UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR 1917–1919

Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces

Volume 7

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UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919

Volume 1  Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 2  Policy-forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 3  Training and Use of American Units With the British and French
Volume 4–9  Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 10  The Armistice Agreement and Related Documents
Volume 11  American Occupation of Germany
Volume 12–15  Reports of the Commander-in-Chief, AEF, Staff Sections and Services
Volume 16  General Orders, GHQ, AEF
Volume 17  Bulletins, GHQ, AEF
FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . . [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army's historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army's months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping-off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of "the war to end all wars." Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C. 1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
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THE SOMME OFFENSIVE OPERATION
August 8 - November 11, 1918

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Preface

This volume presents records pertaining to participation of the II Corps, A. E. F., in the Somme offensive and operations preliminary thereto.

The II Corps, A. E. F., was formally organized by G. O. No. 102, G. H. Q., A. E. F., dated June 25, 1918. Lieut. Col. George S. Simonds had previously been appointed as chief of staff by letter of instructions from G. H. Q., A. E. F., dated Feb. 22, 1918. Subsequent instructions from the same source added G-1, G-4, Ordnance Officer, Quartermaster and Chief Surgeon. With this personnel, Headquarters II Corps conducted preliminary negotiations with G. H. Q. British Expeditionary Forces and carried on its other duties until the official announcement of organization.

The successive locations of Headquarters II Corps, with dates are given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>FROM 1918</th>
<th>TO 1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MONTREUIL (PAS-de-CALAIS)</td>
<td>Feb. 24</td>
<td>Mar. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chateau BRYAS (St-POL, PAS-de-CALAIS)</td>
<td>Mar. 9</td>
<td>Apr. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRUGES (PAS-de-CALAIS)</td>
<td>Apr. 1</td>
<td>Aug. 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUTKERQUE (NORD)</td>
<td>Aug. 30</td>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BEAUVAL (SOMME)</td>
<td>Sept. 3</td>
<td>Sept. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERICOURT-sur-SOMME (SOMME)</td>
<td>Sept. 22</td>
<td>Sept. 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BELLOY Wood (Near ASSEVILLERS, SOMME)</td>
<td>Sept. 26</td>
<td>Oct. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUIRE Wood (Near TINCOURT, SOMME)</td>
<td>Oct. 5</td>
<td>Oct. 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIANCOURT (AISNE)</td>
<td>Oct. 12</td>
<td>Oct. 25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
BERTANGLES (SOMME) Oct. 25 Nov. 27

BONNETABLE (SARTHE) Nov. 27 Feb. 1 (1919)

Battle engagements of the II Corps, A. E. F.

I. ENGAGEMENTS IN BELGIUM

3. Dickebusch Lake August 2-August 8.
5. Voormezeele August 9-September 2.
6. Voormezeele August 31-September 2.
7. Lankhof Farm August 31-September 2.
8. Vierstraat Ridge August 31-September 2.

II. BATTLE OF BELLICOURT (Aisne)

September 27-30, 1918.

(a) Preparatory Engagements.

1. The Knoll September 27.
2. Guillemont Farm September 27.
3. Quennemont Farm September 27.

(b) Final Attack. September 29-30, 1918


III. BATTLE OF MONTBREHAIN (Aisne)

October 6-17, 1918.

1. Montbrehain October 6-7.
2. Ponchaux October 7.
5. Brancourt October 8-9.
12. La Haie-Menneresse October 11.
13. St-Benin October 11-17.
14. St-Souplet October 11-17.
IV. BATTLE OF THE SELLE RIVER

October 17-21, 1918.

1. St-Souplet  
2. St-Martin-Riviere  
3. l'Arbre-de-Guise  
4. Ribeauville  
5. Molain  
6. Jonc-de-Mer Ridge  
7. Arbre-Guernon  
8. Mazinghien  
9. St-Maurice River  
10. Heights of Catillon

The II Corps participated in these battles with the 27th and 30th Divisions, the 33rd, 78th and 80th Divisions having been sent elsewhere late in August, 1918. On August 27, II Corps was directed to take over on August 30 command of the Dickebusch and Canal sectors, where the 27th and 30th Divisions were in the line abreast: but this order was revoked. On September 2 orders were issued to withdraw the 27th and 30th Divisions from the line. From September 3 to September 20, the II Corps, composed of the American 27th and 30th Divisions, formed part of the G. H. Q. reserve, B. E. F.; then it was assigned to the British Fourth Army, which was operating against the Hindenburg Line east of Peronne. The 27th and 30th Divisions moved into front line positions west and northwest of Bellcourt on the nights of September 23/24 and 24/25. At this time, the II Corps was affiliated with the Australian corps and operated under its orders. The II Corps took over, from the Australian corps, command of the front held by the 30th Division on October 6, and began to operate as a tactical unit. It remained constantly in action until October 19, after which it passed to army reserve and resumed intensive training. The Armistice came before the II Corps could again go into action. The strength of the 27th and 30th Divisions at the start and finish of their Somme operations were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>27th Division</th>
<th>30th Division</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Off.</td>
<td>EM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 26, 1918</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>15,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 24, 1918</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>9,917</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This compilation of documents starts with movement orders for the 27th and 30th Divisions on September 2. It ends with a series of reports written some time after the II Corps was withdrawn from the front line.

The attention of the student of the operations of the II Corps during the period of September 22-October 1, 1918, is invited to the "Report on Operations of Australian Corps, 20 September to 6 October" which will be found in Appendix I. This is a brief and succinct account of the preliminary and main operations with outline plans therefor. The action of the various divisions is briefly covered and perusal of this report is deemed essential to a clear understanding of the operations of this period. In this same report of the Australian Corps are also explained the relations existing between the Australian and II Corps during the period of affiliation (September 22-October 6, 1918), during which time the II Corps operated under the orders of the former. This report also serves to cover the operations of the Australian Corps from the time the 27th and 30th
SOMME OFFENSIVE OPERATION
BRITISH FOURTH ARMY
24 SEPTEMBER TO 20 OCTOBER 1918

MAP No 93

All front lines as of midnight unless otherwise noted

Shaded areas indicate ground gained by American Divisions

Compiled by Historical Division
War Department US Army
Divisions were withdrawn from the line (October 1, 1918) until their reentry, with the II Corps in command of the Australian Corps sector, on October 6, 1918.

The following list of initials commonly used as abbreviations in the B.E.F. was published by the II Corps in its Bulletin No. 1 dated April 10, 1918.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initials</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G.S.</td>
<td>General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.G.S.</td>
<td>Chief of the General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.G.G.S.</td>
<td>Brigadier General, General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.O. 1</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.O. 2</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, 2d Grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.O. 3</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, 3d Grade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.O. 1 (O)</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade (Operation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.O. 1 (I)</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade (Intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.O. 1 (Sp. I)</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade, (Special Intelligence or Contra-Espionage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.S.O. 1 (T)</td>
<td>General Staff Officer, 1st Grade (Training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.S.</td>
<td>Military Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.M.S.</td>
<td>Asst. Military Sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.M.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Mil. Sec.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.G.</td>
<td>Adjutant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.G.</td>
<td>Deputy Adj. General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.A.G.</td>
<td>Asst. Adjt. General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q.M.G.</td>
<td>Quartermaster General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.Q.M.G.</td>
<td>Deputy Quartermaster General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.Q.M.G.</td>
<td>Asst. Quartermaster General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.Q.M.G.</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Quartermaster General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.G.R.A.</td>
<td>Major General Royal Artillery (G.H.Q.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.O.C.R.A.</td>
<td>General Officer Commanding Royal Artillery (of an Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.R.A.</td>
<td>Commanding Royal Artillery (of a Corps or Division)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.O. to M.G.R.A.</td>
<td>Staff Officer to Major General Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.O. for R.</td>
<td>Staff Officer for Reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td>Provost Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.P.M.</td>
<td>Asst. Prov. Marshal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.S.C.</td>
<td>Army Service Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. of S.</td>
<td>Director of Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.D.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Director of Supplies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. of T.</td>
<td>Director of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.T.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D.T.</td>
<td>Asst. Director of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.D.T.</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Director of Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.S. and T.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Supplies and Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D.S. and T.</td>
<td>Asst. Director of Supplies and Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.D.S. and T.</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Director of Supplies and Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>O.S.</td>
<td>Ordnance Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.A. and Q.M.G.</td>
<td>Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.A. and Q.M.G.</td>
<td>Asst. Adjut. and Quartermaster General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.G.T.</td>
<td>Director Gen. of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.G.T.</td>
<td>Deputy Director Gen. of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D.G.T.</td>
<td>Asst. Director Gen. of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>D.A.D.G.T.</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Director Gen. of Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.E.</td>
<td>Royal Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. in C.</td>
<td>Engineer in Chief (G.H.Q.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.E.</td>
<td>Chief Engineer (of an Army or Corps)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.R.E.</td>
<td>Commanding Royal Engineers (of Army troops, Corps troops and of a Division)</td>
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<tr>
<td>S.O. to E. in C.</td>
<td>Staff Officer to Engineer in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.O. to C.E.</td>
<td>Staff Officer to Chief Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.A.</td>
<td>Royal Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.V.S.</td>
<td>Director of Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.V.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.D.V.S.</td>
<td>Asst. Director of Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.D.V.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Asst. Director of Veterinary Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.P.S.</td>
<td>Director of Army Postal Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.A.P.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Director of Army Postal Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.A.P. and S.S.</td>
<td>Director of Army Printing and Stationery Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.G.M.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Director General of Medical Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.D.G.M.S.</td>
<td>Deputy Director General of Medical Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.O.</td>
<td>Medical Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.R.L.S.</td>
<td>Despatch Rider Letter Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.H.Q.</td>
<td>General Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.L.O.</td>
<td>Military Landing Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.S.O.</td>
<td>Railhead Supply Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.M.T.O.</td>
<td>Senior Mechanical Transportation Officer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number of a division is written in Arabic numerals, e.g., 6th Division. Number of a corps is written in Roman numerals, e.g., VI Corps. Number of an army is written in words, e.g., Fifth Army.
Letters to a corps headquarters are addressed as follows:

All correspondence dealing with tactical matters, such as training operations, etc., are addressed:

Headquarters (C),
XV Corps.

All correspondence dealing with supplies and administration services generally are addressed:

Headquarters (Q),
IV Corps.

By command of General Pershing:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.,
Chief of Staff.

SOMME OFFENSIVE OPERATION
SEPTEMBER 2 TO NOVEMBER 11, 1918.

Location and Movements of the II Corps Prior to Active Operations,
September 2, 1918 to September 22, 1918

II CORPS WITHDRAWN FROM BELGIAN FRONT.

II Corps Headquarters established at BEAUVAL September 3, 1918 - Corps assigned to G. H. Q., B. E. F. reserve - 27th Division assigned to Third Army, B. E. F. area - 30th Division to First Army, B. E. F. area - transferred September 17 to Third Army, B. E. F. area and ordered to rejoin II Corps.

Transfer of 27th and 30th Divisions to Third and First (British) Armies

O. A. 222/1

ADVANCE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, B. E. F.,
September 2, 1918.

1. The American 27th and 30th Divisions (less artillery) will be transferred to the Third and First Armies respectively and held in G. H. Q. reserve.

2. Entrainment in each case will be at HEIDEBEEK---WAAYENBERG---PROVEN under orders of Second Army.

3. American 27th Division will commence entrainment about midnight September 3/4. It will detrain at DOULLENS and MONDICOURT under orders of Third Army.

4. American 30th Division will commence entrainment at midnight September 5/6. Detraining stations will be notified later.

J. H. DAVIDSON, M. G.
for
Lieut. General,
Chief of the General Staff.

* Syllable "beek" appears also as "beke," variable spelling.
Transfer of II Corps

CONVERSATION with Col. Dobbie, G. H. Q.
12:45 p. m. 2/9/18

American II Corps Hq. will arrive tomorrow and will go to BEAUVAL.
I said they could detrain either at CANDAS or DOULLENS.
American 27th Division will entrain in the north probably midnight Sept. 3/4, and
will be accommodated roughly in an area DOULLENS--ORVILLE--BEAUQUESNE--BEAUVAL.
I said detraining stations would be DOULLENS, CANDAS, MONDICOURT, if 3 stations
required.
Divisional headquarters to BEAUQUESNE.
American 30th Division is going to First Army.

C. J. W.

"G" (Q)
2. 9. 18.

C. J. WALLACE, Major
for Major General,
General Staff, Third Army.

HS Brit. File: (British Third Army): Order

Headquarters American II Corps and 27th Division Transferred to
British Third Army in General Headquarters Reserve

THIRD ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Headquarters American II Corps and American 27th Division (less artillery) are
being transferred to Third Army and will be held in G. H. Q. reserve. Orders for the
move of the above will be issued separately.
American 27th Division will be administered by American II Corps.
2. Headquarters American II Corps will be accommodated at BEAUVAL.

C. J. WALLACE,
Major
for
Major General,
General Staff, Third Army.

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- 8 -
Corps Headquarters Transferred From British Second Army to British Third Army

FIELD ORDERS
No. 11
II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 2, 1918.

MAPS: 1:100,000 HAZEBROUCK (5A) and LENS
1:40,000 Sheets 27, 28, 57D and 57E

1. The headquarters of this corps and D Company, 412th Telegraphic Battalion will be transferred from the British Second Army to the British Third Army.
2. Hq. corps artillery and hq. corps heavy artillery of the British VII Corps will not accompany this corps and will rejoin the British VII Corps under arrangements to be made by them.
3. Instructions will be issued later regarding details of the move.
4. Corps headquarters will close at HOUTKERQUE at 6 p.m., September 3, 1918, and open at BEAUVAL at the same hour and date.

G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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G-4
Orders
II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 2, 1918.

Map: FRANCE 1:100,000 LENS SHEET

[Extract]

1. In accordance with Orders Second Army G 251, August 31, 1918, and G 4 and G 10, September 2, 1918, Second Army, these headquarters will move by rail to the Third Army on September 3.
2. Entrainment of the II Corps Headquarters will be at PROVEN under unstructions to be issued by the camp commandant. Detraining station CANDAS Exchange, destination BEAUVAL.

By command of Major General READ:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.

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FIELD ORDER
No. 14

MAP: Sheet 19 S. E. 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. This division is being transferred to the British Third [First]* Army. The move will be made by rail.
2. (a) Entraining will begin on the night September 5/6.
   (b) Entraining stations will be as follows:

   PROVENC
   WAAYENBERG (X.13.c.5.5)
   HEIDEBECK (X.27.a.2.4)

5. Division headquarters will close at VOGELTJE Convent at 6 p.m., September 4, and open at ESDAILE Camp at same hour. The time division headquarters will close at ESDAILE Camp and time and place of opening in new area will be announced later.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding.

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Move of the American 27th Division

[Extract]

French Transport Order
No. U. S. 228

1. The American 27th Division will be moved by rail from the Second Army to the Third Army, commencing on the 4th Inst.

   * * * * *

   L. C. OWEN,
   Lieut. Col.,
   for
   Director of Railway Traffic.

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* Subsequent documents indicate that "Third" is an obvious error and that it should read "First."
 Movement of Headquarters

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 3, 1918.

To: Third Army, British E. F.

Headquarters American II Corps will close at HOUTKERQUE at 6 p. m., Sept. 3 and will open at BEAUVAL at the same hour and date.

283 G-3, Amer. II Corps

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Movement

FIELD ORDER
No. 40

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 3, 1918—6:30 a. m.

Maps: [HAZEBROUCK 5 A
[LENS 11

[Extract]

1. This division (less all artillery and ammunition and supply trains) is being transferred to the British Third Army, the movement, including horse transport, to be by rail.

2. The division will entrain on September 4 and 5, commencing about midnight of September 3/4, in accordance with entraining table and instructions to be issued in other orders.

3. Entraining and detraining stations will be as follows:

    PROVENC to DOULLENS,
    HEIDEBEKE to CANDAS,
    WAAYENBURG to MONDICOURT.

* * * * *

6. Division headquarters will close at OUDEZEELE September 4 at 10 p. m. and will open at BEAUQUESNE at the same hour.

* * * * *

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Chief of Staff.

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- 11 -
Assignment 52d Field Artillery Brigade

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 121

The 52d Field Artillery Brigade (27th Division), now in the vicinity of BAR-le-DUC, is assigned and will be reported for duty to the 33d Division.

By command of General PERSHING:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

Administration Orders, II Corps

G-4
ORDERS
No. 13

[Extract]

On arrival in the DOULLENS-BEAUQUESNE area, the American 27th Division will be administered by the American II Corps. The following provisional arrangements have been made:

(1) Railhead will be ROSEL on the DOULLENS-AMIENS Road, about 1 1/2 miles south of BEAUVAL. Supplies on the 5th Inst. will be drawn by M. T. and thereafter, by horse transport.

* * * * *

By command of Major General READ:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.
Operations 30th Division

MEMORANDUM:

[Extract]

1. Reference Field Order No. 14, these headquarters, dated September 2, 1918, entraining will begin on the night of 5/6.

* * * * *

By command of Major General LEWIS:

ALLAN M. POPE,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-1.

Operations Report

G-3 II CORPS, A. E. F.,

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon September 4, 1918

[Extract]

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY:

Headquarters II Corps closed at HOUTKERQUE at 6 p. m., September 3, and opened at BEAUVAL at same hour and day.

II Corps Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 412th Telegraph Battalion moved during the afternoon of September 3 and night and morning of September 4, from HOUTKERQUE to BEAUVAL.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, N. A.,
Commanding.

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II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 4, 1918.

[Extract]

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REMARKS: Headquarters 27th Division opened BEAUQUESNE 4 p. m. and closed at OUDEZEELE same hour.

JAMES M. LOVE, Jr.,
Adjutant General.

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230-32.1: Location List

Locations 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918.

Division Headquarters and Hq. Troop
105th Field Signal Battalion
113th Machine Gun Battalion
105th Military Police
105th Engineer Regiment
105th Engineer Train
108th Mobile Vet. Section
118th Field Ambulance
119th Field Ambulance
Hq. 105th Sanitary Train
Hq. 59th BRIGADE
Hq. 117th Infantry
Headquarters Company
Machine Gun Company
1st Battalion
2d Battalion
3d Battalion
Headquarters 118th Infantry
Headquarters Company
Supply Company
Machine Gun Company
1st Battalion
2d Battalion
3d Battalion
114th Machine Gun Battalion
132d Field Ambulance [Br.]

ROELLECOURT
ROELLECOURT and St-MICHEL
St-MICHEL
GRAND-CAMP
FOUFFLIN-RICAMETZ and TERNAS
ROCOURT
GROSSART
RAMECOURT
RAMECOURT
BRYAS
HERNICOURT
SIRACOURT
SIRACOURT
HERNICOURT
PIERREMONT
BEAUVOIS and CROIX
HERNICOURT and GAUCHIN
VALHUON
" "
BOURS
MAREST and GRICOURT
PRESSY
CONTEVILLE and HUCLIER
HERNICOURT
30th Division Assigned to I Corps British First Army

First Army N. G. S. 1408

1. The American 30th Division on transfer from the Second Army to the First Army is allotted to I Corps.
2. The move will take place by strategical train as under:
   (a) Entrainment at HEIDEBEKE---WAAYENBERG---PROVEN, under orders of the Second Army, commencing at midnight September 5/6, 1918.
   (b) Detrainment at WAVRANS---BRYAS---PETIT-HOUVIN under arrangements of the D. A. and Q. M. G., First Army.
3. On arrival in the First Army area, the American 30th Division will be accommodated in the St-POL area (Hq. ROELLE COURT) and will be held in G. H. Q. reserve at 24 hours notice.

EDWARD LASCELLES,
Major,
for
Major General,
General Staff, First Army.
Location Division Headquarters

FIELD ORDER
No. 15

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918.

1. Division headquarters will close at ESDAILE Camp at 12 noon September 5, 1918, and open at ROELLECOURT at the same hour.

By command of Major General LEWIS:

J. K. HERR,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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182-33.1: Operations Report

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon September 5, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * *

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY.
The relief of the 30th Division by the British 35th Division began night of September 3/4, continuing on September 4 and night of September 4/5. The 30th Division in accordance with orders received, has been transferred from the Second Army to the Third [First] Army, B. E. F. Entrainment to take place night of September 5/6 at PROVEN---WAAYENBERG---HEIDEBEKE.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, N. A.,
Commanding.

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- 16 -
Location Headquarters 27th and 30th Divisions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
Beauval, September 6, 1918—6:45 p.m.

G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.
Headquarters EVA [30th Division] opened ROELLECOURT, September 5.

BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps.

230-50.5: Memorandum

Principles of Training

G-3/19
MEMORANDUM ORDERS

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 6, 1918.

PRINCIPLES OF TRAINING FOR 30TH DIVISION WHILE IN ST-POL AREA

1. It is more than probable that the time available for training will be short. We must therefore concentrate all effort upon certain features necessary in the kind of fighting we shall most probably meet on this front.

2. When thrown into the line we will doubtlessly be given a certain objective to take - perhaps a line of trench, or a series of strong points. Often it is easier to gain the objective than it is to keep it. We must always expect counterattacks. Therefore, the captured ground must be consolidated in a hurry - both for shelter against artillery and M. G. fire, and for assistance in repelling the counterattack. The work to be done, often under heavy fire and while expecting every minute the counterattack, might be considered under the following form:

   Wire
   (a) Outpost line   (Organized shell holes   (Special attention to
   (Trenches   alternative positions.)
   (It is not always a good practice to place the outpost line in a captured enemy trench; the enemy artillery knows the range and position too well.)
   (Trace
   (b) Strong Points (Wire
   (Shelter
   (Trenches - all round defense.

3. An infantry unit such as the platoon, company or battalion cannot usually accomplish its mission alone - it must be aided by other infantry units, or other arms, such as artillery, machine guns, 1-pounders or trench mortars. But this aid cannot be rendered unless the position and needs of the unit are known. For these, as well as many other reasons, constant and intimate liaison is imperative. This liaison is not a thing apart from the infantry unit - on the contrary, the unit commander is absolutely responsible for maintaining constant touch to his flanks and rear. Abundant means of
liaison are placed at his disposal, and something is lacking in initiative and efficiency if a commander loses touch with his neighbors and fails to send back information to his superior.

Brigade and regimental commanders must cooperate in correcting one of the gravest weaknesses of this division; the following points should be covered first in this training:

**LIAISON**

(a) Within the platoon.
(b) From platoon to company, and laterally with other platoons.
(c) From company to battalion, and laterally.
(d) Liaison with aeroplanes - panels, flares, etc.

Use of all means of liaison - visual lamps, dogs, pigeons, runners, cyclist, as well as phones and buzzers. The visual lamp has been almost entirely neglected in this division - it has a wide use in semi-open warfare.

4. The third important subject for training at this time, is in the attack. The rigid formality of following the creeping barrage of trench warfare, will be the exception and not the rule in semi-open warfare, and infantry must depend for the most part for success upon its own weapons. Effort will be made in this training to give the battalion commander practice in handling his battalion with such auxiliary arms as machine guns, 1-pounders, trench mortars, and perhaps field artillery. Lack of skill in auxiliary arms causes needless casualties. In this connection, all commanders will consider the proposition of how best to carry forward, in the attack, a trench mortar and ammunition. In the rapid advances of semi-open warfare, commanders of all grades must look out for the protection of their own flanks. The enemy has flanks, also, and your rapid advance will often cause him to fall back or surrender. No progress will ever be made, if an alignment of units is waited for.

The training in attack is not a drill, like close order drill, and false assumptions as to the ground, etc., should not be made except in rare instances. All commanders should watch for any signs of perfunctory performance and must stamp it out at once.

Training in attack should include the following points:
(a) Platoon, company and battalion in attack.
   Special attention - loose deployment, close liaison, and use of Lewis guns, machine guns, 1-pounders, and trench mortars.
(b) Problems in reduction of M. G. nests and strong points.
(c) How to follow a barrage.

5. The preliminary training will be directly under regimental commanders, under supervision of brigade commanders. Schedules of training will, however, be submitted to these headquarters, after approval by intermediate commanders.

Any evidence of perfunctory execution of training at a time so vital will be interpreted as a glaring example of irresponsibility and inefficiency.

By command of Major General LEWIS:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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Operations Report of 27th and 30th Divisions

G-3

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Subject: Operation report for period ending noon, September 6, 1918

[Extract]

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY:
The 30th Division entrained last night for transfer to the British First Army area, division headquarters at ROELLECOURT. The 27th Division finished entraining yesterday for transfer to the British Third Army area, and division headquarters has been established at BEAUQUESNE.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

30th Div.: Org. Rec.: Gen. File 370.4: Order of Battle

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 7, 1918—12 noon.

II Corps Headquarters
30th Division

Headquarters
59th Infantry Brig. Hq.
117th Inf. Hq.
118th Inf. Hq.
60th Infantry Brig. Hq.
119th Infantry Hq.
120th Infantry Hq.
105th Engrs. Hq.

BEAUVAL

ROELLECOURT
HERNICOURT
SIRACOURT
VALHUON
SAINS
MAISNIL---ST-POL
HERLINCOURT
FOUFFLIN-RICAMETZ and TERNAS
27th Division
Headquarters
53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
105th Infantry Hq.
106th Infantry Hq.
54th Infantry Brig. Hq.
107th Infantry Hq.
108th Infantry Hq.
102d Engrs. Hq.

BEAUQUESNE
DOULLENS
FAMECHON
DOULLENS
RAINCHEVAL
TERRAMESNIL
AMPLIER
HALLOY

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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27th Div.: 227-12.3: Telegram

Replacements for 27th Division

FROM: II Corps
DATE: September 7, 1918.
TO: C. of S., G. H. Q., A. E. F.

In view of probable service confronting 27th Division, request that replacements be furnished that division. It has just been withdrawn from tour in the line in which it has suffered considerable casualties and at last report was 62 officers and 2,547 men short. Request that replacements be forwarded in order to have advantage of short period of training before further service.

G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding II Corp.

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230-32.15: Order

Instruction in Action of Infantry With Tanks

G-3

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 7, 1918.

MEMORANDUM ORDERS:

[Extract]

1. Instruction in action of infantry with tanks will take place at SAUTRICOURT as follows:
September 9 - 117th Infantry, entire regiment
" 10 - 118th Infantry, entire regiment
" 11 - 119th Infantry, entire regiment
" 12 - 120th Infantry, entire regiment

* * * * * *

By command of Major General LEWIS:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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G-3: GHQ: 82: Letter

Operation Report

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 7, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, Sept. 7, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * * *

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY.

The 27th Division has taken position in the British Third Army area on the G.H.Q. reserve line.
The 30th Division is taking position in the British First Army area on the G.H.Q. reserve line.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, U. S.,
Commanding.

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- 21 -
Operation Report

G-3

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, Sept. 8, 1918

[Extract]

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY.
   All units of the 30th Division (less artillery) have taken position in the British
   First Army area.
   Nothing further to report.

   * * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, U. S.,
Commanding.

Evacuation of Sick and Wounded

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
September 13, 1918.

SECRET MEMO. 3

The following scheme for the evacuation and care of the sick of this division will
become effective Saturday, September 14, 1918:

1. CHANGE OF MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS:
   (a) The 118th Field Ambulance, now at RAMECOURT, will occupy the hutted camp
       formerly designated as Canadian C. C. S. 1 at PERNES. The main dressing station now
       operated by this unit at RAMECOURT will close on the morning of September 14 and open at
       C. C. S. 1 Canadian, on the same date.
   (b) Prior to departure from RAMECOURT, the wards will be cleared of all patients
       who are capable of being returned to duty; serious cases, those with temperatures, and
       those with communicable diseases will be transferred to Stationary Hospital, at St-POL.
All others will be transferred to the main dressing station which is to be established at the old site of C. C. S. 1 Canadian, at PERNES.

(c) An advance party of one officer and 25 men will occupy C. C. S. 1 Canadian at PERNES this date.

2. Field Ambulance 119 will occupy the site formerly used by C. C. S. 1 Canadian at PERNES, in conjunction with Field Ambulance 118. An advance party of one officer and 25 men will occupy this camp Friday, September 13, 1918; the remaining part of the ambulance will move on Sept. 14, 1918.

3. The 132d Field Ambulance will establish a collecting station at HERNICOURT and will make daily collection of the sick from the following-named units:

- Headquarters 30th Div. and Hq. Troop at ROELLECOURT
- Headquarters 59th Brigade HERNICOURT
- 115th Machine Gun Bn. OSTREVILLE
- 105th Field Sign. Bn. ROELLECOURT and St-MICHEL
- 113th Machine Gun Bn. St-MICHEL
- 105th Military Police GRAND-CAMP
- 105th Engineer Train ROCOURT
- Headquarters 117th Infantry
  - Headquarters Co. and Supply Co.
    - Machine Gun Company HERNICOURT
    - 1st Battalion PIERREMONT
    - 2d Battalion BEAUVOIS and CROIX
    - 3d Battalion HERNICOURT and GAUCHIN
- 114th Machine Gun Bn.
  - 3d Bn., 120th Inf.
    - CONTREVILLE and HUCLIER
    - CROISETTE

4. The 134th Field Ambulance will establish a collecting station for sick at MAISNIL-ST-POL and will make daily call for the collection of the sick for the following-named units:

- Headquarters 60th Brigade SAINS
- Headquarters 119th Infantry MAISNIL-ST-POL
  - Headquarters Company " "
  - Machine Gun Company HERLIN-le-SEC
  - Supply Company NEUVILLE-au-CORNET and
    - MONTS-en-TERNOIS
  - 1st Battalion BUNEVILLE
  - 2d Battalion MONCHEAUX
  - 3d Battalion HERLINCOURT
- Headquarters 120th Inf. and Hq. Co.
  - Supply Company HERLIN-le-SEC
  - Machine Gun Co. HERLINCOURT
  - 1st Battalion PETIT-HOUVAIN and SAINS
  - 2d Battalion ECOIVRES and FRAMECOURT
  - 105th Engineers FOUFFLIN-RICAMETZ and TERNAS

5. The 119th Field Ambulance at PERNES will call daily and transport the sick of the following-named units to the main dressing station at PERNES:

- Headquarters 118th Infantry VALHUON
  - Headquarters Company " "
  - Supply Company " "
  - Machine Gun Company " "

- 118th Infantry at PERNES
6. The motor cars now with the four infantry regiments and supplied by the 118th and 119th Field Ambulance will be replaced by motor cars from the 132d and 134th Field Ambulances, respectively. The 132d Field Ambulance will furnish ambulance cars to the 117th and 118th Infantry; the 134th Field Ambulance will furnish ambulance cars to the 119th and 120th Infantry. Motor cars of the 118th and 119th Field Ambulances upon being relieved will report to their organization at PERNES.

7. A holding party of one noncommissioned officer and four men will remain at the Chateau at RAMECOURT.

8. Acknowledge.

A. M. WHALEY,
Lieut. Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.

30th Division Transferred from First to British Third Army to Rejoin II Corps

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, B. E. F.,
September 14, 1918.

1. The American 30th Division will be transferred from First Army to Third Army to rejoin the American II Corps.

2. The move will be carried out by tactical train and road as follows:
   (a) Tactical trains (personnel only) on September 17 and 18. Entrainment at WAVRANS, PETIT-HOUVIN, and BRYAS under First Army orders. Detrainment at BELLENGLISE and ROISEL under Third Army orders.
   (b) Transport by road under Third Army orders. Move to be complete by afternoon September 18.

3. On completion of the move, the American 30th Division will be held in G. H. Q. reserve in the PUCHEVILLERS-TOUTENCOURT area.

J. H. DAVIDSON,
Major General,
for
Lieut. General,
Chief of the General Staff.
30th Division Transferred From British First Army to British Third Army Under Orders American II Corps

No. G13/462

[Extract]

THIRD ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 15, 1918.

3. On arrival [in Third Army area] the American 30th Division will be accommodated under orders of American II Corps as follows:

A Bde. Hq.    LOUVENCOURT
B Bde. Hq.    TOUTENCOURT

A Regt. Hq.    LOUVENCOURT
B    "    "    ARQUEVES
C    "    "    LEALVILLERS
D    "    "    ACHEUX

A list of villages for the accommodation of the division is attached. IV and V Corps will place the necessary accommodation at the disposal of the American II Corps.

4. American 30th Division will be in G. H. Q. reserve, administered by American II Corps.

5. Acknowledge.

C. J. WALLACE,
Major,
for
Major General, General Staff,
Third Army.

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VILLAGES TO ACCOMMODATE AMERICAN 30th DIVISION

Billets from

ARQUEVES
LEALVILLERS
CLAIRFAYE
HARPONVILLE
TOUTENCOURT
ACHEUX
VARENNES
FORCEVILLE
HEDAUVILLE

V Corps
Enclosure to Third Army No. G.13/462. September 15, 1918.

Method of Supplying 30th Division

G-4
No. 14

Maps - LENS. Scale 1:100,000
57 D Scale 1:40,000

Reference Field Orders 12* II Corps, American E. F.

On arrival in the TOUTENCOURT-PUCHEVILLERS area, the American 30th Division will be administrated by the American II Corps. The following provisional arrangements have been made:

1) Last railhead in the First Army will be at St-POL on the 17th Inst. Supplies will be drawn by mechanical transport to be provided by American II Corps. The first railhead in the Third Army will be at ROSEL on the 18th Inst., on the DOULLENS-AMIENS Road about 1 1/2 miles south of BEAUVAL. Supplies on the 18th Inst. will be drawn by mechanical transport. The S. S. O. of the division will get in touch with the R. S. O. at ROSEL forthwith.

2) S. A. A. for target practice will be drawn from Third Army dump at PUCHEVILLERS. Applications for allotment should be made to G-4, American II Corps.

3) Baths in the divisional area have not yet been handed over by Third Army. Information on this point will be communicated later by wire. Clean clothes are obtainable from No. 1 Area Laundry ABBEVILLE. 30,000 clean sets will arrive weekly and will be drawn by the division and distributed among the divisional baths. Clean clothing will arrive on the supply train and will be returned by the same method.

4) R. E. material is obtainable through C. R. E. Third Army Troop at ROSEL dump. Applications will be made to G-4, American II Corps.

5) The sanitary section for the divisional area is the 21st Sanitary Section, Map Reference 57 D, 0 27 B 4.3.

6) The 16 lorries for the division will be parked in BEAUQUESNE, and will report to the O. C., 39th M. T. Company, who will be responsible for the repair and maintenance of the divisional mechanical transport.

7) Personnel railhead will be notified later.

(8) Ordnance will be demanded by the D. O. O. on the base in the usual manner. Application for ordnance stores over and above the scale prescribed in the M. S. tables which have been published, will be made to American II Corps. This order also applies to area stores.

(9) Canteen stores will be drawn from CANDAS bulk stores. Information is being published by Third Army Q as to the amount allotted to you, and no stores should be drawn until this information is received by you. The division will continue to draw from First Army until next Friday.

(10) Medical arrangements for evacuating sick will be notified separately by the corps surgeon.

(11) Traffic circuits laid down in Third Army traffic map will be adhered to.

(12) Billeting table as attached. [Omitted.]

(13) Acknowledge.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.

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230-32.1: Field Order

Division Transferred to Puchevillers Area, September 17 and 18

FIELD ORDERS
No. 16

Map: LENS 1:100,000

[Extract]

1. This division will move to the PUCHEVILLERS area on the 17th and 18th instant. The move will be made by tactical train. All transport will move by road on the 17th instant, staging at BOUQUEMAISON.

   * * * * *

5. Division headquarters will close at ROELLECOURT at 10 a. m., September 18, and open at PUCHEVILLERS at same hour.

   E. M. LEWIS,
   Major General,
   Commanding.

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American 30th Division Transferred

FIELD ORDERS
No. 13

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 16, 1918—11 a.m.

MAP: 1:100,000 LENS

THE FOLLOWING IS SUBSTITUTED FOR FIELD ORDER NO. 12:

1. American 30th Division (less artillery) will be transferred from First Army area to Third Army Area by tactical trains (personnel only) and will come under the orders of the American II Corps.

2. The move will be carried out as follows:
   (a) Entrainment at WAVRANS, PETIT-HOUVIN and BRYAS on September 17 and 18, under orders of the First Army.
   Detrainment will be carried out at Le ROSEL and BELLENGLISE under orders of the American II Corps.
   (b) Transport will move by road staging if necessary in HAUTE VISEE.
The move to be completed by afternoon of September 18.

3. On arrival, American 30th Division will be accommodated under orders of American II Corps as follows:

   Division Headquarter
   A Brigade Hq.
   B Brigade Hq.
   A Regt. Hq.
   E Regt. Hq.
   C Regt. Hq.
   D Regt. Hq.
   PUCHEVILLERS
   LOUVENCOURT
   TOUTENCOURT
   LOUVENCOURT
   ARQUEVES
   LEALVILLERS
   ACHEUX

4. American 30th Division will be in G. H. Q. reserve, administered by the American II Corps.

5. Detailed instructions relative to supply, change of railhead, evacuation, etc., will be issued later.

6. Acknowledge.

G. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.,
Commanding.
Division Headquarters Closes

MEMORANDUM ORDERS:

1. Paragraph 5, Field Order No. 16, is amended to read as follows: Division headquarters will close at ROELLE COURT, 10 a. m., September 18 and open at HERISSART at the same hour.

By command of Major General LEWIS:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

New Stations for Sanitary Units

Memo. to C. O., 105th Sanitary Train:

1. In compliance with Field Order 16, these headquarters, this division will move to the PUCHEVILLERS area on the 17th and 18th Inst.
3. Field Ambulance 118, which is operating main dressing station at PERNES, will close by 10 a. m., September 17, 1918. All patients will be evacuated prior to closing of M. D. S. All patients capable will be returned to duty.
4. Motor cars (ambulances) assigned to regiments and Hdqrs. 30th Division will accompany units to entraining points, after which they will proceed in convoy in charge of an officer to rejoin their unit at new area.
5. Details of convoy for motor cars of 105th San. Train will be in charge of C. O., 105th San. Train.
6. The C. O., 105th San. Train will detail motor cars (ambulance) with necessary personnel and equipment to proceed in time to meet detraining troops at BELLENGLISE and ROISEL. These motor cars will remain at detraining points to care for the evacuation of all sick.

A. M. WHALEY,
Lieut. Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.
From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Noon

[Extract]

6. Own changes, movements and action during the day. No change.

9. Action during the day and orders issued and received.

Field Order No. 12, these headquarters, was issued at 10 p.m., Sept. 15, ordering the transfer of the 30th Division from the First Army to the Third Army, to rejoin and come under the orders of the American II Corps. Field Order No. 13 was issued at 11 a.m., Sept. 16, covering the same move and in substitution of Field Order No. 12, the entrainment of the 30th Division to take place at WAVRANS, PETIT-HOUVIN, and BRYAS on Sept. 17 and 18. Division headquarters will be established at PUCHEVILLERS.

FIELD ORDERS

Amendment to Field Orders No. 13.

1. Paragraph 3, Field Orders No. 13, is amended as follows:

Headquarters American 30th Division will be at HERISSART, and not as therein stated.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Col., G. D.,
C. of S.
From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Noon

[Extract]

5. Own situation at beginning of the day. 27th and 30th Divisions remain in G. H. Q. reserve.

6. Own changes, movements and action during the day. The movement of the 30th Division from the First Army to the Third Army area, to come under the tactical control of the II Corps, began today, in accordance with Field Order No. 13, issued from these headquarters yesterday.

9. Action during the day and orders issued and received. Field Order No. 13 has this day been amended to read as follows: Headquarters of the American 30th Division will be at HERISSART.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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Troop Movements, 27th and 30th Divisions

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 18, 1918—10 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS
10 a. m., September 18, 1918

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters

BEAUVAL

*

27th Division

Division Headquarters

BEAUQUESNE

DOULLENS

*

53d Infantry Brig. Hq.

*

54th Infantry Brig. Hq.

RAINCHEVAL

*

104th M. Gun Bn. Hq.

RAINCHEVAL

HALLOY

BEAUQUESNE

*


*

102d F. Sig. Bn. Hq.

*

30th Division

Division Headquarters

HERISSART

LOUVENCOURT

*

59th Infantry Brig. Hq.

*

60th Infantry Brig Hq.

TOUTENCOURT

*


TALMAS

113th M. Gun Bn. Hq.

PUCHEVILLERS

105th F. Sig. Bn. Hq.

RUBEMPRE

105th San. Train Hq.

TALMAS

F. E. BUCHAN,
Col. G. S. G-3.

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CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. G. S. Simonds, G. S., U. S. A.

G-1

G-2
Lt. Col. Kerr T. Riggs, Cav., U. S. A.

G-3
Col. Fred. E. Buchan, Inf., U. S. A.

G-4

ADJUTANT GENERAL
Col. James M. Love, Jr., A. G., U. S. A.

STAT. OFFICER
Capt. Corvan Fisher, Inf., U. S. A.

INSPECTOR GENERAL
Col. George D. Moore, I. G., U. S. A.

JUDGE ADVOCATE
QUARTERMASTER
Col. E. S. Walton, Q. M. C., U. S. A.

CORPS SURGEON
Col. C. C. Collins, M. C., U. S. A.

CORPS SIGNAL OFFICERS
1st Lt. Frank L. Tyree, Sig. C., U. S. A.

CORPS GAS OFFICER

CORPS ASST. PROVOST MARSHAL
Major H. A. C. DeRubio, F. A., U. S. A.

MIL. POSTAL EXP. SERVICE
2d Lt. P. M. Christian, Inf., U. S. A.

LIAISON OFFICER
Maj. C. A. Lidbury (British)

CORVAN FISHER,
Capt., Inf., U. S. A.,
Chief Statistical Officer.

GHQ, AEF: Roster Officers 27th Div.: Roster
Statistical Division

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT,
Beauquesne, September 18, 1918.

WEEKLY ROSTER OF OFFICERS

[Extract]

COMMANDING

- 34 -
CHIEF OF STAFF
Col. Stanley H. Ford

G-1
Maj. Edward Olmstead.

G-2
Maj. William T. Starr.

G-3
Col. Theodore B. Taylor.

ADJUTANT
Maj. Homer B. Battenberg (Acting).

STAT. OFFICER
Capt. Theodore W. Janeway.

INSPECTOR

JUDGE ADVOCATE
Maj. James L. Kincaid.

QUARTERMASTER

MEDICAL CORPS (INCLUDE DENTAL AND VETERINARY CORPS)

ENGINEER DEPT.
Col. George B. Pillsbury (Comdg. 102d Engrs.).

ORDNANCE DEPT.

SIGNAL CORPS
C. W. S.  
Capt. Harry W. Terry.

ASST. PROVOST MARSHAL  
Maj. T. Harry Shanton (Comdg. 102d Mil. Pol.).

Hq. TROOP  
Capt. Tristram Tupper.

********

DIV. M. G. OFFICER  

MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICER  
Maj. Walter L. Bell, Attd.

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G-3, GHQ: Fldr. 84: Operations Report

G-3  
II CORPS, A. E. F., September 18, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

5. Own situation at beginning of the day: 27th and 30th Divisions remain in G. H. Q. reserve.

6. Own changes, movements and action during the day: Hq. 30th Division has been established at HERISSART.

F. E. BUCHAN,  
Colonel, G. S., G-3.  
for  
G. W. READ,  
Major General,  
Commanding.

---

- 36 -
G-3: GHQ: Fldr. 84: Operations Report

G-3
From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Noon

[Extract]

... ...

5. Own situation at beginning of the day: 27th and 30th Divisions remain in G. H. Q. reserve.

6. Own changes, movements and action during the day: A divisional maneuver is being carried out today by the 27th Division in the territory around BERNAVILLE, west of BEAUVAL.

... ...

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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II Corps Transferred to the Fourth Army, B. E. F.

II Corps relieved from G. H. Q., B. E. F. reserve September 20, 1918 and transferred to the Fourth Army, B. E. F., - affiliated with the Australian Corps. September 22, corps headquarters moved from Beauval to Mericourt-sur-Somme. The 27th and 30th Divisions ordered to assemble in the Tincourt area.

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American II Corps Transferred to British Fourth Army

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, B. E. F.,
September 20, 1918.

1. The American II Corps is released from G. H. Q. reserve and will be transferred to Fourth Army as under.

2. The American 27th Division will move by tactical train (personnel only) on September 23 and 24, one brigade each day, entraining in vicinity of Doullens under Third Army orders, and detraining in neighborhood of TINCOURT under orders of Fourth Army.

- 37 -
3. The American 30th Division will move by bus on nights 23/24 and 24/25 under arrangements to be made by Fourth Army in consultation with Third Army and bus park.

4. The American II Corps Hq. will move into Fourth Army area under orders of Fourth Army.

J. H. DAVIDSON,
Major General.
for
Lieut. General,
Chief of the General Staff.

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American 30th Division to Move Earlier

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, B. E. F.,
September 20, 1918—3 p.m.

TELEGRAPHED IN CODE

Reference Para. 3 of O. A. 222 of today.

American 30th Division (personnel and transport) will move one day earlier than shown.


W. G. S. DOBBIE,
Lt. Col., G. S.

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HS Brit. File: 30th Div.: Fldrs. 4 and 5: Order

Operations II Corps

Fourth Army No. 42/63 (G).

1. The IX Corps will take over the front from Australian Corps as far north as the grid line running east and west through G.21.c.O.O. The transfer will be complete and command pass at 10 a.m., 22d Instant, at which hour the back boundary between IX and Australian Corps, *** will come into force.

2. On a date to be notified later, the Australian Corps will take over the front from III Corps as far north as the grid line running east and west through F.4.d.O.O., and the back boundary between III and Australian Corps, as shown on attached map, will come into force.
3. Units to be transferred from Australian Corps to IX Corps, and from III Corps to Australian Corps, will be notified later.

4. Acknowledge by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.
for
Maj. General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Adv. H. Q., Fourth Army,

September 20, 1918.

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HS Brit. File: 30th Div.: Fldrs. 4 and 5: Order

Operations II Corps

Fourth Army No. 42/63/1.

Reference Fourth Army No. 42/63 (G), dated September 20, Para. 1.

[Extract]

1. The IX Corps will take over the front from Australian Corps as far north as the grid line running east and west through G.20 central and not as therein stated.

* * * * *

3. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Adv. Hq. Fourth Army,

September 20, 1918.

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- 39 -
Artillery Dispositions of American II Corps

Fourth Army No. 20/22 (G).

American II Corps:
1. Pending further instructions, artillery action on Fourth Army front will consist of:
   (a) Artillery support of local operations.
   (b) Counterbattery fire.
   (c) Harassing fire.
   (d) Usual defensive measures.
2. Subject to the above, it is necessary to:
   (a) Limit artillery action so as to facilitate putting guns and ammunition into position for impending operations.
   (b) Economize ammunition expenditure, more especially -
       60-pdr. gun
       6" How. H. E.
       Smoke shell
       6" gun
   (c) Take every opportunity of pushing forward guns to deal with objectives, the importance of which may only become evident from day to day.
   (d) Site guns irrespective of corps area with a view to local and army enfilade fire.
   (e) Organize and establish a system of observation over the HINDENBURG Line.
   (f) Organize communications with a view to new corps frontages.
   (g) Rest artillery units with a view to impending operations.
3. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Adv. Hq., Fourth Army,
September 20, 1918.

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American II Corps to Take Over Front of Australian Corps

Fourth Army No. 42/64 (G)

[Extract]

1. In continuation of Fourth Army No. 42/63 (G), dated 20/9/18.
2. The Infantry of the American II Corps (27th and 30th Divisions) will take over
the new front allotted to the Australian corps in Para. 2 of above quoted order* under arrangements to be made direct between the American II Corps and the Australian and III Corps.

Relief will be commenced on night September 23/24 and completed by 10 a. m., September 25, at which hour the command will pass and the back boundary laid down in Para. 2 of the above quoted order will come into force.

3. The Australian corps will arrange direct with American II Corps for the artillery necessary to cover this front after 10 a. m., September 25.

4. The following transfers of artillery will take place:
   (a) 46th Divisional Artillery from III to IX Corps, under arrangements to be made between corps concerned.
   (b) From Australian to IX Corps:
       5th Army Bde. R. F. A.
       232d do
       69th Rde. R. G. A.
       One Aust. divisional artillery to be nominated by
       One 8" Bde. R. G. A.
       One 6" Gun Battery Australian corps.

   These transfers will be completed and command pass by 10 a. m., September 22.
   (c) As soon as the 46th Divisional Artillery have joined IX Corps they will relieve the Australian divisional artillery detailed in Para. 2 above, and the latter will then return under orders of Australian corps.
   (d) From III to Australian Corps:
       25th Divisional Artillery
       86th Army Bde. R. F. A.
       104th -do-
       108th Army Bde. R. F. A.
       23d Bde. R. G. A.
       71st " R. G. A.
       One divisional artillery to be nominated by
       One 8" Bde. R. G. A. ) III Corps.
       Two 6" Gun Batteries )

7. Tank corps brigades are allotted as follows:

   The 4th Tank bde. to American II Corps.
   5th -do- to Australian corps.
   3d -do- to army reserve.

All three brigades will be administered by Aust. corps.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

   A. A. MONTGOMERY,
   Major General,
   General Staff, Fourth Army.

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* As amended by 42/63 G/1, 9/20/1918.
American II Corps Attached to Australian Corps

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 20, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 37

[Extract]

1. The American II Corps, consisting of corps headquarters and the American 27th and 30th Divisions, will be employed in conjunction with the Australian corps for the next series of operations.

   * * * * *

   T. A. BLAMEY,
   Brigadier General,
   General Staff, Australian Corps.

II Corps: 182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 20, 1918.

PRECIS OF HINDENBURG LINE PAPERS

NOTE: North boundary whose defense scheme was captured was through BEL LICOURT and hence deals only with BEL LICOURT and southerly [sic]

   1. The HINDENBURG Line was considered to be well adapted to a “stubborn defense” by a minimum garrison.
   2. The rigid defense of the canal defense system was laid down, without much regard to depth, although orders were issued for a rear line to be built to connect the villages in rear. Thus, apparently, the Le CATELET-NAUROY Line appeared.
   3. This close defense was to be effected by concrete and wire, by M. G. emplacements in front and support lines, by supports close up to effect immediate counterattack, and by a close defensive barrage just in front of his own wire.
   4. Enemy considered the canal tunnels the weak points and laid down that this was to be remedied by thicker garrisons and more wire and trenches, making use of tunnel for reserves.
   5. M. G. defensive barrage is to be expected from the Le CATELET-NAUROY Line.
   6. Between BEL LICOURT and CATELET, the HINDENBURG Line is a “top of the crest” line with the tunnel on the reverse slope 500 yards in rear.
      The Le CATELET Line averages 1,000 yards in rear of the tunnel and is on high ground with good observation over the tunnel to the front line.
   7. BEL LICOURT was to be organized for all round defense.
8. Orders were issued for two dams to be made in the tunnel and four north of BELLENGLISE.

9. Artillery: Enemy admits that possession of the Outpost HINDENBURG Line, that we now hold, would give us good artillery observation and that we would to a certain extent "look into his artillery position behind NAUROY from THORIGNY."

An advanced section of guns was to be in concrete in BELMICOURT shooting south to flank the canal and another near BELLENGLISE shooting north to flank the canal.

* * * * *

10. Passage of tanks over line of canal tunnel might be limited by spoil dumps with mines between. Artillery fire on the line of tunnel would probably detonate or displace them.

MAJOR,
General Staff,
Australian Corps.

* * * * *

HS British File: Third Army: War Diary

THIRD ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 1918.

[Extract]

Place Date Summary of Events and Information

** 

VILLERS- 21-24.9.18 1. (a) First Army, after the capture of BOURLON Heights was to push forward and secure its flank on the SENSEE River and operate so as to protect the left of the Third Army.

(b) Fourth Army was delivering the main attack against the enemy's defences from Le TRONQUOY to Le CATELET on a date which would be notified separately. The objectives of Fourth Army, as far as they concerned Third Army, were as follows:

The first objective to be taken by American II Corps was the Line B.25---A.6---west to A.3. and A. 1.

The second objective to be taken by the Australian corps who would leapfrog American II Corps, was the Line B.29---B.10 (E. of BEAUREVOIR)--T.27---west to A.6.

After the capture of the first objective, American II Corps was to exploit northwards in order to assist the advance of the V Corps across the Canal de l'ESCAUT. III Corps was to hold a defensive front on the right of V Corps until the first commenced their exploitation northwards. III Corps were to mop up the ground west of the Canal de l'ESCAUT. After the capture of the second objective, the Fourth Army intended to continue its advance eastwards.

2. (a) The advance of the Third Army would be directed on the general line Le CATEAU-SOLESMES.

(b) Forward lines of demarcation between corps were defined.

(c) Third Army would assist the Fourth Army attack by counterbattery work on the enemy's guns in the region La TERRIERE-VILLERS OUTREAUX.

(d) As soon as the American II Corps had exploited northwards to the line A.6-S.23-S.15-S.13, V Corps would be prepared to pass troops through VENDHUILE in rear
of American II Corps and to relieve the American II Corps on the line from PIENNES (S.23 cent) inclusive to the Canal. V Corps would then operate so as to clear the east bank of the Canal de l'ESCAUT, and free the crossings at HONNECOURT and BANTEUX, while maintaining touch with the advance of American II Corps, and at the same time to advance towards the Canal de l'ESCAUT down the spurs running east from VILLERS-GUISLAIN and GONNELIEU and clear the west bank of the canal as far north as BANTEUX-BANTOUZELLE. It was understood that III Corps would construct the crossings at VENDHUILE for the passage of the V Corps at that place.

Transfer of 30th Division

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 21, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The American 30th Division will be transferred by road from Third Army to Fourth Army (Australian corps area) commencing September 21, 1918.

J. H. DAVIDSON, M. G.,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Location 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 20, 1918.

Showing location of units at 6 a. m.,
September 21, 1918

[Extract]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location of Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advanced Echelon</td>
<td>HERISSART</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rear Echelon</td>
<td>BEAUVILLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *
11. Hq. 59th Brigade

29. Hq. 60th Brigade

47. Hq. 105th San. Train

55. Division Railhead

57D/I.35.c.7.8.

57D/U.1.b.2.1

TALMAS

Le ROSEL

J. SHAPTER CALDWELL,
Major,
Acting Adjutant.

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV (27th Div.): Order

27th Division Transferred

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 21, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The American 27th Division will be transferred by rail and road from Third Army to Fourth Army (Australian corps area) commencing September 22, 1918.

J. H. DAVIDSON, M. G.,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.
**American II Corps Headquarters Transferred**

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS, FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

*September 21, 1918*

No. 10/232/2 (G)

[Extract]

1. The American II Corps Hq. accompanied by corps troops, will be transferred by road from Third Army to Fourth Army on September 22, 1918, under orders of American II Corps.

* * * * *

J. H. DAVIDSON, M. G.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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**Location and Operations 27th Division**

III CORPS, B. E. F.,

*September 21, 1918.*

Appendix II/55

II CORPS OPERATION ORDER No. 325

[Extract]

1. The III Corps front is being reorganized as a one divisional frontage.
2. Reliefs will take place as under:
   (a) Night 23/24 - the front occupied by the 58th Division will be taken over by the 12th Division
   (b) Night 24/25 - 18th and 74th Divisions will be relieved by A. Bde. of the American 27th Division, with 1 regiment in line and 1 in support.
3. An advanced party from the American 27th Division will arrive on the 22d Inst., debussing at LONGAVESNES about 5 p. m. The 74th Division will arrange to meet the busses and billet the party for the night at LONGAVESNES, when further instructions will be issued.

* * * * *
5. A Bde. Group, American 27th Division, will stage the night 23/24 in the LONGAVESNES---SAULCOURT---VILLERS-FAUCON area.

6. B Bde. Group, American 27th Division, will stage the night Sept. 24/25, in the area vacated by the A Bde. and as far west as the new III Corps boundary.

14. The III Corps relief will be completed by 10 a. m., September 25, at which hour the command will pass.

15. ACKNOWLEDGE.

M. C. MORGAN,
Major,
for
B. G. G. S., III Corps.

Issued by D. R. at 8 p. m.

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30th Div.: 230-32.7: Order

Affiliation of Australian and II Corps

1st AUSTRALIAN DIVISION,
September 21, 1918.

GENERAL STAFF CIRCULAR No. 84

[Extract]

1. The American II Corps consisting of corps headquarters and the American 27th and 30th Divisions, will be employed in conjunction with the Australian corps for the next series of operations.

2. In order to ensure uniformity of tactical methods and complete cooperation between the Australian and American forces, an Australian mission under the command of Major General E. G. SINCLAIR-MACLAGAN, C. B., D. S. O., will be detailed from the Australian 1st and 4th Divisions for attachment to American formations and units.

3. Australian 1st Div. will provide the personnel for the American 30th Division.

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Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff,
Australian 1st Division.

P. T. O.

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- 47 -
Orders

II Corps Released From G. H. Q. Reserve

FIELD ORDERS
No. 14

October 21, 1918.

MAPS: 1:100,000 (AMIENS and St-QUENTIN)
1:40,000 62 C

[Extract]

1. The American II Corps is released from G. H. Q. reserve and will be transferred to the Fourth Army.
2. The American 27th Division will move by tactical train (personnel only), on September 23 and 24, one brigade each day, entraining in the vicinity of DOULLENS under Third Army orders, and detraining in the neighborhood of TINCOURT under arrangements with the Fourth Army.

All horse transport will assemble at ACHEUX on September 22, and will move by road leaving ACHEUX in rear of bus column, 30th Division, on evening of September 22/23.

Route: ACHEUX---ALBERT---MEAULTE---BRAY-sur-SOMME, staging there. Transport will leave BRAY at 7 p.m., September 23. Route: CAPPY---HERBECOURT---crossroads 500 yards east of HEM---southern outskirts of CLERY---FEUILLAUCOURT---Mt-ST-QUENTIN---ST-DENIS---BUSSU---TINCOURT.

3. The American 30th Division will move by bus on the nights of Sept. 22/23 and Sept. 23/24, under arrangements to be made by Fourth Army in consultation with the Third Army and the bus park.

6. Headquarters American II Corps will move to MERICOURT-sur-SOMME September 22.

G. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.

182-32.16: Message

Railheads

FROM: Fourth Army, B. E. F.
DATE: Sept. 21, 1918
HOUR: 9:45 a.m.

TO: American II Corps

First railhead for American II Corps troops, American 27th Division, and American 30th Division in Fourth Army will be: American II Corps troops, MERIGNOLLES G N 23d. American 27th Division, PERONNE on 24th. American 30th Division, TINCOURT-BOUCLEY on 23d.
**Railheads**

FROM: Third Army, B. E. F.
DATE: Sept. 21, 1918
HOUR: 1:13
TO: American II Corps

Railhead of American II Corps changes to La FLAQUE on 23d.

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**Movement 105th Engineer Regiment**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 18

Maps: LENS 1/100,000
AMIENS 1/100,000

[Extract]

1. The 105th Engineer Regiment, less one company, will embus at TALMAS, at 8 a. m., September 22, and will debus at ESTREES-en-CHAUSSEE about 2 p. m. Guides will meet regiment at this point and conduct them to camp near FLECHIN where they will come under the orders of the British IX Corps.

