal. Our air service less active. An internal relief of infantry and machine guns took place during the night without event. Movement of troops in enemy back area was normal so far as our observation could determine. General impression of the day very quiet. No change in the location of our line except on the extreme left where it was slightly advanced."

A. The day passed quietly at all points held by our troops.
B. Nothing to report.
C. There is no change in the situation on the western front.

No reports other than those contained in official communique received concerning Italian front.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 43d Reserve from Seventeenth Army in reserve. Seventeenth Army, 187th relieves 2d Guard Reserve. Eighteenth Army, 12th and 119th from Sixth Army in reserve, 3d Reserve and 11th withdrawn from line, sectors taken by adjacent divisions, 302d is dissolved. Seventh Army, 237th withdrawn, sector taken by adjacent units. 87th from Third Army relieves 28th. First Army, 183d from Second Army in reserve. Army Detachment A, 7th Cavalry withdrawn to reserve.

German air forces, June 13 to June 19.
Changes in distribution of German air forces June 13 to June 19 appear principally in further identifications of flights in the NOYON-REIMS sector which were grouped there for the purpose of the recent offensive.

No important changes in location or use of airdromes during the past week.
Activity of hostile forces has been mostly in the NOYON-REIMS sector. During the recent offensive between the SOMME and OISE the activity of hostile aviation was characterized especially by operations of protective flights which were used as battle flights to deal with ground objectives rather than to seek aerial combat. They delivered machine-gun fire upon the first line and reserve troops and attacked Allied planes in the attempt to keep them from penetrating German lines. There are evidences of a tendency to group protective flights in battle squadrons and to increased formation flying in groups of 20 or more machines.

D. 2d Division, June 19 to June 20, noon to noon: The feature of the day consisted in the straightening of our lines in the Bois de BELLEAU. In performing this operation we encountered no resistance. Aside from this the activity of our troops consisted in the work of reconnaissance patrols all along the front. The machine-gun fire of the enemy was very heavy in the vicinity of BOURESCHES. From a machine-gun nest in the extreme northern part of the Bois de BELLEAU there was intermittent fire. The artillery fire on the right half of our sector was much in excess of the fire on our left half: About 1,700 shells on the right and 300 on the left. Many shells were dropped on the PARIS Road near BOURBELIN, on Bois de la MARETTE, and in the vicinity of TRAINTHE Ferme. There was also slight use of gas. BOURESCHES was heavily bombarded during the night, LUCY-le-BOCAGE and La VOIE-de-CHATEL were bombarded intermittently throughout the day and night. The enemy's air movements were about normal, 14 reconnaissance planes flying over the right half of our sector between 1 o'clock afternoon and 7:15 o'clock evening. During the same time 11 flew over the left half of our sector. 5 balloons were visible between 3:30 and 5:30 o'clock evening. There was an abnormal movement of small groups of men in the enemy's rear areas and considerable wagon movement. A few new trenches have been constructed and some new wire strung. Diminution of artillery activity, lack of any infantry action and slight aerial activity made the day particularly quiet.

1st Division, June 18 to June 19, noon to noon: The enemy's machine guns in the vicinity of CANTIGNY were very active during the night, firing on our front line and
support positions. One of our patrols was fired on with machine gun, rifle, grenade and artillery. There was a noticeable decrease in the enemy's artillery fire yesterday, about 2,000 shells being used. Harassing fire was concentrated in the SEREVILLERS-ROCQUENCOURT Road. The circulation along the routes in the enemy's rear areas showed a marked increase. More lorries and wagons were in operation than usual. The aeroplane activity of the enemy was quite marked, a total of 21 aeroplanes passing over our sector during the time covered by this report. 3 were reported as adjusting the enemy artillery and the remainder seem to have been engaged in observation and photographic work. No enemy balloons were observed in ascension on the morning of June 19. General impression of the enemy activity during the day quiet.

3d Division, June 19 to June 20, 8 o'clock, evening to 8 o'clock evening: Night quiet, artillery firing on normal barrage lines. Day very quiet on the whole. Our artillery opened up a fire of concentration along the MARNE from GLAND and BRASLES, on targets indicated from interrogations of prisoners. Fire lasted from 12:30 o'clock to 12:35 o'clock afternoon. Our observers report the normal amount of enemy movement on N. bank of MARNE. Little aeroplane activity in this sector today. The sector extends as follows: E. sector MEZY to FOSSOY, centre sector FOSSOY to BLESMES, W. sector BLESMES to ETAMPES. Hostile artillery fired 200 rounds on E. sector, 100 rounds on centre sector and 250 rounds on W. sector. Aviation active, 21 planes being observed. Day otherwise very quiet.

32d Division, June 19, midnight to midnight: There was unusual artillery activity from the enemy's lines, about 1,300 shells being fired of which 800 were from the direction of HARTWALD. The enemy's infantry was particularly quiet. His machine-gun fire was intermittent during the night all along his sector. Between 6:25 o'clock and 10:45 o'clock morning, 7 aeroplanes were observed in reconnaissance over our lines. These observations were made from posts in the northern half of our sector. Between 5:40 o'clock and 10:40 o'clock morning, 15 aeroplanes were observed from posts in the northern half of our sector (some of these planes may have been the same as those observed in the northern half). 4 balloons were in observation at intervals during the day. There was slight action on the part of our patrols.

26th Division, June 19 to June 20, noon to noon: Day was marked by unusual artillery activity on the part of the enemy including bombardment of our position S. W. of FLIREY. Other regions in the centre part of our sector, including SEICHEPREY were shelled. Our battery positions were also heavily bombarded during the evening. The total number of shells used by the enemy was about 6,000, of which more than half fell in the center of our sector. Otherwise there were no unusual developments. The German machine-gun fire, patrolling and aviation were all normal. Considerable activity was noted on the railroads in the rear. Our own patrols were active but had no encounters and drew fire only in 1 case from the German lines.

23 (40) A. In spite of opposition we again improved our positions N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY. In this region the artillery of both sides continues active. In the VOSGES, where patrolling has been very active, a raid attempted by the enemy was repulsed.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Chief of American Mission with Italian army reported June 22: “Situation W. of PIAVE remains unchanged. In the MONTELLO and on lower PIAVE, Austrian attacks and Italian counterattacks alternate. During last 24 hours Italians have regained territory in both districts.”

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 12th Reserve is relieved by unidentified division and then relieves 36th Reserve. Seventh Army, Bavarian 11th withdrawn from line, sector taken by adjacent units. First Army, 9th from Seventh Army in reserve, 22d from Fifth Army in reserve, 123d from Army Detachment C in reserve.

D. 2d Division, June 21 to June 22, noon to noon: In infantry and machine-gun activity both our own and enemy normal. Our infantry active in patrolling but without
Enemy artillery activity slightly increased. Our artillery active with harassing and demolition fire. Enemy air activity below normal. At 7 o’clock evening, 30 motor truck loads of Germans were seen alighting at LICY and marching towards BELLEAU. Other movements in the enemy rear area normal. An internal relief took place last night without event. General impression of the day very quiet.

2d Division, June 22 to June 23, noon to noon: "No particular activity by enemy and our infantry and machine guns. An attempt to advance our line on the left of our sector was met by heavy machine-gun fire and a barrage. Our patrol activity without incident. In the right of our sector a part of our line was slightly advanced. Enemy artillery bombardment of our front lines and back area slightly increased. The activity of our artillery in harassing, demolition, and interdiction fire increased. Enemy aviation activities excessive during forenoon also numerous balloons in observation. Movement of enemy small groups observed in the back area leading toward our lines, movement not excessive. General impression of the day quiet with increase in enemy air and artillery activity. No change in our line except a slight advance near the right."

1st Division, June 23 (time not given): "Infantry and machine guns normal. Aeroplanes and balloons very little activity. Troop movements none. General impression of the day quiet."

26th Division, June 20 to June 21, noon to noon: Hostile artillery still active but less so than during last few days. Intermittent shelling of entire sector throughout afternoon and evening with heaviest fire concentrated on right and center. On the left XIVRAY bombarded with high explosive and gas. Total number of shells used 1,800. New type of elongated charges (probably for use in destroying our wire) found in Bois de REMIERES after attempted raid of June 16. Each consisted of 42 packages of high explosive each weighing 200 grams, fastened between 2 boards 15 feet long and supplied with stick grenades for ignition.

24 (41) A. Local operations continued in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region where we made further advances, capturing 5 machine guns and other materiel. A German counterattack against our line S. of TORCY broke down with heavy losses under our rifle, machine-gun, and artillery fire. As the result of a raid executed by the enemy against our troops in LORRAINE several of our men were missing.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Chief of American Mission with Italian army reported June 23: “Austrians driven back to left bank of PIAVE from MONTELLO to ZENSON. Austrians still fighting on right bank of PIAVE between ZENSON and CAPO SILE. Italian cavalry reported to be crossing to left bank of PIAVE at PONTE di PIAVE late this afternoon.”

American liaison officer at French General Headquarters reported at 5 o’clock evening, June 24: “From MONTE BELLO to lower PIAVE Austrians driven back across the river. MONTE BELLO itself completely clear of the enemy. In the region of SANTA DON PIAVE the Austrians still hold the bridgehead along the river but it is only half its former size.

The Italians have crossed the PIAVE at PONTE di PIAVE, cavalry and cyclists units were advancing on ODERZO. Farther north another force had crossed the river and were marching S. E. on the same city. 800 prisoners had been taken.”

Changes in German order of battle, Fourth Army, 31st relieves 236th, 79th Reserve withdrawn, sector taken by adjacent units. Sixth Army, 119th from Eighteenth Army takes sector of unidentified divisions S. of 42d. Seventeenth Army, Guard Ersatz from Second Army in reserve. Second Army, 107th from Seventeenth Army relieves 233d. Eighteenth Army, 19th and Bavarian 9th Reserve withdrawn from line, sectors taken by adjacent units. First Army, 123d relieves 232d.

D. 2d Division, June 23 to June 24, noon to noon: “An effort to clean out remaining German machine-gun nests in the northern part of the Bois de BELLEAU last night made considerable progress. 5 machine guns, many rifles, much ammunition and other stores captured.
A German counterattack against our line south of TORCY was repulsed by our artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire with heavy losses to the enemy. On other parts of the front our infantry and the enemy were active with intermittent machine-gun bursts, rifle firing and sniping. Our artillery assisted infantry with barrage, interdiction and harassing fire on enemy positions. Enemy artillery put down a number of barrages and harassing fire on our front lines, and demolition fire in our rear area.

Enemy airplanes were particularly active during afternoon and evening, making numerous reconnaissance flights and being in constant registration of their artillery fire. Their balloon service less active.

Continuous movement of enemy groups and of traffic observed in rear area in direction of front lines. An internal relief was effected by our troops without serious event. General impression of the day: Increased activity by our infantry and heavy increase in activity of enemy aviation. Our lines slightly advanced in the Bois de BELLEAU."

3d Division, June 20 to June 21: "A light harassing fire, including high explosive, shrapnel, gas and a mixture of high explosive and gas was distributed by the enemy along the breadth of our sector both on front and rear areas. The gas used in connection with the high explosive caused sneezing and smarting in the nostrils and eyes. German airplanes were very active flying in groups of from 2 to 9 E. W. along the river. A total of 41 counted during the 24 hours. Hostile patrols appear especially active between BRASLES and GLAND.

3d Division, June 21 to June 22, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening. Enemy artillery again distributed its fire over the 3 divisions of our sector, but his shells were in general of small caliber and no notable concentrations occurred. Airplane activity was somewhat less pronounced. Number of planes over our lines being 29. Sounds of blasting and digging observed from ISLE de BRASLES.

77th Division: Report June 24 received G. H. Q., A. E. F., 6:30 o'clock evening: "Enemy raid on NEUVILLARS between about 3 o'clock morning and 4 o'clock morning more or less successful. Little activity on part of our own machine guns. Same applies to machine guns of the enemy. Activity our trench mortars none. Great activity on part of enemy artillery: 3,000 310's shells, split between high explosive, shrapnel, mustard and phosgene gas, between 3 o'clock and 7 o'clock morning today. Airplanes, our own, 2 dawn, 2 between 10:30 o'clock and 11 o'clock morning today. Enemy, 2 between 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock last night, that regulated enemy artillery fire."

1st Division, June 19 to June 20, noon to noon: Hostile artillery still very active, firing 4,000 rounds on our advanced positions at CANTIGNY and GRIVESNES and our rear areas at VILLERS-TOURNELLES, BROYES and other points. This was mainly harassing fire with some fire for adjustment and some concentrations on our advanced positions. An increase in the movement of troops along routes in the rear zone was observed, a whole battalion at one time being observed in movement on foot and in trucks, another battalion being seen on the way to MONTDIDIER, and 3 sections of infantry being noticed on another occasion. There was some machine-gun fire on our lines during the night. The capture of a prisoner shows the German 82d Reserve Division still to be in sector opposite us. Prisoner referred to, who was captured by one of our raiding parties in early morning of June 20, reports his company situated in trench just broad enough for movement of 1 man and furnished with no sleeping accommodations outside of small excavations dug in forward wall of trench. The wire is concealed in the grass and unsuccessful attempt has been made to conceal whole trench by laying grass and wheat on top.

1st Division, June 20 to June 21, noon to noon: This day was more quiet than the preceding, activity of hostile artillery decreasing to use of 2,100 shells. Besides delivering harassing fire on our front lines N. and S. of CANTIGNY are other points the enemy placed heavy box barrage around CANTIGNY and the trenches to the E. German aviation and circulation in rear areas were both light. 2 hostile ammunition dumps exploded during the night.
1st Division, June 21 to June 22, noon to noon: Hostile artillery again shelled CANTIGNY and neighboring positions. It executed fire of adjustment with 210's on our front lines near GRIVESNES and St-AIGNAN; and placed concentrations on these same points. Otherwise hostile activity was normal or subnormal.

26th Division, June 21 to June 22, noon to noon: The day was quiet except for a rather heavy harassing fire executed by the hostile batteries. A total of 1,450 rounds, mostly of small caliber including a little gas, was used by the enemy. The fire was distributed over most of the sector. Patrolling was normal. One of our patrols operating S. and E. of the Bois de REMIERES met a hostile patrol which threw a number of potato masher grenades. Our patrol withdrew and called for an artillery barrage which was promptly put down.

25 (42) A. There have been no fresh developments at the points occupied by our troops.

B. For our troops in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region the 24 hours from noon, June 20 to noon, June 21 were quiet as compared with the many days of great activity which they have recently experienced. The German artillery, continued to shell both our front lines and rear areas, distributing its fire rather impartially over the sector. The CLEREEMBAUTS and MARETTE Woods, LUCY-le-BOCAGE, TRIANGLE Farm, Le THIOLET and BOURESCHES all received their share. So did the PARIS Road and our other principal lines of communication. But the number of shells used was moderate for this locality and most of them were of small or medium caliber. The fire was of various sorts, some of the harassing sort directed against our billets in rear areas at intervals during the day and night, some for the adjustment of the German batteries and some for the obvious purpose of cutting our communications. As usual some of the lower and wooded areas were shelled with gas, but high explosives and shrapnel were far more frequent. The German machine guns were active against our lines especially in the vicinity of BOURESCHES and snipers near the edges of the BOIS de BELLEAU and around the BOURESCHES railroad station. The enemy made one of his customary attempts to ambush an American patrol in the vicinity of TAFOURNAY Farm but his ambush party was caught and disbursed by our fire. German airplanes were active along our front, paying particular attention to the right half. In rear of the German lines small groups were seen in constant motion passing along the roads between the various farms, towns, and woods. A considerable number of them appeared to be carrying stretchers. Wagons, automobiles and artillery caissons were also in constant movement but in not more than customary number. Our own troops bore their full share of the day's activities, advancing and improving their positions and returning the enemy's attention in the matter of artillery fire. After a burst of fire on a clump of woods a number of the enemy were seen running away in all directions. All of our units sent out patrols which effectively reconnoitered the hostile positions.

In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region the day of June 21 to June 22 produced no marked developments. In the absence of infantry actions artillery played the leading part. The German artillery was active in the same manner as on the preceding day and to a somewhat greater extent. German airplanes were also present in somewhat greater numbers. In the rear the same small groups were again seen and once again our artillery fire had marked effect, driving back into the woods near LUCY Farm a group of men who had attempted to emerge. The German infantry seemed to give most of its attention to the BELLEAU Woods and to checking our patrols. One of our rear parties S. W. of VAUX encountered lively rifle machine-gun fire and from the same point there was considerable sniping on our lines. BOURESCHES and the BELLEAU Woods again received special attention from the German machine gun detachments. German snipers retained their positions of the day before. Our troops as usual returned what they received both in artillery fire and sniping, while our patrols were continuously active.

During the day, June 22 to June 23, our troops near CHATEAU-THIERRY experienced conditions quite similar to those of the preceding 48 hours. Woods, farms, and villages were again shelled with the slight use of gas from time to time and with occasional concentrations. The distribution over the sector was again fairly even. Far more marked
however than the activity of the German artillery was that of the German airplanes which
in number of flights made what is almost a record for activity over one of our small
sectors in a period of 24 hours. During the late evening one of these airplanes dropped
three bombs which produce craters of moderate size. In addition to the movement of
small groups in the German rear areas a column of troops (estimated at about a battalion
and accompanied by combat wagons) was seen in motion during early evening. At another
time two columns of troops, a battery, a number of caissons and several wagons and auto­
mobiles were seen moving along the roads. At another spot a small group was very busy
over a fallen airplane. The enemy is still busily improving his wires. The German
machine guns were somewhat more active than on preceding days, paying great attention to
our patrols both by direct and cross fire. As usual they were also directed against
BOURESCHES and BELLEAU Woods. They did not however prevent our troops from sending out
numerous patrols. Besides the customary activity of our own batteries we made con­
siderable use of mortars. A farm in the German rear area was seen to burst into flames.

On June 22 to June 23, our troops S. of the MARNE experienced the same desul­
tory shelling by the enemy as during the preceding days. The hostile fire fell especially
on CREZANCY, FOSSOY, BLESMES Farm and NESLES. On the whole however the enemy artillery
activity was slight and confined largely to the use of shells of small caliber. Many
German airplanes flew over our front lines, E. and W. along the MARNE. They were prin­
cipally in groups of from two to ten planes. One of them dropped objects which were
burning, which whistled as they fell and made considerable noise when striking the ground.
A number of the enemy were seen during the day, a few coming down to the river to wash in
the morning and others passing in and out of the town of CHARTEVES. Others could be seen
carrying rations or going to and from working parties. The working parties were evidently
digging and probably constructing new emplacements. During the night German patrols
opposite MEZY threw stones across the river at our outposts.

In the WOEVRE region on June 22 to June 23 the enemy’s activity showed some
diminution. Front line positions at SEICHEPREY, Bois de JURY, Bois de REMIERES and other
points as well as BEAUMONT and other positions in rear area were shelled. Our roads also
suffered some bombardment. The shells came mostly from Bois de MORT MARE and Bois de la
SONNARD, but the fire, mostly of the harassing sort, was little above the normal. The
same was true of the machine-gun fire which came mainly from the little villages of
LAHAYVILLE and St-BAUSSANT across the line from SEICHEPREY. German airplanes were little
in evidence. Movements of trucks and wagons in rear of the German lines were normal.
Working parties were observed to be constructing new camouflage. Our own troops were not
especially active.

On June 22, our troops who are fighting in the MUHLHAUSEN area reported a quiet
day. The enemy’s batteries fired a small number of rounds from the MUHLWALD and other
positions in rear. His machine guns were occasionally active and at least one of his
patrols was driven off by our fire. Only in his rear areas was there anything of note.
This consisted of increased movements of men, horses, wagons, trucks, and trains.

C. Following report received from British General Headquarters June 25 (time
not given): “The Italians had occupied the whole of the MONTELLO by the afternoon of
June 23 recapturing 72 lost guns. They are organizing two bridgeheads on the left bank
of this sector. Between PONTE di PIAVE and FOSSALTE, troops had reached the river bank
on a wide front by the evening of June 23. The only bridges remaining available for the
enemy are those at San DONA and one near ORISOLERA. 37 out of 60 Austrian divisions have
been identified.”

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 11th Reserve relieves 216th.
Seventh Army, 53d Reserve from Fifth Army relieves Bavarian 6th Reserve. Third Army, 52d
from First Army in reserve. Army Detachment C, 183d from Third Army takes sector east of
Bavarian 8th Reserve.
D. There are continued in Section B of the cable today resumes of the reports received from our divisions, excluding mention of facts which obviously could not be disclosed to the public. Such resumes have heretofore been cabled in Section D. The information contained in Section B tonight can be made public if considered advisable, as the facts are known to all our correspondents here. Will placing information that can be given to the public from official reports in Section B instead of in Section D assist the department in determining what should be released query. Please advise.

2d Division. June 20 to June 21, noon to noon: Confidential details in addition to those reported Section B this cable: Hostile artillery used 2,600 shells of which 1,500 on right of our sector and 1,100 on left half. Calibers 77, 105, and 150. Of airplanes 18 over our right half of sector and 6 over left half. German divisions consist of 5th Guard, 87th (which has relieved 28th) and 231st. The 36th Division is still opposite CHATEAU-THIERRY.

2d Division. June 21 to June 22, noon to noon: Confidential details in addition to those reported in Section B this cable: Hostile artillery used 1,900 shells on the right half of our sector and 1,100 on the left half of same caliber as preceding day. Number of hostile airplanes over our sector was 32. Movements in rear of hostile planes normal.

2d Division. June 22 to June 23, noon to noon: Confidential details addition to those reported in Section B this cable: German artillery used 1,200 shells on right half of our sector and 1,500 on left half. Number of flights made by hostile reconnaissance planes over our lines was 80. German machine-gun fire particularly active around VAUX.

26th Division. June 22 to June 23, noon to noon: Confidential details in addition to those reported Section B this cable. Total number of shells used by enemy 850. Only one hostile airplane reported.

77th Division. Special report received 1:30 o'clock morning "Herewith resume of German raid on BADONVILLER sector night June 23 to June 24. After heavy bombardment along front line positions between CHAMOIS-NEUVILLER by both shell and gas enemy estimated strength about one battalion and divided into two groups attacked at 3 o'clock morning June 24 our posts N. of NEUVILLER and posts at BADONVILLERS. It appears that enemy airplanes assisted the operation by means of their machine guns and bombs dropped during the course of action. No change in our lines."

A. Late yesterday in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region our infantry, effectively supported by our artillery, attacked the enemy's positions S. of TORCY and advanced our line. 240 prisoners, of whom 5 were officers, 19 machine guns, several automatic rifles and a quantity of other materiel were captured during the operation. Successive hostile counterattacks broke down with losses.

Last night our aviators were again successful in bombing the railroad station and yards at CONFLANS.

B. Material for this section consisting of long list of citations sent as separate cable in order to avoid delay in dispatch of this cable.

C. Nothing to report on Italian situation not shown in communiques. Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 43d Reserve from Sixth Army relieves 24th Reserve. Seventh Army, 201st from Army Detachment C relieves 231st. First Army, 22d relieves 103d. Nineteenth Army, 19th from Eighteenth Army relieves 3d Guard. Report on enemy artillery activity at 6 points occupied by American troops during week ending June 22.

1st Division: Daily average 3,000 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 5,000 rounds, fired on June 17. Minimum for 1 day 1,500 rounds, fired on June 21.

2d Division: Daily average 4,000 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 8,250 rounds,
fired on June 16. Minimum for 1 day 2,100 rounds, fired on June 18.

26th Division: Daily average 1,800 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 6,000 rounds, fired on June 19. Minimum for 1 day, 300 rounds, fired on June 21.

32d Division: Daily average 400 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 1,400 rounds, fired on June 19. Minimum for 1 day 110 rounds, fired on June 21.

3d Division: Daily average 300 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 680 rounds, fired on June 19. Minimum for 1 day 190 rounds, fired on June 20.

42d Division: Daily average 950 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 2,710 rounds, fired on June 18. This division was in line but 3 days of this week after which it was withdrawn.

D. 2d Division, June 23 to June 24, noon to noon: From the northern part of Bois de BELLEAU and a few hundred yards north of BOURESCHES the enemy fired, with machine-gun and rifle fire, upon BOURESCHES and Bois la MARETTE. His artillery fire was normal except for the increase use of gas. Destructive, harassing and interdiction fire were all used in this sector during the day. His most intense fire was from 7 o'clock evening to midnight on Bois de BELLEAU and the vicinity of LUCY. Harassing fire was experienced on our batteries near MARIGNY during the day. In all about 2,400 shells were used and of these about 1,600 were gas shells the majority of which fell on Bois de CLEREMBANTS and Le CENSE Farm. The enemy was exceedingly active with airplanes, more than 103 flights being observed over our lines during the day. His balloons were also doing constant observation work, 8 of them being in evidence during the day. The movement of troops in small groups was also very noticeable in the enemy's rear areas, where between 7:58 o'clock evening and 8:27 o'clock evening as many as 1,100 men were seen to go from Bois de BELLEAU to BONNES in groups of 40 men. Some 40 Germans also left the N. E. corner of Bois de BELLEAU at 4:45 o'clock evening and entered BELLEAU on the BELLEAU-BOURESCHES Road. There were other movements of troops in smaller groups.

Our infantry engaged in an indecisive attack on the northern part of the Bois de BELLEAU where the Germans machine-gun nests are located. On the rest of the sector our patrols were active in reconnaissance and ambush work. Our artillery executed destructive and harassing fire on the northern part of the Bois de BELLEAU and placed a barrage on the edge of the woods. We continued our usual harassing fire on the enemy's rear areas.

32d Division, June 23, midnight to midnight: An enemy ambush patrol of about 30 men penetrated our lines at OUVRAGE between 2:30 o'clock morning and 6 o'clock morning. After infantry fire on the part of our troops the patrol returned carrying 4 of its members. The party left several articles in our line of which the most important to note are the 70 grenades of the potato masher type and a Prussian forage cap. The enemy's artillery fire was intermittent except for a heavy barrage of shells of varying caliber set down on the front lines of a part of our sector at 5:40 o'clock morning to 6 o'clock morning and coming from MUHLENWALD. About 650 shells of different caliber were fired in the course of the day. Only 1 airplane and 1 balloon belonging to the enemy were seen. There were no abnormal movements in the German rear areas and no indication of any work in progress. Our patrols were active in reconnaissance.

1st Division, June 23 (time not given): The German infantry in this, the CANTIGNY sector, appeared to be more alert than has recently been the case. It is noted that our patrols are now met with rifle, machine-gun and grenade fire whenever they attempt to approach the German lines. Otherwise the day was relatively quiet, there was the customary artillery fire on our front line around GRIVESNES, VILLERS-TOURNELLE and adjacent points, a total of 2,200 shells being used. The only difference was the fact that more than the usual proportion of shrapnel, amounting to about 10 per cent was used. Heavy trench mortars were adjusting their fire on CANTIGNY and our front lines to the N. of the village, but their fire was light. Movement in the German rear was above the normal, particularly in relation to wagons of which 49 were counted. No less than 19 automobiles, a number quite unusual, were observed. On the other hand the enemy's aviation was distinctly inactive, only 3 hostile planes observed.
1st Division, June 23 to June 24, noon to noon: Same alertness of enemy infantry observed, especially in machine-gun fire during the night. Hostile artillery used 2,100 shells in harassing fire which was especially heavy on the Bois ADVANCE and the Bois de VILLERS and in fire for adjustment which was especially marked at GRIVESNES and other advanced positions. In the rear areas parties of the enemy were seen to be engaged in erecting wire, digging, constructing camouflage, loading hay and carrying logs. Movements of troops and conveyances were normal. The German airplanes showed increased activity but were effectively checked by our own planes and by antiaircraft batteries. 1 group of hostile planes operating over CANTIGNY dropped 9 bombs on our forward positions during the night.

3d Division, June 23 to June 24, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Hostile artillery showed increased activity, distributing about 500 shells, mainly of small caliber, over our sector. On the right third of our sector some shrapnel was used. French batteries fires 350 rounds against the German positions. Hostile patrols were active, 11 being seen and heard on the N. bank of the MARNE. One German swam across the river at midnight, was chased by our outguard and swam back. No less than 60 German planes, flying in groups of from 2 to 7 planes were in observation over our front lines. In the German rear areas the movements of small groups continued. Construction of German works continues, 100 men being seen digging trenches at 1 spot.

2d Division, June 25 to June 26, noon to noon: At 5 o'clock evening our infantry successfully attacked and captured an enemy strong point S. of TORCY, German prisoners numbering 5 officers and 233 enlisted men passed through these headquarters. 10 heavy and 9 light machine guns, 5 automatic rifles and quantities of other materiel captured. Several counter-attacks repulsed. Our artillery concentrated its fire with 75's and 155's on this point in preparation for the attack and during the attack placed a heavy barrage in front of it with interdiction and harassing fire farther in enemy quarters rear. Enemy artillery less active on our front line positions but increased its fire on sensitive points in our rear. Enemy aviation very active, 68 planes making reconnaissance flights during the day and 13 balloons being in observation at various times. One German plane was brought down in flames within our lines and aviator was killed. Our air service less active. Movement of enemy troops in his rear area not heavy. Excessive movement of animal and motor transportation observed between BONNES and Bois BONNES moving in both directions. General impression of the day quiet except for our own activity. Our lines were slightly advanced in the western part of our sector."

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Extract from letter of German soldier recently engaged at BELLEAU Woods: "We are now in the battle zone and canteens dare not come to us on account of the enemy, for the Americans are bombarding the villages 15 kilometers behind the present front with long range guns, and you will know that the canteen outfit and the others who are lying in reserve do not venture very far; for it is not pleasant to eat cherries with the Americans. The reason for that is that they have not yet had much experience. The American divisions are still very fiery. They are the divisions that the French have entered. They are better than the English, who leave everything stand and lie and run away. The English leave everything to the French. About 400 of us are lying about here. We have on corner of the woods and the American has the other corner. That is not nice, for all of a sudden he rushes forward and one does not know it before.

Therefore one must shoot at every little noise, for one cannot trust them. Here always 2 men have dug a hole for themselves. Here one lies day and night without a blanket only with a coat and a shelter half. One freezes at night like a tailor, for the nights are fiercely cold. I hope that I will be lucky enough to escape from this horrible mess, for up to now I have always been lucky. Many of my comrades are already buried here. The enemy sweeps every evening the whole country side with machine-gun and
rifle fire and then artillery fire. But, we in the front lines are safer than in the support position. At present our food is miserable. We are now fed upon dried vegetables and marmalade and when at night we obtain more food it is unpalatable. It is half sour and all cold. In the day we receive nothing.”

Note that this letter was written before BELLEAU Wood passed entirely into our possession where it now remains.

27 (44) A. Aside from the repulse of hostile parties which attempted to raid our positions in the VOSGES there is nothing to report.

C. The situation on the western front is unchanged.

No reports received giving information on the Italian situation other than that contained in official communiques.

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, 227th and Bavarian 3d withdrawn, sector taken by adjacent units.

The following conclusions have been arrived at here concerning German divisions on the AISNE-MARNE front.

The German line from E. of NOYON, to PRUNAY, covering the front of the offensive which began May 27, is now rapidly assuming a character similar to that of the SOMME and the MONTDIDIER fronts following the offensive of March 21; the line is held by fairly fresh, but third class divisions.

Of the 22 attack divisions that took part in the AISNE Offensive, 16 have now been withdrawn from line and 3 more have not been identified within two weeks and may have been withdrawn also. 5 third class divisions which participated in the early part of the offensive have also been relieved.

10 divisions, none of them first class and only 3 of them second class, have come into line on this front, to relieve attack divisions. All of these 10 were withdrawn from the front between REIMS and ALSACE, none of them coming from the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht. Nevertheless, in an indirect way the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht is contributing to these reliefs, for these third class divisions from VERDUN and other places are in many instances made available because they have been relieved in their former sectors by exhausted divisions from the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht.

The number of divisions on this front is also being reduced. There were as many as 40 divisions in line during the first days of the AISNE Offensive from E. of NOYON to PRUNAY; at present only 23 divisions are presumed to be in line and possibly fewer than this figure.

Of the 16 attack divisions known to have been withdrawn, 3 originally came to this front from the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht. There is no evidence that they have returned to that group.

General nature of hostile artillery activity in American sectors June 16 to 22.

PICARDY sector (1st Division): The enemy’s artillery continued very active. Early in the week the fire was severe on the villages and roads in our rear areas. It was especially heavy on our left sector where 210’s were active on ROCQUENCOURT and COULLEMMELLE. Short but intense concentrations were put down on our front line near CANTIGNY and to the north. 210’s registered on GRIVESNES and heavy trench mortars adjusted on CANTIGNY in the latter part of the week. Two concentrations of Yellow Cross shells were reported, both in the left sector.

OISE sector (2d and 3d Divisions): On our front N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY, hostile artillery was less active than in the preceding week. The wooded regions in our
forward zone again received the greater part of the shelling. It was most severe in the region BELLEAU Woods-BOURESCHES. 150's were very active but no larger caliber was observed. E. of CHATEAU-THIERRY our troops along the MARNE reported slight activity by enemy batteries.

WOEVRE sector (26th Division): In this sector artillery activity was livelier than in any previous period of our occupation. The villages just in rear of our line were subjected to severe harassing by H. E. and gas shell. The fire was distributed throughout the sector with a slight preponderance on the center area. The shelling of roads and back areas continued. BOUCQ, ROYAMEIX, and CORNIEVILLE, villages 15 kilometers behind our lines were bombarded by 150's.

Lorraine sector (42d and 77th Divisions): The first part of the week was marked by a violent night bombardment of our communications. H. E. shell of light caliber and Green and Yellow Cross gas shell were employed.

ALSACE sector (5th and 32d Divisions): Except for two short concentrations on our front line, activity continued weak.

2d Division, June 24 to June 25, noon to noon: The day was marked only by an increase in harassing fire delivered by the Germans on our rear areas. The fire was distributed in general over the same points as those mentioned in reports for the preceding days; with rather more attention to the roads in our rear areas than had recently been shown. There was a moderate use of gas in the woods east of TRIANGLE Farm, CHAMPILLON and LUCY-le-BOCAGE. The German air forces continued active, especially over the right half of our sector where 59 flights were made during the afternoon and morning. The number of flights over the left half was 15. One hostile machine was brought down by a French plane. In the rear areas movements were not marked except on the road leading from BONNES to BOIS BONNES where wagons and trucks were excessively active. New camouflage, including screens and clumps of bushes, has appeared at several points. The activity of the enemy's infantry was again seen only in moderate amount of patrolling and in machine-gun fire which came mainly from the vicinity of VAUX and was directed for the most part on BOURESCHES and BELLEAU Wood. A deserter belonging to the 201st German Division who came into our lines stated that the 201st Division relieved the 231st Division and elements of the 36th Division on the night of June 18 to June 19. The activity of our troops was confined to continuous patrolling along our front and destructive and preparation fire delivered by our artillery.

3d Division, June 24 to June 25, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: The German artillery again showed increased activity, using 850 shells, mainly of small caliber. The fire was distributed along our sector and included small amounts of shrapnel and gas. French batteries replied with about 700 shells. The hostile air forces were less active, the total number of planes reported being 25. In the hostile rear areas men were seen in very small but unusually numerous groups. Working parties showed normal activity. At 10:30 o'clock evening two Germans seen in boat near right bank of river. Fired on by automatic rifles. Both were hit, fell into river and disappeared.

1st Division, June 24 to June 25: The day was unusually quiet. German artillery used 2,100 shells, mostly in harassing and retaliation fire. The heaviest fire was on CANTIGNY and on the GRIVESNES-Le PLESSIER Road. Circulation in the enemy's rear increased, a total of 51 wagons and 28 lorries being seen during the afternoon. Most of them were on the road between FIGNIERES and BOUILLANCOURT. The enemy's air forces were inactive. His machine guns were active at times against our front lines and our patrols.

26th Division, June 24 to June 25, noon to noon: The German artillery, using about 900 shells in all, showed moderate activity between 3 and 5 o'clock afternoon, 8:30 o'clock evening and 3 to 5 o'clock morning. Its fire was directed mainly on SEICHEPREY, Bois de REMIERES, FLIREY and other front line positions. Some gas was used especially in the REMIERES and JURY Woods. Hostile air forces were inactive, only 9 planes being observed. There was the usual patrolling activity on both sides. Generally speaking the day was quiet.
A. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region we again improved our positions S. of TORCY. The number of prisoners taken by us at this point in the operation of June 25 has increased to 309, of whom 7 are officers. There have been no new developments at other points held by our troops.

It is established that our aviators have shot down 3 hostile machines in the TOUL region since the beginning of the week.

C. The situation is unchanged on the western front.

It was reported from British General Headquarters at 11 o'clock morning, June 28: "Fighting continues between new and old PIAVE. Over 500 prisoners captured by Italians during extension of CAPO SILE Bridgehead. About 60 Austrian guns captured by Italians in recent fighting. On the night of the 26th instant only bridges reported intact on Lower PIAVE were two footbridges near AGENZIA TREZZA."

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 36th Reserve relieves 42d. Eighteenth Army, 51st Reserve from Seventh Army in reserve.

D. 2d Division, June 25 to June 26, noon to noon: In addition to information forwarded concerning operations of this division during this period of 24 hours in cable Number 43, June 26, the following facts are now available. The German artillery was extremely active firing 2,100 shells on the right half of our sector and 3,500 on the left half. The calibers ranged from 77's to 150's. As previously noted the fire was directed mainly against sensitive points and road in our rear but throughout the night there was steady bombardment of our positions in the BELLEAU Wood. There was an even more intense bombardment on this point just prior to the attack made by our troops, and a barrage was put down by the enemy on the northern and northwestern edges of the wood between 6:30 and 7 o'clock evening. The use of gas continued. The activity of the hostile air forces was even more marked than was apparent from earlier reports. On the right half of our sector 70 flights and on the left half 21 flights were observed. Early in the evening 3 German planes fired upon our troops on the right half of our sector and 2 other hostile planes dropped 2 bombs of which one failed to explode. The enemy's machine guns were active from the vicinity of the La ROCHE Wood as well as from VAUX. Behind the enemy's lines the circulation of men and vehicles was normal; but considerable new construction in the form of camouflage, trenches and what are taken to be emplacements was observed. The total number of prisoners taken by our troops in the attack made this day S. of TORCY is now ascertained to have been 302 and to have included 7 officers. The enemy made 2 unsuccessful counterattacks. Our batteries were active in destructive, interdiction and barrage fire. At a point in the enemy's rear near BELLEAU a group of 80 men was caught under our fire and dispersed. Our patrols were active but had no encounters.

3d Division, June 25 to June 26, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening. The enemy was active principally in the construction of defensive works. At one point 50 men were seen carrying bags, digging, shoveling and cutting brush. They were apparently constructing a trench and camouflaging it as fast as constructed. The German artillery was less active than during the preceding days and such activity as was shown consisted principally of fire on the right and on the left but not on the center of our sector. The fire was mainly destructive. On the left sector some shrapnel was used. No shells of greater caliber than 105's were noted. The enemy's air forces were constantly in motion, 63 planes being seen in observation during the day. They flew in groups of 2 to 6 E. and W. along the MARNE. It is again stated, as has several times been the case in reports from this division, that the German are making use of at least one plane with French markings. The plane here referred to fired on our position and dropped darts. The German balloons showed normal activity. In the enemy's rear areas the same excessive movement of small groups of men as reported cable of June 27 was again noted. On several occasions trains were heard on the road running N. from CHATEAU-THIERRY. German machine guns and
automatic rifles were unusually active along the front of the river and it is believed that a strong point has been constructed on the river near BLESMES in order to prevent further crossings by our men. Some of our troops are attempting to locate German snipers by the use of dummies to draw fire.

1st Division, June 25 to June 26, noon to noon: The day was again relatively quiet. The enemy used 2,200 shells, of which it was notable that 40 per cent were 150's. This marks a considerable increase in the use of shells of this size. The fire was directed on our front line positions at GRIVESNES, CANTIGNY, the FONTAINE Woods; as well as upon rear positions at COULLEMELLE Woods, at BROYES and other points. The most notable feature was a heavy bombardment of our lines extending from CANTIGNY northward which commenced at 3:45 o'clock morning. Ten minutes later our artillery started counter-preparation fire and by 4:15 o'clock the German bombardment ceased. The enemy continues to construct new works, of which a new trench at MESNIL-St-GEORGES is the most notable. Owing to poor visibility, no report concerning circulation in the German rear areas is possible. Only 19 hostile airplanes were observed over our lines. A german machine gun was silenced by our Stokes mortars.

32d Division, sector north of RHINE-RHONE Canal, midnight, June 23/24 to midnight, June 26/27: There was little activity on either side during these days. The German artillery used about 250 to 300 shells per day. These were all of small caliber, and were used in scattered fire over the sector. Of hostile airplanes 8 were observed on June 24, 7 on June 25 and 15 on June 26. All were on reconnaissance duty. Several were attacked by antiaircraft batteries and by French planes but without result. Machine-gun fire, originating mainly from the direction of BURNHAUPT-le-HAUT and ASPACH-le-BACH, was light and scattered except for one heavy burst at 4 o'clock, afternoon on June 26. Aside from this, occasional rifle fire, and the attempt of one hostile patrol to approach our lines in the early morning of June 26, the German infantry showed no activity. Movements in the German rear areas were very light on June 24, and June 25, but showed some increase on June 26, when several groups ranging in size from 15 to 100 men were seen in motion on the roads. Hostile working parties are constructing new trenches, wire, and camouflage, but not to any very marked extent. Our own troops sent out daily patrols, of which French noncommissioned officers and men sometimes formed a part. No encounters are reported. In the late evening of June 26 a quantity of propaganda was shot into the German lines.

5th Division, June 26, midnight to midnight: No marked developments are reported. The hostile artillery delivered scattered fire on our sector with shells mainly of small and medium caliber. Trench mortars, of which some were of heavy caliber, fired several times on our positions during the afternoon and evening. 12 German airplanes flew over our lines, one of them firing on our trenches. Hostile infantry on several occasions delivered bursts of fire on our advance; positions and on French airplanes. There was also some automatic rifle and grenade fire on our trenches. A hostile patrol which approached our trenches early in the morning was driven off by grenade fire. In the enemy's rear areas no movement was observed except that of occasional groups passing along the roads or signalling and of several much larger groups working in the fields. New emplacements, dugouts, and camouflage are being constructed. Concerning our own troops there is no activity to report except that of the customary patrols and working parties which operated without incident. One working party found the body of a dead German, belonging to the 80th Landwehr Regiment, who was evidently killed in the raid of June 22. 29 (46) A. Raiding and patrolling have been marked at several points. In PICARDY this morning a small detachment of our troops captured 36 prisoners, of whom one was an officer, and inflicted severe losses on the enemy. Our casualties were very small. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region a strong hostile patrol was driven back and suffered severely in a patrol encounter. A raiding party which attempted to reach our lines in the VOSGES was repulsed by rifle fire.
B. In the CHATEAU-TI-IIERRY region the day of June 26 to June 27, noon to noon, was marked by the operations of our troops south of TORCY, where our line was advanced for one-third of a mile and our positions improved with little opposition. Besides this, our infantry was active in continuous patrolling and our artillery in delivering harassing and destructive fire. The German artillery shelled our positions in front and rear with considerable vigor. The BELLEAU, CLEREMBAUTS, and MARETTE Woods along our front lines, as well as positions in the rear extending back several kilometers and covering most of the sector, received harassing and destructive fire during most of the time covered by this report. The hostile batteries were observed to be especially active from the vicinity of TORCY, GIVRY, and PETRET, at all of which points they are able to find cover in patches of woods. The German machine-gun fire was directed as formerly on the BELLEAU Wood and Hill 204. It originated mainly in the vicinity of the La ROCHE Wood, and the outskirts of TORCY. The German air forces were extremely active but performed only reconnaissance work. In the enemy's rear areas movements were mainly confined to small groups although detachments numbering up to about 100 men were more than once observed. There was also considerable traffic of wagons and trucks. The enemy continues to construct works in and near the woods around BOURESCHES. In the early morning a large German patrol was seen near VAUX moving northeast. On being challenged by our listening posts it disappeared. From the firing and cries which were heard shortly after, it is believed that the patrol was fired upon by its own machine guns.

Along the MARNE from the early evening of June 26 to the early evening of June 27, there were no notable developments except further increase in the activity of the German artillery. The fire, which was almost entirely harassing and destructive over the front, and in some areas destructive only, included a considerable amount of shrapnel. The shrapnel fell mainly on the left of our sector. The German airplanes showed an even greater increase in activity, flying up and down the MARNE in numerous groups of from 2 to 7 machines. In the German rear areas a number of men were seen circulating in small groups and seemed to be continuing the pillage of French property which has been noticed on numerous occasions on the north bank of the river. Fresh trenches are being constructed and new wire has been seen. In the enemy's lines the infantry seemed to be more than usually upon the alert.

The United States Army Ambulance Section No. 575 has been cited in the orders of the French army corps, with which it is acting, as follows:

American Automobile Sanitary Section 575: Under the conduct of Lt. Moore, from April 16 to 28, ensured day and night, the rapid evacuation of all the wounded in a very active sector, under a ceaseless bombardment which destroyed or damaged a part of its materiel. The section carried out its mission without a break or failure, with a devotion, calm courage and sacrifice which were admired by all the units engaged.

C. There are no changes on the western front other than those shown in the official communique.

The situation on the Italian front is unchanged.

Changes German order battle, Fourth Army. 4th from Eighteenth Army in reserve. Seventeenth Army, 1st from Second Army in reserve. Second Army Jaeger from Eighteenth Army in reserve. First Army, 33d Reserve withdrawn.

D. 3d Division, June 26 to June 27, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The increase in the activity of the enemy's artillery was very marked indeed. While the shells thrown were mainly of small calibre, a few of heavy calibre were noted on the left part of our sector. The use of shrapnel at this point was also very notable both as compared with preceding days and with the absence of shells of this nature among those used on the center and right sectors. In the center sector only high explosive was used. No less
than 108 German airplanes were counted over our front lines during the day. It is probable that some planes appeared and were counted more than once. Of the enemy works, a new trench on a crest of Hill 190 is especially notable. Construction appears to be proceeding also in GLAND. During the night rockets and searchlights were unusually numerous, especially on Hill 210 and Hill 215. The searchlights, which at times were in operation for considerable periods, appeared to be searching for Allied planes. German patrols were again noted between BRASLES and GLAND. In one or more cases they were recognized by the glow of cigarettes.

2d Division, June 26 to June 27, noon to noon: Confidential details in addition to those reported Section B this cable: The hostile artillery fired 2,500 shells on the right half of our sector and 2,000 on the left half. The shells were mostly of small and medium caliber but some 210's were found. The bombardment extended as far back as COUPRU. Between 10:20 and 11:10 o'clock evening the region of the PARIS Farm was heavily bombarded with gas. A few gas shells fell on the BELLEAU Wood in the early evening. The German airplanes made 87 flights. The works under construction by the enemy are located on the western edge of the La ROCHE Wood where fresh earth has been observed, west of ROCHETS Wood, along the railroad embankment east of VAUX and southeast of Hill 190. At the last named point a camouflage screen has just appeared.

30 (47) A. Except for the increase of artillery activity on both sides in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region, there is nothing to report.

B. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region June 27 to June 28 there was no special activity other than that of the hostile air forces and of the artillery on both sides. The German artillery fire was in fact lighter than on the preceding day, especially on the left half of our sector. Shrapnel and gas were used in moderate quantities. A large part of the hostile fire was concentrated on our lines in the general direction of BOURESCHE and TRIANGLE Farm. The activity of the German air forces was marked only by the frequency of the reconnaissance flights made. German machine guns were intermittently active at the points mentioned in yesterday's report. Behind the enemy's lines activity was normal. In patrolling activities, carried on in the usual fashion by both sides, there occurred an encounter between a hostile patrol of about 20 men and one of our ambush patrols. After a hot skirmish near the La ROCHE Woods the hostile party, having suffered losses, withdrew to its own lines.

South of the MARNE between the evening of June 27 and the evening of June 28 it was noticeable that the activity of the enemy had increased, while a certain nervousness on his part was also observed. His artillery was constantly active throughout the breadth of our sector and as on the preceding day paid special attention to our positions on the left. In the last named region the use of shrapnel was again marked. German airplanes were again busy along our front although somewhat less so than during the days preceding. Very energetic efforts are being made by the Germans to prevent further crossing of the river on the part of our troops.

In contrast to the activity which has recently prevailed in the sector occupied by our troops in PICARDY, the day extending from noon, June 26 to noon, June 27 was very uneventful. The hostile artillery instead of scattering its fire over the whole of our sector fired a greatly reduced number of shells on a few localities, notably the COULLEMEILLE Wood, the HERELLE Wood, the country surrounding BROYES and our positions near CANTIGNY. Gas, high explosive and shrapnel were all used. In some cases the enemy was apparently attempting to adjust his fire. The enemy's trench mortars were in action for a short time during the early afternoon. A few German airplanes appeared during the day. A German patrol attacked one of our outposts during the early morning but was driven off by rifle fire.

In the MULHOUSE sector our troops experienced on June 27 a very quiet day. The only unusual event was the falling within our lines of a number of small propaganda balloons despatched by the enemy. The German artillery delivered a scattering fire of
normal intensity. During the early morning, the late afternoon, and the evening, his machine guns delivered occasional bursts against our lines.

For our troops operating in the vicinity of COLMAR the days of June 26 and June 27 were marked chiefly by the attempts of the enemy to raid our lines. On the night of June 25 to June 26 a large German patrol made a determined attack which was repulsed after two hours of brisk fighting. The condition of the ground as it appeared on the morning of June 26 gave clear evidence that the Germans had sustained casualties, a fact which was further borne out by the amount of materiel left behind. This materiel included 18 bags of grenades, each bag containing 10 grenades, rifles, wire cutters, knives, gas masks, caps, and two lengths of steel pipe charged with explosive, which were obviously intended for blowing up our wire. Another feature of the attack, was the use by the Germans of liquid fire. This was a complete failure, none of the fire reaching our troops. During the night of June 26 to June 27, a hostile raid took place between 11 o'clock evening and 1 o'clock morning. Details will be furnished later. It is reported that the Germans at one point have been attempting to make friends with our men. On the morning of June 25 they made signs signifying "Good Morning." They had deposited some kittens on the parapets of the small posts and threw a package of cigarettes into one of our barbed wire entanglements. Our soldiers do not reciprocate these attentions. Raiding activity has not been above normal on either side. The fire of the German artillery has been light and has not included and marked concentrations. His machine-gun fire has consisted of intermittent bursts and scattered shots distributed on various points along the front of our sector. The same is true of his rifle and grenade fire. A few hand grenades have fallen in front of our trenches. The German airplanes confined their activity to reconnaissance duty. Most of them remained over our lines only for short periods and some remained at very high altitudes. In some cases our antiaircraft batteries succeeded in driving them off. The German balloons showed normal activity. Behind the German lines the most interesting feature was again the appearance of considerable groups of men and women engaged in agricultural work on the fields. These groups are at present largely engaged in making hay. The proportion of women is apparently large. The usual individuals and small groups passing from post to post, signalling, observing our lines and performing other routine duties were noted. There was also the usual movement of wagons, trucks, and trains. In the matter of works, the enemy is showing considerable activity in repairing those already constructed and in making additions at several points. The works are of the customary sort. One of his working parties was broken up by our grenade fire on June 27.

C. There is nothing to report regarding the situation on the western or on the Italian front.

Changes German order battle: Sixth Army, 48th Reserve relieves 32d. Second Army, Bavarian 14th withdrawn from line. Army Detachment C, 13th Landwehr from Seventh Army takes place of unidentified division in sector previously held by 10th Landwehr. Nineteenth Army, 7th Cavalry from Army Detachment A dismounted and organized as infantry relieves 239th. 2d Division, June 27 to June 28, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those reported Section B this cable. The hostile batteries fired 2,400 shells on the right half of our sector and 1,500 on the left half. Calibers ranged from 77's to 150's. Between BOURESCHES and Hill 182, 1,000 shells of calibers 77 and 105 were thrown on our lines. There was nothing notable either in the use of gas or of shrapnel. German airplanes made 40 flights over the right half of our sector and 26 over the left half. Between 10 o'clock evening and midnight, 2 of these planes were seen to exchange signal lights with a balloon, while another dropped a large parachute flare over the BELLEAU Wood.

1st Division June 26 to June 27, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. German artillery used only 1,200 shells in all. Of these 350 were directed on the COULLEMEELLE Woods. The fire on CANTIGNY lasted from
9:30 to 10:30 o'clock morning and was of considerable intensity. The German working
parties seemed to be especially busy in the FRAMICOURT and LALVAL Woods. It is suspected
that most of the traffic in rear of the German lines is carried on at night. Hostile
machine guns were observed to be firing from the CAFRIERE Wood. During the day one of
our guns scored 10 direct hits on a German machine-gun emplacement.

3d Division, June 27 to June 28, 8 o'clock evening to eight o'clock evening:
Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B of this cable. The
vigilant and nervous attitude shown by the enemy as noted in Section B suggests that he
fears an attack from our troops. Not only has his artillery fire shown increasing
activity, especially on the right of our line opposite BRASLES, but his machine-gun and
rifle fire have also been more frequent. On part of his front he appears to be using
machine guns, and on the rest patrols, to forbid our crossing. During the night at some
points bursts of machine-gun fire were delivered at half hour intervals. The use of
shrapnel on the left side of our sector again calls for attention. It is also noted
that at one point the enemy dropped 20 shells of which not one exploded. Guns of small
and medium calibre alone were used. The German airplanes made 59 flights in the same
patrol formation as previously reported. His observation balloons appeared during the
day along our entire front and at an average distance of 5 kilometers from the river.
In his rear areas there was nothing worthy of note except the continued use of an unusual
number of searchlights and signal rockets including white flares, white flares, white
rockets, searchlights, red Very lights and sharp electric flashes. As before, HILLS 210
and 215 seemed to be the centers of the signalling activity.

5th Division, midnight, June 25/26 to midnight, June 27/28, COLMAR sector:
Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German
artillery, while using in general shells of small and medium calibre is also using some
heavy guns. It is noted that a considerable proportion of the shells have failed to
explode. Gas, of a nature not reported, is occasionally used. Front positions, rear
positions and roads have all been shelled, and on one occasion his artillery was directed
on a detachment of our troops on the march. His trench mortars show periodical activity
with shells of small and medium calibre. On June 26, 9 hostile airplanes and on June 27,
12 were observed. The enemy is constructing new camouflage, building a new road,
strengthening his wire, and repairing portions of his front line trenches. Our own troops
are engaged in similar work. Our patrols have done considerable reconnaissance and on
one or two occasions have drawn fire but have had no serious encounters.

32d Division (MULHOUSE sector) June 27, midnight to midnight: Activity of
the hostile artillery was confined to a slight use of guns of small and medium calibre.
Only 6 German planes were seen during the day. Of these two attacked French airplanes
but were driven off by machine-gun fire. The circulation and other movements behind the
enemy's lines were normal. It was observed that the enemy has constructed at one point
a new trench about 40 yards long. Our own patrols executed considerable reconnaissance
without incident.

July, 1918

1. The day has passed quietly at points occupied by our troops.

   A. The day has passed quietly at points occupied by our troops.

   B. In PICARDY between noon, June 27 and noon, June 28, the enemy showed
little aggressiveness. His artillery fire was much lighter even than that of the day
before. It was directed largely against the region of GRIVESNES. The activity of his
airplanes showed the same decrease as regards reconnaissance work, coupled with a marked
increase in bombing operations. During the night, bombs were scattered in small numbers
over a considerable part of our sector. The enemy continues to strengthen his positions.
Hostile patrols attempted more than once to reach our lines, but either retired without
establishing contact, or were driven off by rifle fire. Our own artillery operated very
effectively on the German front lines and also in his rear areas where one of his ammunition

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dumps exploded at 9 o'clock evening. One of his balloons was brought down in flames by an Allied airplane.

In the PICARDY sector the day of June 28 to June 29 was notable in the success of our raiding party as reported in cable of June 29. Our party penetrated the German lines in the region of CHATEAU JENLIS at 3 o'clock morning, taking the enemy completely by surprise. Within the space of 20 minutes they had captured 33 prisoners including an officer, a number equal to that of a large proportion of our party. In the course of the operation they destroyed several dugouts and machine guns. Our casualties were remarkable small. As on the preceding day, the German artillery was fairly quiet. Registration fire was delivered at several points and our positions around VILLERS-TOURNELLE and CANTIGNY were bombarded during the early afternoon with shells of medium and heavy calibre. In connection with our attack, counterpreparation fire changing into a barrage was laid down by the hostile batteries and lasted until 3:45 o'clock. Barrage extended from the FONTAINE Wood as far north as GRIVESNES. There was little trench mortar or machine-gun fire during the day. The German airplanes did comparatively little reconnaissance work but during the night dropped a number of small bombs on our positions and in the course of the afternoon made several attempts to destroy our balloons. In the case of one balloon they were successful but at the cost of one of their machines which was shot down in flames by a French plane. Our antiaircraft batteries forced other German airplanes to retire without accomplishing their mission. A number of wagons were observed during the day in the German rear areas, but the circulation there was not notable in any respect. Of the German working parties, which continued their activities of the preceding days, one was bombed by an American patrol and another dispersed by our artillery. Our artillery fire was again very effective along the enemy's front line.

Particulars of the raids attempted by German troops on our forces in the COLMAR sector on June 27 are now available. They were preceded by machine-gun barrage lasting for half an hour. One party of the enemy entered our lines attacking one of our posts at the same time from the north and from the south with rifle fire and hand grenades. It was repulsed and driven off without obtaining any results. Another party estimated to have been 25 strong attacking another point, was repelled and took to flight. At still another of our posts some of the enemy were heard cutting our wire but were driven off before they had been able to penetrate it. They left behind rifles, caps, and wire cutters. In this sector the day of June 28 furnished no new developments. There was the usual scattered artillery fire, some trench mortar activity, and the customary bursts of machine-gun fire. The Germans also used a few rifle grenades. The aerial activity, movements in the German rear areas, and the operations of the German working parties were all as previously reported.

In the MULHOUSE sector, June 28, the only occurrence of any note was the fire directed by the German artillery on our front lines. On preceding days the German shells had been directed exclusively on our rear positions and our lines of communication. This artillery fire was comparatively light both as regards the caliber of guns employed and number of shells fired. The enemy's machine-gun fire, which consisted of the ordinary short bursts, came as usual from the vicinity of ASPACH les BAS and BURNHAUPT le HAUT. The hostile planes that came over our lines were attacked even more vigorously than usual by our antiaircraft batteries. A German patrol which approached our lines at daylight came under our rifle and machine-gun fire and was quickly dispersed.

The German plane reported destroyed in American Official Communique July 1 was brought down at 6:30 o'clock evening June 30 by Lieutenant Pitman. Its destruction has been confirmed.

C. No reports not covered in official communiques have been received concerning developments on the western and the Italian fronts.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 117th withdrawn, sector taken by adjacent units. Sixth Army, Eighteenth from Fourth Army in reserve. Seventeenth Army, Bavarian 5th Reserve relieves 17th, 52d from Seventh Army in reserve. Second Army, 54th
Reserve relieves 50th Reserve. Seventh Army, 241st and 6th withdrawn from front, sectors taken by adjacent units, 42d from Sixth Army relieves 14th. Army Detachment C, 4th Ersatz withdrawn from line, sector taken by adjacent units.

D. 1st Division, June 27 to June 28, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those given Section B this cable. German artillery used only 820 shells of which 200 fell in the vicinity of GRIVESNES. Some shrapnel fell on COULLEMELE Wood, and along the roads in our front areas during the afternoon. The enemy continued to adjust his fire by the use of airplanes. 10 German airplanes were reported over our lines during the afternoon and 20 during the morning. His bombing planes were active between 10:30 o'clock evening and 2 o'clock morning. A considerable number of bombs fell in our rear areas extending back as far as PAILLART and from the north to south of our sector. The largest number reported at any one point was 10. These fell at PAILLART. The total number has not yet been reported. The enemy seems to have constructed a new strong point consisting of several belts of high wire and machine-gun emplacements. At least one shell hole has recently been organized and occupied. At another point a large camouflage screen with fresh dirt underneath was observed. In the German rear areas conditions appear to be normal.

1st Division, June 28 to June 29, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those reported Section B this cable. Hostile artillery used 2,200 shells during the day. Considering the number employed in counterpreparation and barrage fire, this may be regarded as distinctly subnormal. The counterpreparation fire commenced at 2:54 o'clock, 4 minutes after the commencement of our preparation fire. A most determined attempt to destroy 3 of our balloons was made in the early evening by 3 German planes. 2 of our balloons descended but only one took fire. The German bombing planes dropped 60 bombs on COULUMELLE, VILLERS-TOURNELLE, Le PLESSIER and other points. During the night one of our patrols visited a German strong point which appears to have been unoccupied for some time. An American scout occupied a German listening post without seeing any of the enemy. Our raiding party consisted of 5 officers and 85 men. They were absent only 20 minutes, and encountered little resistance.

5th Division, June 28, midnight to midnight (COLMAR sector): Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The hostile artillery used less than 300 shells of which a few were from guns of large calibre. A number of duds were reported. His batteries fired from RAIN-des-CHENES, FAUDE, La ROCHELLE, CHATEAU de FETE, and GRANDE PLAIN. Concerning the enemy's trench mortar, machine-gun, rifle and grenade fire, there is nothing more than the usual activity to report. 10 German planes were observed, all on reconnaissance duty. In the matter of works the enemy is reinforcing his wire, camouflaging machine-gun emplacements, and carrying out other works of which the nature has not yet been ascertained.

32d Division, June 20, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. German artillery fired about 400 shells of calibres ranging from 77's to 105's with a very few 150's. In the early afternoon 40 grenades were thrown from the vicinity of PONT d'ASPACH. German airplanes made 21 flights over our lines. In the enemy's rear areas all movements appeared to be normal. The construction of a small trench and some new camouflage have been observed. One of our patrols successfully reconnoitered parts of the enemy's positions and returned with sketches. Our ambush patrols were unsuccessful. Attention is called to the fact that the enemy has shelled the day positions of our troops in the front lines for the first time since our troops have come into sector.

2 (49) A. Yesterday afternoon in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region our infantry, with effective cooperation from our batteries, stormed the villages of VAUX, the Bois de la ROCHE and the neighboring woods. The attack was made in cooperation with the French on our right who advanced their line on Hill 204. Our own positions were advanced on a front of a mile and a half and to a depth of 1,000 yards. The enemy's losses in killed and wounded were heavy. His regiment holding the sector attacked offered obstinate resistance and
was practically annihilated. Our losses were relatively light. A German counter-attack made early this morning was entirely repulsed. The enemy again suffered severely and left additional prisoners in our hands. The prisoners captured in the attack and counter-attack number over 500 and include 6 officers. This increases the total of prisoners taken by our troops in this vicinity during the last month to nearly 1,200. The materiel captured by our troops during yesterday afternoon's operation includes trench mortars and over 60 machine guns. The day passed quietly at other points.

American aviation squadrons cooperated with our troops in the action N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY. Three of our aviators did not return.

B. The successful attack made by our troops in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region on the evening of July 1 was carried out by two battalions of American infantry. The attack was preceded by a finely executed artillery preparation which was executed by American batteries and lasted for 12 hours. The infantry action commenced at 6 o'clock evening. All objectives were gained and our positions consolidated inside of one and a half hours. The enemy's losses were exceedingly heavy one of his regiments being practically annihilated. The enemy's positions were taken at the point of the bayonet. The amount of materiel captured was very large, and included considerable quantities of ammunition. At 3:45 o'clock morning the Germans counterattacked. Thanks to the thorough consolidation of the position which had been made, the counterattack was repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy in killed and wounded. It also resulted in the taking by us of additional prisoners. The number of prisoners so far counted is over 500, and includes 6 officers. Our casualties were light, considering the success obtained.

In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region between noon, June 29 and June 30, there was considerable activity of various sorts, although no important developments took place. The German artillery was again aggressive delivering much harassing and demolition fire during the morning hours. This was directed in part on our advance positions along the BELLEAU, CLEREMBAUTS and MARETTE Woods, and was especially heavy on the right of our positions. Numerous points in our rear areas were also shelled. The fire was continuous rather than heavy. High explosive, shrapnel and a small amount of gas were all employed. Besides delivering harassing and demolition fire the German batteries were obviously attempting to register on some of the roads in our rear. Our own batteries vigorously returned the fire and at one point registered directly upon a detachment of the enemy. The activity of the German airplanes like that of the German artillery was notable in being continuous rather than in being concentrated at any one time or place. More than the usual number of balloons were in evidence. One of the hostile planes was brought down by antiaircraft fire opposite the right of our sector and forced to land behind its own lines. Numerous groups of men passed frequently along the roads running between GIVRY, EPAUX, BELLEAU, BONNES, GRISOLLES, ETREPILLY, Le TARTRE and PLAISANCE. Wagons and trucks moved along the same routes singly and in large groups. Infantry activity on both sides was normal.

Along the MARNE on June 28 to 29, the German artillery continued to deliver the scattered but fairly vigorous fire of the days preceding. On this day however the heaviest fire was on the left rather than on the right of our sector. On the other hand our left sector still continued to draw most of the shrapnel. The shelling was confined mostly to the afternoon and evening, and on objectives identical with those afternoon and evening, and on objectives identical with those previously reported. German machine guns were particularly quiet and there was little rifle fire. Hostile airplanes were also less frequently observed than has been usual during the past fortnight. Behind the German lines men were seen strolling about in usual fashion.

In the COLMAR sector the day of June 29 passed quietly. The German infantry delivered some scattering machine-gun and rifle fire and made use of a few hand and rifle grenades. During the night German patrols were observed on several occasions, two of them coming under our rifle and grenade fire. There were no encounters and no serious attempts to reach our lines. The German artillery delivered only light and scattered fire with
guns mainly of medium caliber. His airplanes appeared only at rare intervals and were in nearly every case driven back by our antiaircraft batteries. They were engaged mainly in reconnaissance work, but made some attempts to regulate the artillery fire. Behind the German lines the haymaking, in which women play an increasingly large part, continued, but neither in the matter of circulation nor in the construction of works did anything of note occur.

In the MULHOUSE sector there was no unusual occurrence on June 29 apart from the increased activity on the part of the German air forces. Late in the afternoon an air combat occurred and one of the German machines was seen to descend in an apparently crippled condition. Light artillery fire, the throwing of a few grenades on our wire, with normal machine-gun fire, normal rifle fire and the ordinary circulation in the German rear areas comprised the other activities of the day.

C. No reports not covered by the official communiques have been received from the western and Italian fronts.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 37th from Seventh Army in reserve. Eighteenth Army, 30th withdrawn from line and sent to Third Army, sector taken by adjacent units, Bavarian 3d relieves 204th, 7th from Fourth Army in reserve. Seventh Army, 6th reenters line between 34th and 42d, 10th Reserve withdrawn, sector taken by adjacent units. Third Army, 30th from Eighteenth Army relieves Bavarian 1st, 33d from Seventh Army in reserve.

D. The attack in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region reported Section A and B this cable was executed by one battalion each from the 9th and from the 23d Infantry Regiments. The attack was strongly supported by the 12th, 15th and 17th Field Artillery.

2d Division, June 29 to June 30, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery fired 4,500 shells on the right half of our sector and 1,800 on the left half. Of this total nearly 2,000 comprising shrapnel and high explosive of calibers 77 and 105, were thrown on the MARETTE Wood. The fire was also especially heavy on TRINITY Farm, our front line from CLEREMBAUTS Wood to Hill 182 and the woods E. of TRIANGLE Farm. Considerable harassing and registration fire was delivered on the PARIS Road. The German airplanes made 42 flights. One patrol consisting of 8 machines was noted. Shortly before noon a German plane directed machine-gun fire on La VOIE-du-CHATEL. A considerable proportion of the German planes were engaged in adjusting artillery fire. 15 balloons were visible during the afternoon and morning. In the German rear areas circulation and traffic on the road from BONNES to GRISOLLES, from BONNES Bois to BONNES and on the two roads running S. from ETREPILLY has somewhat decreased but is still notable. Sounds of wagons and marching troops seem to indicate movements from VAUX to Des ROCHETS Wood. 26 trucks and 1 wagon were counted on the GIVRY-EPAUX Road and 16 wagons, 2 automobiles and 22 trucks on the PLAISANCE-Le TARRE Road. New works have been noted at several places: In particular a trench running nearly parallel to the road S. of BELLEAU. Work is also proceeding in the woods N. E. of BOURBELIN, on the TORCY Road and W. of Hill 182. Several new emplacements have been located. The enemy's front line positions are traced as follows: "The enemy positions from BELLEAU to HILL 204 are apparently in the following general line: From BELLEAU along road S. of railroad S. E. to railroad track---S. along railroad track (with advance posts forward of this line) to BOURESCHES Railroad Station---S. and S. E. along railroad track to BOURESCHES-VAUX Road---to western and southern edges of woods just E. of HILL 192---to southern edge of Bois la ROCHE---then S. to western limit of woods just west of VAUX---southern boundary of VAUX---by lines of organized shell holes from VAUX to HILL 204."

3d Division, June 28 to June 29, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artil-
lery used a total of about 1,100 shells. Of those 350 were 105's and the rest or small calibers. The finding of a considerable number of duds, especially on the right half of our sector is again reported. Artillery was heard firing from BRASLES throughout the 24 hours, apparently from a gun located in the western edge of the town. In general however the increase in the German artillery fire seemed to come mainly from the enemy's lines in front of the MONT St-PERE sector. Our divisional artillery fired 200 rounds of which all were 75's. Only 28 German airplanes were counted over our lines. The enemy's work seemed to consist mainly of laying wire. It was especially noted that wire was being placed W. of BRASLES, extending up hill in a northeasterly direction from the western edge of that town. The division report ends with the following interesting note: "Attention is called to the unloading of wagons near bridgehead near MONT St-PERE. On the previous day sounds of hammering were heard in the vicinity of this point. In conjunction with the above the following information was secured from an officer of the 24th pioneer battalion captured on June 22 at COURTHIEZY. The officer stated that he was charged with making a reconnaissance along the MARNE with the idea of preparing bridge emplacements, for 15 small bridges which could be thrown quickly across the river between CHARTEVES and DORMANS. He stated that, the type of bridge to be employed could be thrown over the MARNE in 20 minutes and that the material for these bridges was intended to be in place by July 5."

5th Division, June 29, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The hostile batteries delivered only about 200 shells on the subsectors occupied by our troops. Of those most were 105's. Only 5 hostile airplanes were counted. The nature of the works under construction by the Germans was in most cases indicated only by sounds of hammering on wood and the driving of stakes. At one point however a new work consisted of logs and freshly dug earth was noted. A German observation post has been discovered in a church tower a short distance behind the German lines. The loop holes are well camouflaged but the telescope flashes at times in the sun. At another point we have discovered a signal station used for signalling airplanes when they are in operation over our lines.

32d Division, June 29, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery fired only about 100 shells of calibers not exceeding 105's. Between 5:15 o'clock morning and 8 o'clock evening 23 German planes flying singly or in groups of 2 or 3 were counted. Otherwise there is nothing to report except the continuance, on a decreased scale, of the activities reported for the preceding days. Our own troops sent out 4 patrols, of which 3 went in search of prisoners and the 4th on a special reconnaissance mission. No results are reported.

3 (50) A. N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY there has been intense artillery activity on both sides. In the VOSGES 3 raiding parties which attempted to reach our lines were repulsed and suffered severely from our fire.

B. N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY the day of June 30 to July 1, was occupied by our troops mainly in preparation for the attack made during the evening of July 1 on VAUX. The preparation consisted in continuous and heavy harassing fire from our batteries commencing at 5 o'clock morning. The German artillery on the other hand was somewhat less active than on the preceding day. Its operations took the form of harassing and registration fire which fell mainly on the MARETE Wood, Le THIOLET, La CROISSETTE, BOURBELIN, the PARIS Road, TRIANGLE Farm, La CENSE Farm, the BELLEAU Wood, BOURESCHES and La VOIE-de-CHATEL. Shortly after 5 o'clock afternoon the enemy's fire on MONNEAUX, HILL 204, our line S. of BELLEAU Wood and our positions in the vicinity of BOURESCHES became heavy. The German infantry increased its machine-gun, rifle and grenade fire especially from the region of HILL 204 and VAUX. Otherwise there was no unusual activity until after the commencement of our attack when the circulation of troops and vehicles in the German rear areas greatly increased.

Of the numerous prisoners taken in and around VAUX, July 1 to July 2, one gave especially interesting information regarding the German counterattack. The main points
of his story were as follows. At 4:30 o'clock on the afternoon of July 1 his battalion, while drilling in a rear area, suddenly received the order to fall in with marching equipment. At 7 o'clock they left camp and proceeded by the CHATEAU-THIERRY---PARIS Road and other minor roads through VINCLESSE to a point about 700 yards from VAUX. There they lay in readiness for the counterattack which was scheduled to take place at 3:15 o'clock. So heavy was the artillery fire on both sides however that it was impossible for them to advance until 3:45 o'clock. The counterattack was performed by groups of 8 men deployed in skirmish line and immediately followed by other groups of which each carried 2 light machine guns. After several attempts to go forward they were stopped by our machine-gun fire. Their platoon leader asked for reinforcements before attempting to go forward again but reinforcements were refused and a continuation of the attack ordered. He next sent word that his platoon was receiving flanking fire from 2 machine guns and could make no progress. Once again he was ordered to attack under all circumstances but his men now refused to obey. Another platoon came up, deploying on the left of the first, but this too was decimated by our fire. Finally the men received orders to save themselves as best they could. They then took refuge in a cellar where 50 or 60 of them surrendered shortly before 6 o'clock.

On the day June 29 to 30, the German artillery along the MARNE did not maintain the activity shown on the day previous. The fire, which was mainly from guns of small caliber was distributed almost impartially along the sector. A few gas shells were noted, this being the first occasion that gas has appeared in this sector for sometime. German airplanes again showed moderate activity. Behind the German lines isolated and individual groups were seen here and there, a few of the men riding bicycles. During the night there was a plentiful display of red and white rockets of from 1 to 4 stars each, in conjunction with the usual hanging lights.

In PICARDY between noon, June 29 to noon, June 30, there were no notable occurrences except the activity of the enemy's airplanes. His combat planes were more aggressive than usual and several fights ensued, in the course of which one German plane was brought down. A few bombs were again dropped by German machines during the night, falling on this occasion on our front lines. The total number of German planes was however distinctly below the average. The hostile artillery fire was light, consisting of slight harassing fire in our rear areas with short concentrations at GRIVESNES, the VILLERS Wood and other points. Very little gas was used. In the German rear areas nothing of particular note was observed except that a party of 40 to 50 Germans came under our rifle fire while moving in the vicinity of FONTAINE Wood. They were scattered and put to flight. During the morning a propaganda balloon came down inside our lines.

C. No reports not covered by the official communiques have been received concerning developments on the western and the Italian fronts.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventh Army, 84th enters line between 206th and 17th Reserve, 204th still in line, Bavarian 3d relieved 4th Guard and not 204th. Third Army, owing to change in army boundary 240th is now in Third Army not Fifth Army. Fifth Army, owing to change in boundary 76th reserve is now in Fifth Army not Army Detachment C.

Report on enemy artillery activity at 6 points occupied by American troops during week ending June 29.

1st Division: Daily average 1,830 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 2,200 rounds, fired on June 25. Minimum for 1 day 820 rounds, fired on June 28.

2d Division: Daily average 3,950 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 6,300 rounds, fired on June 25. Minimum for 1 day 2,200 rounds, fired on June 28.

3d Division: Daily average 670 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 1,088 rounds, fired on June 29. Minimum for 1 day 250 rounds, fired on June 24.

5th Division: Daily average 290 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 570 rounds, fired on June 25. Minimum for 1 day 160 rounds, fired on June 27.

26th Division: Daily average to June 25, 1,300 rounds.
32d Division: Daily average 320 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 670 rounds, fired on June 23. Minimum for 1 day 110 rounds, fired on June 29.

D. 2d Division, June 30 to July 1, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those contained in Section B this cable. The German artillery fire comprised the use of 3,700 shells of which 1,200 are classed as heavy and 2,500 as of light caliber. The German airplanes made 66 flights, of which 43 were on the right of our sector. The enemy constructed camouflage and threw up fresh earth N. of BELLEAU. It was also judged from sounds that digging was going on S. E. of BELLEAU and W. of VAUX.

3d Division, June 29 to June 30, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. A number of interesting developments are to be noted. The railroad traffic was abnormal, many trains operating on the railroad running N. from CHATEAU-THIERRY. There was also a considerable amount of road traffic, especially near the bridgehead at MONT-ST-PERE where a number of wagons were unloaded. At BRASLES the movement of transports and sounds indicating the use of metal objects were noted. Another marked feature was the excessive use of rockets, especially from HILL 210. Between 10:30 o'clock evening and 3 o'clock morning, 78 rockets of 3 stars each, 12 rockets of 1 star each, 7 rockets of 4 stars each and 4 hanging lights were counted. At about the same time 62 rockets, ranging from 2 to 4 stars each were sent up at intervals of from 2 to 5 minutes from woods N. W. of GLAND. Of the men seen moving in the rear areas, a considerable proportion seemed to be carrying white sacks for a purpose not determined. The German batteries fired 700 rounds of which 550 were 77's. Only 5 gas shells were counted. A number of duds were again reported. Our divisional artillery fired 200 shells of which 150 were 75's and the remainder 155's. 47 German planes flew along our front lines, singly or in groups of from 3 to 5.

5th Division, June 30, midnight to midnight: Hostile activities subnormal. Nothing of interest to report.

32d Division, June 30, midnight to midnight: The day was notable only for the attempts made by our own troops to capture prisoners. A large raiding party, after artillery preparation which commenced at 9:15 o'clock morning, entered the German trench near PONT d'ASPACH. They found that the Germans had retreated and were forced to return empty handed. Another party consisting of an officer and 25 men spent an hour in the enemy's wire during the preceding night with the same object but failed to obtain results. The German forces showed little activity during the day. Their artillery fired only 130 shells which were of small and medium caliber and were scattered over a number of points in our rear areas. Their machine-gun, rifle and grenade fire was also very light. Only 6 enemy airplanes and 1 balloon were observed. Traffic was normal and no new works were observed apart from some new camouflage. Early in the afternoon the enemy sent up a number of small red paper balloons.

1st Division, June 29 to June 30, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. Only 1,400 shells fell on our sector. A few were 210's. Some winged trench mortar shells fell on our sector. A few were thrown on our lines S. of CANTIGNY during the afternoon. Number of German planes reported was 15.

4. (51) A. In the course of successful patrolling activity in PICARDY and in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region we captured prisoners. In PICARDY a machine gun was also taken. Hostile planes which approached our lines near VAUX and in the VOSGES were driven back by our fire.

Our troops cooperated with the British in their attack made today.

B. Near CANTIGNY one of our raiding parties this morning encountered a Boche raiding party of 70 ready to start out. 25 of our men penetrated enemy's wire, killing at least 20 Boche, wounding others and capturing 3 with machine gun.

Further details are now available concerning the German counterattack in the vicinity of Bois de la ROCHE in the early morning of July 2. The attack broke down completely under our artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire. Besides inflicting heavy losses...
in killed and wounded our troops took 140 prisoners. These were included in the total of 500 previously reported. For sometime after the counterattack the enemy kept up a continuous harassing fire on our front lines and during the day of July 2 intermittent fire on our front lines and on points in our rear areas. Our own batteries were equally active. The German air forces were also active but met considerable opposition from our airplanes whose activity is increasing. Conflicts occurred of which the results have not been reported. In the German rear areas troops were in motion around RONNES Wood and near GIVRY, EPAUX, and the PICARDY Farm. During the night of July 3 to July 4 the hostile infantry showed some slight activity, directing bursts of machine-gun fire on the right of our line and sending out a patrol which attempted to occupy a house N. of VAUX. The patrol was easily driven back. At the same time 2 of our own men penetrated the German lines in the same region and brought back 2 prisoners. Throughout the night the hostile artillery shelled our front and rear positions on the right of our line using more than the usual amount of gas. American artillery vigorously replied. During the day of July 3 there was some machine-gun fire and sniping on the right half of our sector, but such aggressiveness as was shown by the enemy was developed mainly by his air forces. Once again however the American planes showed themselves able to cope with the situation driving some of the German machines back over their own lines.

In PICARDY the day extending from noon, June 30 to noon, July 1 was marked only by the aggressiveness of the enemy's airplanes. The German machines were more active in combat than has been the case recently. They were fired on by our own planes and antiaircraft batteries. No results are as yet reported. The enemy's artillery fire was of moderate intensity and was concentrated only on some of our positions in the vicinity of BROYES and VILLERS-TOURNELLE. Very few shells fell on our front lines. His machine-gun fire, originating mainly from the vicinity of CHATEAU JENLIS was directed principally on our lines near CANTIGNY.

In the MULHOUSE sector on July 1, the feature of the day was the attempt of the enemy to raid our trenches after artillery preparation. In connection with this our advance positions between the DOLLER River and BALSCHWILLER were heavily bombarded between 3 o'clock morning and 5 o'clock morning. The bombardment involved the use of a very large number of shells of small, medium, and large caliber but our casualties were exceptionally light. The raid itself was entirely repulsed by our counterbarrage. Beside the artillery activity on both sides connected with the attempted raid much shelling occurred during the day. The most notable concentration on the part of the enemy was one placed in the vicinity of the DOLLER River shortly before noon. Our own batteries in conjunction with the French artillery were active along the whole front. The German machine guns kept up a continuous fire from the direction of PONT d'ASPACH and BURNHAUPLe HAUT. Between 7 o'clock morning and 6 o'clock evening a number of German planes circled over our lines and over the enemy's advanced positions. Some penetrated our lines but were forced back by antiaircraft batteries in our rear areas. During the night the enemy offered a particularly fine exhibition of signal lights, including 300 flares and rockets at various points along the front, and red and yellow balloons. Carrier pigeons were seen flying from his front to his rear positions. Our own infantry was active in patrol and raiding operations. One party entered the German trenches at PONT d'ASPACH on the night of June 30/July 1. Results are not yet reported.

In the WOEVRE sector the day of June 29 to June 30 passed quietly for our troops. The enemy's artillery delivered a scattered fire which includes moderate concentrations during the early evening and about midnight on the Bois de Jury. A small amount of gas was used. His machine-gun and rifle fire were also light and scattered. His airplanes flew over our lines from time to time, but on more than one occasion were driven back by American machines and by antiaircraft guns. During the night a large number of flares were lighted along his entire front. A propaganda balloon was found by us containing copies of La Guerre qui Vient, L'Anglais Tel qu'il est and Gazette des Ardenness.
In the same sector the day of June 30 to July 1 marked only by activity in the German rear areas. Men on foot, men on horseback, trucks and wagons were seen circulating on the roads and working parties were observed. The enemy's airplanes were normally active, while the number of balloon ascents was above average. None of the balloons remained up longer than 1 1/4 hours. The enemy's batteries showed slightly increased activity, his antiaircraft batteries being greatly on the alert. The area which seemed especially singled out for shelling was the HAZELLE Wood. In this vicinity some gas was used. During the night the German lines were again lighted up with flares, while star shells and rockets were sent up in great numbers.

