UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917-1919

Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces

Volume 8

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A new introduction has been added to Volume 1. Type has been reset, but original pagination has not been altered. Except for front matter, maps, illustrations, and some tables, camera-ready copy was produced by Susan Blair using optical scanning and laser printing technology.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919

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FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . . [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army's historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army's months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of "the war to end all wars." Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C.
1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
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### HIGH-LEVEL DOCUMENTATION PERTAINING TO BOTH ST-MIHEIL AND MEUSE-ARGONNE

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Military Operations
of the
American Expeditionary Forces
At an Interallied conference held on July 24, 1918, at Bombon, it was decided that American forces should reduce the St-Mihiel salient. Concentrations for this purpose were initiated during August and, on August 13, 1918, American First Army Headquarters opened at Neufchateau. Later, these headquarters were moved to Ligny-en-Barrois where General Pershing took command of the entire Woëvre area on August 30, 1918.

Plans for the St-Mihiel Operation crystallized by September 2, 1918 and it was decided that, (1) the operation would take place about September 10, against both the southern and western faces of the salient and, (2) an attack to extend from the Meuse River on the east to the Argonne Forest, inclusive, on the west, would be carried out by the American First Army about September 20-25. (Actually this latter operation began on September 26 and is known as the Meuse-Argonne Operation.)

At 1 a.m. on September 12, 1918, the American First Army began its St-Mihiel offensive. By midnight of September 13, occupation of the limited objective of the operation was practically complete and stabilization of the front was begun from the Moselle River north of Pont-a-Mousson, through Thiaucourt, Vigneulles-les-Hostonchatel to Les Eparges.

Order of Battle*
(Left to Right)

American First Army: General John J. Pershing, Commanding
Brigadier General Hugh A. Drum, Chief of Staff

American V Corps: Major General George H. Cameron, Commanding
American 4th Division
French 15th Colonial Division
American 26th Division

* At time of organization
French II Colonial Corps: Major General Ernest J. Blondlat
  French 2d Cavalry Division (Dismounted)
  French 26th Division
  French 39th Colonial Division

American IV Corps: Major General Joseph T. Dickman, Commanding
  American 1st Division
  American 42d Division
  American 89th Division

American I Corps: Major General Hunter Liggett, Commanding
  American 2d Division
  American 5th Division
  American 90th Division
  American 82d Division

The following American divisions were in corps reserve:

  For V Corps  -  4th Division (less
                   8th Inf. Brig.)
  "  IV  "  -  3d Division
  "  I  "  -  78th Division

----------
General Staff  
No. 1648 [Annex 5]  

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ALLIED ARMIES,  
June 27, 1918.

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies  

To Commander-in-Chief, Armies of North and Northeast  

It is important to begin consideration, immediately, of a renewal of the offensive by the Allied Armies, in 1918, as soon as available means permit.  

In order that this offensive may be launched at the proper time and under the best possible conditions, it is necessary that, from this moment, the command, as well as the troops which are to execute it be prepared.  

For the command, it is essential that the staffs clearly oriented concerning the method of procedure which will be most suitable, bearing in mind instructions on this subject recently published.  

Obviously, there can be no question of again issuing instructions concerning the offensive simultaneously regulating principles and details of application. What is required, is to state governing principles in a broad directive and, insofar as their application is concerned, to depend upon the initiative of the leaders (army and army corps commanders) who will be responsible for the conduct of operations.  

Therein leaders will certainly be able to find, from the additional experience which they have gained during recent combats, and from German documents which have recently come into our possession, means whereby they will be able to put into practice the method which will be indicated to them.  

Any other method of procedure would, moreover, entail inadmissible delays on account of the little time which remains at our disposal before renewal of operations.  

In addition, we must take account of the fact that our offensive mass will probably consist of Allied troops [French, American, British].  

In order that these various troops may be able to act harmoniously it is indispensable that their staffs immediately receive some indication as to the general ideas which are to guide them in their preparations, as well as concerning the documents to which they can refer.  

Such a directive having been issued, it will become a question of conditioning the troops so that they will be able to attack in accordance with the method which is adopted.
For this purpose, it is important to immediately begin formation of the large French and American units which are to participate in the offensive and to establish a plan of employment which will give them sufficient time for training in a camp.

Supervision of such training could, whenever possible, be entrusted to the leaders (army and army corps commanders) who will be called upon to command large units in combat.

I would appreciate it greatly if you would submit to me, as soon as possible, the directive which is discussed above. In addition, I request that you keep me informed concerning all measures which you may prescribe, in connection with the ideas set forth above, to increase the offensive value of the troops which will be called upon to participate in the battle.

For this preparation, it would be advisable to base matters upon an order of battle consisting of: at least 12 American divisions, approximately 10 French divisions, 7 or 8 British divisions, or a total of about 30 divisions, to be ready within two months at the latest.

FOCH.

--------


_Foch Agreed to the Formation of an American Army_

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 21, 1918.

Summary of conference at Bombon, July 21, attended by General Foch, General Petain, General Weygand, General de Barescut. Also present Colonel Boyd and Lt. Colonel de Chambrun.

General Pershing proposed that American divisions be grouped* so as to form two sectors: One in the zone that is active at present, the other on a quiet part of our front. This latter sector would become the American front proper.

A. FORMATION OF THE ACTIVE SECTOR: The American divisions now engaged: The 3d, 4th, 28th, 26th, to which will be added the 42d now in transit and the 32d which will begin to move tomorrow, would form two army corps each having 2 divisions in 1st line and one division in reserve. These two army corps would be placed side by side and in position so as to embrace or extend the American 26th Division on its right or on its left.

These two army corps would form a part of the American First Army the headquarters of which would be either in Coulommiers or in Montmirail, and of which General Pershing would take command, placing himself of his own accord under the control of a French Group of Armies Commander.

These proposals are accepted by General Foch.

B. ORGANIZATION OF THE QUIET SECTOR: General Pershing requests that the sector where his divisions not sufficiently seasoned for battle and his battle-tired divisions will be placed side by side, be quickly designated, and in the St-Mihiel---Toul---Nancy region if possible.

* Documents relating to previous efforts to form an American army will be found in the “Policy Forming” documentation.
General Foch said he would give his answer to the matter tomorrow probably and certainly before 10:30 a.m., Wednesday.

General Pershing specified that these groupments would not be rigid and it was quite possible that his divisions would participate in the attacks in other sectors, and that a French division might be put in line on an American front.

General Petain invited by General Pershing to express his opinion on the propositions formulated by General Pershing, made no objection; he even called attention to the fact that the portion of our line requested by General Pershing to constitute the permanent American front was well chosen, since it covered rear areas already organized by our Allies where there are numerous training camps, rifle ranges, etc.

---

HS Fr. Files: 403-30.1: Letter

**Creation of American Army Agreed Upon**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff

No. 2,280*

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,

Bombon, July 22, 1918.

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Army

My dear General:

[Extract]

In connection with the interview which we had at my headquarters on the 21st in the presence of General Petain:

* * * * *

As we have agreed, this American First Army will be formed in the region north of the Marne around the nucleus already in this locality in your I Army Corps under conditions the details of which I ask you to please draw up with General Petain.

General Petain has informed me that previously to this agreement he had given the order to direct your 32d Division to the French Tenth Army where he had foreseen its entry into the line. This disposition could not be modified except by disturbing the whole play of movements which had already been arranged in order to support the battle being carried on by this army and I ask you in consequence, in order to avoid all changes, to accept that your 32d Division be placed for the moment at the disposal of the French Tenth Army.

---

* This document is printed in full in the Policy volume in this series.
2. With reference to the quiet sector which you desire to be immediately given to
the American army * * * I have decided, on account of the advantages which you find in
this, that the sector extending from Nomeny to north of St-Mihiel will be placed pro-
gressively under American command as the units which can be sent there are available. I
ask you also to arrange all details concerning this occupation with General Petain.

FOCH.

---------

HS French Files: 403-30.1: Memorandum

Creation of an American Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 32962

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

July 25, 1918.

Memorandum for the Commander of the Group of Armies of the East and the
French Military Mission with the American Army, Chaumont

1. Enclosed is a copy of an extract of letter No. 2280 of July 22, 1918 from the
General, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, to the General, Commander-in-Chief of
the American army.

The General commanding the French Group of Armies of the East is directed to prepare
the gradual entrance of the American Second Army on the southern Woëvre front.

He will regulate by agreement with the Chaumont Mission all questions pertaining to
the relief of units, services, and establishments, etc., between the French Eight Army
and the American Second Army [See Doc. 2280 referred to in 1 above] in accordance with
studies which have been made pursuant to Memorandum No. 27247 of May 21, 1918, from the
General, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast.

The recommendations concerning the fixing of the boundaries of the American army and
of its rear zone will be forwarded as soon as possible to the General, Commander-in-Chief
of the Armies of the North and Northeast (Third Section and Direction of the Rear) for
examination and decision.

2. The American 1st and 2d Divisions (American III Army Corps) will be moved to the
east in the near future in order to form with the 82d and 89th [after relief] the nucleus
of the American Second Army. Initially two American army corps sectors will be organized
as a start.

The extension of the American front will at first be toward the east, as far as Nomeny
and later toward the west and the north on the heights of the Meuse.

The American corps headquarters and that of the American Second Army, will work at
first by the side of the two corresponding French headquarters. They will function alone
at a date to be fixed later.

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.

---------
First Army to Relieve French Sixth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 4, 1918.

[Extract]

First Army:

The American First Army will occupy the present front of the French Sixth Army.

Proposed Limits:

East: The limit between the French Group of Armies of the Center and the French Group of Armies of the Reserve.

West: A line passing through Braine---Cys-la-Commune.

The army will comprise in principle 2 American corps side by side and 4 American divisions in the first line. The American First Army will belong to the Group of Armies of the Reserve.

The relief of French units, services, and establishments by the corresponding American elements will be regulated by agreement between the French Sixth Army and American First Army.

The French Sixth Army will leave at the disposal of the American First Army those French troops, services, or establishments that may be necessary for the functioning of the American army, until such time as the Americans will be in a position to relieve these troops, services, or establishments.

* * * * *

Composition of American Second Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, August 4, 1918.

Memorandum on the Composition of the American Second Army (Woëvre sector)

[Extract]

The sector of the American Second Army will correspond initially to the sector previously held by the French First Army (from January 5 to end of March 1918).
Army headquarters to be selected:
Two American army corps sectors, Hq. in Toul and Void.
The American corps of Toul will include, until the formation of the American corps of Void, the American 1st, 2d and 89th Divs.
Until further orders the Second Army will be under the direct control of the General commanding the Group of Armies of the East.
The relief of units, services and establishments of the French Eighth Army by the corresponding elements of the Second Army will be carried out by agreement between the two armies. The Eight Army will leave at the disposal of the American Army the French elements that the Americans could not relieve immediately and which will be necessary for the functioning of the Second Army.

* * * * *

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 658: Letter

American First Army to Attack in the Woëvre

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1 P.C.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
August 9, 1918.

Marshall Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces

General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief American Expeditionary Forces

During the course of the meeting held at Sarcus on the morning of August 9 between Marshal Foch and General Pershing, the following has been agreed upon:

1. The stabilization of the Aisne front, the operations at a later date contemplated for the American Army demand that the constitution of American Army of the Woëvre be pushed with the utmost haste. With this object in view:

   (a) The American Army of the Woëvre will be organized from the army and corps staffs already formed and operating. It will be given the units with the best combat training.

   The American Army will carry out the whole of the operation contemplated. The forces considered necessary by the American command, estimated at about 14 divisions, will be assembled in that region.

   (b) Four American divisions, let us say, will be left initially on the Aisne, forming 2 army corps. General Pershing and General Petain will come to an agreement on the questions of command of the forces in this region.

2. The American 5th and 35th Divisions required by the army of the Woëvre will be relieved in the Vosges by 2 American divisions without artillery:

   the 5th Division by the 92d
   the 35th by another American division without artillery.
The relief of these divisions will be regulated by an agreement between the American and French Commanders-in-Chief.

A later memorandum will determine the necessary complements in artillery, aviation, and tanks to be furnished the American army for the contemplated operations.

F. FOCH.

--------

Apportionment of American Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
1st Subsection
No. 1/P.C.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED HIGH COMMAND,
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES,
Bombon, August 9, 1918.

Memorandum to accompany Letter No. 1/P.C. of August 9, 1918.

The following information is released as a preliminary notice only to permit certain plans to be made. It concerns the apportionment of American divisions between the 2 groups of American forces, and the supplemental means needed by the American Army for the pending operation.

1. Apportionment of American divisions:
   (a) General Pershing intends to assemble in the Woevre the 1st, 2d, 82d, 3d, 4th, 42d, 5th, 35th, 89th, 90th and a certain number of divisions to be taken from the British area where they will be replaced by divisions now on the way.
   (b) He intends to leave on the Aisne the 32d, 28th, 26th and 77th Divisions, and
   (c) To relieve the 5th by the 92d as soon as possible and later on the 35th by the 6th, the 79th or the 91st.

2. From a preliminary estimate of the American Staff, the supplementary requirements which will have to be requested of the French army appear to be as follows:
   (a) Artillery:
       75's 80 Batteries
       155's (howitzers) 40 Batteries
       Heavy Artillery (guns) 86 Batteries
       These figures include only the main attack in a northerly direction; they are therefore the minimum number.
   (b) Tanks:
       Renaults 150
       As there are at this time 2 American battalions whose personnel is ready, it would possible be advantageous to turn over to them the tanks needed to complete the organization of these 2 battalions.

3. The American Staff requests that the French personnel of 60-mm. railways, ammunition depots, etc., of the Woevre region be left in place until further orders.

[FOCH]

--------
Requests for French Artillery Staffs

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, August 15, 1918.

My dear General Petain:

I expect to utilize three of my corps commanders and staffs in the forthcoming operations. Due to delays in bringing over artillery personnel I only have available at the present time one corps chief of artillery and artillery staff for these three corps. May I ask that you provide chiefs of corps artillery with their staffs for the remaining two corps?

I sent you this morning copies of letters addressed to Marshal Foch. I am quite certain that you agree with me that in all questions connected with the present operations we will save time by the direct relations which I proposed should exist between you and myself.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, United States Army.

Armies of the North and Northeast.

Estimate of Batteries and Tanks Required for Operation

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, August 15, 1918.

My dear Marshal Foch:

During our interview on August 9 I gave you tentative estimates as to the number of batteries and tanks which I would require, in addition to my own resources, for the operation with which you have charged me.

As a result of further studies I am able to give you more precise estimates.

On August 9 I gave you as a rough estimate a request for:

- 80 batteries 75's
- 40 batteries 155 howitzers
- 86 batteries for counterbattery, interdiction fire, etc.

I now find that I need an addition 20 batteries of 75's and 10 batteries of 155-mm. howitzers. I, therefore, ask that you furnish me:

- 100 batteries 75's
- 50 batteries 155's
- 86 batteries for counterbattery, interdiction fire, etc.
MANHEULLES--FRESNES-EN-WOEVRE AREA
Looking east from Mont-sous-les-Cotes
In the matter of tanks I now believe that I should have:

150 combat tanks, heavy,
300 combat tanks, light.

For aviation it appears that I should have, in addition to my own resources, the following:

7 observation squadrons
9 pursuit squadrons
5 day bombardment squadrons
10 balloons

In making this estimate I assume that such French G. P. Artillery as may be sent into the sector will be provided with its own aviation.

I think that night bombardment squadrons could be profitably used and I suggest that arrangements be made with the Commanding General, British Independent Royal Air Force, for obtaining his cooperation.

Detailed studies of the operation are proceeding and I will not fail to communicate to you without delay any essential change which may appear necessary in the above estimate.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, United States Army.

To Marshal Ferdinand Foch
Allied Commander-in-Chief,
Allied Armies.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 672: Letter

Request for Retention of French Services and Auxiliaries

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 15, 1918.

My dear Marshal Foch:

With reference to certain details of carrying out the plan set forth by you in your directive relative to the American Army, I suggest the following for your consideration:

That the French services and auxiliary troops now in the sector be retained and that so far as possible they be supplemented by such American troops as I may be able to supply.

That the necessary artillery ammunition be placed in the sector by the French authorities.

That such motor transport as may be necessary and as I am unable to provide be furnished by the French authorities.

That to assist my staff and to secure proper liaison, especially on all matters affecting supplies, the Service of Etapes and the Service of the Rear, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast allow such officers as may be considered necessary to work in the several sections of my staff.

Similarly, that General Petain attach such artillery staffs as may be necessary to insure the proper coordination of the American and French artillery, as well as to assist my artillery commanders, to my chief of artillery and to my commanding general, railroad artillery.
That in all that concerns the operations I deal directly with the Commander-in-Chief, Armies of the North and Northeast.

That in all that concerns territorial command and other matters under the direct control of the Commanding General of the Group of Armies of the East, I deal directly with General de Castelnau.

That I take command of the sector on August 25.

If you agree in principle to the above suggestions, I recommend that the staffs concerned work out further details.

I hope to be able to present to you within a few days preliminary plans.

PERSHING,
General, U. S. Army.

To: Marshall Ferdinand Foch,
Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

Copy to:

General Petain
Commander-in-Chief
Armies of the North and Northeast.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 672: Letter

Request for Transfer of Three American Divisions from British Front

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, France, August 15, 1918.

My Dear Marshal Foch:

Now that the Allied attack at Amiens has so brilliantly succeeded I feel that it is opportune to recur to the question, which we considered during our interview on the 9th instant, of bringing three of my divisions now with Sir Douglas Haig to the region in which you have ordered me to undertake operations.

I am more and more impressed not only with the possibility but with the necessity, as you yourself so strongly pointed out, of making these operations a striking success. It is not only the effect which an American success would have on the enemy but the effect on the Allied morale and especially on that of the American people, leading as it will to redoubled efforts, which causes me to be especially anxious to assemble the greatest possible number of my troops for this operation.

I do not of course lose sight of the very important strategical results which you have in view but, if you will permit me, I insist that the moral effect of an operation successfully carried out by a large body of American troops is of far more importance than the gaining of a mere strategical advantage.

The three divisions which I ask are essential to my plans. In addition to the necessity of undertaking the operation at the earliest possible moment it is especially urgent that these divisions be ordered to join my forces at once. Among other questions, that of the rifles which they are to use depends on the date on which a final decision is taken (you will of course recall that these divisions are now armed with British rifles).
May I not ask therefore that you will issue the necessary instructions without delay? I have today authorized the entry into the British line of the 27th and 30th Divisions. The divisions which should join me are therefore the 33d, 78th and 80th. Please inform me at your earliest convenience of your decision.

J. J. PERSHING, General, United States Army.

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Report G-3, First Army 124: Telegram

Transfer of American Divisions to American Sector

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES, Bombon, August 17, 1918.

General Staff of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, to

Chief of French Mission at Hallencourt (for Marshal Haig),
Chief of French Mission at Chaumont (for General Pershing),
French G. H. Q. at Provins, 3d Section

[Extract]

1. The American 33d, 78th, and 80th Divisions, necessary for the operations of the American Army, will be transported without any delay into the American sector.

2. The French First Army will extend its front north as far as the general vicinity of Lihons in order to release the Canadian army corps to the control of the British Commander-in-Chief.

3. This relief will be made with the greatest possible rapidity. Moreover, Marshal Haig is requested not to wait until the termination of this relief to begin the transportation of the American divisions. The 78th and 80th, which are now free, may be entrained at once. The 33d, which is partially in the line, will follow their movement by the 25th instant at the latest.

   ***

   General Pershing is requested to study the matter of sending to the British front two American divisions from among those now arriving.

   [FOCH]

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Artillery and Tanks to be Furnished Americans by the French

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, General Staff
No. 3059

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, August 17, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces in France.

In reply to your letter of August 15, I have the honor to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast will be prepared to furnish you with:

1. 11 regiments truck-carried, that is: 99 batteries of 75's
   3 foot regiments, that is, 20 gun batteries and 20 howitzer batteries.
   3 regiments of 105's that is: 27 gun batteries.
   3 regiments 155 longs, that is: 27 gun batteries.
   3 regiments 155 hows., that is: 27 batteries
   1 regiment tractor-drawn longs, that is: 12 batteries
   1 regiment tractor-drawn hows., that is: 12 batteries.

You will thus receive:

99 batteries of 75's of the 100 batteries requested
50 batteries of heavy hows. as against 50 batteries requested.
86 batteries of heavy longs of the 86 batteries requested.

2. 5 battalions of light tanks, namely:
   the 2 American battalions in being which are provided with their full equipment (150 tanks)
   and 3 French battalions (225 tanks).
   That is, all in all: 375 tanks.

I am requesting Marshal Haig to lend you the 150 heavy tanks which you consider necessary.

3. The American First Army will receive all it has requested by way of aviation and balloons. Orders have been given for the air division to be moved to the east commencing D - 5 days.

4. French officers in the necessary number will be detailed with the American staffs and services to ensure liaison and supplies of every kind.

5. French troop and service installations to be occupied by Americans will be left as they are.

6. The ammunition necessary on a basis of 5 days of fire will be furnished by the Commanding General of the French Armies of the North and Northeast who will see to the delivery thereof.

F. FOCH.
Foch Approves Pershing’s Proposals

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 3060
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, August 17, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of American E. F. in France

My dear General:

I am entirely in accord with you upon the different points which you have taken up in your letter dated August 15 on the subject of the details for carrying out your plan of operations.

In particular, after we are in agreement on the general plans of these operations, you will deal directly in everything concerning the operations with the Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast, as you have proposed to me.

F. FOCH.

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Decision Concerning General Features of Attack in St-Mihiel Area

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 3061
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, Seine-et-Marne, August 17, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To: General Pershing, Commanding A. E. F. in France

1. I have the honor to inform you as to the general features of the attack decided upon at our meeting on July 24. [See Policy-Forming Vol.]

2. The objective indicated by the memorandum of July 24, for the attack by the American First Army is the freeing of the Paris-Avricourt Railroad in the region of Commercy by the reduction of the St-Mihiel salient.

To attain this objective, while at the same time striking the enemy the heaviest possible blow and obtaining all the results which should be sought in an action of this scale, and also to secure an advantageous base of departure for future operations, this attack will seek to carry the present front forward to the general line: Bouxieres-sous-Froidmont---Lorry-devant-le-Pont---Gorze Creek---Mars-la-Tour---Hannonville-au-Passage---Parfondrupt---Gussainville---Fromezey---Bezonvaux.

In order to reach this line the following attacks are to be undertaken:

(1st) An attack north starting from the general front Lesmesnils-Seicheprey toward
the line Lorry-devant-le-Pont---Le Rud-Mont---Buxieres---Chambley---Hageville---Dampvitoux ---St-Benoit-en-Woevre---Beney.


(3d) An attack flanking the second, starting from the front Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes---Bezonvaux toward the line: Northeast tip of the Bois d'Hermeville---Fromezey--- Haute-Charriere---Grand-Chenas---Bezonvaux.

Attacks 1 and 2 will be connected by a French army corps of 3 infantry divisions holding the passive front from Richecourt to the Grande Tranchee de Calonne. This army corps will take advantage of all advances made on its right and left in order to exert pressure on the enemy along his entire front and to assure constant liaison between the 2 American masses of attack.

It appears that this project involves the employment of 9 American divisions for attack number 1, and 5 American divisions for attack number 2. Attack number 3 requires from 4 to 5 divisions which could be furnished by French troops of the French Second Army.

I request that you be kind enough to inform me if we are in agreement upon these general plans.

F. FOCH.

Role of American First Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau
No. 26989

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARMIES NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 17, 1918.

[Annex 708]

Commander-in-Chief Armies North and Northeast to Commanding General, G. A. E.

Moreover, it is understood that General Pershing will assume command of the American First Army, August 25, with headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois. In principle, that army will consist of 14 American divisions, organized into 3 army corps, plus the French II Colonial Corps with 3 divisions.

General Pershing will correspond direct with me concerning all questions pertaining to operations and with you concerning all questions pertaining to territorial command and to matters relating to the DE [French L of C Direction].

It is particularly important that all facilities be given to the American command in connection with this initial operation.

The American First Army is to take the offensive in the Woevre on or about September 1, with 7 divisions in first line between Haudiomont and Grande Tranchee de Calonne, for the purpose of eliminating the St-Mihiel salient as far as the road from Haudiomont to Mars-la-Tour and, from that point, to Buxieres and Noveant.

That attack will be flanked by a French attack aimed at the general line Bezonvaux---
Dieppe—Fromezez—northeast corner of Bois de'Henneville.

It is requested that you send me, previous to the 22d, a resume giving the broad details of the French attack and the means which you estimate will be required.

The scope of these operations must remain strictly secret, even to your staff, with the exception of your chiefs of staff and, at the most, two other officers.

As a matter of fact, it is deemed highly important to mislead the enemy concerning our plans. In this connection, General Pershing has caused office space to be rented at Belfort and he is going to establish himself there for a few days while, at the same time, inspecting the American divisions which are in that area.

I will be glad to receive whatever suggestions you might see fit to make in order to more surely achieve desired results along this line.

PETAIN.

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Service Arrangements

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, Gen. Staff No. 27631

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARMIES NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

August 17, 1918.

[Annex 710]

Commander-in-Chief of Armies of North and Northeast

To Marshall, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

[Extract]

5. I shall leave in place the French service organizations and troops now within the sectors to be occupied by the American troops.

6. I shall furnish the necessary ammunition, on the basis of 5 days of fire, and I shall see to it that it is placed where needed.

7. Finally I will be able to support the American attack by an action to be carried out by the French Second Army from Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes to Bezonvaux, in accordance with the plan attached hereto. [Follows immediately.]

In view of the inexperience of the major American units concerned, I estimate that to emplace the artillery, the ammunition, and attack troops will require about 15 days. The offensive could, therefore, be launched on or about September 5.

By order:

BUAT,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ARMIES NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
August 17, 1918.

PLAN OF ATTACK IN THE WOEVRE*

Purpose of Attack: Eliminate St-Mihiel salient by moving the front up to the general line Cheminot (on the Seille)---Lorry-devant-le-Pont---Noveant---St-Louis Farm---Les Baraques---Mars-la-Tour---Hannonville-au-Passage---Villers-sous-Pareid---northeast corner of Bois d’Hermeville---Bezonvaux.

Method of the Attack: To achieve this result, two actions are required:

(a) One, jumping off from the front Lesmenils---Seicheprey will aim, initially, at the line running from the bend of the Seille to the west of Cheminot---Bouxieres-sous-Froidmont---Mardigny---Signal de Vittonville---Prey---Vaulny---Xammes---Beney (first objective).

Thence the line Lorry-devant-le-Pont---Volsage---St-Louis Farm---Les Baraques---Chambley---Hageville---Dampvittoux---St-Benoit-en-Woevre (second objective).

(b) The other, jumping off from the approaches of the Grande Tranchee de Calonne to Haudiomont, will aim at the line St-Remy---Herbeuville---Saulx-en-Woevre---Marcheville ---Harville---Moulotte---Villers-sous-Pareid---Bois de Parfondrupt.

It is to be connected with the preceding attack by an exploitation in the direction of St-Benoit-en-Woevre, on one side, and of Hannonville-au-Passage, on the other.

It will be flanked on the left by:

(c) A French attack, jumping off from the front Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes---Bezonvaux, aiming at the northeastern corner of the Bois d’Hermeville---Fromezey---Haute-Charriere---Grand-Chenas---Bezonvaux.

Attacks b and c will be connected by strong artillery fire upon the wooded area which extends between the Haudiomont front, at Chatillon-sous-les-Cotes, and the valley of the Orne.

Should attack a jump off on Jour J [D day], attacks b and c could be launched on the day of J plus 1 [D plus 1].

Troop requirements: Attack a will be carried out by 9 American divisions, of which

7 in first line (one on the right bank of the Moselle).

Attack b, by 5 American divisions, of which 4 in first line.

A French army corps, of 3 divisions, will connect attacks a and b by holding the defensive front from Richécourt to the Tranchee de Calonne. It will take advantage of any gains achieved on its right and upon its left to exert pressure upon the enemy, along its entire front, and it will constantly assure liaison between the two American attacking forces.

* Translator’s Notes: 1. Possible that this is the original outline for St-Mihiel attack. 2. Possible that subparagraph designation used in above document finally evolved into the alphabetical designation which caused St-Mihiel operation to be known as Operation A.

- 19 -
COTE DE SENOIX-GRANDE TRANCHEE DE CALONNE AREA
Looking north from near St-Remy
**Heavy Tanks for American Army**

3d Bureau, General Staff

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES.

[Editorial Translation]  
August 18, 1918.

No. 3062

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief British Forces in France

My dear Marshal:

I would be grateful if you would please let me know if it would be possible for you to furnish 150 of your heavy tanks to the American army, for use in the operations which it is preparing.

These tanks should arrive in the east on or about August 25.

F. FOCH.

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**Suggested Efforts to Mislead Enemy**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 30135

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

Provins, August 19, 1918.

The General Commanding the Armies of the North and Northeast

To the General Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces

My dear General Pershing:

I hear from everywhere, and especially from the armies and civil authorities of the east, that, in their generous enthusiasm on account of the prospect of a great success over the enemy, numerous American officers and soldiers have talked in a public way of the projects of the High Command in the Woëvre.

This is a fact which must be accepted at the present time and although I have not yet notified anyone except General de Castelnau and his Chief of Staff, it remains that the troops and the civil population of the east are all informed as to the offensive actions which are being considered.

Under these conditions it is impossible that the enemy should not be forewarned, but we can attempt to mislead him.

To this end, if you are in accordance with me on this point, you could send American
officers to make reconnaissances in the different sectors of Lorraine, of the Vosges, and of Upper Alsace, which are occupied by French troops. I would give to the French Seventh and Eight Armies instructions which would lead them to believe that an offensive action by American forces is under consideration in these sectors. Thus the enemy’s attention would be to a certain extent taken away from the Woëvre.

I would be much obliged to you if you would inform me if this suggestion is approved by you and what officers you would send to the Seventh and Eight Armies and on what dates.

PETAIN.

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Arrangements for Direct Liaison

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, Gen. Staff
No. 30181
[Annex 734]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 19, 1918.

Commander-in-Chief Armies North and Northeast

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Forces in France

Dear General:

I have the honor of advising you that I shall place the two army corps artillery commanders and staffs which you requested in your letter of August 15 at your immediate disposal.

On the other hand, it is understood that we will be able to use direct liaison to deal with any questions pertaining to the proposed operations, based upon the general plan which Marshal Foch has just set forth in the letter which he sent you on August 17 (No. 3061). Like yourself, I am convinced that such direct liaison will enable us to gain precious time and that it will facilitate the task of those concerned.

Finally, I assure you that everything necessary will be done to give you satisfaction on all of the other matters mentioned in your letter of August 15 to Marshal Foch.

Yours sincerely devoted,

PETAIN.

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General Pershing to Command French Troops Participating in Woëvre Offensive

[Editorial Translation]

No. 3139
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, August 20, 1918.

To the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

My dear General:

[Extract]

I have the honor of asking you to take command of the French troops which are to co-operate in the attack of the American army in the Woëvre, \*\*\* in order to make certain that by single command the best possible results will be obtained from the Allied forces.

Yours very sincerely,

F. FOCH.

---

French Troops Placed under Tatical Command of General Pershing

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 31500
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, August 20, 1918.

The General Commanding the Armies of the North and Northeast

To General Pershing, Commanding the American Expeditionary Forces in France

With a view to securing the best coordination of efforts in the offensive action in the Woëvre, I propose to place under your orders, insofar as concerns tactical matters and for the duration of the operation:

1. The II Colonial Army Corps which will hold the front between your two masses of attack.

2. The French forces (2 army corps, 6 divisions) which will attack on your left up to Bezonvaux. General Hirschauer, commanding the Second Army will be charged, under your direction, with the preparation and execution of this attack.

I believe you will fully agree to these dispositions which give a better guarantee of the success of the projected operation.

PETAIN.

---
Petain Discusses Pershing's Woerw Offensive Plan

[Editorial Translation]


General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

Dear General:

Lt. Col. de Chambrun has communicated to me your plan for the offensive in the Woerwre. As a whole we are entirely in agreement. However, I take the liberty to call your attention to the following points.

1. It does not seem to me possible to attack with French troops in the Spada gap. Not only would this attack be very difficult but also the situation of forces launched in an attack up this narrow corridor would soon become untenable, particularly since their advance is toward the east. Along this portion of the front it would be sufficient for the French troops of the St-Mhiel salient to start to exert pressure against the enemy on the second day in order to hasten his disorganization and prevent him from turning against our troops.

2. The left of your northern attack leaves out of its action all the open ground south of the Bois d'Hermeville, in the region of Ville-en-Woerwre and Hennemont.

The French troops operating north of the Bois d'Hermeville would not be able to act advantageously south of this thickly wooded region. They will only be able to maintain liaison with the American Army in the clearing around Braquis and later on at the right bank of the Orne, toward Gussainville.

Therefore, careful security dispositions should be taken to cover your left flank.

I would be grateful if you could let me know whether we agree on the points brought out in this letter.

PETAIN.
Entry of American Armies into Line

[Contemporary Translation]

3152/A

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, August 20, 1918.

From: Marshall Foch, C-in-C of the Allied Armies
To: C-in-C, Armies of the North and Northeast.
C-in-C, A. E. F.

[Extract]

American Armies will enter the lines on the front of the French Armies of the North
and Northeast.
The aviation grounds needed for these armies will be placed at their disposal • • • • •

By order:

WEYGAND,
Major General.

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Spreading of False Intelligence

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, Gen. Staff,
No. 34552
[Annex 799]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 22, 1918.

Commander-in-Chief to General commanding the Group of Armies of the East

I approve the propositions of your Letter No. 3754, relative to spreading false
intelligence.
In the immediate future, the American command will send 3 field officers to the
French Seventh Army; probably Colonel Fox Conner, Colonel Marshall, Lieutenant Colonel
Grant, to carry out reconnaissances in upper Alsace.
It is requested that you inform the Commanding General of the French Seventh Army of
this fact for the purpose of spreading the rumor that an offensive is being prepared in
that region.
I shall furnish you the means, within the immediate future, for furthering that impression among our own troops, the American troops, the civilians and the enemy (additional balloons and heavy caliber guns).

The other question will form part of a general plan which will be transmitted to you in the very near future.

PETAIN.

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Plan for Woevre Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Sect., Gen. Staff
No. 35675
[Annex 798]

Commander-in-Chief to Commanding General, G. A. C.

You will find attached hereto a plan [See Annex 711, Aug. 17, in this vol.] for the Woevre attack.

The American First Army, over which General Pershing will assume command on August 30 (Headquarters at Ligny-en-Barrois), will furnish the divisions for attacks a and b.

The French Second Army, brought up to strength by the French XI Army Corps, with 4 divisions, and the French II Army Corps, with 2 divisions, will carry out attack c.

For this operation I have decided to place, from the tactical point of view, General Hirschauer and the 6 French attack divisions under the orders of General Pershing. However, you will have to direct all of the preparations of this action north of Haudiomont and the placement of the means required thereof.

You are therefore requested to inform General Hirschauer immediately.

Besides the supplementary artillery items enumerated in the annex memorandum attached hereto, I expect to place a few heavy mortars at your disposal to crush the Jumelles d'Ormes and the Herbois and thus neutralize the flanking action of those heights; in addition, 4 battalions of light tanks will be brought up, in due time, to support the advance of our infantry.

It should be possible to launch the affair September 5.

PETAIN.

-----
Request for Continuance of French Antiaircraft Defense

[Extract]

1. On account of the lack of antiaircraft artillery materiel, the American Expeditionary Force is unable to take over the antiaircraft defense of the area in which our First Army is operating. It would be most gratifying to the Commander-in-Chief if the French authorities continue these defenses until such time as the American materiel is available.*

* * * * *

By direction:

Dep. C. of S.

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Need for Secrecy

[Editorial Translation]

From the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F. to General Petain

My dear General:

In reply to your letter No. 30135 of August 19 I have the honor to inform you that the importance of the considerations which you have set forth relative to the necessity for secrecy in all operations had not escaped me. I keenly regret that indiscretions may have been committed and I consider, with you, that we must attempt to mislead the enemy upon the actual directions of the attack. I have given instructions with this in view to my general staff.

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* This document is printed in full in "Policy-Forming" documentation volume.
In all that concerns the execution, and by what American officers the reconnaissances in Lorraine, in the Vosges, and in upper Alsace, should be made, we may, if you agree, examine together this question during the course of the interview which I intend to request you to give me very shortly.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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G-3, First Army: fldr. 1: Letter

**General Pershing Accepts Command of French Troops Participating in Woëvre Attack**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.

Letter from the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., to General Petain

My dear General:

The arrangements proposed in your letter No. 31,500 of August 20, appear to me as to the best calculated to guarantee the success of the operation under consideration.

In consequence I fully agree and thank you for your assistance which you have been kind enough to place at my disposition, and for placing the units mentioned under my orders for the operation in question.

We may, if you agree, make a definite decision on all of the questions of detail during the interview which I purpose to ask you to give me very soon.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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**Tank Requirements**

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff No. 3273

HIGH COMMAND ALLIED ARMIES, August 24, 1918.

[Annex 824]

Mission Chaumont telegraphs:

American command requests that number of light tanks placed at disposal of First Army be increased to 6 battalions instead of 5, or a total of 288 tanks. This request will be reduced in proportion to the number of battalions which may be furnished by British or equipped as American units.
The British command cannot, on account of operations which are now under way, furnish any heavy tanks at this time, nor say when or how many it may be able to furnish subsequently. Under these conditions, we may have to supply an additional battalion of Renault tanks.

By order:

WEYGAND,
Chief of Staff.

To: Commander-in-Chief, French Armies of North and Northeast


**French Attack to Flank the Left of American Attack**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 39, 216

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

The Commander-in-Chief

To The General Commanding the Group of Armies of the East

(Continuation of the personal and secret letter No. 26989 of August 17.)

[Extract]

1. I have decided that the French attack designed to flank the left of the American attack of Woervre will include 2 army corps and 6 divisions to wit:

II Army Corps - - -3d and 4th Divisions
XI Army Corps - - -21st, 22d, 61st and 151st Divisions.

In addition, a division will be held in reserve at my disposal in the zone of attack.

28th (or 154th) Div.

The II and XI Army Corps will be regrouped in the territory of the Group of Armies of the Center as it is defined by Order 7889 of August 21.

II Army Corps in the region Herpont---Vauault-les-Dames
XI Army Corps in the region Revigny, Bar-le-Duc, St-Dizier so that the territory of the American First Army may be left entirely free to concentrate its own units.

* * * * *
3. As far as the American First Army is concerned it may be foreseen that the installation of the units scheduled to take part in the attacks will take place in the territory of the Group of Armies of the East.

(a) The transportation by rail:
   of the American 26th from the Chatillon region to the Souilly region, August 28.
   of the American 79th from the Prauthoy region to the Vezelize region, Sept. 3
   of the American 80th from the Chatillon region to the Gondrecourt region, Sept. 1.
   of the American 35th from the Remiremont region to the Nancy region, Sept. 3.

(b) The transportation by auto truck:
   of the American 78th from the Bourbonne region to the Souilly region.
   of the American 5th from the Arches region to the Nancy region.
   of the American 42d from the Bourmont region to the Toul region.
   of the American 4th from the St-Blin region to the Toul region.

Between August 28 and September 4.

Finally the moving by auto-truck of the American 3d (Gondrecourt) and the American 33d (Barrois) to the Souilly region.

This information should enable you to make all necessary dispositions and particularly to coordinate the movements of the French units shown in Sec. I with those of the American units detailed above.

You will have to establish an understanding with the American staff relative to the coordination of these various movements.

PETAIN.
Availability of Tanks

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, Gen. Staff
No. 41083
[Annex 850]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 26, 1918.

Commander-in-Chief, to Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

In reply to your Memorandum 3273 of August 24, I have the honor to present statement
on situation of light tank units as of Aug. 27:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Existing battalions</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unavailable</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalions in combat, Tenth Army</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total availabilities</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of these 5 battalions, 3 are already reserved for the American First Army (505th Tank Regiment). The 2 remaining battalions (501st Tank Regiment) were earmarked for the Second Army.

By giving satisfaction to the request of the American command, there will remain only one single battalion of light tanks available to the French Second Army.

I invite your attention to this situation at the same time taking necessary measures for execution of your orders.

By order:

BUAT,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
Tanks

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, General Staff
3d Bureau
No. 3355

MARSHAL, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,
ALLIED ARMIES,
August 27, 1918—23:10 h.

[Annex 863]

Headquarters Bacon to French Mission Chaumont, G. H. Q. (3d Bureau) for information.

(Reply to Letter No. 124/01 of August 23 from French Mission Chaumont.)

Measures have been taken by General Petain to furnish four battalions French light Renault tanks.

By order Chief of Staff:

WEYGAND.

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Cooperation of Royal Air Force in Forthcoming American Operations

[Dictated Translation by Fox Conner]

1st Section, 3d Bureau and Aeronautics
No. 3377/A

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Bombon, August 27, 1918,

Marshal Foch, Commanding the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

I have requested General Trenchard, commanding the British aviation in the east, to inform me as to the conditions under which it would be possible for him to cooperate, with the bombardment squadrons at his disposal, in the operations which you are preparing.

General Trenchard has informed me that his pilots are not trained in the bombardment of the field of battle proper, which requires special training, but that he is willing to cooperate in the operations in question with all his forces (night and day squadrons) by taking as objectives on dates which may be indicated to him, the railroad stations of Metz, Thionville, and Longuyon, which control the railroads by which the enemy transports personnel and materiel to the battle.

I beg of you to arrange directly with General Trenchard, whose headquarters is at Attigny-la-Tour, all details relative to this cooperation which, being concentrated upon the three principal distant objectives which should be bombarded, will permit you to
devote the French squadrons placed at your disposal entirely to the attack of the inlying objectives on the battlefield.

F. FOCH.

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Operations in Upper Alsace

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont-en-Bassigny, Haute-Marne, August 28, 1918.

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, VI Corps, A. E. F.

1. The Commander-in-Chief directs that you proceed, with such members of your staff as you may consider absolutely necessary, to Belfort and prepare detailed plans for an attack in that region.

2. In preparing these plans you will consider the front of attack as extending from Altkirch to Thann. The objective is Mulhouse and the line of heights extending to the southeast from that place. It is intended by the occupation of this line to insure the destruction of the Rhine bridges and eventually to establish our line along the river itself.

3. It is believed that the enemy has been misled by the massing of our troops around Neufchateau and that the attack can be conducted by seven divisions in first line. In addition to the 29th Division now in the Belfort sector, the 80th, 35th, 78th, 91st, 79th and 36th Divisions have been designated as first line divisions. A reconnaissance party of three officers from each of these divisions is being ordered to Belfort to report to you on August 30. You will be informed later as to arrangements for artillery and special services. In order, however, that the feature of surprise may be utilized to the full, it is intended to reduce the artillery to the minimum.

Divisions for the relief of the first line divisions will, in order to avoid massing troops and thus attracting the attention of the enemy, be sent to arrive at least two days after the beginning of the attack.

All troop movements will be ordered by these headquarters, your duties being limited for the present to the reconnaissance and the preparation of the preliminary plan. This work must be expedited as it is desired that the attack be launched not later than September 8. (Copyist's note: date was written in ink by General Conner, after letter was typed.)

4. The Commander-in-Chief expects to take command of the operations in person. Suitable buildings for the accommodation of the Hq. First Army, have already been leased at Belfort.

Col. A. L. Conger has been directed to report to you at once. Col. Conger is the immediate representative of G. H. Q. as well as of G-2, G. H. Q., and is fully informed
as to the Commander-in-Chief's plans. You will consult Col. Conger in any case of doubt. Frequent telegraphic reports are desired, the operation code being used.

You will, of course, appreciate the necessity for secrecy.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 1081: Letter

Reconnaissance

3d Section, G. S.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 28, 1918.

From: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3; G. H. Q., A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, 36th Division, A. E. F. [Same letter to 35th, 78th, 79th, 80th and 91st Divs.]

1. The Commander-in-Chief directs that you send by automobile a reconnaissance party to consist of one officer from your headquarters and one from each of your infantry brigades to report to Major General Omar Bundy at the Grand Hotel du Tonneau d'Or at Belfort before noon on August 30.

Your Chief of Staff will not be one of the officers sent.

2. The Commander-in-Chief directs that you personally warn these officers as to preserving silence as to their mission while in Belfort.

By orders:

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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Operations in Upper Alsace

VI ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Bourbonne-les-Bains, Haute-Marne, August 28, 1918.

From: Commanding General, VI Corps
To: Commander-in-Chief

1. In compliance with secret letter of Aug. 28, 1918, I and selected members of my staff will leave these headquarters for Belfort at 8 a. m., August 29, 1918.

OMAR BUNDY,
Major General.

Boundaries of American First Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff and Direction of the Rear
No. 499/D. A.

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
Provins, August 29, 1918.

(Detailed enumeration of the places forming these boundaries as a result of coded telegram 2,503 dated August 27, 1918.)

West Boundary: Watronville---Haudainville* (these two localities to the American Army)---course of the Meuse---Dieue (to the American Army)---the Dieue-Senoncourt Road (this road to the American Army)---Lemmes (to French Group of Armies of the Center)---road from Verdun to Bar-le-Duc (between Lemmes excl. and Bar-le-Duc excl.) the localities traversed by the road to the Group of Armies of the Center, the road being used by the two groups of armies; then boundary of the communes of Bar-le-Duc, Longeville, Bazincourt Aulnois-en-Perthois, Juvigny, Brauvilliers, La Landre, Osne-le-Val, Thonnance-les-Joinville, Suzannecourt, St-Urbain, Fronville, Ferrieres-et-Lafolie, Morancourt, Dommartin-le-Franc, Courcelles-sur-Blaise, Mertrud, Sommevoire, Nully, Tremilly, Fuligny, Vernonvilliers, Eclance, Bossancourt, Vauchonvilliers, Vendeuvre (these communes to the Group of Armies of the Center); then east boundary of the district of Bar-sur-Seine, as far as the rear boundary of the communications zone. (South boundary of the Department of Haute-Marne).

* Railhead at Haudainville will be used by the French Second Army.

South Boundary: The south boundary is the rear boundary of the communications zone, to wit: from west to east:

South boundary of the Department of Haute-Marne, then south boundary of the Department of Haute-Saone.

By order:

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.

HS Secret File: Flgr. F-2: Record

Discussion of Proposed Operations

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, August 30, 1918.

NOTES ON CONVERSATION BETWEEN GENERAL PERSHING AND MARSHAL FOCH AT LIGNY-EN-BARROIS

Present at the conversation were also General Weygand, Col. Boyd and Captain de Marenches.

Marshal Foch began the conversation by stating that the German Army is in complete disorder and that we must not allow them an opportunity to reorganize. He stated that the British propose to continue their attack in the direction of Cambrai and St-Quentin; that the French will continue their push in the vicinity of Mesnil. He then outlines the plan.

Marshal Foch stated to General Pershing that he realized he was presenting a number of new ideas and that, naturally, General Pershing would need time to think them over before expressing an opinion. He, however, asked for General Pershing’s first impression.

General Pershing stated that naturally anything he would say about the matter now would be only his first impressions without having had time to make any study of the situation; that at first view, it struck him that to make the attack in Woeyeve with the limited objectives would cost but little less than it would to carry out the original plan of which the result would, he thought, be much more productive.

- 36 -
DOMMARTIN-LES EPARGES AREA
Looking north-northwest from Dommartin-la-Montagne
Marshal Foch stated that this was true, but that the fate of the 1918 campaign will be decided in the Aisne region and he requested General Pershing to consider and say what he could do; that as soon as the Woëvre attack was launched and carried out, he wishes to start an action on the Meuse and that we must limit the Woëvre fight so as to make it possible for the American Army to participate in the Meuse fight, which would give far greater results if it succeeds.

General Pershing stated that another thought was that this arrangement would cause a separation of the American forces, leaving some Americans in the Woëvre, then the French Second Army with some Americans on its left; then some French; then some Americans on the Aisne and then the French. That this destroys the thing we have been trying so long to form—that is, an American Army.

Marshal Foch stated that if General Pershing could give a solution satisfactory to him which would permit the execution of the operations in view, he would be glad to carry it out, but that he did not think this possible.

General Pershing remarked again that all of his remarks are made without having had any opportunity to study it; that he might be of a very different opinion after having looked into the matter.

Marshal Foch stated that he had tried to see a way for putting the American Army together and requested General Pershing to think the matter over himself; that he, the Marshal, had studied it very carefully and had sincerely looked for a means to avoid dividing the American Army, but does not believe, that it can be found.

General Pershing remarked that one solution might be to withdraw the Americans to put them with their right on the Meuse and extending as far west as possible.

Marshal Foch stated that this is possible for consideration, but it would be difficult to realize that General Pershing would execute his operation in St-Mihiel and have at the same time to shift his command for action in another place, which would be a very difficult operation; that the relief of the Americans in the salient would be very difficult; that the troops which fight in the first part of the battle in the Woëvre could not fight in the Aisne. There would be no objection to relieving them later by tired French divisions so that they might be sent to the Americans.

General Pershing questioned as to whether they could be relieved as reserves for the next attack.

The Marshal stated that the other attack could not wait for them. The Marshal repeated his general plan and requested that, while the Woëvre battle is going on, General Pershing send reserves toward the Aisne; having made studies and general preparations for the attack so that he could come himself and take command as soon as the army is formed.

General Pershing asked about artillery for the attack in Woëvre.

The Marshal stated that it would be placed at General Pershing’s disposition on the 31st.

General Weygand remarked that since the front of this attack was to be reduced, less artillery for it would be needed.

Then followed a general discussion as to the details for the attack in the Woëvre.

General Pershing stated that limiting the attack to the line Regnieville—Thiaucourt—Vignelles, as proposed by Marshal Foch, with the attack from the south, made the proposition more difficult; that he thought it preferable to attack as planned—to clear the Bois de Hermeville; force the Germans back from the salient by this advance or capture those enveloped in the salient; by making this attack in this way we run less risk of disaster, are more certain of success and can establish the line as desired by Marshal Foch, or wherever we wish since the choice of ground will be ours; that we have made a very careful and detailed study of this plan, which agrees with that of General Petain.

The Marshal stated that an attack from the west will use up many troops which we need. He thought that the Germans would fall back from St-Mihiel at the first sign; that we would only be playing into their hands if they could engage a large number of our troops for a certain length of time; that he did not look for much resistance.
The Marshal then stated that for the operation in the Aisne he had General Degoutte, who is thoroughly acquainted with the country in this region, and General Malcor, who is also acquainted with the country and who was Chief of Artillery of the Fourth Army, whom he would put now at General Pershing's disposition to assist him in preparing this operation; that in General Degoutte he is giving a man of high rank and authority so that he can act without referring to General Petain and can speak in the name of General Petain, therefore rapidly expediting business for the American Army; that while General Pershing was carrying on his fight in Woerwre, these two French generals, with an American staff, could be making plans for the Aisne fight and, the Woerwre battle finished, General Pershing would only have to come and take command on the Aisne.

Then followed some general discussion in which no new points were advanced.

Marshal Foch then again resumed his statement that he proposed, between the Meuse and the Argonne, to launch an attack by mixed American and French troops; an American army west of the Argonne, and when they had advanced beyond the Argonne, which separates these two operations and which is not practicable, the two forces would maneuver toward each other; if, as the operation advances, the Americans on the left of the French Second Army can join hands with those on the right of the Aisne force, he could only see advantage in this.

General Pershing stated that the Americans going to the Aisne will replace certain French divisions. He asked why these French divisions should not take the place of the Americans who would be fighting with the French Second Army, or the reverse; or why not have the Americans take all the sector from the Meuse to the Argonne, thereby relieving troops of the [French] Second Army which could go to the aid of the French Fourth Army on the Aisne. He stated that he did not want to appear difficult, but that the American people and the American Government expect that the American Army shall act as such and shall not be dispersed here and there along the Western Front. Each time that we are on the point of accomplishing this organization, some proposition is presented to break it up.

Marshal Foch asked very plainly: "Do you wish to take part in the battle?" (Voulez-vous aller a la bataille?)

General Pershing replied: "Most assuredly, but as an American Army."

Marshal Foch replied, that means it will take a month.

General Pershing proposed that Marshal Foch immediately give him a sector, that he will take it at once.

He then stated that if the Marshal could place himself in his, General Pershing's place, he would see General Pershing's point of view.

The Marshal asked where this sector should be.

General Pershing stated that it would be wherever the Marshal designated.

The Marshal stated that there are many details to be considered in this connection; that the American Army would not be in a very fit plight if put altogether without any assistance from the French.

General Pershing replied that the French have always insisted that the Americans bring to France only infantry and machine-gun units and that the French would equip them; that this had been done at the repeated and most urgent insistence of the Marshal himself, and that the Marshal had also promised himself to furnish these troops with what was necessary for their organization; that now he, General Pershing, demands that the Marshal fulfill his promise.

Marshal Foch replied that it is now August 30; that we must start the battle on the 15th; that it is a question of time; that he is quite at General Pershing's disposition to listen to any proposition, but that we must act on September 15.

General Pershing stated that he is quite ready to take all the divisions we will not need here in the Woerwre and send them to the west of the Argonne as an American Army; that all extra divisions should be put there; that he did not approve of putting American divisions in the French Second Army.

The Marshal replied that in that event the French have not enough divisions to attack.
General Pershing replied that it is not difficult to send divisions from one army to another; that this is what is being proposed for the American Army now; that it would be just as simple to send part of the French Fourth Army to the aid of the French Second Army.

The Marshal replied that the Fourth Army could not furnish them.

General Pershing then proposed that they organize the American Army between the Meuse and the Argonne.

The Marshal replied that this was his first idea, but on study he sees that it would be a very difficult proposition.

General Pershing then asked about having the Americans on the right of the Meuse and the French on the left.

The Marshal stated that on the right of the Meuse there were no communications.

General Pershing suggested the possibility of organizing two American Armies, one between the Meuse and the Argonne, and the other west of the Argonne.

The Marshal replied that as long as the French Second Army is at Verdun it would be very difficult to get up supplies; that he regarded it as necessary to have around Verdun people who are thoroughly familiar with the country as it is a very complicated proposition to have [sic].

Marshal Foch then withdrew with General Weygand and completed the memorandum referred to in the beginning of this paper, which he then handed to General Pershing and asked him if he had any observations to make on it.

General Pershing replied that he had none except those he had already made. He stated that he had always depended on the Marshal to assist him in carrying out the organization of the American Army; that the American people, the American Government, Secretary of War and President, insisted that the American Army shall fight as such; that the Government, from the President down, and General Pershing himself have been criticized for parcelling out American troops here and there among the Allies; that the President had sent a message to the embassies stating that the American Army should fight as such and that the battle for us would be on the Western Front.

The Marshal stated that he was disposed to do all possible toward accomplishing this end; that he is convinced that General Pershing will, after a careful study of the situation, arrive at the same conclusion as himself.

The Marshal left with the understanding that General Pershing would, after studying the proposition, make a reply to him on these matters at the earliest possible moment.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 658: Letter

Plans for Continuation of Allied Offensive

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, 1st Subsection, G. S. HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES, Bombon, Seine-et-Marne, August 30, 1918.

I. The operation which it was decided on July 24 to undertake in the course of the summer and autumn of 1918 answered to the situation at that time.

Today the successful results of the first two of these operations have thrown the enemy well beyond the first objectives which we set ourselves. The battle extends from the Scarpe to Reims on a front of 200 kilometers where the enemy is falling back and giving clear proof of disorganization.

It is important to exploit to the full this advantageous situation by pushing this battle and extending it to the Meuse and by bringing to it all the Allied forces in a converging action.
For this purpose:

1. The British Armies supported by the left of the French Armies will continue to attack in the general direction of Cambrai---St-Quentin.

2. The center of the French Armies will continue the energetic actions already engaged to throw the enemy beyond the Aisne.

3. The American Army and the right of the French Armies acting on the Meuse and to the west will attack in the general direction of Mezieres.

II. The operations indicated in Pars. 1 and 2 above are now being executed. Those indicated in 3 will comprise:

1. The attack of the American Army on the right bank of the Meuse, to be carried out and to be begun as soon as possible, taking advantage of all the preparation already made so as to leave no respite to the enemy. But this operation will be reduced to obtaining the line Vigneulles---Thiaucourt---Regnieville which will give the results desired: the freeing of the Paris-Avricourt Railroad and a satisfactory base of departure for future operations. It will thus leave available considerable Allied forces for the principal operations in the direction of Mezieres.

2. An offensive covered on the east by the Meuse, in the general direction of Mezieres on both sides of the Aisne, comprising:
   (a) An attack between the Meuse and the Argonne executed by the French Second Army reinforced by a few American divisions (4 to 6), to be prepared at once and launched as soon as possible after that in the Woevre.
   (b) A French-American attack extending from the Argonne to the Souain Road, to be prepared also without any delay so that it may be launched a few days after the preceding one. This attack will be executed by:
      On the right, an American Army acting on each side of the Aisne.
      On the left the French Fourth Army extending its action to the Souain Road.

III. To be fully successful these actions should follow one after the other without leaving the enemy time to reorganize. They should, therefore, be prepared with the greatest energy. To accomplish this purpose it is important in the first place to make the necessary reductions in the original plans for the operation in the Woevre so as to draw up the final plan and proceed to its execution, as well as to figure the forces thus becoming available for the other operations.

The General commanding the American Expeditionary Forces is therefore requested to draw up this final plan without any delay and to inform the Marshal commanding the Allied Armies as to what American forces are to be employed on it in the Woevre.

It would seem that provision should be made for:

1. 8 or 9 divisions for the reduced operation in the Woevre;
2. 4 to 6 divisions to assist the French Second Army of Verdun.
3. for the American Army of the Aisne, 8 to 10 divisions.

The attack in the Woevre ready to begin September 10; the two others between Sept. 15 and 20. [later changed to between 20th and 25th]

With a view to simplifying and expediting matters between the high commands, General Degoutte and General of artillery, Malcor are placed at the disposal of General Pershing.

These officers, who are perfectly acquainted with the situation in the French Armies and with their resources, as well as the prospective zones of operations, are given sufficient authority to ensure the speedy solution of all questions.

FOCH.
Objection to Dispersion of American Units

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

Chaumont-en-Bassigny, Haute-Marne, August 31, 1918.

 Marshal Foch
 Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France

My dear Marshal:

I have carefully examined your note of August 30, in which you point out the fact that the successes already obtained are far beyond those foreseen by your decision of July 24. I agree with you that it is now essential to exploit to the utmost the present situation.

I consider that the combination of an attack extending from the Meuse westward in the direction of Mezieres with the attack in the north in the direction of St-Quentin and Cambrai, as conceived by you, gives the Allies the possibility of a virtually unlimited success. I must, however, invite your attention to the fact that such a success presupposes a very considerable advance, especially in the direction of Mezieres. Whether or not the Allied superiority, both material and moral, is as yet sufficient to insure the realization of your conception, should be carefully weighed.

There are also a number of points which especially affect the American Army and which, I think, must be given the consideration which the American effort in this war warrants. The first of these relates to the method of employing the American forces. I can no long­er agree to any plan which involves a dispersion of our units. This is a matter whose importance is such as to demand very frank discussion. Briefly, American officers and soldiers alike are, after one experience, no longer willing to be incorporated in other armies, even though such incorporation be by larger units. The older American divisions have encountered so much difficulty in their service with the French and British that it is inadvisable to consider the return of such divisions to French or British control.

The same is true of our corps staffs.

It has been said that the American Army is a fiction and that it cannot now be actually formed because it lacks artillery and services. Unfortunately this lack is evident. But our shortages in this respect are due to the fact that America brought over infantry and machine gunners to the virtual exclusion of the services and auxiliaries. Permit me also to recall that when this decision was made, there was coupled with it a promise that the Allies would undertake to provide the necessary services and auxiliaries, and that you yourself have repeatedly guaranteed the formation of a real American Army. It seems to me that it is far more appropriate at the present moment for the Allies temporarily to furnish the American Army with the services and auxiliaries it needs than for the Allies to expect further delay in the formation of an American Army. I am writing faithfully my own ideas, which are those not only of every American officer and soldier, but also of my government.

In considering an attack by the American Army in the direction of Mezieres we should, I think, give weight to the plans on which we have hitherto worked toward the formation, now to be realized, of that army. Since our arrival in France our plans, not only with the consent but at the initiative of the French authorities, have been based on the organization of the American Army on the front St-Mihiel---Belfort. All our depots, hospitals, training areas and other installations are located with reference to this front, and a change of these plans cannot be easily made. For instance, the care of our sick and wounded must be foreseen. We have already had very grave difficulty and no little dissatisfaction in those of our divisions serving under conditions which made us dependent on the French for the handling and care of our sick and wounded.
With reference to the objective to be considered in the St-Mihiel operation, I agree, of course, with you that an advance to the line Thiaucourt---Vigneulles would accomplish the primary result sought by the operation. I think, however, that it is advisable, even in limiting the result sought, to make the attack north of Les Eparges at least as a secondary operation. Unfortunately, both the French and the Americans have talked and it now seems certain that the enemy is aware of the approaching attack. Nevertheless, I believe that the attack should be made and that decision as to the extent to which any success should be exploited should be reserved. To do this it seems essential that I should hold available all the divisions I am now concentrating for the St-Mihiel operation.

The number of American divisions which will be available immediately after the attack can not, of course, be foretold with any certainty. However, it would appear entirely impracticable to carry out the St-Mihiel operation and to assemble the 12 to 16 American divisions for the attack in the direction of Mezieres between September 15 and 20. In fact, it would be necessary to begin at once the movements preliminary to the assembly of the 12 or 16 divisions contemplated by your note. It is improbable that any of the divisions actually engaged in the St-Mihiel operation could be withdrawn and gotten into position for the Mezieres operation by September 20. Even though no second line divisions be actually engaged in the St-Mihiel operation, it is doubtful whether these divisions could be gotten into line for the Mezieres operation by September 20. Then, too, the second line divisions which will not become involved even in the limited attack can hardly exceed six, and these would not be the most experienced divisions.