* * * * *

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding.

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**Fourth Army to Attack**

Fourth Army No. 20/23 (G)

[Extract]

1. At an hour and on a date to be notified later, the Fourth Army will attack the HINDENBURG Defenses between ST-QUENTIN and VENDHUILE.

* * * * *
7. All further orders regarding the operations will be issued in the form of instructions.
8. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

182-33.3: Order

**Transfer of Royal Engineer Units**

FOURTH ARMY No. 10/242/ (G)

AMERICAN II CORPS

[Extract]

1. The following transfers of R. E. units will take place on the date named under arrangements to be made between corps concerned:

From III Corps to IX Corps.
From Australian Corps to IX Corps.
   574th Army Troop Co., R. E., on Sept. 27.
From III Corps to American II Corps.
   144th Army Troops Co., R. E.  )
   288th Army Troops Co., R. E.  ) From Z day
   182d Tunnelling Co., R. E.  ) inclusive.
   1st Siege Co., R. A. R. E.  )
   1 section 353d E and M Co.

* * * * *

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Adv. Hq. Fourth Army,

September 22, 1918.
OUTLINE OF PLAN OF ATTACK ON HINDENBURG LINE

[Extract]

1. The Australian corps with the American II Corps affiliated, will attack the enemy's positions in the HINDENBURG Line in the sector NAUROY-GOUY on a date and hour to be notified.

2. TROOPS AVAILABLE.
   (a) Divisions:
       Australian 3d Division
       Australian 5th Division
       American 27th Division
       American 30th Division
   (b) Artillery:
       (i) Field artillery - 23 field artillery brigades.
       (ii) Heavy artillery - 10 heavy artillery brigades.
   (c) Tanks:
       4th Tank Brigade consisting of 84 tanks, a proportion of which are Mark V and proportion Mark V (Star) tanks.
       5th Tank Brigade between 70 and 80 tanks, portion of which are Mark V and portion of which are Mark V (Star) tanks.
       A portion of 3d Tank Brigade giving a total of 25 Whippet tanks and 1 armored car battalion.
   (d) Mounted Troops - Australian 13th Light Horse Regiment.
   (e) Cavalry. It has not yet been determined whether cavalry will be directly available.
   (f) Special Companies, R. E. Several will be available for smoke screening work.
   (g) Air Forces. 3d Squadron, A. F. C., and auxiliary assistance from 5th Brigade, R. A. F.

3. GENERAL PLAN.
   There will be a preliminary bombardment by all available artillery lasting for a considerable period. The object of this preliminary bombardment will be:
   (a) To complete the demoralization of the enemy;
   (b) The destruction of the enemy's defenses, including wire, dugouts, etc.
   The attack will be carried out on a frontage of two divisions. The operations will be divided into two phases. ***
   (a) First Phase: The American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left will form up on a taped line prior to the given zero hour and will attack with tanks under a creeping artillery barrage. This barrage will include a considerable proportion of smoke shells.

* * * * *
The flanks of the attack will be protected by a smoke screen which will be pro-
vided by one field artillery brigade on each flank. As soon as the artillery barrage
program is completed and the infantry have seized the objective, the smoke barrage on the
flanks will lift outwards and the infantry of division will exploit their success under
the concealment of the flanking smoke barrages.

Definite bodies of troops will be allotted for this exploitation and will re-
quire to commence their movement at such a time as will permit them to follow the advance
of the battle and to deploy facing south and north according to the flank on which
employed, at the conclusion of the advance of the creeping barrage.

In order to secure the northern flank during the early stage of the attack, the
battle front west of the canal will be prolonged beyond the northern entrance to the

As soon as the road situation permits, the armored car battalion will be passed
through the infantry and despatched on special missions with the object of disorganizing
the enemy's communication, headquarters, and etc.

(b) Second Phase: The Australian 5th Division on the right and the Australian
3d Division on the left, each with its own divisional artillery and a proportion of tanks,
and organized in brigade groups, will pass through the American 30th and 27th Divisions
respectively in open warfare formations at a time to be decided later. • • •

In order to secure the flanks of this operation and to extend the base of the
salient created by the advances, the reserve troops of the American 30th and 27th Divi-
sions will extend their operations to the south and north respectively with the object
of seizing the objectives shown in RED on the attached map. A proportion of artillery
which will be allotted from the barrage guns and will be withdrawn as soon as the barrage
program is completed, will be placed at the disposal of each divisional commander for
this. A proportion of tanks will be similarly allotted. A detailed program and timetable
will be issued.

The troops which captured the first objective will be reassembled after the
whole of the brigades detailed to the second objective have passed through them. The
time for this reassembly will be notified.

4. ASSEMBLY.
The line will be held prior to the operation by the American 30th and 27th
Divisions, each with one regiment in the line supported by one regiment, and each with
one brigade in reserve.

The capture of the first objective will be carried out by the reserve brigade
in each case.

The capture of the second objective allotted to the American divisions will be
carried out by the supporting regiment of the line brigade, the line regiment of the
line brigade passing into reserve at a stage which is indicated later.

The program will be so arranged that the two attacking brigade groups of the
Australian 5th and 3d Divisions respectively will pass through the American troops as
soon as possible after the latter have attained the first objective. These two brigades
will follow the regiments of the American 30th and 27th Divisions respectively allotted
to the capture of the RED line. The reserve brigades of the Australian 5th and 3rd Divi-
sions will then be passed through the gap. The last infantry to pass through the gap
from the west to the east side of the canal will be the regiments of the American 30th
and 27th Divisions who were originally holding the line and now pass into reserve.
The order of movement across the tunnel will be therefore -

A and B Regiments of the American 30th and 27th Divisions (that is, the attacking brigade in each case).

A and B Brigades of the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions.

C Regiment of the American 30th and 27th Divisions (that is, the supporting regiment of the brigade originally in the line).

C Brigade of the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions moving in divisional reserve.

D Regiment of the American 30th and 27th Divisions (that is, the regiment which was holding the line when the attack began). This regiment will be concentrated immediately after the last Australian brigade has passed through and will then move according to the orders of the respective divisional commanders.

Assembly areas will be selected and allotted for each American regiment and each Australian brigade in such positions as will best permit of this order of movement being carried out.

5. ROAD MOVEMENT.

The country over which the attack will pass in its early stages is very much shell-pitted and all roads have been very badly damaged.

To enable guns and ammunition wagons and the armored cars to pass across this area, the chief engineer of the corps has arranged to develop four roads as rapidly as possible.

The chief engineer will have at his disposal the five Australian pioneer battalions plus such proportion of the American engineering personnel as may be necessary. Every body of troops will be allotted its own definite road and will on no account use any other. Maps will be issued later showing the roads allotted in each case. Careful traffic control will be organized and all ranks must be warned beforehand and must be prepared to adhere to the traffic rules strictly.

The bivouac areas will be selected in positions which will be convenient to the roads to which each body of troops is allotted.

6. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS

The present situation on the battle front is as follows -

The front line is in the advanced HINDENBURG Line as far north as the inter-divisional boundary for the operations. North of this the front line is now along the old British Outpost Line. The III Corps has undertaken to make every endeavor to seize the front line of the HINDENBURG system before its relief by the American 27th Division. If it succeeds in doing this the forming up line • • • will be available. If the III Corps does not succeed in doing this it will be necessary for the American 27th Division to undertake a definite operation in order to seize the advanced line of the HINDENBURG system.

During the period that this operation takes place, the American 30th Division will advance posts to such a position as will enable it to ensure that the forming up line on its sector will be sufficiently protected.

7. PRELIMINARY ORGANIZATION and PREPARATIONS.

(a) Light Signals. The only light signals to be employed will be -

(i) The S. O. S. signal which will be a No. 32 rifle grenade bursting into three RED lights.

(ii) Success signal which will be a No. 32 rifle grenade bursting into three WHITE lights.

(iii) Message carrying rockets will be made available and will be issued early.
(b) All ranks will be provided with a metal disc sewn on to the reverse side of the box respirator, which will be used for signalling to our aeroplanes when they sound the Klaxon horn, to indicate the position of the troops. Red flares will be issued and will be lit for the same purpose when the aeroplane calls. All ranks must be made to understand that when the aeroplane calls the flares must be lit and the discs shown.

(c) The organization of the troops for the first phase of the operation will ensure that definite bodies are allotted for duty at each entrance to the tunnel with the object of dealing with any of the enemy who may have taken refuge in the tunnel during the bombardment and barrage. These troops must on no account be withdrawn from their task until the tunnel is completely clear of the enemy.

(d) All troops must be warned of the absolute necessity of keeping as close up to the barrage as safety permits in order to deal with the enemy before he can recover after the barrage has passed.

(e) A very liberal supply of -

(i) Operation maps;
(ii) Message maps;
(iii) Oblique and trench photos,
will be issued. All commanders must ensure that these are distributed right down to non-commissioned officers in order that the achievement of their tasks may be facilitated for all ranks. Special instructions as to intelligence functions dealing with prisoners of war, etc., will be issued.

(f) A complete system of liaison between flanks and from front to rear between companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, and divisions will be worked out. The responsibility for liaison and for communications will be from right to left.

(g) A series of code calls for employment between infantry using the Popham panel and contact aeroplanes will be made and issued by Australian corps. These now in use by the Australian divisions will be retained.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

E. A. BLAMEY,
Bragadier General, General Staff.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. 8-10 (30th Div.): Battle Instructions

**Location and Operations 27th and 30th Divisions**

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 22, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 1.

I. INFORMATION.

(a) The American II Corps (corps headquarters and American 27th and 30th Divisions, less artillery) will be employed in conjunction with the Australian corps for the next series of operations.
(b) The American 30th Division (less artillery) arrives in Australian corps area by bus on nights September 22/23 and 23/24, and will be accommodated in the TINCOURT area prior to taking over the sector of front now held by Australian 1st Division.

American 30th Division rear headquarters will be established at HALLE. American 30th Division advanced headquarters will be established with Australian 1st Divisional Headquarters at J.16.a.8.2.

(c) The American 27th Division (less artillery) arrives in Australia corps area by train (detraining at TINCOURT) on nights 23/24-24/25 instant, and passes temporarily to command of III Corps.

American 27th Division will relieve 74th and 18th Divisions (III Corps) under the orders of III Corps.

Advanced headquarters of American 27th Division will be established with 74th Divisional Headquarters at J.11.c.4.9. Rear headquarters are being allotted by III Corps.

74th and 18th Machine Gun Battalions are remaining in line in III Corps sector and will be relieved on the night September 25/26 under orders to be issued by III Corps.

Representatives of all units in line of 74th and 18th Divisions are remaining in line until the morning of September 26.

(d) Headquarters American II Corps, moves to MERICOURT on 22d Instant. American II Corps Advanced Headquarters will open at N.15.d. central (near Australian corps headquarters) on a date to be notified later.

2. RELIEFS.

(a) The American 30th Division (less artillery) will relieve the Australian 1st Division (less artillery) in the line on the 23d and night 23/24 Instant. The relief will be effected under the orders of G. O. C., Australian 1st Division.

(b) The American 30th Division will take over the Australian divisional front with one brigade. One regiment will be in line and one regiment in support. One brigade will be in divisional reserve.

(c) Advance parties of the brigade of American 30th Division going into line will report to Headquarters Australian 1st Division on 22d Instant and will go into line on night 22d/23d Inst.

(d) Representatives of all units of Australian 1st Division in the line will remain with corresponding units of American 30th Division until the morning of September 25.

(e) The relief of the Australian 1st Machine Gun Battalion will be carried out on the night 24/25th Instant.

(f) The relief of Australian 1st Division by American 30th Division will be complete by 10 a. m. on September 24. Command of the sector will pass to G. O. C., American 30th Division at this hour.

(g) Brigade groups of Australian 1st Division will stage through the TINCOURT area on relief prior to moving to the YZEUX area. Orders for the move of the Australian 1st Division to the YZEUX area will be issued later.

(h) Subject to the above, details of the relief will be arranged between G. O. C, Australian 1st Division and G. O. C., American 30th Division.

3. COMMAND.

Command of the battle front taken over by American 27th Division from III Corps will pass to Australian corps at 10 a. m. on 25th Instant.

4. BOUNDARIES.

(a) The boundary between IX Corps and Australian corps * * * will come into force at 10 a. m. on 22d Inst. * * *
(b) The boundary between Australian corps and III Corps will come into force at 10 a. m. on September 25.
(c) The corps area will be organized into A and B Divisional areas.

5. ARTILLERY.
   Orders with regard to artillery moves and reliefs will be issued separately.

6. ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS.
   Administrative instructions will be issued by Q branch of the corps.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. C. CASEY,
Major,
for
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.

Medical General: Fldr. 10: Order

Medical Arrangements

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

Medical Instructions No. 57

In accordance with Australian Corps Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 1 -
1. i. The Divisional Surgeon, American 30th Division will take over from the A. D. M. S., Australian 1st Division, the medical arrangements for the clearance of the divisional sector and area.
   ii. Relief will be completed by midnight 23d/24th Inst., details being mutually arranged between administrative medical officers concerned.
   iii. Medical units of the Australian 1st Division so relieved will be at the disposal of A. D. M. S., Australian 1st Division.
2. All surplus blankets, stretchers, marquees, etc., will be handed over to the American 30th Division.
3. Acknowledge.

A. J. COLLINS,
Major,
for
Colonel,
D. D. M. S., Australian Corps.

Headquarters

September 22, 1918.
Operations 27th Division

III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 78

[Extract]

1. The command of the 44th Brigade, R. F. A. (74th Divisional Artillery) will pass from the G. O. C., 58th Division to the G. O. C., 12th Division at the time the command of the front passes.

2. At 10 a. m., September 25, the field artillery at present covering the III Corps front will be reallocated as follows:

III Corps

12th Division

Reserve

Australian Corps

American 27th Division

12th Divisional Artillery, 44th Brigade R. F. A. (74th Div. Arty.)

18th Divisional Artillery

117th Brigade R. F. A. (74th Div. Arty.)

25th Divisional Artillery

58th Divisional Artillery

86th Army Brigade, R. F. A.

104th Army Brigade, R. F. A.

108th Army Brigade, R. F. A.

* * * * *

MAJOR, G. S.,

for

B G. G. S., III Corps.

Issued at 11:30 p. m.

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G-3: GHQ: 304: Telegram

Location Headquarters II Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

September 22, 1918--10:37 a. m.

327 G-3. Headquarters II Corps closes BEAUVAL 6 p. m., September 22 and opens MERICOURT-sur-SOMME same date and hour. This information in correction of Telegram G-3, 324, September 20.

BUCHAN, G-3.

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Period ending noon September 22, 1918

[Extract]

6. Own changes, movements and action during the day:

Headquarters II Corps, A. E. F., opens at 6 p. m., Sept. 22 at MERICOURT-sur-SOMME, and closes at BEAUVAL same date and hour.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding

GHQ: AEF Records: II Corps: War Diary

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 22, 1918.

[Extract]

Division headquarters closed at Herissart at 2 p. m., 22d and opened at Tincourt (Fourth Army area) same day and hour. 105th Engineers moved in accordance with F. O. 18, these headquarters. 59th Brigade and field ambulance companies began movement to new area in compliance with F. O. 17, these headquarters. 60th Brigade and other units of division made preparations to comply with same order. All transport of division en route to new area.

Available for all duty) Officers 576
Men 18,433

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.

* * * * *
Operations of the II Corps (27th and 30th Divisions) While Affiliated with the Australian Corps, Fourth Army, B. E. F., September 23, 1918, to October 5, 1918.

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THE 27th AND 30th DIVISIONS ENTER THE FRONT LINE

September 23, the 30th Division relieved the Australian 1st Division in the line - the 27th Division relieved the 18th and 74th Divisions, III Corps, B. E. F., September 24 - preparations made to straighten the line and to gain positions from which to launch the attack on the HINDENBURG line.

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182-32.2: Location List

G-3 II CORPS, A. E. F., September 23, 1918—2 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST No. 11

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters

Mericourt-sur-Somme

Railhead II Corps

La Flaque

27th Division

Division Headquarters

Advanced Echelon

Sht. 62C J.11.c.4.9.

Remaining units of 27th Division have not been reported in new location.

BRITISH UNITS to be transferred from III Corps to AMERICAN II CORPS

144th Army Troops Co., R. E.
288th Army Troops Co., R. E.
182d Tunnelling Co., R. E.
1st Siege Co., R. A. R. E. (Royal Anglesey Royal Engineers)
1 Section 33d E. and M. Coys.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Asst. C. of S.,
G. S., G-2.

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- 59 -
LOCATION LIST AND AREA ASSIGNMENT
as at 8 a.m., 23/9/18

[Extract]

American 30th Div. Hq. J.16.b.0.5 Bois de BUIRE

59th Brig. Hq. J.18.a.3.7.
60th Brig. Hq. J.18.a.3.7.

C. BURNETT,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. 8-10 (30th Div.): Artillery Instructions

Artillery Support of 27th and 30th Divisions

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F., September 23, 1918.

ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 267
by
G. O. C. R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS

At times and dates to be notified later, the Australian corps, with the American II Corps affiliated, intends to attack the HINDENBURG Line in the sector NAUROY-GOUY.

It will be necessary to make preparations for two definite operations. The first, or preliminary, attack being dependent on the position of the front line when the new area is taken over from the northern corps.

If the front line is in such a position as to make the objective to be gained possible in one operation then the preliminary attack will not be necessary. On the other hand, if the above is not secured it will be necessary to carry out two operations. The first being planned for the capture of positions far enough forward to enable the final objective of the main operation to be carried out under a creeping barrage.

1. PRELIMINARY ATTACK.

The preliminary attack will take place under a creeping barrage on a front of about 3,000 yards extending from the northern boundary of the corps towards the south, and will entail the use of about 9 brigades of field artillery.

This operation will be carried out about 48 hours before the main attack, and will synchronize with the hour set out for the commencement of the bombardment mentioned later.

- 60 -
On the successful conclusion of this operation, brigades of field and heavy artillery will be pushed up into positions from which the barrage for the main attack can be carried out.

2. MAIN ATTACK.

This operation will differ somewhat from those previously carried out on this front, the chief difference being due to the fact that there are many more strong points and trenches prepared for defense and considerably more wire than has been met with latterly. This necessitates a definite plan for the bombarding of these trenches and the cutting of wire prior to the day of the main attack.

The main attack is divided into two phases and will be delivered on a front of two divisions.

(a) 1st Phase.

The American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left attack under a creeping barrage accompanied by tanks, and have as their objective the Green Line.

(b) 2d Phase.

After the capture of the Green Line, the Australian 5th Division on the right and the Australian 3d Division on the left pass through the American 30th Division and the American 27th Division respectively, in order to exploit towards and capture the Red Line. At the same time, troops specially allotted from the American 30th and 27th Divisions exploit southwards and northwards, respectively, east of the tunnel with a view to broadening the salient.

(c) The field artillery will be allotted as follows:

Northern divisional front - 12 brigades
Southern divisional front - 11 brigades

Briefly, the field artillery will be employed as follows:

9 brigades will be emplaced on the northern divisional front, and 8 brigades on the southern divisional front, in such positions so that they can effectively carry out a creeping barrage up to the protector on the final objective (Green Line).

6 brigades, consisting of two divisional artilleries and two army brigades, i.e., 3 brigades on each divisional front, will be withdrawn from the line to wagon lines and will constitute the artillery supporting the two exploiting divisions. The two army brigades, however, will select positions from which they can place an effective enfilade barrage on the flanks of the area attacked on their own divisional front. They will occupy these positions on the night prior to attack-day.

The divisional brigades will move off with their respective exploiting divisions to which they have been attached, i.e., one brigade of artillery to each of the two infantry brigades of its division.

On completion of the flank barrage, the 2 army brigades will draw out and stand by ready to accompany the supporting infantry brigade to which it has been allotted as it moves forward in support of the two infantry brigades previously mentioned.

4 brigades of divisional artillery will be allotted from the barrage artillery on completion of the barrage, and ordered to move forward. The field artillery brigades will be attached to the regiments forming the protective flanks (2 field artillery brigades on each flank to assist in exploitation to the flanks).

The remainder of the barrage artillery will remain in their positions under corps orders and await further instructions.

(d) Detailed allotment of field artillery:

The detailed allotment and designation of the field artillery will be as follows for the main attack:

American 27th Divisional Front (under C. R. A. Aust. 4th Divisional Artillery)
Aust. 4th Divisional Artillery
25th Divisional Artillery
58th Divisional Artillery
86th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
104th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
108th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
3d Army Brigade, A. R. A.

For exploitation to Red Line by Aust. 3d Division.
(Under C. R. A. Aust. 4th Division)

Aust. 3d Divisional Artillery
3d Army Brigade, A. R. A.

For exploitation northwards to Red Line.
(Under C. R. A. 25th Division)

25th Divisional Artillery
American 30th Divisional Front

For exploitation southwards to Red Line.
(Under C. R. A. Aust. 2d Division)

Aust. 1st Divisional Artillery
Aust. 2d Divisional Artillery
12th Army Brigade, A. F. A.
65th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
84th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
150th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
6th Army Brigade, A. F. A.

For exploitation to Red Line by Aust. 5th Division.
(Under C. R. A. Aust. 5th Division)

Aust. 5th Divisional Artillery
6th Army Brigade, A. F. A.

For exploitation southwards to Red Line.
(Under C. R. A. Aust. 2d Division)

Aust. 2d Divisional Artillery

The S. A. A. sections of Aust. 1st and 4th Divisional Artilleries will be allotted to the American 30th and 27th Divisions, respectively.

3. BOUNDARIES.
Boundaries between corps as regards bombardment and counterbattery work coincide with those between corps as shown on the G. S. map already issued.

4. BOMBARDMENTS.
Bombardments prior to the main attack will commence 48 hours before zero hour.
The program will include:

a. Special gas (B. B) bombardment.
b. Vigorous counterbattery work.
c. Intense harassing fire.
d. Cutting lanes in hostile wire defenses.
5. **SPECIAL GAS (B. B.) BOMBARDMENT**

This bombardment will be carried out by 18-pdrs. and 6" howitzers firing B. B. shells (gas), combined with H. E. during intermittent periods between zero minus 56 hours and zero minus 48 hours.

The objectives will be the hostile defensive system and artillery positions along the corps front so far as the range of guns permits.

Subsequent to zero minus 48 hours no B. B. gas shell will be fired without the authority of the army.

6. **VIGOROUS COUNTERBATTERY WORK.**

This will commence at zero minus 48 hours. Surprise attacks on hostile battery positions will be carried out with H. E. with instantaneous fuzes, and C. G. and N. C. gas shells.

For the methodical bombardment of fortified emplacements and dugouts, delay action fuzes should be employed.

7. **INTENSE HARASSING FIRE.**

This will commence at zero minus 48 hours immediately after the cessation of the special gas B. B. bombardment.

Definite plans will be drawn up by C. R. A. s and B. G. H. A. for the direction of this fire. The keynote of its application should be variety and surprise, and plans must be so framed that throughout the 24 hours of the day and night, the enemy should be permitted no immunity from shell fire.

Facilities of observation must be fully exploited in order to limit the area in which unobserved harassing fire will have to be maintained by day. Areas over which no observation is possible must receive special attention.

In order to gain the full advantage from harassing fire, zones in depth are allotted. Field artillery taking a zone of 2,500 yards east of our front line, and beyond a line 2,000 yards east of our front line by heavy artillery, thus making an overlap of 500 yards.

Artillery positions are to be included in harassing fire tasks. In shelling roads, H. E. with delay action are not to be employed. Use is to be made of gas shell (C. G. and N. C.).

8. **CUTTING LANES IN HOSTILE WIRE DEFENCES.**

This will commence at zero minus 48 hours and will be carried out principally with 4.5" howitzers and 6" howitzers, and when possible with 6" NEWTON mortars.

Arrangements should be made with divisions to keep lanes open by means of rifle and machine-gun fire once they have been cut.

9. **BOMBARDMENT OF SELECTED STRONG POINTS AND LOCALITIES.**

This bombardment will commence at zero minus 48 hours and will be continued until zero hour, with a view not only to the destruction of defences but also to the demoralization of the defenders. Gas shell (C. G. and N. C.) are to be made use of.

It is not considered feasible to carry out a thorough destructive bombardment of concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements.

The tunnels themselves are impervious to artillery fire. Steps will be taken to concentrate a heavy and unexpected fire on their entrances and exits on the day of battle.

Telephone exchanges and specially defended localities such as Le CATELET---BELLICOURT---GOUY---NAUROY and BONY are to be heavily bombarded.

O. P.'s should be engaged towards the latter end of the bombardment.

Blocks in communication trenches will be created where possible.

10. **LONG-RANGE GUN FIRE.**

Long-range guns will deal with the following places: MONTEBREHAIN---BEAUREVOIR---RAMICOURT---ESTREES---ESTREES-MARETZ Road, JONCOURT.

Instantaneous fuzes should be used by all guns firing at long ranges.

Railway guns are being retained under army control and are to engage: BOHAIN---BUSIGNY---BRANCOURT---FRESNOY-le-GRAND---PREMONT---MARETZ---Bols d'ETAVES.
11. AMMUNITION.
Details regarding ammunition allotment will be issued in separate instructions.

H. E. K. MacCARTNEY,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
R. A., Australian Corps.

HS Brit. File: Fldrs. XI and XII (27th Div.): Order

**Location and Operations 27th Division**

*September 23, 1918---4 a.m.*

III CORPS OPERATION ORDER No. 326

[Extract]

1. The relief of the 18th and 74th Divisions by the American 27th Division vide Para. 2 (b) of Order No. 325 will be carried out as follows:
   Of the leading regiment (106th) - 2d and 3d Battalions will relieve 18th Division and 1st Battn. will relieve 74th Division in the front line.
   Similarly of the supporting regiment (105th) - 2d and 3d Battns. will be in support in the 18th Division area and 1st Battn. in the 74th Div. area. The two battns. relieving the front line of the 18th Div. front will take over the line from the corps now right boundary (grid line between F.5 and F.11) to BULL Post (inclusive) ZEBRA Post (inclusive) and the battn. relieving on the 74th Div. front will take over from BULL Post (exclusive) to the corps present right boundary.

7. Advanced Headquarters of American 27th Division will be established with 74th Div. Hq. at J.11.c.4.9. on the 24th Inst.
   Bde. and regimental hq. of American 27th Division will be notified later.

M. C. MORGAN,
Major, G. S.,
for
B. G. G. S., III Corps.

Issued by D. R. at 4 a.m.

HS Brit. File: Fldrs. 11 and 12 (27th Div.): Order

**Location and Operations 27th Division**

GO No. 2104
Appendix II/71

Ref. III Corps O. O. 326, Para. 7

1. Hq. American 53d Brigade on arrival in staging area, will be established at LONGAIVESNES.
   Regimental hq. at LONGAIVESNES and VILLERS-FAUCON.

- 64 -
2. American 54th Bde. Hq. will be established at the present 58th Div. Hq. (D.22.a.2.4.) which will be vacant from 11 a.m., 24th Inst.

Hq. of the 2 leading regiments will be taken over by the 2 regts. of the 54th Bde. on arrival.

3. American 27th Division, in consultation with the 18th and 74th Divisions will decide locations at which they wish the headquarters to be of the brigade and regiments of the 53d Brigade when moved forward into the line.

These locations will be reported to these headquarters by 6 p.m., 24th Inst.

M. C. MORGAN,
Major,
for
B. G. G. S., III Corps.

Hq. III Corps,

Sept. 23, 1918.

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227-32.1: Field Order

27th Division Relieves British 18th and 74th Divisions

FIELD ORDER
No. 45

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918—12:30 p.m.

Map: Ste-EMILIE 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. This division relieves the British 18th and 74th Divisions in the line on night of September 24/25.

* * * * *

6. Command of area will pass to the Commanding General, 27th Division at 10 a.m., September 25.

7. Division headquarters in Bois de BUIRE, J.11.b.0.9.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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* Obviously from the subject matter this F. O. was issued prior to 12:30 p.m., Sept. 25, 1918. It is therefore given the arbitrary date of Sept. 23, 1918 so as to precede F. O. 46 issued at 6 p.m., Sept. 23, 1918.
227-32.1: Field Order

**Location Division Headquarters**

FIELD ORDER 27th DIVISION, A.E. F., No. 46

September 23, 1918---6 p. m.

MAPS: 57 D - 1:40,000
     62 C - 1:40,000

In connection with Field Order No. 44, Headquarters 27th Division, Sept. 21, 1918, division headquarters will close at BEAUQUESNE at 12 noon, Sept. 24, 1918, and open at Bois de BUIRE, J.11.d.4.9., same date and hour.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

--------

230-32.1: Field Order

**30th Division to Relieve Australian 1st Division in the Line**

G-3/33 30th DIVISION, A. E. F., FIELD ORDERS No. 19

September 23, 1918.

Maps: Sheet 62/C 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. The American 30th Division (less artillery) will relieve the Australian 1st Division (less artillery) in the line.

2. The relief will commence on September 23, and will be completed on the night September 23/24,

* * * * *

e) All units of the 30th Division will be under the command of the Commanding General, Australian 1st Division, on entering 1st Division area, and so remain until the command passes.

f) The artillery of the Australian 1st Division will continue to cover the front and will come under the command of the 30th Division when the command passes.

* * * * *
5. The Division Commander, American 30th Division, will assume command of the A Sector at 10 a.m., September 24.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding.

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230-10.3: Order

*Administrative Instructions, Field Order No. 19*

ORDER  
No. 9  
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
September 23, 1918.

Sheet 62 N. E., 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. AMMUNITION: The division ammunition dump will be located at K.21.a.5.5.

2. SUPPLY:
   The division supply dumps are located as follows:
   50th Brigade - J.12.b.4.0.
   60th Brigade - J.29.d.5.5.

3. WATER:
   Water tanks of the following capacity are dug in at the following locations and
   are for the use of the brigades shown:
   59th Brigade - L.4.c.7.1.
   1 - 400-gallon
   2 - 100-gallon
   1 - 50-gallon
   60th Brigade - L.21.b.9.1.
   4 - 100-gallon
   These tanks will be kept filled under division arrangements.

5. BURIALS AND CEMETERIES: Burials will take place under the supervision of the
divisional burial officer.
   The main cemetery is located at HESBECOURT (L.13.c).

6. ORDNANCE: An advanced ordnance dump will be established at K.20.c.8.3.

7. PRISONERS OF WAR: The A. P. M. will be responsible for the collection of all
   prisoners of war rear of the line. The military police will take over the prisoners of
   war as far forward as possible and escort them to the division prisoners-of-war cage,
   which is located at J.18.c.6.0.
9. VETERINARY ARRANGEMENTS: All sick and wounded animals in the forward area will be sent to the veterinary evacuation station at K.22.a.0.5. From this point animals will be sent for further treatment, if necessary, to mobile veterinary section at J.33.e.3.8. At the latter place, wounded and sick animals in the rear area can be treated.

10. DEAD ANIMALS: Regimental commanders will be responsible for the burial of all dead animals in their area.

11. ROAD REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE: One officer and fifteen O. R.'s from the 105th Engineer Regiment will be detailed for road repair and maintenance in each brigade. The division engineer will be responsible that these parties are detailed and give every assistance to the repair of roads in the forward area.

12. ENGINEER MATERIAL: Engineer material will be drawn from the R. E. dump at TINCOURT.

13. BATHS AND CLEAN CLOTHING: Arrangements for bathing and of the issue of clean clothing will be made with the division bath officer at division clothes depot, J.24.a.8.6.

14. Y. M. C. A. and RED CROSS: The Y. M. C. A. and Red Cross will establish their canteens within the area as will best serve the troops.

15. RAILHEADS COMMENCING SEPTEMBER 25, 1918:
   Division railhead - TINCOURT.

   * * * * *

   (b) Reinforcement and school personnel railhead - La CHAPELETTE.

   By command of Major General Lewis:

   JOHN K. HERR,
   Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
   Acting Chief of Staff.

---

230-10.3: Order

Administrative Instructions, Field Order No. 19

30th DIVISION A. E. F.,
September 23, 1918.

APPENDIX I
(To accompany Order No. 9, Administrative Instructions)

[Extract]

AMMUNITION: All ammunition required by the division will be indented for from American II Corps.

* * * * *

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- 68 -
Medical Arrangements

MEMO.
No. 12
Medical Instructions

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
September 23, 1918.

30th DIVISION.
A. E. F.

MEMO.
No. 12
Medical Instructions

Medical Instructions

September 23, 1918.

SCHEME FOR EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED
Ref. Map 62 C----62 B 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. The 30th Division will occupy position as outlined in operative orders from these headquarters. The disposal of battalions in the front line will also conform to operative orders from these headquarters already published.

2. Regimental and battalion aid posts will be located as follows:
   (a) L.11.b.central
   (b) L.17.d.6.5.
   (c) L.23.d.4.8.

   Other aid posts will be established at the discretion of the regimental commander.

   * * * * *

HS Brit. File: (30th Div.): Fldrs. 4 and 5: Summary Operations

Operations II Corps

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 23, 1918.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS

[Extract]

* * * * *

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES:
   The American 30th Division arrived from Third Army and went into corps reserve, Australian corps.

- 69 -
9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   III Corps:
      12th, 18th, 58th, 74th Divisions, 1 Bde., 2d Cavalry Division
   IX Corps:
      1st, 6th, 32d*, 46th Divisions.
   Australian Corps:
      1st, 2d*, 3d*, 4th*, 5th* Australian Divisions.
   American 30th Division*

   * Corps Reserve.

   * * * * * *

   HS Brit. File: (30th Inf.): Flldr. 8-10: War Diary

   AUSTRALIAN CORPS

   [Extract]

   Place    Date    Summary of Events and Information
   N.16.c   23d    During the night hostile shelling was rather more active than
                   normally on the Aust. 1st Div. front. Quiet day. By night 23d/24th whole of American
                   30th Div. had arrived by bus and are concentrated in TINCOURT forward areas of Aust.
                   1st Div. American 27th Div. are arriving by train and are being accommodated temporarily
                   in III Corps area. Arrangements made re advance parties of both of these divisions going
                   into line.

   * * * * * *

   * * * * * *

182-33.3: Operation Report

   G-3

   From: Commanding General
   To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

   Period ending noon September 23, 1918

   II CORPS, A.E. F.,
   September 23, 1918.

   [Extract]

   * * * * * *

   6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY.

   Headquarters American II Corps moved September 22 from Beauval to Mericourt-sur-Somme.
The American 30th Division began movement to Fourth Army area on the night of September 22, headquarters opening at HAUT-ALLAINES.

********

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 18

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 24, 1918.

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Hostile Activity:
       Artillery: Between 6:45 p. m. and 8 p. m., 200 rounds of 10.5 cm. and
       15 cm. Blue Cross gas fell on L 3c and d and at 1:20 a. m., 20 rounds fell in L 8a.
       L 5 was shelled with Yellow Cross throughout the 24 hour period. L 4a and L 3b shelled
       with 150 rounds of 4.2's and 5.9's between 3 p. m. and 7 p. m. Between 11 p. m. and
       midnight, G 1 was shelled with 100 rounds of 4.2's and 5.9's. L 13 and 14 were also
       shelled at intervals between 3 p. m. and 4:30 p. m. On the whole, hostile artillery
       appeared to be slightly above normal.

       Machine Guns: Normal. Intermittent but heavy fire directed on our left
       front during morning.

       Trench Mortars: Nil.

       Aerial: Hostile aircraft was active throughout the day. E. A.'s were
       over our lines from 10:30 to 11 a. m. and again at 4:30 p. m. and 5 p. m. During the
       night, a few bombs were dropped over our rear areas.

       Balloons were up at 81 degrees grid from L 4c 4.6; 50 degrees and 55
       degrees grid from G 1d 2.3 and 64, 67, 80, 93 and 100 degrees grid from L 4a 7.6.

   (b) Our Activity:
       Artillery: Intermittent harassing and destructive fire was directed on
       roads, centers of activity and suspected posts. Special attention was paid to the fol-
       lowing areas: G 16a and b; sunken roads in G 4d, A 27d, G 9a and b, G 3a and roads in G 101
       and approaches to BEL LICOURT, MALAKOFF Wood and trenches in G 3a, b, and c. A sniper
       reported to artillery as located in a house at G 4c 1.2 was knocked out.

       Machine Guns: Nil.

       Trench Mortars: Medium T. M.'s expended 15 rounds on suspected M. G.
       positions at G 8d 7.1, G 8d 8.2 and G 8d 7.4.

       Aerial: Our aeroplanes were active throughout the day and at 5 p. m.,
       engaged E. A.'s attempting to cross our lines.
Patrols: Covering parties were out along the divisional front.

At 3:45 a.m., a patrol of one officer and six men left our lines at G 2a 8.0 and moved along old communication trench to G 2b 4.1 without encountering the enemy. No wire was found in "No Man's Land." The C. L. was in bad repair and very muddy. Patrol returned to point of departure at 5 a.m.

2. HOSTILE MOVEMENT: The enemy is reported to be very cautious and careful not to expose his forward positions by unnecessary movement.

Movement was observed in trench at G 5b 2.2, and frequent individual movement was observed on roads at B 25b 1.4. This movement has been previously observed and reported. Small parties observed going E. and N. along road through BELLICOURT at G 3d 90.15.

Smoke and individual movement was observed at G 4c 7.5 and G 4c 7.7 (Canal Tunnel (?)) at different periods during the day.

MISCELLANEOUS: There is a suspected post at G 9b 5.8. Two men appeared to be wiring at G 5b 1.2 and wiring is probably going on in G 11b. Men wheeling barrows in vicinity of Canal Tunnel at G 4c 7.7 and work appeared to be going on at B 25b 1.4.

The traffic bridges at G 22d 9.8 and G 34d 7.9 are reported by the R. A. F. to be intact. The footbridges over Canal at G 29c 5.8 and 1.4 area also intact.

There has been no material change in our line. The line on our immediate right runs as follows: M 3b 5.9, M 4a 1.4 to crossroads M 3d 4.9, thence along road to M 10a 2.3, M 9b 4.1. Posts established at M 9e 1.3, M 9c 8.3, M 9a 9.1. Touch with division on right at M 9d 05.60. Enemy reported in considerable strength in southern end in PONTRUET village also in PONTRUET and PALARIE Trenches and M. G.'s about M 9d 6.6.

B. Y. READ,
Major, G-2.

FORECAST: Wind between S. W. and W., 10 to 15 m. p. h., probably increasing to 20 to 30 m. p. h.; fair, becoming overcast; some showers or drizzle likely in north, perhaps also in the south. Moderate temperature; visibility fair; wind 7 p. m. W. S. W. 8 m. p. h.; midnight and 4 a. m., S. W. 3 to 5 m. p. h.

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182-32.7: Order

Artillery Allotments

Copy No. 10

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 24, 1918.

A. C/101

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 4
ARTILLERY

1. ARTILLERY TAKEN OVER FROM III CORPS: Field and heavy artillery as under will be taken over from III Corps at 10 a.m. on September 25, on command of the American 27th Division sector passing to the Australian corps.
(a) FIELD ARTILLERY:
Australian 4th Divl. Artillery (Headquarters, 10th and 11th Brigades, A. F. A.)
25th Divisional Artillery (Headquarters, 110th and 112th Bdes., R. F. A.)
58th Divisional Artillery (Headquarters, 290th and 291st Bdes., R. F. A.)
86th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
104th Army Brigade, R. F. A.
108th Army Brigade, R. F. A.

(b) HEAVY ARTILLERY:
23d Brigade, R. G. A.
71st Brigade, R. G. A.
85th Brigade, R. G. A.
89th Brigade, R. G. A.
312th Siege Battery, R. G. A.
449th Siege Battery, R. G. A.

2. DISTRIBUTION:
The distribution of field artillery on the corps front on completion of current moves and reliefs by September 27, will be as under:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Right Divisional Sector</th>
<th>Left Divisional Sector</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>under C. R. A., Aust. 1st Division</td>
<td>under C. R. A., Aust. 4th Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust. 2d Divisional Artillery (4th and 5th Brigades, A. F. A.)</td>
<td>25th Divisional Artillery (110th and 112th Brigades, R. F. A.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Army Brigade, A. F. A.</td>
<td>58th Divisional Artillery (290th and 291st Brigades, R. F. A.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th Army Brigade, R. F. A.</td>
<td>86th Army Brigade, R. F. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84th Army Brigade, R. F. A.</td>
<td>104th Army Brigade, R. F. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>150th Army Brigade, R. F. A.</td>
<td>108th Army Brigade, R. F. A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORPS RESERVE in Right Divisional Sector</td>
<td>CORPS RESERVE in Left Divisional Sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust. 5th Divisional Artillery</td>
<td>Aust. 3d Divisional Artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. HEAVY ARTILLERY:
The heavy artillery under the orders of B. G. H. A., Australian corps will be as follows as at 12 noon on the 27th Instant:

| 9th Brigade, R. G. A. | (Mobile Brigade) |
| 18th Brigade, R. G. A. | (9.2" How. Brigade) |
| 41st Brigade, R. G. A. | (Mobile Brigade) |
| 51st Brigade, R. G. A. | (Mixed Brigade) |
| 68th Brigade, R. G. A. | (8" How. Brigade) |
| 71st Brigade, R. G. A. | (8" How. Brigade) |
| 73d Army Brigade, R. G. A. | (Mobile Brigade) |
| 85th Brigade, R. G. A. | (8" How. Brigade) |
| 89th Brigade, R. G. A. | (Mixed Brigade) |
| 93d Brigade, R. G. A. | (Mixed Brigade) |
4. COMMAND:
   (a) All artillery of the corps will pass to the command of G. O. C., R. A.,
       Australian corps, at 10 a.m. on 25th Instant, who will arrange for the allotment of a
       proportion of field and heavy artillery to each division at the conclusion of the first phase.
   (b) Throughout the period of preparation for the operations C. R. A.'s of line
       divisions will consult the divisional commanders concerned as to their defensive require­
       ments in the emplacement of field artillery.

5. BOMBARDMENT:
   (a) The preliminary bombardment will commence at 10 p.m. on W day and will
       continue until zero hour on Z day.
       The bombardment will consist of -
       (i) Special gas (B. B.) bombardment
       (ii) Vigorous counterbattery fire
       (iii) Intensive harassing fire
       (iv) Cutting lanes in hostile wire defenses
       (v) Bombardment of selected strong points and localities
   (b) Special Gas (B. B.) Bombardment: This bombardment will be carried out by
       18-pdrs. and 6" hows., firing B. B. gas shells in combination with H. E., during inter­
       mittent periods between 10 p.m. on W day and 6 a.m. on X day. Captured German guns
       firing Yellow Cross shells will be employed as far as circumstances permit.
       The objectives will be the hostile defensive system and artillery positions
       along the whole front so far as the range of guns permit. Arrangements will be made
       with the French to extend the front of bombardment on the right.
       Subsequent to 6 a.m., X day, no B. B. gas shell will be fired without the
       authority of the army.
   (c) Vigorous Counterbattery Fire: This will commence at 6 a.m. on X day.
       Surprise attacks on hostile artillery positions should be carried out with H. E. (with
       instantaneous fuses) and gas shells (C. G. or N. C.). For the methodical bombardment of
       fortified emplacements and dugouts, delay action fuses should be employed.
   (d) Intensive Harassing Fire: This will commence immediately after the cessa­
       tion of the special gas (B. B.) bombardment at 6 a.m. on X day. Corps will prepare
       definite plans for its direction on their respective fronts. The keynote of its application should be
       variety and surprise, and plans must be so framed that throughout the 24 hours of the day and
       night, the enemy should be permitted no immunity or security from shell fire.
       Facilities of observation must be fully exploited in order to limit the
       area on which unobserved harassing fire will have to be maintained by day. Areas over
       which no observation is possible must receive special attention.
       In allotting tasks for harassing fire, zones in depth must be allotted to
       different natures of weapons, including infantry weapons and machine guns, according to
       their range. In this connection, the increased range of 18-pdr. guns fitted with air
       recuperators should be taken into account.
       Use should be made of gas shells (C. G. and N. C.).
       Artillery positions should be included in the programme of harassing fire.
       In shelling roads, H. E. with delay action fuses are not to be employed.
   (e) Cutting Lanes in Hostile Wire Defenses: This will commence at 6 a.m. on
       X day and will be carried out principally with 4.5" hows. and 6" hows. (with instantan­
       eous fuses) and, where feasible, with 6" Newton mortars. Lanes, once cut, must be kept
       open by means of rifle and machine gun fire.
   (f) Bombardment of Selected Strong Points and Localities: This bombardment
       will commence at 6 a.m. on X day and will be continued until zero with a view not only
       to the destruction of defenses but also to the demoralization of the defenders. Gas
shells (C. G. and N. C.) should be made use of. It is not considered feasible to carry out a thorough destruction bombardment of concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements.

The tunnels themselves are impervious to artillery fire. Steps should be taken to concentrate a heavy and unexpected fire on their entrances and exits on the day of battle.

Telephone exchanges and specially defended localities such as BELLANGEUSE, NAUROY, BELLOCOURT, BONY, Le CATELET-GOUY, should be heavily bombarded.

Blocks in communication trenches should be created where it is considered practicable and advisable.

(g) Long Range Gun Fire: G. O. C., R. A., Australian Corps, will be responsible for dealing with the following places by means of long range guns: JONCOURT, RAMIECOURT, MONTBREHAIN, ESTREES, ESTREES-MARETZ Road, BEAUVOR.

Instantaneous fuses will be used by all guns firing at long ranges.

(h) Resting of Detachments: Careful arrangements will be made for the relief of detachments during the course of the bombardment.

6. HOSTILE GAS BOMBARDMENT: In the event of a heavy hostile concentration of fire on Y/Z night, especially gas shelling, or any particular part of the army area, every effort will be made, by concentrating the fire of as many guns as possible, to silence the offending groups of hostile artillery.

At the same time, the counterbattery staff officer will indicate as accurately as possible to the 5th Brigade, R. A. F. direct the positions of the active German artillery, with the object of enabling the R. A. F. to bomb the groups concerned.

C. B. S. O. will likewise inform the 5th Balloon Wing, who have arranged to have a balloon standing by ready to take the air within 30 minutes, if weather conditions will permit. It is hoped that this balloon will be able to give useful information as to the positions of the batteries concerned.

G. O. C., R. A., will prepare a plan on these lines.

7. DUMPING OF AMMUNITION:

The following amounts of ammunition are authorized to be held in front of railhead.

25 per cent of these amounts will be held in corps reserve.

In addition, all echelons are to be kept full.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gun Type</th>
<th>Rounds per Gun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pdr.</td>
<td>900 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5&quot; How.</td>
<td>800 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-pdr. gun</td>
<td>600 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; How.</td>
<td>700 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>500 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2&quot; How.</td>
<td>500 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; gun</td>
<td>400 rounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot; How.</td>
<td>300 rounds</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ACKNOWLEDGE.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Australian Corps.
Operations 30th and 27th Divisions

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 24, 1918.

Appendix No. 49

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 7

1. INFORMATION:
   (a) The Australian corps is taking over portion of the III Corps front as far north as the grid line running east and west through F.5.c.0.0 at 10 a. m. on September 25.
   (b) The corps front will be held by the American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left.

2. INTENTION: On September 27, at a zero hour to be notified later, a preliminary operation will be carried out by the left (American 27th) division with the object of gaining the infantry forming-up line for the main operation, as laid down in Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 2, dated Sept. 22, 1918.

   The American 30th Division on the right will cooperate with the object of gaining such portions of the infantry forming-up line on their front as they do not yet occupy.

3. METHOD OF ATTACK:
   (a) The attack will be carried out by the brigade now holding the line of the American 27th Division, assisted by tanks, and under a creeping barrage which will fall on the artillery start line • • •
   (b) The infantry will form up on a taped line (shown as the infantry forming-up line on attached map) prior to zero.
   (c) The barrage will lift at zero plus 3 minutes and thereafter at a uniform rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes until the final protective barrage line is reached. Barrage maps showing the successive lifts of the barrage and lift timings will be issued later.

4. ARTILLERY: 9 brigades of artillery will be available for the operation.

5. TANKS: G. O. C., 4th Tank Brigade, will detail one company (12 tanks) to assist the infantry in the operation. Details will be arranged direct between the tank battalion commander detailed and the American 27th Division.

6. ACTION OF FLANK CORPS: The III Corps will cooperate in the advance by forming a defensive flank to the American 27th Division • • •

7. ACTION OF AMERICAN 30TH DIVISION: The American 30th Division will advance their line simultaneously with the American 27th Division attack, in order to gain such portion of the infantry forming-up line for the main operation as they do not now occupy.

   Artillery action will be arranged by G. O. C., R. A., in consultation with the G. O. C., American 30th Division.

8. BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES: Attached map shows the corps and interdivisional boundaries, infantry and artillery start lines and the objectives for the advance.

9. CONTACT PATROLS:
   (i) A contact aeroplane will fly over the objective line at zero plus 90 minutes.

   The position of the most advanced infantry will be indicated by the following means:

   (a) Red ground flares.
   (b) Bright tin discs.
(c) Groups of 3 or 4 rifles laid parallel across the trench and about a foot apart.
(ii) Divisions will arrange for dropping stations to be manned in the vicinity
of their divisional headquarters.
Location for dropping stations will be notified to corps headquarters by September 26.
10. SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES: Watches will be synchronized through the signal
service at 2 p.m. and 7 p.m. on September 26.
Watches will not be synchronized by telephone in advance of brigade headquarters.
ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. C. CASEY,
Major,
for
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Australian Corps.

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Artillery Instructions No. 268, Australian Corps

ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 268

by

G. O. C., R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS

September 24, 1918.

B. B. GAS BOMBARDMENT

[Extract]

1. A gas bombardment will be carried out prior to the main attack on the
HINDENBURG Line, in accordance with Paragraph 5 of Artillery Instructions No. 267 of
September 23. The date will be night of September 26, zero hour will be notified later.
2. The periods of bombardment and periods of rest will be as follows throughout
the gas (B. B.) attack, except that heavy artillery will continue each bombardment thirty
minutes in place of fifteen minutes as ordered for field artillery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gas Bombardment - Field Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zero to zero plus 15 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero plus 15 minutes to zero plus 2 hours 15 min.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero plus 2 hours 15 mins. to zero plus 2 hours 30 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero plus 2 hours 30 mins. to zero plus 4 hours 30 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero plus 4 hours 30 mins. to zero plus 4 hours 45 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero plus 4 hours 45 mins. to zero plus 6 hours 45 mins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zero plus 6 hours 45 mins. to zero plus 7 hours.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Rates of fire - rapid throughout.

* * * * * *

5. B. B. gas shell only will be employed, and H. E. will be mixed in all cases in the proportion of approximately three gas shell to one H. E.

6. Gas shell other than B. B. are not being mixed owing to the fact that B. B. affords the enemy very little indication of its presence.

   The mixture of other gas shell would at once apprise the enemy of the presence of gas in the area, and would cause him to adjust his mask more readily and thus lessen the effect of B. B.

7. H. E. is being mixed with B. B. in order to disguise as much as possible the smaller burst of the gas shell, and in order to lead the enemy to believe he is under a H. E. bombardment only.

8. 27 areas have been selected, and sufficient shell allowed to impregnate each one.

9. Our troops are safe from a cloud passed from this shell at about one mile if the wind is blowing directly towards them. The best effect is gained in a wind from 10 miles and under, but it can be used with effect in a wind up to 15 miles per hour.

10. The bombardment will take effect whatever the weather conditions may be at the time set out for it to commence.

11. Watches will be synchronized by divisional artilleries and heavy artillery four hours and one hour prior to zero by telephone to corps headquarters.

12. ACKNOWLEDGE ON FORM ATTACHED.

[Signature illegible]
Lt. Col., G. S.,
R. A., Australian Corps.

HS Brit. File: Flrd. 8-10 (30th Div.): Artillery Instruction

Artillery Support of 27th and 30th Divisions

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 24, 1918.

ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 269
by
G. O. C., R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS

1. (a) On September 27, 1918, at a zero hour to be notified later, the preliminary attack referred to in Artillery Instructions No. 267 of September 23, 1918, Para. 1, will be carried out by the left (American 27th) division, with the object of gaining the infantry forming-up line for the main operation as laid down in Paragraph 2 of the above referred to instructions.

   Tanks will cooperate in this attack.

(b) The American 30th Division on the right will cooperate with the object of gaining such portions of the infantry forming up line on their front as they do not yet occupy.

(c) The III Corps are cooperating in the advance by forming a defensive flank to the north of the American 27th Division.
2. **BARRAGE**: The attack of the American 27th Division will be carried out under a field artillery barrage. Lifts and distances will be in accordance with the accompanying barrage map.

   (a) The 18-pdr. barrage will open at zero on the artillery start line, 200 yards east of the infantry forming-up line.

   At zero plus 3 minutes, the barrage will lift at the rate of a hundred yards in three minutes and will continue at this rate until it arrives at the protective barrage line which is 400 yards east of the objective line.

   On arrival on the protective barrage line, the barrage halts and after firing on this line for a period of 30 minutes all barrage fire ceases.

   (b) The 4.5 inch howitzer barrage will conform to the lifts of the 18-pdr. barrage but will move 200 yards east of it.

   (c) **RATES OF FIRE**:

       Throughout creeping barrage and first 10 minutes on protective barrage
       
       Rapid

       On protective barrage to final objective (20 minutes)
       
       Slow

   (d) **AMMUNITION**

       18-pdr.

       40% H. E. non-delay

       50% Shrapnel

       10% Smoke

       4.5" howitzer

       H. E. 106 fuzes

3. **HEAVY ARTILLERY**: Detailed instructions will be issued by B. H. A as regards engaging points of importance within the area to be captured, conforming to the lifts as laid down in the field artillery barrage map.

   Counterbattery work will commence at zero and as many guns as possible will be allotted for this purpose.

   All routes of approach, assembly points, etc., beyond the objective line will be kept under fire from zero to zero plus 75 minutes after which time the bombardment programme for the day will be adhered to.

4. **FIELD ARTILLERY AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE AMERICAN 27TH DIVISION**

   (under the orders of the C. R. A., Australian 4th Division):

   Australian 4th Divisional Artillery

   25th Divisional Artillery

   58th Divisional Artillery

   84th Army Brigade, R. F. A.

   104th Army Brigade, R. F. A.

   108th Army Brigade, R. F. A.

5. **ZONE CALLS**: The usual arrangements will be made for answering zone calls.

6. **S. O. S. and COUNTERPREPARATION**: Arrangements will be made by B. G. H. A and C. R. A. for S. O. S. and counterpreparation to be put into force when the final objective is captured.

7. **ADVANCED TO FORWARD POSITION**: When the final objective is gained, arrangements will immediately be made by C. R. A.'s and B. G. H. A. to reconnoiter and advance guns to positions from which the main attack can be carried out.

8. **ACKNOWLEDGE ON FORM ATTACHED.**

   H. E. K. MacCARTNEY,

   Lt. Col., G. S.,

   R. A., Australian Corps.
**Operations II Corps**

Reference 1/20,000 map

REMAUCOURT

**IX CORPS WARNING ORDER No. 137**

**September 24, 1918.**

1. At an hour and on a date to be notified later, the Fourth Army is to attack the HINDENBURG Defenses between St-QUENTIN and VENDHUILE (7 miles north of BELLENGLISE).

2. The first objective of the IX Corps is shown in green and the second objective in red on the attached map [adapted mapping provided].

3. (a) The American II Corps on the left of the IX Corps is to capture the first objective (green line) on their own front.

   (b) After the capture of the green line, the American II Corps is to exploit success southwards to the green dotted lines.

   (c) After the capture of the first objective (green line) by the American II Corps, the Australian corps will leapfrog and capture the red line on their own front.

4. The attack on the IX Corps front on the first objective (green line) will be carried out by the 46th Division, which will cross the canal between G.34.b.5.0 and the bridge at G.22.d.7.8. This attack will be commenced simultaneously with that of the American II Corps. The attack on the second objective (red line) will be carried out by the 32d Division, which will pass through the 46th Division when the green line has been gained.

5. (a) The 46th Division will gain touch with the American II Corps on the green dotted line.

   (b) The 32d Division will gain touch with the Australian corps on the red line.

6. The IX Corps is to exploit success southwards with a view to assisting the French First Army. Further orders will be issued later as regards this.

7. All further orders regarding these operations will be issued in the form of instructions.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE [IX Corps units only].

   H. SHERBROOKE,
   Lt. Col.,
   for
   Brig. General, General Staff,
   IX Corps.

**III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 11**

**September 24, 1918.**

1. A bombardment of the HINDENBURG Line opposite the III Corps will be carried out. It will commence at 10 p.m. on W day.

2. The allotment of artillery is given in Table A. The 18th Divisional Artillery
will come under the orders of the 12th Division on arriving at their wagon lines on September 25.

3. The 18-pdr. air recuperator guns will be grouped in batteries. The 62d Brigade, R. F. A., will temporarily exchange their air recuperator guns for other guns with the 63d Brigade, R. F. A.

The locations in action of these batteries with air recuperator guns will be reported as early as possible to III Corps, R. A., so that advantage may be taken of their increased range in allotting tasks.

4. Ammunition:
   (a) In addition to all echelons being full, the following amounts of ammunition per gun and how. will be held in front of railhead.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gun</th>
<th>Gun dumps</th>
<th>A. R. P.'s</th>
<th>Corps Reserve</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pdr.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5&quot; How.</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-pdr.</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; gun</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; How.</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2&quot; How.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot; How.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (b) The amounts of B. B. gas shell available are:

   - 18-pdr. 3,000 rounds
   - 6" How. 1,000 "

   This ammunition will be issued to batteries detailed to take part in special gas (B. B.) bombardments.

   (c) All special shell will be included in the amounts laid down in Para. 4(a).

   (d) The amounts of German ammunition available are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gun</th>
<th>H. E.</th>
<th>Blue Cross</th>
<th>Yellow Cross</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>77-mm. gun</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-cm. How.</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (e) As much ammunition as possible will be kept boxed in all dumps including those at the guns.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS, R. A., ON ATTACHED SLIP.

   M. H. DENDY,
   Major, G. S.,
   for
   B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued at 7:45 p. m.

---

TABLE A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>18-pdrs.</th>
<th>4.5&quot; Hows.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12th Div. Arty.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Div. Arty.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th Div. Arty.</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Two 77-mm. guns manned by M. T. M. personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Brigades</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2 - 77-mm. guns</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 81 -
III Corps H. A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formation</th>
<th>Pdrs.</th>
<th>6&quot;</th>
<th>6&quot;</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>9.2&quot;</th>
<th>12&quot;</th>
<th>15-cm.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th Bde., R. G. A. (Mixed)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47th Bde., R. G. A. (How. 8&quot;)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76th Bde., R. G. A. (Mixed)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189th Siege Btry.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mk. VII</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>545th Siege Btry.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mk. XIX</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243d Siege Btry.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mk. IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/III H. T. M. Btry.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

182-32.1: Field Orders, Supplement and Amendment

### Warning Order of Attack of Hindenburg Line

FIELD ORDERS
No. 16

MAPS: 1:20,000 62 C N. E., 62 B N. W., 57 C S. E., 57 B S. W.