C. The following is the British morning situation report for July 4 "This morning Australian corps supported by tanks attacked between VILLERS-BRETONNEUX and the SOMME. All objectives believed captured which include HAMEL Village also HAMEL and VAIRE WOOD. At the same time Australian troops carried out a minor operation E. of VILLE-sur-ANCRE in which our line was advanced 400 yards on a front of 1,200 yards. Total number of prisoners captured already exceeds 500. French front. Successful operations carried out yesterday evening W. of AUTRECHES between AISNE and OISE. All objectives gained on front of 2 kilometers to a depth of 800 meters. As a result of this operation and the operation carried out yesterday morning in the same neighborhood prisoners exceed 1,000."

No reports not covered by the official communiques have been received concerning developments on the Italian front.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 56th relieves 35th. Seventeenth Army, 234th relieves Bavarian 5th Reserve. Eighteenth Army, 75th Reserve relieves 17th Reserve.

General nature of hostile artillery activity in American sectors, June 22-29.

PICARDY sector (1st Division): There was a marked decline in the volume of hostile shelling during the past week. The fire continued to be characterized by severe shelling of villages behind our lines, especially CANTIGNY and GIRVESNES, with occasional heavy bombardments of our front lines. There was slight use of gas shell.

OISE sector (2d and 3d Divisions): N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY the enemy maintained its lively fire on forward areas, especially on the left of our sector. Woods and suspected strong points near our front lines were heavily shelled. There was much harassing of roads in the intermediate zone but little fire against our back areas. On our front E. of CHATEAU-THIERRY hostile artillery showed an increase in activity. The fire was mainly harassing by small calibers.

WOEVRE sector (32d Division): Activity in this sector decreased during the past week. The fire consisted of continued harassing of the villages in the rear of our front lines and intermittent shelling of roads. There was less use of gas than in the previous week.

LORRAINE sector (77th Division): No reports received.

ALSACE sector (5th and 32d Divisions): Hostile batteries displayed slight activity on our sectors. In the southern sector there was one fairly heavy concentration of our battery areas. No large calibers or use of gas shell is reported.

D. 2d Division, July 1 to July 3, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The total number of prisoners taken in the course of the attack and counterattack at VAUX and the Bois de la ROCHE is 503, of whom 7 are officers. This does not include about 40 prisoners taken by our troops in VAUX and turned over by our men to detachments of the French division acting on our right. The materiel captured is now reported as consisting of 6 heavy, 18 light and 1 motorcycle machine gun, 6 trench mortars, 2 grenade throwers, 200 rifles and a large amount of ammunition and equipment. The shelling reported Section B this cable
was carried out by guns ranging in caliber from 77's to 210's. Aside from events covered in Section B there is nothing further to report.

32d Division, July 1, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery fired nearly 9,000 shells ranging in caliber from 77's to 210's. The fire on our front trenches between 3 o'clock and 5 o'clock morning involved the use of no less than 8,000 of these shells. The number of German planes in operation during the day is not definitely reported.

1st Division, June 30 to July 1, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded in Section B this cable. Hostile artillery used 1,500 shells of which some were used in an attempt to destroy our battery positions near BROYES. 400 shells of which all were 150's were used in this manner. VILLER-TOURNELLE and MESNIL-St-FIRMIN were also shelled. There was very little fire on our front lines. About 30 German airplanes were reported, most of them being active on the N. of our sector. Circulation in the German rear areas was slightly less than normal. It has been noted that at one point the enemy's traffic is forced to leave FIGNIERES-BOUILLANCOUR Road and strike across the field in order to escape our interdiction fire. The enemy is constructing new wire near the CHATEAU JENLIS and at other points.

82d Division, June 30 to June 30 (WOEVRE): Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. In the order of battle the following is reported: "The Bavarian 8th Division has apparently widened its sector extending to the left, the 22d B.R.D. Taking over that part of the 5th Landwehr Division sector formerly occupied by the 36th Landwehr Regiment, the latter moving to the right flank." The enemy's artillery fired 525 rounds, of which nearly all were 77's and 105's and which included 24 gas shells. His airplanes in operation numbered at least 9. Our own troops sent out 3 patrols, results not reported.

82 Division, June 30 to July 1: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery used 630 shells, of which all were 77's and 105's and of which 30 contained gas. They were used in harassing fire along the entire sector and especially upon our right. 12 hostile planes and 10 balloons were counted. During the night what is believed to be a new rocket, rising to a height of 400 meters and bursting into 30 or 40 stars, was noted. At 3 o'clock morning a gas alarm was heard in the German trenches. The Allied artillery fire seems to have been effective. After it has shelled St-BAUSSANT the village seemed to be in flames. It is believed that a small German working party was struck at 8 o'clock morning.

5 (52) A. Our patrols again took prisoners in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region. There, in PICARDY and in the VOSGES there was brisk artillery fighting. In the VOSGES a hostile raiding party and 2 patrols which attempted to reach our lines were driven off.

B. Concerning the operations of our troops in the vicinity of VAUX July 1 to July 2, it is stated that the enemy fled in disorder from the Bois de la ROCHE to the Bois des ROCETS before our infantry. Hand-to-hand fighting was of short duration. So effective was our artillery fire that communication between German battalion and regimental headquarters could be maintained only by single messenger dog. Intense machine-gun fire and a heavy bombardment of the CLEREMBAUTS Wood and adjacent points preceded the German counterattack. Sone gas was used. Hostile airplanes, which made frequent flights, dropped bombs on some of our advanced positions in the early morning and in one case fired on our lines. One of them was brought down near TORCY. In the German rear areas long columns of men and wagons moved from point to point, while, during the night red and green rockets gave signals and searchlights kept watch for our airplanes.

In this sector between the evening of July 3 and July 4, activity on both sides greatly decreased. The enemy however shelled the region of the MARETTE Wood with gas during the morning hours and put down some harassing and interdiction fire in our rear areas. Our own batteries maintained a continuous harassing fire, apparently destroying an ammunition dump in ETREPILLY and setting on fire buildings in the enemy's rear areas.
It was again notable that the activity of the enemy's air forces decreased, while our own machines became more aggressive. American snipers seemed to be successful in killing and wounding a number of the enemy during the day. One of our reconnaissance patrols, consisting of a corporal and 2 men crawled from our front lines N. of VAUX to a house inside the German lines at Bois des ROCHETS at 2 o'clock afternoon. They captured a German outpost of 2 men and brought them back to our lines at 4 o'clock afternoon in spite of the continuous fire of German snipers.

Our troops located along the MARNE on July 1 to July 2 from, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening experienced a comparatively quiet day. There was however an increase in the enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire, the result of our activity in patrolling. The enemy's light artillery fire consisted of shells of small caliber. A decrease was also noted in the enemy's airplane activity, which was concentrated on observation and reconnaissance work. These planes made flights along our lines singly and in usual patrol formations. Several hostile observation balloons were also seen. There was an unusual amount of movement in the enemy's rear areas, but no large groups were observed. A large number of wagons were seen in the vicinity of CHARTEVES. The enemy's signalling continues excessive. There were several indications of hits being made by our artillery on the ammunition dumps in the enemy's rear areas. One of these occurred late in the evening when a large blaze was seen in the sky and a heavy explosion heard from a point which had just been shelled by our artillery. Later in the same vicinity an occasional glow was seen and reports were heard. Our guns had been firing very heavily in that direction just prior to the explosion. Another explosion probably of an ammunition dump occurred at about the same time in another locality where a bright light was at first observed, followed directly by a loud explosion. In the early morning of July 2, there was still another report of an explosion. Our guns were playing on this particular spot at the time and the report, the smoke which immediately arose, the high shooting flames and the bursting of cartridges are evidence that this was still another ammunition dump. Still another large fire, accompanied by several explosions, was observed. This was probably an ammunition dump struck by French shells.

In PICARDY the enemy's artillery fire was the only outstanding feature of hostile activity on July 1 to July 2, noon to noon. A large proportion of his fire was employed in concentrations on our lines in the vicinity of CANTIGNY and the northern edge of the Bois FONTAINE. In addition to these concentrations there was slight harassing fire on our front about noon, July 1. The enemy's infantry was quiet during the day; we did however see early on July 2 an enemy patrol returning to its lines. The enemy's airplanes were more active during the morning than at any other time during the day. 1 patrol of 5 planes being seen over our lines at that time. During the night bombs were dropped in what appeared to be an attempt to explode one of our ammunition dumps. Shortly before midnight air combats occurred. At 9 o'clock morning a German plane was brought down by an Allied machine over the enemy's lines. 5 enemy planes were observed engaged in photographic work. The enemy's balloons continued their activity of yesterday. Our antiaircraft batteries and machine guns were in active operation against the enemy's planes. There was only slight movement of troops or traffic of any sort in the enemy's front and rear areas. Enemy working parties were heard at intervals near CHATEAU JENLIS, FONTAINESOUS-MONTIDIER, MONTIDIER and other points. Our artillery apparently registered directly on a German ammunition dump.

In LORRAINE during the day extending from noon, June 30 to noon, July 1, there was unusually heavy machine-gun and rifle fire on our lines, a fact which is taken as indicating nervousness on the enemy's part. The machine-gun fire doubled in the space of 24 hours, originating largely in the German position opposite BADONVILLER. The enemy's artillery fire was light and scattered, consisting mainly of small caliber shells, and including the use of some shrapnel and gas. His planes were fairly active over both our front and rear areas and at one point dropped a few bombs which did no damage. In his rear areas there was considerable movement of men, trucks, wagons and trains.
In the same sector the day following showed the same unusual amount of machine-gun fire and the same moderate artillery activity. The enemy's planes dropped a single bomb during the early morning. On the other hand the circulation in the enemy's rear areas was very notable, automobiles, wagons, trucks, cyclists and pedestrians moving along the roads at frequent intervals. Our patrols were very successful in gaining information.

In the COLMAR sector on July 1, there were no developments of note, conditions being in every case normal. An amusing example of German propaganda, designed to induce our men to surrender easily was found. German plane dropped in our lines postcard reading: "Soldiers of the U. S. A. As we hear from your comrades seized by us, your officers say that we kill prisoners of war or do them some other harm. Don't be such Greenhorns! How can you smart Americans believe such a silly thing?"

C. It was reported from British General Headquarters at 8 o'clock evening July 4: "Infantry detachment of the American 33d Division took part in the successful operation carried out by Australian corps this morning. 1,300 prisoners and over 100 machine guns have been captured. On the remainder of the front nothing of interest to report."

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 23d Reserve from Seventeenth Army relieves 15th Reserve. Seventeenth Army, 2d Guard Reserve relieved 23d Reserve but subject to confirmation. Second Army, 13th from Eighteenth Army relieves 77th Reserve. Eighteenth Army, 37th from Second Army in reserve. Seventh Army, 4th Ersatz from Army Detachment C relieves 5th Guard. Fifth Army, 197th from Seventh Army in reserve. Army Detachment A, 12th Landwehr from Eighteenth Army in reserve.

D. 2d Division, July 1 to July 2, noon to noon: Confidential details contained in reports received since despatch of cable of July 4. General features as follows: "Enemy infantry reaction to our attack, feeble. Enemy counteroffensive artillery preparation strong and well executed. Counterbarrage ineffective and showed lack of organization. Airplane activity somewhat decreased due to activity of our own planes. Circulation normal except in vicinity of BONNES." The German line is given as follows: "As far as can be determined the enemy's lines E. from railroad station at BOURESCHES follows the railroad track---then along southern edge of Bois de ROCHETS (north of VAUX railroad station)---then S. to HILL 204." The following report is made on the German order of battle: "From statements made by various prisoners elements of the 110th Grenadier Regiment (28th Division) are still in line N. of BOURBELIN. The order of battle of the 201st Division from W. to E. places the 402d Regiment N. of VAUX, E. of which are the 401st and 403d. Concerning the operations of July 1 to July 2 it is reported that the German machine guns did not open fire until 15 minutes after our barrage had lifted and did not become really effective until just before the German counterattack. The German artillery used 23,850 shells of which 21,500 were on the right of our sector. Before midnight 500 gas shells containing yperite and phosgene were thrown on our new front. The counterattack was preceded by a barrage of 300 shells per minute. During this counteroffensive preparation the enemy dropped 4,000 shells on the CLEREMBAUTS Wood. Neighboring points were also heavily shelled. German planes made 29 flights on the right of our sector and 28 flights on the left. Bombs were dropped on BOURESCHES. Besides the heavy circulation in the vicinity of the Bois BONNES, which included the movement of a long column of men in single file at 6 o'clock morning, there was much movement in the regions of GIVRY and EPAUX. In the evening 500 men were seen in a field near the PICARDY Farm. A stream of wagons passed into the Bois BONNES early in the afternoon.

2d Division, July 2 to July 3, noon to noon: Confidential details contained in reports received since despatch of cable of July 4. German artillery used 13,350 shells of which 12,000 were on the right of our sector. Of the total 7,000 are classed as heavy and 6,350 as light caliber. Our new line received 5,000 shells consisting of gas and high explosive. 3,500 shells were thrown on the vicinity of La CENSE Farm and the area between that and TRIANGLE Farm. Gas was also used in other regions. Insofar as specified the gas was yperite. The German planes made 39 flights of which 23 were over the right
of our sector. In the enemy's rear areas several columns of troops accompanied by combat trains were seen S. of EPAUX. There was continuous circulation of wagons between BONNES and Bois BONNES, with numerous movements of individuals at other points. The enemy has partially rebuilt and camouflaged emplacements along the BOURESCHES-VAUX-Road which were destroyed by our artillery fire. At 3 points there were indications by fires and explosions that German ammunition dumps were blown up.

3d Division, July 1 to July 2, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening! Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. 3 American patrols which attempted to cross the MARNE during the night failed to accomplish their mission and sustained a number of casualties. A few men are also missing. From the experience of our patrols it is evident that the enemy has the N. bank of the MARNE well covered with rifles and machine guns. The enemy's artillery fire was light, consisting of 325 77's and 5 105's. No shells were reported as falling in the BRASLES subsector, and those reported were distributed about evenly between the St. St-PERE and GLAND sectors. 21 planes were observed during the day. The circulation of individuals in small groups in the enemy's rear was entirely abnormal, far exceeding anything previously observed. Many of the men carried full packs and others the white sacks of which mention has previously been made. Shortly before 10 o'clock evening 49 wagons were seen to leave CHARTEVES in a N. E. direction. The fires and explosions referred to Section B occurred 4 kilometers N. of Mt. St-PERE, at HILL 217, at HILL 210, and at another point not specifically mentioned.

1st Division, July 1 to July 2, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy fired approximately 1,300 shells of 150 caliber on our sector, about 1/2 of which fell on our lines in the vicinity of CANTIGNY, the northern edge of the Bois FONTAINE and the valley S. W. of CANTIGNY during 2 short concentrations at 9 and 10 o'clock morning. There was also slight harassing and adjustment fire. The enemy's machine-gun fire was intermittent last night, one of the machines firing on one of our airplanes. Another machine-gun position has been located.

77th Division, June 30 to July 1, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. German machine-gun fire comprised 153 bursts mostly from NEUVILLER, Bois des HAIES, CHAMOIS, BATTANT des MEULES and other points in that vicinity. German artillery fired about 200 rounds of which nearly all were 77's and of which only 6 contained gas. German planes made 20 flights, penetrating on several occasions to our rear areas and once as far back as BACCARAT. 2 planes reached BACCARAT at 3 o'clock morning, approaching from the E. They dropped 6 bombs without effect. They were heavily bombarded by antiaircraft and machine guns. Working parties several times observed but there is no evidence that works of particular importance are under construction. Train movements were above the normal especially around CIREY. Several patrols composed of American and French soldiers reconnoitered the German lines without incident.

77th Division, July 1 to July 2, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. Total of machine-gun bursts increased to 287. These came from the Bois des PRESTRES and from DOMEVRE as well as from the same vicinities as on the preceding day. The German batteries fired 200 shells of which 40 were 105's. The German planes made 10 flights. In the enemy's rear areas 2 platoons of cavalry and an abnormal number of wagons and individuals were seen. Our patrols located 2 hostile listening posts.

5th Division, July 1, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. Hostile artillery fired 200 rounds of small and medium caliber, its fire originating mainly from RAIN des CHENES, CHATEAU de FETE and Ste-MARIE. Trench mortar fire was delivered from KLANEGH which is reported as being a nest of trench mortars. 7 German planes and one balloon were reported.
35th Division, July 3 to July 4, noon to noon: Hostile artillery fired 120 rounds. Hostile patrol attempted raid which was repulsed. German machine guns intermittently active. 7 enemy planes over our lines.

6 (53) A. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region, where the artillery activity of the preceding days still continues, our patrols again took prisoners. In the VOSGES and in the WOEVRE the enemy once more failed in attempts to reach our lines. In the WOEVRE a strong hostile party succeeded in occupying for a short time one of our outpost positions.

B. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region between noon July 3 and noon, July 4, artillery and machine-gun fire continued pronounced on the right of our sector. The fire of the enemy's artillery diminished greatly in intensity but included a gas bombardment on the region around the MARETTE Wood during the night and barrage fire on our new line around midnight and early in the morning. On the left of our sector the BELLEAU Wood was shelled as usual. Our rear areas received scattered fire. The German planes appeared in still smaller numbers than on the preceding day. Around BELLEAU, RONNES, Bois BONNES, PLAISANCE, Le TARTRE, GIVRY, EPAUX and other centres of activity in the German rear areas horsemen, cyclists, pedestrians and all kinds of vehicles circulated continuously in very considerable numbers. During the night fires occurred in the region of ETREPILLY and CHATEAU-BELLEAU. The fire in the latter region is supposed to have resulted from the success of our artillery in finding one of the enemy's ammunition dumps. Our snipers continued to pick off the enemy in notable fashion.

Concerning the capture of German prisoners by our patrol N. of VAUX during the afternoon of July 4 the following particulars are now available. Our patrol of 3 men crawled to house in Bois des ROCHETS at 2 o'clock as stated cable July 5. One man posted as sentry while corporal and other man entered house. They found in house one man belonging to German outpost sent for observation and to prepare position for machine-gun. A second German was found hiding in the house. Corporal in command of our party sent back one of his men to warn our front line that he was bringing in prisoners and asking for machine-gun protection. The prisoners were brought in safely in spite of German snipers who fired continually.

The MARNE region occupied by our troops was unusually quiet from 8 o'clock evening July 2 to 8 o'clock evening July 3, all activity decreasing except the continuous circulation of troops and traffic which began on the preceding day. The enemy artillery fire which consisted of harassing, destructive and registration fire with slight use of shrapnel was very light. An enemy patrol of about 10 men was seen on the N. Bank of the MARNE. Our automatics opened fire on them, but the result is unknown. The enemy machine-guns were intermittently active and our troops seem to have located another machine-gun position. The enemy's airplane and balloon activity were slight. The number of flares has decreased but brilliant rockets and flares of different colors continued to light up the region at night.

In PICARDY there was very little enemy activity on July 2 to July 3, noon to noon. The artillery fire from the enemy's batteries was concentrated on our front lines at about midnight, the shells being of medium caliber. On our positions N. of CANTIGNY he placed a barrage in reply to our fire from that vicinity. Shells of varying caliber also fell in the vicinity of Bois des GLANDS during the night. The usual machine-gun fire was directed on our lines and on CANTIGNY. One of our patrolling parties examined the enemy wire and an enemy trench at one point. The German air forces were normally active, planes being over our lines yesterday and over CANTIGNY this morning. One plane flew low over our lines in the region of GRIVESNES. Enemy observation balloons were also up. The enemy on discovering one of our patrolling parties threw up rockets which brought a barrage from our batteries followed by a counterbarrage from the batteries of the enemy. During the artillery fighting red and orange rockets were sent up. The circulation in the enemy's rear areas late in the day was distinctly abnormal in the vicinity of MONTDIDIER, FONTAINE and other points where unusual numbers of lorries, wagons and motors were observed.
In the MULHOUSE sector July 2, 3 and 4 were all uneventful days. The German artillery used an average number of shells on the 2d and 3d and an exceptionally small number on the 4th. On July 3, there was a single concentration on our positions in the vicinity of BALSCHWILLER. The German rifle and machine-gun fire was very light. The enemy’s air forces showed little activity on the 2d, less on the 3d and none whatever on the 4th. Little circulation was observed in the enemy’s rear and his working parties did nothing notable except to cut and carry away hay from the vicinity of their first line trenches during the night. On July 2, a hostile patrol discovered in front of our trenches was driven off by infantry fire.

In the LORRAINE sector the day of July 2 to July 3 was uneventful. The artillery fire of the enemy was very light in caliber and amount and scattered both as to origin and objectives. The use of a few heavy shells was however noted. The enemy's machine-gun and rifle fire was more active than usual, occasioned in part no doubt by the unusual activity of our own patrols. The German air forces were moderately active but were held in check by heavy bombardment from our antiaircraft batteries. In the enemy's rear area there was the usual circulation of troops and traffic movement. Our patrolling parties were successful in their observation work.

In the WOEVRE region the day of July 2 to July 3 was quiet except for heavy artillery fire on one of our subsectors where shells of medium and small caliber were used, together with a very little gas. The machine-gun and rifle fire of the enemy was frequent in the afternoon and evening. Part of it was apparently the reaction to the operation of one of our patrols. One of our reconnaissance patrols entered a German trench which proved to be abandoned and in bad condition owing to Allied shell fire. There was but slight enemy activity in the construction of new works.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, 17th Reserve still in line E. of 206th, position of 84th in line is between 75th Reserve and 46th Reserve, 233d and Bavarian 2d from Second Army in reserve, 19th Ersatz from Fifth Army in reserve. First Army, 239th from Nineteenth Army in reserve. Third Army, 33d Reserve from First Army relieves 88th. Fifth Army, 232d from First Army relieves 19th Ersatz. Army Detachment B, Jaeger from Second Army in reserve.

D. 2d Division, July 3 to July 4, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery used 3,500 rounds on the right of our sector and 1,200 rounds on the left. Nearly 1/2 of the shells are classed as heavy caliber. The gas bombardment on the MARETTE Wood involved the employment of 1,500 shells of calibers 77 and 105, containing mustard gas and phosgene. A small amount of high explosive was also used. All the wooded areas on the extreme right of our sector were heavily gassed during the night. About 500 shells fell on the BELLEAU Wood. On the right of our line there was a continuous rifle and machine-gun duel, most of the German fire coming from Hill 204 and being directed on VAUX. German airplanes made 18 flights on the right of our sector and 13 on the left. The circulation of wagons, trucks and small groups of men in the usual vicinity of the enemy's rear was very marked. 2 new trenches connecting the 3 patches of woods N. E. of BOURESCHES have been observed. The apparent explosion of a German ammunition dump took place at ETREPILLY about 10 o'clock evening. Our snipers are believed to have killed and wounded 9 of the enemy.

3d Division, July 2 to July 3, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fire consisted of but about 205 shells of which 198 were 77's. The balance were 105's. Of all these 14% were duds. Harassing fire was directed on the CHARTEVES subsector, destruction fire on the Mt. St-PERE subsector and fire thought to be for registration on the GLAND subsector. Slightly more than half of the enemy's fire was directed on the BRASLES subsector which received no fire at all on the day previous. 15 enemy airplanes were observed flying along our lines singly and in the usual group formations. 2 observation balloons were also seen. Approximately 100 Germans, all of them moving in
small troops of less than 10 and most of them singly or in pairs, were observed in the enemy's rear areas. A few of them were seen in houses, 2 of them in a church and the rest in circulation back and forth N. of BRASLES and in the vicinity of GLAND. 2 of the men seen were wearing a U. S. uniform. The increase in wagon traffic was noted at night when wagons passed through CHARTEVES going N. Machine-gun emplacements have been observed and 3 guns (probably 37 millimeters) on the western edge of the BRASLES-GLAND Road.

1st Division, July 2 to July 3, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fire comprised about 1,000 shells of which about 200 105's were used in concentrations on our front lines at midnight. Most of the others were fired in a barrage put down on our front lines from CANTIGNY to GRIVESNES at the rate of 150 per minute. This barrage was in reply to our fire on the German lines in front of CANTIGNY. 10 enemy planes and 3 balloons observed during the day. Our observers report that in one place the enemy's wire is connected with our fire. A new trench and an organized shell hole have been noted. Working parties have been observed in the western edge of the Bois FRAMICOURT. 30 lorries, 50 wagons and 15 motors were observed between 6 o'clock morning and 11 o'clock morning in the region of MONTDIDIER and FONTAINE.

32d Division, July 2 to July 4, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. Hostile batteries fired about 400 shells on the 2d, 300 on the 3d and 100 on the 4th, of which non were heavier than 105's. The number of German airplanes observed on July 3 was 5 on the 4th was naught. No report for July 2. Along the German lines new earth and new patches of camouflage were observed at several points but no important piece of work was seen.

82d Division, July 1 to July 2: Very little activity on either side. Enemy's artillery fired less than 400 rounds which were nearly all 77's and were widely scattered over our sector. There was much harassing fire around BEAUMONT and the Bois de JURY but no damage was done. Only 6 German planes were counted. A German machine-gun located at Hill 242. Several gas alarms were heard in the German trenches during the night.

The summary of the French corps with which our 3d Division is operating mentions appearance in the region of GLAND and behind the German lines of a man wearing an American uniform he was seen twice on 1 occasion with a white flag behind him. The intelligence report of the 3d Division for July 2 to July 3, referring perhaps to the same matter, refers to 2 men seen at different times in American uniforms in German rear areas. These reports are interesting in connection with a statement made 2 weeks ago by an escaped American prisoner to the effect that he had seen German speaking soldiers in American uniforms talking to German officer behind German lines N. of the MARNE.

The American infantry which cooperated with the Australians in the attack of July 4 consisted of 4 companies of the 33d Division. 6 companies were in reserve but did not take part in advance. Details of operation which were entirely successful given and published in British reports. Our casualties slight. 6 companies reserve have already been returned to 33d Division. Other 4 companies expected today.

82d Division, July 2 to July 3 (time not given): Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The artillery fire of the enemy was concentrated in the vicinity of LIMEY. The total number of the shells fired by the enemy was 500, most of which were of medium and small caliber and only 4 of which contained gas. The shelling of the XIVRAY-RAMBUCOURT and BEAUMONT Roads continued. Eleven German planes were observed and 2 observation balloons. Our troops have seen fresh earth which is believed to mark a new machine-gun emplacement. In addition to the movement referred to Section B there was considerable movement in the trenches in the southern part of the Bois de la SANNARD. For the first time since this division has been in the sector 1 of our reconnaissance patrols entered the German trenches. Numerous patrols were sent out by us all along the sector.

77th Division, July 2 to July 3, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The artillery fire of the enemy consisted of
188 shells of which nearly all were 77's. One heavy gun, described as a naval gun and thought to be of 210 caliber, fired 30 rounds in the direction of BLAMONT with an interval of 30 seconds between rounds. The majority of the other shells fell near BADONWILLER, and most of them were fired from MONTIGNY, Bois du FEYS and BLAMONT. The enemy's snipers continued to be very active, about 153 rounds being counted. This and the heavy machine-gun fire of the enemy, localized on the St-POLE subsector, was the reaction to our patrolling parties. 10 planes were seen over our lines, one of them flying very low for 20 minutes. 4 enemy balloons were also in observation during the day. On the REPAIX Road many men were observed and in the evening there was much wagon traffic. In addition to this there were other smaller groups in movement in the rear areas and some slight automobile traffic. 4 of our patrols were in operation during the night, 2 of them bringing back information as to the condition of the enemy wire and trenches. One of our ambush patrols made up of one officer 28 Americans and 15 French was stopped by machine-gun and rifle fire and forced to return. There were no casualties. Another ambush patrol of one American officer, 20 Americans, one French officer and 22 French was unable to gain contact with the enemy.

A. In the VOSGES we made a successful raid, killing and wounding a number of the enemy and taking several prisoners. The day passed quietly at other points occupied by our troops.

B. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region between July 4 and July 5 the rifle and machine-gun duel on the right of our line continued. Most of the German fire came as before from HILL 204 and the Bois des ROCHETS. Machine guns were also in operation against BOURESCHES. The enemy's artillery fire was distinctly lighter. A much smaller number of his shells fell on the right of our advanced positions than during the preceding days, although this part of our lines remained the principal objective. It was also notable that most of the shells were of small and medium caliber and that the proportion of gas shells had diminished. On the other hand the German airplanes appeared in greater numbers and larger formations, a number of groups of from 5 to 8 planes being observed. In the enemy's rear areas the abnormal troop movements which followed our attack on VAUX seemed to have decreased. The enemy is busily engaged creating machine-gun emplacements and constructing other works. There was evidence pointing to the destruction of still another ammunition dump. Several paper balloons containing copies of the Gazette des Ardennes fell in our lines. American patrols consisting of an officer and 25 men, operating S. of TORCY, killed one of the enemy and captured 2 others, all 3 being found in shell holes. One of our battalion scouts penetrated the German lines, located machine-gun emplacements and returned safely. A group of the enemy on duty at the machine-gun positions fled at his approach.

In the MARNE sector held by our troops the day of July 3 to July 4 was quiet. The enemy's artillery fire was much less than ours and was of a harassing and destructive nature. Most of the enemy machine-gun and rifle fire was in reply to our fire. There was a further decrease in the enemy's aerial activity. The movement of troops in the German rear areas continues abnormal. The flares and signals behind the German lines have slightly increased. From explosions and fire observed in his rear areas at points on which we were firing at the time it is believed that we struck at least 2 ammunition dumps and ignited a fire which burned for several hours.

In PICARDY from July 3 to July 4 the main event was the capture of prisoners and a machine gun by a party of our men. From the statements of prisoners it was learned that the Germans were told to be on the alert, since the Americans were likely to attempt some operation on Independence Day. Our party started in 3 groups supported by a box barrage. The Germans offered strong resistance but were overpowered. Besides suffering heavy losses in killed and wounded they left 3 prisoners in our hands. The German artillery showed only average activity. There were concentrations near CANTIGNY and GRIVESNES with attempts by the enemy to place interdiction fire on our roads around VILLERS-TOURNELLE and
BROYES. There were also attempts at adjustment on the northern part of our advanced positions. There was no really heavy fire at any point. Very few German balloons or planes were in operation. In the German rear areas a fire occurred at MESNIL-St-GEORGES and a heavy explosion between FAVEROLLES and ETELFAY during the night.

In the COLMAR sector on July 2, July 3 and July 4 patrolling and raiding activities were very marked on both sides. During the night of July 1 to July 2 no less than 4 hostile parties of varying strength approached our lines. On the right of the sector 2 German patrols were driven off at 9 o'clock morning and at 1:15 o'clock morning. One of our men was wounded and captured. In the same region a raid was attempted by the enemy at 3 o'clock morning. A party of 40 men, supported by automatic rifle fire approached our wire and threw a large number of grenades. None of the grenades reached our trenches. Our machine-gun and automatic rifle fire, and in particular the flanking fire of one of our machine guns forced the party to withdraw. Our artillery cooperated in forcing the withdrawal. Our own patrols operated this night without incident. On the night of July 2 to July 3 no German patrol approached our lines but one of his parties consisting of about 25 men was encountered and driven back by one of our patrols. Our own patrols, numbering 4, carried our very useful reconnaissance work. On the night of July 3 to July 4 our own patrols were again very successful in investigating the German positions, while a German patrol which approached our trenches and threw grenades was driven off by our rifle and grenade fire. During these days the German artillery was exceptionally inactive, its fire being very light and scattered. The enemy's machine guns on the other hand were decidedly active, especially on the night of July 2 to July 3 when some of his guns fired at intervals during the whole night and others delivered strong bursts from time to time. The German planes showed moderate activity on July 2 but almost none on the 2 succeeding days. There was nothing unusual in the circulation in the German rear areas nor in the works observed there. Red, green and white flares with rockets of the same colors appeared frequently during the nights.

In LORRAINE between July 3 and July 4 our own troops furnished most of whatever activity there was to report. Our batteries heavily shelled the positions of the enemy while his executed only a light and scattered fire in the reply. On the other hand, the German machine-gun fire, which had showed marked increase over the preceding day, again doubled in intensity originating from around DOMEVRE, MONTIGNY, EUVILLER, Bois des HAIES, MONTREUX and others of his advanced positions. Patrolling activity was marked on both sides. Our own parties secured much valuable information, and returned safely. A hostile patrol which attacked one of our advanced positions at 2 o'clock morning was driven off by our rifle and grenade fire. Very few German airplanes and balloons were seen. The enemy working parties were very busily improving their roads and trenches.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 27th from Eighteenth Army in reserve. Third Army, 7th Reserve from First Army relieves Guard Cavalry. Fifth Army, 197th relieves 15th Bavarian. Nineteenth Army, 84th Landwehr Brigade is detached from 301st in Army Detachment A and is in line N. W. of 48th Landwehr Division.

D. 2d Division, July 4 to July 5, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy fire from HILL 204 follows the slightest movement of our troops in VAUX. The enemy's artillery used 2,600 shells on the right of our sector and 1,250 on the left. Of those on the right 1,500 were thrown on our advanced positions between the PARIS Road and BOURESCHES. Gas shells, of which 450 were used, fell on the MARETTE Wood and on the woods S. W. of BOURBELIN. German airplanes made 27 flights on the right of our sector and 34 on the left. At 5:30 o'clock morning 4 planes, flying low, fired on our front lines N. of VAUX. 2 of our planes were brought down. Of German balloons 3 were seen in the afternoon and 6 in the morning. The machine-gun emplacements located by us are S. E. of BOURESCHES. German working parties are digging on HILL 190. The point at which a German ammunition dump apparently blew up was near BEZU-St-GERMAIN.
3d Division, July 3 to July 4, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The fire of the enemy's artillery comprised the use of 192 shells of which nearly all were 77's and most of which fell on the Mt. St-PERE and GLAND subsectors. Our fire consisted of more than 4 times as many shells, all of 75 caliber. Our observers are believed to have located 2 new machine-gun emplacements and a line of probably 20 guns from the bank of the MARNE to the woods, running N. E. to S. W. Only 7 German planes and 1 balloon were observed during the day. In the region N. and N. W. of BRASLES the very abnormal movement of men in small groups continued. At one place 38 men came from the woods at 10 minute intervals, proceeded to a house from which they returned with white bags, to which attention has been called in previous reports. The men kept increasing in numbers until approximately a company was at work. This activity continued for an hour and a half. Again a man wearing a U. S. uniform was seen in a field in the enemy's rear areas with a white flag behind him. The ammunition dumps, for the explosion of which we believe our artillery responsible, were located in the vicinity of La THEODERIE and back of HILL 215. The fire referred to in Section B was in CHARTEVES.

1st Division, July 3 to July 4, noon to noon: The enemy's artillery fired 1,100 shells. Only 4 German planes were observed. No balloons were up during the morning. The day was very quiet.

5th Division, July 2 to July 4, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery was very quiet, the daily average reported being not above 100 shells. On July 2, 9 planes were reported, 2 on July 3 and none on July 4. In the matter of works the enemy is repairing his trenches at a number of points, where digging, hammering and the use of sandbags have been observed. His wires and camouflage are also being added to and improved. In general conditions on all these days were unusually quiet.

77th Division, July 3 to July 4, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. German batteries fired less than 300 shells. Our own fired 2,200 of which 1,700 were 75's and the rest of large caliber. German machine guns fired 270 bursts. Only 4 hostile planes and 4 balloons were observed. Besides the patrols which were driven off as reported Section B a party of 30 Germans attacked a small post at 2 o'clock morning. The occupants of the post retired according to orders but reoccupied the post at 3:30 o'clock morning. A new camouflaged road, a new sap, what is apparently a new trench, and digging operations for a purpose not yet determined have been observed. The enemy is making extensive use of a church tower as a machine-gun emplacement as well as for purposes of observation.

8 (55) A. There have been no fresh developments at the points occupied by our troops.

B. In the sector occupied by our troops in PICARDY, there was some brisk artillery fighting on the day of July 4 to July 5. Our own batteries shelled the LALVAL Wood with gas early in the night and the enemy retaliated by firing on our front lines from the FONTAINE Wood to GRIVESNES and on some of our positions in the rear. The German artillery was particularly active between 10 o'clock evening and midnight, but it was noted that their fire slackened or ceased whenever our artillery started counterpreparation. Most of the German shells fell on the north of our sector. The enemy's trench mortars frequently came into action just prior to the commencement of concentrated fire by his artillery. His machine guns delivered heavy bursts of fire in the morning on the right of our sector. His airplanes were not unusually active except in the dropping of bombs, a small number of which fell on our positions, before daybreak. At two points in the German rear areas fire, smoke and explosions indicated the destruction of German ammunition dumps.

In the MARNE sector which our troops are holding, the activity of the German aerial forces was the most significant feature of July 4 to July 5. There was a slight increase in the enemy's artillery fire but it is still much less than ours and not of great volume. Most of the shells used were of small and medium caliber. The fire was
for harassing and destructive purposes. About half of the machine-gun fire was directed against our planes. The enemy's air forces were entirely abnormal in their activity, some group flights being observed in which 8 and 10 planes participated. There was an increase in the movement of traffic in the rear areas. During the entire night white and green flares were seen. These and rockets were in larger numbers than usual, two searchlights played intermittently from one part of the enemy's sector.

In this same sector conditions during the day July 5 to July 6 were in all respects so normal as to offer nothing of interest.

In the COLMAR sector on July 5 the activity of the German artillery showed some increase on portions of our front, but did not become notably heavy at any point. His airplanes also distributed their activity over the sector, dropping a few bombs at one point. More German patrols than usual were observed, one throwing a few grenades at our positions and another cutting some of our wire. The wire cutting party was discovered and driven off by rifle fire. During the night the German positions were lighted up to a greater extent than usual, mainly by a liberal use of red and white flares. All along our front our own patrols reconnoitered the hostile positions, but in spite of their number and activity encountered no enemy parties and drew no enemy fire.

In the HULHOUSE sector on July 5 the German airplanes showed an activity which is unusual in this region. They circled constantly over their advanced positions and sometimes over ours. Our antiaircraft batteries and a number of Allied planes drove them back on numerous occasions. The enemy's artillery fire was slight and widely distributed. behind the German lines, in addition to the usual movements of pedestrians, horsemen and vehicles, a considerable number of infantrymen in a body was observed on the march during the afternoon. A number of small balloons, probably containing propaganda, were sent up.

In LORRAINE from July 4 to July 5 nothing except the activities of our own patrols called for especial mention. Our patrolling parties did much valuable reconnaissance work in inspecting the enemy's defense positions and returned safely, although one of them came under the enemy's fire. Artillery fighting was very moderate, our own batteries showing much greater activity than those of the enemy. Our antiaircraft guns brought down a German plane in the region of La CHAPELLE. Both pilot and observer were killed. The German machine guns were somewhat more active than usual.

In a sector in the VOSGES recently occupied by our troops conditions were normal on July 5. During the night preceding German troops made two small attacks which were easily repulsed. The German artillery scattered its fire over the sector, using guns of small, and occasionally, of medium caliber. The ordinary number of German airplanes and balloons performed their customary duties. During the day red message balloons were seen over the German lines and at night flares and rockets of the customary sort. Our own patrols performed their usual duties without incident.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 12th from Eighteenth Army in reserve. Army Detachment C, 227th from Eighteenth Army in reserve.

D. 1st Division, July 4 to July 5, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. A new battery reported LALVAL Wood. German trench mortars located in the FRAMICOURT and LALVAL Woods. Believed that a new strong point is under construction in ALLONGE Wood. German planes dropped 24 bombs near MESNIL, GRIVESNES and Le PLESSIER. Points at which German ammunition dumps are believed to have been destroyed were near DAVENESCOURT FINIERES.

3d Division, July 4 to July 5, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fire consisted of but 316 shells, more than half of which were of 77 caliber and of the rest the great majority were 105's. The fire directed against the CHARTEVES subsector, which received more than any of the other subsectors, was harassing while that against the Mt. ST-PERE subsector was destructive. Our fire comprised 442 shells of small and large caliber. Our troops observed a German patrol of 5 men late in the evening but did not
come in contact with it. 74 enemy planes were observed during the day, most of them flying over the CHARTEVES subsector and many of them flying in large groups. An increase in traffic was also noted in the CHARTEVES subsector and an increase in movements opposite the Mt. St-PERE subsector.

3d Division, July 5 to July 6, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. German artillery used 340 rounds of which 57 were 150's and 130 were 105's. Our divisional artillery fired less than 200 rounds. German airplanes were excessively active, a total of 91, in groups of from 2 to 8, being counted. In the German rear areas movement N. and N. W. of BRASLES continued abnormal. The enemy appeared to be constructing new trenches and machine-gun emplacements. The divisional report contains the following note: "It has been noted that the enemy is using against this division tactics similar to those which he has used against new American divisions in respect to the use of gas. His procedure has been to send over during the first 3 weeks but a few shells and those of harmless sneezing nature. This is done with the idea of producing a feeling of apathy in regard to gas and to lull the troops into a sense of false security.

5th Division, July 5, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. Eight German planes were reported, of which 1 is stated to have dropped bombs. Our antiaircraft batteries fired on them without result. During the late evening and early morning there was an exchange of machine-gun fire between the Germans and Americans. One German machine gun seems to be located in a tree and to be used for signalling to the artillery behind SAMBREVOIR. In addition to the usual working parties and wire parties our infantry sent out 2 ambush patrols. No prisoners were taken.

32d Division, July 5, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. No less than 19 German airplanes were reported. Of these 12 seem to have been forced back by antiaircraft batteries and Allied planes, while most of the others made no attempt to cross our lines. The enemy fired less than 150 rounds of which nearly all were 77's. His machine guns firing mainly from PONT d'ASPACH, BURNHAUP-le-HAUT, BURNHAUP-le-BAS and MUHLWALD, were more active than usual. The body of troops seen in the afternoon amounted to about 4 platoons, and were proceeding toward GALFINGEN. The Germans are constructing new camouflage on the BURNHAUP-le-HAUT---SOPPE-le-BAS Road, the camouflage extending along a trench. One of our reconnaissance detachments went out on the night of July 4 to July 5 to lie in observation until the night of July 6 to July 7. Our other patrols engaged in the customary activities.

77th Division, July 4 to July 5, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery fired 130 rounds and our own 325. The German machine guns delivered about 150 bursts on our positions. No German balloons were up. German working parties were observed to be constructing new camouflage and working on their trenches. Our patrols discovered that the Germans had cut our wire in many places early in the morning of July 4. Our ambush patrols were unable to take prisoners.

35th Division, July 5, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German batteries used 4,500 shells of which a few were 105's and the rest of smaller caliber. Their main objectives seemed to be the roads by which our supplies were brought up. 10 German airplanes and 6 balloons were counted. Our antiaircraft batteries were in action without result. Beyond the noise of timber and shovel work there was nothing to report concerning hostile works. The Germans are using the roof of a church as a signal station. No less than 6 of our own patrols operated during the night. Our wire and trenches are being repaired.

A report of the American III Army Corps for July 4, midnight to midnight states that the construction of camouflage and earthworks is increasing along the whole corps front in ALSACE. It draws attention to the large number of duds among German shells fired on our positions, the proportion amounting to 86% in one particular shoot.
A. Nothing to report.

B. In the CHATEAU-TIERRY region conditions were practically normal on July 5 to July 6, the outstanding exception being the activity of the German air forces. The enemy's intermittent artillery fire was heavier in the vicinity of VAUX than usual but the total number of shells which he used on this day was considerably less than on the days immediately preceding. The majority of the shells were of small and medium caliber. An enemy attempt to raid one of our advance positions was driven off by our rifle and machine-gun fire with losses. There was much movement of troops in the German rear areas, where as many as four companies were seen at one time. The traffic was also excessive. Our observers reported buildings on fire at the SONillard Farm and the explosion by our batteries of what is believed to have been a trench mortar ammunition dump. Our troops were continuously active in ambush and reconnaissance patrols and our batteries were active. During the bombardment of VAUX we replied with counteroffensive preparation fire.

This sector on July 6 to July 7 experienced an increase in enemy artillery activity on the right half of our line where there was considerable use of gas, shrapnel, and high explosive shells. Most of the shells were of small or medium caliber. Barrage fire was put down in the vicinity of VAUX and HILL 204. The German air forces were still very active. The planes flew in groups of varying size. At about noon a German patrol of five machines was attacked and driven off by five of our planes. The movement of troops and traffic in the German rear areas continued abnormal. Our own troops continued their activity in patrolling. Our batteries were also active.

In the MARNE sector between July 6 and July 7 conditions were quiet. The enemy's artillery fire was light and scattered, and his airplanes made less than the customary number of flights. His infantry while not aggressive was on the alert. Machine guns fired intermittently from several points on the N. bank of the river and some rifle and hand grenades were thrown at our patrols. In the German rear areas more traffic than usual was observed.

In the COLMAR sector the patrolling of the enemy troops and our own troops were the only incidents of particular interest on July 6. An enemy patrol of about 20 men was seen at about midnight outside of our wires at one point. Rifle grenade fire was immediately put down from our lines and the enemy withdrew. At about 2:30 o'clock morning another patrol of 8 men was heard by our troops. Flares revealed the fact that the patrol was attempting to reconnoiter our positions. Our troops fired on them and they scattered into the brush. At daylight several of the enemy were discovered in shell holes. Five small red balloons were sent up at various intervals. Our own reconnaissance patrols were active.

Our troops in LORRAINE experienced a quiet day on July 5 to July 6. There was little of interest except increased machine-gun fire and abnormal train movement in the German rear areas. Our antiaircraft batteries were active against the German air forces. Three German propaganda balloons were released.

C. No reports not covered by official communiques have been received concerning developments on the western and the Italian fronts.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 25th from Eighteenth Army in reserve, 39th relieves 48th Reserve, 10th Ersatz relieves 207th. Seventeenth Army, 48th Reserve from Sixth Army relieves 171th. Second Army, 233d from Eighteenth Army in reserve. Eighteenth Army, 46th Reserve withdrawn from front sector taken by adjacent units, 207th from Sixth Army relieves 204th. 3d Bavarian is in line immediately W. of 202d, order of battle west to east therefore is 84th, 207th, 3rd Bavarian, 202d. Seventh Army, owing to change of army boundary to TRACY-le-VAL 223d is now in Seventh Army, 23d withdrawn from line, sector being taken by adjacent units, 14th Reserve relieves 47th Reserve, 11th from Seventh Army in reserve, 200th from Second Army in reserve N. of CHATEAU-TIERRY.

D. 2d Division, July 5 to July 6, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fire 2,650 shells, of which only 600 were heavier than 105. 2 barrages were put down, the heavier being on
VAUX and lasting from 6 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening and the other N. of PARIS Road W. of VAUX. A large number of shells in this latter barrage were duds. Shrapnel was thrown on BOURBELIN and Bois des CLEREMBAUTS. In the afternoon there were 21 flights by German planes, in patrols of varying size. In the morning there were 29 flights. 8 German balloons were in observation during the day. A screen N. of the BOURESCHES-VAUX Railroad Track, used to conceal the movements of the enemy on HILL 201, was destroyed by our artillery fire and rebuilt and reinforced during the night. Our batteries cooperated with the French in their operation during the morning on HILL 204.

2d Division, July 6 to July 7, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy fired 4,400 shells during the day. Of these 500 contained gas and nearly all of them were of small or medium caliber. Only about 1/6 were on our lines of communication and none was directed against our batteries. MONNEAU and BOURBELIN were bombarded. Barrage fire was again directed on our lines N. of VAUX and on HILL 204. The Bois de BELLEAU was shelled continuously from 2:35 o'clock afternoon to 3:10 o'clock afternoon. 104 flights were made by German planes over our lines. 3 German observation balloons were counted. The enemy is extremely watchful, and everywhere appears to be taking more precautions than heretofore to conceal his movements near the front line. Our troops however observed considerable troop and traffic movement. Large groups of men were seen on the BONNES-GRISOLLES Road, at the northern edge of the woods W. of Le TARTRE, near the small woods E. of BONNES and N. of the Bois de ROCHE. Troop movement was also reported on the COURCHAMPS-HAUVESNES Road. A new trench is under construction from the railroad near BASCON-le-BAS to edge of Bois des ROCHETS.

3d Division, July 6 to July 6, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German batteries fired 250 shells and our divisional artillery 170. German airplanes made 21 flights. New trenches have been observed in front of BRASLES and GLAND while wagons were heard unloading timber on the river bank in front of CHARTEVES and a point to the east.

5th Division, July 6, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fire was very light, only 70 shells. 13 German planes were observed over our lines. One of our reconnaissance patrols encountered an enemy patrol of about 20 men in front of our wire. Our patrol fired on them and being outnumbered withered. Two other patrols failed to gain contact with the enemy, but obtained information of his positions.

77th Division, July 5 to July 6, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy fired but 93 shells, practically all of which were 77. Our batteries fired 320 shells all 75. The enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire continued to come principally from Bois du FEYS and Bois des HAIES. 15 German planes were in operation, one of which is reported to have dropped bombs on MIGNEVILLE. 8 observation balloons were also seen. The movement of trains in the German rear areas was abnormal in the afternoon.

10 (57) A. The day again passed quietly at points occupied by our troops.

B. For our troops in the CHATEAU-THIERRY region the day of July 7 to 8 was uneventful. The enemy continued to direct much rifle and machine-gun fire on our new line in the vicinity of VAUX and N. of VAUX, and also on BOURESCHES. The activity of the German artillery was not abnormal for so active a sector and consisted mainly of harassing fire on our front lines. Gas was as usual employed in the shelling of the MARETTE, the BELLEAU and other woods. The number of German airplanes in operation again decreased. In the German rear areas the movements observed were mainly those of men in groups of small or moderate size. Our own troops were active in patrolling and in artillery fire.

In the MARNE sector from July 7 to 8 the day passed almost without incident. The enemy's artillery fire was lighter than on the preceding day and only a few of his planes were seen. His trench mortars were active for a time during the evening. There was as little activity on our side. Our batteries exploded one of the enemy's ammunition dumps.
In the WOEVRE there were no notable events between July 3 and July 6 except the attempts of parties of the enemy to penetrate our lines, especially in the region of XIVRAY. On the night of July 3 a German patrol was driven back in this region by one of our patrols after an exchange of fire. On the night of July 4 one of our outposts in this region was fired on by a German patrol but sustained no casualties. On the night of July 5 strong German patrol attacked a weak outpost at XIVRAY with the intention of taking prisoners. Our outpost exchanged hand grenade fire with the assailants. The Germans having failed in their purpose withdrew from the outpost, which was then reoccupied. On the same night there was exchange of grenade fire between another of our outposts and a German patrol, and at another point a patrol encounter. During all 3 days the enemy's artillery maintained a rate of fire which is normal for a quiet sector distributing his shells over our front and rear areas and our lines of communication. Only a small amount of gas was used. His airplanes and balloons did little work between July 3 and July 4 but were moderately active between July 4 and 6. Our own forces were active mainly in artillery work. The German lines were heavily shelled with gas on the morning of July 5.

In the LORRAINE sector the outstanding incidents of July 6 to 7 were the activities of the enemy patrolling parties and of our own. During the night 3 German patrols approached our lines, 2 coming under our fire. One of them used light machine guns but was thrown back by our rifle and grenade fire after a fight lasting 20 minutes.

In the ALTKIRCH sector on July 6 and 7 no unusual acts of any description were reported.

C. It was reported from the British War Office on July 7: "The enemy attempted to cover his withdrawal across the new PIAVE by an attack at 1 a.m. on July 6. The Italians began a general advance before dawn and eventually occupied the whole of the area between the old and new PIAVE but the enemy was successful in withdrawing the majority of his forces. Captures included 1 battery of 6 field guns, many machine guns, trench mortars, and much material. The prisoners captured in this area during the last 5 days number approximately 3,000, and there was evidence of very heavy enemy losses during the same period."

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 58th relieves 121st. Sixth Army, Bavarian 16th from Fourth Army in reserve, 25th relieves 16th. Eighteenth Army, 204th still in line, it was not relieved by 107th and 207th is in reserve in Sixth Army, position of 75th Reserve in line is shifted to between 222d and 206th.

Report on enemy artillery activity at 8 points occupied by American troops during week ending July 6, 1918.

1st Division: Daily average 1,780 rounds, maximum for 1 day 3,000 rounds, fired on July 4. Minimum for 1 day 1,000 rounds, fired on July 2.
2d Division: Daily average 8,060 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 23,850 rounds, fired on July 1. Minimum for 1 day 2,650 rounds, fired on July 4.
3d Division: Daily average 333 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 702 rounds, fired on June 30. Minimum for 1 day 192 rounds, fired on July 3.
82 Division: Daily average 493 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 633 rounds, fired on June 30. Minimum for 1 day 372 rounds, fired on July 1.
77th Division: Daily average 184 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 302 rounds, fired on July 6. Minimum for 1 day 97 rounds, fired on July 4.
5th Division: Daily average 119 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 215 rounds fired on July 1. Minimum for 1 day 70 rounds, fired on July 6.
35th Division: Daily average 300 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 430 rounds, fired on July 5. Minimum for 1 day 170 rounds, fired on July 6.
32d Division: Daily average 400 rounds. Maximum for 1 day 1,500 rounds, fired on July 1. Minimum for 1 day 100 rounds, fired on July 4.
D. 2d Division, July 7 to July 8, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. German artillery used 3,600 shells of which 2,800 were thrown on our front lines. The rifle and machine-gun fire on the right of our line is almost continuous, coming as before principally from HILL 204. German airplanes made 28 flights. Only 4 balloons were up. New German trenches are reported as far back as La REMISE Farm and works are being constructed at HILL 126.

3d Division, July 7 to July 8, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The discovery of 2 fair sized rafts on the N. bank of the MARNE, and the unloading of what appeared to be hollow cylinders at points on the bank near MONT-St-PERE and CHARTEVES suggest that the enemy may be increasing his means of crossing the river. During the night movements of transport were heard all along the front. The German batteries fired 550 rounds and our own 800 rounds. Only 20 German planes were counted.

82d Division, July 3 to July 6: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The German artillery used 600 shells on the first of these days and 500 on each of the other 2. The number of his planes increased from 2 on the first day to 12 on the third. Eight balloons were counted at different times, only 1 being up on July 3 to 4 and all 8 on July 5 to 6. German antiaircraft batteries were very active against our machines.

77th Division, July 6 to July 7, noon to noon: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy artillery used 300 shells of small and medium caliber, the majority of which were 77's. Our own artillery was slightly more active using 75's. The enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire continued to come primarily from the Bois du FEYS and the Bois des HAIES. His machine-guns were particularly active, 324 burst being counted. Three enemy planes were seen in flight and 6 balloons were counted.

32d Division, July 6 to July 7, midnight to midnight: Confidential details supplementing those forwarded Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fired 250 shells of small and medium caliber on July 6, more shells falling on the RODEREN-THANN Road than on any other point. On July 7 approximately 280 shells were fired by the enemy, 200 of which were of 150 caliber and fell in the vicinity of FALCHWILLER. Four enemy airplanes and 2 balloons were seen on July 6 and 11 enemy planes and no balloons on July 7. Our patrols were normally active.

The sector occupied by our 5th Division will in future be referred to as the MUNSTER sector, that occupied by the 32d Division will be referred to as the ALTKIRCH sector. The sector occupied by another of our divisions not yet identified by the enemy will be referred to as the THANN sector. From N. to S. the sectors are thus: MUNSTER sector, THANN sector and ALTKIRCH sector.

11 (58) B. This cable constitutes a part of Section B of American Official Communique No. 58 but is despatched separately in order to avoid delay in transmission of other news.

The following are extracts from a German document recently captured. It is the formal report of a German intelligence officer at the Headquarters of the German Seventh Army and is dated June 17, 1918:

Intelligence Officer of the Supreme Command at Army Headquarters No. 7. J. No. 3528

Army Headquarters, June 17, 1918.

American 2d Infantry Division.

Examination of prisoners from the 5th, 6th, 9th and 23d Regiments captured from June 6 to 14 in the BOURESCHES sector.

Principal points of information.

Purpose of the attacks.
The prisoners were not informed of the purpose of the attacks. The orders for the attacks on BELLEAU Woods were made known only a few hours before the attacks took place.

Arrival in line and relief.

The Marine brigade went into sector from June 2 to June 4, and elements of the other 2 regiments from June 5 to 6 in the area TORCY-VAUX (4 km. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY), 1 battalion from each unit being in the front line. There they relieved French troops of various divisions whose identity they did not know. They had no information concerning their relief. Only the prisoners from the marine brigade considered that on account of heavy losses their relief was imminent.

Organization.

The 3d Marine Brigade belongs to the marine corps which was already in existence in the United States during peacetime. The 1st and 2d Marine Brigades are said to be still at home.

Regarding the distribution of machine guns the prisoners made contradictory statements. They claim that, in the 3d Marine Brigade for instance, each regiment, in addition to the three infantry battalions, has one machine gun battalion of four platoons, each platoon having twelve machine guns. Furthermore each battalion is said to have one brigade machine gun battalion.

According to a captured order of battle of the American 26th Division (Intelligence Officer 7, Number 3228, June 8, 1918) that division has only one machine gun company to a battalion in each regiment. In case the vague statements of the prisoners are correct the discrepancy can perhaps be explained by the fact that the marine corps was part of the United States peace army and was therefore equipped according to principles other than in the case of American 26th Division which has been formed from national guard troops since the war began.

History of the Division.

Elements of the American 2d Division were put into the MOULANVILLE (VERDUN) sector from the middle of March to the middle of May for training and were relieved by unknown French troops.

The division was then moved by rail to the vicinity of VITRY-le-FRANCOIS, where it remained about 5 days. From there the division was transferred by rail, via COLOMMIERS---St-DENIS---PONTOISE, into the region S. W. of BEAUVAIS. The 5th regiment of marines was in the vicinity of GISORS, 30 km. S. W. of BEAUVAIS. The 6th regiment of marines was at CHARLS, 7 km. N. W. of the marines along the PONTOISE to BEAUVAIS Railway.

The 9th and 23d Regiments were quartered with and near the marines.

The division rested 8 days in this region. Maneuvers on a large scale or with large units were not held; only exercises in minor tactics, hand-grenade throwing and target practice were carried out. A few long practice marches (hikes) were made.

On May 31 and 3d Marine Brigade was ordered to move and put into French motor trucks (20 men or 10 officers in each truck.) The 5th Regiment of the Marines was the first to leave and travelled via BEAUMONT---LUCARCHES---EREMONVILLE (W. of NANTEUIL)---Les FLEISSIS-BELLEVILE and MEAUX to LIZY-sur-OURCQ, where they were unloaded after a journey of 18 hours. The next regiment to leave was the 6th Regiment of Marines, which followed the same route, while the 9th and 23d Regiments apparently moved via BEAUMONT---ECOUEN---GONESSE---AULNAY (Environ of PARIS)---CLAVE---MEAUX and were unloaded in the neighborhood of La-FERTE-sous-JOUARRE. The 5th Regiment of Marines was put
into line during the night of June 2/3 as the first regiment of the division, the other elements taking up their position in the sector in echelon.

Fighting Value.

The American 2d Division may be classified as a very good division, perhaps even as assault troops. The various attacks of both regiments on BELLEAU Woods were carried out with dash and recklessness. The moral effect of our firearms did not materially check the advance of the infantry; the nerves of the Americans are still unshaken.

Value of the Individual.

The individual soldiers are very good. They are healthy, vigorous and physically well developed men of ages ranging from 18 to 28, who at present lack only necessary training to make them redoubtable opponents. The troops are fresh and full of straightforward confidence. A remark of one of the prisoners is indicative of their spirit: "We kill or get killed."

Method of attack.

In both attacks on BELLEAU Woods, which were carried out by one or two battalions the following method of attack was adopted:

Three or four lines of skirmishers at about 30 to 50 paces distance; rather close behind these, isolated assault parties in platoon column. Abundant equipment in automatic rifles and hand grenades. The assault parties carried forward machine guns and were ordered to penetrate the German position at a weak point, to swing laterally and to attack the strong points from the rear.

Particulars on the American position.

No details are available. The prisoners are hardly able to state where they were in position.

According to their statements it may be assumed that the front line consist only of rifle pits one meter deep, up to the present not provided with wire entanglements. The organization of the positions in rear is unknown.

General.

Morale.

The prisoners in general make an alert and pleasing impression; regarding military matters, however, they do not show the slightest interest. Their superiors keep them purposely without knowledge of military subjects, for example most of them have never seen a map. They are no longer able to describe the villages and roads through which they marched. Their ideas on the organization of their unit is entirely confused. For example one of them claimed that his brigade had 6 regiments, his division 24. They still regard the war from the point of view of the "Big Brother," who comes to help his hard pressed brethren and is therefore welcomed everywhere. A certain moral background is not lacking; the majority of the prisoners simply took it as a matter of course that they had to come to Europe in order to defend their country.

Only a few of the troops are of pure American origin, the majority is of German, Dutch and Italian parentage, but these semi-Americans, almost all of whom were born in America and never have been in Europe, fully feel themselves to be true-born sons of their country.

von BERG,
Lieutenant and Intelligence Officer
A. In the VOSGES a raid attempted by the enemy broke down with losses before our lines had been reached. The day passed quietly at other points. As the result of a bombing expedition last evening 5 of our machines are missing.

B. In PICARDY the enemy was very quiet on July 5 to 6. His artillery fire was considerably below the average. The vicinity of COULLEMELLE was his principal objective. The German air forces engaged in but little activity. One of our planes brought down an enemy observation balloon. An ammunition dump was exploded in the German rear areas.

Our troops in the MARNE sector experienced a quiet day July 8 to 9. The enemy's artillery activity was slightly less than on the days immediately preceding. Most of the shells were of small and medium caliber, some of them containing shrapnel. Our artillery was very active and drew considerable fire from the enemy batteries. The balance of his fire harassing and destructive. The heaviest fire continued to come from the BRASLES sector in the rear areas of which movement continues active. There was an increase in the enemy's machine-gun fire. Our batteries destroyed 2 ammunition dumps and a dump containing skyrockets and flares.

In LORRAINE our forces were particularly active on July 7 to 8. We easily dispersed 2 enemy patrols; our artillery fire was in excess of the enemy's; our anti-aircraft batteries were active against his normal aerial activity and we sent out successful patrols. One of our patrolling parties penetrated the 3d German line. Another of our patrols penetrated the enemy's entanglements and reconnoitered his advanced positions.

In the MUNSTER sector the enemy's patrols and our own continued active on July 7. 3 enemy patrols, 2 of which were wire-cutting parties, were driven off by our troops. The enemy's trench mortar fire was heavier than usual both in caliber and number of shells. The only hostile plane which made an afternoon flight was driven back by our fire. Our patrols were active all along the sector.

The MUNSTER sector was again quiet on July 8. The enemy artillery fire decreased to a very small number of medium caliber shells. The total trench mortar fire was in excess of the preceding day but was widely scattered and of medium caliber. The German air forces showed a slight increase in reconnaissance and observation flights. Our own wire and ambush patrols continued active in all sectors. One of our reconnaissance patrols penetrated the enemy's 2d line trench and reconnoitered his positions there.

On July 8, the ALTKIRCH sector was quiet. There was a decided increase over the 2 preceding days in the enemy's artillery fire which comprised shells of light, medium and heavy caliber. His airplanes were increasingly active. One of them was attacked by an Allied plane over "No Man's Land" and, after machine-gun fire had been exchanged, the enemy plane was seen to burst into flames. A man fell from it and a few seconds later the gasoline tank exploded and the machine fell to the ground in the enemy's rear area. Our troops continued their patrol activity all along the sector.

The THANN sector was very quiet on July 6 to 8. Several patrols attempting to raid our lines were driven back. The enemy's forces were not particularly active on July 6 but their activity was marked on July 8. On this date we drove back 2 planes over MUHLBACH.

In the WOEVRE the day July 6 to 7 was exceptionally quiet. Report of German intelligence officer which follows by separate cable belongs to this section but is sent separately to avoid delay in transmission of other news.

* Note: The numbering confusion stands thus in the file copy.
C. There is no change in the situation.

Changes in the German order of battle: Fourth Army, 13th Reserve relieves 4th Bavarian. Seventh Army, 51st Reserve from Eighteenth Army in reserve, 15th from Second Army relieves 211th, 47th Reserve relieves 14th Reserve, 1st from Seventeenth Army in reserve. First Army, 6th Cavalry from Army Detachment B in reserve, 7th Cavalry from Nineteenth Army in reserve, 26th from Seventeenth Army in reserve. Army Detachment C, 11th from Seventh Army relieves 183d, 183d relieves Bavarian 8th Reserve, Nineteenth Army, unknown division relieved 7th Cavalry which has gone to First Army.

D. 1st Division, July 5 to 6, noon to noon: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. Only 1,000 shells were fired by the German artillery. 7 observation balloons were counted. One of our balloons was brought down by a German plane. There was very little traffic in the German rear areas except the movement of lorries, wagons and motors between LABOISSIERE and ETELFAY.

3d Division, July 8 to 9, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. The artillery fire of our batteries totaled 7,400 shells of which 500 were 150's and the balance of small caliber. The enemy used only about 500 shells. 20 German planes were counted, several of which were very large and flew low over the sector. They were mounted with 2 machine-guns on each side of the observers seat. This is the first time that large planes have been reported over this sector. 3 observation balloons were up.

77th Division, July 7 to 8, noon to noon: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fired 155 shells of medium caliber of which some contained shrapnel and gas. 9 enemy airplanes and 3 observation balloons were counted. Our patrol which penetrated the German 3d line in the SAILLANT du FEYS reported the sector in very bad condition and evidently very lightly held.

5th Division, July 7, midnight to midnight: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fired 110 rounds of small and medium caliber. He also fired 40 trench mortar bombs of which 30 were of heavy caliber. 4 of his planes and 6 observation balloons were up during the day. 9 of our patrolling parties went out during the night.

5th Division, July 8, midnight to midnight: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. Enemy artillery fired only 40 shells of 105 caliber. His trench mortars threw 80 bombs. Our patrol which penetrated to 2d line enemy trenches found both trenches unoccupied.

32d Division, July 8, midnight to midnight: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. The enemy artillery fired 425 shells of which 150 were 150's and 210's. Most of these heavy caliber shells were used in concentration fire on LARGISWALD. 15 German planes and 5 observation balloons were up during the day. Sounds resembling the handling of iron material were again heard during the night from the direction of CERNAY. Similar sounds have been heard at this point each night during the week. One of our patrols penetrated the enemy's positions but found the locality unoccupied.

35th Division, July 6 to 8, midnight to midnight: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. The enemy's average artillery fire on these days was approximately 200 shells, the majority of which were small caliber. 2 German enlisted men deserted to our lines at 5 o'clock morning. They did not know that American troops were opposite them. On July 6, 5 enemy planes and 1 observation balloon were counted. On July 8, 18 planes and 9 balloons were counted.

82d Division, July 6 to 7: Confidential supplement Section B this cable. The enemy's artillery fired 410 rounds of medium and small caliber. The vicinity of RAMBUCOURT and the Bois du JURY were the principal points shelled. 3 enemy observation balloons and 7 enemy planes were counted. 5 of the planes were observed at 10:50 o'clock evening.
A. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region a trench raid attempted by the enemy broke down with losses under our fire.

Yesterday our aviators shot down a hostile machine in the region of THIAUCOURT.

B. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region conditions on the day of July 8 to 9 normal. German patrol driven back with losses by American patrol in BELLEAU region. Much other patrolling activity on both sides but no incidents except fire directed from German front lines on American patrol. More German artillery fire for adjustment than usual, with customary harassing fire. More shrapnel used. Considerable circulation TORCY region.

In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region from July 9 to 10 the German artillery was more than usually active and his infantry nervously alert. His alertness resulted in use of many flares during the night. His batteries active in counterbattery fire and in harassing fire on our positions in front and rear. Short concentrations during evening in VOIE du CHATEL region. Some gas, mainly of sneezing and lachrymatory variety used. Continued intermittent rifle and machine-gun fire on our positions in VAUX area. German airplane and balloon activity moderate. Patrols on both sides active without particular incident.

Along the MARNE July 9 to 10 the activity of our artillery was the only feature of interest. He shelled enemy’s positions heavily drawing only feeble response from his batteries in counterbattery harassing and registration fire. German hand grenades thrown from N. bank fell into river. Moderate number of German air patrols and large number of German balloons in observation. Ammunition dump near JAULGONNE exploded by our artillery.

In LORRAINE July 8 to 9 the enemy showed no particular activity except in machine-gun fire. Besides a large number of bursts his machine guns on several occasions fired continuously on positions, for periods of from 10 minutes to half an hour. His artillery fire was light. His airplanes and balloons were constantly in observation. Our antiaircraft was successful in driving back his airplanes. Our reconnaissance patrols operated successfully.

The MUNSTER sector was very quiet July 9. There was no fire from enemy’s artillery. We drove off 4 of the enemy’s planes. Our patrols were active.

In the WOEVRE, July 7 to 8, conditions remained normal. American patrol bombed a German outpost during the night.

In the THANN sector July 9 there was no unusual occurrence except an increase in the German machine-gun and rifle fire.

German airplane reported shot down, American Official Communiqué Number 59, was brought down July 11 near THIAUCOURT by Lts. Jones and Tobin. As result of their fire German plane fell in flames.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 207th relieves 44th Reserve, 1st Guard Reserve relieves 38th, Eighteenth Army, 18th from Sixth Army in reserve. Fifth Army, 231st from Seventh Army relieves Bavarian Ersatz. Army Detachment A, 12th Landwehr dissolved. Army Detachment B, 14th Landwehr dissolved, its place in line is taken by miscellaneous independent battalions and by extension of units in line.

D. Confidential details from divisional reports supplementing those given Section B this cable.

26th Division, July 8 to 9, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: German machine-gun and rifle fire still directed on our positions from Hill 204. German artillery adjusted on American batteries by high burst shrapnel. Circulation notable around BONNES, GRISOLLES, SOMMELANS, MONTIERS and TORCY.

26th Division, July 9 to 10, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: German artillery fired 6,000 shells including 50 Blue Cross, German planes assisting in registration. 5 balloons reported. American artillery delivered harassing and interdiction fire.

3d Division, July 9 to 10, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: German artillery fired 500 rounds. American artillery fired 7,300, of which 7,000 were 75's. German airplanes made 25 flights and balloons 14 ascents. Movements behind German lines increased near CHARTEVES, GLAND and BRASLES. Especially notable because new were movements
from BRASLES in direction of CHATEAU-THIERRY. Much signalling around MONT-ST-PERE.

77th Division, July 8 to 9: Enemy's machine-gun fire very pronounced. His artillery fired less than 200 shells of which a few were 150's and 210's. 14 airplanes and 5 balloons were counted. Enemy busily constructing emplacements, pill boxes and observation posts. Much smoke and numerous signal lights behind his lines.

5th Division, July 9, midnight to midnight: 8 German planes and 3 ascents of an observation balloon were counted. 5 of our own wire and ambush patrols were at work.

82d Division, July 7 to 8: German artillery fired 450 shells of which 40 contained gas. Others made little noise in bursting and sent up clouds of white smoke. 12 German airplanes were counted. 6 German balloons were up.

35th Division, July 9, midnight to midnight: Conditions very quiet. German artillery used 300 shells. Of these 2 were reported as making no noise in bursting and as sending clouds of white smoke. Only 2 planes and 1 balloon were seen. 8 of our patrols were out.

I3 (60) A. Nothing to report.

B. In CHATEAU-THIERRY region July 10 to 11 activity on both sides mostly that of infantry. German patrol numbering 40 and equipped with light machine-guns opened fire on American lines near TORCY. Driven back leaving at least 3 killed. Our own patrols very active. German artillery fire much lighter than on previous day. Few German airplanes in operation. Patrol of 8 German planes attacked American photographic mission at 8 o'clock morning 7 kilometers behind German lines.

The MARNE sector experienced decrease in enemy artillery fire and aerial activity and slight increase in transport movement July 10 to 11. Our artillery fire continues very much in excess of hostile fire. Fires and explosions in vicinity of Jaulgonne evidently caused by our artillery. Enemy patrol of 6 men was fired on by our troops and disappeared.

LORRAINE sector unusually quiet July 9 to 10 with decrease in enemy's rifle and machine-gun fire and aerial activity. Abnormal movement of men and indications of work in his rear areas.

In the WOEVRE, July 8 to 9, enemy machine-gun and rifle fire very active along the entire sector. Enemy's antiaircraft batteries heavily shelled the Allied planes which persistently patrolled enemy's lines all day. German aerial activity slightly increased.

In the MUNSTER sector July 10 German machine-gun fire above normal, artillery, and trench mortar fire exceptionally light. No aerial activity. Our patrols very active in reconnaissance.

The ALTkirch sector was very quiet July 9 and 10.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, Bavarian 16th from Sixth Army relieves 8th. Seventeenth Army, 15th Reserve from Sixth Army relieves 2d Guard Reserve. Seventh Army, 241st from reserve relieves 34th. Army Detachment C, 183d in line in its old sector, 227th in line in old sector of Bavarian 8th Reserve, order of battle west to east is 5th Landwehr, 227th, 183d. Nineteenth Army, 11th from Army Detachment C relieves 255th.

D. Confidential details from divisional reports supplementing those given Section B this cable.

26th Division, July 10 to July 11, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: German batteries fired 3,000 shells of which 2,200 were on our front lines. Slight use of gas. Circulation heavy between BONNES and COURCHAMPS and on Road Bois de BONNES-HALLOUDRAY Farm. 15 German airplanes and 2 balloons up.

3d Division, July 10 to July 11, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: Enemy artillery fired 142 shells, majority of small and medium caliber. Our batteries fired 1,094 shells of small caliber and 60 155's. 16 enemy planes and 8 observation balloons
were counted. 29 combat wagons were seen at different times moving in vicinity of BRASLES. Continued activity of enemy on N. bank of MARNE indicates he is still planning to cross river. Recent excavations, barrels and rafts in vicinity of JAULGONNE and a line of small yellow floats in the river between BRASLES and GLAND give evidence of this intention. In the GLAND area he has constructed some new trenches.

77th Division, July 9 to July 10, noon to noon: Enemy's artillery fired 199 shells of small caliber. Our artillery fired 119 75's. No hostile airplanes or balloons seen. At works previously reported there are now 3 minenwerfer guns with small blockhouse in rear. Continuous and very marked movement of men noted in rear area in vicinity of and en route to BLAMONT, REPAIX, VERDENAL and other points. Big explosion heard in BLAMONT followed by large cloud of white smoke.

82d Division, July 8 to July 9: Hostile artillery fired 470 shells of light and medium caliber and hostile antiaircraft guns fired 800 rounds. Concentration of harassing fire directed on our back areas. 26 gas shells used. Among German duds 1 of 77 caliber, American make, found. 15 hostile planes and 9 ascents of observation balloons counted. Increased movement in vicinity of ESSEY and MOMIARD HATTONCHATEL. 2 gas alarms sounded in American trenches during the day, 1 for sneezing and other for chlorine gas.

5th Division, July 10, midnight to midnight: Abnormally quiet. German artillery fired only 40 rounds. German machine guns 120 bursts. No airplanes or balloons. Circulation and activity of working parties slight. 7 American patrols out.

32d Division, July 9 and 10, midnight to midnight: Enemy artillery fired 420 shells of small and medium caliber July 9, and 310 shells of small caliber July 10, 1/2 of the latter falling in vicinity of DIEFFMATTEN. 6 hostile planes and 4 balloons counted July 9 and 4 places and 2 balloons July 10. Signalling from church steeple at GALFINGEN observed. 4 American reconnaissance and 1 American ambush patrol out. On July 9 there was increase in train movement.

14 (61) A. Aside from artillery fighting of moderate intensity in the VOSGES there is nothing of importance to report.

B. In the CHATEAU-THIERRY region July 11 to 12, moderate activity but no marked developments. German artillery fire somewhat increased especially on American front lines. Increased circulation of men and trucks in German rear areas. Very little aerial activity. Patrol encounter with exchange of shots between American patrol and German ambush patrol. Our artillery active on moving groups in German rear areas and in reprisal fire.

In the MARNE sector July 11 to 12, moderate activity continued. Enemy's artillery fire again greatly exceeded by our own. 1 of his patrols which attempted to cross the river driven back. German airplanes fairly active but balloons very quiet.

In the MUNSTER sector, July 11, no unusual developments. 2 German patrols which approached our trenches driven off. German machine-gun and trench mortar fire somewhat above average.

Only the THAN sector, July 11. Germans attempted raid in HELENFIRNEW area at 3 o'clock morning after artillery preparation. Driven off with losses, failing to reach even our fire. German artillery fire otherwise light. Included some sneezing gas. German airplanes unusually active for this sector. Our patrols active without incident.

Only the ALTKIRCH Sector, July 11, no unusual activity except numerous hostile airplanes. Of these 2 attacked American balloon but were driven off by 2 French planes. Patrols active on both sides without incident.

In the WOEVRE on July 9 to 10 everything quiet. American artillery scattered German working party.

C. The situation is unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 41st from 17th relieves 108th. Seventh Army, 33d from Third Army in reserve.
D. Confidential details from divisional reports supplementing those given Section B this cable.

26th Division, July 11 to 12, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: German artillery fired 6,000 shells of which 800 large caliber. Some increase in registration fire with high burst shrapnel. Small use of gas. Usual harassing fire on front and rear. New batteries observed of which 1 of large caliber. Increased circulation in German rear areas especially around Bonnes. Enemy airplanes assisting artillery adjustment. Only 2 balloons up. Further but not exceptional construction of trenches and entanglements.

3d Division, July 11 to July 12, 8 o'clock evening to 8 o'clock evening: German artillery fired 150 rounds and ours 1,500 rounds. 31 German planes in operation but few over our lines. Only 1 balloon up. Movements on road N. from BRASLES continued hot circulation in general decreased. 1 of our patrols as well as 1 German patrol failed to cross the river.

5th Division, July 11, midnight to midnight: German artillery fire 80 rounds, German trench mortars 90 rounds, and German machine guns 100 bursts. 10 German planes and 7 balloon ascents counted.

35th Division, July 11, midnight to midnight: German artillery fired 900 rounds of which 500 in preparation for raid. Of latter 20 per cent duds. 14 German airplanes and 8 balloon ascents counted. 9 American patrols out.

32d Division, July 11, midnight to midnight: German artillery fired 200 round. 22 German airplanes seen. No unusual circulation or works.

82d Division, July 9 to 10: German artillery fired 500 rounds including small quantity of gas. No balloons and only 4 German airplanes reported. Small parties of enemy drilling in rear areas. Some increase in traffic and general movements in German rear. Evidence indicates use of French uniform by German patrol.

15 (62) A. E. of CHATEAU-THIERRY where the enemy succeeded this morning in crossing the MARNE on our front and gaining some ground, our troops counterattacked and drove the enemy back to the MARNE taking 500 prisoners. In the VOSGES 5 trench raids attempted by the enemy broke down under our fire.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2:40 o'clock afternoon July 15 by American liaison officer at headquarters of French Fourth Army: Crossed the river at FOSSBY—thence to CREZANCY—St-AGNAN—CHEZY—CHAMPAILLET—crossed the river at MAREUIL—thence going N. MONTIGNY—BASLIEUX—CHUCERY—NEUVILLE. Enemy's position about 12 o'clock noon: [From liaison officer in from the Fifth Army]. On the Fourth Army front, the attack is on front of 27 kilometers. The depth is 3 divisions, making the total in attack 30 divisions. Everything holds good on Fourth Army front. The Fifth Army front holds good on REIMS to EUPHRAISE. The break came through Italian army corps. Wind is south; has been south all night; little stronger.

It was reported by the French Mission at G. H. Q., A. E. F. at 6:25 o'clock evening July 15: "Front toward the south. According to report by aviation service, GLAND-MEZY Railway Line, a French-American counterattack threw the Boches back to this railway. Line runs between Le SURMELEIN and the MARNE—MONTODON CHAPEL—MAREVIL-sur-MARNE—BELVAIL POURCY. A hostile army corps is advancing by way of ANTHENAY. East of REIMS all hostile attacks have been checked."

The order of battle on front of attack from W. to E. appears to be as follows: 10th Reserve, 10th (these 2 divisions having 36th in reserve), 28th Reserve, 200th, 2 unidentified guard divisions, 3 unidentified divisions, 103d a Chasseurs division, 22d, Bavarian 12th, 123d, 86th, 213th, 242d, 238th, 203d, 80th Reserve, 15th Bavarian, 3d Guard, 26th, 19th Reserve, 199th, 239th, 7th Reserve, 30th, unidentified guard division, Bavarian 2d, Bavarian 1st, 228th, unidentified division, 88th, 2 unidentified divisions, 7th, 33d Reserve.
Following divisions were in line: 28th Reserve, Chasseurs division, Bavarian 12th and 123d, 86th, 213th, 242d, 238th, 203d, 80th Reserve, 19th Reserve, 7th Reserve, 30th, 228th, 33d Reserve. Of these 4 which were in the REIMS Salient were probably not involved except in French artillery fire.

So far the divisions have come from reserve except 1 from LORRAINE, 1 from VERDUN, 3 from the Eighteenth Army, and 2 from the Crown Prince Rupprecht's Group. Crown Prince Rupprecht was credited with 36 divisions in reserve last night.

Other changes in German order of battle: First Army, 117th from Fourth Army in reserve, 20th from Fifth Army in reserve.

The line at 9 o'clock evening reported as along railroad on S. bank of MARNE from FOSSOY to MEZY MOULINS---thence to St-AGNAN---La CHAPELLE---N. of Bois de BRUIL---W. of COMBLIZY---Le VIVIER---MARUEL---CHATILLON---BASLIEUX---1 kilometer E. of MARFAUX---1/2 kilometer E. of VILLE DOMMAGE---Les MESNEUX. The enemy has taken ORMES. E. of REIMS the line is as reported in noon cable.

D. Reported at noon, July 15 that 1st Battalion of 167th Regiment was in first line with 2 other battalions in second line.

16 (63) A. In the course of yesterday's battle, American troops E. of REIMS cooperated with the French in repulsing the enemy's attacks. They maintained their positions at all points and captured a number of prisoners and machine guns. Yesterday morning in the VOSGES the enemy attempted, after artillery preparation to attack our lines on a front of 1,000 yards. The attack broke down under our artillery fire.

B. The counterattack made by the American troops S. of the MARNE on July 15 was a complete success. The enemy who had crossed the river near FOSSOY and had forced back a part of our line was thrown back on the river with severe losses. One battalion was practically annihilated, those who were not killed or wounded being captured by our forces. Officers commanding French troops near this point as well as others belonging to the higher command have expressed great satisfaction concerning the conduct of our forces and the results which they achieved.

On July 15 in HILSENFIRST region of VOSGES enemy attempted to attack our lines on front of 1,000 yards. After artillery preparation, which included use of trench mortars, they left their lines at 7 o'clock morning and commenced to advance through their own wire. A barrage put down promptly by our artillery soon drove them back.

C. Reports received indicate that the enemy has not renewed his attack today.

Line is as reported yesterday.

Changes in German order of battle: Order of battle W. to E. from CHATEAU-THIERRY, Seventh Army, 201st, 10th, 36th, 10th Landwehr in support. First Army, 23d, 200th, 28th Reserve, 10th Reserve, 5th Guard, 2d Guard, 103d, 195th. Bavarian 12th in close support, 22d, 123d, 86th, 213th, 242d, 238th, 203d, Bavarian 15th, 80th Reserve, 3d Guard, 26th, 199th, 19th Reserve, 239th. Third Army, 7th Reserve, 1st, 30th, Bavarian 2d, Bavarian 1st, 88th, 7th, 228th, 33d Reserve. No change in line in other armies.

Changes in reserve. First Army, 37th from Eighteenth Army and 113th from Seventh Army in close support near VILLE-en-TARDENOIS.