Assuming, however, that six of the divisions from the St-Mihiel operation would be available, we should still have to find six to ten divisions in order to make up the 12 to 16 divisions which your note contemplates for employment in the Mezieres operation, and we must seek these divisions elsewhere. The 27th and 30th are now in the British line; the 28th and 77th are in the French line on the Aisne, and the 32d Division is in the French line north of Soissons. The latter three divisions need replacements and may be classed as rather tired. The 29th, 6th, 92d, and 37th Divisions are in the French line from Baccarat to Switzerland---all these are new divisions---and the 6th Division is just going into sector. The only ones of the above divisions which have artillery are the 28th, 32d, and 77th.

It seems apparent to me that it is impracticable to carry out even the limited St-Mihiel operation and yet assemble 12 to 16 American divisions, suitable for undertaking an offensive, by September 15 or 20. It therefore follows that the St-Mihiel operation must be abandoned or that the Mezieres operation must be postponed if 12 to 16 American divisions are to participate in the latter operation. Moreover, if the St-Mihiel operation is carried out, it is only after its completion that it would be practicable to fix a date upon which it would be possible to have available 12 to 16 American divisions fit for a powerful offensive.

My general ideas as to plans for the immediate future, insofar as concerns American troops, are: Carry through the St-Mihiel operation and immediately thereafter withdraw as many divisions as practicable and reconstitute and train them with a view to their employment in attack either in the region of Belfort or Luneville. Add to these divisions the 27th and 30th now with the British, and also the 32d, 28th, and 77th now on the Aisne and near Soissons. After the attack just mentioned, withdraw and reconstitute and again attack, even though it will then be winter, with the best American divisions. During all this time, build up American sectors in the east and finally, during January and February, entrust to America the sector from St-Mihiel to Switzerland. This is, in my opinion, the best utilization of American troops, and I ask that this plan be followed.

However, in your capacity as Allied Commander-in-Chief, it is your province to decide as to the strategy of operations, and I abide by your decision.

Finally, however, there is one thing that must not be done and that is to disperse the American forces among the Allied Armies; the danger of destroying by such dispersion the fine morale of the American soldier is too great, to say nothing of the results to be
obtained by using the American Army as a whole. If you decide to utilize American forces in attacking in the direction of Mezieres, I accept that decision, even though it complicates my supply system and the care of my sick and wounded, but I do insist that the American Army must be employed as a whole, either east of the Argonne or west of the Argonne, and not four or five divisions here and six or seven there.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Flgr. 1121: Letter

Reconnaissance of Belfort Sector

CHAUMONT, HAUTE-MARNE,
September 1, 1918.

From: Col. A. L. Conger, G. S.
To: Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

1. The instructions given me personally by the Commander-in-Chief have been executed. The VI Corps Staff is making its reconnaissance, a preliminary report of which is enclosed. The divisional reconnaissance parties have all completed the reconnaissance work assigned them and departed to rejoin their respective commands.

2. As to the results of this reconnaissance work on the enemy’s plans, I believe, from all sources, that he is now fully acquainted with all that has been done here. His (the enemy’s) sources and channels of information from here via Switzerland are very numerous and take about two days for transmission. Various indiscretions have been committed, as was to be expected, which have made this information easy for him to secure. I do not believe, however, that the enemy takes this reconnaissance very seriously; he has too good a check on every carload and truck load of ammunition and supplies brought into Belfort to be deceived by any mere paper work demonstration or reconnaissances of officers unaccompanied by actual preparations of guns, munition, materiel and subsistence.

I might add to this that our own officers, both corps and division, have taken the work very seriously and have worked hard and in dead earnest. The French staffs have been very polite and helpful, but have given me the impression by their attitude of feeling: “You Americans are very simple minded indeed if you think you can fool either us or the Germans by any such game as this.”

3. I shall continue to do my best to carry out the instructions and wishes of the Commander-in-Chief.

A. L. CONGER.

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Operation in Upper Alsace

VI CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 1, 1918.

From: The Commanding General, VI Corps
To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., attention G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in your secret letter dated August 28, on the subject indicated above, the following preliminary report is submitted:
   (a) Present situation. Inclosed herewith is a statement of present conditions taken from reconnaissance report of the American 29th Division, which division has been in line in this sector for about one month.
   (b) My own reconnaissance and those of the divisional parties sent by your orders to report to me verify facts as set forth in the inclosure; but indicate that, at the present time the difficulties described as due to streams, lakes, ponds and wet marshy ground, are reduced to a minimum. The streams are low and have solid bottoms and the ground at this season is hard and dry. It is not believed that these features would, at this season, present serious difficulties to a rapid advance across the areas lying between the present front line and the objectives given in your letter.
   (c) It is believed that now is a most propitious time for launching an attack in this region. The country is now as dry perhaps as it ever gets, the enemy is weak and conditions otherwise favorable for a surprise attack that would, in my opinion, attain the desired objectives and offer opportunities for an exploitation, to the north, of success gained.
   (d) The most serious difficulty to be encountered is believed to consist of the large quantities of wire, existing in "No Man's Land" as well as in the enemy's defensive organization.
   (e) An attack, to be successful, would require the employment of either a large quantity of artillery or of tanks and artillery in smaller quantity but still sufficient to support the advancing infantry and to insure taking full advantage of the success gained by the occupation of the first objectives.
   (f) A preliminary study indicates that the six divisions, additional to the 29th, needed for the 1st line, can be brought from their present locations in training area, to points opposite their zones of action, along separate lines, without serious interference one with the other. This subject is being studied with a view of keeping the infantry and machine guns as far as possible out of Belfort, and reserving this center of traffic for artillery, tanks and supplies.

2. More detailed report and plan of attack will follow as early as practicable, and will reach you not later than midnight, 3d instant.

OMAR BUNDEDY,
Major General.
Foch's Plans for Employment of American Armies

3d Section, General Staff
No. 3,480

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, September 1, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces

My dear General:

My memorandum of August 30 and my oral explanations of the same day deal with the immediate organization of a general Allied offensive:

(1) in a determined direction,
(2) with the maximum Allied forces,
(3) as soon as possible,
(4) under the most advantageous condition of supply, hence also of communications.

To accomplish this I have planned for the American Army:

(a) a St-Mihiel operation more or less reduced in extent,
(b) an attack west of the Meuse.

In any event the attack west of the Meuse will be carried out in the direction, with the strength and at the time, determined upon.

If, as indicated in your letter of August 31, you consider it impossible to carry out the St-Mihiel plan as a preliminary or simultaneous operation, even on a reduced scale, then I deem it advisable to abandon it.

In any case, in order to organize the operations west of the Meuse without any loss of time, I request that you join General Petain and myself at my headquarters at 2 p.m. tomorrow, September 2. With a view to the adoption of a conclusive and precise general plan for these operations, I would further request that you bring to this meeting such officers of your staff as you may deem necessary to supply the information that may be needed.

I shall have the honor of giving you an early answer concerning the other points raised in your letter of August 31 and to let you know the zone of action considered advisable for the future use of the American Army.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.
Decision Concerning Allied Attacks at St-Mihiel and West of the Meuse

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.  
No. 3528  
HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
Bombon, September 2, 1918.

CONFERENCE OF SEPTEMBER 2

During the conference of September 2 at the headquarters of Marshal Foch, at which General Pershing, General Petain, and their Chiefs of Staff were present, the following was decided upon:

1. The St-Mihiel attack, limited as to objectives to obtaining the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt-Regnieville, limited as a consequence as to the means to be employed, and limited also as to duration, will be prepared for execution September 10. This attack will require 8 to 10 divisions.

2. The attack west of the Meuse will be executed by the American Army covered on its right by the river and supported on its left by an attack of the French Fourth Army. It will be prepared without any delay for execution between September 20 and 25. The American Army will put into this attack all the forces it has available (12 to 14 divisions), and will also shift to this attack such of the divisions from the St-Mihiel attack as may not be needed for it or may later become available. Its front of attack will start at the Meuse and will extend toward the west at least as far as the Argonne.

3. The organization of communications in the Meuse sector necessitates bringing under a single command all the troops operating on the right and left banks of the Meuse. Consequently, General Pershing, who has already taken under his command the St-Mihiel attack sector, will also take under his command for the attack west of the Meuse the present front of the French Second Army at least as far as the Argonne. The French divisions holding the passive front to the east of the Meuse will be retained there for the time being and are placed under American command by the present order.

The operations will be carried out under the high direction of the General commanding the Armies of the North and Northeast.

FOCH.
MONTSEC-SEICHEPREY AREA
Looking east from Montsec
Operation A, St-Mihiel

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins C. P., September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

I. The protocol of the meeting of September 2, 1918, at Bombon prescribes the new conditions according to which the battle is to be fought.

The plan originally agreed upon concerning the operations of the American First Army is changed as follows:

II. PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION: The operation still has for its purpose to release the Paris-Avricourt Railroad and to gain a base of departure adequate for later operations.

This result will be obtained by the reduction of the St-Mihiel salient which will involve the storming of the Heights of the Meuse.

III. INFORMATION OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ENEMY POSITION: The enemy defensive system in the Woëvre includes • • •

(a) An outpost zone, composed, strictly speaking, of the St-Mihiel salient and comprising two successive positions organized in depth (Wilhelm and Schroeter Positions).

(b) A batter zone called "Michel I" marked by the line Preny---Lachaussee---Moulotte.

IV. OBJECTIVES: The attack of the American First Army will have as objectives the general line, from west to east: Les Eparges---Vigneulles---Thiaucourt---the Moselle.

This objective lies entirely on this side of the aforementioned enemy battle zone.

V. The operation involves:

(1) A main attack debouching from the Selcheprey-Limey plateau in a northerly direction and having for general objective the line Vigneulles-Thiaucourt.

(2) A secondary attack debouching from the region Les Eparges---Mouilly in a southeasterly direction and aiming, by its combination with the main attack, at the encirclement of the enemy forces occupying the Heights of the Meuse and the St-Mihiel salient.

(3) These two attacks will be connected by the action of the large units in sector between the two zones of attack. These units will exert pressure against the enemy forces opposite them.

VI. It will be necessary to make provision for the immediate organization of the captured ground as soon as the line indicated is reached.

VII. ORGANIZATION OF COMMAND: All the forces entrusted with the execution of the operations considered in the preceding paragraph will be commanded by General Pershing.

Consequently, the large French units participating in the operation will, effective at once, be placed under the tactical control of General Pershing.

* * * * *

X. In conformity with the orders of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, the attack will take place September 10.

PETAIN,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

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- 49 -
Plan for Converging Attack by Combined Allied Forces on the Western Front

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, September 3, 1918.

At present the Allied offensive is developing successfully from the Scarpe to the Aisne, forcing the enemy to retire all along that front.

In order to expand and intensify this offensive, it is important that all the Allied forces engage in the battle without delay and operate in convergent directions against favorable parts of the front.

To this end, the following plan will govern:

1. The British Armies, supported by the left of the French Armies, will continue their attack in the general direction Cambrai---St-Quentin.

2. The center of the French Armies will continue its action for the purpose of driving the enemy back beyond the Aisne and the Ailette.

3. The American Army will execute the following operations:
   a. The offensive planned in the Woevre, with its objective limited to the line Vigneulles---Thiaucourt---Regnieville, an advance sufficient to attain the desired results, namely: The release of the Paris-Avrincourt Railway and the seizure of a satisfactory base of departure for later operations.
   This attack will be launched as soon as possible, without giving any respite to the enemy, and not later than September 10. [See 15/3, September 2, preceding]
   b. An offensive in the general direction of Mezieres, as powerful and violent as possible, covered on the east by the Meuse and supported on the left by an attack of the French Fourth Army.
   This latter offensive will be prepared with the greatest speed, to be launched not later than September 20 to 25.
   Its initial objective will be to throw the enemy back on the line Stenay---Le Chesne---Attigny, by actions fought on both sides of the Argonne; then to gain the region of Mezieres, always maneuvering from the east to break the resistance of the Aisne.

The successive objectives to be reached are indicated by the lines:

Dun---Grandpre---Challrange---Sommepy
Stenay---Le Chesne---Attigny.

F. FOCH.
Operations in Upper Alsace

3d Section, General Staff

From: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, VI Army Corps, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Referring to letter of instructions from this office of August 28, 1918, you are informed that it has been necessary to postpone the date fixed in that letter for the launching of the attack. The Commander-In-Chief desires, however, that you proceed with the reconnaissance and plans with which you have been charged in as active a manner as possible.

The Commander-In-Chief also directs that your studies be extended in scope so as to include the possibility of the entry into action of divisions to the north and also the method of employing the divisions for exploiting the success. It is believed that your plans should provide for the successive entry into action of divisions at least as far north as the pass east of Gerardmer. The plans should also definitely select the bridgeheads on the Rhine which it would be advantageous to secure.

It is impossible, at the present time, to fix an approximate date for the operations, but you will, of course, see the necessity for pushing the work as rapidly as possible.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Brig. Gen., General Staff.

* * * * *

Directive for Allied Offensive West of the Meuse

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 8260 [Omitted here since this order was revoked and replaced by No. 22.008, Sept. 16]
Inquiry Concerning Disposition of Forces on Meuse-Argonne Front

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 8261

The General, Commander-in-Chief

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, under date of September 4, wrote me as follows:

In order to enable me, with full knowledge of the situation to decide upon the entry into action of the Franco-American forces under your high command, I have the honor to request the following information:

1. The date set by General Pershing for the execution of Operation A [St-Mihiel].
2. The general organization of Operation B [Meuse-Argonne]:
   Organization of the command, the number and numerical designations of army corps and their distribution on the terrain. I need this information in order to enable me to determine successive results to be required of the Franco-American operations, with respect to the battle now in progress in which the mass of the British and French forces are heavily engaged.

There is no need for me to dwell on the necessity which exists on your part for extending every facility and assistance to the preparation of Operation B in particular, the date of which cannot be postponed without grave consequence.

I would be grateful if you would get this information to me without delay, by consultation with General Pershing, if necessary.

Would you please let me have information on:

1. The date decided upon for Operation A.
2. The date on which you expect to be ready to enter upon the execution of Operation B, considering that, in my opinion, this operation will require: In the front line, 8 divisions • • •
3. Some idea of the organization of the command in the sector of attack west of the Meuse (army corps and the locations desired for their headquarters).
4. A similar outline of your intentions concerning the organization of the command in general, that is to say, of the entire front under your authority (from the Moselle, on the east, to the present boundary of the French Second Army, on the west), with location of the headquarters.

The information requested under 3 and 4, above, would be useful to me personally in the preparation for you of all liaison involved in attacking the artillery, and in preparing the assignment of army corps zones, etc.

I shall be grateful if you would send your reply with the least possible delay, both to comply with the desire expressed by the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, and to prevent me from losing a moment on my preparations for Operation B, as prescribed in my Personal and Secret Instructions No. 8260, September 6. [Not printed here since it was revoked and replaced by Instructions No. 22,008 of September 16, 1918.]

PETAIN.

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- 52 -
Release of American Units Serving Under French Command

3d Section, General Staff Number: 9300

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, September 7, 1918.

The General, Commander-in-Chief

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., Chaumont

In course of our latest interviews you requested:

First, the release of the American 37th, 92d and 29th Divisions which are in sector on the front of Lorraine and of the Vosges.

Second, the return to your command of the Headquarters American III Army Corps and of the American 32d, 28th and 77th Divisions, at present at the front of the French Sixth and Tenth Armies.

In accordance with our agreement, the 3 American divisions in the east, specified above, were to be released September 15, 18 and 20, respectively.

Headquarters, American III Army Corps and the American 32d and 28th Divisions were to be released September 9, and the 77th Division, September 12.

1. As concerns the American divisions in the east, I intend to return the 37th Division to you on September 15, as agreed.

In case of the 92d and 29th Divisions the present difficulties of railroad transportation and the limited means available for troop movements prevent me from moving tired divisions from the Group of Armies of the Center in time for the relief of these two units.

Their relief by tired French divisions to be transported by railroad cannot be planned before about September 22, for the 92d Division, and about September 24, for the 29th Division.

Under the circumstances, I request that you designate for these reliefs two of the American divisions recently arrived in France and at present in training in the east.

This solution would agree with your training programs which include a period of instruction in sectors on a quiet front for your newly arrived divisions.

On the other hand it is extremely important that the enemy continues to see American troops at that part of the front.

Finally, this is the only solution which would make possible the relief of the 92d and 29th Divisions in time to take part in the impending operations.

I would appreciate to be informed as soon as possible of your decision as to the relief of the 92d and 29th Divisions by fresh American divisions.

2. Headquarters, American III Army Corps and the American 32d Division will entrain for the American zone on September 9, as agreed.

In case of the American 28th and 77th Divisions the same difficulties of transportation, as mentioned above, compel me to transport them successively.

Under these conditions, I cannot entrain the American 28th and 77th Divisions for their destinations in the American zone until the following dates: The 28th Division, on September 12, and the 77th Division on September 15 or 16.
I deemed it necessary to inform you without delay of the modifications which our limited transportation facilities compel me to make in my former plans concerning the transportation of the 28th and 77th Divisions.

PETAIN.

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G-3, First Army, AEF: 114.02: French Letter

_Allotment of French Artillery, Tank, and Labor Units_

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 11938  

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
Provins, September 8, 1918.

The General, Commander-in-Chief  

To General Pershing, Commanding the A. E. F. in France  

[Extract]  

Supplementary to my personal and secret Memorandum No. 8260 of [Omitted, since instructions contained herein were revoked and replaced by Instructions No. 22.008, dated Sept. 16, 1918] September 6, I have the honor to submit herewith three annexes pertaining to the artillery, tanks, and labor units which will be allotted for the preparation and execution of Operation B.

* * * * *

BUAT,  
General, Chief of Staff.

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ANNEX B - ARTILLERY

The allotment of artillery necessary for the execution of Operation B should apparently be raised to the following strength, in round figures:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery Type</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>75-mm. artillery</td>
<td>60 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy artillery</td>
<td>60 battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy, high-powered artillery</td>
<td>100 guns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The artillery will be composed basically of American units.

The French artillery intended to enable the American First Army to attain at least the above-named figures will comprise:

- **75-mm. Artillery** - The truck-carried artillery which can be withdrawn from the allotment of such artillery for Operation A, with the exception, however, of Regiments Nos. 49, 246 and Colonial 23, which units will revert to my command on the 3d day, at the latest, after the launching of Operation A.

- **Heavy Artillery**
  - a. All French artillery which can be withdrawn from the front of Operation A.
  - b. Artillery units stationed at present in the area of the French Second Army

The total of this supplementary, heavy artillery will amount to 30 battalions, thus constituting one-half of the requirement to be met.

- **Heavy, high-powered artillery** - 50 to 60 guns to be designated later. This number will include:
  - The heavy, high-powered guns at present with the French Second Army, and

No account has been taken of the French heavy, high-powered artillery to be employed in Operation A. It will be necessary to recall a part of this artillery to my command for assignment to other active sectors.

**Movements** - All the designated artillery units will be placed progressively at the disposal of the French Second Army on behalf of the American First Army. The movements will be regulated by the Generals commanding the Group of Armies of the Center and the Group of Armies of the East, respectively, for all the elements which will have to cross the territory of their groups of armies.
RICHECOURT--LE JOLI-BOIS AREA
Looking northnorthwest from Seicherey
ANNEX C

[Extract]

Tank units placed at the disposal of the American First Army.

1. The American First Army will have at its disposal:
   a. The tank units already under its orders for the Woëvre operation, namely:
      Light Renault 2 American battalions:
      Tanks 3 French battalions, 505th Regiment
      Schneider Tanks - 2 provisional battalions (18 Schneider and 10 Renault tanks);
      St. Chamond Tanks - 1 provisional groupment (30 tanks)
   b. The following fresh units:
      504th Regiment (2 battalions of light tanks)
      1 provisional battalion, St-Chamond (12 tanks)

2. The General commanding the American First Army, will have at his disposal for Operation B, the labor units now under the orders of the French Second Army.
Cooperation of Royal Air Force

HEADQUARTERS, INDEPENDENT FORCE, R. A. F.,
Chamont-en-Bassigny, September 9, 1918.

My dear General:

I have today received your letter dated September 6, which I hasten to answer. I and my force will do our best to give you all the assistance that is in our power. I note that you wish me to continue my normal activities up to the date of the attack; this shall be done.

During this period you ask me to attack the railroad stations at Metz-Sablon, Thionville, Ehrange, Bettembourg and Courcelles. I will do this, and in addition attack the aerodromes at Frescaty [sic], Buhl, Montoy and Boulay. I might mention these targets are being continuously bombed now.

With regard to the day of the attack, I will, with my day bombers attack the railroad stations at Metz-Sablon and Courcelles, but I would ask you if possible to allow me to attack other targets farther away than the dumps and troops concentrated at Pagny-sur-Moselle and Mars-la-Tour as my force has not had experience in close fighting amongst large numbers of machines such as will be on the front that day and I fear they would not be of much use at this work. Metz-Sablon and Courcelles are close, but I think I can attack them by going round behind. I hope this will not in any way interfere with your arrangements.

I propose after the day of attack to reserve a few machines to attack long distance targets such as Essen, Cologne and Frankfurt if the weather and moon are very favorable. If the weather is not favorable for the long distance work I will also use these machines for the targets you mention.

I will forward reports as requested to the Commanding General and Chief of American Air Service, First Army, by telegram each morning and evening confirming the reports by motor cyclist each day.

I will also send any information which my bombing squadrons obtain to the Commanding General and Chief of American Air Service, First Army.

As I know the amount of work you are having to do is very great, if convenient to you would you tell the Chief of the American Air Service, First Army to let me know direct of any new targets you want me to attack as operations progress.

Yours sincerely,
H. TRENCHARD.

General J. J. Pershing,
Commander-in-Chief
American Expeditionary Forces.
Proposed Organization and Tentative Date for Meuse-Argonne Operation

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 10, 1918.

From: Commander-in-Chief
To: Commander-in-Chief, Armies of the N. and N. E.

Reference your letter of the 6th instance (No. 8261), permit me to convey to you the following information in response to the questions asked therein by Marshal Foch, C-in-C of the Allied Armies, and also by yourself.

1. The following information is furnished in answer to the questions set forth by Marshal Foch:
   b. General organization of Operation B [Meuse-Argonne Operation]
      Answer: Three American army corps. Each corps will have in the 1st line 3 American divisions and in the 2d line, 1 American division. There will be a 3d line consisting of 3 American divisions which will be employed as army reserve. For the distribution of these divisions please see attached map. [Not found]

2. The following information is furnished in response to the questions set forth by the C-in-C, Armies of the North and Northeast:
   a. Date fixed for Operation A: Answer communicated verbally.
   b. Date prepared to execute Operation B: Answer: September 22.

   NOTE: This date will, of course, depend on securing transportation for the movement of American divisions from their training areas to relieve American divisions now in the sector of the Vosges and at the south thereof.
   c. Please see above.

   In addition to the information stated in the foregoing, may I call your attention to the necessity for supplying the American First Army with artillery, especially counter-battery artillery? There will be available with the American troops the divisional artillery of the 9 divisions in the first line and 1 divisional artillery for the 3 divisions in the second line (corps reserve). Of the 3 divisions in the third line (army reserve) it is expected that 2 will be provided with artillery. However, the artillery of these latter divisions cannot arrive in time for the probable date of the attack. As for the counterbattery artillery, the First Army, A. E. F., will have the organic artillery of one corps and one regiment of army artillery. It will therefore be necessary for the First Army, A. E. F., to receive from the French Army such other artillery as may be necessary for the operation. An estimate of the amount necessary will be furnished you at an early date.

   Information as to the exact location desired for the different corps headquarters will also be sent later.

4. Organization of the Command of the First Army, A. E. F. (From the Moselle to Argonne).

   The general plan proposed is as follows:
   a. 1 American corps (IV Corps) consisting of 4 American divisions, with possibly 1 in reserve, will hold the sector from the Moselle to the vicinity of Vigneulles. Corps headquarters will be in the vicinity of Ansauville.
   b. The French II Colonial Corps, consisting of the 3 divisions now in this corps and the American 26th Division will hold the sector from the vicinity of Vigneulles to
Les Eparges.
Corps headquarters will be in the vicinity of St-Mihiel.
c. A French corps consisting of such French divisions as it may be considered necessary to retain in the line from Les Eparges to the Meuse. Corps headquarters will be located in the vicinity of Verdun.

The remainder of the American sector will be constituted as set forth in the answer given above for Operation B.

5. In connection with the supply of the First Army, A. E. F., relating especially to Operation B, your suggestion that General Hirschauer, commanding the French Second Army, be retained under my command is very acceptable.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, U. S. Army.

TABLE I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>I Corps</th>
<th>V Corps</th>
<th>III Corps</th>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) Artillery with the division.
(N) No artillery with the division.
(ab) Artillery to be brought to division from Operation A.

The General, Commander-in-Chief

To the General Commanding the French Second Army: through Headquarters

Group of Armies of the Center.

1. Immediately after the completion of the operation in the Woëvre, at a date to be determined by the General, Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing will take under his
command, in addition to the present sector of the American First Army, the French Second Army, within its present boundaries.

2. The General commanding the French Second Army will be charged with the preparation, pursuant to the directives of General Pershing, of the operation which is to be executed between the Meuse and Argonne by 15 American divisions.

3. Upon establishment of the general plan by General Pershing, it will be essentially the function of the General commanding the French Second Army, to effect the putting into place of all the means assigned to the operation (troops, services and material), as well as to establish the system of supply and evacuation of every nature.

Previously, he will also have assembled and communicated to General Pershing all pertinent information and have made to him all recommendations of a nature to facilitate the preparation of the operation; he will further cause to be carried out all labor tasks necessary for the attack.

4. The General commanding the French Second Army will keep the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center informed of all movements of troops and artillery, American as well as French, which may take place within his territory.

PETAIN.

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**Time of Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 3059/M

ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
September 11, 1918---19:30 h.

[Annex 1079]

General, Commander-in-Chief, to Headquarters Mirecourt [Group of Armies of the East], Avize [Group of Armies of the Center], Bacon [Group of Armies of the North and Northeast]

Attack American First Army September 12, 5 h.

By order Chief of Staff:

BUAT.

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Effectiveness of the Belfort Ruse

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION,
Berne, September 12, 1918.

[Extract]

4. The state of nervousness of the German command is confirmed from all part of Haute-Alsace. The inhabitants of Sundgau and to the left bank of the Rhine have received the order to be ready to go over to the Duchy of Baden on the first intimation.
5. A superior officer visited all the caves which could be put in state of defense or serve as shelter at Neudorf, Rosenau, Kembs and other villages near Istein.
6. An employee of the customs at Huningue has, like all employees of the railway, received a notice where to go in case of evacuation.
7. Reserve material is being taken away from the stations. At some points the small side tracks are torn up and the rails sent back.
8. Communal, court and bank archives Mulhausen are ready to be sent to Germany. All these measures recall those taken toward the end of 1914.
9. On the other hand, defense works, clearings, trenches, are being pushed forward on the right bank of the Rhine. Four large cannon have been mounted on the Tullingergerb [sic]. (Confirmation)

Alsace Ruse

[Editorial Note: The following letter addressed to an American magazine writer, is reproduced for the summary it affords]

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE,
Berlin, November 25, 1926.*

Dear Mr:

Your letter of November 11 just received. I am very glad you got the information you desired and shall be glad to answer the questions you put to me with some other information, though I fear the answers will not be what you want.

* [Placed arbitrarily in connection with other material dated September 12, 1918, dealing with the Belfort Ruse.]
1. Is it true that you lost a duplicate copy of the attack order? Answer: I did nothing so crude as to lose a copy of the attack order. What I did was to employ a perfectly fresh sheet of carbon paper in writing my report to General Pershing detailing the preparations for the attack and stating that everything was in readiness for him to set the date. This carbon paper was examined to see that it was perfectly legible and then crumpled up and dropped in the wastebasket. I left my room for five minutes to walk around the corridor of the principal hotel in Belfort and upon my return found it gone as I hoped it would be.

2. How was it known that the Germans had gotten the news otherwise than that three divisions had been moved to the Mulhouse area and that was known? Answer: The movement of the three divisions to the Mulhouse area was known by their being identified there by the order of battle section of the general staff during the course of the operations.

After the Armistice I came in contact with Colonel X, who during the period of the operations had been in one of the leading staff positions on the other side and who, on the German side, had received and acted on the information which had come in. I asked Colonel X in detail regarding all the information he had received in regard to the proposed attack. Everything which had been done on the American side had been observed and recorded and as a consequence of these observations Colonel X had written to General Ludendorff that he must have three more divisions for the southern front. Colonel X added to this recommendation: "I recognize quite fully that all these preparations being made for attack may perfectly well turn out to be a ruse de guerre intended to mislead us as to the real point of the attack. However, there is nothing to indicate that it is not the real point of attack and our danger there is so great that I deem it imperative to have these divisions."

In the subsequent matter of Luneville Colonel X stated that every day all the fresh indications of the tank tracks in the Luneville sector, wireless messages, concentration of American artillery fire, airplane flights, etc., were carefully studied by him to determine their purpose.

* * * * * *

I do not recall whether or not I wrote you that there were two phases of the attack preparations in Alsace. I cannot give you the exact dates without my papers but I presume you have those from General Wells. The first contemplated an attack on a 30 kilometer front from the Swiss frontier northward through the Gap of Belfort. This lasted about ten days and upon its completion I directed General Bundy, in General Pershing's name of course, to return with his corps headquarters to his former station and to send his division detachments from the eight reserve divisions to their former locations. I myself returned to Chaumont to report the whole affair to General Pershing. He informed me that the date of the St-Mihiel attack had to be postponed so that he wanted the reconnaissance kept up for a number of days longer. As I recall this second operation lasted about a week from about September 1 to 8. The first may have lasted about two weeks from August 15 to 31. I at once returned to Belfort and found General Bundy and his headquarters all packed up ready to move. Inasmuch as there was no object in making the same reconnaissance all over again and there was no further work to be done on preparations for an attack limited to the Belfort Gap, I now informed General Bundy that General Pershing desired to broaden the scope of the attack to include a front of 60 kilometers as for northward as General Gordon's 6th Division at Gerardmer. This new plan called for fresh measures and plans and fresh reconnaissances and the division reconnaissances parties had to be recalled to do the work all over again to the great alarm of the French army staff who hated to think of having to turn over their sector to the Americans. An amusing feature of this second operation was that the divisional reconnaissance parties and the divisional staffs of these divisions in reserve both became alarmed because while their reconnaissances were being conducted in the Alsatian sector, the divisions themselves were being moved night by night, farther and farther northward. And these movements of the divisions were
anxiously reported to corps headquarters which was asked if American G. H. Q. had not made
some frightful blunder in moving them off in the wrong direction. They had to be reassured
that it was all quite correct according to plans, but what the plan actually was they did
did not learn until later.

Sincerely yours,

A. L. CONGER.
Colonel, G. S.,
Military Attache.

P. S. General Pershing's instructions to me relative to this attack were given to me in
the presence of the Chief of Staff, General McAndrew, and he added: "Now the only people
who are to know about this and that this attack is not real are you, General McAndrew and
myself. Is there anyone else who has to be taken into the secret?" I replied: "Yes,
General Conner will have to issue certain orders for me and he will have to know,"
General Pershing replied: "Very well, then there will be just four, you, General Conner,
General McAndrew and myself and I do not want any other soul to know that this attack will
not actually be carried out except us four."

I then went to General Conner and asked him, by General Pershing's direction: to
prepare and send out two orders as chief of the operations section: one to the VI Corps
Commander to proceed with the general staff and such other parts of his headquarters as
might be necessary, to Belfort where he would receive the special instructions of the
Commander-in-Chief through Colonel Conger. The other orders were directions to seven
division commanders whose divisions were then lying in areas in rear to send reconnaissance
parties consisting of so many officers and men each to report to the C. G., VI Corps,
Belfort, with a view to taking over sectors in that area.

It will thus be seen that I was expressly prohibited by General Pershing from
communicating to either General Bundy, General Wells or any member of his staff, the fact
that an attack at Belfort was not actually to be made.

In the second Luneville operation the Chiefs of Staff of the First and Second Armies
received orders to carry out the measures proposed by me and to place such officers and
troops at my disposal as I requested.

I would rather you would not quote the above conversations which took place between
General Pershing and myself, but I give them to you in order that you may understand my
role in the matter and the part played by other officers. I met General Wells after the
Armistice and he asked me at that time: "Did General Pershing really have any idea of
making an attack at Belfort?" I replied by another question asking him what he had thought
about it at the time. He replied: "During the first preparations I had no suspicions
that an attack would not be made, but when the second operation on a broader front was
taken up I began to suspect that it might be being conducted for an ulterior purpose, but
of course I could not know."

A. L. C.

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MISCELLANEOUS MILITARY: G.78, who receives letters from Alsace (uncensored), sends the following:

1. The question on the lips of the people living on the other side of the Vosges is:
   Will the Americans attack Haute-Alsace or not?
   It is believed that in the Vosges region up to north of Toul there are large forces of Americans. Recent Allied successes have tended to strengthen Alsatian opinion that operations will be recommenced on the right of their front.

2. On the other hand the Germans are showing great activity in this part of the line. Towards Altkirch more villages have been evacuated. Munition depots on the right bank of the Ill have been filled with stocks of ammunition and Austrian artillery. Nevertheless, according to informants the Germans do not intend to launch an offensive themselves, all measures taken being of a purely defensive nature. Thus the troops situated in Haute-Alsace at present (with the exception of certain front line regiments) are units of the Landwehr and Landsturm (reserve regiments).

3. The fortresses commanding the Rhine from Istein to Neufbrisach have been further reinforced with cannon of longer range than formerly. Working operations, which were carried out under protest by the men, seem to indicate that a complex system of trenches has been made between the Ill and the Rhine. On many occasions civilian traffic was suspended in order to avoid indiscretions of any kind.

4. Many rumors are abroad in Alsace concerning this increase of activity; it is stated that the American armies will try to force a passage through Lorraine, at a point near Morhange, and simultaneously an attack will be launched in Haute-Alsace.

Conjectures are made as to whether the Americans intend to bombard the towns of the Duchy of Baden with new cannon - Fribourg-en-Brisgau being a particularly vulnerable spot. Excitement reigns amongst the people, and the Commandant of Fribourg has been obliged to issue proclamations contradicting certain reports. At Mulhouse the population is prepared to evacuate the town, in spite of reassuring articles in the local press.

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Order to Advance Line of Resistance to Enemy Line

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau
No. 17,642/3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES,
OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, September 13, 1918--17:45 h.

The General Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

1. According to the map attached to Annex 5, Order 9 [not found], Sept. 6, 1918, of General Pershing, the line of resistance to be occupied at the end of the operation is marked out by the line:


   With the line of outposts (at the limit of the anticipated zone of exploitation) on:

   Heights southwest of Norroy---Villers-sous-Preny (excl.)---Rembercourt---Charey---

2. It happens according to reports received at 16 h., that on the right the objective of exploitation had been passed and that the American troops had attained the line Jaulny---Pagny-sur-Moselle.

3. On the other hand the aviation reports indicate on the part of the enemy a certain disorder in the region north of the Rupt-de-Mad.

4. In consequence, the General, Commander-in-Chief, authorizes the General commanding the American forces, if he judges it proper, to carry the line of resistance to the enemy fortified line (called Michel I, between Pagny-sur-Moselle and Jaulny).

5. If this measure is ordered, it will be desirable, naturally, to advance equally the outpost line on this part of the front, to a depth which the General commanding the American Army will determine.

6. It will be his mission to have executed on the localities where the enemy is particularly in disorder, all raids which he judges advantageous in order to exploit this situation, with the understanding that the detachments so charged, after the execution of their mission, be brought back into the general dispositions.

   The General commanding the American Army will please make known to the General Commander-in-Chief, the dispositions which he believes he should make in execution of the above order.

PETAIN.

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- 66 -
Petain's Approval of Pershing's Plan

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 17,652
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
September 13, 1918.

The General Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast, to General Pershing, commanding the American First Army.

In its general lines I approve of the plan [Sept. 10, 1918] you suggest to me for the future organization of the command on the front of the American First Army between the Moselle and the Argonne.

The two French army corps which will be in line on the left of the American IV Army Corps from the region of Vigneulles to the Meuse will be therefore from south to north:

The II Colonial Corps,
The XVII Corps (previously relieved by the American III Corps on the left bank of the Meuse).

Because of the substantial and advantageous shortening of your front between the Moselle and Les Eparges, it will be advisable to put into second line two of the four French divisions which have taken part in the attack. This withdrawal would be executed only gradually, if circumstances demand it. Distribution of forces with a stabilized situation would eventually be as follows:

(a) The II Colonial Corps would have one French infantry division and one American division in 1st line with one French division in reserve:

(b) The XVII Corps would have three French infantry divisions in 1st line (including the 18th Inf. Div. and the 10th Colonial Inf. Div. now in sector between the Meuse and Watronville) and one French infantry division in reserve.

These dispositions would assure echelonment in depth, affording complete security during the preparations for Operation B and enabling the XVII Corps and II Colonial Corps to hold out.

Would you please let me know whether you have any objection to these plans? [No record of a direct reply from Pershing]

PETAIN.

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- 67 -
Allotment of French Heavy Artillery to American First Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 19,660

For: The General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center,
    The General commanding the American First Army,
    The General commanding the Artillery General Reserve.

[Extract]

(Supplementary to Annex B, inclosure to personal and secret Letter No. 11938 of September 8, 1918, addressed to the General, commanding the American First Army.)

Operation B - Heavy high-powered artillery

The allotment of French heavy high-powered artillery placed at the disposal of the American First Army for Operation B, will comprise *** a total of 86 guns.

BUAT,  
General, Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 662: Directive

Instructions for Allied Offensive West of the Meuse

[Editorial Translation]

These instructions revoke and replace Secret and Personal Instructions No. 8260 [not printed] of September 6, 1918.

For the General commanding the French Group of Armies of the Center

For the General commanding the American First Army

I. Pursuant to Directive No. 3,537 of September 3, 1918, from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, an offensive in the general direction of Mezieres will take place between the Meuse and the heights northwest of Reims.

The American First Army and the French Fourth Army, operating together, will participate under the direction of the General Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast.
The offensive will consist of:

(1) An operation called B, carried out between the Meuse and the upper course of the Aisne, by the American First Army, designed to gain possession of the Hindenburg Line on the front Brieulles-sur-Meuse—Romagne-sous-Montfaucon—Grandpré, with subsequent exploitation in the direction of Buzancy-Mezieres in order to outflank the enemy line Vouzières-Rethel from the east.

(2) An operation, called C, carried out between the upper valley of the Aisne and the Sûppe by the French Fourth Army with a view to reaching the Aisne from Rethel to Attigny, with subsequent direction toward Mezieres.

(3) An operation, called D, by the French Fifth Army between Reims and the Aisne, aiming at the fall of the Monts line by combined action with the left of the Fourth Army.

II. General Instructions:

Operations B and C will take place simultaneously about September 25; Operation D will be held in readiness beginning September 26.

It is essential that surprise should be achieved, and to that end the utmost secrecy will be preserved up to the last moment.

(a) Commanders will therefore take the most rigorous measure to avoid disclosure of their projects and preparations. They will not hesitate to divert the attention of the participants to contingencies diametrically opposite of these projects. (For instance the American concentration can be justified by the idea of developing and exploiting the battle of the Woëvre. The concentrations of the Fourth and Fifth Armies can appear to be needed as preventive measures to be taken against the possibility of a new enemy attack in the general direction of Reims.)

The present appearance of the front will be maintained at least until D minus 2 days. Artillery reenforcements, ammunition, materiel will not be put in position until the last minute and will be camouflaged with the most particular care.

Fire for adjustment and registration will be limited strictly to the minimum and will be dispensed with whenever possible.

Large units will be concentrated by night movements. Their positions will be concealed from day and night aerial observation, traffic being strictly limited during the daytime and lights being forbidden at night.

The use of the telephone before the day of the attack will be suspended for all troops in sector, below the regiment. Above the regiment, telephone communications will be strictly controlled and will include no information capable of revealing the projects and intentions of the High Command.

(b) The attack on the 1st position will take place in the early hours of D day under cover of an artillery preparation fired during the night of D minus 1 day—D day. (The first enemy position occupied by the main forces of the enemy is under consideration here, and it must not be overlooked that this battle position may be preceded by a deep covering zone.)

(c) The 2d position will be breached the afternoon of D Day with the support of such tanks and artillery elements as may have been able to follow; the halt periods before attacking this 2d position will be reduced to a minimum. (The artillery preparation must create lanes through which the tanks can advance so as to reach the 2d position in the minimum time.)

(d) The breach thus made in the 2d position will be immediately exploited; the advance will be continued during the night of D day—D plus 1 day, so that the morning of D plus 1 day, operations can be developed toward exploitation objectives.

In the exploitation phase, large units will be organized in elastic formations on broad fronts and well echeloned in depth and will not concern themselves with maintaining close contact with each other.

They will strike at distant objectives to the front and to the flanks.

III. Special instructions concerning Operation B:

(a) General scheme of maneuver: The capture of the 1st position will be assured
by two attacks, one toward the Varennes-Cheppy region, the other toward the Montfaucon-Septsarges region, the two attacks meeting northwest of the Bois de Montfaucon.

Successive objectives:

1. Grandpré (liaison with the right of the French Fourth Army).
2. Buzancy
3. Le Chesne

(b) Means: American First Army with about 4 American army corps and 12 to 14 American divisions.

Various French reenforcing elements (artillery, tanks, aviation, etc.) the particulars of which will be determined by special orders.

c) Temporary arrangements: Effective at once the General commanding the French Group of Armies to the Center will be responsible for the concentration of all American and French elements taking part in Operation B and already available.

These elements will be placed in the southern portion of the zone of the French Second Army. To this end, the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center will consult with the General commanding the American First Army.

At a date to be determined later, the General commanding the American First Army will take command of all American, French or Allied forces located between the present east limit of the American First Army, on the east, and the present west limit of the French Second Army, on the west.

The General commanding the French Second Army and that part of his headquarters that will not be employed by General Pershing will remain in Laheycourt in reserve of the General, Commander-in-Chief.

The French elements relieved by the attack elements of the American First Army will be regrouped west of the Argonne at the disposal of the General commanding the French Group of Armies of the Center. (Relief operations will be regulated by agreement between the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center and the General commanding the American First Army.)

IV. Special instructions concerning Operation C:

(a) General scheme of maneuver (three phases):

1st Phase: Capture of the positions between the Aisne and the Suippe up to the Grandpré defile where liaison with the American Army will be effected.

2d Phase: Exploitation toward the northwest (region north of the Suippe) in conjunction with an attack of the Fifth Army in the direction of Bourgogne so as to capture the Monts line.

3d Phase: Development of the attacks of the Fourth Army in the direction of Attigny and Rethel, covered on the left by the Fifth Army.

(b) Means:

1. Elements of the French Fourth Army is now in line east of the Suippe, reinforced by 4 army corps and about 15 infantry divisions. (So as to have the attacking force consist of 6 army corps and from 20 to 22 infantry divisions.)

2. Three American divisions which will be brought up between Sept. 25 and 30 to relieve the left French units of the Fourth Army.

3. One cavalry corps.

4. Various reenforcing elements (artillery, tanks, aviation, etc.) the particulars of which will be determined by special orders.

V. Special instructions concerning Operation D:

(a) General scheme of maneuver:

1. To capture the St-Thierry massif.

2. To capture the Monts line in conjunction with the Fourth Army and cover the flanking of the latter.

(b) Means: Elements of the Fifth Army reenforced by 3 infantry divisions and a part of the artillery of the French Tenth Army.

VI. The boundary between the Group of Armies of the Center and the French Reserve
FLIREY-BOIS DE MORT-MARE AREA
Looking north from vicinity of Flirey
Group of Armies will be as prescribed by Memorandum No. 5401 of September 4.

Effective September 21, the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center will have at his disposal the headquarters of the French Third Army. He will submit his recommendations concerning the employment of that headquarters.

VII. Boundaries of the zones of action of Group of Armies of the Center and of the American First Army:

Binarville---Lancon---Grand-Ham (these localities to the Group of Armies of the Center)---Grandpré---Boult-aux-Bois---Chatillon-sur-Bar (these localities to the American First Army).

PÉTAIN.

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HS Fr. Files, GHQ: 403-30.1: Order

Supply of American First Army during the Meuse-Argonne Operation

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
Section of the Rear
No. 7550/D. A.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, September 19, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Effective September 22, there will be constituted a “French Directorate of the L. O. C. of the American Zone.”

The zone of this directorate will comprise all the French territory assigned to the American Army as its combat zone, from the front to the rear boundary of that zone.

2. The French Directorate of the L. O. C. of the American zone will be under the direct control of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

For settlement of French questions in that zone, this directorate will have all the attributes of a directorate of the L. O. C. in a French zone. It will be charged, particularly, with all French military and civil matters relating to the security of the territory, its policing, general discipline, circulation, relations with the civil authorities, the command and administration of the L. O. C. troops and services (intendance, roads, telegraphs, exploitation of forests, etc.), maintained in the American zone, as well as relations with the American authorities on the subject of these matters. * * *

3. The exploitation of the local resources of the territory under charge of the Directorate of the L. O. C. of the American zone will be effected as follows:

a. In the advance zone (that is, between the front line and a rear boundary to be determined by the General-in-Chief (Directorate of the Rear), upon recommendation of the Directorate of the L. O. C., in agreement with the American Army) by the American or French purchasing services, respectively, for the benefit of the American or French troops, according as the different sectors of the front are held by American or French units.

b. In rear of that zone, the exploitation will be effected exclusively by the French services, in conformity with the provisions of Memorandum No. 7857/D. A., of August 20, 1918.

The resources exploited by the French services in the American zone, not considered indispensable to the needs of the French Armies, may be placed at the disposal of the American Army upon request of that army, by transfer, upon authorization by the General, Commander-in-Chief (Directorate of the Rear).
4. The Directorate of the L. O. C., North, of the Group of Armies of the East, is abolished.

The General, Director of the L. O. C., North, of the Group of Armies of the East, is appointed General, Director of the L. O. C. of the American zone. He will have at his disposal his staff and his present services, as well as the L. O. C. troops and installations located in those parts of the zones of the L. O. C. of the Group of Armies of the East and of the Group of Armies of the Center, which pass to the American zone.

General Headquarters, L. O. C., at Bar-le-Duc, from September 22.

5. On the same date, the Directorate of the L. O. C., South, of the Group of Armies of the East will become the "Directorate of the L. O. C. of the Group of Armies of the East," and take over the entire zone of the L. O. C., assigned to that group of armies.

PETAIN.

HS Fr. Files: 403-30.1: Order

French Organization of Supply for American Army

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
Directorate of the Rear
No. 7551/D. A.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, September 19, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Boundaries: Effective at midnight September 21/22, the boundary between the Group of Armies of the Center and the American Army will be as follows:


In the new American zone thus established, the Headquarters of the Regulating Station at St-Dizier, comprising the towns of St-Dizier, Ancerville, Bettencourt, Hoericourt, Moeslains, Valcourt, Villiers-en-Lieu, Hallignicourt and St-Eulien, will be maintained as a French enclave within that zone.

2. Territorial Command: In the entire zone ceded to the American Army (the territorial zone of the French Second Army and a part of the lines of communication of the G. A. C.), the French territorial command, as well as the exploitation of the local resources, will be effected by the General commanding the L. O. C., of the American zone, under the conditions prescribed in Order No. 7550, of September 19, 1918.

Nevertheless, in the present territorial zone of the French Second Army, the personnel and services whose functions are connected with the territorial command or the exploitation of the local resources (road service, intendance, etc.) will continue,
provisionally, under the authority of the General, L. O. C., of the American zone, to perform the duties with which they are charged, until the corresponding personnel of the L. O. C. of the American zone has received from them all necessary instructions.

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PETAIN.

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HS Fr. File: 403-30.1: Order

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 29,376

ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST, September 20, 1918.

The proposals which formed the subject of the memorandum from General Pershing dated September 19 [not printed] are approved.

Consequently:

1. Effective September 22, General Pershing will take command over all Allied forces stationed within the American zone, as defined in Orders 499/DA of August 29 [printed herein] and 7551/DA of September 19, 1918 [exclusive of the French 73d and 120th Inf. Divs. which, after their relief by the American 91st and 28th Divs. will revert to the control of the General commanding the Armies of the North and Northeast]. General Pershing will establish his headquarters at Souilly.

2. On the same date (midnight September 21/22), the headquarters of the French Second Army will be placed at the disposal of General Pershing under the conditions set forth below (par. 4).

3. General Hirschauer, remaining at Laheycourt, will exercise command of all French troops [with the exception of the L. of C. troops which will be under the Commanding General of the L. of C. of the American zone] stationed either in the zone of the American First Army or in the present zone of the French Second Army, in all matters which do not pertain to their tactical employment.

4. The headquarters of the French Second Army, which has been placed at the disposal of General Pershing, will have the following mission:
   (a) To assist, under the high direction of General Pershing and in collaboration with American officers, in the conduct of the operations on the present front of the French Second Army.
   (b) To ensure, under the direction of General Hirschauer and in conformity with the provisions of Orders 7,550/DA and 7,551/DA of September 19, the administration and supply of the French elements stationed within the zone of the American First Army and within the present zone of the French Second Army.

However, the supply of the French elements stationed in the zone of the American First Army will continue to be handled by the French Mission at Ligny. This mission will retain its present powers and will be under General Hirschauer, effective at midnight Sept. 21/22.

5. Territorial command will be exercised by the Commanding General of the L. of C. of the American zone, under the conditions provided for in Orders 7,550/DA and 7,551/DA of September 19.

BUAT.

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Belfort Ruse

3d Section, General Staff
No. 29095

ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
September 20, 1918.

[Annex 1221]

Commanding-in-Chief Armies of the North and Northeast

To Commanding General, Group of Armies of the East

For the purpose of deceiving the enemy concerning our operation projects, it has been decided, by mutual agreement with the American High Command, that various forms of activity would be undertaken by the Americans on the front of the French Eighth Army.

This activity will be as follows:

a. Sending of American tanks to Liverdun and to St-Nicholas-du-Port for diversionary maneuvers.

b. Operation of American wireless stations within the zone of the French Eighth Army.

c. Employment of a few companies of American infantry, along the front of the French Eighth Army, for the execution of raids, said companies having been informed that they form the advance party of their division into the sector.

d. Artillery fire on the railway stations of Metz by the gun at Dieulouard (such firing to be executed under good observation conditions and limited to a few rounds only so as to avoid enemy reaction).

Requested that all necessary orders be issued which will facilitate the task of the Americans in the zone of the French Eighth Army.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

BUAT.

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Announcement of D day for Meuse-Argonne Operation

[Editorial Translation]

3d Sect., General Staff
No. 29394

The General, Commander-in-Chief

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

Operations B and C will take place on September 26, 1918.

By order:

J. DUFIEUX,
General, Asst. Chief of Staff.

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Precautions to be taken against Antitank Mine Fields

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 31,394

The General Commander-in-Chief

To the General commanding the American First Army

[Extract]

From recent information obtained, it appears that the German are making general use of antitank mine fields on the greater part of their defensive front.

Your attention is invited to this method of defense which could prove very disastrous to our tanks unless the most minute precautions are taken henceforth to frustrate its design.

PETAIN.
Directive Governing Operations B, C and D

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 31047/3

Memorandum for: General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.
General Maistre, Commanding Group of Armies of the Center

1. Operations B and C will take place on the morning of September 26. The attack will begin between 5:30 and 6 o'clock. The exact time will be fixed and announced by the generals commanding the armies concerned.

2. The American Army (Operation B) will launch its attack without artillery preparation, as requested by it.
   The French Fourth Army (Operation C) will commence its attack, following an artillery preparation to be executed during the night of D minus 1 day, September 25/26.

3. At the exact time when the artillery preparation of the French Fourth Army begins, the American Army will start:
   b. Heavy fire of interdiction on the hostile rear areas between the Argonne and the region of Damvillers (east of the Meuse).

4. Liaison between Operations B and C will be effected by a mixed Franco-American detachment composed of infantry and artillery, placed under the orders of the General commanding the right army corps of the French Fourth Army. This detachment will operate on the right bank of the Aisne.
   The presence of this detachment will not prevent the two armies from making special efforts to gain liaison through the terrain corridors Grandpre, La Croix-aux-Bois, and Le Chesne.

5. Operation D (Fifth Army) will be made ready for action by noon, September 28.
   It will be executed only on the express order of the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast, on the recommendation of the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center.

PETAIN.

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Operations of French Fourth Army

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 9240/3

FRENCH FOURTH ARMY,  
September 22, 1918.

[Annex 1250]

SPECIAL INSTRUCTION FOR THE FRENCH XXXVIII  
AND IX ARMY CORPS

At the beginning of its operation, the French Fourth Army will attack on the front  
included between the west bank of the Aisne and the Suippe.  
As soon as the advance shall have progressed sufficiently far, the XXXVIII and IX  
Army Corps will endeavor, first of all, to reach Grandpré, Bouconville and Montcheutin.  
Between the Aisne and La Harazée, the XXXVIII Army Corps will organize a mixed de-

tachment, to be placed under command of Colonel Durand, Brigade Commander (C. P.:  
La Cave); and consisting of 1 French regiment, 1 American regiment and of a French artillery  
unit to be designated by the Commanding General, XXXVIII Army Corps.  
The mission of said detachment is to flank the Argonne on the west and to establish  
liason between the American Army and the French Fourth Army.

GOURAUD.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 669: Letter

Dates of Operations of the Allied Armies in Picardy and Flanders

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff  
No. 4141

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,  
Bombon, September 23, 1918.

My dear General Pershing:

I desire to make known to you for your strictly personal information the dates which  
have been designated today for the next operations of the Allied Armies in Picardy and in  
Flanders.

1. The British First and Third Armies will attack on September 27, in the general  
direction of Cambrai. The British Fourth Army, supported by the French First Army, will  
attack September 29, in the direction of Busigny.

2. The Belgian Army, the British Second Army, and the detachment of the French Army,  
composed of the 3d Infantry Division and the 3d Colonial Division, will attack September  
28, between the sea and the Lys River, under the command of the King of the Belgians.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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French Tank Units Attached to American First Army for Meuse-Argonne Operation

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 4150

To the General, commanding the American First Army

The plan of employment of tanks troops submitted by you is counting upon the following French tank units:

- 505th Tank Regiment (3 battalions)
- 504th Tank Regiment (2 battalions)
- 3 groups of St-Chamond tanks
- 2 groups of Schneider tanks (French light tanks were organized into companies, battalions and regiments. Medium and heavy tanks were organized into batteries, groups (battalions) and groupments (consisting of 2 or more groups))

I have the honor to inform you that:

1. The 504th Tank Regiment has not been assigned to the American Army. The latter should receive September 25, besides the 505th Tank Regiment, the 17th Battalion, 506th Tank Regiment.
2. The 3d Group of St-Chamond tanks will not be available until October 1, and therefore will not join you until October 2 or 3.

Thus, as pointed out in my letter No. 24,370 addressed to you September 17, you will have at your disposal the following tank units:

a. Initially:

- 505th Tank Regiment (3 battalions)
- 17th Battalion, 506th Tank Regiment
- 2 American tank battalions
- 2 groups of St-Chamond tanks (total 30 tanks)
- 2 groups of Schneider tanks

b. From October 2 or 3:

- 1 provisional groupment of St-Chamond tanks.

PETAIN.

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The nature and importance of the operation undertaken on the 26th require that we derive profit, without delay, from all of the advantages which we have acquired; that breakthrough of the line of resistance be exploited unremittingly and as deeply as possible; for that reason, that any temporary time lag be avoided. Particularly, the advance of the American Army between the Meuse and the French Fourth Army, especially since the strength of that army protects it from any great danger; it is therefore necessary that, without further orders, on the initiative of its commander, that army push its advance forward as far as possible.

The American Army must preoccupy itself, first of all, with exploiting its advantages, as far and as rapidly as possible, in the direction of Buzancy.

The French Fourth Army, by an advance executed towards the Aisne, from Rethel, under the same conditions of speed, decision and initiative, will cover the American Army. It must, in any case, seek and maintain liaison with the American Army, but, under no circumstances, must it slow up the movement of that army which remains decisive.

Accordingly there can be no question of fixing, insofar as those two armies are concerned, fronts which are not to be passed without new orders, such instructions being of a nature to prevent the armies from thoroughly exploiting favorable opportunities and to break the momentum which must be maintained above all.

Under present circumstances, it is most important that the shock power of the Allied Armies be increased.

The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, relies upon the determination and initiative of each of these armies.

The General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast, will make a strong appeal to urge those concerned to make use of these qualities.

FOCH.
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, September 30, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

The battle is developing most advantageously in the north.

This favorable development demands that the battle, which has slowed down unduly in the east, be started anew with the least possible delay by being intensified and allowed to develop its maximum power without any retardation.

To this end, it would be well to extend to the east of the Meuse, as well as to the west of the Argonne, the action of the American forces employed between the Meuse and the Argonne, and to draw, if necessary, from the units which are holding the Woëvre front in too great a density.

To accomplish this extension in the minimum of time, the American divisions will be inserted in the French army corps now in position (2 or 3 divisions to the XVII Corps on the right, and 1 or 2 divisions to the XXXVIII Corps on the left).

From the viewpoint of the High Command, as well as to prevent all loss of time, it would be well to effect the following assignment:

1) To the command of General Pershing, the Franco-American forces operating on both banks of the Meuse.

2) To the command of a French army commander, the Franco-American forces operating on each side of the Argonne.

The objectives to be reached remain as prescribed in previous instructions.

The action to be launched on the right bank of the Meuse should be designed to seize the heights of the Meuse between Damvillers and Dun-sur-Meuse. This result would secure the flank of our general offensive toward the north and afford greater liberty of movement to our armies through the possession of the roads and of the railroad in the valley of the Meuse.

I request that you will orient the operations under your direction accordingly.

FOCH.
The General, Commander-in-Chief, Armies of the North and Northeast

To the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

[Extract]

The advance of the American First Army is stopped for the present.

The reasons for this momentary stabilization are to be found, less in the resistance of the enemy than in the difficulties experienced by the American General Staff in moving its troops and in supplying them under the conditions created by the advance of the American First Army on September 26.

Consequently, the Franco-American maneuver which aimed to advance the right by taking the successive objectives Grandpré, Buzancy, and Le Chesne, in order to outflank the line of the Aisne, runs the risk of being compromised.

On the other hand, the progress made by the right of the French Fourth Army might be retarded by reason of the necessity, incumbent on that army, to cover its right flank, facing the Argonne.

Under these conditions, I propose to put into the first line the French Second Army, now at Laheycourt, for the purpose of taking over the present sectors of attack of the army corps forming the right of the Fourth Army (XXXVIII Army Corps) and of the army corps forming the left of the American First Army (American I Army Corps). * * *

Furthermore, I shall take the opportunity to discuss with General Pershing, in the near future, the conditions under which the French Second Army is to be inserted in the front line, whether it should be placed under the command of the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center, or pass to the command of General Pershing.

Whatever the method of this insertion, the solution, in my opinion, appears to present favorable guarantees for the effectual continuation of the operations under way in the American sector.

Please inform me whether or not you see any disadvantages in the proposed general order applying to the dispositions explained above and which I have the honor to submit to you.

PETAIN.
Pershing's Objections to Extension of American Action

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont-en-Bassigny, October 2, 1918.

To: Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

My dear Marshal Foch:

After having taken notice of the letter which you addressed to General Petain on September 30, [preceding] and of which you kindly sent me as a copy, I have the honor to inform you as follows:

1st. I have already made my dispositions to leave only divisions not in complete battle condition on the quiet front of the Woevre (3 on the line and 1 in reserve) and to lead to the battle the experienced units thus released.

2d. In order to relieve the congestion on the battle front between the Meuse and Argonne, I have already withdrawn one division and count on withdrawing another in the course of the approaching advance.

3d. I entirely agree with you on the importance of extending the front of attack to the east of the Meuse and to this end to give to the French XVII Corps two or three American infantry divisions.

I shall confer with General Claudel [French XVII A. C.] and instructions have already been given him to expedite the arrangement of this matter.

4th. I have no objection in principle to formulate in the matter of placing at the disposition of the French XXXVIII Army Corps one or two American divisions. But I fear to encounter difficulties in the application of this measure on account of the reliefs which I am obligated to effect on the battle front of the American First Army.

I am thus forced to reserve a definite reply on this matter, and I ask you to authorize me to take it up with General Petain.

5th. I cannot examine in its details the employment of the French Second Army with its command and staffs, without being struck by the difficulties enumerated below:

(a) There will result from it a change in organization at the precise moment when the advance is resumed. This would cause delay.
(b) The supply of the units of the American First Army would be made difficult to assure since it must continue to be done by the army remaining under my orders.
(c) The question of the lines of communication would be complicated from the fact that the two armies must employ the single main road and the single light railway which now cross the zone of the American I Corps.
(d) Difference in methods employed by the French and American commands; difference which would entail a reorganization in case of a change of command.
(e) Dismemberment of the American First Army at a moment when its elements are striving for success under the direction of American command.
(f) Inconvenience of changing plans which have been carefully studied by General Petain and myself and which have received his entire approval.

In any case, you can rest assured that this exchange of correspondence will not delay in the least the early launching of the attack between the Argonne and the Meuse and the preparations for the attack to the east of the Meuse.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, U. S. Army.