[Extract]

1. **SITUATION:** The enemy opposite the front to be occupied by the American II Corps September 24 and 25 holds the HINDENBURG Line in force. The salient feature of this line is the CAMBRAI--ST-QUENTIN Canal which runs through a tunnel from a point 1,500 yds. S. E. of VENDHUILE to a point 1,000 yds. south of BELLCOURT.

The Fourth Army will attack the HINDENBURG Defences between VENDHUILE and ST-QUENTIN at an hour and on a date to be notified later.

The IX Corps will attack on the right and simultaneously with the American II Corps.

The III Corps will be on our left and will not attack but will hold a defensive front between the American II Corps and the V Corps until the American II Corps has reached the green line. When the troops of the American II Corps commence their exploitation towards the dotted green line, the III Corps will mop up the ground west of the canal.

2. **GENERAL PLAN:** The American II Corps affiliated with the Australian corps will attack the enemy's positions in the HINDENBURG Line in the sector NAUROY-GOUY (both inclusive), on a date and hour to be notified later. There will be a preliminary bombardment by all available artillery lasting for a considerable period. The object of this preliminary bombardment will be -
   (a) To complete the demoralization of the enemy;
   (b) The destruction of the enemy's defenses, including wire, dugouts, etc.

The attack will be carried out on a frontage of two divisions. • • •
3. (a) PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS:
   The present situation on the battle front is as follows:
   The front line is in the advanced HINDENBURG Line as far north as the interdivisional boundary for the operation. North of this the front line is now along the old British Outpost Line. The III Corps has undertaken to make every endeavor to seize the front line of the HINDENBURG system before its relief by the American 27th Division. If the III Corps does not succeed in doing this it will be necessary for the American 27th Division to undertake a definite operation in order to seize the advanced line of the HINDENBURG system.

   During the period that this operation takes place the American 30th Division will advance posts to such a position as will enable it to ensure that the forming-up line on its sector will be sufficiently protected.

   (b) MAIN OPERATION:
   The main operation will be divided into phases as follows:

   (1) First Phase: The American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left will form up on a taped line prior to the given zero hour and will attack with tanks under a creeping artillery barrage. This barrage will include a considerable proportion of smoke shell. The start line is shown in BROWN on the attached map and the objectives are shown in a continuous GREEN line.

   The flanks of the attack will be protected by a smoke screen which will be provided by one field artillery brigade on each flank. As soon as the artillery barrage programme is completed and the infantry have seized the objective, the green line, the smoke barrage on the flanks will lift outwards in order to enable the infantry to exploit their success toward the flanks under the concealment of the flanking smoke barrages: To the north with a view to assisting the advance of the V Corps over the canal, and protecting the Australian corps left in their advance to the red line; to the south with a view to assisting the IX Corps in their advance across the canal, and to protecting the Australian corps right in their advance to the red line.

   (2) Second Phase: The Australian 5th Division on the right and the Australian 3d Division on the left, each with its own divisional artillery and a proportion of tanks, and organized in brigade groups, will pass through the American 30th and 27th Divisions respectively in open warfare formations at a time to be decided later. In order to secure the flanks of this operation and to extend the base of the salient created by the advance, the reserve troops of the American 30th and 27th Divisions will extend their operations to the south and north, respectively, with the object of seizing the objectives.

   A proportion of artillery which will be allotted from the barrage guns and will be withdrawn as soon as the barrage programme is completed, will be placed at the disposal of each divisional commander for this. A proportion of tanks will be similarly allotted. A detailed program and timetable will be issued. The troops which captured the first objectives will be reassembled after the whole of the brigades detailed to the second objective have passed through them. The time for this reassembly will be notified. They will be prepared to advance eastwards on a one-division front, in touch with the Australian corps on their right and with the V Corps of the Third Army on their left.

   (c) ASSEMBLY: The line will be held prior to the operation by the American 30th and 27th Divisions, each with one regiment in the line supported by one regiment and each with one brigade in reserve.

   The capture of the first objective will be carried out by the reserve brigade in each case.
The capture of the second objective allotted to the American divisions will be carried out by the supporting regiment of the line brigade, the line regiment of the line brigade passing into reserve at a stage which is indicated later.

The programme will be so arranged that the two attacking brigade groups of the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions, respectively, will pass through the American troops as soon as possible after the latter have attained the first objective. These two brigades will follow the regiments of the American 30th and 27th Divisions, respectively, allotted to the capture of the RED line. The reserve brigades of the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions will then be passed through the gap. The last infantry to pass through the gap from the west to the east side of the canal will be the regiments of the American 30th and 27th Divisions who were originally holding the line and now pass into reserve.

The order of movement across the tunnel will be therefore:

A and B Regiments of the American 30th and 27th Divisions (that is, the attacking brigade in each case).

C Regiment of the American 30th and 27th Divisions (that is, the supporting regiment of the brigade originally in the line).

A and B Brigades of the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions.

C Brigade of the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions moving in divisional reserve.

D Regiment of the American 30th and 27th Divisions (that is, the regiment which was holding the line when the attack began). This regiment will be concentrated immediately after the Australian last brigade has passed through and will then move according to the orders of the respective divisional commanders.

Assembly areas will be selected and allotted for each American regiment and each Australian brigade in such positions as will best permit of this order of movement being carried out.

(d) ROAD MOVEMENT: The country over which the attack will pass in its early stages is very much shell-pitted and all roads have been very badly damaged.

To enable guns and ammunition wagons and the armored cars to pass across this area, the chief engineer of the corps has arranged to develop four roads as rapidly as possible.

The chief engineer of the Australian corps will have at his disposal the five Australian pioneer battalions plus such proportion of the American engineering personnel as may be necessary.

Every body of troops will be allotted its own definite road and will on no account use any other. Maps will be issued later showing the roads allotted in each case.

Careful traffic control will be organized and all ranks must be warned beforehand and must be prepared to adhere to the traffic rules strictly.

The bivouac areas will be selected in positions which will be convenient to the roads to which each body of troops is allotted.

(e) TROOPS AVAILABLE:

Divisions:

- Australian 3d Division
- Australian 5th Division
- American 27th Division
- American 30th Division

Artillery:

(i) Field artillery - 23 field artillery brigades.
(ii) Heavy artillery - 10 heavy artillery brigades.

Tanks:

4th Tank Brigade consisting of 84 tanks a proportion of which are Mark V and a proportion Mark V (Star) tanks.
5th Tank Brigade between 70 and 80 tanks, portion of which are Mark V and portion of which are Mark V (Star) tanks.

A portion of 3d Tank Brigade giving a total of 25 Whippet tanks and 1 armoured car battalion.

Mounted Troops: Australian 13th Light Horse Regiment.
Cavalry: 5th Cavalry Brigade
Special Companies, R. E.: Several will be available for smoke screening work.

Air Forces: 3d Squadron, A. F. C., and auxiliary assistance from 5th Brigade, R. A. F.

4. PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS, LIAISON, ETC.:

(a) Light Signals: The only light signals to be employed will be -
   (i) The S. O. S. signal which will be a No. 32 Rifle Grenade bursting into three RED lights.
   (ii) Success signal which will be a No. 32 Rifle Grenade bursting into three WHITE lights.
   (iii) Message carrying rockets will be made available and will be issued early.

(b) All ranks will be provided with a metal disc sewn on to the reverse side of the box respirator, which will be used for signalling to our aeroplanes when they sound the Klaxon horn, to indicate the position of the troops.

Red flares will be issued and will be lit for the same purpose when the aeroplane calls.

All ranks must be made to understand that when the aeroplane calls the flares must be lit and the discs shown.

(c) The organization of the troops for the first phase of the operation will ensure that definite bodies are allotted for duty at each entrance to the tunnel with the object of dealing with any of the enemy who may have taken refuge in the tunnel during the bombardment and barrage. These troops must on no account be withdrawn from their tasks until the tunnel is completely clear of the enemy.

(d) All troops must be warned of the absolute necessity of keeping as close up to the barrage as safety permits in order to deal with the enemy before he can recover after the barrage has passed.

(e) A very liberal supply of -
   (i) Operations maps
   (ii) Message maps
   (iii) Oblique and trench photos

will be issued. All commanders must ensure that these are distributed right down to noncommissioned officers in order that the achievement of their tasks may be facilitated for all ranks.

Special instructions as to intelligence functions dealing with prisoners of war, etc., will be issued.

(f) A complete system of liaison between flanks and from front to rear between companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades, and divisions will be worked out. The responsibility for liaison and for communication will be from right to left.

(g) A series of code calls for employment between infantry using the Popham panel and contact aeroplanes will be made and issued by Australian corps. Those now in use by the Australian divisions will be retained, except in the case of the Australian I and IV Corps.
BOUNDARIES AND OBJECTIVES
AMERICAN II CORPS
REFERENCE: FIELD ORDER NO 16, AMER II CORPS
74 SEPTEMBER 1918

AMER CORPS
AUS 3d DIV
AUS 5th DIV

AMER 27th DIV
AUS 5th DIV

AMER 30th DIV

VENOHUILE
LE CATELET
GOUY

BELJICOURT
VILLERET

HARICOURT

BON Y

GUILANCE

VISTILLE

ESTREES

JONCOURT

GROUVILLER

NAURY

BEAUREVOIR

ROISEL
5. LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS AND P. C.:
   (a) Headquarters: No change.
   (b) P. C. to be notified later.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

G. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.

---

182-33.3 (No. 2): Memorandum

Battle Instructions

G-3
MEMORANDUM

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 24, 1918.

[Extract]

2. SECRECY:

   
   
   (c) All movements of troops and transport in an easterly direction will take place by night, whether in the forward or back areas of the Fourth Army, on and after September 23, except where absolutely necessary to move by day.
   
   (d) G. O. C., 5th Brigade, R. A. F., is arranging with corps for aeroplanes to fly over Fourth Army area during days when flying is possible, and to report to corps headquarters any abnormal movement of troops or transport within our lines.
   
   (e) No orders will be given, or reference made to the operations, on the telephone within 3,000 yards of the front line.

   (f) Commanders will ensure that the number of officers reconnoitering the enemy's positions is limited to those for whom such reconnaissance is essential.

   Nothing attracts attention to an offensive more than a large number of officers with maps looking over the parapet and visiting O. R.'s., as has again been proved by information received from German prisoners with reference to the attack of September 13, which was given away by this means.

   Commanding officers of units holding the front line should report at once to higher authority any disregard of these orders.

3. GENERAL:

   (a) The infantry assault will be preceded by a 48 hour bombardment. This bombardment will be preceded by a gas bombardment. For details as regards these bombardments see Section 4 ARTILLERY.

   (b) Zero hour will be communicated to corps in writing at noon on Y day.

   (c) Watches will be synchronized by the II Corps Hq. with the 27th and 30th Div. Hq. on the telephone at 1 p. m. and 6 p. m. on Y day. Wires will be kept cleared for this purpose from 10 minutes before the time until 5 minutes after.

   
   
   

- 87 -
5. TANKS:
(a) The following provisional allotment of tank units is made so as to permit
of tank brigade and other commanders getting into touch with the formations and units
with which they will work. It may be necessary to make some minor changes later.
To IX Corps:
3d Tank Brigade (2 battalions Mk. V., 1 battalion Whippets) - Brig. Gen.
J. Hardress-Lloyd, D. S. O.
To Australian Corps:
5th Tank Brigade (3 battalions Mk. V. or Mk. XV) - Brig. Gen. A. Courage,
D. S. O., M. C.
1 battalion Whippets
17th Armoured Car Bn.
To American II Corps:
4th Tank Brigade (4 battalions Mk. V. or Mk. XV) - Brig. Gen. E. B. Hankey,
D. S. O.
This brigade will provide the tanks necessary for the exploitation of the
American II Corps to the dotted green line as well as for the capture of the green line.
Any transfers necessitated by this allotment will be arranged between the
tank brigades concerned.
(b) The advance of the tanks up to the infantry tape line
will be covered by
the action of the
R A F.,
so as to avoid the noise of the tank engines being heard by
the enemy.
Detailed programmes as regards this will be arranged between the G. O. C.,
5th Brigade, R. A. F. and corps.

6. CAVALRY:
(a) The 5th Cavalry Brigade is placed at the disposal of the Australian corps
forthwith.

9. COMMUNICATIONS:
(a) All possible arrangements will be made so that once the advance has begun,
communications may be maintained by visual signalling, mounted messengers, etc.
Mounted messengers have been found the most reliable, and corps will ar­
range for the distribution of these from their own resources.
(b) When divisional and brigade H. Q. advance, their position must be clearly
marked by distinguishing flags.
(c) Red flares, discs, and rifles placed three in a row parallel to each other
with their muzzles pointing towards the enemy, will be employed to indicate the position
of the troops to aircraft.
(d) The following light signals will be employed:
(i) Success signal, i. e., “We have reached objective,” No. 32 grenade,
white over white over white.
(ii) S. O. S., No. 32 grenade, red over red over red.
(iii) Cavalry signal, i. e., “Advanced troops of cavalry are here,” white
star turning to red on a parachute fired from a 1 1/2 Very pistol
(e) Owing to the rapidity of our advance, and the time it takes for pigeons to
get used to their new locations, very few will be available for work during the oper­
ations.
Available lofts are allotted as follows:

- Australian Corps: M 110. VIGNACOURT
- IX Corps: M 111.
- 3d Tank Bde.: M 103.
- 4th Tank Bde.: M 138. VAUX-en-AMIENOIS
- 5th Tank Bde.: M 101. BERTANGLES

11. ROADS AND BRIDGES:
(a) III Corps will be responsible for the repair of the VENDHUILE Bridges.
(b) IX Corps will be responsible for the repair of the bridges at -

G.22.b.8.0.
G.2.b.5.5.
M.5.b.0.8.

Location and Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 24, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The IX Corps carried out a minor operation with a view to securing the high ground east of SELENCY, east of GRICOURT and S. E. of PONTRUET, this giving protection to the right flank of the army in the event of further operations on a large scale taking place.

The attack was preceded by a deliberate observed bombardment of the enemy’s trenches with heavy artillery during September 21, 22, and 23. At 5 a.m., a creeping barrage, was put down along the front of the attack using H. E., shrapnel, gas and smoke shell. Heavy artillery cooperated in the barrage and fired concentrations on selected targets, while counterbatteries engaged all known and suspected batteries with strong neutralizing fire.

The attack made good progress except in the vicinity of SELENCY and the Quadrilateral where strong resistance was encountered. Several determined counterattacks were repulsed and heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy.

As a result of the day’s operations, the lines was established DOUAI Trench S.9.a.5.9.---west of QUADRILATERAL---along ARGONNE Trench in M.34. and 28---west of GRICOURT---M.22.a---M.16.d.---M.17.a.---M.10.d. The enemy held the southern portion of PONTRUET, then line runs east of St-HELENE---N. E. along trench in M.3.b. to M.3.b.5.7.

Our barrage provoked only a weak retaliation from the enemy. Hostile fire throughout the day was never heavy. At 11 a.m., a fairly heavy concentration was placed on PONTRUET area, and H. V. guns fired occasional rounds into the area near CARTENOY Wood.
2. III Corps: With the exception of normal harassing fire the night was fairly quiet. At 11:30 a.m., the enemy bombarded the front of the 12th Division in support of an attack on DADOS Loop. He gained a footing in DADOS Loop and DADOS Lane, but immediate counterattacks cleared the trenches with the exception of that portion between X.23.d.6.0. and X.22.d.3.4., which the enemy maintained.

RONSSOY and EPEHY were subjected continuously to harassing fire from guns of all calibers and H. V. guns fired on VILLERS-FAUCON and LONGAVESNES.

IX Corps: Zero was at 5 a.m., at which hour the 6th and 1st Divs. advanced to the assault under cover of a creeping barrage and assisted by one battalion of Mk. V Tanks. 12 tanks were allotted to the 1st Div. and 8 to 6th Div. The 46th Division cooperated by advancing their right in conjunction with the left of the 1st Division.

The 6th Division was unable to progress east of HOLNON and was held up west of QUADRILATERAL on account of heavy machine-gun and rifle fire from SELENY and the latter place. The high ground in M.34 was gained early in the operation without experiencing any serious resistance.

The 1st Division reached all the objectives, capturing FRESNOY, ARGONNE Trench and gained the high ground in M.17.a and M.10.d. The enemy counterattacked our positions on this high ground twice during the day but were repulsed each time. In one case, the counterattack passed through our protective barrage and was met by two weak companies of the Sussex Regt. with the bayonet. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy and 50 prisoners secured. Severe fighting also occurred in the vicinity of the Sunken Road in M.17.c. and M.16.b., which changed hands several times during the day and was eventually held by the 1st Division.

Farther north, the 46th Division succeeded in capturing the north and N. W. portion of PONTRUET and gained the high ground east of STE-HELENE. The enemy still held the trench system in the southern portion of the village and frustrated all attempts to eject them, by vigorous machine-gun and rifle fire.

942 prisoners, one 77-mm. gun, 32 machine guns, and five trench mortars were captured as the result of the day's operations.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS: A quiet day. Hostile shelling normal.

3. THIRD ARMY: Situation unchanged.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The French attacked in conjunction with the IX Corps and captured DALLON, l'Epine de DALLON and FRANCILLY. MANCHESTER Hiil was surrounded on the north and south, but the enemy still held the hill in spite of the French attacks.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 675 hours were flown by 258 pilots. Sixteen reconnaissance and 21 artillery patrols were carried out and 68 zone calls sent down. Four hostile batteries were successfully engaged for destruction.

151 offensive patrols were made. 22 combats took place, five of which were decisive. Five E.A. were destroyed. Three of our machines failed to return. Eleven enemy balloons were attacked and 7 shot down in flames.

21 photographic flights were carried out and 468 plates were exposed.

152 25-lb. bombs were dropped on WASSIGNY, BOHAIN and Le CATEAU by night, and 212 25-lb., 17 40-lb. phos. and eight 112-lb. bombs were dropped on suitable ground targets during the day. 16,795 machine-gun rounds were also fired at suitable targets.

(b) Hostile: Hostile aircraft activity showed a considerable increase and was above normal. 32 artillery two-seaters, 41 F. E. A. and 2 R. E. A. crossed the line.

At 11:40 a.m., one F. E. A. at 500 feet crossed the line near VILLERS-FAUCON, penetrated to AIZECOURT-le-BAS, and destroyed one of our balloons on the ground.

A. A. fire crashed one E. A. near HARGICOURT.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through Army cages 6 off., 122 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s 1 off., 11 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Fine.
8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: The 58th Division went into corps reserve from the line, the 12th Division taking over their front.

The American 30th Division from corps reserve relieved the Australian 1st Division in the line, the Australian 1st Division going into corps reserve.

The American 27th Division arrived from Third Army and went into corps reserve, Australian corps.

The Australian 4th Division went into army reserve in CAVILLON area.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:

III Corps: 12th, 18th, 58th*, 74th Divisions, 1 Bde., 2d Cavalry Division (army reserve).

IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d*, 46th Divisions.

Australian Corps: Australian 1st*, 2d*, 3d*, 4th (army reserve), 5th* Divisions, American 27th* and 30th Divisions.

* Corps Reserve.

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HS Brit. File: (30th Div.): Fldr. 8-10: War Diary

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

Place Date Summary of Events and Information

N.16.C. 24th Command of sector passed from Aust. 1st Div. to American 30th Div. at 10 a.m. Battle Instructions Series E, Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 issued. No. 7 of above contains instructions re pushing ahead on the American 27th Div. front in order to secure the start line for forthcoming operations.

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HS Brit. File: (II Corps): Fldr. 3: War Diary

THIRD ARMY, B. E. F., September, 1918.

Place Date Summary of Events and Information

VILLERS- 21/24 1. (a) First Army, after the capture of BOURLON l'HÔPITAL Heights was to push forward and secure its flank on the SENSEE River and operate so as to protect the left of the Third Army.

(b) Fourth Army was delivering the main attack against the enemy's defenses from Le TRONQUOY to Le CATELET on a date which would be notified separately. The objectives of Fourth Army, as far as they concerned Third Army, were as follows:

The first objective to be taken by American II Corps was the line B.25---A.6---west to A.3 and A.1.
The second objective to be taken by the Australian corps who would leapfrog American II Corps, was the line B.29---B.10(E. of BEAUREVOIR)---T.27---west to A.6. After the capture of the first objective American II Corps was to exploit northwards in order to assist the advance of the V Corps across the Canal de l'ESCAUT. III Corps was to hold a defensive front on the right of V Corps until the first commenced their exploitation northwards, III Corps were to mop up the ground west of the Canal de l'ESCAUT. After the capture of the second objective, the Fourth Army intended to continue its advance eastwards.

2. (a) The advance of the Third Army would be directed on the general line Le CATEAU-SOLESMES.
   (b) Forward lines of demarcation between corps were defined.
   (c) Third Army would assist the Fourth Army attack by counterbattery work on the enemy's guns in the region La TERRIERE-VILLERS OUTREAU.
   (d) As soon as the American II Corps had exploited northwards to the line A.6---S.23---S.15---S.13, V Corps would be prepared to pass troops through VENDHUILE in rear of American II Corps and to relieve the American II Corps on the line from PIENNES (S.23.cent.) inclusive to the canal. V Corps would then operate so as to clear the east bank of the canal de l'ESCAUT, and free the crossings at HONNECOURT and BANTEUX, while maintaining touch with the advance of American II Corps, and at the same time to advance towards the Canal de l'ESCAUT down the spurs running east from VILLERS-GUISLAIN and GONNE-LIEU and clear the west bank of the canal as far north as BANTEUX-BANTOUZELLE.

It was understood that III Corps would construct the crossings at VENDHUILE for the passage of the V Corps at that place.

182-33.3: Operation Report

G-3

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Period ending noon September 24, 1918

[Extract]

6. **OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY:** The American 30th Division completed the relief of the Australian 1st Division as directed in our Field Order No. 15, attached to our situation report of Sept. 23, 1918, and the command passed at 10 a. m. this date.
The American 27th Division completes its movement to the TINCOURT area this
date.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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182-10.2: Order

**Passage of Command**

FROM: Australian Corps

OFFICE: 12:45 p. m.

DATE: September 24, 1918

RECEIVED: 1:21 p. m.

TO: American II Corps

Relief of Australian 1st Div. by American 30th Div. complete and command
passed 10 a. m. Addsd. Fourth Army, repeated all concerned.

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GHQ, AEF Records: W. D. II Corps: War Diary

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 24, 1918.

[Extract]

Division headquarters closed at noon at Beauquesne, Lens Map 11, and opened at Bois
de Buire, 62 C 1/40,000 at the same hour.
Available for all duty  ) Officers  493
    ) Men  15,643

STANELY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 24, 1918.

[Extract]

105th Engineers moved from Bernes to Hervilly. 59th Brigade - 118th Infantry in the line; 117th in support. Relief of Australian units by 118th completed after midnight. Relief was made under heavy enemy shell fire. 60th Brigade - 119th and 120th after debussing marched to their camps in the reserve area.

Available for all duty)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>574</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>18,448</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.

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182-33.3: Memorandum

Location Units II Corps

Memorandum G-3
No. 1

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

INSTRUCTION FOR OPERATIONS
SECTION 3, AMENDMENT NO. 1
HEADQUARTERS AND SYNCHRONIZATION

1. HEADQUARTERS:
   Headquarters of formations for the main operation are located as under:

   Headquarters Australian Corps
   Adv. Hq. American II Corps
   Rear Hq. American II Corps
   Hq. B. G. H. A., Australian Corps
   Hq. American 30th Division
   Hq. American 27th Division
   Hq. Australian 5th Division
   Hq. Australian 3d Division
   Hq. 4th Tank Brigade
   Hq. 5th Tank Brigade

   N.16.a.5.0.  (West of BARLEUX)
   N.16.a.
   MERICOURT
   J.12.d.4.8.  (TINCOURT Wood)
   J.16.a.8.2.  (BUIRE Wood)
   J.11.c.4.9.  (BUIRE Wood)
   K.23.d.4.2.  (HERVILLY)
   F.26.c.8.8.  (N of TEMPLEUX-la-GUERARD)
   D.28.central  (TEMPLEUX-la-FOSSE)
   J.10.b.9.1.  (BUIRE Wood)

2. SYNCHRONIZATION:
   Synchronization will be carried out as follows:
   American 27th and 30th Divisions.

- 94 -
A staff officer will leave Australian corps headquarters at 12 midday and at 5 p.m. with a watch synchronized at these times with the "rated" watch at the corps signal office and will visit the headquarters of the American 27th and 30th Divisions. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

READ,
Maj. Gen.

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182.33.3: (No. 2): No. 273 (G)

**Operations Instructions**

**SECTION 1**

**FOURTH ARMY**

**ORDER OF BATTLE AT ZERO**

[Extract]

(a) **III Corps.**

12th Division
18th Division
R. E. : 283d A. T. Co.

(b) **IX Corps.**

1st Division
6th Division
32d Division
46th Division
6th Tank Bn. (Whippets)
5th Tank Bn. (Mk. V)
9th Tank Bn. (Mk. V)
216, 221, 567, 574 A. T. Cos. R. E.
4th Siege Co., R. A. R. E.
180, 253, 254, 256 (T) Cos. R. E.
No. 1 Special Co. R. E. (Mortars)

(c) **XIII Corps.** (Army res.)

25th Division
50th Division
66th Division

(d) **AUSTRALIAN CORPS.**

Aust. 2d Div.
Aust. 3d Div.
Aust. 5th Div.
5th Cavalry Bde.

Cdr. Lieut. Gen. Sir R. H. K. Butler
Cdr. Major Gen. H. W. Higginson
Cdr. Major Gen. R. P. Lee
Cdr. Lieut. Gen. Sir W. P. Braithwaite
Cdr. Major Gen. E. P. Strickland
Cdr. Major Gen. T. O. Marden
Cdr. Major Gen. T. S. Lambert
Cdr. Major Gen. G. F. Boyd
Cdr. Brig. Gen. J. Hardress-Lloyd
Cdr. Lieut. Gen. Sir T. L. N. Morland
Cdr. Major Gen. J. R. E. Charles
Cdr. Major Gen. H. C. Jackson
Cdr. Major Gen. H. K. Bethell
Cdr. Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Monash
Cdr. Major Gen. C. Rosenthal
Cdr. Major Gen. J. Gellibrand
Cdr. Major Gen. Sir J. J. T. Hobbs
Cdr. Brig. Gen. N. W. Haig

- 95 -
Artillery - **
5th Tank Brigade
8th Tank Bn. 1st Tank Bn. ) 4th Tank Bn. )
13th Tank Bn. ) Mk. V and Mk. V Star 301st Tank Bn. )
16th Tank Bn. 17th Armoured Car Bn.
1st Aust., 146, 238 A. T. Cos. R. E.
No. 2, Adv. Section 353 E and M Co.
1st and 2d Aust. (T) Cos. R. E.
No. 11 Pontoon Park
No. 4 Special Co. R. E. (less 1 section)

(c) AMERICAN II CORPS.
American 27th Div.
American 30th Div.
3d Sqdn. Aust. F. C.
4th Tank Brigade
1st Tank Bn. 4th Tank Bn. )
301st Tank Bn. ) Mk. V and Mk. V Star
1st Siege Co. R. A. R. E.
No. 1 Adv. Section 353 E and M Cos.
182 (T) Co. R. E.

(f) CAVALRY CORPS. (G. H. Q. Reserve)
3d Cav. Div.
4th Guards Brigade
Household M. G. Brigade
6th Sqdn. R. A. F.

(g) ARMY TROOPS.
5th Brigade, R. A. F.
15th Wing
8th Squadron 73d Scout Sqdn. ) for work with tank units.

22d Wing Cdr. Lt. Col. P. A. E. Cairns

Single Seater Scouts.
23d Sqdn. (Dolphin) 24th Sqdn. S. E. 5
84th 85th " " Flying " "
92d " " ) balloon destruction.
46th " Camels ) Low attack.
80th 208th " "

Two-seater Fighter.
20th Sqdn. Bristol Fighter - Fighting, bombing, reconnaissance.

Army Two-seater
205th Sqdn. De H.9 (Liberty engine) - Bombing, reconnaissance and photography.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATIONS SECTION 5, AMENDMENT

Reference Section 5, "Tanks", of instructions for the forthcoming operations, Para. (a), the allotment of tank battalions to the 4th Tank Brigade should be amended to read "3 battalions Mk. V or Mk. V Star."

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182-33.3: (Br.) Fourth Army No. 20/23 (G)

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

BRITISH FOURTH ARMY,
September 25, 1918.

[Extract]

3. GENERAL:
   (h) Reference Fourth Army No. 20/23 (G) of 22/9/18, Para. 5 (a).
   The following arrangement has been made with the French First Army as regards their action in relation to the IX Corps:
   (1) The French First Army will be given a right of way for the French XV Corps at zero on Z day by the BEAUVOIS---VILLEVEQUE---ATTILLY---HOLNON Road as far as HOLNON (exclusive).
   (2) As soon as the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel has been captured, and the 1st Division has pushed forward towards it to join hands with the 32d Division, the French First Army will take over the front between SELENCY and GRICOURT (exclusive) and set free the 6th Division. The whole of the transport of the 6th Division must be withdrawn west of the HOLNON-FRESNOY Road prior to zero on Z day.
   (3) As soon as the 6th Division has been withdrawn, the French XV Corps will have right of access to the HOLNON-FRESNOY Road as far as FRESNOY (exclusive).
   (4) As soon as the whole of the 1st Division has passed over the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel, the French XV Corps will have right of access to the FRESNOY---GRICOURT ---THORIGNY---Le TRONQUOY Road, until such time as they have been able to make good and repair a passage over the canal at LESDINS and no longer require a passage over the canal at Le TRONQUOY.
   (5) As soon as the French XV Corps has crossed the canal, it will push eastwards and southeastwards with the mission of protecting the right of the British Fourth Army within the boundary allotted to the French First Army by Field Marshall Foch * * *
(1) Reference Fourth Army No. 20/23 (G) of 22/9/18, Para. 6, and Instructions for Operations, Section 3, General, Para. (g).

(1) The closest touch will be kept by III Corps with the American troops * * *
(2) Until this attack is known to be progressing well and the retreat of the enemy in VENDHUILE threatened by the advance of the American troops, the III Corps will not incur serious casualties by making a frontal attack on VENDHUILE.

The commander of the troops, whose mission it is to mop up VENDHUILE, will keep in the closest touch with the situation, so as to be in a position to take full advantage of any signs of hostile retreat from, or disposition to surrender in, VENDHUILE.

(3) The responsibility for keeping the 38th Division and V Corps fully informed as regards the progress of the American exploiting troops, and of the repair of the bridges at VENDHUILE, will rest on the III Corps.

The III Corps will also be responsible for passing the 38th Division over the canal at VENDHUILE, and will communicate direct with the 38th Division on the subject.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. 8-10 [30th Div.]: Addendum to Battle Instructions No. 7

Operations 27th Division

A. C./104/1
Appendix No. 49

ADDENDUM TO BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, NO. 7

1. Reference Paragraph 3.

One company (12 tanks) of the 4th Tank Battalion has been detailed for the preliminary operation under G. O. C., American 27th Division.

Lying-up place has been selected at E.29.b.

The starting points for the various sections are:

(i) F.10.b.
(ii) F.16.d.
(iii) F.22.d.

The routes from the lying-up place to the starting points run through the area Squares F.7---F.10---F.25---F.29.

The 5th Brigade, R. A. F., is arranging to have aeroplanes in the air over this area from zero minus 3 hours to zero to ensure that the noise of the engines is concealed.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.

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- 98 -
Operations II Corps

A. C./109

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 25, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, NO. 12

ROLE OF 5TH CAVALRY BRIGADE

1. 5th Cavalry Brigade is allotted to the Australian corps for the forthcoming operations.

2. The 5th Cavalry Brigade will keep in touch with the advance of the infantry of Australian 5th Division. It will be prepared to pass through the infantry after the latter have reached the RED line.

3. The role of the 5th Cavalry Brigade will be to seize and hold the line of high ground, Map Sheets No. 57 B, S. W. and 62 B, N. W., le HAMAGE Farm---U.25.a. and c.---C.8.central---1.3.central---1.9.central---1.14.central---1.19.central until the arrival of the infantry.

4. Should the enemy retreat the 5th Cavalry Brigade will maintain contact.

5. Restrictions as to routes and times are contained in Australian corps Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 9, dated September 25, 1918.

[Signature illegible]
Brigadier General,
Australian Corps.

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

A. C./112

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

Appendix No. 59

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, NO. 15

FLANK ACTION

1. SOUTH FLANK:
   (i) Limit of Artillery Barrage: The artillery barrage will extend south to the line Sq. G.21.a.00.75 - G.12.d.00.10 vide map issued with Battle Instructions Series E, No. 2. [Not printed]
   (ii) Action West of Canal:
      (a) Infantry Action: The infantry attack west of the canal will extend southwards as far as the line of the field artillery barrage.
      (b) Smoke Screen: The area between this line and the southern corps boundary (the grid line Sq. G.20.central - Sq. G.22.cent.) as far east as the canal will be kept under a heavy smoke screen by No. 4 Special Company R. E.
(iii) Action East of Canal:
(a) The first objective of C Regiment, American 30th Division will be the green dotted line as shown on the map issued with Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 2.
(b) Arrangements have been made with IX Corps for all artillery fire west and north of this line to cease at 8 a.m., by which time troops should be in position to push southward.
(c) Troops of American 30th Division will not advance from the green to the red line before 11 a.m. After this hour artillery fire of IX Corps will lift clear of the area between the green and red lines.
(d) Exploitation to the dotted red line will only be necessary in the event of troops of IX Corps being unable to force the passage of the canal.
(e) The artillery smoke barrage on the flank will be timed to lift southwards in accordance with the above.
(iv) Arrangements will be made direct between G. O. C., American 30th Division and G. O. C., British 46th Division for the passage of tanks of III Corps between the southern exit of the Tunnel and BLACK Road.

2. NORTH FLANK:
(i) West of the Canal:
(a) The III Corps will advance at zero in cooperation with American 27th Division. Its objective will be a line to be selected to cover the flank of the 27th Division. It is not intended that the III Corps shall enter the village of VENDELUILE during the first phase.
(b) American 27th Division will give right of way to troops of III Corps division to form up in rear of American 27th Division in the vicinity of The Knoll, to permit of the attack being developed in a northeasterly direction down the spur running through Square A.1.
(ii) East of the Canal: The green dotted line shown on the map issued with Battle Instructions Series E, No. 2, will be the first objective of C Regiment, American 27th Division.
The red line allotted to American 27th Division will be the line of exploitation.

ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.
III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 12

Reference III Corps Artillery Instructions No. 11 dated 24/9/18.

1. BOUNDARIES: Boundaries for counterbattery work will coincide with the corps boundaries.

2. The BOMBARDMENT will consist of:
   - Special gas (B. B.) bombardment
   - Vigorous counterbattery work
   - Intensive harassing fire
   - Cutting lanes in hostile wire defenses
   - Bombardment of selected strong points and localities.

3. SPECIAL GAS (B. B.) BOMBARDMENT: This bombardment will be carried out by 18-pdrs. and 6" Hows., firing B. B. gas shells in combination with H. E. during intermittent periods between 10 p.m. on W day and 6 a.m. on X day. Captured German guns firing Yellow Cross shells will be employed so far as circumstances permit.
   - The objectives will be the hostile defensive system and artillery positions along the whole front so far as the range of guns permits.
   - Subsequent to 6 a.m. on X day, no B. B. gas shell will be fired without the authority of the army.

4. VIGOROUS COUNTERBATTERY FIRE: This will commence at 6 a.m. on X day. Surprise attacks on hostile artillery positions should be carried out with H. E. (with instantaneous fuses) and gas shells (C. G. or N. C.). For the methodical bombardment of fortified emplacements and dugouts, delay action fuses should be employed.

5. INTENSIVE HARASSING FIRE: This will commence immediately after the cessation of the special gas (B. B.) bombardment, at 6 a.m. on X day.
   - The keynote of its application should be variety and surprise, and plans must be so framed that throughout the 24 hours of the day and night, the enemy should be permitted no immunity or security from shell fire.
   - Facilities of observation must be fully exploited in order to limit the area on which unobserved harassing fire will have to be maintained by day. Areas over which no observation is possible must receive special attention.
   - In allotting tasks for harassing fire, zones in depth must be allotted to different natures of weapons, including infantry weapons and machine guns according to their range. In this connection the increased range of 18-pdr. guns fitted with air recuperators should be taken into account.
   - Use should be made of gas shell (C. G. and N. C.)
   - Artillery positions should be included in the programme of harassing fire.
   - In shelling roads, H. E. with delay action fuses are NOT to be employed.

6. CUTTING LANES IN HOSTILE WIRE DEFENSES: This will commence at 6 a.m. on X day and will be carried out principally with 4.5" Hows. and 6" Hows. and 6" Hows. (with instantaneous fuses), and, where feasible, with 6" Newton mortars. LANES once cut must be kept open by means of rifle and machine-gun fire.

7. BOMBARDMENT OF SELECTED STRONG POINTS AND LOCALITIES: This bombardment will commence at 6 a.m. on X day and will be continued until zero, with a view not only to the destruction of defenses but also to the demoralization of the defenders. Gas shells (C. G. and N. C.) should be made use of. It is not considered feasible to carry out a thorough destructive bombardment of concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements.
Telephone exchanges and specially defended localities such as Le CATELET should be heavily bombarded.

Blocks in communication trenches should be created where it is considered practicable and advisable.

8. LONG RANGE GUN FIRE: FOSSE URIGNY Dump will be engaged by long range guns. Instantaneous fuses will be used by all guns firing at long ranges.

9. If wire is available, 6" gun batteries will be connected to balloons by a direct telephone line.

10. HOSTILE GAS BOMBARDMENTS: In the event of a heavy hostile concentration of fire, especially gas shelling, on any particular part of the corps area at night, every effort will be made, by concentrating the fire of as many guns as possible, to silence the offending groups of hostile artillery.

At the same time, counterbattery staff officer will indicate as accurately as possible to the 5th Brigade, R. A. F., direct, the positions of the active German artillery. This will be done with the object of enabling the R. A. F. to bomb the groups concerned.

C. B. S. O. will likewise inform the 5th Balloon Wing, who have arranged to have a balloon standing by ready to take the air within 30 minutes if weather conditions permit. It is hoped that this balloon will be able to give useful information as to the positions of the batteries concerned.

This scheme will be put into execution by the corps.

If the hostile batteries responsible are located in the counterbattery area of another corps, arrangements for counteraction will be made direct between the C. B. S. O.'s concerned.

11. During the hours of daylight smoke shells will be mixed with gas shell in all gas concentrations within the range of 18-pdrs. and 4.5" How.

12. Detailed orders for the bombardment will be issued later.

13. Acknowledge to III Corps, R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.,
for
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued by D. R. at 8:15 a. m.

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II Corps: 182-32.7: Operations Orders

Operations II Corps

September 25, 1918.

III CORPS OPERATION ORDER No. 331

Reference Map - 1/20,000 Ste-EMILIE

1. An operation is being carried out by the left (American 27th) division of the Australian corps on a day which has been notified to all concerned with the object of gaining the line QUENNEMONT Farm---GUILLEMET Farm---The KNOLL.
2. The attack is being carried out by the brigade of the American 27th Division
now holding the line, assisted by tanks, under a creeping artillery barrage. Zero hour
for the attack will be notified later.

3. The creeping barrage will be prolonged on the front of the 12th Division, a
barrage map giving the lifts and timings will be issued later.

4. The role of the 12th Division will be to protect the left flank of the American
27th Division by bringing concentrated trench mortar and machine-gun fire to bear on the
trenches in F.5 and 6 and A.1, during the attack and while consolidation is in progress.
Arrangements will also be made to turn on this fire subsequently at any time night or
day, whenever an attack threatens.

5. There will be no infantry attack on the part of the 12th Division, but the 12th
Division will utilize the bombardment and barrage to secure and dig in such advanced
posts as will either assist a subsequent advance or further protect the left flank of The KNOLL.

6. The dispositions and arrangements for these parties will be carefully detailed. In some
cases it may be necessary to make the posts merely with a view to occupying them at night.

7. The programme for the heavy artillery bombardment will be issued by the G. O. C.,
R. A., III Corps.

8. Watches will be synchronized by telephone from corps headquarters at 2 p. m.
and 7 p. m. on September 26. Watches will not be synchronized by telephone in front of
divisional headquarters.

9. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

C. P. FULLER,
B. G. G. S., III Corps.

Issued by D. R. at 11 p. m.

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II Corps: 182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 270
by
G. O. C., R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS

September 25, 1918.

[Extract]

1. MAIN ATTACK: The main attack referred to in Artillery Instructions No. 269,
Paragraph 1, is designed with a view to giving our attacking infantry the support of a
creeping barrage for an average depth from the artillery start line to approximately
4,500 yards east.

This depth, although greater than has usually been demanded, it necessary in
order to ensure the successful capture, with the maximum of artillery support, of Le
CATELET-GOUY, on the north and NAUROY on the south - two strongly defended areas.
It is essential, therefore, that the utmost care should be exercised in the
preparation for the barrage in order to ensure its accuracy.

2. PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS: In this operation, as in those lately undertaken,
accurate registration from battle positions is neither possible, owing to the limit of
time, nor advisable owing to the likelihood of the enemy gaining information of our plans.
For the above reasons the instructions previously issued are reiterated, and are to be adhered to with the utmost care so far as circumstances permit.

(a) Positions are to be selected by C. R. A.'s which will enable a creeping field artillery barrage to be placed from the artillery start line to a protective barrage line which will be 400 yards east of the green line.

(b) The accurate fixation of the battery positions and accurate determination of the exact height of the site selected are to be arranged.

(c) Attention is to be directed to likely alterations in the angle of sight during the progress of the barrage.

(d) The barrage is to be rehearsed without firing, prior to the attack taking place.

(e) Lines of fire are to be checked by direct means where possible.

(f) The field clinometer is to be employed to check the accuracy of every gun on the start line. Throughout the creeping and protective barrages an officer must be told off to check the guns of his battery at stated periods by the same means.

(g) Corrector lengths are to be arranged in order to give 50 per cent of time shell on graze.

(h) So far as time permits, ammunition is to be sorted by lots and carefully checked and grouped.

(i) The most careful attention is to be paid to atmospheric conditions.

(j) It is essential to ensure that sights are tested the day prior to zero day. The enemy must be afforded as little opportunity of learning our plans as is humanly possible. This can be ensured by allowing no unnecessary movement by day on roads or at battery positions.

Reconnaissance officers are not to be permitted to expose themselves or their maps in view of the enemy.

Strict attention is to be paid to the use of camouflage on all forward gun positions and dumps, and where work is being carried out the site is to be previously camouflaged.

* * * * * *

182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

V CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

G. S. 496/11

PENDING OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 2

In continuation of V Corps Instructions No. 1

(G. S. 496/2) dated 23d Inst.

[Extract]

* * * * * *

3. The IV Corps are to launch their attack against the red line at zero plus 120. The attack by the left of the 21st Division with objective AFRICAN Trench will be launched the same time, i. e., zero plus 120.
The 5th Division is the right division IV Corps.

4. The attack by the 33rd and 21st Divisions against the BROWN objective will be made after the left and left center of the IV Corps have gained the blue dotted line (WESLH Ridge) and will be made in conjunction with an attack by the right of the IV Corps with objective CEMETERY Ridge on the front from southern portion of blue dotted line to GONNELIEU.

Zero hour for the attack by the V Corps against the BROWN objective and by the right of the IV Corps against CEMETERY Ridge will be at earliest during Z/Z plus 1 night and will be not earlier than 12 midnight on that night so as to allow of the assembly of troops and of the forward assembly of tanks after dark on Z/Z plus 1 night.

5. Four tanks are allotted to the 21st Division for their attack against the BROWN objective, and three tanks are allotted to the 33rd Division.

6. From Y day inclusive, two companies machine guns, 17th M. G. Battalion will now be allotted to the 21st Division. No additional companies machine guns will now be available for attachment to 33rd Division.

The two companies allotted to the 21st Division will be employed for barrage fire; they are not to take part in the attack or to be employed forward of our present system.

The attachment of these companies will be arranged direct between divisions concerned. Their tasks being completed they will rejoin their own divisions as soon as the situation allows.

7. OUTLINE OF FOURTH ARMY OPERATIONS:

(i) On a day to be notified separately the Fourth Army are assuming the offensive along their entire front.

The corps H. A. will cooperate in the operations of the Fourth Army by such counterbattery work as is possible against the enemy's batteries in the region La TERRIERE---VILLERS-OUTREAU.

(ii) In the Fourth Army operations the role of the III Corps (18th Division) is to establish itself in the enemy's trenches in Squares A.1. and A.2.c. and subsequently as explained in the next subparagraph to mop up the area hachured red on map.

(iii) The American II Corps, on right of III Corps, are attacking with objective the blue line on the attached 1/40,000 map. Having gained this line units of the American II Corps, previously detailed, are to swing northwards to the east of VENDHUILE and are to establish themselves on the blue dotted line facing north with the object of assisting the advance of V Corps across the Canal de l'ESCAUT.

The American II Corps expects to reach the dotted green line on the afternoon of the day of attack.

In conjunction with northern movement of units, American II Corps on to the green dotted line, the 18th Division, III Corps, are to mop up VENDHUILE and the area hachured in red on map and are to throw bridges over the canal at VENDHUILE.

Meanwhile, the Australian corps is to pass through the American II Corps on the green line and are to advance east with objective the red line.

8. The following is a brief outline of the operations to be undertaken by the V Corps on the Fourth Army Z day. Fuller orders will be issued in connection with these operations after tomorrow's conference.*

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* See Par. 1, F. O. No. 16, II Corps, A. E. F., September 24, 1918. F. O. No. 17, II Corps, A. E. F., September 25, 1918 supplements but does not supersede F. O. No. 16.
(i) The 38th Division will cross the canal at VENHUILE in rear of American II Corps and will on Z/Z plus 1 or Z plus 1/Z plus 2 night relieve the American II Corps on the dotted green line from PIENNES (S.23.central) inclusive to the canal. The 38th Division will subsequently advance north astride the HINDENBURG Line preceded by advanced guards, their right to maintain touch with the American corps, their left on the canal and will clear the HINDENBURG Line and the ground west of it to the canal northwards to BANTEUX thus uncovering the crossings over the canal for the 33d and 21st Divisions.

(ii) The 33d and 21st Divisions will establish themselves on the green line within their respective divisional sector if not already there and will push forward from this line eastward to the canal and throw bridges over it to join hands with 38th Division in their advance northwards.

The progress of 21st Division on their left flank will naturally be dependent on the progress made by right of IV Corps.

(iii) The 17th Division will move to an area about HEUDICOURT in a position from which they can either support divisions operating west of the canal or the 38th Division towards VENHUILE, in the event of the enemy attempting a counterattack against the neck of the Fourth Army operations.

9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. H. MANGLES,
B. G. G. S.,
V Corps.

OPERATIONS 27th AND 30TH DIVISIONS

FIELD ORDERS
No. 17

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

MAPS: 1:100,000 RIQUEVAL, or
1:100,000 62 B N. W. and 62 C N. E.

THIS ORDER SUPPLEMENTS F. O. No. 16, Sept. 24, 1918, Par. 3 (a).

1. INFORMATION:
(a) The Australian corps is taking over portion of the III Corps front as far north as the grid line running east and west through F.5.c.0.0. at 10 a. m. on September 25.

(b) The corps front will be held by the American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left.

2. THE GENERAL PLAN:
(a) Missions of Units:
   (1) On September 27, at a zero hour to be notified later, a preliminary operation will be carried out by the left (American 27th) division with the object of gaining the infantry forming-up line for the main operation, as laid down in F. O. 16, Sept. 24, 1918, Par. 3 (a).
The American 30th Division on the right will cooperate with the object of gaining such portions of the infantry forming-up line on their front as they do not yet occupy.

* * * * *

(b) ARTILLERY: 9 brigades of artillery will be available for the operation.

c) TANKS: G. O. C., 4th Tank Brigade, will detail one company (12 tanks) to assist the infantry in the operation. Details will be arranged direct between the tank battalion commander detailed and the American 27th Division.

d) ACTION OF FLANK CORPS: The III Corps will cooperate in the advance by forming a defensive flank to the American 27th Division, approximately as shown on the attached map.

e) ACTION OF 30th DIVISION:

(a) The American 30th Division will advance their line simultaneously with the American 27th Division attack, in order to gain such portion of the infantry forming-up line for the main operation as they do not now occupy.

(b) Artillery action will be arranged by G. O. C., R. A., in consultation with the G. O. C., American 30th Division.

4. LIAISON:

(l) A contact aeroplane will fly over the objective line at zero plus 90 minutes.

* * * * *

G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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182-33.3 (No. 2): Memorandum

Operations Instructions

MEMORANDUM G-3
No. 1
II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

To: C. G., 30th Div.
C. G., 27th Div.

1. In continuation of the II Corps Memorandum G-3 No. 1 dated Sept. 24, 1918, herewith Sections 4 and 10, Subparagraph (c) to Section 5, and amendment to Subparagraph (b) of Section 11 of Instructions for Operations.

2. Please acknowledge.

G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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- 107 -
4. ARTILLERY:
   (a) Preliminary Bombardment: The bombardment will commence at 10 p. m. W day and will be continued until zero hour Z day.
   (b) Allotment of Artillery:
       The following will be the strength of the artillery placed at the disposal of corps:

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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   (c) Boundaries: Boundaries between corps as regards bombardment and counterbattery work coincide with those between corps on maps issued with Fourth Army No. 20/23 (g) dated 22/9/18.
   (d) The bombardment will consist of:
       (a) Special gas (B. B.) bombardment.
       (b) Vigorous counterbattery fire.
       (c) Intensive harassing fire.
       (d) Cutting lanes in hostile wire defenses.
       (e) Bombardment of selected strong points and localities.

   (e) Special Gas (B. B.) Bombardment: This bombardment will be carried out by 18-pdr. and 6" Hows. firing B. B. gas shells in combination with H. E. during intermittent periods between 10 p. m. W day and 6 a. m. on X day. Captured German guns firing Yellow Cross shells will be employed as far as circumstances permit.
       The objectives will be the hostile defensive system and artillery positions along the whole front as far as the range of guns permits. Arrangements will be made with the French to extend the front of bombardment on the right.
       Subsequent to 6 a. m. X day no B. B. gas shell will be fired without the authority of the army.

   (f) Vigorous Counterbattery Fire: This will commence at 6 a. m. on X day. Surprise attacks on hostile artillery positions should be carried out with H. E. (with instantaneous fuses) and gas shells (C. G. or N. C.). For the methodical bombardment of fortified emplacements and dugouts, delay action fuses should be employed.

   (g) Intensive Harassing Fire: This will commence immediately after the cessation of the special gas (B. B.) bombardment at 6 a. m. on X day. Corps will prepare definite plans for its direction on their respective fronts. The keynote of its application should be variety and surprise, and plans must be so framed that throughout the 24 hours of the day and night, the enemy should be permitted no immunity or security from shell fire.
       Facilities of observation must be fully exploited in order to limit the area on which unobserved harassing fire will have to be maintained by day. Areas over which no observation is possible must receive special attention.
       In allotting tasks for harassing fire, zones in depth must be allotted to different natures of weapons, including infantry weapons and machine guns, according to their ranges. In this connection the increased range of 18-pdr. guns fitted with air recuperators should be taken into account.
Use should be made of gas shells (C. G. and N. C.).
Artillery positions should be included in the programme of harassing fire. In shelling roads, H. E. with delay action fuses are NOT to be employed.

(h) Cutting Lanes in Hostile Wire Defenses: This will commence at 6 a.m. on X day and will be carried out principally with 4.5" hows. and 6" hows. (with instantaneous fuses) and, where feasible, with 5" Newton mortars. Lanes, once cut, must be kept open by means of rifle and machine-gun fire.

(i) Bombardment of Selected Strong Points and Localities: This bombardment will commence at 6 a.m. on X day and will be continued until zero with a view not only to the destruction of defenses but also to the demoralization of the defenders. Gas shells (C. G. and N. C.) should be made use of. It is not considered feasible to carry out a thorough destructive bombardment of concrete dugouts and machine-gun emplacements.

The tunnels themselves are impervious to artillery fire. Steps should be taken to concentrate a heavy and unexpected fire on their entrances and exits on the day of battle.

Telephone exchanges and specially defended localities such as BELLENGLISE, NAUROY, BELLICOURT, BONY, Le CATELET, GOUY, should be heavily bombarded.

Blocks in communication trenches should be created where it is considered practicable and advisable.

(j) Long Range Gun Fire:
Corps will be responsible for dealing, by means of their long range guns, with the following places opposite their respective fronts:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IX Corps</th>
<th>Aust. Corps</th>
<th>III Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESDINS-FRESNOY Rd.</td>
<td>JONCOURT</td>
<td>FOSSE-URIGNY Dump</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEQUEHART</td>
<td>RAMICOURT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVERGIES</td>
<td>MONTBREHAIN</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESTREES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ESTREES-MARETZ Rd.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BEAUREVOIR</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Instantaneous fuses should be used by all guns firing at long ranges.

Railway guns will be retained under army control and will engage FRESNOY-le-GRAND, Bois de'ESTAVES, BRANCOURT, BOHAIN, PREMONT, MARETZ, BUSIGNY.

(k) Resting of Detachments: Careful arrangements are to be made for relief of detachments during the course of the bombardment.

(l) Hostile Gas Bombardment: In the event of a heavy hostile concentration of fire on Y/Z night, especially gas shelling, on any particular part of the army area, every effort will be made, by concentrating the fire of as many guns as possible, to silence the offending groups of hostile artillery.

At the same time, counterbattery staff officers will indicate as accurately as possible to the 5th Brigade, R. A. F., direct, the positions of the active German artillery. This will be done with the object of enabling the R. A. F. to bomb the groups concentrated.

C. G. S. G.'s will likewise inform the 5th Balloon Wing, who have arranged to have a balloon standing by ready to take the air within 30 minutes if weather conditions permit. It is hoped that this balloon will be able to give useful information as to the positions of the batteries concerned.

Each corps will prepare a plan on the above lines. The decision to put the plan into execution rests with corps.

If the hostile batteries responsible are located in the counterbattery area of another corps, arrangements for counteraction will be made direct between corps concerned.

(m) Issue of Instructions: Attention is called to the importance of all artillery instructions being issued in sufficient time to permit of subordinate formations being afforded ample time to study them and to work them out in detail. No changes in
the artillery programme at a late hour should be permitted without very urgent reasons.

(n) Dumping of Ammunition: The following amounts of ammunition are authorized to be held in front of railheads.

Not less than 25 per cent of these amounts are to be held in corps reserve.

In addition, all echelons are to be kept full.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Ammunition</th>
<th>Amount per Gun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pdr.</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5&quot; How.</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-pdr. gun</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2&quot; How.</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; gun</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot; How.</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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182-33.3 (No. 3): Instructions for Operations

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

MEMORANDUM G-3
No. 1

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

[Extract]

SECTION 11. Roads and Bridges (Amended).

SECTION 11. (Amended).

1. At zero, minus 12 hours, the 1st Battalion, 102d Engineer Regiment, and the 2d Battalion, 105th Engineer Regiment, will come under the orders of the Chief Engineer, II Corps, as corps troops.

2. For the purpose of this operation these troops will work in conjunction with Australian corps troops * * *

* * * * *

4. MISSION:

(a) American II Corps: The mission of the engineer troops herein specified is the construction, repair and maintenance of certain roads * * *

These roads are designated, respectively from north to south as the Blue, Yellow, Red, and Black Roads, the 1st Battalion, 102d Engineers, with the Australian 1st Tunneling Company and the Australian 3d Pioneer Battalion will be employed on the Blue and Yellow Roads; the 2d Battalion, 105th Engineers, the Australian 2d Tunneling Company, and the Australian 5th Pioneer Battalion will be employed on the Red and Black Roads.

(b) Flank Troops:

(i) III Corps will be responsible for the repair of the VENDHUILE Bridge.

(ii) IX Corps will be responsible for the repair of bridges at:

G.34.d.5.5.

M.5.b.8.0.

(c) The bridges at VENDHUILE will be placed at the disposal of the V Corps for crossing the canal after they have been repaired by III Corps. V Corps will be given
every facility on Z day as regards roads in the III Corps area leading to the VENDHUILE Bridges.

5. The Australian 1st and 2d Tunneling Companies will be responsible for the condition of roads until zero day.

6. Reports on the condition of the roads will be rendered hourly to corps engineer in accordance with detailed instructions.

7. Zero day and hour will be notified later.

11. ROADS and BRIDGES:
   (a) III Corps will be responsible for the repair of the VENDHUILE Bridges.
   (b) IX Corps will be responsible for the repair of the bridges at:
       G.22.b.8.0.
       G.2.d.5.5.
       M.5.b.0.8.

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227-32.1: Order

Operations for September 27

FIELD ORDER
No. 47

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918--9:15 p. m.

Maps: Ste-EMILIE - 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. An operation will be undertaken on September 27 at an hour to be notified later to advance and occupy a new line about 1,000 yards forward of our present front. This operation will be carried out in conjunction with a similar operation by troops on our right flank.

2. Troops available:
   53d Infantry Brigade
   104th Machine Gun Battalion
   106th Machine Gun Battalion
   12 tanks of 4th Tank Brigade
   9 brigades of Field Artillery
   Detachment 102d Engineers
   Detachment 102d Field Signal Battalion

3. The attack will be carried out by the 3 battalions of the 106th infantry side by side disposed in depth on the frontage of the division sector, the boundaries of which are as follows:
   South boundary: From present boundary line at F.30.b.4.0. northeast to A.26.d.5.9.
   North boundary: Present north boundary of division to F.6.c.4.0. thence to A.2.central.

4. The objective of attack is as follows:
   Line from A.26.c.9.9. at its junction with the division at southern boundary along the line of trenches to A.20.c.8.0., thence along trench line in open country to A.14.c.2.0., thence in the open to A.14.c.0.0., thence along the trench to A.14.a.3.8., continued along the trench line to the north boundary of the division at A.1.d.3.5. (as shown on barrage map).
   This objective will be reached in one advance and as soon as taken will be organized and consolidated in depth, Lewis gun groups being pushed out to the front. The
division on our right attacks at the same time and will occupy a line in prolongation of our right. The division on our left will make no attack and as the advance progresses our left flank must be protected and a line occupied by troops other than those taking part in the frontal advance. (The Commanding General, 53d Infantry Brigade is especially charged with the protection of this flank using such parts of the 105th Infantry as necessary.) Combat liaison with the division on our right will be provided for by the 106th Infantry.