D. From Headquarters of American air service in the TOUL region following report received 4:15 o'clock afternoon, July 16: "Yesterday afternoon one of our pilots encountered 3 Pfalz planes, which indicates that the enemy has apparently either a flight or squadron of these planes over here as this is the first time we have encountered Pfalz here. He had a combat with 3 of these planes and reports that the pilots were unusually skillful. He is one of our oldest pilots, with 10 planes to his credit and his judgement is not to be questioned. In his judgment they are the best he has encountered in some months. This morning, one of our observation squadrons which had gone out on a reconnaissance were badly attacked by planes of the same type and the observer of one of the planes was shot through the heart and killed instantly. The pilot of the same plane was struck in the head but was able to recover and get back to the field. The other plane that was acting as protector had 17 bullet holes within 5 feet of the observer but he
was not struck. We have had by this time about 10 combats so far today and we think that we have accounted for about 4 of these Pfalz planes.”

42d Division report received G. H. Q., A. E. F., 4:25 o’clock afternoon July 16, for July 15 to 16: “Intermediate position our sector held intact. Disposition headquarters very optimistic. No infantry attacks since this morning. At this time 9:30 o’clock evening comparatively quiet.”

42d Division report received G. H. Q., A. E. F., 3:14 o’clock afternoon July 16: “Night comparatively calm on the front of 42d Division.”

42d Division report received G. H. Q., A. E. F., 7:20 o’clock evening July 16: “This morning at 12 o’clock the enemy opened terrific bombardment all along our line. At 4:20 o’clock morning his infantry attacked. 42d Division had 4 1/2 battalions on intermediate position with rest of the division on second position of the XXI Army Corps. At no place held by our troops was enemy able to advance. At several points where he had penetrated American units, counterattacks and restored position with great loss to enemy. 27 prisoners together with machine guns were captured. A German airplane was brought down by one of our automatic riflemen and the aviator killed. The conduct of the division has been the subject of congratulations by both French corps and the French army commander. We lost no prisoners and have none missing.”

A severe storm which occurred last night has interrupted telephonic and telegraphic connections. Reports will necessarily be delayed in transmission to these headquarters and from here to Washington.

42d Division report received at G. H. Q., A. E. F., 9 o’clock evening July 16, includes following: “The intermediate position (the combat position on this front) has been held intact from the ARGONNE to REIMS. On the front of the French XXI Corps, of which the 42d Division is a part, the enemy used in the attack of the first day 6 first class divisions, the guard cavalry division, the Bavarian 2d Division, the 88th Division, the 1st Division, the Bavarian 1st Division and the 7th Division.

In spite of the most vigorous attempts of the enemy he was able to set foot on the intermediate position only at one point. A counterattack by 2 companies of French infantry and 2 companies of the 167th Infantry drove him from this position in a bloody hand-to-hand combat. The 167th Infantry captured 25 prisoners and several machine guns and 50 dead Germans were counted in the trenches of one combat group attacked by this unit. By 11 o’clock morning the enemy’s first effort was spent and he began to regroup his forces for a second attack. However, he was so badly shaken by his losses that he was unable to make a strong attack again in the afternoon. His light batteries were pushed forward and there was a great deal of troop movement much of which was exposed to our artillery fire. Nothing developed until 6 o’clock evening. At that hour the enemy launched an attack on the front of the French 13th Division (the right of our sector) but the attack was repulsed at all points. It is estimated that there were more than 300 enemy batteries in action on the front from REIMS to the ARGONNE.”

17 (64) A. In the MARNE sector our troops have entirely regained possession of the S. bank of the river. N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY the enemy yesterday repeated his attempt of the preceding day to penetrate our lines near VAUX. His attack was completely broken up by our infantry and artillery fire before reaching our lines.

Yesterday in the region of THIAUCOURT a hostile airplane was shot down by one of our aviators.

B. N. W. of CHATEAU-THIERRY between the evening of July 14 and the evening of July 16 the enemy made determined but entirely unsuccessful attacks on our positions near VAUX. During the night July 14 to 15 he delivered a heavy bombardment which included the use of much gas and which in the early morning developed into a barrage on the VAUX area. Under cover of this a storming party attacked the village. The system of infiltration by groups was used and some of these groups passed one of our advanced outposts N. E. of VAUX. Our troops delivered withering machine-gun fire on the assailants,
and counterattacked on the right of the assaulting party where the penetration had taken place. At the same time our artillery dropped a barrage in this section to cut off enemy's retreat. Enemy fled but many were caught by our barrage and 18 taken prisoner. The attack was a complete failure, the enemy at no time penetrating our lines. On the evening of July 15 the attacks in this region were renewed. A box barrage, which again included many gas shells, was placed by the enemy on the VAUX region at 9:30 o'clock evening and several large hostile groups attempted to advance, firing heavily on our positions. This attempt also collapsed. Our infantry fire and a creeping barrage from our own batteries again broke up the assault.

C. Reports received concerning the general situation give no information not included in the official communiques.

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, 202d relieved by unknown division goes to Seventh Army. Seventh Army, 105th relieved by 202d, boundary Seventh and First Armies moves E. to BLIGNY between 123d and 86th Divisions, 10th Reserve is in reserve not in line, 1st Guard, 37th and 113th all of which were in First Army reserves are in line in Seventh Army, order of battle W. to E. 201st, 10th, 23d, 36th, 200th, 28th Reserve, 5th Guard, 1st Guard, 37th, 113th, 2d Guard, 103d, 195th, 22d, 123d. First Army, Bavarian 8th Reserve from Army Detachment C in reserve. Third Army, 20th from First Army in reserve.

D. 3d Division, July 15 to 16, noon to noon: "In the left half of our sector the portions of our line which were temporarily affected by the German offensive at this point have been reestablished. In the right center subsector the line held is roughly the line of resistance. In the right subsector troops were drawn back to connect with elements on the right. Situation satisfactory. Total prisoners brought in so far 341."

American liaison officer at French General Headquarters reported at 10 o'clock evening July 16: "I went to the American 3d Division today. The 3d Division sector has been extended to the right and left and they now have the engineer troops in line with the infantry. One regiment was to be relieved today by the 28th Division. On the right I went to the 55th Infantry Brigade, 28th Division. This brigade holds nearly 6 kilometers of front N. E. of PARGNAY. There was only one battalion engaged yesterday. It was with the French. Was to have had one battalion in counterattack today."

Officer of General Staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F., on visit to 3d Division reported 4 o'clock afternoon, July 16: "The Boche is cleaned out in front of the 3d Division. He crossed in boats only, at that point, and all indications were that many got away to the N. last night by the same route. The 55th Brigade had 2 companied of the 110th and 2 of the 109th in line for training with the French 75th Division."

Same officer reported at 9:30 o'clock morning July 17: "3d Division situation unchanged and completely in hand. Situation of the right of 3d Division improved but definite information not receive."

18 (65) A. American troops, cooperating with the French in an attack on the enemy's positions between the AISNE and the MARNE, penetrated his lines to a depth of several miles, capturing many prisoners and guns.

B. On the night of July 15 to 16, a platoon of our troops operating E. of REIMS was attacked by a raiding party of 21 Germans. Our men went over the top to meet them and killed the entire party with the bayonet without loss to themselves.

One of our regiments in this same region reports that a party of Germans with French helmets and coats attempted to penetrate one of our boyaux. The leader succeeded in approaching our machine gunner, posted at this point, saying that he was French. When within a short distance of the gun the German threw a grenade which wounded our gunner. The gunner's team-mate seized the gun, turned it on the Germans and put them to flight. Another of our regiments in the same locality reports that an officer in French helmet and coat approached an outpost guard saying that he was bringing back a detachment of French from farther front and requested the guard not to fire. The detachment proved to be Germans in French helmets and coats.
C. It was reported from headquarters of American 1 Corps at 4 o'clock afternoon, July 18: "I Corps, Tenth Army has taken, to 12 o'clock noon, 4,000 prisoners and 30 guns. The line runs now: MONTS de PARIS---just a little bit S. of SOISSONS---BUZACY---just a little bit W. of VILLE BLAIN---then just E. of BLANZY---OULCHY-la-VILLE---then the line bends back this way."

The line at 1 o'clock afternoon was W. of VAUXBUIN---W. of PLOISY---HILL 157---at PARCY-TIGNY---N. of St-REMY---E. of NEUILLY-ST-FRONT---PRIEZ---COURCHAMPS. One corps reported to have 4,000 prisoners and a large number of cannon. Advances have been made by the Ninth, Fifth and Fourth Armies.

It was reported from French General Headquarters at 5:30 o'clock evening July 18: "The offensive has resulted in a gain of about 12 kilometers and approximately 8,000 prisoners have been captured. 15,000 prisoners are expected by this evening."

American liaison officer at French General Headquarters reported at 1 o'clock morning July 18: "During the day the line fluctuated slightly. The French made counter-attacks at many places between St-AGNAN and VRIGNY. At the end of the day (July 17) the enemy had again advanced towards NANTEUIL and held the eastern edge of Bois de COURTON, giving him a slight gain for the 24 hours. S. of the MARNE, the French had a total gain for the 24 hours the retaking of MONTVOISIN and a slight advance S. E. of there.

In CHAMPAGNE during the day in spite of several German efforts there has been a gain for the French who reoccupied E. of SOUAIN and W. of MASSIGES front line positions evacuated at the time of attack. On the whole the enemy effort was not strong as shown by small number of troops engaged."

Latest reports concerning operations between the AISNE and the MARNE is as follows: "French attack 4:30 o'clock morning July 18 between FONTENOY and FAVEROLLES, complete surprise for enemy. 10,000 prisoners counted, approximately 50 cannon."

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 35th relieves 83d. Eighteenth Army, 105th from Seventh Army takes sector of unidentified division recently occupied by 202d. 10th Landwehr withdrawn, Bavarian 6th Reserve in line, order of battle W. to E. on MARNE in 10th, 36th, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 23d, 200th.

D. 42d Division. "Throughout the night of July 15/16 the enemy aviation was extremely active over our rear areas. Bombs were dropped on roads and towns and the enemy planes fired with machine guns on moving troops and convoys. During the day of the 16th the airplane activity over our forward areas continued. During the evening of the 16th the activity over our rear was renewed but no serious damage has resulted. A low flying plane was brought down by an automatic rifleman about 8 o'clock evening. The aviator was killed. 20 enemy pursuit planes are reported to be in permanent patrol in the sector over our lines to prevent our planes from penetrating the enemy territory. 20 enemy observation balloons have been in ascension on our front.

During the attack various points to a distance of 20 kilometers from the front were bombarded by the enemy. This fire was mainly on roads and cantonments and at midnight July 16/17 shells were still falling in the region of VADENAY. Throughout the day of the 16th one of our positions received a heavy fire of gas shells."

A. Between the AISNE and the MARNE our troops continue to make progress.

C. No change in the line is reported.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 52d from Seventeenth Army relieves 119th, Seventh Army, 3d Reserve from 18th to line, Bavarian 11th, 14th Reserve and 45th Reserve enter line, order of battle AISNE to CHEZY is 241st, 6th Bavarian 11th, 42d, 47th Reserve, 14th Reserve, 115th, 3d Reserve, 40th, Bavarian 10th, 45th Reserve, 78th Reserve. 28th Reserve withdrawn from line, 10th Reserve in line E. of 113th, position of 103d in line is E. of 123d. First Army, Guard Ersatz from Seventeenth Army in line E.
of 3d Guard. Third Army, Guard Cavalry in line E. of 1st. Fifth Army, 32d from Sixth Army relieves 76th Reserve.

D. 2d Division: Reported evening of July 18 that 2d Division attacking on the right of the French Moroccan division, with 1st Division, A. E. F., on its left, has since 4:35 this morning advanced 8 kilometers. It has captured 3,000 prisoners including a division chief of artillery and several battalion commanders, several batteries field pieces, about 100 machine guns, a number of minenwerfer, and holds a front of 3 kilometers on north and south line approximately 2 kilometers west of the SOISSONS--CHATEAU-THIERRY Road. Behaviour of officers and men, following 2 sleepless nights and an all night march last night, with shortage of rations, water and surgical facilities due to being hurried into action before trains could catch up, has done you credit.

26th Division, July 17 to 18: At 4:35 o'clock morning 52d Brigade attacked and took TORCY and BELLEAU. Our bombardment around TORCY and BELLEAU began same time as infantry attack. First objective quickly gained. 26 prisoners through division cage with more coming. During the day our artillery fired on enemy concentrations. Enemy artillery reaction feeble. Our airplanes active. One enemy airplane brought down. Line on left now runs BOURESCLES Station, railroad---GIVRY---TORCY.

20 (67) A. Between the AISNE and the MARNE our troops again broke the enemy's resistance and continued their advance, taking many additional prisoners.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2:15 o'clock afternoon, July 20: "Advance between SOISSONS and CHATEAU-THIERRY continues with rapidity. Germans are continuing withdrawal from S. of the MARNE. French advance 3 kilometers in 2 places in Fifth Army. Prisoners now over 20,000 and more to follow. Over 400 guns now taken.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 187th from Seventeenth Army relieves 39th. Eighteenth Army, 11th from Nineteenth Army relieves 222d. Seventh Army, 79th Reserves from Fourth Army in reserve, 5th Guard in reserve not in line. 14th enters line S. of 202d, 34th enters line S. of 42d, 28th enters line N. of 47th Reserve, 33d enters line N. of 78th Reserve. First Army, 19th Reserve withdrawn. Third Army, 7th Reserve, Bavarian 2d and 33d Reserve withdrawn. Nineteenth Army, 255th in line in its old sector.

D. 3d Division, July 18 to 19: Quiet. German artillery fired 500 rounds, mostly registration and counterbattery. German airplanes and balloons quiet.

26th Division, July 18 to 19: Small hostile counterattack between BELLEAU and BOURESCLES at 2 o'clock morning repulsed. 12 more prisoners taken. Artillery of both sides active. German airplanes quiet.

42d Division, July 17: The day of July 17 was relatively quiet. The enemy artillery maintained a harassing fire along our whole front but it was much lighter than the day before. During the afternoon the enemy renewed his shelling of St-HILAIRE-le-GRAND and the road from SUIPPES to JONCHERY. Our aviators report that the enemy combat planes were fewer and less active than the day before. 4 enemy balloons were brought down in flames and an enemy plane was shot down by French infantry.

III Corps reports: "III Corps continued in action all day yesterday 1st Division in vicinity of PLOISY 4 kilometers S. W. of SOISSONS making gains taking prisoners. 2d Division further S. between VIERZY and TIGNY in making a number of attacks in an effort to pass to the eastward of SOISSONS--CHATEAU-THIERRY High Road. 2 or 3 times it attained the road but could not hold on to it. It retained its stable position between VIERZY and TIGNY and was last night on account of great weariness from 4 day's continuous marching and lighting relieved, taking position in support. Prisoners and guns captured continue to come in. Prisoners now reach for 3 divisions operating together in single corps some 6,000. Both divisions have done well but especially the 2d Division has operated under hard conditions with great spirit.
21 (68) A. Between the AISNE and the MARNE the day has brought fresh successes to our troops. With undiminished vigor and spirit they have continued to force the enemy to yield bitterly contested positions. In the fighting of the past few days more than 6,000 prisoners, more than 100 cannon and many trench mortars and machine guns have been taken by our divisions.

B. Nothing to report.

C. The line as reported at 10:30 o’clock evening, July 20, was: W. front, N. to S.: Ferme CANIVET---MERIN-et-VAUX---BERZY (German)---Ferme ACONIN (ours)---RAPERIE de VILLEMONTAIRE (ours)---PARCY-TIGNY (ours)---Hill 205---PLESSIER-HULEU---GEROMENIL---Hill 184---GRANDMENIL (German). Advance detachments which had passed E. of the SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY Road in the morning were not able to hold. The Germans had many machine guns and were strongly posted. S. of the OURCQ we advanced to NANTEUIL-sur-OURCQ---western edge of WADON Stream---LATILLY (Wood)---Hill E. of SOMMELANS---PETREMONTHERS---Ferme les BRUSSES---BOURESCHELLE Wood. On the eastern front we advanced encountering serious resistance to St-EUPHRAISE (ours)---Bois de la VOLOTT (ours)---BOUILL (ours)---parc of COMMENTREUIL (ours)---CUITRON---MARFAUX---BULLIN (ours)---ESPILLY---NAPES (ours)---all of COURTON Wood (ours)---NEUVILLE-aux-LARRIS (doubtful)---BELVAL (ours)---GRANGE de GRAND PRE (ours)---SARTAS Ferme (ours) we are W. of TINCOURT---REUIL (German). No Germans S. of the river.

It was reported at 10 o’clock morning, July 21: French hold BRASLES---CHATEAU-THIERRY---ROCHEIT Wood---LANONE Wood---PLAISANCE---SIGNAL Plateau between La CROIX and BRENY. Enemy seems to be withdrawing in this area. French are close up to the main road at TAUX Hill N. of TIGNY. They have lost MERIN to heavy hostile counterattack.

It was reported at 10:30 o’clock evening, July 21: Between the ARGONNE and the SUIPPE we have occupied almost entirely our first line positions. E. of the SUIPPE we have advanced our outpost line. Between REIMS and the MARNE there has been heavy fighting today. The line has changed very little today. Along the MARNE at COURCELLES small French detachments have crossed the river. Yesterday S. of the MARNE (left bank) we took a total of over 40 guns and 400 machine guns.

Between the AISNE and the OURCQ the line has changed little. CANIVERT Farm is ours---southern edge of MARVAUX---Bois de COURMELLES---BERZY le SEC (ours)---eastern edge of ACONIN Farm---300 meters W. of BUZANCY. The Germans have retaken VILLEMONTAIRE. We are on the eastern edge of TIGNY; eastern edge of COURDREMAN. Le PLESSIER HULEU is doubtful. S. of that the line is not clearly known. We have continued to advance. We are reported N. of BRENY---along the road toward CHAUDOI---and advancing around and to the N. of the Bois de LUD. We are reaching ARMENTIERES. ROCOURT St-MARTIN is ours---highway to the southern edge of Bois de CHATELET---PIEDI CRUNY---MONT-St-PERE and CHARTEVES.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 83rd relieves 31st, Sixth Army, 16th relieves 25th, 218th not here but in Roumania. Seventh Army, 46th Reserve from Eighteenth Army enters line N. of 28th, 51st Reserve enters line N. of 40th, 5th Guard enters line N. of 4th Ersatz, 78th Reserve withdrawn from line, 10th Landwehr enters line E. of 201st, 50th enters line on army left, E. of 103d. Third Army, 7th Reserve and Bavarian 2d return to line in their recent sectors.

D. Nothing to report.

22 (69) A. Yesterday evening our troops continuing their advance in cooperation with the French S. of the OURCQ crossed the SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY Road between the OURCQ and the CLIGNON and reached the road BEZU---PIEDS---CHARTEVES. Other American units have crossed the MARNE from positions S. of the river and have occupied towns the condition of which shows that the enemy abandoned them in great haste.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10 o’clock morning, July 22: Strong hostile counterattacks regained ROCOURT and BRISOLLES. Front runs PIEDI---Le CHARME---west edge of GRISOLLES---ROCOURT---BRENY. French took 1,000 prisoners yesterday. French have crossed
the MARNE at DORMANS---COURCELLES and MEZY. FERE-en-TARDENOIS is burning. It was reported this afternoon, July 22: French have reoccupied their forces front line E. of River SUIPPES, and have advanced their line W. of it. Between REIMS and the MARNE heavy fighting and no material change. Enemy holds N. bank of the MARNE between REUILLY and CHARTEVES. French line continues approach CHARTEVES---EPIEDS---ROOCOURT and BRENY---MONTGRU---Le PLESSIER HULEU (doubtful)---TIGNY---outskirts of BUZANCY ---COURCELLES---VAUX---PERNANT. Enemy has counterattacked strongly S. of REIMS, and N. of the MARNE.

Changes in German order of battle: 49th Reserve relieves 29th, 52d Reserve withdrawn, sector taken by adjacent units, 31st was not relieved by 83d as reported yesterday. Eighteenth Army, 5th from Seventh Army in reserve. Ninth Army, this new army appears between 18th and Seventh Armies holding front from OISE to OURCQ, on its front it has 105th which had been considered in Eighteenth Army and all of Seventh Army division; from 223d down to 3d Reserve, 20th from Third Army in line S. of 28th, 9th from First Army in line S. of 14th Reserve, 19th Ersatz from Eighteenth Army in line S. of 3d Reserve, 211th from 7th in reserve.

D. 1st Division reports following details concerning its activity on July 18 and 19: "July 18 at 4:30 o'clock morning division assisted by tanks advanced on a 2,000 meter front from COEUVRES to LAVERSINES in liaison with French 153d Division on the N. and the Moroccan division on the S. Our 1st and 2d objectives were taken without trouble. 1st Brigade on the S. in liaison with Moroccan. 153d Division unable to reach final objective due to heavy enfilade machine-gun fire from N. E. At nightfall line approximately CHAUDUN---MISSY-aux-Bois---BREUIL. On 19th line advanced to head of ravine N. of CHAZELLE and PLOISY. Heavy machine-gun and artillery enfilade fire from N. slowed up our left. 2,700 unwounded prisoners, including 1 colonel taken. A large amount of material of all kinds, including a number of field guns, captured."

77th Division reports that as a result of an enemy raid some of our men are missing. 22 (70) A. South of the OURCQ our troops have continued to press the retreating enemy. Our units crossing the MARNE have gained possession of JAULGONNE and the woods to the west.

B. In LORRAINE a hostile raiding party was repulsed by our troops during the night July 22 to 23.

In the THANN Sector, on July 20, our troops carried out a successful raid on the enemy's lines, capturing several prisoners. On the same day one of our patrols in the St-DIE Sector entered a German trench and killed several of the enemy.

C. It was reported at 11:50 o'clock morning, July 23: "The French attacked this morning N. of MONTDIDIER. They have taken so far MAILLY-RANEVAL---SOUVILLERS-MONGIVAL---AUBVILLERS, and many prisoners. S. of SOISSONS the line is VILLEMONTOIRE, which appears to be still held by the Germans---BUZANCY (ours)---TAUX (ours)---HARTENNES-et-TAUX (doubtful). We are in the woods of PLESSIER. Farther S. we have the railway station on the narrow-gauge road E. of La RAILLETTE. We have also GRAND MAISON, S. E. of OULCHY-le-CHATEAU; the latter is not taken but is surrounded on all sides. We are in the woods on the river E. of TRUGNY---then La CENSE a DIEU---then line runs straight to a line one kilometer N. E. of JAULGONNE---then woods N. E. of BARZY-sur-MARNE (we are in these woods)---then PLOY E. of MARCILLY---then to W. of VINCHELLES. Do not know the line definitely in the region of the river. Further signs last night of Germans withdrawing from MARNE pocket. Between noon and 1 o'clock afternoon reported columns of troops seen going northward, also many convoys. The aviation fields of MONT-ST-MARTIN, CENSE-CERINGES and VILLE la DORE appear to be abandoned."

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 233d relieves 243d. Ninth Army, 5th from Eighteenth Army enters line S. of 28th, 241st, Bavarian 11th, 42d, and 115th withdrawn. Seventh Army, 36th withdrawn from MARNE line reenters line between 33d and 5th
Guard, Bavarian 10th withdrawn. Army Detachment A, 4th Guard from Eighteenth Army in reserve.

A document captured by the French indicates that on July 5, 1918, the 14th Reserve Division was in the German Ninth Army and that this army comprised the Groups von Francois (VII Corps Staff), von Staabs and von Watter (XIII Corps Staff). Its front appears to be from the OISE to the OURCQ. It has therefore taken over a front between the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies.

D. American Official Communique Number 69, Section D, July 22, reported some of our men missing from 77th Division as a result of an enemy raid. Further report from this division states that these losses were suffered by one of our patrols.

24 (71) A. Between the OURCQ and the MARNE our troops participated in local combats which restidled in further forcing back the enemy's lines. N. W. of JAULGONNE the enemy's positions were penetrated to a depth of from one to two miles.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 9 o'clock morning, July 24, as a result of the French local attack on July 23 in the MONTDIDIER sector: "Line E. of MONTDIDIER: Eastern point of Bois BELLOI---crossroad one kilometer E. of MALLY-RAINEVAL---western half of Bois de HARPOS---road from BRACHES to AUBVILLERS---eastern edge of AUBVILLERS---northern point of cross of GRIVESNES. There has been no counterattack. There were captured in this attack 1,604 prisoners, of whom 47 are officers, and 2 cannon."

It was reported at 9 o'clock morning, July 24: "Very great enemy artillery activity against Plateau of VINGRE. S. W. of SOISSONS this morning we attacked again, S. of the OURCQ. We have taken ARMENTIERES, Hill 141, Hill 200 E. of COINCY---La GRANGE-aux-Bois---Chateau of MOUCHETON---GRANGE MARIE Ferme---FARY---FRANQUETS Ferme. The resistance seems to be weakened. In CHAMPAGNE we have further reoccupied some of our old advanced line and made prisoners. Last night between REIMS and the MARNE enemy counterattacked at VRIGNY at 9 o'clock. Completely driven back."

It was reported on the morning of July 24: "18 prisoners taken by British 37th Division in raid S. of BUCQUOY. A few prisoners captured also in raid N. W. of ALBERT. British raid in ACHERPENBERG section reached objectives but no prisoners taken. Hostile raid repulsed in ESSARS section. Considerable hostile artillery activity on Second Army front especially about LOCRE. We discharged 2,500 gas cylinders from YPRES sector."

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, July 23: "S. W. of REIMS line runs VRIGNY---MERY Ferme---BOUILLY---MARFAUX. In this sector the British XXII Corps has taken over 1,000 prisoners and 110 machine guns, and recovered 17 75 caliber guns.

It was reported at 8:50 o'clock evening, July 24: "Between the AISNE and the MARNE, American troops are taking part in a general advance. Between JAULGONNE and the TUILLERIE Ferme, they have advanced their line to a depth of two kilometers, in spite of firm resistance. In the vicinity of TRUGNY and EPIEDS, where fresh American troops have now come into line the penetration appears to be deeper, American units having entered the FARY Woods (W. of FORET-de-FERE).

Changes in German order of battle: First Army, Bavarian 8th Reserve Division from reserve to Seventh Army, 80th Reserve Division withdrawn, 6th Cavalry Division from reserve to reserve of Fourth Army. Second Army, 77th Reserve Division from reserve relieves 183d Division in Army Attachment C. Third Army, Guard Cavalry Division withdrawn, Fifth Army, 240th Division from line to Seventh Army, 237th Division from Seventh Army relieves 240th Division. Seventh Army, 10th Division from line to line Ninth Army, on left of 5th Division, 200th Division, 1st Guard Division, 123d Division, 86th Division, Bavarian 12th Division withdrawn, 28th Reserve Division from reserve enters line. Seventeenth Army, Bavarian 5th Reserve Division reenters line probably between 26th Reserve Division and 16th Reserve Division. Eighteenth Army, Bavarian 9th Reserve Division dissolved (making one less division on western front).
D. 77th Division reports further details relative to one of our patrols on July 21, mentioned in American Official Communique Number 70. Section D: “A daylight raiding party, composed of 2 officers, 52 other ranks left GRAND Bois at 2 o'clock afternoon to attack BARRICADE-du-CARREFOUR and secure prisoners. The heavy resistance encountered by our party, the organization of the enemy to meet the attack, the number and location of machine guns and the signals used clearly indicate a preconceived plan of ambush. Before the party started out, a 37-mm. gun was placed in position to neutralize the fire of machine guns if they opened up opposite NEUVILLER or ARC-de-MONTREUX. The crew at this gun was unable to give any assistance to the raiding party owing to the thickness of the woods in which the fight occurred. Our forces were allowed to cross “No Man's Land,” cut the enemy wire and penetrate to the first line trench before the enemy offered any resistance. As they entered the enemy trench a bugle blast was sounded and a rifle shot fired. Immediately after the blast of the bugle the enemy opened fire from the front and left with rifles, machine guns and grenades. Our men replied to this fire with automatic rifles, rifles and hand grenades. At this, the bugle sounded again and machine guns and rifles opened up from the right. 4 enemy machine guns were heard firing, 1 located to the left rear and outside the wire, 2 in front and one to the right. The fight lasted for about 45 minutes when some of the wounded, having lost their firearms returned to our trenches.”

25 (72) A. Between the OURCQ and the MARNE our troops continue to press the enemy. In their advanced eastward, they have taken the southern half of FORET-de-FERE.
   B. Nothing to report.
   C. The communication with our troops has been very difficult on account of wires being down, preventing receipt of detailed reports of the day's operations. A brief report received at 8:45 o'clock evening, July 25, indicated that the line sent in the noon cable was advanced to include all of the southern half of the FORET-de-FERE.

33d Division reported evening, July 25: “Intermittent gas shelling during night of July 24. British 58th Division made a daylight raid at 10 o'clock morning, July 25, capturing 20 prisoners and 4 machine guns.”

Changes in German order of battle: Seventh Army, Bavarian Ersatz Division from reserve of Fifth Army relieves 40th Division, 1st Guard Division from reserve reenters line in sector of Bavarian 6th Reserve Division. Seventeenth Army, 24th Division from reserve to Second Army. Eighteenth Army, 82d Reserve Division withdrawn, its sector taken by extension of front of neighboring units.

D. Report on enemy artillery activity at 5 points occupied by American troops during the week ending July 22: Owing to the German offensive and the Franco-American counteroffensive, definite figures are available for divisions in quiet sectors only.

77th Division: Daily average 112 rounds. Maximum for one day 421 rounds, fired on July 14. Minimum for one day 9 rounds, fired on July 20.

82d Division: Daily average 671 rounds. Maximum for one day 1,088 rounds, fired on July 15. Minimum for one day 383 rounds, fired on July 18.

35th Division: Daily average 275 rounds. Maximum for one day 565 rounds, fired on July 20. Minimum for one day 30 rounds, fired on July 16.

32d Division: Daily average 617 rounds. Maximum for one day 1,880 rounds, fired on July 14. Minimum for one day 30 rounds, fired on July 20.

5th Division: Daily average 101 rounds. Maximum for one day 505 rounds, fired on July 19. Minimum for one day 0 rounds on July 15.

26 (73) A. Yesterday between the OURCQ and the MARNE our troops captured Le CHARMEL. In the region of VERDILLY one of our aviators shot down a hostile machine.
   B. Further reports have been received of the fighting which took place from July 21 to 23 in the region N. E. of CHATEAU-THIERRY. American troops played an important part in the struggle, which ended in our line being advanced to a point about five miles
from the town. The enemy fought rearguard actions with great stubbornness, defending the ground foot by foot, and using large numbers of machine guns. His resistance retarded, but could not stop, our advance, and on the 22d we captured EPIEDS and TRUGNY. The next day the struggle became more bitter. The Germans counterattacked with violence. EPIEDS changed hands four times, and remained German; TRUGNY changed hands three times and remained ours. One of our divisions up to the evening of July 23, had captured three cannon, one trench mortar, 15 machine guns and large quantities of ammunition and other materiel. On the 24th, our troops returned to the attack with vigor and drove the enemy out of EPIEDS and back into the FORET-de-FERE, four miles beyond.

C. It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, July 26: "Official report French First, Third, Tenth and Sixth Armies is: Some fire of concentration to the S. of OULCHY-le-CHATEAU. On the front of the Fifth and Fourth Armies there has been some activity but very moderate. The French are in possession of Hill 240 to the W. of VRIGNY. This hill is regarded as quite important. The French have also gained possession of PORT-a-BINSON. They tried to put a bridge across there last evening and failed, but now they are in possession of the village, it is likely the bridge can be put across. Yesterday they took possession of REUIL and put a bridge across the MARNE at that place. Only few prisoners have been taken today. The explanation for the quiet on the front of the Tenth and Sixth Armies is simple that the battle has now continued for 11 days and the troops are tried out.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 12th relieves 81st Reserve. Eighteenth Army, 84th withdrawn. Ninth Army, the line of the Ninth Army from W. to E. now appears to be 105th, 223d, 15th, 202d, 53d Reserve, 14th, 6th, 34th, 28th, 46th, 20th, 5th, 10th, 47th Reserve, 14th Reserve, 9th Reserve, 3d Reserve, 19th Ersatz, 51st Reserve. Seventh Army, 24th from reserve of Second Army enters line S. of 36th, 87th withdrawn, 1st from line in Third Army enters line N. of 28th Reserve. The line of the Seventh Army from W. to E. now appears to be Bavarian Ersatz, 45th Reserve, 33d, 36th, 24th Reserve, 201st, 5th Guard, 10th Landwehr, 23d, 1st Guard, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 37th, 113th, 10th Reserve, 2d Guard, 195th, 22d, 50th, 103d, 240th, 28th Reserve, 1st, Bavarian 8th Reserve. First Army Guard Ersatz from line to Seventh Army.

D. Nothing to report.

27 (74) A. Between the OURCQ and the MARNE the enemy's resistance has broken down. Our troops with those of our Allies are in pursuit.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 4:55 o'clock afternoon, July 27: "The French Fifth Army has advanced to a line from CHAUMUZY to CHAMPLAT. Also on the line from BELVAL to MONTIGNY. The French have CHATILLON-sur-MAREN, VANDIERES, a point S. of La MALMAISON. They have the town of VERNEUIL. They are N. of VINCHELLES. From the last point indicated, the line runs due N. to S. of RONCHERES, thence N. W. passing to the E. and N. of COURMONT. Patrols are on HILL 227, N. of VANDIERES. Cavalry patrols are S. of La MAQUERELLE. German infantry and cavalry column is on Road CHATILLON-ROMIGNY. Head of column entering ROMIGNY. Another column is entering VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY; that column is entering city named from the E. Another column heads from VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY to VEZILLY. The French are in possession of all the N. bank of the MARNE."

It was reported at 6:25 o'clock evening, July 27: "Latest reports indicate infantry line is as follows: From a point 500 meters W. of BOUILLY---through CHAUMUZY---E. of CHAMPLAT---along S. edge of Bois de la COHETTE to CUISLES. Cavalry is in contact with enemy on line: ROMIGNY---VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY."

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, July 27: "Our infantry line is as follows: Beginning at OULCHY-le-CHATEAU to NANTEUIL---follow the railroad to N. of BRUYERES---S. E. across the road, follow the road parallel to near FERE-en-TARDENOIS---then N. of FERE-en-TARDENOIS---and along the OURCQ S. E. to the parallel of the longitudes (junction of the longitudes)---CHAMPVOISY---thence E. to Les ROSIERS---then N. E. to
St-GEMME---then on due E. to the Bois de la COHETTE---thence N. E. passing to the E. of CHAMPLAT---continuing N. E. to BOUILLY. The cavalry line is as follows: Commencing at BLIGNY---S. to VILLE-en-TARDENOIS---W. of ROMIGNY---VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY---FORET de BARBULLOM. The expectation is that the retirement will continue to the VESLE and ARDRE Rivers. Bridges are reported to have been blown up along the OURCQ in front of RONCHERES, CIERGES and SERGY."

D. Nothing to report.

28 (75) A. North of the MARNE our troops continue the pursuit of the enemy. In spite of his determined efforts to delay their progress by rearguard actions, they have crossed the OURCQ and have taken the towns of SERINGES-et-NESLES, SERGY, and RONCHERES.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 9:20 o'clock, evening, July 28, that the line was as follows: "Beginning at the city of REIMS, the line passes N. of ORMES to Hill 240, which is a very important hill---thence S. passing through Ste-EUPHRAISE---then W. of BOUILLY---thence E. and S. of BLIGNY---then the line runs approximately parallel to the wagon road---passing to the S. of VILLE-en-TARDENOIS. It then continues approximately parallel to the road, crossing to the N. Side of the road S. of ROMIGNY, passing to the N. of St-GEMME to La BRILLERIE and to La GRANGE. From La GRANGE, the line turns N., passing to the E. of RONCHERES---then N. of COURMONT from there following the line of the OURCQ River---passing to the N. of FERE-en-TARDENOIS---due W. to WALLEE---thence N. W., passing to the N. of BUTTE CHALMONT (Hill 180). (The French have that entire hill, which is very important.) Crossing the National Highway and passing N. E. of Le PLESSIER continuing N., very nearly parallel to the National Highway to ROZIERES, thence N. W. passing on the N. W. side of BERZY and through VAUXBUIN to ROUEN.

D. Nothing to report.

29 (76) A. Beyond the line of the OURCQ heavy counterattacks made by fresh troops of the enemy have resulted in severe fighting. SERGY, taken by our troops yesterday, after having changed hands four times remains in our possession.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 12:45 o'clock afternoon, July 29: "The line is now reported to be: ROUEN (W. of SOISSONS)---VAUXBUIN---BERZY---BUZANCY (German)---TAUX (German)---HARTENNES (German)---woods of PLESSIER (German)---Hill 206---GRAND ROZOY---WALLEE---SAPONAY (German)---SERINGES-et-NESLES---SERGY---Hill 188 (due S. of SERGY)---RONCHERES---La GRANGE---St-GEMME---VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY (German)---ROMIGNY (German)---VILLE-en-TARDENOIS (German)---BLIGNY (half French and half German)---to the X. of Ste-EUPHRAISE---HILL 240---VRIGNY---N. of ORMES---REIMS. About 250 prisoners have been taken today. The French 2d Bureau says, 'No new defensive line can be seen on the plateau from either bank of the ARDRE. N. of MONTDIDIER the night was calm. Number of prisoners taken yesterday in the attack on BUZANCY was 200. A good deal of fighting around the village of SERGY. It was taken and lost four times. Finally it remained in the hands of the Americans. Farther to the S. there was violent counterattacking by the 4th Guard Division on the Americans. The attack was stopped with very heavy losses to the enemy. The front remains unchanged.'"

It was reported 4 o'clock afternoon, July 28: "Captures of the French Fifth Army S. W. of REIMS since July 20, 1,750 prisoners, 17 guns. In addition 71 French guns have been recovered."

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 6th Cavalry relieves 1st Landwehr. Sixth Army, 18th Reserve relieves 1st Guard Reserve. Seventh Army, 27th from First Army relieves some elements of 45th Reserve.

D. It was reported at 9:15 o'clock evening, July 28: "From 42d Division. This morning by 9 o'clock we had reached the objectives of the day, from Ridge 212, which is 500 meters E. of SERGY to the crossroads 1 kilometer S. E. of FERE-en-TARDENOIS. The crossroads was covered by American machine-gun fire. The town of SERINGES-et-NESLES,
NESLES, and SERGY were later taken after a vigorous action. The units had crossed the river at 5 o'clock this morning. We have organized from a point a little S. of SERINGES-et-NESLES to a point just S. of NESLES, and have detachments which are mopping up the three towns. We are encountering heavy machine-gun fire also machine-gun fire from airplanes extending back as far as the FORET de FERE. There has also been artillery fire directed on the areas occupied."

3d Division reported at 8:50 o'clock afternoon, July 29: "Advancing N. of RONCHERES on CIERGES."

It was reported at 9:20 o'clock evening, July 29: "Our troops which had reached NESLES and SERINGES-et-NESLES had advanced beyond the units on either side of them, consequently they were exposed to flanking fire and forced to withdraw. The Germans then counterattacked using the 4th Guard Division. SERGY was taken and retaken about four times but finally remained ours and appears to be firmly held. At 3 o'clock this afternoon our troops were advancing once more on NESLES and SERINGES-et-NESLES acting in conjunction with the units on the right and on the left."

30 (77) A. On the line of the OURCQ the enemy has renewed his counterattacks to force back our advancing troops. In severe fighting we have repulsed his attacks and improved our position.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 12:35 o'clock afternoon, July 30: "Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE River the enemy attempted two raids preceded by a violent bombardment on the region on ANTHEUIL and the VAUGENLIEU Ferme. They have been repulsed. Artillery more active than usual. Between the OISE and the AISNE, two attempts by the enemy N. W. of TRACY-le-VAL were stopped by our fire."

Between 10 and 10:30 o'clock evening, July 29, there was lively action of the artillery in the region of St-MIHIEL. In a raid made towards EMBERMENIL we took several prisoners. The Americans repulsed a hostile attack in the region of SENONES. Enemy aviation rather active in the region of BACCARAT and LUNEVILLE."

It was reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, July 30: "On the left our line at 10 o'clock morning ran from Bois de la TERRE a l'Or (S. E. of Bois du PLESSIER)---S. of GRAND ROZOY past the railroad station at BEUGNEUS---through an aviation field E. of BEUGNEUX and across Hill 137 (138). We are before SAPONAY and CAYENNE Ferme, SERINGES-et-NESLES is held by us, also NESLES and SERGY. We have not gained CIERGES by 2 o'clock afternoon but HILL 212 is in our hands. We do not appear to have penetrated far into the Bois de CIERGES or the Bois MEUNIERE. Enemy resistance on the line SAPONAY to Bois MEUNIERE reported stubborn and no sign of further retreat on his part. Evidence at hand that this is his main line of resistance."

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, July 30: "Region of the OURCQ. We continued to press the enemy on the right side of the OURCQ. The struggle was hard, the enemy defending stubbornly the points of support which command the valley. The station of FERE-en-TARDENOIS and the CAYENNE Ferme remain in our possession. We lost SERINGES-et-NESLES and reoccupied the MEURCY Ferme, SERGY, HILL 212, and the retangular wood about one kilometer N. of RONCHERES. From that point the line runs TELEGRAPHE DETRUIT---S. edge of Bois MEUNIERE---La BRILLERIE---NEUVILLE CHATEAU---the dirt road from NEUVILLE to BERTHENAY. S. W. of REIMS, after a violent preparation, the enemy executed during the morning several attacks between Ste-EUPHRAISE and the MONT de BLIGNY. We hold the front 500 meters N. W. of Ste-EUPHRAISE-VILERS Ferme, the road crossing one kilometer N. of BLIGNY (on the road BLIGNY-AUBILLY) and the sumit of the MONT de BLIGNY. In this last point we made several prisoners and took six machine guns. In CHAMPAGNE the enemy artillery was very active on all of the front, firing on our batteries and on our first lines, especially to the S. of Hill 181. To the N. of PERTHES, after a violent bombardment, the enemy succeeded in forcing back slightly our advanced post on a front of 500 meters."
Changes in German order of battle: Ninth Army, 76th Reserve from reserve of Fifth Army relieves elements of 46th Reserve in line; 50th Reserve from reserve of Seventeenth Army relieves 20th; 28th, believed to have been withdrawn, appears to be still in line. Seventh Army, 26th from First Army, relieves 45th Reserve; 4th Guards, from reserve of Army Detachment A in line. First Army, Bavarian 12th from reserve into line; 19th Reserve from reserve into line. Third Army, Bavarian 1st withdrawn from line.

D. Nothing to report.

31 (78) A. Last night on the line of the OURCQ the enemy again renewed his counter-attacks. In the region of SERINGES-et-NESLES assaulting parties which temporarily penetrated our lines were cut off by our machine-gun fire and their members killed, wounded or captured. S. W. of the Bois MEUNIERE our troops, after severe bayonet fighting, drove the enemy before them into the woods. We have taken the Bois de GRIMPETTES, and have reached the village of CIERGES.

In LORRAINE and in ALSACE hostile raiding parties were repulsed with loss.

B. The following is a translation of an order from German G. H. Q. transmitted by the First Army to the Schmettow Corps, June 10, 1918: "In order to hinder the formation of an American army in France, it is important that the American troops engaged along the front be struck as hard as possible. It is intended to use these troops as a nucleus for new formation. Lundendorff."

C. Nothing to report.

D. It was reported at 8 o'clock evening, July 31: "Situation today SERINGES-et-NESLES which had been captured by the Germans was retaken by American troops. Line at 7 o'clock morning extended from S. of CAYENNE Ferme to HILL 184, inclusive, SERINGES, inclusive and S. of SERGY. At 11:30 o'clock morning Germans evacuated CIERGES which we now hold and our elements had reached S. border of clearing in Bois MEUNIERE and between that clearing and HILL 226. Our patrols were on the east border of Bois MEUNIERE. Reported desperate attempts to penetrate our lines near CAYENNE Terme in addition to the temporary penetration at SERINGES-et-NESLES."

29th Division reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, July 31: "Small enemy raiding party repulsed in GUEBWILLER sector."

35th Division reported 5:45 o'clock morning, July 31: "Enemy barrage midnight to 1:15 o'clock morning, July 31, followed by enemy raid, which was repulsed, the enemy leaving one of their party dead in our trenches."

It is proving very difficult to keep up communication with the troops engaged in the battle. Wires are either broken, or so congested that delay is very great. Outside of very brief telephone messages, information is obtained by liaison officers who sent it back in the form of letters to these headquarters by courier. Liaison officer now at front sends in following informal reports. From I Corps Headquarters, 1 p.m., July 28: "At 9:45 we reached the western outskirts of NESLES. SERGY was taken. NESLES is reported as taken. The Boche made a clean get-away over the OURCQ. In an advance of 8 kilometers we got only 4 prisoners. FERE-en-TARDENOIS is doubtful. The French are attempting to flank the Germans to the N. of the OURCQ by advancing on the high plateau country on the upper part of the river. The general line is on the northern edge of the Highroad SERINGES-et-NESLES to NESLES. The Germans are putting down a barrage around FERE-en-TARDENOIS. We hold here a front of 4 kilometers."

The following from Headquarters of the 42d Division, 3:30 p.m., July 28: "At 10 p.m., July 27 some battalions attempted to cross the OURCQ but were driven back by heavy fire of artillery and lighter arms. Starting at 5 a.m., July 28 they entirely crossed the river and after vigorous fighting took SERINGES-et-NESLES, NESLES and SERGY. We are mopping up those towns. By 9 a.m. we had obtained the objectives of the day set for us by the army that is a line from 212 (1/2 kilometer E. of SERGY) to the crossroads which are 1 kilometer S. E. of FERE-en-TARDENOIS. The crossroads were covered only by machine-gun fire."
At present our line extends from point 8/10 kilometers S. of SERINGES-et-NESLES to a point a similar distance S. of NESLES. We are encountering heavy machine-gun fire, and machine-gun fire from airplanes. Up to 10:30 there was heavy artillery fire directed on the heights occupied by the division, on the area immediately south of the OURCQ and the N. E. fringe of the FORET-de-FERE. Since 10:30 this fire has dwindled but is still effective. No calibers heavier than 150's are reported.

Our divisional artillery assisted by the 51st F. A. Brigade has been active since daylight and is said to have preponderance. The corps artillery is moving forward.

We are informed by prisoners that the 201st Div. and the 4th G. D. are immediately in front of us. The latter entered the line July 27 after 5 days rest. The 201st Division is under orders to withdraw with stubborn rearguard action. The 4th G. D. has apparently more explicit orders to hold and delay our advance.

Enemy columns back of FERE-en-TARDENOIS and SERINGES, beyond our artillery range, have been reported since noon moving in a northeasterly direction.

The command is in good condition and, having consolidated its line, is preparing to advance as soon as orders are received. Liaison with the units to the right and left and within the division has not been interrupted at any time. We are holding a front of 5 kilometers and have a striking front of 2 kilometers.

An Alsatin deserter reports that the Germans will make a stand at the VESLE.

The division has been complimented by the army commander for the speed and energy of its advance and by the commander of the - French corps for the way it has enabled the French division on the right to advance.

Following from Headquarters 3d Division, 5:30 p.m.: "There was no further advance last night. This morning we started from Le CHARMEL. When the advance guard was near RONCHERES we gave artillery preparation for the final attack. The Germans had trenches across the road at the south end of RONCHERES. They delivered machine-gun fire from a wood N. E. of RONCHERES and artillery fire from the Bois de CIERGES. RONCHERES was taken at 3:30 p. m. The Germans have been shelling the CHARMEL-CHARTEVES Road and also bombed it by airplanes at 4:30. Our artillery has been active and this afternoon annihilated a German company. The 3d Battalion of the 4th Inf. took RONCHERES.

The American has relieved the - French and has a brigade in line on our left."

Same officer reports July 29 the following from Headquarters 28th Division:

At 11 p. m., July 27 the 55th Brigade (109th and 110th Infantry) took over the sector of the French - Division. The 56th Brigade remains in reserve at the disposition of the corps. The 55th Brigade was ordered to attack at 5 a. m., July 28 across the OURCQ. On reaching the river it was found that bridges were necessary. These were constructed and on the afternoon of July 28, 2 battalions crossed and made some progress. The front covered was 4 1/2 to 5 kilometers. The brigade was in liaison with the American 42d Division on the left.

This morning we made further progress but we are held up by the inability of the American 3d Division to advance. This division is held up by the enemy's resistance in the woods N. of RONCHERES. The line is 1 kilometer S. of SERGY and parallel to the OURCQ. The enemy's batteries are very active and are shelling COURMONT with gas, shrapnel and high explosive.

From the Headquarters of the 3d Division he reports July 30: "We hold the line of the OURCQ and if the enemy expected to hold that line we have him flanked. Since passing RONCHERES we have been held up by machine-gun and minenwerfer fire from the Bois de GRIMPETTES (a small wood N. of RONCHERES) and may take a couple of days to make progress through the Bois de MEUNIERE. The relief commences tonight. We are in liaison with the American 28th Division on our left."

This morning the 4th Inf. took 6 machine guns and 1 minenwerfer. At 7 a. m. today one company of the 4th Inf. attacked, without artillery preparation the Bois de
GRIMPETTES. The enemy still holds the wood with machine guns and minenwerfer. The line is from V in VERT (N. of VILLERS-du-FERE) along the N. and E. bank of the river to SERGY, then to N. and E. of SERGY and again parallel with the river to CARANDA Min. (W. of CIERGES) thence to N. E. of RONCHERES. Last night we caught a messenger dog carrying a message from a section leader to a captain. The message gave the disposition of the enemy's forces."

From Headquarters 42d Division, July 30:

"We had to fall back from NESLES and SERINGES-et-NELES on account of flanking fire especially from Hill 184 (W. of SERINGES at NESLES). The American 28th Division was also unable to keep up with us. The 4th G. D. which had orders to hold at all costs attacked between 8:30 and 10:30 last night. It was repulsed. SERGY became "No Man's Land." It was taken and retaken 4 or 5 times. About noon today we took it, as we hope, once and for all. At present our right is advancing on NESLES jointly with the 28th and our left on SERINGES jointly with the French. We have MEURCY Farm. Besides much shelling, we have been bombed and fired upon by airplanes."

"American 37 and 75 guns are now going up with the infantry in the front line to shoot up the machine-gun nests. This seems to be producing excellent effects and to disturb the Boche. We are using heavy artillery preparation before all our infantry attacks. Our artillery seems to have preponderance and the corps artillery is shelling positions 6 to 8 miles in rear of the Boche lines."

"The airplane situation is not quite so good, but one American squadron with us is doing good work and we are getting valuable results from use of the panel system of signalling in which this division has been well trained. The Boche planes are good at spotting our batteries and at firing on our infantry and convoys and this reacts on the morale of our infantry. Today one of our machine gun companies fired on some of these planes and stopped them."

The 28th Division report of July 30 was: "We have progressed about 500 yards. Our line is one kilometer N. of the OURCQ. We are progressing slowly, being held up by machine-gun fire from the Bois MEUNIERE on our right. At 3:40 o'clock this morning we took the Bois GRIMPETTES (N. of RONCHERES) but had to retire from it later on account of this same machine-gun fire. This afternoon we expect to go forward again in conjunction with the 32d after preparation by the artillery of the 3d Division. There is no indication that the Germans have a prepared line in rear. German artillery fire was heavy during the night around and back of CHARMEL but is not serious now. The enemy is fighting strong rearguard actions and we expect him to fall back again. No captures of prisoners or materiel have been reported. Our casualties about 400 for the 24 hours."

The 42d Division reports: "Yesterday at 6 p. m. the 166th Inf. took SERINGES-et-NELES. The enemy resisted strongly with artillery and machine guns. Hand-to-hand fighting is reported. During the night we repulsed 2 hostile counterattacks. At 9 a. m. today the 84th Brigade started to advance on NESLES (which we did not reach yesterday). At 1 p. m. reported that the 165th Infantry has reached the hill N. E. of MEURCY Farm and are in touch with the 167th Inf. on their right. The line goes from Hill 212, skirts around NESLES, then E. to SERINGES and HILL 184. There are no definite signs that the enemy has a prepared line of resistance in this neighborhood but his resistance is thickening."

"Our wounded for 24 hours number 750, half from artillery and half from smaller arms. About 14% are mortally wounded. Dead not yet counted."

August

1 (79) A. On the line of the OURCQ vigorous local actions, arising from attacks made by our troops and counterattacks launched by the enemy, have occurred at several points. We have taken the village of CIERGES and advanced beyond it. The situation in this vicinity is otherwise unchanged.

B. Nothing to report.
It was reported at 10:35 o'clock evening, July 31: "In the action late this afternoon we took Bois MEUNIERE, CIERGES, probably HILL 220, N. E. of SERGY. The line apparently runs as follows: Southern edge of VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY---one kilometer S. of GOUSSANCOURT---the northern edge of Bois MEUNIERE---ridge 500 meters N. of CIERGES---HILL 212---HILL 220---ridge 800 meters S. of NESLES---then SERINGES-et-NESLES---HILL 184---HILL S. of station of FERE---then 300 meters S. of SAPONAY."

It was reported at 11:10 o'clock morning, August 1: "To the W. of MONTDIDIER the enemy launched between 3 and 3:30 o'clock morning a barrage of 77 and 105 caliber shells on our advanced positions in the region of PERENNES, ABBEQUÉ and ROYAUQUET. No infantry action. Enemy avions dropped bombs on GENTELLES. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE the night was without incident. Rather large artillery activity on the left side of the sector, in particular in the region of GODENVILLERS and Le PLOYRON, W. of MAIGNESEM. To the S. of the AISNE, HILL 205 (E. of GRAND ROZOY) was crossed at 7:30 o'clock morning and CRAMOISELLE was taken towards 8 o'clock. The attack continues in progress. Two companies of English artillery are already on the slopes to the N. of GRAND ROZOY-BEUGNEUX. To the S. of the OURCQ the situation is unchanged except for slight progression of Americans to N. of MEURCY Ferme, and S. W. of SAPONAY. We made about 40 prisoners. Hostile artillery has reacted but slightly on the whole, except by gas in the region of VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY. Very great activity of hostile air bombardment."

"This morning, after a violent bombardment lasting 30 minutes, the enemy attacked MONT-de-BLIGNY at 5 o'clock. He was repulsed everywhere. Hostile artillery continues active in the region of PROSNES, and in the sector of SOUAIN. Violent harassing fire on the batteries to the E. and W. of REIMS."

"E of the MEUSE the enemy executed three raids, in the region of FOUR-de-PARIS, on our parallels between the MEUSE and BEAUMONT, and near the woods of CHAUME. Hostile air bombardment in the regions of TOUL and COMMERCY."

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 4th from reserve relieves 13th Reserve in line. Ninth Army, 211th relieves 241st; 34th, 14th Reserve, 3d Reserve withdrawn from line: The line of the Ninth Army from W. to E. now appears to be: 105th, 223d, 15th, 102d, 53d Reserve, 14th, 211th, 6th, 76th Reserve, 5th, 50th Reserve, 9th, 19th Ersatz, 51st Reserve. Seventh Army, Guard Ersatz from reserve reinforces line; 216th from Fourth Army enters line; 1st Guard withdrawn; 113th relieves 2d Guard; the line of the Seventh Army from W. to E. now appears to be: Guard Ersatz, Bavarian Ersatz, 33d, 26th, 36th Reserve, 24th Reserve, 201st, 4th Guard, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 5th Guard, 10th Landwehr, 23d, 216th, 200th, 37th, 10th Reserve, 113th, 195th, 22d, Bavarian 12th, 103d, 28th Reserve, 240th, 1st, Bavarian 8th Reserve. First Army, 3d Guard and 199th withdrawn. Third Army, Bavarian 1st and Bavarian 2d withdrawn.

32d Division reported at 10:20 o'clock evening, July 31: "The 64th Brigade supported by the 3d Divisional Artillery advanced under strong machine-gun opposition from its last reported position to CIERGES. Later it withdrew to northern edge of GRIMPETTES Wood, which it now holds. The 63d Brigade is engaged in relieving the American 28th Division."

28th Division reported 10:20 o'clock evening, July 31: "One brigade of this division, together with unit on our right, attacked the enemy at dawn after short intensive artillery preparation. Heavy machine-gun fire from woods on right flank prevented progress. Another attack prepared like the first was made at 2:30 o'clock afternoon. An advance was made; and 50 prisoners were captured. SERGY was taken by the unit on our left. Our lines were held on high ground S. of the town on account of danger from gas attack. Our casualties were light, considering the nature of the operations. Two bridges have been completed over the OURCQ. Friendly artillery is very active; enemy artillery much less active. No enemy balloons seen, friendly aviation active, enemy aviation active."
Liaison officer at the front reported 6 o'clock evening, August 1: "In the attacks made by the 42d Division yesterday afternoon, no ground was gained. They were held up mostly by machine guns. The attack made by the other American divisions gave them entire possession of CIERGES and of a narrow strip of ground to the N. In the 42d sector the fighting was quiet on the right of the sector and on the left of the sector the enemy shelled our position with 77's and with high explosive shells of large caliber.

82d Division reported 5:15 o'clock evening, August 1, that as result of small hostile raid in LORRAINE this morning one of our men is missing.

28th Division reported 5:45 o'clock evening, August 1: "For July 31. Number of prisoners taken increased to about 75. Brigade from front line completed movement to its new position in second line. Much aerial activity by enemy from 9 to 12 o'clock evening. Shells dropped in towns along N. bank of the MARNE. No casualties reported. Friendly antiaircraft and machine guns active."

It was reported at 7:50 o'clock evening, August 1: "Situation today: heavy shelling and bombing of region between SERGY and La CENSE last night. Considerable movement of men and tanks reported in vicinity of FORET de NESLES. We have taken CAYENNE Ferme and advanced our line W. of SERGY to N. of Les JOMBLETS Woods and MEUNIERE Woods. Aviation fields reported as being evacuated from between the VESLES and AISNE. There is also a northward movement to artillery."

It was reported by Commanding General, 32d Division, July 31: "The attack made by 32d Division yesterday on GRIMPETTES Woods was a complete success. The woods were taken and the troops advanced to the village of CIERGES, which, however, they did not occupy during the night, because it had been heavily gas shelled.

On our right from the MEUNIERE Woods came a heavy machine-gun fire holding back the right flank which was refused and faced in the direction of these woods, the French on our right having been unable to advance through these woods on account of wire entanglements and machine guns found in the edge. During the night our troops were counterattacked from the MEUNIERE Woods and at one place broke through our line where it joined the French for a short period. One of our companies was sent forward and counterattacked with the bayonet and in connection with our troops on the left completely routed the counterattack of the Germans and killed many of them. The number is not yet known, but the counterattack was completely routed by bayonet fighting in the woods which lasted something like a half hour.

Information was received from a deserter during the night that the enemy was withdrawing all of his heavy artillery under orders during the night. This is confirmed by the fact that no heavy artillery fire was upon us last night. The withdrawal is also confirmed this morning by the French 4th Division on our right which is advancing through these woods. The following information just received: An immense amount of materiel and equipment abandoned indicating the has retirement from Bois de GRIMPETTES and Bois-de- CIERGES: Two 77's in Bois de GRIMPETTES, 8 machine guns in Bois-de-CIERGES, together with rifles, packs and other individual equipment about every three meters."

"On the whole our men are behaving magnificently; we had two officers killed; the number of enlisted men not yet known but something in the neighborhood of 200 casualties, not many serious."

Staff officer of 42d Division reported July 31: "Yesterday we did not reach NESLES. During the night the hostile artillery and machine-gun fire threatened an attack on our whole front but the attack came only around SERINGES where some of the enemy filtered through. These were cut off on the N. edge of the town by machine-gun fire, surrounded and mopped up. Numbers of killed and prisoners not reported. Otherwise, the night was fairly quiet. At 4:30 o'clock this afternoon the battalion on our right was to advance in conjunction with the troops on their right which have been behind us in advancing. Enemy artillery has several times cut our wires so no reports are in. We think that the Germans have withdrawn their artillery and are falling back on our right but on our left. We are not trying at present to advance our left."
A. Yesterday on the line of the OURCQ our troops in hard fighting captured Hill 230 south of COULONGES and the woods east of the hill. This morning the enemy relinquishing his efforts to stop our advance, commenced to fall back with our troops in close pursuit. The fire of our artillery has interrupted his communications and he is attempting to destroy large quantities of materiel. Our advance which has already progressed to a depth of five miles continued.

Last night our aviators successfully bombed the railroad station and yards at CONFLANS. Numerous hits were made causing several fires and one large explosion. All of our machines returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 12:25 o'clock afternoon, August 2: "Germans reported retiring on each side of FERE-en-TARDENOIS. Still resisting strongly immediately north of this town. Following reported from Chief of Staff, 42d Division: 'French on left have advanced to CHATEAU des BRUYERES. Left of 42d Division abreast of them on the west side of FORET de NESLES. 42d Division now advancing through FORET de NESLES.' French report as follows: We hold line through wood north of VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY--FORZY--AIGUIZY--two kilometers north of ROMIGNY, one kilometer north of VILLE-en-TARDENOIS. We hold SAPONAY and La RAPERIE and CRAMAILLE. Cavalry are at HILL 124 (near west edge of SAPONAY Woods)--HILL 139--southeast corner of Bois d'ARCY--RUGNY--MONT JOUR--LAUNOY and northern edge of woods east of LAUNOY--DROIZY Woods and HARTENNES are not yet entirely cleaned up. Impression is that the Germans are giving way on this side. We have reached northeast corner of Bois MEUNIERE and have taken MURFONTAINE Ferme and the southern end of Bois de VEZILLY."

It was reported at 3:35 o'clock afternoon, August 2: "The enemy is retiring. We have passed beyond MERCIN-et-VAUX (near SOISSONS), We are beyond VIGNOLLES--CHACRISE---MAAST-et-VIOYAY---ARCY Ste-RESTITUE---the old chateau of FERE (north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS). We are now on the hill northeast of NESLES. We have passed beyond VEZILLY. It was reported also that we have advanced on the eastern portion of the pocket, but nothing definite is known. The German division headquarters, which have been south of the VESLE, have been moved up to the AISNE. In all this region large fires have been seen, apparently due to destruction of depots and villages."

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, August 2: "Late afternoon. The Germans are continuing their withdrawal. From reports late this afternoon we hold the following line: MERCIN-et-VAUX---MONTAGNE de PARIS---one kilometer east of VAUXBUIN--the west edge of BELLEAU---SEPTMONTS---ECUIRY---CHACRISE---NAMPTUEL---the east edge of VIOLAINE--BRANGES. We have elements in LOUPEIGN and MAREUIL-en-DOLE. The cavalry is entering DRAVEGNY---VILLONE---ABBAYE d'IGNY. We are north of LAGERY and north of LHERY. Our patrols are at the south edge of Bois-le-MOINE. Our aerial reconnaissances over the plateau northeast of AMBRIEF report no German troops on the plateau. All bridges over the AISNE between SOISSONS and the VESLE River have been destroyed. This is taken to mean that the Germans will retire at least to the VESLE.

8 o'clock evening. We have BILLY-sur-ALSNE. Our reconnaissances are approaching VENIZEL on the river. Our troops are in the main square before the cathedral of SOISSONS.

10 o'clock evening. North of the MARNE the situation at 6 o'clock evening was as follows: The infantry was at LAGERY and LHERY---Ferme des MALADES---TRAMERY---POILLY---le Bois du GROS Ferme---AUBILLY---La Ferme de MERY---Court de l'ARBRE (north of AUBILLY). We advanced a little west of HILL 240. Our cavalry was at the northeast point of Bois le MOINE. BROUILLET is German. The woods southeast of BROUILLET is held by enemy machine guns. Our cavalry is in front of FAVEROLLES which is burning but held by the enemy. Our cavalry is at HILL 190, north of TRESILON.

In CHAMPAGNE a counterattack by us during the day gave us after a sharp fight the Bois GUILLAUME and Le SULTANE northeast of St-HILAIRE, with 30 prisoners and 10
machine guns. The enemy artillery reacted strongly on our advance lines. Calm on the rest of the front."

Changes in German order of battle: Seventh Army, 45th Reserve in line north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS; 5th Guard withdrawn from line.

D. 28th Division reported at 3:30 o'clock afternoon, August 2: "Much aerial activity during the night. Bombs were dropped in JAULGONNE and aerial machine guns used against our troops. One enemy plane was reported brought down in vicinity of VENT JEAN GUILLAUME by our antiaircraft and machine-gun fire."

3 (81) A. The full fruits of victory in the counteroffensive begun so gloriously by Franco-American troops on July 18 were reaped today when the enemy who met his second great defeat on the MARNE was driven in confusion beyond the line of the VESLE.

The enemy, in spite of suffering the severest losses, has proved incapable of stemming the onslaught of our troops fighting for liberty side by side with French, British, and Italian veterans. In the course of the operations, 8,400 prisoners and 133 guns have been captured by our men alone.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 6:56 o'clock evening, August 3: "We hold SOISSONS and a line extending along the VESLE to between BRAINE and BAZOCHE. From there to REIMS at 4 o'clock afternoon the line was generally within about three kilometers of the VESLE. Center has been delayed on account of destruction of bridges and encountering of machine guns of rearguard."

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, August 3: "North of MONTDIDIER calm. The Germans have abandoned their first lines west of the AVRE. The front at 4 o'clock afternoon is HILL 115 (which is 500 meters east of GRIVESNES) and the next point 500 meters east of La CHAPPELLE St-AGNAN--the small wood southeast of MONTAGNE-sous-MONTDIDIER---HILL 97 (northeast of MENIL-St-GERCRI)--HILL 60 (800 meters southeast of MENIL-St-GEORGE)--HILL 98 (300 meters north of MOMELIEU). The aviation report that the bridges of BRACHES and HAROCOURT are destroyed. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE German artillery was fairly active."

"South of the AISNE, continuing their forward movement, our troops drove back the enemy rearguards which were still south of the VESLE. Our front is along that river all the way from CIRY-SALSOGNE and FISMES. The enemy is holding strongly the heights on the right bank of the AISNE and the VESLE. Some of our units have crossed the river at SOISSONS and occupy the suburb of St-WAAST. East of FISMES, of which the Americans hold the edge, our advance guard are on the height immediately south of the river."

"North of the MARNE the line at 6 o'clock afternoon was the Farm BONNE--MAISON---HILL 201--the woods north of the Farm MONTAXIM---BRANCOURT---SAPICOURT---COURCELLES---ROSNAY---HILL 102 (which is one kilometer east of ROSNAY)---HILL 88---HILL 111 (which is west of CHAMPIGNY)---the CHATEAU de la MALLE and the bridges over the canal 1,500 meters north of COURCELLES. Our infantry is everywhere in contact with enemy rearguards. Our cavalry was stopped on the line of the railway between JONCHERRY and MUZON by machine-gun fire."

"In CHAMPAGNE, calmer day then preceding one. North of the Farm VACAUES a German grenade attack was repulsed. Harassing fire by artillery."

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 183d which was withdrawn from the WOEVRE about July 10 appears to have been near BAPAUME on July 21. Ninth Army, 46th Reserve and 19th Ersatz retired to second line. Seventh Army, 33d and 36th withdrawn, 201st retired to second line.

D. Liaison officer at the front reported 9:30 o'clock evening, August 3: "During the night of August 2/3 the American 4th Division relieved the American 42d. At daybreak on August 3 the 4th and 32d Divisions advanced from a line running roughly from the center of the FOREST de NESLES to COURCELLES. At 1 o'clock afternoon the 4th Division reached a line running roughly from MONTBANI Ferme through CHERY-CHARTREUVE.
It was in liaison with the French on the left and the 32d Division on the right. At 4:30 o'clock afternoon the 32d Division had reached a line from VILLE-SAVOYE to a point just north of St-GILLES. It was in liaison with the 4th, and patrols of both seemed to have reached the river. On the right the French had crossed the ARDRE between St-GILLES and COURVILLE and were approaching FISMES and VILLETTE. They were advancing cautiously on account of stories from prisoners and French civilians which indicated the probability of traps between the ARDRE and the VESLE. A French report said that the valley of the VESLE and the ARDRE were in flames. Our troops have encountered almost no resistance of any description except a little machine-gun fire. French troops which have reached the river report that shells are falling, but do not state what caliber. A deserter states that resistance will be made north of FISMES. It is reported that the Germans have destroyed the bridges over the VESLE, which at this point is deep and swift. For this reason our troops may be obliged to halt until artillery comes up, but an attempt will probably be made to cross the river very shortly. It may already have been made."

"The American 28th Division is moving up behind the 32d, and will probably pass through it. One brigade of the American 3d has been loaned to the French for a special purpose. No prisoners, and casualties are light."

4 (82) A. Our troops have taken FISMES by assault and hold the south bank of the VESLE in this sector.
B. Nothing to report.
C. It was reported at 1 o'clock afternoon, August 4: "To the west of the AVRE, our patrols and light detachments of contact were pushed forward during the night on all the front between HOURGES and BRACHES; these elements received everywhere rifle fire especially before MOISEL and BRACHES which are still occupied by the enemy. To the south of BRACHES, we hold the wood north of the FILESCAMPS Farm, the west part of the FILESCAMPS Wood. We are stopped in front of the BOUILLANCOURT Woods. We have taken MALPART, La FOLIE Farm and the FRAMICOURT Woods. To the south, no change in the line given last evening. Two prisoners were made in the region of THENNES. The Germans tried this morning a raid in the region of RUBES Courf. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE, calm."

"South of the AISNE, between Le PORT and VENIZEL, intermittent fire on our first lines. Bombardment of our rear particularly the ravines of the CRIZE River, harassing fire on the road crossings between the CRIZE and the AISNE, and on our first lines bordering the VESLE, by all calibers including 210. We crossed the VESLE 1,800 meters northwest of BRAINE and took La GRANGE Farm where we made 11 prisoners. An action in force by two battalions yesterday evening with a view of taking FISMES did not succeed. In front of REIMS slight progression north of CHATEAU de la MALLE. The front passes to the north of CHAMPIGNY, to the south of GARENNE de GUEUX, to the north of ROSNAY, to the north of BRANCOURT, and our elements farther to the west have arrived at the national route REIMS to SOISSONS except in the region of UNCHAIR where it appears that they have reached only north of the village. We are in liaison with the army on our left at La CENSE Ferme. During the night our reconnaissances met with serious resistance in front of UNCHAIR; resistance was forced at daybreak. Very much harassing fire as far as the ARDRE, in the region of BOULEUSE-AUBILLY and on all the roads going north."

"In the eastern sector a series of raids have enabled us to bring in prisoners. We have captured a quantity of enemy materiel north of FLIREY."

"British army. Night calm except for a German raid southeast of DOMART on the LUCE River. No new modification of the front."

It was reported at 10:45 o'clock evening August 4: In the CHAMPAGNE, calm day. The activity of the artillery of the enemy has continued in the region of PERTHES north of SOUAIN and between the SUIPPS and the VESLE. No activity of aviation. North of the MARNE two battalions have crossed the VESLE, the first at the Farm VOISIN at 8:20 o'clock this morning and the second at JONCHERY. During the morning these entire battalions had a footing on the north bank. Toward MUIZON at the clumps of trees southwest of the
station and at the two farms GRAND and PETIT VAUTES were the scenes of sharp fights. We hold the woods of VALLIERE and FORAILLE---GARENNE de GUEUX---HILL 114 (1 kilometer north of THILLOIS)--CHAMPIGNY---CHATEAU de la MALLE and PONT-ST-ThIERRY. There is fighting going on in La NEUVILLETTE and the Farm PIERQUIN. Violent action of heavy artillery between the ARDRE and REIMS.

Under the pressure of our advance post the left bank of the AVRE and the stream TROIS DOMS has been mostly cleaned of the enemy. The Germans are still in MORISEL. We have taken BRACHES and we are along the railway, we have entered HARGICOURT; we are along the edge of COURTEMANCHE and half way between MESNIL-ST-GEORGES and MONTDIDIER. We continue to push. We have made some prisoners. Enemy aviation fairly active. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE, calm. Beggwen the OISE and the AISNE, calm.

South of the AISNE. In spite of the extreme vigilance of the enemy's machine guns and artillery we have crossed the VESLE at the Farm La GRANGE. The farm itself was mined by the enemy and blown up. In spite of our losses we held our position. Bombardment by the enemy along the VESLE and CRISE. Violent harassing fire on the ravines and crossroads south of the VESLE. Great activity of enemy aviation which was flying low and using its machine guns on our infantry south of the VESLE and the AISNE. Farther east we have taken FISMES and have pushed detachments at several points north of the VESLE.

On this part of the front the reaction of the enemy's artillery which was violent during the morning diminished during the afternoon.

The Americans made during the day more prisoners in the sector of BACCARAT.

Changes in German order of battle: The 81st Reserve Division relieves the 19th Division. The Bavarian 14th Division relieves the 21st Division. It is reliably reported that the Austrian 35th Division is in the region of ARLON. This last statement is given under reserve. A document of Ludendorff's which a prisoner states he saw, mentions the arrival of the Austrians and calls upon the German troops to receive them well. The presence of this division is also reported from a British source. It is considered here very likely that the division is actually there. There are no signs tonight up to the present that the Germans will retire to the AISNE.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 8th erroneously reported in battle area west of the MARNE on July 22, probably never left the Fourth Army, and has relieved the 31st. Ninth Army, 46th withdrawn; 18th in line. Seventh Army, 1st Guard in line; 23d and 2d Guard withdrawn; 103d has retired to second line. Army Detachment C, 208th relieved by 31st from Fourth Army. Nineteenth Army, 84th Landwehr Brigade in line. Army Detachment B, 9th Jaeger Bn. south of GUEBWILLER; Jaeger Division left ALSACE about July 22 for the AISNE front.

D. 28th Division reported 4:15 o'clock afternoon, August 4: "Third division advanced towards line northern edge of woods northwest of DRAVEGNY-LONGEVILLE and installed its heads of column on that line echeloned in depth, prepared to move forward through first line troops upon receipt of orders. No aerial activity to report."

Liaison officer at the front reported 7:15 o'clock evening, August 4: "Our troops are halted south of the VESLE and near and west of FISMES. Patrols are close to the river and some are reported to have crossed at ST-ThIBAUT. Artillery and bridge materiel are coming up and it is hoped that a crossing can be made soon. The enemy is shelling our forces at some points from the north bank and there is still machine-gun fire from some points around FISMES and ST-GILLES. The French on our right are reported to have been repulsed in an attempt to cross the river. An attack on FISMES was probably made this afternoon. Hostile artillery has cut some of our wires and definite information is difficult to secure. Two prisoners have been taken, of whom one is reported to belong to the 17th Division but his identification has not yet been entirely confirmed. This prisoner stated that the enemy have a large concentration of troops north of the VESLE."
It was reported 7:40 o'clock evening, August 4: "32d Division has taken FISMES this afternoon. Our general line is along the VESLE river. We have infantry on the heights protecting the engineers, who are constructing bridges."

5 (83) A. On the line of the VESLE brisk artillery fighting is in progress. On August 3 our aviators shot down four hostile airplanes.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 12 o'clock, noon, August 5: "On the left bank of the AVRE we lost contact and obtained it by sharp action which allowed us to completely occupy the wood commanding the stream. Our advanced positions were also pushed up along the railway to the CHATEAU HAYENCOURT, 25 prisoners taken. The station of HARGICOURT is still held by the enemy. We have rebuilt two footbridges at BRACHES. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE, numerous reconnaissance parties do not find any change in the enemy's position. One of the parties which crossed the MATZ north of La CROIX-RICARD was obliged to withdraw under heavy machine-gun fire."

"Between the OISE and the AISNE two raids have been attempted by the Germans, one on PUISALEINE and one on TRACY-le-VAL. Both were repulsed. Normal activity of enemy artillery on the valley west and north with gas shells. Calm during the night along the AISNE. On the VESLE we have enlarged our bridgehead at the Farm La GRANGE. We succeeded in crossing the river east of BRAINE and advanced 600 meters where violent machine-gun fire made it difficult to hold. Farther east marked resistance along the whole front; heavy machine-gun fire. The establishment of footbridges across the river is very difficult. Only a few patrols were able to cross the river except from our right army crops where some larger units were able to cross to the north bank."

In CHAMPAGNE, fairly calm night; usual harassing fires along the AISNE. North of the MARNE situation has not changed since last night. The detachments which crossed the VESLE at the Farm VOISIN and JONCHERY are still held up. Strong enemy reconnaissances have tried to retake the Farm Les VAUTES. They were repulsed. Fairly violent bombardment of the valley. Our artillery took under fire groups of the enemy west of the MOULIN of MOCO (south of St-THIERRY).

British army. No change on the British front. Calm during the night, except for great artillery activity in the sectors of GIEVENCHY to La BASSEE. The British emitted gas in the sectors of LOCON and AUCH-les-la BASSEE and BEAUMONT-HAMEL."

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, August 5: "To the north of the SOMME the day was calm. Vigorous harassing fire in the region of AYENCOURT on the trenches which we have taken to the west of the TROIS DOMS. Calm day north of the AISNE. Our elements which crossed the VESLE this morning to the east of BRAINE, were counterattacked during the morning after having sustained a violent bombardment; they were compelled to retire to the south side of the river. The prisoners which we made during this operation state that they had received the order to retire in case of serious attack upon the right to REIMS, the line of support which was to be the line of resistance. They add that the plateaus to the north were to be strongly held and that the retreat was believed to be terminated. This morning the enemy made a raid on the station of CIRY-SALSOGNE; they took several of our men prisoner, then retired to the north bank of the VESLE. To the south of the river, very active artillery on our first lines near VESSENY. Vigorous harassing fire by 105's and 150's on line and rears. Farther to the east, some elements crossed the VESLE; two companies at La CENDRIERE, two or three companies in the region of BAZOCHES and some elements in the region of FISMETTE. Our extreme right is on the south bank in the region of La CENSE Ferme, in touch with the army on the right.

North of the MARNE, no appreciable change during the day. We completely mopped up the LEGRAS Woods, to the southwest of the MOULIN de COURMONT, and occupy La CENSE Ferme which we still held this morning. Some harassing fire to the north of REIMS on our first lines. Very vigorous harassing fire by 77's, 105's, and 150's between JONCHERY and the line of the army on the first line, Hill 201 (south of HOURGES) to the UNCHAIR Ravine. In CHAMPAGNE nothing to report.
In the eastern sector nothing to report.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 26th Reserve relieved by 183d which was withdrawn from line of Army Detachment C. Seventh Army, 45th Reserve retires to second line; 103d withdrawn from line; 199th from First in support.

D. 42d Division has reported following details of its operations of August 2:

"At midnight of August 1/2, according to statements of prisoners, the enemy began his second retreat from our front. The movements back of the enemy's line in a northerly direction yesterday had suggested that he was withdrawing from his salient on our right but the first intimation we received that he was beginning a retreat was the destruction by the enemy of a number of ammunition dumps in rear of the line. Shortly after daybreak our troops commenced their advance on the right of our line. Our only fresh troops, the 117th Engineers, acting as infantry, pushed over Hill 212, which had been the scene of bloody combat during the last few days. As this regiment neared Bois de la PISSOTTE it was halted by machine-gun fire from the southern edge of the woods. The 167th and 168th Infantry were also halted by machine-gun fire from the same woods and from Les BONS HOMMES Ferme and the woods to the north of it." On our left the 165th Infantry and the 166th Infantry, the latter in liaison with the French division to the west of us, pressed on through the FORET de NESLES and up the open fields to the west of the Foret. The 165th Infantry on reaching the Road MAREUIL-en-DOLE—Les BONS HOMMES Ferme was halted by the enemy artillery fire in the woods. Meanwhile, the Bois de la PISSOTTE and Les BONS HOMMES Ferms had been flanked and the enemy machine gunners put to flight so that the troops on our right were able to advance abreast of those on our left. Our artillery followed the infantry advance and tonight all our regiments of 75's and one regiment of 155's have crossed the OURCQ and are firing. Our most advanced element, the 117th Engineers, occupied CHERY-CHARTREUVE at dawn on August 3."

"In eight days of battle the 42d Division has forced the passage of the OURCQ, taken prisoners from six enemy divisions, met, routed, decimated a crack division of the Prussian Guard, a Bavarian division and one other division, and driven back the enemy's line for 16 kilometers."

It was reported August 5: "American 17th and 148th Aero Squadrons attached to British under administrative command of II Corps destroyed two enemy aircraft each, total of four, August 3."

It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, August 5: "The advanced guards which crossed the VESLE on American and French fronts met with great resistance. Still fighting for the crossing. Estimated casualties 32d Division 2,500."

It was reported at 7:20 o'clock evening, August 5: "Our line held up on the VESLE by heavy enemy artillery fire. The following are reported captured: Large quantity engineer material, about 400 assorted carts and spare wheels."

It was reported 8:30 o'clock evening, August 5: "Considerable resistance has been encountered on the VESLE. There was heavy small caliber artillery fire during the night. The river has been crossed at several points by small bodies of troops which are at work overcoming machine-gun nests. Germans have delivered small counterattacks."

Liaison officer at the front reported at 7 o'clock evening, August 5: "On the line of the VESLE brisk artillery fighting is in progress. The enemy shelled our front line positions with high explosive and shrapnel. No shells of caliber larger than 105 have been definitely reported as falling on our front line. There has been some shelling of our back areas with shells of larger caliber, but this has not been serious. Our own batteries have been shelling the enemy's lines of communication and other points in his rear areas. On account of weather conditions, which have prevented aerial observation, we have been unable to do any counterbattery work. In connection with the attack on FISMES an effort was made to cross the river. Our troops were stopped on the low ground of the south bank by the intense fire of machine guns and shrapnel. Our casualties were considerable and our leading infantry units dug in. We are now occupying a line on the south bank from St-THIBAUT to FISMES. Our patrols have crossed the river at several points."

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The crossing by larger units is held up partially by the enemy's fire of artillery and machine guns and partially by the difficulty of getting up bridge materiel. A train conveying some of this materiel was prevented from reaching the river this morning by the enemy's artillery. A fresh attempt to cross will be made soon. There are practically no Germans on the south bank, but a little isolated sniping and machine-gun fire has been reported from the region near FISMES-VILLE-SAVOYE. Detachments have been sent out to round up snipers. The division on the right (32d Division) seems to have taken about ten prisoners, but a definite report is not available. The division on the left (4th Division) reports one more prisoner. The staffs were unable to say whether any materiel had been taken. In the 4th Division the casualties for 24 hours were about 650, of which about 50 were killed. The 32d Division was unable to give any report except to state that since coming into the sector their hospital had cleared 2,500 wounded. Replacements have commenced to arrive. There is no clear indication of the enemy's intentions at present."

A. In the sector held by our troops along the VESLE the day was marked by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported 11 o'clock morning, August 6: "French troops continue to place themselves along the bank of the AVRE to the north of BRACHES and in the wood of La NEUVILLE. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE, calm night, except on the right bank of the OISE where the hostile artillery was very active, especially in the region of COMPIEGNE, THOUROTTE and LONGUEUIL-ANNEL. On this front French patrols encountered hostile posts whose apparent front is unchanged. A raid was attempted by the Germans southeast of St-MAUR. It was defeated; one killed, one wounded and three prisoners remained in French hands. North of the AISNE, rather great artillery activity near MOULIN-sous-TOUVENT. South of the AISNE, intermittent rafales [bursts of artillery fire] by all calibers on the French positions between VANIZEL and SERMOISE. On the VESLE the enemy attacked twice the posts on the right bank, but the situation is unchanged. At 10 o'clock evening the French occupied the MOULIN at the southeast exist of BRAINE and two bridges nearby. The village is still strongly held by the machine guns of the enemy. Farther to the east the situation is unchanged."