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BOIS d'HEICHE--BOIS--GERARD AREA
Looking east-northeast from Jaulny-Vieville-en-Haye Road
Organization of Command

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section
No. 4412

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,
October 2, 1918—11:30 p. m.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces in France

My dear General:

I have just received your letter which General Weygand brought to me. Amending what I wrote you September 30, I agree to maintaining the present organization of command, as you propose, under the condition that your attacks start without delay and that, once begun, they be continued without any interruptions such as those which have just arisen.

Very sincerely yours,

FOCH.

Orders to Realize on Enemy's Demoralized Condition

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, G. S.
No. 4456

HIGH COMMAND ALLIED ARMIES,
October 4, 1918.

[Annex 137]

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To: Commander-in-Chief, Armies of the North and Northeast

[Extract]

After eight days of unremitting fighting, the French Fourth Army has obtained results which are doubtless worthwhile, but which are less important than those which were to be expected against an adversary who is being attacked on all sides and who, on certain parts of the front, is resisting with only tired, heterogeneous, and hastily assembled units; and within an area wherein all of the enemy's organizations have already been taken.

Yesterday, October 3, in particular, gave a demonstration of a battle which lacks leadership, of a battle which is not pushed, of a battle which has no continuity, due to a
lack of aggressiveness, as well as to failure to achieve coherence in the operation of the various army corps concerned and, consequently, of a battle in which there is no exploitation of successes gained.

We find inert army corps, army corps which do not maneuver, while others are exhausting themselves in successes which have not been exploited.

The high command must take the battle into its hands and conduct itself with utmost energy by assuring that its plans are executed.

* * * * * *

By striking full force, with uniformity, in favorable weather, we conserve the troops and we obtain important results economically, instead of conducting a lagging battle wherein men, munitions and good days are wasted and minor results achieved.

It will not escape you that the considerations which I have just developed concerning the French Fourth Army also apply to several others.

I, therefore, ask you to be good enough to issue instructions accordingly to the high command * * *

FOCH.

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HS Fr. Files: 403-30.1: Memorandum

**American First Army to Extend Attack East of Meuse**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

No. 6213

October 5, 1918.

Instructions for the American First Army

I. The general objectives assigned to the American First Army by Personal and Secret Instructions No. 22,008 of September 16, 1918, remain unchanged. They aim at the capture of the Hindenburg Position, from Brieulles-sur-Meuse to Grandpre, by way of Romagne-sous-Montfaucon, with later exploitation in the direction of Buzancy-Mezieres.

In addition, with a view to extending the active front of the Allied Armies, the First Army will attack on the right bank of the Meuse.

II. That attack will have as its objective the bluff from Dun-sur-Meuse to Damvillers. It will be executed by the French XVII Army Corps, reinforced by two or three American divisions and by the necessary amount of artillery, taken from the present allotment of the American First Army.

The preparations for it will be pushed vigorously, so that the operation may be launched at a date as near as possible to October 7.

III. The prospects opened up by that operation relieve the forces engaged between the Meuse and the Argonne of all concern for their right flank and permit them to renew, on their right, the effort which brought such good results during the day of October 4, particularly in the CuneI region; this with a view to bringing about at one stroke the collapse of the organized position from Romagne-sous-Montfaucon to Champigneulle.

There would be an advantage in assuring, as far as possible, coordinates of that effort with the attack of the French XVII Corps.

IV. In anticipation of the extension of the front which will result from the attack of the
XVII Corps, the headquarters and nondivisional units of the French XXX Corps are placed immediately at the disposal of the American First Army, to strengthen the forces on the right bank of the Meuse and to assure the command of the passive portion of the present front of the XVII Corps.

PETAIN.

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GHQ, AEF: V Corps: File 6008.02: Memo.

* Conservation of Ammunition *

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES,
OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, October 8, 1918.

NOTE FOR ARMY AND GROUP OF ARMIES COMMANDERS

[Extract]

Since the battle of 1918 has begun, the attention of the command, in all echelons, has been repeatedly called upon to the necessity of closely watching the ammunition expenditure in order to hold out.

This necessity is now more imperious than ever before. If the rate of expenditure remains as high as it is today, the course of operations might soon be very seriously and badly influenced by the constantly growing shortage of our supplies, and particularly of 75-mm. ammunition.

The hostile artillery being considerably reduced by losses, and on the other hand showing generally but little activity, it is inadmissible that the ammunition expenditure be constantly maintained as for an incessant artillery battle, very often out of proportion with required results.

It is specially inadmissible that the consolidated returns of ammunition expenditure, furnished to General C-in-C, would show discrepancies with actual expenditure amounting for a single day, and for a single corps, to several thousand rounds, as a recent example has demonstrated.

It is absolutely necessary that all commanders take particular care to supervise and regulate ammunition expenditure---this suggestion being specially important in zones of battle.

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PETAIN.

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Forming the Second Army

October 11, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies, France

My dear Marshal Foch:

In order to facilitate the supply, administration and employment of my present forces, I have formed a Second Army Staff. This staff has assembled at Toul. I intend to exercise command of the American IV Corps and of the French II Colonial Corps through this new staff. I believe also that it is desirable to appoint in the very near future army commanders for the two American Armies. When this is accomplished, I would expect to continue, under the present situation, to exercise my own functions as commander of a group of armies under the immediate direction of General Petain.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

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Directions to Outflank Serre-Aisne Defenses

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 14,447

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

October 11, 1918.

For the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve
The General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center
The General commanding the American First Army

[Extract]

I. The advance of the British and French forces between the Sensee and Oise Valleys is expanding sufficiently to make it possible to combine as one maneuver the push of the left flank of the French Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Champagne-Meuse offensive by the French and Americans.

The object of that maneuver is to outflank the defenses of the Serre and of the Aisne from the west (French First Army) and east (American First Army, French Fourth Army). Between those two maneuvering flanks, liaison will be effected by the interior armies (French Tenth and Fifth Armies).

II. Group of Armies of the Reserve:
   a. The objective of the main body of the Group of Armies of the Reserve is the region Fourmies---Hirson---Vervins.

   The capture of that objective will be brought about by a continuous and powerful action of the French First Army along the general axis of advance: Guise-La Capelle, in close liaison with the British Fourth Army, the role of the Tenth Army being confined
to assuring continuity of the front and liaison with the left of the Group of Armies of the Center.

III. Group of Armies of the Center and American First Army: The Mezieres-Sedan region constitutes the general objective of the Champagne-Meuse offensive.

American First Army: The American First Army will continue its attacks on both banks of the Meuse, its prime purpose being:

- On the left bank, to break through the Kriemhild position and to reach the Buzancy region;
- On the right bank, to capture the bluff from Damvillers to Dun-sur-Meuse.

It will maintain, as it advances along the wooded Argonne massif, constant liaison with the French Fourth Army (liaison to be established successively by way of the defiles of Grand-Pre, La Croix-aux-Bois, Quatre-Champs).

Group of Armies of the Center: The prime mission of the Group of Armies of the Center is to throw the enemy back to the right bank of the Aisne and, by the same stroke, seek to establish offensive bridgeheads on that bank.

If the enemy offers resistance on the front formed by the Aisne, the Group of Armies of the Center will turn that front on both flanks:

- The right flank, joining with the American Army, will operate east of Vouziers and Attigny in the direction of Le Chesne and Poix-Terron.
- The left flank (Fifth Army) will cross the Aisne as soon as the maneuver of the Group of Armies of the Reserve north of the Serre causes the enemy forces clinging to the Laon massif to yield ground. In liaison with the French Tenth Army it will outflank the line of the Aisne, following the general axis of advance: Amifontaine—Nizy-le-Comte—Chaumont-Porcien.

IV. Zones of Action:

A later order will prescribe the extension beyond Boult-aux-Bois of the boundary separating the zones of action of the Group of Armies of the Center and the American First Army; that decision will actually be governed by the form that the maneuver of all our forces takes.

V. In the present phase, the battle will be conducted vigorously, allowing the enemy no respite. Consequently the reengagement of second line divisions cannot depend on the arrival of reinforcements. The immediate restoration of those units will be sought, if necessary, by interior organization consisting of reducing the number of infantry battalions or companies, artillery battalions or batteries in the regimental organization.

The important thing is to place, at all times, completely integrated and cohesive forces in combat.

PETAIN.
Forming the Second Army

October 11, 1918.

General Petain
Commanding Armies of the North and Northeast

My dear General Petain:

I have assembled the Second Army Staff at Toul and expect to exercise command through that staff of the American IV Corps and the II Colonial Corps beginning at noon, October 12.

Referring to our conversation on the subject, I think it is desirable to designate army commanders for the two armies and to begin to exercise my functions as a group commander. Under the present situation, I would, of course, expect to continue to operate under your immediate direction.

JOHN J. PERSHING.

Necessity for Immediate Attack by American First Army

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
October 12, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commanding the American Expeditionary Forces in France

My dear General:

I have just received your letter of the 11th. I share entirely the sentiments which prompted your new organization [Formation of Second Army]. I again request that you take steps to support without delay, at least with the left of your forces, by a determined advanced, the right of the French Fourth Army which, following the course of the Aisne, reaches the outskirts of Attigny today.

Sincerely yours,
F. FOCH.

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French Fourth Army Mission  

[Editorial Translation]  

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 4231/M  
Operations - Priority  

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,  
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
October 12, 1918—5:10 p.m.  

General, Commander-in-Chief  

To Headquarters: Avize [French Group of Armies of the Center]; Souilly [American First Army] as information, Bacon [Headquarters Allied Armies]  

1. Because of withdrawal of the enemy on front of French Fourth Army, I have instructed American First Army to continue its efforts to break enemy resistance and push unremittingly in direction of Buzancy-Mezieres.  

2. Under present conditions, the Fourth Army must operate on right bank of the Aisne.  

3. As long as American First Army is less advanced than Fourth Army, Fourth Army will not limit its operation on Aisne right bank strictly to the area assigned to it as zone of action by Paragraph 4 of my Instructions No. 14,447. With its right the Fourth Army will operate by way of defiles of Grandpre, La Croix-aux-Bois, Quatre-Champs, Le Chesne, in order to overcome successively resistance opposing the left wing of American First Army.  

Communicate with General Pershing immediately to assure coordination of the operations of Fourth Army and American First Army.  

PETAIN.  

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G-3, First Army, AEF: 112.05: Telegram  

Petain Informed of Forthcoming Attack  

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
October 12, 1918.  

To Commander-in-Chief, Army of the North and Northeast  

No. 166 Sec. G. S. Reference your No. 4231 M. American First Army continues to press the enemy on the front east and west of the Meuse. A specially strong attack with fresh divisions having the object of breaking the hostile front between Argonne and the Meuse has been ordered for the 14th instant. This attack will be pushed with utmost vigor. The situation is fully appreciated and all efforts are being and will be exerted for decisive results.  

PERSHING.  

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NOTES ON CONVERSATION
between
General Pershing and Marshal Foch
at Bombon
October 13, 1918.

Present at conversation were also General Weygand and Colonel Boyd:

 Marshal Foch asked what General Pershing thought President Wilson expects to do under the present conditions. He was afraid that the President would allow himself to become involved in a long conversation; also that Mr. Wilson might assume to speak for the Allies, and stated that the Allies had not heard much from Mr. Wilson as yet. He expressed lack of confidence in the sincerity of the Germans and stated that he was afraid that the Allies would allow the Germans an opportunity to withdraw and reform their armies.

 General Pershing stated that he had received no communication whatsoever from President Wilson, but that, according to the papers at home, everyone favored pushing the war to a definite and favorable decision; that he had heard that it had been given out from the White House that Mr. Wilson would not become involved in a long conversation.

 Marshal Foch asked General Pershing how matters were progressing on the American front.

 General Pershing stated that we had met with very hard fighting and the Germans were putting up a very determined resistance.

 Marshal Foch stated that on all other parts of the front the advance was very marked; that the Americans were not progressing as rapidly as the others; that he would like to see them advance.

 General Pershing remarked that the fighting which is being done by the Americans facilitates the advance of the armies because we are drawing to our front from in front of the others a number of German divisions.

 Marshal Foch stated that each one is disposed to say that the fighting in his front is the hardest; that he himself only considered results; that the American Army had not advanced as much as the others and he wished the American Army to come up on the line with the other armies.

 General Pershing stated that the American Army had pushed as hard as any other army and that no army in their place would have advanced farther than the Americans; that we have fought on our front since the beginning of operations 26 German divisions.

 Marshal Foch shook his head and said that he would show General Pershing his figures on this.

 General Pershing stated that he proposed to continue his drive until the Germans gave way, provided, of course, this was the Marshal's desire.

 The Marshal stated that by all means this is what he wanted done; that the general offensive was progressing favorably on all parts of the front except in the American sector; that he wanted them to come up on a level with the other armies in the direction of Mezieres. He stated that in order to have an attack succeed the commander must go considerably into details so far as corps, division, brigade and even regimental orders are concerned; that the commanders should be required to bring their orders in writing so that they could be examined and operations of different units coordinated; that if they were not required to bring them up in writing, sometimes they were never written.

 General Pershing stated that this had always been done in the American First Army and that
it was for this reason that he knew that we were not advancing, simply because of the
difficulties of the ground and resistance of the enemy; that the Germans are fighting by
echeloning machine guns in depth and that we were meeting with resistance which would hold
up any troops; that nothing that anyone could say would put more good will, energy, or
coordination into our operations; that he himself had done all in his power, and the
officers under him also.

Marshal Foch stated that results are the only thing to judge by; that if an attack is
well planned and well executed, it succeeds with small losses; that if it is not well
planned and well executed the losses are heavy and there is no advance.

General Pershing stated that this is true only to a certain extent; that something
depends on what the enemy himself does; that he was not making any explanations or excuses
- he had not even intended discussing this subject, but since it was brought up by the
Marshal he would ask the Marshal to please bear in mind that he, General Pershing, was
talking about conditions which actually exist; that if the American Army had not advanced
this was due to these conditions which would not have been overcome by any other troops;
that he would call particular attention to the ground over which the Americans are attack-
ing.

Marshal Foch stated that he did take this into consideration and that he had no doubt
of the energy and good will and ability of the American Army; that he realized the
difficulties of the ground and it was for this reason that he had proposed to General
Pershing to make his attack west of the Argonne Forest, but that General Pershing had
wished to attack where he is now attacking and he had, consequently, allowed him to do so.

General Pershing stated that he had not understood the matter exactly this way; that
Marshal Foch had in the first place suggested that General Pershing divide his forces,
part attacking between the Argonne and the Meuse and part to the west of the Argonne; that
he had not wished to divide his army and had stated that he wished to keep them together
and that he would have them fight wherever the Marshal indicated, but that he was obliged
to ask that they fight together as an American Army.

Marshal Foch stated that this was now of no importance and that all he wanted was
results.

American Group of Armies:

Marshal Foch stated that he had received General Pershing's letter with reference to
the formation of the American Second Army and agreed fully with General Pershing's ideas;
that it was of no importance to him how General Pershing organized in rear of the front,
so long as he kept things going at the front; that any arrangement which permitted this
would suit him.

General Pershing stated that he had talked with General Petain on this subject and
that General Petain had agreed that it would be just as well for General Pershing to come
directly under the orders of Marshal Foch, as are Marshal Haig and General Petain: that
he, General Pershing, thought this advisable for reasons which he did not think it neces-
sary to go into.

General Pershing stated that he would like to take this opportunity to say to
Marshal Foch that his relations with General Petain had always been most agreeable; that
General Petain had coordinated with him throughout to the fullest extent and had gone out
of his way to assist the Americans in every possible way.

Marshal Foch agreed to this. He stated that just now he was not anxious to see
General Pershing get too far from the front for fear of losing the impetus which General
Pershing would naturally give to the attack.

General Pershing stated that he was going to remain at Souilly for the present.
Marshal Foch stated that he had no objections to having General Pershing report
directly to him as Commander-in-Chief, that in this event he thought that the French
Mission would have to be reorganized to a certain extent and that there should be an
American Mission at his headquarters; organized and operating in the same way as the
British Mission is there. For example, with Colonel Mott as head of the mission and with a few officers representing the different bureaus of the General Staff.

Colonel Mott was directed to talk the matter over with General Weygand and come to advance headquarters in a day or so with a proposed scheme for the organization of the American Mission.

Second Army Gen. File: Fldr. 259: Memorandum

Activation of the Second Army

G-3

October 13, 1918.

Confidential for the Chief of Staff

The American Second Army has been formed by order effective at noon, October 12. The Second Army occupies the front Port-sur-Seille---Fresnes-en-Woëvre and is composed of the American IV, VI, VII and French II Colonial Corps. Three divisions of the VII Corps now in the Vosges in the French Seventh Army will be withdrawn by the end of the month. The First Army composed of the American I, III, V, and French XVII Corps occupies the front Fresnes-en-Woëvre to the west of Grandpré. General Liggett has been assigned to the command of the First Army and General Bullard to that of the Second Army. I retain personal command of the group of Armies.

I recommend that Generals Liggett and Bullard be advanced to the grade of Lieutenant general.

Pershing.

Mission of American Army Unchanged by Withdrawal of Divisions

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 4779. Very urgent. For General Pershing: The action that has been undertaken today by the Belgian, French, and British troops in Belgium has made sufficient progress to enable us to expect important results if it is pushed through and, with that object, followed up with sufficient forces.

Under those conditions and to that effect, I order that two American divisions chosen among those that have taken part in offensive preparations, be sent to that region. The first of those divisions will be ready to entrain by October 16, at noon, the second on October 17. One of those divisions could be sent without artillery.
VILCEY-BOIS DE PRESLE AREA
Looking east-northeast from Vilcey-sur-Trey
Please let me know by telegram on October 15, before noon, the numbers of these divisions, which it seems, ought to be chosen among the 26th, 89th, 90th, or 78th Divisions. It is always understood that this reduction of the American forces will to no extent change the mission assigned to the American Army, especially between the Meuse and the Aisne.

FOCH.

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Continuation of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 9971/3
[Annex 257]

FRENCH FOURTH ARMY,
October 15, 1918---16:30 h.

Order for the day of October 16

[Extract]

I. Continuing its fortunate attacks of yesterday, during the course of the night and early in the morning, the French XXXVIII Army Corps has succeeded in enlarging its bridgehead.

About 15 h., it was holding Olizy, the northern edge of the woods of the Sarthe, Erbaude.

Along the rest of the front, the situation remains unchanged.

II. Tomorrow, October 16, the missions of the French IV, XI and XXI Army Corps remain those already assigned to them.

* * * * *

VII. Boundaries:

(a) The boundary with the American First Army is defined as follows: Grandpré---Talma---road Talma to Boult-aux-Bois, via the Bois de Bas and the Bois de Briquenay---Boult-aux-Bois (to American First Army).

* * * * *

GOURAUD,
The Army Commander.

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General Pershing to Receive Instructions Direct from Marshal Foch

[Contemporary Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 4845

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
Bombon, October 16, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces

My dear General:

I have the honor of confirming to you the conclusions of our interview of October 13 by informing you that in future I will send instructions of a tactical order directly to you without passing through the intermediary of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast, as I proceed towards Marshal Haig.

It is well understood that you will continue to treat directly with General Petain in regard to all questions of execution raised by the close collaboration of the numerous French units with the American Armies.

Very sincerely yours,

F. FOCH.

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Objectives Designated by Allied Commander-in-Chief

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.
No. 4925

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
October 19, 1918.

In order to exploit the advantage gained, the action of the Allied Armies is to be continued as follows:

1. The Group of Armies of Flanders will march in the general direction of Brussels; its right toward Hal, approaching the Escaut at Pecq, the Dendre at Lessines.

   In that march the forcing of the important water lines: Escaut, Dendre - - is to be combined, if necessary, with a flank action, turning those lines, executed by the British Armies.

2. The British Armies (Fifth, First, Third, Fourth) will advance south of the line Pecq---Lessines---Hal, their right moving by way of Froidchapelle and Philippeville on Agimont (north of Givet).

   The mission of the British Armies continues to be to throw the enemy forces back to the almost impenetrable massif of the Ardennes, where they cut the enemy's principal rocade, and, at the same time, to assist the advance of the Group of Armies of Flanders by enabling it to cross the principal water lines: Escaut, Dendre . . . which might stop its progress.
They in turn will be supported by the French First Army.

3. The French Armies (First, Tenth, Fifth, Fourth) and the American First Army will operate south of the above line.

Their missions are as follows:

For the French First Army: To support the attack of the British Armies by advancing in the direction of La Capelle---Chimay---Givet, and to maneuver with its right so as to turn the enemy resistance on the Serre-Sissonne line;

For the French Fifth and Fourth Armies, and American First Army: To reach the Mezieres-Sedan region and the Meuse up-stream, bringing about the fall of the line of the Aisne by a maneuver of the two wings: that on the left (French Fifth Army) in the direction of Chaumont-Porcien; that on the right (French Fourth Army and American First Army) in the direction of Buzancy-Le Chesne.

FOCH.

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First Army: G-3: 111.06: Memorandum

Mission of American First Army and French Fourth Army

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Senlis, Oise, October 21, 1918.

MEMORANDUM

With a view to ensure close cooperation between the American First Army and the French Fourth Army, it will be necessary to observe the following:

The general aim to pursue in the combined actions of the American First Army, and the right wing of the French Fourth Army is to reach the region of Buzancy (American First Army) and that of Le Chesne (French Fourth Army) in order to turn the line of the Aisne from the east.

The result of the operations conducted by these armies in the Olizy-Grandpre---St-Juvin region has been to ensure their complete liaison at the Grandpre defile and to enable the American Army to come out of the wooded region which was limiting its actions.

Now that this first and indispensable result has been reached, the purpose of the combined attacks of these armies must be to attain the objective fixed: Buzancy-Le Chesne, by outflanking the wooded massif of the Argonne from the east and west, in actions of broader scope and without using up troops in fighting in woods which is always costly and yields poor results.

With this in view, it is necessary:

1. For the American First Army to plan and execute without any delay a powerful attack towards Boult-aux-Bois---Buzancy---Bois de la Folie, making use of the wide opening it has conquered north of the Bois des Loges and Bois de Romagne, thus avoiding becoming involved in combat in woods in the Argonne and in the Bantheville region.

An attack on such a large scale, alone, can enable it to gain the objective that has been set for it.

2. For the French Fourth Army, while maintaining its liaison with the American Army only at Grandpre, to act rapidly and in force by way of Vouziers in the direction of Quatre-Champs and from the general line Vandy-Terron and more to the north, in the direction of Les Alleux and also toward Le Chesne, resolutely widening its attack.
The attention of both the General commanding the American Army and the General commanding G. A. C. is drawn to the above directives which tend to widen the scope of action proper to each army and at the same time to ensure the convergence of their efforts to reach the assigned objectives.

They are each requested to be so kind as to make known what dispositions they will take to comply with the directives and also any arrangements they might agree upon in order to ensure the coordination of their actions.

FOCH.

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Temporary Reduction of Authorized Strength of Divisions

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, October 22, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff

To: The Commanding General, First Army, Second Army

1. During the continuance of the present shortage of replacements the authorized strength of divisions will be reduced by 4,000 men. This will require you to make certain readjustments within units so as to equalize infantry companies at about 175 men per company. Calls for replacements will be made on the basis of the full authorized strength, as heretofore, but only the requirements in excess of 4,000 men per division will be forwarded.

2. Army commanders will take immediate steps to utilize to the utmost available motor transportation by forming army and corps pools from surplus divisional transportation. Constant reports of half empty trucks going to the front indicates an inefficiency which demand immediate corrective measures.

3. The salvage of materiel at the front must be organized and exploited to the utmost.

J. W. McANDREW,
Major General.

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HS Fr. Files: Armies N. and N. E., Part V: Letter

Use of American Divisions Assigned to French

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.
No. 5061

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
October 23, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast

Since General Pershing is now receiving from me the directives concerning operations, all questions relative to the return to the American Army of American divisions attached
to the French Army, or the assignment to the French Army of fresh American divisions, will be submitted for my decision.

In order to start out on a firmly established basis in this new order of affairs, I ask that you be good enough to inform me what has been decided up to the present, or contemplated between you and General Pershing on the subject of the American divisions assigned to French sectors, quiet or active, or French divisions attached to one of the American Armies.

FOCH.


First Army Exchanges Four French Divisions in the American Zone for Four American Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
October 24, 1918.

3d Section, General Staff
No. 33,814

General, Commander-in-Chief

To Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

In response to your letter No. 5061 of October 23.
The situation of the French large units in the American zone and of the American
large units in the French zone is as follows:
a. Nondivisional units of three French corps, and six French divisions are in the
American zone: Nondivisional units of the XVII and XXXIII Corps and the II Colonel Corps.
b. Four American divisions are in the French zone, to wit:
2d and 36th Divisions with the French Fourth Army
81st Division in the Vosges
88th Division in Upper Alsace

By letter (unnumbered) of September 19, 1918, General Pershing asked that I return to
him on October 25 the 81st Division, which is poorly equipped to spend the cold season in
the Vosges. I acceded to his request with the condition that, in exchange, one of the six
French divisions in the American zone would be put back at my disposal.

More recently, through the mediation of General MacAndrews, General Pershing verbally
requested of me that the 2d, 36th, and 88th Divisions be put back at his disposal because
of his requirements on his own front.

- 1 -

18th Inf. Div., 2d Dismounted Cavalry Division, 26th, 39th, and 10th Inf. Divs., and
15th Colonel Inf. Div.

General Pershing and I have agreed that those three divisions would likewise be re-
turned to him in exchange for three additional French divisions in the American zone.

- 100 -
My letter No. 26677 of October 19 to General Pershing and his response of October 20, copy of which letter I forwarded to you in the form of a report on October 23, summarize the matter:

The four American divisions referred to above will be put back at the disposal of General Pershing in exchange for the four French divisions from the American zone (18th, 2d Dismounted Cavalry, 26th, and 39th) on the dates specified in the letters cited above.

The necessary movements for these exchanges have already begun:
- The American 2d Division set out October 23 from the Champagne for the American zone;
- The 18th Inf. Div. and 2d Dismounted Cavalry Division are moving from the American zone to the French Group of Armies of the East.

After the proposed exchanges are carried out, no American divisions will remain in the French zone. However, there will be remaining in the American zone nondivisional units of two French corps (XVII and II Colonial Corps) and two French divisions (10th and 15th Colonial Inf. Divs.).

I may add that I made a point of the four French divisions which are to be returned to me by General Pershing for the constitution of the maneuver mass of 15 additional divisions provided for the Lorraine operation.

The proximity of those divisions to the future attack terrain will permit a concentration of those elements by dirt road near Lorraine; that consideration is not without value in view of the present state of transportation means.

By order:

BUAT,
Major General.

Project for French Fourth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff  GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,
No. 4434  October 24, 1918.

[Annex 366]

Major General Maistre, Commanding the Group of Armies of the Center

To: The Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

You requested me, in the last paragraph of your Memorandum 4985, of October 21, to report to you on measures taken to assure execution of the orders of this memorandum, as well as the agreement with the American First Army to secure coordination between the operations of that army and those of the French Fourth Army.

Insofar as the operations which are to be carried out by the French Fourth Army, are concerned, I transmit to your liaison officer a copy of a plan which has been approved by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and the Northeast and which will serve as basis for the work of the French Fourth Army.
Insofar as coordination of the actions of the two armies is concerned, a conference took place, on October 24, at Suippes Farm, to achieve the agreement prescribed in your memorandum, already cited.

At this meeting were present, the Commanding General of the American First Army and his Chief of Staff, as well as the Chief of Staff of the G. A. C.

It was agreed that the American First Army would attack November 1 and that the French Fourth Army would attack November 2; these dates were based, for the American First Army, upon putting its artillery into position, which includes that of the American 2d Infantry Division (only arrived at point of employment today); for the French Fourth Army, upon the limited possibilities of completing placements of its divisions.

The question of limits of zone of action of the artillery of the two armies, after arrival upon final objectives, has also been settled.

Finally, General Gouraud and General Liggett came to an agreement concerning the necessity for maintaining close liaison, at the various echelons and concerning means whereby maximum benefit can be obtained from liaisons.

MAISTRE.

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Annexes: Telegram

Foch to Direct Operations

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 5109

High Command Allied Armies,
October 25, 1918—9:30 h.

[Annex 379]

Headquarters Bacon

To: Headquarters Avize
   G. Q. G. (3d Bureau)
   Military Mission Chaumont (to be communicated to General Pershing)

Direction of the operations of the American Army now being assured directly by Marshal Foch, the Marshal directs the General Commanding the G. A. C. to personally be responsible for coordination of the operations of the French troops of the right of the G. A. C. and of the American First Army. For this purpose he will contact the commander of the American troops with whom it is most important that he confer.

By order Chief of Staff:

WEYGAND.

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Expansion of Operations and Objectives

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,

No. 5175

October 26, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies of the North and Northeast

I am sending you herewith a memorandum [following] prompted by the attack method practiced by the French Group of Armies of the Center and the American First Army.

It is expedient now to expand our operations and our objectives.

I ask that you be good enough to communicate those remarks to the Group of Armies of the Center unless you find some objection to it.

A copy of that memorandum will be sent to General Pershing.

FOCH.

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Foch's Views on Limited Objectives

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,

No. 5174

Serlitz, Otse, October 25, 1918.

MEMORANDUM

The operation plans of the French Fourth Army and the American First Army anticipate for these armies an attack on fronts of limited objectives, to be reached successively.

Such methods, in force for a long time during the war of position, can still be appropriate in certain special cases where only a limited result is desired. However, it cannot be used as a general thing, because it can only produce limited results.

Limiting beforehand the progress of troops to lines placed on the map, preventing the troops in consequence from taking advantage of the opportunities which always present themselves after a successful start, the command by its restrictive orders compromises the final result and in any event makes it more costly.

Important results like those which we are striving for in the present situation, and in the presence of an enemy whose losses from attrition are daily mounting, can only be hoped for by a rapid advance as deep as possible.

Troops launched in an attack need only know their direction of attack. On this direction they advance as far as possible, attacking and maneuvering against the enemy who resists, without any attempt at alignment, the most advanced units working to assist the advance of those who are checked for the moment. They work, therefore not toward
lines indicated a priori according to the terrain, but toward the enemy, with whom they do not lose contact once they have gained it.

F. FOCH.

Foch's Directive for American First Army

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S. No. 5254

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
October 27, 1918.

Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

The point which we have now reached in our battle should enable us to obtain great results if all the Allied Armies redouble their blows upon the enemy in well ordered attacks.

The moment has come for the American Army, restored to good condition after its successful offensive of Sept. 26 and capable today of a powerful effort, to resume its place in this battle which the other Allied Armies have been fighting unceasingly.

The direction of attack of the American First Army laid down in my directive No. 4985 of Oct. 21, and agreed upon by the arrangements made with Gen. Maistre, October 26, has a vital importance for the operations as a whole.

It is then of the highest importance that the American First Army be able to begin its operations on the date agreed upon, that is, starting Nov. 1, and that it be able to continue them as rapidly as possible, until important and sure results have been attained.

I therefore direct that the attacks which will be undertaken November 1 by the American First Army, be pushed and continued without pause until that army has taken possession of the Boult-aux-Bois—Buzancy Road and east thereof, and has assured the occupation of that region, as a first result to be obtained.

FOCH.
Date of Attack of French Fourth Army

[Editorial Translation]

Coding Section, General Staff
No. 4727/M

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
October 29, 1918---10:30 p. m.

Headquarters Avize [French Sixth Army]

To: Headquarters Souilly-Provins [American First Army-French G. H. Q.]
No. 7737/B

For General Pershing

The date of attack of the French Fourth Army is fixed at dawn, November 1.
For Souilly only: please advise if the American First Army is still prepared to
attack on that date.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 658-A: Letter

Instructions Concerning Attack

ADVANCE P. C., GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
Ligny-en-Barrois, October 29, 1918.

From: The Chief of Staff
To: The Commanding General, American First Army

[Extract]

1. Enclosed herewith is a translation of a letter received by the Commander-in-Chief
from the Allied Commander-in-Chief. [No. 5254, Oct. 27]

It will be noted that the Marshal mentions November 1 as the approximate date of
attack; whether or not November 1 is to be the actual day of attack is, as you have been
informed, dependent upon the date of attack of the French Fourth Army and under the in-
structions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, is to be finally determined by General
Maistre.

* * * * *

3. The Commander-in-Chief now directs that you not only take the necessary steps to
insure that your divisions push their advance to the farthest possible limit on the first
day but that you leave nothing undone to assure that your troops reach the regions
indicated by the Allied Commander-in-Chief at the earliest possible moment.

In this connection your attention is invited to the fact that while your attack is
to be launched in coordination with that of the French Fourth Army it is not contemplated
that you should slow up your attack on the second day merely because the French Fourth Army may have to delay their attack in order to bring their artillery across the River Aisne.

J. W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff,
Major General, General Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF:Fldr. 658-A:Telegram

**Directive for American First Army**

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombo, November 2, 1918---9:15 a.m.

Headquarters Bacon [Hq. Allied Armies]

To French Military Division Souilly (for American G. H. Q.)

Supplementing my directive of October 27, No. 5,254, directing possession by the American First Army of the Boult-aux-Bois---Buzancy Road and east thereof, it is important that the brilliant results obtained by the center of the American First Army on November 1 be exploited without delay in the above-indicated direction and that to this end the heights north of Sivry-les-Buzancy, those of Thenorgues and those north of Briquenay, be taken, in order to reach the Boult-aux-Bois---Buzancy Road.

Moreover our previous understanding remains unchanged, that the operation of the American First Army is to be continued in cooperation with the French Fourth Army on the Le Chesne-Stonne Road, to be carried through there in the direction of Sedan-Mezieres.

The attention of the Commander of the American First Army and the Commander of the French Fourth Army is particularly called to the above indications.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF:Fldr. 58-A:Letter

**Future Missions of First and Second Armies**

ADVANCE P. C., GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, November 5, 1918.

From: Commander-in-Chief

To: Commanding General, First Army
    Commanding General, Second Army

1. The energetic action of the First Army should completely expel the enemy from the region between the Meuse and the Bar within the next few days. The results obtained by this army have been felt on the entire front from the Moselle to Holland. The situation of the enemy on the entire front west of the Moselle demands the boldest and most energetic
action on the part of both the American and Second Armies in order that the fullest advantage may be taken of his present confusion.

It is desired that, in carrying out the directions that are outlined herein, corps and division commanders push troops forward wherever resistance is broken, without regard for fixed objectives and without fear for their flanks. Special attention will be given to impress upon all officers and soldiers that energy, boldness and open warfare methods are demanded by the present situation. The complete destruction of the enemy's armed forces is the immediate result sought for.

2. The First and Second Armies will at once prepare to undertake operations with the ultimate purpose of destroying the enemy's organization and driving him beyond the existing frontier in the region of Briey and Longwy.

3. As preliminaries of this offensive, the First Army will:
   (a) Complete the occupation of the region between the Meuse and the Bar.
   (b) Complete the present operation of driving the enemy from the heights of the Meuse north of Verdun and south of the Forêt de Woëvre.
   (c) Conduct an offensive with the object of driving the enemy beyond the Theinte and the Chiers.

   The operation ordered in (c) will be begun at once by establishing a footing on the east bank of the Meuse in the region of Stenay-Mouzon.

4. The Second Army will:
   (a) Conduct raids and local operations in accordance with verbal instructions already given.
   (b) Advance its line between the Moselle and the Etang de Lachaussee toward Corze and Chambley.
   (c) Prepare plans for an attack in the direction of Briey along the axes Fresnes---Conflans---Briey.

   In submitting plans under (c), recommendations will be made as to the necessary extension of the present Second Army front toward the northwest.

JOHN J. PERSHING,
General, United States Army.

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Orders for Change of Front

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 5678

[Annex 506]

Marshall Foch, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies

To: Commander-In-Chief, Armies of the North and Northeast

In their movement towards the Meuse, begun November 5, the zone of action of the French First, Third, Fifth, and Fourth Armies will progressively become narrower.

ALLIED ARMIES,
November 6, 1918.

- 107 -
CROIX DES VANDIERES--XON HILL AREA
Looking east-northeast from Norroy
On their arrival upon the Meuse, those armies would only have, at the most, a front of about 75 kilometers from Glivet to Bazeilles. On the contrary, the front of the American First Army, on the left bank of the Meuse, would be greatly expanded (about 40 kilometers). However, it is advisable to permit the American Army to rest up its forces, in view of employment of those forces in the Lorraine offensive. Consequently, it is my intention to fix the future boundary between the French Fourth Army and the American First Army, not at Bazeilles, but in the vicinity of Mouzon. It is requested that you inform General Maistre accordingly, directing him to plan for whatever measures may be necessary to enable him to take over the front Bazeilles-Mouzon as soon as the American First Army shall have reached Bazeilles.

FOCH.


**Change of Boundary**

[Editorial Translation]

From: General, Commander-in-Chief, French Army

At: French General Headquarters

Date: Nov. 7, 1918 Hour 4:42 p. m. No. 5046/M


1. The boundary between Group of Armies of the Center and American First Army will be changed as follows:

2. New boundary will go into effect at noon, November 9, south of Boult-aux-Bois. Before that date the American Army can make use of available billets in the zone which it is to take over according to agreement with the Group of Armies of the Center.

3. The Group of Armies of the Center and the American Army will come to an agreement with reference to putting into effect the new boundary and relieving American troops west of Mouzon.

4. The Group of Armies of the Center will temporarily retain disposition of Autry station and right of passage over road leading thereto, particularly main highway Ville-sur-Tourbe---Sechault---Monthois.
5. Medical units of the French Fourth Army situated in former zone will remain attached to that army until their displacement. Engineer depots and sawmills will remain attached to the Fourth Army. Camp and billeting personnel will remain in place and will pass to the Direction of Lines of Communication of American zone.

By order:

Deputy Chief of Staff.

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GHQ, Files: Report of G-3, First Army, File 111.06: Letter

Preparations for Relief of American I Army Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 48/P. C.

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,
November 7, 1918.

General Maistre, commanding the Group of Armies of the Center

To General Pershing, Commander-in-Chief, American Army

Informational copies to: Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies
French General Headquarters
French Fourth Army

In conformity with telephone message No. 5734 of November 7 from the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, I have the honor to make the following recommendations:

1. The boundary between the American First Army and the French Fourth Army will be traced in conformity with Telegram 5046/M of the General commanding the French Armies [preceding].
2. This new boundary will be in force at noon on the 9th.
3. With a view to permitting the French elements which are to replace the American elements on the Bazeilles-Mouzon front, to enter this new sector without crowding, it is requested that the American First Army leave to the west of the proposed boundary the equivalent of only one division and inform the Group of Armies of the Center as to the date on which this will be done. On that date will actually depend the one to be fixed for the final relief by units of the Fourth Army.
   The details of this relief will be regulated by agreement between the two armies concerned.
4. The date of passage of command will be fixed by agreement between General Pershing and General Maistre.

MAISTRE.
**Correction on Previous Boundary Directive**

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,
Chaumont-en-Bassigny, November 8, 1918.

Received 14:10 h.

Brig. Gen. Fox Conner,
Headquarters First Army

November 8, 11:30 h. Reference to message yesterday subject limits American First and French Fourth Armies. Marshal Foch directs that the locality of Tannay will belong to the French Fourth Army and not to American First Army. Acknowledge.

MURPHY.

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**Anticipation of Cessation of Hostilities**

ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
Paris, November 8, 1918.

The Commanding General,
American First Army, France

My dear General:

The following message has just been received from Marshal Foch and the directions contained therein will be carried out:

1. Hostilities will cease along the whole front beginning at date and hour not yet determined, Paris time.

2. The Allied troops will not pass the line reached by that hour on that date until they get further orders. Report carefully what this line is.

3. All communication is forbidden up to the time of receipt of instructions, which will be sent to the Commanders-in-Chief of Armies.

FOCH.

In compliance with above instructions, the necessary orders will be given by army commanders, who will report by telegraph to G. H. Q., Chaumont, the exact line occupied.
at the time of receipt of orders referred to. These orders are to be sent direct from
Allied Commander-in-Chief to American Army Commanders, according to my request, in order
to avoid any delay.

Very sincerely,

PERSHING.

--------

G-3, GHQ, AEF, First Army: Fldr. 234: Memorandum

Armistice not in Effect

Parts, November 8, 1918.

Chief of Staff, A. E. F., Chaumont

Reference message regarding armistice transmitted by Colonel Mott and sent by me to
army commanders this afternoon, inform army commanders immediately that the Armistice has
not been signed and there is no cessation of hostilities.

The message above referred to was sent by Colonel Mott in anticipation of signing of
armistice and does not take effect until armistice is signed and until orders from these
headquarters.

PERSHING.

Telephone to General Eltinge
By General Pershing 7:50 p. m.
November 8, 1918

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Annexes: Telegram

Determination of Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

1st Section, 3d Bureau, G. S. COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, ALLIED ARMIES,
No. 5825 November 9, 1918—11:35 h.

[Annex 542]

Headquarters Bacon

To: French Military Mission, Chaumont
   General Pershing
   Headquarters St-Memmie
   Commanding General, Armies of the North and Northeast

   Boundary, on the right bank of the Meuse, between the American First Army and the
   French Fourth Army, will be as follows: Mouzon---Carignan---Les Deux-Villes---Williers---
Pin---Jamoigne---Etalle. All of these places to the French.

General Pershing and General Maistre are requested to come to an understanding so that the American and French troops will be progressively placed within their respective zones as defined above, along that part of the right bank of the Meuse already occupied by us.

By order:

Chief of Staff.

--------

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 656: Telegram

**First and Second Armies to Push Attack**

No. Militaire 5828

**ALLIED GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,**

**Senlis, November 9, 1918--17 h.**

General Staff Bacon [Allied G. H. Q.] (G. Q. G. (For General Petain)
(Mission Chaumont) For General Pershing)
(Mission Ytres (For Marshal Haig)
(Conde (For General Degoutte)

The enemy disorganized by our repeated attacks is withdrawing along the whole front.
It is important to maintain and hasten our action.
I appeal to the energy and initiative of Commanders-in-Chief and their armies to secure decisive results.

UBjr 11/9--8:45 p. m.

(Blue pencil notation):

Get it to the armies at once.

ELTINGE.

--------

Annexes: Letter

**Armistice**

[Editorial Translation]

[Annex 568]  

**November 11, 1918.**

Marshal Foch

To: Commanders-in-Chief

1. Hostilities will cease along the entire front beginning on November 11 at 11 h., French time.
2. Allied troops will not until further order pass the line reached on that date and at that hour. 
   Render report concerning that line.
3. All communication with the enemy is forbidden until receipt of instructions sent to army commanders.

FOCH.
DOCUMENTATION PERTAINING TO
ST-MIHIEL OPERATION

First Army: General Orders

GENERAL ORDER
No. 120

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
July 24, 1918.

I. In accordance with authority contained in War Department Cablegram (No. 743), the
American First Army, is organized as indicated hereinafter, to take effect August 10, 1918.

II. The American First Army, will consist of the following organizations:

A. Headquarters:
   Station: La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Department of Seine-et-Marne, France.
   Commander: Gen. John J. Pershing, U. S. Army

   Staff: Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Hugh A. Drum, G. S.
          Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1, Lt. Col. Jens Bugg, G. S.
          Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, Lt. Col. Willey Howell, G. S.
          Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, Col. Robert McCleave, G. S.
          Asst. Chief of Staff, G-4, Lt. Col. John L. DeWitt, G. S.
          Asst. Chief of Staff, G-5, Lt. Col. Lewis H. Watkins, G. S.

B. Troops and Services:

   A. Administrative and Technical Services:

      Adjutant General, Col. Joseph F. Barnes, A. G. D.
      Inspector General, Col. Jacob C. Johnson, I. G. S.
      Judge Advocate, Lt. Col Blanton Winship, J. A.
      Chief Quartermaster, Major George Luberoff, Q. M. R. C.
      Chief Surgeon, Col. Alexander N. Stark, M. C.
      Chief Engineer, Brig. Gen. Jay J. Morrow, N. A.
      Chief Signal Officer, Lt. Col. Parker Hitt, S. C.
      Chief Ordnance Officer, Col. Edward P. O'Hern, Ordnance Dept., N. A.
      Chief of Air Service, Col. William Mitchell, S. C.
      Chief of Motor Transport Corps, Col. William H. Winter, Q. M. C.
      Chief of Chemical Warfare Service (To be designated later).
      Chief of Tank Corps (To be designated later).
      Provost Marshal (To be designated later).

   B. Troops:
      Capt. Edward C. McGuire, 3d Cavalry.
      Such assistants as may be necessary will be designated in orders of the First
      Army.

   Such assistants as may be necessary will be designated by
   confidential instructions of these headquarters.

III. The staff officers mentioned in Sec. II above and such assistants as may be
     authorized by the army commander will proceed to La Ferte-sous-Jouarre for station in time
     to take over their duties on the date indicated above. The travel directed is necessary
     in the military service.

IV. The provisions of Sec. III, G. O. No. 65, current series, these headquarters, are
so amended as to designate the Fourth Section (G-4), General Staff, referred to therein, as G-4, Second Army.

By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

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HS French Files: 403-30.1: Memorandum

American First Army to take over French Sixth Army Front

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

[Editorial Translation]

No. 32,696

July 25, 1918.

Memorandum for the Commander of the Group of Armies of the Reserve

1. It has been decided that the American First Army will enter the line on the front now held by the French Sixth Army.

The arrangement of the American First Army will, in principle, be based on the occupation of the two American corps sectors, each American corps to have two divisions in line and one in reserve. This occupation will start beginning July 25.

The American First Army will consist, initially, of the American 3d, 4th, 26th, 28th, 32d, and 42d Divisions.

The headquarters of the American First Army will be established at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre. The American First Army will be under the French Group of Armies of the Reserve.

2. The Generals commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the French Sixth Army will take the necessary steps to facilitate the entry into sector of the American First Army and will arrange for the relief of French units, services, or establishments by the corresponding American elements.

The date of taking over of command by the American First Army will be fixed later.

PETAIN.

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191-32.15: Memorandum

Organization of Army Headquarters Staff Echelons

No. 1

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,


1. The staff of Army Headquarters, First Army, will be divided into two echelons:

1st Echelon will consist of the Commanding General, Chief of Staff, Asst. Chief of Staff (G-1), Asst. Chief of Staff (G-2), Asst. Chief of Staff (G-3), Asst. Chief of Staff (G-4), Asst. Chief of Staff (G-5), Chief of Artillery, Chief of Air Service, Chief Signal Officer, Chief Surgeon, and the Provost Marshal. Only such office personnel for these officers as is considered absolutely necessary will be attached to the 1st Echelon.

The 2d Echelon will be composed of the remaining officers of the army staff.

2. The 1st Echelon will be prepared at all times for rapid changes of station. With the foregoing in view, a system of live and dead records will be established in each office, live records to consist of current business, and only in special cases of records older than one month. Dead records will consist of all completed business and records of
over one month, except in special cases. The dead records of the 1st Echelon will be
carefully indexed and packed and turned into the Adjutant General for disposition.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM.
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 233: Letter

**Transfer of Troops between Corps**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 29, 1918.

Col. Fox Conner,

Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

My dear Conner:

There are several things that I would like to talk over with you and also to let you
know what is happening.

Our troops are disposed as follows:

In the American I Corps the 42d Division is in line, the 4th Division is in 2d
Echelon, and the 26th Division is in 3d Echelon.

In the French XXXVIII Corps, one-half of the 28th Division and one-half of the 3d
Division are in line; the 32d Division is in 2d Echelon moving forward to relieve the two
units indicated above. The other halves of the 28th and 3d Divisions are in 3d Echelon.

All of these latter troops are under the French XXXVIII Corps. I am now arranging for the
American III Corps to take over the functions of the French XXXVIII Corps and hope to have
our corps in tactical command by August 2 or 3 [See Memo 32,696, July 25, preceding]. I
will, shortly after the above has been accomplished, transfer the army artillery brigade
now attached to the I Corps to the III Corps.

As you realize without my going into details there will be a need for considerable
corps troops with the III Corps. I do not want to go ahead and make transfers from one
corps to the other without your knowledge, so please send me as soon as you can your
desires in this connection. There will be needs at once for a corps artillery park as the
ammunition distribution is serious, due to long hauls and constant advances. The question
of engineers for the III Corps also needs attention immediately.

The air service situation as it appears to me is as follows:

We now have 3 observation squadrons and 4 pursuit squadrons with us. Colonel Mitchell
claims that the French are willing to attach to the First Army three observation squadrons
for corps use and three for army use. This would give us our quota for corps and sufficient
for army use at the present time. The balloon situation as you know needs attention. It
seems to me that the minimum that we should have is two balloons for each corps and two
balloons for the army, depending upon the amount of army artillery you send us and the
amount we receive from the French. On Lahm's recommendation, who is in touch with Foulots,
I am wiring today asking for one squadron and one balloon company. They seem to think that
it is practicable for these to be sent to us.
The prospect of the line that we will hold in the near future places the Marne as an interesting feature in our operations. Bridges are scarce and there is no doubt that as soon as we begin to operate the French will throw the burden of this phase of the work on us. General Morrow tells me that the 601st Engineers is to be made a replacement regiment and also that the 1st Battalion of this regiment has had some good training in bridge building, etc. I am therefore requesting by wire today that this battalion be assigned to the III Corps as a sapper battalion and it may be that we can get some work out of it in connection with the bridges.

As soon as practicable I wish that you would give me an official notification as to the troops that are assigned to the First Army. I am going ahead on the basis that everything over here comes into the First Army.

We are progressing and would be in shape at the present time if our service of supplies had come across with the office furniture and headquarters troops personnel which I requested on the 18th inst. Neither the furniture nor the personnel requested on that date has been received. I have sent several wires to keep things stirring but so far only promises have come out.

There is another point that I believe you should keep in mind. The present offensive will no doubt continue for a few days longer and will use up a certain amount of manpower. This will have special reference to the 42d and 32d Divisions, so that your previous view in looking on these two divisions as fresh troops will not be entirely accurate.

H. A. DRUM,
Lt. Col., Gen. Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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191-64: Orders

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 3
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 31, 1918.

1. Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from G. H. Q., A. E. F., Colonel A. B. Barber, General Staff, is hereby announced Asst. Chief of Staff G-1, First Army, vice Liet. Col. Jens Bugge, hereby relieved.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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From 20 o'clock, August 4 to 20 o'clock, August 5

[Extract]

VIII. CHANGES IN DISPOSITION OF TROOPS: * * * At 8 o'clock, this corps took over the command of the French III Corps. Our sector now comprises that formerly held by the French XXXVIII Corps and the French III Corps.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
G-3.

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4. Miscellaneous: The corps moved its P. C. from Chateau-Moucheton to Fere-en-Tardenois at 8 a. m., August 5. At the same time it took over the French 62d Division and corps troops of the French II Corps and with them occupied the French II Corps sector in the line.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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Plan for Relieving French Sixth Army

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, August 7, 1918.

Colonel Fox Conner,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3,
G. H. Q., A. E. F.,

[Extract]

My dear Conner:

There are several points I would like to bring to your attention. I made a trip today to the front and got in touch with the two corps. The attack to secure the ridge north of the Vesle is still progressing. • • •

The order of battle stands at the present time as follows: In the I Corps, the French 62d Division is on the left, and the American 4th Division on the right. In the second line is the 42d Division, and in the third line, well to the rear, is the 26th Division. In the III Corps, the American 28th Division on the left, the 6th Brigade of the American 3d Division in the center, and the French 4th Division on the right. In the second line is the American 32d Division, in the third line, the American 3d Division less one brigade. As you may know, our two American corps are commanding all troops in the Sixth Army at the present time. I arranged for this as it will greatly facilitate the American First Army taking control.

• • • When the 77th Division arrives in the forward area which will be in the course of the next three or four days, it will have to be put in the front line to the left of the American 4th Division. I must retain some division as a second line division for the I Corps. The departure of the 26th Division necessitates the retention of the 42d Division. In view of the foregoing I sent a telegram this morning recommending the transfer from the 26th Division of sufficient replacements to bring the 42d Division up to full strength. I believe that if this is done and the division (42d) is moved to a back area along the Marne and allowed about three weeks rest it will be in shape for further use. • • •

The 6th Brigade of the 3d Division will be withdrawn from the front on the 8th and 9th and replaced by the French 164th Division. The 32d Division after having been engaged for eight days has suffered losses reported to be a little over 3,000. I have been unable to visit this division up to the present time. • • • The 28th Division is now in the front line and carrying on the attack for the crossing of the Vesle. It is therefore evident that the complete front of the First Army cannot be taken over by American divisions until after the arrival of the 82d Division. I hope to arrange for the French 164th Division to remain under our command until this time. In view of the foregoing the 32d Division will have been considerably reduced and also, no doubt, the 28th Division as a result of the present fighting.

It therefore seems to me that you should plan to send to the First Army as soon as practicable two more divisions than were included in your first plan. These divisions will be needed to relieve the 42d Division and one of the divisions in the III Corps. I feel that it would be a good solution for the Army to have a seventh division as an army reserve which could be turned over to either of the corps to relieve any division which may suffer losses demanding relief.

I am having the question of losses investigated today and hope to get some definite conclusions as regards the same.
As I telephoned you yesterday I believe that the situation here as far as active fighting is concerned will terminate about the 11th or 12th instant. Thereafter we will take up stabilized warfare. With this in mind I feel that it would be much better for us to move over to our eastern sector and get down to work for the offensive that we want to make in that vicinity. A decision to that effect if it is to be made should be rendered without any delay. Otherwise considerable materiel, effort, etc., will be expended here without any benefit to the American Army.

* * * * *

H. A. DRUM,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF:Fldr. 233: Letter

Troops Constituting First Army

3d Section, G. S. GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

From: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

To: Chief of Staff, First Army

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to the provisions of paragraph II B, General Orders No. 120, G. H. Q., A. E. F., July 24, 1918, the following troops are announced as constituting the First Army, subject to such additions and deductions as may be hereafter indicated in confidential instructions from these headquarters.

2. First Army

I Corps
III Corps
Army Troops * * *

* * * * *

3. At present the I Corps consists of the 4th, 26th, and 42d Divisions, with certain corps troops * * * The III Corps consists of the 3d, 28th and 32d Divisions, with corps troops * * *

Upon completion of the movements now being arranged, the 6 divisions for duty in the First Army will be the 4th, 77th, 42d, 32d, 28th and 82d.

* * * * *

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff.

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Operation Report

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Souilly, Meuse, November 14. * 1918.

From: Colonel R. T. Ward, Chief of Subsection 1, G-3, First Army
To: A. C. of S., G-3, First Army

[Extract]

10. * * * A special study was made for the first operation expected to be carried out by the American First Army which was to be the taking of the heights north of Fismes, including a crossing of the Vesle River. Studies were made of communications, circulation, corps and army boundaries, axes of liaison, possible posts of command, operating areas and documents. Maps and papers relating to the operations on the Sixth Army front were gathered together and filed, and detailed arrangements were made for taking over the Sixth Army front.

* * * * *

12. August 9, Field Order No. 1, was prepared and approved by the Chief of Staff, and issued at 5 p.m., taking over the front of the French Sixth Army, at the same time the final arrangements were made for the actual transfer from the 3d Bureau, French Sixth Army, of files and plans to the American First Army, G-3. * * *

* * * * *

14. August 10, secret instructions were received to the effect that the American First Army would not operate on the Vesle front but in the vicinity of St-Mihiel, and that the transfer of command would not take place. Accordingly Field Order No. 2 was issued revoking Field Order No. 1. On this same date, in accordance with instructions from Colonel McCleave, G-3, all maps and records pertaining to the Vesle fronts were destroyed and preparations were made to move to a new station.

* * * * *

R. T. WARD,
Colonel, Engineers.

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* [Editorial Note: This document is arbitrarily placed under date of August 10 since it concerns primarily operations at that time.]
III Corps to Remain in Sector

FIRST ARMY,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, August 10, 1918.

Assistant Chief of Staff
G-3, H. A. E. F.

No. 51 see G. S. understand situation. Following to remain: Pauline [III C] comprising Dolly [77th Div.], Kitty [28th Div.], Eliza [32d Div.], artillery Pauline [III Corps], 308th Engineers, one battalion 1st Pioneer Infantry, one ambulance company, one field hospital company, three evacuation hospitals, one remount depot, one veterinary hospital, one squadron observation. Pauline selected by Commander-in-Chief. Please wire me at once if foregoing meets with your approval. I am arranging movement here so that I can personally arrive G. H. Q. tomorrow evening leaving part of staff here to complete arrangements.

DRUM.
8:35 p. m.

---------

American First Army to take Command

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 9756/3
680/01

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH AMERICAN ARMY,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 10, 1918.

Lt. Col. Linard, Chief of Staff of the French Military Mission with the American Army

To the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (G-3)

I have the honor to transmit below a copy of Telegram No. 2570 which I have just received from the Commander-in-Chief supplementing the agreement that has been reached:

The arrangements already made being amended accordingly, the American First Army will function and take command at 4 p. m., August 30.

H. LeROY.

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Cable: P-1585-S

**Pershing Assumes Command of First Army**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 11, 1918.

The Adjutant General of the Army, Washington

[Extract]

1. In accordance with authority contained in War Department Cable No. 743 [Feb. 7, 1918], the organization of the First Army, A. E. F. was completed on August 10 and I assume personal command of it on that date.

* * * * *

PERSHING.

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191-32.13: Order

**First Army Headquarters Close**

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 26

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF G-3,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, August 11, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Headquarters, First Army, less rear echelon, will be moved to another area, movement to commence 9 [7] a. m., August 12.

* * * * *

3. The P. C. First Army, will close at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre August 11, 1918, and open August 12, 1918, at station [Neufchateau] to be announced later.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

-------
HATTONCHATEL-VIGNEULLES AREA
Looking south from east edge to Hattonchatel
Paris Group Reconstituted

4th Section, General Staff
No. 3354

Commanding General, Services of Supply

[Extract]

Instructions issued this date make following changes effective at once: Headquarters First Army less G-4 is transferred to Neufchateau. The present G-4 First Army resumes its former status as G-4 Paris group and will be responsible for the supply of divisions remaining in that group. Headquarters First Army upon its arrival at Neufchateau absorbs G-4 now functioning there. Colonel DeWitt is transferred to Neufchateau and remains G-4 First Army. • • •

MOSELEY.

II Corps Artillery Park Transferred

G-3
SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 31

1. The II Corps Artillery Park, now attached to the III Corps, is transferred to the I Army Corps.
2. The movement of the II Corps Artillery Park will be under the direction of Commanding General, I Corps.

By command of General Pershing.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
191-32.13: Orders

**Movement Delay for Army Headquarters**

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 33

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF G-3,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, August 12, 1918.

The execution of Special Orders No. 26, Headquarters First Army, A. E. F., France, G-3, August 11, 1918, will be delayed 24 h.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Secret Documents, Bound Vol. F 2: Memorandum

**Preparation and Plans for Operations**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Neufchateau, August 13, 1918.

(Pencil notation):---Col. Drum states approved by C-in-C
Aug. 14, 1918.  G. C.

Memorandum for Chief of Staff [G. H. Q.]

In connection with verbal conversation of this date, the following is submitted:
1. Preparation and plans for operations.

While this work must necessarily be carried on by the staffs of both G. H. Q. and the First Army, it is believed that a definite division thereof should be made. The following is recommended:

(a) The staff of G. H. Q. should make provision for the following:
1. The concentration in distant areas and training of the troops to be engaged in the operation.
2. The equipment, supply, etc., of the above troops, and the supplies and transportation necessary for the operation.
3. The arrangement with the French and British for all troops and services of their armies to be used in the operations and the concentration of these elements.
4. The designation of the sector and area for the operations, and the supply of the materiel therefor.
5. The assignment of the First Army to the command of the sector to be included in the operations.
6. The assignment to the First Army of the troops and services to be used in the operations. The date of this assignment and location of troops at the above date to be given.
7. The arrangements with French authorities for the cooperation of adjacent French armies.

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8. Directions to the First Army to carry out the operation in question by a given date and with the troops and services specified.

9. A statement of the mission, purpose, and a general plan of the operations, including the part to be taken by any Allied forces should be furnished the First Army at once.

(b) The First Army Staff, based on the foregoing should cover the following:
   1. Prepare the detailed plan for the operation and submit it to the Commander-in-Chief for approval, etc.
   2. Install the necessary installations for the operations.
   3. Execute the detailed plan as approved by the Commander-in-Chief.

While much help will be secured from G. H. Q., and the same work carried out in cooperation by the two staffs, it is believed that definite tasks should be assigned each. This is especially desirable in view of the necessity for haste.

H. A. DRUM,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff, First Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 235: Memorandum

Changes in Locations of Headquarters

3d Section, General Staff
G-3

MEMORANDUM

1. The following changes in locations of headquarters are announced:
   Headquarters of First Army at Neufchateau, rear echelon temporarily at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre.
   Headquarters of IV Corps at Toul.
   Headquarters of I Corps have been ordered to Satzerals.
   Headquarters of VI Corps at Bourbonne-les-Bains.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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Reorganization

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 17
RAILWAY ARTILLERY RESERVE,
Neufchateau, August 15, 1918.