5. The infantry will form upon a taped line one hour prior to zero hour. Time-table of attack as follows:

At zero hour the attack leaves the parallel of departure; at zero plus 36 the objective is reached. The rate of march will be 100 yards in 3 minutes throughout the advance. The advance will be made under cover of a creeping barrage by artillery and machine guns and when the objective is gained a protective barrage will be continued for 39 minutes.

6. The 12 tanks of the 4th Tank Battalion will assist the advance. Specific tasks will be assigned those tanks.

7. A contact aeroplane will fly over the objective line at zero plus 90 minutes.

The position of the most advanced infantry will be indicated by the following means:

(a) Red ground flares
(b) Tin discs
(c) Groups of 3 or 4 rifles laid parallel across the trench, and about one foot apart.

Divisional dropping station will be established at J.11.c.6.2.

8. Watches will be synchronized as follows:

An officer from division headquarters will take the time to brigade headquarters at 3 p.m. and at 8 p.m. on September 26. Similar means will be taken by subordinate commanders to synchronize with subordinate units.

Under no circumstances will the time be given over the telephone.

9. Division headquarters unchanged.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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227-40.1: Orders

Movement 27th Division

ORDERS
No. 93

Reference Maps: Sheet 62B 1:40,000
Sheet 62C 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. AMMUNITION: Division ammunition dump will be located at E.28.d.2.0. Division will deliver to the following regimental dumps for right and center bns., in line - F.22.d., left bn., in line - F.17.c.3.4.
All demands for ammunition will be sent by regiments to division ammunition dump.

2. SUPPLY: Railhead - TINCOURT.

4. WATER: Water tanks of the following capacity will be dug in at the vicinities shown below:
   For units in the right sector, front line, 500 gals., - F.22.d.
   For units in the left sector, front line, 500 gals., - F.10.d.

6. EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED:
   Main Dressing Station - at DRIENCOURT
   Advance Dressing Station - at Ste-EMILIE F.13.c.0.2.

7. PRISONERS OF WAR: **
   Corps cage is located - at K.10.central.
   Divisional cage is located - at F.26.d.8.8.

8. STRAGGLERS: The A. P. M. is responsible for the establishment of straggler posts along the line, LEMPIRE---RONSSOY---HARGICOURT---VILLERET---L.23.

9. VETERINARY ARRANGEMENTS: All sick and wounded animals in the forward area will be sent to the 105th Mobile Veterinary Section, located at J.10.a.1.8. **

11. ROADS REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE: 1 officer and 20 men from the 102d Engineers will be detailed for road repair and maintenance in forward area. The divisional engineer will be responsible that these parties are detailed and given every assistance to the repair of roads.

12. ENGINEER MATERIAL: This will be drawn from the following engineer dump:
    Ste-EMILIE.

13. ORDNANCE: The advance ordnance dump will be established at E.28.d.2.0. **

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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227-40.1: Orders

**Ammunition Supply**

ORDERS
No. 93
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

APPENDIX A.

AMMUNITION

[Extract]

1. All ammunition required by the division will be indented for from Australian corps.

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ORDERS
No. 93
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

APPENDIX C

1. MAIN DRESSING STATION: This division is being served by the main dressing station of the 18th Division at TEMPLEUX-la-FOSSE, J.4.b.4.6., which will close noon Sept. 26, 1918. Main dressing station, DRIENCOURT, J.3.d.5.1. will open Sept. 26, 1918, Field Hospital Co., No. 105.


3. Hq. Director of Field Hospitals at LONGAVESNES. Hq. Director of Ambulance Companies at Ste-EMILIE.

4. Motor Transport Ambulance Section, 102d Sanitary Train, LONGAVESNES.


F.28.d. 2 posts 1 post
L.4.b. 1 post F.22.d.

1 post
F.21.b.

2 posts


8. Division Rest Station HAUT-ALLAINES: 133d Field Ambulance.

9. Two motor lorries will report to director of ambulance companies at LONGAVESNES, 8 a. m., Sept. 26, 1918, and will be used in the evacuation of walking wounded.

APPENDIX D

The following Changes No. 1 are issued as Appendix D to Orders 93.

1. MAIN DRESSING STATION: LONGAVESNES E.25.b.5.1. opens noon Sept. 26, 1918, Field Hospital Co. No. 106. Main dressing station, DRIENCOURT, closes 1 p. m. Sept. 26, 1918. Field Hospital Co. No. 105 in reserve at VILLERS-FAUCON.

2. DIVISION SICK COLLECTING POST: DRIENCOURT - J.3.d.5.1. opens 12 noon, Sept. 26, 1918, 133d Field Ambulance. HAUT-ALLAINES will close.
3. BATTALION AND POSTS:  
F.21a.7.2.  
F.21.central  
F.28.a.4.9.  
F.15.d.6.4.  
F.16.c.8.4.  
F.22.d.7.8.  
HAUSSAR Road  
F.28.d.8.9.  
TEMPLEUS Switch

4. RELAY POSTS:  
Left Relay  F.22.c.3.6.  
Right Relay  F.28.c.8.5.

5. CAR POSTS:  
Left  F.21.a.7.3.  
Right  F.21.d.6.3.

Medical General:  C 482-E, D 2, Fldr. 10:

Dressing Stations

D. D. M. S. Australian Corps

The Divisional Surgeon

American 30th Division

1. Will you please establish dressing stations at the following locations as soon as possible:
   a. Advanced dressing station and walking wounded dressing station at TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD.
   b. Main dressing station and divisional gas centre at MARQUAIIX.
   ii. Three huts will be erected by chief engineer, Australian corps at each of these sites.
   iii. Medical instructions will be issued later.
   iv. Acknowledge and notify completion with map references.

A. J. COLLINS,
Major,
for
Colonel,
D. D. M. S., Australian Corps.

Headquarters,

Sept. 25, 1918.
PERIODICAL REPORT
12 m., Sept. 24 to 12 m., Sept. 25

1. Normal.
2. Nil.
3. Hostile artillery very active between 5 and 6:30 p.m. Six E. A.'s over our lines observing hits. Working parties reported in trenches at G.34.b. Frequent movement observed at A.28.a. and c. An enemy party made an unsuccessful attempt to raid our posts at G.8.a. at 5 a.m., 25th. An attempted raid on our lines at G.2.a. and c. was also repulsed.
4. Nil.
5. Normal.
6. Australian machine-gun units were relieved by units of the 59th Brigade.
7. Information received about 5:45 a.m., 25th, from the division on our right that the enemy was going to attack at daybreak.
8. Orders received from supporting artillery giving program of harassing fire.
9. At 5:45 a.m., 25th, information was received through artillery liaison officer that his liaison officer with the right battalion had reported that the enemy had broken through on front of our right battalion G.14.b. and d. with tanks. This report was corroborated by the C. O., 118th Infantry, a few minutes later. Warning order was at once issued to the supporting regiment to be in readiness.
10. Immediately after S.O.S. signal a heavy barrage by our supporting artillery was put down. Report was received from commander of our right battalion that the enemy had attacked and captured our outposts in front of a center company and were advancing with tanks. No accurate information was received regarding this report during the period of this report. The raid was reported over by the battalion commander at 7:02 a.m.
11. Nil.
12. No change.
13. No change.
14. Morale, good; supplies, adequate.

Unofficial reports have been received that none of our men were captured by raiding party.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.
1. The 30th Div. will attack the enemy's positions in the HINDENBURG Line in the sector Nauroy-Gouy on a date and hour to be notified later.

2. Troops Available:
   (a) 30th Division (less artillery).
   (b) (1) Field artillery - 9 F. A. brigades.
       (2) Heavy artillery - about 5 brigades.
   (c) Tanks - 4th Tank Brigade (34 Mark V and Mark V Star tanks) plus a proportion of Whippets.
   (d) Contact infantry aeroplanes will be available.

3. General Plan: There will be a preliminary bombardment by all available artillery for a considerable period, for the purpose of completing the enemy's demoralization and of destroying his defenses.

   The attack will be carried out in conjunction with the 27th Division, which will be on the left, and the XIX Corps on the right. The operation will be divided into two phases. Boundaries of divisions are as shown on attached map. The interregimental boundary line extends along the road on Sentinel Ridge to Bellicourt, thence along railway from G-4 d.0.3 to crossing of sunken road at G. 5d.9.7, thence due east to objective (G.6.c.55.85).

   (a) First Phase: The 60th Brigade will form upon a taped line prior to the given zero hour and will attack with tanks under a creeping barrage. This barrage will include a considerable proportion of smoke shells.

   Orders relative to taping out the line will be given direct from these headquarters to the 60th Brigade.

   The flanks of the attack will be protected by smoke screen on right flank. As soon as the artillery barrage programme is completed and the infantry has seized the objective, the smoke barrage on the flank will lift outwards and the infantry will exploit its success under concealment of the flanking smoke barrage. The 117th Inf. is allotted for this exploitation; movement will be commenced at such a time as will permit them to follow the advance of the battle and to deploy facing south at the conclusion of the advance of the creeping barrage. The position of the 117th Infantry at the conclusion of the first phase is shown by the dotted green line extending from sunken road at G.12.d 1.0 through Nigger Copse to the canal, facing southeast. The 60th Brigade will be on the green line, showing the first objective, all being covered by protective barrage. This line will not be consolidated.

   (b) Second Phase: The Australian 5th Division with its own artillery and tanks will pass through the 60th Brigade toward its objective. After the whole of the Australian division has passed through, the 60th Brigade will be reassembled. The time for this reassembly will be notified.
During the operation of the Australian division, the 117th Inf. will resume its advance in order to protect the flanks of this movement. Its objectives during this phase are shown in red on the map and its left flank resting on the black line. This movement will be supported by tanks and will be covered by artillery placed at the disposition of the division commander.

4. ASSEMBLY: Prior to this operation the line will be held by the 118th Infantry. On night of D-2 day, this regiment will be relieved by the 60th Brigade, which will hold the line, deploying on the morning of D day, with two regiments side by side (120th on the right), each regiment with two bns. In the front line, and one in support. Deployment to be completed one hour before zero hour. This brigade will break the HINDENBURG Line and take the first objective where it will halt as explained in Par. 3. The supporting bns. of this brigade will be given the special mission of mopping-up, special attention being paid the village of Bellicourt and the underground canal tunnel which has its southern entrance about G-16.b.0.8. and extends northward beyond the northern divisional boundary. The importance of this underground Canal Tunnel must be impressed upon the mopping-up party; it is used as shelter by German troops, and doubtlessly has more exits than its southern entrance. The latter must be secured as quickly as possible.

The 117th Infantry will be in support of the 60th Brigade, and will closely follow across the tunnel in order that there may be no delay in carrying out its special mission already defined. Especially close liaison with brigade headquarters and artillery support is necessary by this regiment.

The 118th Infantry becomes the divisional reserve concentrated immediately after the Australian division has passed, and will then move under orders from these headquarters. The order of movement across the tunnel will be therefore:

(a) 119th and 120th Infantry (attacking troops).
(b) 117th Infantry (support, on special mission).
(c) The Australian 5th Division (including reserves).
(d) The 118th Inf. (division reserve)

6. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS: The 60th Brigade on the D-2 night will advance its posts to such a position as will enable it to ensure that the forming-up line in its sector will be sufficiently protected. On D-2 night, stakes will be placed, and on D-1 night before midnight, tapes will be laid under the supervision of an engineer officer detailed from these headquarters. Work to commence after the advance posts provided for above have been established by front line.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No. 1 - APPENDIX No. 1

Plan for use of tanks.

1. For the purpose of this operation the following assignment of tanks from the 4th Tank Brigade is made:
   - 117th Infantry 12
   - 119th Infantry 12
   - 120th Infantry 10

2. Tanks detailed to the 119th and 120th Inf. will be brought up on the night of D-1 day to a concentration point about 2,000 yards in rear of the line of departure. Details of their use with the regiments will be fixed after consultation between C.O. tank brigade and brigade and regimental commanders concerned.

3. All ranks will be reminded that the tanks in the front line expect to follow the creeping barrage about 70 yards distance and that the first wave of assaulting troops should be at about 70 yards behind the tanks. In no case will they get in front of the tanks except when the latter are disabled.

4. The following signals displayed by the tanks for communication with infantry will be carefully explained to all ranks upon receipt of this order:
   a. Green and white flag "all right; job finished."
   b. Yellow and red "tank out of order - disabled."
   c. Tricolor (red, white and blue) "going to rear for supplies, etc."

   Should the infantry be held up by the enemy's fire from any locality, they will signal to the tank by putting their helmets on the end of their rifle and holding it up so it can be plainly seen from the tank. The direction of such locality will be indicated by pointing the rifle toward it. Regimental commanders will make an effort to secure a phosphorus rifle grenade for the purpose of signalling a point they desire to have attended to by the tanks. One enlisted man will be detailed for each tank by regiments employing tanks, whose duty it will be to watch at all times for such signals from the infantry.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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APPENDIX No. 1

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No. 1 is amended as follows:

1. Allotment of Tanks: The principle of tanks is to ensure that sufficient tanks are available for each task; that all tanks will be employed on one task only. Tanks
will be employed in action under the command of the infantry commanders of the units to which they are attached. Tanks will be allotted as follows:

(a) 4th Tank Brigade.
   To the 119th Inf., Company A.
   1st Tank Bn. (12 tanks) 4 to each battalion.
   To the 120th Inf., Company C.
   1st Tank Bn. (10 tanks)
      4 tanks to left bn.
      3 tanks to right bn.
      3 tanks to support bn.
   To the 117th Inf., Company D.

Complete arrangements will be made by infantry commanders of regiments and bns. to ensure that the exact position of the starting point is known to the respective commanders of tank companies or sections; that they arrive there at the designated time.

2. Mopping-up the Tunnel: The tanks allotted to infantry units, detailed for the mopping-up of the tunnel, will be given most stringent orders to ensure that they carry out this role thoroughly and do not advance beyond the tunnel line except to deal with dugout entrances, etc., leading into the tunnel.

3. Lying-up Positions: Lying-up positions of the 1st Tank Bns. on X/Y night is K.11b; on Y/Z night they will move forward from the lying-up places to starting points at zero minus 6 hours. They will move with full engines to positions not nearer to the starting point than 3,000 yards; thence forward they will continue the movement to the tank starting points at a slow rate as quietly as possible. Starting points will be fixed approximately 1,000 yards in rear of infantry taped line. Tanks will leave starting points at such times as will ensure their arrival at infantry forming-up line at zero hour.

Tanks detailed to the first phase of the operation will be reassembled under arrangements made between the G. O. C., 4th Tank Brigade and the division commander.

Tanks allotted for the mopping-up of the tunnel will not be withdrawn until mopping-up is completed.

Tanks detailed to the 117th Inf. will be reassembled under arrangements made between the Commanding Officer, 117th Inf., and the Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Bn. Tanks allotted to the 117th Inf. are available until the conclusion of the task set for this regiment.

One O. R. will be detailed as observer in each tank by the infantry bns. which they support. They will report to the Commanding Officer, 1st Tank Battalion, at the lying-up positions on Y day.

An officer will be detailed from each infantry bn. to assist in conducting the supporting tanks to the starting points.

30th Div.: 230-42.5: Report

Description of St-Quentin Canal

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,

September 25, 1918.

Herewith copies of report on the St-QUENTIN Canal showing:

(i) Sources of Supply.
(ii) Description of the Canal.
REPORT ON THE ST-QUENTIN CANAL

1. SOURCES OF SUPPLY: This canal was built to connect the canalized river ESCAUT with the SOMME Canal, which it joins at St-SIMON. It then continues south to meet the SAMBRE-OISE Canal at FARGNIER (west of La FERE), and the OISE-AISNE Canal southwest of CHAUNY.

   In its upper reaches north of St-QUENTIN, the Canal is supplied with water from three sources.
   (a) The ESCAUT River at Le BOSQUET. North of this point the canal merges into the ESCAUT Canal.

       Note on the ESCAUT: This river rises at 62B, A.18.d. and flows past GOUY and Le CATELET to near VENDHUILE and thence north alongside the canal till it is itself canalized at Le BOSQUET. East of the Sources de l’ESCAUT there is the so-called Canal des TORRENS, shown running through an artificial cutting from east of BEAUREVOIR. It is not navigable, and the cutting seems intended to contain one of the riots or torrents common in the CAMBRAI area in wet weather. The banks are solid and strengthened by masonry at points. It is reported to be 2 to 3 meters wide and 2 meters deep when full. Soft ground must be looked for along the ESCAUT near Le CATELET.

   (b) The Sources du Souterrain or springs issuing from the canal bottom in the BELLICOURT-VENDHUILE Tunnel.

       (c) A canal feeder which enters the canal at LESDINS and supplies it with water from the OISE River, and from the Noirieu Stream (above LESQUELLES). The feeder syphons under the OISE Canal and is regulated by a dam at VADECOURT. It is also known as the Rigole de l’OISE (or du NOIRIEU). For 14 kilometers of its course from the OISE to LESDINS it runs underground. At LESDINS it is 10 meters wide and 2.2 meters deep. At other points it is from 6 to 8 meters wide, and from 1.2 to 1.8 meters deep. These measurements do not include the sloping banks.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE CANAL:

   The flow of water is from north to south.

   The difference in water level, amounting to 9 meters, between BELLICOURT and the St-QUENTIN Bridge is allowed for by five locks (all below LESDINS).

   South of BELLICOURT the canal emerges at RIQUEVAL from the long tunnel into a cutting, which gradually decreases in depth on approaching RIQUEVAL Farm Bridge at G.22.d.

   (Note: Along both sides of the canal a bank has been thrown up to a height of about 10 ft. at the tunnel entrance decreasing towards RIQUEVAL Farm bridge.)
Thence onwards the canal is contained between banks as far as the LEHAUCOURT Bridge. At BELLENGLISE these banks are 16-17 feet above the normal water level of the area. The maximum height is at the control gate by which water is let through a sluice into the OMIGNON Valley.

Southwards from the LEHAUCOURT Bridge, the canal enters an ever-deepening cutting till it disappears into a tunnel under the Le TRONQUOY Ridge. The canal re-emerges in a cutting which gradually decreases in depth till it reaches N.16.a.5.9. Thence southwards past the LESDINS Bridge as far as N.22.d., the water is practically flush with the adjacent country. Towards the OMISSY Bridge the canal is slightly banked up, i.e., it runs between dykes as it approaches each lock. It is above the level especially of the SOMME Marshes on its eastern side.

An ideal longitudinal section of the canal is given in Sketch 1.

Note: At both ends of the tunnel, banks have been thrown up along the sides of the canal to maximum height of 10 and 8 feet at the northern and southern ends respectively.

3. DIMENSIONS OF THE CANAL:

Average width at surface 59 feet.
" " bottom 32 feet. 10".
" depth 6 1/2 feet.

There is a towpath on both banks in the cuttings and on one side at least in the tunnels. The locks can hold barges 35 m. long by 5 m. wide. A latitudinal section of the canal cutting at G.29, north of BELLENGLISE seems to be as given in Sketch 2.
4. POSSIBILITIES OF FLOODING: To preserve the canal as a front line obstacle, the enemy proposed according to a captured scheme of defense, to carry out the following work (since executed).

   (i) The locks at MORCOURT and LESDINS were blocked up with cement and sacks full of sand. Further obstructions were provided for by sinking barges loaded with sand and cement, e. g., at the entrances of the tunnel. In each tunnel two dams were to be built and others on each side of BELLENGLISE to prevent the whole canal being emptied, should the banks be destroyed at BELLENGLISE.

   (a) Note. - The enemy made three cuts closed by coffer dams in the W. bank near BELLENGLISE (according to a captured map at M.5.a.1.7, M.5.a.3.5, and G.34.d.5.7.). At M.5.a., the 80-meter contour touches the canal, the normal water level of which is 83.72 meters. But by these cuts only a local flooding in G.34.d., M.4.b.5.a. is possible, as the 85-meter contour closely approaches the canal. The enemy recognizes that this local flooding on W. side of the canal soon drains away and cannot be regarded as a permanent obstacle. (Note. - The area so flooded nearly coincides with the thin belt of wire W. of the canal.)

   (b) The enemy built a dam across the OMIGNON at M.4.b. If this dam and the coffer dams at BELLENGLISE were destroyed the upper reach of the canal would drain into the already marshy OMIGNON Valley. As the breach would be large it would take only half a day to empty and the OMIGNON would be sufficiently swollen to obstruct our lateral communications. (Before the war to drain the canal for repairs, water was let out from the upper reach by the lock gates and through the sluice at M.5.a. into the OMIGNON. It took 4 days to empty and in preparation the bed of the OMIGNON was cleared of weeds).

   (c) It is also possible by closing the sluice gate in M.5.a. to flood a small area E. of the canal in M.5.b. up to the embanked Le CATELET Road and to keep communication with the canal bank by a causeway between concrete walls (reported to exist).

   (ii) The enemy proposed to flood the flat low-lying areas of the SOMME Marshes and W. of canal at OMISSY and BRO COURT, so that the canal should not be emptied if the dam were destroyed. (The water level of the canal would thus subside only to the level of the flooding.) The SOMME Valley S. of the canal (by dams with suitable sluices) was to be made more marshy.

   (a) At MORCOURT. By shutting the OMISSY Lock and cutting the canal dyke just above it. A head of water was stored at CROI X-FONSOMME for the purpose.

   (b) Down to La GLORIETTE in R.4.b. By opening three sluices in the raised OMISSY-MORCOURT Road, he could flood up to the bank of the La GLORIETTE Road in R.4.c.

   (c) Still more completely by breaking these banks and holding up the canal water by a dam or obstructions at ST-QUENTIN Bridge. Water would then also drain into the marshy ground N. E. of ST-QUENTIN.

   (iii) In addition, swampy ground (produced by enemy dams with sluices) may be anticipated between VENDHUILE and HONNECOURT, and the valley of the ES CAUT, in which the canal runs, can also probably be flooded (to the extent of increasing the area of soft ground) with no more difficulty than farther south. The soft ground west of the canal between OSSUS Wood and CANAL Wood is also defended by thin belts of wire. There are 5 or 6 sluices at VENDHUILE filled up with concrete.

5. THE TUNNELS: As originally designed in 1769, the canal was to run by a direct underground tunnel over 13 kilometers long from Le TRONQUOY to VENDHUILE. A million francs were spent on making a gallery from Le TRONQUOY to NAUROY, but this scheme was abandoned in 1802 and work was carried on as now with only two isolated tunnels at Le TRONQUOY and BEL LICOURT. Napoleon visited the RIQUEVAL section in 1810.

   NOTE: When abandoned this original tunnel was 4 meters broad by 12 meters high. Signs of a few ventilating shafts are reported to remain about MAGNY and ET RICO URT, and
a staircase down to water-level near NAUROY in G.12.c., the enemy made efforts to find it but failed. A recent report however, by the Deputy of St-QUENTIN gives the line of an old "souterrain" BELLICOURT---NAUROY---ETRICOUR---LEHAUCOURT---LeTRONQUOY, with an entrance near BELLICOURT Square. This souterrain 40 m. deep, was discovered in 1880, when the wells of NAUROY Sucrerie were being dug. From these wells the BELLICOURT exit and the vicinity of LESDINS Sucrerie can be reached. The deputy thinks it is likely the enemy found it and cleared it for use, as it forms a shelter 7 kilometers long, and 3 meters high and broad. He says the Le TRONQUOY part was much worked on by thousands of Russian and Rumanian prisoners. (This last probably refers to the known southern tunnel at Le TRONQUOY.)

The BELLICOURT Tunnel runs for 5.7 kilometers at a depth underground carrying from 15 to 20 meters. It is 10 m. wide at the top by* kilometers at water-level, and strongly built of masonry. A towpath runs all along the eastern side and another along at least part of the tunnel on the west side. There are reported to be air holes every 300 meters and also chambers cut in the walls.

Early in 1918, there were 25 barges in the tunnel north of the BELLICOURT block in G.16.a. used for billets; according to recent prisoners these barges are now broken up or sunk. There are footbridges across the water bed.

Prisoners in 1917 stated that there were four or five approach galleries about 30 meters apart with entrances (30 to 40 steps down) on the W. side of the road about G.10.c.5.5. The location of these lateral galleries is fixed by captured German maps which show a gallery from G.10.c.7.6. to exit at G.10.c.1.6. and other entrances at G.10.c.75. 45., G.16.a.80.85., G.10.a.70.25. and G.10.a.84.53., of galleries leading down to the tunnel. Some of these are discernible on photographs. The German map also shows 3 galleries into the canal cutting just south of RIQUEVAL - exits at G.16.b.1.3., G.16.b. 18.23. and G.16.d.22.88. (In addition, a prisoner reports another exit in a cellar of a villa at G.10.2.30.55., and that the shaft at G.10.c.45.60., has an exit on the BELLICOURT Road).

These galleries are confirmed by maps and by a prisoner of an electric power company whose engine was in one of the chambers cut in the east wall of the tunnel at BELLICOURT.

No German map is available for the main length of the tunnel north of BELLICOURT to near VENDHUILE. According to prisoners' statements, in 1917 there were 15 underground galleries leading from the GOUY-BELLICOURT Road into the tunnel. These would enable one to enter or leave the tunnel unobserved. As far as can be gathered from a recent prisoner, he emerged from one of these lateral galleries close to the GOUY-BELLICOURT Road at G.22.c. There is little trace of such exit on photographs as they are camouflaged with brush wood. According to a prisoner, there are about 9 such galleries from the tunnel between BELLICOURT and BONY.

Apart from the air shafts shown along the tunnel, there is a series of dugouts cut into the east bank of the long spoil heap which runs above ground over the line of the tunnel. It does not seem likely that these dugouts lead down into the tunnel, as the latter is 15 to 50 meters below.

It is possible that there are also galleries leading west from the tunnel to exits shown along the HINDENBURG Support Line.

Note: (In case of an attack by our troops across the GOUY-BELLICOURT Tunnel, it would be of the most extreme importance (a) for the HINDENBURG Support Line to be garrisoned throughout the length running from A.9.d.---15.b and d.---21.b. and d.---27.b. and d.---G.3.b. and d.---9.b. and 10.c.; (b) for the dugouts along the top of the tunnel to be mopped up; (c) for the entrance along the GOUY-BELLICOURT Road to be searched for and guarded. These measures would be necessary in order to prevent the enemy from emerging from the tunnel in rear of our men and cutting them off.)

There is a block (SPUNDWAND) at each entrance of the tunnel. These blocks are

* Blank in copy.
described by a prisoner as thick ferro-concrete, containing an upper chamber over the waterway with a platform. The blocks are provided with slits for two machine guns to command the entrance of the tunnel; also with a ventilating shaft containing an electric fan. The center block in G.4.c. under BELLICOURT appears to be similar, but with no machine-gun openings. The blocks fill the entire tunnel from the water level to the roof, and are passed by means of a door on the towpath *** There is a large concrete machine-gun nest at S. entry to tunnel at N. W. corner of the cutting (G.16.a.7.6), and there are other M. G. emplacements here to enfilade the open canal.

For BELLICOURT and the RIQUEVAL Tunnel

II. The Le TRONQUOY Tunnel: This tunnel runs for 1.1 km. at Le TRONQUOY, under Hill 127. On the ground above the tunnel passes the LEHAUCOURT-LESDINS Road on an embankment gradually dwindling towards each end of the tunnel.

There are reported to be 30 chambers cut in the walls of the tunnel at regular intervals and connected by a passage. Barges here are also said to have been used for billets and ammunition.

A captured German map (1/5,000) gives accurately the lateral galleries to this tunnel. Entrances are marked at N.2.d.05.30, N.2.d.35.15, N.9.a.03.58 and N.9.a.3.3. of four short galleries leading into the tunnel. These entrances coincide with holes or dugouts clearly visible on photographs. No tracks lead up to these, and it is probable they are only used as emergency exits. In addition, map also shows a long lateral gallery with entrance (from a dugout known to exist) in FLECHE Wood, N.3.c.4.7. and leading to the tunnel at N.8.b.6.8. and farther W. exit in a trench dugout at N.8.b.2.3. near TRANCHEE Wood.

This map confirms previous prisoners’ statements describing the tunnel as having 6 lateral galleries branching east at intervals of 200 yards. There is also apparently a communication from above by shafts 20 feet by 10 feet.

III. The BELLENGLISE Galleries:

(a) MAGNY Tunnel: A captured German map shows a tunnel running from the eastern edge of the wood in G.36.a. to the northern outskirts of BELLENGLISE at G.35.c.25.8.5., with another entry from the BELLICOURT Road at G.35.b.10.13.

The prisoners of the electric power coy. mentioned above described this tunnel in Feb. 1918, as 1 1/2 meters broad and 2 meters high, with 4 additional exits in BELLENGLISE close to church at G.34.d.90.85, G.35.c.08.53, G.35.c.10.75 and G.35.c.14.72. These galleries enter the main tunnel at about G.35.c.25.85. A prisoner could also locate one at G.35.a.10.33, which led to the Starkstrom Kommando Station supplying electric light to the tunnel. This last named location is doubtful.

It is certain that the tunnel goes farther east than the point marked on the map (G.35.b.) and that it emerges near MAGNY. In February 1918, prisoner could not definitely locate it, but it was near the crossroads at H.25.a.30.25. A pioneer prisoner states that on September 18, 1918, his company and an infantry regiment used this tunnel from MAGNY. The entrance is apparently about H.31.a.6.8 (where photographs show a dugout in a trench) and the tunnel, which is not quite straight, runs for over 2 kilometers via BELLENGLISE to about 100 yards of the canal. It is revetted with wood, and there are a series of 16 dugouts as well as a trench tramway, inside the tunnel. Traffic is facilitated by switch tunnels which are also provided with dugouts.

Prisoners in Feb. 1918, stated that the tunnel contained a dressing station, canteen, and a kitchen. One battalion was quartered here in reserve and at least another could be put in. There were several airshafts and an electric fan.

(b) In addition, a previous prisoner stated that there were at BELLENGLISE two straight approach galleries to the canal about 35 m. apart with entrances on W. side of road at G.34.d.95.90. The galleries were 40 m. long, 1.8 m. high, and 1.2 m. broad, revetted with wooden frames
6. **QUARRIES:** The quarry in G.16.d. contains important accommodation for troops, including, in the northern face, a gallery capable of holding at least a battalion. This gallery has three entrance shafts and 3 large exits. There are also 2 large dugouts in the W. face side by side and several in the eastern face, probably capable of holding a large number of men. There used to be two antiaircraft machine guns emplaced near the dugouts in the W. face. The northeastern corner contained a large dugout, then used as regimental battle hq. There was a battalion hq. in the dugouts shown on the 1/10,000 map at G.22.b.55.85.

**NOTE:** This quarry is of great tactical importance. Its garrison is undoubtedly intended to attack our troops in flank should they succeed in crossing the canal tunnel south of BELLICOURT. Its importance is referred to in the HINDENBURG defense scheme.

7. **BRIDGES:** Bridges exist as indicated on the maps and fully described in topographical reports. In addition, there are many footbridges at short intervals along the canal.

The bridges occur at narrowings of the canal, and are raised about 3 to 4 meters above the water level. They are nearly all fixed iron bridges on stone foundations, many as at BELLENGOLSE and LEHACOURT having two spans (20 meters long). The Pont de RIQUEVAL at G.22.d., however, is of solid masonry, and so is the St-QUENTIN Bridge (double-arched, with stone pier in center of canal). In addition, there are bridges over the river SOMME E. of the canal at St-QUENTIN, MORCOURT, and ROUVROY.

8. **PRESENT CONDITION OF CANAL:** The canal is now practically empty between the locks in HONNECOURT and from the lock in S.13.d. to the northern end of the tunnel near Le CATELET. South of the lock, in S.13.d. to VENDHUILE, the water consists mainly of small pools. The bottom appears very muddy. The existence of bridges over the channel E. of the canal N. of VENDHUILE without corresponding bridges over the canal itself would indicate that the bed is passable for foot traffic at certain points.

9. **TRENCHES:** The SIEGFRIED Stellung.

The enemy chose the line of the canal to take advantage of the latter as a natural obstacle. But there is much evidence that from BELLICOURT to St-QUENTIN the original scheme was not quite maintained. He at first chose the E. bank as his main line of resistance and proceeded to sink shafts at frequent intervals from the top of the east bank to connect with dugouts which would again connect with a circulating trench running under the lee of the bank. A support line was planned 150 yards behind this on the higher ground. Then, perhaps because the dugouts filled with water draining from the canal, he abandoned the bank itself as his main line; the shafts were replaced by small fire bays at intervals, connected with the circulating trench (in recent photographs these fire bays appear neglected). He was now obliged to draw back his line to higher ground, in order to command ground otherwise dead.

This probably explains the series of holes, apparently purposeless, visible in some parts between the east bank and the present main HINDENBURG Line. They represent the dugouts of a projected line not carried out (work was on the usual SIEGFRIED Line principle, starting first on the dugouts).

Captured German secret maps of February 1917, show in detail the HINDENBURG Line as projected on that date, and as since executed.

The canal obstacle was enhanced by wire on the inner side of the W. bank and by felling the trees and leaving the stumps interlaced with wire. The bridges are ready mined and the approaches defended by machine.

The HINDENBURG Line as projected in 1917 was based on principles of defense since obsolete. It was executed on these principles even up to March 1918, perhaps because the enemy felt reliance on its unusual strength and that it could not be attacked.
The front line was provided with concrete dugouts at 40 or 50 yards interval; the captured maps show all the machine guns in the front and support lines, and the artillery not disposed in depth.

Modifications must now be expected in these directions.

But even for the HINDENBURG Line, the enemy was careful to keep a series of forward positions to deny observation and in 1918 did much work on outpost lines. These were strongly elaborated between PONTRUET and the bastion of the HINDENBURG Line enclosing the city of St-QUENTIN.

Where the natural obstacle of the canal is lacking, i. e., at the long tunnel between VENDHUILE and BELLICOURT and the shorter Le TRONQUOY Tunnel, the enemy organized particularly strong and well-wired trenches in the form of a slight salient. The wire is particularly strong, the forward belt being in the form of triangles characteristic also of the DROCOURT-QUEANT Line.

E. of VENDHUILE, the HINDENBURG Line is drawn well back from the canal and goes north past La TERRIERE to rejoin the canal at BANTOUZELLE. In this sector, also, the wire is of similarly strong character. At BANTOUZELLE, the system crosses the canal, runs N. W. to MOEUVRES and QUEANT - now in our hands.

Work before March, 1918.

From January, 1918, a considerable amount of work was noticed on outpost lines, e. g., much wiring and work on trenches was done near OSSUS Wood and in the PONTRUET---THORIGNY---St-QUENTIN area. In the latter area there appeared a considerable number of wired-round strong points.

There was much activity on the repair of roads, the making of new military roads, especially at ITANCOURT and to the canal bridges. New tramways were built and the enemy increased his footbridges and causeways and made several bridges for heavy traffic.

Recent work.

Since we again approached the HINDENBURG Line work on that system has not been so conspicuous as might be expected. On Sept. 15, photographs showed various new lengths of trench: Across the ridge E. of BELLENGLISE from G.29.c. to G.36.c., across KNOBKERRY Ridge from G.24.c. to G.30.b.; from NAUROY at G.11.d. across the RIQUEVAL Ravine and BELLICOURT Ridge to the tunnel at A.28.c (with some gaps); in A.22.c.c; along the Le CATELET-BELLICOURT Road in A.11.c.16.b.; and along the canal north of VENDHUILE. Since then, no new trenches have appeared but activity and work on trenches is visible, especially at Bony and BELLENGLISE. The work done has been noticeably slight at the LEHAUCOURT---LESDINS---St-QUENTIN area. In general, however, the HINDENBURG Line was ready before and remained in good condition; the wire is excellent.

Little or no work has been recently done on back lines behind the HINDENBURG Line, e. g., the Le CATELET---NAUROY---MAGNY Line, a single trench with dugouts, not very heavily wired and on the MASNIERES-BEAUREVOIR Lane which is more heavily wired and consists of front and support trenches. Behind this is the WALINCOURT-AUDIGNY Line, most merely traced.

On the other hand, the enemy evidently does not wish us to approach too close to the HINDENBURG Line, and he did a good deal of work on various outpost lines, e. g., GILLEMONT Farm-QUENNEMONT Farm. In particular, the FRESNOY-FAYET Ridge was strongly organized with new trenches and considerable belts of wire.
Location and Operations of 27th and 30th Divisions

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The IX Corps captured GRICOURT early yesterday evening and held it in spite of strong hostile counterattacks in which several prisoners were captured.
   Early in the morning the attack was renewed against SELENCY and the QUADRILATERAL with success. The enemy counterattacked several times during the day at various points but without success.
   North of BRAETOW Post the enemy carried out a silent attack against troops of the III Corps but were repulsed after hard fighting.
   The enemy's artillery was less active generally and except for the shelling occasioned by the IX Corps operations, was limited to strong harassing fire on forward areas. H. V. guns were active by day on the valley between Le VERGUILIER and GRAND-PRIEL Farm, and ROISEL received slight attention.

2. III CORPS: The attack by the 12th Division on DADOS Lane was unsuccessful and the enemy maintained their hold on trenches captured yesterday.
   At 4:45 a. m., the enemy attacked the 12th Division north of BRAETOW Post with an approximate strength of four companies. The attack was repulsed with machine-gun fire and rifle fire. 30 of the enemy were killed and one prisoner remained in our hands.
   The 12th Division attacked EGG Post at 10 p. m. on the night of September 24/25 and captured one machine gun.
   IX CORPS: During the night, DOUAI Trench from S.9.a.0.0. to S.3.d.1.4. was captured. Patrols were pushed forward towards SELENCY in the early morning and approached the village from the north and south. CHATEAU Wood was completely occupied and eventually the line was established east of the road running along the eastern edge of the village.
   The enemy opposed the advance, which was carried out by the 6th Division, with heavy machine-gun fire from the outskirts of SELENCY, but the advance was very gallantly continued and the objectives realized. Farther north the enemy held out in the QUADRILATERAL but commenced to give ground as soon as CHATEAU Wood was captured. The QUADRILATERAL was finally cleared of the enemy without difficulty.
   At 10:30 a. m., two counterattacks from the direction of FAYET were delivered against ARGONNE Trench and both were broken up by machine-gun fire and rifle fire. The enemy reformed later and endeavored to advance up the SUNKEN Road in M.35.a. and again were checked by the action of our Lewis gunners. Counterattacks north of GRICOURT were also repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, and our line maintained intact.

3. THIRD ARMY: No change in the situation.
4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The situation remained unchanged.
5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 354 hours flying were carried out by 188 pilots. Six reconnaissance and six artillery patrols were carried out and 12 zone calls sent down. Four hostile batteries were successfully engaged for destruction.
      Three photographic flights were made and 188 plates exposed.
      84 offensive patrols were undertaken. Six combats in the air took place.
three of which were decisive, two E. A. being destroyed and one driven down out of control. All our machines returned.

98 25-lb. bombs were dropped on BOHAIN, VAUX, ANDIGNY, and BUSIGNY by night. During the day, eight 112-lb. bombs were dropped S. W. of BUSIGNY and 38 25-lb. bombs were dropped and 3,750 rounds of ammunition fired at suitable ground targets.

(b) Hostile: Hostile aircraft activity showed a considerable decrease but was above normal considering the flying conditions which were extremely unfavorable until 4 p.m. Eight F. E. A. and two artillery machines crossed the line.

6. PRISONERS:
Through Army Cages 22 off. 1,099 O. R.
Through C. C. S.’s 2 off. 88 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Misty until late afternoon.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: The American 27th Division relieved the 18th and 74th Divisions in the line, these two divisions going into corps reserve.

The northern boundary of the Australian corps is thus extended northwards.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
III Corps: 12th, 18th*, 58th*, 74th* Divisions, 1 Bde. 2d Cavalry Division (army reserve).
IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d*, 46th Divisions.
Australian Corps: Australian 1st*, 2d*, 3d*, 4th (army reserve) and 5th*

Divisions.

American 27th and 30th Divisions.

* * * * *

182-33.1: Operations Report

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon September 25, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: 30th Division report slight increased enemy artillery in vicinity of L.10.c.6.5 from 6 to 6:30 p.m., September 24. Six enemy airplanes over the 30th Division lines during the same period. Regulation enemy artillery is reported. Active shelling in area L.10.c.4.5 from 1:30 to 2 a.m., September 25.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF THE ENEMY DURING THE DAY: No further information.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: The 30th Division reported the repulse of a small enemy raid against their outposts in G.14 early this morning. No other details have as yet been received.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: See No. 6 following.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The American 27th Division has completed the relief of the British 74th and 18th Divisions, and the command passed to the Commanding General of the American 27th Division at 10 a.m. today.

* Corps reserve.
7. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: In communication.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None received.

9. ACTION DURING THE DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: Field Order No. 16, these headquarters, issued today, copy attached.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: As a result of the action noted in Paragraph 1 above, the 30th Division report two casualties in 118th Infantry; one O. R. killed, and one O. R. wounded.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: Inclosed is a map showing the boundaries of the American II Corps, and the interdivisional boundary lines.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: None to submit.

13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: The 27th and 30th Divisions will execute on the morning of the 27th Inst., minor operation outlined in Paragraph 3 (a), Field Order No. 16, these headquarters, September 24, 1918.

14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.
   Morale excellent. Method of supply satisfactory. Troops in good health.

   F. E. BUCHAN,
   Colonel, G. S., G-3.
   for
   G. W. READ,
   Major General,
   Commanding.

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GHQ: AEF Records: War Diary

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

[Extract]

Hq. II Corps moved from Mericourt-sur-Somme to Assevillers.

J. E. BUCHAN,
G-3.

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GHQ: AEF Records: War Diary

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

[Extract]

59th Brigade - 117th Inf. spent day in preparing shelter, dugouts, etc. 118th Infantry in front line. An enemy raid on an outpost (G.14.b) was repulsed. Situation
generally quiet. 60th Brigade - day devoted to allotting of billets to men and cleaning equipment.

Available for all duty  | Officers  | 574
| Men  | 18,448

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.

---

HS Brit. File: (30th Div.): Fldr. 8-10: War Diary

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary of Events and Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.16.c.</td>
<td>Sept. 25</td>
<td>During the night enemy raided American 30th Division and secured identification. This means that enemy now knows that American 30th and 27th Divisions are holding the line. Slight shelling only on forward areas during the day. Nothing abnormal happened. Battle Instructions, Series E, Nos. 8 to 15 issued dealing with forthcoming operations.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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HS Brit. File: (27th Div.): Fldr. 11 and 12: III Corps War Diary

[Extract]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary of Events and Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 25 7:19 and 8:05</td>
<td>18th Division - Relief by American 27th Division complete.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74th Division - Relief by American 27th Division complete.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Location II Corps Units**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Units</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>Advanced Echelon</td>
<td>62C N.16.d.central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rear Echelon</td>
<td>Mericourt-sur-Somme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railhead II Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>La Flaque</td>
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</table>

27th Division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Headquarters</th>
<th>53d Infantry Bde. Hq.</th>
<th>54th Infantry Bde. Hq.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

BRITISH UNITS TO BE TRANSFERRED FROM III CORPS TO AMERICAN II CORPS:

- 144th Army Troops Co. R. E.
- 288th Army Troops Co. R. E.
- 182d Tunnelling Co. R. E.
- 1st Siege Co., R. A. R. E.
- 1 Section 33d E. and M. Coy.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Asst. C. of S., G. S.,
G-3.
Location 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 25, 1918.

Map: Sheet 62c

Showing location of units at 6 a. m.,

September 26, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location of Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Hq. 59th Brigade</td>
<td>L.26.e.4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Hq. 60th Brigade</td>
<td>K.27.a.6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LOCATION OF ATTACHED UNITS

American 27th Division
American II Corps
Australian I Corps
British 46th Division

North end of Bois de BUIRE
MERICOURT-sur-SOMME
BELLOY Wood - N.16.a.
URAIGNES - G.19.b.7.7.

J. SHAPTER CALDWELL,
Major,
Acting Adjutant.
British Cavalry Corps Transferred

FOURTH ARMY, No. 10/254/(G)

American II Corps:

[Extract]

1. The cavalry corps (less 2d Cavalry Division) accompanied by the Mobile 4th Guards Brigade and the household M. G. brigade will be transferred to Fourth Army by road and on arrival will be held in G. H. Q. reserve.

2. (a) Cavalry corps H. Q. will move to Fourth Army area on September 27 and 28 and on arrival will be located near HAUT-ALLAINES.

(b) The 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions will move to the TORTILLE Valley during the nights of September 26/27 and 27/28 respectively.

(c) The Mobile 4th Guards Brigade and the household M. G. brigade will move to an area west of BRAY-sur-SOMME on September 27/28.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Hq. Fourth Army.

September 26, 1918.

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Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

FOURTH ARMY No. 273 (G)

[Extract]

1. In continuation of Fourth Army No. 273 (G) dated 23/9/18.

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A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.
Hq. Fourth Army,

September 26, 1918.

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[Extract]

3. GENERAL:
   (d) The day of the Third Army infantry attack in all G. H. Q. and Third Army instructions is called Z day, and that of the Fourth Army Z plus 2 days; whilst in all Fourth Army orders the day of the Fourth Army infantry attack is called Z day, and the previous 2 days X and Y day respectively. Care will be taken by III Corps to ensure that confusion does not arise owing to this.

   (e) Special attention will be paid by the Australian corps to the blocking of all exits from the galleries leading from the tunnels. Several of these are known to be some distance from the main tunnel itself. Similar precautions will be taken by IX Corps as regards the MAGNY-BELLEGLISE Tunnel.

   (f) The actual date of Z day will, in every case, be communicated verbally and not published in any written orders.

   (g) In order to protect the left flank of the American corps during its advance to the green line, III Corps will attack the following objective at zero:
       MAQUINCOURT Tr. A.2.c.5.0---A.1.b.9.0---A.1.b.3.2.
       TOMBOIS Tr. - F.6.c.95.10 (Ref. 1/20,000 map).

       * * * * *

4. ARTILLERY:
   (o) Corps will issue orders enjoining the necessity for special measures being taken to ensure accuracy of fire.

       * * * * *

(viii) The following transfers of artillery will take place:

From III Corps to XIII Corps:
   18th Divisional Artillery.
   All R. G. A. units with III Corps.

From IX Corps to XIII Corps:
   Two 9.2" Brigades R. G. A.
   Two 6" gun batteries.
   Two 12" Hows. batteries.

From Australian Corps to XIII Corps:
   25th Divisional Artillery.
   Two 9.2" Brigades R. G. A.
   Two 6" gun batteries.
   One 12" How. battery.

From Australian Corps to III Corps:
   58th Divisional Artillery.

       * * * * *

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- 136 -
Artillery Instructions

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

September 26, 1918.

FOURTH ARMY ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION AND
ALLETTMENT SUBSEQUENT TO Z DAY

1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS:
   (a) Divisions in the line will be allotted:
       1 D. A. and 1 army brigade R. A. F.
       1 mobile or mixed brigade (less 8" and 9.2" How.).
   (b) Corps will retain under their immediate orders some brigades of R. A. F.
       and R. G. A., and the 8" and 9.2" batteries withdrawn from mixed brigades R. G. A.
   (c) Brigades and units of R. F. A. and R. G. A. not allotted to divisions and
       corps will constitute an army reserve, under the immediate orders of the XIII Corps. In
       the reserve, divisional artilleries will be with their own divisions.
   (d) The R. G. A. units retained under the corps control of the Australian corps
       will function also for the American corps.
   (e) A. B. G. R. A. (without staff) will be detailed by A. H. Q. for the American corps, to act as artillery advisor and to coordinate the action of the artillery allotted to divisions of this corps. This officer will act with the American corps as representative of the G. O. C., R. A., Australian corps.
   (f) The 25th and 58th Divisional Artilleries will rejoin their divisions - the
       former with the XIII Corps and the latter with the III Corps as soon as possible after
       Z day.
   (g) The three divisional artilleries of the III Corps, viz, 12th, 58th, and
       74th, will be withdrawn and prepared to move to another army to join their divisions.
   (h) The following transfers of artillery will take place:

From III Corps to XIII Corps:

   18th Divisional Artillery.
   All R. G. A. units with III Corps.

From IX Corps to XIII Corps:

   Two 9.2" brigades R. G. A.
   Two 6" gun batteries.

---------
# Operations II Corps

**ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 271**

*by G. O. C., R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS*

*September 26, 1918.*

1. **FIELD AND HEAVY ARTILLERY DISTRIBUTION:** With reference to Paragraph 2 (d) of Artillery Instructions No. 267 of September 23, the artillery distribution for exploitation will be as follows: This distribution will come into force on the completion of the protective barrage to the GREEN line.

## ALLOTMENT IN DETAIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aust. 2d</td>
<td>Aust. 2d D. A. (Brig. Genl. O. F. PHILLIPS, D. S. O.)</td>
<td>12th Army Bde.</td>
<td>9th Bde. R. G. A. (Mobile)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Army Bde.</td>
<td>51st Bde. R. G. A. (Mixed) less 8&quot; and 9.2 Btys.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aust. 5th</td>
<td>Aust. 5th D. A. (Brig. Genl. A. J. BESSELL-BROWN, C. B. C. M. G., D. S. O.)</td>
<td>6th Army Bde.</td>
<td>41st Bde. R. G. A. (Mobile)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>American 30th</td>
<td>Aust. 1st D. A. (Brig. Genl. S. M. ANDERSON, D. S. O.)</td>
<td>150th Army Bde.</td>
<td>93rd Bde. R. G. A. (Mixed) less 8&quot; and 9.2&quot; Btys.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td></td>
<td>86th Army Bdes.</td>
<td>2 Btys. 8&quot; 68th 222d Btys.</td>
<td>104th Army Bdes.</td>
<td>2 Btys. 9.2&quot; 71st Btys. and 504th Siege Btys.</td>
<td>84th Army Bdes.</td>
<td>89th Bdes. 504th Siege Btys.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Army
25th and 58th Divisional Artilleries
Reserve Artilleries

18th and 312th and 494th Siege Bdes.
23d 449th Bty.
RG.A
494th Siege Bty.
R. G. A. Btys.

2. HEAVY ARTILLERY PLAN - MAIN ATTACK: No regular creeping barrage will be carried out by the heavy artillery, but strong points, likely assembly areas, machine-gun positions, O. P.'s, lines of approach, etc., will be engaged. Lifts will conform with the movements of the field artillery barrage, but a distance of not less than 800 yards will be maintained east of the 18-pdr. barrage.

The B. G. H. A. will prepare a plan and instructions accordingly.
Guns for counterbattery work will be allotted according to the reports of enemy guns opposite our front just prior to zero day, but approximately two-thirds should be allotted for this latter purpose.

[Signature Illegible]
Lt. Col., G. S.,
R. A., Australian Corps.

II Corps: 182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 272
by
G. O. C., R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS

September 26, 1918.

1. MAIN OPERATION - BARRAGES:
   I. FIELD ARTILLERY:
      (a) The 18-pdr. barrage will open at zero on a line 200 yards east of the infantry start line.

      At zero plus 3 minutes, the barrage will lift and will move forward at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes. There will be 6 lifts at this rate.

      The rate of lift will then decrease to 100 yards in 4 minutes until the artillery halt line is reached. The barrage halts on this line for a period of 15 minutes, i.e., zero plus 85 minutes to zero plus 100 minutes.

      At zero plus 100 minutes, the barrage will advance at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes until the protective barrage line to the 1st Objective (GREEN line) is reached, which is 400 yards east of the green line.

      All fire ceases at zero plus 215 minutes.

      (b) The 4.5" Howitzer barrage will conform to the lifts and times of the 18-pdr. barrage, but will move 200 yards in advance of it.

      (c) SMOKE BARRAGES: Smoke barrages will be placed by flank barrage brigades on positions and for periods as shown on the barrage map.

      (d) RATES OF FIRE:

      Throughout creeping barrage:

      18-pdrs.
      4.5" Hows.

      3 rounds per gun per minute
      2 rounds per gun per minute

- 139 -
While on protective barrage and artillery halt line:
18-pdrs. and 4.5" Hows. 1 round per gun per minute

Except on the artillery halt line between A.22.b.13 to A.28.b.40, where it will remain 3 rounds per gun and howitzer per minute respectively.

Smoke barrages: To be arranged by C. R. A.'s.

AMMUNITION:

- 40% H. E. non-delay
- 50% shrapnel
- 10% smoke
- H. E. 106 Fuzes
- 20% smoke
- 30% H. E. 106 Fuzes
- 50% shrapnel

Flank Barrages:

II. HEAVY ARTILLERY: The B. G. H. A. is preparing instructions and a plan showing the objectives to be engaged during the barrage.

The C. B. S. O. is arranging for the engagement of hostile batteries in accordance with Artillery Instructions No. 271 of September 26.

2. DURATION OF FIRE ON CERTAIN AREAS:

Southern Exploitation Sector: All fire is to be lifted beyond:
- Green dotted line by 8 a.m.
- Red line by 11 a.m.
- Red dotted line by 11:30 a.m.

Northern Exploitation Sector: Fire is to be lifted beyond the red line after 11 a.m.

Heavy Artillery:
- No heavy artillery fire will be permitted west of the grid line between north and south lines B.19 and 20 after 11 a.m., B.20 and 21 after 12 noon, B.21 and 22 after 1 p.m.
- All heavy artillery fire to be east of the red line by 2 p.m.

The above does not prevent fire being brought to bear on targets within these areas by order of the divisions concerned.

3. COUNTERPREPARATION: The B. G. H. A. will arrange to place at the disposal of the C. B. S. O. such guns as will enable an intense counterbattery programme to be put into force in case the enemy puts down counterpreparation during assembly for the attack on Z day.

4. NORMAL FIRE UP TO ZERO: Normal harassing fire will be continued by heavy and field artillery up to zero hour for the attack.

5. S. O. S. INOPERATIVE: 15 minutes prior to zero S. O. S. will be inoperative.

6. ADDENDUM: With reference to Artillery Instructions No. 271 of September 26, Paragraph 1, 5th Line, after “Green Line” add “except in the case of the Australian 2d Division which will be notified later.”

[Signature Illegible]
Lt. Col., G. S.,
R. A., Australian Corps.
III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 13

September 26, 1918.

1. The artillery of the III Corps will support an operation to be carried out by the 12th Division in conjunction with the corps on our right on X day.

2. Creeping Barrage: A creeping barrage will be formed by twelve 18-pdr. batteries of the 12th Division at zero. The first lift will be at zero plus 3 minutes. All other lifts will be at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes according to the barrage tracing attached [omitted].

   Ammunition will be shrapnel and H. E. mixed.
   Rates of fire will be for first 3 minutes RAPID, during remainder of barrage, NORMAL.

3. Protective Barrage: On reaching the protective barrage line all units will carry out bursts of fire searching to a depth of 500 yards for 5 minutes in every 15 minutes until zero plus 75 minutes.
   Rate of fire - NORMAL.

4. One 18-pdr. battery and one 4.5" How. battery will enfilade Lark Trench from Lark Post to F.5.b.9.9. and from F.6.a.3.3. to F.6.b.9.2.

   The fire of these batteries will be lifted as follows:

   18-pdrs. according to the barrage tracing.
   4.5" Hows. 100 yards in advance of the 18-pdr. barrage.

5. One 18-pdr. battery will enfilade Stone Trench from zero until a time required by 12th Division.

6. One 4.5" Howitzer battery will enfilade Bird Lane. The fire of this battery will be lifted down the trench keeping 100 yards beyond the 18-pdr. barrage.

7. Twelve 60-pdrs. will search Tombois Road and Tombois Valley with shrapnel and will lift 100 yards beyond the 18-pdr. barrage.

   These guns will be prepared to fire on these objectives in the event of the S. O. S. signal being sent up by the American 27th Division.

8. One 4.5" Howitzer battery will form a smoke screen from X.29.d.5.4. to X.30.c. 9.5. from zero to zero plus 120 minutes.

   An officer will be put in charge of this screen. He will be stationed where he can best observe the effect of the fire and will be responsible for the rate of fire.

9. From zero to zero plus 60 minutes:

   (a) One 8" Howitzer battery Mark VI will bombard the Bird Cage and Lark Post.
   (b) Six 6-inch Hows. will bombard Lark Trench.
   (c) Two 8-inch Hows. will bombard junction of CATELET and Stone Trenches.
   (d) Four 6-inch Hows. will bombard junction of Stone Lane and Stone Trench.

   If the fire of these batteries is required to be lifted before zero plus 60 minutes, it will be done at the request of the G. O. C., 12th Division.

10. Vigorous counterbattery work will be carried out.

11. Orders for S. O. S. calls during the barrage programme

   Call from the air
   Fleeting targets
   Recalling H. A. fire
will be as issued in former instructions.
12. Watches will be synchronized under orders to be issued by III Corps.
13. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS, R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.,
for
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued by D. R. at 6:15 a. m.

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182-32.7: Operation Orders

Use of Artillery

III CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

AMENDMENT No. 1

to

III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 13

1. In Para. 7, Line 2 erase "and will lift 100 yards . . . . . . . barrage," and substitute "from F.6.c.3.8. eastwards from zero till zero plus 60 minutes."
2. The following paragraph will be added:
   (a) A bombardment by the heavy artillery will be commenced forthwith of TINO Support and MACQUINCOURT Trench from A.1.b.0.9. to A.2.c.4.0. From zero onwards this trench will be kept under heavy fire. In order to increase the fire on these trenches four 8" Hows. may be taken off the BIRD CAGE at zero plus 30 minutes if sufficient howitzers are not otherwise available.
   These trenches will be the S. O. S. targets for these howitzers if the S. O. S. is sent up from the KNOLL.
   (b) From zero onwards 60-pounder guns will search the area A.1.d. and A.2.c.
3. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS, R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.,
for
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued by D. R. at 11:45 a. m.

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Gas Instructions

III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 14

B. B. GAS BOMBARDMENT

Reference III Corps Artillery Instructions Nos. 11 and 12

1. A B. B. gas bombardment will be carried out between 10 p. m. on W day and 6 a. m. on X day.
   2. The areas to be engaged by 18-pounder guns of the 12th Division are as follows:
      a. Hq. and banks about S.25.b.2.5.
      b. Approaches on both sides of canal to VENDHUILE Bridge at S.26.b.5.0.
      c. Approaches on both sides of canal to bridge at S.26.a.7.3.
      d. Hq. at S.26.a.9.8.
      e. HARGIVAL Farm about A.3.b.1.9.
      f. RICHMOND Copse about S.28.a.0.0.
      g. RICHMOND Quarry about S.28.a.2.8.

320 rounds of B. B. shell will be fired on each target. In targets b and c the approaches on the east and west sides of the canal will be considered as separate targets.

3. The areas to be engaged by 6-inch howitzers are as follows:
   1. MACQUINCOURT Farm. Hq. and dumps.
   2. A circle with a radius of 200 yards about A.5.b.1.1.
   3. Hq. at A.4.c.5.9.

330 rounds of B. B. shell will be fired on each target.

4. CATELET will be engaged by the two 5.9-inch howitzers. During the period 10 p. m. W day to 6 a. m. X day, as much of the 1,000 rounds of yellow Cross shell as possible will be fired.