In CHAMPAGNE night calm. Constant harassing fire on both sides of this sector of the front. North of the MARNE, information furnished in the report of August 4, 10:45 o'clock evening, to the effect that two battalions had crossed the VESLE, was incorrect. In reality three or four sections crossed at the VOISIN Ferme and four or five sections at JONCHERY. The rest of the battalions remained on the south side of the river. Last night these elements which the French had on the north side of the VESLE near JONCHERY were violently counterattacked at 10 o'clock and were compelled to return, in part, to the south bank of the river, bringing two prisoners. The French still retained on the north side of the river a section at the heights of the VOISIN Ferme. Everywhere else the combat groups which they tried to throw to the other side of the river were stopped by fire of machine guns."

In the eastern sector following fire from projectors, French patrols entered the hostile positions of Bois de LUSSE and south of the hill of SAINTE-MARIE which they found unoccupied. Gas bombardment of the front of VAUX from 2 o'clock morning to 3:30 o'clock morning."

On the British front, gas bombardment on the wood of VAIRE."

It was reported at 9:20 o'clock evening, August 6: "To the north of MONTDIDIER, calm day, nothing in particular to report. From MONTDIDIER to the AISNE, no infantry activity. The usual harassing fire on our first lines."

To the east of SOISSONS, the enemy continues to bombard FISMES Intermittently. Harassing fire on our first lines in the CROUTEILLE Ravine---St-MEDARD Woods---CIRY-SALSGNE and SERCHES. Great hostile artillery activity on the VESLE. To the north of the MARNE, situation unchanged, hostile artillery less active than during the preceding day."
“In CHAMPAGNE, calm day marked only by harassing fire of the enemy’s artillery.”
In the eastern sector nothing to report.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventh Army, 17th from reserve of Seventeenth Army in line near Bazoche: 201st, 10th Landwehr, 37th and Bavarian 12th withdrawn from line. Nineteenth Army, 81st Reserve from Fourth Army relieved 19th, withdrawn from line.

D. Liaison officer at the front reported at 9:38 o’clock evening, August 6:
“The enemy is now strongly entrenched N. of VESLE with many concealed machine-gun and minenwerfer positions. The river is wired (with barbed wire) on both banks and in the channel. Part of the S. bank is swamp and impassable for troops. The enemy has constructed a bridge across the river N. of FISMES. The activity consists principally of heavy machine-gun and minenwerfer fire which is very effective on account of the close range. Some shells of 77 caliber are also falling on our front lines. On our rear areas some 150’s are being thrown as far N. as MONT-St-MARTIN and as far S. as MARNEUIL but this is not serious.”

7 (85) A. East of Bazoche our troops have crossed the VESLE and gained the REIMS-SOISSONS highway. Hostile counterattacks broke down under our fire.

C. It was reported at 1:40 o’clock afternoon, August 7: “To the west of the AVRE; night calm. The French reached the west side of the TROIS DOMS River south of FRAMICOURT and pushed their small posts to the southeast of MESNIL-St-GEORGES. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE, artillery rather active during portion of night, especially in the region of MERY-LATAULE; the French reconnaissance reported nothing new in that sector except that the Saint-MAUR Ferme was found unoccupied and they have occupied it.”

“Oh the VESLE, yesterday evening the French repulsed an attack directed on their elements at La GRANGE Ferme and reinstalled themselves at the station of CIRY-SALSOGNE. The hostile artillery was very active. In conformity with the order given, French elements on the north bank of the VESLE were brought back on the south bank. To the east of BRAINE, an attack was made last evening which permitted six battalions (four American battalions and two French to be sent to the north bank. 100 prisoners were taken. Toward 10:30 o’clock evening a barrage fire was delivered by the French and a German counterattack prevented. West of REIMS, the posts which the French had on the north bank of the VESLE were compelled to retire to the south bank after a fight. Rather large activities of artillery north of REIMS along the front generally.

“In CHAMPAGNE, some harassing fire on our first lines and rear. This morning at 4:30 o’clock after destructive fire, begun by the enemy at 3 o’clock, he attacked two of the French centers of resistance south of AUBERIVE: he was repulsed.”

“The French executed some raids without results in the Saint-DIE and REICHACKER regions. A raid attempted by the enemy, north of CHENICOURT was completely repulsed.”

“Oh the British front, in the course of the night the British executed two local operations; one north of CLARENCE where their line was advanced from 100 to 200 meters on a front of about 500 meters; the other occupied the region to the right of the CORBIE-BRAY Road, where the British have retaken a part of the trenches lost to the Germans in the German attack of yesterday. Otherwise night calm on all their front.”

It was reported at 9:50 o’clock evening, August 7: “North of MONTDIDIER rather severe harassing fire in the regions of MERVILLE—MAILLY-RANEVAL and SAUVILLERS. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE calm day. Between the OISE and the AISNE, after a short but violent bombardment, the enemy attempted two raids towards noon near BAILLY and TRACY-le-VAL. He was repulsed.

On the AISNE, on the whole calm day. On the VESLE, harassing fire on the first lines and great activity of the hostile air service. East of BRAINE, the hostile line
remains unchanged along the railway. Two counterattacks by the enemy have been repulsed since this morning. In the right part of the American sector, some more companies have passed across the VESLE, but the enemy is intrenched in front of them about 1,000 meters from the river. On the VESLE, during the course of the day, harassing fire on all of the valley and the villages of ROSNAY—COURCELLES—BRANSCOURT—TRESLON, which received fire of heavy calibers.

"In CHAMPAGNE, calm day. Constant harassing fire. North of REIMS we pushed our line forward about 400 meters between the railways of RETHEL and of LAON. We maintained ourselves there in spite of a counterattack."

Changes in German Order of Battle: Seventeenth Army, 39th has relieved 185th. Second Army, Bavarian 14th has relieved 21st. Eighteenth Army, 24th has relieved 6th Reserve. Ninth Army, the order of battle from west to east in the Ninth Army is apparently: 105th, 223d, 15th, 202d, 53d Reserve, 14th, 211th, 6th, 76th Reserve, 5th, 50th Reserve, 9th. Seventh Army, 51st Reserve has retired to second line; the order of battle from west to east in the Seventh Army is apparently: Guard Ersatz, 18th, Bavarian Ersatz, 17th, 26th, 24th Reserve, 1st Guard, 4th Guard, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 216th, 200th, 113th, 195th, 22d, 28th Reserve. The 240th, Bavarian 1st and 8th Reserve, hitherto reported as in line on the east of the sector of the Seventh Army, apparently form part of the First Army.

D. Liaison officer at the front reported by letter, August 6: "Commanding General and Staff Officer of 32d Division said, August 6. "We are to be relieved tonight by the American 28th Division. Our men are tired and I estimate that our losses for the last 24 hours amount to 1,000. A good many of these were incurred in our attempts to filter across the river. The proportion of dead and mortally wounded is not high. We are proud that we have not had one death from gas nor even one very serious case, although the enemy has been using mustard gas on us constantly.

The lines are now so close, with the Germans in FISMETTE and our men in FISMES, that we are almost under conditions of trench warfare - in range of grenades. The enemy has a first class guard division opposite us and two good divisions in rear.""

Liaison officer at the front reported at 6:50 o'clock evening, August 7: "This afternoon the 4th Division (on the left of our sector) reported as follows: "Yesterday afternoon at 4:30 o'clock we attacked across the whole front of our sector with an objective on the north bank of the VESLE. Our attack was met by very heavy machine-gun and minewerfer fire and artillery fire from 77's and 105's. On the right of our sector our troops succeeded in crossing the river and advancing to the highway which runs from REIMS to SOISSONS. On the left of our sector the advance was held up by the enemy's fire. This left one battalion across the river, and two companies were placed on each side of it to protect its flanks. At 8 o'clock last evening the enemy counterattacked but his attack was broken up by our artillery fire. This morning the troops on the left of our sector advanced across the river and are now, 12:30 o'clock afternoon, on the railroad line on the north bank. Our casualties have been considerable but figures cannot yet be compiled. Prisoners, of whom 30 were taken yesterday, state that the positions now occupied by the enemy will be held only until positions farther back have been prepared. One of these prisoners stated that the enemy will fall back to the positions on the AISNE occupied before the May offensive. These prisoners belong to the 17th Division and the 4th Guard.""

8 (86) A. North of the VESLE there were local combats resulting in a gain of ground for our troops.

B. A letter written by a German lieutenant to his father has been found in the BOIS-de-la-TOURNELLE, southwest of FERE-en-TARDENOIS. This wood was the scene of sharp fighting from July 24 to 26, in the course of which the officer was killed. The writer describes in the following paragraphs his experiences in the CHATEAU-THIERRY sector during the opening days of the Franco-American counteroffensive:
At 2 o'clock in the afternoon artillery fire started which lasted about an hour and a half. We were expecting then that something was going to happen in front of us. Suddenly the fire ceased and immediately runners came to warn us that the Americans were attacking on the entire line. Never have I seen such a thing. Nobody could have withstood them. The enemy was six or eight times as strong as we were. We were disseminated in the advance zone in checkered formation by groups of eight men every 200 or 300 meters, and the Americans were arriving by regiments.

In this case the decision imposed by hand-to-hand fighting plays a most important role. Many of the enemy fell but others took their places. It was like killing a few bees from a swarm.

What would we do ourselves, very inferior in number, especially when the enemy fire was so terrible? It seemed best to run when we could not hold, take another position, resume the fight and gradually retire.

Those who could not run have fallen into the hands of the enemy. Many of them had that fate. There were also a large number of killed and wounded. Those who are not too severely wounded are the luckiest. The country received them in her arms and they are out of an unlucky situation.

I did not participate in that fight which lasted until late in the night. At nightfall I went to see the commanders of the company to give them orders for the future. The French and the Americans having attacked and advanced more to the north, we have been obliged to abandon the position and we went several kilometers towards the north. Yesterday morning they put us at rest in a wood, but the wicked enemy was there in front of us. Other troops who are just as tired as we are, had stopped them for a while. Last night we were engaged again, but my battalion was in reserve at about 600 meters from the first line, for the reason that we had seriously melted in number. But any minute we expect to be engaged to repulse a new attack, as the French, with renewed courage, are attacking constantly.

The battle continually sways back and forth. The village changes hands frequently. With the exception of a few points of minor importance we hold the position occupied yesterday.

The blockheads attacked with seven tanks today; according to the reports the tanks have been destroyed. Their cavalry is also engaged.

There is terrible noise here. Our own and enemy shells are passing constantly over our head and bursting sometimes close to us. Before us the machine guns are crackling; which is proof that the enemy are engaged. Let's hope they will not pass.

Summing it all up I think we have underestimated Foch and his reserves, and especially the Americans. I have a presentiment I shall lose my skin also. I wish it were tomorrow.

C. It was reported at 11:35 o'clock morning, August 8: "Attack reported to be progressing satisfactorily on whole front and first objectives captured. British III Corps north of SOMME believed to have reached final objectives except at one point. Line believed to be approximately as follows: MOREUIL---DEMUIN---MARCELCAVE---LAMOTTE (all inclusive)---CERISY (exclusive)---CHIPILLY (inclusive)---along Bray-Corbie Road to old line. Local operations by British 12th Division reported to have reached MORLANCOURT---VILLE-sur-ANCRE Road. No details as to captures at present."

It was reported at 12:25 o'clock afternoon, August 8: "Late information reports the British to be at MORCOURT---HARBONNIERES---CAIX---BEAUCOUR and MAISON BLANCHE. The French are reported to be at VILLERS-aux-ERABLES, east of MOREUIL, east of La NEUVILLE SIRE-BERNARD. The action is described as follows: 'There is no opposition and cavalry and tanks are having considerable opportunity for activity. One German general has been taken. It is believed considerable artillery has been captured.'"
“South of MONTDIDIER, a raid near AYENCOURT gave us eight prisoners. Between MONTDIDIER and the OISE, calm night. French patrols have contact with the enemy on all the front. Two prisoners captured north of the OISE. On the left bank of the OISE, enemy artillery active; also on the AISNE.”

“On the VESLE, nothing to report further than considerable gas bombardment, distributed along the Allied first and second lines. Very violent harassing fire north and west of REIMS, also in the valley of the VESLE and the region of BRANSCOURT---ROSNAY ---GUEUX---and VILLE-DOMMANGE. The night air service very active, bombs dropped on ROSNAY ---UNCHAIR and EPERNAY.”

“In CHAMPAGNE, great activity of hostile artillery during the night, from the VESLE to TAHURE. The enemy also bombarded with gas and high explosive our first lines and the villages of MOURMELON-le-GRAND---MOURMELON-le-PETIT---LIVRY and LOUVERCY. At 4 o’clock morning the enemy made an attack on our combat groups west of SOUAIN. The enemy’s push from the FREDERIC Woods and the SULTAN seems to be penetrating the GUILLAUME Woods. Reconnaissance is being made to determine the situation. Great activity of hostile air service which bombed several places, in particular SOMMESOUS.”

“In the eastern sector the Germans made a raid north of PONT-a MOUSSON and were repulsed, leaving one dead and two prisoners. Patrols were in combat near XIVRAY, five Americans missing.”

Between SAMOGNEUX and BEAUMONT a prisoner was captured from the 106th Reserve Regiment, 123d Division. (This division has been in the reserve of the Seventh Army.) In the ARGONNE the enemy employed projectors, Some men were gassed.”

It was reported at 5:45 o’clock afternoon, August 8: “According to reports received up to 30 minutes ago the line runs: MORLANCOURf---southeast to the woods of GRESSAINE---east of CERISY---north of MORCOURf---south edge of MERICOURf---west edge of PROYART---east edge of HARBONNIERES---CAIX---west edge of Le QUESNEL---east of FRESNOY ---east of PLESSIER.”

It was reported at 10:25 o’clock evening, August 8: “The British report that they have thus far counted 7,000 prisoners and 100 guns. They captured one corps staff except the general who escaped in his automobile pursued by an armed automobile. The British report the capture of one train. They report that they have captured the men of two batteries, asleep in their beds. According to latest reports received our line runs: beginning at the north---MORLANCOURf---MERICOURf---west edge PROYART---east of HARBONNIERES---east of CAIX---west edge of Le QUESNEL---west of FRESNOY-en-CHAUSSEE ---west of PLESSIER---ROZAINVILLERS.”

“After a short and violent preparation the French attacked this morning, in connection with the British, the hostile positions on the right bank of the AVRE, south of the Road AMIENS-ROYE, on a front of 11 kilometers. The French have successfully taken MORISEL---MOREUIL---the strongly fortified positions to the east of MOREUIL---VILERS-aux-ERABLES---MEZIERES---La NEUVILLE---SIRE-BERNARD. The advance exceeds eight kilometers in depth in certain parts. Many prisoners have been taken, 2,500 being already counted. Important materiel has been captured. East of MONTDIDIER, French patrols have made prisoners. Moderate artillery activity in the region of the AISNE; a deserter of a squadron of the 222d Division came to the French lines. Day marked by considerable artillery activity. Some gas shelling.”

“Following a violent bombardment, at about 1:30 o’clock afternoon the enemy launched an attack to the west of BAZOCHE. This attack was completely repulsed at 2:30 o’clock afternoon. On the VESLE no infantry activity. Vigorous artillery harassing fire on our first lines in the region of UNCHAIR and SAPICOURT, with 77’s and 105’s.”

“In CHAMPAGNE. Following the attack reported this morning, it is confirmed that the enemy is in possession of GUILLAUME Woods. 52 of our men are missing. Another attack farther to the west (800 meters east of the road leading to SOUAIN), was repulsed, leaving bodies on the ground.”
“German raid on three French combat groups in the region of SCHRATZ, details lacking. Hostile artillery activity at Bois de LUSSE and north of THANN. Violent bombardment in the region of FLIREY. German deserter in the same region, order of battle confirmed.”

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 27th from reserve of Sixth Army has relieved 107th. Seventh Army, 1st Guard and Bavarian 6th Reserve retired to second line; Bavarian 12th has relieved 22d, which has retired to second line. First Army, 199th has relieved Bavarian 8th Reserve which has retired to second line; 240th has retired to second line.

D. It was reported at 10:50 o'clock evening, August 7: “Artillery on both sides very active. We have constructed a few bridges but action has consisted mainly in working small elements across. On our left French troops hold a position behind the railroad across the river near BAZOCHES where they have repulsed several counterattacks.”

82d Division reported evening, August 7: “Two enlisted men reported missing in offensive operation night. 34 killed in action.”

Liaison officer at the front reported 7:45 o'clock evening, August 8: “The 4th Division (on the left of our sector) reports: 'The line is unchanged. The troops on the left of our sector have established themselves on the railroad north of the river. On our left several French companies have crossed and are now in communication with us. On the right of our sector, elements of the 28th Division have crossed and are in communication with us. Yesterday the enemy counterattacked and was entirely repulsed. We took five prisoners and ten machine guns. We are receiving heavy machine-gun fire on our front line and trench mortar fire on St-ThIBAUT. The enemy's artillery fire is light both in caliber and amount. Our casualties yesterday were about 400. For the last four days they have been about 1,800.'”

9 (87) A. Along the VESLE the situation is unchanged.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 1 o'clock afternoon, August 9: “British army. North of the LYS the situation remains unchanged since last night. A slight advance was made by the British northwest of LOCON and to the east of CORNET-MALO. North of the SOMME a British counterattack has retaken CHIPILLY. Farther to the south no change. An aviation report states that the English appear to be in Le QUESNEL. Only slight movement reported in PERONNE and to the west of the SOMME. The railway stations at BRAY and CHAULNES do not appear to be very active.”

“On the VESLE, the enemy has taken the station of BREUIL, which village he still occupies. Harassing fire constantly on the Allied first lines and villages.”

“In CHAMPAGNE, night marked by great enemy artillery activity. Violent artillery fire on the French first lines. Under cover of this bombardment, accompanied in certain places by the use of smoke, the enemy executed a series of raids in the region of PROSNES and of MONT sans MON as a result of which nine men are missing. In the region of SOUAIN, the enemy's effort failed completely and left three prisoners.”

Following an intense bombardment, the enemy made a raid between WATRONVILLE and RONVAUX. Result not known. North of MAIDIERES, violent bombardment of the French positions this morning about 4 o'clock but not followed by any infantry action.

It was reported at 5 o'clock afternoon, August 9: “According to latest reports received the line in the SOMME sector runs: MORLANCOURT---CHIPILLY---north of MORCOURT ---MERICOURT---RAINECOURT---VAUVILLERS---ROSIELS---west of ROUVROY---east of FOLIES ---east of ARVILLERS---southeast of PLESSIER---CONTOIRE---PIERREPONT. The British Mission reports that 13,000 prisoners have been counted and over 200 guns, that the impression is good and that the advance continues and so far but one new division has been indentified, namely the 82d Reserve. At French Headquarters there has been received today but two short messages, the second one received at 1:10 o'clock afternoon, reading: ‘HANGEST taken. The English have taken Le QUESNEL. General impression, good. The movement continues.’ The French report having counted over 3,000 prisoners.”
It was reported morning, August 9: “North of the SOMME British troops were unable to maintain their positions in the spur north of CHIPILLY. No further change reported on battle front.”

It was reported 4:40 o’clock afternoon, August 9: “Allied attack was renewed this morning. British are reported to have taken BEAUFORT and to be fighting on general line FOLIES---ROSIERES---RAINECOURT. Prisoners in Fourth Army cages and casualty clearing stations at 8 o’clock morning; 300 officers and 13,000 other ranks. Guns, 200 including a 9.2-inch railway gun with three trucks of ammunition. One complete railway train captured, also trench mortars and machine guns in large numbers and quantities of stores and materiel. French report 3,450 prisoners. Report received from Italian front that British 7th and 48th Divisions have carried out eight simultaneous raids on ASIAGO front, capturing upwards of 315 prisoners, some trench mortars and machine guns and five pack mules.”

It was reported at 9:40 o’clock evening, August 9: “The French continued to advance during the day and have taken the village of HANGEST, the wood of Saint-HUBERT and the village of CONTOIRE. the French line at 5 o’clock follows the railway east of HANGEST until a point south of the village, then HILL 105 between HANGEST and CONTOIRE, then to the mill east of CONTOIRE, then to the south of PIERREPONT. South of MONTDIDIER the French attacked at 4 o’clock morning. The attack is progressing normally. Number of prisoners so far counted is 4,000. The number of guns has not yet been determined. The enemy artillery has been very active on both banks of the OISE, firing on the French batteries and rear areas. Little activity on the first lines. No change in lines.

On the AISNE, calm day, except for the bombardment of VIC-sur-AISNE, where a shell damaged the bridge, temporarily interfering with movements. On the VESLE, we have taken FISMETTE, which we hold solidly with one battalion. We took 100 prisoners. West of FISMES our patrols have advanced to the REIMS-SOISSONS highway. DRAVEGNY---COHAN and COULONGES received a few 150 shells. Big explosion 5 kilometers northwest of BRAINE.

Calm day, marked by harassing fire on our rear, on the whole CHAMPAGNE front and by destructive fire of 210’s on the batteries in the region of COURVILLE. We made 20 prisoners in the region of AUBERUVE.

An enemy raid between WATRONVILLE and RONVAUX cost of the French about 20 men, 9 missing. French detachment which was in ambush last night returned to its lines bringing back one officer, one noncommissioned officer and five men captured in the Bois des FOSSES.”

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 1st Guard Reserve has relieved 12th Reserve; 52d from line of Sixth Army near LENS has relieved 207th; an unidentified division has relieved the 52d. Seventeenth Army, 21st Reserve has relieved Bavarian 5th; 2d Guard Reserve has relieved Bavarian 5th Reserve. Second Army, 108th which was about to relieve the 43d Reserve when the British attack began, is in line north of 43d Reserve; 117th from Fourth Army, which was relieving 109th when the British attack began, is in line north of 109th; field artillery regiments of 13th Reserve, 243d and 107th Division have reinforced battle line north of the SOMME. Eighteenth Army, it appears that the Group of Armies of Crown Prince Rupprecht extends to the OISE and now includes the Eighteenth Army. Ninth Army, 5th Reserve from Eighth Army has relieved 223d. Seventh Army, 29th in line near COURLANDON: 113th and 115th retired to second line; the 22d appears to have been relieved by the Bavarian 2d, and not by the Bavarian 12th as previously reported; the Bavarian 12th is, therefore, still in reserve. Fifth Army, 123d from reserve seventh Army has relieved Bavarian 6th.

Liaison officer at the front reported at 7 o’clock evening, August 9: “The 4th Division reports: ‘No activity of infantry on either side. Our line is unchanged. There has been moderate artillery fighting. Some points in our rear area have been heavily shelled during short periods of time. Most of the artillery fire has been light in character and it is not believed that the enemy has more than two batteries of heavy artillery operating against our sector. There is no indication that the enemy has any
organized line of resistance. It is suspected that he will fall back but will fight for the present in order to inflict as many casualties as possible upon our troops before retiring. We have taken three more prisoners."

The 28th Division reports: "As a result of a successful operation last evening we have now 11 companies of infantry and some machine-gun detachments on the north bank of the river. Others are ready to follow but are waiting for the units on each side to catch up. We have taken about 100 prisoners. The enemy's artillery was very active last night, especially around FISMES where a good many gas shells were thrown. On our right the enemy used shells ranging in caliber up to six inches. On our left he used only 77's. A further advance by our troops in this sector many be expected soon."

The 6th Brigade reports: "The situation is unchanged. We have no report of casualties, prisoners or captured materiel. We hope to advance soon."

89th Division reported 4:30 o'clock afternoon, August 9: that a hostile gas concentration during the night of August 7/8 caused following casualties: Officers 9; soldiers 256.

10 (88) A. There is nothing of importance to report from the sectors occupied by our troops.  
B. Nothing to report.  
C. It was reported at 11 o'clock morning, August 10: "British Fourth Army confirms capture of one divisional headquarters at LIHONS. American troops took part in the attack yesteray in this sector."

It was reported at 11:45 o'clock morning, August 10: "On the AISNE during the night rather heavy artillery activity all along the front, bombardment of the French first lines and harassing fire of the rear areas."

"On the VESLE, the French made eight prisoners at La GRANGE Ferme. Hostile artillery activity rather marked at REIMS and to the west of the city. In a raid on the mill, east of MUIZON, a prisoner was captured belonging to the 86th Division."

"In CHAMPAGNE, calm night. Usual harassing fire. This morning the French attacked the GUILLAUME Woods northwest of SOUAIN, taking 23 prisoners and identifying the 22d Division. A hostile airplane was brought down by the French antiaircraft service in the French lines south of MINAUCOURT."

"Violent bombardment this morning in the DICKEBUSCH sector and in the region of the MONTS at 4:15 o'clock - no infantry action."

It was reported at 3:30 o'clock afternoon, August 10: Beginning at CHILLY the line runs: West of FOUGUESCOURF—west of PARVILLERS—east of ANDECHY—north of GUEHBIGNY—through WARY—east of LIGNIERES—east of PIENNES—east of ROLLOT—east of MORTEMER—north of ORVILLERS—east of La NEUVILLE—east of BOURMONT. British report more than 300 guns. French more than 200. French 1st Cavalry Division was near ANDECHY. French 2d Cavalry Division was near LIGNIERES."

It was reported at 4:40 o'clock afternoon, August 10: "The line now runs; west of MAUCOURT—southeast of DAMERY—southeast of ANDECHY."

It was reported at 9:15 o'clock evening, August 10: "In the MONTDIDIER sector the French continued their attacks and broke the enemy's resistance on all fronts. North of the AVRE they have taken ERCHES and ANDECHY. South of the AVRE, MONTDIDIER, surrounded on the south and east, fell. Following up their success the French troops advanced eastward and reached the front, LABOISSIERE, FESCAMPS and REMAUGIES. Since August 8 the French alone have taken more than 8,000 prisoners and well over 200 guns. Southeast of MONTDIDIER the French attacked the enemy this morning from COURCELLES—EPAYELLES and CHEVINCOURT. The troops continued their advance and have taken the hills of BOULOGNE-la-GRASSE. At the end of the day the French held the front: ORVILLERS—BOULOGNE-la-GRASSE—CONCHY-les-POTS—the station of ROYE-sur-MATZ—La NEUVILLE—BOURMONT—ELINCOURT—CHEVINCOURT. French artillery caught under fire large convoys which were retreating in the region of NOYON and GUIiscard.
Towards SOISSONS nothing to report except for enemy artillery fire in that region and along the VESLE. There were some minor operations towards BAZOCHES and FISMETTE, north of FISMES. No change in the line. Unsuccessful enemy attempts east of FISMES. Artillery activity diminishing except in the ARDRE Valley and in the region of ROSNAY where it continued severe. Only small calibers were fired at REIMS. A hostile captive balloon was brought down in the region of BRIMONT.

In CHAMPAGNE, calm except north of SOUAIN, where the enemy reacted violently as a result of the French action this morning on GUILLAUME Woods. A strong counterattack with artillery took place at 9 o'clock morning and the enemy succeeded in throwing the French out of the woods.

In the eastern sector the French fired on the munitions dump of DEUXNOIDS-aux-Bois with heavy artillery. Several explosions were reported.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 52d Reserve relieved 58th. Second Army, 31st engaged. Eighteenth Army, 119th and 82d Reserve engaged; 54th relieved 204th. Ninth Army, 53d Reserve, 6th and 9th withdrawn. Seventh Army, Bavarian Ersatz and 10th Reserve withdrawn. First Army, Bavarian 15th withdrawn. Army Detachment B, 47th Reserve is near MULHAUSEN.

D. It was reported at 7 o'clock evening, August 10: "On the line of the VESLE there is no change except that our troops have fallen back slightly toward the north bank of the river."

11 (89) A. Aside from the usual artillery activity along the VESLE, the day passed quietly in the sectors occupied by our troops.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 8:45 o'clock morning, August 11: Allied line on the SOMME-OISE front reported this morning as follows: DERNANCOURT---1,500 yards north of ETINEHEM---ETINEHEM (exclusive)---MERICOURT (exclusive)---PROYARD (exclusive)---LIHONS (exclusive)---CHILLY (exclusive)---FOUQUES COURT (exclusive)---PARVILLERS (exclusive)---DAMERY (exclusive)---La CAMBUSE---LECHELLE (exclusive)---GRIVILLERS---CONCHY-les POTS---BIERMONT (exclusive)---RICHQUEBOURG---BOURMONT---ELINCOURT---CHEVIN CourT. The enemy made a local attack this morning north of KEMMEL - situation is still uncertain.

It was reported at 11:55 o'clock morning, August 11: the French continued their attack at 4:30 o'clock this morning, no details. Situation north of KEMMEL has been cleared up; the British line intact. A few prisoners were taken. Nothing further to report.

It was reported at 2:50 o'clock afternoon, August 11: No change reported on the British front. The French line is reported approximately as follows: ANTOVAL---SAMSON---MAREUIL---LABERLIERE---Hill 83---Le PLESSIER (all inclusive to French)---thence to western outskirts of TILLELOY---POPINCOURT---DANCOURT---ARMANCOURT---thence no change.

It was reported at 5:10 o'clock afternoon, August 11: South of the road ROYEU-AMIENS nothing has changed in the front line. There was no reaction by enemy infantry. There was fairly active bombardment of the region of MARQUEVILLERS and also bombardment by airplanes. The French attack started again this morning. At first reports French troops have occupied the wood north of VILLERS-les-ROYE, and entered the part of TILLELOY. Farther south the French advanced late last evening. The line now passes the southern edge of LABERLIERE---HILL 143 which is one kilometer west of FURY---MAREUIL---LAMOTTE (ours)---ELINCOURT---the quarry north of CHEVIN CourT---the southern part of the plateau of St-AMAND. Nothing particular occurred during the night. Farther south the attack started again at 5 o'clock morning. The French have reached ANTOVAL and BELLE ASSISE.

Between the OISE and the AISNE enemy artillery was active on FONTENOY and AUTRECHES. One prisoner was taken near MOULIN-sous-TOUVENT. South of the AISNE calm night. On the VESLE considerable enemy artillery activity. An enemy raid on the railway crossing at MACO was repulsed, one prisoner was captured.
In CHAMPAGNE there were raids during the night. South of MAISON de CHAMPAGNE a raid by an American Negro regiment found the enemy trenches evacuated. An enemy raid in this same region was repulsed. North of PROSNES three prisoners were captured. As a result of an enemy raid near Les MARQUISES Ferme two men are missing. A hostile attack on FORT de la POMPELLE at 3 o'clock morning after a violent bombardment failed completely.

From the eastern sector there is nothing to report.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, August 11: Full report from the British has not been received. They appear to have advanced somewhat north of ETINEHEM towards BRAY-sur-SOMME. LIHONS is still doubtful. The enemy resistance has been serious, with strong counterattacks.

The French continued their attacks during the day; the enemy reinforced by fresh troops offered vigorous resistance. His artillery was active especially north of the MONTDIDIER-ROYE Road. North of the AVRE the French advanced their lines to the western edge of VILLERS-les-ROYE and repulsed an enemy counterattack in this region. South of AVRE they have taken ARMANCOURT the part and village of TILLOLOY. Farther south the French troops continued their advance on all the front; the line is: The wood north of La POSTE --- CANNY Ferme --- Hill 81 --- western edge of GURY --- the edge of the St. CLAUDE Ferme --- HILL 166 --- northern part of SAMSON-La CENSE Ferme --- the quarries of MONTIGNY --- ANTOVAL. On this last part of the front materiel, munitions and arms abandoned on the ground are in great number. The French Third Army has taken more than 2,000 prisoners, 30 guns including one battery of 150's and 16 heavy minenwerfer.


In CHAMPAGNE calm day, usual harassing fire. Our destructive fire brought about a large explosion at the hill of PROUILLY.

In the eastern sector, a hostile captive balloon was brought down in flames south of the forest of MANGIENNES, and an enemy airplane near LEROUVILLE.

Aerial reconnaissances during the night reported railway activities in the line HAM --- TERGNIER --- NOYON to be abnormal; a great many lights in the station of St-QUENTIN and on the lines BOHAIN --- St-QUENTIN and MARLE-LAON. Many lights in the woods around LASSIGNY and east of GUISCARD. Early in the morning there was little movement apparent on the roads in the region of LASSIGNY, ROYE, NOYON. In CHAMPAGNE railway activity was above normal on the line REIMS-RETHEL and in the valley of the RETOURNE; on the roads there was great activity between the SUIPPES and RETOURNE and in the PONTAVERT region. Cantonments appeared very much lighted in the region of REIMS, RETHER and SISSONE, especially around PONTAVERT, BAZANCOUHT, Le CHATELET. In upper ALSACE nothing abnormal was reported.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, Bavarian 16th relieved about July 31 by extension of fronts of adjoining divisions. Second Army, 243d, 107th, Bavarian 5th, 79th Reserve, 221st, engaged; 117th withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 19th Division, from reserve of Nineteenth Army, in line east of Bavarian 3d. Ninth Army, 6th reengaged; Bavarian 1st from reserve of Third Army, in line northeast of SOISSONS. Seventh Army, 200th, 18th and Guard Ersatz withdrawn from line. First Army, 86th re-engaged; 1st withdrawn from line. Third Army, 22d Reserve from line of Fifth Army has relieved 30th.

The arrival in the rear areas of the western front of the Austrian 33d Division (infantry) is now accepted. Austrian soldiers whose shoulder straps bore the number 51, 64, and 35 were identified at ARLOHN, July 15/16, and 23, according to the statements of several prisoners of various divisions. The 51st Infantry Regiment and the 64th Infantry Regiment belong to the Austrian 35th Division. This division was on the left flank at the CAPPORIETTO battle in October 1917. It has long held a quiet sector on the upper PIAVE, where it was last identified June 23.
A prisoner of the 197th Division, in line near VERDUN, states that his regiment is about to be reorganized. Two battalions, the 13th and the 25th, are to be relieved by Austrian troops, the 26th Battalion to remain to instruct the Austrians in methods of fighting on the western front.

Prisoners of other divisions in line in the WOEVRE, notably the 227th, 77th Reserve, 13th Landwehr, and 235th, have reported the expected relief of their divisions by Austrians; but all these divisions are still in line according to recent identifications. It is far more likely that for the present the Austrians will be brigaded in with German troops, as may occur in the 197th Division. A secret order by Ludendorff is reported to have appeared on July 29 announcing the arrival of Austro-Hungarian troops on the western front and inviting both officers and soldiers to give their comrades in arms a hearty reception.

When troops were brought over from the eastern or Italian fronts to the western, the custom of the Germans was invariably to detrain them in the areas in the rear of the sector in which they subsequently went into line. It is highly probable therefore that when the Austrians appear in the front trenches it will be in the WOEVRE. The length of time of rest in the rear areas for the troops from Russian and Italy was usually one month. If the same custom is followed with the Austrians they may be expected in the front lines after August 15.

Movements observed on railways confirm statements of prisoners that an offensive was intended in Flanders for July 25 and show the breaking up of the Reserve Group of the Crown Prince Bavaria as a result of the counter-offensive of July 18. In all a total of 12 divisions have left the region from CAMBRAI to the sea between July 21 and August 1. Of these, seven (4th Guard, 216th, 17th, 18th, 24th Reserve, 29th and 50th Reserve) have been used in the MARNE battle. The 4th Guard Division, which was in LORRAINE, was transported to Flanders for the intended offensive there and was immediately sent down to the MARNE sector. Two divisions (31st and 81st Reserve) went from Flanders to the calm sectors, relieving the 208th and 19th. Two unknown divisions passed by LIEGE going towards LORRAINE. One division (117th) went from Flanders to the line south of ALBERT.

D. Liaison officer at the front reported at 6:25 o'clock evening, August 11: The 4th Division reports: There was no infantry activity on either side. The line remained as given yesterday. Our patrols have met heavy fire all along the line. Hostile artillery was intermittently active along the front. Its activity was largely in connection with that of our patrols. Hostile airplanes have been very active.

The 28th Division reports: There is no change in the line. The enemy has made no counterattack and we have not attacked in force. By a small operation yesterday afternoon we cleared up the wood near CHATEAU du DIABLE. This afternoon we hope to procure some information and some fresh prisoners but no important action is at present contemplated. Hostile artillery was very active last night and early this morning, especially around FISMES and FISMETTE. Hostile airplanes bombed some of our positions just before noon today. There is nothing further to report.

II Corps reported afternoon, August 11: South of ALBERT the offensive of the British Fourth Army continues. Between DERNANCOURT and the SOMME two British divisions with the American 131st Infantry Regiment on the right attacked the body of the enemy which had occupied CHIPILLY Spur, thus seriously menacing the left flank of the Australians. All objectives were reached. Casualties, American 131st Infantry Regiment: Killed, five officers, 40 enlisted men; wounded, three officers, 250 enlisted men.

Liaison officer at the front reported by letter, August 10: Staff officer of the 4th Division said: Early yesterday afternoon the Commanding Officer of the 47th Infantry reported that he thought he could go through BAZOCHES and get his troops on the highroad. At 3:45 o'clock afternoon his right flank had reached the road but the left was held up in BAZOCHES by machine-gun fire. He expected to be able to advance the left flank in conjunction with the French on his left. The troops suffered severely both in BAZOCHES and on the road to the right. At 11 o'clock evening our right withdrew from the highroad.
to the railroad and our left to a line on the river. The French on our left are still north of the river. No prisoners or materiel reported.

The casualties of August 8 to August 9 amounted to 133 wounded and 172 gassed.

The withdrawal of the right flank of the 4th Division exposed the left of the 28th Division to heavy flanking fire from the woods around CHATEAU du DIABLE. The left elements of the 28th Division then fell back to connect with the 4th Division, i.e. they dropped back from the slope on which they were to the railroad.

On the right of the sector the troops in FISMETTE attacked at 4 o'clock morning today. They were to move north and a little east to get a jumping-off place of the road at La CARCANERIE covering the foot of the two ravines at the head of which PERLES and BLANZY-les-FISMES are situated. Later, after advancing, they were also to cover the next ravine to the east and go up. A creeping barrage went ahead of them.

They made some progress but soon got flanking fire from both east and west. On the west the fire came from CHATEAU du DIABLE. On the east the inability of the 6th Brigade to advance left their right flank exposed. They had to fall back into FISMETTE. There they found their position very difficult. Flanking machine-gun fire came from both sides and heavy casualties were reported. A box barrage was placed around the town and ammunition was sent up. One battalion with one machine-gun platoon is in the town. It has received orders to hold it at all costs. This was the situation at last reports.

Last night there was heavy shelling on both sides, the enemy's fire covering the sectors and going back as far as brigade headquarters - much gas and high explosive were used.

A staff officer of the 6th Brigade said their attack started at 4 o'clock morning and that there was an artillery preparation of half an hour followed by a creeping barrage. The barrage stopped at BASLIEUX. In all, the artillery was in action for two hours (3:30 to 5:30). Two companies were in the advance guard but only two platoons went across the VESLE. The attack was held up at once by barbed wire and machine-gun fire. He estimated the casualties for 24 hours at 40. The Germans are 300 yards from the river.

Along the VESLE hostile attacks in the vicinity of FISMES were repulsed with severe losses to the enemy.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 12 o'clock noon, August 12: British army: Situation unchanged north of the LYS. Considerable hostile artillery activity in the course of the night in the valley of the ANCRE. A local operation in the valley of the SOMME to the east of MERICOURT enabled the British to bring in 200 prisoners. Calm night on the rest of the battle front.

The French are in contact with the enemy on all of the front west of ROYE. There was some bombardment of MARQUIVILLERS and GRIVILLERS. Numerous bombs were dropped by airplanes in the valley of the AVRE. The French have progressed as far as the south edge of the Bois des LOGES and are now in possession of GURY, but they have not been able to pass ROYE-sur-MATZ.

The Aisne moderate hostile activity. A raid by Germans on VINGRE cost the French 3 men missing. There was a violent bombardment for 20 minutes about 4 o'clock morning on MOULIN-sous-TOUVENT and AUTRUCHES. Hostile airplanes bombarded the valley and and the bridges of the Aisne. On the VESLE calm night. In the region of REIMS and the ARDRE hostile harassing artillery fire with high explosives and gas.

In CHAMPAGNE calm night except for harassing fire by the Germans particularly on the batteries in the region of the TOURBE. At 5 o'clock morning a German balloon fell in flames near MONT-sans NOM. At 5:45 o'clock morning a other balloon fell in flames near MONT-St-SOUPLET, destroyed by the French air service.

In the eastern sector: An enemy raid was repulsed in the sector of St-CLEMENT, one prisoner remaining in our hands. A French raid on the village of CRAINCOURT resulted in the capture of eight prisoners. An air bombardment in the region of NANCY-BOUXIERES aux DAMES caused the following casualties: Two killed, four wounded.
It was reported at 3 o'clock afternoon, August 12: On the British front the
general situation is unchanged. The French have taken Les LOGES, south of ROYE, and have
made progress on the high ground east of MAREUIL. They have crossed the OISE in the
neighborhood of La VERRUE Ferme, west of BAILLY.

It was reported at 9:45 o'clock evening, August 12: The resistance of the enemy
was accentuated during the day. The French were able, however, to advance north of St-
CLAUDE Ferme and took possession of l’ECOVILLON, where they made a number of prisoners.
The Bois des LOGES, which the French had taken, was retaken at 1 o'clock afternoon following
a hostile counterattack which drove the French out to the south edge of the wood. A
return offensive is now going on. The enemy evacuated west of BAILLY the organizations
which he occupied north of the MATZ and retired behind the canal. The French immediately
sent outposts to occupy these organizations.

On the VESLE, the day was marked by two hostile attacks, one on FISMETTE and the
other between FISMES and VILLETTTE. The enemy was repulsed with severe losses. Toward
noon, to avoid the violence of hostile fire our troops passed over to the south bank of
the VESLE; they have reoccupied their positions on the north bank during the afternoon.
At present our line is completely reestablished; we still have FISMETTE.

There was hostile harassing fire by large calibers on the REIMS front, and on
La GARENNE de GUEUX.

In CHAMPAGNE, calm day.

In the eastern sector a hostile balloon was brought down north of MULHOUSE by
two French airplanes, one of which did not return. A hostile airplane was brought down
near FONTAINE in ALSACE.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 26th Reserve engaged; 13th
withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 204th engaged. Ninth Army, 6th, erroneously,
reported engaged on August 11, is still in rear, unlocalized. First Army, Bavarian 15th
appears to have been withdrawn. Army Detachment B, Bavarian 5th Reserve and 14th Reserve
are in rear area in ALSACE.

Up to and including August 10, 29 German divisions had been engaged in the
SOMME battle on a front of 70 kilometers extending from ALBERT to LASSIGNY. Of these
divisions, only 6 are of first class quality; 9 are of second class; and 14 are of third
class. There were 19 divisions in line at the beginning of the attack; and of these, 7
had been holding the front for three months or more, 9 had been in for over a month and
the remaining 3 had entered the line within the week and were fresh. Of the 10 divisions
brought in from reserve, only one is of first class quality, 4 are of second class and 5
are of third class. Six of these divisions (108th, 82d Reserve, 54th, 117th, 79th
Reserve and 221st) had been resting for a month or longer. The remaining 4 divisions
(Bavarian 5th, 119th, 233d, 107th) were thrown into the battle after very little rest.
The 107th in fact had only just been relieved, after having held the MORLANCOURT sector
for 6 weeks. The reserves called upon to repel this attack are apparently not of formidable
quality. Of the 29 divisions in the battle, 7 (all third class) had not taken part in
heavy fighting on the western front this year.

D. II Corps reported afternoon, August 12: Several fires noticed in ALBERT.
South of ALBERT some shelling of the old front systems between 3 and 3:30 o'clock morning.
American 131st Infantry Regiment captured three officers, 150 men and seven 105 caliber
guns.

A. Aside from intermittent artillery activity, there is nothing to report from
the sectors occupied by our troops.

On August 11 and 12 our aviators successfully bombed the railroad yards, at
LONGUYON, DOMMARY-BARONCOURT and CONFLANS. All our machines returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, August 12: Since the morning of
August 8 the British Fourth Army has captured more than 20,000 prisoners and over 400 guns.
It was reported at 2:25 o'clock afternoon, August 13: Southwest of the LYS, a slight advance was made northeast of the wood of PACAUT and north of LOCON. The Germans made a local attack in the sector of MERRIS. No details have been reported. Calm night on the front of the SOMME. A small German counterattack was repulsed southeast of FOUGUES/SCOURT; and the Canadians have slightly bettered their positions west of PARVILLERS-DAMERY.

To the west of ROYE the situation remains unchanged. The regions of GRIVILLERS and MARQUIVILLERS were seriously bombarded. No infantry action. The number of prisoners made by the French First Army since August 8 exceeds 8,500, including 180 officers among whom are 3 regimental commanders. The First Army has also taken about 260 cannon of which 25 are of large caliber, a great number of minenwerfer, more than 1,600 machine guns and an enormous quantity of materiel not yet counted. To the west of LASSIGNY, calm night and no change. A counterattack was repulsed northeast of ELINCOURT, the French capturing 20 prisoners.

On the AISNE and on the VESLE, nothing new to report. The usual harassing fire in the region of TRACY-le-VAL and MOULIN-sous-TOUVENT. The French occupied by surprise 2 small posts northwest of the CHATEAU de la MALLE.

In CHAMPAGNE night rather calm. Violent bombardment in the PROSNES sector, with increasing intensity from 7 o'clock evening to 3:45 o'clock morning. No infantry action.

In the western sector the enemy made 3 raids, all of which failed: The first in the VOSGES north of WISSEMBA; the second in HAUTE-ALSACE near CARSPAHV; the third in the region of BURNHAUPT-le-HAUT, which cost us 4 men missing. Some bombs were dropped on TOUL and SAIZERAI.

It was reported at 9:25 o'clock evening, August 13: East of MONTDIDIER no modification of the situation. Hostile artillery fire on the first line. In the hilly region south and southeast of LASSIGNY the French attacked at 11 o'clock morning. From the St-CIAUDE Plateau they advanced on ATTICHE Ferme and CARNOY Ferme. They encountered an enemy strongly organized. Despite the difficult ground, the French advanced to within 100 meters of these two points. North of the St. CLAUDE Plateau notwithstanding the German resistance, the French penetrated the Park of PLESSIER and reached the eastern edge of BELVAL. Near GURY, they reached the little wood 800 meters northeast of the village. They captured 250 prisoners, including 7 officers.

On the rest of the front there was no infantry action. Harassing fire on the FORET de l'AIGLE and VENIZE; and on our first line and our batteries in the region of the VESLE.

In CHAMPAGNE calm day. Nothing to report.

Great hostile air activity in the region of BACCARAT, a hostile airplane was brought down in our lines following an aerial combat.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 236th in line. Second Army, 38th, from reserve of Sixth Army, engaged; 21st, Bavarian 14th and 192d withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 121st, from reserve of Fourth Army, engaged; 84th engaged.

D. II Corps reported morning, August 13: The situation from YPRES to ALBERT is unchanged. South of ALBERT on the left of the battle front it is generally quiet. British and American troops astride the SOMME in local operations have advanced their line, capturing 1 officer and 59 men.

96th Aero Squadron reported August 12: On August 11, 10 of our airplanes started out to raid DOMMARY-BARONCOURT. The objective was not reached, but 56 bombs were dropped on the railroad tracks north of LONGUYON. Four bursts were observed on the tracks. All our machines returned.

96th Aero Squadron reported August 13: During the morning of August 12, seven airplanes raided DOMMARY-BARONCOURT. 8 direct hits were observed on the southern end of the railroad yards. All our machines returned.

During the afternoon of August 12, 6 airplanes raided CONFLANS and dropped 30 bombs on the railroad yards. 10 direct hits were observed on the tracks, and 10 burst close to the roundhouse and warehouses. All our machines returned.
1st Division reported August 12: After artillery preparation a strong raiding party moved forward at 5 o'clock afternoon, August 11, to reconnoiter enemy positions but was repulsed by enemy counterbarrage and machine-gun fire. Heavy casualties are reported, exact figures unknown. There was a decrease in friendly artillery activity. Enemy artillery continued harassing fire on our lines and back areas. Enemy aircraft artillery active; enemy observation balloons were up on our front all day.

14 (92) A. In LORRAINE one of our patrols made a successful raid on the enemy's lines and brought back prisoners. In the VOSGES a hostile raiding party was repulsed. With the exception of considerable artillery activity along the VESLE there is nothing further to report.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 11:40 o'clock, August 14: On the British front: This morning at 3 o'clock violent bombardment of the British first lines in the sectors of SCHERPENBERG and of DICKEBUSCH. No infantry action. Artillery fire between the LYS and the LAWE and south of ARRAS. Big explosions were reported south of ALBERT. On the SOMME front no change. Noticeable increase in the enemy's artillery activity.

West of ROYE no change. Some bombardment by airplanes on the French rear areas. Activity of enemy artillery on the first lines in the region of TILLOLOY. In the region southeast of LASSIGNY nothing to report. Violent bombardment by yperite of the French first lines and batteries in the region of ROYE-sur-MARTZ and CONCHY-les-POTS. Between the OISE and the AISNE enemy artillery fairly active. Harassing fire and gas bombardment of the FORET de LAIGLE. RIBECOURT is still occupied by the enemy. French patrols which entered the villages were driven off by machine-gun fire.

South of the AISNE and enemy raid on French posts near CIRY-SALSOGNE was repulsed. On the VESLE the night was marked by activity of artillery; no infantry action; considerable aerial bombardment on our rear areas. An enemy raid on the station of BREUIL was repulsed. This raid was preceded by violent bombardment with gas and by airplanes. Considerable activity of enemy aviation during the night and bombs dropped in the region of CRUGNY-BROUILLET and in the region of EPERNAY.

In CHAMPAGNE calm night. A raid without losses to the French in the region of MESNIL-les-HURLUS brought in nine prisoners. In the sector of PROSNES a patrol brought in an enemy sentinel. As a result of an enemy raid in the region of BACONNES the French report 2 missing. Fairly violent bombardment of SOMMESOUS at 10 o'clock evening.

In the LUCEY sector an American raid (89th Division) during the night brought in 4 prisoners. An enemy airplane was brought down undamaged this morning east of LUNEVILLE. The aviator was made prisoner. Bombardment of EPINAL by airplanes; little material damage; 2 killed, 12 wounded.

It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, August 14: West of ROYE there was no change in the situation; no infantry action. Enemy's artillery was active in the region of ANDECHY. West of LASSIGNY fairly great activity of artillery on both sides. In front of BELVAL the French infantry, after breaking up an enemy counterattack, captured 7 officers, of whom 2 were battalion commanders, and a certain number of other prisoners. 6 minenwerfer were also taken. At 2 o'clock afternoon the French took RIBECOURT. The total number of prisoners captured since August 10 in this region exceeds 1,880, of whom 35 are officers. There have also been taken 35 cannon and a large number of machine guns and minenwerfer. Between the OISE and the AISNE there is nothing to report. South of the AISNE, marked activity of enemy artillery in the region of BILLY-sur-AISNE and of BELLEU. The aviation was active on the VESLE and in the region of SOISSONS.

In the eastern sector 2 enemy airplanes were brought down. The aerial bombardment reported this morning on EPINAL was extended during the night to include CHATEL-NOMEXY, 4 slightly wounded, and DONCIERES, no losses, no damage. This morning a French detachment captured an enemy outpost south of ABAUCOURT and brought in 3 prisoners.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 207th, previously reported as having been relieved by 52d from the line of the Sixth Army, is in line south of LENS.
The 207th and 52d appear to have exchanged sectors about August 7. Eighteenth Army, 208th from Army Detachment C has entered line north of CHEVINCOURT. Fifth Army, 33d Reserve, from reserve of Third Army, appears to have relieved 22d Reserve northwest of VERDUN early in August.

In the SOMME battle 30 German divisions are deployed on a front of 72 kilometers, less than two and a half kilometers per division. This deployment affords a strong line of resistance, except for the fact that the majority of the divisions are not high class. The number of divisions brought from reserve into line during the past four days is as follows: August 9, 4; August 10, 5; August 11, 2; August 12, 3.

On the VESLE front there are 13 divisions holding a front of 45 kilometers, three and a half kilometers per division. This is a stronger position naturally than that on the SOMME and in addition is being rapidly fortified and wired. During the past four days no additional divisions have been brought into line on the VESLE front.

From a captured document it is established that the German Eighteenth Army became a part of the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria on July 23.

II Corps reported morning, August 14: During the 24 hours ending at 6 o'clock morning, August 14, the situation south of ALBERT was generally quiet. There was slightly increased shelling near DERNANCOURT; and some shelling including gas on our front on the north bank of the SOMME.

5th Division reported at 5:50 o'clock afternoon; August 14: On August 13, our artillery was active for one hour; enemy artillery heavily bombarded for one hour our line in the southern portion of our sector. Otherwise the day was quiet.

5th Division reported at 9:55 o'clock evening, August 14: An attempted enemy raid was repulsed.

III Corps reported at 9:15 o'clock evening, August 14: Enemy artillery is still shelling FISMES and battery positions in that vicinity. Friendly artillery inactive. Enemy aircraft very active. Considerable number of bombs dropped in the vicinity of DRAVEGNY between 10 and 12 o'clock evening. Friendly aircraft active. One enemy balloon is reported to have been destroyed by an Allied airplane northwest of FISMES.

Commander of air service reported August 14: "On August 7, the first complete squadron of 18 American D H 4 planes with liberty motor crossed the German lines on independent reconnaissance mission in LORRAINE sector under command of General Foulois and Lieutenant Blair Thaw. All planes returned successfully from their mission."

15 (93) A. There is nothing of importance to report from the sectors occupied by our troops.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10 o'clock morning, August 15: "The British have advanced their line slightly between RAINECOURT and HERLEVILLE. Captures by British Fourth Army since August 8 are reported as 482 officers and 21,362 other ranks. Northeast of BEAUMONT-HAMEL the line reported this morning runs approximately through SERRE and PUISIEUX-au-MONT to BUCQUOY; British patrols in this sector have captured 44 prisoners and 3 machine guns."

It was reported at 2:55 o'clock afternoon, August 15: No further change reported on British front.

The Italian Seventh Army attacked on August 14, on a 15 mile front, from MONTE-San-MATTEO to MENCICIGOLO in the mountains between Lake GARDA and STELVIO. The Italians have captured MONTE-San-MATTEO, MONTE-MANTELEO, one peak of the CAOLI and the highest peak just east of MONTE-ALBIOLO. Farther south they have occupied the PONTA-Dei-SEGNI and MONTE-STABEL, and have made progress towards MENCICIGOLO.
It was reported at 9:35 o'clock evening, August 15: "The French have occupied the trenches along the road of POPINCOURT to TILLOLOY. The Germans blew up the crossroads west of BEUVRAIGNES. Light artillery activity west of ROYE; heavy only in the region of La CAMBUSE. During the day in a small operation the French took the quarries about two kilometers northwest of RIBECOURT belonging to the ATTICHE Ferme and MONOLITE; the enemy made a desperate resistance. The German counterattack at 2 o'clock-afternoon was repulsed. In this region the French captured 2 officers and about 20 men. Between the OISE and the AISNE and on the AISNE the day was quiet. Fairly heavy activity of enemy aviation over the FORET de LAIGLE; the French brought down 1 captive balloon near PONTOISE."

"During the night the first lines and also the villages immediately south of the VESLE received numerous gas shells. Intense harassing fire on the French lines east of REIMS and in the region of ORMES and GUEUX. Intense harassing fire with gas shells in the valley of the ARDRE towards CRUGNY. Following concentrated fire this morning, the enemy executed an attack southeast of TROU BRICOT which was a complete failure."

"Artillery activity in the region of HILL 378, and CHARNY; gas shell bombardment on the ravine of MOUILLY. Enemy airplanes dropped 24 bombs on TOUL; material damage important; 1 civilian killed. 3 bombs were dropped between PONT-Saint-VINCENT and BLAINVILLE; no victims, no damage."

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 21st has entered line south of LIHONS. First Army, 199th withdrawn from line.

From the German official communique of August 4 it appears that General von Boeln has been given command of a new group of armies. This group appears to include the Second and Eighteenth Armies, holding the sector between the ANCRE and the OISE and hitherto under the command of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria. General von Boeln had been in command of the Seventh Army since March 1917.

D. II Corps reported morning, August 15: "South of ALBERT it is generally quiet. British patrols entered ALBERT last night and encountered rifle and machine-gun fire. There was some shelling during the night on the British-American front."

28th Division reported August 15: During August 14, midnight to midnight, there was a decrease in the activity of hostile artillery. Our artillery was fairly active. Enemy aircraft were very active, dropping bombs in the vicinity of DRAVEGNY.

35th Division reported 8 o'clock evening, August 15: "During August 14, midnight to midnight, there was increased activity on the part of our artillery and that of the enemy. Our airplane activity also increased: that of the enemy was normal. One of the planes was brought down, Lieutenant Stiles and Lieutenant Drew being credited equally with the destruction of the machine."

C. It was reported at 9:25 o'clock evening, August 16: Beginning this morning the French made a series of partial attacks which overcame the successive obstructions of the enemy west of ROYE. In conjunction with the Canadians, who had taken La CHAVATTE, the French line was pushed to the eastern edge of GOYENCOURT, to the western edges of ST-MARD and LAUCOURT. The French hold the Road LAUCOURT-TILLOLOY and the little woods to the east of that Road TILLOLOY-le-CESSIER---Hill 102. 200 prisoners were taken during the day. Farther to the south the village of Les LOGES was taken by French infantry and their infantry advanced to the Bois de LOGES. An officer and 40 prisoners were taken at this point. Nothing to report on the rest of the front except harassing fire on the first lines of the Americans, and ranging by big calibers on the Chateau of VIRLY."

In CHAMPAGNE, calm day.

At 9:30 o'clock this morning the Germans made a raid in HAUTE-ALSACE north of
LARGITZEN: several French are missing.

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, 197th from line of Fifth Army, is engaged west of the OISE, east of 105th; Alpine Corps, from reserve of fourth Army, is engaged north of DAMERY, between 82d Reserve and 24th. Fifth Army, 33d, from reserve of Seventh Army, has relieved 197th. Army Detachment B, Bavarian 5th Reserve is in the region of COIMAR.

On August 15, the German divisions on the western front were distributed as follows: Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria (Fourth, Sixth and Seventeenth Armies): In line, 36 divisions; in reserve, four; exhausted, five. Army Group of von Boehn (Second and Eighteenth Armies). In line, 35 divisions; in reserve, five; exhausted, three. Army Group of German Crown Prince (Ninth, Seventh, First and Third Armies): In line 34 divisions; in reserve, 15; exhausted, 35. Army Group of von Gallwitz (Fifth Army and Army Detachment C): In line, 13 divisions; in reserve, none; exhausted, one. Army Group of Duke Albrecht of WURTEMBERG (Nineteenth Army, Army Detachments A and B): In line, 15 divisions; in reserve, three, exhausted, one.

D. II Corps reported 10:50 o'clock morning, August 16: "During 24 hours ending at 6 o'clock morning, August 16, there was some shelling, including gas, on the British-American front."

The reports from the American divisions holding the various sectors of the front show very little activity of any kind.

17 (95) A. In the VOSGES our troops, in the course of a successful local attack, captured the village of FRAPELLE.

Yesterday in LORRAINE one of our aviators shot down a hostile machine.

C. It was reported at 9:15 o'clock morning, August 17: "Canadian corps reports its line as east of BLAVET Wood---east of SCHWETZ Wood---east of La CHAVATTE---east of FRANSART---then to old line east of MAUCOURT. North of the ANCRE, British troops have reached the road from BEAUCOURT-sur-ANCRE to PUISIEUX-au-MONT."

It was reported at 1:35 o'clock afternoon, August 17: "West of ROYE, night very calm. Great activity of hostile artillery. Large numbers of minenwerfer and machine guns in action. This morning one French corps attacked LAUCOURT. The operation was stopped under barrage fire and machine-gun fire. Another corps attempted to take BEUVRAIGNES. Its right reached the southwest of the village. Its left is in front of the cemetery. The operation continues. Further to the south the French reached the eastern edge of the Bois des LOGES and met a lively resistance. Two strong German attacks at 5 and at 6:30 o'clock morning on La MONOLITHE and on the CARNOY Ferme were both repulsed. French positions were maintained. In this region a German airplane was brought down by infantry fire. Following a local operation executed this morning at 5 o'clock in the region of AUTRECHES the French made an advance of 1,500 meters on a front of 5 kilometers. Enemy reaction was feeble. The French line passes by a point 500 meters east of the Farm PUISEUX---south of Le TIOLET---head of the ravine going down to AUTRECHES---edge of HILL 151---HILL 128. The French made 21 prisoners and burned 3 hostile balloons. On the VESLE calm night. Moderate artillery action. Great activity of hostile bombardment planes. In CHAMPAGNE, hostile artillery fire south of the MONTS and on the valley of the SUIPPES. Hostile raid on La NEUVILLETTE was repulsed. Great activity of hostile air bombardment in the region of TOUL---NANCY---PONT-St-VINCENT. No important destruction. 8 Americans wounded."

It was reported at 9:35 o'clock evening, August 17: "During the day the French continued to progress despite the resistance of the enemy. North of the AVRE the French occupied the CAMP de CESAR and pushed forward to a point 500 meters west of the station of ROYE. South of the AVRE the French passed the Road LAUCOURT-tilloloy, and took hold at
BEAUVRAIGNES where combat followed, and finally occupied the French lines south of the village. Since yesterday morning the French in that region have progressed more than 3 kilometers on a 12 kilometer front, and have captured more than 1,000 prisoners, numerous machine guns and important materiel. Farther south the French infantry took CANNY-sur-MATZ, also the Farm LAROQUE. There also the French made prisoners. The enemy artillery executed some firing on the border east of the Bois des LOGES. The enemy executed at 1 o'clock afternoon a new counterattack on the Farm CARNOY which was repulsed. Light enemy artillery activity on all the front southeast of LASSIGNY. North of the AISNE continuous violent bombardment on the trenches taken this morning and also in the ravines of the valley. Number of prisoners made this morning amounted to 240.

"South of the AISNE, habitual harassing fire, notably on CERSEUIL and BILLY. On the VESLE, day calm. At 5:30 o'clock morning in the region of MUIZON, the enemy tried to cross the VESLE. He was repulsed with losses.

"In CHAMPAGNE: A raid was executed this morning by the enemy on the French trenches east of AUBERIVE, it was repulsed. Artillery activity in the region of La NEUVILETTE-BETHENY. Action by projectors in front of REIMS at 4 o'clock this morning, no losses reported so far. Half an hour later the enemy raided La NEUVILLY and two others centers of resistance in front of BETHANY and was repulsed without loss to the French."

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, Bavarian 6th from reserve of Fifth Army, relieved 206th. Ninth Army, Jaeger division from division Detachment B relieved 76th Reserve.

D. II Corps reported 10:50 o'clock morning, August 17: "During 24 hours ending 6 o'clock morning, August 17, generally quiet on front south of ALBERT. Intermittent shelling on GRESSAIRE Wood. Enemy aircraft bombarded this front between 9 and 10 o'clock last night."

5th Division reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, August 17: "This morning at 2:30 o'clock, after strong artillery preparation, American infantry captured the village of FRAPELLE (St-DIE sector). 2 prisoners were taken of the Bavarian 39th Reserve Division. Our troops are consolidating the line north of the road running into FRAPELLE from the southeast. The enemy artillery did not react very much to our artillery preparation. The operation is not a large one but shortens our line and improves it a great deal. Our casualties were light: Officers, none; men, three killed, eight wounded."

5th Division has reported the following summary for the fortnight from July 28 to August 12: "The significant features of the period covered are the enemy's evacuation of the civil population from MENIL and PETITE FOSSÉ, the active patrolling of our troops and the increased patrolling activity of the enemy. The enemy holds his front line lightly with sentinels posted at relatively short intervals ready to give the alarm to troops in second and third lines. 16 enemy patrols have been fired on and 22 others seen or heard. On the night of July 28/29/60 of the enemy attempted a raid on a combat group of the 60th Infantry in subsector ravines but were driven off. On August 4 a large enemy patrol attacked in the vicinity of COULEE, but was driven off by our combat groups which had been reinforced. Apart from the evacuation of MENIL, August 4/6, the movement within and behind the enemy's lines has been normal. Hostile artillery fire has been light, directed principally on the valley of the RABODEAU, the FORAIN and the Bois du PALON. Our own troops have been very active in patrolling, having sent out over 170 reconnaissance, combat, and ambush patrols besides patrols of our own wire and liaison patrols. On August 11 and 12, the enemy dropped at many points in our lines propaganda balloons containing copies of the Gazette des Ardennes, America in Europe and La Guerre Qui Vient."

37th Division has reported the following summary for the period between July 28 and August 14: "During this period there has been marked increase in artillery activity, the enemy having fired more than twice the number of shells fired during the previous fortnight. This fire has been distributed over our entire sector. Enemy machine-gun fire has also greatly increased. Enemy aerial observation has been very active, especially over our forward area. Several bombs were dropped by night bombing planes, but little
damage was accomplished. The back area movement of the enemy, active the first part of
the fortnight, gradually reached the normal about August 9 and has continued normal up to
the present time. The hostile raid which was attempted against ANCERVILLER on the night
of August 3/4 was broken up by our artillery and no other raids have been attempted by the
enemy. During this period our troops sent out 45 patrols, reconnaissance, ambuscade and
combat."

18 (96) A. Aside from military activity and fruitless hostile raids in the VOSGES
there is nothing to report.

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C. It was reported at 1:05 o'clock afternoon, August 18: "Situation unchanged
on the British front. Intermittent bombardment by gas on the woods of MARTINSART (west
of LENS). Numerous movements have been observed on the east bank of the ANCRE during the
night. South of the SOMME, some artillery activity. A Canadian corps made a slight
advance to the east of DAMERY and PARVILLERS.

On the AVRE, night relatively calm. Moderate action of artillery. A German
effort to make a raid on the PARC PLESSIER was vigorously repulsed. Germans left in
French hands 9 prisoners and 1 light machine gun. In front of BELVAL violent hostile
artillery bombardment with gas. Between the OISE and the AISNE, great activity of
artillery especially on the lines which the French conquered yesterday, which received a
counterpreparation offensive fire from midnight to 5 o'clock morning. The French have
taken La GRANGE Ferme and 2 prisoners.

On the VESLE, calm night. The French made 8 prisoners. Artillery action is very
strong in the region of GUEUX, VRIGNY and UNCHAIR.

"Great hostile artillery activity in CHAMPAGNE. Vigorous harassing fire by gas
on center of the sector of MONTS. The region of ST-THOMAS (east of VILLE-sur-TOURBE),
very violent firing on French first lines and bombardment of French rear areas. At 4:45
o'clock morning the enemy attempted 2 raids in the region of ST-THOMAS and in the region
of MAISONS de CHAMPAGNE. Both raids were repulsed. The enemy left in the French hands
1 officer, seriously wounded, and 4 men. None of the French were missing. An effort by
the Germans to make a raid on one of the French small positions north of SILLERY was also
repulsed.

"In the eastern sector, a hostile raid was made on the VANNEQUEL Woods northeast
of ST-MARTIN-sur-VEZOUSE - result not known; and on one of the posts south of the CHAUME
Woods, where the enemy was repulsed. The French made two raids successfully in the region
of BRIN (CHAMPENOUS Forest) and took 2 prisoners. In the region of LEINTREY the French
made seven prisoners. In the region of REGENVILLE 4 Alsatian deserters gave themselves
up."

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, Bavarian 4th from reserve
of Fourth Army, enters line north of 111th, near BUCQUOY. Second Army, 225th withdrawn.
Eighteenth Army, 119th withdrawn. Ninth Army, 223d reengaged east of the OISE, 222d and
53d Reserve enter line between 202d and 14th. First Army, 19th Ersatz, from reserve of
Seventh Army, is in the region of JUNIVILLE.

D. 35th Division reported at 12:24 o'clock afternoon, August 18. On August 17
an enemy raid was driven back, and another raid attempted by the enemy was repulsed. We
suffered no casualties.

28th Division reported at 2:47 o'clock morning, August 18: "During 24 hours
ending midnight August 16, the enemy artillery was active. A great number of gas shells
were used on our front lines and there was harassing fire with high explosive shells on
the region of ARCIS-le-PONSART between 5:30 and 5 o'clock afternoon. Enemy aircraft were
active, a number of bombs being dropped on ARCIS-le-PONSART between 9 and 11 o'clock
evening."

5th Division reported afternoon, August 18: "Enemy heavily shelled FRAPELLE and
From this entire operation up to date following casualties are reported: Officers: 8 slightly wounded, 2 slightly gassed; soldiers: 14 killed, 70 wounded, 13 slightly gassed."

North of TOUL a hostile raid was repulsed with losses to the enemy.

C. It was reported at 1:25 o'clock afternoon, August 19: "Yesterday's operation in the sector of METETEREN was on a front of about four kilometers between the south or the railway HAZEBOUACK-BAILEUL and southeast of METERN. The British advanced to a depth of 1,500 meters, taking OUTTERSTEENE and HOGENAER and over 500 prisoners. German counterattack this morning was repulsed. Violent reaction of the enemy's artillery during the night. No change in the situation in the LYS Valley. British patrols advanced slightly northwest and southwest of MERVILLE, which the enemy is still holding. North of the SCARPE the British reconnaissances met strong resistance, but were able to advance a little southeast of FEUCHY.

During the night west of ROYE violent bombardment by gas on the woods taken by the French yesterday. Number of prisoners taken on the 18th in this region is over 400, west and south of LASSIGNY the first report shows that the attack is progressing normally. French troops have gained a foothold at FRESNIERES and have taken Le HAMEL. The enemy artillery and machine guns interfered with progress between these two points. Between the OISE and the AISNE the operation of last night succeeded completely. On a front of over 15 kilometers the French have advanced between one and a half and two and a half kilometers. On the whole, all of the objectives were reached. The front is: Mill of Les ROSSETTES (this point is 1,500 meters south of CARLEPONT)---point on slopes south of the woods of La MONTAIGNE---head of ravine west of NAMPCEL---the crest of the ARBRE-OBSERVATOIRE---La GRANGE des MOINES---slopes one kilometer south of VASSENS---Plateau 300 meters west of MORSAIN---Farm FALLOISE---NOUVRON-VINGRE, the line rejoins the old line at the salient of FONTENOY. The number of prisoners counted up to date is 1,700, among whom are two battalion commanders and one divisional staff officer.

"On the VESLE the French have continued to clean up the edges of the river. In the American sector the enemy bombarded the first line with gas.

"Calm night on CHAMPAGNE front, except in region south of Les MONTS where the enemy keeps up a continuous bombardment of the first lines. In REIMS sector fairly heavy bombardment of first lines. Artillery activity noticeable near ROSNAY.

"At 4:15 o'clock morning enemy started violent bombardment in the region of REGNIEVILLE. We answered by counterpreparation offensive. The enemy attacked opposite REGNIEVILLE; attack repulsed by Americans. On the rest of this front the enemy was not able to leave his trenches. During the night, bombs were thrown in DIEULOUARD and BACCARAT: no victims; no damage."

It was reported at 8:55 o'clock evening, August 19: "After vigorous combats the French took the SENDU Woods, the BRAGUERMONT Woods and the La GRANGE Ferme (all north of ROYE); they occupied the major part of BEUVRAIGNES and advanced to the south of that place. Farther to the south they have also progressed, notwithstanding the vigorous resistance of the enemy. The French front now passes by the woods of LOGETTES---the ABAVANT Farm---TREMIERE---RUE de BOUCADES---the quarries of Saint-AUBIN---the south part of the woods of CAVE and ORVAL---Le HAMEL---the outskirts of DRESLINCOURT and the village of PIMPREZ. The French took 100 prisoners in this region. North of the AISNE the French took MORSAIN and occupied the quarries of HILL 126. On the VESLE the usual harassing fire by hostile artillery. Calm day in CHAMPAGNE, marked by artillery activity in the region of HURLUS, SOUAIN, PROSNES and THUIZY."

"Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 13th Reserve, from reserve of Eighteenth Army, has relieved 35th. Sixth Army, 220th withdrawn from line. Second Army, 185th from reserve of Seventeenth Army, has relieved 41st. Army Detachment C, an Austro-Hungarian division has relieved 235th."
D. 5th Division reported at 1:31 o'clock afternoon, August 19: "Enemy continued shelling the newly occupied FRAPELLE positions with high explosive and gas shells. Our troops continue the organization of the new positions. Village at NEUVILLES almost totally destroyed. Back area of La FORAIN-LESSEUX heavily shelled. Our artillery very active in reply. Enemy heavily shelled RABODEAU sector. Our artillery replied actively."

II Corps reported August 19: "All elements of the American 80th Division have been withdrawn from the line."

20 (98) A. With the exception of artillery activity along the VESLE and in the VOSGES, there is nothing to report.
B. Nothing to report.
C. It was reported at 1:55 o'clock afternoon, August 20: On the British front the Germans retired their advanced posts to the west of the road VIEUX BERQUIN---NEUF BERQUIN on a front of three kilometers; contact is maintained. No change in the situation on the LYS. Some yperite shelling in the valley of the SCARPE. South of the SOMME the German effort to throw back the English northeast of CHILLY was broken up.

To the west of ROYE, calm night. In front of LASSIGNY, the Germans during the night threw a good deal of gas especially on FRESNIERES and the ravine of DRESLIN Courtney. Great activity of patrols on the whole front. Between the OISE and the AISNE during the night the French occupied VASSENS without fighting. This morning the attack started at 7:10 o'clock. The progress is good along the whole front. According to reports received at 11 o'clock morning the line now runs: La QUENOTTERIES (north of BAILLY)---Le CHAMP du MERLIER (south of CARLEPONT)---La MOTTE Farm---north edge of MONTAGNE Woods---BELLE FONTAINE---south of BLERANCOURDELLE---HILL 140 north of AUDIGNICOURT---north side of HILL 162---the FORET Farm---HILL 146 (Southeast of the FORET Farm)---the western edge of BERLINVAL---TARTIERS---BOUDEROLLES---OSLY-COURTIL. The enemy's artillery reaction was relatively feeble and executed principally by heavy calibers. The French have taken over 800 prisoners. On the VESLE, night calm.

In CHAMPAGNE nothing in particular to report except artillery harassing on the French front lines and rear areas. German raid west of MAISONS de CHAMPAGNE was broken up. The French delivered artillery fire on sensitive points of the front between PRUNAY and BREUIL.

In the eastern sector, a raid by Senegal riflemen penetrated as far as the church of ASPACH-le-BAS and brought back two prisoners. Light hostile artillery activity on FRAPELLE. German aviation was very active in LORRAINE: 50 bombs on NANCY; four fires, important material damage; six killed; 17 wounded; some bombs near ROYAMEIX, on MARBACHE and near BOUZIERES-aux-DAMES; neither victims nor damage.

It was reported at 6:05 o'clock evening, August 20: "Between the OISE and the AISNE the French advance continues normally. At 2:45 o'clock afternoon French troops had reached the heights on both sides of CAISNES; they had penetrated the Bois de-CUTS, and were south of GIZANCOURT. On the right they had passed TARTIERS and occupied Les VAUGERINS. Resistance was strongest in the center, especially at the head of the ravine of MESNIL (northeast of AUDIGNICOURT) and on the line: HILL 160---VEZAPONIN. More than 2,000 prisoners have been taken.

It was reported at 10:10 o'clock evening, August 20: The French took the town of BEUVRAIGNES after severe fighting. Farther to the south, following counterattacks last night by the German infantry, the French again attacked. At the close of the day the French line runs: North of the brook of PLESSIER---200 meters west of the ROLAND Tower---west of the DIVETTE Woods---the eastern edge of CANNY Woods---CANNY---the eastern edge of FRESNIERES---the woods of BUOYER, where the progress continued. More than 500 prisoners were taken in this region. No change southeast of LASSIGNY.

Between the OISE and the AISNE the line runs: CARLEPONT---MONT de CHOSY---south of GIZANCOURT---BRESSON---MONT du ROCH---south of SELENS---VEZAPONIN---west of BIEUUX---east of TARTIERS---east of OSLY-COURTIL. One corps reports the capture of 3,000
prisoners in this region.

In the region of the VESLE, calm day. The usual harassing fire in the region of the Chateau of LIME and the northern edge of ARCY---Ste-RESTITUE.

In CHAMPAGNE, calm day.

In the eastern sector: A French balloon was burned in the region of BETHELAINVILLE by a German airplane which itself was brought down by French antiaircraft guns.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 16th withdrawn from line, its place being taken by extension of front of neighboring divisions. Seventeenth Army, 111th and 1st Reserve withdrawn from line. Second Army, 108th withdrawn from line to reserve. Eighteenth Army, 82d Reserve withdrawn from line.

From the German communiques of August 17 and 19 it appears that the sector occupied by the group of armies under von Boehn has been extended south of the OISE at least as far as NOUVRON-VINGRE. As this sector is held by divisions of the Ninth Army, it is possible that this army is now included, with the Second and Eighteenth Armies, in the Army Group of von Hoehn.

The XXV Army Corps Staff has been transferred from the Seventh Army to SIERENZ, upper ALSACE.

It appears probable that the German 6th Reserve Division has been broken up and its effective distributed between the 5th, 6th and possible the 2d Divisions. The 6th Reserve, rated as third class, was brought from Russia to the western front in February 1918, and engaged in April and May with the Seventh and Ninth Armies.

Photographs received since August 18 confirm the existence of two additional German airfields in the region MOSELLE-BOSGES. In the regions ARGONNE-MOSELLE and VOSGES-Switzerland there is no change in the number of airfields. Photographs received since August 18 also confirm the following increases in the capacity of German airfields: ARGONNE-MOSELLE, plus 21; MOSELLE-VOSGES, plus 103; BOSGES-Switzerland, plus 38.

5th Division reported at 10:52 o'clock morning, August 20: Enemy continued shelling FRAPELLE position and back area. Our artillery replied actively.

28th Division reported at 9:15 o'clock evening, August 20: During 24 hours ending midnight August 19 enemy artillery activity increased on our front lines and rear areas, particularly in the vicinity of ARCIS-le-PONSART. Our artillery also has more active. There was increased activity of both enemy and friendly aircraft.

21 (99) A. Small hostile attacks in the VOSGES and northwest of TOUL broke down before reaching our lines.

Yesterday our aviators successfully bombed the railway at FLABEUVILLE. All our machines returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 9:55 o'clock evening, August 21: Southwest of ROYE, calm day. North of the OISE, the enemy gave way under the continued pressure of the French troops. LASSIGNY has been taken. PLEMONT is surrounded. The French line at 4 o'clock reached the northeastern slope of the PIEMONTE---wood of NAIREE---wood of MALADIERE---St---AUBIN---LOERMONT---wood of ORVAL---HILL 141---southern edge of CHIRY-OURS-CAMPS. The enemy is offering little resistance; some artillery reaction. The advance on the DIVETTE continues.

Along the VESLE, calm day. The Americans cleaned FISMETTE and its surroundings and made some prisoners.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 7th Cavalry from reserve of First Army, is in reserve near COURTRAI. Sixth Army, 35th, from reserve of Fourth Army, is in reserve at LILLE. Seventeenth Army, 83d from reserve of Fourth Army, is in reserve at DOUAL. Second Army, 43d Reserve withdrawn, from line. Eighteenth Army, 1st Reserve has relieved 75th Reserve; XVIII Reserve Corps Staff has moved from the Fourth Army to the Eighteenth Army. Ninth Army, 34th is reengaged in the region of CUTS; Bavarian 1st has moved from the line north of SOISSONS to the line north of LOMBRAY. Fifth Army, 37th
from reserve of Seventh Army, has relieved 231st Army Detachment C, 10th, from reserve of Ninth Army, is in reserve.

D. II Corps reported August 21: During 24 hours ending at 6 o'clock morning, August 21, artillery was active to the right of the sector occupied by our troops. All units of the 33d Division were withdrawn from line during the night.

5th Division reported at 12:40 o'clock afternoon, August 21: Hostile attack on left of our new FRAPELLE positions completely repulsed by our fire with losses to the enemy. We sustained no casualties in this encounter.

1st Division reported at 3:35 o'clock afternoon, August 21: Small enemy raid at 7:15 o'clock this morning repulsed; we captured one prisoner. Artillery activity normal. Airplanes and balloons active.

35th Division reported at 6 o'clock afternoon, August 21: Our patrols encountered hostile patrols during the night of August 20/21. Enemy activity in rear areas has increased. Slight increase in hostile artillery fire in north of sector.

96th Aero Squadron reported August 21 the following details of the bombing operation referred to in Section A: At 5 o'clock afternoon, August 20, seven airplanes left the lines to bomb the railroad yards at LONGUYON. On reaching the objective the aviators found the target so obscured by ground mists that bombs could not be dropped with accuracy. They therefore proceeded along the railway to FLABEUVILLE where 44-kilo. and four 45-kilo. bombs were dropped. Five direct hits were observed. All the machines returned safely at 6:50 o'clock.

Northwest of TOUL one of our aviators shot down a hostile machine. On August 21 and 22 our aviators successfully bombed the railroad yards at LONGUYON---AUDUN-le-ROMAN, and CONFLANS. Three and one half tons of bombs were dropped and many direct hits were observed. All our machines returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 9:40 o'clock morning, August 22: British III Corps attacked at 4:45 o'clock morning, August 22, between the SOMME and the ANCRE.

It was reported at 1:35 o'clock afternoon, August 22: British front - enemy counterattacks were repulsed in the sector of LOCRE. British succeeded in local operation northwest of BAILLEUL. Enemy continued retirement between the LYS and OUTTERSTEENE, British patrols keeping in contact. British advanced from two to two and a half kilometers to the heights of HAUTE MAISON and western edge of NEUF BERQUIN, two kilometers east of MERVILLE. In the LYS sector hostile artillery fire on the rear areas of the British. Hostile fire with gas shells in the valley of the SCARPE. British occupy the farm of BEAUREGARD as well as the trenches west of HAMELIN/COURT. Between ALBERT and BRAY the attack which was started this morning is continuing satisfactorily. It is reported that the British infantry is on the crest southeast of MEAULTE and north of BRAY.

During the night intense bombardment with gas shells and high explosive on the woods north of ROYE, and on the French first lines south of the town this morning. North and east of LASSIGNY the line runs: The woods of SUSSEX---the Farm St.HUBERT---the farm of LA MALMAISON---CUY and then along the DIVETTE River to its mouth. During the night there was considerable reaction of enemy artillery with gas shells. Between the OISE and the AISNE the advance continues. The French held the southern bank of the OISE to VARESNE, the edge of BRETAGNY, and are north of BOURGIGNON and St-PAUL. They have reached the AILETTE on which they hold L'AVAOIRE and La QUINCY-BASSE and La TINETTE. Between the AILETTE and the AISNE no change. North of the AISNE considerable harassing fire by machine guns on the plateau. Continued hostile gas bombardment on the AISNE Valley and along the VESLE. East of BRAINE nothing to report.
In CHAMPAGNE, calm night. Activity of enemy aviation in the regions of FLORENT---EUVILLE---BACCARAT and EPINAL; several killed and wounded and some damage. Hostile artillery bombarded COMMERCY.

It was reported evening, August 22: Latest figures indicate that the French Tenth Army, operating between the OISE and the AISNE, has captured 13,000 prisoners and 200 cannon since August 16.