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in letter Chief of Artillery, First Army, A. E. F. (320.2), August 12, 1918, Paragraph 2, General Orders No. 12, these headquarters, c. s., is amended to read as follows:

Under the authority of General Orders, Nos. 116 and 121, G. H. Q., A. E. F., c. s., and letter Chief of Artillery, First Army, A. E. F., July 24, 1918, the 51st Artillery (C. A. C.), the 52d Artillery (C. A. C.), the 53d Artillery (C. A. C.), and the Howitzer Regiment, 30th Artillery Brigade (C. A. C.), are reorganized into two brigades and one attached regiment in accordance with tables of organization as follows:

30th Artillery Brigade (C. A. C.): Tables of Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Headquarters</th>
<th>No. 204 Series C, Mar. 20, 1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>42d Artillery (C. A. C.)</td>
<td>No. 207 W. D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52d Artillery (C. A. C.)</td>
<td>No. 210 W. D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53d Artillery (C. A. C.)</td>
<td>No. 210 W. D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Attached to 30th Artillery Brigade (C. A. C.)

| 43d Artillery (C. A. C.)     | No. 207 W. D.                   |

39th Artillery Brigade (C. A. C.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Headquarters</th>
<th>No. 204 Series C, Mar. 20, 1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44th Artillery (C. A. C.)</td>
<td>No. 205 W. D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Artillery (C. A. C.)</td>
<td>No. 225 W. D.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By command of Brigadier General Chamberlaine:

H. C. BARNES,
Colonel, C. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Reduction of St-Mihiel Salient

G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 16, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff

To: Chief of Staff, First Army

1. The Commander-in-Chief directs that the First Army undertake the reduction of the St-Mihiel salient. The minimum result to be attained by this operation is the reopening
of the Paris-Nancy Railroad in the vicinity of Commercy.

2. The main portion of the forces of the First Army will be used against the south face of the salient, the main attack extending from the vicinity of Fey-en-Haye to the vicinity of Richécourt.

A smaller portion (approximately three to four divisions) will be used in the region immediately north of Les Eparges, this secondary attack being directed to the east and southeast.

The general conception of the operation is thus the converging of enveloping forces in such a way as to cause the fall of the entire salient.

3. The minimum objective of the operation may be roughly defined by the lines Vandieres—heights north of Jaulny and Thiaucourt—Vigneulles—eastern edge heights of the Meuse.

The ultimate objective may be roughly defined by the line Marieulles (east of the Moselle)—heights south of Gorze—Mars-la-Tour—Etain.

4. There is enclosed herewith a list of troops hereby assigned to the First Army. You will assume control of all these troops, except those coming from beyond the limits of the French Eighth Army, and not yet arrived at destination (unless otherwise shown under remarks) and except for tactical command of those in sector, at noon August 18. The decision as to the exploitation of success from the minimum to the ultimate objective will depend primarily upon the degree of surprise realized during the first day's operations and this decision will be made by the commander, First Army.

As you are aware, Col. de Chambrun is taking up verbally the matter of securing French assistance to the left of our secondary attack through a French attack in the direction of Etain.

It is desired that the attack be launched prior to September 11, 1918.

5. Under existing instructions the IV Corps Staff is now exercising administrative control over all troops in the French Eighth Army. The V Corps Staff is exercising similar control over all troops in the French Seventh Army. The VI Corps Staff is charged with the training of the 79th and 91st Divisions.

Your attention is especially invited to the fact (stated under remarks) that certain aviation units now in the region of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre are to be moved by your orders.

6. For your information it is hoped that the training of one division not now assigned to the First Army will be completed between Sept. 10 and 20. The assignment of this division will depend upon circumstances.

7. All division commanders have been, or will be, notified of their assignment to the First Army by G-3, these hq. You will notify all other commanders concerned.

8. There is also enclosed herewith a list of such S. O. S. troops and miscellaneous units in sector as are of record in G-3 these hq.

J. W. McANDREW.

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Troops Assigned to First Army

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F., Chaumont-en-Bassigny, Haute-Marne, August 16, 1918.

1. Attached hereto are lists of troops which have been assigned to the First Army by a letter signed by the Chief of Staff, dated August 16, 1918.

2. The following extracts from the letter mentioned are quoted for your information:

   4. There is enclosed herewith a list of troops assigned to the First Army. You will assume control of all these troops except those coming from beyond the limits of the French Eight Army and not yet arrived at destination (unless otherwise shown under remarks) and except for tactical command of those in sector at noon, August 18.

   5. Under existing instructions the IV Corps Staff is now exercising administrative control over all troops in French Eight Army. The V Corps Staff is exercising similar control over all troops in the French Seventh Army. The VI Corps Staff is charged with the training of the 79th and 91st Divisions.

7. All division commanders have been, or will be, notified of their assignment to the First Army by G-3, these headquarters. You will notify all other commanders concerned.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

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**LIST OF TROOPS ASSIGNED TO FIRST ARMY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PRESENT LOCATION</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY TROOPS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Army Headquarters</td>
<td>Neufchateau</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>53d Pioneer infantry</td>
<td>Base Ports</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 44th Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Billy-le-Grand (French IV Army)</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td>Fr. XXXII Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., 44th Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Dannemarie</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn., 44th Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Louvercy</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 51st Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Domevre-en-Haye</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., 51st Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Griscourt</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bty D, 53d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Dieulouard</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., 57th Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Lagney</td>
<td>Toul</td>
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</table>

Attached Div. in Toul sector.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PRESENT LOCATION</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>ARTILLERY TROOPS</strong></td>
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<td>Artillery: Cont'd.</td>
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<td>2d Bn., 42d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Champenoux</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>First Army Arty. Park</td>
<td>Limoges</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>59th Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>18th Area</td>
<td>18th Area</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>65th Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Limoges</td>
<td>18th Area</td>
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<td><strong>ENGINEERS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>23d Engrs., Truck Co. No. 3</td>
<td>Le Havre</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>30th Engrs., Co. C</td>
<td>Lagney</td>
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<tr>
<td>30th Engrs., 1st Bn., Hq. and Co. D.</td>
<td>La Ferte region</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>37th Engrs., Reg. Hq. and Co. E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>27th Engrs., Reg. Hq. and Co. B.</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>SIGNAL</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>319th Field Signal Bn.</td>
<td>La Ferte region</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>411th Telegraph Bn.</td>
<td>La Ferte region</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>401st Telegraph Bn.</td>
<td>S. O. S.</td>
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<td><strong>SANITARY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Evacuation Amb. Cos. 1 and 6</td>
<td>La Ferte region</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evacuation Hosps. 6, 7 and 8</td>
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<td>Mobile Hosps. 1 and 3</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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<td>Amb. Co. 108, personnel (27th Div.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aviation Hq., Air Service, First Army 1st Pursuit Wing</td>
<td>La Ferte region</td>
<td>To be assnd by First Army at La Ferte-sous Jouarre are to be ordered to First Army destinations by it when needed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Pursuit Group: 27th, 94th, 95th and 147th Aero Squadrons</td>
<td>La Ferte Region</td>
<td>To be assnd by First Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flight C, 648th Aero Sqdn.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>474th Aero Sqdn. (Construction)</td>
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<td>&quot;</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2d Pursuit Group:</strong> 13th, 49th, and 139th Aero Sqdns.</td>
<td>Toul</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3d Pursuit Group:</strong> 93d, 103d and 213th Aero Sqdns.</td>
<td>Vaucouleurs</td>
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<tr>
<td>91st Aero Sqdn. (Army Observ.)</td>
<td>Gondreville</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>101st Photo Section</td>
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<tr>
<td>96th Day Bombardment Sqdn.</td>
<td>Amanty</td>
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</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PRESENT LOCATION</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>183d Sqn. (park) less 1 flight</td>
<td>La Ferte region</td>
<td>To be assnd by First Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>218th Aero Squadron (park)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**I CORPS TROOPS**

I Corps Headquarters  La Ferte region  Saizerais-Liverdun

Cavalry:
- Troops A and C, 2d Cav.  "  18th Area

Artillery:
- Hq. 66th FA Brig.  "  "  "
- 146th FA  "  "  "
- 148th FA  "  "  "
- 1st Trench Mortar Bn.  "  "  "
- Btry. B, 1st AA Bn. (CAC)  "  "  "
- Btry. C, 1st AA Bn. (CAC)  Martincourt  "

Artillery:
- 1st AAMG Bn. (less Co. A)  La Ferte region  18th Area
- Co. A, 1st AA MG Bn.  Langres  "
- II Corps Arty. Park less personnel formerly in La Ferte region  Base Port  Neufchateau
- Personnel of II Corps Arty. Park formerly in La Ferte region  La Ferte region  18th Area

Engineers:
- Det. 1st Bn., 29th Engrs. (Attached to I Corps)  La Ferte region  "

Signal:
- 322d Field Signal Bn.  "  "  "
- 406th Telegraph Bn.  "  "  "
- 6 Mobile Pigeon Lofts  "  "  "

Sanitary:
- 161st, 162d and 163d F. Hosps.  "  "  "
- 163d Amb. Co.  "  "  "

Trains:
- 413th Motor Supply Train  Base Ports  "
- Mobile Vet. Hosp. No. 1  En route to I Corps  "

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LIST OF TROOPS ASSIGNED TO FIRST ARMY - CONT’D

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PRESENT LOCATION</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aviation:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq. Air Service, I Corps</td>
<td>La Ferte region</td>
<td>To be assnd</td>
<td>Aviation units at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre are to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by First Army</td>
<td>First Army Destinations by it when needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Aero Squadron (Observa.)</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>12th Aero Squadron (Observa.)</td>
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<td>648th Aero Squadron (Observa.)</td>
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<td>Photo Sect. No. 1</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>Balloon Wing Co. A</td>
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<td>Balloon Co. 1</td>
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<td>Balloon Co. 2</td>
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**IV CORPS TROOPS**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>IV Headquarters</th>
<th>Toul</th>
<th>Toul</th>
<th>Temporarily attached to French XXXII Corps</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry:</td>
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<tr>
<td>51st Pioneer Inf.</td>
<td>En route to Toul</td>
<td>Toul</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cavalry:</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 troops, 2d Cavalry</td>
<td>S. O. S.</td>
<td>2d Area</td>
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<td>Signal:</td>
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<td>405th Telegraph Bn.</td>
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<td>Aviation:</td>
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<td>8th Aero Squadron (Observa.)</td>
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<td>50th Aero Squadron (Observa.)</td>
<td>Amanty</td>
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<tr>
<td>90th Aero Squadron (Observa.)</td>
<td>Ourches</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>135th Aero Squadron (Observa.)</td>
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<td>106th Photo Section</td>
<td>Ourches</td>
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<td>Balloon Wing, Co. B</td>
<td>Toul</td>
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<tr>
<td>3d Balloon Co.</td>
<td>Brouvville</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th Balloon Co.</td>
<td>Raulecourt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Balloon Co.</td>
<td>Domevre-en-Haye</td>
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<tr>
<td>7th Balloon Co.</td>
<td>Griscourt</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th Balloon Co.</td>
<td>Menil-la-Tour</td>
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<td>9th Balloon Co.</td>
<td>Boucq</td>
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<tr>
<td>43d Balloon Co.</td>
<td>En route from</td>
<td>to be assnd.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Souge</td>
<td>by IV Corps</td>
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<td>69th Balloon Co.</td>
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<td>DIVISIONS</td>
<td>PRESENT LOCATION</td>
<td>DESTINATION</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>Saizerais sector</td>
<td>5th Area</td>
<td>To be relieved by 90th Division which begins move on Aug. 17.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2d</td>
<td>Marbache sector</td>
<td>6th Area</td>
<td>To be relieved by 82d Division which begins movement on Aug. 16.</td>
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<td>3d</td>
<td>En route</td>
<td>1st Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>Region Chateau-Thierry</td>
<td>4th Area</td>
<td>Move ordered to begin Aug. 18</td>
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<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>St-Die sector</td>
<td>Arches Area</td>
<td>Being relieved</td>
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<tr>
<td>26th</td>
<td>En route</td>
<td>12th Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>33d*</td>
<td>Region Amiens</td>
<td>20th Area</td>
<td>Movement depends on order from Allied C-in-C</td>
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<tr>
<td>35th*</td>
<td>Vosges sector</td>
<td>As desired</td>
<td>Cannot be relieved until about Aug. 31</td>
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<td>42d</td>
<td>Region Chateau-Thierry</td>
<td>3d Area</td>
<td>Move begins Aug. 17</td>
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<tr>
<td>78th*</td>
<td>Region St-Pol</td>
<td>11th Area</td>
<td>Movement depends on order Allied C-in-C</td>
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<tr>
<td>80th*</td>
<td>Region British Front</td>
<td>14th Area</td>
<td>Movement depends on order from Allied C-in-C</td>
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<td>82d</td>
<td>Region Toul</td>
<td>Marbache sector</td>
<td>Moves Aug. 16 to relieve 2d Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>89th*</td>
<td>Lucey sector</td>
<td>Lucey sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>90th*</td>
<td>14th Area</td>
<td>Saizerais sector</td>
<td>Moves on Aug. 17 to relieve 1st Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>79th*</td>
<td>10th Area</td>
<td>10th Area</td>
<td>Training now incomplete but should be available for operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st*</td>
<td>8th Area</td>
<td>8th Area</td>
<td>Training incomplete but should be available for operations</td>
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</table>

* Less artillery. The artillery brigades of the 78th and 30th Divisions have been ordered to Toul. The brigade of the 78th Division is intended to relieve the artillery of the 1st Division. The artillery brigade of the 30th Division may be used as the First Army may arrange. Depending on equipment and transportation it is hoped to begin the movement of the artillery brigade of the 33d Division to the Toul region beginning about August 21. This move will be ordered by G-3, G. H. Q.
List of S. O. S. and miscellaneous units, not combatant, shown by G-3 records as located in Toul region

Azerailles

Railhead Det.
305 Labor Bn. Co. D.

Boucq

QM Labor Co. 304

Gerard-Sas

23d Engrs. Co. B (less Det.) (Roads)
Truck Co. 2

Ligne

Det. Truck Co. 2
23d Engrs. (Roads) Det.

Leonval

23d Engrs. Wagon Co. 2

Menil-la-Tour

QM Supply Co. 305
QM Supply Co. 304
Sales Comsy. 5
Salvage Squad 4
Motor Supply Repair Shop 1
21st Engrs. Co. E (Light Ry.)
Truck Co. 2
Wagon Co. 2
23d Engrs. (Roads), Co. B less Det. Wagon Co. 2
37th Engrs. (Elec.-Mech) Hq. 1st Bn. and Co. A
Evac. Hosp. 1
Evac. Prov. Amb. Co. 1
508th Engrs. (Service Bn.), Co. C less Det.

Nancy

Laundry Depot
Provisional Laundry Unit
Machine Shop Truck Unit 317
Foden Disinfecting Unit 4

Pagny-sur-Meuse

2d Cav., Troop M
List of S. O. S. and miscellaneous units, not combatant, shown by G-3 records as located in Toul region - Cont'd

Rangeval

23d Engrs., Hq. 1st Bn.
23d Engrs., Wagon Co. 1

Sanzey

23d Engrs. (Roads) Hq. and Hq. Co.

Sorcy

28th Engrs. (Quarry) Hq. 1st Bn. and Det. Co. A and B
Railhead Det.
304th Labor Co.
Camouflage Det.
Base Hosp. 39

Toul

Railhead Det.
Hq. First Army Radio S. C. less Det.
Hq. 1st Pursuit Org. Center
306th Labor Bn. (Co. A)
Labor Bureau Co. 102
Labor Co. 304
Mobile Vet. Sec. 101
Evac. Hosp. 1
Butchery Co. 310, less Det.
Radio Intel. Sec.
Motor Transport Repair Shop
Salvage Det.

Trondes

28th Engrs. (Quarry) Co. B
40th Engrs. (Camouflage) Det.

Vertuzey


Void

Advance Unit, Army Ord. Depot
Troops in the Zone of the First Army

ARMY TROOPS

30th Engineers - (Gas and Flame) Cos. B and D (Le Bourget)
23d Engineers - (Road) - Co. A - to join army at once
37th Engineers - (Elect. and Mech.) Co. B, or C or D - to join army at once
26th Engineers - (Water Supply) - Co. A - to join army at once
411th Telegraph Battalion - under orders to move
319th Field Signal Bn. - under orders to move
Evacuation Hospitals Nos. 5 and 7
Evacuation Hospital No. 6 under orders to move
41st Ambulance Co. under orders to move
41st Field Hospital Co. under orders to move
120th Ambulance Co. under orders to move to Coulommiers - Evac. Hosp. 7
120th Field Hosp. Co. under orders to American Red Cross Hosp. Jouy-sur-Morin
Evacuation Ambulance Cos. 5, 6, 7, 8 - to join army, after receiving trucks at La Pallice

CORPS TROOPS

I Corps:

1st Pioneer Infantry - to join corps at once (present plan contemplates detaching one battalion for III Corps when latter enters line as such)
146th FA - Iverny
148th FA - Coulommiers
31st Arty. Brig. Hq. )
55th Arty. ) under orders to join I Corps
56th Arty. )
1st Trench Mortar Battery - Germigny-l'Eveque
I Corps Artillery Park - La Ferte-sous-Jouarre
406th Telegraph Bn. - La Ferte-sous-Jouarre
322d Field Signal Bn. - Ru-de-Vrou [sic]
Pigeon Det. - 2 Mobile Lofts - La Ferte
1st and 12th Aero Squadron (Observation) - Francheville
27th, 94th, 95th and 147th Aero Squad. (Pursuit) - Saints
648th Aero. Squad Flights B and C (Park Cos.) - Courtelain
Cos. 1 and 2, 2d Balloon Squad - Ferme Moras and Francheville
308th Engineers
40th Engineers (Camouflage)
2d Cav. - Troops A and C - under orders to join corps
162d FH Co. - under orders to join corps
163d Amb. Co. - under orders to join corps
27th Engineers, Cos. B and C
I Corps AA, MG Bn., less 1 co.

III Corps:

308th Field Signal Bn.
52d Telegraph Bn. - under orders to join corps
88th Aero Squadron (Observation)
1 troop cavalry - under orders
330th Amb. Co.
330th FH Co.

---
### Additions to List of Troops Assigned to First Army

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Chaumont, August 16, 1918.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>PRESENT LOCATION</th>
<th>DESTINATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flash Regt. Sec. No. 2</td>
<td>Langres</td>
<td>Menil-la Tour</td>
<td>Ordered by rail August 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound Regt. Sec. No. 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq. 32 Arty. Brig. CAC</td>
<td>La Courtine</td>
<td>18th Area</td>
<td>Ordered Aug. 17 to move Aug. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th FA Brig., 108th Ammunition Tn. and Mobile Replacement Shop</td>
<td>Valdahon</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td>Ordered Aug. 17 to move by Aug. 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation Ambulance Cos. 7 and 8</td>
<td>Paris Group</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered Aug. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation Hospital Co. 3</td>
<td>Paris Group</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered Aug. 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Regt. Sec. No. 1</td>
<td>Paris Group</td>
<td>Menil-la-Tour</td>
<td>Ordered by rail August 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sound Regt. Sec. No. 2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Hospital No. 41</td>
<td>Paris Group</td>
<td>Sorcy</td>
<td>Ordered overland August 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance Co. 41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Veterinary Unit</td>
<td>Paris Group</td>
<td>Neufchateau</td>
<td>Ordered by rail August 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>477th and 474th Aero Squad (Constr.)</td>
<td>Advance Section, S. O. S.</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered (now present) Aug. 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99th and 104th Aero Squads</td>
<td>VII Corps</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered overland Aug. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photo Section No. 5</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>111th Engineers and Train</td>
<td>36th Div.</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered (disposition First Army) August 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36th Division</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Hosp. and Ambulance Co. 44</td>
<td>Base ports</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered (G-4), August 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evacuation Hosp. 12, 13, 14, and 9</td>
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<tr>
<td>55th Telegraph Bn.</td>
<td>VII Corps</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered (disposition First Army) August 22</td>
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<td>UNIT</td>
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<td>REMARKS</td>
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<tr>
<td>462d, 484th, 495th and 463d Aero Squads. (Constr.) temp. dy.</td>
<td>Advance Section, SOS</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered (disposition First Army) August 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>22d and 28th Aero Squads (Pursuit)</td>
<td>Advance Sector SOS</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered (disposition First Army) August 22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobile Hospital No. 2</td>
<td>Paris Group</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered Toul Aug. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th Signal Bn.</td>
<td>85th Div.</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambulance Cos. (Bn. Div.) 132d, 310th, 318th, Field Hospital 117</td>
<td>Fargo Billet [sic] etc.</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered First Army August 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cos. E and F, 1st Gas and Flame Regiment</td>
<td>Fas field</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered (disposition First Army) August 24</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Balloon Cos.</td>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Toul</td>
<td>Ordered Toul Sept. 1-Aug. 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>317th Field Signal Bn.</td>
<td>II Corps Sch.</td>
<td>Ligny</td>
<td>Ordered V Corps August 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation Hosps. 10 and 11 (after equipment by SOS)</td>
<td>Base port</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered First Army Aug. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bn. Hq. 2d Bn., 37th Engrs.</td>
<td>SOS (Is-sur-Tille)</td>
<td>Void</td>
<td>Ordered G-4 Aug. 26-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58th Arty. CAC</td>
<td>La Courtine</td>
<td>18th Area</td>
<td>Ordered G-3, Aug. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Corps (attached First Army)</td>
<td>No change</td>
<td>Bourbonne-les-Bains</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Aero Squad</td>
<td>Advance Section, SOS</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E and F Cos., 26th Engrs.</td>
<td>Base ports on arrival</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-4 Aug. 26</td>
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<tr>
<td>414th Motor Supply train</td>
<td>Base ports on arrival</td>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>Ordered G-4 July 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>415th Motor Supply Train</td>
<td>Base ports on arrival</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-4 Aug. 27</td>
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<table>
<thead>
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<th>REMARKS</th>
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<tr>
<td>418th Motor Troop Transport Train</td>
<td>Base ports on arrival</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-4 Aug. 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 platoons, Co. A, 56th Engrs. (Searchlight)</td>
<td>Colombey and Mont-Valerien</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug. 28</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 platoons, Co. D, 56th Engrs. (Searchlight)</td>
<td>Is-sur-Tille</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug. 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Artillery, CAC</td>
<td>Souge</td>
<td>First Army 18th Area</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug. 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57th Artillery, CAC less 2d Bn.</td>
<td>Souge</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Sept. 6 Aug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balloons Cos. 10, 11, 12, 42</td>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Toul, First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balloon Wing Co. C</td>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>Toul, First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Hospital No. 4</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Aug. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. B, 56th Engrs.</td>
<td>Creil</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Ordered G-3 Sept. 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn. (C and D) 52d Arty., CAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>C. G. Army Arty. as per letter to G-4, Aug. 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53d Arty. CAC (less Btr. D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>C. G., Army Arty. as per letter to G-4, Aug. 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Bn. and Btry B, 43d Arty. CAC</td>
<td></td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>C. G., Army Arty. as per letter to G-4, Aug. 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation Ambulance Cos. 15 and 16</td>
<td>Base ports, via SOS</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Telegram G-4, Sept. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIT</td>
<td>PRESENT LOCATION</td>
<td>DESTINATION</td>
<td>REMARKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co. A, 2d AA, MG Bn.</td>
<td>Langres</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>C. of A, First Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Engineers (Railway,</td>
<td>SOS</td>
<td>First Army</td>
<td>Telegram G-4,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 battalions)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

191-32.15: Memorandum

**First Army Assumes Command of Troops in its Area**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

*Neufchateau, August 17, 1918.*

1. The First Army assumes command of the American troops in this area tomorrow morning, the 18th instant.
2. The troops concerned are:
   - Army troops of the First Army
   - I Corps, consisting of corps troops, and the 5th, 82d, 90th, 42d Divisions
   - IV Corps, consisting of corps troops, and the 1st, 2d, 4th, 89th, 37th Divisions
   - V Corps, consisting of corps troops, and the 3d, 33d, 35th, 78th, 26th and 80th Divisions
   - VI Corps, consisting of 79th and 91st Divisions
3. A complete order of battle will be furnished by G-1 when completed.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff,
G-3.

191-30.8: Study

**Analysis of German Defensive System in St-Mihiel Salient**

[August 18, 1918.]

[Extract]

1. Between Damloup (northeast of Verdun) and Les Eparges, about 17 kilometers, the enemy holds a line at the foot of a high, wooded bluff which is occupied by the Allies. This bluff, some 300 to 500 feet in height, commands the low ground in the plain to the northeast held by the enemy.
2. Between Les Eparges and Apremont, about 30 kilometers, the enemy holds a section of the high wooded bluff mentioned above.

3. Between Apremont and Norroy (north of Pont-a-Mousson), about 32 kilometers, the enemy holds a line between the high bluff mentioned above and the Moselle. At its western end this section of the hostile line is supported by Le Mont [Loupmont] and Montsec, two high, narrow mountains. At its eastern end it runs through the broken wooded country near the Moselle. At its central part it is supported by the mass of woods of which Bois de Mort [-Mare] forms a part.

4. Between Les Eparges and Norroy the hostile line forms an acute salient, the point of which contains St-Mihiel. At about the center of the base of this salient is Etang (lake) de Lachaussee and mass of woods to the west. Farther to the south is the mass of woods of which Bois de Thiaucourt forms a part, and farther south still is the mass of woods of which Bois de Gargantua is a part. This section of the salient is low, contains numerous lakes, and in the rainy season which begins about the middle of September is more or less impassable. For a single attack against either flank of the salient, these woods and lakes and the marshy ground form a formidable barrier to prevent the attack against both flanks of the salient, they form a formidable obstacle for the withdrawal of the hostile garrison holding the salient, and further make hostile counterattack against the points of penetration which cut off the salient, very difficult.

5. The enemy has held this ground for a long time and has strongly fortified it • • •

Attention is called to the following:
(a) There is a large amount of wire entanglement some of which is no doubt strong, heavy wire.
(b) About two kilometers in rear of the first line along the entire front is an intermediate position, which protects a great part of the hostile artillery and which will permit this hostile artillery to continue its action safely until this position is captured. This position may also be used temporarily at least as a main line of resistance.
(c) Extending from Etain southeast through Dampvitoux to Pagny-sur-Moselle is what is commonly called the Hindenburg Line. Between Etain and Pareid and between Rembercourt and the Moselle it serves as a second hostile position. Between Pareid and Rembercourt it serves as a withdrawal position for the evacuation of the salient.
(d) The southern face of the salient contains a second position extending from Rembercourt southwest through Nonsard to Senonville on the west face of the salient.
(e) The northern face apparently contains no second position. The enemy apparently relies on the Foret de la Montagne which is a strong natural barrier and which has probably been strongly fortified for holding this section of the salient until it can be evacuated or time gained for counterattack to gain lost ground. These woods are located on the high bluff (300 to 500 feet) commanding the plain to the northeast and making a movement from les Eparges towards Etang de Lachaussee difficult until these woods are captured or its garrison neutralized. The enemy has placed a further barrier to a movement from Les Eparges towards Etang de Lachaussee by extending the first line of the position from Les Eparges northeast to connect with the Hindenburg Line at Pareid.

Thus the enemy, in addition to his front and intermediate lines, has two barriers to our closing the neck of the salient; one, a second line position in rear of the southern face; the other, the strong commanding barrier formed by Foret de la Montagne. For a single attack from either flank, the barrier of lakes and woods mentioned in Par. 4, above, would serve as an additional barrier.

6. For enemy’s supply system, railroads, roads, communications, depots, etc., • • •

Attention is called to the following:
(a) Railroad centers of Metz and Conflans.
(b) Railroad line running south from Conflans through Chambley and Waville to Arnaville where it connects with railroad in the Moselle Valley from Metz.
(c) The communications into the salient of which St-Maurice---Woel---Vigneulles---St-Benoit---Thiaucourt---Pannes---Heudicourt and Chaillon are centers.
LAMARCHE-VIGNEULLES AREA
Looking southeast from east edge of Hattonchatel
7. The hostile garrison occupying the front under consideration seems to be at present approximately as follows:
   From about two kilometers southeast of Damloup to about two kilometers north of Les Eparges, one division.
   From the latter point to about three kilometers southwest of Les Eparges, one division. (Note the short section of line held by this division.)
   From the latter point around salient to four kilometers east of Apremont, 3 divisions.
   From the latter point to the Moselle, 3 divisions.
   One division in local reserve.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Flr. 1078: Letter

Taking over of Command in the Toul Region

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
August 18, 1918.

From: The Commander-in-Chief
To: The Chief, French Mission

1. In accordance with plans already agreed upon, it is suggested that the American I Army Corps assume command of the Saizerais and Marbache sectors on August 22. It is suggested that the American IV Army Corps assume command of the sector now occupied by the 89th Division, on August 20.

2. May I ask that you will please make the necessary arrangements with the French authorities.

By direction:

DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

191-32.13: Orders

Headquarters V Army Corps Moved

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 42
FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF G-3,
Neufchateau, August 19, 1918.

The Headquarters, V Army Corps, will proceed overland to Ligny-en-Barrois for station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
Transfer of I Corps Headquarters

G-3
SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 44

Headquarters, I Army Corps, will proceed overland to Saizerais for station. On arrival at their new station these headquarters will be notified of suitable locations for I Corps troops.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

---------

Organization of V and VI Army Corps

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 136

[Extract]

I. Major General Joseph T. Dickman, U. S. A., is relieved from command of the 3d Division, and is temporarily assigned to the command of the IV Army Corps, A. E. F. Major General Dickman will proceed to join that command. The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

II. 1. The V and VI Army Corps, A. E. F., will be organized as hereinafter indicated.

2. The divisions pertaining to each corps are those which have already been designated in confidential instructions, with such changes as may from time to time be communicated to army and corps commanders and others specially concerned.

Similarly, the corps troops for each corps will be designated later in confidential instructions.

3. (a) V Army Corps
   Headquarters
   Chief of Staff: Brig. Gen. Wilson B. Burtt, U. S. A.

   * * * * *

   (b) VI Army Corps
   Headquarters
   Commander: Major Gen. Omar Bundy, U. S. A. (temporary)
   Chief of Staff: Col. Briant H. Wells, G. S.

   * * * * *
III. Major Gen. William M. Wright, U. S. A., is temporarily assigned to the command of the VII Army Corps, A. E. F. and will proceed to join that command. The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

---------

First Army Gen. File 333: Memorandum

**Chemical Warfare Parks, First Army**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Neufchateau, August 19, 1918.

Memorandum for Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, First Army:

[Extract]

1. It is desired that you take steps to place Army Chemical Warfare Parks, with competent personnel to operate same, at Les Monthairons and at Toul. This personnel will take station at the earliest practicable date, and not later than August 21. It has been directed that all supplies for these parks will be en route by August 21. • • •

• • • • •

By direction:

J. L. DeWITT,
A. C. of S., G-4.

---------

I Corps, Gen. File: Fldr. 290: Letter

**I and IV Corps to Assume Command of Sectors**

3d Section, General Staff
No. 9485/3

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION,
WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 19, 1918.

The Chief of the French Military Mission with the American Army

To the Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, G-3

I have the honor to inform you that, in accordance with the agreement concluded with your staff, the Commander-in-Chief has given orders to the French Group of Armies of the East and to the French Eight Army for the American IV Army Corps to assume command on
August 20 of the sector held by the American 89th Division [Lucey section] and American I Army Corps to assume command of the sector held by the American 1st and 2d Divisions (Satzerais-Marbache) on August 22.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief, 3d Section.

---

HS Fr. Files: 448-30.3: Report of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 4184/3

FRENCH XXXII ARMY CORPS,
August 19, 1918.

From 4 p. m., August 18 to 4 p. m., August 19, 1918

[Extract]

Miscellaneous: The General commanding the American 82d Division assumed command of the Marbache sector at 8 a. m., August 19.

PASSAGA,
General Commanding XXXII A. C.

---

HS Fr. Files: 418-30.1: Station List

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 6685

FRENCH EIGHT ARMY,
August 20, 1918.

Locations of Hq. of Corps and Divisions on August 20, 1918

[Extract]

French XXXII A. C.
Toul

[American 1st Div. Satzerais
[American 2d Div. Colombey-les-Belles
[American 82d Div. Marbache
[American 90th Div. Gondreville
Assignment of Field Artillery Brigades

G-3  
CORRECTED COPY

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 47

The 58th Field Artillery Brigade is attached to the IV Corps and will be reported to the commanding general for temporary duty as corps artillery. This assignment will involve no change of station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 48

The 66th Field Artillery Brigade is detached from the I Corps and assigned as army artillery, under the orders of the Chief of Artillery, First Army. This assignment will involve no change of station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
**Disposition of Field Artillery Brigades**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Neufchâteau, August 20, 1918.

1. Artillery, 33d [58th Field Artillery Brigade] Division, goes to Toul to be held in that vicinity.
2. Artillery, 78th [153 Field Artillery Brigade] Division, arrived night 19th at Toul to relieve artillery of 1st Division.

R. McCleave,
Colonel, General Staff,
G-3.

---

**French Artillery Placed at Disposal of American Army**

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 9508/3

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION
WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 20, 1918.

To the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces, G-3

[Extract]

I have the honor to inform you that the Commander-in-Chief has given the following orders:
1. There is placed at the disposition of the American First Army:
   - the 160th Regt. of foot artillery (16 batteries)
   - the 182d Regt. of heavy artillery (12 batteries)
   - the 163d Regt. of heavy artillery (12 batteries)

The transportation of these units will be by railroad and will commence on August 22.

* * * * *

(a) The following units will move by marching beginning August 21 to the territory of the American First Army (region of Toul-Vaucouleurs) where they will remain until further orders at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief.
   - 456th Regt. of heavy artillery (105's) coming from Dampierre-le-Chateau.
   - 317th Regt. of heavy artillery (155 Hows.) coming from Somme-Vesle.

* * * * *

By order:

LEMAIRE,
Chief of the 3d Bureau.
Toul Zone Divided between American I and IV Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 4191/3

FRENCH XXXII ARMY CORPS,
August 20, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 143

[Extract]

By order of French General Headquarters the defensive zone of Toul will be divided between the American I and IV Corps. The General commanding the American IV Corps will assume command of the sector held by the American 89th Division at 3 p.m., August 20.

Hq.: Toul

The General commanding the American I Corps will assume command of the sectors held at the present time by the American 1st and 82d Divisions at 3 p.m., August 22.

Hq.: Saizerais

The boundary between the two American corps will be the boundary between the American 89th and 1st Divisions.

All formations belonging to the American 1st and 82d Divisions, now stationed in the zone of the American IV Corps and at Toul will be kept in place until further orders.

Hq. of the French XXXII Army Corps and the nondivisional units of the XXXII Corps will be withdrawn from the defensive zone of Toul and will relieve the headquarters and nondivisional units of the French XVI Army Corps on August 22.

The General commanding the XXXII Corps will assume command of the Essey Zone at 8 a.m., August 25.

* * * * *

The Colonel commanding the American 51st Pioneer Regiment will relieve, at Pagny, the Colonel commanding the French 63d Terr. Inf. Regt. and will assume command of the barrier position in the Lucey sector.

* * * * *

Hq. of the American 1st Div. will evacuate Saizerais before 3 p.m., August 21.

The General, the Chief of Staff, and a reduced initial echelon, will set up headquarters at Villers-en-Haye, which will begin to function at the same hour on the same date.

The other elements of hq. will be sent to Vaucouleurs on the same day.

Hq. of the American 90th Division will be established on the 24th at Villers-en-Haye, effective at 8 a.m., and will detail an initial echelon with headquarters of the American 1st Division effective on the 21st in order to receive orders of the sector in conformity with Special Orders No. 412 of August 18, 1918.

The battalions of the American 82d Division stationed at Liverdun will evacuate that locality the morning of the 21st and will move as follows:

1 bn. to Camp Neyette
1 bn. to Camp at Vaurot Farm and to Aingeray

PASSAGA,
General Commanding the XXXII Corps.

* * * * *

- 151 -
Assumption of Command

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 4200/3

FRENCH XXXII ARMY CORPS,
August 20, 1918.

From 4 p. m., August 19 to 4 p. m., August 20, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * *

Miscellaneous: The General commanding the American IV Corps assumed command of the Lucey sector at 3 p. m.

PASSAGA,
General Commanding XXXII A. C.

-----------

First Army: Orders

Announcement of Chief of Tank Corps

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 9

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Neufchateau, August 21, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Brigadier General S. D. Rockenbach, U. S. A., Chief of Tank Corps, having reported at these headquarters for temporary duty is announced as Chief of Tank Corps, First Army, A. E. F. (temporary).

* * * * *

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

--------
From 4 p. m., August 21 to 4 p. m., August 22, 1918

[Extract]

Miscellaneous: The General commanding the American I Corps assumed command of the Marbache and Saizerais sectors at 3 p. m. on the 22d.

PASSAGA,
General Commanding the XXXII A. C.

II Corps Artillery Park Station

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 56

The II Corps Artillery Park is detached from the I Corps and will be reported to the Commanding General, IV Corps, for duty and assignment to station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
**Movement of V Army Corps Headquarters**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,  
Neufchateau, August 23, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR: A. C. of S., G-3, First Army  

[Extract]  
Please take the necessary action in the following points:  
Headquarters V Corps to be ordered to move on the 25th instant to Benoltevaux where its headquarters will be established.

* * * * *

H. A. DRUM,  
Chief of Staff.

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**French Artillery to First Army**

GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
Provins, August 23, 1918.

From: General commanding the Armies of the North and Northeast  
To: General Staff: Avize, Mirecourt, Chaumont  

[Extract]  
The 212th and 228th Regiments of 75's, carried on motor trucks, will proceed to the territory of the American First Army in the region of Toul-Vaucouleurs. The 48th Regiment will remain until further orders in reserve at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

* * * * *

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French Artillery Attached to IV Corps

FIRST ARMY ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Neufchateau, August 23, 1918.

From: Chief of Artillery, First Army, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, IV Army Corps, A. E. F.

1. Upon my recommendation, the following letter, I am informed by the Chief of Staff First Army, was sent you yesterday:

1. The following units of the French field artillery are now en route, or shortly will be, to the area occupied by your corps:

   5 regiments (numbers unknown), each containing 9
   batteries 75-mm. guns
   320th Artillery, 9 batteries 155-mm. C
   160th Foot Artillery (R. A. P.), containing 6 batteries 155-mm. C.
   8 " 120-mm.
   2 " 220-mm. H.

454th Artillery, 9 batteries 105-mm.
456th Artillery, 9 batteries 105-mm., left Dampierre-le-Chateau, by marching, August 21, 1918

All the foregoing units are complete with necessary staffs.

2. The army commander desires that you assume command of the above organizations as soon as they arrive in your area and that you provide quarters and supplies for them.

3. The army commander further desires that proper reconnaissances be made with a view to placing all these French units, as well as those of your own corps, in emplacements as soon as possible. Great care will, of course, be taken to assure secrecy as to arrival and completion of positions.

2. The following similar letter was sent to the Commanding General, I Army Corps:

1. The following units of the French field artillery are now en route, or shortly will be, to the area occupied by your corps:

   3 regiments (numbers unknown), motorized, each containing
   9 batteries 75-mm. guns.
   317th Artillery, 9 batteries 155-mm. C, left Somme-Vesle
   by marching, August 21, 1918.
   416th Artillery, 9 batteries 155-mm. L.
   163d and 182d Foot Artillery (R. A. P.), each containing
   2 batteries 155-mm. C., 8 batteries 120-mm., 2 batteries
   220-mm. C.
   451st Artillery, 9 batteries 105 mm.
   2d Battalion, 342d Heavy Artillery (R. A. L.), 3 batteries
   155-mm. C.; now at Toul.
   1 battery 6th Foot Artillery (R. A. P.), now at Toul serving
   1 battalion 155-mm. C., and 2 batteries 120-mm.
2. The army commander desires that you assume command of those troops now at Toul and of the remaining organization listed above as soon as they arrive in your area and that you provide quarters and supplies for them.

3. The army commander further desires that proper reconnaissances be made with a view to placing all these French units, as well as those of your corps, in emplacements as soon as possible. Great care will, of course, be taken to assure secrecy as to arrival and occupation of positions.

4. The French authorities have been requested to direct these units upon the most convenient points for service with your corps, advising us as to the location of such points and exact date of arrival.

5. The regiments appearing as the 163d and 182d in paragraph 2, should perhaps be the 168th and 183d, French information on the subject having been at fault.

6. The Chief of Staff desires me to inform you as above with a view of facilitating the disposition of these units upon arrival.

E. F. McLACHLIN, Jr.
Major General, N. A.

181-33.1: Operation Report

From noon, Aug. 24, to noon, Aug. 24, 1918

[Extract]

5. The sector was held by the 1st and 82d Divisions; each with 4 regiments in the line. Infantry of the 1st Division had been largely relieved by the 90th Division. There was no activity.

6. No changes occurred. Relief of the 1st Division Infantry, was completed during the night and the C. G., 90th Division, took command of the left sector at 8 a. m., August 24. **

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

--------
Command of French Artillery Units

[Contemporary Translation]

General Castelnau, Commanding Eastern Armies Group

To Chief of French Mission, American First Army

Answer to points raised on August 21 by Chief of Staff, American First Army, concerning the command of French artillery units remaining in the future sector of this army.

1. As regards artillery attached organically or otherwise to XXXII Corps previous to its relief there shall be no difficulties; it will automatically pass under direct orders of American I and IV Corps, respectively.

2. Army artillery, which the General commanding the Eighth Army has kept at his disposal, shall remain under the orders of the General commanding Eighth Army Artillery until August 30, on which date the General commanding the artillery of the American First Army shall himself take over command from the French artillery commander. Until that date, the General commanding the Eighth Army will be responsible for the defense of the zone occupied by the two American army corps. The regulation of the use and distribution of this army artillery shall be left to his sole command.

3. It would be necessary for the staff of the American First Army to get in touch on this subject with the Eighth Army for the passing over of such units on August 30, as well as for the settlement of all questions which might arise in the execution of the transfer during the present transitory period.

French Aviation Fields

FIELD ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
AIR SERVICE,
Provins, August 24, 1918.

To the Commander of the American Expeditionary Forces, G. H. Q.

Chaumont

[Extract]

The commander of the French Mission has sent me a request relating to French fields and aviation units to be furnished to the American First Army for the operation which has been planned.

This demand was followed up by your letter of August 22, 1918.
I. Aviation Fields: The following aviation fields will be placed at the disposal of the American First Army as you request:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fields</th>
<th>Date on which the field may be occupied by the American First Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saizerais</td>
<td>From the American First Army's entry on the line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gondreville</td>
<td>When Eighth Army has been able to remove the squadrons which are stationed there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toul</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicqueley</td>
<td>From the American First Army's entry on the line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lay-St-Remy</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosieres-en-Blois</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naives-en-Blois</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vavincourt</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumont</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(This field is occupied by the air service of the II Colonial Army Corps. It would be advisable to keep it there.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belrain</td>
<td>As soon as evacuated by the Second Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rembercourt</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulainville</td>
<td>From the American First Army's entrance in the line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soilly</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issoncourt</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behonne</td>
<td>Do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(It is asked that this field be left to the French Pursuit group which will be placed at the disposal of the American First Army.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
II. Air Service Units: The quantities available and the necessities of the battle now in progress do not allow the placing of all the units requested at the disposal of the commander of the American First Army.

The French units which will be placed at his disposal are the following:
(a) 3 observation squadrons, divisional type, that is, one for each American army corps in line.
(b) 3 observation squadrons for the II Colonial Army Corps.
(c) 6 artillery squadrons.
(d) 1 pursuit group.
(e) 6 balloon companies, of which 3 are destined for the II Colonial Army Corps.

These units will be under the orders of the commander of the American First Army as far as their tactical use is concerned.

For supply, personnel and administration they will be attached to the French Second or Eight Army according to a distribution which will be made subsequently.

The air service commanders of the Second and Eight Armies will keep themselves in liaison with the air service commanders of the American First Army and will be especially kept informed by the latter of the movements of the squadrons attached to them.

I also am counting on placing the aerial division or a fraction of that division directly under the orders of the commander of the American First Army as the operations on the rest of the front will permit.

I can plan now upon sending one brigade, the other would follow later if necessary.

The night bombing groups, G. B. 2 and B. B. 18, will be placed at the disposal of the commander of the American First Army for the duration of operations.

The units of the aerial division and the night bombing units will be stationed on the fields of the G. A. E. and G. A. C. They will assure their own supply and administration.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

BUAT.

Project for Movement of Divisions and Artillery to Front

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF G-3,
Neufchateau, Meuse, August 24, 1918.

Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, First Army
(through A. C. of S., G-3)

1. The undersigned have gone over with Col. Watkins this morning the projected movement of divisions and artillery to the front.
2. Assuming that the offensive should start about September 5, we find that the time is so short that any plan that will work should be adopted without delay, for there is not time to wait until a complete meeting of minds can be arranged between the various French and American authorities in regard to all details.
3. The plan as outlined by Col. Watkins, indicates that there is no crossing of routes except
(a) Army artillery in moving from 18th Area crosses a great number of the divisional lines of march. If the army artillery should be ordered to proceed at once to the sectors, this difficulty will be obviated, as it will have crossed the divisional lines of march before the divisions need the roads.
(b) French artillery units ordered into the sectors may cross the lines of march. This condition is not as grave as it seems. Many of their artillery units have already come in; moreover, their 75's are motorized, and other columns of artillery will be short, so that not much delay would be experienced. It would of course be well to know just when these units were coming in and where but it must be accepted as a practical impossibility to obtain this information in time to avoid dangerous delays.

4. The plan as now outlined is a safe plan. While it provides for very little bus or train movement, and requires considerable marching, it gets things started, wastes no time, and the movement can be halted in place, or modified by use of busses or trains almost any time.

5. Recommended:
(a) That the plan so far perfected be adopted and thatCols. Ward and Watkins be directed to proceed along the lines on which they are now working, notifying G-1 and G-4 of the proposed movement, in order that the latter may get up the necessary plans of circulation and assign railheads, etc.
(b) That the army artillery from 18th Area, the animal transportation of the 5th Division, and divisional artillery of 4th Division, and divisional artillery of 5th Division be started at once, and that remaining movement progress as contemplated in the plan.
(c) That necessary march tables, maps, etc., be prepared without delay and furnished to corps commanders.
(d) That especial care be taken in notifying corps commanders of the dates when they may expect the artillery (army, corps, or divisional) so that places may be selected in which to conceal them, and stringent measures against circulation adopted.
(e) That information be obtained from chief of army artillery as to where the French expect to deliver the artillery that is to supply the complement for our divisions that are now without it.
(f) ThatCols. Ward and Watkins be directed to draw up such orders as may be necessary in putting their plan for marching the divisions into execution at once.

W. S. GRANT,
Lt. Colonel, Gen. Staff.

G. C. MARSHALL, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Gen. Staff.
Assignment of French Artillery

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Neufchateau, August 24, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army, A. E. F.
To: Commanding General, V Army Corps, A. E. F. (Attention C. of A.)

[Extract]

1. The following units of French artillery will be, or have been, directed to the area to be occupied by your corps:

3 regiments (designations not known), motorized, each of 3 battalions of 3 batteries, 75-mm.

81st Regt. (Tractor), ---

4 groups (8 btries.) 155 G. P. F.
2 " (4 " ) 145-mm.

286th Regt. (Tractor), ---

3 groups (6 btries.) 220-mm. Hows., T. R.
1 group (2 " ) 220-mm. Hows., A. C. S.
2 groups (4 " ) 280-mm. Hows.

330th Regt. (Horsed), ---

3 groups (9 btries.) 155-mm. C., St. Ch.

417th Regt. (Horsed), ---

3 groups (9 btries.) 155-mm. L.

2. The army commander desires that you assume command of the above organizations as soon as they arrive in your area and that you provide quarters and supplies for them.

* * * * * *

H. A. DRUM,
Colonel, G. S.
Memorandum for the Chief of Artillery, First Army, A. E. F.

The following is the status of the units of the railway artillery reserve:

42d Artillery (CAC) (Colonel McMillin):

- Battery A. 4 24-cm. G's Lachapelle-sous-Rougemont (Belfort)
  - B. 4 24-cm. G's Royaumeix (Meurthe-et-Moselle)
  - C. 4 24-cm. G's Champenoux
  - D. 4 24-cm. G's Hans (Marne)
  - E. 4 24-cm. G's Suippes (Marne)

All batteries to remain in present positions

52d Artillery (CAC) (Colonel Young):

- Battery A. 2 32-cm. Dieue (Meuse)
  - C. 2 32-cm. Haussimont (Marne)
  - D. 2 32-cm. Donmartin-la-Planchette (Marne)
  - E. 2 32-cm. "
  - F. 2 32-cm.

Batteries C and D are to be ordered from Haussimont (Marne) to cpts in vicinity of Domevre. All other batteries to remain in present positions.

53d Artillery (CAC) (Colonel Moore)

- Battery A. 2 400-mm. Haussimont (Marne)
  - C. 2 400-mm. Dieulouard (Meurthe-et-Moselle)
  - E. 4 19-cm. G's (Plat) Haussimont (Marne)
  - F. 4 19-cm. G's (Plat)

Battery A to be ordered to Dieue-sur-Meuse

- C "
  - B " Cousances-aux-Bois
  - " Sommedieue

Batteries E and F to be ordered to Pont-a-Mousson

43d Battery (CAC) (Colonel Kerrick):

- Battery A. 4 19-cm. G's (Plat) Haussimont (Marne)
  - B. 4 19-cm. G's
  - C. 4 19-cm. G's
  - D. 4 19-cm. G's
  - E. -
  - F. -
Battery A to be ordered to Tilly-sur-Meuse
" B " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " " 

ASSUMPTION OF SECTOR COMMAND BY V CORPS

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
Neufchateau, August 25, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army
To: Commanding General, V Corps

[Extract]

1. By direction of the Commander-in-Chief, you will on the 29th instant assume command of such sector of the front as may be assigned you by the Commanding General, Group of Armies of the East (G. A. E.).

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H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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LOCATION OF FRENCH II COLONIAL CORPS

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Neufchateau, August 25, 1918.

Memorandum for A. C. of S., G-2:

Herewith designation and location of the headquarters of the only French corps that is to serve under the command of the American First Army:

II Colonial Corps P. C. at Ernecourt, about 10 kilometers a little south of west of Commercy.

This in reply to your request of even date.

STEPHEN O. FUQUA,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant G-3.

---
First Echelon, First Army, Moves

MEMORANDUM

No. 3

FIRST ECHelon, FIRST ARMY, F. E. F.

OFFICE OF HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT,
Neufchateau, August 25, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In accordance with Memorandum No. 20, Headquarters First Army, dated August 25, 1918, paragraph 12, and by direction of the Chief of Staff, the movement of the first echelon, Headquarters First Army as named and scheduled in Memorandum No. 20, will take place on Tuesday, August 27, 1918, except the chief of artillery section which will move sometime between 8 a. m., August 27 and 8 a. m., August 28, 1918.

* * * * * *

ALLEN POTTS,
Major, Infantry,
Headquarters Commandant.

VI Corps Attachment

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont-en-Bassigny, August 26, 1918.

Commanding General, American VI Army Corps

Number 591 G-3. The VI Corps is hereby attached to the First Army.

By order:

CONNER.

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**Disposition of American Units**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau  
No. 4192  
HEADQUARTERS EASTERN ARMIES GROUP  
August 26, 1918.

For the General commanding the Second Army

[Extract]

1. The territory which the Second Army shall hand over on August 30 to the American First Army shall be occupied from that date by the American V Corps and the II Cavalry Corps (composed of three divisions) both corps under American First Army orders.

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191-32.15: Letter

**44th Coast Artillery Assigned as Army Artillery**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,  
Neufchateau, August 26, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff  
To: Commanding General, IV Corps

1. The army commander directs me to inform you that the 44th Coast Artillery, units of which are commencing to arrive in your corps area, is assigned as army artillery under the orders of the Commanding General, Army Artillery, these headquarters.

H. A. DRUM,  
Chief of Staff.

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ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE FIRST ARMY

Issued by: First Section, G-1, General Staff, First Army

I CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Corps Hq.</td>
<td>Saizerais</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Div.</td>
<td>Colombey-les-Belles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Div.</td>
<td>Area near Arches</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Div.</td>
<td>In sector (in Vosges)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82d Div.</td>
<td>Marbache (in sector</td>
<td>On temporary detached service, under administrative control of VII Corps and tactical control of French Seventh Army, to be relieved about August 31.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>astride Moselle)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Div.</td>
<td>Villers-en-Haye</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(153d Arty. Brig.)</td>
<td>(In sector)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(78th Div. Attach.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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IV CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps Hq.</td>
<td>Toul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Div.</td>
<td>Vaucouleurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6th Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42d Div.</td>
<td>Bourmont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78th Div. (less arty. brig.)</td>
<td>Bourbonne-les-Bains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11th Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th Div. (55th FA Brig. attached includes 105th Am. Tr. and 105th M. Ord. Repair Shop)</td>
<td>In sector Lucey</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
French to Assume Transportation and Placing of Artillery and Ammunition

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
August 27, 1918.

Memorandum for A. C. of S., G-4

The following is an extract from a memorandum received by General Pershing from General Petain, dated 24th instant.

Transportation and placing of artillery and ammunition will be assumed by the French. Movements and transportation have begun August 22. The French undertake to supply the necessary personnel in specialists and labor. The French D. S. A. (Direction du Service Automobile) will also supply the trucks which the American Army will not be in a position to bring to the Woervre sector. The officers of the general staff of artillery and services that are necessary for satisfactory working of liaison and supplies and for the solution of questions of services of the rear have already been sent. General Maurin in charge of A. L. G. P. has left this morning.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
Assignment of Engineer Troops

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 82
Neufchateau, August 27, 1918.

[Extract]

2. Upon arrival in the First Army area, the following engineer troops are assigned and will be reported for duty to the commanding generals of the corps as indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Troop</th>
<th>Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53d Pioneer Infantry (less 1st Bn.)</td>
<td>I Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111th Engineers [36th Division]</td>
<td>I Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Pioneer Infantry</td>
<td>IV Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301st Engineers</td>
<td>IV Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 53d Pioneer Infantry</td>
<td>V Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310th Engineers, Reg. Hq. and 2d Bn.</td>
<td>V Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>602d Engineers, Reg. Hq. and one battalion</td>
<td>V Corps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

General Plan of Concentration

Ligny-en-Barrois, August 29, 1918.

The following information is furnished you:

Note: This plan is based on instructions from Chief of Staff, A. E. F., that we should be prepared to carry out the operation ten days after notice of the date of attack. The plan is therefore made up of two features:

1. The preliminary moves necessary to place the divisions, etc., in positions from which the concentration and attack can be made in ten days, and
2. The method of concentration for the attack.

Northern attack - V Corps consisting of 5 divisions

26th Division: Ordered to move by railroad from Chatillon-sur-Seine, detraining vicinity of Bar-le-Duc and going into the area of Vavincourt. This division should vacate the Vavincourt area not later than September 1 and should enter its sector completely by September 4.

33d Division: Now in the vicinity of Ligny-en-Barrois. Will march directly to sector on date given when the date of operation is known.
80th Division: Now in the 14th Area. Should move by marching at once to the vicinity of Chatillon-sur-Seine where it will entrain very soon and move to an area to the east of St-Dizier. From the area east of St-Dizier it will move to the front by marching on a date to be fixed later.

4th Division: Now in the St-Blin area. Movement of this division to be made as follows: Infantry, etc., by bus, all wheeled transportation by marching. The bus movement should be arranged so that this division will arrive in the Vavincourt area night of September 1/2. All other elements of the division should start at once to march to the Vavincourt area.

3d Division: This division is now in the 1st area, Gondrecourt, and will move by marching at such time as may be designated. Details to be arranged by the Commanding General, V Corps. The artillery of this division may be brought forward earlier.

82d Division: Now in line.

90th Division: Now in line.

Southern Attack, I Corps

5th Division: To be moved night of August 29/30 by bus to the camp of Saffais which is north of Bayon and southwest of Dombasle. The division will remain in this area until ordered forward for the concentration, which movement it will make by marching. The part of the division which does not move by bus should move overland at once from Arches to Saffais.

2d Division: In the 6th Area. Goes forward by marching, date to be fixed later. Artillery going a little in advance.

35th Division: Now in sector in the Vosges. Moves from sector to Remiremont. Moves from Remiremont by train night of September 3/4, to training camp at Saffais. From this point moves forward by marching to reserve corps. The date of this movement to be announced later. Details of the movement to be carried out by corps commander.

IV Corps

89th Division: Now in line.

42d Division: Now in 3d Bourmont Area. To move at once to 2d Area, occupying a concentrated billet and bivouac disposition. The artillery of this division can continue its march forward under direction of the corps commander for the purpose of gradual installation into the front. From the 2d Area this division takes 7 days to reach the line and move will be by marching.

1st Division: Now in 5th Area. Will move forward by marching when date is settled. Artillery can go forward a short time before.

78th Division: Now in 11th Area. Will move to the 3d Area where it will wait for date of attack. It then moves forward by bus. It takes 9 days to move this division from the 3d Area to its position as corps reserve.

Army Reserve

91st Division: Now in the 8th Area. Will move by train, detraining in the vicinity of Gondrecourt, when it will move forward by marching. Detrainment at Gondrecourt should be completed D-3.

79th Division: Now in the 10th Area (Prauthoy). Will move forward by train to vicinity of Vezelise; its detraining at Vezelise should be completed on D-3. From this point it moves forward by marching.

36th Division: Now in the 13th Area. To be moved by train to the Bar-le-Duc---Ligny-en-Barrois Area; movement to be completed night of D-1.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff.
CONCENTRATION FOR
St-MIHIEL OPERATION
27 AUG - 11 SEPT 1918

MAP No 108

- 171 -
First Army Takes over Front from French

FIELD ORDERS
No. 8

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

Ligny-en-Barrois, August 29, 1918—12 p. m.

1. The First Army, A. E. F., will take over command of the front from Port-sur-Seille (W. of Nomeny) on the east to Watronville (S. E. of Verdun) on the west, at 4 p. m., on August 30, 1918, relieving the French Eighth and Second Armies, respectively, of the portions of this front now held by them.

The First Army, A. E. F., will function under the General Headquarters, French Armies of the East and Northeast, in all matters concerning operations; under the Headquarters Group of French Armies of the East in certain matters concerning supply; and under G. H. Q., A. E. F., in all matters concerning administration and in certain matters concerning supply.

2. Troops: The following army corps, now in sector from east to west in the order named, will pass under the command of this army:

I Army Corps, A. E. F.
IV Army Corps, A. E. F.
French II Colonial Corps
V Army Corps, A. E. F.

American I Corps
American IV Corps
French II Colonial Corps
American V Corps

American army troops located within the zone of the First Army, A. E. F., pass under the command of this army for the present and will continue in the discharge of their assigned missions.

3. Zone and Sector Limits: The existing corps sectors and zones remain unchanged.
Each corps will submit to these headquarters on the 30th instant a map showing the limits of its sector and zone and the distribution of troops therein, as well as the position of resistance and subsidiary positions in advance and to the rear thereof included in each corps zone.

4. Plans of Defense: The existing plans of defense will continue in force until further orders.

In case of a serious hostile attack the army commander will immediately place one division at the disposal of the corps commander whose front is threatened, provided a reserve division is not already at the disposal of the corps commander within his corps zone.

Corps commanders will prepare plans for the employment of this reserve division, and arrange for the reconnaissance of the terrain by the interested division commander, his staff and suitable details from his command.

For the present the following divisions are designated for possible employment as corps reserves:

American I Corps
American IV Corps
French II Colonial Corps
American V Corps

American 2d Division
American 1st Division
American 33d Division
American 26th Division

(P. C. Vaucouleurs)
(P. C. Colombey-les-Belles)
(P. C. Tronville)
(P. C. Mussy-sur-Seine)

5. Detailed Arrangements: Chiefs of general staff sections and chiefs of all corps and services, these headquarters, will make the necessary arrangements with the chiefs of the corresponding sections, corps and services of the French Second and Eighth Armies of the transfer of command.
6. Reports: Reports, telephonic, telegraphic, and written will be made to these headquarters as heretofore prescribed by the French Second and Eighth Army commanders, for French units, and by these headquarters for American units.

7. Posts of Command:
   American First Army---1st Echelon, Ligny-en-Barrois
   2d Echelon, Neufchateau
   American I Corps---Saizerais
   American IV Corps---Toul
   French II Colonial Corps---Ernecourt
   American V Corps---Benoitevaux

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.15: Memorandum

Administrative and Tactical Control of French Units

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, August 30, 1918.

1. The following regulations are announced for the tactical and administrative control and for the supply of French units incorporated in the First Army, A. E. F., or placed at its disposal:
   (a) Tactical Control: Under the orders of the army commander for tactical employment or assignment.
   (b) Administrative Control: Under the Commanding General, Group of French Armies of the East. This includes all questions of organization, administration, discipline, and daily service.
   (c) Supply: Under the Commanding General, Group of French Armies of the East. This will function through Major Riegel, French Army (G-4), these headquarters.

2. The territorial command in the army zone will be under the Director General of the Northern Etapes of the Group of French Armies of the East. Questions regarding the advance zone will be adjusted by agreement with Major Riegel, French Army.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Details of Rear Organization

[Contemporary Translation]

4th Bureau, General Staff
No. 6184/4

FRENCH SECOND ARMY,
August 30, 1918.

General Hirschauer, Commanding the French Second Army

To the Commanding General, American First Army

The General Commander-in-Chief of the French Army having requested me, by Telegram No. 2169/CDA of August 29, 1918, to arrange with you with reference to the allotment of the rear organizations situated on the French Second Army territory, I have the honor to propose to you to kindly accept the following modifications fixing the rear organizations which might be utilized by the American Army.

Railheads for Food Supply: The French Second Army will transfer the Dugny Station to the American First Army and will keep Souhesmes Station.

The French Second Army would have, in case of necessity, the right to establish a railhead at once of the Souilly Stations, in case they were not fully utilized by the American Army.

Artillery Yards: The French Second Army will transfer to the American First Army the depot of Lempre (this has already been done) and will retain in exchange the stations of Lemmes (normal gauge and meter gauge) which are indispensable for their food supply and for supply of its artillery depot at Lemmes. So as to avoid all confusion which might result of telegram above mentioned, No. 2169/CDA, it remains well understood that Landrecourt Station remains to the French Second Army.

The artillery tracks of Evres will be used jointly by the French and American Armies.