5. Ammunition to be expended by 18-pounders and 6" howitzers will be one round of H. E. for each round of B gas shell.

6. Times for bursts of fire for 18-pdrs. and 6" Hows.
   10 p. m. to 10:15 p. m.
   12:25 a. m. to 12:40 a. m.
   2:40 a. m. to 2:55 a. m.
   4:15 a. m. to 4:30 a. m.

   The amounts of ammunition will be equally divided between each burst of fire.

7. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS, R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.

for

B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued by D. R. at 6:15 a. m.
Use of Artillery

III CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

AMENDMENT No. 1
to

III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 14

1. To Para. 2 add subparagraphs:
   (h) Approaches on both sides of canal to bridge at A.3.a.5.5.
   (i) Hq. at S.25.d.5.0.
   In the last subpara. of Para. 2:
   for "320 rounds" read "260 rounds," and
   for "in targets (b) and (c)" read "in targets (b), (c), and (h),"

2. In Para. 3:
   To Subpara. (1) add "and Hq. at A.3.d.7.5."
   Subpara. (2) is cancelled and the following will be substituted:
   "Concentrations on crossroads at A.5.c.8.3., A.5.c.4.8., and
   A.5.b.1.1."

3. In Para. 4:
   For "CATELET" substitute "Crossroads at A.4.d.4.1."

4. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS, R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.,
for
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued at 11:45 a. m. by D. R.

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Continued Plan for Artillery

III CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 15

1. On the completion of the operation detailed in III Corps Artillery Instructions No. 13, the artillery of the III Corps will continue the bombardment of the HINDENBURG Line as laid down in III Corps Artillery Instructions No. 12.
2. HARASSING FIRE:
   (a) The field artillery will be responsible for harassing the enemy as far east as the north and south grid line through A.4.c.0.0. Brigades will be allotted lanes. This fire will be carried out by 18-pdr. guns firing bursts of fire at irregular intervals. Three bursts of fire per hour will be fired and each burst will consist of 6 rounds per gun. One section per battery will be employed (see Para. 7).
   (b) The heavy artillery will be responsible for harassing the enemy to the limits of their ranges east of the north and south grid line through A.3.c.0.0.
   (c) The 12th Division and heavy artillery will make out plans for carrying out this harassing fire.

3. CUTTING LANES IN HOSTILE WIRE: Lanes will be cut by 4.5" howitzers, using 106 fuses, in the wire in A.2.a. and b., A.1.a. and X.30.b. and d.

4. BOMBARDMENTS BY 4.5" HOWS.: Gas bombardments will be carried out by 4.5" howitzers, using C. G. and N. C. shell, of the trenches from A.2.b.2.9. to S.25.d.9.1.
   These bombardments will be carried out whenever the atmospheric conditions are favorable. They will be carried out chiefly during the nights when there is usually less wind.

5. On X/Y night, gas concentrations will be carried out on PUTNEY by two 4.5" howitzer batteries and one 6" howitzer battery firing C. G. and N. C. gas.
   These concentrations will each be of 5 minutes duration commencing at 12:55 a. m., 2:10 a. m., and 5:55 a. m.
   Rates of fire: RAPID.
   Watches will be synchronized between the 12th Divisional Artillery and the III Corps H. A.

6. The amount of 4.5" howitzer ammunition to be fired during the bombardment will be 200 rounds per gun per 24 hours.

7. RESTING DETACHMENTS: Careful arrangements will be made for the relief of detachments during the bombardment.
   In order that the harassing fire may be continuous one section per 18-pdr. battery will keep up the fire while two sections rest.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.
for
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued at 7:45 p. m. by D. R.
Artillery Targets

III CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

ADDENDUM No. 1

to

III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 15

Reference III Corps Artillery Instructions No. 15.

1. CUTTING LANES IN HOSTILE WIRE: 6-inch howitzers will cut lanes in the wire from S.27.c.4.2. to S.21.d.4.0.

2. BOMBARDMENTS BY HEAVY ARTILLERY:
The following targets will be bombarded by the heavy artillery:
(a) MACQUINCOURT Trench and TINO Support from A.2.c.4.0. to A.1.b.3.2.
(b) TINO, BELOW, and HAWK Trenches from F.6.a.8.2. to X.24.d.0.3.
(c) VENDHUILE Trench from S.25.d.9.1. to A.2.b.1.7.
(d) HARGIVAL Farm.
(e) HINDENBURG Line from S.27.c.8.2. to S.2.d.3.1.

Gas concentrations of (C. G. and N. C.) shell will be fired on these targets, particularly on targets (d) and (f), whenever the weather is favorable. These gas concentrations will mostly be fired at night when there is usually less wind than during the daytime.

3. LONG-RANGE GUNS:
6" guns will engage the following targets:
(a) GOUY-BEAUREVOIR Road B.8.a.3.4.---B.9.b.2.2.
(b) USIGNY-FOSSE Dump about B.11.b.7.5.
(c) GUIZANCOURT Farm and Road T.27.c.0.7.---T.27.b.7.1.
Two guns will engage each target which will be kept under bursts of fire.

4. COUNTERBATTERY WORK:
The approximate number of guns and howitzers allotted will be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gun Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60-pounders</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; howitzers</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; howitzers</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2&quot; howitzers</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot; howitzers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Gas concentrations will be fired on hostile batteries when the weather is favorable. The targets to be engaged by these concentrations will include Richmond Quarry.

The 15-cm. German howitzers will be allotted to counterbattery work.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS, R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.,
for
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued at 6:15 a. m. by D. R.
Protection of Left Flank

III CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

[Extract]

1. An attack will be carried out on a date [Z day] and at an hour to be notified later along the Fourth Army front. The III Corps will cover the left flank of the main attack, which is being carried out by the Australian corps, and by the American II Corps affiliated, on our right.

C. P. FULLER,
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Headquarters II Corps Units

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

To: Commanding General, American 27th Division

Commanding General, American 30th Division

Advanced headquarters open at 62.C.N.15.d.central, September 26 at 6 p. m. Rear headquarters remains at MERICOURT-sur-SOMME. All communications relating to operations, intelligence and questions of supply will be sent to advanced headquarters. All routine and other communications will be sent to rear headquarters.

400 G-3, Amer. II Corps.
BRITISH III CORPS

REFERENCE: BRITISH OPERATIONS ORDER NO 332
26 SEPTEMBER 1918

NOTE: Shaded area will be mopped up by Br III Corps when green line has been reached by Amer II Corps and while Amer II Corps is exploiting to the dashed green line.

MAP REF: BRITISH 1:40000 SHEETS 57B, 57C, 62B AND 62C

MAP No 96
Disposition of Corps Artillery

FROM: Fourth Army
DATE: September 26, 1918
HOUR: 11:30 a.m.
TO: American II Corps

[Extract]

Hq. corps artillery and Hq. corps heavy artillery of VII Corps will be transferred by road from Second Army to Fourth Army on 27th Instant under arrangements being made by Second Army. On arrival in Fourth Army area, they should report to American II Corps, rear Hq. MERICOURT-sur-SOMME. * * *

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Operations of Tanks

4th BRIGADE, TANK CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

American 30th Division

24 tanks which have been allotted to the IX Corps will be following behind the 117th Regiment of the 59th Brigade on Z day to take part in operations with the IX Corps east of BELLEGLISE.

Their distinguishing marks will be as follows:

Figure 9 on each side of the tank near the nose of the tank.

L. B. HANLEM,
Brigadier General,
Commanding 4th Tank Brigade.

---------

Operations II Corps

1st TANK BATTALION, B. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

INSTRUCTION No. 1

Tanks

1. American 30th Division assisted by the 1st Tank Battalion.

1st Phase: American 30th Division will attack and capture the green line on
2d Phase: American 30th Division will attack southwards and capture the red line; in the event of the IX Corps failing to force a crossing over the canal at BELLENGLISE this attack will be continued to the red dotted line.

2. The American 27th Division assisted by the American 301st Tank Battalion.

1st Phase: American 27th Division will attack and capture the green line in the northern part of the Australian corps front.

2d Phase: American 27th Division will attack northwards and capture the red line.

3. The Australian 5th and 3rd Divisions with the 5th Tank Brigade will pass through the American 30th and 27th Divisions, respectively, on the green line to capture the red line east of the green line.

4. The 17th Armoured Car Battalion will pass through the American 27th Division via BONY as soon as the situation permits for special missions with the object of disorganizing the enemy communications, headquarters, etc.

H. H. JOHNSON,
Lieut. Colonel,
Commanding.

227-32.1: Order

Operations 27th Division

FIELD ORDER
No. 48
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 26, 1918.

Map: Ste-EMILIE 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. In preparation for the main operation, the 54th Infantry Brigade will relieve the 53d Infantry Brigade except 104th, 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions, in the line on the night of September 27/28, the 108th Infantry occupying the right regimental sector and the 107th Infantry occupying the left regimental sector.

2. The brigade will march on the morning of September 27 to vicinity of RONSSOY so that the command may be rested and prepared to take over the front line during the night.

9. Headquarters 54th Infantry Brigade will be F.21.b.2.1., present headquarters of the 106th Infantry. Headquarters 53d Infantry Brigade will be F.21.a.7.4., present headquarters of the 105th Infantry.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Operations 27th Division

A C./113

APPENDIX 65

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,

September 26, 1918.

SERIES E, No. 16

[Extract]

1. The following decisions of the corps commander given at the conference held at Australian corps headquarters today, are promulgated.

2. FIELD ARTILLERY BARRAGE:
The barrage programme will be as follows:
The barrage will come down on the artillery start line at zero.
The first lift will be at zero plus 3 minutes.
The barrage will creep forward at the rate of 100 yards every 3 minutes up to and including the sixth lift. From the seventh lift inclusive, the barrage will advance at the rate of 100 yards every 4 minutes (vide barrage map) [omitted].
There will be a halt for 15 minutes on a line approximately 500 yards east of the canal.
The final protective barrage at the end of the field artillery barrage programme will continue for 15 minutes.

Normal S. O. S. arrangements: The normal arrangements for S. O. S. will be inoperative from zero minus 15 minutes onwards.

3. ACTION IN CASE OF ENEMY BOMBARDMENT: In the event of the enemy opening a heavy bombardment prior to zero, G. O. C., R. A., will arrange for an artillery counterattack on enemy batteries.
A scheme will be prepared to put this into operation.

4. ARMING OF TECHNICAL TROOPS: All technical troops employed in the preparation of the roads will be armed, and equipped with ammunition.

5. COOPERATION WITH III CORPS: The American 27th Division will not pass the green dotted line east of the canal before 11 a. m. After 11 a. m., III Corps is arranging to lift all heavy artillery fire north and east of the red line.
Arrangements will be made direct between American 27th Division and the right flank division of the IX Corps for one company of troops of the IX Corps to advance with C Regiment, American 27th Division, with the object of working northwards on the eastern side of and along the canal.

6. COOPERATION WITH IX CORPS: Twenty-four tanks for employment with the right division of the IX Corps will move across the canal between the entrance to the tunnel and the BLACK Road.
Arrangements are being made for these tanks to carry a distinguishing flag.
They will advance across the green line at 11 a. m.

7. WHIPPET TANKS: All Whippet tanks above the total already allotted to the Australian 3d and 5th Division and the 12th Armoured Car Battalion will be held in corps reserve under the orders of G. O. C., 5th Tank Brigade.

* * * * *

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.
Administrative Orders

ORDERS
No. 94

Reference Maps: Sheet 62C 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. LOCATIONS:
   Div. Hq., Rear Echelon TEMPLEUX-la-FOSSE
   Hq. 53d Brig. E.18.a.9.6.
   Hq. 54th Brig. D.22.a.2.8.

By command of Major General O’Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Summary of Intelligence
No. 20

27th DIVISION, A. E. F., September 26, 1918

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Hostile Activity:
      Artillery: Enemy artillery was normal throughout the 24-hour period, shelling being chiefly confined to the forward areas. The outstanding feature of his activity was the quantity of gas shelling which commenced about 10 p. m. and continued intermittently until daybreak. The principal areas gassed were the valleys in the areas L 3, 9, and 10, and L 5, 11, and 12. Blue and Yellow Cross gas was used and approximately 500 shells were fired.
      Between 10:30 a. m. and 12:30 p. m., 300 rounds of 10.5, 15 and 21-cm. hows. were fired on HARGICOURT and this village was again shelled with 50 rounds of 10.5 cm. between 5:40 and 6 p. m.
Machine Guns: Normal. A M. G. is reported to be located at G.8.b.3.2.

Trench Mortars: Trench mortars fired a few rounds on our trenches in G.2.a. and c. but the location of these T. M.'s has not been determined.

Aerial: Comparatively inactive during the day with some increased activity during the night at which times he attempted to bomb some of our battery areas.

Five E. A. over our lines between 5 and 6 p. m. were engaged by A. A.

The following balloons were observed from G.14.c.7.5: 172 degrees, 140 degrees, 120 degrees, and 160 degrees grid. Our rear areas are under observation from these balloons.

(b) Our Activity:

Artillery: Selected targets of frequent enemy movement were harassed throughout the period. BELLICOURT and NAUROY received the usual consideration as did his lines of communication to his forward areas. This applies especially to the approaches to BELLICOURT. As a result of this shelling a fire was started at G.9.a.4.4 and stretcher bearers were observed carrying away the wounded.

Six N. F. calls were answered during the day, hurricane concentrations being put down on G 12d 8.3, G 12d 5.1, G 12d 6.6, G 18c 4.5, G 10d 2.2 and G 16a 7.7.

An S. O. S. signal from the right battalion front was answered and barrage was put down from 8:10 p. m. until 8:24 p. m.

Machine Guns: Below normal. The Lewis gunners made good use of their guns during the attempted raid on our lines in G 15c, when the hostile raiding party was driven off. 500 rounds were fired on the sunken road in G 3a 1.4.

Trench Mortars: Below normal. Eight rounds were fired on the S. O. S. lines at daybreak this morning. This was a test shoot.

Aerial: Our planes were active throughout the day in patrolling the forward areas.

Patrols: Nil, excepting a few patrols sent out to maintain lateral communication between the forward units.

2. HOSTILE MOVEMENT: Visibility poor. Individual movement appears to be slightly on the increase in the enemy back areas, but he is careful not to expose his positions by unnecessary movement in the forward areas. Individual movement was observed at the following points: G 3c 5.5; 2 men working on wire between G 10b 8.1 and G 10b 2.7, and wiring is also going on at G 10b 8.1 and b 2.4. A sniper is reported to be working from G. 3c 3.3. A T. M. has been previously reported here. Work is going on at G 3c 5.5, at G 10a 7.2 and at G 3a 4.3.

An enemy post is located at G 15c 5.6. Several men were observed at G 12a 8.8 on what appears to be a mound of earth. There is frequent movement between G 18a 8.6 and trench at G. 18a 2.2; and from this latter place to G 18d 6.2.

3. MISCELLANEOUS: The French and Americans attacked at 5:30 a. m., this morning on a front of about 60 kilos. The Americans attacked between the MEUSE and the ARGONNE Forest and the French, between the ARGONNE Forest and SUIPPES. The attack started well and was assisted by good weather and ground mist. Enemy artillery action was slight. The Americans are reported fighting in MONTFAUCON and have captured CHEPPY, both of which are several kilos. inside German lines. No further news at present.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

FORECAST: Wind S. W. 15 to 20 m. p. h., increasing to 25 to 30 m. p. h. and probably reaching gale force at times and changing later to W. Cloudy, becoming overcast with slight rain or drizzle tonight, probably more in the north than in the south: afterwards likely to be fair again. Moderate temperature. Visibility good early; fair later.
Temperature day 60; night 50 to 55.

LATER: The enemy attempted to raid one of our posts in A 26d 1.0 at 1 p. m. today, but was driven out by our counterattack, leaving one dead man in our hands. Identification 258th R. I. R.

230-33.1: Periodical Report

Operations 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

12 m., Sept. 25 to 12 m., Sept. 26

[Extract]

3. Area of the regiment in line shelled continuously from 2 a. m. until 12 noon, L.10.c.4.5. Enemy artillery put over about 500 Blue and Yellow cross gas shells and 300 rounds of 10.5's, 15 and 21-cm. hows. Individual movement appeared to be slightly on the increase in enemy back areas.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.

230-40.1: Order

ORDERS
No. 10

SHEETS 62C N. E., and
62B N. W., 1:40,000

[Extract]

PLAN FOR COMMUNICATION, SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

1. AMMUNITION: The division ammunition dump will be located at K.21.a.5.5.* * *
2. SUPPLIES:
The division supply dumps are located as follows:
Present dumps:
   59th Brigade, J.12.b.4.0.
   60th Brigade, J.29.d.5.5.
After the advance:
   Both brigades, K.18.b.2.3.

* * * * *
3. WATER:
Water tanks of the following capacity are dug in at the locations given and are for the use of the brigades shown:
59th Brigade - L.10.a.2.2.
   3 - 200 gallon
60th Brigade - L.23.d.central
   4 - 100 gallon

6. ORDNANCE: An advance ordance dump will be established at K.18.b.3.2.

9. VETERINARY ARRANGEMENTS: All sick and wounded animals in the forward area will be sent to the veterinary evacuation station at K.22.a.0.5. From this point, animals will be sent for further treatment, if necessary, to mobile veterinary section at J.33.c.3.0. At the latter place, wounded and sick animals in the rear area can be treated.

11. ENGINEER MATERIALS: Engineer material will be drawn in the present area from the R. E. dump at ROISEL; in the advanced area at L.15.d.5.9.

14. TRAFFIC:
   (a) The existing M. T. roads and the M. T. circuit ROISEL---HARGICOURT---RONSSOY---VILLERS-FAUCON---LONGAVESNES---TINCOURT, will be put in order for work on Z day.

17. RAILHEADS:
   (a) Division railhead, present area, TINCOURT; advanced area, ROISEL.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
APPENDIX I

[Extract]

To accompany Order No. 10, Plan of Communication, Supply and Evacuation, Headquarters 30th Division, September 26, 1918.

AMMUNITION:
1. All ammunition required by the division will be indented for from the Australian corps.

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APPENDIX II

[Extract]

SCHEME OF EVACUATION OF WOUNDED:

1. The advance dressing station and station for walking wounded will be located at TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD (L.2.b.central). The advance dressing station and the evacuation of the forward lines will be operated by the 119th Field Ambulance. The walking wounded station will be operated by personnel from the 132d Field Ambulance.

Med. Gen. Surgeon 27th Div.: Memorandum

Medical Arrangements

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF DIVISION SURGEON,
September 26, 1918.

CHANGES NO. 1

Map Ref. 1/40,000

France - Sheet 62 C
1. MAIN DRESSING STATION: LONGAVESNES E.25.b.5.1., opens noon Sept. 26, 1918, Field Hospital Co. No. 106. Main dressing station at DRIENCOURT closes 1 p. m., September 26, 1918. Field Hospital Co. No. 105 in reserve at VILLERS-FAUCON.
2. DIVISION SICK COLLECTING POST: DRIENCOURT J.3.d.5.1., opens 12 noon September 26, 1918, 133d Field Ambulance. HAUT-ALLAINES will close.
3. **BATTALION AID POSTS:**
   - F.21.a.7.2.
   - F.21.central
   - F.28.a.4.9.
   - F.15.d.6.4
   - F.16.c.8.4.
   - F.22.d.7.8. HAUSSAR Road
   - F.28.d.8.9. TEMPLEUX Switch

4. **RELAY POSTS:**
   - Left Relay F.22.c.3.6.
   - Right Relay F.28.C.8.5.

5. **CAR POSTS:**
   - Left F.21.a.7.3.
   - Right F.2.1.d.6.3.

WALTER C. MONTGOMERY,
Lieut. Colonel, M. C., Div. Surgeon,
American 27th Division.

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Medical General C 482-E, D 2, Fldr. 10:

**Medical Arrangements**

30th DIVISION MEDICAL SITUATION

Ref. Maps. 62 C and 62 B.

W. E. ________________

Line Held.                  R. half American II Corps line.
Division Surgeon's Office   J.16.b.0.5.
UNITS                       LOCATION
MAIN DRESSING STATIONS      1  K.14.d.8.8.
ADV. DRESSING STATIONS      1  K.24.a.2.2.
AMB. COLLECTING POSTS       2  L.10.a.central---L.17.d.central
DIV. REST STATIONS          -  None
FLD. AMBS. (In rest or      1  K.14.d.8.8.
[Gas Center] reserve)      -  None

PHILLIP NORRIS,
Major, M. C.

Date: Sept. 26, 1918

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From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Period ending noon, September 26

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: No change reported. Hostile artillery normal in area occupied by 27th Division. Very active in area occupied by 30th Division. Heavy shelling in early morning with H. E. and with mustard gas.

   * * * * *

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Advance echelon of corps headquarters moved from MERICOURT-sur-SOMME to point near ASSEVILERS at N.15.d.central (62C). Field Orders Nos. 16 and 17 issued.

   * * * * *

10. RESULT OF ACTIONS, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: 30th Division reports 88 casualties from shell fire and gas during morning; 3 killed.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None.


13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: Operations to be carried out in accordance with plan contained in Field Orders Nos. 16 and 17.


   F. E. BUCHAN,
   Colonel, G. S., G-3.
   for
   G. W. READ,
   Major General,
   Commanding.

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MESSAGES FROM AUSTRALIAN CORPS, Sept. 26, 1918

30th Div.: 230-32.16: Message

HOUR Recd.: 7:51 a.m.

TO: American 30th Div.

Morning report. Heavy barrage was put down by enemy east of HARGICOURT at about 9 p.m. S. O. S. was sent up and it is believed that enemy attempted raid on our trenches in this vicinity. Further particulars will be wired later. Heavy gas shelling between 7 and 8 p.m. on area just west of VILLERET. Enemy aircraft bombed forward area heavily at about midnight.

---

HOUR: Recd.: 7:47 p.m.

TO: American 30th Division.

Evening report - situation quiet. A few rounds Blue Cross and Yellow Cross shells on support area left division. Right division [118th Infantry, 30th Division], reports that at 1 p.m., hostile party worked south along trench, bombed and rushed our post at A 26 D 1 0, succeeding in capturing one of our garrisons. Immediate counterattack drove the enemy out leaving one dead in our hands. Low flying aircraft active during morning, directing arty. fire on right division front.

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MESSAGES TO AUSTRALIAN CORPS, Sept. 26, 1918

30th Div.: 230-32.16: Message

FROM: American 30th Div.

HOUR: 4:45 p.m.

E. A. nil. Captures nil. Enemy attack on our right front battalion at 5:05 a.m. repulsed. General shelling throughout the day of area L.10.0.4.5. resulted in a few casualties. Repeat to American 27th Div. and to British 46th Div.

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FROM: American 27th Div.

HOUR: Recd.: 7:50 p.m.

No. 115


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WAR DIARY 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

September 26, 1918

[Extract]

Preparations being made for attack in accordance with Battle Instructions No. 1. 118th Infantry holding front line in compliance with orders from these headquarters advanced 500 to 600 yards on a 1,200 yard front for the purpose of straightening out the
line in preparation for the operation called for in Battle Instructions No. 1. The advance was accomplished and objective reached with practically no casualties.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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HS Brit. File: Fl. 8-10 (30th Div.): War Diary

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

Place  Date  Summary of Events and Information

N.16.c.  Sept.  At 9 p.m., enemy put down heavy barrage on our trenches in vicinity of HARGICOURT, and under cover of this succeeded in rushing our post at A.26.d.1.0. and capturing one of the garrison. They were driven off by immediate counterattack. Low flying enemy aircraft active directing artillery fire on front of right division during the day. Dispositions - Hq. of Formations as at 6 a.m., 27th.

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Preliminary Operations of the 27th and 30th Divisions

Operations on September 27 and September 28 preliminary to general assault on Hindenburg Line by Fourth Army, B. E. F. - the 27th and 30th Divisions in line, followed by Australian 3d and 5th Divisions, attack - fail to attain and hold objectives.

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HS Brit. File: (30th Div.) Fl. 8-10: Location list

Locations Australian and II Corps

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 26, 1918.

DISPOSITIONS - HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

as at 6 a.m., September 27, 1918

[Extract]

Ref. Sheet 62C

Australian Corps  N.16c.
3d Squadron A. F. C.  BOUVINCOURT
13th A. L. H. Regt.  0.16.b.
Australian 1st Division  LONG Area

* * * * *
Australian 2d Division

Australian 3d Division

Australian 4th Division

Australian 5th Division

American II Corps

American 27th Division

American 53d Bde.

American 54th Bde.

American 30th Division

American 59th Bde.

American 60th Bde.

3d Tank Brigade

4th Tank Brigade

5th Tank Brigade

5th Cavalry Brigade

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27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.
Operations Instructions

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In continuation of Fourth Army No. 273 (G), dated September 23, 1918, herewith Paras. (h) and (l) to Section 3 of "Instructions for Operations."
2. Please acknowledge receipt by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

3. GENERAL:

(h) Reference Fourth Army No. 20/23 (G) of September 22, 1918, Para. 5 (a).
The following arrangement has been made with the French First Army as regards their action in relation to the IX Corps:

1. The French First Army will be given a right of way for the French XV Corps at zero on Z day by the BEAUVOIS-VILLEVEQUE-ATTILLY-HOLNON Road as far as HOLNON (exclusive).

2. As soon as the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel has been captured, and the 1st Division has pushed towards it to join hands with the 32d Division, the French First Army will take over the front between SELENCY and GRICOURT (exclusive) and set free the 6th Division. The whole of the transport of the 6th Division must be withdrawn west of the HOLNON-FRESNOY Road prior to zero on Z day.

3. As soon as the 6th Division has been withdrawn, the French XV Corps will have right of access to the HOLNON-FRESNOY Road as far as FRESNOY (exclusive).

4. As soon as the whole of the 1st Division has passed over the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel, the French XV Corps will have right of access to the FRESNOY-GRICOURT-THORIGNY-Le TRONQUOY Road, until such time as they have been able to make good and repair a passage over the canal at LESDINS and no longer require a passage over the canal at Le TRONQUOY.

5. As soon as the French XV Corps has crossed the canal, it will push eastwards and southeastwards with the mission of protecting the right of the British Fourth Army within the boundary allotted to the French First Army by Field Marshal Foch and shown on the map issued with Fourth Army No. 20/24 (G), dated September 24, 1918.

(l) Reference Fourth Army No. 20/23 (G) of September 22, 1918, Para. 6, and "Instructions for Operations," Section 3, General, Para. (g).

1. The closest touch will be kept by III Corps with the American troops exploiting to the dotted green line.
(2) Until this attack is known to be progressing well and the retreat of the enemy in VENDHUILE threatened by the advance of the American troops, the III Corps will not incur serious casualties by making a frontal attack on VENDHUILE.

The commander of the troops, whose mission it is to mop up VENDHUILE, will keep in the closest touch with the situation so as to be in a position to take full advantage of any signs of hostile retreat from, or disposition to surrender in, VENDHUILE.

(3) The responsibility for keeping the 38th Division and the V Corps fully informed as regards the progress of the American exploiting troops, and of the repair of the bridges at VENDHUILE, will rest on the III Corps.

The III Corps will also be responsible for passing the 38th Division over the canal at VENDHUILE, and will communicate direct with the 38th Division on the subject.

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MESSAGES FOR AMERICAN 30th DIVISION, SEPT. 27, 1918.

30th Div.: Records Gen. File, 370.2

FROM: Aust. Corps I

HOUR: 7:30 p. m.
Office: 7:55 p. m.
Rec'd.: 8:09 p. m.


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230-32.16: Field Message

FROM: Intelligence American 27th Division

HOUR: 3:20 p. m.
Office: 3:25 p. m.
Rec'd: 3:50 p. m.

Prisoners so far through division cage: 8 officers, 130 O. R. Order of battle, north to south seems to be 153d I. R. of 8th Division. 90th R. I. R., 27th R. I. R., 84th I. R. of 54th Division, 7th R. I. R. of 121st Division. The 84th I. R. has position astride GUILLEMONT Farm. 3d Battalion in line, 1st Battalion in support, 2d Battalion in reserve. Regtl. Hq and Res. battalion headquarters in HARGIVAL Farm.

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- 163 -
Changes Dispositions of 27th and 30th Divisions

APPENDIX No. 62

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

SECOND AMENDMENT TO BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 9

1. Paragraph 8 will be amended as follows:
   BLACK ROAD: After A Regiment of American 60th Brigade insert C Regiment of American 59th Brigade.

2. American 27th and 30th Divisions, and Australian 3d and 5th Divisions to ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

R. C. CASEY,
Major,
for
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.

Movement of Australian 2d Division

A.C./110/2

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 13A

1. With reference to Serial No. 6 of move table attached to Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 13, dated September 25, 1918, on the night Y/Z Australian 2d Division will move into assembly positions in the areas TINCOURT---ROISEL---VILLERS-FAUCON---LIERAMONT---TEMPLEUX-le-FOSSE.

2. In addition to routes already laid down the following road also may be used:
   From crossroads at K.33.a.8.3. through K.22.central to ROISEL.

3. Brigade groups of the division will be so disposed as to permit of one brigade moving eastwards via the BLACK and RED Roads, and one brigade via the BLUE and YELLOW Roads.

4. After midday on Z day, the Australian 2d Division will be held in readiness to move at two hours' notice.

   Australian 2d, 3d, and 5th Divisions to acknowledge by wire.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Australian Corps.

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II Corps: 182-32.7: Order

**Operations II Corps**

A. C./112/1

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 27, 1918.

**BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, 15A**

1. With reference to Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 15, dated September 25, 1918 the following arrangements have been made for the coordination of action between IX Corps and Australian corps on the right flank of the Australian corps.

2. The boundary line between IX Corps and Australian Corps will be the grid line G.20.central---G.21.central---G.22.central---G.23.central---G.24.central---the sunken road at H.19.b.5.0.---thence N. E. along sunken road (inclusive to Australian Corps), to H.15.a.4.6.---thence due east as per final corps boundary on barrage map.

3. The above boundary will be the dividing line for both infantry and artillery action, except where IX Corps barrage overlaps the Australian corps front west of the canal.

4. Should the G. O. C., left division of IX Corps find it necessary, he will arrange direct with American 30th Division for the latter division to operate south of this line, and will at the same time make the necessary arrangements for lifting IX Corps artillery fire, as may be arranged between divisional commanders.

5. G. O. C., R. A., Australian Corps, will arrange to keep under fire the high ground about G.23.b.---G.24.a.---and G.18.d.---from zero as long as the infantry advance allows.

6. The southern limit of the Australian corps barrage west of the canal will be the line G.20.b.3.4.---G.21.b.9.6.---thence along the road to the canal.

The Australian corps smoke screen along this line will lift in accordance with the timed lifts of the Australian corps field artillery barrage.

Acknowledge by wire.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Australian Corps.

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II Corps: 182-32.7: Order

**Operations II Corps**

A. C./116

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 27, 1918.

**BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 18.**

1. Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 12, dated September 25, 1918, are cancelled and the following substituted.

2. The 5th Cavalry Brigade is allotted to the Australian corps for the forthcoming operations. B Battery, 84th Field Army Brigade, R. F. A., is placed under the orders of G. O. C., 5th Cavalry Brigade from 11 a. m. on zero day, under arrangements to be made direct between G. O. C., 5th Cavalry Brigade and C. R. A., Australian 1st Division.

3. The 5th Cavalry Brigade will maintain close liaison with the Australian 5th
Division through whose lines it will pass as soon as possible after the infantry have captured the BEAUREVOIR Line.


5. Should the enemy retreat, the 5th Cavalry Brigade will maintain contact.

6. As soon as the objective has been gained, two squadrons will be pushed forward to reconnoiter the withdrawal of the enemy -

(a) One squadron towards PREMONT-BUSIGNY
(b) One squadron towards BOHAIN

Should the enemy's resistance be entirely broken and should the opportunity offer, these squadrons will be prepared to destroy the enemy's railway communications with the object of closing in any rolling stock on the lines running south and east. They will be prepared to act vigorously against enemy headquarters, etc.

The squadrons detailed will be warned that the 17th Armoured Car Battalion, supported by one company of Whippet tanks, is operating in the same general direction with the same object - vide Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 11, dated September 25, 1918.

7. Routes allotted and times are contained in Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 9, dated September 25, 1918.

Acknowledge by wire.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Australian Corps.

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182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

A. C./118

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 27, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 20

AIRCRAFT

[Extract]

1. Aircraft units will be working on the corps front on Z day as under:

(a) 3d Squadron A. F. C.
   (i) Markings: Rectangular black panels 2 feet by 1 foot on both lower planes about 3 feet from fuselage.
   (ii) Roles: Contact patrols.
          Counterattack patrols.
          Dropping smoke bombs.

(b) 8th Squadron R. A. F.
   (i) Markings: Black bands on under side of tail.
   (ii) Roles: Cooperation with tanks.
          Reporting of location and progress of tanks.
          Engaging of antitank guns with M. G. fire and bombs.
(c) Eight single-seater army squadrons will be employed on low altitude attacks on enemy organizations and troops. These machines will not carry any distinctive markings.

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II Corps: 182-32-7: Order

**Operations II Corps**

**ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 273**

by

G. O. C., R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS

*September 27, 1918.*

1. **ALTERATIONS - AUSTRALIAN CORPS AND IX CORPS SOUTHERN BOUNDARY:** With reference to Artillery Instructions No. 272 of September 26, 1918, Paragraph 2, first subparagraph Southern Exploitation Sector, delete this subparagraph and substitute:

   (a) The boundary line between the IX Corps and Australian corps will be grid line through G.20.central, G.21.central, G.22.central, G.23.central, G.24.central to sunken road in H.19.b.5.0, thence along sunken road (inclusive to Australian corps) to H. 15.a.4.6., thence due east as shown on barrage map.

   (b) The above boundary will be the dividing line for troops and all artillery fire, except where the IX Corps barrage overlaps west of the canal.

   (c) Should the G. O. C., left division of the IX Corps find it necessary, he will arrange direct with the American 30th Division for this latter division to cover south of the line referred to in Subparagraph (a) above, and will at the same time make the necessary arrangements for lifting the IX Corps barrage.

2. **ALTERATION IN SOUTHERN LIMITS OF BARRAGE WEST OF CANAL:** The southern limit of the Australian corps barrage west of the canal will be the line G.20.b.5.4.-G.21.b.9.6., thence along road to canal.

   The Australian corps smoke screen along this line will conform to the lifts of the 4.5" howitzers in the field artillery barrage.

3. **ENGAGEMENT OF HIGH GROUND EAST OF CANAL:** The B. G. R. A. will arrange for the high ground in G.23.b., G.24.b., and G.18.c. to be kept under fire from zero, lifting this fire in accordance with the field artillery barrage timetable.

4. **HEAVY ARTILLERY PLAN - MAIN ATTACK:** With reference to Artillery Instructions No. 271 of September 26, Paragraph 2 on first page - last line, for 800 yards read 400 yards.

5. **ALLOTMENT OF 18-pdr. BATTERY TO 5th CAVALRY BRIGADE:** B Battery, 84th Army Brigade, R. F. A. (Major Brown commanding), will be placed under the command of the G. O. C., 5th Cavalry Brigade from 11 a. m. on Z day.

   Detailed instructions will be issued later by G. O. C., 5th Cavalry Brigade to C. R. A., Australian 1st Division for the movements of this battery.

   Location of battery - L.17.c.27.97.

6. **ACKNOWLEDGE ON FORM ATTACHED.**

   [Signature Illegible]

   Lt. Col., G. S.,

   R. A., Australian Corps.

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Operations II Corps

ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 274

by

G. O. C., R. A., AUSTRALIAN CORPS

September 27, 1918.

[Extract]

1. With reference to Artillery Instructions No. 271 of September 26, Paragraph 1, the left and right divisional creeping barrage brigades mentioned in Artillery Instructions No. 267, Paragraph 2 (d), will remain under the command of C. R. A.'s Australian 1st and 4th Divisions until the infantry of the Australian 3d and 5th divisions have passed eastwards through troops holding the green line and until the artillery covering this infantry are in such positions as to be capable of supporting their advance.

C. R. A.'s, Australian 1st and 4th Divisions will notify corps R. A. as soon as this condition exists in order that these field artillery brigades may pass, with the exception of those allotted to the divisions for exploitation, into corps reserve.

When passed to corps reserve they will come under command of C. R. A., Australian 2d Division.

Operations III Corps

No. G. S. 100

III CORPS, B. E. F.,

September 27, 1918.

INSTRUCTION No. 1

With reference to III Corps Order No. 332, Paras. 4, 5 and 7, the role and action of the 18th and 12th Divisions will be as follows:

1. (a) 18th Division: One brigade will be formed up at zero on the left of and in the American 27th Division area, and will attack under a creeping barrage and capture the following objective:

MACQUINCOURT Trench from about A.2.c.3.4. to A.1.b.4.2. on reaching this objective, the troops will reorganize and consolidate their gains.

The American 27th Division, meanwhile, will be continuing their attack to the green line, and will establish a flank post at about A.2.b.4.0.

This brigade of the 18th Division will not carry out a direct attack on VENDHUILE in the face of strong opposition. Its role will be to:
(i) protect the left flank of the Americans in this area against counter-attack;
(ii) to maintain a steady pressure on the enemy at VENDHUILE in order that the right moment may be seized to push on into and clear the town.

One company of this brigade (together with some R. E. and machine guns) will be affiliated to and will accompany the battalion of the American 27th Division detailed to advance towards VENDHUILE, east of the canal bank. This detachment will bivouac with the battalion to which it is affiliated on Y/Z night. A second company will be detailed to follow up in conjunction with the brigade detailed in (b), and keep touch with the first company on the eastern bank of the canal.

(b) The second brigade, arriving on Y/Z night and bivouacking in the area E.5.a. and c., will follow the Australian 3d Division (which advances in rear of the American 27th Division) to the MACQUINCOURT Valley, and will then advance on VENDHUILE from the south, and mop it up, forming bridgehead across the canal to enable work on the repair of bridges and roads at VENDHUILE to be carried out unmolested.

(c) The third brigade, arriving in busses on Z morning, will bivouac in E.5.a. and c., and will be in corps reserve.

2. (a) 12th Division: The role of the 12th Division will be:
(i) To cover the left flank of the 18th Division;
(ii) To form a defensive flank, facing north, along LARK Spur towards OSSUS;
(iii) To mop up the area between the present front line and the canal, within their boundaries (vide Para. 5).

(b) One battalion will be assembled in the 12th Division area, east of EPEHY, and will move forward in rear of the Australian 3d Division, and in advance of the brigade of the 18th Division (vide Para. 1 (b) to Crellin Avenue). This battalion will be used to exploit the success in the direction of the high ground in F.6.a. and X.0.c.

It will not, however, carry out a set attack on this spur, but will make ground by pushing forward patrols, and following them up closely. The remainder of the 12th Division holding the line will make good the eastern slope of LARK Spur---X.25.c. and d., and will gain ground to the front along their whole line, by pushing forward patrols under the barrage.

3. The boundary for mopping up purposes between the 12th and 18th Divisions will run from A.1.b.0.0. through S.25.c.central.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE

C. P. FULLER,
D. G., G. S.,
III Corps.

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182-32.7: Order

Operations III Corps

No. G. S. 100/1

III CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

ADDENDUM No. 1 TO INSTRUCTIONS No. 1

Para. 1 (b). Delete from will follow Australian 3d Division to will then advance on VENDHUILE and substitute will march to the MACQUINCOURT Valley and, if the situation allows, will be prepared, at 11 a. m., to advance on VENDHUILE.
Para. 2 (1), lines 2 and 3, delete "in rear of the Aust. 3d Division and"

A. P. FULLER,
D. G., G. S.,
III Corps.

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182-32.7: Order

* * *

**Operations III Corps**

No. G. S. 101

INSTRUCTIONS No. 2

[Extract]

HEADQUARTERS: 1. Headquarters of corps, division, and flank corps and divs. will be as under at zero.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III Corps</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Advanced</td>
<td>G.18.d.2.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>CARNOY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps R. A.</td>
<td>C.18.d.2.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Corps H. A.</td>
<td>J.5.c.1.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th Division</td>
<td>D.16.c.1.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Division</td>
<td>LIERAMONT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American II Corps</td>
<td>N.15.d.central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Corps</td>
<td>N.16.c.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American 27th Division</td>
<td>J.11.0.2.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33d Division</td>
<td>EQUANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38th Division</td>
<td>V.18.c.1.8.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Advanced III Corps Headquarters will open at C.18.d.2.5. (east of MOISLAINS) at 6 p. m. on Y day.

BRIDGES: 2. (a) Bridges in VENDHUILE are being constructed by the 18th Division Engineers and by 283d A. T. Coy., R. E., under orders of C. E., III Corps.
(b) In order that above units, and units for road making, may move forward at earliest possible moment, a wireless set will be placed at the disposal of C. R. E., 18th Division, who will arrange for it to move forward close behind the infantry.

As soon as VENDHUILE is reported clear, a wireless message will be sent to Headquarters 18th Division, LIERAMONT, where mounted representatives from following units will be assembled:

- 12th Division Pioneers
- 18th Division Pioneers
- 70th Field Coy. R. E. 283d A. T. Coy. R. E.
- 178th Tunnelling Coy. (less 2 sections)

Above units will be assembled about E.1.a. and c. by midnight Y/Z night.

* * * * * * *

No troops or transport, with the two exceptions noted below, are to enter RONSSOY.

The R. E. bridging train, consisting of some 30 pontoons and 25
lorries, will be parked at 12 noon on Z day, with the head of the column at, but clear of, the crossroads at F.8.a.5.3., ready to advance to VENDHUILE via RONSSOY. Heavy artillery, which may have to move forward down the LEMPIRE Road to the valley west of LITTLE PRIEL Farm (f.4.), may pass through RONSSOY for this purpose.

LIAISON: 5. The Australian corps are detailing an officer to report to Advanced III Corps Headquarters by 7 a. m. on Z day. An officer from III Corps Headquarters will report at American 27th Division Headquarters by 6 p. m. on Y day, to act as liaison officer between 27th and 18th Divisions.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

C. P. FULLER,
B. G. G. S., III Corps.

Hq. III Corps,
27/9/1918.

182-32.7: Order

Operations American II Corps

No. G. S. 102

III CORPS OPERATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS No. 1

1. With reference to Para. 16 of III Corps Order No. 332:
   A contact plane will fly over the corps front at the following hours:
   (a) Zero plus 1 hour.
   (b) Zero plus 3 hours.
   (c) Zero plus 4 hours.
   (d) Zero plus 5 hours.

and subsequently as ordered:
   The observers in flights (b) and (c) above will report especially on the position of American troops on the spur in S.28.d.

2. The American 27th Division have orders not to pass the line S.27.d.5.0.---S.28. central---S.29.central---S.29.d.9.0., east of the canal before 11 a. m. After 11 a. m., the hour at which the American 27th Division will commence their exploitation northwards, the III Corps will lift all heavy artillery fire north and east of the following line:
   S.30.a.0.9.---S.23.central---S.22.central---S.15.d.0.5.---S.14.c.0.4.

3. After the 38th Division has crossed the canal and taken over the American 27th Division front, from about PIENNES to the canal in S.14., the III corps will cover their front with artillery, under orders to be issued by the G. O. C., R. A., III Corps, until relieved by artillery from the V Corps.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

C. P. FULLER,
B. G. G. S., III Corps.

Hq. III Corps
27/9/1918.
Operations III Corps

III CORPS OPERATIONS

INSTRUCTIONS No. 4

1. In conjunction with the mopping-up operations in the VENDHUILE area, the V Corps have instructed their right (33d) division to gain possession of the remainder of LARK SPUR and to push forward to the canal to the east of LARK SPUR with a view to:
   (a) Throwing bridges over the canal.
   (b) Covering the movement of 38th Division on VENDHUILE via Le CATELET Valley.
2. The scheme of operations will be coordinated by the G. O. C., 12th Division with G. O. C., 33d Division.
3. 12th Division to acknowledge.

C. P. FULLER,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
III Corps.

Hq. III Corps,
September 27, 1918.

III CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS No. 18

Reference III Corps Operation Instructions No. 3

1. When the 38th Division has crossed the canal and has taken over from the American 27th Division, the 12th Divisional Artillery will be transferred from the 12th Division and the 18th and 74th Divisional Artilleries from the 18th Division to the 38th Division. These three divisional artilleries will remain under the orders of the 38th Division until relieved by artillery of the V Corps, when they will be withdrawn under orders to be issued later.
2. At the same time, the III Corps H. A. will cover the 38th Division front. One brigade R. G. A. will be detailed to be affiliated to the 38th Division.
3. A heavy artillery officer (not below the rank of captain) will be attached to the 38th Divisional Headquarters. This officer will act as liaison officer from the corps heavy artillery and will be prepared to offer suggestions as to suitable objectives for engagement by the heavy artillery.
   He will also give any information required by the 38th Division as to the number and nature of heavy guns and siege howitzers that can bring effective fire to bear on any objective which it is desired to engage.

III CORPS, September 28, 1918.

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This liaison officer will join the 38th Division at a time and place to be notified directly by the 38th Division to III corps heavy artillery.

4. The 38th Division will obtain from their affiliated brigade R. G. A. any support required by the G. O. C., 38th Division through the H. A. liaison officer.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE TO III CORPS R. A.

M. H. DENDY,
Major, G. S.,
for
B. G., G. S., III Corps.

Issued at 3:45 p. m. by D. R.

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182-32.7: Instructions

**Operations II Corps**

IX CORPS, B. E. F.

IX CORPS INSTRUCTIONS - SERIES B, No. 7

1. With reference to IX Corps Warning Order No. 137 of September 24, para. 2, the boundary line between the IX and Australian Corps will be adjusted as follows:

   The grid line G.20.central to G.24.central as far east as the sunken road H.19.b.5.0., along the sunken road (inclusive to Australian corps) to H.15.a.4.6, thence original boundary to H.17.a.0.7, thence straight to J.1.a.0.7, thence to D.22.d.0.6, thence to D.18.b.0.7.

   The southern boundary of the corps east of the canal will run from N.16.d.8.0 to L.34.central, thence due east to J.32.a.0.0, thence to L.7.a.0.3.

2. The northern boundary laid down in Para. 1 will be the dividing line between troops and barrages of the IX and Australian Corps with the exception that west of the canal, the IX Corps barrage may overlap the northern boundary by mutual arrangement between 46th Division and American 30th Division.

3. Should the G. O. C., 46th Division find it necessary, he will arrange direct with the American 30th Division for the latter to operate south of the northern boundary east of the canal. In this event he will at the same time, make the necessary arrangements for lifting the barrage on the IX Corps front.

4. The Australian corps are arranging to keep under fire the high ground about G.23.b.---G.24.a.---G.18.d. from zero as long as the infantry advance allows.

5. The southern limit of the Australian corps barrage west of the canal will be the line G.20.b.5.4---G.21.b.9.6---thence due east to road at G.21.b.5.5. and along this road to the canal.

   The Australian corps smoke screen along this line will be adjusted according to the advance of the infantry of the American 30th Division.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE:

H. SHERBROOKE,
Lt. Col.,
for
General Staff, IX Corps.

September 27, 1918.

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- 173 -
Operations II Corps

PENDING OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS No. 3

Reference Para. 8 of V Corps Instructions No. 2, dated September 25.

1. On September 29, the 38th Division will move from BEAULENCOURT, ROCQUIGNY, and LECHELLE to the HEUDICOURT---PEIZIERE---SOREL-le-GRAND area.
   The route to be followed during this move will be: ROCQUIGNY---EQUANCOURT---HEUDICOURT.
   (a) Busses will be provided for 115th and 113th Brigade Groups if available and will move in accordance with attached table to HEUDICOURT, where a turning point can be arranged. If busses are not available these brigade groups will move by march route to the areas mentioned on the early morning of 29th instant.
   (b) 114th Brigade Group will in any case march to the area allotted.
   (c) To provide for the possibility of a further advance on the 29th Instant, all first line transport of the BEAULENCOURT Brigade Group, 38th Division will be concentrated about LECHELLE on the evening of September 28. This is subject to busses being available on 29th for the move of the personnel of this brigade group.
   (d) 38th Division, when located in the HEUDICOURT, PEIZIERE---SOREL-le-GRAND area will be at one hour's notice to move after midday, 29th instant.
   (e) 38th Division Hq. will be established in the present headquarters of 10th Infantry Brigade, 33d Division, west of SORDEL-e-GRAND (V.18.c.1.8).

2. On a date communicated to all concerned, the 38th Division will relieve the American 105th Infantry Regiment, American 27th Division on the green dotted line, from PIENNES (S.23.centrul) to the canal.
   The route to be followed by 38th Division will be: PEIZIERE---LEMPIRE---VEND-HUILE---for transport and mounted units.
   Infantry will march as far as possible clear of the roads. (A map showing tracks will be issued to G. O. C., 38th Division, later if available.)
   The 18th Division, III Corps, are to repair the VENDHUILE Bridges over the Canal de l'ESCAUT and roads leading to these as soon as the situation allows.
   Suitable initial headquarters for 38th Division is F.1.b.8.0. (at present Brigade Hq. 35th Infantry Brigade, 18th Division).
   A. D. signals will establish lines forthwith to link up these hq. with V Corps Hq.
   Details of relief of American 105th Infantry Regiment by 38th Division on the dotted green line will be arranged direct between 38th Division and American 27th Division. Present headquarters Bois de BUERE, S. W. of TINCOURT due east of PERONNE.
   Subsequent moves by Hq. American 27th Division and by American 105th Infantry Regiment will be notified 38th Division.

3. The Brigade Group, 17th Division, at LESBOEUFS will march on September 29 at 8 a. m. to ROCQUIGNY. The 17th Division will subsequently move forward to the area DESSART Wood---FINS---EQUANCOURT in support of 21st Division under orders to be issued separately.
   The 17th Division will from 12 midday, September 29, remain in a state of readiness to move at one hour's notice.

4. Action of 38th Division after relief of American 105th Infantry Regiment, on the green dotted line:
Preceded by advanced guards, the 38th Division will:

(i) Make good the Hindenburg System up to the line BONABUS Farm, RANCOURT Farm.

(ii) Maintain touch with the American II Corps on their right.

(iii) Clear the ground as far as this may be found necessary between the HINDENBURG Line and the canal northwards to HONNECOURT.

5. The IV Corps meanwhile should be across the canal and the HINDENBURG Line to the north of BANTOUZELLE. The Australian corps will probably be east of BEAUREVOIR. The probability therefore is that the HINDENBURG Line between RANCOURT Farm and BANTOUZELLE will be clear of the enemy and that the 21st Division will be able to cross the canal directly to their front and to advance on to the HINDENBURG Line on the front RANCOURT Farm BANTOUZELLE.

The 38th Division will cooperate in this move by threatening the HINDENBURG Line to the north of RANCOURT Farm, while the 33d Division will attack if necessary between HONNECOURT and RANCOURT Farm towards S.3., and S.4.central to facilitate the passage of the 21st Division over the canal. The 17th Division will move forward in support of the 21st Division regulating their advance by the progress made by 21st Division and will be prepared to pass through the 21st Division when ordered.

The position occupied by divisions subsequent to the relief of the American 105th Infantry Regiment and subsequent to the passage of the canal by 21st Division will therefore be:

38th Division main body in HINDENBURG System facing east on the front PIENNES-RANCOURT Farm, covered by advanced guard who will maintain touch on their right with American II Corps.

33d Division in support of 38th Division.

21st Division main bodies in HINDENBURG Line on the front RANCOURT Farm-BANTOUZELLE - covered by advanced guards who will maintain touch on their left with the advance of the IV Corps and on their right with 38th Division

17th Division in support of 21st Division.

6. The 38th and 21st Divisions will gain ground eastward as the situation allows, supporting divisions to conform and to keep themselves informed of the situation by close liaison.

7. The artillery arrangements in connection with the operations to be undertaken by the 38th Division will be as follows:

(i) On the completion of the operation for the capture of GONNELIEU:

(a) The 121st and 122d Brigade, R. F. A., will be withdrawn from the line and will revert to the 38th Division.

These brigades will assemble in the neighborhood of W.13.d. on the night 28/29.

(b) The B. G., C. H. A., will place one 6" howitzer battery directly under the orders of the C. R. A., 38th Division.

(c) The two mobile mortars of the 33d D. A. will be placed at the disposal of the C. R. A., 38th Division, who will find personnel and transport for them.

(ii) The 21st Division will then be covered by the 17th Divisional Artillery and the 94th Brigade (21st D. A.). These brigades will come under the command of the C. R. A., 21st D. A., at an hour to be notified later.

(iii) The 33d Division will be covered by the 33d D. A. and two brigades which are arriving from the IV Corps after the capture of their objectives on September 27.

The 33d Division will be responsible for assisting the advance of the 38th Division by direct fire against the HINDENBURG Line. Their artillery will for this purpose if necessary come down the forward slopes west of the canal on the assumption that the hostile artillery will have withdrawn.

8. One company 5th Cyclist Regiment (other than the company now attached to 21st and 33d Divisions) will be attached to 38th Division from 27th Instant, under arrange-
ments to be made direct between O. C., 5th Cyclist Regiment and Hq. 38th Division.

9. One section 183d Tunnelling Coy. R. E., will be attached to 38th Division for the detection of booby traps and one for the clearing of the wells in VENDHUILE and La TERRIERE, under the supervision of C. E., V Corps.

These sections will come under the orders of Hq. 38th Division from 28th Instant, under instructions to be issued by C. E., V Corps, and to be communicated by him to G. O. C., 38th Division.

10. The following will be the interdivisional boundary east of the Canal de l'ESCAUT: HONNECOURT---RANCOURT Farm Road---RANCOURT Farm---BONABUS Farm---Bois de Mortho (all inclusive to southern division sector), thence T.1.central to N.30.c.0.0.

These boundaries will in no way affect operations entailed by 38th and 33d Divisions in opening passages over the Canal de l'ESCAUT and will not come into force until after the 21st Division have established themselves in the HINDENBURG Line east of the canal.

11. Routes for supply will be:

33d and 38th divisions: FINS---EPEHY---LEMPIRE---VENDHUILE, until the crossings over the canal at HONNECOURT have been established when the route will be: FINS---PEIZIERE---VILLERS-GUISLAIN---HONNECOURT---La TERRIERE.

17th and 21st Divisions: FINS---GOUZEAUCOURT---thence-VILLERS-GUISLAIN or GONNELIEU to BANTOUZELLE.

Prior to the crossings at BANTOUZELLE being available, the route for supply of the 21st and 17th Divisions will cross to the east of the canal by the VILLERS-GUISLAIN---HONNECOURT Road.

12. To keep in touch with the progress made in throwing bridges at VENDHUILE, the G. O. C., 38th Division, will arrange to have a liaison officer attached to Hq. 18th Division. Similarly, to keep informed of the situation and progress made by the American 105th Regiment*, American II Corps, detailed to gain the dotted green line, the G. O. C., 38th Division, will attach a liaison officer to that regiment (Hq. regiment will be notified later).

These officers will be attached from the evening of Fourth Army Y day.

13. Acknowledge by wire.

R. H. MANGLES,
B. G., G. S., V. CORPS

Operations II Corps

V CORPS,
September 27, 1918,

G. S. 496/48

ADDENDUM No. 1 to V CORPS INSTRUCTIONS No. 3

1. (a) The 38th Division (less artillery) will now move to the HEUDICOURT---PEIZIERE---SOREL-le-GRAND area on 28th Inst., and will bivouac in that area night 28/29.

(b) The 38th Division will cross the Canal du NORD at MANANCOURT and will move via EQUANCOURT, FINS, HEUDECOURT, using tracks as far as possible.

* It will be noted that the American 105th Infantry during this period was serving under the American II Corps as part of its own---27th---Division, and that the British V Corps was instructed to take over that part of the American II Corps front which was held by the American 105th Infantry. Pars. 2,4, and 12 of the Instructions and Par. 3 of Addendum No. 1 are pertinent.
(c) Time of march of brigade groups is left to the discretion of G. O. C., 38th Division, and is to be reported to corps headquarters. Route for transport as already detailed.

(d) The artillery arrangements for 38th Division will be as laid down in V Corps Instructions No. 3, Para. 7.

2. The Brigade Group, 17th Division, at LESBOEUFS will now march to ROCQUIGNY on the afternoon of 28th Instant.

The 17th Division will from 11 a.m., September 29, remain in a state of readiness to move at two hours' notice.

Either (i) to the area DESSART Wood---FINS---EQUANCOURT or (ii) to the area HEUDECOURT---PEIZIERE---SOREL-le-GRAND as may be ordered.

3. (a) The 38th Division will relieve the American 105th Infantry Regt. on the green dotted line as soon as the necessary crossings at VENDHUILE are made available by III Corps.

(b) G. O. C., 38th Division, will be kept informed by Headquarters III Corps as to progress made in bridges and on receiving the word GO from III Corps will march on VENDHUILE.

(c) Should a message to this effect not be received by G. O. C., 38th Division, by 2 p.m., 29th Instant - the division will at this hour move east to a position of readiness between VENDHUILE and PEIZIERE. The leading brigade group should be located in the neighborhood of the Valley F.5.c. and b.---X.29.

The G. O. C., 38th Division, will by 12 noon, 29th Instant, establish his hq. at EPEHY (F.1.b.9.8.0.) and will open an advanced report center at a wireless station to be erected by 18th Division in the vicinity of VENDHUILE (location will be reported to 38th Division by 18th Division), so that a staff officer may keep in close touch with the progress made in the crossing, thus avoiding delay in continuing the advance across the canal directly when bridges are ready. A wireless station will (in addition to the above) be erected by 38th Division at EPEHY (F.1.b.8.0.) so as to pick up messages from the VENDHUILE station.

4. The advance of 38th Division east of PEIZIERE will be made by the CATELET Valley. Any guns or transport unable to move by this valley [or between it and the EPEHY---LEMPIRE---VENDHUILE Road] will necessarily have to move by the PEIZIERE---LEMPIRE---VENDHUILE Road. 38th Division transport moving by this road when once on it will clear the section between EPEHY and LEMPIRE as rapidly as possible as this section is required by the Australian corps. Should a delay in the VENDHUILE Canal crossings necessitate a halt, 38th Division transport moving by the road will be parked clear of the road between LEMPIRE and VENDHUILE.

5. To be prepared for hostile shelling formations passing through VENDHUILE will do so in small units at wide intervals.

6. A liaison officer from 38th Division will not now be required with Hq. 18th Division, III Corps.

7. (i) In conjunction with 18th Division, III Corps, mopping-up operations in the VENDHUILE area and north of it on Fourth Army Z day, the 33d Division will gain possession of the remainder of LARK SPUR and will push forward to the canal to east of LARK Spur with a view:

(a) To throwing bridges over the canal.

(b) To covering the movement of 38th Division on VENDHUILE via the CATELET Valley.

Scheme of operations to be coordinated by G. O. C., 33d Division, with G. O. C., 18th Division, III Corps.

(ii) As soon as a bridge is completed the 33d Division will pass a brigade across the canal and relieve the left brigade 38th Division.