It was reported at 1:10 o'clock afternoon, August 22: British Fourth Army reports attack between ALBERT and the SOMME successful and all objectives gained. Over 1,000 prisoners to date. The new line is approximately: East of ALBERT---BECORDEL-BECOURT---western outskirts of BRAY. British Third Army reports hostile counterattacks opposite MIRAUMONT and east of COURCELLES repulsed; line unchanged. In the attack of August 21 the British Third Army captured 2,000 prisoners and a few guns.

It was reported at 10:20 o'clock evening, August 22: To the west of ROYE, calm day. Some harassing fire in the region of La CHAVATTE. During the day the French continued to clean up the south side of the DIVETTE River. They are along the river from PASSEL to EVRICOURT. At EVRICOURT and at EPINOY they crossed to the north bank. The Germans still hold CUY and DIVES. The French have made a few prisoners.

Between the OISE and the AISNE the French continue to advance, reaching this morning as far as the AILETTE, north of GUNY, driving the Germans northeastward on the AILETTE and the OISE, and eastward on the plateau between the AILETTE and SOISSONS. The French are along the OISE as far as PONT a la FOSSE. From that point the line runs north of BRETIGNY---QUIERZY---GUNY---PONT-Saint-MARD-BAILLY Farm---MAREUIL Farm---BAGNEUX---VILLERS-le-FOSSE---VAUXREZIS---POMMIERS, all of which are in French hands.

The Americans mopped up La CARCANERIE east of FISMETTE, taking 11 prisoners.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 52d withdrawn from line, its sector being taken by extension of front of neighboring divisions. Second Army, 20th is in rear area near CAMBRAI. Eighteenth Army, 17th Reserve withdrawn from line: 231st from reserve of Fifth Army, engaged near LASSIGNY. Ninth Army, 237th, from the line of Third Army, engaged near St-AUDIN; Guard cavalry division, from reserve of Third Army, in line in sector of Jaeger Division which appears to have moved westward. First Army, 199th reengaged near JONCHERY. Third Army, 28th, from reserve of Ninth Army, relieves 7th. Fifth Army, 115th, and not the 33d Reserve, is in line northwest of VERDUN in the sector recently held by 22d Reserve; the 33d Reserve is still in reserve of Third Army.

Reports have been received of possible offensive intentions of the enemy in the Bois de CHEPPY area and in the region of the upper MEUSE. Recently three experienced assault divisions have come into this sector: Two (37th and 33d) in line, and one (10th) in reserve. None of these divisions has been in this sector this year. All three fought with credit in the SOMME, the AISNE and the REIMS Offensives. All are first class fighting divisions of the sort usually used for piercing the line and they have had an average rest of about three weeks. Austro-Hungarian divisions are reported to be in this sector, and one has already been identified in line. New battery emplacements, new munition depots and new aviation fields have been noted in the region of the upper MEUSE.

Information from a reliable source confirms the reported removal of the German General Headquarters from SPA to BONN.

D. 28th Division reported morning, August 22: Activity during 24 hours ending midnight, August 21: FISMES and MONT-St-MARTIN were heavily shelled with gas and high explosive for four and a half hours during early morning. At 9:15 o'clock evening hostile aircraft dropped four bombs 600 yards southeast of St-GILLES.

Since the situation along the VESLE became stabilized the hostile artillery has continually harassed the front and rear areas of the sector occupied by American troops. On August 18/20 the harassing fire became more intense and extended more deeply behind the
lines. FISMES---COURVILLE---ARCIS-le-PONSART---CHERY CHARTREUVE---La TUILERIE---MONTBANI Ferme---Ferme des DAMES and the FORET-de-FERE were shelled persistently. Most of the firing occurred during the afternoon and early evening. Phosgene and mustard gas shells were used in the area between St-GILLES and COURVILLE. The main roads and the centers of activity were also subjected to intermittent fire. Three small hostile raids in the night of August 19/20 were repulsed.

37th Division reported at 3:50 o'clock afternoon, August 22: Enemy raid repulsed. Both hostile and friendly artillery and aerial activity slightly increased.

29th Division reported afternoon, August 22: Enemy raid in the region of HAGENBACH, at 5 o'clock morning, August 21, repulsed. Two of our men are missing. Our casualties also included four killed and 26 wounded.

89th Division reported at 4:15 o'clock afternoon, August 22: Increased activity of both hostile and friendly artillery and aviation.

The following details of the bombing operations referred to in Section A have been reported: Nine airplanes left at 10 o'clock morning, August 21 to bomb the railroad yards at LONGUYON. Three returned before crossing the lines, but six reached the objective. 1,200 kilograms of bombs were dropped. The bursts were well grouped on the yards between the station and the locomotive repair shops. Antiaircraft fire was accurate at LONGUYON but elsewhere light and ineffective. No enemy aircraft were observed. All our machines returned.

At 4 o'clock afternoon, August 21, nine airplanes left to bomb the railroad yard at AUDUN-le-ROMAN. Two turned back; but seven reached the objective. 880 kilograms of bombs were dropped and three direct hits were observed on the eastern end of the yard. All the machines returned safely at 6:20 o'clock.

At 10 o'clock morning, August 22, seven airplanes bombed the railroad yard at CONFLANS, dropping 1,120 kilograms of bombs. Ten direct hits were observed on the tracks in the central part of the yard. All our machines returned safely at 12:20 o'clock.

The aerial combat referred to in Section A took place in the region of RAULECOURT at 6:30 o'clock morning, August 22. Lieut. Putnam of the 139th Aero Squadron shot down the hostile machine, a Rumpler bi-plane which fell in flames. Both pilot and observer were killed.

An American Aero Squadron has reported the following details of a bombing operation carried out in conjunction with the British Royal Air Force against the VARSSENAERE airdrome, on August 13: 12 American machines participated in the raid, and all but two reached the objective. 200 bombs were dropped on hostile airplanes on the ground, hangars, workshops, chateau and machine-gun emplacements. 3,880 rounds were fired at the target from machine guns. During the operation our machines flew at 200 feet above the airdrome. Six enemy airplanes on the ground were destroyed: and the chateau and some of the hangars set on fire. One of our machines which failed to reach VARSSENAERE dropped four bombs on the OSTEND Docks from a height of 6,000 feet. All our machines returned safely.

23 (101)A. One of our outposts between FISMES and BAZOCHES which was driven back in a small local action, later reoccupied its position.

Our aviators successfully bombed the railroad yards at CONFLANS. All our machines returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 1 o'clock afternoon, August 23: British front: A local attack by the Germans in the sector of St-JEAN-CAPELLE was repulsed. British patrols made slight progress southwest of BAILLEUL. No change between the LYS and the SCARPE. The British attacked at 5 o'clock morning on a front aggregating about 35 kilometers extending from south of ARRAS to LIHONS. On the northern part of the front attacked they have taken BOIRY-BEQUERELLE---BOYELLES---GOMICOURT and HAMELINcourt. South of the SOMME they have taken HERLEVILLE and CHUIGNOLLES. About 2,000 prisoners have already been taken.
Between BEUVRAIGNES and the OISE, German artillery and airplanes were very active. After a violent bombardment of PASSEL and CHIRY-OURSCHAMP the enemy succeeded in entering PASSEL: the French drove them out by a vigorous counterattack, capturing 12 prisoners.

Between the OISE and the AISNE: French patrols have reached the canal east of PONT-St-MARD. French attack on the Ferme de MONTECOUVE failed. The Germans are holding strongly north of SOISSONS. Along the VESLE the Americans reestablished during the night the position which the French occupied before the attack of August 22 and took several prisoners.

In CHAMPAGNE: Night relatively calm. Germans attempted raids east of the SOUAIN---SOMME---PYE Road and east of SILLERY.

In the eastern sector: Violent bombardment at 4 o'clock morning in the region of APREMONT. Hostile airplanes bombed KUNEVILLE, one killed, seven wounded, important damage; and St-CLEMENT and NEUVES-MAISONS.

It was reported at 6:35 o'clock evening, August 23: On the front of the British attack today the line runs: MERCATEL---BOIRY---west of MORY---SAPIGNIES---MIRAUMONT---AUTHUille---AVELUY---ALBERT---south of RECORDERL---BRAY---sur-SOMME---west of CAPPY ---east of CHUIGNOLLES---east of HERLEVILLE. South of the SOMME the British have taken 2,000 prisoners and 14 cannon.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, August 23: North of BEUVRAIGNES and between BEUVRAIGNES and the OISE, German artillery and machine guns were very active. South of the OISE the French reached the farms of MALHOTEL and MONTECOUVE.

Along the VESLE calm day. The Americans captured four prisoners east of FISMES. Three of our companies crossed to the north bank of the VESLE and reached the railway west of FISMES.

In CHAMPAGNE calm day; usual harassing fire. Following the hostile raid reported this morning to the east of the Road SOUAIN---SOMME---PY, the French lost three wounded and ten men missing. In the eastern sector: Nothing to report besides considerable artillery activity in the sector of HAUTE ALSACE and in the region of HOEVILLE on the front of LORRAINE.

The British have made 4,000 prisoners today.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 113th, from reserve of Seventh Army, is in reserve in Belgium. Sixth Army, XIX Corps is engaged in former sector of IX Reserve Corps. Seventeenth Army, 40th, from reserve of Seventh Army, is in line north of Bavarian 4th; 52d, from reserve of Sixth Army, engaged northeast of MIRAUCOURT; 23d, from reserve of Seventh Army, is in reserve near DOUAL. Ninth Army, 206th and 11th, from reserve of Eighteenth Army, engaged southeast of NOYON; 103d, from reserve of Seventh Army, engaged near QUIERZY. Seventh Army, 4th Guard withdrawn from line. First Army, 240th, from reserve of Seventh Army, relieved Bavarian 15th. Army Detachment C, 10th, from reserve, relieved 227th. Army Detachment B, 54th Corps is near COLMAR.

D. III Corps reported evening, August 22: At 10 o'clock last night a patrol of one officer and ten men advanced to the tannery west of FISMES after an artillery preparation of 20 minutes. No serious opposition was encountered and the patrol held their objective. At 4 o'clock this morning the enemy laid down a heavy barrage along the sector of the 308th Infantry. At 5 o'clock the fire lifted and the enemy advanced forcing our units on left to withdraw south of the VESLE. Fighting continued until about 4 o'clock afternoon. Enemy airplanes took part in this attack. We have taken 4 prisoners.

5th Division reported evening, August 22: Enemy continued shelling FRAPELLE and rear areas with high explosive and gas shells. Day quiet elsewhere.

35th Division reported evening, August 22: Greatly increased aerial activity on the part of the enemy.

1st Division reported August 21: An enemy patrol of one officer and 20 men rushed one of our day posts this morning at 7:15 o'clock and was quickly repulsed with two men wounded, one of whom was taken prisoner. We suffered no losses.
35th Division reported August 23: Increased activity of enemy patrols and aerial observation.

96th Aero Squadron reported August 23: At 9:25 o'clock morning nine planes left to bomb the railroad yards at CONFLANS. One turned back before reaching the lines; eight reached the objective. 1,200 kilograms of bombs were dropped. Five direct hits were observed on the northern and western parts of the yard and one on a warehouse near the station. At 11:10 o'clock south of CONFLANS, three pursuit planes rose to attack the formation, but gave up the chase without coming into contact. All our machines returned safely at 11:15 o'clock.

37th Division reported August 21: One of our ambush patrols consisting of two officers and seven men encountered a strong hostile patrol and after an engagement lasting 45 minutes drove the enemy back to his own lines.

28th Division reported August 23: During 24 hours ending midnight August 22: Usual harassing fire from enemy artillery with slight increase noted in the vicinity of MONTAON Ferme. Considerable number of sneezing gas shells used in all shelling. Friendly aircraft continues active. Decrease in enemy aircraft activity over our rear areas.

24 (102) A. East of BAZOCHEs our troops slightly advanced their line. In the VOSGES a hostile raid was repulsed with losses. From the other sectors held by our troops there is nothing to report.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 4:40 o'clock afternoon, August 24: On the front of the British attack the line runs: NEUVILLE---St-LEGER---west of MORY---SAPIGNIES---AVESNES-les-BAPAUME---GREVILLERS---PETIT MIRAUMONT---GRANDCOURT---west of POZIERES---west of FRICOURT---west of CAPPY---CHUIGNES---west of FOUCAUCOURT---LIHONS.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 83d, from reserve, relieved 3d Naval Division. Second Army, 25th, from reserve of Sixth Army, engaged east of ALBERT; 109th withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 84th withdrawn from line; 19th Ersatz, from reserve of First Army, engaged west of QUIERZY; 223d, 5th Reserve, 15th and 202d withdrawn; it appears that the 5th Reserve, 11th, 206th, 223d, 15th, 34th, Bavarian 1st, 237th and 202d hitherto included in the sector of the Ninth Army now form part of the Eighteenth Army; the Ninth Army, erroneously reported to be in the Army Group of von Boehn, remains in the Army Group of German Crown Prince. Ninth Army, 211th withdrawn from line. Seventh Army, 18th reengaged near BRAINE.

D. 28th Division reported morning, August 24: During 24 hours ending midnight, August 23: Increase in number of mustard gas shells used by enemy on our front lines but decrease in general artillery activity. Friendly aircraft continues active, reducing enemy activity in entire sector.

37th Division reported following details of repulse of hostile raid reported in American Official Communique Number 100: One of our ambush patrols, consisting of one officer and 20 men, left our lines at 11 o'clock evening, August 21. They were followed by a covering patrol of two officers and 34 men. A short distance in front of the line they encountered an enemy raiding party of between 60 and 70 men. After a brisk fight the enemy retired to his own lines, and laid a machine-gun barrage on our trenches. Our two patrols reentered our lines at 1 o'clock morning.

82d Division reported 3:05 o'clock afternoon, August 24: One of our ambush patrols was enfiladed by the enemy: One officer, nine enlisted men wounded, one man missing.

25 (103) A. In ALSACE, hostile raiding parties were again driven back in attempts to reach our lines. At other points occupied by our troops the day was uneventful

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, August 24: South of the SOMME situation generally unchanged. North of the SOMME approximate line reported as follows: East of BRAY---east of ALBERT---POZIERES (inclusive)--- COURCELETTE (inclusive)---PYS (probable)---LOUPART Wood---west edge of AVESNES---BIEFVILLERS (inclusive)---MORY
It was reported at 1:45 o'clock afternoon, August 25: British army: A small German attack was again made north of BAILLEUL. It was repulsed. Otherwise nothing to report north of the SCARPE. Yesterday at close of the day a German counterattack threw the British out of AVESNES-les-BAPAUME and the eastern edge of BIEFVILLERS and GREVILLERS. This morning operations were resumed on all the front of attack north of the SOMME. To the left the British debouched from HENIN-sur-COJEUL, advancing in the direction of HENINEL. No change on the front of CROISILIES, ST-LEGER and MORY, all three of which belong to the Germans. This morning the British recaptured BEHAGNIES and SAPIGNIES and resumed the attack on BAPAUME. They appear to have entered BAPAUME but this awaits confirmation. The German resistance seems to diminish. The British are on the western edge of Le SARS and of MARTINPUICH. The British have taken CONTALMAISON. North of BRAY the attack advanced towards SUZANNE and FRICOURT. Situation unchanged south of the SOMME.

French Army: During the night the Germans with lance-flame attempted a big raid north of ROYE. They left 21 prisoners in the hands of the French. The French still hold ST-MARD. Farther to the south a German raid was repulsed. Violent gas and explosive bombardment in the region of BEUVRAIGNES. A reconnaissance attempted on the French small posts to the east of LASSIGNY was driven off. To the east of BAGNEUX a local action enabled the French to carry their line to CHAUSSEE BRUNEHAUT. South of the AISNE the German artillery was active on LINE and CERSEUIL. Americans brought in one officer and four prisoners.

Vigorous German artillery activity around REIMS, principally in the suburbs of LAON.

It was reported at 9:25 o'clock evening, August 25: Heavy enemy counterattacks south of PONT-ST-MARD repulsed this morning. Progress eastward of one kilometer on five kilometer front between PONT-ST-MARD and BAGNEUX.

It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, August 25: East of LASSIGNY enemy artillery very active between the OISE and the AISNE. An active day. The French advanced somewhat, so that their line is 1,200 meters east of the Highway BRUNEHAUT. The enemy reacted by local counterattacks. The French lost the MALHOTEL Farm, but are holding on to the reverse slope of HILL 124. In these actions the French made 400 prisoners, a large proportion of whom were noncommissioned officers. On the VESLE there was violent bombardment during the morning of the positions which were taken last night.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 23d engaged south of ARRAS: 3d Naval reengaged south of ARRAS. Second Army, 13th engaged south of ALBERT; 43d Reserve reengaged on the SOMME; 26th Reserve withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army, 7th Reserve withdrawn from line of Third Army engaged on the OISE. Seventh Army, 195th in reserve at SISSONNE. First Army, 1st Guard from reserve of Seventh Army in reserve at BETHEL; 4th Ersatz from reserve of Seventh Army in reserve at RETHEL. Fifth Army, 203d from line of First Army in reserve north of VERDUN. Army Detachment B 1st Landwehr from reserve of Fourth Army in reserve.

D. 28th Division reported August 23d: Generally quiet. No infantry activity. Raid with artillery preparation, mission prisoners. Three patrols departed from our line at midnight and returned at 12:45 o'clock morning. Destroyed machine-gun emplacements and captured four prisoners.

26 (104) A. In a local action west of FISMES our troops gained ground and captured prisoners. In ALSACE a hostile raid was repulsed with losses.

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C. It was reported at 12:30 o'clock afternoon, August 26: British front. Nothing to report north of the SCARPE except small counterattacks which forced the British to retire slightly north of FAMPOUX. This morning operations were resumed between the SCARPE and THE SOMME. Canadian VI Corps took MONCHY-le-PREUX and reached western edge of GUEMAPPE. Some progress was made north of CROISILLES. In the region of MORY several German counterattacks have been repulsed. The British are in possession of FAVREUIL and have reached the road between BEUGNAIRE and BAPAUME. Farther south an attack was repulsed east of EAUCOURT l'ABBAYE. A number of prisoners were taken. The advance continues east of NAMETZ and CARNOY. The British have reached the western edge of MARICOURT. Situation unchanged south of THE SOMME.

In the course of the night German harassing fire was vigorous west of ROYE and on BEUVRAIGNES. A hostile raid north of FRANSART was repulsed, leaving one prisoner with the French. The French launched an attack at 4:45 o'clock morning on FRENSNOY-les-ROYE, preceded by a vigorous artillery preparation: 200 prisoners already reported. A German raid west of DIVES was repulsed, leaving prisoners in the hands of the French. Great activity of hostile artillery on several points of the front between the OISE and the AISNE, especially in the region of MONTECOUVE. On the VESLE night calm, some harassing fire on QUINCY and TANNIERES.

Night calm in CHAMPAGNE. Hostile artillery active in the sector of REIMS and the valley of the ARDRE. At 6 o'clock morning violent bombardment by 150's and trench mortars on the French first lines between JONCHERY and VILLE-aux-Bois Ferme.

In the eastern sector: Enemy aviation continues active. Bombs were dropped on MARBACHE, three Americans and one civilian wounded, important material damage; and on DIEULOUARD.

It was reported at 5:45 o'clock afternoon, August 26: South of the SCARPE, the line on the British front runs: East of MONCHY le PREUX---east of WANCOURT----west of HENINEL----north and west of CROISILLES----east of St-LEGER---east of MORY----west edge of BRUNNAIRE----encircling BAPAUME----west of THILLOY----west of LONGUEVAL----west of MARICOURT----SUZANNE----CAPPY. Between BAPAUME and THE SOMME feeble resistance of the infantry; hostile artillery only slightly active.

It was reported at 9:35 o'clock evening, August 26: The French attack this morning on FRENSNOY-les-ROYE was entirely successful; French took the village entirely, notwithstanding very great resistance and repulsed the German counterattack. This afternoon the French took ST-MARD. The number of prisoners captured in these operations exceeds 600. Many machine guns have also been taken.

In the eastern sector: A German raid, following severe bombardment on BALSCHWILLER was repulsed, leaving two bodies in the hands of the Americans; another raid, after violent bombardment, on the French combat groups north of VIOLU cost the French three men missing.

It is reported that between July 1 and August 26 the Allies have taken 112,000 prisoners, of whom 58,000 were taken by the French, 45,000 by the British and 9,000 by the Americans. During the same period the French have captured 800 guns, the British 460 and the Americans 125.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 220th from reserve or Sixth Army, engaged near GREVLILLERS; Bavarian 6th Reserve, from reserve of Seventh Army, engaged northwest of BAPAUME; 234th, 2d Guard Reserve, Bavarian 4th withdrawn from line. Second Army, 225th, from reserve engaged north of FRICOURT. Eighteenth Army, 82d Reserve reengaged northwest of ROYE; 25th Reserve and 222d withdrawn from line. Ninth Army, 1st Guard, from reserve of First Army, engaged at CRECY-au-MONT. Seventh Army, 4th Guard reengaged near COURLANDON. Third Army, 3d Guard, from reserve of First Army, engaged north of St-HILAIRE. Fifth Army, elements of the 1st Austro-Hungarian Division are attached to the 123d.

General von Carlowitz has replaced General von Eben in the command of the Ninth Army.
Sixth German divisions which faced the British attack of August 8/12 lost the following numbers of prisoners: 13th Division, 2,768 prisoners; 117th, 2,306; 41st, 2,099; 225th, 2,036; 108th, 1,785; 109th, 1,491.

D. 28th Division reported August 26: For 24 hours ending midnight, August 25: Local attacks by troops of 55th Brigade gained some ground and captured six prisoners. Friendly artillery active; usual harassing fire by enemy artillery.

27 (105) A. Aside from renewed local combats along the VESLE between BAZOCHES and FISMES, there is nothing to report.

B. The Commander-in-Chief has issued the following general order dated August 27: It fills me with pride to record in general orders a tribute to the service and achievements of the I and III Corps, comprising the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, and 42d Divisions of the American Expeditionary Forces.

You came to the battlefield at the crucial hour of the Allied cause. For almost four years the most formidable army the world had as yet seen had pressed its invasion of France, and stood threatening its capital. At no time had that army been more powerful or menacing than when, on July 15, it struck again to destroy in one great battle the brave men opposed to it and to enforce its brutal will upon the world and civilization.

Three days later, in conjunction with our Allies, you counterattacked. The Allied Armies gained a brilliant victory that marks the turning point of the war. You did more than give our brave Allies the support to which as a nation our faith was pledged. You proved that our altruism, our pacific spirit, our sense of justice have not blunted our virility or our courage. You have shown that American initiative and energy are as fit for the test of war as for the pursuits of peace. You have justly won the unstinted praise of our Allies and the eternal gratitude of our countrymen.

We have paid for our success in the lives of many of our brave comrades. We shall cherish their memory always and claim for our history and literature their bravery, achievement and sacrifice.

This order will be read to all organizations at the first assembly formations after its receipt.

C. It was reported at 12:30 o'clock afternoon, August 27: This morning the French continued to make progress west and southwest of ROYE. Despite strong resistance they captured LAUCOURT. The new line follows the railway from HALLAU to south of ROYE. Prisoners made yesterday number 1,100 of whom 38 are officers.

Between the OISE and the AISNE yesterday morning the Germans failed in an attack west of CHAVIGNY leaving 26 prisoners in the hands of the French. During the evening a small operation by the French permitted them to advance their line 1,200 meters to the east of the wood DOMAINE, on a front of one kilometer. During the night the German artillery was very active, especially to the east of the OISE from SEMPIGNY to MONT-a-LAGACHE. At daybreak the French occupied the farm of MALHOTEL.

On the VESLE the German artillery and aviation was very active. The Americans penetrated into BAZOCHES this morning.

It was reported at 7:45 o'clock evening, August 27: The French and British have made an important advance today. Beginning at the north the line runs: North of ARLEUX—west of OPPY—east of GAVRELLE—west of PLOUVIAN—PELVES—Bois du SART—VIS en ARTOIS—FONTAINE les CROISILLES—west of ECOUST St-MEIN—west of VRAUCOURT—east of BEUGNATRE—west edge of BAPAUME—le BARQUE—FLERS—east of LONGUEVAL—two kilometers east of MONTAUBAN—three kilometers east of SUZANNE—DOMPIERRE—west of CHAULNES—PINCHY—FONCHES—LIANCOURT—CREMERY—GRUNY—CARREPUI—VERPILLIERS—AMY. An order was captured at ROYE addressed to the German 221st Infantry Division directing it to retire immediately behind the CANAL du NORD believed BUVERCHY and LIBERMONT.

The Americans repulsed a German attack near FISMES.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 20th, from reserve, enters line at MONCHY-le-PREUX north of 39th; 44th Reserve, from reserve of Sixth Army, enters line northeast of MARTINPUICH north of 3d Naval; 111th, from reserve, relieved 40th; 87th,
from reserve of Seventh Army, entered line at LONGUEVAL south of 83d; 183d withdrawn from line; 26th Reserve, localized at DOUAI, from reserve of Second Army. Second Army, 14th Reserve, from reserve of Army Detachment B, engaged north of 233d.

General von Eberhardt, who has previously commanded the XV Reserve Corps and the X Reserve Corps, has been given the command of the Seventh Army, left vacant by the appointment of von Boehn to the command of an army group.

The German Ninth Army has been taken from the Army Group of the German Crown Prince and assigned to that of von Boehn.

D. 92d Division reported 10:10 o'clock evening, August 26: One platoon of 367th Infantry assisted French in repulsing hostile combat patrols near Hill MERE-HENRY (northwest of SENONES). Our casualties were two killed and nine wounded.

28 (106) A. North of the AISNE our troops, in cooperation with the French, advanced to the railroad west of JUVIGNY and captured 200 prisoners. Along the VESLE local hostile attacks forced our outlying detachments in BAZOCHES and FISMETTE to retire.

C. It was reported at 3:10 o'clock afternoon, August 28: On the VESLE a hostile patrol attacked the MOULIN de BRAINE without result. Patrols sent to reconnoiter the crossings found them strongly held by the Germans. German raid cost the French six missing. BAZOCHES, taken yesterday morning by Americans, was lost during the day. FISMETTE appears to have been largely taken by the Germans.

American patrols brought in three prisoners in sector of LUCEY and one prisoner in sector of BACCARAT.

It was reported 7:30 o'clock evening, August 28: The French First and Third Armies, except for a short distance, are now along the western bank of the river SOMME and the CANAL du NORD. Nothing further to report from the French Tenth Army. British Third Army advanced today and British Fourth Army is in liaison with the left of French First Army. British report fighting continues in the vicinity of LONGUEVAL.

It was reported at 5:15 o'clock afternoon, August 28: South of the SOMME the front of the British Fourth Army runs: East of FRISÉ—east of DOMPIERRE—east of FAY—west of DENICEOURT—east of ABLANICOURT—northwest of MARCHELEPOT. Between the SOMME and the SCARPE no change, except that Canadians captured PELVES.

Change in German order of battle: Fourth Army, Bavarian 11th Reserve, from Seventh Army, relieves 49th Reserve. Seventeenth Army, 35th, from reserve Ninth Army, engaged at MONCHY-le-PREUX; 20th engaged east of MONCHY-le-PREUX; 26th Reserve engaged east of VIS-en-ARTOIS; 87th from reserve Seventh Army, engaged south of LONGUEVAL; 2d Guard, from reserve Seventh Army, engaged in Bois de BERNAFAY. Second Army, 54th Reserve withdrawn; 117th engaged at MARICOURT. Eighteenth Army, 103d and Bavarian 1st withdrawn. Ninth Army, 14th withdrawn; 7th, from reserve Third Army, engaged west of JUVIGNY. Nineteenth Army, 3d Reserve localized at CHATEAU SALINS. The regiments of the 235th Division, dissolved, have been used to reinforce the 10th Division.

D. 28th Division reported morning, August 28: For 24 hours ending midnight, August 27: Strong enemy raiding parties attacked FISMETTE at 4:20 o'clock morning, August 27. Last reports indicate we still have troops in the town. Increase in enemy artillery activity and in number of large caliber shells. Enemy aircraft bombed our rear areas during early morning, August 27. Friendly aerial activity normal.

It was reported at 2:18 o'clock afternoon, August 28: At 9:30 o'clock morning American 32d Division (acting with French Tenth Army) had reached railway west of JUVIGNY, and captured 200 prisoners.

29 (107) A. North of the AISNE, our troops have made progress in the region of JUVIGNY, in spite of the strong resistance of the enemy. Our patrols were active along the VESLE and in the WOEVRE, and brought in prisoners.

B. Nothing to report.
C. It was reported at 12:30 o'clock afternoon, August 29: British front:
This morning the Germans violently counterattacked in the sector of GAVRELLE and in the valley of the SENSEE west of HAUCOURT. These attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the Germans. Situation unchange as far as the Somme. The British progressed from CURLU on the SOMME toward HEM-MONACU. South of the SOMME they have captured FEUILLERES, HERBECOURT, ASSEVILLERS, BELLOY.

During the night German artillery was active on French first lines and rear areas west of the SOMME. The Germans remain on the right bank of the river. Grenade combats at the edge of MOYENCOURT. In front of NOYON the French resumed their attacks at 5:30 o'clock morning; they have taken the cavalry barracks and progressed in the suburbs of the city.

In the attack this morning the OISE and the AISNE the French have progressed in the region of PONT l'EVEQUE and MORLINCOURT. They crossed the AILLETTE in the region of CHAMPS. At another point where they had crossed the AILLETTE they were compelled to return to the south bank. At 7:40 o'clock Americans were in the woods of ALSACE east of JUVIGNY. The enemy is resisting strongly. On the VESLE hostile artillery was very active during the night.

In CHAMPAGNE: Night relatively calm. Four French raids in the regions of SOUAIN and AUBERIVE brought in 14 prisoners belonging to three divisions. The raids were followed by hostile harassing fire.

In the eastern sector: The French captured two prisoners east of SAMOGNEUX. American patrols made four prisoners in the WOEVRE. Raids by the Germans in the region of St-CLEMENT and in the region of COMMERCY failed completely. Violent hostile bombardment south of SAIZERAIS. Americans have two missing as result of patrol encounter in the region of METZERAL. The Germans executed a raid south of LAUCH, in the VOSGES, of which details are lacking.

It was reported at 3:40 o'clock afternoon, August 29: According to reports dated noon today the Americans operating with French Tenth Army have progressed toward TERNY-SORNY, occupying the farm and woods of BEAUMONT. The French are south of CRECY-au-MONT and occupy the trenches between PRE GAYANT and the railway southwest of La MONTAGUE. The situation in the region of LEURY is uncertain. The Germans are still in JUVIGNY but apparently practically surrounded. The French have taken VILLETTE north of CHAMPS.

British Front: Report dated 12:30 o'clock afternoon states: The Australians are between BIACHES and VILLERS-CARBONNEL. North of the SOMME the British have taken GINCHY and GUILLEMONT and are advancing toward COMBLES. The Germans appear to be evacuating BAPAUME. The British are entering THILLOY, LIGNY-THILLOY and GUEUDECOURT without opposition.

It was reported at 6:45 o'clock evening, August 29: The British are on the line HAUCOURT---FONTAINE les CROISILLES---west of VRAUCOURT---two kilometers east of BAPAUME---BEAULENCOURT---Le TRANSLOY---MORVAL---COMBIES---CLERY sur SOMME---in front of PERONNE. The attack of the French Tenth Army seems to be halted. Some of the ground gained has been lost.

It was reported at 9:15 o'clock evening, August 29: The French have continued to press the enemy during the day. Their troops succeeded in penetrating BETHENCOURT, BREUIL and MOYENCOURT. At 5 o'clock afternoon the line runs: The east edge of EPENANCOURT---HILL 89---eastern edge of BETHENCOURT---HILL 59---BREUIL---MOYENCOURT---ERCHEU---the QUESNOY Woods. In that part of the front the French took 50 prisoners. Farther to the south the battle has assumed a more violent character; the enemy, vigorously reinforced in artillery and solidly organized along the CANAL du NORD, has opposed the attacks of the French with strong resistance. The French have taken NOYON and the infantry has passed beyond the city and is along the slopes of MONT-St-SIMEON and the southern part of HAPPLINCOURT. The French made several hundred prisoners. From the woods of QUESNOY the French line passes by the edge of CATIGNY---BEAURAINS---south of HAPPLINCOURT---LANDRIMONT---MORLINCOURT. On the VESLE, calm day. The Germans made two
attempts to raid the French small posts on the edge of the LINE-COURCELLES Road. Both were repulsed.

In CHAMPAGNE, calm day. As a result of the attempted German raid reported this morning in the region of COMERCY, the body of a German officer and two prisoners were brought into the French lines. Order of battle confirmed. The French lost four men missing in the raid south of LAUCH reported this morning. Activity of German artillery in the WOEVRE and bombardment of the COL-du-BONHOMME.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 12th Reserve localized near LENS. Seventeenth Army, 83d withdrawn; 16th localized at DOUAI. Second Army, 27th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army, 17th Reserve in line south of Bavarian 6th. Fifth Army, 123d relieved by 1st Austro-Hungarian. Nineteenth Army, 195th, from reserve Seventh Army, localized at METZ. 46th Reserve and Bavarian 10th dissolved. The western boundary of Ninth Army is the OISE.

D. 92d Division reported August 28: Several small enemy patrols repulsed. 35th Division reported August 29: During 24 hours ending midnight, August 28: Enemy patrols active; aerial observation active.

28th Division reported 5:40 o’clock evening, August 29: Usual reconnaissance patrols by our infantry. Enemy still cover FISMES and approaches with machine guns and one-pounders. Friendly artillery active. Enemy positions heavily shelled with gas. Harassing fire by enemy artillery on entire sector. One enemy plane shot down on our right. The enemy plane used machine guns on our front lines. Seven enemy balloons up during morning. Four patrols from right subsector were sent out at 3:30 o’clock morning to establish themselves on railroad. Left patrol succeeded. Two center patrols caught in enemy barrage. Right patrol reached railroad and encountered 75 enemy; after engagement of 30 minutes our patrol withdrew. Casualties heavy; no official check.

30 (108) A. In the VOSGES a strong raiding party which advanced under cover of artillery fire to our lines was driven back without securing any result. Aside from artillery fighting in this region there is nothing else to report.

During the day the railroad yards at BARRICOURT and CONFLANS were effectively bombed by our aviators. All of our machines have returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 3:15 o’clock afternoon, August 30: British front: Between BAILLEUL and the La BASSEE Canal British patrols have advanced southwest of BAILLEUL and east of VIEUX BERQUIN, and are 500 meters southwest of NEUVE CHAPELLE. A great number of fires are reported in the villages of BAILLEUL, ESTAIRES and NIEPPE. According to prisoners there is no more heavy artillery west of STEENWERCK toward which the enemy seems to be retiring. In the sector of the SCARPE at the end of the day the line ran northwest of PLOUVIAN---one kilometer west of HAMBLAIN-les-PRES---1,500 meters east of BOIRY NOTRE DAME---along the river SENSEE southwest of ETERPIGNY.

On the SOMME and the CANAL du NORD situation unchanged. Harassing of the rear areas during the night, much gas. The combat was continued during the night in the park of the Chateau of BEAURAINS which the Germans still hold. Between the OISE and the AISNE night relatively calm. Some French elements were able to cross the canal and are now along the AILETTE. The enemy counterattacked several times east of PASLY but the French maintained their gains. On the VESELE night calm. Attacks at 3:35 o’clock morning on French positions near the bridge between LIME and COURCELLES were repulsed. Enemy threw 200 gas projectiles on the American sector.

In CHAMPAGNE: Night rather lively in the region north of MOUREMELON where the Germans heavily bombarded, using some gas. Two German raids in the sectors of TOURBE and MASSIGES failed. Hostile gas bombardment on the Butte of CONERY: no infantry attack.

It was reported at 7:30 o’clock evening, August 30: In the region of ARMENTIERES the British line runs: BAILLEUL---DOULIEU---west of ESTAIRES.
In front of the Tenth Army: CRECY-au-MONT---west of JUVIGNY---east of CHAVIGNY---south of LEURY---west of CROUY---north of VILLENEUVE to VENIZEL, thus indicating an appreciable advance today.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 1st Guard Reserve withdrawn. Seventeenth Army, 58th, from reserve Fourth Army, engaged at BULLECOURT. Eighteenth Army, Bavarian 1st, 202d, 103d, 15th transferred to reserve Ninth Army. Ninth Army, 5th Reserve, from reserve Eighteenth Army engaged near CHAMPS; 84th, from reserve Eighteenth Army, engaged north of MANICAMP; 223d, from reserve Eighteenth Army, engaged near CHAVIGNY; Jaeger division withdrawn. Third Army, 200th from reserve Seventh Army, relieved 22d Reserve.

The Bavarian 10th has been disbanded and its effectives transferred to the Bavarian 6th Reserve and Bavarian 11th and 14th. This reduces the number of German divisions on the western front to 201.

D. 28th Division reported August 30: For 24 hours ending midnight, August 29: Friendly artillery active. Enemy artillery activity confined to night harassing fire on roads and towns. Very few enemy planes observed. One hostile plane reported shot down by our antiaircraft fire. Seven enemy balloons observed in ascension during the day.

28th Division reported August 28: Opposite our right, the enemy occupies FISMETTE, his line being along the northern bank of the VESLE. His machine guns, trench mortars and one-pounders are active, directing their fire on the streets that run north and south in FISMES. During the afternoon and night the southern and eastern limits of FISMES were subjected to heavy shell fire by large caliber guns. A patrol of six men sent out to reconnoiter the situation in FISMETTE found it impossible to get within 100 yards of the bridge between FISMES and FISMETTE owing to hostile machine-gun fire. Opposite our left sector the enemy is along the railroad as before. There has been here only moderate amount of sniping and machine-gun fire. One of our patrols encountered an enemy patrol at the ROUEN-REIMS Road and drove them back after a combat with grenades.

32d Division reported 1:15 o'clock afternoon, August 30: Situation unchanged. Artillery active. Night uneventful.

28th Division reported at 4:30 o'clock afternoon, August 30: Usual patrols keeping contact with enemy. Enemy continues to cover FISMES and south bank of VESLE with machine-gun fire. Enemy using searchlight on bridge between FISMES and FISMETTE during night. Moderate activity by friendly artillery. Enemy activity increased slightly on roads and towns. Increase noted in enemy activity over front line. No change in line.

It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, August 30; by 77th Division: Our patrols active along VESLE fired on by enemy machine guns. Artillery normal.

31 (109) A. North of the AISNE our troops took JUVIGNY by assault and captured 150 prisoners. In the WOEVRE and in the VOSGES the enemy was again repulsed in attempts to raid our lines. In ALSACE a successful raiding party penetrated the enemy's trenches and inflicted losses.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported August 31: Prisoners taken by Australian 2d Division at MONT-St-QUENTIN last night now amount to 1,500 including two battalion commanders. British Third Army reports capture of whole of REINCOURT-les-BAPAUME with several prisoners and three guns. Heavy German attack early this morning northeast of BAPAUME driven off. British attacked this morning between BRAUCOURT and BULLECOURT and are reported to be making progress. LONGATTE and ECOUST believed taken.

It was reported 9 o'clock evening, August 31: French retook this morning the Woods des QUINETTAS into which the enemy had penetrated; also the Wood CASSIMIR and some prisoners. During the afternoon enemy artillery reacted violently on first lines and batteries in the region east of NESLE. During day enemy resisted French attacks and counterattacked several times, especially at BUSSY and CHEVILLY, which was taken and retaken twice. French took CHAMPAGNE and advanced on MONT-St-SIMEON. At 4 o'clock after-
noon the line in this sector was otherwise unchanged. The French have taken 200 prisoners. North of the AILLETTE the French hold the Wood des VACHES and the edge of the BASSE FORET-de-COUCY opposite CHAMPS. Between the OISE and the AISNE the French tenth Army attacked at 4 o'clock afternoon. There was a heavy counter-offensive preparation. No definite report. Along the VESLE nothing to report.

In CHAMPAGNE French patrol captured a prisoner from the German 42d Division north of HURLUS. The Germans captured one prisoner this morning in their raid east of THANN in ALSACE.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 1st Guard Reserve withdrawn. Seventeenth Army, 58th in line south of 52d; 111th withdrawn, 16th in line south of 20th; 21st withdrawn; 39th withdrawn; Second Army 13th withdrawn; 233d withdrawn; 43d Reserve withdrawn; 225th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army, 206th withdrawn; 11th withdrawn. Ninth Army, 223d in line south of 7th; 7th Reserve withdrawn. Third Army, Jaeger localized northwest of SOUAIN; 22d Reserve relieved by 200th. 47th Reserve dissolved. Bavarian Ersatz still in reserve of Seventh Army. The 78th Reserve, rated as third class, has been disbanded. This division suffered heavy casualties in the fighting in the region of REIMS and was removed from the line about July 22.

D. 82d Division reported August 30: One of our patrols met and successfully repulsed enemy patrol.

It was reported August 31: 32d Division holds JUVIGNY. They took about 150 prisoners in course of their attack yesterday. In general, enemy holds tenaciously. Night uneventful.

29th Division reported morning, August 31: Strong raiding party entered German trenches in BALSCHWILLER early this morning inflicting losses.

35th Division reported August 31: Artillery active; two enemy raids repulsed, enemy failed to reach our trenches.

89th Division reported 5 o'clock afternoon, August 31: Enemy attempted raid on our lines repulsed leaving two dead. Our casualties three men wounded.

77th Division reported August 31: Enemy artillery activity slightly increased; our own artillery active, placing harassing and destructive fire on BAZOCHES. The small wood between the VESLE and the railroad west of the wood of the CHATEAU du DIABLE has been cleared of the enemy.

30th Division reported August 31: Reports received from neighboring units and our observation posts indicate general withdrawal on our division front. Special strong patrols sent out last night found few signs of enemy troops. This morning strong patrol sent out to get in contact with the enemy met machine-gun fire but few troops. They captured some prisoners and caused numerous casualties. Our casualties are light. Three of our men are reported to have been taken prisoners near VOORMEZEELE. Our line is advancing behind the patrols.

II Corps reported August 31: British patrols on summit of KEMMEL HILL. Patrols have reached Kleine KEMMEL Beek. Farther north enemy alert and occupying posts in normal strength.

September

A. North of the AISNE our troops have made further progress east of JUVIGNY. There is nothing else of importance to report.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported afternoon, September 1: British Fourth Army attack going well. ANVIL Wood taken and PERONNE being mopped up. British troops reported moving east from ST-DENIS. Progress being made on MONT-ST-QUENTIN and up spur to EPINE de MALASSISE. RANCOURT and PRIEX Farm taken. About 850 prisoners. British Third Army captured MORVAL and BEAULENCOURT, ridge east of BANCOURT and FREMICOURT, high ground east of VAULX-VRAUCOURT, BULLECOURT and HENDECOURT Village and CHATEAU. Prisoners in these operations include battalion commander and staff. British troops on northern and eastern outskirts of Le TRANSLOY where fighting is in progress.
It was reported 9 o'clock evening, September 1: At 4 o'clock afternoon French attacked HILL 77. They have crossed the CANAL du NORD east of QUIQUERY and are advancing satisfactorily east of ROUY-le-PETIT. North of the AILETTE the French secured a foothold in the woods west of COUCY-le-CHATEAU. South of the AILETTE they have occupied the Chateau and the village of CRECY-au-MONT. North of the AISNE they made a slight advance in the region of CROUY.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 16th, from reserve, to line south of Bavarian 16th; 7th Cavalry, from reserve of Fourth Army, engaged south of 16th; 12th Reserve, from reserve of Sixth Army, engaged south of 7th Cavalry; 21st Reserve, 39th, 52d, and 11th withdrawn. Second Army, 2d Guard from line of Seventeenth Army, engaged south of Bavarian 14th; 11th, 13th, 43d Reserve, 225th, and 233d withdrawn. Eighteenth Army, 2d, 17th Reserve, 79th Reserve, and 206th withdrawn. Ninth Army, 7th Reserve withdrawn; Bavarian 1st, from reserve of Ninth Army, engaged south of 237th; 51st Reserve, from reserve Seventh Army, to reserve region of MARLE; 24th, from reserve Eighteenth Army, engaged east of 5th Reserve. Third Army, 28th relieved by 42d. Jaeger division is still in reserve of Ninth Army.

Increases in enemy airdromes from ARGONNE to the Swiss border, August 1 to August 31. In the ARGONNE-MOSELLE sector the enemy has constructed seven new airdromes with 44 hangars and nine sheds, and has added 18 hangars and two sheds to old airdromes, thereby increasing the machine capacity of the sector 237. In the MOSELLE-VOSGES, nine new airdromes with 32 hangars and four sheds have been constructed. 27 hangars have been added to old airdromes, and one airdrome with nine hangars has been vacated. The machine capacity of the sector has been increased 181. In the VOSGES-Switzerland sector, the enemy has constructed two new airdromes with nine hangars, and has added 37 hangars to old airdromes, thereby increasing the machine capacity of the sector 123. The largest increases have taken place in the area of MOUZON, west of METZ, north of CHATEAU SALINS, SAAREBOURG, and SCHLESTADT. The enemy is probably carrying out his policy of having several times as many airdromes as are actually needed at one time to permit rapid transfer of flights to the region in which they are most needed.

D. 35th Division reported September 1: Enemy patrolling active; otherwise quiet.

II Corps reported September 1: Patrols along front of 27th Division active, capturing one officer and 22 men. Our own and enemy artillery active. 30th Division captured two prisoners who did not know Americans were on this front. Line now runs VOORMEZEELE to LANHOF Farm where fighting is now going on.

It was reported September 1: Capture of TERNY-SORNY announced last night not yet confirmed. 32d Division troops held RAPERIE, north of TERNY-SORNY. Road running north of TERNY-SORNY has been reached on front of two kilometers. LEURY taken by French at 4 o'clock morning. Slight progress north of SOISSONS. On rest of front between the OISE and the AISNE night uneventful.

28th Division reported September 1: Active patrolling last night by our troops.

30th Division reported September 1: Strong patrols sent out from our right met considerable machine-gun fire in VOORMEZEELE. Patrols from our left after advancing to MIDDLESEX Road were subjected to machine-gun attack and retired to their original front. Our airplanes report burning of materiel by the enemy but no movement of troops.

III Corps reported August 30: Late reports of enemy attack upon FISMETTE on morning of August 27 indicate that the battalion making the attack was very roughly handled. Eight dead Germans have been discovered in one spot, and in another spot among the dead were found three enemy officers. The defense of FISMETTE by our troops was a most creditable performance, and it is believed that the attacking battalion was seriously crippled. The artillery activity of the enemy continues to decrease and while his infantry is very alert it is not aggressive. Our patrols constantly maintain contact. The enemy is paying more attention to his front line and outposts positions. In rear
areas he appears to be growing rather careless as to concealment and more movement has been observed.

37th Division reported August 28: During the past two weeks there has been a slight decrease in artillery activity; the enemy artillery has begun to concentrate a great deal of its fire on the right half of the sector. Hostile aerial observations have continued active, especially over our forward area. Bombs have been dropped on several of the towns within the area, and in a number of cases, enemy airplanes have used their machine guns on the streets. The back area movement, with the exception of two days has continued very active. Our patrols have shown increased activity during the period; about 52 patrols, reconnaissance, combat, ambush, and covering, have been out. Enemy fire has been patrolled. Several new machine-gun emplacements have been located, and others verified. Two trench mortar emplacements and several dugouts and abandoned parts of the enemy trenches have been verified. Encounters with enemy patrols have been frequent, and our patrols have in every instance given a good account of themselves.

It was reported September 1: Today 32d Division organizing conquered terrain. They took TERNY-SORNY evening of August 31 with prisoners but withdrew to road to protect flanks. 63d brigade in preliminary report gives as approximate figures 572 prisoners, two 105 caliber guns, 14 heavy guns, 64 light guns and considerable quantity artillery and small arms ammunition and rifles.

2 (111) A. North of the AISNE our troops have continued to advance in spite of the strong resistance of the enemy, and have taken the village of TERNY-SORNY. In the operations yesterday in this region they captured 572 prisoners, two 105 caliber guns and 78 machine machine guns. North of the VESLE two local hostile attacks west of FISMES were repulsed with losses.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2:45 o'clock afternoon, September 2: British front: South of the SCARPE, British attacked at 5 o'clock this morning. First reports indicate that Canadians have already crossed the line QUEANT-DROCOURT and have taken DURY. Attack is progressing satisfactorily.

Night marked by violent reaction of enemy on the SOMME front. French attempts to pass the river met heavy barrages in the region of VOYENNES. French hold the sunken road from ROUY-le-GRAND to HILL 77. Near QUIQUERY an attempt is being made to surround HILL 77. Along the canal, harassing fire by gas shells. Two strong enemy counterattacks north of CHAMPAGNE were repulsed by French who still hold the village. North of the AILETTE, French have reached the western edge of Bois de MONTHEZEL and have advanced to the woods west of COUCY-le-CHATEAU, capturing 100 prisoners. French have taken HILL 124 east of PONT-St-MARD. On the VESLE calm night: enemy reconnaissances in American sector were repulsed.

It was reported afternoon, September 2: Situation in SAILLY obscure. British hold SAILLY-SAILLISEL and road to Le TRANSLOY. Enemy still in Le TRANSLOY. British have captured VILLERS-au-FLOS and have occupied western half of BEUGNY and the southern outskirts of NOREUIL. VILLERS-les-CAGNICATION is doubtful. Canadians have captured DURY. Enemy counterattacked British outposts southeast of GAVRELLE six times yesterday afternoon and was repulsed with loss. British patrols reported to have made progress in southern and western portion of LENS.

It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, September 2: Along the AILETTE and on the plateau between the AILETTE and the AISNE the French Tenth Army attacked at 2 o'clock afternoon and in spite of great resistance of the enemy is advancing satisfactorily. The French have reached the canal north of BETHANCOURT and have taken LEUILLY, L'HERMITAGE, and La FONTANE St-REMY. TERNY-SORNY has been cleaned up. Advanced elements are reported on the Road CROUY to PONT-ROUGE and northwest of BUCY-le-LONG. The advance continues slowly.

In CHAMPAGNE and along the VESLE great activity of aviation: numerous combats between airplanes.
Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 30th, from reserve Third Army, relieves 15th Reserve; 26th Reserve withdrawn; 2d Guard Reserve engaged south of 4th Ersatz; 3d Reserve, from reserve Nineteenth Army, engaged south of 2d Guard Reserve; 22d, from reserve Seventh Army, engaged at BULLECOURT; 49th Reserve, from reserve Fourth Army, engaged at VILLERS-au-FLOS. Second Army, 25th, 117th, 21st, 41st withdrawn; 113th, from reserve Fourth Army, localized at MAUBEUGE. Eighteenth Army, 75th Reserve engaged at LIBERMONT. Ninth Army, 227th, from reserve Army Detachment C, engaged at TERNY-SORNY; 53d Reserve withdrawn. Fifth Army, 123d engaged in former sector of 232d.

On August 31 the Germans had 70 divisions in reserve on the western front divided according to classes as follows: 1st class 17, 2d class 31, 3d class 19, 4th class 3. Fifty-two of these divisions had been resting for one week, 3 for two weeks, 8 for three weeks, 6 for four weeks, one for five weeks.

D. It was reported at 2:36 o'clock morning, September 2: Between the OISE and the AISNE day characterized by minor local actions and organizing of conquered territory. 32d Division made a few prisoners but undertook no forward operations. French made progress toward Les RIBANDES, south of CRECY-au-MONT.

89th Division has reported the following details of repulse of hostile raid reported in American Official Communiqué Number 109, August 31: The raid was preceded by a barrage of high explosive shells and a light barrage of mustard gas. At 3:40 o'clock morning upwards of 60 Germans entered our lines from the west. In the meantime our outguards had withdrawn and, when the Germans entered, opened fire. The Germans retreated. No effort was made to follow them up, as they were covered by machine guns. Two of the enemy were killed and 6 or 8 wounded. Our casualties were 2 slightly wounded.

92d Division reported September 2: Artillery unusually active in region of FRAPELLE. Enemy airplanes and balloons unusually active. Our patrols active.

77th Division reported September 2: Our troops repulsed two local enemy attacks during night in woods south of CHATEAU du DIABLE.

82d Division reported September 2: One of our patrols met and repulsed enemy patrol.

39th Division reported September 2: Our left regiment advanced after ten minute artillery preparation and captured LANKHOF Farm and Chateau after strong resistance on the part of the enemy. Several pillboxes were taken. Our right regiment is still holding the ground which it won in yesterday's fighting and last night captured and is now holding Lock No. 8 of YPRES-COMINES Canal on its left. This division has occupied and is now consolidating the entire objectives assigned to it. Our airplanes have continually surveyed enemy lines and reported no movement but machine-gun activity at several points.

3 (112) A. Aside from successful patrol encounters along the VESLE and a hostile raid in LORRAINE which was repulsed, there is nothing to report.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 12:45 o'clock afternoon, September 3: "French front: Along the SOMME and the CANAL du NORD situation unchanged. No change on the AILETTE and on the plateau between the AILETTE and the AISNE. The Germans blew up the bridge COURSON on the canal northwest of LEUILLY. French are across ravine of FONTAINE-St-REMY and hold the farm of the HERMITAGE. From that farm the line follows the road to TERNY-SORNY. On the VESLE night calm; gas bombardment of FISMES and MONT NOTRE DAME. In the VOSGES enemy artillery active in the region of FRAPELLE."

It was reported at noon, September 3: Enemy is going back on front of British Third Army. British troops reported unofficially to have reached BERTINCOURT, VELU and DOIGNIES.

It was reported at 1:40 o'clock afternoon, September 3: British front: North of the LYS the British have entered WULVERGHEM and made progress northeast of NEUVE- EGLISE and of STEENWERCK. South of the LYS the British are west and south of SAILLY-sur-la-LYS and have crossed the Road ESTAIRES-La BASSE as far as the heights of NEUVE-CHAPELLE where they are on the west side of the town. A number of prisoners were made in this
sector. The German resistance is reported as very slight. British occupied all the northwestern part of LENS. South of the SENSEE the Germans have evacuated the terrain situated to the west of the CANAL du NORD; they are pursued by the British advance guards. On this part of the front the line this morning passed: One kilometer east of DURY---BRIOCHE Farm---CAMBRAI Road---west edge of BUissy---on the railroad as far as QUENZT which was occupied without opposition. Farther to the south the British have occupied PRONVILLE, LAGNICOURL, MORCHIES, ROCQUIGNY and made prisoners. Numerous fires have been reported in the region of BUS and BERTINCOURT. The situation is unchanged between SAILLY-SAILILISEL and PERONNE. The bridges on the SOMME south of PERONNE were violently bombarded during the night.

It was reported at 9:15 o'clock evening, September 3: On the CANAL du NORD, the French have occupied the PANETTERIE Ferme, making 30 prisoners. The French have reached the northern entrance of the canal tunnel, the enemy reacting violently with artillery and machine guns. East of EPENANCOURT the French infantry are on the right bank of the SOMME. The French hold the greater part of the town GENVRY, taking 200 prisoners. The enemy reacted violently on all of the front and harassed the rear areas. North of the OISE, following a local operation, the French enlarged their positions on the CHAUNY Road near SALENCY and MONT-ST-SIMEON. Between the AILETTE and the AISNE, actions are in progress. The first information indicates satisfactory advances. On the VESLE calm day; big fires are reported towards MERVIAL and BARBONVAL. FISMES was bombarded by long-range cannon, A great deal of movement on the Roads VAUXTIN-DHUIZEZ and VAUXCERE-LONGUEVAL, where a convoy of 200 vehicles was seen going towards the north. In CHAMPAGNE calm day; German raids last night, in the region of PROSNES, cost the French 6 missing. Hostile aircraft very active along the VESLE, in CHAMPAGNE and in LORRAINE.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 111th engaged east of HENDECOURT; 1st, from reserve Ninth Army, engaged north of ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road; 1st Guard Reserve engaged north of ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. Eighteenth Army, 25th Reserve engaged west of VOYENNES. Ninth Army, 238th, from the First Army, engaged west of LEUILLY, 103d engaged west of COUCY-le-CHATEAU. First Army, Bavarian 12th, from reserve Seventh Army, relieved 238th.

D. 32d Division reported 5:48 o'clock morning, September 3: During past 5 days this division has made advances against the enemy each day. Total distance gained approximately six kilometers through very difficult terrain and against violent opposition. During this period two fresh enemy divisions were placed in line in front of the division. Prisoners were captured by the division during this period as follows: Officers 11, noncommissioned officers 106, other enlisted men 814, total 934. Of the above number the following prisoners were wounded: Officers 4, noncommissioned officers 6, enlisted men 70, total 80. Following is an approximate estimate only of materiel captured: Two 105 caliber guns, two 75 caliber guns, one 3-inch antiaircraft gun, ten light trench mortars, six 6-inch trench mortars, 28 heavy machine guns, 84 light machine guns, a large number of rifles, 8,000 rounds artillery ammunition and 300,000 rounds machine-gun ammunition. The spirit of the division is excellent. There have been practically no stragglers. Reports on killed and wounded are made as rapidly as possible. Casualties not greater than should be expected from the severe fighting that has taken place. Note: It is important that this dispatch be not made public at present as it would identify the division; the German official communique this date speaks of Americans divisions in this sector of the battle front.

37th Division reported September 3: Enemy raid repulsed; our casualties 1 man killed, 5 wounded, 6 gassed.

30th Division reported September 3: Active patrolling in front of our lines has been carried on to determine the enemy's line of resistance and to secure our new line as reported yesterday. Work of consolidating this line continues.

77th Division reported September 3: Two daylight patrols penetrated BAZOCHES and attacked enemy patrols, inflicting losses. Our patrols suffered only one casualty.
A. Yielding to the continued pressure of the Allied forces, the enemy is in retreat north of the VESLE. Our troops, in close pursuit, have taken BAZOCHES, PERLES, FISMETTE and BASLIEUX, capturing prisoners and machine guns. They have reached the line VAUXCERE---BLANZY---Le GRAND HAMEAU. In the VOSGES a hostile raiding party was repulsed, leaving prisoners in our hands.

Yesterday our aviators successfully bombed the railroad yards at LONGUYON, DONMARY-BARONCOURT, and CONFLANS.

B. It was reported at 12:50 o'clock afternoon, September 4: British front: Slight advance northeast of BAC-St-MAUR on north bank of the LYS as far as l'EPINETTE; strong resistance east of WULVERGHEM; some progress by British patrols northeast of FESTUBERT. South of the SENSEE British advance guards have reached the canal as far south as ETRICOURT. South of ETRICOURT attempts to cross the canal have been stopped by enemy machine-gun fire.

Two American battalions reported to have crossed the VESLE near BAZOCHES without much opposition.

It was reported at 4:45 o'clock afternoon, September 4: French occupy PAARS and the infantry is ascending the slopes of the plateaus. American troops hold plateau southwest of PERLES and BASLIEUX. Under their protection the elements of the left of the French Fifth Army are coming out of the region of COURLANDON and also crossing the VESLE. Other bridges blown up above VAILLY. Up to the present the French III Corps and the American III Corps have engaged only their advance guards.

North of NOYON the French are in GIASCARD, QUESMY and BABOEUF.

It was reported at 2:35 o'clock afternoon, September 4: British troops have crossed TORTILLE River. Farther north they are east of VALLULART Wood, YTRES and RUYAULCOURT, and are approaching northern portion of HAVRINCOURT Wood. Attack on MOEUUVRES proceeding. Otherwise no change on battle front.

It was reported at 9:45 o'clock evening, September 4: As the result of continued pressure the enemy began this morning a withdrawal south of BUVERCHY. French have taken LIBERMONT, FRENCHES, FRETOY-le-CHATEAU, Bois de l'HOPITAL and ESMERY-HALLON. At 5:30 o'clock afternoon, cavalry was on the line GIASCARD-BUCHOIRE; and the infantry on the line: BEAUGIES---GRANDRU---MONDESCOURT---La BRETELLEY---APPILLY. Many prisoners, including a battalion commander, machine guns, trench mortars, and cannon have been taken. North of the AILETTE the French repulsed a counterattack west of COUERY and took the farm GRAND CHAMP with 200 prisoners. The French have crossed the AISNE at La BISA Farm and have taken BUCY-le-LONG, Le MONCEL and La MONTAGNE Farm. French have crossed the VESLE and advanced beyond CHASSENY and BRENELLE. Farther east the line runs: Chateau of BELLINI---MONTUSSART Farm---north of VAUBERLIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY---crest north of BASLIEUX---HILL 180, northeast of COURLANDON. French patrols which crossed the VESLE between VOISIN Farm and JOCHERY were stopped by machine-gun fire from GOULOT Wood.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 52d Reserve and 12th from line Fourth Army to line southeast of ARRAS; 25th in line near MANACOURT; Bavarian 4th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army, 54th reengaged; 204th in reserve. Ninth Army, 5th Guard, from reserve Seventh Army, enters line; 80th Reserve, from line First Army, enters line. Army Detachment C, 192d, from reserve Second Army, in reserve in rear of 31st.

D. It was reported September 3: This afternoon 35,000 men came ashore at BREST and 11,000 more will be off before noon tomorrow. 15 ships came in at 10 o'clock this morning of which 12 will be cleared and ready for return by noon tomorrow. Note: If made public, substitute for BREST "One of our base ports."

96th Aero Squadron reported September 4: At 5:40 o'clock morning, September 3, nine airplanes left for LONGUYON. Two dropped out before the crossing the line. Six
reached LONGUYON and dropped 1,300 kilo. of bombs. Seven bursts were observed on the eastern end of the yards, two on locomotive repair shops and two on buildings northeast of the repair shops. One plane developed engine trouble at DOMMAY-BARONCOURT and was forced to return, first dropping its bombs and observing four bursts on the south neck of the railroad yards at DOMMAY-BARONCOURT and two bursts on building beside the tracks. All our machines returned at 8:10 o'clock.

At 5 o'clock afternoon eight airplanes left for CONFLANS. Two dropped out before reaching lines. The other six reached objective and dropped 1,040 kilos. of bombs. All bursts were well bunched on the tracks before the junction of the CONFLANS-BRIEY and the CONFLANS-METZ Roads. The railroad bridge on the CONFLANS-BRIEY Road was destroyed. Five enemy aircraft pursued the formation south of CONFLANS to FLIREY, one fell in flames between HANNONVILLE and LABLEVILLE. All our machines returned safely at 7:10 o'clock.

III Corps reported at 7:38 o'clock evening, September 4: This corps has advanced along its eleven kilometers front across the VESLE. Now on the plateau south of the AISNE. Have captured prisoners and machine guns. Our casualties light. Number not known.

92d Division reported at 7 o'clock evening, September 4: Enemy raid on FRAPELLE repulsed. Casualties: 1 officer wounded, 1 gassed, 6 men wounded, 2 gassed. Three prisoners taken.

82d Division reported at 7:25 o'clock evening, September 4: Special patrol encountered enemy; casualties: 2 officers slightly wounded, 8 men slightly wounded.

28th Division reported at 8:57 o'clock evening, September 4: This division pushed forward and crossed the VESLE and progressed about three and one-half kilometers on its entire front. The villages of FISMETTE, COURLANDON, BASLIEUX, Le GRAND HAMEAU, have been taken. Some prisoners and machine guns. Attack still in progress. Casualties light.

77th Division reported at 5:15 o'clock afternoon, September 4: Patrols along front crossed the VESLE and forced back enemy opposition; one combat patrol as far as La CROIX la MOTTE between VAUXCERE and BLANZY; three battalions across the VESLE.

5 (114) A. Our troops, continuing their advance in cooperation with the French, have crossed the plateau north of the VESLE and have reached the crest of the slopes leading to the valley of the AISNE. There is nothing of importance to report from the other sectors occupied by our troops.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 1:15 o'clock afternoon September 5: French have crossed the SOMME at EPENANCOURF. Southward their line runs: VOYENNES---west edge of OFFOY---east of HOMBLEUX---east of ESMERY-HALLON---east of FLAVY-le-MELDEUX---west of BERLANCOURT. More than 300 prisoners taken in this region. Between the AUTRECOURT Hills and the OISE the advance was resumed this morning. North of the AISNE, French have taken CLAMECY, BRAYE and MISSY-sur-AISNE. North of the VESLE, French patrols have reached CYSLA-la-COMMUNE and VIEIL-ARCY. On the right bank of the AISNE the enemy has a large number of machine guns. No definite news of advance guards of American corps. French battalion is 1,500 meters northeast of COURLANDON on the road to ROMAIN and in liaison with Americans. French patrols hold part of BREUIL and Les VENTEAX but have not been able to advance. Strong resistance was met at CHATEAU MARETZ. In the VOSGES Americans took two prisoners in an ambush north of COICHOT.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, September 5: On the SOMME front French troops hold FALVY, OFFOY, CANIZY, and VILLETTE. Southward the line runs: FLAVY-le-MELDEUX---west edge of BERLANCOURT---BEAUGIES---CREPIGNY---MONDESCOURF---MAREST---DAMPcourT. The enemy has reacted violently with artillery and machine guns. South of the OISE the line runs: MARIZELLE---AUTREVILLE---ROND d'ORLEANS in the BASSE, FORET-de-COUCY---ARBRE de BARISIS---HILL 175---CRANNE Farm---LANDRICOURF---COURSON---ANTIOCHE Farm---NEUVILLE-sur-MARGIVAL---west edge of LAMPAUX---QUINCY CHATEAU---FORT de CONDE---MISSY---AISNE Canal to CYSLA-la-COMMUNE. The villages of DHUIZEL, LONGUEVAL, BARBONVAL, and MERVAL.
and the plateau of BEAUREGARD have been taken. ROMAIN is still occupied by the enemy, who is resisting seriously in this region. In the region of JONCHERY an attempt to advance was stopped by enemy machine guns.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, Alpine Corps, from line Eighteenth Army, relieves 2d Guard. Ninth Army, 19th Reserve, from line First Army, enters line. Seventh Army, 19th, from reserve Eighteenth Army, relieves 4th Guard. First Army, 10th Reserve, from reserve Seventh Army, relieves 86th.

D. Note: At this crucial time it is considered of the utmost importance by the supreme command of the Allied armies that the locations of units in the line and in reserve in rear of the line be kept as secret as possible. Rigid orders have been issued throughout the Allied armies that information on these locations be limited to fewest possible officers, and that even speculation as to movements and plans be absolutely prohibited. For this reason, it is urged that nothing be made public by the War Department which would indicate which of our divisions are, or have been in line, or the portion of the line held by them until these troops are definitely known to have been identified by the enemy in battle or as the result of a raid.

28th Division reported at 4 o'clock afternoon, September 5: Our troops have crossed the VESLE in force and are pursuing the enemy to the north. Enemy using machine guns and one-pounders to retard our progress. Harassing fire by enemy artillery with some shells falling in FISMES and vicinity. More rapid advance held up by enfilade fire from our right flank. Our front line troops are on plateau at head of ravine sloping towards the AISNE.

6 (115) A. North of the Vesle our troops have taken the villages of LONGUEVAL, MERVAL and GLENNES and have reached the line VIEL-ARCY-VILLERS-en-PRAVIERES-REVILLON. Our patrols are on the south bank of the AISNE Canal. Elsewhere the day passed without incident.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 5:50 o'clock afternoon, September 6: Situation not materially changed on front of French Tenth Army. During night slight progress towards AULERS and VAUXAILLON. No enemy infantry reaction. Harassing fire of enemy artillery on front line and rear areas.

It was reported at 10:10 o'clock evening, September 6: French First Army has advanced on all its front for a depth of 10 kilometers. At 6 o'clock afternoon its line ran: LANCHY-FORESTE--VILLERS-St-CHRISTOPHE-ESTOULLY-BROUCHY-VILLESELVE. HAM, in flames, was surrounded and taken. Resistance very stiff in some places; French took prisoners. French Third Army took CHAUNY this morning. Artillery reaction and infantry resistance made advance difficult during afternoon. At end of day its line ran: North of BUTTE des MINIES-UGNY le GAY-COMMENCHON-CAUMONT-VIRY-NOUREUIL-SINCENY-CHAUSSEE de SOISSONS-PETIT BARISIS. Cavalry are in front of VILLEQUIER-AUMONT. Third Army captured a number of prisoners, materiel and munitions in the forest of COUCY. French Tenth Army has continued to advance from PETIT BARISIS the line runs: NORMEZIERE Farm--ROSIE Farm-HILL 105-QUINCY BASSE-QUINCY Wood-west edge of VAUXAILLON-MOISY Farm-Le BESSY-LAFFAUX-VAUVENY-Wood of VERDONNE-west edge of FORT de CONDE-River AISNE. Tenth Army has captured prisoners and taken 15 cannon and 240 trench mortars today. South of the AISNE situation unchanged. American 77th Division holds line: VIEL-ARCY-VILLERS-en-PRAVIERES-north of REVILLON. Its advance elements are on the canal. Definite information regarding American 28th Division is lacking. French, in liaison with Americans are west of Le GRAND HAMEAU on the slopes northeast of HILL 182 and in ravines south of HUIT-VOISINS. Very vigorous reaction of enemy artillery.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 193d, from reserve Seventeenth Army, enters line Sixth Army. Second Army, 6th Cavalry, from line Fourth Army, enters line Second Army; 119th, from reserve Eighteenth Army, enters line.
D. 77th Division reported at 11 o'clock evening, September 5: North of the VESLE strong patrols are being pushed forward and are encountering strong resistance by machine guns. Casualties slight.

28th Division reported at 11 o'clock morning, September 6: Our troops in close contact with the enemy between the VESLE and the AISNE.

28th Division reported at 5:30 o'clock afternoon, September 6: Close contact with enemy maintained. Further advance held up by enfilade machine-gun fire on our right flank. Harassing and destructive fire by our artillery on the AISNE bridges. Enemy artillery harassing FISMES, VILLETTE, COURVILLE and villages in rear areas, using greater number of mustard gas shells. No report of casualties available.

7 (116) A. South of the AISNE troops entered the village of MUSCOURT and captured 50 prisoners. Hostile counterattacks in this sector were repulsed and our line was slightly advanced. Two strong hostile raids in the WOEVRE were beaten off leaving prisoners in our hands. In ALSACE a successful raiding party inflicted losses on the enemy.

C. It was reported at 1:40 o'clock afternoon, September 7: In FLANDERS British have taken ROSSIGNOL Farm north of HILL 63 and have made progress south of the WULVERGHEM-MESSINES Road. Enemy artillery very active east of MESSINES Ridge. Situation unchanged between the LYS and HADRINCOURT. British have occupied greater part of HADRINCOURT and have taken METZ-en-COUTURE, and 70 prisoners. They have entered FINS and advanced beyond SOREL-le GRAND, and east of TINCOURT and HANCOURT. Enemy artillery very active along the COLOGNE River.

Between the OMIGNON and the OISE French have continued their advance. Contact with the enemy has been maintained everywhere. French are on the line: VAUX---DOUCHY---HAPPENCOURT---FLAVY-le-MARTEL---MENNESSIS---along the canal to TERNIER, which has been occupied. North of the AILETTE the advance continues although the enemy is offering serious resistance at several points. French have occupied BARISIS, AULERS and BADSOLES-AULERS. A violent counterattack at MOULIN de LAFFAUX threw the French back to the trench of ROSSIGNOL. Farther south French have occupied NANTEUIL la FOSSE, CHIMY Farm, FORT de CONDE and CONDE-sur-AISNE. Violent enemy reaction with machine guns and gas. Along the AISNE no change. Elements which tried to cross the canal during the night were everywhere stopped by machine guns and trench mortars. Situation on front of American divisions in this sector is unchanged. Enemy resistance continues strong. French troops on right of Americans have been unable to advance. In the St-MIHIEL sector hostile raiding party of 100 men were repulsed leaving two prisoners in the hands of the French; French suffered three casualties.

It was reported at 3:40 o'clock afternoon, September 7: British believed to hold GUYENCOURT. The line runs from that point by west edge of HEUDICOURT to METZ-en-COUTURE.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, September 7: French advance east of the SOMME reached a depth of from seven to eight kilometers. Enemy opposed increased resistance with machine guns and artillery; passage of the canal at TUGNY and ST-SIMON required lively combat. At 6 o'clock evening line ran: West edge of VAUX---west edge of FLUQUIERES---HILL 109---west edge of HAPPENCOURT---TUGNY Bridge---ST-SIMON---AVESNE---SAVRIENNOIS Chateau---west edge of JUSSY---along railway to TERNIER---VIRY-NOUREUIL---AMIGNY-ROUY---HILL 101---MAISON de l'EPINOIS---BARISIS. South of the OISE situation on the whole not changed. French took important materiel and a number of prisoners. They have made some progress-north of VAUXAILLON and have occupied the CHAMP VAILLY and LA RAQUE. They have taken CELLES-sur-AISNE and the plateau to the north and are along the ravine from SANCY to CELLES. Hostile counterattacks in the afternoon south of MOULIN de LAFFAUX and near NANTEUIL Wood were repulsed with heavy losses. Artillery activity moderate north of the
AILETTE and in the AISNE Valley; very heavy in the region of LAFFAUX. South of the AISNE no change in the situation. North of the VESLE enemy counterattacked in the region of BREUIL; no change in the line.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 30th erroneously reported in line Seventeenth Army, is in reserve. Seventeenth Army, 15th Reserve engaged at OPPY. Second Army, 16th Reserve, from reserve Seventeenth Army, engaged north of EQUANCOURT. Eighteenth Army, 79th Reserve engaged east of EPENANCOURT; 17th Reserve engaged at ESMERY-HALLON. Ninth Army, 206th, from Fifteenth Army, engaged south of FRESNES; 103d withdrawn; 109th, from reserve Second Army, in reserve; 50th Reserve withdrawn; 1st, erroneously reported in line Seventeenth Army, is in reserve. Seventh Army, 4th Guard reengaged at BASLIEUX les FISMES. First Army, Bavarian 15th engaged in former sector of 80th Reserve. Third Army, 33d reserve is dissolved.

The extent of the German efforts to check the Allied offensives on the OISE-AISNE and SCARPE-SOMME fronts is shown by the following summary: Considering as fit for offensive action a division which has had four weeks rest, the Germans had available on July 15, 38 fit divisions out of 86 that were in rest, and of that number, many had as high as eight weeks rest. On August 31, of the 47 divisions regarded as actually in rest and not in close support, but 11 divisions could be considered fit and of these but 3 have had as much as five weeks rest. On the front from the SCARPE to REIMS, 59 divisions fit divisions and 50 divisions not yet reconstituted were used between August 10 and September 4. On September 2 on this line there were actually 80 divisions as compared to 50 on August 8; and on the entire western front there were 156 divisions in line or close support as compared to 126 on August 8, despite the shortening of the line by reduction of various salients.

D. 28th Division reported at 11:40 o'clock evening, September 6: Pursuit of enemy across plateau towards the AISNE continuing. Attack in conjunction with French on our right this afternoon resulted in pushing our line to HANGAR de BEAUREGARD with patrols in MUSCOURT. Strong resistance from GLENNES which we do not hold. French meeting strong machine-gun resistance from ROMAIN. Enemy artillery fire weak except for long-range harassing fire. Have 2 battalion 75's across VESLE. Machine gun and one-pounder fire very heavy. 2 enemy counterattacks on our right flank repulsed. 43 prisoners including 2 officers were captured around MUSCOURT. Great aerial activity both sides. Weather clear. Visibility good.

77th Division reported at 10 o'clock morning, September 7: Weather fair. Our division pushing forward towards the AISNE encountering increasing resistance along our right flank. Our artillery have taken position north of the VESLE, firing on sensitive points north of the AISNE. Enemy artillery firing on our advancing line and concentrated on towns. Our airplanes active; enemy airplanes very active firing on our advancing troops with machine guns and registering for artillery. Visibility fair. All our troops north of the VESLE and advancing. Patrols have reached the AISNE Canal, enemy troops being forced to retire north of the AISNE. Casualties: 15 killed, 160 wounded.

82d Division reported at 10:20 o'clock evening, September 6: Hostile raid on one of our outposts: Casualties 2 men wounded and taken prisoner, 2 men wounded.

29th Division reported at 11:10 o'clock morning, September 7: Early this morning a raiding party supported by artillery entered lightly held enemy trench in BADRICOURT sector inflicting losses. Our casualties very slight.

28th Division reported at 6:20 o'clock afternoon, September 7: Our troops in close contact with enemy on our immediate front. Enemy launched in force two counterattacks on our right flank during afternoon but both were repulsed. 2 officer and 4 men captured by our troops. Our line slightly advanced. Friendly artillery very active with harassing and counterbattery fire, also barrages during counterattacks. Harassing fire by enemy artillery on FISMES, COURVILLE and vicinity. Intermittent shelling of plateau between VESLE and AISNE Rivers. Known casualties: 2 officers, 273 men: not final.

It was reported September 7: Three airplanes of 91st Squadron on photographic mission were attacked this afternoon by five enemy machines. Our formation was broken up
and one of our airplanes was forced to land under control north of CONFLANS.

8 (117) A. Aside from patrol encounters and heavy artillery fighting south of the AISNE there is nothing to report from the sectors occupied by our troops.

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C. It was reported September 8: Situation on front of French Tenth Army unchanged. Heavy enemy artillery reaction on front lines; marked use of gas.

It was reported 9:45 o'clock evening, September 8: During the day French made progress notwithstanding strong resistance of the enemy who reacted violently with artillery and machine guns. North of the SOMME French have taken VAUX, FLUQUIERES, HAPPOUENCOUET and Le HAMEL. South of the SOMME sharp fighting continues north and east of St-SIMON. French occupy ARTEMPS. Enemy retook AVESNES but was driven out by a counter-attack which threw him back to La MOTTE Farm. French made about 100 prisoners. LIEZ on the east bank of the St-QUENTIN Canal is strongly held by the Germans. French are along the canal to QUESSY. They hold the village of QUESSY, with outposts 500 meters to the east and are in the trenches on the eastern edge of FARGNERS. French patrols made 20 prisoners in this region. South of the OISE the French are along east edge of La BASSE-FORÊT de-COUCY and in the trench one kilometer west of SERVAIS. South of the AILETTE French have taken VAUXAILLON and have made some progress in the region of NANTEUIL-la-FOSSE.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army. Bavarian 12th, from line First Army, is engaged at YPRES in former sector of 6th Cavalry. Seventeenth Army, 187, from reserve Sixth Army, engaged at INCHY. Second Army, 201st, from line Third Army, engaged near FINS. Ninth Army, 5th Reserve, 1st Guard and 76th Reserve withdrawn.

D. 77th Division reported September 7: Fighting continued along the entire front; strong resistance from the enemy, from the enemy from the neighborhood of GLENNES. Line runs along the Road VIEIL ARCY---VILLERS-en-PRAYERES to a point west of REVILLON then south to the east of MERVAL. Our troops moving up to consolidate line; enemy concentrating to the northeast of GLENNES. Our troops driving the enemy out of La CENTRIERE Farm and patrolling the AISNE Canal. Harassing and concentration fire of artillery; enemy using large percentage of gas. Our airplanes observing; enemy airplanes harassing advancing troops with machine-gun fire and bombing sensitive points at night. Weather fair. Casualties: Officers, 1 killed, 6 wounded, 3 gassed; men, number killed not known, 157 wounded, 24 gassed.

77th Division reported September 8: Weather: Rain. Active patrolling encountering resistance from enemy machine guns and snipers. No change in lines. Harassing and destructive fire north of the AISNE by our artillery; enemy artillery firing on all towns and woods occupied by our troops. Aerial activity decreased. General impression of the day, considerable activity along the front. Casualties: One officer killed, 1 wounded, 10 gassed; 2 men killed, 111 wounded, 163 gassed.

9 (118) A. In the WOEVRE a hostile patrol which attacked one of our outposts was repulsed. Elsewhere the day was uneventful.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 1 o'clock afternoon, September 9: Night calm on the British front. Activity of German artillery in the sector of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI Road. British local action now in progress west of GOUZEAUCOURT seems to be developing favorably. North of the SOMME moderate artillery activity. This morning the French took La MOTTE Farm west of CLASTRES. Farther to the south enemy artillery reaction with gas. French crossed the canal by surprise and advanced toward the crest of the Fort LIEZ. Between the OISE and the AISNE situation unchanged. Lively enemy artillery and infantry activity during the night. Two German counterattacks in the region of LAFFAUX were repulsed, leaving 80 prisoners of five different regiments. Systematic bombardment of the French rear areas notable at LANDRICOURT, JUMENCOURT, COURSON and CONDE. Air bombardment of LEUILL. An
effort to cross the canal of the AISNE west of St-MARD was stopped by enemy machine-gun fire. In CHAMPAGNE night marked by activity of German and French infantry in the region of MONT-sans-NOM; French made two raids in which they captured five prisoners. An important German raid was made west of AUBERIVE but failed under the French fire; Germans abandoned two wounded and three killed. German artillery very active in regions of BEAUSEJOUR, HURLUS and south of the MONTS.

It was reported at 3:20 o'clock afternoon, September 9: As result of operation this morning British hold ridge southwest and west of GOUZEaucourt and also GOUZEaucourT Wood. British troops east of the line GOUZEaucourt Wood-southeast edge of HAVRINCOURT Wood were heavily counterattacked and situation not clear.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, September 9: During the day French continued their advance notwithstanding the enemy's resistance. They have crossed the CROZAT Canal, taking REMIGNY, MONTESCOURT-LIZEROLLES, CLASTRES and SERAUCOURT le GRAND. Advance elements occupy HILL 117, railway station of ESSIGNY le GRAND and HILL 103 south of CONTESCOURT. North of the SOMME they have taken ROUPY and ETREILLERS. North of the OISE the French in small operations have taken CANLERS Farm, the Fort of LIEZ and the woods northwest of LIEZ. South of the OISE they have taken the railway station of SERVAIS and La BRICUETERIE, capturing 50 prisoners. North of the AIETTE very calm. South of the AIETTE French have made some progress north of LAFFAUX and have occupied the ROSSIIGNOL trenches on a front of 300 meters.

Changes in German order of battle: Eighteenth Army, 11th, from reserve Ninth Army, has relieved 22d Reserve; 17th Reserve withdrawn; 45th Reserve, from reserve Seventh Army, localized near AVESNES. Ninth Army, 211th dissolved. Seventh Army, 28th Reserve withdrawn. Gen. von Boehn relieved of command Army Detachment A, new commander unknown.

The 211th Division, which has been out of line since August 3, may now be considered as dissolved. Two of its regiments have been disbanded and the men drafted to the 42d and 87th Divisions, and its third regiment transferred intact to another division. The 211th fought in the SOMME. AISNE and MARNE offensives this year and was rated second class. It is now established that during the period between the end of May and July 18 the following German divisions were dissolved and their effectiveness used to fill up other division: The 226th in favor of the 4th Guard; the 302d in favor of the 117th and 195th; the 12th Landwehr; The Bavarian 9th in favor of the Bavarian 6th Reserve and the Bavarian 12th; and the 101st. Since July 18 the Germans have made the following further dissolutions: The 6th Reserve in favor of the 5th and 6th; the 10th Landwehr in favor of the 36th, 37th and 201st; the 46th Reserve in favor of the 4th; the 235th in favor of the 10th; the 33rd Reserve in favor of the 34th; the 78th Reserve in favor of the 20th; the Bavarian 10th in favor of the Bavarian 6th Reserve and the 11th and Bavarian 4th. Considering two independent brigades as a division and taking into account the two Austro-Hungarian divisions, it appears that there are now 198 enemy divisions actually identified on the western front.