Engineer Yards: The French Second Army will keep the Station of Haudainville Village belonging to the American Army.

Evacuation Hospitals: The French Second Army will keep the evacuation hospital of Lisle-en-Barrois, having transferred the evacuation hospital at Vaubecourt to the American First Army.

These modifications do not seem likely to me to interfere with the supply and evacuation of the American First Army, as they are actually organized; on the other hand, if they are not accepted, the French Second Army will be (in view of the proposed operation jointly with the American First Army) in a poor situation, not to say an impossible one.

I therefore venture not to doubt that the arrangement on this subject will be rapid and easy between us.

HIRSCHAUER.
Disposition of V Corps Divisions

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, August 31, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army
To: Commanding General, V Army Corps

1. The Commander-in-Chief directs as follows:
   (1) The 26th Division will be concentrated in concealment as far as practicable anywhere in the vicinity of Souilly, under the direction of the Commanding General, V Corps. This division will be considered as a reserve and may be used with authority first received from the Chief of Staff, First Army.
   (2) The 80th Division will continue its movement as planned to the area east of St-Dizier and will remain in that area until further orders.
   (3) The 4th Division will continue its movement to the Vavincourt area, where it will be held awaiting orders.
   (4) It will be distinctly understood that the 33d Division, the 80th Division, 4th Division, and the 3d Division are not to be moved without orders from these headquarters, except as stated above. The orders for the 80th and 4th Divisions have been issued from here.
   (5) No more artillery will be emplaced without orders from these headquarters. All artillery received will be held until further orders, in concealment.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

Employment of 1st and 2d Divisions as Corps Reserves

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, August 31, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff
To: Commanding General, I Corps, A. E. F.
Commanding General IV Corps, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. In connection with F. O. No. 8, these headquarters, and letter of the 30th instant, these headquarters, prescribing the concentration of divisions, army commander directs as follows:
   The 1st Division is hereby placed at the disposal of the commander of the IV Corps for employment as a corps reserve.
The 2d Division is hereby placed at the disposal of the commander of the I Corps for employment as a corps reserve.

The foregoing divisions will be advanced without delay to such positions as corps commanders may deem necessary for the employment of these units as corps reserves.

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H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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First Army, G-3 File 1.1: Fldr. 235: Memo

* * * * *

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Location and Composition of First and Second Echelons

3d Section, G. S.

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, August 31, 1918.

Memorandum for: I, IV, V, VI Corps

[Extract]

1. The 1st Echelon only of First Army Headquarters is situated at Ligny-en-Barrois (Meuse). The 1st Echelon consists of the following sections, departments and technical services of the general staff:

   The Commanding General's Section,
   Chief of Staff Section,
   Secretary, General Staff Section,
   Asst. Chief of Staff Sections G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, G-5,
   Chief of Artillery,
   Chief of Tank Corps,
   Chief of Air Service,
   Chief Signal Officer,
   Message Center,
   Headquarters Commandant,
   French Mission,
   British Mission
   Chief Engineer

2. The 2d Echelon of these headquarters is situated at Neufchateau (Vosges). It includes the remainder of the sections, services and departments of these headquarters as follows:

   Adjutant General
   Inspector General
   Judge Advocate
   Chief Quartermaster
   Chief Surgeon

   Chief M. T. O.
   Chief Ordnance Officer
   Chief Gas Officer
   Provost Marshal

* * * * *

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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- 176 -
Assignment of Air Unit

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 108
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 1, 1918.

1. The First Pursuit Group, consisting of Group Headquarters, 27th, 94th, 95th and 147th Aero Pursuit Squadrons, 218th Aero (Park) Squadron, and Flight C, of 648th Aero Squadron, upon arrival at Remercourt will report to the Chief of Air Service, First Army, for assignment to duty and station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Instruction for Reduction of St-Mihiel Salient

No. 1
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

All preceding instructions from these headquarters for operation against St-Mihiel salient are rescinded,* and following are substituted therefor.

Based on the following instructions, the Commanding Generals, I Corps; IV Corps; French II Colonial Corps; V Corps; and the following officers of the First Army; namely the Chief of Army Artillery; Chief Engineer Officer; Chief of Air Service; Chief Signal Officer; A. C. of S., G-1; A. C. of S., G-2; the Chiefs of Services under A. C. of S., G-4; the Chief of Tank Service; and the Chief of Chemical Warfare Service, will draw up their plans and submit same to the Chief of Staff, First Army, not later than 6 p. m., September 6.

1. General Plan:
   (a) An operation having for its general object the reduction of the St-Mihiel Salient will be made on D day.
   (b) The operation will comprise:
       (1) An attack from the south through the wooded area southeast of Vigneulles.

* Hence, the bulk of the documents on plans issued prior to this date have been omitted.
(2) A follow up attack on the left flank of the southern attack.
(3) An attack between Les Eparges and Seuzey towards Hannonville and Hattonville.
(4) An exploitation and follow up attack on the right flank of the western attack.
(5) Eventual exploitation.
(c) The attack from the south will be delivered by the I and IV Corps and will be divided into four phases:
   (1) The first phase line or intermediate objective is the general objective to which divisions must advance as promptly as possible without waiting for others on their right and left. As it is, the line beyond which the artillery (without moving forward) cannot furnish the necessary rolling barrage in front of the advancing infantry, batteries of light artillery will be quickly advanced so as to give support, if necessary, for the advance beyond this line.
   (2) The first day line is the general objective to which corps must advance as promptly as possible without waiting for corps on their right or left.
   (3) The first phase second day line is the general objective to which the corps will advance under orders from the corps commanders.
   (4) The army objective is an objective to which the corps may be ordered to advance after they have reached the first phase second day line, such advance to be made under orders from the army commander.
   Note: The Exploitation Line to which strong reconnaissances should be pushed after the army objective is reached is shown on map.
(d) The follow up attack on the left flank of the southern attack will be delivered by the French II Colonial Corps and will be executed as follows:
   When the IV Corps on the right of the French II Colonial Corps has made a certain amount of progress, the French II Colonial Corps will advance to the line marked ("First Day (French)"). In conformity with this plan, the French II Colonial Corps will start its advance at H plus 2 hours. On reaching the first day's objective it will push strong patrols into the Bois de Gargantua, and on the second day will advance to the western limit of its sector.
(e) The attack from the west will be delivered by the V Corps and will be divided into two phases:
   (1) The 1st Day Line is the line to which the divisions must advance as rapidly as possible.
   (2) The army objective is the line to which the corps will advance under orders from the army commander.
   Note: The Exploitation Line to which strong reconnaissances should be pushed after the army objective is reached is shown on map.
(f) The exploitation and follow up attack on the right flank of the western attack will be delivered by the French II Colonial Corps and will be executed as follows:
   When the V Corps on the left of the French II Colonial Corps has made a certain amount of progress, the French II Colonial Corps will advance to the line marked Exploitation Line and follow up in conformity with this plan the French II Colonial Corps will start its advance at H plus 2 hours. It will then continue its progression in liaison with V corps, within the sector limits assigned it for this exploitation and follow up movement.
(g) That part of the French II Colonial Corps not involved in the southern and western attacks will make deep raids at different points in the enemy's line, especially in the valley east of Spada, and towards Varneville, to detect an enemy withdrawal, and will press the enemy. Upon indications of a withdrawal by the enemy, the French II Colonial Corps will follow on the axis St-Mihiel---Hattonville and will join up the southern and western attacks on the army objective between Hattonville and Le Chaufour [Bois].
2. General Organization of Command: The Commanding General, First Army, will have command of the operation, in which following will participate:

I Corps with following divisions:
- 1st Line (in order from right to left):
  - 82d, 90th, 5th, 2d.
- 2d Line: 78th

IV Corps with following divisions:
- 1st Line (in order from right to left):
  - 89th, 42d, 1st.
- 2d Line: 3d.

French II Colonial Corps with following divisions:
- 3 divisions now in sector.

V Corps with following divisions:
- 1st Line (in order from right to left):
  - 26th Div., 1 French div. (numerical designation to be furnished later)
- 2d Line: One American div.

Army Reserve: 35th and 91st Divisions.

* * * * *

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Operation A, St-Mihiel

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 15/3

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins C. P., September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

VIII. Forces to be Used:

(1) Main Attack:

Large units: 8 American divisions

Artillery:

(a) Organic artillery of the large units
(b) In addition, the following:
  - 6 regiments of 75's (truck-carried) (18 bns.)
  - 49 batteries of foot artillery
  - 3 regiments of 105's
  - 2 regiments of 155's long (1 of 2 bns.

- 180 -
2 regiments of 155's howitzers
Tanks: 1 regiment (For high-powered heavy artillery and trench artillery, see below.)

(2) Secondary Attack:
Large units: 1 American division
1 French infantry division

Artillery:
(a) Organic artillery of the large units
(b) In addition, the following:
   2 regiments of 75's (truck-carried)
   1 tractor drawn bn. of 3 batteries of 155-mm. long guns (Filloux)
   1 regiment of 155's long of 2 bns.
   1 regiment of 155 howitzers of 3 bns. plus (for your information) a part of the 18 foot batteries from the French Second Army.

(3) High-powered Heavy Artillery:
The total allotment of high-powered heavy artillery to be used for the two attacks will include:
- 270-mm. hows.
- 3 bns.
- 293-mm.
- 1 bn.
- 16-cm. naval
- 5 batteries
- 240-mm. St-Chamond
- 2 bns.
- 240-mm. T. R.
- 1 bn.
- 32-cm.
- 3 batteries
- 340 B
- 1 battery

(4) Trench Artillery: The total allotment for the two attacks is that appearing in Memorandum No. 45,900 of August 30; namely:
   (a) The 35th Battery of the 9th Bn. and the entire 10th Bn. of the 176th Regiment, from the French Eighth Army.
   (b) 2 bns. of the 176th Regiment, from the Second Army (1st and 5th Bns.).

   This allotment will be supplemented by the General commanding the French Group of Armies of the East, so that the First Army will have at its disposal a minimum of 8 batteries of 240-mm. longs and 5 batteries of 58-mm. No. 2.

(5) Liaison between the two attacks: Two or three French infantry divisions and their organic means.

IX. The means in aviation and the ammunition now on hand or in transit: No change.

X. In conformity with the orders of the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, the attack will take place September 10.

PETAIN,
Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

184-12.8: Memorandum

Artillery in First Army Area

FIRST ARMY ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 2, 1918.

The following artillery is now present in the First Army Area as noted. Divisional is included as available.
I CORPS:

| 69 | Batteries | 75's | (American 2d, 5th, 60th, 153d and 157th F. A. Brigade and Fr. 238th Arty.) |
| 42 | " | 155 C's | (American 2d, 5th, 60th, 153d and 157th F. A. Brig. and 2d Bn. 342d R. A. I. and Fr. 317th Arty.) |
| 4 | " | 155 C's | (Foot Artillery) Fr. 182d and 183d Arty.) |
| 9 | " | 105's | (Fr. 451st Arty.) |
| 16 | " | 120's | (Foot Artillery) Fr. 182d and 183d Arty.) |
| 4 | " | 220's | (Foot Artillery) Fr. 182d and 183d Arty.) |
| 2 | " | 220's | (25th and 26th Btys. Fr. 282d Arty.) |
| 2 | " | 6" | American Newtons, T. M. |
| 5 | " | 58 | T. M. (3 American 2 Fr.) |
| 1 1/2 | " | 150 | T. M. (Fr.) |
| 4 1/2 | " | 240 | T. M. (1/2 Fr. and 4 American) |

and the following sector artillery, which is immobile:

| 26 | Pieces | 90 | (Fr. 6th Foot Arty.) |
| 38 | " | 95's | " " " " |
| 6 | " | 145's | " " " " |
| 4 | " | 155 L | " " " " |
| 22 | " | 120 L | " " " " |

Army Artillery in I Corps Group actually on hand:

| 1 Battery | 145's | (Detach. American) |
| 6 Batteries | 8" H. | (American 59th Arty.) |
| 4 | " | 9.2" H. | (Due at Vaucouleurs August 31) |
| 2 | " | 240 St. C. | (American 1st Bn., 51st Arty.) |
| 2 | " | 240 T. R. | (Fr. 2d Bn., 71st Arty.) |
| 2 | " | 270 M. | (American 2d Bn., 51st Arty.) |
| 2 | " | 270 | (Fr. 8th Bn., 73d Arty.) |
| 2 | " | 16-cm. | (Fr. 1st and 9th Btys. Navy) |
| 2 | " | 293's | (Fr. 11th Bn., 73d Arty.) |
| 1 Gun | 340 | (can fire on Metz) (American Bty. D., 53d Arty.) |

IV CORPS:

| 75 Batteries | 75's | (American 1st; 55th; 58th; and 67th F. A. Brig. and Fr. 212th; 228th and 250th Arty.) |
| 33 | " | 155 C's | (Fr. 1st; 55th, 58th; and 67th F. A. Brig., 2d Bn. 342d and Fr. 160th Arty.) |
| 8 | " | 120's | (near Toul Fr. 160th Arty.) |
| 18 | " | 105's | (Fr. 454th and 456th Arty.) |
| 2 | " | 220's | (near Toul) Fr. 160th Arty.) |
| 3 | " | 58 T. M. | (2 American and 1 Fr.) [2 bat. 6" Newton (2 American)] |

and the following sector artillery, immobile:

| 23 | Pieces | 90's | (4 Bat at 2 pieces 120L) |
| 8 | " | 95's | (1 Bat at 2 pieces 155C) |
| 12 | " | 120L |
| 2 | " | 145's |
| 2 | " | 155's |
Army Artillery IV Corps Area:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batteries</th>
<th>155 GPF</th>
<th>(2d Bn., American 57th Arty.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 &quot;</td>
<td>8&quot; H.</td>
<td>(American 44th Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
<td>240 St. C.</td>
<td>(Fr. 4th Bn. 71st Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 &quot;</td>
<td>16-cm.</td>
<td>(Fr. 13th Btry.-Navy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 &quot;</td>
<td>24 G's</td>
<td>(Btry. C., American 42d Arty. R. R.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V Corps - American

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batteries</th>
<th>75's</th>
<th>(American 3d; 4th; 51st; and 52d F. A. Brigs.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 &quot;</td>
<td>155 C's</td>
<td>(American 3d; 4th; and 51st F. A. Brigs. and Fr. 330th Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 &quot;</td>
<td>270 M.</td>
<td>(Fr. 1st and 4th Bns. 73d Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
<td>58's T. M.</td>
<td>(American)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the following sector artillery (immobile)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pieces</th>
<th>120L</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 &quot;</td>
<td>155L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 &quot;</td>
<td>220M</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army Artillery in V Corps Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batteries</th>
<th>155's GPF</th>
<th>(American 66th F. A. Brig.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td>16-cm.</td>
<td>(Fr. 11th and 16th Btys.) Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td>(4 guns) 329</td>
<td>(American 1st Bn. 52d Arty.) R. R.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FRENCH II COLONIAL CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batteries</th>
<th>75's</th>
<th>(Fr. 2d Bn. 273d and 16th and 39th Arty.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 &quot;</td>
<td>155 St. C/17</td>
<td>(Fr. 8th Bn., 113th Arty. and 6th Bn., 120th Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
<td>105's</td>
<td>(Fr. 1st Bn. 142d Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
<td>155 L's</td>
<td>(Fr. 3d Bn. 142d Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td>58's T. M.</td>
<td>(Fr. 1st Bn., 176th Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot;</td>
<td>240's T. M.</td>
<td>(Fr. 1st Bn., 176th Arty.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the following sector artillery (immobile):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pieces</th>
<th>90's</th>
<th>(Fr. 16th; 55th and 56th Btys. 6th Ft. Arty.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 &quot;</td>
<td>95's</td>
<td>(Fr. 24th and 25th Btys., 6th Ft. Arty. and 17th and 18th Btys., 10th Ft. Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 &quot;</td>
<td>120 L</td>
<td>(Fr. 14th; 18th; 26th; 31st; 32d; and 34th Btrys., 5th Ft. Arty. and 7th Bty., 6th Ft. Arty.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 &quot;</td>
<td>155 L</td>
<td>(Fr. 15th; 19th and 27th Btys., 5th Ft. Arty.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army Artillery in area Fr. II Colonial Corps:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batteries</th>
<th>240 St. C</th>
<th>(Fr. 13th Btys. 5th Bn. 71st Arty.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 &quot;</td>
<td>24 G.</td>
<td>(Fr. 22d Bty. 77th Arty.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following organizations are due to arrive as indicated:

For I Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batteries</th>
<th>75's</th>
<th>(Fr. 219th and 247th Arty.) due Saizerais Sept. 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 &quot;</td>
<td>155 L</td>
<td>(Fr. 413th Arty.) (less 1 battalion)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For IV Corps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Batteries</th>
<th>155 C's</th>
<th>(Fr. 308th Arty.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
For V Corps

18 Batteries 75's (Fr. 203d and 211th Arty.)
2 " 280 C's (not heard from )
1 " 240 T. M. ( " " )
3 " 155 GPF (Group C, (Fr. 86th Regt.)
6 " 155 L (Fr. 420th Regt. (2 groups only)

For II Colonial Corps:

2 Batteries 240 T. M. (not heard from)

For General Davis (American 32d Arty. Brig.)

4 Batteries 280 C (not heard from)

For Colonel Gilmer's Command:

6 Batteries 155 GPF (American 60th Arty.)

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191-32.8: Instructions

Plan of Defense, First Army, A. E. F.

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrots, September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Mission
   (a) In General: To insure the occupation and defense of the zone of the Army
limited on the east (contact with French Eighth Army) by the line -
   Clemery (exclusive)--Ruisseau de Thiebaupont (inclusive)--Millery (inclusive)
   --Pompey (exclusive)--along the Route de Frouard through the Foret de Haye, and limited
on north and west by the line -
   Watronville (inclusive)--Haudainville (inclusive)--Dieue (inclusive)--Senon-
court (inclusive)--the Verdun--Bar-le-Duc Road from Souilly to Naives (all towns on
road exclusive except Helippes, and road subject to joint French-American use)
   (b) In Particular: To insure the possession of the outpost position in case of
local, unimportant attacks.
   To concentrate on the defense of the position of resistance in case of a general
attack. This is the principal mission of divisions and corps in sector.
   To defend the fortress of Toul in conjunction with the defense of the fortified
area of Frouard by the French Eighth Army.

2. Organization of the Defensive Positions:

   * * * * *

(a) Outpost Positions: This is the zone in front of the position of resistance
organized for defense by a limited garrison, to deny to the enemy favorable ground in
which to emplace his artillery (particularly his minenwerfer) and to form up his infantry
for launching an assault against the position of resistance, and to gain time for the
occupation of the position of resistance.
As a general rule the garrisons manning the outpost zone will be located beyond hostile minenwerfer range (2000 meters). The following points partially within minenwerfer range must be garrisoned and held because of their tactical importance:

Region of Xon: The line Lesmenils---Xon---Pont-a-Mousson. (Favorable observation points for the enemy).

Bois-le-Pretre: Favorable positions for hostile artillery. In portions of the front along the heights of the Meuse the outpost position is merged into the position of resistance owing to the character of the terrain.

(b) Position of Resistance: This is the zone, in rear of the outpost position, on which the army, corps and divisions will engage the enemy with the bulk of the available troops. The position must be maintained intact; all considerations regarding the defense of the Army front must be based primarily upon the defense of this position.

It consists of a series of supporting points forming a continuous defensive line, all located beyond the range of the enemy's minenwerfer and covering the combat positions of our artillery.

(c) Barrage Position: This is a zone some distance in rear of the position of resistance destined to be occupied by army reserves and to serve as a base of departure for operations to retake lost ground to the front. It is to be occupied by security garrisons during the first phases of an enemy offensive, to cover the detrainment, disembarkment and assembly of army reserves in case the enemy should effect a rapid penetration of the position of resistance. As but few defensive works exist on this position the natural features of the terrain must be utilized to their best advantage.

(d) Fortress of Toul: The defenses of the Fortress of Toul, consisting of the Forts de Lucey, de Bruley, d'Ecrouves, Ouvrages de la Cloche de Bouvron, de Francheville, du Ropage, Fort du Vieux-Canton, Ouvrages du Mordant and [Ouvrage] de Villey, St-Etienne, are armed and have permanent garrisons.

The commanders of the forts are French. The forts are under the tactical control of the corps commander within whose zone they are situated (American corps).

The Commandant d'Armes of Toul (i.e. the commander of the city) is also under the tactical orders of the commander of the American IV Corps.

(e) Intermediate Positions: Between the zone of the position of resistance and the zone of the barrage position lie certain lines or positions, generally consisting of wire entanglements without trenches or cover. These are available for occupation by troops employed to stop gaps which might develop in the position of resistance.

3. Distribution of Troops and their Missions:

The army corps in sector will insure the defense of the position of resistance and the occupation and defense of the barrage position by its security garrisons. To this end their troops will be disposed, in principle, as follows:

(a) Outpost Position: The minimum force necessary to maintain active surveillance of the enemy, to prevent enemy reconnaissances, to give the alarm in case of attack, to repulse unimportant enemy attacks and to slow down and disrupt a serious hostile offensive.

One-third of the infantry will constitute the maximum force to be employed on this position.

(b) Position of Resistance: On this position 2/3 to 3/4 of the infantry will be employed to halt and defeat the advancing enemy and to retake by counterattack ground which may be lost.

At least fifty per cent of the infantry and the machine gunners must live normally on the position in the immediate vicinity of their combat positions, so that the rapid occupation of combat posts will not be prevented or disorganized by the hostile artillery preparation. The remaining infantry must live normally within one hour's march of the position.
The artillery of the divisions, corps and army will be echeloned in depth under cover of this position, in such manner as to be able to deliver effective fire in front of the position, including counter-preparation and barrage fire in front of the outpost position.

(c) Barrage Position: This position will be provided with security garrisons composed, in principle, of 1 battalion of infantry per division in sector and such elements of engineer troops, labor troops, cavalry and machine gun companies of position as are available. Those elements normally located too far in rear of the position to be designated as security garrisons will be utilized as reserves to reinforce the position at the threatened point.

The normal quarters of the elements designated as security garrisons must be as close as possible to their combat positions, in order to permit their prompt occupation at the alert.

4. General Instructions:
(a) Infantry: The infantry in the outpost position will be disposed in combat groups organized, provisioned and wired for all-around defense and grouped in strong points permitting an effective development of machine-gun and automatic rifle fire. The intervals between strong points will be covered by artillery fire.

The infantry in the position of resistance will be organized into supporting points so as to cover the entire front with fire.

Garrisons and materiel must be provided with shelter to furnish protection against gas and artillery fire, and will be located so as to permit the rapid occupation of combat positions.
(b) Artillery: All the artillery of the army, corps and divisions, including trench mortars, will be echeloned in rear of the position of resistance in such a manner that:

Field Artillery and heavy howitzers can execute counter-preparation fire 1500 to 2000 meters in front of the outpost position.

Heavy guns and heavy howitzers moderne can effectively deliver counterbattery fire.

High power heavy artillery can execute fire of interdiction on the enemy's communications and important centers.

In order to fulfill missions which cannot be executed from emplacements in rear of the positions of resistance some guns may be placed in front of this position, but every precaution must be taken to effect the rapid withdrawal or the destruction of these guns in case the enemy launches a general attack. The fire to be directed on portions of the interior of our positions (between strong points, in front of the position of resistance, etc.) and the fire to be employed in connection with previously prepared counter-attacks, will be minutely regulated.

Antitank guns will be disposed in depth so as to furnish the maximum protection for the position of resistance. The crews must be provided with adequate infantry protection.
(c) Transmission of Alert: Corps commanders will make detailed arrangements to guarantee the prompt transmission of the alert to all units under their command, including the army troops located within their sectors. This does not include the army artillery. Special care will be taken to insure the prompt transmission of the alarm by the garrisons of the outpost position, in case of a surprise attack.
(d) Liaison between Corps and Armies: Close liaison, by means of joint or mixed posts, will be maintained between adjacent corps and armies on the outpost position, position of resistance and barrage position.
(e) Employment of separate units: Army troops (engineers, labor, pioneer, etc.) normally located within corps sectors will be assigned combat missions by corps commanders in the vicinity of their normal locations.

5. Conduct in Case of Attack:
(a) Expected Attack: In the event that information is obtained accurately forecasting a general attack, and sufficient time is available for the purpose, the
strength of the garrison of the outpost position will be reduced by half, the troops withdrawn being used to reinforce the position of resistance. Those remaining on the outpost position will fight to the last. The partial withdrawal of the outpost troops stated above will only be carried out upon authority of the army commander.

The garrisons of the position of resistance quartered in rear of that position will be placed in the close proximity to their combat positions.

The security garrisons of the barrage positions will be held ready to occupy their combat positions.

(b) Surprise Attack: In the event that the enemy succeeds in launching a general attack without warning other than a short artillery bombardment, no retirements of any character will be permitted. All must fight in place and to the last.

(c) Counterattacks: In the event of a serious offensive, counterattack will not be launched into the zone of the outpost position from the position of resistance unless the enemy has been definitely checked in front of the latter position. The orders for such counterattacks must emanate from commanders of division or corps or the army commander, according to the importance of the enterprise.

Similarly, counterattacks will not be launched from the barrage position before the arrival of sufficient reinforcements to insure the integrity of that position.

In the event of a small attack or raid on the outpost position, counterattacks will be launched from the position of resistance to retake the ground lost in the outpost position.

Should the position of resistance be penetrated by the enemy the larger portion of the available troops will be employed on the flanks of the breach to limit the extent of the rupture; smaller forces being employed to confront the enemy’s direct pressure. As soon as the expansion of the breach is checked, counterattacks must be delivered against the flanks of the hostile progression.

(d) Artillery: The artillery will cooperate in the defense of the position of resistance:

By delivering a fire of counterpreparation with the maximum number of guns possible. This is the principal mission of the artillery in defense.

By delivering barrage fire in front of the position of resistance and in the intervals of the outpost position.

The guns of the fortress of Toul and a limited number of guns emplaced in rear of the barrage position, will be employed to cover the approaches to this position.

6. Special Instructions: During the preparations for offensive operations corps commanders are, of necessity, authorized to depart from the foregoing regulations in the emplacing of the necessary batteries in advance of the position of resistance and in strengthening the outpost position to cover the deployment of the artillery. The last should be accomplished mainly by increasing the number of machine guns and disposing the necessary infantry to protect these guns.

7. Command: Division commanders in sector will be charged with the defense of their sectors in depth to include the barrage position, including such defenses of the Fortress of Toul as are included within the limits of that position. As reserve divisions arrive on the barrage position the command of the portions of that position occupied by these divisions will pass to their commanders.

Corps commanders will exercise general command over their sectors and will be charged with directing the forward movement of reserves turned over to them by the army. The Commanding General, American IV Corps, is charged with the defense of the Fortress of Toul, including the city itself.

Posts of Command:

First Army
1st Echelon: Ligny-en-Barrois
2d Echelon: Neufchateau
1 Corps
Salzeralb

- 187 -
ESSEY-PANNES AREA
Looking northwest from Essey-Flirey Road, in general direction of Pannes
Army Zone and Corps Sector Limits

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 3, 1918.

[To accompany the Plan of Defense [F. O. No. 8, Hq. First Army, August 29, 1918.]
(All localities and roads are inclusive unless otherwise stated)

1. Army Limits:

East: (Map 1/80,000) Ruisseau de Thiebaupont, ravine between Bois de Beauzard, Bois de Tempavart [and Bois de] Bronze, wayside cross 600 meters east of Landremont, elevation point 226 on Ruisseau de la Natagne, Landremont-Millery Road, Millery, Millery-Marbache Road, Marbache, Marbache-Ferme du Chalet-[Ferme] de Vaurot and Sexey-les-Bos Road to the southern edge of the Bois de la Tete-l'Ermite, western edge of the Forest de Haye to the Toul-Nancy Road, Poste-de-Velaine, thence a straight line south cutting the Route du Renard near the letter u in [word] du, Bois de Gondreville, road fork southeast of Anc. [Ancien] Bois de Lambanie (exclusive), Moselle River via Marron (exclusive) to lock 800 meters east of Sexey-aux-Forges (Map 1/200,000), Hill 400, Maizieres (exclusive), Marthemont (exclusive), junction with army southern limit.

West: (Map 1/200,000) Watronville, Haudainville, line of the Meuse River, Dieue, Senoncourt, Lemmes (exclusive), Verdun---Bar-le-Duc Road from Lemmes south to Bar-le-Duc (villages along road all exclusive), Bar-le-Duc (exclusive), the following villages all exclusive: Longeville, Bazincourt, Aulnois-en-Perthois, Juvigny, Brauvilliers, La Landre, Osne-le-Val, junction with southern limit.

South: (Map 1/200,000) Effincourt, Aingoulaincourt, Soulaincourt, Bressoncourt, Lezeville, Avranville, Chemisey, Midreux, Pargny-sous-Mureau, Mont-les-Neufchateau, Bazoilles-sur-Meuse (exclusive), Harreville-les-Chanteurs (exclusive), Sartes, Cendreville, Medonville, Roncourt, Hagneville, Ollainville, Landaville, Certilleux, Rebeuville, Rol-lainville, Harchechamp, Gemonville, Favieres, Dolcourt, Crepey, Germiny, Maizieres (exclusive), junction with eastern limit.

2. Army Corps Limits:

(a) American I Corps:

East: Same as eastern limit of army to intersection with Nancy-Toul Road.

West: (1/20,000 Map) elevation 307.1 S. of Remenaucourt, road forks at elevation 274.5 three hundred meters N. E. of Limey, N. W. corner of the Bois du Bouchot, crossing of the St-Jacques [Fme]---Noviant Road and the St-Jean---Lironville Road, Domevre (exclusive), N. W. corner of Bois Chaude, junction of Manoncourt-Francheville Road and Manoncourt-Royaumetx Road, W. Edge of Bois Chateau, Bouvron Redoubt, junction of the Toul-Dieulouard Road and the Toul---Menil-la-Tour Road.
Reassignment of Divisions to Army Corps

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 3, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army, A. E. F.
To: Commanding Generals, I, IV, and V Corps

1. The following changes in corps organization and march tables for the concentration of divisions are ordered:
   The 78th Division is transferred from the IV Corps to the I Corps and will be
employed as Corps Reserve, I Corps.

The 35th Division remains assigned to the I Corps but will be employed as army reserve.

The 3d Division is transferred from the V Corps to the IV Corps and will be employed as Corps Reserve, IV Corps.

2. The following changes of locations have been ordered:
   (a) The 3d Division will move to the 5th Area beginning night September 4/5.
   (b) The 42d Division will move to the 6th Area beginning night September 4/5.
   (c) The 78th Division will move to the 2d Area beginning day September 4.

3. In the concentration march tables the following changes are ordered:

   I Corps:
   (a) 2d Division has already moved up and is under corps control.
   (b) 5th Division no change. Should be warned to be ready to move its animal-drawn transportation on three hours’ notice.
   (c) 35th Division moves as prescribed in the table and under the supervision of the corps commander, except that this division will be halted in the area Liverdun—Les-5-Tranchee, as army reserve. This division complete leaves area in the vicinity of Saffais night of D-5/4.
   (d) 78th Division as corps reserve has been ordered to the 2d Area, moving on September 4. This division moves as prescribed by the corps commander in the following columns:
       Animal transport marches overland, moving night of D-5/4 and must be kept east of Colombey-les-Belles.
       The division less animal transport moves by bus under corps orders and leaves night of D-2/1.

   IV Corps:
   (a) 1st Division now under corps control.
   (b) 42d Division marches to 6th Area night September 4/5. Thereafter moves as here-tofore contemplated and under corps direction. The division leaves this area night of D-5/4.
   (c) 3d Division, corps reserve, moves on night of September 4/5 to the 5th Area. Moves under corps direction from 5th Area to corps reserve position beginning of D-4/3.

Army Reserve Divisions: No change except that 36th Division will not be included in the operation.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.2: Letter

Change in Army and Corps Limits

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 3, 1918.

From: Commanding General, First Army, A. E. F.
To: Commanding General, French Eighth Army

1. In order that there may be cooperation on a larger scale between the artillery of the left corps of the French Eighth Army and the right corps of the First Army, A. E. F.,
it is requested that the line between the zones of normal action of the artillery of the American I Army Corps, and the French XXXII Corps, be carried to the Road Cheminot---Sillegny---Pournoy-la-Chetive.

2. It is also requested that the changes in the disposition of the artillery of the French XXXII Corps be necessitated by the above modifications and the lines between the artillery zones be ordered by the French Eighth Army.

H. A. DRUM,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.16: Telegram

Command of Sector

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 3, 1918.

Commanding General, V Corps

Number one seventy G three. Assume tactical command immediately of front to include the line Watronville-Haudainville on the north. Place elements of French 10th Colonial Division now south of above line under tactical control of French 2d Colonial Division a Pied. Acknowledge.

DRUM.

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191-32.15: Memorandum

Offensive Preparations

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 3, 1918.

1. Outpost Position: In order to provide proper protection for the artillery and dumps now being located in advance of the position of resistance, corps commanders are authorized to increase the strength of the garrisons of the outpost position for this purpose.

So far as practicable the forward zone within our lines which has been unoccupied for several months, should not be garrisoned during the daytime as signs of unusual activity in this region would convey to the enemy information regarding our offensive intentions.

The number of machine guns in the outpost position should be materially increased.

2. Secrecy: Army corps commanders are authorized to inform such members of their staffs of the details of the proposed plan of operations as they consider necessary for the conduct of the preparations.
3. Aerial Activity: The restriction placed on the air service which prohibited an increase of aerial activity in advance of D day, is removed insofar as concerns the employment of units to secure photographs of the enemy’s defensive organization.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.13: Orders

**Attachment of 1st Brigade Tank Corps**

G-3
SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 120

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 3, 1918.

The 1st Brigade Tank Corps is relieved from duty with the V Army Corps and is attached to the IV Army Corps. The brigade commander and his staff will proceed immediately and report to the Commanding General, IV Army Corps, for temporary duty.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.: Letter

**Attack of V Corps**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 4, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army
To: The C. G., V Corps

[Extract]

The Commander-In-Chief directs as follows:
1. The attack of the V Corps will be made by the 26th Division and the French 15th Division, the latter division being today assigned to the V Corps.
2. To the left of the attack and occupying the remainder of the sector under command of the V Corps will be a regiment of infantry of the 4th Division, to which will be attached a French artillery command to be designated later. * * *

* * * * *
4. You will inform these headquarters of the earliest date at which it is possible to place the 15th Division in sector as above directed.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.13: Order

Assignment of French 15th Colonial Division

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 118
FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 4, 1918.

The French 15th Division Infantry [French 15th Colonial Division] is assigned and will be reported to the V Corps for duty and station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, First Army: File 124 (Fldr. 1): Telegram

French Air Units for American Forces

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, September 4, 1918.

From: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

To: Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast, Provins

In conformity with your offer of the air division for service with this army I would be very much pleased to have the movement begin at once [so that it will be ready to operate on September 10]. I also would appreciate it very much if you would place the bombardment escadre at my disposal dating from September 8.

PERSHING.

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Relief of Elements of French 10th Colonial Division

G-3

Commanding General, V Corps

No. 173, G-3. Relieve elements of 10th Colonial Division now within your sector, by one regiment of 4th Division before September 5, 24 h. Acknowledge.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Concentration of American Divisions Prior to St-Mihiel

From: Chief of Staff, First Army, A. E. F.
To: Commanding Generals, I, IV and V Corps

1. All movements prescribed herein will be made under the orders and control of the corps commanders to whose command the divisions enumerated pertain. The 35th Division will also move under the supervision of the Commanding General, I Corps. The movements of the 80th and 91st Divisions will not be under corps control.

2. Corps commanders will report at earliest practicable date to these headquarters the points at which they propose to locate their reserve divisions, with location of headquarters of same.

3. I Corps:
   (a) 82d Division---now in line
   (b) 90th Division---now in the line
   (c) 5th Division---The movement of this division was ordered through Commanding General, I Corps, to start on night of September 4/5, movement to be under control of I Corps.
   (d) 2d Division---Hq. at Francheville, north of Toul. Under corps control.
   (e) 78th Division---Moved night of September 4/5, from Bourmont area (3d Area) to Neufchateau area (2d Area). This division will move from 2d Area as follows:
       Animal transportation to march, starting night of D-5/D-4, via Rainville---Favieres---Thuilley---Chaudeney---Gondreville.
       Division (less animal transportation) moves by bus on night of D-2/D-1, via Neufchateau---Colombey-les-Belles---Moutrot---Toul.
   (f) For 35th Division see Paragraph 5, a.
4. IV Corps:
   (a) 89th Division—now in the line
   (b) 42d Division—moved from Neufchateau area (2d Area), to Martigny-les-Gerbonvaux or Colombey-les-Belles area (6th Area), starting night of September 4/5. It will start by marching from Martigny-les-Gerbonvaux area on night of D-5/D-4.
   (c) 1st Division—Hq. now at Pagny-sur-Meuse. Will march from Void and Pagny-sur-Meuse on night of D-3/D-2.
   (d) 3d Division—moved from Gondrecourt area (1st Area), to Vaucouleurs area (5th Area), on night of September 4/5, movement to be completed night of September 5/6. It will march from 5th Area via Void and Pagny on night of D-3/D-2.

5. Army Reserve:
   (a) 35th Division—This division completes its detrainment in Romain-Landre-court area on southern part of Saffais area at 6 p.m., September 6. It will march from Saffais area on night D-3/D-2, and will be halted in the area Liverdun—Les-5-Tranchees.
      Chief Signal Officer, First Army, has been directed to install a direct telephone wire from Hq. First Army to Hq. of 35th Division at Liverdun.
   (b) 91st Division—This division will entrain on September 7, and will complete detrainment in Gondrecourt area (1st Area), on night of September 8/9. It will march from 1st Area on night of D-2/D-1. One brigade should reach Void and vicinity, and one brigade Pagny-sur-Meuse and vicinity, on night of D-1/D.
      Chief Signal Officer, First Army, has been directed to install a direct telephone wire from Hq. First Army to Hq. of 91st Division at Void.

6. V Corps:
   (a) 26th Division—now under corps control, to be used in 1st Line.
   (b) 4th Division—Now under corps control. These hq. will be notified of location assigned this corps for the operation.

7. Other Divisions:
   (a) 33d Division—Leaves vicinity of Ligny-en-Barrois (Tronville area), beginning night of September 5/6.
   (b) 80th Division—Moves from vicinity of Tronville [Tannois area] to vicinity of Ligny-en-Barrois (Tronville area) on night of D-2/D-1. Chief Signal Officer, First Army, will install a direct telephone wire from Hq. First Army to Hq. 80th Division at Tronville.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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French Cavalry Division at Disposal of First Army

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 5, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army
To: Commanding General, V Corps
     "     " II Colonial Corps
     "     " 2d Cavalry Division

[Extract]

1. In accordance with instructions from French G. H. Q., the 2d Cavalry Division is placed at the disposal of the American First Army.

2. This division will be relieved by the American 26th Division under direction of American V Corps, and reported to the Commanding General, II Colonial Corps, for duty.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Corps Boundaries

CORRECTED COPY

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 5, 1918.

1. Between I and IV Corps: The limit between these two corps will be changed at 8 a.m., September 11, to the line marked by Limey (to I Corps), western tip of Bois des Hayes, Minorville (to IV Corps), Bois de Minorville, Bois de la Cumejie, Bois d'Andilly, Bois-Chazeau (all to IV Corps), Nancy-Toul Road at eastern edge of Dommartin.

2. Between IV Corps and II Colonial Corps: The limit between these two corps will be changed at 8 a.m., September 10, to the line marked by Hill 239, south of Richecourt (to IV Corps), Hill 241, Rambucourt, Raulecourt, Jouy-sous-les-Cotes (all to II Colonial Corps), Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey and Vertuzey (to IV Corps), Sorcy-sur-Meuse (to II Colonial Corps).

3. Between II Colonial Corps and V Corps: The limit between these two corps will be changed at 8 a.m., September 8, to the line marked by edge of woods 1 km. south of Moulilly (to II Colonial Corps), Le Vionlut-Bois (to V Corps), bend in the Ruisseau de Rupt, 300 meters north of elevation point 223, Hill 261 (to II Colonial Corps), Tilly-sur-Meuse (to II Colonial Corps), present limit.
ESSEY-PANNES AREA
Looking north-northwest from vicinity of Essey
4. Corps commanders will make the necessary readjustment of troops, by mutual agreement, before the time set in each case.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.13: Orders

Allotment of American and French Tank Corps Units

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 135

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 5, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The following allotment of tank corps troops is announced:
   American 1st Brigade (2 bns.) and one-half French groupment, to the IV Corps, de-training point Ansauville.
   French 505th Regiment (3 bns.) and one-half French groupment, to the I Corps, de-training point Bois Villers-en-Haye.
   Headquarters American 3d Brigade only, and the separate French battalion, to the reserve, training point Bois de la Rappe.

* * * * *

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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191-32.7: Letter

Proportion of Gas Shells for First Army Increased

1st Section, General Staff
(Artillery and Engineers)
No. 8195

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, September 6, 1918.

The Commander-in-Chief

To the General commanding the American Expeditionary Forces in France, at Chaumont

By letter of August 28 you called my attention to the need there would be to increase the proportion of gas shells allotted to the American First Army because of the special nature of the operations contemplated.
According to the information with which I have been furnished, the proportion of gas shells at the disposal of that army, counting shipments arranged and not yet delivered, is:

For the 75: 23%
For the heavy artillery: 12.4%

Under similar circumstances, the proportions furnished to the French armies have not exceeded:
For the 75: 20% and
For the heavy artillery: 12%

Nevertheless, in order to comply with the desire which you have expressed, I placed at the disposition of the American First Army, in its allotments already approved:
30,000 rounds of heavy artillery gas shells, which will bring up to about 19% the proportion of gas shells for the American First Army.

PETAIN.

191-32.13: Orders

Air Service Units Assigned to Army Corps and First Army

G-3
SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 151

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 6, 1918.

1. The following (French) air service units are assigned as follows:
   To I Army Corps: 214th Divisional Squadron and 208th Artillery Squadron, with station at Bicqueley.
   To IV Army Corps: 218th Divisional Squadron, with station at Orches.
   To V Army Corps: 42d Divisional Squadron, with station at Souilly.
   To II Colonial Corps: 28th Divisional Squadron, with station at Rumont and the 236th Artillery Squadron, with station at Belrain.
   To Air Service, First Army: 206th Artillery Squadron, with station at Bicqueley.

219th A. I. G. F. Squadron and the 234th Artillery Squadron, with station at Lay-St-Remy.
225th Artillery Squadron, with station at Belrain. Groupe de Combat No. 16 with Park No. 102, with station at Vaucouleurs, south.

2. The 28th, 42d, 219th and 236th Squadrons will be under the French Second Army for administration and supply, and under the tactical supervision of the Chief Air Service, American First Army. The 206th, 208th, 214th, 218th, 225th, and 234th Squadrons, and Groupe de Combat No. 16 with Park No. 102, will be under the French Eighth Army for administration and supply and under the tactical control of the Chief Air Service, American First Army.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
Assignment of the 155th Field Artillery Brigade

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 153

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 6, 1918.

1. Upon arrival in the region of Bar-le-Duc the 155th Field Artillery Brigade will be reported to the 80th Division for duty and assignment to station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

Assignment of the 158th Field Artillery Brigade

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 154

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 6, 1918.

1. Upon arrival in the region of Bar-le-Duc the 158th Field Artillery Brigade will be reported to the 79th Division for duty and assignment to station.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

Assignment of 80th Division

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 6, 1918.

1. Par. 4, Field Orders No. 8, these headquarters, dated August 29, 1918, is modified so as to assign the American 80th Division (P. C. at Tronville-en-Barrois) as the reserve division for the sector of the II Colonial Corps, in place of the American 33d Division.

2. Commanding General, II Colonial Corps, will arrange for the reconnaissance of the terrain by the Commanding General, 80th Division, his staff, and suitable details from his command.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
ORGANIZATION OF RAILWAY ARTILLERY, FIRST ARMY

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 1

RAILWAY ARTILLERY RESERVE,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 6, 1918.

[Extract]

I. The French units listed below having been directed to report to the commanding
general of the railway artillery reserve by the Inspector General of Artillery of the
French Army, by Note de Service No. 2169-0 of September 2, 1918, the following organiza­
tion of the railway artillery of the First Army, A. E. F., is announced for the informa­
tion and guidance of this command:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Position</th>
<th>Calibre</th>
<th>Number of Guns</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Garage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M-1</td>
<td>19-G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(3 Bn., 53d Arty. (CAC) (Btry. E, 53d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Dieulouard Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-2</td>
<td>19-G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(3 Bn., 53d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*-230 bis</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Btry D, 53d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>&quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>32-(84)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4th Btry., 77th Arty. (Fr.)</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>221</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(French Group</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>32-(81)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(2 Bn., 52d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Position No. 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>219</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(Btry C and D, 52d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Position No. 219</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CENTRAL GROUPING: (Major Pirie) - P. C. Grimaucourt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Position</th>
<th>Calibre</th>
<th>Number of Guns</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Garage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G-65</td>
<td>19-G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Btry D, 43d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Lerouville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-64</td>
<td>24-G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2d Btry., 77th Arty. (Fr.)</td>
<td>Ferme Girouet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-43</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Btry C, 53d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Cousances-aux-Bois</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WESTERN GROUPING: (Colonel McMillan) - P. C. Dieue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. Position</th>
<th>Calibre</th>
<th>Number of Guns</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Garage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(x)-G-61</td>
<td>19-G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(3 Bn., 43d Arty. (CAC) (Btry F, 43d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Genicourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-161 bis</td>
<td>19-G</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(Btry E, 43d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Tracks near Tilly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-62</td>
<td>32-(81)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(1st Bn., 52d Arty. (CAC) (Btry A and B, 52d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Genicourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-41</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Btry A, 53d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>Dieue (south)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(x)-G-60</td>
<td>19-G(plat)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Btry A, 43d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>&quot; (north)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(*)-957</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22d Btry., 77th Arty. (Fr.)</td>
<td>Sommedieu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(*)-956</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Btry B, 53d Arty. (CAC)</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 202 -
(*) These batteries will receive their firing orders directly from these headquarters, and will fire only upon receipt of such orders.

(x) Platforms will probably be ready shortly. Grouping commanders will reconnoiter positions.

* * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Chamberlaine:

F. C. JEWELL,  
Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps,  
Chief of Staff.

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Mission

191-32.1: Order

Mission of First Army

FIELD ORDERS  
No. 9  
FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,  
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 7, 1918.

MAP: 1/80,000 (Commercy  
(Metz

[Extract]

1. The enemy is retreating on the front from Arras to Reims, under pressure of the Allied troops. He now has in the St-Mihiel salient between Les Eparges and the Moselle about 7 divisions holding the front, 1 division southeast of Vigneulles, and 1 division near Metz. The strength and morale of these divisions is in general below the usual standard.

2. Mission of the American First Army:
   (a) The First Army will attack at H hour on D day with the object of forcing the evacuation of the St-Mihiel salient.
   (b) I Corps:
      (1) The I Corps will attack on a front from Fontaine du Pere-Hilartion (inclusive)---Limey (inclusive) and will push a determined advance to the 1st Day Line * * * ultimately advancing under orders of corps commander to the 1st Phase Second Day Line, which coincides with army objective and continuing reconnaissances to the Exploitation Line * * *
      (2) It will assist the IV Corps in the outflanking, capture and cleaning up of Bois d'Euezézin and Bois du Beau-Vallon.
   (3) It will not retard its advance should the IV Corps on its left be delayed, but will maintain liaison with the IV Corps by strong detachment of infantry and machine guns.
   (c) IV Corps:
      (1) The IV Corps will attack on a front from Limeo (exclusive)---Hill 230 and Richecourt (both inclusive). It will drive hard on St-Benoit and Vigneulles, pushing forward from 1st Phase Line to 1st Day Line and from 1st Day Line to 1st Phase, Second
Day Line *** under orders from corps commanders, reconnoitering to the army objective *** and to the west of the Vigneulles-Buxieres Railroad. It will drive on to army objective when orders for same have been given by army commander. When army objective is reached it will be organized for defense and reconnaissances will be pushed boldly forward to Exploitation Line ***

(2) It will assist the I Corps in the outflanking, capture and cleaning up of Bois d’Euvezin and Bois du Beau-Vallon.

(3) It will assist the I Corps in the capture of Thiaucourt, and should circumstances delay the I Corps, it will capture and turn over Thiaucourt to the I Corps on its arrival.

(4) It will not retard its advance should the I Corps on its right be delayed, but will maintain liaison with the I Corps by strong detachments of infantry and machine guns.

(5) It will carefully guard its left flank.

(6) It will assist advance of French II Colonial Corps (on its left) by sending detachments west into Bois de Gargantua and will maintain liaison with it.

(d) V Corps:

(1) The V Corps will attack on a front from Montgirmont (inclusive)—-line 600 meters south of and parallel to road between Bois de St-Remy and Loclont-Bois and will drive with aggressive determination to 1st Day Line *** pushing reconnaissances toward army objective. Under orders from army commander it will drive on to army objective *** will organize same for defense, and will push strong reconnaissances to Exploitation Line ***. In the advance from 1st Day Line to army objective it will take proper measures to protect its right flank in liaison with French 2d Colonial Cavalry Division of the II Colonial Corps on its right.

(2) It will assist the advance of 2d Colonial Division (on its right).

(e) II Colonial Corps: The II Colonial Corps has three distinct missions:

(1) (a) It will attack on the front Hill 230 (exclusive) to eastern edge of Haute-Charriere-et-Gerechamp, pivoting on its left, advancing 1 hour after the IV Corps on its right has attacked.

(b) It will swing to the northwest to the line marked 1st Day *** and in liaison with the IV Corps will push west through the Bois de Gargantua to the western limit of its sector ***.

(2) (a) It will attack on the front La Schouse (inclusive)—-edge of woods 1 km. south of Mouilly and 1 hour after the V Corps on its left has attacked, and will push forward to the line marked exploitation and follow up *** When the V Corps advances to 1st Day Line to army objective, it will guard the right flank of the V Corps and will push flank guard covering forces to the southeast to overlook the valley of the Ruisseau de Creue. Upon withdrawal by the enemy from the salient or as soon as the salient south of the Ruisseau de Creue has been effectually cleaned up it will advance to the army objective between Thillot (inclusive) and Hattonchatel (inclusive), organizing same for defense and pushing strong reconnaissances to Exploitation Line ***

(3) On the remainder of the front now occupied by it, the II Colonial Corps will make deep raids at different points in the enemy line, especially in the valley east of Spada and toward Varneville to serve as entering wedges for continued advances, and to detect an enemy withdrawal.

The infantry action of these raids will start at H plus 1 hours. The II Colonial Corps will press the enemy and upon indications of his withdrawal will follow on axis St-Mihiel---Hattonville and will join up the southern and western attacks on the army objective between Hattonville (inclusive) and northern tip of le Chaufour-Bois, will organize the army objective for defense, and will push strong reconnaissances to the Exploitation Line.

Army Reserve:

(a) The 35th Division, 91st Division and 80th Division will constitute the army reserve.
(b) The 35th Division will take station in the vicinity of Liverdun, and by noon of D day, will have its brigades in concentrated billets and will be in readiness to move. It will reconnoiter the crossings of the Moselle and roads which it might be necessary to use northwest to the vicinity of Maney, Lironville, and Bernecourt, and northeast to the vicinity of Bezaumont.

(c) The 91st Division will take station in the vicinity of Void and Pagny-sur-Meuse, and by noon of D day will have its brigades in concentrated billets, and will be in readiness to move, presumably by bus. It will reconnoiter roads which it may be necessary to use northeast towards Bernecourt, north towards Bouconville and northwest towards Lerouville and St-Julien.

(d) The 80th Division will station in the Tronville area, and by noon of D day will have its brigades in concentrated billets and will be in readiness to move.

3. General Instructions for Different Arms:
   (a) Infantry:
      (1) To include the hostile intermediate positions the infantry advance (and artillery rolling barrage fire) of the I and V Corps will be regulated on the basis of 100 meters in four minutes. The infantry advance beyond the hostile positions indicated above will be dependent upon the local situation in each corps and division, but should be rapid in order that the enemy be not given an opportunity to recover from the first shock.
      (2) Penetration will be sought by infantry by utilizing zones of least resistance and easy access in order to cause fall of strong points by outflanking them.
      (3) The advance from the 1st Phase Line to 1st Day Line in each corps will be ordered by corps commanders; and the advance from the 1st Day Line to the 1st Phase Second Day Line will be similarly ordered. When the I and IV Corps reach the 1st Phase Second Day Line, and when the V Corps reaches the 1st Day Line, army commander will be promptly notified by corps commanders, who will also inform him of the degree of resistance met with, in order that he may form a proper decision as to the time for ordering the advance to the army objective.
      (4) If the 1st Day Line is reached at an early hour the I and IV Corps should push on with all speed to the 1st Phase Second Day Line. It is not essential or desirable to delay this advance to the second day if the progression has been rapid.
   (b) Artillery: (For Plan of Employment of Artillery see Annex No. 1).
      (1) The artillery fire (including preparation) will start at H hour minus the time desired by corps commanders for beginning of the barrage fire. The commanders of the I and IV Corps will arrange mutually the hour of starting their barrage fire. Such artillery fire as is necessary to conceal the advance of tanks is authorized but should be limited as far as practicable to normal fire of sector.
      (2) Artillery will refrain from destructive fire on bridges over the Rupt de Mad, southwest of Thiaucourt.
      (3) Army artillery will cease firing on points within the following lines at the hours designated:
         Southern Attack:
         South of 1st Phase Line (American) and 1st Day Line (French)---at H hour.
         South of 1st Day Line---at H plus 3 hours.
         South of 1st Phase, 2d Day Line---at an hour to be designated by Commanding General, IV Corps.
         Western Attack: Lines and hours to be designated by Commanding General, V Corps, after agreement with Commanding General, II Colonial Corps.
      (4) The commanding general, army artillery, will designate certain units to move forward as advance progresses in order to be in position to continually increase the distance of the ultimate limit of the zones covered by the heavy guns, and will designate routes over which they shall go.
      (5) Corps commanders will similarly arrange for the movement forward of
units of corps and divisional artillery. These organizations will have right of way over organizations of army artillery.

(6) If gas is used on the following localities, or on other areas near limits between corps zones of action, its use will cease not later than the hours below specified, except by agreement between commanding generals of army corps concerned:

- Bois D’Euvezin, H minus 4 hours
- Bois du Beau-Vallon, H minus 3 hours
- East portion of Bois de Mort-Mare, H minus 4 hours
- Bois de Gargantua, H minus 3 hours
- Le Joli-Bois, H minus 3 hours
- Loclont-Bois, to Hill 394 (2 km. south of Dommartin) H minus 4 hours

(c) Antiaircraft Defense: (For Plan of Antiaircraft Defense see Plan of Employment of Artillery, Annex No. 1)

(d) Tanks: (For Plan of Employment of Tanks see Annex No. 2.)

(e) Aviation: (For Plan of Employment of Aviation see Annex No. 3.)

(1) Beginning at the commencement of artillery preparation and barrage, the army air service will take the offensive against the enemy with every branch of aviation. The army pursuit aviation will defend the army front from hostile air attack, protect its own observation aviation, and hold itself in readiness to attack troops on the ground in the immediate vicinity of our front. The army observation aviation will carry out all missions, both day and night, ordered by G-2. The bombardment aviation will attack the railroad stations and supply points of Metz, Thionville, Mars-la-Tour, Conflans, Dommary, Baroncourt, Longuyon, the bridges of the Meuse from Dun to Stenay, and the most important hostile airfields.

(2) The army dropping ground for messages from airplanes will be at a point two and one-half kilometers southeast of Ligny-en-Barrois. Four command airplanes will be held ready to execute any missions given, at the army landing field at Maulan.

(3) Certain balloon companies will be designated by Chief of Air Service, First Army, to follow advances.

4. (a) Liaison: (See Plan of Liaison, Annex No. 4.)

(b) Organization of Conquered Ground: (See Plan of Organization of Conquered Ground Annex No. 5.)

(c) Evacuation and Supply: (See Plan of Evacuations of Sick and Wounded and Supply, Annex No. 6.)

(d) Engineer Troops, Material and Water: (See Plan of Employment of Engineer Troops, Supply of Engineer Material and Water Service, Annex No. 7.)

(e) Circulation and Prisoners: (See Plan of Circulation and Evacuation of Prisoners, Annex No. 8.)

5. Axis of Liaison: (See Plan of Liaison, Annex No. 4.)

Posts of Command:
- American First Army
  - Ligny-en-Barrois
- I Corps
  - Saizerais
- IV Corps
  - Menil-la-Tour
- French II Colonial Corps
  - Ernecourt; later Rupt-devant-St-Mihiel
- V Corps
  - Ancemont

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
BENEY-THIAUCOURT AREA
Looking north-northeast from Euwezin, across the Rupt de Mad
Plan of Employment of Artillery

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

September 6, 1918.

ANNEX NO. 1

FIELD ORDERS

No. 9

Map 1/80,000, Metz-Commercy sections

1. a. Artillery fire, including preparation, will commence at H minus the time desired by corps commanders for the beginning of barrage fire.
   b. The artillery will refrain from destructive fire on bridges across the Rupt de Mad southwest of Thiaucourt (excels.).
   c. Barrage tables will be coordinated by army corps commanders to provide continuity across boundaries between the corps.
   d. If gas is used on the following localities, or on other areas near army corps boundaries, its use will cease not later than the hours below specified, except by written agreement between commanding generals of the army corps concerned.
      - Bois d'Euvezin, H-4 hours
      - Bois du Beau-Vallon, H-3 hours
      - East portion of Bois de Mort Mare, H-4 hours
      - Bois de Gargantua, H-3 hours
      - Le Joli-Bois, H-3 hours
      - Woods along La Grande Tranchee de Calonne, H-4
   e. The antiaircraft artillery will attack hostile aircraft appearing over our lines. The mobile sections will have the right of way on roads while on this duty. Barrages will be established to protect balloons and other installations. It will promptly inform the air service of hostile activity in the air.

2. Zones of Fire:
   a. The line dividing the normal zones of army and army corps artillery is as follows:
      - Louvigny-sur-Seille (incl.)—Bois-Jurlieux (incl.)—east edge of Bois de Daumont—Road Sillegny to Arry—Pagny-sur-Moselle (incl.)—Road Pagny-sur-Moselle to Preny to Thiaucourt to Bouillonville to Pannes—the Madine [Creek]—Buxieres (excl.)—Savonnieres-en-Woivre (incl.)—Chaillon (incl.)—Road Chaillon to Hattonchatel to St-Maurice-sous-les-Cotes to Woel.
   b. Normal zone boundaries are as follows:
      - Moselle Grouping (Brig. Gen. W. C. Davis):
        - East line, Seille River
        - West line, Pannes (incl.), Bois de Thiaucourt (excl.), Bois de Dampvitoux (incl.).
      - Retne Grouping (le Capitaine Brettzner):
        - East line, same as the west line of East Grouping
        - West line, Buxerules (incl.), Hills 327 and 387.

Errata: Normal zone boundary, II Colonial Corps: North line should be line 600 meters south of road which divides the Bois de [St] Remy from the Loqont-Bois instead of as shown. Eventual zone boundary, II Colonial Corps: North line same as for normal zone, instead of as shown.
I Army Corps:
East line, Morville-sur-Seille (excl.), Eply (excl.), Louvigny-sur-Seille (incl.)
West line, Limey (incl.), Euvezin (excl.), Thiaucourt (incl.).

IV Army Corps:
East Line, same as for the west line of I Corps
West Line, Richecourt (excl.), Bois-Rate (incl.), Nonsard (excl.).

French II Colonial Corps:
East line, same as the west line of the IV Corps
North line, the line from the south edge of Rupt-en-Woëvre
to the bend in La [Grande] Tranchée de Calonne,
south of Dommartin, thence La Tranchée toward Hattonchatel.

V Army Corps:
South line, same as north line of the II Colonial Corps
North line, Road Tresauvaux to Combres to Herbeuville to
St-Maurice-sous-les-Cotes

c. Eventual zone boundaries are as follows:

Moselle Grouping (Brig. Gen. W. C. Davis):
East line, same as for normal zone
West line, same as for normal zone

Reine Grouping (le Capitaine Breitzner):
East line, Remenauville, Vieville-en-Haye
West line, Loupmon (excl.), Woinville (incl.), Savonnieres-en-Woëvre (incl.).

I Army Corps:
East line, same as for normal zone
West line, Flirey (incl.), Euvezin (incl.), east edge
Bois de Dampvitoux.

IV Army Corps:
East line, Remenauville (incl.), Bois du Four (incl.),
Bois d'Heiche (incl.), Jaulny (incl.).
West line, same as for eventual zone of west army grouping

II Colonial Corps:
East line, the Rupt-de-Mad River
North line, La Grande Tranchée de Calonne.

V Army Corps:
South line, Vaux-les-Palameix (incl.), Dompierre-aux-Bois
Deuxnouds-aux-Bois (incl.).