(iii) The first position of the 38th Division on its relieving the American 105th Infantry Regt., will be as already laid down. On the relief of 38th Division left
brigade by a brigade 33d Division, the brigade so relieved will move in rear of the division and occupy AUBENCHEUL-aux-Bois. Meanwhile, the 33d Division will pass the remainder of the division across the canal under cover of the brigade already across and the 38th Division will capture La TERRIERE with its left.

(iv) The 33d Division will then relieve the 38th Division in La TERRIERE and will occupy the general line La TERRIERE-HONNECOURT, both inclusive.

(v) The 38th Division will then be on the general line La TERRIERE exclusive-AUBENCHEUL to the corps boundary, in touch with the left of the Fourth Army.

(vi) It will be the duty of the 33d Division to facilitate the passage over the canal by the 21st Division by attacking northwards towards S.3 and S.4 central should the resistance meet render such a move necessary.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. H. MANGLES,
B. G. G. S., V Corps.

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182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

G. S. 496/51

V CORPS,
September 27, 1918.

ADDENDUM No. 2 TO INSTRUCTIONS No. 3

1. Cancel Para. 11 and substitute new para. as under:
Par. 11. Routes for supply will be:
(a) For 38th Division, FINS---EPEHY---LEMPIRE---VENDHUILE until the crossings over the canal at HONNECOURT have been established.
(b) For 33d Division, and for 38th Division after the crossings over the canal at HONNECOURT have been established: FINS---PEIZIERE---VILLERS-GUISLAIN---HONNECOURT---La TERRIERE.
(c) 17th and 21st Divisions: FINS---GOZEAUCOURT---thence VILLERS-GUISLAIN or GONNELIEU to BANTOUZELLE.
Prior to the crossing at BANTOUZELLE being available, the route for supply of the 21st and 17th Divisions will cross to the east of the canal by the VILLERS-GUISLAIN---HONNECOURT Road.

2. Please acknowledge.

R. H. MANGLES,
B. G., G. S., V Corps.

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ADDENDUM No. 3 TO V CORPS INSTRUCTIONS No. 3

[Extract]

Reference Addendum No. 1 to V Corps Instructions No. 3, dated 27th Inst.

2. Reference Para. 4.
   The following forward route is being improved by III Corps: EPEHY---F.8.a.5.3.
   ---thence a cross-country track (marked III Corps route) via F.9.c. and d. to F.16.a.9.7.,
   thence along main road to VENDHUILE.
   This route from PEIZIERE to VENDHUILE will therefore be used by all guns and
   transport of 38th Division unable to move across country and the main road south of
   F.8.a.5.3. through RONSSOY will not be used.

3. Para. 7, Subpara. (i) delete "18th Division" and substitute "12th Division."

4. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

H. B. PEGRAM,
Capt., G. S.,
for
B. G., G. S., V Corps.

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Relief of 105th Infantry

Reference Para. 2, first sentence.
   The date of relief of American 105th Infantry Regiment of the dotted green line east
   of the Canal de l'ESCAUT by the 38th Division, is the night September 30/October 1.

R. H. MANGLES,
B. G., G. S., V Corps.

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II Corps: 182-32.7: Order

Operations III Corps

G. S. 496/50

Reference V Corps Instructions No. 2, Para. 4.  
The attack on the Brown Line will not take place on the night September 27/28.  
This operation will be carried out on night September 28/29, under instructions to be issued later.  
Acknowledge.

R. C. CHICHESTER-PONSTAKIE,  
Maj.,  
for  
B. G., G. S., V Corps.

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Gen. File 371.3: Letter

General Battle Instructions

FROM: Chief of Staff

TO: Commanding General, 30th Division, A. E. F.

1. In the various conferences of corps commanders held by the army commander, certain points have been brought up in discussion to which the corps commander desires the division commanders of this corps to give special consideration. While these matters have been covered to some extent in training and in some cases covered in orders issued from corps and division headquarters, further attention is invited to the following, and it is desired that division commanders issue further instructions and take the necessary steps to insure their being sufficiently impressed upon all ranks to which they pertain.

2. Use enough troops to accomplish mission successfully but no more. Any troops considered surplus should be disposed in reserve in suitable areas and formations to minimize losses. These reserves must not be so far to the rear that they cannot be put into the action in time to meet emergency.

3. Teamwork important: Every unit down to platoon and every officer and man must have a specific task assigned, and this task must be accomplished by each one with precision and accuracy. Each commander must exercise close supervision over this in the next lower command, i.e., the company commander for his platoons, the battalion commander for his companies, and so on.

4. Limited objectives must not be passed until orders are received from competent authority. A violation of this rule makes the coordination between the various arms impossible and interferes with the plans of the high command.

5. Make sure that orders reach everybody in sufficient time, down to the men in ranks.

6. Troops must be fully instructed in use of signals, e.g., the success signal; the signals by flare and disk by front line troops to airplanes, upon call.
7. Information, both positive and negative, must be sent back from the front line frequently. If there is nothing positive, send report to that effect at least once every hour.

8. All commanders must give the closest attention to keeping their men fit. The men must have food and sleep. Arrangements must be effective for getting food to front line, hot if possible. The men must have sleep before going into action, if they are to be fresh and fit for their maximum effort.

9. In all actions there are several phases. After one phase is fully launched, commanders should think ahead of all the details of the next phase so as to be prepared to launch it according to plan.

10. Traffic control in the battle area is of great importance. The highest discipline is necessary upon the part of all, including staff officers. Road march discipline must be strictly enforced and the rules obeyed by all.

11. In the front areas, movement must be restricted to necessities. Officers and men off duty must not be permitted to wander about the areas. All movement assists the enemy's observation service.

12. In the attack, each unit, down to the company and platoon, must have its specific objective and must maintain its proper direction. This applies to units of each successive line. Prominent landmarks will be of assistance in maintaining direction.

13. Before an attack is made upon a trench system of the enemy, the wire is either destroyed by our artillery or lanes are cut through the wire and information given to our infantry of the location of such lanes. Lanes through the wire are also made by tanks when tanks are used in an attack. None the less, sufficient wire cutters must be carried by the infantry.

14. The attacking line is followed by mopping-up troops. Each unit for this mopping-up must be specially designated for this duty and must be given a specific section for which it will be directly and fully responsible. Each mopping-up unit must confine itself strictly to carrying out its own special mission. Under no circumstances will a mopping-up unit leave its special task until it receives orders to do so from higher authority.

15. Towns, villages, and groups of buildings encountered in an advance to the line of the main objective should be flanked and encircled, according to the principles of attacking machine-gun nests and strong points. A frontal attack would generally be too costly.

16. It must be a point of honor with every officer and group leader of the II Corps to accomplish his individual mission with the least cost. The preservation of the manpower of the nation is a primary obligation. The preservation of the lives of our comrades, as far as this may be done in carrying out our respective mission, is a sacred duty. Bold aggressiveness, combined with commonsense prudence in using cover and open formations will generally result in success at the minimum cost.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.
Battle Dispositions 27th and 30th Divisions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATIONS SECTION

[Extract]

1. The following decisions of the Australian corps commander given at the conference held at Australian corps headquarters today are promulgated.

2. FIELD ARTILLERY BARRAGE: The barrage programme will be as follows:
   - The barrage will come down on the artillery start line at zero.
   - The first lift will be at zero plus 3 minutes.
   - The barrage will creep forward at the rate of 100 yards every 3 minutes up to and including the sixth lift. From the seventh lift inclusive, the barrage will advance at the rate of 100 yards every 4 minutes (vide barrage map). There will be a halt for 15 minutes on a line approximately 500 yards east of the canal.
   - The final protective barrage at the end of the field artillery barrage programme will continue for 15 minutes.
   - Normal S. O. S. Arrangements: The normal arrangements for S. O. S. will be inoperative from zero minus 15 minutes onwards.

3. ACTION IN CASE OF ENEMY BOMBARDMENT: In the event of the enemy opening a heavy bombardment prior to zero, G. O. C., R. A., will arrange for an artillery counterattack on enemy batteries.
   - A scheme will be prepared to put this into operation.

4. ARMING OF TECHNICAL TROOPS: All technical troops employed in the preparation of the roads will be armed and equipped with ammunition.

5. COOPERATION WITH III CORPS: The American 27th Division will not pass the Green Dotted Line east of the canal before 11 a. m. After 11 a. m., III Corps is arranging to lift all heavy artillery fire north and east of the Red Line.
   - Arrangements will be made direct between American 27th Division and the right flank division of the IX Corps for one company of troops of the IX Corps to advance with C Regiment, American 27th Division, with the object of working northwards on the eastern side of and along the canal.

6. COOPERATION WITH IX CORPS: Twenty-four tanks for employment with the right divisions of the IX Corps will move across the canal between the entrance to the tunnel and the Black Road.
   - Arrangements are being made for these tanks to carry a distinguishing flag.
   - They will advance across the Green Line at 11 a. m.

7. WHIPPET TANKS: All Whippet tanks above the total already allotted to the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions and the 12th Armoured Car Battalion will be held in corps reserve under the orders of G. O. C., 5th Tank Brigade.

* * * * *

GEO. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.,
Commanding.

- 182 -
Assignment of Tank Units to 27th and 30th Divisions

Memorandum G-3
No. 1

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

September 27, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATIONS, SECT. 5., AMENDMENT No. 1

TANKS

1. Tanks are allotted as follows:
   4th Tank Brigade:
   (i) 1st Tank Battalion:
       3 sections each of 4 tanks, total 12 tanks, to each of A and B Regiments of American 30th Division.
       2 sections each of 5 tanks, total 10 tanks, to C Regiment of the American 30th Division.
       Total allotment to American 30th Division - 34 tanks.
   (ii) American 301st Battalion - total 47 tanks.
       3 sections each of 5 tanks, total 15 tanks, to each of A and B Regiments of American 27th Division.
       2 sections each of 5 tanks, total 10 tanks, to C Regiment of American 27th Division.
       Total allotment to American 27th Division - 40 tanks.
   (iii) Australian Corps Reserve.
       4th Tank Battalion - 2 companies each of 12 tanks, total 24 tanks, and 7 tanks of the American 301st Battalion.

   One company of the 4th Tank Battalion is detailed for employment in the preliminary minor operation and the total numbers of tanks as laid down for this battalion may not be available for the main operation.

2. TANKS IN CORPS RESERVE: The tanks retained in corps reserve are to remain under the command of tank brigade commanders.

   They are to be moved forward the night after the battle to suitable lying-up positions from which it will be convenient to advance to the battle front.

3. MOPPING UP OF TUNNEL: The tanks allotted to infantry units detailed for the mopping up of the tunnel will be given the most stringent orders to ensure that they carry out this role thoroughly and do not advance beyond the Tunnel Line except to deal with dugout entrances, etc., leading into the tunnel.

4. ASSEMBLY 4th TANK BRIGADE:
   (a) Lying-up Positions: Lying-up positions for tanks detailed to the first phase of the operations have been selected in E.15.d. (for American 301st Battalion) and K.11.b. (for 1st Tank Battalion). They will occupy their lying-up positions on X/Y night. On X/Y night, they will move forward from their lying-up places to starting points at zero minus 6 hours. They will move with full engines to positions not nearer to their starting points than 3,000 yards. Thence forward they will continue the movement to the tank start line at a slow rate and as quietly as possible.
       Starting points will be fixed approximately 1,000 yards in rear of the infantry taped line.
       Tanks will leave their starting points at such times as will ensure that they arrive on the infantry forming-up line at zero.
   (b) Concealment of Engine Noise: To conceal the noise of the engines during the advance of the tanks to the zero line, the 5th Brigade, R. A. F., is arranging to have aeroplanes flying continuously over the corps area from zero minus 6 hours onwards to zero.
5. REASSEMBLY:
Tanks detailed to the first phase of the operation: Tanks detailed to the first phase of the operation will be reassembled under arrangements to be made between G. O. C., 4th Tank Brigade and divisional commanders, as soon as the battle troops and tanks detailed for the second phase have passed the green line.
Divisional commanders will ensure that tanks allotted to the mopping up of the tunnel are not withdrawn until the mopping up is completed.

6. LIASON: Tank brigade commanders have been instructed to see that each division deals with one tank commander only.
Tank battalion commanders detailed to the various divisions should be put in direct touch with divisional commanders as early as possible.

7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GEO. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.,
Commanding.

182-33.3: Instructions

Flank Action

MEMORANDUM G-3
No. 1

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATIONS SECT. 13.

1. SOUTH FLANK:
   (i) Limit of Artillery Barrage: The artillery barrage will extend south to the line Sq. G.21.a.00.75---G.21.d.00.10., vide map issued with F. O. No. 16.
   (ii) Action West of Canal:
      (a) Infantry Action: The infantry attack west of the canal will extend southwards as far as the line of the field artillery barrage.
      (b) Smoke Screen: The area between the line and the southern corps boundary (the grid line Sq. G.20.central---Sq. G.22.cent.), as far east as the canal will be kept under a heavy smoke screen by No. 4 Special Company, R. E.
   (iii) Action East of Canal:
      (a) The first objective of C Regiment, American 30th Division will be the Green Dotted Line as shown on the map issued with F. O. No. 16.
      (b) Arrangements have been made with IX Corps for all artillery fire west and north of this line to cease at 8 a. m., by which time troops would be in position to push southward.
      (c) Troops of American 30th Division will not advance from the Green to the Red Line before 11 a. m. After this hour, artillery fire of IX Corps will lift clear of the area between the Green and Red Line.
      (d) Exploitation to the Dotted Red Line will only be necessary in the event of troops of IX Corps being unable to force the passage of the canal.
The closest liaison will be necessary between the British 46th Division and the commander of C Regiment, American 30th Division, to ensure that the troops of the two formations do not come into conflict, and at the same time, to ensure that no opportunity be lost of clearing the passage across the canal.
      (e) The artillery smoke barrage on the flank will be timed to lift southwards in accordance with the above.
(iv) Arrangements will be made direct between G. O. C., American 30th Division and G. O. C., British 46th Division, for the passage of tanks of III Corps between the southern exit of the tunnel and Black Road.

2. NORTH FLANK:
   West of the Canal:
   (i) The III Corps will advance at zero in cooperation with American 27th Division. Its objective will be a line to be selected to cover the flank of the 27th Division. It is not intended that the III Corps shall enter the village of VENDHUILE during the first phase.
      (a) American 27th Division will give right of way to troops of III Corps division to form up in rear of American 27th Division in the vicinity of The Knoll, to permit of the attack being developed in a northeasterly direction down the spur running through Square A. 1.
   (ii) East of the Canal: The Green Dotted Line shown on the map issued with F. O. No. 16, will be the first objective of C Regiment, American 27th Division. The Red Line allotted to American 27th Division will be the line of Exploitation.

ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

GEO. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.

182-33.3: Instructions

Allocation of Guns

MEMORANDUM G-3
No. 1

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR OPERATIONS

SECTION 15

Action of machine guns during the attack will be as follows:

1. Regimental machine gun companies with their respective regiments.
2. Brigade machine gun battalions on barrage as indicated on attached map. Hour of commencing, lift, and cessation of barrage will be furnished later.*
3. The divisional machine gun battalions are placed at the disposal of the respective regimental commanders detailed to exploit the flanks. The machine gun battalion commanders will report accordingly not later than 12 noon, D-1 day.

* To 27th and 30th Divisions only.
NOTE: On completion of barrage, the four brigade machine gun battalions will assemble in selected areas and become divisional reserve for their respective divisions.

GEO. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.,
Commanding.

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227-32.1: Order

American II Corps Affiliated with Australian Corps.

FIELD ORDER
No. 49

[Extract]

1. (a) GENERAL OBJECT OF THE OFFENSIVE: The American II Corps affiliated with the Australian corps will attack in the general direction GOUY-NAUROY on a date and at an hour to be specified later. The corps will attack with two divisions (27th on the left, 30th on the right).

After the penetration of the HINDENBURG Line, the divisions will push on to the first objective indicated by the Green Line on the map. The front line divisions (27th and 30th) will move forward in the given sector and capture the 1st objective indicated by the Green Line east of the sector GOUY-NAUROY.

As soon as this objective is taken by the 27th and 30th Divisions, the Australian 3d Division on the left and the Australian 5th Division on the right will immediately pass through the front line American divisions and capture the 2d objective, indicated by the Red Line.

GENERAL PLAN:
(a) There will be a preliminary bombardment lasting for a considerable period. The British 18th Division on the left of our corps will simultaneously attack, as far as the canal.
(b) The operation will be divided into two phases, the boundaries and objectives being shown on accompanying map. Our corps will complete the first phase, the Australians, the second phase.
(c) First Phase: The 54th Infantry Brigade (with part of the 53d Infantry Brigade following in rear of its left flank) will form up on a taped line prior to zero hour and, with tanks, will attack under a creeping shrapnel, H. E. and smoke barrage. On the map the start line is shown in Brown and the objective in continuous Green Line.
(d) Second Phase: The Australian 3d Division with its own artillery and tanks will pass through the 54th Infantry brigade in open warfare formations at a time to be decided later. Their objective is shown in Red on map.

In order to secure the left flank of this operation and extend the base of the salient thus created, reserve troops of the 27th Division will extend their operations to the north to secure the objective shown in Red on map. A proportion of artillery and tanks will support this movement.
The 54th Infantry Brigade will be reassembled after the whole of the Australian 3d Division have passed through their line.

(e) The program will be so arranged that two attacking brigade groups of the Australian 3d Division will pass through the 54th Infantry Brigade as soon as possible after the latter have attained the first (Green) objective. These two brigades will follow the 105th Infantry allotted to turn north and secure the left flank. The reserve brigades of the Australian 3d Division will then follow their advance brigades. The last infantry to cross the tunnel from the west to the east, will be the 106th Infantry in reserve.

The order of movement across the tunnel will therefore be:

1st 54th Infantry Brigade,
2d 105th Infantry,
3d Attacking brigades of Australian 3d Division,
4th Brigade in reserve of Australian 3d Division,
5th 106th Infantry. This regiment will be concentrated immediately after the Australian brigade has passed through and will then move according to orders from Commanding General, 27th Division.

* * * * *

227-32.1: Order

Plan of Communication, Supply, and Evacuation

ORDERS 27th DIVISION, A. E. F., September 27, 1918.
No. 95

Reference Maps: 62C 1-40,000
62B 1-40,000

[Extract]

1. Broad-Gauge Railroads:
   Ammunition TINCOURT
   Supplies TINCOURT
   R. E. Stores ROISEL
   Personnel La CHAPEL

2. Roads:
   (a) The 4 main roads will be developed for traffic in the corps area. These roads from right to left (south to north) are known as the BLACK, RED, YELLOW, and BLUE Roads respectively. They will be respectively marked on the ground by signboards, painted in the same sequence of colors.
   
   The BLUE and YELLOW Roads are included in boundaries of this division as is also portion of the RED Road. Of these roads, the RED and YELLOW will probably be developed into M. T. roads. BLACK is not likely to be suitable for any but pedestrian and horse transport traffic.
(b) The course of the roads included in 27th Division area is as follows:

Reading from south to north: RED Road from BELLICOURT diagonally across the Square A.29. from southwest to northeast with one branch to MONT-St-MARTIN (A.18.d. 0.5.) and another branch across Squares A.30 and B.25 ESTREES.

The course of YELLOW Road, LONGAVESNES---VILLERS-FAUCON---RONSSOY---F.22.a.8.9.---F.30.a.5.0.---southern limits of village at A.15.central---MONT-St-MARTIN (A.18. central).

The course of BLUE Road, LIERAMONT---northern edge VILLERS-FAUCON---E.10.c.0.9.---F.8.a.6.3.---BASSE-BOULOGNE---LEMPIRE---eastward to Farm A.13.b.central---northern edge of village at A.15.central---Le CATELET-GOUY and eastward to B.8.a.0.5.

(c) It is anticipated that all roads named will be suitable for the use of horse-drawn artillery as far east as the Le CATELET line by 9 a. m. on zero day.

d) Tanks will use YELLOW Road.

Light tanks will, whenever practicable, move close and not entirely on these roads.

(e) In order to consolidate an alternative marching track for infantry, the following is assignment of roads in this divisional area to battle troops and the order of movement in each case:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROAD</th>
<th>Unit Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YELLOW</td>
<td>A Regiment of American 54th Brigade (As far as start line only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Car Battalion (throughout).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A Brigade Group of Aust. 3d Div., with artillery (throughout)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLUE</td>
<td>B Regiment of American 54th Brigade (As far as start line only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B Brigade Group of Aust. 3d Div., with artillery (throughout)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RED</td>
<td>D Regiment of American 53d Brigade (throughout)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reserve brigade group of Aust. 3d Div. (throughout)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No units of this division will move by RED ROAD.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(f) The following timetable will control use of these roads by units to which allotted.

1. Units of this division have right of way and preferential use of all roads, as far east as the Start line, up to zero hour on zero day. After that hour, no troops of the division other than D Regiment, are to use any of these roads.

2. From zero hour on zero day, the above roads east of the Start line, will be under the exclusive control of the engineers and pioneers until 9 a. m. No traffic of any description, other than for the service of these engineers and pioneers and urgent signal traffic, may use these roads east of the Start line going east before 9 a. m.

3. During the remainder of the zero day, troops will have right of precedence on those 4 roads for the whole length in the following order:

   - Between 9 a. m. and 11 a.m. - Artillery detailed to support American O Regiment, east of the line, LEMPIRE-HARGICOURT.
   - Between 11 a.m. and 12 noon - Australian 3d and 5th Divisions, reserve brigades followed by D Regiment, American division.
   - After 2 p.m. - Cavalry brigade on RED ROAD only.

4. Tanks will have precedence of all other traffic on the YELLOW ROADS.

   If the artillery detailed to support American C Regiment require to move east of the canal to carry out their task, they will have precedence at 9 a. m. on BLUE ROAD.
No M. T. or tractor-drawn artillery may use any of these roads until after 5 p.m. on zero day. One or more of these roads will be assigned for use of heavy artillery according to the situation.

(b) The existing M. T. roads and M. T. circuits, ROISEL---HARGICOURT---RONSSOY---VILLERS-FAUCON---LONGAVESNES---TINCOURT are to be put in order for work on zero day. Until orders issued at a latter date, M. T. will not proceed beyond above circuit.

Horse transport will not use traffic circuit as above, but will use the horse transport roads and dry weather tracks in the forward area.

No horse transport other than artillery, to be forward of the line JEAN-COURT---HARGICOURT---RONSSOY---LEMPIRE until 8 p.m. on zero day.

Horse transport will use the RED, YELLOW and BLUE tactical road, but will give way in every case to the troops and artillery having priority over these roads.

Motor transport roads will be indicated by a white rectangular notice board bearing the black letters, H. T.

3. TRAFFIC CONTROL: The responsibility for the traffic control in this division will rest with Australian 3d Division, assisted by A. P. M. and personnel of Military Police, 27th Division.

Traffic posts will be double (1 Australian and 1 American) as far east as the line, LEMPIRE-HARGICOURT, beyond which traffic control will be single (Australian personnel only). Special precautions will be observed for efficient traffic control on the tactical roads (BLUE, YELLOW and RED).

Only forward traffic uses the roads and empty traffic, dry weather tracks along side. Traffic instructions relating to direction of traffic on circuits, double banking and avoidance by H. T. of the M. T. circuit will be strictly observed and enforced.

Special regulations for traffic control on tactical roads BLUE and YELLOW are as follows:

No traffic of any description other than urgent signal traffic, will be permitted on any of these roads after 9 a.m.

Roads west of the Start line will be kept clear of all traffic after zero hour, except for battle troops, in accordance with timetable as per Par. 2 (f).

No transverse crossing of any of these roads, from north to south, or vice versa, will be permitted on zero day, except for single vehicles or single tanks or small bodies of troops. All north and south traffic must give way to, and avoid blocking, all east-bound traffic.

Tanks moving east to assembly positions or moving west to rallying points, must keep clear of these roads and must not cross them unless absolutely unavoidable.

PART II SUPPLIES [Details omitted here]

PART III EVACUATION

1. Medical Arrangements:
   Advance Dressing Station - Ste-EMILIE Route via VILLERS-FAUCON to Main Dressing Station - LONGAVESNES thence over to Casualty Clearing Station at - TINCOURT or DOINGT.

2. Veterinary Arrangements:
   Mobile Veterinary Section - At LONGAVESNES (E.19.d.2.3.) Veterinary Evacuation Station - At TINCOURT (J.29.c.5.5.)

Units will evacuate the 105th Mobile Veterinary Section, conducting parties turning over animals to mobile veterinary section will then rejoin their units.
3. PRISONERS OF WAR:

Divisional Cage at F.26.d.3.8.
Corps Cage at K.10.central.

Commanding officer, military police, will detail suitable number of his command for the collection of prisoners and for their escort to corps cage. Prisoners en route to corps cage must not be delayed nor employed, except may be utilized for one trip only for carrying wounded men toward the rear. Under no circumstances will prisoners of war be taken back toward the front to make a second trip with wounded.

4. STRAGGLERS POSTS: In conjunction with the Australian 3rd Division, personnel of the 102d Military Police will establish suitable straggler posts; each half American, half Australian, along the line, VILLERET---HARGICOURT---RONSSOY---LEMPIRE---F.4.c.8.0.

Later, a line of straggler posts is to be established by the Australian 3rd Division, along the BELLICOURT-Le CATELET Road.

Sufficient number of military police will be maintained at advance dressing station as a straggler collecting post, to direct unwounded men back to their units and usual functions of such a post.

5. SALVAGE: Under direction of Salvage Officer, II Corps, American E. F., Salvage Co. 16, will collect and evacuate all salvable articles from camps, huts, areas or positions which have been occupied by units of this division.

6. CAPTURED TROPHIES: By arrangement between II Corps, American E. F., and Australian corps, captured trophies are to be considered with reference to areas in which operations have been conducted and trophies of war are to be allotted to formations to which has been assigned the task of capturing a specified area or objective.

7. SANITATION: Special steps will be taken to ensure that adequate sanitary arrangements are immediately made by every unit occupying a forward position and that action is taken to provide for any fouling of the ground that occurs.

Commanding officers of all organizations are charged with directing attention to the foregoing for strict compliance by all personnel and any recommendations of a medical officer on the subject.

Sanitary appliances are available for issue at all engineer dumps.

Supply officers will apply to the nearest engineer dump for the necessary material for the construction of latrines, etc.

8. DISPOSAL OF THE DEAD: Australian 3rd Division is to be responsible for clearing the battlefield in this divisional area.

Commanding Officers of 105th, 106th, 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments, will each detail the following personnel, with full equipment and 2 days' rations:

- 1 Sergeant
- 3 Squads

to report at 10 a.m., on Sept. 28, to division burial officer at Ste-EMILIE, at advance dressing station. This personnel will work with the burial party of the Australian 3rd Division and will be responsible for the burial of all American dead, make the prescribed records and observe all regulations.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

Prisoners' statements:

A sergeant of the 84th I. R. (54th Division), 3d Battalion, 10th Company, states regiment relieved 446th I. R. night of 24/25. Occupy sector directly west of Le CATELET. Thinks one battalion in line and two battalions in reserve. Battalion front about 400 meters. Company strength about 80 or 90 men. 3d Battalion in line at present, consisting of 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Companies. Prisoner had not seen guard division reported to be in this sector. The reason for holding the line with only one battalion, is, that the line is held strongly on both sides.

A corporal of same unit states each unit (company) had 2 heavy and 6 light trench mortars and 2 heavy and 6 light machine guns. States that Allied artillery prevents new work from being done in the HINDENBURG Line. States that there is water in the canal.

Officer of the 84th I. R. states there was a shortage of ammunition because the supplies failed to come up last night. The attack was a complete surprise.

Enemy order of battle, north to south: 84th I. R., 27th I. R., 90th I. R.

Prisoners state division came from south of St-QUENTIN where they were in reserve. Have not been in front line for one month and then in the vicinity of LASSIGNY. Also state that they had no knowledge of American troops occupying this sector.

NOTE ON GERMAN 54th DIVISION:

German 54th Division was in rest near La VALLEE in the Eighteenth Army. It was reported at rest on September 16 and was then classed as a tired division.

On September 10, the 54th Division was withdrawn from the line. On September 4, the 27th R. I. R. was near SELENCY. On September 3, the 84th I. R. was in the line at MONT-SIMEON [SIMON?]. On August 30, this division was in front of BEAULIEU.

During period September 3-8, the 54th Division came from reserve to north of the OISE, relieving the 105th Division.

DIVISION IS CLASSED AS TIRED.

A. B. PETERSON,
1st Lieut, Div. Int. Officer.
6. According to a pre-arranged schedule, our front was advanced approximately 200 yards on a 1,500 yard front. Objective reported gained at 1:35 a.m.

10. Enemy made a daylight raid on trench occupied by the 1st Battalion at A.26.d.1.0. This resulted in the loss of 1 Lewis gun and 1 man missing. One of the enemy was killed in our counterattack, which was launched immediately, and he was subsequently identified as private in 258th R. I. R.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

Synchronization of Time

1. Synchronization of time: A staff officer will leave division hq. at 1 p.m. and 6 p.m. with watch synchronized at these times with the rated watch of a staff officer of the Australian corps, and will visit the Hq. of the 59th and 60th Brigades. A staff officer of each brigade will then visit each regimental hq. with a rated watch, and regimental hq. will similarly send a staff officer to battalion hq. with rated watch.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.
Artillery Instructions

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No. 4

[Extract]

1. Artillery: The offensive movement outlined in Battle Instructions No. 1 will have a most powerful artillery support by both field and heavy artillery. Destructive fire against the enemy's defenses and counterbattery fire will commence 48 hours prior to Z day. Lanes in the wire will be cut by both heavy and field artillery at places marked on map already furnished. The lighter wire of the minor trench system in front of the main HINDENBURG Line will be cut by trench mortars.

The S. O. S. signal becomes inoperative 15 minutes before zero. The field artillery barrage comes down on a line approximately 200 yards in front of the infantry departure line, and remains there for three minutes. It then progresses for the first 6 lifts at the rate of 10 yards in three minutes, and after that 100 yards in four minutes. This marks the rate of the infantry advance and infantry success depends upon hugging the barrage. Previous instructions given in Appendix No. 1, Battle Instructions No. 1, that the leading wave would follow tanks at a distance of 70 yards, are accordingly revoked; safety from counterattack is only possible when infantry closely follows the barrage, irrespective of the action of tanks.

After crossing the canal the barrage halts for 15 minutes on a line about 500 yards east of the canal tunnel. After crossing the divisional boundary the barrage halts on a line about 400 yards east of the objective for the same length of time. The barrage will arrive at this line at zero plus 3 hours and 20 minutes. All artillery fire will be off the area east of the canal between the Green Dotted Line and the divisional boundary by 8 a. m. Artillery fire north of the Red Line lifts at 11 a. m.

2. Machine Guns: The division machine gun battalion is assigned to the 117th Infantry (C Regiment). One company of this battalion will be assigned to the company of the 117th Inf, designated to the special mission of cleaning up the triangle included between the southern boundary of the Australian corps, the northern boundary of the IX Corps and the canal.

The brigade machine gun battalions will be grouped under corps orders for the purpose of delivering overhead covering fire. They will deliver two bands of fire, the first on the HINDENBURG Line and next on the tunnel.

After the completion of their task they will be assembled in rear of their fire positions ready to move forward upon receipt of orders from these headquarters.

The regimental machine gun companies will be employed under the direction of the regimental commanders.

The division machine-gun officer will arrange for telephonic communications with his command post (L.14.c.3.0.).

* * * * *

5. Special Instruction to Attacking Troops: Each company commander will detail an officer or noncommissioned officer whose duty it will be to march on the flank of the first wave for the purpose of preserving proper direction. This officer or noncommissioned officer should be provided with a compass and should be given accurate compass directions. A second noncommissioned officer should be told off to replace this detail in the event of his becoming a casualty.
6. The 117th Inf. will not advance beyond the amended Green Dotted Line before 11 a.m. This regiment is also forbidden to advance beyond the Red Line unless requested to do so by the 46th Division. Tanks assigned to the 117th Inf. go with the regiment and must keep off the roads. 24 tanks belonging to the IX Corps will pass through this regiment on their way to the front. These tanks will display a special flag for identification. This regiment will take care to connect up with the Australian 5th Division on the Red Line. The Australian division will occupy the Red Line shown on the map directly east of the objective of our main attack. The Australian division expects to cross our objective, the Green Line, at 11 a.m. Maps showing amended line referred to above have been issued to organizations concerned.

7. Road Traffic and Troop Movements: A traffic map has been issued showing 2 roads running approximately east and west between our present area and Bellicourt. The southern, or Black Road runs from Roisel-Hervilly southern edge, Hesbecourt southern edge, Villeret to Bellicourt. A northern, or Red, road from Roisel to Templeux-Hargicourt to north edge of Bellicourt and then northeast. These roads will be used as follows:
   (a) This division has right-of-way and preferential use of both roads as far east as the Start line up to zero hour on zero day. After that hour no troops, except the 118th Inf., can use either road. This regiment follows in rear of the reserve brigade, Australian 5th Division, in the Black (southern) Road across the canal.
   (b) From zero hour on zero day, these roads east of the Start line will be under the exclusive control of the engineers and pioneers until 9 a.m. No traffic of any description, except for the service of these engineers and pioneers and urgent signal traffic, may use these roads east of the Start line going west before 9 a.m.
   (c) In moving up to the start line, the 120th Inf. will use the Black Road, and the 119th Inf., the Red Road.
   (d) All north and south traffic must give way to avoid blocking east-bound traffic.

John K. Herr,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

American and British Dispositions for Attack

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No. 5

1. The Commanding Officer, 117th Inf., will assign one company of infantry, with one machine gun company of the 113th M. G. Bn. attached, to the special mission of cleaning up the triangle formed by the southern boundary of the advancing barrage, the northern boundary of the IX Corps and the canal.

2. This company will form for attack on that portion of the tape line between the northern boundary of the IX Corps and the 120th Inf. This company will be under the command of the Commanding Officer, right battalion, 120th Inf., for the purpose of forming up and until the attack is launched. Accomplishment of this special mission will then rest entirely with the commanding officer of the infantry company.
3. The troops of the IX Corps on the right start at the same hour 1,000 yards in advance with their left on the northern boundary of the IX Corps, and special care must be exercised that no fire is directed south of the IX Corps boundary.

4. In this advance barrage cannot be put down on the entire area on account of danger to IX Corps troops, and a portion of smoke shells will be used to conceal the advance.

5. A liaison party of one officer, one noncommissioned officer and twenty men from the 46th Div. has been detailed to accompany this attack.

6. Upon completion of this mission the command will cover the advance of the 117th Inf. with machine-gun and rifle fire, after which it will rejoin the 117th Inf. east of the canal.

7. No fire will be directed south of the Red Line.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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230-32.11: Order

Signal Instructions

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
September 27, 1918.

Signal Instructions No. 1

Ref. Map 62-C N. E. and 62-B N. W., 1/20,000

LOCATION:

1. Division forward message center - L.10.a.1.4.
   Right regimental forward message center - G.11.a.1.1.
   Left regimental forward message center - G.4.b.2.3.
   Locations of flank regimental forward message centers will be communicated to all concerned.

MEANS OF COMMUNICATION:

2. (a) Telegraph and telephone.
   (b) Wireless and T. P. S.
   (c) Dispatch riders, runners, cyclists, and mounted D. R.'s.
   (d) Visual.
   (e) Rockets, message.
   (f) Pigeons (limited supply).
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE:

3. Telegraph and telephone to brigades and forward message center, telephone and buzzer-phones to regiments and battalions.

WIRELESS:

4. Wilson set at forward message center, trench sets at div. P. C., brigades, and regiments. The trench set with the 60th Brigade will be withdrawn and is allotted to the 119th Infantry for use at their regimental forward message center. C. O., Co. A, 105th Field Signal Bn. will arrange details.

A trench set will be installed at the 2d Advanced Division Message Center at G.10.b.35.50.

The trench set of the 117th Infantry will be established at the regimental forward message center of the 120th Infantry at G.11.a.1.1. This set will handle all traffic for the 117th and 120th Infantry. The wireless personnel with equipment will report to the Regimental Signal Officer, 120th Infantry at 6 p. m., Y/Z night.

The trench set at 118th Infantry will be established at the Hq. of the 117th Infantry at G.17.b.4.3. Personnel of the 118th Infantry to report to the Regimental Signal Officer, 117th Infantry at 6 p. m., X/Y night.

T. P. S. will be established at the battalion forward command posts of the assaulting battalion (which will be established in the vicinity of the regimental forward message center). This set will communicate with the sets taken forward by the assaulting companies of their respective battalions. IMPORTANT: All radio and T. P. S. stations, this division, will be required to close station on signal repeated from corps headquarters dispatch riders.

5. Motorcyclists to brigades and regiments. No timetable will be issued during the operation. They will run as required.

VISUAL:

6. Central division visual station at G.14.c.4.7. This station will be connected to division forward message center. Stations forward of regiments will be established under regimental arrangements. These stations will communicate to division visual station who will transmit all traffic to addresses.

MESSAGE ROCKETS:

7. Receiving stations will be selected by regimental signal officers who will notify their positions to all concerned. Lookout men will be on duty throughout the operation. Allotment of rockets as follows:

- 4 to each battalion
- 2 to each company
- more are available if required.

These rockets will mainly be used to cover barraged areas and are alternative means of communication only.

PIGEONS:

8. Ten pair are available and are allotted as follows:

- 2 pr. to each assaulting battalion
- 1 pr. to exploiting battalions of 117th Infantry.

These birds will be delivered to regiments from division. Regiments will make own arrangements for delivery to battalions.

FORWARD CIRCUITS:

9. At the regimental forward message center the following circuits will be connected to this switchboard:

- 1. Advance regimental hq. to regimental forward station.
  (1 pr. laid and maintained by regimental signal personnel)
2. Artillery brigade liaison circuit. (Laid and maintained by artillery signal personnel)
3. If necessary, heavy artillery liaison circuit (laid and maintained by heavy artillery signal section).
4. One circuit to each battalion forward command post of the assaulting battalion (laid and maintained by regimental signal personnel).
5. Laterals to flanking regiments. (Each regiment lays and maintains from right to left)

STORES:
10. A dump of cable and signal stores will be established at the division forward message center. Lieut. Eppler, 105th F. Signal Bn. will be in charge.

ACCUMULATOR CHARGING ARRANGEMENTS:
11. A charging set will be established at the division forward message center.

CARRYING PARTY:
12. A carrying party of one N. C. O. and six men should be made available and should report to officer in charge of report center. Artillery to make own arrangements for carrying parties for carrying accumulators.

MAINTENANCE:
13. Divisional linemen will be posted as follows:
4 at division message center.
4 at each brigade.
2 at each regiment.
2 at K.12.d.3.0.)
) Relay posts.
2 at L.9.c.7.8. )
118th Infantry signal personnel will maintain forward of hq. of regiments in trenches after zero hour. Assaulting regiment will maintain forward of old front line.

AEROPLANE CODE CALLS:
1st Battalion K. T. 1st Battalion L. T.
2d Battalion K. V. 2d Battalion L. V.
3d Battalion K. W. 3d Battalion L. W.
118th Inf. Regt. K. B. 120th Inf. Regt. L. B.
1st Battalion K. X. 1st Battalion L. X.
2d Battalion K. Y. 2d Battalion L. Y.
3d Battalion K. Z. 3d Battalion L. Z.

DROPPING STATIONS:
15. An aeroplane dropping station will be established at K.11.c.9.8. zero hour onwards. Division Signal X will be displayed when plane calls.

J. G. TAYLOR,
Lt. Colonel, U. S. A.,
Chief Signal Officer.
1. The Australian corps carried out a successful minor operation against the HINDE­
BURG outpost line this morning to improve their position in the HARGICOURT sector with a
view to future operations. GUILLEMONTE and QUENNEMONT Farms were captured together with
a number of prisoners.

The operation provoked a very heavy bombardment of the front line lasting for a
short period after which the enemy's artillery activity was restricted to the normal
harassing fire and shelling of back areas with long-range guns.

2. III CORPS: With the exception of minor patrol encounters in the vicinity of
DADOS Loop the day passed quietly.

IX CORPS: Posts were established at S.9.d.2.7., S.9.d.5.7. and S.10.a.1.3.
southeast of SELENCY. Patrols were active throughout the day exploiting the high ground
in S.10.c. and gained a little ground.

Hostile shelling was fairly heavy early in the morning, but decreased
during the day.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS: At 5:30 a. m., the American 27th Division attacked the
HINDE­BURG outpost line with a view to establishing the line QUENNEMONT Farm---knoll in
F.12.a.

The enemy offered considerable resistance and opposed the advance with heavy
machine-gun fire from the vicinity of GUILLEMONTE Farm. The objective was gained early
in the morning, but a vigorous counterattack drove our troops from the knoll almost as
soon as it was captured. An immediate counterattack succeeded in restoring the situation
and the line was maintained intact throughout the remainder of the day.

At intermittent periods between 10 p. m. and 6 a. m., artillery of all corps
carried out a special bombardment of the hostile defensive system and all known battery
positions with the new B. B. gas shell mixed with H. E.

The artillery of the Australian corps supported the attack with a creeping
barrage and directed neutralizing fire against hostile batteries. Heavy artillery en­
gaged selected targets and concentration areas.

The operation was entirely successful and about 200 prisoners were captured.

3. THIRD ARMY: In conjunction with the First Army, operations were resumed from
GOUZE­AUCOURT to the SENSEE River with success. The Third Army employed seven divisions
and the First Army four divisions in the operation, the objective being the general line
VILLERS---MARCOING---FONTAINE---SAUCHY.

By nightfall the objective for the day was gained and about 5,000 prisoners
captured.

Considerable opposition was encountered in the vicinity of GRAIN­COURT, other­
wise fighting was not severe.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: No change in the situation.

5. AIRCRAFT:

(a) British: 585 hours were flown by 277 pilots. Seven reconnaissance and 27
artillery patrols were carried out and 50 zone calls sent down. Eleven hostile batteries
were successfully engaged for destruction and eight successfully neutralized.

Eight photographic flights were made during which 203 plates were exposed.
133 offensive patrols were undertaken and 11 combats in the air took place, five
being decisive. Four E. A. were destroyed and one E. A. was driven down out of control.
Three of our machines failed to return. Two balloons were attacked, one of which was
shot down in flames.

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26 25-1b. bombs were dropped on LEVERGIES and MORCOURT by night. During the day, 237 25-lb. bombs were dropped on and 26,950 machine-gun rounds fired at various ground targets.

Kite balloons carried out 7 successful shoots.

(b) Hostile: Enemy activity was normal considering the weather. 21 artillery machines and 7 F. E. A. crossed the line.

6. PRISONERS: Through army cages Nil

Through C. C. S.'s 8 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Cloudy.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES:

The 74th Division was transferred to Fifth Army.

1 Bde. 2d Cavalry Division was transferred from III Corps to Australian corps.

The 1st Cavalry Division and 4th Guards Bde. moved into the army area and were held in G. H. Q. reserve under the Cavalry Corps.

XIII Corps Hq. was transferred to Fourth Army (army reserve) from Fifth Army.

The 25th Division (XIII Corps) was transferred from Fifth Army and went into army reserve.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:

III Corps: 12th, 18th* Divisions, 50th Div. (G.H.Q. reserve)

IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d* and 46th Divisions.

Australian Corps: 1st (army reserve), 2d*, 3d*, 4th (army reserve), 5th*

Australian Divisions, American 27th and 30th Divisions, 1 Bde. 2d Cavalry Division*.

XIII Corps: 25th Division (army reserve).

Cavalry Corps: 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions, 4th Guards Bde. (all army reserve).

* Corps reserve.

Operations 27th Division

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 27, 1918.

OPERATION MESSAGES RECEIVED AND ISSUED

[Extract]

From Australian Corps.

7:18 p. m. American 27th Division attacked at 5:30 a. m. this morning and reached their objective the line of The Knoll---Guillemont Farm---Quennemont Farm. Enemy counter-attacked strongly and drove back troops who had gained the Knoll, but this was retaken by a further attack by American 27th Division at 12:20 p. m. Considerable fighting has taken
place during the day. An officer who returned from the front line at 5 p. m. reports definitely that The Knoll---Guillemont Farm---Quennemont Farm are in our hands. Pockets of the enemy remain to be mopped up. Arrangements are in hand to have this completed. Right division reports 6 E. A. on front at 6:30 a. m. Hostile artillery quiet.

*******

From III Corps.

5 p. m. Americans report 12:25 that reports from center indicate our troops at Claymore Trench A19.b. and 20.a. Guillemont Farm 800 yards north not yet clear of enemy. Support companies dealing with this.

*******

To G. H. Q.

6:20 a. m. IX Corps reports hostile artillery very active on forward area left division. Australian corps reports right division gained objective by 1:30 a. m., but no details yet received. Left division reported to have advanced from assembly position this morning successfully, hostile retaliation being light. III Corps unable to maintain position in Dados Loop at X.22.d.8.3. and now holding original block at X.22.d.6.0. Hostile artillery and machine guns active during night and some shelling of back areas. R. A. F. report one E. A. crashed.

7:45 p. m. IX Corps have established posts S.9.d.2.7.---S.9.d.5.9.---S.10.a.1.3. and are pushing forward patrols towards high ground in S.10.c. Considerable movement of troops and transport going both ways in north and south road in V.2. and U.8. Australian corps report American 27th Division attacked 5:30 a. m. and reached line Knoll---Guillemont Farm---Quennemont Farm. Enemy counterattacked strongly and regained Knoll, but this was taken again by further attack. Considerable fighting has taken place during day. Knoll, Guillemont Farm and Quennemont Farm are in our hands, but pockets of enemy remain to be mopped up. This is in hand. Hostile artillery slight. III Corps patrols report Dark Post, Eagle and Snipe Quarries strongly held by enemy. Estimated prisoners today 200. Prisoners to Sept. 26. through army cages, 353 officers, 13,684 O. R., through C. C. S., 50 officers, 1,829 O. R. Total 15,916.

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MESSAGES SENT BY AUSTRALIAN CORPS, September 27, 1918

30th Div.: 230-32.16: Messages

HOUR: 2:45 p. m.

TO: American 30th Division

Contact patrol. Flares called 11:15 a. m. - 12:15 p. m. None seen. From our troops in trenches, line apparently runs: F.11.a.8.8.---F.11.b.3.0.---F.11.d.7.3.---F.17.b.8.2.---F.18.c.1.0.---F.24.c.1.9.---F.24.e.1.1.---F.30.a.5.1.---A.25.d.2.5.---G.2.a.6.9.---G.2.c.6.8.---G.2.c.15.00---G.8.a.20.05---G.14.a.2.8.---G.14.central---G.14.d.6.2.---G.21.a.6.7.---G.21.c.7.5. Enemy seen BONY Avenue A.14.d. fairly strongly held; also trenches front BONY. Heavy machine-gun fire from trenches G.3.9., A.14.d.15.21. No machine-gun fire from line of canal south of BELLICOURT. Area squares F.12, 18, 24, A.13, 19, 25, apparently deserted. A. A. fairly active.

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HOUR: 7:50 p.m.

TO: American 30th Division

Contact patrol reports flares called for 5:30/6:10 p.m. No flares seen. From our troops seen, line apparently runs, north to south: F5C51---F11B55---F11A91---F11C98---Doleful Post (F17B)---F17A95---F18C54---F24C94---A25D24---G1B88---G2A53---G7B95---G8C27--G8D20 (DISC)---G14D73. Party 20 men thought to be Huns F12C15 (Causeway Alley). Heavy M. G. and rifle fire along line particularly intense direction Guillemont Farm. Trenches around QUENNEMONT Farm A26---G2B--- and D---G8B and D---G15A apparently deserted. Weather fine, visibility poor due to failing light.

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HOUR: 10:20 p.m. NO: 159

TO: 27th Division

Contact patrol between 6:30 and 7 p.m., reports line as follows:
A 26 D 7 5.---A 26 B 3 7.---A 26 A 3 0---A 14 A 2 1---A 13 B 7 7---F 12 C 6 8---F 11 B 4 5---F 4 B 9 5. Fighting reported to be going on around The Knoll where situation is obscure owing to bad visibility. Addsd. all concerned.

182-33.1: Operations Report

II CORPS, A. E. F., September 27, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. G., American E. F.

Period ending noon September 27, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Enemy party bombed and rushed post of 30th Div. at A.26.d.1.0 and captured one prisoner. Immediate counterattack restored situation, leaving one enemy dead. Some gas shelling with Blue and Yellow Cross N. of Hargicourt. Considerable enemy movement observed in rear enemy sector during afternoon and evening of 26th. Area as far as NAUROY-MAGNY under observation. Strong machine-gun defenses appear to be distributed in depth to about 6,000 yards and well organized. Enemy aircraft and enemy artillery active.


3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: Heavy machine-gun fire encountered and hostile aircraft very active. Resistance encountered by 27th Division
much stronger than that encountered by 30th Division. Hostile artillery and machine guns were active during night and some shelling of back areas. Hostile retaliation in front of left division light during attack.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: No change.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: In accordance with plans the 27th and 30th Divisions successfully carried out preliminary operations this a.m.

7. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: British III Corps on left reported to hold position in DADOS Loop at X-27-D.6.0. No report from British IX Corps on right.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None.

9. ACTION DURING THE DAY ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: 30th Division establishing advance headquarters at K-11-c-5-11 and 27th Division at Ste-EMILIE Quarry, E-18-d-0-8.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: 27th and 30th Divisions have attacked, reached and hold objectives assigned for preliminary operation. Casualties slight, mostly from shrapnel.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: No change.

13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: No change.

14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.
   Morale excellent; supply satisfactory; general situation unchanged.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

MESSAGES SENT BY THE II CORPS ON SEPTEMBER 27, 1918

II Corps: 182-10.2: Messages

To: III Corps, B. E. F.

Advanced headquarters of division, this corps: 27th Division, Ste-EMILIE Quarry, E.18.d.0.8. 30th Division, K.11.c.5.7.

G-3,
American II Corps.
AUSTRALIAN CORPS

[Extract]

Place  Date  Summary of Events and Information

N.16.c.  Sept.  American 27th Division attacked at 5:30 a. m. this 27 morning and reached their objectives the line of The Knoll---Guille-mont Farm---Quennemont Farm. A strong enemy counterattack drove them back, but after further fighting the final objectives were retaken and held. Enemy artillery retaliation slight. Attack was a surprise and about 150 prisoners were captured.

* * * * *

182-33.3 (No. 2): British Fourth Army Operations Messages

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

BRITISH FOURTH ARMY,
September 27, 1918.

[Extract]

TO

* * * * *

G-3, G. H. Q.  406 G-3 - Situation 24 hours ending 6 a. m., Sept. 26. 30th Div. sector heavily shelled during early morning with gas and H. E. Reports three killed and eighty-five wounded. Buchan G-3

G-3, G. H. Q.  407 G-3 - Situation 24 hours ending 6 a. m., Sept. 27. 27th and 30th Divisions attacked this morning as per program proceeding satisfactorily. Buchan G-3.

V British Corps  408 G-3 - Hq. 27th Div. 62C J.11.c.4.9. Hq. 30th Div. 62C J.16.b.0.5. Bois de BUIRE.


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### III CORPS, B. E. F.,
*Querrieu, September 23-29, 1918.*

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DISPOSITIONS - HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

as at 6 a.m., September 28, 1918

Ref Sheet 62 C

[Extract]

Australian Corps N.16.c.
3d Squadron A. F. C. BOUVINCOURT
13th A. L. H. Regt. 0.16.b.
Australian 1st Division LONG (MAIRIE)

********

Australian 2d Division G.25.d.1.3.

********

(Rear) L.36.b.3.3.

********

Australian 4th Division CAVILLON

********

Australian 5th Division HERVILLY

********

American II Corps N.16.d.central
American 27th Division J.11.c.2.9.
American 54th Bde. F.21.b.2.1.
American 30th Division (Adv.) K.11.c.5.7.
(Rear) J.16.b.0.5.
American 59th Bde. L.26.c.4.7.

********

- 205 -
American 60th Bde.  

3d Tank Brigade  
4th Tank Brigade  
5th Tank Brigade  
5th Cavalry Brigade  

182-32.7: Fldr. 21: Order of Battle

[Extract]

AUST. CORPS HEADQUARTERS

Commander


AUST. 1st DIVISION

Headquarters

Commander


AUST. 2d DIVISION

Headquarters

Commander


AUST. 3d DIVISION

Headquarters

Commander


AUST. 4th DIVISION

Headquarters

Commander

AUST. 5th DIVISION

Headquarters
Commander

182-32.2: Location List

Location II Corps Units

G-3 II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 28, 1918—7 p. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

7 p. m., Sept. 28, 1918

LIST No. 13 (CORRECTED)

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.) 62 C N.15.d.central
(Rear) Mericourt-sur-Somme

BRITISH UNITS TO BE TRANSFERRED

FROM III CORPS TO AMERICAN II CORPS

144th Army Troops Co. R. E.
288th Army Troops Co. R. E.
182d Tunnelling Co. R. E.
1st Siege Co. R. A. R. E.
1 section 33d E. and M. Co.

27th Division
(Rear) J.4.d.5.9.

30th Division
(Rear) BEAUVAL

F. E. BUCHAN,
Asst. C. of S., G. S., G-3.

- 207 -
Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 28, 1918.

FOR PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 21 to 27 (INCLUSIVE)

1. OPERATIONS: Throughout the week, fighting has been continuous along the entire front, especially opposite the northern and southern flanks. The enemy has offered strong opposition, as is shown by the fact that he counterattacked on 14 different occasions. Some of these counterattacks were successful, but on every occasion the enemy has finally been defeated, has been driven back to the main HINDENBURG Line between BELLENGILSE and VENDHUILE, and has lost severely in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

On our northern flank, the majority of LARK Spur is also in our hands, while on the southern front we hold SELENCY and GRICOURT.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES: During the week, the enemy reinforced the front opposite the Fourth Army by 5 divisions, namely, the 8th, 232d, 54th, 2d, and 11th.

Of the above, the 8th Div. arrived from YPRES soon after the 20th Inst. It is engaged for the first time on the SOMME Battlefield. It is, however, reported to be of fair fighting value only. The remainder have already been engaged two or three times against the French or ourselves since August 8.

Since our successful attack on the 18th Inst. the Germans have reinforced this front by 9 divisions, which shows how heavily they lost, and also how extremely quick divisions become exhausted in the present stage of operations.

During the same period, it is considered that 7 divisions have been withdrawn.

It is not intended to convey that the Germans have weakened their front to the extent of 2 divisions, but the difference is accounted for by the fact that some of these divisions were in the course of relief by divisions now in the line, other than the 5 reinforcing divisions.

3. RESERVES: From captured maps, it appears that the Bav. 1st Corps, holding the BELLENGILSE—St-QUENTIN front, had a counterattack division in immediate support. It is, therefore, considered that opposite the Fourth Army front, there are three counterattack divisions in the SEQUEHART—LEVERGIES—VEAUREVOIR and VILLERS-OUTREAUX areas, respectively. In rear of this, it is not possible to state how many divisions are in reserve, as a number of the very exhausted ones are probably being transferred to quiet parts of the western front.

In view of the successful attack of the Third Army, it is probable that a large part of the reserves of the German Second Army will be drawn to the CAMBRAI area. It is considered, therefore, that there may be 6 divisions which could be spared by the German Second and Eighteenth Armies to reinforce this front, within 72 hours in the event of an attack.

4. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: From the number of counterattacks carried out by the enemy, from the opposition they have offered to our advance, and from captured documents and maps, it is quite certain that the enemy have no intention of giving up a yard of ground unless forced to do.

No trench rumor of a German retirement has been received from prisoners, and it is, therefore, considered that for the time being the enemy have no intention whatever of giving up the HINDENBURG Line without a struggle.

5. AIR ACTIVITY: During the week, air activity has been above normal, when the inclement weather is taken into consideration. He has persistently reconnoitered the army
area as far back as the SOMME Canal, and he has also frequently attacked our balloons with varying success. From prisoners' statements it is evident that the enemy consider an attack by the Fourth Army likely, owing to increased movement of troops, etc., reported by hostile aircraft during their reconnaissances.

6. ARTILLERY: Artillery activity has also increased during the past week. A considerable number of German guns were west of the canal until the 18th Inst. on which date over [sic] were captured and the remainder forced to retire.

Gas shelling has been, on the whole, slight. Owing to the inclement weather conditions it has not been possible to gauge the strength of the hostile artillery. It is estimated, however, that it corresponds to that of a normally active front, i.e., about 80 guns of all calibers per division.

7. MOVEMENT: A considerable amount of movement has been seen during the week. There is no question that our attacks between BELLENGELISE and ST-QUENTIN were known to the enemy, and that he reinforced the front in consequence.

The remainder of the movement can be accounted for by the number of divisions relieved during the week.

8. ENEMY DEFENCES: Very little new work had been visible on rear lines of defence, such as the Le CATELET---NAUROY LINE (Switch Line) and the MASNIERES-BEAUREVOIR Line (S. 11. on German maps).

No new trenches have been dug in the HINDENBURG Line, and less work has been done on it than might have been expected. Increased activity has been visible near BONY, BELICOURT, BELLENGELISE, and the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel.

In the forward area west of the canal there has been increased activity at trenches south of THORIGNY and the enemy did some work on the VENDHUILE Position, from OSSUS Wood across The KNOLL to GILLEMONT and QUENNEMONT Farms, and attempted to retake this line by counterattacks.

Much information has been received regarding the St-QUENTIN Canal and its tunnels and lateral galleries. There is little water in the VENDHUILE section and at BELLENGELISE from below the dam in G.34.b. to LEHAUCOURT. The MAGNY-BELLENGELISE Tunnel has been twice used by infantry regiments moving into line, and the exits to the galleries here and at Le TRONQUOY have been well ascertained.

9. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS:

Aerodromes: The tendency to a decrease in the forward aerodromes has continued, and there is only one small new aerodrome (FRESNOY). The number and accommodation of aerodromes especially in the forward group, is a good deal below normal. The chief concentration is in the GUISE Group, which may serve two fronts.

Stations and Dumps: Activity has notably increased at BOHAIN, Le CATEAU and FRESNOY-le-GRAND, especially at the first-named, and rolling stock has lately been considerable at these stations. On the other hand, many dumps, well known in March, show little sign of activity such as BRANCOURT, MONTBREHAIN, and ELINCOURT.

Railways: Very little new railway work, apart from new portions of light railway near ST-BENIN and east of BOHAIN. Many of the light railways near the canal are shown to be broken or disused.

Hospitals: There has been a notable increase in the number of hospitals. There are now 5 at FRESNOY, 3 at SEBONCOURT and new hospitals in four other villages at about the same distance from the line.

Billets and Headquarters: Much information has been compiled from captured maps and documents.