D. 82d Division reported at 6:15 o'clock evening, September 9: Enemy patrol attack on one of our outposts was successfully repulsed. Harassing fire by our artillery on enemy lines; marked decrease in enemy artillery fire during the day.

10 (119) A. Except for artillery fighting in LORRAINE and in the VOSGES the day passed quietly in the sectors occupied by our troops.

B. The following details of a strong hostile raid in the WOEVRE, reported in American Official Communiqué number 116, have been reported. At 4:30 o'clock morning, September 7, approximately 200 enemy infantry accompanied by 20 prisoners raided our line between FLIREY and LIMEY. A box barrage was laid down 200 meters south of the METZ Road. The raiding party entered the sector and then rushed the outpost group, which retired, firing on the enemy. Dividing into three detachments, the enemy tried to encircle this group, but a deployed platoon succeeded in routing them successfully, causing them to retire. Seven of the enemy were captured, two of whom were wounded. Three of the enemy were killed in the trenches and it is believed there are several others dead in "No Man's
The combat groups state that they saw many enemy wounded being carried off by their own men. Only one of our men was captured and he succeeded in escaping before the enemy could get him back to their lines. Interrogation of the prisoners captured established that the raid was made in order to get prisoners for identification of the opposing troops. As no prisoners had been taken for a considerable period of time it was decided that a large raiding party should be sent out made up of units from each regiment of the German division in the sector. Volunteers were asked for but as none were obtained men were conscripted for the raid. A second hostile raid on the same day in the same sector was also repulsed. Our casualties in these two encounters were exceptionally light.

C. It was reported at 8:45 o'clock evening, September 10: French have continued to make progress during the day despite violent reaction of the enemy. They have taken the villages of HINACOURT and TRAVECY. At 5 o'clock afternoon the line ran: East edge of ETREILLERS---ROUPY---HILL 93---southeast of CONTESCOURT---crossroads 800 meters west of BENAY---HILL 100---east of HINACOURT---west edge of LY-FONTAINE---woods 1,500 meters south of VENDEUIL---TRAVECY---along the road between TRAVECY and La FERE. South of the AILETTE the enemy counterattacked several times on the trenches taken by the French yesterday in the region of LAFFAUX but was repulsed. A hostile raiding party this morning crossed the VESLE near MOULIN COMPENSE, but was thrown back to the north bank. Hostile raid in the region of SEPOIS in ALSACE cost the French one missing and left one prisoner in their hands.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 6th, from reserve of Ninth Army, localized at THOUCOURT. Eighteenth Army, 2d engaged south of CLasters. Ninth Army, Bavarian 3d, from reserve of Eighteenth Army, engaged south of TERNI; 1st relieves 227th; 7th withdraws. First Army, 203d, from reserve of Fifth Army, engaged east of 242d.

D. 92d Division reported at 8:20 o'clock morning, September 10: Artillery very active in region of HERMANPERE and BAN-de-SAPT since 5:30 o'clock morning.

82d Division reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, September 10: Activity of our artillery and that of the enemy on left sector, otherwise day quiet.

C. It was reported at 3:30 o'clock afternoon, September 11: British carried out successful local operations this morning north of PEIZIERE capturing 26 prisoners. A hostile attack in the sector EPEHY-NAVRINCOURT was repulsed.

No further change in the situation on the western front has been reported.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 44th Reserve, 16th Reserve, 58th withdrawn; 113th, from reserve Second Army, engaged near METZ-en-COUTURE. Second Army, 185th, Bavarian 14th, 243d, 232d, 14th Reserve, 6th Cavalry withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 197th, 54th withdrawn. Ninth Army, 19th Ersatz withdrawn. Army Detachment A: 21st Landwehr Brigade now 12th Landwehr Division.

It appears that the 12th Landwehr Division has been reconstituted and that it is now composed of the 21st Landwehr Brigade, which consists of the 87th and 436th Landwehr Regiments, and the 346th Regiment. Both the 87th and 436th Landwehr Regiments formerly formed part of the 12th Landwehr Division and, subsequent to its reported dissolution, they held a portion of the line in Army Detachment A at EMBERMENIL. The 346th Regiment, formerly part of the 14th Landwehr Division, has recently returned from Russia and entered line near the 21st Landwehr Brigade at EMBERMENIL. This reconstitution while not greatly
Increasing the numerical strength on the western front, raises the number of the enemy divisions to 199.

The diminution in German effectives is indicated by evidence showing that the battalion strength has been reduced from four to three companies in the following 24 divisions: 2d Guard, 22d, 31st, 36th, 52d, 56th, 77th, 121st, 200th, 202d, 207th, 220th, 1st Reserve, 11th Reserve, 13th Reserve, 25th Reserve, 26th Reserve, 52d Reserve, 53d Reserve, 75th Reserve, 77th Reserve, 82d Reserve, Bavarian 11th, Bavarian 14th.

D. 37th Division reported morning, September 11: As result of a raid carried out this morning two kilometers east of BADONVILLER our troops penetrated deeply enemy's lines, inflicted losses and captured one prisoner belonging to 21st Landwehr Division.

37th Division reported afternoon, September 11: Successful raids were made; captured some prisoners and inflicted casualties.

92d Division reported at 11 o'clock evening, September 10: Enemy raid on Bois de PALON and La FONTENELLE at 7 o'clock morning repulsed; our casualties: Four men killed, 16 men wounded, two men missing. Enemy observed carrying back dead or wounded.

12 (121) A. This morning our troops operating in the St-MIHIEL sector made considerable gains. Assisted by French units they broke the enemy's resistance and advanced at some points to a depth of five miles. We have counted 8,000 prisoners up to the present. The operation is still in progress.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 3:35 o'clock afternoon, September 12: Attack by British IV and VI Corps this morning successful; TRESCAULT and MAVRINCOURT taken, except that enemy holds northern portion of MAVRINCOURT. Attack by XVII Corps on MOEUVRES successful; between 200 and 300 prisoners taken.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, Bavarian 8th Reserve, from First Army, is in reserve at ATH. Eighteenth Army, 121st withdrawn. Ninth Army, 227th engaged at PINON, 237th, 5th Guard, Guard Cavalry, 223d withdrawn. Seventh Army, 26th withdrawn. Army Detachment C, 192d relieved 31st.

D. It was reported September 12 that an American airplane landed at 9 o'clock this morning in Switzerland 1,500 yards from the frontier. The aviators, Lieut. Brook-Haret and Lieut. Fuller, are now at DELMONT. They were forced to land on account of bad weather.

13 (122) A. In the St-MIHIEL sector we have achieved further successes. The junction of our troops advancing from the south of the sector with those advancing from the west has given us possession of the whole salient to points twelve miles northeast of St-MIHIEL and has resulted in the capture of many prisoners. Forced back by our steady advance the enemy is retiring and is destroying large quantities of materiel as he goes. The number of prisoners counted has risen to 13,000. Our line now includes HERBEUVILLE---THILLOT---HATONVILLE---St-BENOIT---XAMMES---JULNY---THIAUCOURT and VIEVILLE.

B. Nothing to report.

C. No change in the situation in the sectors of the western front held by our Allies has been reported.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 12th Reserve and 7th Cavalry withdrawn. Second Army, Jaeger relieves 87th, 21st reengaged near VENDELLES, 6th Cavalry reengaged south of GOUZEAUCOURT. Ninth Army, Bavarian 1st withdrawn, 5th Guard reengaged north of 1st.

D. Owing to misunderstanding of instructions report of operations in St-MIHIEL sector was omitted from yesterday's cable. The following paragraphs contain complete report of operations in this sector from the morning of September 12 to date.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock morning, September 12: Attack which started at 5 o'clock between RICHECOURT and the MOSELLE proceeding satisfactorily. Light enemy reaction; progress rapid. Line at 7:30 o'clock runs: South of Bois JOLI---QUART de RESERVE---south of MAIZERAIS---HILL 258.4---north edge Bois MONT MARE---PROMENADE des MOINES.
It was reported at 1:30 o'clock afternoon, September 12: Line at 10 o'clock morning ran: Bois RATE---ESSEY---MAIZERAIS---VIEVILLE-en-HAYE. Attack on front between TRESAUVaux and RICHECOURT started later. Les EPARGES has been taken and satisfactory progress is being made elsewhere. Enemy front line was lightly held and dumps have been blown up in forward areas. Prisoners taken state attacks were anticipated and troops ordered to resist bitterly, but force of attack overwhelmed them.

It was reported at 5:15 o'clock afternoon, September 12: Line on south front of attack runs: Two and a half kilometers southeast of VILCEY---one kilometer northeast of VIEVILLE---one kilometer south of JAULNY---THIAUCOURT, inclusive---one kilometer south of BENEY---Bois de NONSARD---NONSARD---Bois JOLI. Prisoners taken up to this time approximately 6,000. French troops have made progress west of APREMONT, on HILL 331 (three kilometers north of St-MIHIEL), one kilometer east of SEUZEY. American troops south of TRESAUVaux are progressing favorable. St-REMY and COMBRES have been captured and advanced is approaching DOMMARTIN.

It was reported at 8:45 o'clock evening, September 12: On front east of RICHECOURT American troops have reached first day's objectives and are advancing beyond them northward. Line runs: NONSARD---Bois de THIAUCOURT---BENEY---north of THIAUCOURT. Northern attack approaching first day's objectives.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, September 12: the attack progresses satisfactorily. Only slight changes in situation. Northern attack is meeting considerable resistance; progress slow. French troops, stopped for a time by machine guns in the region of St-MIHIEL, are now progressing favorably. Attack on southern front has reached southern edge of XAMMES. Number of prisoners so far counted exceeds 10,000. No report yet as to number of guns and materiel captured.

Reports so far received indicate casualties light.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock morning, September 13: The advance continues rapidly. Line runs as follows: Two kilometers southeast of VILCEY---one kilometer east of VIEVILLE---south edge of JAULNY---north of XAMMES---across Bois de DAMPVITOUX---through St. BENOIT---north of Bois de VIGNEULLES. American troops advancing from the south reached VIGNEULLES at 8 o'clock morning. American troops advancing from the west have taken HERBEUVILLE---HANNONVILLE---DOMPierre, and entered VIGNEULLES at 3:15 o'clock morning.

It was reported at 12:20 o'clock afternoon, September 13: The advance has continued rapidly throughout the morning all along our line. HATTONVILLE---HATTONCHATEL---VIGNEULLES and St-BENOIT have been occupied by our troops. The St-MIHIEL Salient has been entirely bottled up and French troops are advancing rapidly from south and west, capturing prisoners and materiel. St-MIHIEL has been taken, and French have advanced beyond WOINVILLE and MONTSEC.

It was reported at 5:30 o'clock afternoon, September 13: Operations proceeding satisfactorily on the whole front of the offensive. Line runs: North and east of COMBRES---HERBEUVILLE---HANNONVILLE---THILLOT---St-MAURICE---VIEVILLE-sous-les-COTES---HATTONCHATEL---HATTONVILLE---across Bois CHAUFour---north of ST-BENOIT---across de DAMPVITOUX---north of XAMMES---VILCEY. In the old St-MIHIEL Salient a large stretch of territory, including Bois de la GRANDE ENCEINTE and part of the large forest to the south, is entirely surrounded by American and French troops and is being rapidly entered from all sides. The number of prisoners taken so far is estimated at 12,000. We have taken guns and materiel of all kinds not yet counted. Our losses are exceedingly small.

Casualties reported so far by three of the American divisions engaged in the St-MIHIEL sector total about 1,500.

14 (123) A. In the St-MIHIEL sector our advanced units have maintained touch with the enemy's forces and have repulsed a counterattack attempted by them in the region of JAULNY.

We are now able to estimate the success obtained during the two previous days. The dash and vigor of our troops and of the valiant French divisions which fought shoulder
to shoulder with them is shown by the fact that the forces attacking on both faces of the salient effected a junction and secured the results desired within 27 hours.

Besides liberating more than 150 square miles of territory and taking 15,000 prisoners we have captured a mass of materiel. Over 100 guns of all calibers and hundreds of machine guns and trench mortars have been taken. In spite of the fact that the enemy during his retreat burned large stores a partial examination of the battlefield shows that great quantities of ammunition, telegraph material, railroad material, rolling stock, clothing and equipment have been abandoned. Further evidence of the haste with which the enemy retreated is found in the uninjured bridges which he left behind.

French pursuit, bombing and reconnaissance units and British and Italian bombing units divided with our own air service the control of the air and contributed materially to the success of the operation.

C. It was reported at 5:35 o'clock evening, September 14: 1st Battalion of 154th Brigade, American 77th Division, participated in French attack this morning north of the VESLE. Americans attacked REVILLON and GLENNES and reached second objectives, capturing 50 prisoners. French divisions on right of Americans reached first objectives, capturing 200 prisoners, but further progress difficult owing to machine-gun fire.

It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, September 14: Southwest of St-QUENTIN, French advanced their lines to the edge of FONTAINE-les-CLERCS. During attack this morning south of the AILETTE, French captured ALLEMANT, 2,500 prisoners were taken, of whom 1,100 were captured on a front of 1,500 meters. North of the VESLE line on front of Franco-American attack runs: REVILLON—north of GLENNES—HILL 180—to points approximately one kilometer west and south of ROMAIN; enemy counterattacked violently. Hostile raid in the region of PERTHES left eight prisoners in hands of French. Enemy violently bombarded region of DOUAUMONT this afternoon. French detachments at Bois due GRAND CHENAS and HILL 231 were attacked by superior forces and forced to retire slightly. French maintained their position at ABAUCOURT.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 40th relieves 236th.

Eighteenth Army, 22d Reserve reengaged near CONTESTOUR. Ninth Army, 50th Reserve relieves 80th Reserve. First Army, 14th, from Ninth Army, in reserve north of REIMS. Army Detachment C, 123d, from line Fifth Army, engaged north of Bois le PRETRE; 28th Reserve, from Seventh Army, in reserve in region of SPINCOURT-CONFLANS; 31st engaged west of 123d. 109th Division has been dissolved.

D. It was reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, September 14: French and American patrols have entered WADONVILLE—SAULX—FRESNES—MANHEULLES and MARCHEVILLE and have been sent forward in strength all along the front.

The American division operating in the St-MIHEIL sector has reported casualties up to morning September 14 approximately 500; prisoners captured by the same division up to that time estimated at 1,300. Another American division has reported casualties up to morning, September 14: Wounded 1,035, killed, number not known; up to that time this division had captured 604 prisoners.

It was reported at 10:10 o'clock evening, September 14: There has been no change in our line in the St-MIHEIL sector, French and American patrols have been active and the former are reported to have entered JONVILLE.

6th Division reported September 14: Attempted enemy raid near STOSSIWIHR repulsed. Our casualties four slightly wounded.

29th Division reported at 3:11 o'clock afternoon, September 14: Our patrols active. Own and enemy long-range guns very active on rear areas during the night.

77th Division reported at 11:35 o'clock evening, September 13: Our patrols active along entire front. Artillery on both sides continues active.
76th Division reported September 13: Machine gun and sniping activity and harassing and interdiction fire by artillery on both sides.

82d Division reported September 14: Patrols from right sector forced to withdraw before heavy machine-gun and light artillery fire; in left sector we successfully carried out raid on enemy trenches capturing prisoners. Enemy artillery very active during night using gas and high explosive. Casualties: Officers, 6 wounded; men, 44 wounded, 2 gassed.

15 (124) A. In the St-MIHIEL sector there was increased artillery and aviation activity. A counterattack launched by the enemy at daybreak near St-HILAIRE was easily repulsed and a number of prisoners taken.

On the the left bank of the MOSELLE our lines have been advanced one to two miles and now include the towns of VILCEY and NORROY.

The normal extension of our lines beyond JAULNY resulted in the bringing in of 72 additional guns abandoned by the enemy in his hasty retreat. This brings the total number of guns captured to date to more than 200.

C. It was reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, September 15: British front, enemy artillery active north of the LYS and in the sectors of HAVRINCOURT and GOUZEAUCOURT, small hostile attack in region of TRESSCAULT repulsed. North of the OISE calm night. South of the OISE violent reaction of hostile artillery; French took l'ARBRE d'AUDOUILLE; French patrols found enemy lines west of ANIZY strongly held. South of the AILETTE two counterattacks pushed the French lines back slightly at two points; a third very strong counterattack failed. North of the VESLE violent enemy bombardment between VILLERS-en-PRAVERES and ROMAIN this morning; situation unchanged. In CHAMPAGNE two enemy raids left wounded prisoners in hands of French but cost French two men missing. In LORRAINE attempted enemy raids on French advance posts in region of BEZANGE and EMBERMENIL failed.

It was reported at 3:30 o'clock afternoon, September 15: British captured NAISSEMY this morning in successful minor operation; taking about 70 prisoners.

It was reported afternoon, September 15: North of the AISNE, French captured MENNEJEAN Farm north of SANCY this morning. HINDENBURG line is strongly held; situation unchanged on rest of front between the OISE and the AISNE.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, September 15: South of the OISE enemy counterattacked violently last night and this morning; French have maintained their positions intact. French have occupied Chateau east of VAUXAILLON, and have taken HILL 169 north of CELLES-sur-AISNE. Number of prisoners taken in this region since yesterday morning now exceeds 3,500.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 1st Reserve, from reserve Eighteenth Army, relieves 21st. First Army, Bavarian 8th Reserve, from Sixth Army, engaged near REIMS.

German order of battle in the St-MIHIEL sector from west to east is as follows:
8th Landwehr, 13th Landwehr, 35th Austro-Hungarian, 192d, 5th Landwehr, 10th, 77th Reserve, 31st, 123d, and 255th. The enemy is now known to have available for reinforcing the line the following divisions: 195th, 188th Reserve, 37th Austro-Hungarian and 1st Landwehr.

D. It was reported evening, September 14: In the St-MIHIEL sector contact not gained on our left. We hold MANHEULLES---FRESNES-en-WOEVRE---CHAMPLON---SAULX-en-WOEVRE---WADONVILLE-en-WOEVRE---DONCOURT-aux-TEMPLIERS and WOEL. Our patrols have penetrated as far as MAIZERAY, BUTGNEVILLE and JONVILLE. The enemy holds HAUMONT and from thence his line runs along the northern edge of Bois de CHARAY to XAMMES and JAULNY southeast of CAMP St-MARIE---south of VILLERS-sous-PRENY---north of NORROY---and thence east of the MOSELLE.
It was reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, September 15: A counterattack on American troops at St-HILAIRE in the WOEVRE was repulsed leaving six prisoners in our hands.

It was reported at 12:30 o'clock afternoon, September 15: Patrols which pushed forward as far as HAUMONT were stopped by machine-gun fire. Enemy division moved down this morning in the vicinity of PRENY and pushed back part of our observation line.

It was reported at 6:30 o'clock afternoon, September 15: Our patrols in contact with the enemy very active throughout the day. Line of Allied outposts now runs: HAUDIOMONT---north of MANHEULLES---PINTHEVILLE---north of RIAVILLE---MARCHEVILLE ---St-HILAIRE---WOEL---HAUMONT---REMBERCOURT---Bois du TROU de la HAIE---Bois des RAPPES---to the MOSELLE at VANDIERES.

5th Division reported 6 o'clock afternoon, September 15: Reconnaissance in force to line between REMBERCOURT and Ferme de SOULEUVRE to gain contact with enemy, captured some prisoners, sustained slight casualties and drove back enemy patrols. Our artillery active, enemy artillery lightly shelled our forward positions. Two enemy planes shot down by our machine guns.

82d Division reported at 6 o'clock evening, September 15: Left flank advanced about 1,200 meters. Out artillery and that of the enemy very active. Two enemy balloons shot down in flames.

VII Corps reported September 15: Day quiet except enemy artillery bombardment of VAUTHIERMONT.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, September 15: Nothing to report from St-MIHIEL sector except raiding activity on both sides and activity of enemy's bombing planes behind our front lines.

16 (125) A. Aside from local combats in which we took prisoners and a further increase of artillery and aviation activity there is nothing to report from the St-MIHIEL sector.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, September 16: Between ZILLEBEKE and St-ELOI, British advance their lines one kilometers without much opposition; new line runs East of ZILLEBEKE Pond---SPOIL Bank on the YPRES-COMINES Canal---west edge of St-ELOI; 50 prisoners and some machine guns were taken. Enemy artillery active in region of MOEUVRES and HAVRINCOURT. Between the AILETTE and the AISNE the French took MONT-des-SINGES, capturing 278 prisoners. They have also taken VAILLY. An attack now in progress appears to be developing favorably. Total prisoners taken in this region since morning of September 14 exceeds 4,000.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, September 16: North of the OISE calm day; harassing fire on French first lines and long-range fire on HAM; enemy aviation very active. South of the AILETTE, French attack this morning toward ANGE and COLOMBREX Farms resulted in advance of one kilometer on front of four kilometers. French advanced beyond SANCY and took the Farm LA LOGE and CHANTEREINE. They captured 600 prisoners and two 105 caliber guns.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 4th Ersatz, from reserve of Seventeenth Army, relieves 183d. Seventeenth Army, 22d withdrawn. Second Army; 18th Reserve, from reserve of Sixth Army, to reserve Second Army. Ninth Army, 84th withdrawn; 29th, from reserve of Seventh Army, and 105th, from reserve of Eighteenth Army to reserve Ninth Army. First Army; 9th, from reserve of Ninth Army, to reserve First Army. Third Army; 202d, from reserve of Ninth Army, to reserve Third Army; 53d Reserve, from reserve of Ninth Army, engaged at VAUGUOIS in old sector of 201st. Army Detachment C, 88th, from line of Third Army, to reserve Army Detachment C.

D. It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, September 16: "In the St-MIHIEL sector: An enemy balloon was shot down near CONFLANS. Our patrols were fired on near VILLE-en-WOEVRE and MARCHEVILLE. COMMERCY was bombed during the night, two wounded and material damage. Increased heavy enemy shelling on THIAUCOURT. No enemy outposts reported south of PRENY,"
Summary of air activity in St-MIHIEL Salient on September 12 and 13: Weather unfavorable, clouds an wind. Enemy activity: Feeble at all times, with the exception of a few reconnaissances of little importance, activity was usually confined to patrols of a half dozen to 15 pursuit planes operating will within the enemy's line in the vicinity of his antiaircraft defenses. Neither his planes nor his antiaircraft artillery prevented our making constant deep reconnaissances at a very low altitude, with only slight losses to us. Our activity: Pursuit, observation and bombardment units performed many valuable missions in conformity with the well organized plan. The rear areas were thoroughly searched by army observation planes, while operating undisturbed behind barrage, patrols established by pursuit aviation, the corps airplanes kept in constant contact with the advance. All types of airplanes attacked the ground forces of the enemy continually throughout the advance. There was little aerial combat.

29th Division reported morning, September 16: Artillery on both sides active yesterday.

It was reported September 16: Our aviators successfully bombed the railroad yards at CONFLANS and LONGUYON today. 4,200 kilograms of bombs were dropped and several direct hits were observed.

17 (126) A. In the St-MIHIEL sector the day was quiet except for continued activity of artillery and aviation, and patrol encounters in which we captured prisoners. An enemy raid in the VOSGES was repulsed.

B. Referring to our attack of September 12 on the St-MIHIEL Salient, German communique of September 13 stated: In expectation of this attack, the evacuation of this salient, which is exposed on both sides, had been planned for years and was begun some days ago. Therefore we did not fight the battle to a decision and carried out the movements which we had planned. The enemy was unable to check them. In this connection the following captured order of the German 10th Division dated September 8 will prove of interest: This division was in line in the salient on September 12.

10th Infantry Division, Section 1a, No. 1713 Hq., Sept. 8, 1918. Orders for the Defense.

1. It is essential that each company commander, platoon leader, and squad leader should understand thoroughly the mission that falls to him. For certain elements of the troops, the location of the shelters is unfavorable to taking combat position, and this must not give rise to any hesitation (such as the case at the present moment in the 398th Infantry and the right company of G II, left.)

2. Alarm position: This may be ordered by the battalion, regiment, brigade, or division. The greatest vigilance is necessary, in the trenches as well as in the artillery and in the battalions at rest. Every officer and soldier must take his assault equipment, gun in hand; the machine guns must be uncovered, and everything must be ready to take combat formation at once. The rounds of ammunition carried by each man must be verified, as well as the means of liaison, especially with the artillery. Have carts ready to start for CHAREY, and load them immediately important documents, papers, and secret orders (be ready to do this in case of alarm even if the alarm position has not previously been taken). A special alarm in case of fog will not be ordered. It goes without saying that in foggy weather, surveillance must be reinforced (if necessary increase the number of sentinels), and that in case the situation becomes tense, the order to take alarm position may be given. In any case, in foggy weather, all the men must be awake.

3. Give the alarm as soon as the enemy's approach is visible or as soon as the alarm signals from the front are seen. The alarm will be given by all means: Gongs, bells, sirens, whistles, bugles, and horns called "Alarms." The bugle will blow the alarm, and this call will be repeated to the rear. (In case of fog, there will be sound signals for the artillery.) There is no difference between the combat alarm and the gas alarm.
4. **Light Signals:** No barrage fire on the whole front but only destruction fires a and b. Destruction fire a is adjusted in front of the garrison of the advanced zone b immediately before the principal resistance line. Use judgment in calling for fire b, for it might happen that the garrison of the advanced zone would be endangered. These two destruction fires are executed only at certain of the most vulnerable spots to be attacked. The sketches are known to the commander of the combat troops.

5. **The Garrison of the Advanced Zone:** This is constituted by the small advanced posts and the N. C. O. posts, and if possible, the strength should not be more than one-third of the occupants of the principal line of resistance. This garrison has for its mission to observe and then to attract the attention of the principal line of resistance by a violent fire. It then falls back at once. The road leading to the company must be known exactly. At night, no one must sleep; change the positions of sentinels frequently in order that our formation may remain unknown to the enemy and that no surprise may be possible. The enemy's patrol must be pushed back and captured.

6. **The principal line of resistance passes south of the village of MONTSEC ---MONTSEC 240-2 (map 1/2500) immediately north of RICHECOURT---immediately north of LAHAYVILLE---southern edge of the SONNARD Wood. This line must be held at all costs and must remain in our possession at the end of the combat. There must be no falling back without order, and no one must leave the position. If the artillery destruction fire is not precise, the infantry must drive the enemy back by its own means. As soon as the alarm is given, everyone will come out of the shelters and go to the parapet. Each one has his place exactly marked, the machine guns are in position; keep the squads well grouped in order to obtain precision fire in front, obliquely on the sides and behind. If necessary, hold the parados against the hostile elements that may have filtered through. The gas masks are on the breast; order them to be put on in case a gas attack is threatened. The principal targets for the machine guns and riflemen are the hostile skirmishers and not the tanks; fire at the latter at a distance of not over 400 meters for the machine gun and with armor-piercing bullets. Tanks are harmless, they cannot aim accurately.

7. **Line of Artillery Protection:** On the right wing in front of the 398th Reserve Infantry to the village of MONTSEC, inclusive, the same as the principal line of resistance, and passing then to the southern edge of the forest (by the Kanonenwaldchen) by the QUART de RESERVE, crest of MAIZERAIS to the south of Camp HECKEN. This is at present under construction. Security Garrison for the line of artillery protection. One company to the right and one to the left of the KANONENWALDCHEN (on the edge of the wood (G I left)), one company on the crest of MAIZERAIS (from G II left) one company on the southern edge of the QUART de RESERVE (from G II right), and one company on the crest to the southwest of Camp HECKEN on both sides of the road. Each squad always occupied the same position and must be able to find it without hesitation at night and in foggy weather.

8. **Reserve Companies** (at each of the following points: G II right, G II left, G III right; 2 at G III left), will assemble at the alarm near the commander of the combat troops. The latter will decide according the situation whether the reserve companies are to hold the enemy back by their fire, which by reason of the great length of our front will be the rule, or whether there will be opportunity (as for example at G III left) to counterattack.

9. **Battalions at rest.** For alarm position, see Par. 6. In case of alarm, the battalions at rest will assemble. As the camps will very probably be bombarded by the enemy, the 398th will assemble at the pioneers camp, the 47th in the region northwest of MAIZERAIS, the 6th Grenadiers southeast of ESSEY. Slight detours may be made to avoid hostile artillery fire.
10. The staffs will go to their combat posts. The divisional staffs will go to Crest 255 south of BOUILONVILLE.

11. Artillery. In case of alarm, all the gun crews will be at their guns, machine guns in position, limbers hitched up, the sector-battery at the wagon lines. The batteries of field artillery at rest (with the exception of the army reserve battery, which will go to Point 3081) will join immediately the resting infantry battalions (the 9th Battery will join the 398th Infantry, one-half battery will join the 47th Infantry and one-half the 6th Grenadiers). At the alarm signal, the position batteries will fire, in foggy weather or in case there is any doubt about the light signals, a burst of destruction fire a; if the “Alarm” is repeated on the front, a new burst will be fired.

12. The mobile reserves will, in case of an alarm report to the major of camps and cantonments. This officer will see to stopping stragglers, who will be assigned to the mobile reserves. Look out for the approach of the enemy. Be sure which position you are to occupy. (Check up per regiment and per brigade).

By order of Baron von GRUTER:

OELSNER,
Lieut.

C. It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, September 17: South of the AILLETTE, French have continued to enlarge their gains. Local attacks carried their lines forward north of ALLEMANT and on the plateau of L'ANGE GARDIEN. They captured about 100 prisoners. North of the VESLE, enemy made three unsuccessful attacks on the plateau southeast of GLENNES.

Changes in German order of battle: Ninth Army, 29th, from reserve, is engaged east of ALLEMANT; Bavarian 3d withdrawn. Third Army, 117th, from reserve Second Army, to reserve Third Army in the ARDENNES; 53d Reserve engaged in former sector of 201st. Army Detachment C: 77th Reserve withdrawn from line. Nineteenth Army; 107th, from reserve Second Army, to reserve Nineteenth Army near METZ.

D. 6th Division reported noon, September 17: Enemy raid in SATTEL sector in the VOSGES repulsed; casualties; One man killed, 11 wounded.

96th Aero Squadron reported September 17: Unsuccessful bombing raid made last night. 600 kilograms of bombs were dropped on CONFLANS. Four machines are missing.

It was reported at 6:10 o'clock evening, September 17: In the St-MIHIEL sector everything quiet except for slight increase in artillery and aviation activity. Last night THIAUCOURT, BENEY and XAMMES were heavily shelled. A patrol west of CHAREY took five prisoners. This afternoon an enemy balloon was shot down in flames near DAMPVIOTOUX.

82d Division reported at 5:40 o'clock afternoon, September 17: Our patrols penetrated the enemy’s line, gaining contact and inflicting casualties; no prisoners were taken.

5th Division reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, September 17: Outpost patrols encountered enemy, capturing 20 prisoners.

18 (127) A. Aside from artillery activity in LORRAINE and in ALSACE there is nothing of importance to report from the sectors occupied by our troops.

In the course of a bombing operation in LORRAINE our aviators were attacked by superior forces. Five of our machines are missing.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 11:30 o'clock morning, September 18: British front: British outposts which reached southern edge of La BASSEE were repulsed by counterattack. Yesterday evening enemy captured MOEUVRES; British now immediately west of the village. British attacked this morning on front GOUGEACOURT-HOLONON. Attack reported to be going well. Unconfirmed reports indicate capture of FRESNOY, TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD, RONSSOY and EPEHY.
It was reported at 12:30 o'clock afternoon, September 18: Further reports at present unconfirmed give situation northwest of St-QUENTIN as follows: Right of British attack and French are meeting with considerable opposition south of FRESNOY. Center and left of XIX Corps making satisfactory progress but no locations given. Australians are on the line ASCENSION Farm-VILLERET (inclusive) and report 1,000 prisoners. III Corps have taken RONSSOY and PEIZIERE and having stiff fighting at EPEHY where German Alpine corps are fighting well; it is hoped they will be surrounded. IV Corps report troops at beetroot factory south of VILLERS-GUISLAIN; 500 prisoners taken. Considerable resistance opposite GOUZEAUCOURT. Later: EPEHY now reported clear of the enemy.

It was reported afternoon, September 18: British line on Fourth Army front approximately as follows: HOLNON---FRESNOY---BETHAUCOURT---VILLERET---BASSE BOULOGNE---PEIZIERE (all inclusive). British troops are advancing beyond this line. Heavy fighting taking place about LEMPIRE and also at EPEHY, where situation is not clear. 3,000 prisoners and a few guns taken.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, September 18: French attacked this morning in conjunction with the British west of St-QUENTIN. Strong resistance by the enemy. French have taken the Bois de SAVY, have reached the western edge of FRANCILLY-SELENCY, and have gained a foothold on the crest west of EPINE de DALLON. They have taken FONTAINE-les-CLERCS. South of the SOMME they have reached south edge of CONTESCOURT and enlarged their positions west of ESSIGNY le GRAND. Between the AILETTE and the AISNE French continue to make progress. They have taken the COLOMBE Farm. In the course of violent counterattacks the enemy suffered heavy losses and left 130 prisoners in the hands of the French. More than 300 prisoners have been taken in this region since yesterday morning.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 30th from reserve of Sixth Army to reserve Seventeenth Army at CAMBRAI. Second Army, 2d Guard, from reserve Second Army, engaged east of RONSSOY. Ninth Army: Bavarian 3d withdrawn; 227th withdrawn; Bavarian 16th from reserve Seventeenth Army to reserve Ninth Army north of VERNINS. Seventh Army, 24th Reserve withdrawn. Third Army, 202d from reserve Ninth Army to reserve Fifth Army near DAMVILLERS. Army Detachment C, 10th withdrawn. Army Detachment B, 14th Reserve from reserve Second Army to reserve Army Detachment B near FERRETTE.

D. 29th Division reported September 18: Our patrols active. Gas bombardment by enemy artillery; casualties: One man killed, four men wounded, 232 slightly gassed.

It was reported evening, September 18: 18 airplanes of the 11th and 20th Bombing Squadrons left airdromes at 4:40 o'clock afternoon. The 20th Squadron returned at 6:25 o'clock afternoon. Four of the 11th Squadron returned with motor trouble. The rest of this squadron was attacked over MARS le TOUR by ten Fokker machines; in the encounter five of our machines were lost, one returned at 6:40 o'clock afternoon.

19 (128) A. In the WŒVRE our detachments successfully raided the enemy's lines, capturing 15 prisoners. In the VOSGES a hostile raiding party was repulsed with losses.

C. It was reported September 19: Yesterday evening, French penetrated into CONTESCOURT which was defended foot by foot. During the night the enemy counterattacked on the EPINE de DALLON, after a heavy bombardment; results not yet known. The number of prisoners made on this front on the 18th is 200. South of the OISE great activity of enemy artillery. In the region of MOISY Farm enemy launched violent attacks at midnight; French hold all their positions. An enemy raid at midnight on MANHEULLES in the WŒVRE was repulsed. Patrol encounters at midnight in the sectors of St-CLEMENT and of ANCER-VILLER resulted in capture of prisoners.
It was reported at 11:35 o'clock morning, September 19: British front: Australian 4th Division attacked and captured HINDENBURG Outpost Line on entire divisional front last night, taking 350 prisoners. Australian 1st Division made progress in HINDENBURG Outpost Line. North of BERTHAUCOURT line runs approximately: West and north of PONTRUET --along old German front line east of VILLERET---HARGICOURT and RONSSOY---LEMPIRE, inclusive---east of EPEHY---south and west of VILLERS-GUISLAIN---GAUCHE Wood, inclusive---west of GOUZEACOURT. Severe fighting east of EPEHY. Hostile counterattacks repulsed last night south of VILLERS-GUISLAIN and GAUCHE Wood. Yesterday afternoon after intense bombardment enemy attacked in strength on TRESCAULT-BOURSIES front and also north of MOEUVRES; he was completely repulsed with heavy losses, British capturing 150 prisoners.

It was reported at 9 o'clock evening, September 19: Southwest of St-QUENTIN, French renewed their attack this morning but progress was slow owing to strong resistance of the enemy. North of the SOMME little advance was made. South of the SOMME the French passed beyond CONTESCOURT, and took CASTRES and the station of ESSIGNY-le-GRAND. They advanced to the western edge of BENAY. Between the AILETIE and the AISNE the enemy counterattacked strongly after violent bombardment. He was repulsed with heavy losses and pushed back beyond his starting point. Three hostile raids in the CHAMBRETTE region cost the French one man missing, but left four prisoners in their hands.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 39th engaged northeast of ECOURF---St-QUENTIN. Second Army, 185th engaged near VILLERET. Eighteenth Army, 107th, from reserve of Nineteenth Army, engaged northwest of St-QUENTIN; 75th Reserve withdrawn. Ninth Army; 1st withdrawn; 24th Reserve, from reserve of Seventh Army, engaged in sector of 5th Guard; 76th Reserve engaged south of ALLEMANT; 12th from reserve of Second Army to reserve Ninth Army near LAON. Nineteenth Army, 25th, from reserve of Second Army, to reserve Nineteenth Army near METZ.

On September 18, the enemy had in reserve 87 divisions, exclusive of three Austro-Hungarian divisions reported to be in the vicinity of METZ. Of this number 13 divisions, which have had more than one month's rest, may be considered fit for immediate offensive action; and 20 other divisions, which have had at least three weeks' rest, as being fairly fit. Of the 13 rested divisions three are first class, six second class, two third class and two fourth class. All were heavily engaged during July and August and latest identifications do not indicate any concentration of them for offensive action. Of the 20 fairly fit divisions, 11 have not been localized since their withdrawal from line. That the enemy is attempting to build up a reserve of rested divisions would appear from the fact that since September 7, twenty-five divisions, all with less than two weeks' rest, have returned to the line although certain rested divisions were apparently available.

D. 26th Division reported 9 o'clock evening September 19: During the night we made two raids preceded by artillery preparation. One was against St-HILAIRE and was without result as the enemy retreated. The other was against Bois de WAVRILLE and resulted in our capturing 15 prisoners. Known casualties: Officers, one wounded; men, three wounded.

29th Division reported September 19: Hostile projectile attack in region of BALSCHWILLER this morning followed by short bombardment.

It was reported at 5:40 o'clock afternoon, September 19: St-MIHIEL bombed three times last night. Slight increase in enemy artillery activity between the MOSELLE and HAUMONT.

92d Division reported at 6:25 o'clock evening, September 19: Attempted enemy raid in St-DIE sector was repulsed with losses to the enemy.

The letter quoted in Section B was written by the Commanding Officer, 211th Squadron, Royal Air Force in commendation of the American 17th Aero Squadron. This is the second time that the work of this squadron has been commended by the British.

20 (129) A. Renewed attempts of the enemy to raid our lines at four points in the WOEVRE
and in the VOSGES were repulsed. Aside from artillery activity in the WOEVRE and in ALSACE there is nothing further to report.

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C. It was reported at 11 o'clock morning, September 20: Northwest of St-QUENTIN, British line runs: West of FRESNOY le PETIT—BERTHAUCOURT—Ste-HELENE—north of PONTRUET. From that point to MOEUVRES situation unchanged. British 52d Division recaptured MOEUVRES last night, but a party of the enemy is still holding out in the village. Total number of guns taken since morning, September 18 now is 72.

It was reported at 9 o'clock evening, September 20: During the day French continued to advance south of the SOMME between CASTRES and BENAY. They took SABLIERS east of ESSIGNY and made some prisoners. An enemy raid near TRAVCEY was repulsed. South of the AILETTE continued activity of artillery in the region of the Farm COLOMBE. During the morning French made some progress towards the eastern edge of the plateau of the Farm MOISY. About 10 o'clock a violent enemy counterattack east of the Farm COLOMBE pushed back the line slightly.

It was reported at 4 o'clock afternoon, September 20: Situation on British front unchanged.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, Bavarian 6th Reserve, from reserve Seventeenth Army, relieves 8th; 52d, from reserve Seventeenth Army to reserve at COURTRAI. Seventeenth Army, 6th, from reserve Fourth Army, relieves 52d Reserve. Second Army, 121st, from reserve Eighteenth Army, engaged near LEMPIRE; 87th reengaged at VILLERS-GUISLAIN. Eighteenth Army, 197th reengaged north of CRICOURT; 26th Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army to reserve Eighteenth Army at BOHAIN. Ninth Army, 17th, from line Seventh Army, engaged near COLOMBE Farm. First Army, 51st Reserve from reserve Ninth Army to reserve First Army north of REIMS.

D. 29th Division reported at 9:30 o'clock morning, September 20: Our patrols active. Our artillery very active; enemy artillery bombarded our lines in northern part of sector with gas shells. Our casualties: Three men killed, three wounded and 11 gassed.

6th Division reported at 11:30 o'clock morning, September 20: Increased activity of enemy artillery, otherwise quiet.

It was reported at 6:25 o'clock evening, September 20: Intermittent shelling of THIAUCOURT continues.

90th Division reported at 5 o'clock evening, September 20: Active patrolling by our troops and by the enemy. Our artillery active; enemy shelled our front lines during the night.

92d Division reported at 1:15 o'clock afternoon, September 20: Two enemy raids repulsed in region of LESSEUX. Our casualties: Two killed, three wounded.

26th Division reported at 8 o'clock evening, September 20: Except for considerable harassing fire by enemy artillery and retaliation and moderate harassing by our artillery there is nothing to report.

21 (130) A. Aside from patrol encounters and increased aviation activity in the WOEVRE, the day was uneventful in the sectors occupied by our troops.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 4 o'clock afternoon, September 21: Attack by British III Corps this morning east of EPERY and LEMPIRE made good progress at first in spite of considerable resistance but met heavy counterattacks which forced back the line.

It was reported at 9:15 o'clock evening, September 21: Except for enemy artillery activity in the AISNE Valley and in upper ALSACE the day was quiet on the front from St-QUENTIN to Switzerland.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 3d Naval, from reserve Seventeenth Army, to reserve Fourth Army near THOUROUT; 16th, from line of Seventeenth
Army to reserve Fourth Army near BRUGES; Eighteenth Army, 2d withdrawn. Seventh Army, 227th, from reserve Ninth Army to reserve Seventh Army near BOURGE-et-COMIN. First Army, army boundary between First and Third Armies is moved one divisional sector to the east thus placing 3d Guard now in line of First Army. Nineteenth Army, 83d, from reserve Seventeenth Army, relieves 12th Landwehr. Army Detachment B, 28th, from reserve Third Army, to reserve Army Detachment B near MULHOUSE; 45th Reserve, from reserve Eighteenth Army to reserve Army Detachment B near MULHEIM.

D. 90th Division reported at 7:15 o'clock evening, September 21: Our Patrols had several encounters. Artillery active on both sides. Enemy aviation very active especially during the night with bombs and machine guns over our positions.

A. In the WOEVRE our raiding parties penetrated the enemy's lines at two points inflicted numerous casualties and brought back 25 prisoners. A hostile detachment which attempted to reach our positions was repulsed, leaving two of its men in our hands.

B. The following details have been reported of repulse of one of the enemy raids reported in American Official Communique No. 129, September 20: At 5 o'clock morning, September 20, and enemy combat party of two officers and 100 men, armed with six heavy and two light machine guns, and preceded by 15 minutes artillery preparation, came from DAMPVITOUX to the crossroads southeast of CHAMP-FONTAINE Farm to establish an outpost, locate our front line and identify our troops. Our artillery barrage, quickly regulated to a concentration fire, scattered the enemy and inflicted casualties. Our infantry captured three prisoners and one heavy machine gun. Our only casualty was one officer wounded.

C. It was reported at 9:45 o'clock evening, September 22: During the day, French continued to advance south of the SOMME. Line runs: Farm east of ESSIGNY-le-GRAND ---LAMBAY Wood---CAPPONNE Farm---Le MOULIN Farm---FORT de VENDEUIL---then to TRAVECY. South of the OISE calm day. South of the AILLETTE small operation east of COLOMBE Farm gave French 13 prisoners: Three small hostile attacks north of ALLEMANT failed.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army, 75th Reserve, from reserve Eighteenth Army, engaged west of BELLENGLISE. Eighteenth Army, 225th, from reserve Second Army, to reserve Eighteenth Army; 11th withdrawn. Landwehr; 195th, from reserve 19th engaged south of JONVILLE.

D. 42d Division reported at 4:15 o'clock afternoon, September 22, following details of raids reported in noon cable this date. We made two highly successful raids on HAUMONT and NARIMBOIS Farm, capturing 25 prisoners belonging to two enemy divisions. Aviation and artillery activity on both sides, enemy artillery putting down barrage on our raiding parties. Our casualties: Four men killed, 15 men wounded.

26th Division reported night, September 21: Between 40 and 50 of the enemy attempted raid on our outpost in CHAMPON at 11 o'clock evening, September 20. They were repulsed leaving two prisoners in our hands. Our casualties, four men wounded.

23 (132) A. In the WOEVRE our raiding parties were again active, bringing in 20 prisoners and two machine guns. Three hostile raids in the WOEVRE and in the VOSGES were repulsed.

C. It was reported at 9:25 o'clock evening, September 23: In the morning the French advance posts reached the OISE, north of La FERE, between VENDEUIL and TRAVECY. Nothing to report on the rest of the front.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army, 2d Guard Reserve withdrawn; 234th, from reserve Army Detachment B, in reserve Seventeenth Army near DOUAI. Second Army, 232d, from reserve, engaged near VILLER-GUISLAIN. Ninth Army, 50th Reserve withdrawn; 10th Reserve, from line Seventh Army in reserve in rear of 17th. Fifth Army, 117th, from reserve Third Army, relieves 37th. Army Detachment C, 192d withdrawn; 88th, from reserve engaged south of CHAREY between 5th Landwehr and 31st. Nineteenth Army, 107th, from line Eighteenth Army, to reserve Nineteenth Army; 38th Austro-Hungarian, from Austria,
in reserve Nineteenth Army near METZ; 21st Reserve, from reserve Seventeenth Army, to
reserve Nineteenth Army; 41st, from reserve Second Army, to reserve Nineteenth Army near
CHATEAU SALINS.

From the German official communiques of recent days it appears that the Ninth
Army has been transferred back to the Group of the Crown Prince, to which it belonged
prior to its inclusion in the newly organized group under von Boehn.

D. It was reported at 10:40 o'clock morning, September 23: In St-MIHEL sector
night quiet except for slight harassing fire. We made three raids and captured five
prisoners.

81st Division reported September 23: Enemy raid preceded by artillery fire last
night at La FORAIN in the VOSGES was repulsed. We had no casualties.

90th Division reported afternoon, September 23: Artillery and aviation active
on both sides. Two enemy combat patrols were repulsed.

It was reported at 6:55 o'clock evening, September 23: The total prisoners
taken in several raids last night in St-MIHEL sector was 28 men and one officer. Two
light machine guns were also captured.

24 (133) A. In the WOEVRE a successful raiding party brought in prisoners. Aside from
increased artillery activity in the same sector there is nothing further to report.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, September 24: British made local
attack this morning in cooperation with the French between the OMIGNON and the SOMME.
Satisfactory progress made despite great resistance. British are now east of PONTRUET,
midway between FRESNOY and GRICOURT, and east of SELENCY. 800 prisoners reported so far.

It was reported at 9:20 o'clock evening, September 24: French attack started
this morning in liaison with the British and developed under good conditions. During the
day, north of the SOMME, FRANCILLY-SELENCY, the EPINE de DALLON and the village of DALLON
were taken. South of the SOMME, French reached the western edge of GIFFECOURT. More than
500 prisoners were taken, and a large number of machine guns. This morning after violent
bombardment, the enemy attacked in force south of the AISNE between La HAYETTE and MERV.
The line was bent back slightly near Hill 169. A counterattack at 2 o'clock afternoon
completely reestablished the line, making 48 prisoners. At 4 o'clock afternoon numerous
hostile groups which were coming out of GLENNES were dispersed by French artillery fire.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 11th from reserve Seventeenth
Army to reserve Fourth Army at TOURCOING. Seventeenth Army, 7th Cavalry from reserve
Second Army is engaged near MARQUION; 1st Guard Reserve and 49th Reserve are withdrawn.
Eighteenth Army, 79th Reserve withdrawn; Bavarian 5th Reserve from reserve Seventeenth
Army to reserve Eighteenth Army at SAINS-du-NORD. Second Army, 21st Reserve, from
reserve of Nineteenth Army, engaged at VILLERS-GUISLAIN; 38th withdrawn. Ninth Army, 50th
Reserve withdrawn. First Army, 14th relieves 3d Guard; 103d from reserve Ninth Army to
reserve First Army near ANNELLES. Fifth Army, 1st Guard, from reserve Ninth Army, engaged
in VARENNES sector. Army Detachment C: 107th, from reserve Nineteenth Army, engaged at
St-HILAIRE between 13th Landwehr and 35th Austro-Hungarian.

On September 23, there were 116 enemy divisions in line on the western front,
and 83 in reserve of which 15 are considered as fit for offensive action. Of the 15 fit
divisions in reserve 11 are considered to be located between the ARGONNE and Switzerland.
Since September 11, four enemy divisions have been withdrawn from line in the St-MIHEL
sector and six fairly fresh divisions put in, thus increasing the number of divisions in
line in Army Detachment C from 7 to 9, despite the shortening of the front.

D. It was reported at 9:25 o'clock morning, September 24: Considerable in­
crease in enemy artillery activity during the night over the entire front in the St-MIHEL
sector.

26th Division reported morning, September 24, following details of one of the
successful raids reported in American Official Communique No. 132, September 23: Strong
patrols supported by machine-gun and artillery fire attacked hostile groups around St-
HILAIRE killing six of the enemy and capturing 13 prisoners and one machine gun. Our casualties: 6 men wounded.

90th Division reported 4:45 o'clock afternoon, September 24: In raid on enemy trench we took five prisoners. Our casualties were slight. Enemy patrols active.

Artillery active on both sides.

89th Division reported afternoon, September 24: Our patrols active. Artillery very active on both sides. Enemy airplane brought down within our lines uninjured.

It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, September 24: Considerable increase in enemy artillery fire along whole front in the WOEVRE. Noticeable increase in long-range heavy artillery fire.

25 (134) A. The day passed quietly in the sectors occupied by our troops.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, September 25: Enemy attack on EPINE-de-DALLON north of the SOMME this afternoon was repulsed. This morning after a violent bombardment enemy attacked French positions between MOISY Farm and ALLEMAN. After severe fighting these attacks were repulsed. During the afternoon, following a new bombardment, the enemy renewed his attacks and succeeded in forcing the French back to the railroad along the east edge of Hill 158.6. The combat continues. On the rest of the front quiet day.

Changes in German order of battle. Sixth Army, 36th, from reserve Seventeenth Army, engaged near LILLE. Seventeenth Army, 214th engaged south of SAILLY-en-OSTREVENT. Second Army, 8th relieves Alpine Corps: Bavarian 5th, 1st Reserve, 119th withdrawn.

Eighteenth Army, 25th Reserve withdrawn; 21st from reserve Second Army to reserve Eighteenth Army north of St-QUENTIN; 2d reengaged south of BELLENGLISE; 79th Reserve reengaged near PONTRUET. Ninth Army, 10th Reserve reengaged south of COLOMBE Farm. First Army, 9th relieves 203d. Third Army, Bavarian Ersatz engaged in old sector of 88th north of PERTHES.

D. It was reported at 6:30 o'clock afternoon, September 25: Notable decrease today in enemy artillery activity in the WOEVRE.

90th Division reported at 5:45 o'clock afternoon, September 25: Patrols active on both sides. Usual artillery activity. Increased activity of our aviation. Our casualties: Men, 1 killed, 13 wounded, 1 gassed, 1 missing.

30th Division reported at 8 o'clock evening, September 25: One of our brigades now in front line. Enemy attack on our right front battalion at 5 o'clock this morning, east of HARGICOURT repulsed by our rifle machine-gun fire. Enemy artillery heavily shelled our lines between 1:30 and 2 o'clock morning. Our casualties: Officers: 1 killed; men: 4 killed, 21 wounded.

27th Division reported at 9 o'clock evening, September 25: Have taken over forward sector from British division.

26 (135) A. This morning northwest of VERDUN the First Army attacked the enemy on a front of 20 miles and penetrated his lines to an average depth of seven miles.

Pennsylvania, Kansas, and Missouri troops serving in Major General Liggett's Corps stormed VARENNES, MONTBLAINVILLE, VAUQUOIS and CHEPPY after stubborn resistance. Troops of other corps, crossing the FORGES Brook, captured the Bois de FORGES and wrestled from the enemy the towns of MALANCOUR, BETHINCOURT, MONTFAUCON, CUISY, NANTILLOIS, SEPTSARGES, DANNEVOUX and GERCOURT-et-DRILLANCOURT. The prisoners thus far reported number over 5,000.

C. It was reported afternoon, September 26: On the French front west of the ARGONNE the line at 1 o'clock afternoon ran: North of BINARVILLE---north of SERVON---north of CERNEY-en-DORMOIS---north of ROUVROY---north of RIPONT---north of BUTTE de TAHURE---across railway east of SOMME-PY---north of Farm NAVARIN---1,500 meters south of St-SOUPLET.
It was reported at 3:15 o’clock afternoon, September 26: The French have captured the Forest of PINCE, about one kilometer north of the railroad between SOMME-PY and MARNE. They have also captured the park of FONTAINE-en-DORMOIS.

It was reported at 9:30 o’clock evening, September 26: French line west of the ARGONNE unchanged. Reaction everywhere rather heavy especially east of TAHURE. Two corps report 2,000 prisoners each; no reports from other corps.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army, 2d Guard Reserve relieves 9th Reserve. Seventeenth Army, Bavarian 5th reserve for reserve Eighteenth Army to reserve Seventeenth Army near CAMBRAI. Eighteenth Army, 11th reengaged near St-QUENTIN. Ninth Army, 17th withdrawn. Seventeenth Army, 227th engaged at PONT d’ARCY, Third Army, 1st Guard Division from line of Fifth Army to line of Third Army near AIRE River; 53d Reserve withdrawn. 43d Reserve Division has been dissolved.

D. It was reported at 4 o’clock afternoon, September 26: From the MEUSE westward line at noon today ran approximately: South of DANNEVOUX—northwest edge of Bois de SEPTSARGES—CUISY—600 meters north of Bois de MONTFAUCON—north edge of Bois CHEHEMIN—then due north to HILL 265—west ward through EPINONVILLE—ECLISFONTAINE—southwest to BOUZON in the ARGONNE Forest—then westward through the forest. One American division reports very light losses and 325 prisoners taken; another American division reports over 300 prisoners.

It was reported at 7 o’clock evening, September 26: Our line runs approximately: DANNEVOUX—north of Bois de SEPTSARGES—one kilometer north of MONTFAUCON—one kilometer south of CIERGES—EPINONVILLE—ECLISFONTAINE—CHARPENTRY—MONTBLAINVILLE—BOUZON—St-HUBERT in the ARGONNE Forest. Enemy resistance heavy at CHEPPY and MONTFAUCON: lighter in the valley of the AIRE and west of the MEUSE. Enemy artillery activity slight except in the center. Slight activity of enemy aviation. Our casualties generally reported light. Prisoners about 5,300. One corps reports the capture of 20 guns.

90th Division reported at 6 o’clock evening, September 26: Our raiding parties, penetrating first trenches of HINDENBURG Line, encountered strong machine-gun fire. They captured six prisoners. Artillery active on both sides.

78th Division reported at 7:30 o’clock evening, September 26: Our patrols took prisoners. Artillery active on both sides.

42d Division reported at 9:25 o’clock evening, September 26: Patrols sent out to sound enemy resistance met with heavy machine-gun fire from enemy outpost lines. Artillery violently active on both sides.

It was reported September 26: 34 planes of the 96th, 20th and 11th Bombing Squadrons started on bombing operation at 8:30 o’clock morning. 15 reached the objective and dropped 4,000 kilos of bombs on the southern part of the town of DUN. There were several combats. Five planes of the 20th and one of the 11th are missing.

The 11th and 20th dropped 2,200 kilos of bombs on ETAIN this afternoon. Two bursts were observed in the town and one on the railroad track. All our machines returned safely at 5:15 o’clock afternoon.

27 (136) A. Northwest of VERDUN the First Army continued its attack begun yesterday. The towns of CHARPENTRY, VERY, EPINONVILLE and IVOIRY were taken. Repeated hostile counterattacks on Major General Cameron’s Corps were thrown back by troops from Ohio, from New Jersey, Maryland and Virginia, and from Oregon, Washington, Colorado, Wyoming and Montana. The captured materiel includes over 100 guns of which 12 are heavy calibers, many trench mortars and hundreds of machine guns. The number of prisoners has risen to over 8,000, including 125 officers.

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C. It was reported at 1:30 o'clock afternoon, September 27: British attack in front of CAMBRAI had reached at noon the line: MARQUION--BOURLON--ANNEUX--GRAINCOURF--east of FLESQUIERES--RIBECOURF--east of BEAUCAMP. The resistance is reported to be very strong.

It was reported at noon, September 27: French front west of the ARGONNE runs: Two kilometers north of SERVON-MELZICOURT--north of the Bois de CERNAY--north of the Bois de l'ECHELLE--two kilometers north of CERNAY-en-DORMOIS--one kilometer north of ROUROY and RIPONT--three kilometers north of TAHURE--across railroad track east of SOMME-PY--then south of the railroad track and parallel to it at 1,000 meters distance to a point south of ST-SOUPLET--then southwest to AUBERIVE, French II Corps had passed north of the Bois de la TOURTERELLE, capturing 1,000 prisoners and much materiel.

It was reported at 7 o'clock evening, September 27: On left of French Fourth Army strong counterattack forced back the line slightly in the region of AUBERIVE. In the center the attack is going well; the line runs from a point 500 meters north of FONTAINE-en-DORMOIS--north of GRATREUIL--through MARNE to COIX-St-WALFROY--then south of SOMME-PY--passing by outskirts of Ste-MARIE-a-PY to AUBERIVE.

It was reported at 4:45 o'clock afternoon, September 27: Reports from British First Army state British troops hold BOURLON Wood whence line runs northward to southern outskirts of SAUCHY-LESTREE. British Third Army believed to hold PREMY Chapel, east of FLESQUIERES. Enemy is holding out at GRAINCOURF and west of the village, but British troops believed to have taken ANNEUX and to be progressing toward CANTAING.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock morning, September 27: Local operation on British front to secure line QUENNEMONT Farm-GILLEMONT Farm northwest of BELLICOURF believed successful and 200 prisoners taken.

It was reported at 9:45 o'clock evening, September 27: British front: ANNEUX and the village and woods of BOURLON have been taken. GRAINCOURF has been encircled and it is believed mopped up. British are at the west edge of CANTAING and are preparing to attack FONTAINE-NOTRE DAME. More than 5,000 prisoners have been taken. Impression very satisfactory.

It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, September 27: American 27th and 30th Divisions, operating on British front, attacked this morning as per program. Proceeding satisfactorily.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 111th relieves 11th Reserve. Seventeenth Army, 18th Reserve from reserve Second Army to reserve Seventeenth Army north of DENAIN. Ninth Army, 17th reengaged at VAUXELLES. Seventh Army, 199th from reserve First Army engaged near JONCHERY. First Army, Guard Cavalry from reserve Ninth Army relieves Bavarian 15th. Third Army; 5th Guard from line Ninth Army to reserve Third Army in rear of 1st Guard; 7th from reserve Ninth Army engaged; 103d from reserve First Army engaged in sector of 115th. Army Detachment C, 8th Landwehr reengaged in former sector. Nineteenth Army, 204th from reserve Eighteenth Army to reserve Nineteenth Army near METZ; Bavarian 1st Landwehr withdrawn.

The 233d Division and the 27th Division which have been resting for more than a month must now be considered fit for offensive action, increasing to 18 the number of fit enemy divisions in reserve in the western front.

D. It was reported at 5:30 o'clock afternoon, September 27: Enemy strongly counterattacked today and took NANTILLOIS, ECLISFONTAINE and MONTFAUCON. The Americans later counterattacked and retook these places.

It was reported at 7 o'clock evening, September 27: Generally heavy resistance along the entire front between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE. Many machine-gun nests encountered; hostile artillery active. Counterbattery work by our artillery. At 3:30 o'clock afternoon the line from west to east ran: Bois d'APREMONT--north of MONTBLAINVILLE--southwest of CHARPENTRY--ECLISFONTAINE--EPINONVILLE--northeast of IVOIRY--north of MONTFAUCON--east of NANTILLOIS--Bois de la COTE LEMONT--along the MEUSE to FORGES Brook.

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It was reported evening, September 26: The airplane previously reported missing from the 11th Bombing Squadron has returned. Our pursuit planes extremely active performing not only patrols but also reconnaissance missions; many combats have taken place. Enemy airplanes bombèd St-MIHIEL night of September 26/27.

30th Division reported at midnight, September 26: Enemy artillery and aviation very active over forward areas. Our artillery active with harassing and destructive fire on roads and trenches.

89th and 90th Divisions reported evening, September 27: Usual patrolling and decreased artillery activity in the WOEVRE.

A. The attack begun on September 26 continues to develop successfully. Today our troops, advancing in the face of heavy infantry, artillery and machine-gun fire, have reached the outskirts of BRIEULLES and EXERMONT. More than 20 towns and enormous quantities of materiel have fallen into our hands. The number of prisoners continues to increase. American aviators have kept command of the air. They have brought down 12 balloons and more than 60 enemy planes, while less than third of that number of our planes are missing. In conjunction with French and British aviators they have, notwithstanding unfavorable weather, rendered valuable service and successfully executed many missions.

B. The following extract is from a German soldier's letter found in the WOEVRE, September 22: "Americans are in front of us. To the right of us, Indians of the Sioux tribe were identified in one of the last attacks. After the war Karl May can write another book about his war experiences with his dear Indians."

C. It was reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, September 28: After three hours' artillery preparation Belgians attacked at 5:30 o'clock this morning north of YPRES. The first enemy position was carried by 8 o'clock; the second enemy position has been taken along a large part of the front. The line runs approximately: WOUMEN---CLERCKEN---the whole of the forest of HOUTHULST---west of WESTROOSEBEKE---east of ZONNEBEKE---GHELUVELT. About 2,000 prisoners have been taken: British warships are bombarding the coast. The British in their attack south of the SCARPE are at SANCOURF, NOYELLES, and MARCOING; they have taken 12,000 prisoners and 200 guns.

It was reported at 3:15 o'clock afternoon, September 28: Belgians have reached the line: ZARREN---STADEN---WESTROOSEBEKE---PASSCHENDAEL. The British cooperating on right of Belgians, are at BECELAERE, ZANDOORDE and WYTSCHAETE. Advance has been rapid despite heavy rains. In front of CAMBRAI, British are on the Line: OISY-le-VERGER---EPINOY---SANCOURF---west of TILLOY---PROVILLE---west of RUMILLY and MASNIERES---GOUZEAUCOURT. Between the AILETTE and the AISNE enemy appears to be withdrawing. French patrols are maintaining contact in the JOUY Ravine; American 370th Regiment participating. It is believed enemy is retreating to the OISE-AISNE Canal. In CHAMPAGNE, French renewed the attack this morning. They have taken SOMME-PY with many prisoners and 10 guns, and are south of ARDEUIL and SECHAULT.

It was reported at 5:20 o'clock afternoon, September 28: Advance elements of French Tenth Army have reached the AILETTE north of VAUXAILLON and are also east of the line: CHAVIGNON---PARGNY---FILAIN. PINON has been taken. Enemy offers delaying rearguard resistance. American 370th Regiment participating in advance.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, September 28: North of the SOMME, French have reached wood east of SELENCY and trenches northwest of OESTRES. South of the SOMME they have occupied wood south of URVILLERS and are 200 meters from HILL 113, south of CERIZY. South of the AILETTE French have reached the line: Canal south of FORET de MORTIER---south edge of FORET de PINON---CHAVIGNON---heights east of PARGNY-FILAIN---west of ROYERE Farm---GERLAUX Farm---POLEMPRISE Farm---thence south to the AISNE. Patrols have reached the AILETTE in front of URCEL. Between the OISE and the AILETTE, French patrols have found enemy line strongly held.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, relief of 11th Reserve by 111th
reported in error September 27, 11th Reserve is still in line Fourth Army; Bavarian 16th from reserve Ninth Army to reserve Fourth Army at ROULERS; 44th Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army to reserve Fourth Army. Sixth Army; 111th from reserve Fourth Army relieves 207th. Seventeenth Army, 49th Reserve engaged east of GRAINCOURT; 3d Naval from reserve Fourth Army to line Seventeenth Army west of MARCOING. Second Army, 30th from reserve Seventeenth Army to line Second Army south of VILLERS-GUISLAIN; 54th from reserve Eighteenth Army relieves 232d. Third Army, Bavarian 1st from reserve Ninth Army to line Third Army north of TAHRUD; Bavarian 15th from reserve First Army to line Third Army southeast of SOMME-PY; 3d Guard from reserve First Army to line Third Army near SOMME-PY; 76th Reserve from reserve Ninth Army to line Third Army north of SERVON; 5th Guard engaged at MONTBLAINVILLE. Fifth Army; 37th engaged near MONTFAUCON; Bavarian 5th Reserve from reserve Eighteenth Army to line Fifth Army southwest of DANNEVOUX. Nineteenth Army, 19th Ersatz from reserve of Ninth Army relieves 81st Reserve.

German order of battle from the west edge of the ARGONNE to the MEUSE is as follows: 9th Landwehr (4th class), 2d Landwehr (4th class), 5th Guard (1st class), 1st Guard (1st class), 117th (2d class), 37th (1st class), 7th Reserve (2d class), 115th (3d class) and Bavarian 5th (2d class).

The 26th Reserve, 41st and 222d Divisions are now considered ready for offensive action; but since the 3d Naval, Bavarian 5th Reserve and 37th have been placed in line the number of rested enemy divisions in reserve remains at 18. On the western front on September 27 enemy had 132 divisions in line, 18 fit divisions in reserve and 48 divisions resting and refitting.

D. It was reported at 4:20 o'clock afternoon, September 28: First Army attack northwest of VERDUN is progressing well despite considerable opposition from machine guns and artillery Some prisoners taken. Our casualties slight. Our line runs approximately from west to east: Two kilometers southeast of BINARVILLE---APREMONT---500 meters southeast of EXERMONT---800 meters north of ECLISFONTAINE---one kilometer north of CIERGES---north of Bois de BUEGE---NANTILLOIS---north edge of Bois de la COTE LEMONT---south along the MEUSE. Advance continues, though slowly.

It was reported at 7:20 o'clock evening, September 28: Between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE progress has been slight but steady in face of persistent machine-gun opposition and considerable hostile artillery fire. Several minor counterattacks were attempted but met with no success. Approximate line: Position unchanged in the ARGONNE---heights southwest of CHATELCHEHERY---one kilometer north of APREMONT---L'ESPERANCE---one kilometer south of EXERMONT---east of TRONSOL Farm---north of CIERGES---Bois-du-FAYS---northern tip of Bois de la COTE LEMONT.

26th Division reported at 7 o'clock evening, September 28: We repulsed hostile combat patrol, capturing two prisoners and killing several Germans including one officer. Our casualties one officer killed, eight men wounded and 25 men gassed.

27th Division reported at 9 o'clock evening, September 28: Enemy still holds portion of trench system captured by us yesterday. Prisoners now total 298, including 8 officers. Our casualties 412.

29 (138) A. Our troops have continued to meet with determined resistance on the part of the enemy, who has been forced hastily to bring up and engage divisions from other part of the front. Between CIERGES and the valley of the AIRE we have met and repulsed heavy counterattacks.

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C. It was reported at 3:15 o'clock afternoon, September 29: FLANDERS front: Belgians have taken ZARREN and British have taken WATERDAMHOCK. On CAMBRAI---St-QUENTIN

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front line runs: North and south outskirts of CAMBRAI---RUMILLY---GONNELIEU---VENDHUILE---Le CATELET---NAUROY---BELLENGLISE. A great many prisoners and a large number of guns taken. In CHAMPAGNE French have captured AUBERIVE and BOUCONVILLE.

It was reported at 7:35 o'clock evening, September 29: On FLANDERS front line is as follows: DIXMUDE, inclusive---ZARREN---TERREST---STADENBURG---WESTROOSEEKE---east of PASSCHENDAELE---east of MOORSLEDE---east of DADIZEELE---one kilometer west of COMINES.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, September 29: French front in CHAMPAGNE runs: Two kilometers north of SERVON-MELZICOURT---southeast edge of Bois de CERNAY---Bois de l'ECHELLE---north of BOUCONVILLE to point on road two and one-half kilometers south of MONTMOIS---south of MARVAUX and AURE---along north edge of woods west of AURE for 3 kilometers then southwest to point one kilometer north of SOMME-PY---southwest through Ste-MARIE-a-PY to AUBERIVE.

It was reported at 5:20 o'clock afternoon, September 29: British hold BLECOURT, north of CAMBRAI, and MASNIERES, south of CAMBRAI. French have taken URVILLERS and CERIZY, south of ST-QUENTIN.

It was reported at 8 o'clock evening, September 29: American 27th and 30th Divisions, cooperating with the British north of ST-QUENTIN, attacked at 6 o'clock morning, crossing HINDENBURG First Line and the ST-QUENTIN Canal, 27th Division captured BONY and Le CATELET; 30th Division captured BELLOCOURT and NAUROY. All objectives reached by noon.

It was reported at 10:25 o'clock evening, September 29: French cavalry, operating with the Belgians, is reported to have broken through enemy line and to have reached ROULERS.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 23d from reserve Seventeenth Army to line Fourth Army northeast of BIXSCHOOTE; Bavarian 4th from reserve Seventeenth Army to reserve Fourth Army near TOURCOING. Seventeenth Army, 58th relieves 39th; 3d Reserve withdrawn; 22d engaged near EPINOY; 207th from reserve Sixth Army to line Seventeenth Army near SAILLY; 1st Guard Reserve engaged near BOURLON Wood; 18th Reserve engaged north of BEAUCAMP; 26th Reserve from reserve Eighteenth Army to reserve Seventeenth Army near DENAIN. Second Army; 6th Cavalry and 201st withdrawn, Ninth Army; 105th relieves 206th. Third Army; 51st Reserve from reserve First Army to line Third Army northeast of SOMME-PY; 45th Reserve from reserve Army Detachment B to line Third Army near BAULNY; 50th Reserve from reserve Ninth Army to reserve Third Army near St-PIERRE---ARNES; Bavarian 3d from reserve Ninth Army to reserve Third Army near Saint-ETIENNE-a-ARNES. Nineteenth Army, Bavarian 1st Landwehr reengaged in former sector. Army Detachment A; 204th from reserve Nineteenth Army to reserve Army Detachment A near BLAMONT.

It appears that the 233d and 54th Reserve Divisions have been disbanded and their effectiveness transferred to other units. These dissolutions and the transfer into line of the 51st Reserve and 45th Reserve Divisions reduces the number of rested enemy divisions available on the western front to 14.

D. It was reported at 6:35 o'clock evening, September 29: Our troops engaged in numerous attacks and counterattacks on the entire front between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE. From APREMONT to Bois de la COTE LEMONT the line runs east and west, approximately between these two points. Strong hostile counterattacks launched at EXERMONT GESNES and CUNEL were repulsed. Our losses have been heavy today.

42d and 90th Divisions reported afternoon, September 29: Usual patrolling and artillery activity in the WOEVRE.

30 (139) A. From the MEUSE to the AISNE our troops have maintained and consolidated their newly captured positions in the face of counterattacks and heavy gas and artillery bombardments.

B. There is nothing to report in this section

C. It was reported at noon, September 30: Line on ST-QUENTIN---CAMBRAI Front
runs: GRICOURT---east end of Le TRONQUAY Canal Tunnel---LEVERGIES---west edge of JONCOURT---NAUROY---west edge BONY thence no change as far as GONNELIEU, which British hold. Northward line believed to run through BANTEUX along west bank of canal through Les RUES des VIGNES---MASNIEREX---RUMILLY---FAUBOURG-de-Paris, thence as reported in British morning communique, September 30: In FLANDERS British are east of GHELUWE.

It was reported at 4 o'clock afternoon, September 30: French Fifth Army attacking north of the VESLE has taken Le GRAND HAMEAU and MONTIGNY and advanced about two kilometers north of ROMAIN. In CHAMPAGNE counterattack forced French to retire slightly from Ste-MARIE-a-PY. In FLANDERS, British advance guards have reached the line WARNETON-COMINES.

It was reported at 8 o'clock evening, September 30: The French IX Corps made good progress today in CHAMPAGNE and have taken MARVAUX and Les PETITS ROSIERS and reached the outskirts of MONTHOIS.

It was reported at 9:20 o'clock evening, September 30: French line west of the ARGONNE runs; North edge of BINAVALLE---south edge of CONDE-les-AUTRY---north edge of Bois de MOYON---south edge of Bois des AULNETTES---north of BOUCONVILLE---northwest to point one kilometer south of MONTHOIS---southwest to point one kilometer north of SOMME-PY---passing north of MARVAUX and AURE---south edge of Ste-MARIE-a-PY---AUBERIVE. North of the VESLE no change except that French have advanced to a point northwest of VENTELAY.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, September 30: French attacked west and southwest of St-QUENTIN this afternoon; they have taken GUINGUETTE Farm south of URVILLERS. French have occupied railway station of ANIZY-le-CHATEAU. Between the AILETTE and the AISNE they have reached l'EPINE de CHEVREGNY and railway 800 meters east of OSTEL. Americans made prisoners at SONDERNACH in the VOSGES.

It was reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, September 30: CAMBRAI---St-QUENTIN Front: Troops of American II Corps have occupied BEAUREVOIR, GOUY and JONCOURT. Two German divisions are behind them at BONY. Americans advancing on the south and British on the north passed these German divisions which are now being attacked by Australians. Enemy is still in VILLERS-GUISLAIN. Farther north British are at CREVECOEUR.

It was reported at 4 o'clock afternoon, September 30: North of CAMBRAI, Canadians have taken TILLOY and BLECOURT. In FLANDERS, British hold west bank of the LAIES River from NEUVE CHAPELLE to south of PICANTIN. They hold northern half of COMINES and are on the railway north of WERVICQ. Belgians reported to have captured STADEN.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 16th Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army to reserve Fourth Army near BRUGES; 52d Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged west of MOORSLEDE; Bavarian 16th engaged near WESTROOSEBEKE; 39th from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged east of GHELUVELT; 3d Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged near ZARREN. Seventeenth Army, 16th from reserve Fourth Army to reserve Seventeenth Army. Second Army, 87th and 2d Guard withdrawn. Eighteenth Army; 221st withdrawn; 34th from line Ninth Army engaged southwest of St-QUENTIN. Ninth Army, 237th engaged at SERVAIS; 203d from reserve First Army to reserve Ninth Army near LAON; 50th from reserve Seventh Army to reserve Ninth Army, in rear of 10th Reserve. Third Army: Bavarian 4th from reserve Fourth Army engaged north of MANRE; 42d, Bavarian Ersatz and 103d withdrawn; 52d from reserve Fourth Army engaged in valley of AIRE; 12th from line Seventeenth Army engaged northwest of MONTBLAINVILLE. Fifth Army; 115th withdrawn and localized north of DANNEVOUX; 108th from reserve Second Army to reserve Fifth Army; 106th Austro-Hungarian from Italian front to reserve Fifth Army near LOISON. Nineteenth Army; 81st Reserve re-engaged on NOMENY front. 233d and 54th Reserve Divisions have been dissolved.

D. II Corps reported at 6 o'clock morning, September 30: Prisoners taken north of St-QUENTIN on September 29 by American 27th and 30th Divisions total 40 officers and more than 1,200 other ranks.
American divisions in the WOEVRE report usual patrolling and artillery activity during night September 29/30.

81st Division reported morning, September 30: One of our patrols encountered enemy patrol in RABODEAU sector; no casualties.

VII Corps reported afternoon, September 30: Hostile raid east of St-DIE; we suffered no casualties.

It was reported at 8 o'clock evening, September 30: No reported change in our front line between the MEUSE and the ARGONNE. Afternoon quiet with slight increase in hostile artillery.

October 1

A. During the day we advanced our lines in the Forest of ARGONNE. Farther to the east our patrols have passed beyond CIERGES and are operating north of that point and on the road from EXERMONT to GENSES, maintaining contact with the enemy. In the north our troops are advancing with the French and British and participating in their successes. Since September 26 our aviators have shot down more than 100 hostile planes and 21 balloons.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 1 o'clock afternoon, October 1: FLANDERS front: British have taken LEDEGHEM and ROLLEGHEM-CAPPELLE. CAMBRAI--ST-QUENTIN front: North of CAMBRAI, Canadians have captured BLECOURT, BANTIGNY and ABANCOURT; north of ST-QUENTIN, Australians have taken ESTREES and FOLEMPIRE Farm.

It was reported at 3:45 o'clock afternoon, October 1: French line from SOUPIR on the AISNE to REIMS runs along south bank of the AISNE to MAIZY--MEURIVAL--FAITE Farm --BOURGOGNE--BOUVANCOURT--HARVELON Chateau--TRIGNY--CHENAY--MERY--La NEUVILLE.

It was reported at 6:20 o'clock evening, October 1: French Fourth Army has taken Bois de la MALMAISON, capturing many machine guns and much materiel. They have reached the vicinity of VAUX-les-MOURON.

It was reported at 5:45 o'clock afternoon, October 1: St-QUENTIN has been taken. Allied troops have reached point one kilometer west of LESDINS. French are along the AISNE as far as CONCEVREUX; farther south they have taken the hill north of TRIGNY. West of the ARGONNE, French have taken Hill 121, west of VAUX-les-MOURON, heights of CROIX GILLE, south of LIRY and wood 2,000 meters west of CROIX GILLE.

Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army: 13th from reserve Ninth Army to reserve Sixth Army near LILLE. Seventeenth Army: 26th Reserve engaged near TILLOY; 49th Reserve and 7th Cavalry withdrawn; 12th from line Third Army engaged near EPINOY. Second Army; 9th Reserve from reserve Sixth Army engaged near MARCOING: 21st from reserve Eighteenth Army engaged near BELLICOURT: 2d Guard engaged near BELLICOURT; 221st from reserve Eighteenth Army engaged south of JONCOURT. Eighteenth Army; 25th Reserve engaged near LEHAUCOURT. Seventh Army; 4th Guard withdrawn; 5th changes sector, relieving 199th. Third Army; Bavarian 15th and 9th Landwehr withdrawn; 199th from line Seventh Army engaged south of ORFEUIL. Fifth Army, 7th Reserve withdrawn. Army Detachment C; 195th withdrawn. Nineteenth Army; 236th from reserve Fourth Army to reserve Nineteenth Army near METZ. 222d Division has been dissolved.

On September 25 the enemy had nine divisions in line and four divisions in reserve between AUBERIVE-sur-SUIPPES and the MEUSE. Since the Franco-American attack the enemy has engaged 15 new divisions in this sector and brought four others into reserve. On September 30, he had in this sector 20 divisions in line and ten in reserve; of the divisions in line eight are first class, seven second class, three third class and two fourth class; of the divisions in reserve three have had sufficient rest to be considered fit for offensive action.

D. 90th Division reported afternoon, October 1: Our patrols captured three prisoners.

II Corps reported afternoon, October 1: Situation 24 hours ending 11:50 o'clock evening, September 30: Our troops forced bridgehead 6,000 yards wide through HINDENBURG
Line. Now engaged in cooperating with Australians in mopping up and extending gains east and north. Our line runs approximately VENDHUILE—BONY—northeast of NAUROY—east of JONCOURT. Enemy artillery active.

3 (141) A. Except for heavy shelling and machine-gun fire west of the MEUSE and at other points held by our troops nothing of unusual importance has occurred during the day. A partial count of the materiel captured during the past week shows 120 guns of all calibers, 750 trench mortars, 300 machine guns, 100 heavy tank guns, thousands of artillery shells and hundreds of thousands of rounds of small arms ammunition.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 1:15 o'clock afternoon, October 2: East of St-QUENTIN the enemy is holding line along east bank of the canal, then southward through ITANCOURT.

It was reported at 3 o'clock afternoon October 2: Northwest of REIMS French hold north bank of the AISNE Canal to point opposite PONTAVERT, thence line runs: South edge Bois de GERNICOURT—west edge LOIVRE—west of COURCY—La NEUVILLETTE.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, October 2: North of St-QUENTIN, French have made progress east of Le TRONQUOY; southward French line runs: West edge of LESDINS—OMISSY—west edge of MORCOURT—eastern suburbs of St-QUENTIN—west of NEUVILLE—St-AMAND and ITANCOURT—MOY. South of La BASSEE, British have reached western edge of HAISNES and eastern edge of HULLUCH; north of La BASSEE they have occupied FLEURBAIX. No important change in other sectors.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army; 13th Reserve, 23d and Bavarian 16th withdrawn; Bavarian 1st Reserve, from line Sixth Army, engaged southwest of ROULERS; 6th Cavalry, from reserve Second Army, engaged near LEDEGHEM. Sixth Army: 16th, from reserve Seventeenth Army, engaged near LOOS. Seventeenth Army: 187th, 6th and 20th withdrawn; 220th engaged at BLECOURT; 234th now in sector north of TILLOY. Second Army: Bavarian 5th and 38th engaged near RUMILLY; 119th engaged at ESTREES; 121st, 75th Reserve and 185th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army; 84th, from reserve Ninth Army, engaged at LEVERGIES; 1st Reserve, from reserve Second Army, engaged northeast of CERIZY; 2d withdrawn. Seventh Army; 50th, from reserve Ninth Army, engaged at PROUILLY; 4th Guard engaged at GLENNES. Third Army; 9th Landwehr engaged west of the AISNE; 53d Reserve engaged near GESNES; 25th from reserve Nineteenth Army to reserve Third Army. Fifth Army; 115th engaged; 117th withdrawn. Army Detachment C; 17th Reserve from reserve Eighteenth Army to reserve Army Detachment C. The Bavarian 14th, 223d and 225th Divisions have been dissolved. The 12th Landwehr Division, reported reconstituted in August, appears to have been disbanded. These dissolutions reduce number of enemy divisions on western front to 192, including four Austro-Hungarian divisions.

D. It was reported at 12:30 o'clock afternoon, October 2: Enemy kept up rather heavy intermittent bombardment along the front from EXERMONT to the MOSELLE between 2:15 and 6 o'clock this morning, using high explosives and gas.

90th Division reported afternoon, October 2: One of our patrols captured three prisoners.

81st Division reported afternoon, October 2: Enemy raiding party and enemy patrol which attacked our lines repulsed; our casualties two men wounded.

26th Division reported at 8 o'clock evening, October 2: One of our companies raided Bois de WAVRILLE and Les HAUTES-EPINES this morning after artillery preparation and captured 49 Austrians, including one officer. Our casualties were eight men wounded, three gassed.

It was reported October 2: Our aviators this morning dropped 1,700 kilograms of bombs on St-JUVIN and 1,240 kilograms on CORNAY.

II Corps reported at 8 o'clock evening, October 2: Total prisoners by this corps north of St-QUENTIN to date 70 officers, 2,197 other ranks. Number of guns and machine guns taken by Americans not determined.

3 (142) A. American troops fighting with the French have driven back the enemy and taken BLANC MONT and other positions in CHAMPAGNE. Between the MOSELLE and the Forest of
ARGONNE we carried out the usual artillery and patrol activity, taking a number of prisoners.