3. Missions of the Army Artillery:
A. The army artillery (including railway artillery reserve) will maintain.
   a. Counterbattery and destructive fire upon:
      Hill 1 km. west of Loupmon
      Vicinity of St-Mihitel
      Important points in the Forêt de la Montagne
      Combres and vicinity
   and outside the normal zones of the army corps
b. An intense bombardment on hostile strong points near:
   Norroy
   Villers-sous-Preny
   Vilcey-sur-Trey
   and on the hostile second position.

c. Harassing and prohibitive fire upon:
   Railroad junctions and important places near Metz
   Moselle Valley from Corny (incl.) south to Norroy (incl.),
   Gorze.
   Valley of the Rupt de Mad, from its mouth to Bouillonville
   (incl.)
   Preney
   Vieville-en-Haye
   Mars-la-Tour
   Conflans-en-Jarnisy
   Railway and highway from Heudicourt (incl.) to
   Herbeuville (incl.)
   St-Benoît-en-Woëvre
   Pannes
   Nonsard
   Tunnels through Hill [of] Le Mont (north and west of Loupmon)

   d. Army artillery will cease firing on points within the following areas
   at the hours designated:

   Southern Attack:
   South of 1st Phase Line, I and IV Corps, at H hour
   South of 1st Day Line, Fr. II Colonial Corps, at H hour
   South of 1st Day Line, I and IV Corps, at H plus 3 hours
   South of 1st Phase, 2d Day Line, at an hour to be
   designated by the Commanding General, IV Corps

   Western Attack: Lines and hours to be designated by Commanding General,
   V Corps, in agreement with Commanding General, Fr. II Colonial Corps.
   Firing by army artillery within the normal zone of the artillery of the
   Fr. II Colonial Corps will not be executed after H plus 2 hours except upon request of
   the Chief of Artillery, Fr. II Colonial Corps.
   The firing on the region Vigneulles-les-Hattonchatel, Creue, Heudicourt
   will cease upon orders from the chief of artillery of the army.

   4. General Organization of Command:
   Chief of Artillery: Major General E. F. Mc McLachlin, Jr.,
   (Code: Waterfall Seven).
   The army artillery is divided into tactical groupings as follows:
   (a) East Grouping: Col. J. A. Moore.
      C. P. at Domevre (Code: Underwood)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery D, 53d Artillery (CAC)</th>
<th>Btys.</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 42d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Battalion, 52d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>(Walker)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Battery, 76th Regiment Artillery</td>
<td>(French)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19th Battery, 78th Regiment Artillery</td>
<td>(French)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Battery, 77th Regiment Artillery</td>
<td>(French)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d Battery, 77th Regiment Artillery</td>
<td>(French)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Battalion, 53d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Central Grouping: Col. J. H. Pirie
      C. P. at Grimaucourt (Code: Union)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery D, 77th Regiment, Artillery (French)</th>
<th>Btys.</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Battery, 77th Regiment, Artillery (French)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery C, 53d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery B, 43d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) North Grouping: Col. R. F. McMillan
      C. P. at Dieue-sur-Meuse (Code: Uncle)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery D, 77th Regiment, Artillery (French)</th>
<th>Btys.</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Battalion, 52d Artillery (CAC) (Green)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Btry. B, 53d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22d Battery, 77th Regiment Artillery (French)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 43d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery A, 53d Artillery (CAC)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Battalion, 43d Artillery (CAC) (Noyes)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19-G</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

      C. P. at Salzerais (Code: Davis)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery D, 77th Regiment, Artillery (French)</th>
<th>Btys.</th>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65th Artillery, CAC (less 1 bn.) (U. S.)</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9.2&quot; H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st Artillery, CAC (less 1 bn.) (U. S.)</td>
<td>8 - 270M and</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>240 H St.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., 71st Artillery (French)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>240 TR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th and 11th Bns., 73d Artillery (French)</td>
<td>8 - 270M and</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>293 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st and 9th Btrys. Navy French</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16-cm.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 btry. (Manned by detachment)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 211 -
C. Reine Grouping: Capitaine Breitzner, French Artillery.  
C. P. at Ferme de la Migoterie (Code: Breitzner)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Guns</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Battalion, 71st Artillery (French)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13th Battery, Navy, French</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. Antiaircraft Artillery:

Sector E (Grouping):
2d, 3d and 9th sections (trailers) (French), 6 guns,  
Batteries A and C, 2d A. A. C. Battalion (CAC)

Sector D (19th Grouping):
9th, 38th and 74th sections (Auto Cannon) (French), 6 guns.  
Hq. Sp. and Battery A, 2d A. A. C. Battalion (CAC).

Sector C (23d Grouping):
17th, 32d and 72d sections (Auto Cannon) (French), 6 guns.  
Batteries B, C and D, 2d A. A. C. Battalion (CAC).

Sector B:
57th, 70th 119th, 163d, 164th and 208th sections  
(Semi-fixed) (French) | 12 guns |
7th Antiaircraft Battery (CAC)  
One section 146th Regiment (French) | 8 machine guns |
9th section of projection (French) | 4 searchlights |

Sector A:
48th, 51st, 55th and 125th Posts (semi-fixed) (French)  
Battery B, 1st A. A. C. Battalion (CAC) | 2 guns |
Co. B, 1st A. A. C. M. G. Battalion | 12 guns |

To cover front of I and IV Corps:
1st A. A. C. M. G. Battalion (less Co. B) | 36 guns |
Co. A, 2d A. A. C. M. G. Battalion | 12 guns |
Cos. A and B, 56th Engineers (searchlights) | 27 searchlights |

5. Commanders, Command Posts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Command Post</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McGlachlin</td>
<td>Ligny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamberlaine</td>
<td>Morlaincourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moore</td>
<td>Domevre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirie</td>
<td>Grimaucourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McMillan</td>
<td>Dieue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway Artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Railway Grouping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Railway Grouping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Railway Grouping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moselle Grouping</td>
<td>Davis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reine Grouping</td>
<td>Breitzner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Artillery</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saizerais</td>
<td>Ferme de la Migoterie (N. W. of Sanzey)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Antiaircraft Artillery

Sector E  Collins  Ligny
Sector D  Lucy  Dieulouard
Sector C  Faget  Tremblécourt
Sector B  Machet  Royaumeix
Sector A  Lebourhis  Commercy
          Goulard  Les Monthairons

Chief of Artillery
I Corps  Vincent  Saizerais
IV Corps  Lassiter  Royaumeix
II Colonial Corps  Jacquey  Ernecourt
V Corps  Alexandre  Benoittevaux

6. Balloon units of the Air Service are assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Railway</td>
<td>11th Company (AEF)</td>
<td>Gezoncourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>39th Company (French)</td>
<td>Bois de la Rappe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Railway</td>
<td>10th Company (AEF)</td>
<td>Royaumeix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>41st Company (French)</td>
<td>Gironville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Railway</td>
<td>93d Company (French)</td>
<td>Genicourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moselle</td>
<td>39th Company (French)</td>
<td>Bois de la Rappe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11th Company (AEF)</td>
<td>Gezoncourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reine</td>
<td>41st Company (French)</td>
<td>Gironville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10th Company (AEF)</td>
<td>Royaumeix</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. Observation squadrons of the air service are assigned as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grouping</th>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Railway</td>
<td>219th Squadron (French)</td>
<td>Lay-St-Remy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Railway</td>
<td>234th Squadron (French)</td>
<td>Lay-St-Remy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Railway</td>
<td>225th Squadron (French)</td>
<td>Belrain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moselle</td>
<td>206th Squadron (French)</td>
<td>Bicqueley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reine</td>
<td>234th Squadron (French)</td>
<td>Lay-St-Remy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

--------
THIAUCOURT-BOIS d'HEICHE AREA
Looking north from vicinity of Thiaucourt
PLAN OF EMPLOYMENT OF TANKS

September 5, 1918.

1. Based on the general plan, detailed reconnaissances, and the troops to be available, viz., 1 regiment French light tanks; 1 groupment and 2 groups, French medium tanks; American 1st Brigade (2 bns. light tanks) and Headquarters American 3d Brigade; the following allotment of tanks is made:

(a) Allotment:
   (1) The French 505th Regiment (3 battalions) and one groupment, to the I Corps.

   Liaison with the corps to be maintained by the Chief of Staff, tank corps and Headquarters American 3d Brigade.

   Detraining points: Bois-de-Villers-en-Haye
   Bois de la Rappe

   (2) The American 1st Brigade (2 battalions) and French groups to the IV Corps.

   Detraining point: Ansauville.

(b) Headquarters Tank Corps Troops at Ecrouves.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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ANNEX NO. 3 (Field Orders No. 9) September 7, 1918.

Subject: Plan of Employment of Air Service Units, American First Army

1. Plan of Employment: This will consist of four stages, as enumerated below:

   A. Early preparation (from now to day of attack)
   B. Preparation immediately preceding the attack (from the beginning of the artillery preparation);
   C. The attack (1st and 2d days);
   D. The exploitation.

   A. Early Preparation (from now to day of attack):

      I. Its general intent:

      (a) Keeping up the normal bombardment of the sector so as not to draw enemy’s attention to our air concentration.
      (b) Preventing access to our lines of hostile reconnaissance aviation - Hindering the observation work of hostile balloons.
      (c) Gathering all information necessary to the preparation of the attack, especially for the artillery preparation.

      These missions should be carried out so as not to change the usual aspect of the sector.

      II. Missions of Each Branch of Aviation:

      (a) Bombardment - French Night Bombardment, British Day and Night Bombardment - the normal bombardment of the sector
      (b) Pursuit -

      (1) French Air Division Pursuit Aviation: Will be ready to act D-2.

      It will only be called upon to act during this period if the activity of hostile
aviation should make it necessary to strengthen the army pursuit groups, and only in such proportion as will be necessary to prevent enemy reconnaissance inside our lines.

(2) Army Pursuit Aviation (4 groups): It will insure the absolute barrage of the front and protect our observation aviation at every altitude, from the Verdun-Etain Road as far as the region N. E. of Nancy. It will carry out offensive patrols; attack balloons and troops on the ground, when ordered.

(c) Army Reconnaissance Aviation: Photographic reconnaissance will be carried on beyond the line marked by the following points: Pagny-sur-Moselle, Preny, Jaulny, St-Benoit, Vigneulles, Doncourt-aux-Templiers, Malzeray, Etain, as far as the Seille Valley and the Metz, Conflans, Etain Railway. Visual reconnaissance will be carried out by day or by night in order to watch the movements of concentration or possible withdrawal of the enemy between the lines mentioned above and Spincourt, Thionville, Boulay Line, according to instructions received from G-2.

(d) Army Artillery Aviation and Army Corps Aviation: Photographic reconnaissance and visual reconnaissance of kinds ordered by the army artillery and army corps as far as the line mentioned above.

Spotting of artillery targets and any adjustments or registrations necessary.

B. Immediate Preparation preceding the Attack (from the beginning of the artillery preparation):

I. Its general purposes: The action of aviation should be concentrated forward of the lines, as far as the hostile detraining and refilling railheads throughout the zone of operations. Enemy aviation and balloons should be strongly attacked.

II. Special missions of each branch of Aviation:

(a) Bombardment - Bombardment at medium distance from the zone of attack dealing with detraining and refilling railheads, such as - Metz, Chambly, Conflans, Dommary, Baroncourt, Longuyon, bridge of the Meuse between Dun and Sedan.

Hostile Posts of command. Important aviation fields, previously ordered by G-3.

(b) Pursuit:

(1) Aerial Division - Will destroy all hostile aviation and balloons throughout the zone assigned to the army corps as far as the line of exploitation, and on the flanks, as far as 12 kilometers north of Pont-a-Mousson, and as far as Etain inclusive.

(2) Army Pursuit Groups - Will destroy all hostile aviation in front of our lines to a depth of five kilometers. Will insure the absolute liberty of action of our observation aviation and balloons throughout this zone.

Will attack those hostile balloons, which are considered especially dangerous.

(c) Army Reconnaissance work - Reconnaissance (Photographic and visual) of the whole sector allotted to the army observation group.

(d) Artillery and Army Corps Aviation:

(1) Photographs of destructions.

(2) Observation of artillery fire.

(3) Surveillance.

(4) Reconnaissance and command.

C. The Attack (1st and 2d days):

I. General Purposes: Same as during preceding period. The aviation will take every occasion to attack troops, trains and important targets on the ground.

II. Especial Missions of each Branch of Aviation:

(a) Bombardment - Attack of all important objectives, such as large gatherings of troops, material, airdomes, and P. C.'s.

(b) Pursuit - Same as during preceding period. Moreover, low-flying patrols should attack with bombs and machine guns, either enemy reinforcements marching to the attack, or enemy elements retreating.
(c) Army Reconnaissance: Same as during preceding period.
(d) Army Artillery Aviation and Army Corps Aviation:
   (1) Observing artillery fire and its destructions.
   (2) Liaison with infantry.
   (3) Observation for the benefit of the high command of the maneuver
of the enemy.

D. The Exploitation: The same system will be followed as in the period of attack -
it being varied according to the necessities of the moment.

* * * * *

The plans for the utilization of aeronautical units with the army artillery and with
the army corps conform to the general scheme and are prepared in detail by those units.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

---

ANNEX NO. 4 (Field Orders No. 9) September 7, 1918.

Subject: Plan of Liaison

Part I

Means of Information

[Extract]

1. Liaison Agents:
   (a) The First Army will detail one officer to each of the following units to
   act as liaison agents for the operation:
       I Corps P. C. Salzerais
       IV Corps P. C. Royaumetz
       French II Colonial Corps Ernecourt
       V Corps P. C. Ancemont
   (b) Each corps will detail one officer to act as liaison agent at the P. C. of
   the army.
   (c) All of the above mentioned officers will be provided with motor transporta-
   tion and will report to the P. C.'s indicated at H-12 hour.
   (d) In addition to the above mentioned liaison officer, each corps will furnish
liaison officers and make arrangements for liaison, both combat and information, with the
   corps at its right and left.

2. Army ground observations stations will be established according to the infor-
mation plan and arrangements will be made to occupy forwarded observation stations in the
   captured territory.

3. Air Observation. (See plan of employment of aeroplanes and balloons.)
Part II

Means of Transmission.

* * * * * *

(b) The existing army network of telephone lines will maintain the communications as far as corps headquarters. Each corps will arrange for the advance of the telephone circuits along its axes of liaison according to the corps plan. In addition to the lines along the axes of liaison, the army signal officer will arrange for a secondary axis of liaison from Cornievillle to Rambucourt---Beaumont---Flirey.

(c) The army radio net, with stations at army headquarters and at each corps headquarters, will be prepared to handle radio messages between these headquarters. All messages must be sent in code.

For characteristics, wave lengths and call letters see signal table already issued by the Chief Signal Officer, First Army (radio officer).

* * * * * *

II. Liaison by Visual Signaling:

(a) Each corps will make its own arrangements for visual signaling. The call letters of visual stations will be the same as those of the corresponding radio stations. Communication by visual signaling from rear to front will be exceptional and stations so sending should be located so as to be invisible from enemy observation. * * *

III. Liaison by Pigeons: Each corps will have at its disposal the pigeon lofts now assigned to it. Divisions will receive their allowance of pigeons according to the corps plan.

IV. Liaison by Motorcycles and Automobiles: The message center of the army will arrange for a regular courier service every three hours between the P. C. of the army and the P. C. of each corps during the entire attack. In addition a squad of three motorcycle messengers will be held at each corps P. C. ready for emergency work in case the telephone or other communication methods fail to function properly. In the same way a detachment of six motorcycle messengers will be held at army P. C. for emergency work.

V. Liaison by Signal Fireworks: See Conventional Codes 1 and 2, Appendix 1 [Omitted].

VI. Air Service Liaison:

(a) From aeroplane to ground, see Code 2, Appendix 1 [Omitted]. The dropping ground for aeroplanes will be located near each army and corps P. C. and the information concerning the location of these dropping grounds will be communicated to the air service.

(b) Signals from ground to planes, see Appendix 2 [omitted] and the panel signals given in Column 2, 3, and 4, Page 76-77, liaison for all arms.

(c) Signals for staking out the first wave.

(1) The staking out of the first wave will be done on demand of the infantry air plane which will use the conventional signal. (One cartridge of six stars).

(2) The staking out will be done by lighting red Bengal lights. In case the line is in the woods or the supply of Bengal lights has run out location will be given by firing red star cartridges on the ground from signal pistols. In addition small rectangular panels will be used to mark out the line.

(d) Radio from aeroplanes: The army and each corps will provide the necessary means for receiving messages from aeroplanes and call letters have been transmitted to corps and divisions.

VII. The assignment of numbers for the designation of towns and other localities is given in Appendix 3. [Omitted].
VIII. The list of indicative markings for corps aeroplanes and balloons is given in Appendix 4. [Omitted]

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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ANNEX NO. 5 (Field Order No. 9) September 6, 1918.

Subject: Plan for Organization of Conquered Ground

[Extract]

1. The following plan will govern the organization of the conquered ground in the operation directed in Battle Instructions No. 1, dated September 2, 1918, these headquarters.

2. Trace and Organization of Positions.
   (A) Position of Resistance.
      (1) Trace: Should the operation follow its normal course the trace of the
          army objective will constitute the first parallel of the position of resistance.
          Should the exploitation beyond the army objective justify a further general
          advance, the trace of the first parallel of the position of resistance cannot be defined
          in advance. Corps commanders must therefore select the strongest line available.
      (2) Organization: The position must be developed as a series of mutually
          supporting strong points grouped in supporting points forming a continuous line organized
          in depth. The rear limit of the position will be determined by the necessity of covering
          the artillery, which must be emplaced so as to be able to deliver effective barrage
          and counterpreparation fire 1500 meters in front of the outpost position.
          The prompt organization of the following localities will be given special
          attention: Bois-Friere, Boise-Claude, high ground south of Vieville-en-Haye, Bois-Gerard,
          Bois d'Heiche (eastern and northern portion) Bois du Fey, region of small woods 1 km.
          north of Thiaucourt, ridge between Beney and Thiaucourt, southeastern portion of Bois de
          Dampvitoux-[Bois de] Beney.

   (B) Outpost Position
      (1) Trace: An outpost position must be established covering a zone from
          1500 meters to 3 kilometers in advance of the position of resistance. The tactical im-
          portance of the army objective from Xammes southeast to the Bois-le-Pretre demands that
          it be held as the position of resistance regardless of whether or not it proves possible
          to establish an outpost zone farther to the front.
      (2) Organization: The position must be developed as a series of strong
          points affording a maximum development of automatic rifle and machine-gun fire, all
          organized in depth.

3. Distribution of Troops and Missions
   (A) Outpost Position: During the period immediately following the completion of
the attack and up to the moment the enemy has had sufficient opportunity to effect a large installation of minenwerfer, the density of the troops disposed in the outpost position must be greater than normal in order to cover the organization of the position of resistance by definitely arresting enemy counterattacks. Approximately one-third of the infantry and machine guns should constitute the garrison during this period. This density will later be reduced either by the extension of the front, effected by the withdrawal of divisions from the line, or by reducing the proportion of infantry and machine guns not to exceed one fourth of the number in sector.

Counterattack elements consisting of complete companies must be disposed under cover in rear of the intervals between strong points or facing probable routes of hostile advance. The position must be held intact against hostile advances until the organization of the position of resistance has sufficiently progressed.

(B) Position of Resistance: During the period of the initial organization of the position approximately one-half of the infantry and machine guns should constitute the garrison of the position, in order to furnish the necessary combatant personnel in the immediate proximity of combat posts and the work details required. The remaining infantry will be disposed in reserve positions for employment as counterattack elements or for reinforcing the position of resistance, which must be held.

4. Corps Limits: As soon as the army objective has been attained and the cleaning up of the interior of the salient has been accomplished, the following limits between corps will be effected, the adjustments being carried out, by agreement between corps commanders when necessary, as rapidly as practicable:

(a) Between American I and IV Corps: Unchanged, except that Bois du Beau-Vallon and Bois d'Euvezin pass to I Corps.

(b) Between American IV Corps and II Colonial Corps: Le Chaufour-Bois (divided), W. edge of Bois de Vigneulles (to IV Corps), Etang du Grande-Montfaucon (to II Colonial Corps), Etang de Champrex (to IV Corps), Montsec (to II Colonial Corps) Brousse (to IV Corps) Gironville (to II Colonial Corps) joint use of road through village, Jouy-sous-les-Cotes (to IV Corps).

(c) Between II Colonial Corps and American V Corps: Thillot-sous-les-Cotes (to II Colonial Corps), direct road and trail from Thillot to Dompierre-aux-Bois (to II Colonial Corps), Dompierre-aux-Bois (to V Corps), road via Seuzey to Lacroix-sur-Meuse (to V Corps) (including villages), Hill 268 and Forêt de Marcoulieu (to II Colonial Corps), Thillombois, Courouvre and Pierrefitte (to V Corps).

Corps limits in advance of the army objective will be as defined in the Plan of Engagement.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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ANNEX NO. 6 (Field Orders No. 9) September 6, 1918.

Subject: Plan of Evacuation of Sick and Wounded and Supply

I. Evacuation of Sick and Wounded
(A) I Corps, IV Corps and Army Troops

Severely Wounded
Army and corps troops in 1st Division sector, including 1st Division Mobile Hospital No. 39 at Aulnois-sous-Vertuzey, 1/2 km. south of Aulnois on Aulnois-Vertuzey Road
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location Description</th>
<th>Hospital Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All other troops west of Moselle River</td>
<td>Evacuation Hospital No. 1 at [Ferme de] Sevastopol, 5 km. north of Toul on Toul-Menil-la-Tour Road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All troops east of Moselle River</td>
<td>Evacuation Hospital No. 13 at Chaligny, 10 km. southwest of Nancy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slightly Wounded</td>
<td>Evacuation Hospital No. 3 in the Justice Group of Barracks just south of Toul will receive the overflow from the above hospitals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army and corps troops in 1st Division sector, including 1st Division</td>
<td>A careful sorting must be effected at the divisional sorting stations so that these hospitals are not overwhelmed with slight or gassed cases necessitating a secondary evacuation to hospitals to which they should have been sent originally.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps and Army Troops adjacent to IV Corps (less 1st Division)</td>
<td>Provisional Evacuation Hospital, Sorcy R. R. Station, about 1 1/2 km. north of Sorcy. Reached by one way road leaving Aulnois-Sorcy Road just north of bridge over R. R. and crossing over Canal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Corps and army troops adjacent to I Corps</td>
<td>Provisional Evacuation Hospital at Pagny-sur-Meuse Railroad Station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All troops east of Moselle River</td>
<td>Provisional Evacuation Hospital 1 1/2 km. north of Trondes on Trondes-Menil-la-Tour Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gassed</td>
<td>Evacuation Hospital No. 14 in the Perrin-Brichambault section of the Justice Group of Barracks just south of Toul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All troops</td>
<td>Provisional Evacuation Hospital at La Malgrange, 1 km. south of Nancy on Nancy-Richardment Road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagious</td>
<td>Gas Hospital, La Marche section of Justice Group of Barracks just south of Toul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All troops</td>
<td>Hospital for contagious diseases in Justice Group of Barracks just south of Toul.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sick, Nervous and Shell Concussion

All troops

Base Hospital No. 45, La Marche section, and Base Hospital No. 51, Favler section, of Justice Group of Barracks just south of Toul.

Army Artillery American and French

Evacuation ambulance companies will be stationed: one at Dieulouard, one at Domevre-en-Haye and one at Cornievile, subject to call of regimental or battalion commanders of army artillery units for transportation of wounded from First Aid Stations to evacuation hospitals as designated above.

(B) V Corps

Severely Wounded

All troops

Evacuation Hospital No. 8 at Petit-Maujouy [Maujouy Fme], 1 1/2 km. east of Senoncourt on Senoncourt-Ancemont Road.

Mobile Hospital No. 2 at Recourt. A careful sorting must be effected at divisional sorting stations to preclude the danger of these hospitals being overwhelmed with slight or gassed cases necessitating a secondary evacuation to Souilly where they should have been sent originally.

Slightly Wounded and Sick

All troops

Evacuation Hospitals No. 6 and 7 at Souilly.

Evacuation Hospital No. 9 at Vaubecourt.

Nervous and Shell Concussion

All troops

Gas Hospital, Rambluzin, 3 km. east of Heippes on Heippes-Recourt Road.

Nervous and Shell Concussion

All troops

Benoite-Vaux, 7 km. southeast of Souilly on Recourt-Neuville Road, (Selected cases).
II. Evacuation of Animals
I and IV Corps

As prescribed by corps commander.

To army animal evacuation station at Jeanne d'Arc Caserne, 3 miles east of Toul on Toul-Nancy Road.

V Corps

To army animal evacuation station at Souilly.

II Colonial Corps
(French)

As directed by corps commander.

* * * * *

(2) Corps munition officers will issue on demand of army artillery units in their corps areas such small arms ammunition as may be demanded by these units.

(3) Division munition officers will issue on demand of antiaircraft units in their areas, 8-mm. Hotchkiss ammunition in strips up to 1,000 rounds per gun per day of firing.

(4) Artillery reports will be daily, closing at eighteen hours. Infantry reports will be made every ten days.

(5) Attention is invited to instructions in letter from G-4, First Army, to corps commanders, on plan of ammunition supply, dated September 1, 1918.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

ANNEX NO. 7 (Field Orders No. 9) September 6, 1918.

Subject: Plan of Employment of Engineer Troops, Supply of Engineer Material and Water Service

1. The operations of army engineer troops, within the army area will be directed by the Chief Engineer, First Army.

2. Supplies: The following army dumps have been established and will be operated by army engineer troops, and from them supplies will be fed forward to corps and divisional dumps:

   Domgermain, Leoval, Menil-la-Tour and Manonville.

   In American sectors the following corps dumps are established and will be operated by army engineer troops:

   I Corps Dieulouard
   IV Corps Ansauville
   V Corps Rattentout

   Divisional dumps will be established in advance and operated by divisional engineer troops, under direction of chief engineers, corps, as follows:

   I Corps St-Jean, [Foret de] Puvenelle, Foret de Facq
   IV Corps Noviant
   V Corps Luxembourg [sic]
As the advance progresses divisional and corps dumps will be advanced as necessary.
Chief engineers of corps will arrange to establish forward dumps by salvage from captured German dumps and to keep their divisional engineers advised of the location of such dumps.

3. Light Railways: In the American sectors the light railways will be extended, maintained, and operated by army engineer troops. Immediately after the advance the light railway lines will be extended to connect with the German system along the following lines:
- Point-de-Metz [sic]---Remenauville---Bois-du-Four
- Flirey---Bois-de-Mort-Mare
- Bois-Chanot---Richecourt
- Amblonville [sic]---Mouilly---Bois de St-Remy

4. Highways: Divisions are responsible for the construction, repair and maintenance of roads in the immediate rear of the line. Corps are responsible for construction and maintenance in rear of divisions and within their corps sectors, in the eastern sector in advance of the line Dieulouard, Griscourt, Manonville, Ansauville, Mandres, Raulecourt, and in the western sector in advance of Rupt.

Army road troops will repair and maintain all highways in rear of the points above mentioned. As the advance progresses, army troops will take over additional area as the chief engineer, army, may designate, until such time as new limits are defined. Chief engineers, corps, will be responsible for work within the above designated limits.

Advance dumps for road material are established at the following points:
- I Corps: Mamey, St-Jean
- IV Corps: Noviant, Mandres (east edge) [Faux-) Bois
- Nauginsard, Raulecourt
- V Corps: Rupt, [Les] Trois-Jures

5. Electrical and Mechanical Work: Army electrical and mechanical troops will assist in the installation and operation of water points, and will supply and operate lighting plants for divisional and higher headquarters, and for evacuation hospitals. They will operate a shop at Toul for repairs to electrical plant.

6. Camouflage: Army camouflage troops are assigned to each divisional sector, and will operate under the direction of division engineers. A detachment has been assigned to the army artillery and will operate under the direction of the commanding general, army artillery. Corps commanders will call on divisional camouflage officers for necessary work for corps artillery.

7. Water Supply: The army water supply troops will supply water to water points, from which organizations will supply themselves. The attention of all organizations is called to the fact that the portable water supply will be exceedingly limited and every possible measure to suppress waste must be applied.

Corps engineers will be supplied with information as to water points available during the concentration.

In American sectors water points will be established at the following points in rear of present lines (organization transport will be sent to these points for water):

I Corps:

(1) Foret de Puyenelle, on ravine road, 3 km. east of Mamey;
(2) Foret de Puyenelle, on road, about 3 km. N. of Griscourt;
(3) On Limey---St-Jacques [Fme] Road, about 2 1/2 km. S. E. of Limey.
IV Corps:

(1) Minorville (Sterilized water)
(2) Grosrouves (Sterilized water)
(3) Etang de la Mosee, near crossroad (Sterilized water); this water point to be moved forward to Etang Neuf de Mandres as soon as practicable.

V Corps:

(1) Foret d’Amblonville - 3/4 km. W. of Les Trois-Jures crossroads. The project for the V Corps is still incomplete, and the point designated is the only one that can be given at the present moment.

As the advance progresses water points will be established in the vicinities indicated below, and will be supplied by army water transport:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>In Bois du Four</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps</td>
<td>In Bois de Mort-Mare, on road north from Flirey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Corps</td>
<td>On [Grande] Tranchee de Calonne Road in Bois de St-Remy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Additional advance points for drinking and horse watering will be installed as the advance progresses. * * *

* * * *

Water points are under the control of the army water supply service representatives of this service, including water guards, are empowered to control the use of water points. * * *

8. Ponton Bridge Equipage: A ponton park and ponton bridge equipage of three French divisions, with wagons, but without animals, have been ordered to Toul. These are placed temporarily at the disposal of the I Corps.

9. Zone of II Colonial Corps [Instructions given in addition to Annex No. 7, above]

* * * *

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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ANNEX NO. 8 (Field Orders No. 9)  

Subject: Plan of Circulation and Evacuation of Prisoners

CIRCULATION

1. Roads: See First Army circulation map. [omitted]
2. Traffic Control:
   (a) In corps areas by each corps except on reserved roads (Route Gardees).
   (b) In army area by army provost marshal (except on reserved roads).
   (c) At railheads, by the corps served by the railhead.
   (d) On reserved roads (routes Gardees) by D. S. A. (Direction of Automobile Services).

September 6, 1918.
3. Stragglers Post: established by corps.

PRISONERS OF WAR EVACUATIONS

(a) By divisions to corps cages, located by corps.
(b) By corps to army cages.
   No. 1 cage at Ligny-en-Barrois. * * *
   No. 2 cage at Pagny-sur-Meuse. * * *
(c) Evacuation Railheads for Prisoners of War.
   Nancois-Tronville. For prisoners accumulated at No. 1 army cage.
   Pagny-sur-Meuse. For prisoners accumulated at No. 2 army cage.

If necessary, on account of large numbers of prisoners, evacuations may be specially authorized direct to S. O. S. from railheads in vicinity of corps cages. Detailed arrangements under charge of Provost Marshal, First Army.

CAPTURED MATERIAL

Collected, inventoried and turned over to salvage service by corps at corps salvage dumps.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

191-32.15: Memorandum

No Preliminary Artillery Bombardment in Coming Operation

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 7, 1918.

Memorandum for: Commanding General, I Corps, IV Corps, V Corps, II Colonial Corps, and Staff Sections, First Army

The army commander directs as follows:

1. In the coming operation there will be no preliminary artillery bombardment. The artillery fire will start at H hour minus the time desired by corps commanders for the beginning of the barrage fire. The commanders of the I and IV Corps will arrange mutually the hour of starting their barrage fire. Artillery fire deemed necessary by corps commanders to conceal the advance of tanks is authorized. However, as far as practicable, this fire should be limited to the normal fire of the sector.

2. In connection with the foregoing, the army commander directs that plans be prepared by all concerned for a preliminary bombardment of 14 hours. It is desired that these plans be so completed that they may be substituted on short notice for the decision given in paragraph 1 above. However, there will be no change in the decision given in paragraph 1 above without further orders from these headquarters.
3. To include the hostile intermediate position, the infantry advance and artillery barrage fire will be regulated on the basis 100 meters in four minutes. The advance and employment of artillery during the advance beyond the hostile position indicated above will be based on the local situation in each corps and division.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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First Army, Chief of Air Service, AEF: 1105: Memorandum

**Control over Air Service, First Army**

AIR SERVICE, FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 7, 1918.

For Chief of Staff, First Army

1. The French Aerial Division has reported this morning and all units of this force will be in place within three days. All other air units, both American and French, are either in place or arriving. The British aviation also is cooperating with us.

2. It is therefore considered very necessary that the control over this very large force be made as simple and as systematic as practicable.

3. The missions of the aviation have been ordered by the commanding general, through G-3, the reconnaissances through G-2; the whole conforming to the plan prescribed in general orders.

4. In order to avoid any doubt in the matter your approval is requested as follows:
   
   That all tactical missions for any branch of the army air service be given to the chief of air service for execution. This includes:
   
   All American Army units or French units attached to the Army;
   The French Air Division;
   The French Night Bombardment Wing.

5. G-2 to give all orders for reconnaissance direct, and receive the reports direct of the reconnaissances ordered by G-2.

6. As the reports of missions performed in the various branches of aviation are addressed to the chief of air service, and as these reports often contain matter of interest to the Chief of Staff, G-2 and G-3, which require immediate action, it is recommended that such data be sent direct from the headquarters of the chief of air service to the necessary offices or officers.

Wm. MITCHELL,
Colonel, A. S., U. S. A.,
C. A. S., First Army.

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Assigns Air Service Units to American First Army

G-3
SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 163

1. The following air service units, having been placed at the disposal of the American First Army, will be reported to the Chief Air Service, First Army, for duty:
   The French Aerial Division, headquarters at Tannois.
   The 2d and 18th groups of night bombardment (French), headquarters at Epiez.
2. The 11th and 20th Aero Squadrons, now stationed at Amanty, are assigned to the First Army Air Service, and will be reported to the Chief Air Service, First Army, for duty.
3. Flights A and C, 360th Park Squadron, now stationed at Colombey-les-Belles, are assigned to the First Army Air Service, and will proceed to Vaucouleurs for station, reporting upon arrival to the Chief Air Service, First Army, for duty.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

Mines in Zone of Advance

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 8, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army
To: Commanding General, I Corps, IV Corps, V Corps and II Colonial Corps

1. Information indicates that following points have probably been mined. Due care should be exercised when in the vicinity of these points:
   Crossroads of Croix du Gue-au-Saut, southwest of Chaillon (1/20,000 map).
   Crossroad at Varvinay.
   Crossroads on road that leads from Hill 396 (west of Woinville) to Heudicourt.
   Crossroads on road that leads from Hill 396 to Bois-Jura (northwest of Apremont).
   Crossroad on the Grand Tranchee de Calonne at point 480.465
   The highways which connect the towns of the Cotes to the region Chambley, particularly the Road St-Maurice---Woel---Mars-la-Tour. This road is supposed to be mined about every three kilometers. Mines consist of small tunnels perpendicular to the axis of the roads (height of gallery, 1.8 m., thickness of road, 1 m.); passing through the roadway and having two mine chambers. To be discharged by electric wires carried in piping along road.
2. It is believed that Hattonchatel is mined, as important diggings have been made in view of its destruction.

3. The castle at St-Benoit where German army corps staff is located, is believed to be mined.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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V Corps: Gen. File 15: Fldr. 331: Letter

Changes of Command

V ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Benoitevaux, A. P. O. 768, September 8, 1918.

From: Commanding General, V Army Corps
To: Chief of Staff, First Army

I report the following changes of command:

(a) Command of the sector in front of the American 26th Division, passed to the commanding general of that division at 9 a. m., this date.

(b) The headquarters of the French 2d Division C. P. moved from Genicourt to Troyon-sur-Meuse yesterday afternoon.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, Commanding.

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V Corps: War Diary

V ARMY CORPS,
Benoitevaux, September 8, 1918.

[Extract]

Headquarters: Benoitevaux
Weather: Good to Rain
Roads: Good
Health: Good
Camp: Good

First Army Assign 1 co. Caterpillars to V Corps and transfers French 71st Arty. from V Corps to II Colonial Corps. 59th Inf. Regt. (4th Div.) now occupies front from Watronville (inclusive) to Tresauvaux (exclusive). Each bn. has three cos. in line making nine in division's front.

HARRY C. KAEFRING,
Adjt., V Corps.

\[\text{\ldots}\]

181-33.1: Operations Report

\textbf{Sector Activities of the I Corps}

507/G-3

61/3-0

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Satzerals, September 8, 1918.

From Noon, Sept. 7 to Noon, Sept. 8

\[\text{[Extract]}\]

\begin{itemize}
  \item The corps held the sector with the 82d and 90th Divisions in the line. Eight battalions in the first position. The 2d Div. was concentrated in the region of Francheville as corps reserve. The 5th Division Arty. was located in the southwest part of the corps sector. The remainder of the division was en route to the corps sector. The 35th was in the Saffais area with headquarters at Rosieres-aux-Salines. The 78th Division in the Chatenois area with headquarters at Chatenois.
  \item The 2d, 35th, 78th Divisions and the 5th Arty. Brig., did not move. Infantry of the 5th Div. moved north and is now in the corps area. P. C. 5th Div., Martincourt. A few batteries of French arty. went into position. The Fr. 49th Arty. was en route from Vitry-le-Francois to Bôis de Villey-St-Etienne.
  \item The corps on our right and left report a quiet day.
\end{itemize}

\[\text{\ldots}\]


MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

\[\text{\ldots}\]
Artillery Bombardment in Proposed Operation

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 9, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army
To: Commanding General, V Corps
      " " IV Corps
      " " II Colonial Corps
Chief of Artillery
Chief of Air Service

1. In connection with the proposed operation the following modifications in the existing instructions are given:
   (1) The infantry attack of the V Corps will be preceded by an artillery bombardment of four hours starting at H hour, the infantry attack to start at H plus four hours on D day.
   (2) The artillery of the 2d Dismounted Cavalry Division (French) will participate in the bombardment authorized in par. 1 above, starting at H hour and continuing until the beginning of its infantry attack, i.e. H plus five hours.
   (3) The remainder of the artillery of the II Colonial Corps will conform to the orders already given in Field Order No. 9 with respect to artillery bombardment except as indicated below.
   (4) The infantry attack of the 2d C. A. C. made to the west of the IV Corps will start not later than H plus 2 hours. The artillery fire for this attack may start, at the corps commanders discretion, before the infantry attack, but under no conditions prior to H hour.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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185-33.1: Operations Reports

No. 12

V CORPS, A. E. F.,
Benoitevaux, Meuse, September 9, 1918.

12 Noon, Sept. 8 to 12 Noon, Sept. 9

[Extract]

6. Own changes, movements and action during day: Relief of French units by American troops continues in 26th Div. sector C. G., 52d Brigade, assumed command of C. R. Liege at
19:25 o'clock. As a precaution against suspected enemy raid, line of observers was withdrawn and French artillery (heavy) fired into enemy's position, opposite right of 26th Div. sector from 19:00 to 21:00 o'clock. 52d Inf. Brigade will extend its north sub-sector limit to 2938---3333---3630 tonight.

246th R. A. C. (French artillery) is established in P. C. Toulon. The 2d and 3d Groups have relieved the batteries of the 273d Artillery (Fr.).

Two French planes over our lines during day.

* * * * *

T. H. EMERSON,
Colonel, Engineers,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Artillery Preparation for St-Mihiel Offensive

G-3
FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 10, 1918.

Memorandum for: Chief of Staff (through A. C. of S., G-3.)

As members of the Operations Subsection, G-3, First Army, we feel it our duty to bring to your attention the following points.

The decision has been made that the artillery preparation for the coming operation will start with the commencement of the barrage, but that plans must be made to put down a 14-hour artillery preparation, so that, if at the last moment it should be deemed advisable to do so, it can readily be done.

In our opinion this 14-hour preparation should be made. The reasons for this are here enumerated.

1. There is no instance in this war where an attack has been made against a position as highly organized as this one without artillery preparation or the assistance of numerous heavy tanks.

2. To attack this position without artillery preparation is taking a gambler's chance - it may succeed, but we must not be content with that: for, it must succeed.

3. An artillery preparation, considering the amount of artillery at our disposal, can do no harm, but can make the operation easier by shaking the enemy's morale and determination, by putting confidence in our own troops, by causing breaches in trenches and wire, and by putting and keeping hostile batteries out of action.

4. Such preparation will permit a certain amount of registration, which we consider vital.

5. From the moment the first gun is fired interdiction fire can be kept up to prevent the sending forward of any enemy reinforcements or altering his dispositions and can interfere materially with his exercise of command.

6. The artillery at our disposal constitutes a powerful weapon; to refrain from using it up to the maximum possible, without affecting the element of surprise, deprives us of a great advantage.

7. It had been hoped that large tanks would be available for cutting wire. Large tanks have not been forthcoming, and the small number of medium and small tanks are not sufficient for proper wire cutting.
8. Many areas such as woods, etc., should be drenched with gas before our troops are to pass through them, the gas bombardment on these places ceasing several hours before our troops arrive there. If there is no artillery preparation until H hour we will be deprived of the use of gas on those localities where the necessity of gas is the greatest.

9. It has been argued that if the artillery preparation is to commence on D-1 day it should start at daylight, otherwise many batteries, necessarily emplaced in the open, would be exposed to the enemy's view thus precipitating the artillery phase of the battle. We do not concur in this. Sufficient batteries can be emplaced in reasonably concealed localities to start the preparation at H minus 14 hours, the remaining batteries going into position at H minus 10 hours.

   Enemy batteries cannot interfere with our guns, however much exposed; our superiority is too great.

W. S. GRANT,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

G. C. MARSHALL, JR.,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.

---

To the Chief of Staff:

I concur in the above, and recommend that artillery registration be completed just before dark. The fire to continue throughout the night, with the attack at daylight.

R. McCLEAVE,
Col., G. S., G-3.

---------

191-32.14: Letter

**Designates Day and Hour of Attack**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 10, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff

To: Commanding Generals, I Corps, IV Corps, V Corps, II Colonial Corps, Chief of Artillery, First Army, Chief of Air Service, First Army A. C. of S., G-3, First Army, French Second Army, French Eighth Army

The army commander directs you to be informed as follows:

(a) The day of the attack is September 12, 1918.
(b) The hour of the attack will be 5 a.m., i.e., H (hour) is 5:00, Sept. 12, 1918.

The I and IV Corps will attack at H hour.
The V Corps will attack at H plus three hours.
The Fr. II Col. A. C. will attack as follows:
   (1) The attack west of IV Corps at H plus one hour.
   (2) The attack south of the V Corps at H plus four hours.
   (3) Designated raids will be at H plus no hours, i.e., at H hour.
(c) The artillery bombardment will commence at:
   (1) I and IV Corps at H minus 4 hours.
   (2) V Corps at H minus 4 hours.
   (3) II Col. A. C.
      (A) The attack west of IV Corps at H minus 4 hours.
      (B) The attack south of V Corps at H minus 4 hours.
      (C) The designated raids and rest of front of this corps at H minus 4
      hours.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

Hq. Army Artillery, First Army (1st Echelon), A. E. F., France, Sept. 11, 1918
Copy furnished for the information and guidance of commanders of railway artillery reserve, Moselle Grouping, Reine Grouping; for the information of chiefs of artillery of corps, who will receive their orders from corps commanders; and for the information of Chiefs of Artillery, French Second and Eighth Armies.

E. F. McGlachlin, Jr.
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of Artillery

-------

191-32.15: Letter

Designation of Time

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 10, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff
To: Commanding General, I Corps, IV Corps, V Corps, II Colonial Corps

1. Designation of time will be according to the French method, from 1 to 24 hours during the day instead of the English and American system of a. m. and p. m.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

-------

- 234 -
191-10.6: Order of Battle

1st Section, General Staff

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 10, 1918.

Issued by: 1st Section, G-1, General Staff, First Army

[Extract]

*****

Following divisions are placed at disposal of French Second Army for tactical control and administration.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Disposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>33d Division</td>
<td>Morlaincourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79th Division</td>
<td>Prauthoy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Corps Hq.</td>
<td>Saizerais-Liverdun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Division</td>
<td>Francheville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Division</td>
<td>Martincourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35th Division</td>
<td>Rosieres-aux-Salines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78th Division</td>
<td>Rosieres-en-Haye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82d Division</td>
<td>Marbache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90th Division</td>
<td>Villers-en-Haye</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Corps Hq.</td>
<td>Toul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Division</td>
<td>Rangeval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Division</td>
<td>Vaucouleurs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42d Division</td>
<td>Toul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89th Division</td>
<td>Lucey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V Corps Hq.</td>
<td>Benoitevaux</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Division</td>
<td>Vavincourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Division</td>
<td>Rupt-en-Woervre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80th Division</td>
<td>Tronville-en-Barrois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI Corps Hq.</td>
<td>Bourbonne-les-Bains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91st Division</td>
<td>Gondrecourt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REPLACEMENTS:

VI Corps Replacement Bn. Chalindrey

---
Orders

Announces First Army and Army Corps Artillery

G-3
SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 175

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 11, 1918.

1. The following organizations are announced as army and corps artillery. Organizations not already directed in orders are assigned as indicated herein. All orders at variance with these assignments are revoked.

Army Artillery

American

42d Artillery (CAC) (Battery C only); 43d Artillery (CAC) (less 1st Bn.); 51st Artillery (CAC) (less 3d Bn.); 52d Artillery (CAC) (less 3d Bn.); 53d Artillery (CAC); 65th Artillery (CAC) (less 1 bn.); First Army Artillery Park.

French

1st, 9th and 13th Btrys., French Navy; detrainment 6th R. A. P., manning 4 pieces 145’s; 71st Artillery Regt., 2d and 4th Bns.; 73d Artillery Regt., 8th and 11th Bns.; 74th Artillery Regt., 2d Bn.; 76th Artillery Regt., 20th Battery; 77th Artillery Regt., 2d, 4th and 32d Batteries; 78th Artillery Regt., 19th Battery; Blank Artillery Regt., manning 4 batteries 280 M; 1st and 9th Cos. Caterpillar Tractors (less 1 section); French Auto Repair Unit 282.

Army Reserve

60th Brigade F. A.
Artillery Assigned to I Corps

American

2d F. A. Brigade; 5th F. A. Brigade, 153d F. A. Brigade; 157th F. A. Brigade; 164th F. A. Brigade; 59th Regt. (CAC); 60th Regt. (CAC); 1st Bn. Trench Mortars.

French


American


French

160th Artillery; 176th Artillery (39th Btry. only); 212th Artillery; 228th Artillery; 250th Artillery; 308th Artillery (one bn. only); 342d Artillery (1st Bn. only); 454th Artillery; 456th Artillery; detachment of 6th R. A. P., and 250th Artillery, manning 23 pieces of 90's, 16 pieces of 95's, 12 pieces of 120 L's, 2 pieces of 145's, 2 pieces of 155 L's and artillery of Toul, 8 pieces of 120 L's, 2 pieces of 155 C's.

Artillery Assigned to V Corps

American

4th F. A. Brigade; 51st F. A. Brigade; 66th F. A. Brigade (less 148th Regt. F. A.);
11th and 16th Batteries French Navy; 71st R. A. L., 3d and 6th Groups—temporarily assigned to V Corps; 22d Artillery (Regiment); 73d Artillery (1st and 4th Bns. only); 86th Artillery (3d and C Bns.); 142d Artillery (6th Bn. only); 176th Artillery (17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 28th and 32d Btrys.); 203d Artillery; 211th Artillery; 246th Artillery; 282d R. A. L., 5th Group, temporarily assigned to V Corps; 330th R. A. L.; 420th R. A. L. (less 1 bn.) and the following sector artillery: 5th R. A. P., 15th, 16th, 22d, 26th and 28th Btrys.; 1 section 1st Co. Caterpillar Tractors (Fr.)

Artillery Assigned to French II Colonial Corps

French 16th Artillery; French 23d Colonial Artillery; French 39th Artillery; 57th C. A. C. (less 1 bn.); 71st A. L. G. P., 5th Bn.; French 103d Artillery (8th Bn. only); French 113th Artillery (8th Bn. only); French 120th Artillery (6th Bn. only); French 142d Colonial Artillery (1st and 3d Bns. only); French 176th Artillery (1st Bn. and 23d and 24th Btrys.), (5th, 6th, 7th, 8th Btrys.); French 273d Colonial Artillery; French 208th Artillery (less 1 bn.) and the following sector artillery (immobile): 5th R. A. P. (14th, 18th, 19th, 26th, 27th, 31st, 32d and 34th Btrys.); 6th R. A. P. (7th, 16th, 24th, 25th and 56th Batteries); 10th R. A. P. (17th and 18th Batteries).

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

191-32.13: Orders

Organizations Forming the Army Antiaircraft Service

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, Meuse, September 11, 1918.

1. The following organizations are announced as the army antiaircraft service. Organizations not already directed in orders are assigned as indicated herein. All orders at variance with these assignments are revoked.

(a) Artillery

French: 9, 17, 32, 38, 72, 74 Section, Auto Cannon; 2, 3, 9 Remorgues (Trailers); 70, 163, 208 Section, Semi-fixed; 48, 51, 55, 56, 57, 119, 123, 125, 164 Post Semi-fixed.


Btries. A, B, C, D 2d Antiaircraft Bns., C. A. C.; 7th Antiaircraft Battery, C. A. C.


(c) Searchlights: Company A, 56th Engineers (Searchlight); Company B, 56th Engineers (Searchlight) 9th Section of Projectors, French.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.
REGNIEVILLE--VIEVILLE-EN-HAYE AREA
Looking north from vicinity of Regnieville-en-Haye
Memorandum to the Chief of Staff

[Extract]

V Corps: Nothing to report.
II Colonial Corps: Nothing to report.
IV Corps:
Right Sector: Usual infantry patrols during the night. Unusually heavy artillery activity on both sides. • • •
Left Sector: Nothing to report.
I Corps: Usual artillery fire during night, especially on the sector of the 359th.
Movements in the sector of the 82d Division carried out according to schedule. Otherwise nothing to report.
French Second Army: Nothing to report.
French Eighth Army: 3 prisoners taken by the Americans in the region of Badonviller.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Memorandum to the Chief of Staff

V Corps: Nothing to report.
French II Colonial Corps: Instructions have been issued to all divisions in the corps to send out reconnoitering parties to take positions of all unoccupied territory, as a result of a report that a reconnaissance flight found empty enemy trenches as far as 2d line.
IV Corps: Nothing to report.
I Corps: Nothing to report.
French Second Army: Nothing to report.
French Eighth Army: American units serving with French Eighth Army carried out raid this morning 2 km. from Badonviller. Losses were inflicted on the enemy and one prisoner belonging to 20th Regt., 21st Landwehr, was taken. Order of battle confirmed.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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5. The corps held the sector with the 82d and 90th Divisions in the line; eight battalions in the first position. The 2d Div. was concentrated in the region of St-Piermont. The 5th Div., was in the region of Martincourt with division P. C. at Martincourt. The P. C. of the 78th Div., was at Chatenois. Mounted organizations were en route to the corps area and the remainder of the division was in the Chatenois area.

6. Mounted organizations of the 78th Div., continued their march and infantry moved by truck, commencing at 3 p.m., Sept. 10. Headquarters of the division is now at Roeville. The inf. brigades are in Bois de la Cote-en-Haye, except the 310th Inf. which was delayed en route. The 2d Div., (P. C. Bois-Montjoie) began the relief of the 89th and 90th Divisions by placing the 2d Battalion of the 5th Marines in the 1-bis position. Artillery of the division, either in or near the positions previously arranged. The P. C. of the artillery brig., was in the Bois-Montjoie. The 5th Div., P. C. moved to the woods southwest of Mamey---St-Jacques-Fme. Units of the 10th Brig., are in the forward area, the 9th Brig., is in the Queue-de-Theinare. The 90th Div., made the necessary adjustments for the occupation of the sector by the 2d and 5th Divisions. One battalion of the 257th Inf. being relieved by the 5th Div. The P. C. of the 90th Div., and 153d F. A. Brig. was established at Mamey.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Bombing Targets Designated

3d Section, G. S.

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 11, 1918---[6 p. m.,]*

Memorandum For: Chief of Air Service, First Army

1. The following bombing targets for this evening and tonight are designated: Vigneulles and roads in vicinity, to destroy transport and troops on the road [and block traffic].* Chambley---railroad center and ammunition dump. [Road junction of Champs just S. W. of Chambley (transport).]* Mars-la-Tour---railroad center, dump and airdrome (British). Gondrecourt---munition dump.

* Notation made in ink and signed by: R. McCleave,
Col., Gen. Staff,
G-3.
Valleroy (at once if possible) munition dump.
Metz (Station) (British).
St-Jean-les-Buzy---dump.
Dommary-Baroncourt---railroad center and dump.
[You will issue the necessary orders for the above and request cooperation of the
British Independent Air Service.]

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

--------

G-3, First Army: 123.02: Letter

* Operations of French 26th Division *

FROM FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrots, September 11, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff
To: Commanding General, French II Colonial Corps

1. Referring to your letter of the 11th instance relating to the day and date of the
operations ordered by the army commander, and specifically to the operations of the French
26th Division, the army commander has approved your request. The raid to be carried out
by the French 26th Division will therefore be made at H plus 4 hours.

2. In connection with the foregoing, the army commander desires me to call your
special attention to the necessity of learning early whether or not the enemy actually
does or makes any preparations for a withdrawal on the front of the French 26th Division.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

--------

* Notation made in ink and signed by: R. McCleave,
Col., Gen. Staff,
G-3.
From noon, September 10 to noon, September 11, 1918

[Extract]

5. Own Situation at Beginning of Day: The 89th Division continues in the sector on the right, P. C. Lucey; the 1st Division occupies the sector on the left, P. C. Rangeval; the 42d Division continues its move into center sector, P. C. Ansauville; the 3d Division moving into sector, P. C. Vaucouleurs.

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action during Day: The P. C:s of the divisions are as follows: 1st Division, changed to Beaumont; 42d Division remains in Ansauville; 89th Division, changed to Noviant; the 3d Division changed to l'Ermitage (W. of Bois de la Rehanne).

The 3d Division continues its movement into sector from the Vaucouleurs area.

The divisional commander of 42d Division assumed command of the divisional sector at 9 a.m., September 11, 1918. * * *

14. Morale: Good; Supplies: Normal; Weather: Rainy; Visibility: Poor throughout day.

S. HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Operations Reports: First Army: Tables of Concentration

TABLES OF CONCENTRATION
for
ST-MIHIEL OPERATION
(Aug. 26-Sept. 11, 1918)

Note: Items marked (a) are taken from reports of divisions.
Items marked (c) are taken from letter of Chief of Staff, First Army to corps commanders under date of September 5, 1918.
P. C.'s are taken from records of 2d Subsection (troop movements) G-3, First Army.
R. H.'s (railheads) from records of G-4, First Army.
Items underlined describe assumed movements based on the orders issued.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26-</td>
<td>82d Division</td>
<td>In line. P. C. Marbache. R. H. Belleville</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>90th Division</td>
<td>In line. P. C. Villers-en-Haye, R. H. Toul and Manoncourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26-31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8-11</td>
<td></td>
<td>In line. P. C. Villers-en-Haye, R. H. Belleville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td></td>
<td>Arches area. P. C. Arches. F. O. 6, First Army, Aug. 27 directed movement of wheel transportation and artillery by marching at once and foot troops by bus the night of Aug. 29/30 to the Saffais area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Wheel transportation and artillery moving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29</td>
<td></td>
<td>Foot troops moved by bus the night of 29/30. R. H. Rambervillers and Rosieres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td></td>
<td>In area in vicinity of Neuviller-sur-Moselle (from situation map).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>In area (P. C. Neuviller-sur-Moselle) R. H. Rosieres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2/3</td>
<td></td>
<td>In area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Received orders from I Corps, Sept. 4, to move forward. Artillery began its move forward night of Sept. 4/5. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery moving forward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Infantry moving forward.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td></td>
<td>Moving forward. R. H. Belleville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td></td>
<td>In area in vicinity of Martincourt. P. C. Martincourt. R. H. Fme Boyer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td></td>
<td>The infantry moved to position in the Bois de Martincourt and de Couleur and in La Queue de Theinare the night of Sept. 9/10. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td></td>
<td>The artillery completed its occupation the night of Sept. 10/11. The div. relieved elements of the 90th Div. the night of Sept. 10/11. P. C. St-Jacques Fme. (a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**I CORPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>5th Division</td>
<td>In line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27-31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area via Xevilly-Liverdun and Bieque [sic] ley-Gondreville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. R. H. Toul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. R. H. Manoncourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area in vicinity of Francheville. P. C. Francheville (c).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5-7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Fme Boyer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>On night of Sept. 9/10, div. moved into woods north of line Noviant-aux-Pres---Manonville. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In woods north of line Noviant-aux-Pres---Manonville. P. C. Lironville. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moved to jumping off position night of Sept. 11/12. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 5, First Army, Aug. 27, directed that div. move to 3d Area, vicinity of Clermont and Bourmont movement to be completed Sept. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29/30</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. R. H. Meuse-Montigny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. Vicinity of Bourmont. (From situation map.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Bourmont.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. P. C. Bourmont.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>S. O. 129, G-3, Tel. 163, First Army, Sept. 3, directs that div. move to 2d Area (vicinity of Chatenois) R. H. Certilleux.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Began movement night Sept. 4/5. (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### I CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>78th Division</td>
<td>In area vicinity of Chatenois. P. C. Chatenois.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Chatenois.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>The horse transportation moved out of Chatenois the night of Sept. 8/9. P. C. Rosieres-en-Haye. (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Horse transportation moving.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>The foot troops moved by bus the night Sept. 10/11 via Neufchateau and Toul to Bois de la Cote-en-Haye and the Bois des Trenches (a) R. H. Toul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moved into position in the Bois de Greney Bois de la Rappe the night of Sept. 11/12 (a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corps P. C. Saizerais

### IV CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26</td>
<td>89th Division</td>
<td>In line. P. C. Lucey. R. H. Sorcy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In line. P. C. Lucey. R. H. Manoncourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8-10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In line. P. C. Lucey. R. H. Manoncourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In line. P. C. Euvezin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26</td>
<td>42d Division</td>
<td>In 3d Training Area (in vicinity of Bourmont) P. C. Bourmont. R. H. Bourmont.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. F. O. 4, First Army. Aug. 27; directed move by marching to 2d Area vicinity of Chatenois, to begin at once to be completed by Sept. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. R. H. Certilleux.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 30</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Move to new area in compliance F. O. 4 First Army completed by midnight of Aug. 30 (Tel. 42d Div., 10 a. m., Aug. 31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. F. O. 4, First Army. Aug. 27; directed move by marching to 2d Area vicinity of Chatenois, to begin at once to be completed by Sept. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. P. C. Chatenois</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. P. C. Chatenois</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IV CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>42d Division</td>
<td>In area. S. O. 129, G-3, Tel. 162, Sept. 3, directs move of div. night of Sept. 3 from 2d Area to 6th Area. G-3 Memo IV Corps directed march to 6th Training Area during nights Sept. 4/5 and 5/6 in two columns, right column by Rainville---Vicherey Favieres---Colombey-les-Belles---Moutrot and left column by Neufchateau---Martigny-les-Gerbonvaux---Autreville---Barizey-Barizey-la-Cote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Began move to new area night of Sept. 4/5. (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In 6th Area. P. C. Colombey-les-Belles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 8, IV Corps, Sept. 6, directed move to position for attack on nights of Sept. 7/8, 8/9, 9/10 via Toul and Foug - Etang-Rome-Forêt de la Reine to relieve all of 89th Div. Troops in its zone except front line night of Sept. 10/11 and front line night of 11/12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>P. C. Toul. G-3 Memo. 52, IV Corps. Sept. 7, directed that left column conduct its march the night of Sept. 8/9 so as to have its head clear road fork 1 km. south of Trondes not later than 10:15 p. m. Moving to new area. R. H. Toul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. R. H. Manoncourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. P. C. Ansauville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Assembling in new area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In Forêt de la Reine with 1 bn. in vicinity of Beaumont and Mandres-aux-Quatre Tours and 1 bn. in vicinity of Hanoville. These bns. relieved troops of the 89th Div. night of 10/11. Entered line night of Sept. 11/12.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26</td>
<td>1st Division</td>
<td>In area vicinity of Vaucouleurs (Part of 5th Training Area). P. C. Vaucouleurs. R. H. Vaucouleurs and Manoncourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27-31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>1st Division</td>
<td>G-3 Memo. 25, IV Corps, Sept. 2, directed continuing movement to area south of Cornivel-Boucq line. Moving to new area. R. H. Sorcy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. P. C. Trondes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. F. O. 6, IV Corps, Sept. 5, directed that div. relieve troops 89th Div. on line of resistance in 1st Div. zone nights Sept. 6/7, 7/8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area around Pagny-sur-Meuse. Moved forward to position night Sept. 6/7. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Relieving 89th Div. in position of resistance night of Sept. 7/8. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Relief of elements of 89th Div. completed night of Sept. 8. (a) P. C. Rangeval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9/10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In Forêt de la Reine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26</td>
<td>3d Division</td>
<td>In Gondrecourt (st Training Area) P. C. Gondrecourt. R. H. Gondrecourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27-</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>S. O. 129, G-3, Tel. 161, First Army directed movement of div. from 1st to 5th Training Area night of Sept. 3. R. H. Vaucouleurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area (Vaucouleurs) by marching beginning 8:30 p. m., Sept. 4 (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area, movement to be completed night of Sept. 5/6 (c) P. C. Vaucouleurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Completed movement night of 5/6. In Vaucouleurs area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In accordance with F. O. 9, IV Corps, the div. marched the night of Sept. 7/8 in two columns, via Void and Pagny-sur-Meuse to position in readiness south of east and west line through Etang de Beuge. (a)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IV CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>3d Division</td>
<td>In position.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In position. R. H. Toul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In position. P. C. Boucq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In position.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corps P. C. from August 26 to Sept. 9 - Toul
from Sept. 10 to Sept. 11 - Menil-la-Tour

### V CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26</td>
<td>26th Division</td>
<td>In vicinity of Chatillon-sur-Seine (12th Training Area) P. C. Mussysur-Seine. R. H. Chatillon-sur-Seine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 7, First Army, Aug. 27, directs that wheel transportation and artillery be moved at once to Vavincourt area, north of Bar-le-Duc and the balance of the div. by bus on Sept. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moved by train to Ligny-en-Barrois night Aug. 28/29 (from records G-4).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 30</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In Vavincourt area. P. C. Vavincourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 2, V Corps, Aug. 31, directs that 26th Div. halt in place. Letter C. of S., First Army, to C. G., V Corps, Aug. 31, directs that the 26th Div. be concentrated in concealment in vicinity of Souilly. F. O. 3, V Corps, Aug. 31, directs that div. be concentrated with all elements north of Rumont by daylight Sept. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area between Rumont and Souilly. P. C. Sommedieue. R. H. Rattentout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In vicinity of Souilly. R. H. Souilly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 5, V Corps, Sept. 3, directs that the 52d Brigade be moved to the vicinity of Sommedieue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>52d Brigade in vicinity of Sommedieue. Div. (less 52d Brigade) in vicinity of Souilly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>26th Division</td>
<td>F. O. 7, V Corps, Sept. 5, directs that the div. take over front from 2d D. C. P. with div. concentrated in rear of the lines, all elements to be east of the Chaumont (-sur-Aire)-Issoncourt-Souilly Road by 10 p. m., Sept. 5. P. C. Rupt-en-Woevre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>The div. relieved the 2d D. C. P. Sept. 6. (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>French 15th D. I. C.</td>
<td>At Joinville-en-Vallage. The artillery directed to move north the night of 4/5, by marching and the foot elements night of 5/6 by bus, via Bar-le-Duc---Souilly. (Tel. No. 175, G-3, First Army.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 8, V Corps, Sept. 5, directs that div. on arrival in the vicinity of Sommedieue be placed in sector between 26th and 4th Div. Foot troops moved by bus night 5/6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In line and area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8-11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27/28</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 29</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>S. O. 91, G-3, First Army, Aug. 29, directed that division proceed by bus to the Vavincourt area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 30</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tel. 130, G-3, First Army, Aug. 30, directs that div. transport halt the night of the 30th and await orders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tel. 136, G-3, First Army, Aug. 31, directs that movement to Vavincourt be made as originally directed on night of Sept. 1/2. Wheeled transportation to continue movement to above area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moved by bus from Rimaucourt to Bar-le-Duc night Sept. 1/2. P. C. Reynel. (from records of G-4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### V CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>4th Division</td>
<td>In new area vicinity of Vavincourt. P. C. Vavincourt. R. H. Nancois-Tronville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In Vavincourt area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 6, V Corps. Sept. 4, directed that one regiment of div. relieve elements of the 10th D. I. C. and 2d D. C. P. that one bn. move by bus via Chaumont (-sur-Aire)-Souilly-Ancemont to the vicinity of Sommedieue and the balance of the regiment by bus the night of Sept. 5/6. 1 bn. moved night of 4/5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 10, V Corps. Sept. 5, directs that remainder of 8th Brigade move by bus beginning 7 p. m., Sept. 6 to position in concealment north of Sommedieue-Haudimont Road. The 59th Inf. began the relief of elements of the 10th D. I. C. and the 2d D. C. P. the night of Sept. 5/6. (a) 1 regiment (less 1 bn.) moving by bus night 5/6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Relieving elements of 10th D. I. C. 2d D. C. P. (a) 8th Brigade (less 1 regt.) moving night 6/7 by bus.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Relief of elements of the 10th D. I. C. and 2d D. C. P. completed this day (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 15, V Corps. Sept. 8, directs that div. (less arty. and 8th Brig.) move by trucks and marching to area north of Sommedieue-Haudimont Road, between Sommedieue and Haudainville the nights of Sept. 9/10 and 10/11. Marches beginning 9/10, horse transportation to move the night of 9/10 to Foret de Souilly south of Senoncourt-Dieue Road and to rejoin div. the night of the 11th. P. C. Haudainville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. R. H. Rattentout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area. In line (8th Brigade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In new area. In line (8th Brigade)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Corps P. C. Aug. 26 to Sept. 9 - Benoitevaux
Sept. 10/11 - Ancemont
### ARMY RESERVE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>F. O. 3, First Army, Aug. 27, directs that div. move at once by marching from the 14th Area to the area of Chatillon-sur-Seine, movement to be completed Sept. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 28</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to new area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Tel. from div. (G-1 Pendleton) Aug. 31, reported entrainment completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In new area. P. C. Stainville at 8 p. m., Sept. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Nancois-Tronville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3/4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. S. O. 145, G-3, First Army, Sept. 5, directs that div. be moved the night of the 7th into the region Ligny-en-Barrois-Tronville-Nancois-le-Grand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moved to Ligny-en-Barrois-Tronville area night Sept. 7/8 (Records G-3-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9-11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27- Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>33d Division</td>
<td>S. O. 134, G-3, First Army, Sept. 5, places div. under French Second Army and directs movement to area of that army to begin the night of Sept. 5/6. 65th Brig. night Sept. 5/6 (Tel. Freeman liaison officer V Corps, Sept. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6-8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>66th Brigade to move night of 6/7 (Tel. Freeman liaison officer, V Corps, Sept. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9/10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>P. C. Blercourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>P. C. Fromereville. R. H. Vadelaincourt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 26</td>
<td>35th Division</td>
<td>In the Vosges, Gerardmer sector. P. C. Gerardmer. R. H. Gerardmer and Cornimont.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27-29</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Assembling in vicinity of Gerardmer (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 30/31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. Tel. 142, G-3, First Army, Sept. 1, directs that div. move by rail night of Sept. 3/4 to vicinity of Saffais.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Corcieux and Cornimont.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Blainville.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Began entrainment for Rosieres area (a)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Entraining and moving by train to Rosieres area. P. C. Romain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving by train to Rosieres area. (a) Completed detrainment in Romain-Landrecourt (southern part of Saffais) area at 6 p. m. Sept. 6. (c)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. P. C. Rosieres-aux-Salines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Rosieres.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>The division moved to vicinity of Tomblaine ---Jarville---Maron the night of Sept. 10/11. (a) P. C. Liverdun. R. H. Champigneulles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 11</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>The division moved to bivouac in the Foret de Haye the night of Sept. 11/12. R. H. Toul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 27-30</td>
<td>91st Division</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 31</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. Tel. 139, G-3, First Army, Aug. 31, directs that div. be concentrated for entrainment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1/2</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Concentrating in area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 3/4</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 5</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. Tel. 196, G-3, First Army, Sept. 5 directs preparation of div. for active service and a rail movement by 6 a.m., Sept. 7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 6</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Division will begin entrainment Sept. 6. Began detrainment same day at Gondrecourt. Telephone message 78/Sec. French G. H. Q. Sept. 5. P. C. Gondrecourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 7</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In new area. R. H. Gondrecourt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 8</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 9</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>In area. R. H. Vaucouleurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 10</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>Moving to Void---Sorcy-sur-Meuse area. (From Situation map)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PAGNY-SUR-MOSELLE--VANDIERES AREA
Looking north-northeast from vicinity of Norroy
Combat

1st Day of Operation

ORDER OF BATTLE

Total army front about 88 kilometers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>II Col. Corps</th>
<th>IV Corps</th>
<th>I Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4-15F--26</td>
<td>2F--26F--39F</td>
<td>1--42--89</td>
<td>2--5--90--82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MISSION FOR THE DAY

Field Orders No. 9. September 7.
To attack at 5 hours on September 12 with the object of forcing the St-Mihiel salient.