10. PRISONERS: The number of prisoners captured during the week is 2,144, of which 53 are officers.
GENERAL

From statements of prisoners it is apparent that an attack by the Fourth Army is expected. This conclusion is based on air reports and on the fact that no wire or trenches have been constructed by our troops. No date, however, is assigned to a possible attack.

Information from all sources shows that the enemy has no intention of withdrawing from the HINDENBURG Line, but will hold it at all costs. It is, however, worthy of note that the number of hospitals and the size and activity of dumps would appear to be inadequate for the supply of his troops. This is the only evidence at present obtainable which might indicate that he contemplates a further withdrawal.

Civilians are also being evacuated from villages. This, however, is no indication of a retirement, as he will require all available billeting accommodation for his troops.

V. VIVIAN,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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HS Brit. File: Flldr. 8-10 (30th Div.): Operation Report

Operations of 27th and 30th Division

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 28, 1918.

OPERATIONS AGAINST HINDENBURG LINE, SEPTEMBER 29, 1918

[Extract]

1. INFORMATION:

(i) On the 26th Instant, the French and the Americans attacked the enemy on either side of the ARGONNE Forest on a frontage of about 40 miles. Attack was completely successful. A penetration of 7 miles has been effected in places and over 20,000 prisoners taken.

(ii) On the 27th Instant, the British First and Third Armies attacked on a frontage of about 13 miles opposite CAMBRAI. Attack reached a depth of 5 miles in places and over 10,000 prisoners and 200 guns were taken. MARCOING and the whole of BOURLON Wood were taken. Canadians are within 1 mile of CAMBRAI.

(iii) This morning the British Second Army in conjunction with the French and Belgians attacked between YPRES and the sea.

Reports indicate that the attack is proceeding successfully, HOOG has been taken. The Belgians reported 1,000 prisoners before breakfast. POELCAPELLE, VELDHOEK and TOWER (sic) Hamlets are captured.

(iv) The British Fourth and French First Armies are attacking between EPEHY and the OISE tomorrow morning on an approximate frontage of 25 miles.

The boundaries between the two armies run north of the following towns: LESDINS---FONTAINE [UTERTE]---BEAUTROUX---BOUKINCAMP.

(v) The British Fourth Army is attacking with the IX Corps on the right in touch with the French. On the left of the IX Corps are the American II and Australian Corps, which have been affiliated on one corps frontage.
III Corps is attacking on the left of Australian corps. 
XIII Corps is in army reserve.

2. GENERAL PLAN OF ATTACK:
   (i) The Australian corps will attack opposite the underground portion of the St-
       QUENTIN Canal between BELLICOURT and VENDHUILE.
       The American 30th Division is on the right and the American 27th Division
       is on the left.
       Behind these are respectively, the Australian 5th and 3d Divisions who will
       pass through the Americans.
       The Australian 2d Division is in corps reserve.
       The attack will be carried out under a creeping field artillery barrage as
       far as the Green Line.
       The Australian divisions will pass through the American divisions on the
       Green Line and advance on the Red Line in open formations.
   (ii) RIGHT FLANK: IX Corps on the right are attacking across the canal as far
       south as LESDINS.
       When the passage across the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel has been forced, the French
       XV Corps will take over their sector as far north as GRICOURT and move across the canal
       at Le TRONQUOY working eastwards and southeastwards to protect the right flank of the IX
       Corps.
   (iii) LEFT FLANK: III Corps are to keep in close touch with the American 27th
       Division on the left of Australian corps. Should the first advance of the Americans
       cause the enemy to retreat from VENDHUILE, the III Corps will mop up the village and pre-
       pare crossings for the 38th Division (V Corps).
       If, however, the enemy still remain firm here, the American 27th Division
       after crossing the canal will push northwards, thus threatening the enemy from the rear.
       III Corps will cooperate and mop up the area west of the canal.
   (iv) CAVALRY: The 5th Cavalry Brigade will pass through the infantry on the
       Australian 5th Divisional front when the BEAUREVOIR Line has been captured.
       Their role is to seize the high ground on the general line VILLERS-OUTREUX
       ---BRANCOURT---SEQUEHART and hold it until the infantry arrive.
       Should the enemy retreat, they will maintain contact and two squadrons are
       being pushed forward with this object, one towards PREMONT and BUSIGNY, and the other
       towards BOHAIN. If opportunity offers, these squadrons will operate against enemy head-
       quarters, communications, and railways.
   (v) TANKS AND ARMoured CARS: Tanks will support the attack of all divisions.
       Armoured cars and Whippet tanks will be pushed through the advanced infantry
       as soon as possible and will operate against enemy headquarters and centers of communi-
       cation towards BUSIGNY.
Operations II Corps

A. C./119

With reference to Australian Corps Battle Instructions, Series E. No. 2, dated September 22, 1918, zero hour will be 5:50 a.m. on Sept. 29.

ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

[Signature Illegible]

for
Brigadier General,
General Staff,
Australian Corps.

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Amends Battle Instructions No. 14

A. C./111/1

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

Amendment to Battle Instructions, Series E. No. 14, dated September 25.

Advanced Headquarters American 27th and 30th Divisions will be at E.18.d.0.8 and K.11.c.5.7., respectively, on Z day. Headquarters Australian 2d Division will open at I.36.b.3.3. in DOINT at 6 p.m. tonight.

Tactical situation permitting 5th Tank Brigade report center will open at A.21.a.9.9. at 10 a.m. on Z day. Addsd. all recipients of Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 14.

From: Australian Corps

R. A. CASEY,

for
B. G., G. S.

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Battle Instructions No. 16A Australian Corps

Appendix No. 72

AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
September 28, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS SERIES E, No. 16A

1. Reference Paragraph 6 of Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 16, dated September 26, 1918.

One battalion of 3d Tank Brigade Mark V (Star) Tanks with one company of Whippet tanks which are to be employed under the orders of the IX Corps, will cross the Canal Tunnel at the extreme south and during the operations.

2. The lying-up position of these tanks is in the Wood in Square L.19.d.

From there they will approach the southern end of the tunnel via L.14.d.0.8---L.15.v.0.4---L.16.central---L.17.central---G.14.b.0.3.

They will cross the end of the tunnel and will move across the HINDENBURG Line in Square G.16.b. They will then turn southward and form up under cover of the barrage of the IX Corps.

These tanks will not cross the tunnel prior to zero plus 2 hours.

3. The Mark V (Star) Tanks employed will be marked with the ordinary RED and WHITE bands and the large Roman numeral IX in rear of the band markings.

The section commanders of the companies of the Mark V Tanks will each fly a RED and BROWN flag.

ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.

Operations of 27th Division

Appendix No. 73

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, B. E. F.,
September 28, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES E, No. 21

1. In order to protect the left flank of the American II and Australian Corps during the advance beyond the HINDENBURG Line, the III Corps is attacking the following objective at zero: MACQUINCOURT Trench---A.2.c.5.0---A.1.b.9.0---A.1.b.3.2. TOMBOIS Trench---F.6. c.9.10 - (Reference 1/20,000 map).

2. As soon as it is clear that the exploitation by the American 27th Division to the Dotted Green Line is progressing, and the retreat of the enemy in VENDHUILE is threatened by the advance of the American troops, the III Corps is to proceed with the mopping up of VENDHUILE.

3. In order to ensure that the closest touch is kept between the III Corps and the American 27th Division, III Corps is detailing a liaison officer to report to the American 27th Division for the operation.
4. The advance east of the canal and north of the American corps will be carried out by the 38th Division of the V Corps, the III Corps ceasing to function after the canal line has been gained.

The 38th Division is to be prepared to move from HEUDICOURT by 12 noon on Z day. It will depend on the situation as to whether the movement of the 38th Division commences on the afternoon of Z day or on Z plus 1 day.

5. The 38th Division will relieve the American 27th Division on the Green Dotted Line as soon as possible.

The approach march of the 38th Division east of PEIZIERE will be via the CATELET Valley.

Guns and transport unable to move by this valley or between it and the EPEHY---LEMPIRE---VENDHUILE Road will require to move by the PEIZIERE---LEMPIRE---VENDHUILE Road. This road, within the Australian corps area, will not be available for any guns or transport of the 38th Division before 2 p.m. on Z day, or until the whole of the battle troops of the American 27th and the Australian 3d Divisions have passed.

6. As soon as the 38th Division has taken over the Green Dotted Line from the American 27th Division, the corps boundaries as shown on the attached map will come into operation for the further advance.

ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

T. A. BLAMEY,
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.

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230:32.16: Message
FROM: Aust. Corps
DATE: September 28, 1918 TIME FILED: 1:55 p.m. TIME RECD.: 2:19 p.m.
TO: 27th Division
G. O. C. R. A., General MacLain

In view of the uncertainty of the situation of the front of the American 27th Div., the army commander has decided that there will be no substantial alteration in the plan. The tanks will be reinforced as much as possible. The infantry will be formed up in attack order as far forward as the situation permits one hour prior to zero. The tanks will advance with the infantry who will be prepared to fight their way if necessary to the forming-up line. The barrage will come down as already arranged at zero and will remain for four minutes. It will then lift in accordance with the barrage map, except that all lifts throughout will be of four minutes per 100 yards. The halt will be at the place and for the period already arranged. Acknowledge. Addsd. 27th Div. G. O. C. R. A., Gen. MacLain.

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- 214 -
Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 28, 1918.

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Situation twenty-four hours ending 6 a. m., September 28: The 27th and 30th Divisions reached their objectives in the preliminary operation according to schedule. Enemy counterattacked strongly and regained KNOLL, but this was promptly retaken by counter-attack and held.

414 G-3, American II Corps.

GHQ-G-2A: C 49: D 4: Summary of Intelligence

No. 1

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 28, 1918.

NOT TO BE TAKEN FARTHER FORWARD THAN REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: Approximate line objectives gained 27th Instant were maintained.
   (b) Artillery: Artillery bombardment has been carried out according to program.
   (c) Prisoners: Two prisoners 249th R. I. R. (75th Res. Div.) were captured by right battalion, right division.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES: The following identifications have been secured during the period:
   Corps Front
   75th Res. Div.
   (Confirms battle order)
   Right Flank Corps
   2d Div.
   44th I. R. Prisoners BELLENGLISE Sept. 28
   (Confirms battle order)

3. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Harassing fire on forward areas and communications; some Yellow Cross shells on right sector.


ENEMY'S DISPOSITIONS - Order of battle from north to south is: 250th R. I. R., 249th R. I. R., and 251st R. I. R. The 1st Battalion and two companies of 2d Battalion, plus 1st and 2d M. G. Companies occupy trench system from east of PEARL Woods to west of PIKE Copse, two companies, 2d and 3d Bns., plus 3d M. G. Company in reserve about 500 yards directly in rear on both sides of canal. Approach is by footbridge. Trench strength of companies, 249th Regt., 60 to 65 men; companies all have full complement of 6 machine guns and M. G. companies have 12 guns.

LOSSES in regiment have been very heavy in recent fighting, but not within the last week.

MORALE of the prisoners is poor. Their food has been of indifferent quality. Prisoners were unaware that Americans had come into line and did not expect an attack.

KERR T. RIGGS,
Lieut. Colonel,
A. C. of S., G-2.

227-32.15: Memorandum

Operations British Troops on Left 27th Division

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 28, 1918.

Memorandum to Commanding General, 27th Division

At the close of the first phase of the operations contemplated, the 38th Division of the V Corps, B. E. F., will be on the left flank of the 27th Division to take over the sector exploited. Major General Corbit commands the 38th Division and Colonel Munday is the G. S. O. officer with whom you should get into touch to make the necessary arrangements.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., (G-3).

230-33.1: Operations Report

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 28, 1918.

12 m., Sept. 27 to 12 m., Sept. 28

1. Normal.
2. Information received that enemy was strongly entrenched in Le CATELET-NAUROY System with machine-gun nests in MALAKOFF Wood.
3. Enemy conduct indicates strong defensive attitude.
4. Nil.
5. Occupation of new line to be used as starting point for troops in the attack, with the exception of a few posts bordering on MALAKOFF Wood and adjoining the right of the 27th Div.
6. Our left battalion was reinforced by one company to protect our left flank.
7. Reports received indicate the 27th Division on our left has failed to advance up to the jumping-off line as attempted.
8. Nil.
9. Orders and memos. issued regarding coming attack, with detailed instructions as to mopping up and overcoming difficulties to be encountered in the advance.
10. We now hold all of the jumping-off line with the exception of 200 yards on our left flank.
11. Nil.
12. With the exception of our left flank being somewhat exposed, the situation is favorable.
13. Attack in accordance with orders from Australian corps.
14. Morale, excellent; supplies, adequate.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 21

6 a.m., September 27 to 6 a.m., September 28, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS:

Identifications: Two prisoners from the 75th R. Div., constituting a patrol, were taken by our right battalion this morning (9-28-18) at 4 a.m., at approximately G.21.a. The order of battle from north to south is as follows: 250th R. I. R., 249th R. I. R., 251st R. I. R. This confirms the Australian corps situation map, 6 p.m., September 27, 1918.

The prisoners belonged to the 6th Company, 2d Battalion. The 1st Bn. and 2 companies of 2d Bn. plus 1st and 2d M. G. Companies occupying trench system from east of PEARL Woods to west of PIKE Copse. Two companies 2d and 3d Bns. plus 3d M. G. Co. in reserve about 500 yards directly in rear of both sides of canal. The method of approach is by footbridge covering canal. The 75th Res. Div. relieved the 119th Div. night September 19/20.

Strength of Regiment: The trench strength of the companies of the 249th Regiment average 60 to 65 men and one or two officers. The companies all have their full complement of 6 machine guns, and the M. G. companies 12 guns.

Losses in the regiment have been very heavy in recent fighting, though not within the last week. No particular attack is expected, and the prisoners were unaware that Americans had come into line.

Morale: The morale of the prisoners is bad, they are well satisfied not to be in line. Their food has been of indifferent quality, brought up from rear in kitchens.

(a) Hostile Activity:

Artillery: Enemy artillery was active throughout the period, particularly in the forward areas. L 10 c and d, L 6c, L 11c, L 12a, b, c and d, L 17 a, b, c, and d.
L 18a, L 23a, b, c, and d, L 24a and A 14c and 20b were the principal areas shelled. The areas receiving particular attention were: L 14 b: 150 rounds, 4.2's and 5.9's, L 11d and 12c: 160 rounds; L 23: 60 rounds, and G 18a: 50 rounds of the same caliber. At 9:40 p.m., L 12a was quite heavily shelled with 4.2's. In view of a recently captured German order increasing the annihilating fire on the assembly points, it is not likely that this was, strictly speaking, a barrage as reported.

Frequent use of Yellow Cross gas was made at intervals over the forward areas.

Machine Guns: Enemy machine guns were active throughout the period, especially during the advance of our troops.

Trench Mortars: Excepting some L. T. M. fire from the direction of MALAKOFF Wood - A 26, his T. M.'s were quiet.

Aerial: E. A.'s were quite active during the afternoon, flying low over our lines. They were engaged by our A. A. At 7:35 p.m., a bombing plane dropped 5 bombs in L 23.

Enemy observation balloons were up during the afternoon on the following grid bearings from L 22B 1.6: 103 degrees, 30 degrees, 95 degrees, 106 degrees, 111 degrees.

(b) Our Activity:

Artillery: Normal. The usual shoot on BELLICOURT and NAUROY and the approaches to these villages was carried out. At 9:30 p.m., a barrage was laid down along our front, as previously arranged and during the night, an extensive programme of gas shelling was carried out.

Machine Guns: More active than usual. During the advance to the line now held by our troops, our machine guns maintained a fairly heavy fire upon targets previously selected.

Trench Mortars: Nil.

Aerial: Our planes were active throughout the day although heavily engaged by enemy A. A. and M. G. At 4 p.m., an E. A. was brought down. Again at 5:30 p.m., another E. A. was brought down by our planes.

Patrols: A patrol consisting of one officer and 20 O. R. went out from the left company for the purpose of clearing an enemy M. G. post out of G 21b 5.1; but upon arriving at this point it was found that the enemy had evacuated his position.

2. HOSTILE MOVEMENT: Visibility poor. Frequent individual movement continues on the high land around G 6c 4.6. Three men entered trench at A 27c 8.2 at 5:20 p.m. A train was seen at 5:35 p.m., moving west through NAUROY.

A machine-gun post is located at G 21b 6.3. Two men were putting up new wire from G 6c 5.6 to G 6c 4.6. New work is going on in trench at G 11d 1.3.

During the early part of last night our lines were advanced to an average depth of 300 yards, on a front of approximately 2,000 yards. No material opposition was encountered and the new positions were consolidated under cover of the Vickers and Lewis gunners.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.
Medical Arrangements 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
September 28, 1918.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No. 1

[Extract]

1. Information. The American 30th Division will attack the enemy's position in the HINDENBURG Line in the sector NAUROY-GOUY, on a date and hour to be stated later. The division on our left and corps on our right will attack in conjunction. After objectives are obtained by the 27th and the 30th Divisions, the Australian 5th Division on the right and the Australian 3d Division on the left will pass through the 30th and 27th Divisions, respectively.

2. The disposition of medical units at zero will be as follows:
   (a) AID POSTS: Left Sector L.5.b.4.5.
       Right Sector L.22.a.6.8.
   (b) AMBULANCE LOADING POSTS:
       L.10.a.4.6.
       L.17.d.6.4.
   (c) ADVANCE DRESSING STATION:
       Left Sector TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD (L.2.b.central)
       Right Sector JEANCOURT (L.26.c.3.4.)
   (d) STATION FOR WALKING WOUNDED: TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD (L.1.d.7.2.)
   (e) MAIN DRESSING STATION: MARQUAIX (K.14.d.8.8.)
   (f) DIVISIONAL GAS CENTER: MARQUAIX (K.14.d.8.8.)
   (g) AMBULANCE DISPATCH POST: ROISEL (K.16.d.4.7.)

* * * * *
G-3

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Period ending noon September 28, 1918*

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: No change.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF THE ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Identifications made showing the enemy order of battle to be as follows from north to south: 8th, 54th, and 121st Divisions.

   * * * * *

7. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: In communication with neighboring units by means of liaison officers. The 46th Division of the British IX Corps is on our right, and the 18th Division of the British III Corps on our left.

   * * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

for

G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

* The Summary of Operations Fourth Army, B. E. F. for Sept. 28, 1918, and the Weekly Appreciation, Fourth Army, B. E. F. for the period Sept. 28-October 4, 1918, are missing from the files. Reports of the Australian corps and Australian divisions covering the operations of the British flank units insofar as they affected the operations of the Australian corps with which the II Corps was affiliated, will be found in Appendices I and II.
II Corps: War Diary

[Extract]

C. P. established at Ste-EMILIE E.18.d.0.8. (in quarry).
Available for all duty (Officers 481
(Men 15,619

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

by

L. M. CLARK,
2d LIEUT, Inf.,
Asst. G-3.

---

30th Div.: War Diary

[Extract]

Final preparations were perfected for attack on HINDENBURG Line in accordance with Battle Instructions No. 1 issued from these headquarters. 118th Infantry relieved in front line by 60th Brigade. Relief completed at 2 a. m.
Available for all duty (Officers 565
(Men 18,316

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.

--------

HS Brit. File: (30th Div.): Fldr. 8-10: War Diary

AUSTRALIAN CORPS

[Extract]

Place Date Summary of Events and Information
N.16.c. Sept. 28 Quiet day, nothing of interest to report. Our artillery maintained harassing fire on enemy villages and communications. Weather showery.

* * * * * 

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- 221 -
27th and 30th Divisions Attack the Hindenburg Line

On September 29, the II Corps participated in the general assault of the British Fourth Army against the Hindenburg Line - its right captured BELLICOURT and entered NAUROY - Australian 5th Division relieved 30th Division, which remained in support until October 1/2, when it was transferred to MESNIL-HARBECOURT area. The 27th Division, reinforced by the Australian 3d Division captured QUENNEMONT Farm - was withdrawn from the line September 30 and transferred to the PERONNE area.

---

182-32.2: Location List

G-3 II CORPS. A. E. F.,

September 29, 1918---10 a. m.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 13

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv) 62 C N.15.d.central
II Corps Headquarters (rear) Mericourt-sur-Somme

27th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv) J.11.c.2.9.
Division Headquarters (rear) J.4.d.5.9.

30th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv) 62 C J.16.b.0.5.
Division Headquarters (rear) Beauval

F. E. BUCHAN,
Asst. C. of S., G. S., G-3.

--------

- 222 -
230-32.7: Orders

**Operations II Corps**

G.226

4th TANK BRIGADE.

LOCATION OF UNITS 4th TANK BRIGADE

6 a.m., September 29, 1918

4th Tank Brigade Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Tank Battalion Adv.</td>
<td>62 C D.28.central</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>62 C K.5.d.1.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Tank Battalion Adv.</td>
<td>57 C V.13.d.9.0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>62 C E.29.b.2.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>57 C U.30.b.4.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>57 C U.20.b.3.4.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tank Corps Headquarters Adv.</td>
<td>62 C FEUILLERES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>62 C N.16.c.2.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II American Corps Headquarters</td>
<td>62 C N.15.d.5.4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th American Division Adv.</td>
<td>62 C E.18.d.0.0.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>62 C J.11.c.4.9.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th American Division Adv.</td>
<td>62 C K.11.c.5.7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear</td>
<td>62 C J.16.b.0.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Tank Brigade</td>
<td>62 C J.10.b.9.1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Tank Battalion</td>
<td>62 C P.5.d.5.0.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Signature Illegible],
Captain,
Brigade Major, 4th Tank Brigade.

Headquarters 4th Tank Bde.
28. 9. 1918.
S.
Operations of Fourth Army, B. F. F., and Opposing Enemy Units

EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS BELONGING TO ALL THREE REGIMENTS OF 2d DIVISION, CAPTURED NEAR BELLONGLISE ON 29 SEPTEMBER 1918

[Extract]

The 2d Div. went into line at MONTDIDIER on 1st day and had taken part in the retreat without any period of rest since then.

*****

STRENGTH:

33d Fus. R.: All 3 bns. have [illegible] cos., each and each co. has a fighting strength of 50 - 60.
44th I. R.: 1st Bn. average Co. Fgt. Str. 40 (4 cos.)
2d Bn. " " " 120 with draft from 373d I. R.
3d Bn. " " " 25-30 (3 cos.).

Owing to the difficulty in getting drafts, men who were formerly excused for duty in the front line, such as officers' batmen, sanitary men, cooks, etc., are being combed out of the transport lines and sent forward.

LOSSES: Slight during the first part of the retreat but heavy during the last tour in line (since Sept. 19).

*****

EFFECTS OF OUR ARTILLERY FIRE: Prisoner, who was in the MAGNY-la-FOSSE Tunnel, stated that they received no food for three days owing to our bombardment.

HEADQUARTERS: Prisoner belonging to the Regtl. Nachrichten Co. (an expert telegraphist) states that he was at AVESNES working at the GROSSE HAUPTQUARTIER until 3 weeks ago.
The KAISER was then at SPA.
The CROWN PRINCE was at CHARLEVILLE.
HINDENBURG and LUENDORFF were both at AVESNES, together with the Austrian General Staff.

ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF LUENDORFF: On Aug. 25, at 6:30 p. m. (English time), a Landsturm man threw a bomb at LUENDORFF. The bomb failed to explode and the man was declared insane, though he was probably sane enough.

VISIT OF RUSSIAN MILITARY MISSION: On Aug. 26, a mission of several Russian generals (probably from the UKRAINE) visited HINDENBURG at AVESNES and asked for help against the Allies who had broken through on the MURMAN coast.

FOOD SHORTAGE IN BERLIN: Prisoner states that food is very short in BERLIN, the poorer classes getting practically nothing to eat, and that the misery is awful.

GERMAN INTENTIONS: The only orders issued were to hold the line at all costs.
COMMANDERS: 2d Div., M. G. von DOMMES
3d Inf. Bde., Col. von BALKE
4th Gren. Regt., Major PIEPER
33d Fus. Regt., Major von PLATRE
44th I. R., Major HOFFMAN.

MORALE: Very poor.

Fourth Army (Intelligence).
6 October 1918.

182-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 2 II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 29, 1918.

From 6 p. m., September 28 to 6 p. m., September 29, 1918

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: Corps attacked HINDENBURG Line on a front of approximately
       7,500 yards, breaking through the main HINDENBURG and the Le CATELET-NAUROY Line in the
       southern sector. Line at 6 p. m., 29th, runs approximately as follows:
       The KNOLL-WILLOW Trench---A22---A29C---G5B---G6C---G6D.
   (b) Artillery: Our artillery attacked batteries on sixty occasions during the
       battle. Harassing fire on routes, approaches and battery areas. Barrage. Heavy bom-
       bardment on requests. Fire continued until 2 p. m. Close liaison with infantry. Back
       areas harassed were FRESNOY, MASSIGNY, BOHAIN, PREMONT, BRANCOURT, MONTBREHAIN,
       RAMICOURT, WIANCOURT, ESTREES Crossroads, VILLERS Farm.
   (c) Prisoners: During the operation more than 1,200 prisoners were captured,
       including 40 officers.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES: The following divisions were identified by pris-
   oners captured on corps front.

8th Div. 153d I. R.
54th Div. 84th I. R.
       27th R. I. R.
       90th R. I. R.
121st Div. 7th R. I. R.
       60th I. R.
185th Div. 65th I. R.
       161st I. R.
       28th R. I. R.
75th Res. Div. 250th R. I. R.
       249th R. I. R.
       251st R. I. R.

The following additional units were identified:
65th Res. F. A. R.
42d Foot Art. Bn.
3. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Reaction was moderate only; barrage weak and broken, later recovered slightly with harassing fire of 10 and 15-centimeter guns and 15 and 21-centimeter howitzers firing at long range. The areas in our own lines receiving most attention were, G1 and 7, HARGICOURT, A7 and 13, a few rounds on RONSSOY, high velocity guns on ROISEL and TINCOURT.

4. PRISONERS' STATEMENTS: Prisoners of 84th I. R. state that their regiment received 250 reinforcements from 86th Fus. Regiment, 18th Division. This would indicate that the regiment has been disbanded.

5. MISCELLANEOUS: Morale: Morale of the prisoners captured was generally poor.

KERR T. RIGGS,

230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 22

30th DIVISION SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE

6 a. m., September 28 to 5 a. m., September 29, 1918

[Extract]


Enemy Activity:
Artillery: Vicinity of Hargicourt was shelled by 5.9's from 2:30 p. m. to 5:45 p. m. At 5:45 p. m., our forward area was shelled by shrapnel; number of rounds 30. Shelling was very light during the day.

Aerial: Seven E. A. over our lines at 7:30 a. m., were driven back by M. G. fire. 4:25 p. m., 1 E. A. flying very low over our line was driven back by A. A. fire. 4:50 p. m., 1 E. A. crossed our lines, but was driven back by A. A. and M. G. fire. 5:25 to 6:35, E. A. very active, flying over our artillery positions.

2. MOVEMENT: 7 a. m. to 8:30 a. m., small parties of two and three men seen coming across field at B 27c, disappearing on ridge at G 11b. 3:30 p. m., cloud of smoke seen rising at G 29b - appeared to be an ammunition dump burning, caused by our heavy artillery fire.

Visibility 7 a. m. to 9:30 a. m., poor; 9:30 to 11:45 a. m., good; 11:45 to 2:55 p. m., nil on account of rain; 2:55 p. m. to 6:35 p. m., good.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.
5 a.m., September 29 to 4 p.m., September 29, 1918

All summaries of intelligence and orders are of value to the enemy if captured, and are not to be taken into action. This summary must not go beyond battalion headquarters and will be destroyed upon receipt of current summary.

1. OPERATIONS: Following an intense barrage, the answer to which was weak, our troops attacked at 5:50 a.m. on a front of 3,500 yards, successfully crossed the Hindenburg Line and the canal behind it, capturing the towns of BELLICOURT and NAUROY, in the order named and Cabaret Wood Farm.

   Neighboring units: The division on our right is going well. The situation of the division on our left is uncertain.

   Prisoners: The prisoners were glad to be captured; were of average physique; low morale and ignorant of our success on other fronts. All, including bn. C. O. and staff agreed that the war would soon end in favor of the Allies and all were willing to give information. The number of prisoners received at the divisional cage is 40 officers and 811 O. R., including one major and two captains.

   Enemy order of battle, north to south:

   28th R. I. R. )
   161st I. R. ) 185th Div.
   65th I. R. ) in reserve.

   249th R. I. R. )
   250th do ) 75th R. D.
   251st do )

   Identifications: 75th M. G. Marksmen Det. (3 companies) came from Belgium about two weeks ago, where they had been with the 161st Div., 117th Inf. Regt.; captured prisoners belonging to 384th L. I. R. (20th Lwd. Div.).

2. MISCELLANEOUS: Boche carrier pigeon picked up near Div. P. C. with code message in German, forwarded to American II Corps.

   British aviator made forced landing near ROISEL, and reports that as he flew over CAMBRAI between 9 and 10 o'clock, the west end of the town was in flames.

   Majority of prisoners captured by this division belonged to 161st I. R., which indicates that this regiment has practically been wiped out.

   Prisoners' statements indicate German company strength at 40 men with four light M. G.'s with each company; two heavy M. G. companies with six guns each with each regiment.

   The 258th Regiment is disbanded and elements sent to 161st Regiment. Attacking troops followed barrage so closely that there was no time to bring enemy M. G.'s into action.

   A number of M. G.'s and T. M.'s, also antitank guns were captured, but not counted as yet.

B. Y. READ,
Mayor, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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- 227 -
According to the latest reports received, Fourth Army has reached following line:
GRICOURT---LEHAUCOURT---MAGNY-la-FOSSE---ETRICOURT---NAUROY---BELLOCOURT---W. of
BONY---The KNOLL---LARK Spur. American troops are reported in advance of this line, but their
location is not definitely known. IX Corps will get into touch with the American troops
who are reported by aircraft to have reached BEAUREVOIR Line E. of JONCOURT. Secure Le
TRONQUOY Tunnel if not already captured with a view to passing the French XV Corps through
as early as possible. Push forward to secure high ground on line Le TRONQUOY---SEQUEHART
---PRESELLES. Capture JONCOURT and thus assist advance of Aust. corps on ESTREES. Aust.
corps will endeavor to get into touch with the American troops who are reported by air-
craft to have advanced beyond the line now held by the Aust. troops. Capture ESTREES and
FOLEMPRISE Farm (B.25). Secure Hindenburg main line through BONY as far as northern
entrance to Tunnel and spur between BELLOCOURT and A.17 central and establish a flank on
line GUOY-MACQUINCOURT Fme. American II Corps will concentrate their troops as soon as
they can be relieved by Aust. corps and assemble in position in Aust. corps area, under
arrangements to be made with Aust. corps. III Corps will maintain their present position
and occupy VENDHUILE if opportunity offers. Assist operation of Aust. corps tomorrow
with all available artillery. XIII Corps will remain in its present position holding 50th
Div. ready to move at 2 hours' notice from 12 noon tomorrow. Cav. corps will remain in
its present position ready to march at 4 hours' notice from 7 a. m. tomorrow. * * *

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
M. G. G. S.

------------------------

FROM: Australian Corps
DATE: 9/29/1918
HOUR: 9:15 a. m.
TO: II Corps, A. E. F.

Aust. Corps A. C./111/1: Amendment to Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 14, dated
September 25. Advanced Headquarters American 27th and 30th Divisions will be at
E.18.d.0.8. and K.11.c.5.7., respectively on Z day. Headquarters Australian 2d Division
will open at I.36.b.3.3. in DOINGT at 6 p. m. tonight. Tactical situation permitting 5th
Brigade Tank, report center will open at A.21.a.9.9. at 10 a. m. on Z day.

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- 228 -
FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Fourth Army attacked the Hindenburg Line between BELLINGLISE and VENDHUILE with the general line LEHAUCOURT---MAGNY-la-FOSSE as the first objective or Green Line, and Le TRONGUOY---LEVERGIES---WIANCOURT---BEAUREVOIR as the Red Line or final objective for the day.

* * * * *

The forces engaged in the operation comprised:

(a) III Corps: 12th and 18th Divisions.
IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d and 46th Divisions.
Australian Corps: Australian 2d, 3d and 5th Divisions.
American II Corps: American 27th and 30th Divisions.
Cavalry Corps: 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions, 4th Guards Bde. (G. H. Q. Reserve).

(b) [Table]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>III</th>
<th>IX</th>
<th>Australian</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. F. A. Bdes.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. G. A. Bdes.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfraged Sge.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteries</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One 14&quot; gun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One 12&quot; gun</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(c) 3d Tank Brigade:
1 Bn. Whippets
2 Bns. Mk. V Allotted to IX Corps.

4th Tank Brigade:

5th Tank Brigade:
1 Bn. Whippets Allotted to
3 Bns. Mk. V and Mk. V* Australian
1 Armoured Car Bn. Corps.

(d) 5th Brigade, R. A. F.

The general plan of the operation was as follows:
The task of capturing the first objective or the Green Line in the Australian corps area was allotted to the American II Corps. After the capture of the Green Line, the American II Corps were to exploit success southwards, with a view to assisting the IX Corps over the Canal and to protecting the right of the Australian corps when the latter leapfrogged to the Red Line. Similarly, exploitation was to be made northwards to protect the left of the Australian corps and to assist the advance of the V corps (Third Army).

* Corps reserve.
As soon as the attacking divisions of the Australian corps had passed through the Green Line, it was intended to concentrate the American II Corps (less exploiting troops), preparatory to advancing eastwards on a one-divisional front between the Australian and V Corps. The task of the IX Corps was to capture the Green and Red Lines in conjunction with American II Corps and Australian corps, respectively. On gaining the Red Line, the intention was to exploit southwards with a view to assisting the French First Army operating to the north of St-QUENTIN.

The function of the III Corps was to mop up the area west of the canal when the American II Corps commenced exploitation northwards to the Green Dotted Line.

In the event of this operation being successful, it was anticipated the Australian IX and American II Corps would continue the advance eastwards, each operating on a one-divisional front.

On account of the strength of the HINDENBURG Line a preliminary bombardment was considered essential. This was commenced at 10 p.m. on September 26 and continued until Zero hour on September 29. The bombardment consisted of:

(a) Special gas bombardment with field guns and 6-in. howitzers, firing the new BB gas shell for the first time, in combination with H. E., at intermittent periods between 10 p.m. on September 26 and 6 a.m. on September 27.

In addition, a number of captured German guns firing Yellow Cross gas shells was employed extensively. This gas shelling was limited to concentrated shoots on small areas and centers of activity, as experience with the enemy's gas shell bombardments has proved it to be more efficacious and resulting in more casualties than a general pro-longed bombardment embracing an extensive area.

(b) Vigorous counterbattery fire on occupied battery areas 48 hours prior to the operation.

(c) Intensive harassing fire, cutting lines in wire, and bombardment of selected strong points and localities commenced after cessation of the special gas BB bombardment at 6 a.m. on September 27 and was continued intermittently until the morning or September 29. A considerable number of gas shells were employed.

(d) Long-range batteries dealt with villages, strong points, roads and dumps east of the Hindenburg Line. Only Instantaneous fuses were used. Railway guns engaged FRESNOY-le-GRAND, Bois d'ETAVES, BRANCOURF, BOHAIN, PREMONT and BUSIGNY.

Zero was at 5:50 a.m., at which hour the artillery barrage opened simultaneously with the advance of the infantry.

By a brilliant maneuver, the IX Corps carried the canal defenses at BELLENGLISE in the first rush and gained the Green Line in schedule time. The leapfrogging division passed through and reached the western end of the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel---MAGNY-la-FOSSE ---H.20. central.

On the Australian corps front, the American 27th and 30th Divisions, allotted the task of capturing the Green Line, commenced to advance in accordance with program and succeeded in penetrating in parts beyond the HINDENBURG Line. In their eagerness to push on, the tunnels and dugouts in the HINDENBURG Defenses were neglected, with the result that the Australian divisions following in rear were held up by heavy machine-gun fire from A.21, BONY, A.9 and A.8 and advanced elements of the American divisions were cut off. The situation remained obscure for some considerable time, but eventually the Australian divisions obtained control of the situation and established the general line NAUROY---BELICOURT---BONY (exclusive).

The III Corps, in order to protect the advance of the American 27th Division, attacked and captured the trenches S. W. of VENDHUILE with 250 prisoners.

123 Mk. V and Mk. V* and 18 whippet tanks supported the infantry. Of these, 46

* Corps Reserve
were knocked out by direct hits from antitank guns and 27 failed to rejoin their units after the operations. In some instances, the tanks did extremely well, but for the most part the thick ground mist combined with the vigorous opposition encountered from well-sited antitank guns, tended to hamper the action of the tanks and minimized their utility.

2. IX CORPS: The advance to the Green Line was carried out by the 46th Division. The 32d Division followed in support and when the Green Line was captured, leapfrogged toward the Red Line.

The 46th Division made good progress and captured the Green Line in schedule time. The advance was so rapid that in many cases the enemy were unable to complete the demolition of many of the bridges. This, combined with the excellent work of the bridging parties supplied by the engineers, enabled the supporting troops to keep up with the advance and greatly facilitated the crossing of the 32d Division.

Several hundred prisoners were captured in the mopping up of the HINDENBURG defenses. BELLINGEN was captured and also LEHUAUCOURT and MAGNY-la-FOSSE after little fighting.

The attack of the 32d Division met considerable resistance especially N. E. of MAGNY-la-FOSSE, presumably on account of the Australian corps being held up east of NAUROY. After hard fighting, the 32d Division succeeded in capturing the western entrance to the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel.

In conjunction with the attack of the 46th Division, the 1st Division, operating between GRICOURT and BELLINGEN, advanced the line to M.17. central---FORESTIER Trench M.18.a.5.3.---GLU Trench M.12.d.---road at M.12.a.4.0.---thence along the road to Canal bridge at M.5.b.8.2., which was found to be intact.

The high ground of THORIGNY and TALANA Hill was held in strength by the enemy and attempts to join up with 32d Division at the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel were held up for some considerable time.

Captures by the IX Corps on September 29 totalled 4,600 prisoners and 70 guns. Of these, 4,200 prisoners and all the guns were captured by the 46th Division.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS: The American 27th and 30th Divisions attacking simultaneously with the IX Corps, penetrated the HINDENBURG Line between BELLICOURT and VENDEHUILE, and, pressing forward to the Green Line, lost touch with the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions behind them. The limit reached by the most advanced American troops is not definitely known, but reports received suggest that elements of the 30th Division reached the Green Line in places, and that parties of the American 27th Division penetrated as far as GOUY.

As soon as the Americans had passed over the HINDENBURG Defenses and the tunnel, the enemy appear to have emerged from their dugouts and the tunnel and to have checked the supporting troops with heavy machine-gun fire on the northern part of the front. In the excitement of their first battle combined with the difficulty of finding all the dugout and tunnel entrances on account of smoke and mist, the American moppers-up appear to have gone on instead of dealing with the large number of enemy who had evidently taken shelter from the bombardment during the initial advance.

When the smoke and mist cleared, some of the advanced elements realizing their precarious position, succeeded in getting back to our line, but a considerable number - chiefly of the 27th Division - were cut off and probably captured.

Failure to realize the objective in the case of the American 27th Division may, in addition to the lack of experience in mopping up, be attributed to the fact that the QUENNEMONT-GUILLEMON Line, captured during the night of September 27/28, with a view to facilitating the assembly for the attack on September 29, was not maintained. This resulted in subsequent disorganization and when the assaulting troops advanced to the attack at 5:30 a. m. on September 29, they were at least 1,000 yards in rear of the creeping barrage. Consequently, the supporting regiments of the American 27th Division and the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions were met with very heavy machine-gun fire and were unable to make much progress, but after hard fighting with practically no artillery support, succeeded in establishing the line H.20 central---east of NAUROY---east of BELLICOURT---west of BONY---KNOLL.
As the result of the day's operations, 41 officers, 1,328 O. R. and 15 guns were captured.

III CORPS: The 18th and 12th Divisions attacked in conjunction with the American 27th Division and succeeded in advancing the line to KNOLL Trench (A.7.b.)---TOMBOIS Support (A.1.d.)---TINO Support as far north as X.30.c.5.6. TINO Trench (F.6.a.)---LARK Trench F.6.a.---CATELET Trench---thence to original line. The enemy offered vigorous resistance and fighting was severe all day.

As a result of this operation, 250 prisoners were captured.

3. THIRD ARMY: The advance was continued today by the Third Army. Strong resistance was encountered at GONNELIEU and VILLERS-GUISLAIN and the advance was held up west of RUMILLY and MONT-sur-l'OEUVRE. At the conclusion of operations for the day, the general line was established west of VILLERS-GUISLAIN---east of MASNIERES---west of RUMILLY---west of MONT-sur-l'OEUVRE.

Since the commencement of operations on the morning of September 27, 296 officers and 11,423 O. R. have been captured.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: At 10:30 a. m., the French XXXI Corps attacked and captured URVILLERS and CERIZY with 500 prisoners. East of these villages the enemy offered considerable resistance and no further attempts to progress were successful.

5. AIRCRAFT:
(a) British: 680 hours were flown by 285 pilots. Nine reconnaissance, 19 artillery and 24 contact patrols were carried out and 78 zone calls sent down. Five hostile batteries were successfully engaged for destruction and nine hostile batteries successfully neutralized.

219 offensive patrols were made and 42 combats in the air took place, 16 being decisive. 12 E. A. were destroyed and four driven down out of control. Seven enemy balloons were attacked, five of which were shot down in flames. Four of our machines are missing.

Six 112-lb. and 192 25-lb. bombs were dropped on SEQUEHART and LEVERGIES by night. Many good hits were observed. 3,650 machine-gun rounds and 40 2-lb. shells were also fired into back areas. During the day two bomb raids were carried out on BRANCOURT and BEAUREVOIR, 26 112-lb. bombs being dropped. In addition, 230 25-lb. bombs, 104 40-lb. phosphorous bombs were dropped on and 26,734 machine-gun rounds fired at various ground targets.

Kite balloons carried out 24 successful shoots.

(b) Hostile: Poor weather conditions considerably hampered flying. Nine artillery planes, six F. E. A. and one R. E. A. crossed the line.

6. PRISONERS:
Through Army Cages 218 O. R.
Through C. C. S.'s [Casualty Clearing Stations] 9 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Very misty early. Fair visibility at midday, then drizzle.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: The 18th Division went into the line from corps reserve. The Australian 3d and 5th Divisions went into the line from corps reserve. The 32d Division went into the line from corps reserve.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
III Corps: 12th, 18th Divisions, 50th Division (G. H. Q. reserve).

Australian Corps: 1st (army reserve), 2d, 3d, 4th (army reserve), and Australian 5th Divisions, American 27th and 30th Divisions, 5th Cavalry Brigade.*
IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d and 46th Divisions.

XIII Corps: 25th and 66th Divisions (both army reserve)

Cavalry Corps: 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions, 4th Guards Bde. (all G. H. Q. reserve).

* Corps reserve.
10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Ammunition Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13-pdr. A. A. H. E.</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13-pdr. R. H. A. H. E.</td>
<td>3,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-pdr. H. E.</td>
<td>99,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5&quot; How. H. E.</td>
<td>57,857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Smoke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-pdr H. E.</td>
<td>12,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; H. E.</td>
<td>60,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; Gas</td>
<td>3,186</td>
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<td>6&quot; Mk. VII H. E.</td>
<td>1,293</td>
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<td>&quot; S.</td>
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<td>&quot; Smoke</td>
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<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>9,764</td>
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<td>9.2&quot; How.</td>
<td>7,769</td>
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<td>12&quot; How.</td>
<td>805</td>
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<tr>
<td>12&quot; Gun</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>14&quot; Gun</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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182-33.3: Operation Report

Operations II Corps

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 29, 1918.

FROM: Commanding General

TO: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Period ending noon, September 29, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Enemy order of battle last evening from north to south was 250th R. I. R., 249th R. I. R. and 251st R. I. R. The 1st Battalion and two companies of the 2d Battalion, and the 1st and 2d M. G. Companies occupy trench system from east of PEARL Woods to west of PIKE Copse, while two companies, 2d and 3d Battalions and 3d M. G. Company were in reserve about 500 yards directly in rear on both sides of Canal. Approach by footbridge. Trench strength of 249th R. I. R. 60 to 65 men per company. All companies with full complements of six machine guns each and machine gun companies have twelve each.

Prisoners taken state their food has been of indifferent quality. Morale poor. State did not know Americans had come into sector and did not expect an attack.

Some bombing of forward areas last night and harassing fire effecting same and lines of communication. Some Yellow Cross shells fired on right sector.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Reported that the 233d, 222d, 54th Res., 52d Res., 14th Bav. and 39th and 13th Divisions have been disbanded.
Prisoners of the 28th I. R., 171st I. R., 65th I. R., 185th I. R., 384th I. R., 153d I. R., 27th I. R., and 250th I. R., 249th I. R., 251st and 75th, 54th, 33d, and 8th Divisions have been taken, some of whom say the attack was a surprise, others that it was expected. Had instructions to hold HINDENBURG Outpost Line at all cost.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: Enemy had mined bridges across Canal, but failed to explode the charges before retiring. Enemy forced to retire or were captured along entire front. Very heavy fighting in vicinity of BONY, where there were very strong machine-gun positions that held up the advance of the 27th Division for some time. Hostile artillery laid down heavy barrage in ASCENSION Valley on front of British IX Corps at five minutes before ZERO hour this morning. Along front of the 27th and 30th Divisions enemy artillery opened barrage about five minutes after our own started, but it was ineffective and weak. Prisoners state the hostile artillery was mostly neutralized by our fire.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: 27th and 30th Divisions reached and held all objectives of preliminary operations. The 27th was heavily counterattacked several times in and about KNOLL, but held fast.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: During the afternoon of 28th, consolidated positions taken and prepared for major operations of today. According to plan, the 27th and 30th Divisions, in conjunction with British IX Corps on the right and III Corps on the left, attacked at 5:50 a.m. this morning. The operation was progressing satisfactorily and reports received up to noon indicate that all objectives had been reached according to schedule. Very heavy fighting encountered in sector of 27th Division, especially about GUILLEMON, QUENNEMON Farms and BONY. The 107th Infantry encountered especially stubborn opposition, mopping up HINDENBURG Line.

Contact planes report enemy in retreat along practically whole front.

7. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: Attacking British corps on right and left are making satisfactory progress. The III Corps on the left have encountered very stubborn opposition in the about VENDHUILLE, and considerably delayed. The IX Corps on the right appear to have reached all objectives according to schedule.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None.

9. ACTION DURING THE DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: No orders issued. Action as described under six (6) above.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: We had taken NAUROY, BELICOURT, CABARET Wood, RAILWAY Ridge, GOY, Le CATELET, before noon according to schedule and were mopping up the HINDENBURG Line before noon. Considerable difficulty was experienced in and about BONY, where snipers and isolated groups of machine gunners were able to hold out for a considerable time in the defenses at this point.

The 30th Division reports that 36 officers and 645 other ranks had passed through their prison cages by noon. The 27th Division reports a large number of prisoners taken, but no definite figures given. Report of Corps Surgeon last evening shows number of wounded passed through casualty clearing stations to be: 27th Division, two officers and 216 other ranks; 30th Division, 17 other ranks.

There have been no reports or estimates of casualties during today's fighting received as yet, other than statements that they were thought to be light.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Action progressing very favorably on right, but encountering very stubborn opposition on our left. Gives every indication of success.

- 234 -
13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: Continuation of operation according to previously reported plan.

14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: No change.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Col., G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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230-33.1: Operations Report

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 29, 1918.

12 M., Sept. 28 to 12 M., Sept. 29

1. Enemy showing strong resistance, especially on the left.
2. Prisoners captured stated they knew of no pending attack and did not know that
   the Americans were in front of them.
3. No hostile movements reported.
4. Nil.
5. Favorable. 60th Brigade attack the enemy with two regiments in the front line.
6. The attack started off on time at 5:50 a.m. By 9 o'clock the left regiment
   had broken the HINDENBURG Line and crossed the Canal Tunnel. At 7 a.m., the 3d Battal-
   ion, 119th Inf., had occupied trenches in G.14. The Australian 8th Brigade passed
   through BELLICOURT at 9:40 a.m.
7. On the left the 27th Division appears to be catching up with the schedule. All
   going well. On the right we have seen troops of the 46th Div. east of the CANAL. Re-
   ceived 9:55 a.m.
   46th Div. took BELLENGLISE at 9:40 a.m.
   At 10:05 a.m., the 27th Division crossed the HINDENBURG Line and appears to be
   coming along well.
8. Nil.
9. Every possible means employed in an attempt to keep in touch with the situation as
   the attack progresses.
10. The HINDENBURG Line has been broken by our troops; BELLICOURT captured and the
    troops advancing on NAUROY. Prisoners are coming freely.
11. Nil.
12. The situation is favorable except on our left flank for the 27th Division has
    met with strong resistance.
13. To hold our present gains and assist the Australian division which will pass
    through and exploit the success of the attack.
14. Morale, excellent; supplies, adequate.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

---------
FROM: 30th Division

DATE: September 29, 1918  HOUR: 5:30 p. m.

TO: General Headquarters, A. E. F.

27 G-3 29. The 30th Division as a part of the American II Corps attacked the main HINDENBURG System in the GOUY-NAUROY Sector. Attack was made with tanks on a front of 3,000 yards and was completely successful penetrating enemy's lines 5,000 yards to objective. Attack was a surprise; more than a 1,000 prisoners of whom 36 were officers, together with much material taken. Enemy's position particularly strong as it contained underground St-QUENTIN Canal Tunnel, capable of holding a division.

American 30th Division 5 p. m.

II Corps: War Diary

27th DIVISION, A. E. F., September 29, 1918.

[Extract]

Headquarters at Ste-EMILIE E.18.d.0.8 (in quarry).

Available for all duty  Officers  478
                      Men  15,552

* * * * *

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S., Chief of Staff.

30th Div.: War Diary

September 29, 1918.

[Extract]

The 60th Brigade attacked in accordance with Battle Instructions No. 1 at 5:50 a. m. Attack was made with the two regiments of the 60th Brigade side by side. At 9 a. m., the left regiment had broken the Hindenburg Line and crossed the Canal Tunnel. The right regiment experienced only normal resistance and attained their objective as indicated in Battle Instructions No. 1. The left regiment encountered considerable resistance from the enemy on account of the division on our left being unable to advance. One battalion of the 118th Infantry and machine gun company, same regiment, were sent forward to protect our flank. At 3 p. m., our troops were reported to be on or near their objectives at which time the Australian 5th Division passed through our troops.
Available for all duty

) Officers 567
) Men 18,274

* * * * * *

HS Brit. File: (30th Inf.): Fldr. 8-10: War Diary

AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary of Events and Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N.16.c</td>
<td>Sept. 29</td>
<td>American 30th and 27th Divisions attacked at 5:50 a. m. this morning on right and left sector of Australian corps front. The attack started on time under a good barrage. Enemy barrage which was rather heavy came down about 5 minutes after Zero. 30th Division took BELICOURT. Elements of 27th Division reached Le CATELET and GOUY, but there a large number of enemy not mopped up in the Canal Tunnel and dugouts of the HINDENBURG Line. These held up the support regts. of the 27th Division. Subsequent advance of Aust. 3d Div. in the left sector was held up on line of KNOLL-GUILLEMONT Farm. 5th Division passed through American 30th Division. Line at 6 p. m. ran as follows---M.19.a. to G.18.b. through NAUROY to trench lines through G.11.b. and G.5, thence to G.4.b. and a. to G.4.a.5.4., thence up line of Tunnel to A.28.a.3.2.--A.27 b and a. to A.20.d and c.--F.24.a to W. of GUILLE-MONT Farm--A.7.d. and b. Prisoners through corps cage to 4 p. m., numbered 40 off., 1,100 O. R.'s.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


III CORPS, B. E. F.

[Extract]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Summary of Events and Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUERRIEU</td>
<td>Sept. 29</td>
<td>18th Division (phone)---Liaison officer with Amer. 27th Division reports 3 Bns., 107th Regt., across the Canal. Right Bn., 105th Regt., fallen back slightly. Mopping up causing some difficulty and tunnels giving trouble, but situation generally very good. Australians seen in F.28.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 237 -
QUERRIEU-Cont. Sept. 29
11:11 a. m.

27th Division (British liaison officer)---
27th Division reported well over Hindenburg
Line at 8:10 a. m. Australians close up and
all going well.

******

1:05 p. m.

Australian Corps---Amer. 30th Division have
taken up NAUROY mopping up Hindenburg Line,
and across line of Tunnel. From air reports,
Amer. 27th Division east of BONY and in GOUY.
Nest of enemy still in BONY.

2 p. m.

27th Division (phone)---Enemy snipers and
light machine gunners have appeared in and
about GUILLEMONTE Farm and QUENNEMONT Farm
and particularly in BONY Avenue. Appears that
tunnelled communications exist connecting
tunnel in main HINDENBURG System to forward
system. One remaining tank ordered to pro-
ceed at 1 p. m. to neighborhood GUILLEMONTE
Farm to mop up again. 18th Division unable
to get up MACQUINCURT Valley on account of
machine-gun fire. Additional troops re-
quired to complete mopping up. Parties of
107th and 108th Regiments on Green Line.
GOUY apparently still held. Some hundreds of
prisoners.

******

DISPOSITIONS - HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS
as at 6 a. m., September 30, 1918

[Extract]

Ref. Sheet 62 C.

Australian Corps N.16.c.


3d Sqdrn. A. F. C. BOUVINCOURT

- 238 -
13th A. L. H. Regt. 0.16.b.
1st Australian Division LONG (Mairte)

* * * * * *

2d Australian Division I.36.b.3.3.

* * * * * *

3d Australian Division 9th Aust. Inf. Bde.
10th " " " F.17.a.3.1.
11th " " " F.17.d.7.4.

3d Australian Division 5th Aust. Inf. Bde.

* * * * * *

4th Australian Division CAVILLON

* * * * * *

5th Australian Division K.23.d.3.2.

* * * * * *

II American Corps N.17.d.central

27th American Division J.11.c.2.9.

* * * * * *

30th American Division 30th American Division
(Adv.) K.11.c.5.7.
(Rear) J.16.b.0.5.

* * * * * *

3d Tank Brigade 0.13.b.4.7.
4th Tank Brigade D.28.central
5th Tank Brigade J.10.b.6.2.

5th Cavalry Brigade ROISEL

----------
SITUATION
AMERICAN II CORPS
NOON 30 SEPT 1918

MAP REF FRENCH 1:20000 ROISEL and Le-CATELET

MAP No 97
HS Brit. File: (27th Div.): Fldr. 7-9: Location List

No. 94

V CORPS

LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS AT 12 noon, September 30, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * *

FLANK CORPS

* * * * *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II AMERICAN CORPS</th>
<th>N.15.d.cent.</th>
<th>(Sheet 62c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Rear)</td>
<td>J.11.c.4.9.</td>
<td>(Sheet 62c)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *

T. B. JOHNSON,
Capt.,
for
Lieutenant General,
Commanding V Corps.

Sept. 29, 1918

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182-33.3: Telegram

Location and Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 30, 1918.

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Situation twenty-four hours ending 6 a. m., September 30: We attacked yesterday morning and pierced and hold the HINDENBURG Line from VENDHUILLE to BELLENGLISE. The right division reached its objective. The attack of the left division was partly successful. Prisoners: 40 officers and more than 1,200 other ranks. Our line now runs: The KNOLL--WILLOW Trench A 22 a 29 c G 5 b G 6 c G 6 d.

442-G-3, Amer. II Corps.

---------

- 241 -
1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: Mopping up of St-QUENTIN Canal Tunnel continued through the day from BELLICOURT north. The line at 6 p.m. runs approximately as follows:
   H15c---H7d---G12d---G11b---Le CATELET---NAUROY Line to A28b---west to HINDENBURG Line---north to BONY, west along BONY Avenue to GUILLEMONT Crescent, thence KNOLL Trench.
   (b) Artillery: There was no counterbattery work today.
   The heavies continually harassed the areas north of the Canal in the region of PUTNEY, while the long-range artillery was active on all towns and roads east of the BEAUREVOIR Line. In support of infantry operations in the morning CABARET WOOD Farm was shelled. In support of the operation at 5 p.m. FOLEMPRISE Farm and northwards and trenches in vicinity were taken on, later lifting to the trenches in rear. Simultaneously the BEAUREVOIR Line from 1,000 yards north of JONCOURT northwards was bombarded. During the remainder of the period harassing fire on all areas 1,000 yards clear of out-post line.
   (c) Prisoners: Estimated captures in the past 24 hours: 6 officers and 5 other ranks.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES: The following divisions were identified by prisoners captured on corps front:

   21st Div. 81st I. R. I Bn.---G5b III Bn.---A28b
   2d Guard Div. 3d Gren. Gd. R. I Bn. )
   2d Gren. Gd. R. I Bn. ) BELLICOURT
   1st Gren. Gd. R. I and III Bns. ) Area
   75th Res. Div. 251st R. I. R. II Bn. (CONFIRMATION)

3. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: The shelling has decreased, chiefly harassing fire on back areas. BELLICOURT and NAUROY were shelled, the latter receiving considerable attention.

   * * * * * *

230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 24 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

6 a.m., September 29 to 6 a.m., September 30, 1918

1. OPERATIONS: The Australians have passed through our lines and are now to the east. From S. to N. we are, roughly, on the Green Line from the Canal, southern edge of NIGGER Copse, the Green Line to WATLING Street, through NAUROY, Sunken Road through G 12, G 6, G 5, G 5b 00.10, Le CATELET-NAUROY Line trench to A 28d 9.9, A 27b 2.2.
Visibility until noon, was very poor. From noon until 6 p. m., it was fair, only.

Enemy Artillery: Shelling was heavy at intervals but slackened during the afternoon and up to 3 p. m., this afternoon, has been comparatively slight and scattered. Enemy planes were active during the entire day. A bombing plane was over the Canal and bombed the area G 29.

At 11:30 a.m., several fires were observed in BELLICOURT yesterday. At 11:45 a.m. and 12:10 p.m., explosions were observed there, but as visibility was not good, observers could not determine whether or not they were caused by fires.

Up to 5 p.m., this afternoon, 41 officers and 1,256 men have passed through the divisional cage. A few prisoners are still to be counted.

Captures from the 185th Division amount to 694, including one major and two captains, and captures from the 75th R. Division amount to 370. Prisoners report that their casualties were heavy. Prior to our attack these divisions averaged 36-50 and 50-60 men to the company, respectively. It is therefore possible that they will be either disbanded or withdrawn for a long period of rest and reorganization.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

All regimental summaries have not been received. An annex may therefore, be issued later in the day.