C. It was reported afternoon, October 3: British Fourth Army has reached line: SEQUEHART---RAMICOURT---GOY---Le CATELET, all inclusive. 3,000 prisoners taken. South of ARMENTIERES enemy withdrawal continues; line runs: Bois GRENIER---east of FROMELLES ---east of ILLIES---SALOME---west edge of VENDIN-le-VIEIL---east edge of LENs, which has been cleared of the enemy---west edge of MERICOURT and ARCHEVILLE---OPPY.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 3: Northwest of REIMS, French have completely cleaned up west bank of the AISNE Canal except for few enemy elements at MOSCOUR, SAPIGNETTE and along the road from LOIVRE to COURCY. French Fourth Army reports no further change in line; 2,800 prisoners taken. French attacks northeast and east of ST-QUENTIN met with violent resistance; no change in line.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army; 16th Reserve engaged south of STADEN; Bavarian 11th withdrawn. Sixth Army: 12th Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army relieves 36th Reserve. Seventeenth Army: 207th and 1st Guard Reserve withdrawn. Second Army: Jaeger withdrawn; 241st from line Ninth Army engaged east of RAMICOURT. Eighteenth Army: 208th withdrawn. Ninth Army: 17th withdrawn. Seventh Army: 5th withdrawn. First Army: 80th Reserve relieves 213th; 1st from reserve Ninth Army engaged near Bethany; 50th Reserve from reserve Third Army engaged near BETHENY; Bavarian 8th Reserve and 242d withdrawn. Third Army: 203d from reserve Ninth Army engaged near MARVAUX; 213th from line First Army engaged at St-MARIE-a-PY. Fifth Army: 15th engaged east of 1st Austro-Hungarian; 236th from reserved 19th engaged near CIERGES. Army Detachment B: 243d from reserve Second Army to reserve Army Detachment B.

D. It was reported at 12:20 o'clock afternoon, October 3: American 2d Division, operating under French Fourth Army, made an advance of two kilometers this morning, reaching MEDEAH Farm.

81st Division reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, October 3: German patrol of 40 men made an unsuccessful raid on our lines.

It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, October 3: The American 2d Division has advanced altogether about three kilometers. The line now extends from MEDEAH Farm south-west along the road to BLANC MONT. They have captured 1,000 prisoners. Their casualties are estimated at about 500.

26th, 89th and 90th Divisions reported evening, October 3: Active patrolling and artillery fire in the WOEVRE.

It was reported at 10:20 o'clock evening, October 3: Nothing to report from sector between the MEUSE and the ARGONNE.

A. This morning the attack was resumed west of the MEUSE. Overcoming a stubborn resistance, we have advanced our lines from two to five kilometers, carrying HILL 240, north of EXERMONT and taking from the enemy the villages of GESNES, FLEVILLE, CHEHERY and LA FORGE. In the face of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, troops from Illinois, Wisconsin, western Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia, and regular troops belonging to Major General R. L. Bullard's Corps, forced the enemy back to the KRIEMHILDE Positions south of the Bois-de-FORET.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 4: Northeast of ST-QUENTIN, French have taken MORCOURT; east and southeast of ST-QUENTIN heavy enemy counterattacks were repulsed; French have taken 400 prisoners in this region. North of the AISNE, Italians have taken METZ Farm. In CHAMPAGNE, line runs east to west: South of AUTRY, VAUX and CHALLERANGE---south of MОНTHOIS---ORFEUIL and ST-ETIENNE-a-ARNES, inclusive---north edge GRAND BELLOIS---two kilometers north of ST-SOUPLET---one kilometer north of DONTRIEN, thence to old line. ST-ETIENNE was captured by American 2d Division.
Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army: 187th relieves 15th Reserve; 113th withdrawn. Second Army: 21st Reserve now in GOUY sector. Second Army: 34th from line Eighteenth Army engaged at WIANCOURT. Ninth Army: 26th from reserve Seventh Army engaged near ANIZY-le-CHATEAU. Seventh Army: 5th engaged near CORMICY. Third Army: 13th from reserve Sixth Army engaged south of MONTHOIS. General Fritz von Below has been given command of Army Detachment B in place of General von Gundell.

D. It was reported at 5:30 o'clock afternoon, October 4: Line between the AISNE and the MUSEE at 3:30 o'clock afternoon ran: BINARVILLE---ARREMONT Road---La VIERGETTE---Le MENIL---Ferme des GRANGES---one-half kilometer south of FLEVILLE---EXERMONT---southern slope of HILL 240---one-half kilometer north of Ferme d'ARETAIL---south edge Bois de MONCY---north of GESNES---south of CUNEL---southern edge Bois-de-FORET ---southwest of BRIEULLES---southeast along the MEUSE.

1st Division reported at 7 o'clock evening, October 4: Our troops attacking on both sides of EXERMONT have progressed in spite of strong opposition from the enemy. Enemy strongly resisting with machine guns in organized positions but being driven back. Approximately 350 prisoners taken. Casualties 1,500.

4th Division reported at 7 o'clock evening, October 4: At 5:25 o'clock morning our troops launched an attack after short artillery preparation. They met with stubborn resistance; heavy machine-gun and artillery fire. Great aerial activity on both sides. Our troops have advanced about two and a half kilometers; progress continues.

89th Division reported at 7 o'clock evening, October 4: In the WOEVRE enemy patrol repulsed without losses to our troops, three enemy killed.

26th and 90th Divisions reported at 7 o'clock evening, October 4: Increased patrolling and artillery activity in the WOEVRE.

5 (144) A. Our attack west of the MEUSE, which continued today, met with determined resistance by artillery and machine guns from well entrenched positions. The enemy's strong counterattacks were everywhere repulsed with heavy losses to him.

B. One American company belonging to a division which is operating with the French in CHAMPAGNE assisted by some volunteers from a French division, took an enemy machine-gun nest this morning near St-ETIENNE. As a result of this operation they captured four officers, 209 men, 75 machine guns, a number of trench mortars and a large new tractor, without themselves suffering a single casualty.

C. It was reported at 3 o'clock afternoon, October 5: In CHAMPAGNE from St-ETIENNE westward line runs: St-PIERRE---BETHENIVILLE---north edge Bois MALVAL---NAUROY ---south edge Le DESERT---CERNAY---BETHENY---Bois de BRIMONT---BERMERICOURT, thence to original line.

It was reported at 3 o'clock afternoon, October 5: Enemy reported to be retiring from salient of La TERRIERE, north of Le CATELET; British troops have crossed canal between VENDHUILE and BANTOUZELLE and believed to have occupied HINDENBURG Line.

It was reported at 6:20 o'clock evening, October 5: French front in CHAMPAGNE west of St-ETIENNE runs: St-PIERRE---HAUVINE---BETHENIVILLE---NAUROY---north of BEINE---south of NOGENT-l'ABBESSE---south of WITRY-les-REIMS---BOURGOGNE---ORAINVILLE---HILL 108, southeast of BERRY-au-BAC. French cavalry are north of EPOYE and advancing on St-MASMES.


American company referred to in Section B belonged to the Marines forming part of 2d Division.

78th Division reported evening October 4: Successful daylight raid on enemy
observation and liaison post after artillery preparation; we captured nine prisoners and three machine guns.

6th Division reported morning, October 5: Large enemy raid on SONDERNACH repulsed, leaving five prisoners in our hands.

81st Division reported afternoon, October 5: Our troops repulsed small hostile raid, killing one of the enemy; our casualties four men wounded.

It was reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, October 5: 1st Division made slight advance north of FLEVILLE; otherwise line unchanged between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE.

4th Division repulsed strong hostile counterattack west of BRIEULLES capturing six machine guns and some prisoners.

6 (145) A. Our troops have made slight advances during the day. Between the MEUSE and the Bois des OCONS there has been stubborn infantry fighting. Farther to the west machine-gun and artillery combats were constant and heavy, with everywhere increased artillery activity by both sides.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2:30 o'clock afternoon, October 6: British have taken BEAUREVOIR with 120 prisoners; north of BEAUREVOIR line runs; GUISAN COURT Farm---AUBENCHEUL-aux-Bois---Bois de MORTHO---MONTECOUVEZ Farm---thence as previously reported.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 6: Northeast of St-QUENTIN, French captured LESDINS, REMAUCOURT and TILLOY Farm with sev-hundred prisoners. In CHAMPAGNE, French have reached the ARNES and the SUIPPE at nearly all points and have crossed both rivers at several places.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: Bavarian 16th engaged near ROULERS. Second Army: 201st engaged at CREVECOEUR; 121st engaged near GOUY. Eighteenth Army: 25th Reserve engaged northeast of LESDINS. Third Army: 7th withdrawn; 76th engaged near AUTRY. German order of battle from the ARGONNE to the MEUSE: 9th Landwehr, 76th Reserve, 2d Landwehr, 5th Guard, 52d, 37th, 236th, 28th, Bavarian 5th Reserve.

D. 89th Division reported evening, October 5: In patrol encounters we captured two prisoners and inflicted casualties on the enemy; our losses: Two men killed, three wounded and two missing.

It was reported at 6:15 o'clock evening, October 6: Enemy rather active today between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE. Line unchanged. Some prisoners were taken. Our air service very active; enemy had ten balloons up of which we brought down four.

1st Division reported afternoon, October 6: Yesterday afternoon we captured Ferme d'ARIETHAL and advanced our line 400 yards beyond. Last night be occupied Hill 269, in Bois-de-MONCY.

4th Division reported afternoon, October 6: Day characterized by patrolling, maintaining and organizing our positions and opposing small counterattacks in the Bois-du-FAYS. Enemy active and aggressive.

77th Division reported afternoon, October 6: Slow progress made northeast of Binarville against stubborn resistance by machine guns and trench mortars.

7 (146) A. Our troops have driven the enemy out of CHATEL CHEHERY and overcoming his desperate resistance have seized the commanding heights west of the AIRE. In other sectors held by us nothing of importance has occurred.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, October 7: French have taken BERRY-au-BAC; their detachments have crossed the SUIPPE at PONT GIVART, AUMENANCOURT, GUERLET Farm, and at all other points have reached the south bank of the river. They have taken HAUVINE and have retaken St-ETIENNE-a-ARNES. Enemy is resisting strongly on this front.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 36th Reserve relieves Bavarian 16th; Bavarian 12th withdrawn; Guard Ersatz from reserve Army Detachment B engaged at ROULERS. Second Army: 24th from line Seventh Army engaged near SEQUEHART.
Eighteenth Army: 232d from reserve Second Army engaged at LESDINS. First Army: Bavarian 8th Reserve engaged at BAZANCOURT. Third Army: 242d from reserve First Army engaged northeast of St-PIERRE-a-ARNES; 195th from reserve Army Detachment C engaged at St-ETIENNE-a-ARNES. Army Detachment C: 10th from line Third Army to reserve Army Detachment C. Army Detachment B: 4th Cavalry reengaged near GUEBWILLER; Bavarian 30th Reserve reengaged near ASPACH-le-BAS; 228th from reserve Third Army to reserve Army Detachment B.

D. It was reported at 6:15 o'clock evening, October 7: Very little enemy artillery activity between the MEUSE and the AIRE. 28th Division reports steady advance, consolidating CHATEL, CHEHERY, Hill 244 and ridge from Le CHENE TONDU to La VIERGETTE.

82d Division reported evening, October 7: One brigade entered line last night and attacked this morning, advancing about one kilometer, occupying HILLS 180 and 223 north of CHATEL CHEHERY. We captured 46 prisoners including one officer; our casualties very light.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 7: At 5 o'clock afternoon, enemy counterattacked and reoccupied HILL 223, north of CHATEL CHEHERY.

It was reported morning, October 7: American 2d Division, operating with French Fourth Army in CHAMPAGNE, has captured 1,700 prisoners since its entry into line on October 3. Its casualties estimated at 3,000.

8 (147) A. We captured CORNAY and against stubborn fighting continued our advance in the ARGONNE Forest. East of the MEUSE French and American troops serving with the First Army made a brilliant attack in the vicinity of the Bois des CAURES and the Bois d'HAUMONT. The villages of CONSENVOYE, BRABANT, HAUMONT and BEAUMONT have been occupied and the enemy has been driven well beyond them. On both banks of the MEUSE our own troops and the French are now pushing the enemy from the scene of the desperate struggles for VERDUN. The number of prisoners taken as a result of the day's operations exceeds 3,000. Of these over 1,600 were taken by French units east of the MEUSE. This brings the total number captured by this command in the last few days to over 4,000. The French also captured 18 mortars of heavy caliber and other materiel.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 12:30 o'clock afternoon, October 8: British attack south of CAMBARI has reached line: NIERGNIES---FORENVILLE-La TARGETTE---MOULIN d'ESNES---CHATEAU des ANGLES---east of VILLERS-OUTREAU---SERAINE---PREMONT---BRANCOURT. From BRANCOURT to west of FONTAINE-UTERTE line is uncertain, thence as previously reported.

It was reported 5:15 o'clock afternoon, October 8: The French Fourth Army, assisted by the 2d and elements of the American 36th Divisions, attacked this morning on a 20 kilometer front from a point south of LIRY to HAUVINE, the attack converging on MACHAULT. Advance of two and one-half kilometers has made; no precise information as to location of line.

It was reported at 6:20 o'clock evening, October 8: East of the MEUSE front of French XVII Corps runs: 500 meters north of CONSENVOYE---point one kilometer southwest of FLABAS---1,500 meters northwest of BEAUMONT, thence south to old line. French 26th Division took 800 prisoners on this front.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, October 8: Northeast of St-QUENTIN, French have taken FONTAINE-UTERTE; 1,200 prisoners have been captured by French in this sector today. In CHAMPAGNE, French and American troops have reached point half way between ST-ETIENNE and CAUROY; French have taken plateau northeast of AUTRY.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 2d Guard Reserve from line Sixth Army engaged near LEDEGHEM. Seventeenth Army: 22d relieves 48th Reserve. Second Army: 108th from reserve Fifth Army to reserve Second Army. First Army: 1st withdrawn. The 183d Division has been dissolved. This reduces the number of German divisions on the western front to 187 of which four are dismounted cavalry divisions. The Austro-Hungarian 38th Division previously considered to be in reserve in Army Group of von Gallwitz.
appears to be still in Italy. This reduces the number of Austro-Hungarian divisions
definitely known to be on the western front to three. Of the total of 190 enemy
divisions 142 are in line and 48 in reserve, of which latter ten are to be considered fit
for offensive action.

It was reported at 6:20 o’clock evening, October 8: Our line in the ARGONNE
Forest and the AIRE Valley was slightly advanced today, now running from point two kilo-
meters north of Binarville---northeast of HILL 244---west of Chatel Chehery---then north
through Cornay---then east to HILL 240, thence as previously reported. 300 prisoners were
taken in this sector today.

9 (148) A. East of the MEUSE our troops maintained their yesterday’s advance in spite
of violent and repeated counterattacks and progressed to the southern outskirts of Sivry
and into the Bois de Chaume. West of the MEUSE against freshly-engaged divisions we have
penetrated the enemy’s main line of resistance between Cunel and Romagne-sous-
Montfacon. In the ARGONNE Forest we have taken important heights south of MARCO and
have joined hands with the French at LANCON. Over 2,000 additional prisoners have been taken.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 11:30 o’clock morning, October 9: British First Army
north of CAMBRAI has taken ABANCOURT, BANTIGNY, CUILLERS, ESWARS, RAMILLIES and
ESCAUDOEUVRES. CAMBRAI has been completely occupied. Attack of British Third and Fourth
Armies this morning met with slight opposition. Southeast of CAMBRAI line runs: AWOINGT
---CATTENIERES---HAUCOURT---LIGNY---CLARY---MARETZ---1,500 yards west of BOHAIN---
northwest of FRESNOY-le-GRAND. North of the SCARPE, British posts have been established east of
ACHEVILLE, west of ROUVROY and east of MERICOURT.

It was reported after noon, October 9: British line southeast of CAMBRAI at mid-
day had been advanced to include MONTIGNY, BERTRY, west edge of BUSIGNY, railway west of
BOHAIN and FRESNOY-le-GRAND. PATROLS are in advance of this line and progress continues.
Farther south, French hold line: CROIX---FONSOMMES---HOMBLIERES---MESNIL ST- LAURENT
---ITANCOURT---MOY. Prisoners taken by British armies since yesterday morning 10,000. North of the SCARPE, enemy is holding line: VITRY-en-ARTOIS---IZEL-les-EQUERCHIN.

It was reported at 6:30 o’clock evening, October 9: In CHAMPAGNE French
Fourth Army has reached woods southeast of LA NEUVILLE. French are in the ARGONNE Forest
northeast of LANCON. American 36th Division operating with the French in CHAMPAGNE has
taken 300 prisoners.

It was reported at 10 o’clock evening, October 9: French, operating east of St-QUENTIN
in liaison with the British, have reached the line: Bois d’ETAVES---west of BEAUFREUX---west of
FONTAINE-NOTRE-DAME---MARCY---west of REGNY---MEZIERES-sur-OISE---along the
OISE to old line at MOY. More than 2,000 prisoners taken on this front since yesterday.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army: 48th Reserve relieves
18th Reserve. Second Army: 9th Reserve and 21st withdrawn; 208th from reserve Eighteenth
Army engaged at NIEGNIES; Jaeger Division engaged north of WALINCOURT: 204th from
reserve Army Detachment A engaged east of BEAUREVOIR: 20th from reserve Seventeenth Army
engaged east of MONTBREHAN. Eighteenth Army: 29th from line Seventeenth Army engaged east of
REMAUCOURT. Third Army: 3d Guard withdrawn: 5th Guard withdrawn: 108 dissolved.

D. It was reported at 10:30 o’clock evening, October 9: Between the ARGONNE
and the MEUSE our line runs: From point east of LANCON northeast through the ARGONNE to HILL
244---CORNAY---north of FLEVILLE---HILL 247, southeast of SOMMERANCE---south of HILL
263---southern outskirts of ROMAGNE---north of ROMAGNE-CUNEL Road---southern outskirts of
CUNEL, then as previously reported to the MEUSE. East of the MEUSE the line runs from
southern outskirts of SIVRY southeast through Bois de CHAUME to ORMONT Farm, then as
previously reported.

33d Division reported afternoon, October 9: This division, operating with
French XVII Corps, attacked this morning north of CONSENOY and reached final objectives
by 9 o’clock. About 650 prisoners were taken.
1st Division reported afternoon, October 9: We have advanced in spite of strong resistance in the sector east of FLEVILLE, and have captured 230 prisoners.

A. On the right bank of the MEUSE, French troops, fighting with the American First Army continued the advance and valiantly held their ground against counterattacks. The heights east of SIVRY have been cleared of hostile troops and remain in our hands.

On the left of the MEUSE the COTE DAME MARIE was stormed and taken after severe fighting. Farther to the west, the enemy has been driven from the ARGONNE Forest, which he had so tenaciously held, and our troops have reached the line SOMMERANCE---MARQE---CHEVIERES and opposite GRAND PRE.

Among the prisoners captured today, which numbers more than 1,000, there are one colonel and two complete battalion staffs.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 7 o'clock evening, October 10: French Fourth Army has reached the line: Station of GRAND PRE---south edge of BRECY---two kilometers north of MONTBOIS---one kilometer north of Les MONTS CHERY---two kilometers north of ORFEUIL, thence to line previously reported.

It was reported afternoon, October 10: British front south of the SENSEE runs: ETRUN---along west bank of ERCLIN River---west edge of BOUSSIERES---south edge of INCHY---Le CATEAU, believed inclusive---west edge of St-BENIN---VAUX-ANDIGNY---east of BOHAIN---west of de RIQUEVAL. Southward French hold line: SEBONCOURT---MONTIGNY---west edge of NEUVILETTE---thence along west bank of the OISE.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, October 10: East of ST-QUENTIN, French have advanced their line to west edge of BERNORVILLE and to BERNOT. South of the OISE they have taken SERVAIS. Between the AILETTE and the AISNE enemy is withdrawing. At 5 o'clock evening, French had reached the line: GRAND PONT---MALVAL Farm---GREINES Farm ---BEAULINE-et-CHIVRY---VERNEUIL-COURTONNE---wood 1,200 meters north of BOURG-et-COMIN---800 meters north of OEUILL---CUISSY-et-GENY---JUMIGNY---Hill 166---thence to the AISNE. French patrols are in GRAND PRE.

Changes in German order to battle: Seventeenth Army: 10th Ersatz from reserve of Sixth Army engaged east of TILLOY. Second Army: 6th from reserve of Seventeenth Army engaged west of CAMBRAI; 9th Reserve reengaged near NIERGNIES; 241st withdrawn. Third Army: 14th Reserve from reserve of Army Detachment B engaged southwest of ORFEUIL; 53d Reserve from reserve of Fifth Army engaged southwest of CORNAY; 41st from reserve of Nineteenth Army engaged north of Bois de CORNAY; 1st Guard withdrawn. Fifth Army: 228th from reserve of Army Detachment B engaged near CUNEL; 32d changed sector, now engaged near SIVRY; Bavarian 5th Reserve withdrawn. Army Detachment B: 25th from reserve of Third Army engaged near ALTKIRCH. On the western front on October 9 there were 145 enemy divisions in line, and 44 in reserve, of which latter six are to be considered fit for offensive action.

D. 30th Division reported afternoon, October 10: In operations October 8 to 10 this division advanced 17 kilometers on a five kilometer front, capturing the villages of PREMONF, BRANCOURF, BUSIGNY, VAUX-ANDIGNY and ST-SOUPLET. Prisoners counted up to evening October 9: 50 officers, 1,800 men, 32 guns, many machine guns and other materiel have been taken.

In the sectors between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE and east of the NEUSE no change in line other than as reported in Section A.

A. On both sides of the MEUSE violent counterattacks and desperate resistance have failed to stem the advance of French and American divisions.

We have taken MOLLEVILLE Farm north of the Bois de CONSENOY. Our troops have passed through the Bois-de-FORET and are before the villages of LANDRES-et-ST-GEORGES and ST-JUVIN which is in flames.

An American army corps operating with the British has fought its way more than ten miles through the enemy's defensive system and had captured over 1,900 prisoners.
since October 5. Today this corps took the villages of ESCARFOURT, St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET.

Of the 8,000 prisoners captured by the American First Army since October 8, French units have taken over 2,300.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, October 11: French have taken BERTRICOURT and VARISCOURT and are along the AISNE to PIGNICOURT. In CHAMPAGNE line now runs: AUSSONCE---La NEUVILLE---1,500 meters north of MACHAULT---CONTRÉVE---SUGNY. MACHAULT was taken by the American 36th Division.

It was reported at 3 o'clock afternoon, October 11: British troops are east of the SELLE River between MONTAY and NEUVILLY and south of BRIASTRE, which is clear of the enemy. Some progress made northeast of QUEIVY. Otherwise no change on the British front east of CAMBRAI. North of the SENSEE British hold SALLY-en-OSTREVENT, VITRY-en-ARTOIS, IZEL-les-EQUERCHIN, DROCOURT and FOUQUIERES.

It was reported at 11 o'clock evening, October 11: Enemy is retiring in CHAMPAGNE. French advance detachments have reached SAVIGNY-sur-AISNE, Ste-MARIE, MONT St-REMY, VILLE-sur-RETOURNE and BIGNICOURT. Farther west French are in woods near MENIL-LEPINOIS and one kilometer north of Bots des GRANDS USAGES. Resistance is strong at BERRY-au-DAC and along the AISNE to the west. No further change between the AISNE and the AILETTE. North of the OISE enemy is resisting strongly on line previously reported.


D. II Corps reported morning, October 11: Our line includes: St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET and thence runs southwest to VAUX-ANDIGNY. Our attacks continues today: Enemy resistance has stiffened: hostile artillery active over forward area.

D. II Corps reported morning, October 11: Our line includes: St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET and thence runs southwest to VAUX-ANDIGNY. Our attacks continues today: Enemy resistance has stiffened: hostile artillery active over forward area.

No changes in line between the ARGONNE and the WOEVRE other than as reported in Section A.

12 (151) A. East of the MEUSE heavy fighting has been in progress in the Bois des CAURES. On both sides of the river our troops have attained their objectives. The total number of prisoners captured in this sector since September 26 amounts to 17,659.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2 o'clock afternoon, October 12: Enemy apparently began retirement from positions in front of St-GOBAIN massif during night. South of the forest French have crossed the AILETTE and occupied MONANPEUILL, CHEVRÉGNY and TRUCY. On the west they have progressed toward SEPTVAUX. Contact maintained; pursuit continues.

It was reported at 3 o'clock afternoon, October 12: East of LENS British hold line: COURRIERES---COURCELLES---east of FLERS---east of CUNICY---CORBEHAM---ESTREES---ARLEUX. Northeast of CAMBRAI British have made progress toward AVESNES-le-SEC and hold VILLERS-en-CAUCHIES. Between NEUVILLY and MONTAY, British have reached high ground east of the SELLE.

It was reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, October 12: In CHAMPAGNE French have reached GRIVY-LOISY and have taken QUILLY. American 36th Division took PAUVRES. Farther west line this noon ran: Two kilometers north of St-REMY-le-PETIT---VAUBOISON Farm---VIEUX-les-ASFELD---along the AISNE to PIGNICOURT---south of JUVINCOURT---north of VILLE-aux-Bois---south of CORBENY---north of CRAONNE---north of AILLES.

It was reported at 9:30 o'clock evening, October 12: Advance continues on front of French Tenth Army. Line at 6 o'clock evening ran: SEPTVAUX---FRESNES---BRANCOURT---ANIZY---CHAILLEVOIS---LAVAL---VORGES. Cavalry have reached CHIVY-les-ETOUVELLES.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 12: French hold south bank of the AISNE from the ARGONNE to ASFELD-la-VILLE thence line runs due west to CRAONNE and the CHEMIN-des-DAMES.
Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 6th Cavalry withdrawn; 23d Reserve from line of Sixth Army engaged near DADIZEELE; 243d from reserve Army Detachments B to reserve Fourth Army near COURTRAI. Seventeenth Army: 18th Reserve engaged southwest of IWUY. Second Army: 17th Reserve from reserve Army Detachment C engaged at Le CATEAU; 5th Reserve from reserve Seventh Army engaged at Le CATEAU; 54th withdrawn. Fifth Army: 123d from line Army Detachment C engaged south of CUNEL; Bavarian 5th Reserve reengaged southeast of CUNEL; Austro-Hungarian 106th engaged southeast of SIVRY; 192d from reserve Army Detachment C engage in former sector of 32d; 8th Landwehr engaged in former sector of 123d. The enemy order of battle from GRAND PRE to BEAUMONT on October 11 was: 76th Reserve (3d class), elements of 2d Landwehr (4th class) and of 53d Reserve (3d class), 45th Reserve (2d class), 41st (2d class), 52d (1st class), 115th (3d class), 228th (3d class), 236th (3d class), Bavarian 5th Reserve (2d class), 28th (1st class), Austro-Hungarian 106th (2d class), Austro-Hungarian 1st (2d class), 15th (2d class).

A captured document dated September 28 shows that General von Marwitz was at that date commanding the German Fifth Army. On October 11 there were on the western front 149 enemy divisions in line and 40 in reserve, of which latter four are to be considered fit for offensive action.

D. It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, October 12: Nothing to report from front of First Army except two counterattacks against the 4th Division which were repulsed by machine-gun fire with losses to the enemy. Two new enemy divisions were identified during these attacks. Patrols of 4th Division occupy Hill 299 north of Bois de FORET.

81st Division reported at noon, October 12: Enemy raid in St-DIE sector repulsed.

13 (152) A. On both sides of the MEUSE our troops today broke up strong and repeated attempts of the enemy to dislodge them from their recently won positions. American divisions continued to participate in successful operations under command of the British south of Le CATEAU and of the French in CHAMPAGNE. At other points held by our troops there is nothing of importance to report.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 13: French Tenth Army pursuing enemy encountering strong rearguard resistance. Line at 6 o'clock evening ran: East from VERSIGNY along railway to DANDRY Farm---BESNY-et-LOIZY---ATHIES---EPPES.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 3d from Russian front in reserve. Seventeenth Army: 12th withdrawn. Second Army: Alpine Corps from reserve to the Balkans; 44th Reserve from reserve Fourth Army engaged north of MONTAY: 121st and 2d Guard withdrawn; 54th reengaged near Le CATEAU. Eighteenth Army: 51st Reserve from line Third Army engaged near BERNOT; 82d Reserve withdrawn. Seventh Army: 11th from reserve Eighteenth Army engaged near BARISIS; 24th Reserve withdrawn. Fifth Army: 107th from line Army Detachment C engaged in Bois de FORET; 7th Reserve withdrawn; 27th engaged southwest of FLABAS.

D. 29th Division reported evening October 13: East of the MEUSE our troops have cleared most of Bois d'ORMONT of the enemy, who offered stubborn resistance with machine guns. Hostile heavy artillery very active.

II Corps reported afternoon October 13: Situation unchanged.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 13: Our attack on GRAND PRE this morning met very heavy machine-gun fire and our troops were finally forced to retire south of the AIRE. Hostile counterattack at 8 o'clock evening south of LANDRES-et-St-GEORGES was repulsed.

14 (153) A. This morning American troops resumed the advance. North of VERDUN they are now operating against positions of greatest strategic value and natural strength. Today we passed beyond the towns of CUNEL and ROMAGNE. We have patrols in the Bois de BANTHEVILLE and our attacking line has penetrated the positions of St-GEORGES and LANDRES-et-St-GEORGES. About 750 prisoners have been reported.

B. Nothing to report.
C. It was reported afternoon, October 14: North of LAON French have met more serious resistance. Line at 10 o'clock morning ran: ANGUICOURT---MONCEAU-les-LEUPS--AUMENCOURT Farm---south of MONT FENDU---BARENTON-BUGNY---MONCEAU-le-WAAST---south of LIESSE.

It was reported at 5:30 o'clock afternoon, October 14: Attack by British, French and Belgians this morning between the LYS and DIXMUDE has reached the line DIXMUDE---CORTEMARCK---BEVEREN---ISEGHEM---WINKEL-St-ELOI---GULLEGHEM---north of MENIN.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, October 14: In Belgium British have reached north edge of MENIN and of WEVELGHEM. 8,000 prisoners taken today on this front. North of LAON, French took HILL 105, south of ASSIS-sur-SERRE, MONT FENDU and MONT St-GEORGE. SISSONNE has been taken: from that town line runs: MACQUIGNY---HILL 105, southeast of La SELVE---HILL 106---Le THOUR---St-GERMAIN-MONT---GOMONT---then along southbank of the AISNE. West of GRAND PRE, French took TERMES, capturing over 300 prisoners.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 23d withdrawn. Sixth Army: 12th from reserve Seventeenth Army relieves 4th; 49th Reserve from reserve 17th relieves 111th. Seventeenth Army: 26th Reserve relieves 22d; 220th withdrawn. Second Army: 20th and 5th Reserve withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 25th Reserve withdrawn; 15th Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged east of BOHAIN. Third Army: 53d Reserve dissolved; 200th withdrawn. Army Detachment C: 77th Reserve transferred to eastern front. Number of enemy divisions on western front is now 187, of which 142 are in line: of the 45 divisions in reserve 2 are to be considered fit for offensive action. Since September 26, enemy has used 17 fresh divisions on the front between the ARGONNE and BEZONVAUX in addition to the 7 divisions in line at that date. Latest German communiques indicate that army group commanded by von Boehr has ceased to exist, the Second Army having reverted to the Army Group of Prince Rupprecht and the Eighteenth Army to that of the Crown Prince.

D. 29th Division reported afternoon, October 14: Enemy has been entirely driven from Bois d'ORMONT. our line established on northern edge of this wood.

36th Division reported afternoon, October 14: Our troops hold line south of the AISNE between ATTIGNY and GIVRY with patrols on south bank of the river.

Hostile raids on front of 92d Divisions near LESMENILS east of the MOSELLE and on the front of 27th Division south of Le CATEAU were repulsed.

It was reported at 5:30 o'clock afternoon, October 14: Between the MEUSE and the ARGONNE our troops have reached the following approximate line: South of BRIEULLES---northwest edge of Bois de FORE---north edge Bois de la PULTIERE---one kilometer north of ROMAGNE---south of LANDRES-et-St-GEORGES and St-GEORGES---HILL 182, north of St-JUVIN---then along south bank of the AIRE to point south of GRAND PRE. Our troops encountered strong enemy resistance by machine guns, supported by artillery.

15 (154) A. Our troops today continued their attacks on both sides of the MEUSE, encountering stubborn resistance from a reinforced enemy. East of the MEUSE, French and American troops have gained ground. West of the river the fighting has increased in violence and our troops have made substantial gains including HILL 299, which changed hands three times. We have broken the KRIEMHILDE STELLUNG at new points, where our men closed with the enemy in a series of hand-to-hand encounters in which they took prisoners.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 4 o'clock afternoon, October 15: Line on Belgian front runs: BOSCHESCHEEDEWEGE---VYTHUYSHOEK---TURKYEN---WYNENDAAL---BEVEREN---RUMBEKE---ISEGHEM---WINKELHOEK---LENDELEDE Station---CAPPELLE Ste-CATHERINE---GULLEGHEM---WEVELGHEM---MENIN, inclusive. Southwest of LILLE, British have occupied SANTES and have crossed Canal de la HAUTE DEULE from MEURCHIN to PONT-a-VENDIN.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 15: French crossed the OISE north of MONT d'ORIGNY but were unable to advance beyond the highroad. They have crossed the SERRE east of ACHERY. From that point they hold the south bank of the SERRE as far as POUILLY, whence line runs straight to SISSONNE. East of SISSONNE line runs: La SELVE---NIZY-le-CONTE---east of Le THOUR---POMPE, two kilometers east of St-GERMAIN-MONT---then...
along south bank of the AISNE. North of the ARGONNE, French hold the road OLIZY-GRAND PRE as far east as PETIT TALMA.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 38th Landwehr engaged at HANDZAIME; 13th Reserve engaged near CORTEMARCK; 23d engaged at GEIT---ST-JOSEPH; 52d Reserve and 40th withdrawn; 10th from reserve Army Detachment C to reserve Fourth Army near HALLUIN; 7th Cavalry from reserve Seventeenth Army to reserve Fourth Army near MENIN. Second Army: 8th and 24th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 82d Reserve engaged east of BERNOT. First Army: 1st engaged near BALHAM. Third Army: 42d engaged near OLIZY; 1st Guard engaged near MOURON; Bavarian 15th entered north of SOMMERANCE. Fifth Army: 3d Guard from reserve Third Army engaged south of ROMAGNE; 115th and Austro-Hungarian 1st withdrawn. Both the Bavarian 15th and 3d Guard Divisions, which have entered line between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE; suffered heavy losses in the CHAMPAGNE battle which began on September 26; the 15th Bavarian having been withdrawn from line about September 29 and the 3d Guard on October 6.

D. It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, October 15: Our line is slowly advancing, encountering strong machine-gun resistance. The line is as follows: 500 meters south of GRAND PRE---500 meters south of CHAMPIGNEULLE---southern edge of St GEORGES---500 meters south of LANDRES-et-ST-GEORGES---south of La TULERIE Farm---southern edge of Bois de BANTEVILLE---500 meters north of ROMAGNE---northern edge of Bois de la PULIÈRE---HILL 299---south to Bois-de-FORET---southeast to HILL 280---western edge of Bois de la COTELMONT--east along the MEUSE to a point 500 meters south of SIVRY---through Bois PLAT CHENE---west of MOLLEVILLE Farm---northeast of Bois de la REINE---eastern edge of Bois d'ORMONT---northeast of Bois d'HAIMONT---through Bois des CAURES---south of Bois de CHAMPNEUVILLE---through the Bois WAVRILLE---through Bois de CHAUME---thence along the old line.

II Corps reported afternoon, October 15: Heavy shelling of our rear areas last night. In successful raid yesterday afternoon between SELLE River and railway east of ST-SOUPLET we captured one officer and 29 men.

81st Division reported morning, October 15: In ST-DIE sector hostile raiding party of 40 men repulsed.

88th Division reported October 15: Our outposts which occupied AMMERTZWILLER during night of October 13/14 have been withdrawn to original position. 16 (155) A. The American First Army continued its attack today. To the east of the MEUSE we advanced in the Bois de la GRANDE MONTAGNE and hold the summit. To the west of the MEUSE our troops have advanced on and hold the COTE de CHATILLON. They are south of the Bois des LOGES and at nightfall were fighting in CHAMPIGNEULLES and GRAND PRE. Along the front of the Second Army the day was quiet. During the night enemy raids were repulsed.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 7:30 o'clock evening, October 16: West of GRAND PRE French have taken TALMA, HILL 222 and BEAU-REPAIRE, capturing 100 prisoners; enemy still holds TALMA Farm. Between the AISNE and the SERRE French attacks have met serious resistance; no changes in line except that French have taken NOTRE-DAME-de-LIESSE and have entered ACHERY. On the east bank of the OISE enemy resistance serious; French hold part of CHOIGNY and north edge of MONT d'ORMIGNY.

It was reported at 7 o'clock evening, October 16: In Belgian line runs approximately: North of BEERST---north of THOUROUT---east of COLLSCAMP---east of HARLEBEKE---along the LYS River which British have crossed at MENIN, BOUSBEQUE, WERVICQ, and COMINES. West and southwest of LILLE British have occupied HALLENES, ALLENNES, CARNIN, CAVRIN and OIGNIES.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: Bavarian 16th from reserve to line near THOUROUT; Bavarian 11th from reserve to line south of 36th Reserve; 6th Cavalry from reserve to line south of ROLBERS; 52d Reserve from reserve to line near ROLBERS; 40th from reserve to line near WEVERGHEM; 23d Reserve withdrawn. Second Army: 34th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 84th withdrawn; 2d from reserve to line in sector of 1st
Reserve: 29th withdrawn. Seventh Army: 24th Reserve from reserve to line east of 105th: 238th, 19th Reserve and 26th withdrawn, First Army: 80th Reserve withdrawn. Third Army: 202d withdrawn; 25th from line Army Detachment B to reserve Third Army. Army Detachment C: 8th Landwehr now in sector previously occupied by 123d near REMBERCOURT.

D. It was reported at 11 o'clock evening, October 16: Two battalions of the 78th Division have reached northern edge of Bois des LOGES West of CHAMPIGNEULLES. 42d Division has taken COTE de CHATILLON. East of the MEUSE 29th Division has advanced to the summit of Bois de la GRANDE MONTAGNE.

17 (156) A. Severe fighting has continued on the entire front of the First Army. We have broken up counterattacks in the Bois de la GRANDE MONTAGNE and in the vicinity of CHAMPIGNEULLES and the Bois des LOGES. Our troops have taken and passed beyond GRAND PRE and have improved their positions throughout the line. 1,000 additional prisoners have been taken.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 7:30 o'clock evening, October 17: In Belgian line runs: OSTEND--west outskirts of BRUGES--THIELT. Enemy withdrawal continues.

It was reported after noon, October 17: British have taken LILLE. British Fourth Army attack has reached line: Le CATEAU--Le QUENELET Farm--west of MAZINGHIEN--west of RIBEAVILLE--east of La VALLEE MULATRE--ANDIGNY. 1,800 Prisoners reported.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 17: French First Army, attacking north of the OISE in liaison with the British, has reached line: Le PETIT VERLY--MARCHAVERNE--north edge of GROUGIS and AISONVILLE--west edge of BERNOVILLE--wood one kilometer east of Hill 110--wood 500 meters east of Hill 139--outside of HAUTEVILLE. East of the OISE French have taken MONT d'ORIGNY. 1,200 prisoners have been taken.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 3d Landwehr from Russia engaged near CORTEMARCK; 3d engaged near THOUROUT; 3d Reserve, Guard Ersatz and Bavarian 1st Reserve withdrawn from line. Sixth Army: 23d Reserve from reserve Fourth Army to line Sixth Army west of LILLE. Second Army: 25th from reserve Third Army engaged near BRIAISTRE; Jaeger, 201st, 38th and 54th withdrawn from line. Eighteenth Army: 238th from reserve Seventh Army engaged near MONT d'ORIGNY; 29th withdrawn. Seventh Army: 26th engaged near LIESSE. Third Army: 52d withdrawn. Fifth Army: 199th from line Third Army engaged at CUNEL. On the western front on October 16th enemy had 141 divisions in line and 47 divisions in reserve. Of the divisions in reserve: 26 had come out of line within five days after suffering severe losses, 3 within 10 days, 9 within 15 days, 4 within 20 days, 1 within 25 days; and four are to be considered as rested and fit, having been out of line more than a month.

D. II Corps reported morning, October 17: We attacked with 2 divisions this morning against line of the SELLE River from St-SOUPLET to MOLAIN, inclusive. Attack progressing favorable.

18 (157) A. West of the MEUSE our advance has continued. Our troops have taken the village and wood of BANTHEVIL and have reached the northern edge of the Bois des LOGES. West of GRAND PRE they captured TALMA Farm after severe fighting. East of the MEUSE a fresh attempt by the enemy to drive us from our new positions in the Bois de la GRANDE MONTAGNE was repulsed.

American troops participating in the British attack yesterday south of Le CATEAU penetrated the enemy's lines to a depth of two miles. They stormed the pillages of MOLAIN, St-MARTIN RIVIERE, and L'ARBRE de GUISE and captured 2,500 prisoners.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2:30 o'clock afternoon, October 18: North of the SENSEE British have reached line: PONT MARAIS--PECHAIN--PRESSAIN--VILLERS-au-TERTRE--ERCHIN--LEWARDE--DECHY--SIN-le-NOBLE--RAIMBEAUCOURT--MONS-en-PEVELE--AVELIN, thence as previously reported.

It was reported at 3:30 o'clock afternoon, October 18: Belgians have taken BLANKENBERGHE. Enemy is resisting along canal from BRUGES to ZEEBRUGGE. BRUGES is not yet occupied; all bridges near BRUGES are destroyed.

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It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 18: French attack north of the OISE has reached the line: East edge of FORET d'ANDIGNY---Bois de TUPIGNY Farm---east of GROUGIS and AISONVILLE---west of HAUTEVILLE- Between the OISE and the SERRE, French have reached the line: SERY-les-MEZIERES---SURFONTAINE---RENANSART---NOUVION-et-CATILLON; advance is continuing. French have taken over 1,000 prisoners on this front. East of VOUZIERS, French crossed the AISNE on a front of five kilometers and advanced beyond VANDY, taking several hundred prisoners.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 6th Cavalry withdrawn; 6th from line Second Army engaged in former sector of Bavarian 1st Reserve; 207th from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged near THIELT; 7th Cavalry engaged near COURTRAI. Sixth Army: 2d Guard Reserve withdrawn. Seventeenth Army: 18th Reserve withdrawn. Second Army: 243d from reserve Fourth Army engaged near St-BENIN; 3d Naval from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged at MOLAIN; 119th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 18th from line Seventh Army engaged at BERNOVILLE; 19th Reserve from reserve Seventh Army engaged near MONT d'ORIGNY; 82d Reserve and 51st Reserve withdrawn. Third Army: 203d and 9th Landwehr withdrawn; 13th from line north of the AISNE to line east of 41st. Fifth Army: 1st Landwehr from line Army Detachment B engaged near FLABAS.

D. Enemy divisions employed to meet the attack of the American First Army to date. During the 23 days since the opening of the attack on the VERDUN front, 33 enemy divisions have been employed on the front of the First Army.

The extent to which the German High Command has gone to protect this most vital part of his entire line, where a breakthrough or a retirement threatens the quadruple part of his famous switch tracks connecting the northern and southern fronts, is well illustrated by the fact that the number of enemy divisions employed has steadily increased until on the 22d day after the opening of the attack elements of 23 divisions are engaged. On the front of the attack September 26, 5 enemy divisions were found in line. This number increased to 12 on the day prior to the extension of the attack east of the MEUSE which action found 3 other divisions in the sector engaged, and the number has steadily increased under the continual pressure until the figures heretofore mentioned were reached. 1 division, the 2d Landwehr, has been in line the entire time. others have varied from 1 to 20 days. Up to date the average length of time in line has been 8 days. The fact that the German High Command is very hard pressed for reserves, to meet the numerous Allied attacks, is evidenced by the fact that on the VERDUN front under consideration, 8 divisions have been engaged twice, and one three times, within three weeks. The average time of rest for these units has been 4 days between engagements. Of the divisions engaged, 9 are first class; 12 second class; 10 third class and 2 fourth class. The first class divisions have been engaged for an average of ten days each.

Considering the divisions in line at the opening of the attack and the rested ones subsequently added, 16 of the divisions employed may be considered as having been fit for offensive action; 17 divisions have been withdrawn from the line. In view of the depleted condition of the enemy reserves, it is fair to assume that these divisions have been maintained in line as long as their effective strength warranted, and that their withdrawal has only taken place after severe losses.

The following order of Gen. Marwitz, commanding the Fifth Army, well illustrates the reason for the enemy's stubborn resistance in the sector under considerations:

Fifth Army Staff, Ia No. 10619. Army Hq., October 1, 1918. According to information in our possession, the enemy is about to attack the Fifth Army east of the MEUSE and try to push toward LONGUYON. The object of this attack is to cut the LONGUYON-SEDAN Line, the most important artery of the army of the west. Moreover, the enemy's intention is to render it impossible for us to exploit the BRIEY Basin, on which depends in a large part our steel production. Thus the heaviest part of the task will once more fall on the Fifth Army in the course of the combats in the coming weeks, and the safety of the Fatherland will be in its hands. It is on the unconquerable resistance of the VERDUN front that depends the fate of a great part
of the west front, perhaps even of our nation. The Fatherland must rest assured that every commander and every man realizes the greatness of his mission and that he will do his duty to the very end. If we do this, the enemy's attack will as heretofore break against our firm will to hold. The Commander-in-Chief von der Marwitz, General of Cavalry and Adjutant General.

19 (158) A. West of the MEUSE there has been heavy infantry fighting in the Bois des LOGES. At other points on the battle front north of VERDUN the day was marked by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.

In their attack north of WASSIGNY, American troops, operating with the British, have reached the SAMBRE-OISE Canal.

Yesterday our pursuit squadrons on the front of the First Army were engaged in 25 combats in which 17 enemy machines were shot down. Our bombing units dropped four and one-half tons of bombs on BUZANCY, BAYONVILLE and REMONVILLE.

B. Nothing to report

C. It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, October 19: Entire Belgian coast has been cleared of the enemy. The line now runs from BRUGES, which is held by the Belgians, northeast of the Dutch frontier.

It was reported at 2:45 o'clock afternoon, October 19: French Tenth Army attacked this morning on front of ten kilometers north of LAON and took VERNEUIL, Le MOULIN de VERNEUIL, and FAY-le-SEC.

It was reported at 5 o'clock afternoon, October 19: South of ROUBAIX, British line runs: East of La MARQUE River---TEMPLEUV---east of VRED---SOMAIN---ROEULX---BOUCHAIN. North and east of Le CATEAU, British Fourth Army hold Line: Along RICHEMONT Brook---CATILLON---along the OISE Canal to OISE.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 19: South of OISY, french line runs: ETREUX---VENEROLLES---HANAPPES---NOYALES! South of the OISE, their line runs: LUCY---VILLERS-le-SEC---one kilometer east of FAY-le-NOYER---CATILLON-du-TEMPLE. Attack of French Tenth Army against HUNDING STELLUNG north of LAON has reached the line: MISSY ---PAY-le-SEC---CHANTRUD Farm---VERNEUIL. East of NIZY-le-COMTE, French took BETHANCOURT and captured the enemy positions two kilometers north of ST-GERMAINMONT, taking 600 prisoners. East of VOUZIERES, French have reached the line: MACQUART Farm---HILL 193---Brook 1,500 meters east of CHESTRES---PARDONNE Farm; they captured in this sector 400 prisoners, 10 guns and many machine guns.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: Guard ERSATZ engaged at COSTROSEBEKE: 6th Cavalry engaged near HARLEBEKE: 2d Guard Reserve from reserve Sixth Army engaged at COURTRAI. Sixth Army: 12th Reserve withdrawn. Seventeenth Army: 22d engaged; 6th from line Fourth Army in reserve Seventeenth Army: 18th Reserve engaged at HASPRES. Second Army: 21st Reserve withdrawn: 29th engaged west of RIBEAUVILLE.

Eighteenth Army: 5th Reserve from reserve Second Army engaged west of MENNEVRET: 221st from line Second Army to reserve Eighteenth Army: 34th from reserve Second Army engaged near MENNEVRET: 2d withdrawn. Third Army: 1st Guard withdrawn: 240th from line First Army engaged north of St-JUVIN. Fifth Army: Bavarian 3d from reserve Third Army to reserve Fifth Army near DUN-sur-MEUSE. Army Detachment C: 224th from Russia relieves 88th.

D. It was reported 5:30 o'clock afternoon, October 19: On the front of the I Corps there was heavy fighting in the Bois de LOGES. Troops west of the Bois de LOGES were heavily shelled.

5th Division reported afternoon, October 19: We carried out reconnaissance in force in the Bois des RAPPES where we are holding strong outpost positions. Strong enemy resistance with machine guns.

82d Division reported afternoon, October 19: Heavy enemy machine gun and artillery fire on our lines and rear areas.

20 (159) A. West of the MEUSE our troops have continued their pressure on the enemy. East of BANTHEVILLE in the course of local fighting in the Bois des RAPPES they captured over 100 prisoners. On the entire front north of VERDUN there has been heavy artillery
and machine-gun fire. Severe counterattacks have been thrown back with heavy losses to the enemy.

During the heavy fighting of the past week north of VERDUN, we have drawn from other parts of the western front a constantly increasing number of German divisions, which are bitterly contesting every foot against our strong attack in order to secure the retreat of the German army, the position of which has been compromised by the attacks from the south and the west.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, October 20: From the LYS at DESSELGHEM the British line runs: East of DEERLYCK—east of SWEVEGHEM—BELLEGHEM—DOTTIGNIES—LEERS NORD—TENNELEUVE—MARQUIN—MOUCHIN—LANDAS—DOUSIGNIES—Bois des ECHUSETTES—HALEVUY—DENAIN—DOUCHY—FLEURY—MAISON BLEUE on the VENEGIES—SOLESMES Road—SOLESMES—AMERAL—DAZUEL—OISY—ETREAUX. Resistance stiffening north of the SCHELDT Canal. In attack of British Third Army this morning all but 2 divisions reached final objectives east of the SELLE River; 840 prisoners and 3 guns were captured.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 13th Reserve and 39th withdrawn; Bavarian 12th engaged near HERSEAUX. Sixth Army: 12th Reserve engaged at WATTIGNIES. Eighteenth Army: 121st from reserve Second Army engaged near CATILLON: 221st engaged near WASSIGNY; 82d Reserve engaged in old sector south of 81st Reserve. First Army: 14th withdrawn; 7th from reserve Third Army engaged near GIVRY. Third Army: 199th from line Fifth Army engaged near VANDY; 203d engaged near OLIZY; Bavarian Ersatz dissolved. Nineteenth Army: 10th from reserve Fourth Army engaged near CLEMERAY; 87th from reserve Second Army engaged at BIONCOURT; 84th Landwehr Brigade withdrawn. The enemy order of battle on front of American First Army from GRAND PRE to BEZONVAUX on October 19 was: 76th Reserve, 3d class; 2d Landwehr, 4th class; 45th Reserve, 2d class; Bavarian 15th, 3d class; 240th, 3d class; 41st, 2d class; 13th, 1st class; 3d Guard, 1st class; 228th, 3d class; 236th, 3d class; 115th, 3d class; 123d, 3d class; 107th, 3d class; Bavarian 5th, Reserve, 2d class; 28th, 1st class; 32d, 3d class; Austro-Hungarian 106th, 2d class; 27th, 1st class; 1st Landwehr, 2d class; 15th, 2d class; 33d, 1st class.

D. It was reported at 5:45 o'clock afternoon, October 20: West of the MEUSE, III Corps has mopped up Bois CLAIRS CHENES, taking 68 prisoners, and is making progress in the Bois des RAPPELS in the face of strong resistance.

78th Division reported afternoon, October 20: Enemy machine guns very active; heavy artillery fire on both sides; our line withdrawn to GRAND PRE—St-JUVIN Road. 21 (160)A. In the course of stubborn fighting north of VERDUN we have advanced our line at several points. This morning our troops took Hill 297 and drove the enemy from the Bois des RAPPELS, capturing in this operation six officers, 255 men and a number of machine guns. Farther west they have improved their positions on the northern edge of the Bois de BENTHIEVILLE and have made progress northeast of St-JUVIN. East of the MEUSE the enemy violently bombarded our positions in the Bois des CAURES.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10 o'clock morning, October 21: British east of COURTRAI resumed this morning and met serious resistance. Line runs: VICHTE—St GENOIS—TENFER—along the SCHELDT to PECQ. Stiff resistance at ORCQ, south of which line runs: TAIINTIGNIES—RUMIGIES—ROSULTE—MILLON-FOSSE—railway to LA GOULEE—WAVRECHAIN—HAULCHIN—THIANT. Farther south British are west of line: VERCHAIN—St-MARTIN—VERTAIN—ROMERIES—thence east of SOLESMES—east of AMERVAL—west of FOREST.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 21: North of the SERRE, French took RICHECOURT-et-MESBRECOURT; other attacks between the SERRE and the OISE met very violent resistance. East of VOUIZERS French progress has been checked by repeated counterattacks. West and northwest of VALLONCENNES British have reached the line: West edge of St-LEGER—HERIN—AUBRY—RAISMES—west edge of St-AMAND—LECELLES—RUMIGIES, then as previously reported.

Changes in German order of battle: Second Army: 121st from line Fifteenth Army relieves 204th: 1st Guard Reserve from reserve Seventeenth Army relieves 30th; 206th
and Bavarian 5th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 82d Reserve and 107th withdrawn; 8th from reserve Second Army to reserve Eighteenth Army east of GUISE. Third Army: Bavarian Ersatz, erroneously reported in cable of October 20 as being dissolved, is still considered in reserve Third Army. Fifth Army: 28th withdrawn. Army Detachment B: 91st from Russia to reserve Army Detachment B at MULHOUSE. Of the 190 enemy divisions on the western front on October 20, 138 were in line. Of the 52 divisions in reserve, five, which have had more than one month's rest, are considered fit for offensive action; of the 47 remaining divisions but eight have been out of line more than ten days.

D. A captured order issued by General von Gallwitz, commanding the army group which includes the German Third and Fifth Armies now opposing our attack north of VERDUN, gives further evidence of the importance which the enemy attaches to his position on this front and of his determination to hold them at all costs. This order, which was contained in a document issued by the German XXI Corps and captured by our troops during their advance west of the MEUSE reads as follows:

MEUSE Group west, General Command XXI Army Corps, Abt. Ia. Nr. 1590 op. Corps Headquarters, September 30, 1918. Army Group Gallwitz wires with Ia. Nr. 4073: The simultaneous attacks against us on a large scale on several fronts show that the Entente expects to force a decision at this time. Probably they are compelled to do so to avert a crisis among their own forces. A failure on their part may have tragic consequences. The crowning effort of our heroic combats in which so much German blood was split, is the stemming of the tide (for the time being) and inflicting ever increasing losses on the enemy. Every commander and every man must be filled with these thoughts. Every strong position must be most tenaciously defended and the most extensive use of our weapons must be made. If an attack in ordered everyone must do his best. Only then shall we reach our goal: The defeat of our enemy. The more desperate the fighting, the stronger must the influence of the commanders grow. German divisions which have been forced back have not only stopped, but have returned to counterattack the enemy when they saw the division commanders leaving their available weak reserves in person. The troops must be impressed with the hollowness of the American mass attacks. The denser the advancing masses, the more they are hampered in an advance and the greater the losses caused by the fire of the defenders. Single machine-gun nests on several occasions have compelled entire attacking companies to flee in disorder. I expect the best from every man in this most important struggle, and believe that everyone will defend our beloved Fatherland to his last breath.

Von Gallwitz, General of Artillery and Commander-in-Chief. For the General Command - Chief of the General Staff: Ludwig, Lt. Col.

A German aviator of the 20th Battle Flight who was captured on October 20 near GRAND PRE, in the course of an examination stated that "The Americans selected for themselves the worst bloodletting sector of the front, where it was the purpose to dispute every foot of advance and inflict the heaviest possible losses, while the Germans readjust their lives between the VERDUN front and the sea."

It was reported at 9 o'clock evening, October 21: 89th Division occupied northern and eastern edges of Bois de BANTHEVILLE. 5th and 3d Divisions attacking at 11:30 o'clock morning took Hill 297 and Bois des RAPPES.

82d Division reported afternoon, October 21: Northeast of St-JUVIN strong detachments pushed forward about 500 meters and took up new positions.

Our 37th and 91st Divisions have been sent to FLANDERS to participate in operations now in progress on that sector of the front.

On the VERDUN front we have maintained and extended our gains of the preceding days. Violent counterattacks on our new positions on Hill 297 and in the Bois des RAPPES brought the enemy only severe losses, our line remaining everywhere intact. Farther east our troops have taken the Bois de FORET, capturing 75 prisoners. Artillery
fire has increased in intensity and aviation has been more active on both sides of the MEUSE.

In the WOEVRE in the course of a successful raid our troops captured 26 prisoners.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported 3:30 o'clock afternoon, October 22: West of VALENCIENNES, British hold line: FAUBOURG-de-PARIS---St-WAAST la HAUT---ANZIN. Northwest of TOURNAI they have taken FROYENNES and patrols have crossed SCHELDT and PONT-a-a-CHIN.

No change in line on French front other than as reported in French communique evening, October 22.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 39th engaged near VIClITE. Seventeenth Army: 4th from reserve Sixth Army engaged southwest of DENAIN. Second Army: 208th withdrawn; 30th engaged near NEUVILLY. Eighteenth Army: 79th Reserve engaged near ETREUX; 237th, 11th and 105th from line Seventh Army to line Eighteenth Army owing to change in army boundaries. First Army: 50th from line Seventh Army to line First Army owing to change in army boundaries; 213th and 17th from line Third Army to line First Army owing to change in army boundaries. Third Army: 242d withdrawn is in reserve near VOUZIERS; 202d engaged near FALAISE; 1st Guard engaged near CHESTRES. Fifth Army: 88th from reserve Army Detachment C to line Fifth Army near CUNEL. Army Detachment C: Bavarian 3d from reserve Fifth Army engaged in former sector of 8th Landwehr.

D. 5th Division reported October 22: In attack yesterday on Bois des RAPPES we met stubborn resistance by machine guns, supported by artillery and infantry fire. Our troops captured entire position, with 170 prisoners, including five officers. Enemy counterattacked at 6:30 o'clock evening, supported by heavy artillery fire; he was repulsed with heavy losses.

23 (162) A. On the battle front north of VERDUN we have made progress at several points in the face of determined resistance. In the course of a local attack in the heavily wooded and hilly country east of the MEUSE our troops took the Bois BELLEAU and penetrated the enemy's positions in the Bois d'ETRAYES and the Bois de WAVRILLE, capturing over 100 prisoners. West of the MEUSE, BANTEHEVILLE has been completely occupied and our line has been established along the ridge northwest of the village. In the course of bitter fighting north of GRAND PRE our troops captured 75 prisoners and eight machine guns. Artillery fire has been violent on the whole front, reaching its greatest intensity east of the MEUSE and north of the AIRE.

The day has been marked by increased serial activity on both sides of the MEUSE. In the course of many combats our pursuit squadrons shot down 15 enemy airplanes and one observation balloon. Three of our observation balloons were destroyed and six of our machines are missing. Our bombing units dropped five tons of explosives on enemy concentration points.

B. There is nothing to report in this section.

C. It was reported afternoon, October 23: British attack between Le CATEAU and the SCHELDT successful; good progress made on whole front. Line now runs: ORS---BOUSIES---VENDEGIES---ESCARMAIN---ST-MARTIN. Estimated prisoners 2,500.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 56th withdrawn; 119th from reserve Second Army to reserve Fourth Army near GHENT. Sixth Army: 12th withdrawn. Seventeenth Army: 113th engaged southeast of DOUCHY; 111th withdrawn to reserve near VALENCIENNES. Second Army: 4th from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged northeast of SOLESMES. First Army: 80th Reserve engaged at NANTEUIL-sur-AISNE; 9th withdrawn. Third Army: 42d withdrawn.

D. It was reported evening, October 23: East of the MEUSE 29th and 26th Divisions attacked this morning with limited objectives, after artillery preparation of 45 minutes; strong resistance encountered; Bois BELLEU taken and progress made in Bois de WAVRILLE and Bois d'ETRAYES; over 100 prisoners. West of the MEUSE 3d Division holds
woods north of HILL 299. 90th Division has occupied BANTHEVILLE and ridge northwest of the village. 78th Division attacked this morning between TALMA Farm and GRAND PRE; advance slow in face of stubborn machine-gun and artillery resistance; reached ridge north of TALMA Farm and foot of hill north of GRAND PRE but forced to fall back later at both points; 75 prisoners and 8 machine guns taken. Patrol which entered BRIEULLES last night found village unoccupied and being shelled by the enemy.

24 (163) A. On the VERDUN front there has been local fighting throughout the day. In a minor operation in the region of BZNTHEVILLE our troops advanced their line 500 meters, reaching the ridge north of the village and capturing 170 prisoners. As a result of yesterday's successful action east of the MEUSE our troops are now established on the high ground in the Bois d'ETRAYES. Artillery fire has continued severe on the whole front, especially on the COTE, de CHATILLON and the Bois des CAURES.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, October 24: Between the SCHELDT and the SAMBRE Canal, British have reached line: MAING---along road to SOMMERAIN---BERME AIN---RUESNES---GHISSIGNIES---POIX du NORD---ROBERSART---MALGARNI---ORS, exclusive. Strong resistance encountered.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, October 24: South of the OISE French have reached HILL 120, south of ORIGNY and HILL 140, north of VILLERS-le-SEC; otherwise line between the OISE and SERRE as previously reported.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 56th engaged at St-GENOIS. 3d Reserve engaged at MEERENDRE; Bavarian 1st Reserve engaged south of DEYNZE. Sixth Army: 12th engaged near MARQUAIN; 2d Guard Reserve from line Fourth Army to line Sixth Army south of FROYENNES. Second Army: 21st Reserve engaged north of HAUSSY: 8th relieves 3 44th Reserve southwest of FOREST. 204th engaged north of CATILLON. Third Army: Bavarian 1st withdrawn; 242d engaged near CHESTRES; Army Detachment C: 94th from eastern front engaged in old sector of 107th near WADONVILLE, Bavarian Ersatz and 77th Reserve dissolved. On October 23 there were 190 enemy divisions on the western front, of which three were Austro-Hungarian. Of the 43 divisions in reserve one is rested and fit for offensive action and 12 may be considered as fairly fit. Of the divisions which entered line yesterday none had been out of line for as long as two weeks.

D. In view of the importance of the operations now in progress, I have decided, for the present, to issue a morning and an evening communique, beginning on the morning of the 26th. This will conform to the present practice of the Allied Armies and will facilitate explaining to our own and neutral and Allied publics the nature of the operations in progress, which cannot be done as well in one communique. The morning communique will be contained in our noon cable to the War Department and evening communique will be contained in evening cable, as at present.

It was reported evening, October 24: Troops of III Corps pushed forward in region of BANTHEVILLE after 10 minutes artillery preparation and reached ridge north of the village, taking 171 prisoners. Elements which reached GRAND CARRE Farm retired owing to heavy concentration of enemy artillery using high explosive and gas. Considerable machine-gun resistance encountered.
B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported evening, October 25: British line southwest of VALENCIENNES runs: From St-LEGER—south of TRITH—SCHELDT—east of MAING—QUERENAING—SEPHERIES. British Second Army attacked at 9 o'clock this morning and report progress. British troops are in MOEN.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, October 25: French have taken VILLERS-le-SEC and several other points in that vicinity, capturing about 600 prisoners. Attack of French Tenth Army begun this morning has continued; bridgehead of 1,200 meters has been established between CRESSY and MORTIER. East of the SOUCHE French have taken HILL 79; front passes beyond VESLES-et-CAUMONT. 250 prisoners were taken in this operation. East of SISSONNE, French have taken St.QUENTIN-le PETIT, from which line runs: Southern and western edge of BANOGNE—south of RECOUVANCE—RECOUVANCE-CONDE—Ie HERPY Road—Ie HERPY. Very strong resistance encountered. Over 2,000 prisoners counted. Two 77-mm. guns and a heavy battery captured.

German order of battle from the Dutch frontier southward: October 23, Fourth Army: 1st Naval, 2d Naval, 38th Landwehr, Bavarian 16th, 3d, 16th Reserve, 23d, 2d Reserve, 36th Reserve, Bavarian 11th, 207th, Bavarian 1st Reserve, 3d Landwehr, 52d Reserve, Guard Ersatz, 6th Cavalry, 7th Cavalry, 40th, 39th, Bavarian 6th Reserve, 11th Reserve, 56th, 12th Bavarian. Sixth Army: 12th, 23d Reserve, 2d Guard Reserve, 4th Ersatz, 36th 16th, 12th Reserve, 49th Reserve. Seventeenth Army: 234th, 35th, 214th, 26th Reserve, 10th Ersatz, 111th, 22d, 113th, 48th Reserve. Additional units south of the 48th Reserve will be included in cable for October 26.


D. 89th Division reported evening, October 25: Enemy harassing fire on Bois de BANTHEVILLE.

82d Division reported evening, October 25: Enemy raid of 30 men on one of our outposts was repulsed; we suffered one slight casualty.

It was reported at 5:50 o'clock evening, October 25: 78th Division is along ridge in Bois BOURGOGNE and advancing satisfactorily. Very heavy bombardment in region of GRAND PRE. Intense artillery activity in Bois d'ETRAYES and BELLEU Bois. Slight withdrawal of 29th Division between Bois d'ETRAYES and BELLEU Bois.

It was reported at 10:50 o'clock evening, October 25: Enemy laid down a barrage at 7:10 o'clock evening in the region south of Bois de BANTHEVILLE, north of Bois de RAPPE and in the valley north of BANTHEVILLE. This barrage of half hour duration followed by infantry attack which we repulsed.

26 (165) For Chief of Staff: On the VERDUN front yesterday evening the enemy extended to the west side of the MEUSE his efforts to wrest from our troops the gains of the preceding days. In the region of BANTHEVILLE, after artillery preparation lasting half an hour, he attacked our positions between the Bois des RAPPE and the Bois de BANTHEVILLE. After sharp fighting he was repulsed with heavy losses, our line remaining everywhere unchanged. North of the AIRE our troops have organized the ground won in yesterday's local attack and are now established in positions in the southern portion of the Bois de BOURGOGNE. On both banks of the MEUSE artillery fire continued heavy throughout the night. The battle being fought by our First Army north of VERDUN, which today enters upon its second month, is continuing with incessant severity, frequently rising to a pitch of extreme violence. On the entire front of 25 miles the enemy is opposing to our successful attack a determined resistance, made necessary by the great importance to him of this sector, and made possible only by the constant reinforcement of his hard-pressed
divisions. Besides having inflicted on the enemy severe losses in killed and wounded, we have captured on this front since September 26 more than 20,000 prisoners; and in the course of our advance, over 150 guns, nearly 1,000 trench mortars and several thousand machine guns have fallen into our hands.

It was reported at 11:30 o'clock morning, October 26: On the VERDUN front there is no change in the situation.

It was reported evening, October 25: On the ASIAGO, Italians have withdrawn from SISEMOL. Between the BRENTA and the PIAVE, Mt. PERTICA has been taken. No further change. ASIAGO was not taken by Italians as reported yesterday.

26 (166) A. North of VERDUN our troops have made further progress in the Bois de BOURGOGNE, reaching the hamlet of FUMAY. Artillery fire has continued heavy, particularly in the region of BANTHEVILLE and east of the MEUSE.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported morning, October 26: British Second Army now holds west bank of the SCHELDT Canal from BAMEGNIES to AUTRIVE, inclusive. North of AUTRIVE line runs: DRIESCH---OOTEGHEM---STERBOEK, thence as previously reported.

It was reported at 9:05 o'clock evening, October 26: French First Army continued attack begun yesterday between the OISE and the PERON, taking PLEINE-SELVE---PARPEVILLE---CHEVRESIS-les-DAMES and pushed on to COURJUNELLES. Strong enemy resistance at MONT d'ORIGNY and ORIGNY St-BENOITE. French Fifth Army has repulsed many counterattacks on positions gained yesterday between BANOGNE-RECOURLANCE and the MOULIN HENRY. Attack resumed today. Several hundred prisoners and hundreds of machine guns were taken.

German order of battle south of 48th Reserve, October 24: Second Army: 9th Reserve, 58th, 21st Reserve, 18th Reserve, 4th, 25th, 8th, 185th, 30th, 17th Reserve, 44th Reserve, 243d, 204th, 121st, 3d Naval. Eighteenth Army: 19th Reserve, 29th, 200th, 79th Reserve, 34th, 81st Reserve, 22d Reserve, 18th, Bavarian 6th, 231st, 238th, 1st Reserve, 232d, 237th, 221st, 11th, 105th, Seventh Army: 24th Reserve, 86th, 10th Reserve, 26th, 221th, 216th, 19th, Bavarian 2d, 5th, 4th Guard. First Army: 50th, 1st, 50th Reserve, Bavarian 8th Reserve, 80th Reserve, Guard Cavalry, 239th, 213th, 17th, 7th.


D. It was reported at 10:40 o'clock evening, October 26: Enemy launched infantry attack at 5:15 o'clock afternoon midway between the Bois des RAPPES and BANTHEVILLE. Attack stopped by our barrage before it had reached our lines.

It was reported evening October 26: Along entire front of Second Army active patrolling and increased artillery fire.

26th Division reported at 7:50 o'clock evening, October 26: We attacked at 3:30 o'clock afternoon after intense artillery fire. Enemy resisted stubbornly at all points and our line remains unchanged.

29th Division reported at 3 o'clock afternoon, October 26: Organization and consolidation of entire front line. Heavy enemy artillery fire.

92d Division reported at 8:35 o'clock evening, October 26: Increased enemy artillery fire, particularly in the region of MOUSSON and PONT-a-MOUSSON.

27 (167) North of VERDUN the enemy renewed without success his attempt to regain the ground lost in recent fighting. Yesterday evening an attack launched with strong forces against our positions between BANTHEVILLE and the Bois des RAPPES broke down under our artillery fire before reaching our lines. East of the MEUSE there has been sharp fighting in the region of the Bois BELLEU.

On the front of the Second Army there was lively artillery fighting in the WOEVRE.

27 (168) A. On the VERDUN front east of the MEUSE infantry and artillery fighting was
in progress throughout the day in the region of the Bois BELLEU. West of the LEUSE there has been heavy artillery and machine-gun fire south of AINCREVILLE and north of the AIRE.

The improvement in the weather has made possible active aerial operations on the front of the First Army. Our pursuit squadrons engaged the enemy in many combats, in the course of which 13 enemy airplanes and 5 of our machines were shot down. Our bombing units dropped 3 1/2 tons of explosives on BRIQUENAY.

B. Nothing to report.

C. German order of battle west of 7th Division to Swiss frontier, October 25:


Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: Bavarian 12th engaged south of 2d Guard, Bavarian 16th withdrawn. Bavarian 5th relieves 23d Reserve. Second Army: 208th engaged south of 9th Reserve, 22d from line of Seventeenth Army relieves 185th, 14th from reserve First Army engaged south of 18th Reserve. Eighteenth Army: 82d Reserve engaged south of 2d: 81st Reserve withdrawn from line. Seventh Army: 86th withdrawn. Fifth Army: 3d Guard withdrawn. Nineteenth Army: 117th from reserve Fifth Army to reserve Nineteenth Army near METZ. It appears that from noon, September 25 to noon, September 26, six enemy divisions have been moved from reserve to line. None of these units has been out of line for as much as a week, despite the fact that there are now 15 enemy divisions which have been out of line for from ten days to four weeks, and one rest ed division.

D. It was reported afternoon, October 27: 26th Division attacked again this forenoon. No information as to line. Aviation very active on both sides.

29th Division reported evening, October 27: Continuing organization of position. Enemy exceptionally quiet.

78th Division reported afternoon, October 27: Our troops have completed occupation of ridge north and northwest of GRAND PRE.

It was reported evening, October 27: Enemy shelling our new positions on ridge north and northwest of GRAND PRE.

28 (169) On the VERDUN front east of the MEUSE our troops yesterday carried out a successful local attack against the Bois BELLEU. As a result of this operation, this wood, which has been the scene of constant fighting since October 25, is entirely in our hands. Farther south lively combats are in progress in the eastern portion of the Bois d'ORMONT. Artillery fire has been violent on the front from Bois de la GRANDE MONTAGNE to the Bois des CAURES.

West of the MEUSE hostile elements, which attempted under cover of heavy shelling to penetrate our positions north of GRAND PRE, were repulsed by our machine-gun fire.

In other sectors held by our troops the day was quiet.

It was reported at 11:05 o'clock evening, October 27: Northeast of GRAND PRE patrols of the 78th Division, early on morning of October 27, entered LA BELLEJOYEUSE which they found unoccupied.

It was reported at 10:35 o'clock morning, October 28: Increased enemy artillery activity, with harassing fire, high explosive and gas, on BANTHEVILLE---CUNEL---BRIEULLES and the Bois de DAnneVOUX.

28 (170) A. On the VERDUN front the day was marked by heavy artillery fire on both sides of the MEUSE. An enemy counterattack against the Bois BELLEU was repulsed. In the WOEVRE our detachments successfully raided the enemy's lines and captured prisoners.
In spite of poor weather conditions our aviators were again active on the front of the First Army and shot down three enemy airplanes and one observation balloon. All our machines returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 8:30 o'clock evening, October 28: During the day violent counterattack against new French positions in region of OISE Canal, between Le GRAND VERLY and west of GUISE, compelled French to retire to west bank of the canal. Farther south French crossed the OISE to the west of St-CLAIRE Farm and north of CRECY-sur-SERRE took HILL 136.

It was reported afternoon, October 28: In local attack north of FARMARS, British advanced line to AULNOY-Le-POIRIER Road, taking 130 prisoners.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army, 119th engaged south of 207th. Seventeenth Army: 187th engaged south of 234th, 37th from reserve Third army engaged south of 10th Ersatz. Eighteenth Army: 231st withdrawn. Seventh Army: 84th from reserve Eighteenth Army engaged east 227th. First Army: 51st Reserve from reserve Eighteenth Army relieves 7th. Fifth Army: Austro-Hungarian 1st engaged east of 228th, 20th from reserve Second Army to reserve Fifth Army near MONTMEDZ. Army Detachment A near MOLSHEIM. On the western front on October 27 the enemy had 150 divisions in line and 39 in reserve. Of the divisions in reserve, 24 had been withdrawn from line within one week, after suffering severe losses, seven within two weeks. Seven had been out of line more than two weeks and one was considered rested and fit.

D. It was reported at 1:55 o'clock afternoon, October 28: One of our patrols which entered CLERY-le-GRAND was fired on by machine guns. At 6:05 o'clock another of our patrols entered CLERY-le-PETIT without encountering any of the enemy.

29 (171) Artillery and machine-gun fire continued heavy during the night on the front of the First Army north of VERDUN, reaching particular intensity in the region of the Bois BELLEU and the Bois d'ORMONT.

From the remainder of the front there is nothing of importance to report.

It was reported October 28: Offensive on Italian front continues. Progress between San VITO and VIDOR, to line: San GERTASIO---100 meters of south of Mt. PERLO---BUSE---BIGOLINO---San GIOVANNI---VIDOR, against determined resistance and counterattacks. East of the TEVA line runs: BOSCO---MOSNIGO---SERNAGLIA---CHIESOLA. No change in line opposite the MONTELLO, at the eastern edge of which bridges have been destroyed by artillery fire. Opposite PAPADOPOLI Island line runs: BARCO---SANTA LUCIA---ROVINAZZO---BORGO-BIANCHI---ORMELLE---RONCADELLE. Advance is steady in direction of CONEGLIANO.

28th Division reported afternoon, October 28: Our troops located six machine-gun positions, capturing three prisoners.

29 (172) A. On the VERDUN front there has been heavy artillery and machine-gun fire today west of the MEUSE, especially in the region north of St-JUVIN.

With more favorable weather conditions there has been increased aerial activity on the front of the First Army throughout the day. Our pursuit squadrons engaged the enemy in numerous combats, in the course of which 18 enemy airplanes were shot down. Five of our machines did not return. Our aviators also carried out important reconnaissance and photographic missions.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Changes in German order of battle: Second Army: North to south 21st Reserve, 9th Reserve, 208th, Jaeger, 58th, 14th, 18th Reserve, 4th, 25th, 8th, 22d, 30th, 17th Reserve, 44th Reserve, 243d, 204th. Fourth Army: 119th has moved south relieving 3d Landwehr, 23d withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 231st engaged south of Bavarian 6th, 22d Reserve withdrawn. Third Army: 2d Landwehr withdrawn, 3d Guard from reserve of Fifth Army engaged east of 14th Reserve. Fifth Army: 115th withdrawn.

D. 33d Division reported afternoon, October 29: One of our patrols of 23 men was flanked by an enemy patrol of 40 men who opened fire with rifles, grenades and rifle grenades. Our patrol returned fire and drove the enemy off. One of our men was slightly wounded.
28th Division reported evening, October 29: One of our raiding parties captured eight prisoners and one machine gun in the Bois DOMMARTIN. Another patrol captured one prisoner in the same locality. As a result of an enemy raid on HAUMONT, held by our patrol, three of our men were wounded and three are missing.

Reports from the 82d, 92d, 42d, and 89th Divisions indicate that during the 24 hours ending at three o'clock afternoon, October 29, our patrols have been active in the respective sectors held by these divisions.

30 (173) North of VERDUN our troops have occupied AINCREVILLE, and have established their lines just north of the village. Lively artillery fighting occurred during the night at various points along the front.

In the WOEVRE our patrols successfully engaged hostile detachments and captured prisoners.

It was reported evening, October 29: On the Italian front between the BRENTA and the PAVE latest reports indicate that Italians now hold Mt. ASOLONE and that Austrian artillery is on the heights in the vicinity of Mt. APINONCIA opposing advance there and destroying bridges across the PAVE near PEDEMOBBA. East and north of the PAVE line runs: Mt. LIANER---VALDOBBIADENE---SAN PIETRO---Mt. MONCADER---heights north of FARRA di SOLIGO and SOLIGO---REFRONTOLO, exclusive---south through Mt. CUCCO---PARE---CONEGLIANO---CAO di VILLA---thence along the MONTICANO to FONTANELLE---thence south through ORMELLE---RONCADELLE. Many prisoners surrendering on the plain; road leading to the north reported to be filled with retiring troops.

It was reported at 10:45 o'clock morning, October 30: Harassing fire last night on ravines of the Bois des CAURES and on VERDUN. Three of our aerial patrols were active during the night.

It was reported at 11 o'clock morning, October 30: On the British front between TOURNAI and VALENCIENNES inundations of the SCHELDT have greatly increased, making any passage extremely difficult.

30 (174) A. On the VERDUN front the day was marked by heavy artillery fire east of the MEUSE. An enemy raid on our lines east of BEAUMONT was repulsed.

In the WOEVRE our patrols were again active and brought in prisoners.

Our pursuit squadrons operating on the front of the First Army shot down 21 enemy airplanes and two observation balloons. Two of our machines are missing.

B. Nothing to report.


D. It was reported at 1:50 o'clock afternoon, October 30: On the front of Second Army our patrols attempted to enter BOUXIERES but were driven off by rifle, machine-gun and artillery fire.

42d, 78th, 82d, 89th and 92d Divisions reported, evening, October 30, active patrolling in their respective sectors during 24 hours ending 3 o'clock afternoon, October 30. In the vicinity of MOUSSON a strong combat patrol of the 92d Division established contact with the enemy at EPLY and BEL AIR Farm, resulting in increased machine-gun and artillery fire on both sides.

33d Division reported 4:30 o'clock afternoon, October 30: Increased enemy artillery activity about 2,000 high explosive and gas shells fell in vicinity of FRESNES. One of our patrols captured five prisoners.

It was reported at 7:30 o'clock evening, October 30: On the VERDUN front artillery active in region of the Bois d'HAUMONT and the Bois des CAURES: 45 shells fell on the VERDUN Railroad Station. An enemy detachment attacked an advanced post held by two of our men, killing one and taking the other prisoner. An enemy raid on La WAVRILLE stronghold was repulsed.
5th Division reported 8 o'clock evening, October 30: In local attack last night on AINCREVILLE, referred to in American official communiqué, morning October 30, we took two prisoners. Enemy has directed harassing machine-gun and artillery fire on our new positions and rear areas. Our patrols operating near CLERY-le-GRAND took one prisoner.

It was reported at 5:45 o'clock evening, October 30: On October 28 an American air unit attached to the British reported that the 148th Squadron destroyed five fokker bi-planes and drove two others down and out of control. All our machines returned safely.

31 (175) On the VERDUN front there was heavy artillery and machine-gun fire during the night on both sides of the MEUSE. North of GRAND PRE our troops advanced their lines and occupied the BELLEJOYEUSE Farm.

Yesterday our bombing units attached to the First and Second Armies carried out a number of successful raids, dropping six tons of explosives on BARRICOURT, BAYONVILLE, and LONGUYON.

28th Division reported 10:30 o'clock evening, October 30: On the entire Divisional front our patrols were active, one of them in the Bois DOMMARTIN capturing ten prisoners.

It was reported evening, October 30: On the Italian front there is no change in the ASIAGO sector. Between the BRENTA and the PIAVE, where there is no material change, the enemy’s artillery is opposing advance north of VALDOBBIADENE. The advance to the east and the north of the PIAVE continues rapid, reaching the following general line: SEGUSINO---Mt. CESE---COMDAI---FOLLINA---VITTORIO---ORSAGO---GAJARINE---ODERZO, all inclusive. Cavalry has reached SERRAVALLE, north of VITTORIO and SACILE on the LIVENZA River. Bridgeheads have been established on the PIAVE south of RONCADELLE and at REVEDOLI, near the mouth of the PIAVE, where marines have crossed the river. Italian aviators report all roads in rear full of retiring troops. Over 33,000 prisoners have been counted, of whom 802 were officers: and several hundred guns have been taken.

Reports from French and British armies indicate no appreciable change in their respective sectors on the western front.

31 (176) A. North of VERDUN our troops drove the enemy from the village of BRIEULIES on the west bank of the MEUSE. Artillery fighting continued lively on the whole front throughout the day, reaching particular intensity between AINCREVILLE and the Bois de BANTHEVILLE.

Last night French bombing units attached to the First Army successfully raided MEZIERES and POIX-TERRON and dropped nearly 12 tons of explosives on the important rail ways in that region. This morning our aviators dropped three tons of bombs on the roads and dumps in the vicinity of TAILLY, BARRICOURT and VILLERS-devant-DUN, and machine-gunned enemy troops and convoys. In the course of the day seven enemy airplanes were shot down. All our machines returned.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, October 31: In Allied attack today in FLANDERS nearly all objectives have been gained. North of the LYS Canal resistance was particularly stiff. Allied troops have progressed between DEYNZE on the LYS and AVELGHEM on the SCHELDT. Germans began retirement at certain points at beginning of Allied bombardment. About 800 prisoners have been taken.