Artillery preparation at 1 h.
A deep drive or main attack from the south with I and IV Corps toward Xammes---St-Benoit---Vigneulles.
A secondary attack by the V Corps southeast from Les Eparges.
A holding attack by the French II Colonial Corps.
The attack to be followed by the clearing of the St-Mihiel salient southwest of Vigneulles and exploitation towards the Hindenburg Line.
I Corps to attack at 5 h. with its three left divisions while holding with its right division.
IV Corps to attack at 5 h. with all three divisions driving hard on St-Benoit---Vigneulles.
V Corps to attack with its right - southeast from Les Eparges at 8 h. while holding with its left.
II Colonial Corps to follow up left of IV Corps at 6 h. To follow up attack of V Corps at 9 h. To make deep raids on rest of the front at 6 h. To follow up withdrawal of the enemy on the axis St-Mihiel---Hattonville.

NATURE OF OPERATION

General Attack:

APPROXIMATE LINE

The I Corps reached the army objective on the general line Jaulny---Vieville-en-Haye.
The IV Corps reached the general line Bois de Nonsard---Bois de Thiaucourt---Beney---Xammes with a cavalry patrol in the Bois de Creue.
The II Colonial Corps advanced its right to line Apremont---Loupmont---Montsec and its left to Dompierre-aux-Bois---Lavigneville---while elements entered the city of St-Mihiel.
The V Corps attacked successfully and gained the 1st Day Line and an advance was made toward the army objective.

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Operation of IV Corps

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 12, 1918—3 p. m.

From: Colonel Drum, C. of S., First Army
To: Colonel Heintzelman, C. of S., IV Corps

C. of S., IV Corps reported at this time that orders were about to be issued for the advance of the IV Corps to the 1st phase, 2d Day Line; the advance to be pushed. He stated that the 1st Division will be pushed to the line of the Ruisseau de Naugipont and to the south. 42d Division will carry the line from the east from the above river to the south of the Bois de Dampvitoux exclusive. 89th Division will carry the line from that point to Xammes. He stated that division commanders reported this could be done; that some of their artillery was now advancing.

Above advance was authorized with the following proviso:
IV Corps must take the necessary steps to be able to hold under any condition, the line of the 1st day objective. He was also told that the French attack on his left would be informed of the above and directed to advance in accordance therewith. The Chief of Staff informed me that the squadron of cavalry had been directed to move forward in the direction of the Buxieres-Vigneulles Road.

----------

IV Corps to Push to 1st Phase, 2d Day Line

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 12, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army, A. E. F.
To: Commanding General, French II Colonial Corps

1. The army commander desires me to inform you that he has authorized the American IV Corps to push its attack this date to the 1st phase, 2d day line, with the proviso that the line of the 1st day objective will be held for defense. This order will carry the left of the IV Corps through the woods of [Bois de la] Belle-Oziere and through the Bois de Gargantua.
2. The army commander, therefore, directs that the 39th Division conform to the attack of the IV Corps and that the 39th Division carry its right forward to the line of the 1st phase, 2d day, as indicated in the field orders of these headquarters.

Please inform me if this order is not clear.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

----------
**Estimate of Situation with Respect to Hindenburg Line**

G-3

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

Ligny-en-Barrois, September 12, 1918.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

1. A study of the reports of operations received this date indicate:
   
   (a) That there is no information to show that the Germans have moved any new divisions to the Hindenburg Line.
   
   (b) That there is information to show that he has rushed a few thousand men up to that line in the vicinity of Dampvitoux.
   
   (c) That from the statements of prisoners he intended to put up a resistance south of Pannes, and failing in that, that he intends to put up a resistance on the Hindenburg Line.
   
   (d) That there are many reports of wagon, artillery, and train movements, but that they are chiefly concerned with measures connected with a withdrawal; and cannot in themselves be construed as connected with the placing of troops in the Hindenburg Line.

2. My estimate of the situation, based on information available, and the lack of information pointing to the definite arrival of troops in any numbers on the Hindenburg Line is:
   
   (a) That enemy is making effort to withdraw his artillery and the bulk of his troops occupying the tip of the salient tonight.
   
   (b) That he has manned the Hindenburg Line with such small effectives as he had in hand to beat off an advance which startled him by its rapidity, and to permit a retreat through it.
   
   (c) That he will attempt during the night to bring in more troops to man that line - the number he can bring in being dependent upon the distance of disposable reserves from the line, and the availability of camions and trains.
   
   (d) That the troops retreating in front of our troops will be partially placed on that line; a certain proportion passing through to the rear; and others, consisting principally of machine-gun groups and some artillery, being disposed during the night to delay our further advance, and gain time for arrival of reserves.
   
   (e) That while he can make a stiff resistance on the Hindenburg Line tomorrow, he will be numerically much inferior to us for several days yet, but will have the factors of the knowledge of what to expect, and fairly strong works, to enable him to put up a stiff resistance on that line.

W. S. GRANT,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff.
Orders to Artillery and Air Service

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 12, 1918.

The chief of artillery stated at 9 p. m. that orders would be issued and would be received in time to stop all interdiction fire on the line east of Creue-Buxleres and north of the line Creue-Chalillon.

The chief of air service was ordered at 9:05 p. m. not to bomb Vigneulles after 11 p. m. tonight.

--------

Plan for Continued Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 10

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 12, 1918.

1. The First Army, A. E. F., has defeated the enemy, causing him heavy losses in men, material and morale. All of our divisions have reached their assigned objectives today and several have progressed a considerable distance beyond these objectives. The IV and V Corps are moving this night to gain contact with each other in the vicinity of Vigneulles.

2. The attack will continue tomorrow, with a view to completing the hostile defeat and gathering the booty.

3. A. The detachment of the IV and V Corps now en route to Vigneulles will close the eastern exit of the salient and prevent the enemy’s escape therefrom.

B. The I Corps will organize for defense and hold the army objective as indicated in F. O. 9, these hq. It will push exploitation parties to the exploitation line as indicated in Field Orders No. 9, these headquarters, and reconnaissances on the front of the 90th and 82d Divisions.

C. The IV Corps will, less detachment indicated in paragraph 3 (a), in close liaison with the left of the I Corps, hold the 1st Phase, 2d Day Line and push strong reconnaissances beyond the army objectives. The left of the IV Corps will be advanced to a position from which it can control the exits from the St-Mihiel salient and from which it can insure the capture of enemy endeavoring to withdraw from that salient.

D. The II Colonial Corps will carry out the following missions:
   (a) The 39th Division will continue the attack to the west in liaison with the left of the American IV Corps, and with the object of freezing the Apremont-Buxieres Road.
   
   (b) The 2d Cavalry Division (dismounted), reinforced by one regiment of the American 80th Division, will push its attack to the southeast, its left following the Trenches [Grande Tranchee de] Calonne, in close liaison with the American 26th Division.
   
   (c) The rest of the II Colonial Corps will push the attack on its whole front, forming a passage into the valley of Ruisseau de Creue. Close contact will be maintained with the retreating enemy. The original plan as set forth in Field Order No. 9, these headquarters, giving assignments of army objective remains the same.

E. The V Corps will push its attack to Hattonchatel seizing and holding the line of the army objective and pushing strong exploitation forces to the exploitation line as
indicated in Field Orders No. 9, these headquarters.

4. The air service will continue its reconnaissances and bombing plan as approved by these headquarters and announced in Field Orders No. 9, these headquarters.

5. The army artillery will continue to carry out the plan announced in Field Orders No. 9, these headquarters, except that no fire will be directed west of the line of the army objective after 1 a.m., the 13th instant.

6. Messages as heretofore to these headquarters.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 13, 1918.

2d Day of Operation

ORDER OF BATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>IV Corps</th>
<th>I Corps</th>
<th>II Colonial Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Corps</td>
<td>4--15F--26</td>
<td>1--42--89</td>
<td>2F--26F--39F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2--5--90--82</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note this corps policing salient - the V Corps and the IV Corps had formed a junction at Vigneulles.

MISSION FOR THE DAY

Field Orders No. 10 September 12 23:55 h.

1. The First Army, A. E. F., has defeated the enemy, causing him heavy losses in men, material and morale. All of our divisions have reached their assigned objectives today and several have progressed a considerable distance beyond these objectives.

The IV and V Corps are moving this night to gain contact with each other in the vicinity of Vigneulles.

2. The attack will continue tomorrow with a view to completing the hostile defeat and gathering the booty.

3. (a) The detachment of the IV and V Corps now en route to Vigneulles will close the eastern exit of the salient and prevent the enemy's escape therefrom.

(b) I Corps to organize army objective and exploit toward exploitation line.

(c) IV Corps to hold 1st Phase, 2d Day Line, and exploit beyond the army objective. Left to advance to a position from which it can control the exits from St-Mihiel salient.

(d) II Colonial Corps to continue its attacks.

(e) V Corps to advance to Hattonchatel - setting the line of the army objective and exploiting toward the front.

Nature of the Operation

Combination of the attack.
The V Corps and the IV Corps formed a junction at Vigneulles early in the morning. I Corps took Vilcey and Norroy. IV Corps occupied the army objective on the general line Hattonchatel-Jaulney and pushed strong reconnaissance toward the front. II Colonial Corps engaged in mopping up the St-Mihiel salient. V Corps reached the general line Fresnes---Manheulles---Saulx-en-Woevre---Wadonville ---Hattonchatel.

191-32.13: Instructions

**II Colonial Corps to Press Attack**

G-3

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

*Ligny-en-Barrois, September 13, 1918.*

Instructions to Commanding General, II Colonial Corps

In compliance with Field Orders Nos. 9 and 10, you will continue to press forward with your troops and will take over from the American IV Corps and American V Corps, the portion of the army objective now held by them, which was assigned to the II Colonial Corps in Field Orders No. 9 above referred to. The Commanding Generals of the IV and V Corps have been instructed to withdraw their troops from the front of the army objectives assigned to the II Colonial Corps, as soon as you have placed your troops in position on the line.

By command of General Pershing:

R. McCLEAVE,
Asst. Chief of Staff.
G-3.

191-32.13: Message

**V Corps to Continue to Hold Army Objective**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

*Ligny-en-Barrois, September 13, 1918---3:30 p. m.*

To Chief of Staff, V Corps

Continue to hold all portions of the army objective carried by you, which are located within the eventual zone of the II Colonial Corps, until the latter corps has occupied it with sufficient troops to insure its security. Then withdraw your troops within the limits of the zone defined for your corps in Annex No. 5, Field Orders No. 9.

By command of General Pershing:
FIELD ORDER
No. 11
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 13, 1918--23:45 h.

1. The First Army, A. E. F., has today completed the junction between the northern and southern attacks, completely cutting off the St-Mihiel salient and capturing many prisoners, materiel and munitions of war. The objective was reached at all points. Strong reconnaissances are now being pushed out by the I, IV and V Corps to determine whether the Hindenburg Line is held and in what strength.

2. (a) The army objective will be occupied by all corps tonight and organized for defense in conformity with the directions contained in F. O. 9, these headquarters. All corps will advance strong reconnoitering forces to the Hindenburg Line. Early information is desired as to whether or not this line is held by the enemy and if it is held, to determine hostile strength occupying same.

(b) II Colonial Corps will continue the mopping up of the St-Mihiel salient N. W. and S. W. of Vigneulles.

(c) The American IV Corps, II Colonial Corps, and the American V Corps will carefully guard all exits from the forests of the St-Mihiel salient to prevent the escape of enemy parties.

(d) The air service will continue its reconnaissances and bombing plan as announced in F. O. 9, these headquarters, special attention being given to enemy convoys with transports and troops and concentration of troops in the Moselle Valley. Early information is desired of hostile movements north of the Hindenburg Line.

3. The army artillery will reconnoiter positions west of the line Herbeuville--Vigneulles--St-Baussant, and will emplace sufficient army artillery to cover the entire front.

4. Messages to these headquarters as heretofore.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

-----
3d Day of Operation

ORDER OF BATTLE

Front of army about 58 kilometers

V Corps        II Colonial Corps        IV Corps        I Corps
4--15F--26       2F--39F                1--42--89       2--5--90--82

Remarks

This day really ends the active operations in the St-Mihiel salient.

191-32.1: Orders

First Army Continues to Consolidate Positions

FIELD ORDERS
No. 12

1. The enemy has made a considerable aeroplane concentration near Conflans. There has been considerable railroad activity today on the lines leading south through Mars-la-Tour, Conflans and Chambly, indicating a possible enemy concentration. An intercepted message stated he will counterattack tonight near Remercourt. Our patrols have crossed the Hindenburg Line in numerous places. The French Second Army has occupied the towns of Wadonville, Saulx, Fresnes, Manheulles, Avillers, Riaville, Pintheville, and St-Hilaire. The army corps report further capture of enemy officers, soldiers, guns and material.

2. This army will continue to consolidate the present line, establish an outpost line about 2 kilometers to the front and push strong reconnaissance in advance of the outpost line to maintain contact with the enemy.

3. No change in the orders for the air service. Program already established will be continued.

4. Chief of Artillery, First Army, has been directed to push forward heavy sector artillery in sufficient amount to support the entire front.

5. Messages to these headquarters as heretofore.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Changes in Corps Zones

FIELD ORDER

No. 13

Ligny-en-Barrois, September 14, 1918.

1. Change of corps zone and relief of corps headquarters.
   (a) II Colonial and V Corps: The Commanding General, II Colonial Corps will
   assume command of the present zone and front of the American V Corps on September 16 at
   12 h. The troops serving in the V Corps on that date will pass under the control of the
   II Colonial Corps, subject to existing orders for future movements.
   The headquarters American V Corps will stand relieved from duty in its present zone
   on September 17 at 9 h., at which time it will be placed at disposal of the French Second
   Army.
   (b) I and IV Corps: The Commanding General, American IV Corps will assume
   command of the present zone and front of the American I Corps on September 18 at 12 h.
   The troops serving with I Corps on that date will pass under the control of the IV Corps,
   subject to existing orders for future movements.
   The Headquarters American I Corps will stand relieved from duty in its present
   zone on September 19 at 9 h., at which time it will be placed at the disposal of the
   French Second Army.

2. Change of corps limits: The following limit between the American IV Corps and
   the II Colonial Corps is defined. It will become effective on September 16 at 12 h.,
   except that the limit north of Montsec will be adjusted by agreement between corps
   commanders at as early a date as practicable.
   Lachaussee---southern tip of Etang de Lachaussee---Etang Belian---Etang de Vigneulles
   ---southwest along trail in Bois de Vigneulles---Bois de la Belle-Oziere---Etang de la
   Perche---Haute-Charriere-et-Gerechamp---northwestern tip of Etang de Gironde---Fremereveille---Vignot (all to IV Corps except Etang de la Perche to II Colonial Corps.)

3. Change of P. C.: The post of command of the II Colonial Corps will be changed
   to St-Mihiel at as early a date as the corps commander finds practicable. He will report
   the day and hour selected for the change.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>P.C.</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5th Div.</td>
<td></td>
<td>St.Jacques [Farm]</td>
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<tr>
<td>35th Div.</td>
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<td>Liverdun</td>
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<td>78th Div.</td>
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<td>Marbache</td>
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<td>82d Div.</td>
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<td>Mamey</td>
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<td>90th Div.</td>
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<td>Menil-la-Tour</td>
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<td>IV Corps</td>
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<td>Nonsard</td>
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<td>1st Div.</td>
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<td>Beaumont</td>
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<td>3d Div.</td>
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<td>42d Div.</td>
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<td>89th Div.</td>
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<td>V Corps</td>
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<td>Euvezin</td>
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<td>4th Div.</td>
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<td>Fr. 15th D. I. C.</td>
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<td>Rupt-devant-St-Mihiel</td>
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<tr>
<td>VI Corps</td>
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<td>Bourbonne-les-Bains</td>
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<tr>
<td>II Colonial Corps</td>
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<td>(French)</td>
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<td>26th Div.</td>
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<td>39th Div.</td>
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<td>2d Cav. Div. (Dis-</td>
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<td>French Second Army</td>
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<td>III Corps (Att.</td>
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<td>to Fr. Second Army)</td>
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<td>28th Div.</td>
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<td>32d Div.</td>
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<td>33d Div.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29th Div.</td>
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<tr>
<td>37th Div.</td>
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<td>Vosges-Baccarat</td>
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<tr>
<td>92d Div.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vosges-Bruyeres</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS

St.Jacques [Farm] Moves to new area September 15/16
Liverdun Moves to new area September 15/16
Marbache September 17
Mamey September 17
Menil-la-Tour Moves to new area September 17
Nonsard Moves to new area September 17
Beaumont Moves to new area September 17
Pannes September 17
Limey September 17
Euvezin September 17
Ancemont September 17
Rupt-devant-St-Mihiel September 17
Rupt-devant-St-Mihiel September 17
Sommedieu September 17
Bourbonne-les-Bains
Rupt-devant-St-Mihiel
Rupt-devant-St-Mihiel
Apremont
Troyon-sur-Meuse
Laheycourt
Rampont Moves to new area September 17/18
Joinville-en-Ballage Moves to new area September 17/18
Fromerex Move September 17/18
Bar-sur-Aube Moves to new area September 17/18
Not selected September 17/18
Robert-Espagne September 16/17
Tronville-en-Barrois September 17/18
Vavincourt September 16/17
Vosges---Montreux-Vieux September 23.
Vosges-Baccarat September 17.
Vosges-Bruyeres September 21.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff,
G-3.
G-3; First Army: 110.03: Report of Operations

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

Ligny-en-Barrois, September 15, 1918.

4th Day of Operation

[Extract]

ORDER OF BATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V Corps</th>
<th>II Colonial Corps</th>
<th>IV Corps</th>
<th>I Corps</th>
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<td>2F--39F</td>
<td>1--42--89</td>
<td>2--5--90--82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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191-32.1: Orders

**Situation Remains Unchanged**

FIELD ORDERS

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

No. 14

Ligny-en-Barrois, September 15, 1918.

1. The situation remains unchanged.
2. Orders heretofore remain in force without change.
3. The daily issue of field orders will be discontinued, such orders being issued hereafter only when necessary.
4. Messages to these headquarters as heretofore.

By command of General Pershing:

H. A. DRUM,

Chief of Staff.

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282-12.8: Letter

**Assignment of French 69th Divisional Infantry**

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,

Ligny-en-Barrois, September 15, 1918.

From: A. C. of S., G-3, First Army, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, I Corps

1. The French 69th D. I. will be placed at the disposal of the I Corps to relieve the American 82d Division on the right of the Moselle.
2. The movement will be so regulated that the relief will be terminated by September 21, 1918, at the latest.
3. After the relief, the 82d Division will be assembled, prepared for movement under orders to be issued later.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff,
G-3.

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G-3, First Army: 110.03: Report of Operations

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 16, 1918.

5th Day of Operation

ORDER OF BATTLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>V Corps</th>
<th>II Colonial Corps</th>
<th>IV Corps</th>
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<td>2F--39F</td>
<td>42--89</td>
<td>78--5--90--82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MISSION OF THE DAY

Field Orders No. 13.
II Colonial to take over front of V Corps September 16.
IV Corps to take over front of I Corps September 18.

NATURE OF THE OPERATION

Stabilization and preparation for Argonne-Meuse offensive.

APPROXIMATE LINE

Manheulles---Fresnes---Champlon---Saulx-en-Woevre---Wadonville---Doncourt---Woel---
south of Etang de la Chaussee---Haumont---south of Dampvitoux---Charey---Les-Huits-
Chemins---south of Vandieres---to the Moselle.

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191-33.1: Operations Report

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF G-3,
Ligny en Barrois, September 17, 1918 --10 p. m.

Memorandum to the Chief of Staff:

[Extract]

French II Colonial Corps: No message received since 6 p. m.
IV Corps: Infantry quiet on the front; activity confined to patrols, all without
encounter. Increased artillery activity. St-Benoit---Pannes---Essey shelled. Our planes very active. Enemy planes also active, machine gunning and bombing of troops. We had six balloons up - the enemy seven. In accordance with orders, our advance posts were pushed forward. * * *

I Corps: Everything quiet; slight increase in artillery activity.
V Corps: Corps headquarters moving tomorrow morning.
French Second Army: No message received since morning.
French Eighth Army: Artillery activity considerably increased. Yesterday at Nomeny a dyke was destroyed causing inundations. Aerial activity also increased. Two fresh French divisions have just arrived in this section and the Germans are evidently expecting an attack in force from us.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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191-33.1: Operations Report

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF G-3,
Ligny-en-Barrois, September 18, 1918---6 p. m.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

II Colonial Corps: Very active circulation on the Road Mars-la-Tour---Baraques. Tractors seen on the road between Hannonville and Lahayville. Convoy of about a dozen vehicles resembling tanks on the Road Suzemont---Sponville---Puxieux.

IV Corps: Usual patrolling during the night. Patrols at Haumont state that enemy is mining as if preparing to leave. Slight decrease in artillery activity with heavy shelling at Xammes. Artillery reports blowing up enemy ammunition dumps and destroying boxcars; and a hit on a big dump at Lachaussee. The 89th reports a big gun to be in position just east of Dommartin. An increase in the enemy machine guns and in sniping. Enemy continues heavy shelling of Xammes-Beney and main crossroads. Active artillery reconnaissance on both sides. Allied plane brought down a German balloon at 4:20 near Xonville. The 82d Div. reports everything quiet. Extreme left sector is taken from the 90th Div. The western bank of the division is now the Moselle. The 90th Division had nothing to report.

I Corps: The I Corps stated that they had been relieved from the sector and reports were going through the IV Corps.

French Second Army: Nothing to report.
French Eighth Army: Nothing to report.

R. McCLEAVE,
Colonel, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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185-33.1: Operations Report

REPORT
No. 15

V CORPS, A. E. F.,
Ancemont, Meuse, September 12, 1918.

From 12 noon, September 11 to 12 noon, September 12

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: No change in situation from noon, Sept. 11 until 1 o'clock, Sept. 12, when artillery opened fire as directed by operation order.

2. Information Received of Enemy During Day: * * * Aerial observation disclosed the fact at 11:10 that Germans had abandoned the region of Seuzey and Domplierre-aux-Bois.

3. Hostile Movements, Changes and Conduct During Day: * * * Enemy was inactive until after start of our artillery preparation and then retaliated by scattered shelling and intermittent machine-gun fire.

   The enemy resistance was very weak as a whole and only a few strong points were encountered. These were held chiefly by M. G. fire. Very little artillery activity by enemy.

   *

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action During Day: Heavy destruction by artillery starting at 1 o'clock and at 8 o'clock rolling barrage was commenced. Under this cover infantry advanced to enemy's trenches taking prisoners.

   Centers of resistance were overpowered by our troops and at 12 noon the 26th Div. reported their line as running approximately along western edge of Bois-Chanot.

   *

4th Div. did not participate in the attack but patrols would be sent as directed by army commander.

   At 12 noon the French 15th D. I. C. had a general line front of the Cote [des] Eparges through the Ravine of the [de la] Gentille-Femme and extending around the north and west of St-Remy.

   *

At 9:15 Crete des Eparges---Crete de Bois-Brule and Crete de Combres reported taken by 15th D. I. C. Patrols from 15th D. I. C. have entered the Ravin de la Gentille-Femme. The French reported attacking St-Remy from the west M. G. fire active on Cote Amaranthe and St-Remy which is holding up capture of town.

   *

8. Orders Received: At 10:30---Army commander directed attack be pushed to first day line and beyond to army objective, maintaining contact with 2d D. C. P. and keeping contact by reconnoissance with the south.

   At 10:50---Army commander directs that the 4th Div. 8th Brigade send out small reconnoissance to feel out positions of enemy in their front.

   *


T. H. EMERSON,
Colonel, Engineers.
A. C. of S., G-3.

185-33.1: Operations Reports

REPORT

No. 16

V CORPS, A. E. F.,
Ancemont, Meuse, September 13, 1918.

From 12 noon, September 12 to 12 noon, September 13

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: There is a retirement in general before our attack, and in many cases it has developed into a full retreat.

3. Hostile Movements, Changes and Conduct During Day: Generally speaking the enemy have been retreating along the whole front. In many cases, however, there has been delaying action of infantry and in isolated cases stubborn resistance has been met.

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action During Day: The French after having met with strong resistance, captured the town of St-Remy and the attack progressed against Cote-Amaranth which was captured at 19:39.* *

At 20:45 the C. G., 26th Div., issued orders directing a march on Vigneulles, with the artillery following, the direction to be along the [Grande] Tranchee de Calonne. The div. moved in two columns, the right one advancing along the Grand Tranchee de Calonne and the left by small roads and across country. The head of the column was reported at 46.00-47.43 at 22:45 o'clock and had encountered no resistance and at 2:45 one regt. of the 26th Div. reached Hattonchatel. At 3:15 they entered Vigneulles, capturing 252 prisoners on the way, 6 auto trucks, 1 ambulance and some machine guns. Patrols were then pushed out to Creue and Heudicourt to get in contact with the American IV Corps.

The 15th D. I. C. commenced its advance at daybreak and encountered no rifle or artillery fire and advanced through Le Bouchet at about 6:30 and at noon they reported that all objectives had been reached, and that patrols are being sent towards Champion-Saulx and Wadonville.

The 4th Div. sent out patrols all along subsector des Hures, during afternoon, night and morning, reaching Fresnes-en-Woevre and Manheulles at 9:30 a. m. without resistance. This division kept up heavy artillery fire all along sector, diminishing about 7 a. m.

The 7th Brigade moved to Hill 378---40.8-53.5 to await orders of corps, arrived at 6:35 a. m.
The 26th Div. reports an infantry brigade in vicinity of Vigneulles and one in Hattonchatel area at noon.

8. Orders Received: The army commander issued orders directing that the 26th Div. and the 15th D. I. C. push their attack as hard as possible to prevent escaping enemy.

9. Action During Day and Orders Received and Issued: V Corps commander directed 26th Div. at 20:00 o'clock to advance along the Grande Tranchee de Calonne so that by daylight you will have established contact with 1st Div.

10. Results of Action Own and Enemy: * * * The activity of our troops caused a retirement along whole front and advance were made by the 26th Div. during the entire night without resistance. Prisoners were taken in large numbers in many cases surrendering without a pretext of resistance.


T. H. EMERSON,
Colonel, Engineers,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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12 noon, September 13 to 12 noon, September 14

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: The retirement of the enemy seems to be almost general along the right portion of the V Corps front, towards the Hindenburg Line, where it is expected that reserves will be massed. This is according to the statements of prisoners.

3. Hostile Movements, Changes and Conduct During Day: Enemy planes, nine in number, in V formation, seen south of Vigneulles in late afternoon, but the principal activity of the enemy at this time seems to be in effecting their retirement. Much of this is along the line Mars-la-Tour---Amanvillers---Harville towards Conflans. * * *

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action During Day: In the early afternoon, Sept. 13, the 26th Div. reported that units of the division are on a line running approximately from Creue through Vigneulles to Hattonchatel and St-Maurice, maintaining liaison on the left with the 15th D. I. C. in the vicinity of Hannonville. Patrols sent out in the early
afternoon from 4th Div. encountered resistance on the eastern edge of Bois de Ronvaux. Resistance also met with from the Tranchee [de la] Croizille in the shape of heavy M. G. fire. All patrols were subjected to artillery fire.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon the 26th Div. had troops in St-Maurice, Thillot, and La Grange Crossroads with more coming up and they report that the enemy is in full retreat and prisoners still coming in. The French 15th D. I. C. on the left of the American 26th Div. at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, announce that their regiments now occupy objectives fixed in the orders for operations, that there is no hostile resistance and that contact with the enemy seems to have been lost on their entire front. Liaison is being maintained with the American 4th Div. between Saulx-en-Woevre and Champlon and with the American 26th Div. by the French 5th Regt.

At 17:15 o'clock the French D. I. C. occupied Thillot and secured contact with the American 26th Div.

French troops were observed in St-Hilaire---Wadonville and Butgneville and the towns of Fresnes and Champlon were reported evacuated at 17 o'clock. The towns of Billy and Vieville ablaze.

Friendly artillery fire in the late afternoon was reported as being directed on Metz and French troops at this time are reported moving along the road from Fresnes to Marcheville.

* * * * *

During the night the 2d D. C. P. took over the line Vielilly-sous-les-Cotes, Billy-sous-les-Cotes, Thillot-sous-les-Cotes (all inclusive) from the 26th Div. Troops relieved started to new sector as assigned by F. O. 23, V Army Corps. In the afternoon of the 13th, French Cavalry patrols reconnoitered in the vicinity of Wadonville---Doncourt and St-Hilaire. They found Doncourt unoccupied. A rearguard was encountered at St-Hilaire and retired in the direction of Marcheville. Contact with the enemy was later established on the road between Marcheville and Butgneville.

* * * * *

8. Orders Received: * * * Memo from First Army---II Col. Corps will take over tonight from IV and V Corps the portion of the army objective assigned it by F. O. 9.

* * * * *


* * * * *

T. H. EMERSON,
Colonel, Engineers,
A. C. of S., G-3.
From 12 noon, September 14 to 12 noon, September 15

[Extract]


2. Hostile Movements, Changes and Conduct During Day: In the early afternoon the enemy was holding Haudiomont. They were also holding individual squad trenches and shell holes between Lachaussee and Dommartin and on this side of the Hindenburg Line. Enemy heavily shelled Manheulles and Bois de Manheulles at 15:30 o’clock and at 17 o’clock hostile artillery was delivering a greater volume of fire on this village, our troops having established outpost positions about the town.

At 18:40 the enemy artillery concentrated heavy fire on Bonzee at the rate of 15 shells per minute. * * *

Great activity of enemy antiaircraft fire also reported by the 4th Div. The 15th D. I. C. reports harassing fire of artillery on Jonville—Wadonville—Fresnes—Champlon and north of Saulx during the day.

3. Hostile Movements, Changes and Conduct During Day: In the early afternoon the enemy was holding Haudiomont. They were also holding individual squad trenches and shell holes between Lachaussee and Dommartin and on this side of the Hindenburg Line.

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Great activity of enemy antiaircraft fire also reported by the 4th Div. The 15th D. I. C. reports harassing fire of artillery on Jonville—Wadonville—Fresnes—Champlon and north of Saulx during the day.

4. Hostile Movements, Changes and Conduct During Day: In the early afternoon of the 14th our troops were in Manheulles and outskirts of Fresnes meeting opposition by M. G. and artillery fire; about this time our troops were being held up outside of Haudiomont.

During the late afternoon the 26th Div. reports that they had completely searched Fresnes without finding any of the enemy.

A French patrol from the 15th D. I. C. entered the town of Jonville driving out 2 Austrian and 1 German companies. This place is inside the Hindenburg Line.

5. Hostile Movements, Changes and Conduct During Day: In the early afternoon of the 14th our troops were in Manheulles and outskirts of Fresnes meeting opposition by M. G. and artillery fire; about this time our troops were being held up outside of Haudiomont.

During the late afternoon the 26th Div. reports that they had completely searched Fresnes without finding any of the enemy.

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A French patrol from the 15th D. I. C. entered the town of Jonville driving out 2 Austrian and 1 German companies. This place is inside the Hindenburg Line.

7. Own Changes, Movements and Action During Day: In the early afternoon of the 14th our troops were in Manheulles and outskirts of Fresnes meeting opposition by M. G. and artillery fire; about this time our troops were being held up outside of Haudiomont.

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8. Own Changes, Movements and Action During Day: In the early afternoon of the 14th our troops were in Manheulles and outskirts of Fresnes meeting opposition by M. G. and artillery fire; about this time our troops were being held up outside of Haudiomont.

During the late afternoon the 26th Div. reports that they had completely searched Fresnes without finding any of the enemy.

A French patrol from the 15th D. I. C. entered the town of Jonville driving out 2 Austrian and 1 German companies. This place is inside the Hindenburg Line.

9. Action During Day and Orders Received and Issued: * * * S. O. 185 First Army—calls for movement of 80th Div. and for it to report to the C. G., French Second Army at Laheyecourt at once for orders. * * *
S. O. 195. First Army, orders the 4th Div. to be assembled and prepared to march in
the vicinity of Ancemont. This div. will report to French Second Army.

* * * * *

Supplies: Normal.

* * * * *

T. H. EMERSON,
Colonel, Engineers,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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185-33.1: Operations Reports

REPORT
No. 19

 Ancemont, Meuse, September 16, 1918.

From 12 noon, September 15 to 12 noon, September 16

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: Line held by the enemy continues un-
changed. Opposite the 26th Div. sector this line ran roughly through Paried---Harville---
Jonville and reports indicate that it is now more strongly held.

* * * * *

5. Own Situation at Beginning of Day: Practically unchanged since yesterday. Con-
tinuance of consolidation and organization of positions.

* * * * *

8. Orders Received: Field Order 14---First Army. Special Order 195, First Army,
calls for assembly of 4th Div. preparatory to movement to Ancemont reporting to C. G.,
French Second Army. Special Orders 209, First Army, movements of various units. * * *

* * * * *

13. Plans for Future: New plans for this sector now in the hands of the C. G.,
French II Colonial Corps.

Morale, excellent.

* * * * *

T. H. EMERSON,
Colonel, Engineers,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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- 273 -
BOIS DE LA GRANDE-SOUCHE—BOIS DE BENEY AREA
Looking north from St-Benot-en-Woevre
From 12 h., September 11 to 12 h., September 12, 1918

[Extract]

The artillery preparation began at one o'clock in the morning.

Situation at 12 h.

The 39th Division; the attack on the right had reached the objective which was assigned to it south of Joli-Bois, eastern edge of the Bois le Ponce and Le Tombois woods, eastern edge of the Haute-Charrriere-et-Gerechamp Woods. Reconnaissance was pushed forward on Montsec.

The attack on the Bois-Brule redoubt reached its objective, but it could not go beyond having been stopped by enemy machine-gun fire.

26th Division: The battalion which held Hill 322, stopped toward the east, made slow progress towards the south.

The patrols and reconnaissance sent into the peninsula of Chauvoncourt and of Bislee and in the Ally Woods found the enemy's lines still occupied.

2d D. C. P.: The northern attack of the 2d D. C. P. went beyond the Vaux-les-Palameix ---St-Remy Road.

The attack by one regiment in the general direction of Seuzey---Dompiere-aux-Bois was launched at 11:30. It met strong resistance which required a new artillery preparation.

During the night a bridge was thrown over the Meuse between Chauvoncourt and St-Mihiel.

French troops entered St-Mihiel at 7 in the morning.
Situation at 12 h.

2nd D. C. P. reached the general line - crossroads [where] Calonne Trench---Creve---St-Maurice Road [meet]---Bois de l'Etanche---southern edge of Bois de la Cote-Roquant.

26th Division reached the general line east of Lavigneville---Bois-Chanot---Bois de la Petite-Pitancerie---[Champ de Manoeuvres] east of St-Mihiel---Bois-Pernosse---Bois de la Corvee-des-Pretres, and continues to advance on the Varviny-Savonnieres line.

39th Division marches from south to north in the general direction of the Woinville---Bois de Creve front.

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191-33.1: Operations Report

[Contemporary Translation]

G-3
No. 73 0/3
Ernecourt, Meuse, September 14, 1918.

From 12 h., September 13 to 12 h., September 14, 1918

[Extract]

2nd D. C. P.---The 2nd D. C. P. having reached all its objectives occupied at the end of the day, September 13, the Raquatet Wood north of the Calonne Trench • • •

The 2nd D. C. P. received the order to relieve during the night Sept. 13/14 the American troops on the front - Hill 360 (northwest of Hattonchatel) north outlet of Thillot-sous-les-Cotes.

After the relief, the advance posts and the line of resistance were held by one battalion of the 8th Cuirassiers on the left and by two battalions of the 12th on the right.

• • • • • •

During the morning of Sept. 14, the 12th Cuirassiers sent one company forward to Woel, captured it and took prisoners from the 64th K. U. K. [Austrian].

26th D. I.: The 26th D. I. as it advanced continued to clean up the wooded zone south of the Spada Gap. The battalion which had been put at the disposition of the 2nd D. C. P. rejoined its division.

• • • • • •

39th D. I.---The 39th D. I. kept up its advance in liaison on the right with the American 1st Division, and was located at the end of the day as follows:

146th eastern edges of the Vigneulles Wood, and the Creve Wood.

153d---2 bns. at Vigneulles---1 bn. at Creve.


During the night of Sept. 13/14, the P. C. of the D. I. moved to Woinville. The 153d and the 146th made ready to relieve elements of the 26th and 1st Divisions, between Hattonchatel (inclusive) and the northern corner of the Chaufour Wood.

On the morning of the 14th---the 146th received the order to push reconnaissances as far as the northern edges of the Tagniere Wood [liaison with those of the 2nd D. C. P. at
the Paquis Brook, and with the 1st Division at Hill 270, southern edge of Lachaussee Pond; afterwards to send patrols forward to Joinville.

• • • • • •

By order of the Chief of Staff:

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191-33.1: Operations Report

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, Staff
No. 90 0/3

FRENCH II COLONIAL CORPS,
Rupt-devant-St-Mihiel, September 15, 1918.

From noon, September 14 to noon, September 15, 1918

[Extract]

Our units are keeping contact with the enemy by pushing their reconnaissances beyond the army exploitation line.

• • • • •

The 2d Division of Dismounted Cavalry occupies the front from Thillot-sous-les-Cotes (inclusive) to Hattonchatel (exclusive) with three regiments.

39th Division of Infantry: The 39th Division of Infantry has occupied the woods of Tagniere and has pushed elements as far as the Farm des Hauts-Journaux.

The 39th Division of Infantry occupies the sector from Hattonchatel (inclusive) and the northern point of the wood of Chaufour.

In the two sectors, the relief of American units was terminated during the night.

The enemy is supposed to occupy the line Butgneville, northern part of the woods of Harville, the road from Harville to Jonville, Hadonville-les-Lachaussee—Lachaussee.

• • • • •

By order of the Chief of Staff:

(Signature illegible)

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For Sept. 15/16, 1918, Noon to Noon

[Extract]

(a) Weather: Clear

(d) Aeronautic Activity:

FRENCH

Great activity of our aviation

ENEMY

Night bombardment of St-Mihiel, Commercy, and Vignot.

(e) Visibility: Good.

(g) General Impressions of the Day: Slight enemy reaction in the region of Jonville.

The French line at present held by the patrols runs from the southern edge of the Bois des Hautes-Epines—Bois de la Vachere—Ferme de Bouchot [Bouvrot?]—northern edge of the Bois de la Haute-Voye.

By order of Chief of Staff:

(Signature illegible)

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184-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 23

From noon, September 11 to noon, September 12, 1918

[Extract]

3. Hostile Movements, and Conduct During Day: Enemy retreated along entire line of corps front. His resistance was slight and reaction ineffective. Machine-gun nests gave
considerable trouble throughout advance. Practically no aeroplane activity; very few balloons reported in ascension.

* * * * *

5. Own Situation at Beginning of Day: The 89th Division in sector on the right; P. C. Noviant; 1st Division in sector on the left, P. C. Beaumont; 3d Division continuing its movement into the sector from the Vaucouleurs area, P. C. l'Hermitage (W. of Bois de Rehanne); 42d Division continuing movement into center sector, P. C. Ansauville.

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action During Day: All reliefs and movements, prior to attack, completed on schedule. The IV Corps attacked with the 89th Division on the right; 42d Division in the center; 1st Division on the left; and the 3d Division in reserve. Promptly at 1 h., September 12, the artillery preparation commenced. This preparation lasted until 5 h., at which time the attack was launched. During the attack our troops met with but little infantry, machine-gun and artillery resistance. All objectives were reached. At noon, September 12, the line of the first phase, 1st day, had been passed. The general line Nonsard---Pannes---about 1 km. S. of Bouillonville---about 2 km. S. of Thiaucourt was reached.

The 3d Division moving to new position under cover of Beaumont Ridge south of St-Dizier---Metz Road.

* * * * *

14. Morale---Good; Supplies---Normal; Weather---Rainy; Visibility---Poor throughout day.

S. HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

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184-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 24

IV ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

Menil-la-Tour, September 13, 1918.

From noon, September 12, to noon, September 13, 1918

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: The enemy was retreating burning villages, woods, and destroying material. Our forces were in close pursuit. At noon, September 12, the enemy had been driven beyond the general line Nonsard---Pannes---about 1 km. S. of Bouillonville---about 2 km. S. of Thiaucourt.

2. Information Received of Enemy during Day: The enemy is apparently disorganized and is retreating as rapidly as possible before our troops. He has offered but little resistance. * * *

3. Hostile Movements, and Conduct during Day: No movements of large bodies of troops have been reported. There are numerous reports of small groups retreating in a general northerly direction. There has been no hostile artillery fire of importance; machine guns are being used quite extensively, the retreat being covered by their fire.

* * * * *
5. Own Situation at Beginning of Day: At 12 h. on the first day of the attack in the St-Mihiel salient, the 89th Division, on the right, the 42d Division in the center, and the 1st Division on the left had advanced beyond the first phase, 1st day, and were on the general line Nonsard---Pannes---about 1 km. S. of Bouillonville---about 2 km. S. Thiaucourt. The 3d Division was held in reserve moving into position under cover of the Beaumont Ridge, south of the St-Dizier---Metz Road, P. C. l'Hermitage.

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action during Day: All divisions of the IV Corps accomplished more than the mission assigned them for the day. The 89th Division, 42d Division and 1st Division, continuing their advance, passed the first phase, second day line and pushed strong reconnaissances beyond the army objective in their respective zones.

A regiment of the 1st Division was reported as having reached Vigneulles at 8 h. this morning, there making contact with the 102d Infantry, 26th Division, of the V Corps. All positions were being organized to assure the defense of the first phase, second day line. Liaison throughout the advance, good.

The 3d Division, held in reserve, was ordered to move forward to a position in readiness between Nonsard and Pannes, and just south of the Madine River; movement began by marching at 6:30 h., September 13.

Artillery---The divisional artillery continued very active, keeping up as much as the condition of the roads permitted. The heavy artillery fired on the congested enemy traffic in the salient.

Tanks did good work clearing machine gun nests, where same appeared, and attacking towns with infantry. Some difficulty was experienced in trenches. Gas used up much faster than expected.

* * * * *

14. Morale---Good; Supplies---Great difficulty experienced, on account of the bad condition of roads, in bringing up ammunition and rations; Weather---Cloudy and rainy; Visibility---Poor throughout day.

S. HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

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184-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 25

IV ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

MentHa-ToUT, September 14, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: The enemy was still retreating at noon, September 13, and had been pushed beyond the army objective. No enemy front line established.

* * * * *

3. Hostile Movements, and Conduct During Day: The enemy has not offered battle to our troops, but is continuing his backward movement in a general northerly direction. * * *

The enemy has renewed his aerial activity.

* * * * *
5. Own Situation at Beginning of Day: By noon, September 13, the 89th Division on the right, the 42d Division in the center, and the 1st Division on the left had reached the army objective, were organizing same for defense and were pushing forward strong reconnaissances for exploitation. The 1st Division had sent a brigade of infantry to the west of its sector, a regiment of which reached Vigneulles early in the morning, there joining with elements of the V Corps, and closing the St-Mihiel salient. The 3d Division was still held in reserve, moving forward to a position in readiness between Nonsard and Pannes, just south of the Madine River.

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action during Day: The 3d Division was withdrawn from its position just south of the Madine River, between Nonsard and Pannes to the positions formerly occupied behind the Beaumont Ridge.

No change in the 42d and 89th Division front lines. The 42d and 89th Divisions are digging in on the army objective and have pushed strong patrols to the northward, a patrol of the 42d Division reaching Woel. * * *

* * * * *

10. Results of Action, Own and Enemy: 3705 men and 33 officers have passed through the IV Corps cage to date. Full reports of prisoners captured not yet received from the divisions.

* * * * *

14. Morale---Good; Supplies---Normal; Weather---Fair; Visibility---Good.

S. HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

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184-33.1: Operations Report
G-3
No. 26

IV ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Menil-la-Tour, September 15, 1918.

From noon, September 14 to noon, September 15, 1918

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: The enemy held the sector in front of the IV Corps with elements of the 31st, 192d, 5th Landwehr and 35th Austro-Hungarian Divisions.

* * * * *

3. Hostile Movements, and Conduct during Day: Very little movement of the enemy observed. There was very little infantry activity. * * *

* * * * *

5. Own Situation at Beginning of Day: The corps sector was held by the 1st, 42d, and 89th Divisions in line, with the 3d Division in reserve behind the Beaumont Ridge.

6. Own Changes, Movements and Action during Day: The II Colonial Corps having
reached the army objective, the 1st Division with the 58th F. A. Brigade assembled in the area Bois de la Belle Oziere---Nonsard---Etang de Pannes. * * *

* * * * *

14. Morale---Good; Supplies---Normal; Weather---Clear; Visibility---Good.

S. HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

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184-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 27

IV CORPS, A. E. F.,
Menil-la-Tour, September 16, 1918.

From noon, September 15 to noon, September 16, 1918

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at Beginning of Day: No change.

* * * * *

3. Hostile Movements and Conduct during Day: 89th Division reports enemy patrols pushed out well in front of Hindenburg Line, although none were encountered. 42d Division reports practically no infantry activity.

Both divisions report an increase in artillery activity, although the number of batteries from which it emanated is not large. * * *

Aeronautics---Marked increase in activity. * * *

* * * * *

5. Own Situation at Beginning of Day: The corps sector was held with two divisions in line, the 89th on the right and the 42d on the left, and the 1st Division in support assembled in the area Bois de la Belle Oziere---Nonsard---Etang de Pannes; the 3d Division continued behind the Beaumont Ridge, with P. C. at l'Hermitage.

* * * * *

14. Morale---Good; Supplies---Improved proportionately with traffic; Weather---Fair; Visibility---Good throughout day.

S. HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

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From noon, Sept. 11 to 6 p. m., Sept. 12

[Extract]

1. The enemy held the sector opposite the I Corps with the 77th Div., 255th Div., 31st Ldw. Brig., and 84th Ldw. Brig. No action was in progress.
2. Examination of prisoners captured during the day identifies units known to be in the sector and confirms the order of battle. Prisoners state that an attack was expected, but not until Sept. 13.
3. Due to the element of surprise in our attack, the intense artillery bombardment, which preceded and accompanied the advance and the heavy smoke screen that concealed initial dispositions, enemy infantry made little effective resistance. Artillery reply to the preparation fire was slight at first. At no time was there any heavy and destructive shelling. Two enemy balloons were burned shortly after ascending. Enemy planes attempted numerous patrols over our lines with little success.

6. • • • The 78th Div. moved north and is now concentrated in the area between Martincourt and Domevre, with division P. C. at Rogeville.
7. The XXXII Corps on our right was inactive except for some artillery fire to support our attack. • • •

9. Artillery preparation for the attack began at 1 a. m., Sept. 12. In addition to army artillery there was one groupment of heavy corps artillery behind each of the attacking divisions, besides the divisional field artillery brigade. Each of the three divisions had additional units of French and American artillery under its command.

The 1st Gas Regiment put on a successful smoke barrage including some thermite bombs from 4" Stokes on the front of all three attacking divisions. The screen lasted from twenty to forty minutes according to the situation to permit troops to reach the jumping-off position.

The infantry attack began at 6 a. m. As stated above resistance was weak and ineffectual. Prisoners were captured in large groups as they came from dugouts where they had been held by the artillery barrage. The advance was made according to schedule to the first phase line. Progress to the army objective was rapid and by 6 p. m. all divisions reported this objective attained. • • •

There were two groups of heavy tanks and three battalions of light tanks assigned to the corps for the attack. One group of heavy tanks with the 2d Div., advanced a certain distance through the enemy first lines, but was held up by trenches and deep mud. One group of heavy tanks with the 5th Div. attacked with eight tanks—six were ditched and two proceed with the infantry, attaining their objective.

One battalion of light tanks was held as corps reserve and at 4 p. m. was at Regnieville. The battalion with the 2d Div. had great difficulty in crossing enemy trenches and took no part in the attack. One tank fell into a trap.
The battalion with the 5th Div. had the same trouble in crossing broken ground. Ten of the tanks finally reached Vieville-en-Haye. Each division held out one company which remained with the reserve infantry brigade of the division.

Due to intermittent rain and low clouds reconnaissance by aeroplanes was not very successful. **

* * * *

10. The line at the beginning of the day ran: Limey---Remenauville---Regnieville---Fey-en-Haye---at the end of the day along the army objective north of Thiaucourt, south of Jaulny, through the Bois-Gerard and from Vieville-en-Haye to the original corps line. On the left outposts were two kilometers beyond this line.

* * * *

14. The morale of our troops is excellent. The divisions in the line used less than half of their troops for the attack. The 2d and 5th Divisions each have one fresh brigade of infantry and none of the troops are greatly fatigued. Supplies; normal. There is great difficulty in moving trucks and wagons through the former trench area, but all available men are at work constructing and repairing roads. Weather; rainy, low-hanging clouds and poor visibility. Roads, muddy, but still in good shape.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-33.2: No. 182: Operations Reports

569/G-3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Saizerais, Meurthe-et-Moselle.

From 6 p. m., Sept. 12 to 6 p. m., Sept. 13, 1918

[Extract]

1. The enemy held the 24 kilometer sector in front of the I Corps with disorganized elements of the divisions originally on the old line. Our patrols were exploring in front of the new position, but no fighting was going on.

* * * *

3. Enemy infantry was not aggressive. Enemy artillery put a little harassing fire on our forward areas. A considerable number of enemy planes patrolled the east sector and a few night bombing planes came over the back areas. **

* * * *

5. We held the sector from Thiaucourt to Port-sur-Selle with 4 divisions in line and one in reserve. The 2d Division held 3 kilometers on the left ** The next 3 kilometers were held by the 5th Division, ** The sector of the 82d Division unchanged,
extending from Port-sur-Sellie to Bois-le-Pretre. 90th Div. sector extended 7 kilometers west through Bois-la-Pretre to Cabane Fre (Forestiere). The 78th Div. was located in the Bois de Greney with headquarters at Rogeville.

9. * * * Infantry of the 2d and 5th Divisions pushed out patrols towards the exploitation line. The 90th Division, in accordance with instructions from the corps, made an exploitation of their line, taking the town of Vilcey and Bois de Presle and established outposts 1/2 kilometer south of Norroy.

Due to intermittent rain and low clouds, reconnaissance by aeroplane was not very successful. * * *

10. The line of the beginning of the day ran: Limey---Remenauville---Regnieville---Fey-en-Haye---at the end of the day along the army objective north of Thiaucourt---south of Jaulny---through the Bois-Gerard and from Vieville-en-Haye to the original corps line. On the left, outposts were two kilometers beyond this line.

14. The morale of our troops is excellent. The divisions in the line used less than half of their troops for the attack. The 2d and 5th Divisions each have one fresh brigade of infantry and none of the troops are greatly fatigued. Supplies: Normal. There is great difficulty in moving trucks and wagons through the former trench area, but all available men are at work constructing and repairing roads. Weather: Rainy, low hanging clouds and poor visibility. Roads, muddy, but still in good shape.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

First Army: Fldr. 10a: Report of Operation

From 6 p. m., September 13 to September 14, 1918

G-3
No. 334

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 14, 1918---11 p. m.

From: I Corps. Operations report covering period from 6 p. m., September 13 to 6 p. m., September 14, 1918

[Extract]

1. Enemy held the 24 km. sector in front of the I Corps with elements of the 31st, 123d and 255th Divisions, the 31st and 84th Landwehr Brigades. * * *

3. There was not much infantry activity in the sector of the 82d Division. A counterattack by the enemy during the late evening launched against the 5th Division broke
down and our lines were maintained. Enemy artillery shelled our forward areas during the
night and day, particularly in the right sector of the 90th Division. Enemy made patrols
over our forward areas and regular artillery fire in the early afternoon. One of our
balloons was burnt. Several enemy balloons were up. Exact locations not determined. Two
of these were destroyed.

5. We held the sector from Thiaucourt to Port-sur-Seille with 4 divisions on the
line and one in reserve.

6. The French 49th, 219th, 238th, 247th Regiments of 75's which have been
attached to division were withdrawn from the front by orders of the chief of corps
artillery.

9. F. O. 53, dated September 14, 16 o'clock directs the relief of the 2d and 5th
Divisions less the artillery brigade by the 78th Division on the night of September
15/16 and 16/17 respectively. The 2d Division being relieved will go to Ansauville-
Royaumeix and the 5th Division to Domevre. The infantry of the 5th Division report by
effective fire of the artillery of the corps and the 5th and 90th Divisions threw back
the enemy counterattack during the night. During the day the three divisions west of the
Moselle advanced strong detachments toward the enemy exploitation line; on the sector of
the 90th Division the line was advanced and now runs Norroy---Dilles-sur-Truny [Villers-
sous-Preny?] and then northwest to Reimvercourt [Rembercourt ?]. No change in the 82d
Division sector, east of the Moselle. In the west the lines were advanced to Norroy.

12. Counterattacks by the enemy were not heavy. It is not likely that the areas
between our present position and the Hindenburg Line is strongly occupied.

14. Morale - good; Supplies - normal; Weather - good; Visibility - poor; on account
of mist; roads are in good condition. Moonlight during the early evening.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

181-33.2: No. 182: Operation Report

610/G-3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Saizerais, Meurthe-et-Moselle, September 16, 1918.

From noon, Sept. 15 to noon, Sept. 16, 1918

[Extract]

1. The enemy held the 24 kilometer sector opposite the I Corps with elements of the
31st, 123d, 255th Divisions and the 31st Ldw. Brigade. No action was in progress.
2. Examination of prisoners captured the previous day confirmed the order of battle. No other important information was obtained.

3. Enemy infantry was not active. There was considerable artillery fire on our forward areas, particularly on the west bank of the Moselle at Vandieres and Hill 327. Enemy planes patrolled our front lines harassing the infantry with machine-gun fire and bombs.

* * * * * *

5. We held the line with four divisions: the 2d, 5th, 90th and 82d. The 78th Div. was in reserve on the left flank in the Bois-d'Euvezin.
6. During the night, the infantry of the 2d Div., was relieved by the 78th Div.

* * * * * *

10. Patrols of the 82d Div. were withdrawn from Vandieres to the hill south of that town. Otherwise the line is unchanged.

* * * * * *

Our line was advanced a little west of the Moselle and now runs Bois du Rupt, Fme de Souleuvre, Bois des Rappes, Vandieres and thence on the former line.

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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Annex to St-Mihiel Documentation

Translated German Documents

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. III: Field Message

[Editorial Translation]

From: Operations Section
At: Supreme Headquarters
Date: September 1, 1918 Hour: 9:15 No. 10105
To: Composite Army C

The following was wired to Group of Armies Gallwitz:

There are increasing reports to the effect that the Americans intend to attack Metz on both sides of the Moselle.
I request that the Saxon 123d Inf. Div. be moved forward without delay to the boundary between Composite Army C and the Nineteenth Army and that it be held in readiness to support the Nineteenth Army.