It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, October 31: West and northwest of HERPY the French have been engaged in severe fighting throughout the day; they have gained some ground and taken 120 prisoners.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 39th withdrawn, 38th from reserve Second Army engaged south of 56th. Second Army: 44th Reserve, 25th and 30th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 81st Reserve engaged south of 2d. Seventh Army: 50th from line First Army engaged east of 4th Guard, 50th Reserve from line First Army engaged east of 50th. First Army: 9th Landwehr from line Third Army engaged east of 239th. Third Army: 103d now in line east of 76th Reserve. Fifth Army: 88th has extended its front to the west relieving the 107th. Army Detachment C: 241st from reserve Second Army to reserve
Army Detachment C near AUDUN-le-ROMAN. From the German official communique of October 30 it appears that General von Mudra has been relieved of the command of the German First Army and has been replaced by General von Below. (It is not known whether it is Otto or Fritz von Below.) On October 30 the only three enemy divisions on the western front which have been rested a month or more, and are considered fit for offensive action, have been identified between the MOSELLE and the Swiss frontier. Seven enemy divisions appear to have been withdrawn from line on October 30.

D. 5th, 42d, 92d, 78th Divisions reported, evening, October 31: Active patrolling in their respective sectors during last 24 hours. Troops of the 5th Divisions occupied BRIEULLER, referred to in Section A.

28th Divisions reported October 30 following details of enemy raid on HAUMONT reported in American Official Communique, Section D, Number 172, October 29: Enemy patrol of 40 men entered HAUMONT without artillery preparation, wounding three of our men and taking three prisoners.

November
1 (177) On the VERDUN front the night was marked by artillery fire on both sides of the MEUSE.

From the other sectors held by our troops there is nothing of importance to report.

It was reported at 10: 30 o'clock morning, November 1: British Second Army gained all objectives in yesterday's attack. Line runs: WAERMAERIE---KERKHOVE---east of CASTER---one kilometer west of ELSEGHEM---thence to ANSEGHEM. Over 900 prisoners and three guns were taken in this operation.

1 (178) A. The American First Army continued its attack on the west bank of the MEUSE in conjunction with the French Fourth Army on its left.

The perfect cooperation of all arms - infantry, artillery, airplanes and tanks - succeeded in overcoming and disorganizing the enemy's determined resistance, and in breaking up his counterattacks. Enemy divisions, rapidly brought up, were intermingled with units already in line in a vain attempt to stop our advance.

Our victorious troops have already taken and passed beyond ST-GEORGES, LANDRES-et-St-GEORGES, IMECOURT, CHENNERY, BAYONVILLE, REMONVILLE, ANDEVANNE and CLERY-le-GRAND.

Up to the present 3,602 prisoners have been counted of whom 151 are officers.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 2:20 o'clock afternoon, November 1: British continued attack from ANSEGHEM to the SCHELDT. They have progressed as far as BOSCHKANT.

It was reported at 10 o'clock evening, November 1: British attack south of VALENCIENNES met very serious resistance, including two counterattacks. Line runs from the SCHELDT one kilometer south of VALENCIENNES---AULNOY---PRESEAU, exclusive---MARESCHES---to old line. Over 1,700 prisoners captured.

No reports received relative to operations of French armies later than those contained in French official communique, evening, November 1.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 13th Reserve reengaged south of 2d Guard, 6th Cavalry engaged south of Guard Ersatz, 23d Reserve engaged south of 49th Reserve, 21st from reserve Second army engaged south of 6th Cavalry. Eighteenth Army: 1st Reserve withdrawn. Army Detachment C: 28th Reserve withdrawn. It now appears certain that General Fritz von Below is in command of the German First Army. The enemy now has on the western front 189 divisions of which 141 are in line. Of the 48 divisions in reserve, three are to be considered rested and fit for offensive action, two have been rested slightly more than three weeks, seven have been rested from two to three weeks and 33 have been out of line less than two weeks.

D. 78th Division reported afternoon, November 1: Our troops attacked this morning in First Army offensive, meeting heavy enemy machine-gun fire in the vicinity of Bois des LOGES. Enemy is established in strong positions; our advance continues slowly.
89th Division reported afternoon, November 1: In First Army attack this morning our troops reached their objectives as scheduled; our artillery provided effective preparatory bombardment. 800 prisoners captured.

90th Division reported afternoon, November 1: In First Army attack this morning we advanced our lines more than two kilometers. Satisfactory progress continues.

5th Division reported afternoon, November 1: Our troops captured CLERY-le-GRAND in this morning's First Army attack taking a few prisoners. North of AINCREVILLE we took 53 additional prisoners, including one officer, and continued our advance into the Bois de BABIEMONTE. Considerable materiel was captured in yesterday's occupation of BRIEULLES.

37th Division, operating with the French between the LYs and the SCHELDT, reported evening, October 31: Our troops attacked this morning at 5:30 o'clock on the CRUYSHAUTEM front. At noon we had advanced four kilometers, taking 267 prisoners, 11 of whom are officers. Later report indicates attack continued and we have advanced to within one kilometer of CRUYSHAUTEM.

36th Division, which has been operating with the French Fourth Army, reported October 30 following details of local attack referred to in French official communiqué.

morning, October 28: Our troops attacked at 4:30 o'clock afternoon, October 27, behind a very successful barrage. The attack was a complete success; we gained all objectives and took 191 prisoners, including four officers and several noncommissioned officers.

2 (179) The First Army continued its attack west of the MEUSE this morning. The operation is progressing favorably.

No reports later than morning official communiques November 2, received from American and British armies relative to operations in their respective sectors on the western front. No report received relative to French operations later than evening official communiqué, November.

2 (180) A. A series of raids skillfully carried out by troops of the Second Army in the WOEVRE resulted in the capture of two officers and 63 men.

The First Army today continued its successful advance, overcoming all resistance. Among the most important towns taken are CHAMPAGNEULLES, BEFFU-et-MORTHOMME, VERPHELIVRY-lez-BUZANCY, THENORGUES, BRIQUENAY, BUZANCY, VILLERS devant-DUN and CLERY-le-PETIT. In spite of bad weather conditions, our aviators, flying at extremely low altitudes, carried out important missions over the MEUSE Valley and along the whole front of attack.

The number of prisoners has risen to more than 4,000 men and 192 officers, among whom are four battalion commanders with their staffs.

The enemy was forced to abandon large quantities of materiel of all kinds. An official count shows that 63 guns of medium and light calibers, and hundreds of machine guns, have been captured. A Bavarian battalion of artillery was taken with its personnel, horses and materiel complete.

In the course of the operations of the past two days south of the river LYs our troops, acting under the command of the king of the Belgians, advanced nearly ten miles, reaching the western bank of the SCHELDT and capturing several hundred prisoners.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported afternoon, November 2: British progress south of VALENCIENNES had, at noon today, reached the line: Eastern outskirts of VALENCIENNES---MARLY---along MARLY-PRESEAU Road---1,500 yards east of PRESEAU---1,000 yards east of MARESCHES. 350 additional prisoners have been taken, and two tanks captured.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army: 25th from reserve Second Army engaged south of 187th, 10th Ersatz withdrawn, 28th Reserve from reserve Army Detachment C engaged south of 214th. Second Army: Jaeger, 208th and 4th withdrawn. First Army: 51st Reserve now engaged east of 80th Reserve, 7th engaged east of 9th Landwehr. Third Army: Divisions entering line: Bavarian 1st from reserve, 31st from line Army Detachment C, 52d from reserve, 18th from line Eighteenth Army, 117th from reserve Nineteenth Army, 88th from line Fifth Army, 213th from line First Army; divisions withdrawn from line: 199th Bavarian 4th, 45th Reserve, 41st, 13th; 37th erroneously re-
ported in line Seventeenth Army is now in reserve Third Army. Fifth Army: 107th engaged east of 28th, 7th Reserve engaged east of 228th, 123d relieves 1st Austro-Hungarian.

Nineteenth Army: 45th Reserve from line Third Army to reserve Nineteenth at ST-MARIE-aux-CHENES.

The following is the presumed order of battle, west to east, from ATTIGNY-to PONT-a-MOUSSON November 1: Third Army: 14th Reserve, 213th, 3d Guard, 242d, Bavarian 1st, 1st Guard, 42d, 202d, 195th, 76th Reserve, 203d; 240th, Bavarian 15th, 31st, 52d, 18th, 117th, 88th. Fifth Army: 28th, 107th, Bavarian 5th Reserve, 123d, 228th, 7th Reserve, 192d, 1st Landwehr, 15th, 33d, Austro-Hungarian 106th. Army Detachment C: Bavarian 3d, 13th Landwehr, 94th, 35th Austro-Hungarian, 5th Landwehr, 224th, 8th Landwehr, Nineteenth Army: 255th, 10th.

D. 77th Division reported morning, November 2: In First army attack on morning, November 1, our troops attacked, meeting machine-gun resistance from large number of well organized and active nests in CHAMPIONEULLES and on the crests of hills to the east of that town. Our troops took heights northwest of CHAMPIONEULLES after hard fighting. Along the entire divisional front our lines were advanced nearly two kilometers.

90th Division reported afternoon, November 2: In spite of the enemy's machine-gun resistance strong detachments of our troops are pushing forward. Our line has been advanced about three kilometers today.

35th Division reported afternoon, November 2: Our patrols penetrated into ZEE, but did not come into contact with the enemy.

28th Division reported evening, November 2: Our troops carried out a successful raid on BOIS BONSEIL, east of LACHAUSSEE Lake, resulting in capture of two officers, 16 noncommissioned officers and 26 privates.

91st Division, operating with the French between the LYS and the SCHELDT, reported November 2: On November 1, our troops, supported by artillery barrage and machine-gun fire, rapidly advanced over six kilometers in spite of activity of enemy artillery and machine-gun fire. The enemy was driven from the west bank of the SCHELDT and at noon, November 1, we were on heights immediately northwest of AUDENARDE.

3 (181) This morning the First Army continued its attack west of the MEUSE. The operation is developing satisfactorily.

It was reported November 2: Advance on Italian front continues. In ASIAGO sector troops have advanced northward to Mt. ZEBIO, Mt. CIMON and Mt. BARBATEL; they have advanced by the BRENTA Valley to CASTELNUOVO and are moving north from GRINGO. West of the PIAVE CESIO and MIS have been occupied and other troops have reached PONTENELLE ALPI and are moving up the PIAVE. Troops are across the LIVENZA River and cavalry has reached the TAGLIAMENTO and SPILIMBERGO.

No reports received to indicate later progress of American, British and French troops than that indicated in their respective official communique, for morning, November 3.

3 (182) A. The American First Army continued its successful attack today, capturing in its advance the following villages: BOULT-aux-Bois, AUTRUCHE, BELLEVILLE-sur-BAR, HARRICOURT, GERMONT, BAR, AUTHE, FOSSE, SOMMAUTHE, BELVAL, NOUART, ST-PIERREMONT, BARRICOURT, TAILLY, HALLES, MONTIGNY, SASSEY, CHATILLON-sur-BAR and BRIEULLES-sur-BAR.

Heavy losses have been inflicted on the enemy, due to the continuous blows during the past month and by the surprise and force of the renewed attack of November 1. Statements of prisoners show that his organizations have been thrown into great confusion. Several complete batteries and whole battalions have been captured by our troops. The number of prisoners now exceeds 5,000 and the number of guns more than 100.

During the past three days we have already penetrated to a depth of 12 miles on an 18 mile front, and gained control of dominating heights which enables us to bring the fire of our heavy artillery on the important railroad lines at MONTMEDY, LONGUYON, and CONFLANS.
Since November 1, 17 German divisions have been identified on the front of the attack, nine of which were in line on that morning; and eight additional divisions have reinforced the line since the beginning of the attack in a futile effort to stop our progress.

In addition to regulars, there were in this attack divisions composed of national army troops from Texas and Oklahoma; from Kansas, Missouri, Colorado and New Mexico; from New York; from New Jersey, Maryland and West Virginia; and from Maryland, the District of Columbia and Virginia.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported afternoon, November 3: East of VALENCIENNES British First Army, maintaining contact with the retiring enemy, is on the general line: SAULTAIN---West of ESTREUX---west of OMNAING---thence to old line.

It was reported November 3: Belgian cavalry, in pursuit of the enemy, has passed BASSEVELDE and SLEVINGE, north of GHENT.


D. It was reported at 6 o'clock evening, November 3: From BELLEVILLE-sur-BAR, where the American First Army is in liaison with the French Fourth Army, the new line of the First Army runs: AUTHE---AUTRUCHE---Les TARONNES Farm---two kilometers east of VAUX---BRONVAUX Farm---Le CHUMPY BAS---just north of TAILLY---QUEAUCLAIR, exclusive---MONTIGNY---Devant SASSEY---MONT-devant-SASSEY---SASSEY-sur-MEUSE---south to CLERY-le-GRAND, exclusive of the basin surrounding HILL 216---CLERY le PETIT---along west bank of the MEUSE---SIVRY, exclusive---VILLENEUVE Farm---southeast to old line.

78th Division reported evening, November 2: Our troops have driven the enemy from the Bois des LOGES and are closely following his retreat.

77th Division reported morning, November 3: We renewed the attack on morning November 2, overcoming slight enemy resistance. Our heavy artillery active on roads and ravines north of CHAMPIGNEULLES. Enemy retreating before our advancing troops.

90th Division reported evening, November 3: Our troops have rapidly advanced six kilometers, meeting slight resistance.

79th Division reported evening, November 2: Our troops fired on enemy patrol of six men, killing all of them.

37th Division reported evening, November 2: During night November 1/2 we consolidated our positions on west bank of the SCHELDT. A crossing of the river was affected at first by small groups, who were later followed by strong detachments. The enemy resistance was by machine-gun and rifle fire. Our troops control the road from the river. We have captured seven 60-mm. guns.

4 (183) Carrying our attack farther into the enemy's territory today, our troops have passed through the Bois de BELVAL and the Bois du Port GERACHE and are on the heights two kilometers south of BEAUMONT. Farther to the west we are approaching VERRIERES. All of the towns situated on the west bank of the MEUSE south of HALLES are now in our hands.

This morning our attack was extended to the east bank of the MEUSE, where it is progressing favorably.

The 37th Division reported November 3: On night November 2/3 our position on east bank of the SCHELDT was improved in spite of enemy artillery and machine-gun fire. Bridgehead established and assured by three and a half battalions infantry and four machine gun companies.

91st Division reported November 3: From east bank of the SCHELDT, in vicinity of EYNE, active machine-gun resistance against our progress towards the river. Our patrols have forced enemy patrols to retire from vicinity of AUDENARDE. An additional enemy division is believed to have been moved to point opposite our front.

It was reported evening, November 3: On the front of the French Fourth Army new
line runs approximately: SEMUY---along south bank of the canal---north edge Bois de VONCQ, and Bois du CHESNE---along the BAR to CHATILLON-sur-BAR, where French are in liaison with American First Army.

It was reported noon, November 3: On a wide front south of the SCHELDT the British First, Third and Fourth Armies in conjunction with the French First Army launched an attack this morning. No details have been received except that the attack was begun satisfactorily.

It was reported evening, November 3: On the Italian front, November 1, seventeen American aviators in Italian planes bombed bridges and enemy troops in vicinity of the TAGLIAMENTO. American troops were also in line in vicinity of the river.

4 (184) A. On the entire front from the MEUSE to the BAR, the First Army continued its advance. On the extreme right, breaking down the last efforts of the enemy to hold the high ground, our troops drove him into the valley of the MEUSE, and forcing their way through the forest of DIEULET, occupied LANEUVILLE opposite the important crossing of the MEUSE at STENAY. The BEAUMONT-STENAY Road is in our possession and our troops are on the heights overlooking BEAUMONT. On the left our line has advanced, in spite of heavy machine-gun and artillery opposition, to GRANDES ARMOISES. The enemy again today threw in fresh troops in an effort to arrest the penetration of his lines by our victorious attack.

Our vigorous advance compelled the enemy to abandon large stores of undamaged munitions, food and engineer materiel.

In the course of the day improving weather conditions permitted our planes to carry out very successfully their missions of reconnaissance and infantry liaison. A raid with a force consisting of 45 day bombardment and 100 pursuit planes was made against MONTMEDY and obtained excellent results on the crowded enemy traffic at that place, over five tons of bombs were dropped. Determined attacks by enemy pursuit gave us added opportunities to destroy his airplanes. During the day's fighting 30 enemy planes were destroyed or driven down out of control and three balloons were burned. Seven of our planes are missing.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported November 4: On the Italian front north of Lake GARDA troops have advanced beyond STENCIO. Between Lake GARDA and the BRENTA the line LEVICO CALDONAZZO has been reached. BORGO has fallen and troops are advancing along the VAL SUGANA. North of FONZASO, Mt. CASTELLO has been reached. The TAGLIAMENTO has been reached. between PINZANO and San VITO, and detachments have crossed the river between San VITO and LATISANA. Railway bridge at LATISANA is intact. The cavalry corps reports surrender of an entire division with 20 batteries. Total prisoners captured during present operation 130,000 Exclusive of two captured divisions. Over 3,000 guns captured.

It was reported 10:20 o'clock evening, November 4: The attack of the British First and Fourth Armies, begun this morning, has reached the following line: East of FESMY---LANDRECIES---CARREFOUR du CHENE---LOCUIGNOL---HERDIGNIES---FRASNOY ---WARGNIES---SEBOURQUIAX---east of ONNAING. 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns have been captured. Note: The report, relative to this operation, contained in noon cable, November 4, was made November 4 instead of November 3 as stated in error.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: Bavarian 16th engaged south of 3d. 1st Naval, 2d Naval, Guard Ersatz, 2d Guard, Bavarian 1st Reserve, 3d Reserve and 36th Reserve withdrawn. Seventeenth Army: 12th from line Sixth Army to reserve northeast of MARESCRES. Second Army: 243d, 17th Reserve and 9th Reserve withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 82d Reserve withdrawn, 24th from reserve Second Army to reserve near FOURMIES. Third Army: 199th engaged west of 1st Guard, 41st engaged east of 115th. Fifth Army: 7th Reserve withdrawn, 37th from Reserve Third Army engaged east of 106th Austro-Hungarian. Army Detachment C: 5th Guard from reserve Third Army engaged west of Bavarian 3d. It now appears to be established that the 201st Division has been dissolved. On November 3 the enemy had in line 137 divisions, and 51 divisions in reserve. Of the divisions in reserve two are rested, one has been out of line from three to four weeks, two from two to three weeks and 12 from one to two weeks and 34 for less than one week.
D. It was reported at 8 o'clock evening, November 4: On front of First Army contact with the enemy has been established and maintained; enemy resistance with machine-gun and artillery fire is stiffening. MAGENTA Farm was captured by the enemy in a counterattack but was later recaptured and is now in our hands. On the front of Second Army numerous fires and explosions of ammunition dumps were observed in the enemy's rear in the region of CHAMBLEY and NOVEANT. Movement of troops convoys on left bank of the MOSELLE, apparently retreating northward, were also reported.

It was reported morning, November 4: Since the beginning of the preparations for the First Army attack of November 1, our airplanes have destroyed and shot down out of control 124 enemy airplanes and burned five balloons. During the same period our losses have been 29 airplanes and five balloons.

79th Division reported 7 o'clock evening, November 4: One of our brigades attacked on left of sector taking 81 prisoners and eight machine guns. Our artillery laid down two barrages in connection with our attack. Strong resistance was encountered and several counterattacks were repulsed. Our troops are reported to have gained position on Hill 378.

26th Division reported 8:45 o'clock evening, November 4: Reconnoitering patrols out during the night met machine-gun, rifle and grenade fire. Enemy line reported to be unchanged and of usual strength. Our troops attempted a raid, supported by artillery fire. Heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and party returned to our lines. An enemy plane was brought down in flames near CREPION.

28th Division reported 6:25 o'clock evening, November 4: Three strong reconnoitering patrols, of one company each, left our lines this morning to determine whether enemy was withdrawing. They encountered heavy machine-gun and harassing artillery fire, and returned to our lines.

5 (185) This morning the First Army resumed the attack. In spite of desperate opposition our troops have forced a crossing of the MEUSE at BRIEULLES and at CLERY-le-PETIT. They are now developing a new line in the heavily wooded and very difficult terrain on the heights east of the river between these points. On the entire front the enemy is opposing our advance with heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, notwithstanding which we are making excellent progress. The west bank of the MEUSE as far north as opposite POUILLY lies in our hands.

In the course of several successful raids in the WOEVRE detachments of the Second Army have penetrated the enemy's trenches, destroying materiel, dugouts and emplacements, and capturing prisoners.

91st Division reported November 5: Enemy machine-gun fire from east bank of the SCHELDT and artillery active on both sides on night November 3/4. Our troops have been withdrawn from line to a billeting area.

It was reported at 9:15 o'clock morning, November 5: Between CHATEAU PORCIEN and SISSONNE the enemy is in retreat, followed by French troops of the Fifth Army who have advanced approximately two kilometers. A battalion of the French Fourth Army has crossed the ARDENNES Canal at Le CHESNE.

No further reports received as to progress of Franco-British attack.

5. (186) A. The First Army under Lieutenant General Liggett has continued its success.

Crossing the river south of DUN-aux-MEUSE under a heavy artillery fire which frequently wrecked the newly constructed bridges, the troops of Major General Hines' Corps fought their way up the slopes of the east bank. Breaking the enemy's strong resistance, they captured HILL 291, HILL 260, LINY-devant-DUN and drove him from the Bois de CHATILLON. During the afternoon our gains in this sector were extended northward; DUN-sur-MEUSE was captured and our line pushed forward a mile beyond that town, as far as the village of MILLY.

The troops of Major General Summerall's Corps reached the river at CESSE and LUZY and mopped up the forest of JAULNAY. The important road center of BEAUMONT fell
before our victorious forces, who pushed on to the Bois de l'HOSPICE, two miles north of that town, capturing in their advance the village of LETANNE. At BEAUMONT we liberated 500 French citizens, who welcomed our soldiers as deliverers.

The advance of the past two days has carried our line to points within five miles of the SEDAN-METZ Railroad, one of the main lines of communication of the German armies.

Between BEAUMONT and the BAR, Major General Dickman's Corps, in close liaison with the French Fourth Army on its left, pushed forward under heavy artillery and machine-gun fire through the rugged forest areas beyond STONNE. The villages of YONCQ, La BESACE and STONNE were taken.

We have taken today west of the MEUSE, fifty-one additional guns, making a total of more than one hundred fifty since November 1.

Thirty of our bombing planes executed a successful raid on MOUZON and RAUCOURT this morning, dropping over two tons of bombs with good effect. Reconnaissance and pursuit squadrons carried out many successful missions, machine gunning enemy troops and greatly assisting the advance of our infantry. Seventeen enemy airplanes were shot down and two enemy balloons burned. Seven of our planes are missing.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 10:15 o'clock evening, November 5: The new line reached by the British and French armies, south of the SCHELDT, runs: CONDE-sur-SCHELDT---VICQ---ANGRE---ANGREAU---ROISIN---AMFROIPRET---FORET MORMAL, inclusive---BERLAIMONT---NOYELLES---Le GRAND FAYT---PRISCHES---BARZY---Le NOUVION---ESQUEHERIES---LAVQUERESSE---MALZY---RICAUMONT---Le NEUVILLE---MARLE---EBEULEAU---BUCY---DIZY---Le GRANGE---WALEPPE---St-FERGEUX---CHATEAU PORCIEN. The line on the extreme right of the French Fourth Army runs: DAY Farm---CHATEAU de Bois l'ABBE---south of LOUVERGNY---southern border of Bois de la CASSINE---southern border of Bois du MONT DIEU.

Changes in German order of battle: Seventeenth Army: 35th, 214th and III withdrawn; 12th engaged south of 48th Reserve. Second Army: 12th Reserve from line Sixth Army engaged south of 206th, 4th engaged south of 113th, 239th from line First Army engaged south of 4th, Jaeger engaged south of 14th, 18th Reserve withdrawn, 22d Reserve from reserve Eighteenth Army engaged south of 54th. Eighteenth Army: 18th from line Third Army engaged south of 79th Reserve, 9th from reserve First Army engaged south of 29th. Seventh Army: 3d Naval from reserve Second Army relieves 10th Reserve. Third Army: 103d withdrawn, 236th from reserve Fifth Army engaged east of 41st. Fifth Army: 117th from line Third Army engaged east of Bavarian 5th Reserve, 20th engaged east of 123d. Army Detachment C: Austro-Hungarian 35th withdrawn.

D. It was reported at 6:15 evening, November 5: On the front of the First Army the line runs from west to east: one kilometer east of TANNAY---GRANDES ARMOISES---STONNE---BEAUMONT---greater part of FORET de JAULNAY---LUZY---CESSE---LANEUVILLE-HILL---205---WISEPPE---VILLEFRANCHE---SAULMORY---SASSEY---along west bank of the MEUSE to east of JUPILLE Farm---across the MEUSE to DUN-sur-MEUSE, inclusive---HILL 292---HILL 260---LINY-devant-DUN---center of Bois de SARTELLE---VILOSNES, inclusive---SIVRY, inclusive---thence to old line.

5th Division reported 5 o'clock evening, November 5: Our troops, in spite of strong enemy resistance, forced passage over the MEUSE and the canal at CLERY le PETIT and BRIEULLES and continued active operations northward. They took DUN-sur-MEUSE and MILLY, capturing over 75 prisoners, including one officer. All new positions firmly held. Our artillery continued harassing fire on the enemy.

79th Division reported 8:40 o'clock evening, November 5: Our patrols active, encountering strong enemy resistance, principally fire from machine guns which are echeloned in depth lightly supported by infantry. Our artillery active with harassing and counterbattery fire and gas concentrations. Enemy harassing fire continued with large quantities of mustard gas...
92d Division reported at 7:30 o'clock evening, November 5: Eleven of our reconnaissance and combat patrols, supported by artillery fire, active and encountered enemy machine-gun fire.

26th Division reported at 8:20 o'clock evening, November 5: Our reconnaissance patrols were very active and found enemy dispositions and line strength unchanged. A raiding party from our lines, supported by box barrage was unable to penetrate enemy's heavily wired line which was defended by machine guns. Harassing artillery fire from both sides; enemy's fire, from large caliber guns, directed on our battery positions and rear areas.

28th Division reported at 5 o'clock evening, November 5: One of our patrols last night captured 14 prisoners at MARIMBOIS Farm; another patrol destroyed dugouts and pillboxes in vicinity of the farm and captured 12 prisoners.

33d Division reported at 7:45 o'clock evening, November 5: One of our numerous patrols engaged an enemy outpost, killing 3 and capturing 17 of the enemy.

35th Division reported at 3 o'clock afternoon, November 5: Five of our reconnaissnce patrols failed to gain contact with the enemy. Two enemy balloons were burned and one Allied balloon was brought down.

6 (187) Between the BAR and the MEUSE the American First Army continued its advance northward, opposed by strong resistance.

Our troops are in the Bois du FOND de LIMON, whence the line extends through FLABA, MAISONCELLE and CHEMERY.

On the line of the MEUSE which we now hold from the Bois de l'HOSPIRE, inclusive to SASSEY, and on the heights to the east of MILLY and thence to DUN-sur-MEUSE, there was severe artillery and machine-gun fighting during the night.

Franco-American units, operating in the difficult terrain east of the MEUSE against positions long held by the enemy on the front SIVRY to the Bois de la GRANDE MONTAGNE, are heavily engaged.

During successful air combats, yesterday afternoon, 3 additional enemy planes were brought down. All of our machines returned.

It was reported at 11:05 o'clock morning, November 6: Hostile artillery activity along the SCHELDT. The British First, Third and Fourth Armies this morning continued their advance south of CONDE. No details received.

No report received as to progress of French armies; and, other than the morning American official communique no information of importance from the the American armies.

6 (188) A. The American First Army has made further important gains on both sides of the MEUSE.

East of the MEUSE our troops advanced to a depth of more than four kilometers. Neither the extremely difficult nature of the terrain nor the two fresh divisions hurriedly brought up by the enemy greatly delayed our progress. On the COTE St-Germain, however, the enemy defended his positions with particular obstinacy, and we were able to secure them only as a result of a bitter struggle. Near MURVAUX, HILL 284, and FONTAINES fell into our hands. The battle still continues, with the enemy making desperate efforts to maintain a last foothold on the heights of the MEUSE which he has held since 1914.

West of the MEUSE the enemy again failed to check our rapid progress. Along the river bank we took VILLEMONTRY and MONTE de BRUNE and reached the western outskirts of MOUZON. To the west our line passes through AUTRECOURT and BEAU MENIL Farm to CONNAGE. We have also taken BULSON, HARAUCAOURT and the important town, RAUCOURT.

Since the beginning of our attack on November 1, 22 enemy divisions have appeared on our front between the MEUSE and the ARGONNE.

Our pursuit planes dropped a ton of explosives on several important road centers which were being used by the enemy to make his escape. Seven enemy airplanes were shot down during the day. Two of our machines are missing.

B. Nothing to report.
C. It was reported at 9:45 o'clock evening, November 6: On the British front north of the CONDE Canal there has been considerable artillery activity. On the front of the British First and Third Armies, south of the canal, there was considerable opposition today. The line from FRESNES southward runs: Two kilometers east of VICQ---ANGRE---ROISIN---MEURAIN---BETTRECHIES---west and south of BAVAY---MEQUIGNIES---west of HARGNIES---AULNOYE---LEVAL---MARBAIX---CARTIGNIES---BEAUREPAIRE. Several hundred prisoners have been captured.

It was reported at 11:40 o'clock evening, November 6: On the front of the French Fourth Army progress towards the MEUSE continues, reaching the following general line: Bois du MONT DIEU---Bois de la CASSINE---CHAGNY-les-OMONT---JONVAL---GUINCOURT---TOURTERON---ECORDEL---SOUCY---BANTHEMON---AUBONCOURT-VAUZELLES. Thence the line of the French Fifth Army, which took RETHEL and many villages, runs approximately: DYONNE---CAMP Romain---touching railway AMAND-LIART---DOUMELY-BEGNY---west edge CHAUMONT-PORCIEN---VAUX-les-RUBIGNY. To the north the French army has also made rapid progress, reaching the general line: ROZAY-sur-SERRE---RENEVAL---northern part of Bois-du-VAL St-PIERRE---HARY---VERVINS---FONTAINE-les-VERVINS---FORET-du-REGNEVAL---eastern edge FORET-du-NOUVION. In all of the French operations prisoners and materiel have been captured.

Changes in German order of battle: Fourth Army: 3d Reserve engaged south of Bavarian 16th, 39th relieved 23d Reserve. Seventeenth Army: 111th reengaged south of 12th, 25th and 220th Divisions withdrawn. Second Army: 44th Reserve engaged south of 14th, 8th withdrawn, 18th Reserve engaged north of 58th. Eighteenth Army: 5th Reserve engaged south of 238th, 34th engaged south of 2d. Seventh Army: 86th reengaged south of 3d Naval. Third Army: 10th from line Nineteenth Army engaged east of 236th. Fifth Army: 32d relieved Austro-Hungarian 106th. 1st, 35th and 106th Austro-Hungarian are considered as having been withdrawn from the western front, this reducing the number of enemy divisions on this front to 185. The following is the presumed German order of battle, west to east, from ATTIGNY to PONT-a-MOUSSON, November 5: 14th Reserve, 213th, 3d Guard, 242d, Bavarian 1st, 199th, 1st Guard, 42d, 202d, 105th, 76th Reserve, 203d, 240th Bavarian 15th, 31st, 52d, 41st, 18th, 236th, 32d, 115th, 88th, 27th, 28th, 107th, Bavarian 5th Reserve, 117th, 123d, 20th, 228th, 192d, 33d, 1st Landwehr, 15th, 10th, 37th, 5th Guard, Bavarian 3d, 13th Landwehr, 94th, 5th Landwehr, 224th, 8th Landwehr, 255th, 31st Landwehr. Brigade.

D. First Army reported at 8 o'clock evening, November 6: The line of the First Army runs: CONNAGE---one kilometer north of BULSON---BEAU MENIL Farm---southeast to the southeast of HARAUCOURT---MONT de BRUNE---VILLEMONTRY---LETANNE---west bank of the MEUSE to LUZY---CESSE---LENEUVEILLE---WISSEPE---VILLEFRANCHES---SAULMAURY---SASSEY---east across the river to LION-devant-DUN-MURVAUX---FONTAINES---VILOSNES---south of SIVRY---La BORNE de CORNOULLER, inclusive---thence to old line.

77th Division reported, November 5: Our troops engaged in severe fighting just north of OCHES, east of La POLKA Farm and in the Bois St-PIERREMONT. Our troops overcame the strong enemy resistance along his entire line and by noon had taken STONNE and La BESACE. Our artillery was active, firing on enemy's retreating columns. Enemy artillery active with harassing fire. Aviation active on both sides, enemy flying over our front lines and machine gunning our advancing troops. Two enemy planes were brought down.

92d Division reported 8:30 o'clock, November 6: Raiding and patrol activity marked on both sides, supported by artillery and machine-gun fire.

79th Division reported 7:30 o'clock evening, November 6: In local fighting our troops took seven prisoners on the left of our sector.

26th Division reported evening, November 6: Our patrols, supported by artillery concentration fire, were active, bringing in four prisoners.

7 (189) At 4 o'clock yesterday afternoon advance troops of the American First Army took that part of the city of SEDAN which lies on the west bank of the MEUSE.
The bridge leading across the MEUSE into the remainder of the city, which is filled with the retreating enemy, has been destroyed and the valley of the river flooded; the railroad bridges have also been destroyed. The enemy's principal lateral line of communication between the fortress of METZ and his troops in northern France and Belgium is, by the success of the American army, no longer open to him.

All French territory west of the MEUSE within the zone of action of the American army has now been cleared of the enemy by the gallant and dashing advance of our troops.

Since November 1, we have advanced 40 kilometers, broken down all enemy resistance, freed 700 square kilometers of France, liberated 2,000 civilians who joyfully hailed our soldiers as deliverers, captured nearly 6,000 prisoners including an unusually large proportion of officers, and great quantities of arms, munitions, stores and supplies.

It was reported at 10:30 o'clock evening, November 6: On the Italian front the American 332d Infantry under Colonel William Wallace, left TREVISO at 10:30 o'clock evening, October 29, as part of Italian 31st Division attached to Tenth Army. After four days of forced marches they reached the TAGLIAMENTO near VALVASONE at 3 o'clock afternoon, November 3. 2d Battalion with detachments from 1st and 3d Battalions, with machine gun detachment with 16 guns, crossed TAGLIAMENTO by single plank over wreckage of destroyed bridge at PONTE de la DELIZIA between 3:45 and 5:20 o'clock morning, November 4, in face of machine-gun fire from front and flank. Troops deployed on left bank of the river and pushed forward ten miles to final objective, VILLORBA, where they were at 3 o'clock afternoon when Armistice went into effect. American casualties were one enlisted man killed and seven wounded. The American regiment was the first infantry organization across the TAGLIAMENTO. Large stores of munitions, transport and field piece captured. In conjunction with the British on our left and the Italians on our right large numbers of prisoners were taken.

It was reported at 11:25 o'clock morning, November 7: Great activity of the enemy's artillery along the entire Belgian front from early this morning. The French Group of Artilleries of the Center and the Group of Artilleries of Reserve have continued their pursuit of the enemy this morning.

A. The American First Army continued its offensive, starting with a precarious footing on the east bank of the MEUSE, in a region of unusual natural difficulties and defended by an enemy rendered desperate by the knowledge that the heights north of VERDUN were vital to his plan. The 5th Division, and National Guard troops from Wisconsin and Michigan, employed in this operation, have slowly but steadily fought their way throughout these days of continuous battle. In this region we now hold LION-devant-DUN, the heights overlooking BRANDEVILLE, three kilometers east of HARAUMONT, SILLON-FONTAINE Farm, and thence southeast to the old line.

The Rainbow Division and units of the 1st Division seized the heights south and southeast of SEDAN and the suburbs of that city, lying on the west bank of the MEUSE. The entire region between the MEUSE and the BAR has now been liberated by the American First Army in close cooperation with the French Fourth Army.

In the WOEVRÉ the troops of our Second Army have executed a number of highly successful raids, entering the enemy's lines and returning with 50 prisoners.

The number of guns of all calibers taken by the American First Army since November 1 now exceeds 250. A partial count of captured munitions and materiel shows more than 2,000 machine guns, over 5,000 rifles, 75 trench mortars, many antitank guns, several hundred thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, nearly 3,000,000 rounds of small arms ammunition and much other materiel.

A regiment of American infantry particularly distinguished itself in the final victorious in Italy.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, November 7: At latest reports the line on the front of the French Fourth Army ran: South of SEDAN---OMICOURT---TERRON-les-VENDRESSE---CHAGNY-les-OMONT---Les TAILLES---La HORGNE---MAZERNY---south of VILLERS-le-TOURNEUR---north of NOVION-PORCIEN.
Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army: 8th from reserve Second Army relieves 16th, 36th engaged south of 4th Ersatz. Second Army: 243d engaged south of 58th, 121st engaged south of 22d. Third Army: 103d engaged east of 240th, 14th Reserve now engaged east of 76th Reserve. Fifth Army: 241st from reserve Army Detachment C engaged east of Bavarian 5th Reserve.

D. It was reported at 6:30 o'clock evening, November 7: The line on the front of the First Army, at latest report, ran: WADELINCOURT---along west bank of the MEUSE including all towns to VILLEFRANCHE---across the MEUSE to HILL 212---north of LION---devant-DUN---BRANDEVILLE---one kilometer west of BREHEVILLE---through the Bois de BREHEVILLE---HARAUMONT---south to SILLONFONTAINE Farm.

I Corps reported evening, November 6: Our troops continued their successful advance, forcing the enemy to retire. The towns of FLABA, RAUCOURT, HARAUCOURT and AUTRECOURT have been taken and patrols have pushed on as far as the MEUSE. The civilian population found in the towns was sent to the rear as rapidly as possible to protect them from enemy artillery fire which was concentrated on towns. Large quantities of materiel was captured during the advance.

5th Division reported evening, November 6: Following heavy bombardment on enemy position our troops attacked this morning, rapidly overcoming the enemy resistance and capturing LION-devant-DUN, MURVAUX, FONTAINES and VILOSNES-sur-MEUSE. More than 250 prisoners were taken.

5th Division reported 6:15 o'clock evening, November 7: Our troops, supported by artillery fire, continued their advance despite enemy's continued resistance, principally with machine guns. Most of our artillery crossed the east bank of the MEUSE, following in support of infantry. Additional prisoners taken: Two officers and 132 men.

33d Division reported at midnight, November 6: One of our patrols, of 9 men, was surprised and captured.

28th Division reported at 3:30 o'clock afternoon, November 7: In a raid from left subsector, evening November 6, into the Le SEJOUR Bois our troops cleared the wood and captured 14 prisoners and one machine gun.

92d Division reported at 8:45 o'clock evening, November 7: Our troops repulsed an enemy raid, supported by machine-gun fire, on PORT-sur-SEILLE, in the vicinity of VANDIERES, and captured prisoners.

8 (191) On both sides of the MEUSE the night was marked by heavy machine gun fighting and sniping. There was heavy artillery fire in the region of SEDAN and east of the MEUSE.

First Army reported at 11:15 o'clock morning, November 8: Crossings over the MEUSE have been made at REMILLY and VILLERS-devant-MOUZON. A battalion of the 77th Division crossed the river at VILLERS-devant-MOUZON.

It was reported at 11:15 o'clock morning, November 8: Troops of the French Fourth Army crossed the BAR before daybreak and have occupied St-AIGNAN and FRENOIS. Patrols pushed forward as far as TORCY.

8 (192) A. This afternoon, French and American units operating under the command of the American First Army wrested from the enemy his last hold on the heights east of the MEUSE, memorable as the scene of the great battle of VERDUN in 1916, and drove him back into the lowlands of the WOEVRE.

On a front of 14 kilometers we advanced to a depth of 6 kilometers, taking LISSEY, ECUREY, BREHEVILLE, PEUVILLERS, DAMVILLERS, FLABAS and other towns and villages.

Along the line of the MEUSE from VILLEFRANCHE to WADELINCOURT, lively artillery and machine gun combats have taken place during the day. Six additional guns of heavy caliber, many more machine guns, two thousand rifles, and a large airplanes workshop, captured during our advance west of the MEUSE, have been reported.

In the WOEVRE, on the front of the American Second Army, our patrols were very active, capturing prisoners in the course of several successful enterprises near Lake La CHAUSSEE.

Despite adverse weather conditions, our aviators, flying at a height of 100 meters, carried out a number of reconnaissance missions. They bombed and machined gunned
concentrations of enemy troops in the region of BAALON and REMOIVILLE and blew up an ammunition dump at GIBERCY. Four enemy balloons were destroyed and three enemy airplanes were shot down during the day. One of our planes is missing.

B. Nothing to report.


D. First Army reported at 6:15 o'clock evening, November 8: The line on the front of the First Army at last report ran: WADELINCOURT---along west bank of the MEUSE to VILLEFRANCHE----HILL 212---north of LION-devant-DUN---La SENTINELLE---BRANDEVILLE---BREHEVILLE---PEUVILLERS---REVILLE---south of BELLEU Bois---FLABAS---eastern edge of Bois des CAURES---thence south to old line.

2d Division reported evening, November 7: This morning our troops cleared the west bank of the MEUSE, at MOUZON, of the remaining machine guns and snipers. Enemy artillery active on roads in our rear, and trench mortar and machine-gun fire from the east bank of the river.

2d Division reported at 6:20 o'clock evening, November 8: Our patrols crossed the MEUSE south of MOUZON. The enemy continues severe harassing and machine-gun fire on roads in our rear.

33d Division reported at 11:30 o'clock evening, November 7: Our troops, aided by barrage fire, carried out a successful raid on CHATEAU AULNOIS, capturing one officer and 22 men. One of our men was slightly wounded.

26th Division reported 7:20 o'clock evening, November 8: One of our patrols, while carrying out a relief, engaged an enemy patrol of four men, killing one of them and capturing the other three.

92d Division reported 7 o'clock evening, November 8: In the vicinity of the MOSELLE strong combat patrols were sent out from our lines. Four prisoners were captured and casualties were inflicted on the enemy.

81st, 89th and 90th Divisions reported evening, November 8: Active patrolling along respective sectors.

9 (193) East of the MEUSE, in the region north and south of DAMVILLERS, our advance successfully continues, meeting strong resistance from machine-gun fire.

Along the line of the MEUSE from SASSEY to WADELINCOURT, the night was marked by artillery and machine-gun fighting.

American First Army reported at 10:55 o'clock morning, November 9: No important change on the front of the First Army.

5th Division reported 4:55 o'clock morning, November 9: Our troops have consolidated and made secure our new positions, and despite stubborn resistance principally from machine guns, have driven enemy from Bois du CARROL and La SENTINELLE and captured BRANDEVILLE. Our artillery fire continued active harassing of enemy front and rear areas. In these operations our troops captured 47 prisoners, four 210 caliber guns, 125 machine guns and other materiel.

33d Division reported 9 o'clock morning, November 9: One of our patrols of one company captured eight prisoners in Bois de WAVRILLE. In a raid on ST-HILAIRE, supported by artillery, our troops captured one prisoner.

9 (194) A. Opposed by machine-gun fire from retreating hostile rearguards, troops of the American First Army, in cooperation with French units serving under the same command, gained additional important areas east of the MEUSE, today.

Crossing the river south of STENAY, our troops captured MOUZAY. Pushing rapidly through the FORET de WOEVRE from the west and southwest, they converged on JAMATZ, 13 kilometers east of the MEUSE, which with LOUPPY-sur-LOISON and REMOIVILLE, was taken.

On the front south of DAMVILLERS, MOIREY, CHAUMONT and MANHEULLES, though vigorously defended, fell before our advance.
Despite heavy rains and mist, our aviators executed reconnaissance missions, and successfully bombed and machine gunned enemy troops in the vicinity of MONTMEDY.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported at 8 o'clock evening, November 9: The French Fourth Army has taken MEZIERES and are approaching CHARLEVILLE.

It was reported at 3:20 o'clock afternoon, November 9: On the front of the British front the advance of all armies continues. British troops have reached the following general line: BERCHEM---CELLES---CHEMIN VERT---TOURNAI---east of ANTOING---PERUWELZ---to junction of Canal MONS-CONDE with ANTOING Canal---JEMAPPES---AULNOIS---ASSEVENT (east of MAUBEUGE)---SARS POTERIES---SAINS-du-NORD.

Changes in German order of battle: Four Army: 23d engaged south of 119th, 207th and 6th Cavalry withdrawn. Seventeenth Army: 25th engaged south of 28th Reserve, 48th Reserve withdrawn, 111th withdrawn. Second Army: 44th Reserve now engaged north of 18th Reserve, 21st Reserve, 113th and 58th withdrawn. Eighteenth Army: 1st Reserve engaged south of 5th Reserve. Seventh Army: 1st from reserve First Army engaged east of 50th Reserve, 105th from line Eighteenth Army engaged north of 24th Reserve. First Army: 199th from line Third Army engaged east of 9th Landwehr. Third Army: 7th from line First Army engaged west of 1st Guard, 76th Reserve, Bavarian 15th, 41st and 13th withdrawn. Fifth Army: 123d withdrawn. Since the American attack was launched on November 1, 19 new enemy divisions have been identified on the American front. On November 8 the enemy had in line on the western front 142 divisions and 34 divisions in reserve. Of the divisions in reserve two are reated, one has been out of line from three to four weeks, three from two to three weeks, eight from one to two weeks and 29 for less than one week.

D. First Army reported at 8 o'clock evening, November 9: The line on the front of the First Army at lastest report ran: WADELINCOURT---along west bank of the MEUSE toVILLEFRANCHE---MOUZAY---CHARMOIS---through FORET de WOEVRE---REMOIVILLE---LOUPPY-sur-LOISON---JAMETZ---railroad one kilometer northeast of BREHEVILLE---PEUCILLERS---500 meters west of DAMVILLERS---CHAUMONT-devant-DAMCILLE---ORNES---DIEPPE---MORANVILLE---CHATEAU d'AULNOIS---FRESNES.

33d Division reported at 9:28 o'clock evening, November 9: Strong combat patrols active along entire divisional front, meeting heavy machine-gun resistance on PINTHEVILLE Road.

79th Division reported evening, November 9: Our troops are advancing in generally northeasterly direction with right flank in Bois de DAMVILLERS.

90th Division reported at 8 o'clock evening, November 9: Our troops, supported by artillery fire, advanced in direction of GREMILLY, ORNES and BEZONVAUX, in spite of enemy's rearguard machine-gun resistance.

10 (195) Along the front of the First Army on the west bank of the MEUSE and from MOUZAY to FRESNES-en-WOEVRE, the night was marked by heavy artillery fire and by sharp machine-gun fighting.

Second Army reported evening, November 9: Our patrols and raiding parties penetrated enemy's first lines, but short distance beyond they encountered strong resistance. Enemy active in patrolling; and enemy artillery fire increased along the entire front.

5th Division reported midnight, November 9: Our patrols drove the enemy, whose resistance was principally with machine-gun fire, from MOUZAY, inflicting many casualties and capturing six prisoners.

77th Division reported evening, November 9: Two of our patrols succeeded in crossing the MEUSE in daylight and reconnoitering the terrain on northern bank of the river. Another patrol of one officer and one man crossed the river at night and entered AMBLIMONT which is occupied by the enemy. Our artillery fire limited to machine-gun emplacements and crossroads. Enemy artillery active with heavy caliber harassing fire on all roads in our rear.

First Army reported at 11:50 o'clock morning, November 10: Situation unchanged on front of the First Army, except that 90th Division is advancing towards BAALON, encountering no resistance.
A series of local operations by the American First and Second Armies resulted in considerable gains, today, at many points along the line between the MEUSE and the MOSELLE.

Troops of the First Army, with whom French units are operating, reached the southern outskirts of STENAY and occupied Bois de CHENOIS, south of BAALON. Beyond the eastern slopes of the heights of the MEUSE, the villages of GIBERCY, ABAUCOURT and GRIMAUCOURT were taken.

In the WOEVRÉ, despite stubborn resistance from machine guns and heavy artillery, troops of the Second Army penetrated the enemy’s lines and drove him from several well organized and strongly held positions. The towns of MARCHEVILLE and ST-HILAIRE were taken and the Bois DONMARF were cleared of the enemy.

B. Nothing to report.


D. 89th Division reported at 4:40 o'clock afternoon, November 10: One of our patrols crossed the MEUSE and captured 3 prisoners just east of LETANNE. Our artillery continued heavy harassing fire on enemy sensitive points.

33d Division reported at 9 o'clock evening, November 10: Our troops carried out a successful raid on MARCHEVILLE, occupying the town and taking 80 prisoners, including 3 officers. Our artillery was active in support of this and other patrolling operations. Our patrols in vicinity of RAVILLE and PINTHEVILLE did not penetrate into the towns.

28th Division reported at 5 o'clock afternoon, November 10: Our patrols are keeping in constant contact with the enemy and have progressed to include on their lines Ferme des HAUTE JOURNAUX, northern edge Bois des HAUDRONVILLES BAS, HAUMONT, MARIMBOIS Farm and Bois DOMMARTIN.

VI Corps reported November 8 following details of repulsed enemy raid, reported by 92d Division on November 7 and reported in American official communique, Section D, November 7: An enemy patrol of 3 officers and 178 men was driven from Bois FREHAUT by machine-gun and artillery fire.

In accordance with terms of the Armistice, hostilities on the fronts of the American armies were suspended at 11 o'clock this morning.

First Army reported at 10:55 o'clock evening, November 10: The line on the front of the First Army at latest reports ran: STENAY---west of BAALON---through northern part Bois de WOEVRÉ---LOUPHY---REMOIVILLE---JAMETZ---eastern edge of Bois de LISSEY---western edge Bois de DAMVILLERS---DAMVILLERS exclusive, one kilometer north of CHAUMONT ---MOIREY, inclusive---HERBEBOIS---Le CHAUME---BEZONVAUX---DIEPPE, exclusive---ABAUCOURT---GRIMAUCOURT---CHATEAU d'ÂULNOIS.

Second Army reported evening, November 10: The operation which began this morning for the purpose of taking advantage of any weakness on the enemy’s front, occasioned by his preparation for a withdrawal, met stiff rifle and machine-gun resistance. We made slight progress.

37th Division reported November 10: 73d Infantry Brigade, operating under French XXXIV Corps, attacked at 7 o'clock this morning to force crossing of the SCHELDT in force. Violent enfilade machine-gun fire, heavy artillery fire and the flooded condition of the terrain delayed construction of bridges and crossing. At 10:45, American 146th Regiment crossed the river at HEUVEL and began advance eastward. Later report states:

"In face of continuous heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and in spite of difficult terrain our troops continued to cross the SCHELDT, and advanced about two kilometers, taking NEDERZWALM-HERMELGEM."

A. Nothing to report.

B. Nothing to report.
C. Changes in German order of battle: Sixth Army: 10 Ersatz from reserve Seventeenth Army engaged south of 36th. Seventeenth Army: 82d from reserve Eighteenth Army engaged east of 86th. First Army: 10th Reserve from reserve Seventh Army engaged west of Bavarian 8th Reserve, 50th from line Seventh Army engaged east of 9th Landwehr, 7th from line Third Army engaged east of 51st Reserve. Third Army: 199th from line First Army engaged west of 213th. Fifth Army: 13th from reserve Third Army engaged east of 88th, 75th Reserve from reserve Army Detachment A engaged east of 228th. The entrance of the 75th Reserve Division into line of Fifth Army, opposite American First Army front, increased to 20 the number of new enemy divisions identified on the American front since the American attack was launched on November 1. This division had been out of line for 40 days and was one of the enemy's two rested divisions.

D. 3d Division reported afternoon, November 11: In yesterday's operations of our troops advanced about three kilometers east of BREHEVILLE.

33d Division reported 6:20 o'clock evening, November 11: Strong patrols from our lines engaged in sharp fighting and captured 83 men and three officers. This morning we attacked, but were halted in accordance with Armistice terms.

92d Division reported November 11: Our troops began an advance at 7 o'clock morning, November 10, reaching Bois FREHAUT, Bois de la VOIVRETTE and Bois CHEMINOT and capturing some prisoners. All these positions are being consolidated.

5th Division reported evening, November 11: Despite increased resistance by machine-gun and artillery fire we continued to advance our lines and captured 18 prisoners, three large caliber guns, six minenwefer and large quantities of materiel.

It was reported at 11:30 o'clock morning, November 11: On the left of the French army of Belgium, American troops have crossed the SCHELDT east of HEUVEL, advancing on the south 15 kilometers and on the center from the vicinity of AUundenarde seven kilometers.

12 (199) A. Nothing to report.
B. Nothing to report
C. Nothing to report.
D. It was reported evening, November 10: The commanding general of the French army of Belgium states that he feels himself fortunate to have had American divisions under his orders. He desires to express his admiration of the Americam 37th Division and its commanding general. The first crossing of the SCHELDT under fire he terms a brilliant manoeuvre, efficiently carried out. He further expresses his high opinion of the discipline, organization, initiative and combative qualities of the 37th Division.

89th Division reported noon, November 12: During night of November 10/11 our troops crossed the MEUSE at POUILLY, INOR and STENAY.

26th Division reported evening, November 11: After active night patrolling and artillery preparation fire, our troops continued their operations begun on November 10 and moved against a series of strongly organized enemy defenses. The operation was terminated at 11 o'clock, in accordance with Armistice conditions.

71th Division reported evening, November 11: Our troops consolidated their new positions and our patrols across the river were in contact with the enemy.

13 (200) A. Nothing to report.
B. Nothing to report.
C. Nothing to report.
D. It was reported that: The front line of the American First Army at the conclusion of hostilities at 11 o'clock morning, November 11, ran approximately as follows: West to east (coordinates refer to 1/20,000 Plan Directeur) PONT MAUGIS---west bank of MEUSE---BELLE-FONFAlNE Farm Point 311.7-311.4---INOR, exclusive---MEUSE River to point in river at first bend north of STENAY---STENAY, inclusive---La JARDINETIE Farm, inclusive---eastern edge of Bois du CHESNOIS---ROBINSON, inclusive (20.9-99.8)---thence to southwest corner of Bois ROBERT---along road to Point 243-99.3---thence to Crossroad 239 (25.8-97.9)---thence along road to Crossroad 228---thence to point 100 meters
south of HUGNE Farm---400 meters north of LOUPPY---400 meters northeast of REMOIVILLE---
four meters east of JAMETZ-PEUVILLERS Road one kilometer south of JAMETZ Church---thence 
south along eastern edge of Bois BOEMONT and Bois de LISSEY to Point 29.9-89.5 on 
VITTARVILLE-ECUREY Road---thence to Point 30.5-89.2 on JAMETZ-PEUVILLERS Road---thence 
due south to bridge over the THINTE at 30.4-87.5---along the River THINTE east of 
DAMVILLERS---thence to Cote 319, inclusive---500 meters east of CHAUMONT devant 
DAMVILLERS---VILLE devant CRAUMONT, inclusive---west edge of HERBEOIS---two kilometers 
west of ORNES---thence to BEZONVAUX, inclusive---one kilometer west of DIEPPE---ABACOURT 
---inclusive---Bois le PETIT COGNON---west edge Bois de la CHABOTTE and Bois de la FAYEL--- 
across the Bois de MANHEULLES to crossroads two kilometers east of village of MANHEULLES. 

It was reported that: The front line of the American Second Army at the con­
cclusion of hostilities at 11 o’clock morning, November 11, ran approximately as follows: 
West to east chateau and Ferme d’AULNOIS, inclusive---southern part of RAIVALLE---southern 
edges MARCHEVILLE---St-HILAIRE, inclusive---BUTgneVILLE, inclusive---point on HARVILLE- 
JONVILLE Road at northern edge of Bois d’HARVILLE---northern tip of Bois des HARAVILLERS 
---Ferme des Pts. JOURNAUX---northeastern edge of Bois des HAUDRONVILLES BAS---north­ 
estern tip of land 700 meters northeast of FRANCHEVILLE Farm---point 300 meters south of 
southwestern corner of Bois BONSEIL---MARIMBOIS Farm, inclusive---Bois de DOMMARTIN, 
inclusive---point on XAMMES CHAREY Road one kilometer southwest of CHAREY---point 500 
meters southwest of MON PLAISIR Farm---crest of Ridge 323 at a point 100 meters north of 
south edge of woods---crossroads at eastern tip of Bois du TROU de la HAIE---point 600 
meters south of Anc. Min. de PRENY---CARRE at eastern end of Bois des RAPPEES---Cote 327--- 
VANDIERES, inclusive---MOSELLE River one kilometer southwest of CHAMPEY---Bois FREHAUT, 
inclusive---Bois de la VOIVROTTE, inclusive---northern tip of Bois de CHEMINOT---point 
on SEILLE River 500 meters east of Bois de CHEMINOT---SEILLE River to point 700 meters 
southeast of PORT sur SEILLE.

17 (201) A. This morning the American Third Army under the command of Major General 
Dickman began its march into the territory evacuated by the enemy in accordance with the 
terms of the Armistice. At nightfall advance elements had reached the line ECOUVIEZ--- 
SORBEY---GOURAINCOURT---MARS la-TOUR.

18 (201) A. The Third Army continued its advance today into the territory evacuated by 
the enemy.

On the left crossing the Belgian frontier, our troops occupied VIRTON and by 
evening had reached ETALLE and St-LEGER. Between the CHIERS and the MOSELLE they passed 
through SPINCOURT and the important railroad centers of LONGUYON and CONFLANS. At the 
close of the day they entered the historic French fortress of LONGWY, situated at the 
junction of the boundaries of France, Belgium and Luxemburg. Farther south they have 
occupied AUDUN-le-ROMAN and the town of BRIEY, the center of the great iron district of 
LORRAINE.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported evening, November 17: The Allied Army in Belgium began its 
advance on morning of November 17. During the day the cavalry reached the approximate 
line: STRYTHEM---LIEDEKERKE---ALOST---TERMONDE---ANTWERP. infantry units reached the 
line: NINOVE---BORSBEKE---BAAVEGEM---SCHELLEBELLE---CALCKEN.

D. Nothing to report.

19 (203) A. On the front of the Third Army the day passed without incident, our troops 
occupying the general line ETALLE---St-LEGER---LONGWY---AUDUN---le-ROMAN---BRIEY.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. lll Army Corps, in report from noon to noon, November 16/17 states: Our 
advance began on morning, November 17; indications are that physical condition of German 
troops is becoming less hardy from lack of proper food. Civilians and repatriated 
soldiers state that food shortage opposite our sector is everywhere serious and that 
situation will become worse as result of confiscation by the enemy of cattle, horses and
poultry. Released American prisoners of war unanimous in statement that their treatment by the enemy was not particularly harsh; several hundred other released prisoners state that enemy’s conduct was severe and brutal. American soldiers, on their way to our lines, were fed and sheltered by civilian population.

Third Army reported November 19 for period from noon to noon. November 17/18: Our advance continued, our troops everywhere being welcomed by the inhabitants. It is estimated that 15,000 enemy troops passed through LONGUYON from November 12/17, all going in north and northeast direction. Last German troops passed through MONTMEDI, November 16. 20 (204) A. In the course of its advance today the Third Army crossed the German frontier of 1914, entered the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and progressed farther into southern Belgium. Our columns passed through the towns of ESCH and ARLON, and by evening had reached the general line: GANDRINGEN---WOLLMERINGEN---DUDELANGE---MONDERCANGE---AUTELBAS---GRENDSEL.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. Third Army reported November 19, for period from noon, November 18, to noon, November 19: Enemy withdrawal continues. There are indications of greater confusion of enemy units in LUXEMBURG area than in BRIEY area.

Third Army reported evening, November 20: In the advance today our troops have been welcomed universally with enthusiasm. Improvised American flags were seen everywhere, including LUXEMBURG. No untoward incident reported in the day's operations.

2d Division reported November 18, for period from 5:30 o'clock morning, November 17 to 10 o'clock morning, November 18: Reports indicate that enemy is leaving behind wagons because of lack of horses, and motor trucks because of lack of gasoline. Railroad cars have also been abandoned apparently of lack of engines.

21 (205) A. Continuing its advance the Third Army reached this evening the general line: VICHTEN---MERSCH---SCHUTTRANGE---RENTGEN---KATENHOFEN. During the afternoon our troops passed through the city of LUXEMBURG, where they were welcomed as deliverers by the civilian population, who showered them with flowers and accompanied them in their march through the flagbedecked streets.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. Third Army, in report from noon to noon, November 19/20, states: The morale of the retreating enemy varies. Relations between officers and men have in many cases been bad, with frequent cases of insubordination. The troops coming from the front were generally better disciplined than troops from the rear areas. Troops from region of METZ, who seem to have been influenced by Bolshevistic propaganda, were often out of control, though not extremely disorderly. Troops marching through BRIEY were reported to be carrying red flags but on the whole were orderly and in good spirits. Troops passing through Luxemburg were reported in good marching order and apparently under control. Many of them carried red flags, but on passage through city of LUXEMBURG, on November 18 and 19, they purchased and carried many German flags. On entering Luxemburg and Germany there was a conscious effort to keep up the morale. Pillaging had been limited in general to German supply depots, and in the last weeks had not affected the civilian population. The Mayor of LUXEMBURG states that in the last three weeks the attitude of the German forces has abruptly changed for the better. The civil authorities in both LONGWY and south Luxemburg region welcomed American occupation as a check to looting by stragglers and unruly elements of the civil population. Everywhere there is a seemingly honest appreciation of American military and financial aid.

Third Army reported evening, November 21: Our advancing troops continue to be everywhere received with great enthusiasm. In the city of LUXEMBURG, where a holiday had been declared, the streets were lined with a solid mass of people as our troops marched by, accompanied by LUXEMBURG societies, workmen's unions, boy scouts, women's societies and bands of music. Banners and proclamations were everywhere in evidence; one banner read "To the Saviours of our dear country," and some of the proclamations were dedicated "To Our Deliverers" and signed by the Union National.
III Army Corps, in report from noon to noon, November 18/19, states: The interrogation of several hundred civilians and repatriated soldiers during the past week clearly established the fact that shortly before the acceptance of the Armistice by German enemy troops withdrew in an orderly manner conducted by their officers. After the Armistice had been signed there occurred a fast growing demoralization which, during the last few days, reached a point of insubordination and pillage. In many cases, officers, fearful that maintenance of discipline would prove impossible, hurriedly departed and left their troops in charge of noncommissioned officers.

22 (206) A. The Third Army continued today its progress through the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to the line INGELDORF---BETZDORF---REMIC---SCHENGEN.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Following details have been reported relative to capture in GROSBOUS of German troops by units of French Fifth Army, mentioned in French official communiqué, November 21: A detachment of French troops, finding the enemy in GROSBOUS, encircled the village without opposition. The German colonel in charge of the enemy troops stated that he had received orders that the time limit of occupation had been extended until November 23, and that he had orders to retire to ETTELBRUCK during the night. Orders were issued by the French corps commander that the enemy should lay down all arms. On the morning of November 22, seven German officers, one of whom was a battalion commander, gave themselves up as prisoners on parole. The regimental commander has not been found. The estimate of probable prisoners is 250-300.

D. Third Army, in report from noon to noon, November 19/20, states: During the first three days after the signing of the Armistice evacuation of enemy troops was towards METZ. After November 14, troops withdrew through Luxemburg and were seldom billeted in towns. As the withdrawal continues the morale of the enemy improves.

III Army Corps, in report from noon to noon, November 19/20 states: Austrian troops were the first to withdraw from the neighborhood of BRANDEVILLE and are said to have been in St-LEGER in large numbers on November 16. It appears that the railroads were used by the enemy for the transportation of materiel and that troops were evacuated by march. In VIRION and its vicinity large quantities of hardware supplies and lumber were distributed to the civilian population. The estimated value of materiel distributed from the VIRION supply depot alone was 250,000 francs. A similar distribution in MOUSSON and vicinity was appraised at 1,000,000 francs.

23 (207) A. The Third Army, advancing through Luxemburg, has now reached the German frontier from WALLENDORF to SCHENGEN.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. First Army reports that 17,181 repatriated soldiers had crossed the lines of the First Army, from 11 o'clock morning, November 11 to November 22. Of these 311, including three officers, were American, 6,634 French, 98 British, 3,535 Italians, 3,683 Russian, 9 Belgian, 361 Roumanian, 50 Serbian, and 2,500 were unclassified. Of the 2,025 civilians who crossed our lines in the same period 1,381 were French, 30 Belgians, one Italian, and 613 were unclassified. Some of the civilians were in a weak condition owing to lack of food, and were poorly clad.

Second Army reports that 6,969 repatriated soldiers had crossed the lines of the Second Army, from 11 o'clock morning, November 11 to 12 o'clock noon, November 22. Of these 21, including three officers, were American, 1,341 French, 869 British 2,225 Italian, 2,414 Russian, 86 Belgian, 11 Roumanian, 2 Portuguese. Of the 61 civilians who crossed our lines in the same period 55 were French, four Belgian and two American.

Third Army, in report from noon to noon, November 21/22, states: The enemy has cleared the eastern boundary of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg; he is withdrawing in good order, and all indications of rioting and disorder seem to have disappeared. The civilian population has not been harmed in any way and only petty thefts have been reported. The cattle which the enemy drives before him was brought from farther south, it would seem,
for there are no reports of thefts in the immediate vicinity. Every American in Luxem-
burg is greeted with marked cordiality. The released prisoners of war were of all
nationalities and had received food before starting out from TREVES. They were in good
physical condition and no particular complaint to make. In TREVES the assumption seemed
to be universal that the war was completely over and that there was no possibility of a
resumption of hostilities.

24 (208) A. No communique issued.
B. Nothing to report.
C. Nothing to report.
D. Third Army reported November 24: There was no forward movement on the
front of the Third Army today. The Germans are releasing Alsatians and Lorrainers from
the army on their request.

III Corps, in report from noon to noon, November 20/21, states: Repatriated
prisoners of war continue to enter our lines in large numbers. The mental condition of
the majority is dull, and their physical condition is in all cases poor. In many cases,
particularly among the Russians and Italians, medical attention has been immediately
necessary.

It was reported November 23: In the triumphs entry into BRUSSELS on November
22 a battalion of the American 37th Division and three batteries of the American 91st
Division were the first troops to follow King Albert. The 37th and 91st Divisions are
enroute to rest billets east of the SCHELDT.

25 (209) A. No communique issued.
B. Nothing to report.
C. Nothing to report.
D. Third Army reported evening, November 24: During our advance to the
Luxemburg-German border hundreds of guns, many airplanes, railway cars, engines and other
materiel have passed into our hands. No forward movement tomorrow.

III Corps, in report from noon to noon, November 22/23, states: During period
of this report prisoners of war have entered our lines. Their physical condition is only
fair, but they seem in healthier condition than those received during previous ten days.
The population everywhere continues to give our troops a friendly welcome.

26 (210) A. No communique issued.
B. Nothing to report.
C. Nothing to report.
D. Third Army, in report from noon to noon, November 23/24, states: The with-
drawal of the enemy opposite the front of this army continues in the general direction of
TREVES, although some units are reported to be withdrawing in the direction of SAARBRUCKEN.
It is reported that unfriendliness was evident between the Prussian and Bavarian troops.
The newly occupied territory is in very good sanitary condition and the roads have been
well maintained. There is sufficient food, but prices are high. Much of the livestock,
which the enemy drives before him, seems to be infected with hoof and mouth disease. When
enemy troops in SCHIERON learned that the French had captured a number of the enemy in
GROSBOUS, march orders were immediately issued and the town was cleared in two hours.

Third Army reported evening, November 25: Line on army front unchanged. No
forward movement tomorrow.

Third army reported evening, November 26: Line on army front unchanged. No
hostile act or demonstration was taken place. No forward movement tomorrow.

27 (211) A. No communique issued.
B. Nothing to report.
C. Nothing to report.
D. It was reported evening, November 26: The German troops made prisoner by
the French in GROSBOUS on November 21 were released to the enemy at WALLENDORF on Novem-
ber 25.

Third Army, in report from noon to noon, November 24/25, states: Information
gathered by the American Third Army and the French Fifth Army warrants the following deduc-
tions relative to movement of enemy forces: Second Army absorbed by Seventeenth Army; Fourth Army withdrew along the line: MALINES---AERSCHOT---HASSELT; Sixth Army through general area of LIEGE and south of LIEGE; Eighteenth Army through MALMEDY area; Seventh Army through CINEY area; First Army through WAXWEILER area; Fifth Army through TREVES area; Army Detachment C through BOUZONVILLE area. It is assumed that the 5th and part of the Third Army will retire to vicinity of COBLENZ.

D. Third Army, in report from noon to noon, November 24/25, states: Many discharged German soldiers are entering Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, but no regular enemy units remain in the Grand Duchy. During period of this report few repatriated prisoners of war have entered our lines; they are all in good spirits. Of the estimated one and a half millions of prisoners to be released by the enemy, approximately 200,000 will pass through our lines. A partial inventory of materiel turned over to us by the enemy includes: 695 guns, 342 minenwerfer, 4,455 heavy and light machine guns, 31 airplanes, 38 locomotives, 495 railway cars, many auto trucks, caissons, limbers and various materiel dumps.

Third Army reported evening, November 26: It is estimated that 20,000 repatriated prisoners of war have come into our lines since the signing of the Armistice. Of these approximately 35 per cent were Russian, 30 per cent French, 10 per cent Italian and the remaining 25 per cent American, British and other nationalities. Repatriated American prisoners probably does not exceed ten officers and 400 men. To date the majority of prisoners released by the enemy had been employed by him in areas directly back of the front.

III Corps, in report from noon to noon, November 24/25, states: Materiel left behind by the enemy is generally in good condition, but on November 16, German officers burned six German planes in a field south of MERFERT. There are numerous complaints that enemy troops failed to pay for billets and supplies which they took from the inhabitants. Few repatriated prisoners of war have entered our lines during the period of this report; an improved physical and mental condition is apparent. It seems to be established that the Germans have taken back with them a great many Russian prisoners of war, reported to be in poor physical condition, insufficiently clothed and to have been very poorly fed, particularly during the last fortnight.

Third Army reported evening, November 27: No forward movement tomorrow.
Third Army, in report from 10 o'clock morning to 10 o'clock morning, November 28/29, states: The good march discipline of the enemy troops, so noticeable in withdrawal through Luxemburg, appears to be somewhat lowered as the troops approach the RHINE crossings. Lack of sufficient forage and overwork is reported to be responsible for many deaths among the horses of the enemy's retiring army. The physical and mental condition of the few French, Belgian and Italian repatriated prisoners, crossing our lines during the period covered by this report, varied from fair to good.

III Corps, in report noon, November 27, to 10 o'clock morning, November 28, states: There is an increasing cordiality towards our troops on the part of the population of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg. The French, Belgian, British and Russian repatriated prisoners crossing our lines, during the period covered by this report, were in fairly good mental and physical condition.

Third Army reported November 30: Line unchanged on army front.

December

1 (215) A. The American Third Army crossed the German frontier today and reached the general line ALFERSFEG---WINTERSCHEID---MASTHORN---MULBACH---CORDEL---TREVES---KONZ---SAARBURG---TABEN.
B. Nothing to report.
C. Nothing to report.
D. Third Army reported afternoon, December 1: Troops of Third Army crossed German frontier today at 5:30 o'clock morning and reached line reported in Section A. No untoward incident has been reported. All flags and decorations in German territory occupied by our troops had been removed before our entry. The German people stood quietly along the roadside and along the streets of the towns through which we passed.

2 (216) A. The American Third Army, continuing its advance into Germany, today reached the general line KREWINKEL---METTERICH---RIEVENICH---MORSHEID---HIRSCHFELDERHOF. The important city of TREVES has been occupied by our troops.
B. Nothing to report.
C. It was reported evening, December 1: In today's advance the French Tenth Army reached the general line SCHEIDEN---LOSHEIM---WAHLEN---LIMBACH---THALEXWEILER---DIRMINGEN---SCHIFFWEILER---MEUNKIRCHEN---EINOD---MASSWEILER---WALDFISCHBACH.
D. The line of the American Third Army reached today is as follows: KREWINKEL---ROTH---NEUENDORF---DANSFELD---NEIDENBACH---METTERICH---RIEVENICH---MORSHEID---MANDERN---HIRSCHDELDERSHOF.

3 (217) A. The American Third Army, in its advance into Germany, today reached the general line DAHLEM---EISENSCHMITT---WITLICH---BERNCASTEL---OSANN---STEINBERG.
B. Nothing to report.
C. It was reported December 2: The general in command of the German X Reserve Corps, addressing the troops of the German Fourth Army at DUSSELDORF, on November 29, urged them to continue to perform their military duties. He added that the work of the Volunteer Regiment of the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council in DUSSELDORF should not be interfered with. To the inhabitants of the city he expressed his appreciation of the friendly reception accorded the troops and the hope that officers and men would be shielded from molestation.
D. III Corps, in report from 10 o'clock morning at 10 o'clock morning, November 30-December 1, states: The orderly conduct of our troops, their good nature and kindly behavior, during their stay in the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, gained the respect and good will of the inhabitants and their constantly increasing friendship.

III Corps, in report from 10 o'clock morning to 10 o'clock morning, December 1/2, states: The population of the occupied territory at first seemed apprehensive of the conduct of our troops, an attitude which soon changed to one of reserved interest. Travel is difficult because of poor roads and hilly country. There is some congestion and straggling among the enemy troops as they cross the RHINE in large numbers; no serious disorder is reported. There appears to be no serious food shortage among the inhabit-
ants in the corps sector. About 120 men of METTENDORF were recently discharged from the German forces and returned to their homes. On November 30 an order was received directing members of the 1918 and 1919 classes to return to the colors. To date no one in METTENDORF has obeyed the order and the general impression is that it will not be complied with.

Third Army, in report from 10 o’clock morning to 10 o’clock morning, December 1/2 states: In the newly occupied territory the people seem well fed and food is to be had at reasonable prices. In the cities there is a shortage of bread and potatoes. The mayor of EHRANG in an interview stated: “There has been some looting and petty thieving by deserters from enemy units. We shall welcome the Americans who will help us maintain order.”

Third Army reported evening, December 3: In our advance today no untoward incident has occurred. The general line reached by our troops runs: DAHLEM---GLAADT---OBERBETTINGEN---KALENBORN---WALLENBORN---EISENSCHMITT---WITTLCICH---ZELTINGEN ---BERNCASTEL---OSANN---REINSFELD---STEINBERG.

4 (218) A. The American Third Army, continuing its advance south of the MOSELLE, today reached the general line BERNCASTEL---MALBORN---OTZENHAUSEN. Northwest of BERNCASTEL our line remains unchanged.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. Third Army reported evening, December 4: In our advance today south of BERNCASTEL the following general line was reached: GORNHAUSEN---HUNOLSTEIN---BASCH ---MALBORN---MONNWEILER---OTZENHAUSEN.

5 (219) A. The American Third Army, continuing its advance into Germany, is tonight on the general line GLAADT---WALLENBORN---DAUN---RAVERSHEUREN---RINGEL KOPF.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. 2d Division, in report from 10 o’clock morning to 10 o’clock morning, December 1/2, states: Enemy troops, withdrawing before us in this sector, were well disciplined and conducted themselves in an exemplary manner. Released soldiers and civilians in METTENDORF show no hostility towards our troops, but hold themselves aloof from them individually, regarding them as unwelcome guests. They regard America’s entry into the war as immediately responsible for their defeat. Released German soldiers regard the relationship existing between the officers and enlisted men of the American forces as ideal. The condition of the occupied territory and its inhabitants is better than German propaganda indicates. Food is plain but seems to be plentiful. Butter, milk and meats, and fuel are in greater abundance and cheaper in price than in France, Belgium and Luxemburg. The general impression is that the German people have suffered less during the war than any of the Allied peoples and probably less than the people of neutral countries.

Third Army reported afternoon, December 5: Except for the left division, which remained halted, our advance continued today, reaching the general line: DAUN---WALLSCHEID---SCHEIDWEILER---RAVERSHEUREN---BRUCHWEILER---RINGEL KOPFF.

6 (220) A. The American Third Army, advancing along the entire army front, today reached the general line UDELHOVEN---DOCKWEILER---LAURACH---DRIESCH---TODENROT ---Ndr. WORRESBACH.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported December 6: The French Tenth Army today reached the general line: BIRKENFELD---BAUMHOLDER---ALTENGLAN---KAISERLAUTERN. Its further advance will correspond generally with movement of American army on its left. Marked politeness and absence of hostility in reception of French troops by enemy officials and civilian population.

D. 2d Division, in report from 10 o’clock morning to 10 o’clock morning, December 2/3 states: During the German withdrawal there passed through RITTERSDORF, in
eight days, almost 270,000 men and 70,000 horses of the German Third and Fifth Armies. The number of dead horses and disabled trucks left on the roadside by the retreating enemy indicate that extreme difficulty was experienced by the enemy in his retreat through the sector now occupied by this division. About 30 discharged soldiers returned to their homes in RITTERSDORF, but on November 30, others were received for the remobilization east of the RHINE of the 1918 and 1919 classes. The order was not obeyed in RITTERSDORF by the men effected and was revoked the following day. This is of interest in connection with report of III Corps in Section D, Daily Cable Number 217.

2d Division, in report from 10 o'clock morning to 10 o'clock morning, December 3/4 states: In the divisional sector the enemy's morale seems to be lower since he crossed the Luxemburg-German frontier. The appeal that the safety of the troops is dependent on their orderly withdrawal seems no longer sufficient to maintain rigid discipline among them. Considerable discarded equipment has been found as we advance. The occupants of homes in which our officers are billeted are unusually courteous and hospitable. The territory traversed by this division is in good condition. The inhabitants seem to have all the necessities of life, except that a shortage seems to exist in meats, oils and leather.

42d Division, in report December 3/4 states: The enemy territory traversed by this division is in excellent condition, with carefully cultivated fields and prosperous villages. The inhabitants give no indication of malnutrition. Food supplies seem plentiful and varied. The inhabitants are willing to sell food, including butter and jam.

III Corps, in report from 10 o'clock morning to 10 o'clock morning, December 2/3 states: In our advance the careful reserve of the enemy population has somewhat decreased, as they have observed the considerate action of our troops. There is evident a marked reaction to the military severity existant in Germany for so many years. No appreciable change in enemy morale. His troops are tired; transportation is inadequate; and there is congestion near the RHINE, as the result of inadequate means for crossing; but good order is maintained. Condition of German territory traversed by our troops during the period of this report compares unfavorably with that of the Duchy of Luxembourg.

III Corps, in report from 10 o'clock morning to 10 o'clock morning, December 3/4, states: To date there is no evidence of the serious food shortage so frequently reported by the enemy. Population appears well fed and well clothed. Large reserve supplies of hay and oats have been located, and it is believed that there are reserve food supplies, especially among the farmers. There is an increased desire on the part of the German soldiers to be discharged and to reach home so that they may participate in new government. Enemy horses are in poor, under-fed condition; many have died of anequine disease, Rende.

Third Army, in report from 10 o'clock morning to 10 o'clock morning, December 3/4, states: There seems to be no difficulty in obtaining good food at reasonable prices at hotels and inns. In certain parts of the country there is a fuel shortage.

7 (221) A. The American Third Army, continuing its advance into Germany, today reached the general line RUPPERBATH---BOOS---KEMPENICH---MAYEN---GREIMERSBURG---SIMMERN---KELLENBACH.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. Nothing to report.

8 (222) A. Units of the American Third Army north of BOOS advanced today, reaching the line MECKENHEIM-KEMPENICH. South of KEMPENICH our line remains unchanged.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. 42d Division reported December 5: The billeting in the occupied territory meets with no more opposition than in a friendly country; there are many indications of friendliness. The country seems in excellent condition. Food is not only sufficient but plentiful, and with the exception of a few desirable but unnecessary articles of diet, there is not the slightest indication of any scarcity.
Third Army reported December 5: Apparently news of the excellent behavior of our troops has preceded them; the attitude of the population is becoming less reserved. They are orderly, show no signs of hostility of our troops and seem anxious to create a favorable impression. Inhabitants of occupied territory continue at their usual occupations.

9 (223) A. The American Third Army, continuing its advance into Germany, today reached the RHINE from ROLANDSECK to BROHL, and at nightfall was on the general line ROLANDSECK ---BROHL---WASSENACH---MUNSTERMAIFELD---RHEINDOLLEN.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported December 9: British cavalry is on the RHINE from south of BONN to COLOGNE.

D. Nothing to report.

10 (224) A. The American Third Army, continuing its advance, today reached the RHINE from BROHL to ANDERNACH and from BOPPARD to TRECHTINGSHAUSEN. The general line at the end of the day ran along the RHINE from ROLANDSECK to ANDERNACH---thence to BASSENHEIM ---BOPPARD---thence along the RHINE to TRECHTINGSHAUSEN---north of RINGEN.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. Third Army reported December 8: The country through which the army has passed during the last twenty-four hours is very hilly; roads are in poor condition due to wet weather. With the exception of dairy products of which there is a shortage in the towns, the present food supply in the occupied territory appears to be sufficient.

III Army Corps reported December 7: The population of the occupied territory appears to lack any appreciation of what the terms of peace will bring to the German nation. They seem to feel that the sole responsibility for the war rests with the Kaiser and his immediate advisors. The idea that the German people as a whole are responsible for the war, or for the years of preparation which preceded it, is completely lacking. Their chief desires are that the occupation of German territory by Allied forces shall terminate as soon as possible, that the German people be allowed to form their new government and to live according to their own desires. There appears to be no knowledge of the methods of warfare initiated by the German army during the period of the war. The population maintains a stoic indifference to our occupation; no acts of hostility have been reported. The German army continues to appear in good order; the fighting morale of the enemy has ceased to exist, his troops are tired and impatient to reach home. The fields in the occupied territory are well cultivated; the people are not in want but on the contrary, seem well fed and well clothed.

42d Division reported December 6 and 7: Officers and soldiers of the retreating armies have shown general lack of consideration for the population of the territory through which this division has passed. Petty thievery and seizure of desirable articles by enemy troops have been frequent. In our dealings with the population we have found the local authorities, civilians and discharged soldiers quiet and business-like, cooperating with us in our administration of the occupied territory. There seems to be ample food supply and the country is in excellent state of cultivation.

11 (225) A. Units of the American Third Army, which were yesterday on the line ANDERNACH ---BASSENHEIM---BOPPARD, today advanced to the RHINE and occupied the important city of COBLENZ. At nightfall our troops were along the west bank of the river from ROLANDSECK.

B. Nothing to report.

C. It was reported December 10: The line reached today on the front of the French Tenth Army ran approximately: TRECHTINGSHAUSEN---FREI WEINHEIN---northeast of BINGEN---KI.WINTERHEIM---NIERSTEIN---thence along the RHINE to right army limit.

D. Nothing to report.

12 (226) A. On the front of the American Third Army there was no advance today. The army sector has been shortened and now extends along the west bank of the RHINE from ROLANDSECK to BREY.
D. III Army Corps, in report from 10 o'clock morning to 10 o'clock morning, December 8/9, states: Our troops are in good conditions; march discipline has been excellent, and there is little straggling. The population continues to exercise care in disclaiming all responsibility for the war. As we advance toward the RHINE we find an increased dislike on the part of the civilians, to the occupation of the territory, notwithstanding the fact that they report to be satisfied with the conduct of American troops. As the enemy approached the RHINE his march discipline was fairly well maintained but the troops abandoned an increasingly large amount of equipment. The enemy's treatment of the inhabitants of the territory now occupied by us seems to have become more domineering as he approached the RHINE; officers were particularly offensive. The country is in fair condition with no shortage of necessary foods, except meat. There is also a scarcity of leather and oil.

A. The American Third Army crossed the RHINE today and occupied the COBLENZ Bridgehead.

B. Nothing to report.

C. Nothing to report.

D. As the American Third Army has now reached its general objectives on the COBLENZ bridgehead, there will be no further American Official Communiques issued.

PERSHING.