The same message has been sent to Group of Armies Albrecht, Composite Army C, and the Nineteenth Army.

LUENDORFF.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. III: Telegram

*Instructions to Meet Full-Scale Attack*

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 3322

GROUP OF ARMIES VON GALLWITZ,

September 3, 1918.

To Composite Army C:

The following telegram has been sent to Supreme Command:

By authority of the Supreme Command contained in No. 6729, April 24, 1918, Composite Army C will fall back into the Michel Position in case of a large-scale enemy attack. Indications and the enemy forces assumed to be opposite the south front of the army have not thus far pointed to enemy intentions to make a full-scale attack against the entire front of the army.

Also agents and statements of prisoners speak only of local thrusts on either side of the Moselle.

Consequently the question arises whether in case of an attack of smaller proportions, possibly in conjunction with an attack against the Nineteenth Army and against the east portion of the south front of Composite Army C, the Michel Movement should also be executed.

The army group takes the position that an attack against the east portion of the south front from the Moselle to the approximate vicinity of Flirey would not warrant the execution of the Michel Movement with all its drawbacks especially since, in the east portion of the south front, the Michel Position lies close in rear of the forward battle position and since a reinforcement of the front by 2 or 3 divisions for action against a small hostile attack west of the Moselle and a relatively slight increase in artillery would suffice.

The question of the action to be taken in the event of a hostile attack against the major portion of the south front (around Apremont, the boundary between the French Second and Eighth Armies) which the enemy would execute only in heavy force, is quite another matter.

To accept battle in such a case would require the commitment of several full divisions and the alerting of several counterattack divisions, with a considerable increase in artillery and machine-gun organizations.

If this reinforcement could be committed in ample season, it would probably succeed in beating off the attack in the present battle position. Moreover there is the remaining consideration that the apex of the St-Mihiel salient and the west front of Composite Army C would be in serious danger if the defense were not completely successful.
The army inclines to the view that in case of an attack against the major portion of the south front, the present battle position should be held in order not to concede an easy success, particularly since we are dealing with Americans.

On the other hand, the Army Group is not fully persuaded of the success of the defense in an attack against the major portion of south front unless the requisite and considerable reinforcements and their timely intervention can be assured. In view of the present general situation such prospects appear doubtful to the Army Group. The group therefore requires a decision whether in event of a hostile attack against the major portion of the south front, battle be accepted in the present forward battle position or whether, as in the case of a full-scale attack against the entire salient, a withdrawal should be made into the Michel Position.

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 4, 1918.

To: Group of Armies, von Gallwitz

Reference: No. 3322 Operation Section [Preceding]

I can only concur in the reasoning of the commander of the Group of Armies in every respect.

The forces for repulsing a broad attack against the greater portion of the south front of Composite Army C are not at present available. The attack is therefore not to be met in the present forward combat zone, but in this case, avoiding it by a withdrawal into the Michel [Position] is contemplated, though only in the event of an enveloping attack.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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COMPOSITE ARMY C,
September 5, 1918.

Re: Group of Armies von Gallwitz No. 3346, Operations Section

With reference to No. 10153, September 3, Operations Section Supreme Headquarters [preceding], report is made herewith that Composite Army C always has intended to order a
timely withdrawal into the Michel Zone in case the enemy threatens attack on a large scale
and that it has reported the fact to the Group of Armies in Army Order No. 2567 (Par. 3),
August 29, 1918, Operations Section.

Because of the conformation of the terrain on the south front (Le Mont and Montsec)
any enemy attack extending to the west beyond Flirey or Seicheprey must take in the
Apremont region and is therefore always to be handled by Composite Army C as a large-scale
attack.

The preparations necessary in that sense have already been made, in conformity with
the directions for the Michel defense contained in No. 1700, June 21, 1918, Operations
Section. Therefore no changes in the present measures will be necessary after receipt of
the order of the Supreme Command.

Considering the importance of the matter Composite Army C requests that Supreme Head­
quarters be apprized of this interpretation.

FUCHS.

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GS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Telegram

Proposed Attack Approved
[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 10204

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 8, 1918.

To Group of Armies Duke Albrecht

I am in accord with the proposal to attack on both sides of the Moselle if this can
take place within a few days. Group of Armies von Gallwitz will conduct the attack. I
desire it to be understood that the group has direct control over the Nineteenth Army.
As far as can be judged from here, the action east of the Moselle will be limited to the
capture of Mousson. Wittenberg [sic] could, therefore, be greatly decreased here.

LUDENDORFF.

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Indications of Impending American Attack
[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2753

COMPOSITE ARMY C,
September 9, 1918.

To: Group of Armies von Gallwitz

[Extract]

From recent observations, it can be assumed with certainty that the Americans are
accumulating ammunition and materiel, perhaps also heavy guns, on the south front of
Composite Army C for an attack to be launched there at a not too-distant time. It cannot be estimated at present how far this attack will extend to the west, how far it will reach beyond the Moselle in front of the Nineteenth Army, nor to what extent the west front of Composite Army C will be attacked simultaneously with the south front or after a short interval.

Increasing signs in the last few days that similar preparations are in progress west and southwest of Verdun are an indication that the enemy will not be contented with the tactical result of the capture of the St-Mihiel salient, but has set himself a higher, strategic goal. He intends to launch a French attack on both sides of the Verdun-Etain Road as well as an American attack on both sides of the Moselle in the direction of Metz, thereby eliminating the Michel Position which is known to him.

One thing at any rate is certain enough: If we remain inactive, we will sooner or later be attacked on one or both fronts. We may then be fortunate and succeed in effecting a timely retirement into the Michel Zone without considerable losses. But it remains to be proved whether by an offensive stroke with limited objective the enemy's intentions could not be thwarted and enough damage caused him to prevent him from carrying out his plans for some time to come.

Such a stroke against the west front offers no prospect of success. The fortress of Verdun and the wooded hills present almost insurmountable obstacles to the conduct of an attack.

Neither will it be of any avail to make preparations for a real attack somewhat east of Verdun nor to improve our own position in the St-Mihiel salient to any extent.

Prospects are far brighter for an assault on the south front. Here with Montsec as pivot, an advance can be made against the Xivray---Noviant-aux-Pres---Blenod line.

By such an attack, Composite Army C will gain the following advantages:
Capture of a large amount of the materials the enemy has accumulated for his attacks, especially artillery.
Gaining observations points (Beaumont, Bois du Jure, Mousson) which afford an extensive view in our territory and are extremely unfavorable to Composite Army C and the Nineteenth Army.
Facilitating the Michel Movement by forcing the enemy farther away from the pivot of this movement and by enlarging the salient position of the Composite Army where it is the most vulnerable.
Further removal from the front of the Metz-Conflans Railroad, the Briey ore basin, and the fortress of Metz.

In addition to these tactical advantages an attack would raise the morale of the troops.

The danger of an enemy attack on the west and south front during our own attack preparations remains present. Therefore constant observation of the west front is enjoined.

In such a case the Michel Movement will be considerably more difficult. It can succeed only if, along with attack preparations, preparations for the withdrawal on the west front and in the Michel salient proper continue.

For these reasons Composite Army C is in favor of an attack with limited objective against the Xivray-Blenod line. A preliminary condition to such an attack is the transfer of the present sector of the 255th Inf. Div. to Composite Army C and also the attack and capture by the Nineteenth Army of the enemy bastion projecting into its position east of Pont-a-Mousson.

* * * * *

The attack is intended to be carried out as a surprise attack with a short fire preparation, and the line gained will be held.

Secrecy will be easier to keep from the fact that at the time all measures of Composite Army C are directed toward the defense, they should be kept so until further
orders. Therefore the change of intention will not need to be made known until just shortly before the attack.

Preparations would have to be accelerated as much as possible; the attack itself would be launched only when the enemy’s attack preparations have definitely been completed, giving thereby absolute guaranty that the blow would really strike him hard.

The following forces are held necessary:
6 divisions in the front line
2 counterattack divisions.


FUCHS.


HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Memorandum

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  
No. 220

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,  
September 9, 1918.

To Supreme Headquarters

Reference your No. 10204 [Sept. 8, herein]

Careful study of the plan of attack of Composite Army C disclosed that it is impossible in the few days available for the artillery to complete its preliminary preparations or for the troops to prepare to overcome the difficulties of crossing the very deep outpost zone.

In addition, ever since September 8 numerous new indications have been appearing which make probable the cooperation of the French by an attack from the west with the American attack directed against the south front of Composite Army C. This is also from the standpoint of the enemy High Command entirely probable, if French G. H. Q. has forces at its disposal to support an American attack in such a manner that it could develop into a big tactical and moral victory. This being the case, we no longer have the prerequisites for the proposed offensive to solve the situation which is developing on the south front of Composite Army C, since the danger appears too serious that we will be attacked from the west face of the salient in the very midst of a battle on the south front. Rather, in view of the likelihood of being attacked simultaneously from the south and west, the conditions for the occupation of the Michel Position as they were decided upon long ago already exist. The Group of Armies, therefore, believes that the proposed attack no longer can be undertaken. It requests a decision whether on the basis of the latest reports the overall situation is similarly adjudged by Supreme Headquarters, in which case it must request an order for the occupation of the Michel Position.

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery.

Dispatched at 8:35 p. m., September 9, 1918
Indications Pointing to Large-Scale Attack in Lorraine and Alsace

(Editorial Translation)

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
AT HEADQUARTERS, GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
No. 12350
September 9, 1918.

IDENTIFICATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 8, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * * *

General: Several of the prisoners captured yesterday in the sector of the Ninth Army again speak of an impending American large-scale attack against the St-Mihiel salient and in Alsace.

That at the same time the French are holding out fresh reserves for a major action they have planned, can be concluded from the disinclination they display toward committing their reserves opposite the Ninth Army for new attacks.

Where the mass of the fresh French divisions is located (about 17 divisions) is not clear. The possibility of an attack in Champagne and particularly east of Reims still exists. However, it is more likely that they will employ their fresh reserves not separately from the Americans but together with the latter when the next large-scale attack is made. The indications that these attacks are planned in Lorraine and Alsace predominate.

ANKER.

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Proposed attack Abandoned and Salient Ordered Evacuated

(Editorial Translation)

Operations Section
No. 10204, Addendum No. 1
September 10, 1918.

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

To Group of Armies von Gallwitz

Reference your No. 220, dated September 9, 1918 [preceding]

I request that you abandon the proposed attack and begin and execute the measures for the occupation of the Michel Position according to plan. The withdrawal of the troops from their present positions and the resultant abandonment of the position itself is, if possible, to be postponed as long as the tactical situation will permit, even after the evacuation of the Michel foreground, in order that time may be gained to improve the general situation.
Group of Armies von Gallwitz will be responsible for coordination in the movement of
the right flank of the Nineteenth Army and will issue the necessary orders to that army.
After the execution of the movements it will probably be necessary to transfer part of the
forces of Group of Armies von Gallwitz to Group of Armies Duke Albrecht.

LUDENDORFF.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Memorandum

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,

September 10, 1918---2:10 p. m.

To Supreme Headquarters

In view of the increasing tension on its front this headquarters considers that a
single command over troops on the west bank of the Moselle is urgently necessary since the
projecting left flank of the present position at that point, as well as of the whole
Michel Position, will attract, to an unusual degree, the enemy attack. The Group of
Armies therefore requests that the eastern boundary of Composite Army C be extended to the
Meuse and that the troops of the Nineteenth Army designated for the defense west of the
Moselle be placed under the orders of Composite Army C. No impairment of the defense can
result from these measures in the opinion of this headquarters, since an enemy break­
through in the valley of the Moselle seems out of the question unless the enemy obtains
possession of the heights on both banks.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Abandonment of Projected Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,

September 10, 1918---4:18 p. m.

To Composite Army C

[Extract]

The projected attack will not be carried out. The measures for the systematic occupa­
tion of the Michel Position will be started at once. * * * Only such demolition as is
absolutely necessary will be effected; first, in order not to arouse the enemy's attention
prematurely, and second, if, contrary to expectation, there should be an easing of the
situation, it appears possible that the General Headquarters will postpone the Loki Movement. To start the Loki Movement, the consent of the Group of Armies must be obtained.

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fl dr. IV: Memorandum

Call for Reenforcements

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 225

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,
September 10, 1918.

To Supreme Headquarters

The enemy apparently is aiming at cutting off the St-Mihiel salient. In view of the heavily wooded terrain the danger exists of a surprise attack against the base points of the Michel Position. These are therefore all the more in need of sufficient support as there will be only a very slight withdrawal in carrying out the Michel Movement or none at all, as in the Damloup sector. At the present time the number of troops at these points is insufficient, particularly on both sides of the boundary between the Fifth Army and Composite Army C.

This headquarters, therefore, requests the immediate release of the 88th and 31st Inf. Divs. for the support of both flanks of Composite Army C and the release of the 107th Inf. Div. for the support of the left flank of the Fifth Army, likewise for the release of the 93d and 239th (Res.) Army F. A. Regts. for Composite Army C and the 278th and 600th Army F. A. Regts. for the Fifth Army.

The rest of the divisions and the army field artillery regiments which have been placed in reserve at the disposal of G. H. Q. can remain in their present quartering areas for the time being.

In the plan of the Michel Movement it is intended to place a corps headquarters on the right flank of Composite Army C. The attachment of a corps headquarters for this purpose is requested.

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Possibilities of French-American Large-Scale Attacks

[Editorial Translation]

INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
AT HEADQUARTERS, GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
No. 12372

FRENCH AND AMERICAN RESERVES

[Extract]

(b) Americans: Of the American divisions at present in reserve or rest, 2 were recently in line on the British front (33d, 78th), 1 opposite the Ninth Army (32d), 5 opposite the Seventh Army (3d, 4th, 26th, 28th and 42d), and 6 in the territory from the Moselle as far as the Sundgau [Upper Alsace] (1st, 2d, 5th, 35th, 80th and 91st).

Of 11 divisions it is only known that they have arrived in France; their presence on a front has not yet been established.

Numerous agents' reports and prisoners' statements recently speak of large bodies of American troops being assembled in Lorraine and in Alsace. As a matter of fact, very recently fewer American divisions have appeared on the fronts of the Groups of Armies Prince Rupprecht, Boehn, and the German Crown Prince. In this connection the relief on September 8 of the American 28th Division by a French division on the Aisne is particularly conspicuous. Only 1 American division (77th) is on that front at present. The relief in the near future of even this division by French troops is considered to be probable by prisoners of the French 62d Division.

Consequently it seems as if most of the American divisions are being gathered in and, similar to the fresh French divisions, preserved for a major operation that is planned.

It is probable that the two forces, French and Americans, are to be used together in one large-scale operation under unified command, and not separately. Neither the French nor the American reserves alone are strong enough for a large-scale offensive, the less so, as the French attacks against the Ninth Army apparently are to be continued and a certain number of reserves is required for this purpose.

Since in contrast to the purely British front as far as St-Quentin and the front from St-Quentin as far as the territory southeast of Verdun, which lately has become almost purely French, the front from that point to the Swiss boundary has become decidedly mixed with French-American troops, a French-American large-scale attack is very likely to be made within that stretch of front in the near future.

This conclusion, based solely on the interpretation of definite observations, is confirmed by numerous agents' reports and prisoners' statements which predict a French-American offensive in Lorraine and in Alsace. In addition, the political reasons must be considered which speak for such an offensive. It is still not clear whether the attack is planned to be made only in Alsace or only in Lorraine or simultaneously in both places, with a comparatively large gap in between. Reports are about evenly divided on all three possibilities.

ANKER.

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Preparation for Defense

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 233

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,
September 10, 1918—7:20 p.m.

To Group of Armies Duke Albrecht

Reference G. H. Q. Order No. 10204

Subject to the approval of G. H. Q. the proposed attack will not be executed. Since during the past few days there have been increasing indications that the enemy will also attack the west front of Composite Army C, the Army will withdraw into the Michel Position according to plan. In conformity with the G. H. Q. order Group of Armies von Gallwitz will provide for the coordination of the movements of Composite Army C and the right flank of the German Nineteenth Army. This headquarters has requested the Nineteenth Army to agree that the orders necessary for this movement be issued directly to the Metz Group by the Composite Army C. In addition, the Nineteenth Army has been requested to increase the defensive strength of its 255th Inf. Div. by assignment of artillery, machine-gun units, etc., as much as possible.

Shifting of Forward Boundary into Moselle Valley

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 10238

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 11, 1918.

To Group of Armies von Gallwitz, Reference No. 221, September 10

" " " " " " Duke Albrecht

The forward boundary between the Groups of Armies von Gallwitz and Duke Albrecht will be shifted to the Moselle Valley. Boundary security north of Arnville and the time of the transfer of commands will be arranged by direct agreement between the Groups of Armies. I request that the result be reported.

By order:

LUENDORFF.

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Indications Point to French-American Attack at St-Mihiel

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 11, 1918.

[Extract]

French Front

4. Verdun-Sundgau [Upper Alsace]
   (a) French-American attack against the St-Mihiel salient imminent.
       The American attack expected for some time on both sides of the Moselle will in
       all probability also be extended to the west front of the St-Mihiel salient. The conver­
       sation of several American aviators captured the past few days, reveals that the American
       First Army with about 10 divisions is to attack between St-Mihiel and Pont-a-Mousson in
       the very near future, while French divisions are to attack at Les Eparges. According to
       these reports, by cutting off the St-Mihiel salient favorable lines of departure will be
       provided for further attacks in the spring.
       Other indications also betoken the probability of a French-American attack of the
       extent mentioned by the aviators:
       Aerial reconnaissances and front line observations of the past few days have dis­
       closed a considerable increase in the traffic on railroads and roads in the areas south of
       Verdun and northeast of Toul. Yesterday two tanks were observed south of Limey. The
       villages south of Pont-a-Mousson show an increase in the number of troops occupying them
       and there is greater activity in the railroad stations.
       Reliable intelligence and reports from the front continue to direct special
       attention to the sector of the American divisions, particularly the area of the American
       90th Division. Lately there have been some indications that southeast of Verdun, approxi­
       mately in the sector of the 2d Cuirassier Div., the front has been reinforced. However,
       further observations are necessary.
       Reliable reports indicate that the sectors of the French II Colonial Corps on
       both sides of St-Mihiel and of the former French XXXII Army Corps on both sides of the
       Moselle have been taken from the French Second and Eighth Armies the past few days and
       organized within a new army unit. Whether the American First Army is concerned here, as
       the documents of one of the captured aviators and the statements made by the latter seem
       to indicate, has not yet been established.
       In the past few days, agents' reports and prisoners' statements predicting a
       French-American attack in the direction of Metz, are on the increase. The fresh 28th Div.
       (XIV Corps) which was relieved on the Lorraine front the end of August, according to
       prisoners' statements, is reportedly lying at Blainville (southwest of Lunéville), where
       it is being trained in attack with tanks. The men expect to be put in line on the Moselle,
       where the attack is to be made between September 15 and 20.
       Apart from this, we do not have many clues as far as the attack troops themselves
       are concerned. Front line reports reliably indicate the presence of the American 1st
       Div. and also the 5th Div. in the rear area. Some of the elements of both of these di­
       visions apparently have already been in line in the sector of the American 90th Div. west
       of the Moselle. The presence of the American 2d and also 35th Div. must be reckoned with.
It is not unlikely that the American 3d, 4th, 26th, and 42d Divisions, put to the test in the battles on the Marne and on the Vesle, are being moved here. These divisions have been in rest for over four weeks and have not been identified on the battlefront for some time. The American 37th Div. which was relieved northeast of Baccarat in the past few days, must also be taken into account as reserve. In addition, it is possible that the American divisions relieved on the British front (27th, 30th and 33d) will be moved here. As far as the French troops are concerned, the XI Army Corps (21st, 22d, 61st and 151st Divisions) may have been assigned for the attack.

It is not unlikely that a rather large-scale attack in the Sundgau [Upper Alsace] is planned as a diversion, about the same time as the attack on both sides of St-Mihiel.

According to statements of prisoners, elements of the French 53d Div. held exercises with small tanks around Belfort. On or about September 18 a French-American attack is to be executed on both sides of the Dolder. The 36th Div., XVIII Corps [sic] which according to troops reports was relieved in the Argonne about August 27, has arrived in the region of Belfort. The movement of the division to Alsace has already been predicted the end of August by prisoners of the Italian 3d Div., but has not yet been confirmed.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. VI: Order

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 2784

GERMAN COMPOSITE ARMY C.

September 11, 1918.

Issued in advance orally and by telephone September 10 and 11.

[Extract]

1. According to the latest intelligence, the attack preparations of the enemy on the south front continue. On the west front also an enemy attack against the left wing of the Fifth Army and the right of the Composite Army seems to be in the preparatory stages.
2. Composite Army C will prepare to repulse these attacks.
3. Combres Group will accelerate the work in its rearward combat zones.

* * * * * *

6. The divisions (88th and 31st Inf. Divs.) placed at the disposal of the groups will work with all the other available forces in the Hagen Zone or Michel Zone respectively. The labor units placed at the disposal of the groups or the Michel construction staff, as the case may be, by these divisions in conformity with army orders of September 4 and September 6, will rejoin their divisions.

7. The 107th and Saxon 123d Inf. Divs. will also remain in G. H. Q. reserve. Both divisions will make preparations for rapid assembly, the 107th Inf. Div. in the Labeauville---Latour---Jonville area; the Saxon 123d Inf. Div. in the Bayonville---Arnville---Pagny---Preny area.

* * * * *
9. The modern heavy batteries assigned to the Mihlel and Gorz Groups will be put in position so that they can be used from the forenoon of September 12 on to harass the enemy's attack preparations. They will report when ready to fire. The order to open fire will be issued only by army headquarters.

* * * * *

13. The shifting of the main line of resistance of the Wilhelm Zone in Gorz sector to the artillery protective position will be prepared as thoroughly as possible so that it can take place at any time on receipt of an order from the group. The time of the shift will be left to the discretion of the group. Report will be made to army headquarters.

FUCHS.

HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Message

Reserves Released to Group of Armies von Gallwitz

[Editorial Translation]

From: Ludendorff
At: Supreme Headquarters
Date: September 12, 1918 Hour: 2:15 a.m. No. 10239
Sent by: Telephone
To: Group of Armies von Gallwitz
Reference your No. 225 dated September 10

[Extract]

1. 88th, 31st, and 107th Inf. Divs. are at your disposal as proposed. I request I be kept informed of their employment.
2. Wuerttemburg XIII Army Corps Headquarters will be transferred to Group of Armies von Gallwitz from the Group of Armies German Crown Prince.
3. The 239th (Res.) and the 600th F. A. Regts. are at the disposal of the Group of Armies. I cannot yet approve the employment of the 93d Motorized F. A. Regt, which lacks all mobility. Similarly I cannot release at present the 278th F. A. which is tired and badly in need of rest.

* * * * *
[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 3513

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,
September 12, 1918---4:40 a.m.

To the 4 Groups of Armies

At 2 a.m., artillery and trench mortar fire opened on the Fifth Army, at first only east of the Meuse, then extending also to the west, as well as against the entire front of Composite Army C to the Moselle. In the Fifth Army and on the west front of Composite Army C it slackened in the early morning hours but it continued throughout the forenoon against the south front of Composite Army C. Since noon the artillery fire against the interior flanks of the Fifth Army and Composite Army C has been increasing again. Reports of enemy infantry attacks have been submitted up to now only from the south front of Composite Army C. Fighting is in progress there.

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BATTLE NOTES OF THE CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF ARMY DETACHMENT C

[Extract]

Since 2 a.m. there has been heavy fire on Groups Combres and Gorz, particularly in the rear areas (toward Etain and Warq), Pannes, Xammes, etc.; on Group Mihel not so heavy. The 31st and 123d Inf. Divisions have already been alerted.

11:30 a.m.: Order by the 88th Div. for the march from Allamont to St-Julien.
12 Noon: Order to Group Mihel: Loki Movement is to begin at once.
12:05 p.m.: Group Combres is informed of order for Loki Movement.
Addition: Position on Combres Heights must be held by all forces.

1 p.m.: Combres Heights and Herbeuville Heights are in our hands.
Combres
Order: Combres Heights---Herbeuville Heights---Artillery Protective Position is to be held under all circumstances. No counterattack by the Rest Battalions.

- 302 -
2:10 p. m.: Group Combres will hold the Schroeter Position by all means.

Combres

• • • • •

2:45 p. m.: Order to Group Mihiel: The Loki Movement is to be continued after reaching the Schroeter Position.

• • • • •

HS Ger. File: 813-60.32: Fldr. I: Order

Loki Movement Continued

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section No. 2813

GERMAN COMPOSITE ARMY C, September 12, 1918.

[Extract]

1. At nightfall, the Groups Combres and Mihiel, maintaining close contact with each other, will continue without interruption the Loki Movement which has already begun and is now in progress. Group Combres will regulate its movement on Group Mihiel and make it possible for the latter to withdraw to Spada sector.

2. The Mihiel Position will be occupied as follows by security detachments, making use of all available forces, and will be held under any circumstances:
   Group Combres: Hautecourt, Hermeville, Braquis, Buzy sectors by the 8th Landwehr Div.
   Bonzee and Eparges sectors by the 107th Inf. Div.
   Seuzey sector by the Austro-Hungarian 35th Inf. Div.
   Group Mihiel: Spada sector by the 192d Inf. Div.
   Apremont sector by the 5th Landwehr Div. and the von Puttkammer Regt.
   Group Gorz: Lahayville sector by the 88th Inf. Div.
   Flirey sector by the 31st Inf. Div.
   Remenauville sector by the 123d Saxon Inf. Div.
   Pagny sector by the 255th Inf. Div.

3. The following divisions will pass through the Mihiel Position and will be placed in positions in readiness in rear of the position where they will be at the disposal of the groups:
   13th Landwehr Div. by Group Combres in rear of the Buzy sector.

4. In addition the following reserves are available: The 28th Res. Div. in rear of the right flank of the army and for the present still at the disposal of the Fifth Army

   The 195th Inf. Div. in rear of the left flank of the army, for the present still at the disposal of G. H. Q.

5. Units of the additional artillery brought up to the army are assigned as follows:
   The 41st Army F. A. at present in Ars to Group Gorz.
The 512th Army F. A. Regt. to Group Combres. For the present this regiment will be placed in readiness in Mars-la-Tour at the disposal of G. H. Q.

* * * * * *

7. The security detachments now in the Michel Position will begin during the night the installation of tank obstacles.

8. A special order will be issued to all troops making it clear that the main line of resistance with a deep outpost must be held under any circumstances.

FUCHS.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. IV: Message

Supreme Headquarters Demands Explanation of Tardy Movement of Army Reserves

[Editorial Translation]

From: von Hindenburg
At: Supreme Headquarters
Date: September 13, 1918 Hour: 11:43 a. m. No. 10273 Sent by: Telegraph
To: Group of Armies von Gallwitz

I request information why the Saxon 123d and 31st Inf. Divs. were not kept closer to the front Composite Army C when it was seen that the 77th Res. Div., with its many Alsatians, was not particularly reliable. Only in this neglect can I see the reason for the deep penetration in the direction of Thiaucourt. At the same time I request a report as to why the center of Composite Army C was immediately withdrawn into the Michel Position. I express the definite expectation that the Michel Position will be held and will take drastic action wherever I note any relaxing of effort. I also request that Composite Army C be notified.

Transmitted to Composite Army C at 3:20 p. m., September 13.
[Following note appears with the foregoing:] The Group of Armies will bring out in its reply, that the divisions were G. H. Q. reserves and that while their release was requested the evening of September 10, it was not until 2:15 a. m., September 12, that this was done by Supreme Headquarters.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  
No. 3556  
GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,  
September 13, 1918.

[Extract]

1. We must expect an enemy attack against the left wing of the Fifth Army and the right of Composite Army C.
2. At daybreak September 14 the armies will be held at increased readiness for action.

4. The 28th Res. Div. is placed at the disposal of Composite Army C for employment on its right wing. Composite Army C will place reserves in readiness behind its right wing. These forces will be made as strong as possible and will include horse-drawn artillery. The 107th Inf. Div. is counterattack division behind the left flank of Composite Army C.
5. Two combat teams of the 195th Inf. Div. will be brought forward from the Gorze-Noveant area to the region east of Conflans; the 28th Inf. Div. will move to Nouillompont by rail.

RUITH,  
Chief of Staff.

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN COMPOSITE ARMY C,  
September 13, 1918.

MORNING REPORT

The Michel Position has been systematically occupied on the left flank by Group Gorz. The greater portion of the 13th Landwehr Div., the Austro-Hungarian 35th Inf. Div., the 192d Inf. Div., and the 5th Landwehr Div. have arrived in the center of the Michel Position. The last regiments of these divisions are now passing through it. The movements for the occupation of the Michel Position are being carried free from enemy pressure. During the night only rather weak enemy harassing fire on villages.
BOIS DE BENEY-XAMMES AREA
Looking northeast from vicinity of Lamarche-en-Woevre
**Enemy Attack Imminent**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 3598

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,

September 14, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Indications of the imminence of an enemy attack against the left wing of the Fifth Army and Composite Army C are increasing.
2. At 5 a.m., September 15, the armies will stand in full readiness for action, reserves designated for immediate counteraction will be moved close to the front, headquarters up to and including division headquarters on the field of action.
3. The Fifth Army will place the 37th and 28th Inf. Divs. and the 17th Res. Div. which is in transit, in readiness behind its left flank in such a manner that they can be led forward at once for counterattack against any enemy force that may break through there. The Austro-Hungarian 106th Inf. Div. is released to the full control of the Fifth Army.
4. The 28th Res. Div., 107th Inf. Div., and the 88th Inf. Div. are placed at the disposal of Composite Army C. At 5 a.m., Composite Army C will place two combat teams of the 195th Inf. Div. in readiness near Mouaville, and one team near Olley-Jeandelize as Group of Armies reserve in such a manner that rapid counteraction in a westerly and northwesterly direction and also to the south is possible. • • •
   From 5:30 a.m. on, the 228th Inf. Div. stands at the disposal of Supreme Headquarters with its leading element near Corny. • • •
5. Both armies will hold the main line of resistance with all their forces. If contrary to expectations the enemy succeeds in penetrating on the interior flanks and the situation cannot be restored by counterattack, the Volker Position there or the Orne will be held in any case.
6. The Groups of Armies of the German Crown Prince and of Duke Albrecht are requested to participate with supporting aviation. • • •
7. The enemy can be expected to employ many tanks. The troops will be reminded again that attacking tanks and even those which have broken through are not dangerous if calmness and presence of mind are preserved.

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery.

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Possibility of Further Enemy Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 3579

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,
September 14, 1918---3:05 a.m.

To the 4 Groups of Armies

[Extract]

The Michel Position has been occupied without interference by the enemy. The enemy pursued slowly. We have been in contact with him since this morning on the entire front of Composite Army C. The enemy has pushed forward infantry detachments down from the Cotes [de Meuse] into the Woere plain against the left wing of the Fifth Army and the right of Composite Army C. Prisoners' statements and our observation indicate the imminence of a major attack by the enemy, possibly from the Bezonvaux-Combres line in an easterly direction. Whether an attack against the left of Composite Army C west of the Moselle will take place in conjunction with this attack cannot yet be determined.

Enemy planes very active.

Evacuation of Michel Position Ordered

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 232

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,
September 14, 1918---10:40 p.m.

To Supreme Headquarters

Reference G. H. Q. Order No. 10273, dated September 13, 1918 [printed herein]

The divisions in reserve in the area of the Group of Armies before the beginning of the fighting were all held at the disposal of G. H. Q. and quartered according to instructions from that headquarters. Composite Army C regulated the details of the quartering so that combatant troops in the southern portion of the designated quartering area were located with a view to accelerating their assembly toward the front. In view of the constantly mounting tension recognizable in the situation since September 7 telephone communications repeatedly emphasized to Supreme Headquarters the importance (recognized as necessary by Composite Army C and this headquarters) of supporting the flanks of the Michel Position and the necessity of releasing some divisions and army field artillery regiments.

On September 10 this headquarters also sent an urgent telegram (dispatched at 7:50 p.m., September 10) requesting the release of several divisions and army field artillery.
The telegram in reply to this request was not received by the Group of Armies until the night of September 11/12. Meanwhile at 2 a.m., September 12, violent artillery fire and opened on the entire front of the group of armies. This could very well be regarded as the opening of the expected attack. Thereupon, at 2:30 a.m. Composite Army C on its own initiative alerted the 31st and Saxon 123rd Inf. Divs. which were still at the disposal of G. H. Q. and immediately put them in march toward the south front, which had to be regarded as the chief objective of the enemy attack in view of the general situation and the strength and volume of the artillery fire. Furthermore, the Army made arrangements so that at 11 a.m. the order for a counterattack against the enemy, who in the meantime had pressed forward as far as Thiaucourt, could be dispatched to both divisions.

2. At noon on September 12 it was evident that the intervention of the reserves could prevent the enemy from advancing farther north. On the other hand, the enemy attack was gaining ground to the northwest by pushing the 10th Inf. Div. back. At the same time on the west front Combres Hill was lost for a time and the lines of the Austro-Hungarian 35th Inf. Div. situated there were broken through in several places.

Since we did not have sufficient force at our disposal to support the 10th Inf. Div. which was fighting on a very wide front and also the 13th Landwehr Div. and the Austro-Hungarian 35th Inf. Div. which were on the hills, there was serious danger that the 192d Inf. Div. and the 5th Landwehr Div., which were still fighting in the St-Mihiel salient, would be cut off. A quick decision had to be made. Therefore, Composite Army C ordered immediate evacuation, at the same time dispatching a report to the group of armies. In so doing it considered it was acting in the sense of the instructions issued in G. H. Q. Order No. 10204, Addendum No. 1, August 10, 1918, according to which the evacuation of the outpost of the Michel Position was to be postponed as long as the tactical situation at all permitted.

I concurred in this decision and consider it not only justified but absolutely necessary.

von Gallwitz,
General of Artillery.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 3602

GROUP OF ARMIES von Gallwitz,
September 14, 1918.

To Supreme Headquarters

Period September 8 to September 14, 1918

[Extract]

2. Estimate of the Situation: Owing to our movement into the Michel Position, the continuation of the enemy attack has been delayed. On September 13 and 14, the enemy worked his way forward with advanced guards thus coming into contact with most of the outpost of the Michel Position.
The enemy now seems to be shifting the main effort of his attack to the north. Prisoners' statements and observation make it seem very likely that a full-scale attack is impending in the very near future from the line Bezonvaux-Combres in an easterly direction. Simultaneously with this attack we must count on an attack against the east half of Composite Army C from the line Vieville-Haumont.

Opposite the interior wings of the two armies the enemy today maintains a continuous and powerful antiaircraft defense, which no doubt is to screen further assemblies of troops for attack in this region. The Group of Armies therefore expects a large-scale attack on September 15.

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GERMAN COMPOSITE ARMY C,
September 14, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

The enemy remained quiet opposite the Combres and Mihiel Groups. In Woel and St-Benoit several posts were pushed back a trifle.

Since noon, the hills north of Xammes in front of Gorz Group have been heavily occupied. Strong forces assembling in the ravines near Vilcey-sur-Trey and heavy traffic from Bernecourt via Flirey toward Beney-Thiaucourt.

Increase noted in railroad traffic from Toul toward Dieulouard. We are expecting attacks against the left flank of Mihiel Group and against Gorz Group.

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GERMAN COMPOSITE ARMY C,
September 15, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

Outpost fighting on the entire army front still going on in Bois-Chabotte, [Bois de] Warville, and Bois [les] Hautes-Epines and southwest of Charey. The Austro-Hungarian 35th Inf. Div. took prisoners and captured 2 machine guns. It regained Butgnerville in a counterattack. ** The 31st Inf. Div. in a counterattack ejected the enemy who had penetrated into the outpost in Rembercourt and repulsed him at Tautecourt Farm. The 123d and 255th Inf. Divs. repulsed counterattacks against the new outpost at Souleuvre Farm and near Pagny, inflicting severe losses on the enemy. Artillery fire has increased in
front of Gorz Group. For the first time Gorze lay under the fire of heavy calibers. Heavy traffic in front of Mhiel and Gorz Groups. Troops assembling in the St-Maurice--Vigneulles area. Tanks moving from the south to Thiocourt. Only little traffic observed from the Meuse Valley over the Côtes [de Meuse]. Eleven enemy planes, 3 enemy balloons, and 2 of our balloons were shot down. Combat planes participated successfully in the outpost engagements.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 235

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,

September 16, 1918...3 p.m.

To Supreme Headquarters

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION ON THE MORNING OF SEPTEMBER 16, 1918

[Extract]

The attack which we have been expecting to be delivered against the center of the Group of Armies since September 14 did not take place today either. This gives us a chance to move up our reserves and dispose of them suitably.

The enemy's delay is undoubtedly due to the fact that he has reconnoitered our outpost area, wishes to work his way forward over this terrain first and move his artillery up correspondingly. In addition, he must reconnoiter the possibilities of moving his numerous tanks before resuming his attack.

The disposition of the enemy forces on the front line which have been rather accurately determined to be 6 French and 9 American divisions between the Meuse and the Moselle, as well as the manner in which he works his way forward indicates that the enemy no longer plans to deliver the next blow as a local attack against the interior flank of the two armies, but to extend it the whole front of Composite Army C and the left wing of the Fifth Army. Between Manheulles and Bois des Rappes along three French and eight American divisions occupy a 35-kilometer front ** a very considerable density. Opposed to them we have scarcely 7 divisions, Landwehr, Austrians, and divisions which have been fatigued by combat, with an average frontage of 5 km. The enemy knows this and doubtless will seek a decision here by a breakthrough in the direction of Conflans.

The countermeasure of an offensive solution to the problem by thrusting into the attack preparations of the enemy, however desirable in itself, no longer seems capable of execution. On the north flank we cannot make another advance against the Cotes [de Meuse] and the fortifications of Verdun. In the south, where the terrain conditions are more favorable, inferiority of force, insufficient artillery, and the time necessary for preparation prevent such action. We presumably would run into an enemy who was already prepared.

Thus the only course left open to us is defense with counterattacks at suitable points. At the present time I have moved all reserves, with the exception of the 37th Inf. Div. ---the Austro-Hungarian 106th Inf. Div. can no longer be considered combat troops---behind Composite Army C. These total six divisions, two of which, however, it is presumed will be put in line in the near future ** The enemy's reserves are estimated to consist of 4 French and 6 American divisions which are equivalent to 16 of ours.

I submit these statements in connection with my orders of the 10th instant, No. 226 [not found] Operations Section. My opinion expressed there---that here it may be a
matter of the enemy's seeking a major decision and major victory---has been confirmed. In my opinion the enemy must at all costs be prevented from gaining a success at this point, particularly in view of the negotiations for peace which have just begun. I have drawn all the conclusions of which I am capable; the rest I may leave to the consideration of Supreme Headquarters.

von GALLWITZ.
General of Artillery.

Plea for Tenacious Defense

[Editorial Translation]

From: von Hindenburg
At: Supreme Headquarters
Date: September 17, 1918 No. 10328
To: Group of Armies von Gallwitz

In reply to your Order No. 235, dated September 16, 1918
The severe defeat of Composite Army C on September 12 has rendered the situation of the Group of Armies critical. I have, insofar as the situation permits, adjusted the consumption of forces caused for the most part by faulty leadership and will also give further aid although it is very difficult for me to do so. After the opportunity of striking the enemy a blow east of Thiaucourt was missed on September 12, there is now nothing left for us to do but offer stubborn defense. I can only hope that the Group of Armies employing the forces which I am allotting to it will hold the position. The Group of Armies will bear the complete responsibility for this. I am not willing to admit that one American division is worth 2 German. Wherever commanders and troops have been determined to hold their position and the artillery has been well organized, even weak German divisions have repulsed the mass attacks of American divisions and inflicted especially heavy losses on the enemy.

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,
September 19, 1918---evening.

Reference your No. 10298 [not located]

To Supreme Headquarters

Composite Army C reports the following:
After a penetration effected by the enemy at Souleuvre Farm on the evening of September 14 was apparently eliminated by a counterattack employing the division
reserve, the division received fresh reports at 5:45 a.m., September 15, from which it was clear that its right flank stood on the line Souleuvre Farm—Grosser Stern [sic], while its center and left held the slopes of Trey Creek. Consequently a gap arose between the region of Grosser Stern and the edge of the woods north of Neuf-Moulin [Farm]. We are not yet certain whether this situation resulted from a new enemy penetration or whether the report of the success of the counterattack on the preceding evening was incorrect. Since 5:45 a.m. the division had no reserve at all at its disposal, executing a counterattack was out of the question. An attempt could be made to hold the line: Souleuvre Farm—Grosser Stern—heights northwest of Vandieres. But at that time the division was forced to receive a fresh enemy attack on unorganized ground on terrain permitting no observation. However, neither the condition of the troops nor the available effectives was such that serious resistance could be offered on said line. Therefore, the division recommended to the corps withdrawal into the organized Michel Position. Since at this time the corps had no reserves at its disposal, the recommendation of the corps was approved. Furthermore, in view of the weak forces at its disposal and the difficult terrain, army headquarters did not expect any success from a counterattack. Therefore, when it received information concerning the events that had taken place, it ordered that portions of Bois des Rappes and the ridge northwest of Vandieres be held as an outpost and if these points had already surrendered, that they be recaptured again by counterattacks.

In the opinion of the Army no officer can be said to be guilty of neglect of duty.

The Composite Army C has been directed to clarify the events of the evening of September 14 which are still in doubt, for only then can we definitely conclude whether and if so to what degree any officer has been guilty of neglect of duty.

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery.

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[Editorial Translation]

No. 2991

COMPOSITE ARMY C.
September 19, 1918.

Pursuant to verbal order of September 18, 1918

Events up to Evening of September 11

When the first information of an intended hostile attack on the St-Mihiel salient reached the Army, it was holding the 84-km. front of the salient with an average sector of 12 km. for each division in line.

Among the divisions assigned to the salient were three Landwehr divisions, one Austro-Hungarian division, the completely exhausted 192d Div., the 77th Res. Div., considered unreliable, and a single other division, the 10th, which had suffered heavy losses but had been partly filled up again. As reserve behind the Army there was at first only the 31st Div., which had just been relieved.

The Saxon 123d, and the 107th and 88th Divs. were hurriedly brought up later.

The Army, whose front had been weakened by two divisions since the spring offensive, had always clearly realized that a greater danger existed in holding this inherently dangerous
PLAN OF OPERATION AND ADVANCE
AMERICAN FIRST ARMY
ST-MIHEL OFFENSIVE
12-18 SEPTEMBER 1918
salient with only a slight force. A purely defensive battle called Michel was worked out and, in order to prevent deep penetrations in the salient before the evacuation was completed, four counterattack divisions, two field artillery regiments, ten battalions of heavy artillery and a reinforcement of the air forces were requested (Order No. 1700, Operations Section, July 21, 1918).

When the situation became critical, the Army made the following recommendation for the relief of the unreliable 77th Res. Div.:

Operations Section
No. 2592
COMPOSITE ARMY C.,
August 31, 1918.

To the Group of Armies von Gallwitz

The Army requests authority for the relief of the 77th Res. Div. as quickly as possible by the 107th Div., which is now en route by rail. The division (77th Res.) is in line in that part of the Army sector especially exposed to hostile attacks. It is a prerequisite to the execution of the Michel Operation without interference that this part of the line hold fast.

Since the division has been in line (7 weeks), a total of 23 Alsace-Lorrainers have deserted. Further desertions must be expected on account of the large number (800) of Alsace-Lorrainers in the division. At the present time the danger undoubtedly exists that the enemy, reckoning upon this weakness and---so far as the Alsace-Lorrainers are concerned---this unreliability, will make a surprise attack. If it succeeds, it will lead to a very considerable loss of personnel and material for the other divisions in the St-Mihiel salient. It therefore seems imperative that the division be shifted to another part of the front.

FUCHS.

With the knowledge that the endangered southern front in particular was too weakly held, the Army had made repeated requests since September 2 for the release of the 31st and Saxon 123d Divisions which were being held behind the Army as G. H. Q. reserve. It was the intention of the Army to put in one of these divisions between the 10th Inf. Div. and the 77th Res. Div. in order to reinforce front that has obviously been too weakly held at that point and to bring the other division up closer to the front line. A decision had not yet been made, however, at the time the hostile attack occurred.

On September 2 the representations made on August 27 relative to assigning the sector of the 255th Div. to the Army were renewed and shown to be especially urgent in view of the tense situation. However, it was not until 5:45 a. m. on the day of the battle, that approval was received, by telephone.

In order to make sure that the divisions being held behind the Army front as G. H. Q. reserve would be engaged at the proper time, an order was issued on September 2 that the infantry and accompanying artillery were to be billeted in the southern part of the billeting areas of the divisions. Furthermore, special orders were issued providing for assembling these divisions in quickest possible manner at Dampvitzou, St-Julien, and Onville and for conducting them into the sectors of the 77th Res. and 10th Divs.

By a series of orders beginning August 25, all troops engaged in working on the position that could be made available the minenwerfer companies, pioneer companies, and gas projector battalions, and the resting regiment of the Austro-Hungarian 35th Div. were assigned to the Gorz Group to expedite the organization of the artillery protective line, in order that the intended transfer of the main line of resistance to the artillery protective line might be accomplished as soon as possible. At the same time other troops,
even units of the resting battalions, were made available for work on the rearward positions. Furthermore, on September 2, orders were issued stopping all road and standard-gauge railroad construction and the laying of all dispensable field railway track, the reduction of all ammunition and supply depots and the removal of all ammunition still on the Cotes [de Meuse] that had been ordered for Waldkater [Operation code name].

On September 5, the Army sent its entire artillery reserve, in all 9 heavy and 3 light batteries, into position behind the Gorz Group on the general line of Thiaucourt in order to support that flank which was considered to be especially endangered. On September 8, after a considerable number of reinforcement batteries, especially of heavy artillery, had been promised, but before they had arrived, an order was issued (Order No. 2728) for the withdrawal behind the Michel Position of all heavy batteries that lacked teams. At the same time it was ordered that the 5th and 6th guns of the field artillery that were without teams be taken away from the center divisions which had the longer march routes and that they be assigned to the flank divisions which had the shorter march routes.

On September 7 it was tentatively decided, on the instigation of the Group of Armies, to smash the enemy’s offensive preparations by an attack with limited objectives on the southern front. At that time it was ordered that the salvage operations be continued on the western front as directed and temporarily stopped (60-cm. railroads) only on the southern front. The plan of attack was worked out in a conference with the Group of Armies at Montmedy on September 9, but was abandoned because a material change in the situation had occurred in the meantime—the probability of a simultaneous hostile attack against the western front of Composite Army C had risen materially. It was decided to obtain an order from the Supreme Command for starting the Michel Movement immediately.

Already on September 10, even before the appropriate order was received from the group, the work of salvage and demolition was ordered to commence (in conference by Chief of Staff), so that this work was in full progress when the order of the group and the decision of the Supreme Command arrived. On the same day request was made by telegraph for the reinforcements considered necessary. On the evening of September 10, the Gorz Group reported that all preparations had progressed so far that the main line of resistance could be transferred back to the artillery protective line on the night of September 11/12. Army headquarters gave its approval and stipulated that the movement, which had been in preparation for weeks, should be completed by 4 a.m., September 12.

Thus on the morning of September 12, the work of salvage and demolition was in full progress. Some of the batteries without teams had already been withdrawn (Michel Group) and the others were to be withdrawn that night. The Gorz Group was engaged in moving back its main line of resistance. The available counterattack divisions were disposed so that they could be used either on the western or southern front.

This was the situation when the enemy’s attack struck the Army by surprise on the night of September 11/12.

FUCHS,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.
MOULIN DE REMBERCOURT-BOIS HAILBAT AREA
Looking northeast from Jaulny, across Rupt de Mad
In compliance with verbal order of the Group of Armies, September 18.

Events of September 12

At 2 a.m., September 12, very heavy artillery fire opened along the entire army front. Although the reserves of the G. H. Q. had not yet been made available---in spite of several requests---the 31st and Saxon 123d Divs. were alerted at 2:30 a.m. and the 88th Div. at 2:50 a.m. As it became more and more certain that the expected large-scale attack had begun and as the situation, therefore, did not warrant waiting for the approval of the Supreme Command but demanded an immediate and independent decision, the 31st and Saxon 123d Div. were assembled in the vicinity of Dampvitoux and Onville respectively. The 31st Div. was then sent forward to Xammes at 6:45 a.m. while the most advanced regiment of the 123d Div., which was already at Onville at 4:15 a.m., was put in march to La Grange-en-Haye Farm at 5:45 a.m., therefore, before the attack. At 8:15 a.m. the army commander gave permission to advance the foremost regiment of the 123d Div. to the cross-road 2 km. southwest of Presy and to let the rest of the division follow to La Grange-en-Haye Farm.

It was also necessary to act independently in the case of the 255th Div. which was not assigned to the Army until 5:40 a.m. on the day of the battle. On September 11, this division, in conjunction with the Gorz Group, was directed to withdraw its main line of resistance to the Vencheres Position.

The enemy's infantry attacked at 6 a.m. At 4:20 a.m. it was reported to the Group of Armies, in reply to an inquiry, that the Loki Movement would not be started as there were no compelling reasons yet for such action. The events which took place after the attack had begun, showed however that the very lightly held southern front was not equal to the task of sustaining the attack of greatly superior forces.

The two weak divisions lacked the necessary distribution in depth on their 22-kilometer front and were unable to check the attack of an enemy from four to five times as strong. The Gorz Group reported at 10:25 a.m. that rearward movements had been observed in Sector H.

In order to restore the situation in the 77th Res. Div. and to meet the threat of an envelopment of the left wing of the 10th Div., one regiment of each of the divisions in reserve, namely, the 31st and 123d (which were moving forward), was placed at the disposal of these divisions.

Already at 11:15 a.m. it was reported that the enemy had broken through the 77th Res. Div. and appeared to have taken Vieville, that the Gorz Group therefore, inasmuch as it could not establish immediate telephone communication with the Army had already issued orders on its own responsibility (10:45 and 11 a.m.) for the 31st and 123d Divs. to execute a coordinated attack against the flanks of the advancing enemy, the former through Thiaucourt, the latter in the direction of Vieville.

Meanwhile the Combres Group in Sectors B and D and the Mihiel Group in Sector F had been attacked and were engaged in heavy fighting.

The report received from the Gorz Group at 11:50 a.m. read: The enemy is southeast of Thiaucourt and at Tautecourt Farm. The 77th Res. Div. appears to be annihilated. No information yet concerning the counterattack of the 31st and 123d Divs.

At the time of this report therefore the enemy had already advanced to within 1 kilometer of the main line of resistance of the Michel Position. Furthermore, the left of the 10th Div. had undoubtedly been outflanked and driven back by the 6-kilometer penetration near Thiaucourt. There was not only the danger of a breakthrough at the decisive point in the Michel Position, but also a serious threat at the line of retreat of the Mihiel Group which was still in the salient.
The situation demanded an immediate decision. If the troops in the St-Mihiel salient were to be saved from capture, there could no longer be the slightest delay in ordering the withdrawal of the front to the Michel Position. Army headquarters therefore issued the following order to the Mihiel Group at noon:

The Loki Movement will begin at once.

At 12:10 p.m. the Combres Group reported that the enemy had taken St-Remy, had penetrated sectors B III and D I and was advancing.

At the same time the Gorz Group reported that heavy columns of troops were advancing upon Nonsard.

The correctness of the decision which had been made was hereby shown. The 10th Div. also was driven back without having any reserves at its disposal. The entire Michel Movement therefore was placed in jeopardy.

As reports up to 1 p.m. showed that Maizerais, Essey, Euvezin, and the entire plateau on the right bank of the Mad were in the enemy's hands, the Combres Group was ordered to make possible the seriously endangered retirement of the Mihiel Group by holding at all costs the line Combres Heights---Herbeuville---artillery protective position. Beney, too, was taken by the enemy early in the afternoon.

It is due only to the vigorous stand of the Combres Group, to the splendid leadership and conduct of the Mihiel Group, and to the timely decision made by the army command upon its own responsibility that the Mihiel Group was able to make the 30-kilometer flank march with heavy rearguard fighting and the loss of only 1,100 men and three guns (bore bursts) and that this group was able to reach the Michel Position next morning, under the protection of the covering force composed of the Assault Regiment and the 88th Div., the latter of which had been moved up at the proper time on the initiative of the Army. Two flank detachments of the 5th Landwehr Div. and the failure of the Americans to recognize their tactically favorable position prevented the latter from converting the misfortune of Composite Army C into a catastrophe. At the same time the attacks of the 31st and 123d Inf. Divs., even though they gained but little ground, succeeded in preventing the breakthrough of the Mihiel Position northeast of Thiaucourt.

FUCHS,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

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Withdrawal of Main Line of Resistance

[Editorial Translation]

From: Operations Section
At: Group of Armies von Gallwitz
Date: September 20, 1918 Hour: 2:20 p.m. No. 3745 Sent by: Teletype
To: Composite Army C

Reference Report No. 2991 dated September 19, 1918

Reference last page, request immediate telegraphic report stating when the withdrawal of the main line of resistance was ordered, at what time it was to be carried out.

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how it was executed, and why considerable numbers of troops remained in the outpost especially in the sector of the 77th Res. Div.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES von GALLWITZ,

September 20, 1918.

Telegram from Group of Armies von Gallwitz to Composite Army C

The Supreme Command wires under No. 10391, Operation Section:

The liaison officer of the Supreme Command with the Second Army gives his tactical interpretation of events—in which I concur—as follows:

I am persuaded that many a recent failure was due to the fact that the main line of resistance was too thinly occupied, a result of schematic distribution of the regiments into front line, support and reserve (rest) battalions, and to the consequent use of battalions in rear of each other without regard to the breadth of the sector, combat strengths, methods of attack of the enemy, and especially to the morale of the troops.

This formation which had proved its worth on many former occasions is mostly ordered by higher authority, the successive lines lying to the rear being designated for the several battalions. This too thin occupation leads to failure not only because too few material means are employed, but also because it robs our men of the confidence in their ability to repulse a strong attack. The less steady the troops are, the easier it is for that fatal feeling to take hold. Unfortunately, morale has greatly suffered. When a company with a trench strength of 50 to 60 men, as is often the case, has to occupy 300 meters or more, and in addition has to send out sentries to the front and hold out an assault detachment for the company commander, this state of mind is easily induced and is the basis for the failure of the company. Moreover, the company commander loses control of his men scattered over such wide sectors, a thing which is more important today than formerly.

The method of attack often used by the enemy nowadays, that is, a brief artillery preparation and a surprise attack with masses of troops, allows, in fact demands, a stronger occupation of the main line of resistance contrary to former procedure. There must be enough machine guns and rifles in the front line to put the enemy hors de combat before he can penetrate into our position. The sector will be often more securely held by employing 2 battalions in front line and 1 in reserve than by the use of 3 battalions in rear of each other. The outpost also, especially when too strongly occupied, gives rise to concern. Comment is being made on all sides by troop officers. They say that too strong occupation of the outpost leads the men to pick up and move to the rear. When the troops occupying the outpost fall back, they easily sweep along with them the weak forces occupying the main line of resistance. The disposition in depth of the machine guns is also much overdone and often leads to over-dispersion. They too must be under the control of their officers so they will not fail to remain at their post. Therefore it is essential that troops be held together.

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XON HILL-MOUSSON AREA
Looking south-southeast from Norroy, across Moselle Valley
Operations Section
No. 3021

To Group of Armies von Gallwitz

Reference your No. 3745 [Sept. 20]

[Extract]

1. The order for the withdrawal of the main line of resistance into the artillery protection position was given over the telephone to the 10th Inf. Div. and the 77th Res. Div. before 12 noon, September 11. The written order was received by the divisions at 1:30 p. m. The divisions had been prepared for it by the order of Group of Armies issued September 3, 1918, and a previous conference. On September 5, 1918, the artillery protective position was designated as the main line of resistance in case of a withdrawal order of the Army. On the morning of September 11 when the divisions were asked if the regrouping could be executed by 4 a. m., September 12, both divisions replied in the affirmative.

2. The regrouping for the defense of the main line of resistance (artillery protective position) was to be completed by 4 a. m., September 12.

3. The regrouping was essentially executed by the 10th Inf. Div. by 4 a. m., in spite of the heavy artillery fire which began at 2 a. m. In the 77th Res. Div. in the face of the written order the artillery had not been maintained in a state of readiness for action. The change of positions of the batteries was executed too late and almost simultaneously. Therefore, the artillery of the 77th Res. Div. was almost altogether lacking for the defense. The regrouping of the infantry regiments on the flanks was executed under enemy fire. No report is available from the center regiment, since the regimental commander is missing.

4. According to the instructions of the Group of Armies the front line companies were to remain in their positions and be disposed in the foreground as deep as possible. The purpose of this measure was to screen the regrouping from the enemy, to simplify its execution, and consequently to be able to accomplish it quickly even in the strained situation. The 77th Res. Div., however, still had left in the outpost area, in addition to the front line companies, 2 M. G. cos. in each regimental sector and the divisional boundary company on the left boundary, and had given them the order that the wooded area in the outpost was to be held determinedly by the outpost garrison. This contradicted the order of the Group of Armies, which had ordered the outpost garrison to withdraw fighting in case of an enemy attack on a large scale. **

[Note]

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To: Supreme Headquarters

The Group of Armies submits to the Supreme Command two reports of Composite Army C with reference to the events up to September 11 and the battle of September 12 [printed herein]. The observations are, in general, concurred in, with the following additional remarks in particular:

1. The request to have the 77th Res. Div. relieved by the arriving 107th Inf. Div. was not approved, since this division arrived in a very exhausted condition and its re-organization by the addition of an outside regiment was impending.

2. The insertion of a division between the 10th Inf. Div. and the 77th Res. Div. met with the objection that the withdrawal of the main line of resistance to the former artillery protective position was already in prospect and it seemed useless to push forward new forces. Moreover, in the new position the support of the weak front line divisions could be effected by inserting troops on the line by holding counterattack troops well forward. Since neither the Army nor the group had any reserves at its disposal, only G. H. Q. reserves could be considered in both solutions. To the application made at 7:50 p.m., September 10, for the release of these divisions no decision was announced by the supreme command in the course of the whole day of September 11, so that this day was lost so far as moving divisions toward the front was concerned. Authorization did not reach these headquarters until 2:15 a.m., September 12. Before its arrival at Composite Army C, the latter, on its own responsibility, had alerted the divisions.

3. The request that the sector of the 255th Inf. Div. be placed under Composite Army C was disapproved by the Supreme Command on September 1, 1918, in Order 10031, Operations Section, with the notation that the existing situation demanded the rejection of such a change. Not until these headquarters made representations to the effect that, in view of the increasing tension on its front, a unified command on the west bank of the Moselle was considered urgently necessary, was this request approved, on September 11. After getting in touch---as was necessary---with the Group of Armies of Duke Albrecht with respect to the time of the change of command and the course of the boundary, the appropriate instructions were immediately issued to Composite Army C.

The events of September 12 are not yet clear in their entirety. However, I believe that I can summarize as follows the reasons for the failure of that day:

a. The most profound reason lies in the extraordinarily unfavorable shape of the former position of Composite Army C, the acute triangle of St-Mihiel. Its abandonment for the great battle had been planned beforehand. So long as all went well with us, we could afford the risk for reasons of morale. With the gradual change in our situation as a whole, the decisive step of voluntarily retiring in good time to the Michel Position was probably indicated. When finally, the evidence became plainer that it was not a question of an attack merely against the south front but also from the west, I gave expression, in a conference with Lt. Gen. Fuchs on September 9, to the conviction that the proper thing to do was to commence the Loki movement at once. It is true, we did not consider the commencement of the attack as imminent as it later turned out to be. It seems to us that in this evaluation we were of the same mind as the Supreme Command for, as late as September 10, Lt. Col. Wetzell expressed to the Chief of Staff his surprise that we regarded the situation as so urgent. Also, with respect to my representations of September
9. under No. 220, that the assumptions for the occupation of the Michel Position were fulfilled, the Supreme Command decided that the measures for the systematic occupation of the Michel Position should be initiated and carried out, but that the actual withdrawal of the troops from the positions, and hence the abandonment of these positions, should be delayed as long as the tactical situation would at all permit. Thus, for the sake of the salvage operations, time was spent with no adequate return.

b. The south front was too thinly held. The two weakened divisions which had to meet the main blow occupied a front of 22 kilometers. How it came about that they were not supported in time, even on September 11, is set forth under par. 2 above.

c. The hostile attack, unfortunately, was launched on the night on which was to be executed the necessary withdrawal of the main line of resistance and a regrouping with respect to it resulting from the order to give greater depth to the forward area. The attached report of Composite Army C gives a detailed explanation of this.

d. The instructions issued by the 77th Res. Div. for the night of the withdrawal are in conflict with the directives which had been given. They were a precautionary measure; but, as a result of them, considerable portions of the division were overrun by the superior masses of the Americans before the fight for the main line of resistance could open. This departure from existing orders can hardly have been known to the army high command; but, on the other hand, it is something of a shock that the next higher headquarters, the group, did not scrutinize the division's order with this in mind.

e. The 31st and 123d Inf. Divs. arrived at the front as quickly as practicable, in view of the location of their previous billets and the decision of the army high command, reached independently, immediately after the commencement of the surprise artillery fire, to alert these G. H. Q. reserves. However, there appears not to have been a sufficiently forceful execution of the order for the counterattack by these two divisions issued by the Gorz Group at 10:45 and 11 a. m. respectively. It is not yet clear to what extent the strength of the opponent, defects in the orders or insufficiently vigorous action on the part of the troops are to blame for this.

von GALLWITZ,
General of Artillery.

PIN: 067696-000