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230-33.1: Operations Report

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

12 M., Sept. 29 to 12 M., Sept. 30

1. Attack progressing on our right and center, with strong hostile resistance on our left.
2. The attack was a surprise to the enemy.
3. No special hostile movements were reported. Strong resistance continues on our left. The 27th Division on our left are still having difficulty in pushing forward.
4. Nil.
5. Situation on our right fairly quiet; on the left considerable fighting is going on from the northern boundary to G.6.c.1.3.
6. At 1 p.m., 29th, BELLICOURT had been taken and was being mopped up. One battalion of the 117th Regiment was sent to assist in this work. At 1:30 p.m., BELLICOURT was mopped up and eighty prisoners taken from one dugout. New battalion headquarters was established at this time in BELLICOURT. At the same time, tanks were assisting in clean up of NAUROY. One battalion of the 118th Regiment was sent to protect the left flank of the division, to take and hold their position in the Le CATELET-NAUROY System.
7. 46th Division on our right made good progress and attained all its objectives. On our left the 27th Division are still having trouble in parts of the HINDENBURG Line and the Le CATELET-NAUROY System.
8. Nil.
9. After the Australian 5th Division had passed through the American 30th Division all objectives of the Green Line were reported captured at 3 p.m. and the advance continuing. Order given by the commanding general that reorganization of all units of the division will take place on the morning of the 30th and assembly places chosen for this.
10. The line continues to advance. The strongest enemy resistance continues to come from the left flank.
11. Nil.
12. The American 30th Division with the exception of a few units protecting the left flank are now out of the fight and the work of reorganization will begin at once.
13. The division is to be relieved from the line and moved into back area to be completely reorganized and given a rest.
14. Though very tired from their strenuous fighting, the morale of the troops is excellent and supplies adequate.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

230-16.1: Operations Report

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 30, 1918.

Examination of prisoners taken by 30th Division from 5:30 a. m., Sept. 28 to 8 a. m., Sept. 30.
TOTAL: 41 officers and 1,164 other ranks, captured from the following organizations, passed through divisional cage.

Prisoners

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>185th D.</td>
<td>(161st I. R.</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>Officers include 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(28th R. I. R.</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>major and two</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(65th I. R.</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>captains</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(185th F. A. R.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75th R. D.</td>
<td>(249th R. I. R.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(250th R. I. R.</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(251st R. I. R.</td>
<td>259</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(55th R. F. A.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121st D.</td>
<td>(7th R. I. R.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(60th I. R.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plus 60 O. R.'s not classified.</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Other Identifications.

Prisoners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d D.</td>
<td>4th Gren. Regt.</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(87th I. R.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(81st I. R.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>226th D.</td>
<td>(64th R. F. A.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(Sector artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(42d Ft. Art. Bn.,</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Gd. Ft. Art. Regt.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORDER OF BATTLE  
(N. to S.)

121st D.  
(7th R. I. R.  
(60th I. R.  
(South flank, 60th I. R., about 2 km., north of BELLICOURT.  
(56th I. R. (in reserve).

185th D.  
(Adjoining 121st Div. and extending to southern edge of  
BELLICOURT  
(65th I. R. in close reserve in rear of BELLICOURT.

75th R. D.  
(251st R. I. R. Southern edge of BELLICOURT  
(250th R. I. R.  
(249th R. I. R. 2 km. south of BELLICOURT.

2d Gd. D.  
(4th Gd. Gren. Regt. Stated to be in reserve near LESDAIN.

21st D.  
(78th [87th?] I. R. Has been in close reserve north of  
BELLICOURT for 10 days.

COMPANY STRENGTHS: The average company trench strength of the 7th R. I. R. and  
60th I. R. (121st Div.) was reported as 45-60 men, with a total strength of 60-80 men per  
company, somewhat stronger than that of the 185th Div. or 75th R. Div. This division was  
in line on the northern flank of the division and not many prisoners were taken.  
The 28th R. I. R. (185th D.) averaged 36-50 men in trench strength, with, as a rule,  
one officer, and in some cases, two.  
The 161st I. R. averaged 35-50 men per company.  
The companies of the 65th I. R. ran from 25-40 men. The 3d M. G. Co. of this regi-  
ment had only 15 available fighting men, and three heavy machine guns. Almost the entire  
2d Bn. of this regiment was captured, including the bn. commander and staff and six other  
officers.  
The company strength of the 249th, 250th and 251st R. I. R.’s (75th R. D.) averages  
50-60 men.  
All companies had from 3 to 5 light M. G.’s, only one had 6, while another had two  
light and three heavy M. G.’s.  
STRENGTH OF M. G. COMPANIES: Most of the M. G. companies averaged from 50-60 men,  
fighting strength, but still had their quota of 12 heavy machine guns in most cases.  
ARTILLERY: The batteries averaged 120-130 men, total strength. All had four field  
pieces, and prisoners stated that guns were quickly supplied in case of destruction.  
Most of the prisoners were forward observing fire, when captured. Their morale was good,  
and they seemed in much better condition and spirits than the infantry prisoners. They  
state that their horses are in bad condition, which prevents their rapid movement.  
Counterbattery work has been effective, and the lieutenant commanding the 2d Bn., 42d Ft.  
Art. Bn. stated that three of his four guns had been put out of action within the last  
three days. This battalion was stationed in ESTREES.  
MINENWERFER: Prisoners complained about shortage of ammunition. The companies  
were of a reduced size, with few guns in action.  
PIONEERS: Only one pioneer prisoner was captured; a member of the 384th Pioneer  
Co., 17th Pioneer Bn. attached to the 75th R. D. He was occupied in digging tank traps at  
the time of capture, but upon the short notice, none of the traps had been finished. He  
stated that he knew nothing of any mining which had taken place in the Tunnel or any tank  
mines, and did not believe that the sector had been mined to any great extent.
Prisoners report that the tunnel north of BELLICOURT is to be used as a place to hide reserves. The Canal has been bridged in many places by footbridges, which are means of approach of reserves from rear.

RECENT LOSSES: Prisoners state that the barrage of Sept. 27 and artillery preparations preceding the attack, caused rather heavy casualties. The 11th Co., 28th R. I. R., suffered 25 casualties within the last week, while many other companies lost 5-10 men. The 2d Battery, 42d Ft. Art., lost 12 men through artillery fire and gas within the last three days. Other organizations report slight casualties, due to a gas attack several days ago.

CONDITIONS AT TIME OF ATTACK: Prisoners state that, in general, they had expected an attack within a few days, but that the attack at this time was a complete surprise. A prisoner from the 1st M.G. Co., 161st I. R., says that the entire company was at breakfast when the alarm was given and that they did not even have time to man the guns before it was too late. He says, "The men who thought they could get away ran, while some of us thought we would rather surrender."

MORALE: The morale of most of the infantry men was thoroughly bad. They were quite fed up and glad to be out of the war. The opinion of the men was that Germany is on its last legs. The officers gave evasive replies and refused to commit themselves. One man said that German prisoners were full of men who had deserted recently, and that they would do anything rather than to continue.

The morale of artillery men was much better. They had evidently had an easier life and better food, and were much less willing to admit defeat.

GENERAL: From prisoners' statements and reports of casualties, it may be supposed that the 185th D. and 75th R. D. must either be disbanded, or must be withdrawn for a long period of time for rest and reorganization. From what can be learned, the 121st D. is still in fair condition, but should not be considered formidable if left in line.

Office examining prisoners,

E. SCHOBINGH,
1st Lt., Inf., U. S. A.

--------


American II Corps to Come Into Army Reserve

No. 1
Fourth Army No. 20/25 (G)

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 30, 1918.

1. The IX Corps will continue the operation it is now undertaking with a view to securing the Le TRONQUOY--SEQUEHART Ridge, and the BEAUREVOIR Line from SEQUEHART as far north as the WIANCOURT-JONCOURT Road.

2. The Australian corps will continue the operation it is now undertaking, with a view to securing an approximate line - along the high ground about JONCOURT and ESTREES, thence to MONT-St-MARTIN and the northern entrance to the Tunnel, gaining touch with the III Corps about MACQUINCOURT Farm.

3. The III Corps will arrange to relieve the 12th Division tonight.

4. (a) The XIII Corps will take over command of the present III Corps front from the III Corps at 12 noon tomorrow, October 1, and all troops in III Corps area.

(b) The XIII Corps will arrange to move up 50th Division to relieve 18th Division on the canal front as far south as the present left of the Australian corps about

- 246 -
MACQUINCOURT Farm tomorrow night. As soon as relieved, the 18th Division will be withdrawn into a back area to refit, but will remain in XIII Corps.

(c) As soon as the situation on the Australian corps front is cleared up and the Australian corps has reached the objectives allotted to it in para. 2 above, the XIII Corps will take over the front from the Australian corps as far south as MONT-ST-MARTIN.

5. The American II Corps will concentrate in the Australian corps area about MESNIL and PERONNE as already ordered, and will then come into army reserve.

6. The cavalry corps will remain in its present position ready to move at 2 hours' notice after 7 a. m. tomorrow morning.

7. The 5th Cavalry Brigade has been allotted to IX Corps until further orders.

8. The French XV Corps on the right of the IX Corps is moving on the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel, with a view to crossing over it as early as possible. After crossing over the Tunnel, its mission will be to advance in an easterly direction and to protect the right flank of the IX Corps.

The IX Corps will keep touch along the interarmy boundary with French advance.

9. As the situation develops on the lines given in the above paras., the object of the Fourth Army will first be to turn the enemy's defenses on the Canal opposite the Third Army by working northwards on the general line BEAUREVOIR---GOUY---VENDHUILE, pivoting on the left.

The IX Corps, while keeping touch with the French on their southern boundary, will put its weight in a northeasterly direction so as to assist the Australian corps.

The Australian corps also working in a northeasterly direction towards BEAUREVOIR will assist the right flank of the XIII Corps, which will press northwards pivoting on VENDHUILE.

10. As soon as the above movement has resulted in enabling the V Corps to get across the canal and resume their advance eastwards, the Fourth Army will turn eastwards and corps will resume the new boundaries marked on the attached map. All three corps of the Fourth Army will then advance eastwards in depth on a one-division front.

11. Further instructions will be issued to the cavalry corps for the further action as the situation develops.

12. Acknowledge by wire.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

-----------

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B (II Corps): Letter

**Units American II Corps Attached to British XIII Corps**

No. 20/26 (G)

1. Reference para. 4 (a) of Fourth Army No. 20/25 (G) of 30/9/18, and Order of Battle, Section I of Instructions for Operations, Fourth Army No. 273 (G) of 23/9/18.

2. The following units will come under command of XIII Corps when they take over command from the III Corps:
(a) All the artillery allotted to III Corps in Table A.
   35th Squadron R. A. F.
   283d A. T. Co., R. E.
(b) 180th (T) Co., R. E. from IX Corps under arrangements to be made direct
    with IX Corps.
(c) 144th, 288th A. T. Cos., R. E.
    1st Siege Co., R. A. R. E.        From American
    No. 1 Advanced Section 353d       II Corps
    E and M Cos.
    182d (T) Co., R. E.               under arrangements to be made direct with American II Corps.
(d) The transfer of administrative units will be carried out under orders to be
    issued by Q Fourth Army.
3. The 4th Tank Brigade is transferred to Australian corps forthwith.
4. The Order of Battle will be amended accordingly.
5. Acknowledge by wire.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
   Major General,
   General Staff, Fourth Army.

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230-32.16: Field Message.

Passage of Command

FROM: American 30th Division
DATE: September 30, 1918       HOUR: 9:25 a. m.
TO: C. G., 59th Brigade, C. G., 60th Brigade

Command of front and area we now occupy passes to Commanding General, Australian 5th
Division, at once.

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230-32.16: Field Message

Reorganization of 30th Division

FROM: 30th Division
DATE: September 30, 1918       HOUR: 10:45
TO: C. G., 60th Brigade, C. G., 59th Brigade

1. It is absolutely essential that the American 30th Division be reorganized today
   and fed tonight.
2. This can only be done by most thorough personal reconnaissacne and drive from above
downwards. Waiting for tardy reports and map references is waste of time. Checking on the
ground and actually seeing the various commanders and their men is the only satisfactory way.
3. Commencing immediately, the following reconnaissances should be made:
   (a) Divisional staff officers to all regts. and some battalions of 119th and
       120th Regts.
   (b) Every regt. commander should go forward and see personally all his bn.
       commanders and M. G. commanders.
   (c) Every bn. commander must go forward and see all his co. commanders and the
       latter their platoon commanders.
   (d) Every officer in charge of supply and transport should go forward and get
       in touch with the commander whom he directly supplies.

4. All the above officers should take with them a proportion of N. C. O.’s and
   runners who can afterwards act as guides. When C. O.’s have reconnoitered, seconds in
   command must do so, taking fresh N. C. O.’s and runners with them and the process must be
   continued till all N. C. O.’s and runners as well as officers know the situation for
   certain.

5. A report in writing (not on the telephone) should be required from lower forma­
   tions to each higher formation stating:
   (a) Locations of their commands and map reference of their own hq.
   (b) Report of number of officers, N. C. O.’s and men who have made the personal
       reconnaissances already referred to and who are familiar with the situation.
   (c) Report (from both front units and rear units) as to arrangements made for
       supply of food tonight, meeting of ration parties at definite rendezvous, guides, etc.

6. All above information should be tabulated and also put on maps by intelligence
   personnel of each unit.

7. Australian Mission will make independent reconnaissances today on similar lines
   and will report also as in (5) above, to Major Anderson through regt. and bde. channels.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. 4 and 5 (30th Div.): Summary of Operations

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.

[Extract]

1. During the night Sept. 29/30, the IX Corps captured Le TRONQUOY and the whole of
   the Tunnel defenses.

   Operations were renewed during the morning by the IX and Australian corps. The 1st
   Division attacked south of the Canal and joined up with the 32d Division at the Le
   TRONQUOY Tunnel defenses. The Australian 5th and 3d Divisions attacked northwards along
   the railway and BONY Spur, making some progress east of NAUROY and along NAUROY Trench,
   also on BONY Spur.

   Farther north, the III Corps attacked DADOS Loop meeting considerable opposition,
   but as the result of continued pressure throughout the day, enemy withdrew across the
   Canal and evacuated VENDHUILE.

   The action of our artillery in support of the Australian corps operations was re­
   stricted on account of a number of Americans suspected of being in the enemy’s territory
   in advance of our line. This affected considerably the advance of the Australian corps,
   who were unable to make very much progress on account of the weak artillery support.

   The majority of the enemy’s artillery fire was from H. V. guns firing at almost ex­
   treme range. With the exception of a light barrage on the forward area west of JONCOURT
   in the morning, no heavy shelling was experienced. Activity chiefly took the form of
   harassing fire distributed over the whole of the battle area.

   HARGICOURT---TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD---RONSSOY received intermittent attention, and
   NAUROY and BELLICOURT were harassed continually. Later the Le TRONQUOY and
   LEHACOURT area, and the Tunnel entrance were fairly heavily shelled.

- 249 -
2. IX CORPS: During the night, the 32d Division advanced east of LEHAUCOURT and captured Le TRONQUOY and the tunnel defenses, and also gained the Red Line on the right.

At 8 a.m., the 1st Division attacked south of the Canal with a view to effecting a junction with the 32d Division at the Le TRONQUOY Tunnel and forming a protective flank from GRICOURT to the east of THORIGNY and TALANA Hill. This was accomplished successfully and about 500 prisoners captured.

The line a 6 p.m. was established M.17.c.4.5.---THORIGNY (incl.)---east of TALANA HILL---N.9.d.3.8.---N.4. central---H.33.central---H.27 central---H.21.d.8.0---H.15.d.2.0 ---H.15.a.2.3.

Since the morning of September 29, the IX Corps captured 5,400 prisoners and 89 guns, also about 300 machine guns.

AUSTRALIAN CORPS: In consequence of the disorganization caused by the failure of the 27th and American 30th Divisions to realize their objectives, the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions were unable to make very much progress.

These Australian divisions were allotted the task of clearing up the situation and, if possible, of establishing the line JONCOURT-GOUY. At 5 a.m. operations commenced. The Australian 5th Division attacked northwards towards MILL Ridge and along the RAILWAY Spur, and the Australian 3d Division along the BONY Spur, with the object of securing the northern entrance of the St-QUENTIN Tunnel. Considerable opposition was encountered and fighting was severe all day. BONY was captured with the exception of the defenses through the northern portion of the village.

At 6 p.m., the line was reported to run H.15.c.0.4---H.7.d.1.3.---G.12.d.8.9---G.11.b.9.9.---Le CATELET---NAUROY Line---A.28.b.8.8.---west to HINDENBURG Line---Thence north to BONY---west along BONY Avenue---GUILLEMONT CRESCENT---KNOLL Trench. By this time the American 27th and 30th Divisions, which were very disorganized, were collected and withdrawn into support of the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions prior to a complete withdrawal from the battle area.

III CORPS: The 12th Division attacked DADOS Loop at 5:30 a.m., but were unable to make any progress. Pressure was renewed at this point and eventually the enemy withdrew to the east of the Canal and the 12th Division occupied VENDHUILE. Finally, the 12th Division held MACQUINCOURT and HIDDEN Trench with posts along the canal bank from S.26.d.6.3. to S.26.a.0.0. BELOW and HAWKE Trenches were also occupied and patrols were sent forward to the western bank of the Canal.

3. THIRD ARMY: Pressure was maintained along the whole of the front especially in the vicinity of VILLERS-GUISLAIN and GONNELIEU. After heavy fighting throughout the day, both villages were captured and the line advanced to the western bank of the canal as far north as MASNIERES. Progress was also made north of MASNIERES to west of MONT-sur-L'OEUVRE and east of PROVILLE. Attacks during the afternoon against MONT-sur-L'OEUVRE were unsuccessful.

Captures since September 27 total 320 officers and 12,100 O. R. prisoners, and 140 guns.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: An operation in the vicinity of URVILLERS met considerable resistance and made little progress. La GUINGUETTE and La FOLIE were captured and about 50 prisoners taken.

As the result of an enemy counterattack last night near URVILLERS, the enemy penetrated into the north portion of the village, otherwise the counterattacks were repulsed.

5. AIRCRAFT:

(a) British: 227 hours were flown by 137 pilots. Nine reconnaissance, 19 artillery and 32 contact patrols were carried out, and 80 zone calls sent down.

71 offensive patrols were carried out and three indecisive combats took place. Four of our machines failed to return.

Six 40-lb. phosphorus bombs, 192 25-lb. bombs were dropped on, and 23,966 machine-gun rounds fired at suitable ground targets during the day.
(b) Hostile: Activity was below normal, but high wind and bad weather prevented flying to a great extent.

6. PRISONERS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Through Army Cages</th>
<th>125 off.</th>
<th>4,996 O. R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Through C. C. S.'s [Casualty Clearing Stations]</td>
<td>7 off.</td>
<td>185 O. R.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total for September | 489 off. | 18,898 O. R. |
Total for September | 58 off. | 2,083 O. R. |

TOTAL | 547 off. | 20,981 O. R. |

7. WEATHER: Overcast with rain.

8. RELIEF AND MOVES: The 6th Division was relieved by the French and went into corps reserve.

The 46th Division front was taken over by the 32d Division, the former going into corps reserve.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:

III Corps: 12th and 18th Divisions, 50th Division (G. H. Q. reserve).

IX Corps: 1st, 6th,* 32d and 46th* Divisions.

Australian Corps: 1st (army reserve), Australian 2d,* 3d, 4th (army reserve) and 5th Divisions, American 27th and 30th Divisions, 1 Bde. 2d Cavalry Division.*

XIII Corps: 25th and 66th Divisions (both army reserve).

Cavalry Corps: 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions, 4th Guards Bde. (all G. H. Q. reserve).

* * * * *

11. GENERAL:

Captures for September:

| Machine guns and trench mortars | 7,232 |
| Guns | 245 |

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

182-33.3: Operations Report

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 30, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, September 30, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The enemy order of battle last evening from north to south was 153d I. R. Regt. of (8th Div.), 84th I. R., 27th I. R.

---

* Corps reserve.
Hostile artillery reaction was moderate only; barrage weak and broken, but later recovered somewhat delivering harassing fire of 10 and 15-centimeter guns and 15 and 21-centimeter howitzers. Area in our own lines receiving majority of the fire were, G1 and 7, HARGICOURT, BELLICOURT, A 7 and 13, a few rounds on RONSSOY, high velocity guns on ROISEL and TINCOURT.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Prisoners of the 84th I. R. state that their regiment received 250 reinforcements from 85th Fus. Regiment of 19th Div, This would indicate that the regiment had been disbanded. Morale of the prisoners captured was generally poor.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: A large number of the enemy, seem to have taken shelter during our barrage, in the Canal Tunnel (5h, 62B A 9 b 7 9 to G 16 a 8 6) and in subterranean passages connected with it. After elements of the 27th Division had crossed the Canal Tunnel, enemy machine gunners and snipers emerged in some force from the subterranean passages, and reinforced by machine gunners advanced in a southwesterly direction up MACQUINCOURT Valley, checked the advance of our 27th Division's support regiment.


5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The 27th and 30th Divisions occupied lines running as follows: The Knoll, A 7 d 7 0, A 15 c 5 0, A 22 d 5 3, G 5 central, NAUROY, G 24 8 a and having one battalion of the 107th Infantry in GOUY.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The 27th and 30th Divisions spent the day in mopping up captured areas, and in consolidating the new positions.

7. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: On our right the IX Corps has taken LE TRONQUOY and LEVERGIES and joins with the right of the 30th Division. On our left, the III Corps attacked capturing MACQUINCOURT Trench and TINO Support.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: Orders for relief of 27th and 30th Divisions.

9. ACTION DURING THE DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: Steps towards the relief of the 27th and 30th Divisions taken. Action as described under six (6) above.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: We have taken NAUROY, BELLICOURT, southwestern outskirts of BONY, GUILLEMNONT Farm, and that portion of the main HINDENBURG Line running from the southern outskirts of BONY to G 22 b 8.0. The failure on the part of the 27th Division to mop up quickly the area in the vicinity of Canal Tunnel, and the enemy’s action in taking advantage of this, resulted in the holding up of the support regiments of the 27th Division and in the isolation of one battalion of the 107th Infantry which had advanced to the Green Line. The 30th Division which had advanced to the Green Line, subsequently drew in its left flank to conform to the position of the 27th. The Australian 3d and 5th Divisions are now passing through the 27th and 30th Divisions respectively, to exploit the forward territory.

The 30th Division reports 4 officers and 425 other ranks had passed through prison cages by noon. The 27th Division had approximately 12 officers and 386 other ranks pass through their cages by noon. (The above figures are in addition to those mentioned in yesterday’s report.) Report of corps surgeon shows number of wounded passed through corps casualty station, 27th Division, 13 officers and 375 other ranks, 30th Division, 33 officers and 1,186 other ranks.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The action has been successful; the main HINDENBURG Defenses have been broken and a bridgehead of 4,500 yards has been established by our troops.
13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: Resting of the 27th and 30th Divisions, and continuation of operations according to previously reported plan.

14. REMARKS, MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: No change.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Col., G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

182-33.3: Memorandum

HOUR: 3:50 p.m.

TO: II Corps

I have just returned from P. C.'s of 54th Brigade, 53d Brigade, this division, and Australian 3d Division. The report of yesterday that we had three companies of 108th in the Hindenburg Line south of BONY was confirmed and by Australians who have joined up with them. Their runner reported to 54th Brigade last night that their strength was about 140 men and that they had 102 Boche prisoners with many papers, maps and some officer's portfolio and that they would hold on until relieved. Last night my Chief of Staff forward of 108th Hq. met some 108th men who had just delivered between 30 and 40 prisoners taken by their company to 30th Division. At 9 a.m., this morning two officers' patrols left 108th in an effort to join up with battalion of 107th which reached GOUY yesterday evening behind the barrage and whose presence there [was reported by an] Australian artillery officer who was there with them and got back at 6 p.m. yesterday. A major of enemy captured this morning by the Australians in A.22.c.3.3. stated they had captured several hundred Americans, but I have been unable to learn when or where. He may refer to some of the 106th who reached their advance [objective?] they met many small units and groups of our division holding on and that they went forward with 3d Division and will be relieved and sent back tonight. 3d Division say these detachments with them aggregate at least one thousand men. 3d Division report that at 10:20 a.m. their line ran from A.8.c.2.2. to 21 central, where they met the companies of 108th Regiment to 21.d.94. Our losses yesterday very heavy, but units well in hand, guides will meet the detachments tonight who are with 3d Div. now.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Comdg, 27th Div.
DAILY FRONT LINES
AMERICAN 27th and 30th DIVISIONS
24 SEPT - 30 SEPT 1918
ALL LINES ARE AS OF MIDNIGHT UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED

Compiled by American Battle Monuments Commission 1938
WAR DIARY OF 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

September 30, 1918

[Extract]

With the exception of one battalion, all units of this division are now out of the attack, the Australian 5th Division having passed through our troops. Positions now held by our units being consolidated; the killed and wounded being evacuated; all units being reassembled and reorganized. Orders were issued for the movement of this division to back area for complete reorganization and rest.

Available for all duty

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>18,265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

227-32.13: Order

Operations 27th Division

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 30, 1918.

WARNING ORDER

The division is to be relieved during the day by the Australian 3d Division and organizations will be assembled at their transport lines.

Orders later.

In preparation for this, detachments in rear, and stragglers will be marched as soon as practicable to transport lines.

Commanding officers will see that troops police up their property and equipment and not have it scattered about for general salvage later.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

Map: Sheet 62c unless otherwise shown

Showing location of units at 6 a. m.,
October 1, 1918

[Extract]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location of Unit</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td>ROISEL J.16.b.0.5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Division P. C.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rear Echelon</td>
<td>HALLE</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>* * * * * * * * *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Hq. 59th Brigade</td>
<td>L.26.c.4.7</td>
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<td>* * * * * * * * *</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Hq. 60th Brigade</td>
<td>62b/L.10.a.1.d</td>
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<td>* * * * * * * * *</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

J. SHAPTER CALDWELL,
Major, Acting Adjutant.

HS Brit. File.: Fldr. IV B (II Corps): Letter

American II Corps Remains in Reserve

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In continuation of Fourth Army No. 20/25 (G) of 30-9-18.
2. (a) The IX Corps have captured the Le TRONQUOY---SEQUÉHART Ridge and the BEAUREVOIR Line from SEQUEHART as far north as the JONCOURT---WIANCOURT Road.
   (b) The Australian corps have secured an approximate line along the high ground about JONCOURT and ESTREES (both villages inclusive), thence to MONT-St-MARTIN and the northern entrance to the tunnel in touch with XIII Corps about MACQUINCOURT Farm.
   (c) The French First Army have reached the Canal about LESDINS and are marching through ST-QUENTIN, which has been evacuated.
3. (a) The IX Corps will continue to exploit its success with cavalry and infantry in the direction of FRENOY-le-GRAND, BRANCOURT, MONTBREHAIN, WIANCOURT, with a view to
securing a passage for the advance of the cavalry corps early tomorrow morning.

(b) The IX Corps will maintain touch with the French XV Corps along its southern boundary.

4. (a) The Australian corps will exploit tomorrow towards BEAUREVOIR and the railway between BEAUREVOIR and GOUY.

(b) Should the enemy maintain his present positions during tomorrow, the Australian and IX Corps will be prepared to carry out an attack ** at dawn on October 3.

(c) The Zero hour for the attack in (b) above will be arranged by Australian corps with IX Corps direct, and XIII Corps informed.

5. (a) The XIII Corps will take over the front of the Australian corps as far south as MONT-St-MARTIN on night October 2/3. The relief will be completed and the command will pass at 6 a.m., October 3, at which time the new back boundaries, shown on map issued with Fourth Army No. 20/25 (G) of 30-9-18, will come into force.

(b) The XIII Corps, after they have relieved the Australian corps, will conform with any advance of the Australian corps on October 3 **.

(c) One divisional artillery now covering the front of the Australian corps, which is to be taken over on night of October 2/3, will be transferred by Australian corps to XIII Corps under arrangements to be made between corps concerned, at 6 a.m., October 3.

6. (a) The cavalry corps will take advantage of the exploitation of the IX Corps early tomorrow morning. It will keep the closest touch with the troops of the IX Corps, who are clearing a passage for their advance, in order that no time may be lost in pressing forward to their objectives.

(b) The IX and Australian corps will arrange for routes to be cleared for the passage of the cavalry corps tomorrow morning at an hour to be arranged direct by cavalry corps with the corps concerned. The cavalry corps during the period of passage to have precedence over all other traffic.

(c) Instructions for the action of the cavalry after they have passed through the advanced troops of the IX Corps have already been issued.

7. The American II Corps will continue its concentration as already ordered, and remain in army reserve.

8. Boundaries for counterbattery work will be the same as the inter-corps and inter-army boundaries shown on Map B.

9. Map B issued herewith shows the amended boundaries between corps and between the Fourth Army and the French First and Third Armies for a further advance eastwards after the operations outlined above have been completed.

This cancels the boundaries shown on map issued with Fourth Army No. 20/25 (G) of 30-9-18.

10. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.
Operations II Corps

FROM: Fourth Army, B. E. F.
DATE: October 1, 1918
TO: II Corps

Little opposition is being met with on Fourth Army front and a rapid advance has been made. Blue Line has already been passed on most of the front. Corps will continue the advance forthwith, with object of reaching the following objectives:

XIII Corps - Le CATEAU. American II Corps MOLAIN---St-SOUPLET---St-BENIN and crossings over River SELLE at these places.
IX Corps high ground N. and S. of ANDIGNY-les-FERMES.

Tactical boundaries between corps will be same as administrative boundaries laid down in map B issued with Fourth Army No. 20/27 (G) of 1-10-18.

Cavalry corps will push forward as rapidly as possible on Le CATEAU and after reaching that place will carry out mission already allotted to them by C-in-C. Acknowledge.

G-319 Fourth Army, B. E. F.

MESSAGES SENT BY II CORPS, A. E. F., ON OCTOBER 1, 1918

182-33.3

TO: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

447 G-3 - Situation 24 h. ending 0600 Oct. 1. Our troops forced bridgehead 6,000 yards wide through Hindenburg Line now engaged in cooperation with Aust. in mopping up and extending gains east and north. Our line runs approximately VENDHUILE---BONY---Northeast NAUROY---east JONCOURT. Enemy artillery active. Our air squadron brought down 2 enemy aircraft in flames. Pilots returned safely. Aerial observers report considerable movement troops and guns eastward towards BEAUREVOIR; also considerable movement trains to southeast indicating possible reinforcements line north of St-QUENTIN.

TO: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

455 G-3 - Estimated that total casualties in past two days' fighting are: For 27th Division, 4,000 men; 30th Division, 1,500 men. Before beginning of battle, 27th Div. was short about 3,000 men, 30th Div., about 1,000 men. No replacements have been furnished in response to requisitions since the arrival of these divisions in France in May. Request replacements be furnished earliest possible date. Request also that 100 officers be sent to replace casualties and to be attached during absence of officers at schools. Efficient operation of divisions greatly hampered by lack of officers. Under present plans active operations of this corps are to be continued.

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27th and 30th Divisions Withdrawn from Front Line

FIELD ORDERS No. 18
II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

MAPS: 1:40,000 62B and 62C

1. The American 27th Division and American 30th Division (less 118th Infantry) will be withdrawn from the forward areas.

The 118th Infantry of the American 30th Division will not be withdrawn until further orders. It will remain in reserve in rear of the Australian 5th Division.

2. Detailed arrangements for the withdrawal will be made between the division commanders of the Australian 3d and the American 27th Divisions and between the Australian 5th and the American 30th Divisions.

3. The PERONNE area is allotted to the American 27th Division, with staging area as follows: HAUT ALLAINES area west of line LIERAMONT---AIZECOURT-le-BAS---TEMPLEUX-la-FOSSE---all exclusive.

The Le MESNIL-BRUNTEL area is allotted to the American 30th Division with staging area as follows: TINCOURT area west and south of the line TEMPLEUX-la-FOSSE---TINCOURT ---BOUCLY---HAMEL---all exclusive.

Australian 2d Division will remain in occupation of all quarters as at present.

4. The above withdrawal is to be proceeded with at once and progress reported frequently to these headquarters.

5. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GEO. W. READ,
Maj. Gen.

FIELD ORDERS No. 18
II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

AMENDMENT No. 1

MAPS: 1:40,000 62B AND 62C

1. So much of Field Order No. 18, para. 1, as refers to the 118th Infantry being held in reserve in rear of the Australian 5th Division is revoked. This regiment is placed at the disposal of the C. G., American 30th Division and will be withdrawn to the Le MESNIL-BRUNTEL area.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
FIELD ORDERS
No. 18

AMENDMENT No. 2

1. In continuance of Field Orders No. 18, these headquarters, Oct. 1, American 27th Division will move from PERONNE area to SUZANNE area on Oct. 4, 18, via CLERY [SOMME] clearing PERONNE area by 11 o’clock, Oct. 4, 18.

2. Headquarters American 27th Division will clear present quarters at J.11.c.4.9. by 12 o’clock, Oct. 3, and will move to SUZANNE-Chateau direct and not to DOINGT.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

G-3: GHQ: AEF: (27th Dtv.): Fltr. 1: Message

Relief of 27th Division

FROM: 27th Division
DATE: October 1, 1918 HOUR: 2:32 p. m.
TO: American II Corps, Australian Corps, Australian 3d Division

Troops of 27th Division were not relieved last night. All are now relieved, except detachments actually operating with Australians.

27th Division Transferred to Peronne Area, October 1 and 2

FIELD ORDER
No. 50

[Extract]

1. The division will move to the PERONNE area by road march on October 1 and 2.
2. The units now engaged in the front line with Australian 3d Division will not move with the 27th Division, but will remain with the Australian 3d Division until it is deemed practicable to send them to join the 27th Division, for which orders will be given by Australian Division.
3. (a) On October 1, troops will march as follows:
The 54th Infantry Brigade to camp southeast of SAULCOURT.
The 53d Infantry Brigade (less 106th Infantry) to camp north of VILLERS-FAUCON.
The 105th Infantry will remain in its present camp.
The 102d Engineers and engineer train to camp in the vicinity of DRIENCOURT.
The 104th Machine Gun Bn. to camp near the 54th Infantry Brigade.
Other divisional troops will move west of TEMPLEUX-la-FOSSE.

(b) On October 2, troops will march as follows:
54th Infantry Brigade to PERONNE area.
53d Infantry Brigade " " "
102d Engineers and engineer train to PERONNE area.
104th M. G. Battalion to PERONNE area.
Other divisional troops to PERONNE area.

(c) The 102d Field Signal Battalion and sanitary train will move to the PERONNE area as arranged.

* * * * *

9. Move of division headquarters will be announced later.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

227-32.16: 27th Div.: Messages

Location of Division Headquarters

FROM: 27th Division
DATE: October 1, 1918 HOUR: 9:05 a.m.
TO: 30th Division

Division headquarters will close at Ste-EMILIE Quarries at 1 p.m., October 2 and open at J.11.c.2.9 at same hour. On October 3, division headquarters will close at J.11.c.2.9 at 10 a.m. and open DOINGT at the same hour.

182-32.16: II Corps: Messages

Location of 27th Division Headquarters

FROM: II Corps
DATE: October 1, 1918 HOUR: 22:30
TO: G-3, G. H. Q.

465 G-3---27th Division headquarters will move October 4 to SUZANNE-Chateau.

- 261 -
Administrative Orders

ORDERS
No. 96

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

Reference Map: 62C 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. The following in connection with operations directed in Field Orders No. 50.
2. Units will be located in the PERONNE area as follows:
   (a) Divisional Troops
       102d Engrs. J.21.d.0.5. (Hill Camp)
       104th M. G. Bn. L36.b.0.5.
       102d F. Sig. Bn. I.36.a.9.4.
       102d Sanitary Tn. J.32.c. COURCELLES
       133d Field Amb. PERONNE
       Divisional Ordnance Officer PERONNE
       Railhead Supply Det. PERONNE

   (b) 53d Infantry Brigade
       Brig. Hq. I.19.b.0.7. HALLE
       105th M. G. Bn. J.15.c.

       105th Inf. I.18.b. and J.13.a. BUSSU
       * * * * * *

       106th Inf.
       * * * * * *

   (c) 54th Infantry Brigade
       Brig. Hq. I.36.b.0.5. DOINGT
       106th M. G. Bn. BUIRE

       107th Inf.
       Regiment complete I.30.b. and vicinity

       108th Inf.
       Regiment complete BUIRE

   (d) M. V. S. Location to be notified later
       (probably PERONNE).

   * * * * * * *
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 2, 1918.

12 M., Sept. 30 to 12 M., Oct. 1

1. Progress continues on our right front and resistance continues on our left flank.
2. Enemy positions are being held by irregular concentrations of machine-gun nests.
3. No special hostile movements reported.
4. Nil.
5. With exception of one battalion on our left flank and burial parties left behind by the regiments making the attack, all of our troops are out of the attack.
6. Work of reorganization has been taken up and is progressing favorably.
7. The 27th Division on our left has been replaced in the line by the Australian 3d Division; and on our right, the 46th Division was relieved by the 32d Division.
8. Orders were received to move to back area for rest and reorganization.
9. Orders issued for the movement of the division to the back area and releasing the 118th Infantry which is being held as a regiment.
10. Preparations being carried out for the move.
11. Nil.
12. The troops will be moved back to rest area by easy marches, where the reorganization of units will be completed and complete check of all casualties made.
13. Work of reorganization will be carried as rapidly as possible to render division available for duty in the line within a few days if possible.
14. Morale, excellent; supplies, adequate.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

FIELD ORDER
No. 22

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

1. This division (less 118th Infantry) will move from present area to the Le MESNIL-BRUNTEL and HERBECOURT areas according to movement table attached herewith. Movement will take place on October 1 and 2, staging night of October 1 in TINCOURT area.
2. Move from staging area to new areas will be under brigade arrangements. For the purpose of the march, 113th Machine Gun Battalion is attached to the 59th Brigade; division headquarters and Headquarters Troop to the 60th Brigade.
3. Billeting parties consisting of one officer from each brigade, regiment and battalion or similar unit, and one enlisted man from each company, will proceed to new areas by lorry leaving brigade headquarters at 9 a. m., October 1. Billeting parties will carry two days’ rations.
4. First line transport will accompany organizations; second line transport and all motor transport will move under arrangements made by G-1. New railhead will be communicated later.
5. Division headquarters will close at K.30.c.5.0. at 3 p. m., October 1 and open at J.16.b.0.5. (Buire Wood) at same hour. It will close at latter place 12 noon, October 2 and open at same hour at HERBECOURT.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Comdg.

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230-32.1: Memorandum

Change in Stations

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

MEMORANDUM for Commanding Generals, 59th and 60th Brigades:

1. Move table attached to Field Order No. 22 should be amended so as to send the 59th Brigade Headquarters, 118th Infantry and the 114th Machine Gun Battalion to Le MESNIL-BRUNTEL area and the 117th Infantry to the HERBECOURT area.

2. The 60th Brigade should go to the HERBECOURT area.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.

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Medical General C 482-E, D 2, Fl dr. 10: Memo

Medical Instructions

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
October 1, 1918.

MEMO. No. 17-A

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Field Order 22, Hq. 30th Division, American E. F., dated October 1, 1918, Field Ambulance Nos. 118, 119, 132, and 134, will move to areas indicated below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Ambulance</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Map</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>118th</td>
<td>O.16.b.9.2</td>
<td>62 C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119th</td>
<td>FEUILLERES</td>
<td>H.14.c.9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
132d Field Ambulance to BIACHES I.25.d.central Map 62 C
134th " " " ASSEVILLERS M.13.b.central Map 62 C

* * * * *

A. M. WHALEY,
Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. 4 and 5 (30th Div.): Summary of Operations

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

[Extract]

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: 12th Division relieved by 18th Division extending its front-age. 12th Division to corps reserve. American 27th and 30th Divisions relieved by Australian 3d and 5th Divisions and went into army reserve under American II Corps. 5th Cav. Bde. transferred from Australian corps to IX Corps (corps reserve). 50th Division transferred from III Corps to XIII Corps (army reserve).

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
III Corps: 12th, * 18th Divisions.
Australian corps: Australian 1st (army reserve), 2d, * 3d, 4th (army reserve), 5th Divisions.
XIII Corps: 25th, 50th, 66th Divisions (all army reserve).
American II Corps: American 27th and 30th Divisions (all in army reserve).

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MESSAGES SENT BY FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F., ON OCTOBER 1, 1918

182-33.3

HOUR: 9:15 a. m.

TO: II Corps

G208: IX Corps report LEVERGIES captured and our troops in JONCOURT. Aust. corps report we hold Le CATELET-NAUROY Line as far N. as A22d4.8., but enemy still occupy

* Corps reserve.
trench running from this point to A22c4.3 BONY not yet cleared up and enemy hold trenches in northern portion of village. Forward area heavily shelled early this morning. Aust. 5th Div. are now attacking between JONCOURT and G6d. Situation unchanged on III Corps front.

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II Corps: 182-10.2

HOUR: 11:15

TO: American II Corps

IX Corps report line 32d Div. now runs H34d07---S. E. edge LEVERGIES to H18d9.0---N. edge LEVERGIES---H28c1.7---H 21 central---H21b5.5---H15 cent. Aust. corps report Aust. 5th Div. assisted by tanks attacked at 0600 N. W. JONCOURT and has captured MILL Ridge (HS)---ESTREES and FOLEPRISE Fme (B25C). Patrols now exploiting forward.

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182-33.3

HOUR: 14 h.

TO: II Corps

G1202: Air reports 6:30-9: Railway abnormally active. Movement on main double line showed no particular tendency. Movement on MONT-d'ORIGNY---VERLY---GUISE Line chiefly eastward. Some movement on CAUDRY---CLARY---MALINCOURT single line. BOHAIN and dump very active. 9 trains steaming in BUSIGNY at 8:10. Much traffic east 6:30-7:45 from GOUY to VILLERS-OUTREAUx and BEAUREVOIR. PONCHAUX dump active 7:05. Only troop movement reported 3 platoons infantry with HT [Heavy Transport] going SEQUEHART to FONTAINE-UTERTE.

---

HOUR: 15:05

TO: II Corps

G204: Bn. Comdr., 84th I. R., under special examination states men informed plenty of reserves behind. Really very few. Believes if British continue to attack they will capture BOHAIN within a fortnight. Officers can no longer rely on their men and states half of his bn. never fired yesterday. Believes majority of reserves in METZ area. His morale very low.

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HOUR: 17:20

TO: II Corps


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- 266 -
From: Commanding General

To: G-3. G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, Oct. 1, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: No change reported. 21st Division identified in front of NAUROY and 119th in ESTREES.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY:
   (a) Prisoners captured by Australians (in our front) at ESTREES state left behind as rearguard. They are very much disorganized.
   (b) 65th I. R. had heavy losses yesterday. They received 150 of draft of 400 from 261st I. R., which arrived from Russia two days ago after journey of 8 days; also draft of 180 from BEVERLOO three days ago. These men also came from Russia where they belonged to 99th L. I. R., 85th L. Division.
   (c) Bn. commander, 87th I. R., states men informed plenty of reserves behind, but really very few. Officers cannot longer rely on men. Half of his bn. never fired yesterday. Believes morale of majority of reserves in METZ area very low.


4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None submitted.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: 27th and 30th Divisions occupied same positions as yesterday.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Parties of 27th Division assisting Australians in mopping up BONY and GUILLEMON Farm.

7. INFORMATION OF NEIGHBORING UNITS: On our right IX Corps have taken LEVERGIES and in cooperation with Australians, JONCOURT.
   On our left III Corps has been relieved by XIII. Former have taken VENDHUILE. Bridges across Canal appear to be down except possibly one in VENDHUILE.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: Relief of all units of 27th and 30th Divisions has been ordered.

9. ACTION DURING THE DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: See under 6 and 8 above.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: As result of our operations on Sept. 29 and 30, the main Hindenburg Line was broken on the front represented by the canal tunnel. 27th Division report they have taken 17 officers and 763 O. R. prisoners; our casualties estimated at 4,000. Two enemy aircraft brought down by machine guns. 30th Division report they have taken 41 officers and 1,104 O. R. prisoners; our casualties estimated at 1,500. All reports indicate heavy enemy casualties.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None Submitted.

12. ESTIMATE OF SITUATION: The operation appears to have been very successful, especially on front held by 30th Division where opposition was not so strong. Enemy appears badly shaken.

13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: Resting of the 27th and 30th Divisions preparatory to new operations.
14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale high, wounded very cheerful; supplies satisfactory.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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WAR DIARY OF 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

October 1, 1918
[Extract]

With the exception of the 118th Infantry, all units of the division moved by marching to the TINCOURT area. Preparations were made to continue march to HERBECOURT and MESNIL areas in compliance with Order No. 22, these headquarters. Division headquarters closed at K.30.c.5.0 at 3 p.m. and opened at J.16.C.0.3 (BUIRE Wood) at same hour.

Available for all duty) Officers 566
                      ) Men 18,113

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C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. XIV (30th Div.): War Diary

GENERAL STAFF 5th AUSTRALIAN DIVISION

Place Date Summary of Events and Information

OCTOBER 1918

On September 29, the Australian corps in conjunction with the American II Corps attacked the enemy's positions in the Hindenburg Line in the NAUROY-GOUY section, with the American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left. The Australian 5th and 3d Divisions subsequently leapfrogging through them. On October 1, the operations were still in progress. The IX Corps was on the right of the Australian 5th Division.

At 0600, the division attacked in accordance with Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 15

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- 268 -
German Divisions Opposed to 27th and 30th Divisions, A. E. F.,
in the Somme Offensive from September 24, 1918 to
include October 20, 1918

German 2d Guard Division

American Division Opposed

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<th>Dates</th>
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<td>30th</td>
<td>October 6, 8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German 3d Marine Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>October 11, 12, 15, 16 and 20</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German 8th Infantry Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>September 27, 28 and 29</td>
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<td>German 19th Res. Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>October 19, 20</td>
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<td>German 20th Infantry Division</td>
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<td>30th</td>
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<td>30th</td>
<td>October 6, 8</td>
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<td>German 54th Infantry Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>September 27, 28, 29; October 19</td>
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<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>October 19</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>German 75th Res. Division</td>
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</table>
30th  September 24, 25, 27, 29
    German 84th Infantry Division

30th  October 8
    German 119th Infantry Division

30th  October 6
    German 121st Infantry Division

27th  September 27, 28, 29; October 19, 20

30th  September 24, 25, 27, 29; October 6, 8, 19, 20
    German 185th Infantry Division

30th  September 24, 25, 27, 29
    204th Wuerttemberg Division

27th  October 20

30th  October 20
    German 204th Infantry Division

27th  October 11, 12, 15, 16

30th  October 11, 12, 15, 16
    German 221st Infantry Division

30th  October 6
    German 232d Infantry Division

30th  September 24
    241st Saxon Division

30th  October 6
    243d Wuerttemberg Division

27th  October 15, 16, 19, 20
CAPTURE OF THE BEAUREVOIR DEFENSES AND MONTBREHAIN

SEPTEMBER 20 TO OCTOBER 6

PHASE E

1. MINOR OPERATIONS: On September 20, the corps front was held by the Australian 4th Division on the right and the Australian 1st Division on the left.

At 1 a.m. on September 21, the right brigade of the Australian 4th Division carried out a successful minor operation which resulted in the improvement of their position on the right.

During the night September 20/21, strong fighting patrols were sent out by both divisions with the result that the left brigade of the right division and the right brigade of the left division succeeded in establishing a new line approximately 500 yards in advance of their old line.

These minor operations were continued at 5:40 a.m. on September 21, when the left brigade of the left division advanced our line about 800 yards in conjunction with the III Corps on our left.

2. RELIEFS AND ALTERATIONS OF CORPS FRONT: During the night September 21/22, the 46th Division (IX Corps) relieved the Australian 4th Division and command of this portion of the front passed to IX Corps on the morning of September 22, leaving the corps temporarily on a single divisional front.

On relief, the Australian 4th Division moved back to TINCOURT area preparatory to moving to a rest area in the vicinity of AMIENS.

On September 22 and 23, the American 27th and 30th Divisions commenced to arrive in the corps area by bus and train and were concentrated in the TINCOURT and HAUT-ALLAINES areas prior to going into the line.

On the night September 23/24, the American 30th Division relieved the Australian 1st Division in the line on the Australian corps front, command passing to G. O. C., American 30th Division at 10 a.m. on September 24.

The Australian 1st Division on relief moved to the TINCOURT area and thence to HERBECOURT area prior to entraining for the LONG area between AMIENS and ABBEVILLE.

The American 27th Division relieved the center and right divisions in line of the III Corps on the night September 24/25, under the orders of III Corps.

Command of the front held by American 30th and 27th Divisions passed to G. O. C., Australian corps at 10 a.m. on September 25.

3. RELATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN II CORPS: The American II Corps was affiliated to the Australian corps for operations against the main Hindenburg Line. It established its advanced headquarters close to the headquarters of the Australian corps and was thus able to keep closely in touch with the situation on the corps front.

An Australian Mission was formed and was attached to the American II Corps from September 24. The object of the Mission was to ensure that all units and formations of the American divisions were thoroughly in touch with our methods and procedure. The personnel was carefully selected and included representatives of all branches and arms. The scale of attachment of personnel was such that every unit down to companies had an officer or senior N. C. O. attached.

On the night September 25/26, the enemy carried out raids in strength on the front of both the American 27th and 30th Divisions and it is probable that he secured identifications in each case.
4. PREPARATIONS FOR THE ATTACK ON HINDENBURG LINE: Preparations for the main attack on the Hindenburg Line were now well in hand.

A conference was held at Australian corps headquarters on September 23 which was attended by staffs and commanders of American II Corps and the divisions and brigades of the corps. At this conference full details and methods were discussed and the plan of operations for the capture of the Hindenburg Line was laid down by G. O. C., Australian corps.

A second conference which was attended by all divisional commanders, chiefs of departments, staffs, etc., of formations concerned of American II Corps and Australian corps was held at Australian corps headquarters on the morning of September 26.

The G. O. C., Australian corps, outlined the whole scope and detail of both the preliminary and the main operations and such points as had not previously been decided were discussed and decisions reached. The operations were discussed at length and all aspects and possibilities were made clear to all concerned.

5. PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS: The American 30th Division advanced its line at certain points in order to secure a good line for the infantry to form up on during the night September 26/27.

It had not been possible for the III Corps to secure the proposed infantry start line on the front taken over by the American 27th Division, prior to this portion of the front being handed over to the Australian corps. It was, therefore, necessary to carry out a preliminary operation to gain this line.

The American 27th Division endeavored to capture this line at 5:30 a.m., September 27, with the assistance of a company of tanks and under a creeping barrage. The attack was met with strong opposition and the final position reached was the subject of conflicting reports from the troops engaged and from the air.

There were several hostile counterattacks during the morning of September 27, and in the early afternoon the position was partially restored on the left by a further local attack by the Americans. Subsequent events showed that small parties of Americans had reached the vicinity of their objective and had very gallantly maintained themselves there, but the line as a whole was not materially advanced by the day's operations.

The nonsuccess of this operation considerably embarrassed the preparations for the main attack on the HINDENBURG system.

The barrage could not be brought back on this flank owing to the knowledge that parties of American troops, as well as a number of American wounded, would then be exposed to our own fire. Also any alteration in the barrage plans, which had already been issued, would inevitably lead to confusion.

It was, therefore, decided by the army commander that the artillery start line as originally planned would hold good and that the troops of the American 27th Division would form up for the attack on a line as far forward as possible and would be assisted by an additional number of tanks. It was decided to augment the strength in tanks to such an extent as should easily overwhelm the enemy resistance west of the start line. It was thought that this, with the slow rate of barrage would enable the American 27th Division to carry out its task.

6. OUTLINE OF PLAN FOR THE MAIN OPERATION: Arrangements were, therefore, made on these lines on the afternoon of September 27. Instructions for the operations were issued in Australian Corps Battle Instructions, Series E.

A concentrated artillery gas bombardment of hostile defenses and approaches was carried out during the night September 26/27. The general plan of attack was as follows:

The Australian corps was to attack the main Hindenburg System on the corps front in conjunction with the IX Corps on the right. The III Corps on the north was to protect our left flank, and, if opportunity offered, capture VENDHUYLE and prepare crossings over the Canal for the V Corps.

The attack was to be carried to the GREEN Line (approximately NAUROY-GOUY, both inclusive) by the American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left.
The Australian 5th and 3d Divisions were to pass through the American 30th and 27th Divisions respectively and gain the RED Line (JONCOURT---WIANCOURT---BEAUREVOIR, all inclusive), whilst the American 30th and 27th Divisions pushed south and north respectively from the GREEN Line in order to extend our bridgehead over the Canal.

The attack was to be preceded by a 48 hours' bombardment of enemy defenses and approaches.

The attack was to be delivered under an artillery barrage which would advance to the GREEN Line and cover the consolidation of the American divisions on that line.

The 4th and 5th Tank Brigades were placed at the disposal of the corps for the operation. Tank units were allotted to each division and were detailed by each division to infantry formations and units to assist in the carrying out of each task.

Arrangements were made for the rapid construction and maintenance of roads in each divisional sector and for the definite allotment of infantry, artillery, cavalry, and tank units to definite roads which would be clearly signboarded throughout. Units allotted to distant objectives were to have priority on certain roads between prescribed hours.

The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed under the orders of the corps for the operation. Its role was to be the exploitation of success and dislocation of enemy organizations in advance of the RED Line, in conjunction with the Whippets and armoured cars.

The assaulting brigades of the American 30th and 27th Divisions took over the battle front in their respective sectors during the night September 27/28.

The Australian 3d and 5th Divisions moved into their assembly bivouac areas on the night September 27/28.

The Australian 2d Division was to be in corps reserve and was moved from the CAPPY area to the vicinity of PERONNE by bus on the same night.

Arrangements for the assembly of tanks, and for the action of tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery were the same as for previous major operations undertaken by the corps.

The 17th Armoured Car Battalion was allotted a role similar to that of August 8.

Zero hour was 5:50 a.m. on September 29.

7. ATTACK ON THE HINDENBURG LINE:
   (i) Action of American Divisions: The attack started well on the American 30th Division front, but on the American 27th Division front trouble from hostile machine guns inside the barrage was experienced from the start.

   A number of tanks supporting the American 27th Division were put out of action by enemy shell fire and by antitank mines, and with this support gone, the infantry in this sector of the attack rapidly lost touch with the barrage. Enemy machine guns were thus free to harass the main weight of the attack with the result that only isolated parties were able to get forward.

   The attack on the American 30th Division front had, meanwhile, progressed fairly well and the infantry had pushed forward. However, the intricate trench system and the confusion of wire and dugouts was responsible for a certain amount of loss of cohesion with the result that by the time the village of BELLICOURT had been reached the attacking troops were some distance behind the barrage and a good deal of the weight had gone out of the attack.

   Air reports indicated that parties of the American divisions pushed on beyond NAUROY and GOUY, but no information came back from those bodies, and it was found that the enemy resistance was as strong as ever along the Canal line and the trench systems. If these troops penetrated through as the air reports indicated, they failed entirely to mop up the intervening defenses. It will be impossible to state accurately in what strength these parties were until all evidence is available.

   (ii) Advance of Australian 5th Division: The leading brigades of the Australian 5th Division moved forward in artillery formation behind the American 30th Division. A certain amount of opposition was encountered from hostile machine guns and snipers who had been overlooked in the first phase of the advance by the Americans, but this was quickly overcome and they deployed and moved through BELLICOURT and took over the battle-
front in this sector from the American 30th Division. Their advance was carried out by sheer hard fighting in the face of the most vigorous opposition. During the advance a great many men of the American divisions went forward with the Australian troops.

(iii) Advance of Australian 3d Division: As stated above, the American 27th Division had been held up from the outset and free movement was impossible on this flank on account of hostile shelling and machine-gun fire.

The Australian 3d Division was, therefore, faced with the difficult task of carrying out the task originally set for the American 27th Division, but without the assistance of a barrage and in broad daylight. The fighting was severe and the right of the division advanced in conformity with the Australian 5th Division, but practically no progress was made on the left. The tanks detailed to assist the Australian 3d Division suffered considerably from hostile shell fire and it was soon found to be impossible to continue the advance on this flank.

(iv) Operations on September 30: Early the following morning, the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions attacked in a northeasterly direction along the HINDENBURG Line and also along RAILWAY Spur. In this attack artillery action was limited owing to the uncertainty as to the whereabouts of the advanced troops of the American 27th Division. This made the infantry task particularly difficult.

A considerable amount of opposition was met with and heavy hand-to-hand fighting took place throughout the day. Progress was made on the BONY Spur, along NAUROY Trench and also east of NAUROY Village. By bombing along the HINDENBURG Line the troops of the Australian 3d Division entered the southern outskirts of BONY and the mopping up of the town proceeded.

(v) Operations on October 1: On the morning of October 1, the Australian 5th Division made an organized attack with tanks between JONCOURT and the LAMP Signal Station. MILL Ridge, ESTREES and FOLEMPRISE Farm were captured after severe fighting, especially in the neighborhood of the LAMP Signal Station. The Australian 3d Division completed to mopping up of BONY and progressing along the HINDENBURG Line northwards secured the northern entrance to the Canal Tunnel. Patrols were pushed forward and by nightfall were operating on the high ground east of Le CATELET.

The whole of the HINDENBURG Defenses along the corps front were thus taken. It was a stiff fight and the endurance of the infantry was highly tested. Casualties were very severe, but this was mainly due to the enforced limitation of artillery action already described.

The boundary between the Australian corps and the IX Corps was altered on the night October 1/2 to run on the line JONCOURT-WIANCOURT.

20 officers and 600 other ranks belonging to seven different regiments of three divisions were captured, and a number of civilians were liberated. The Australian 2d Division was relieved in the line by the American 30th Division, relief being completed about 0200 on the morning of October 6.

At 19 h. on October 6, the command of the Australian corps front passed to G. O. C., American II Corps, the Australian corps passed into army reserve.

SUMMARY

1. The Australian corps came into the line on the SOMME front at the end of March. It promptly commenced a series of minor offensive operations which had the double effect of securing AMIENS and establishing a moral superiority of the Australians over the enemy. The culmination of these was the successful action at HAMEL and they were continued by the seizure of the area east of VILLERS-BRETONNEUX.

These advances had involved, in the total, a considerable number of casualties.

2. On August 8, the Australian corps, after considerable fighting extending over a period of four and a half months was called upon to open the offensive which has led to such great results, along with the III Corps and Canadian corps.
The corps maintained this offensive from August 8 to October 6, a period of approximately two months, and, therefore, was engaged in active operations for a total period of six and a half months when it was withdrawn from the line.

3. During the period August 8 to October 6, the total number of prisoners captured was 610 officers and 22,244 other ranks. The total number of enemy guns captured was 322. A total of 30 enemy divisions was engaged, of which several were engaged twice and a few three times. Of these 30 divisions, six have since been disbanded.

The advance of the corps was pursued for a total distance of 37 miles. 116 towns and villages were captured and the total area recovered was approximately 250 square miles.

The total casualties for the whole of these operations since August 8 were:

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: II CORPS: Fldr. 3: Telegram

Operations II Corps

Appendix 2
AMERICAN CORPS
G-313

October 8, 1918.

On this, the first occasion on which the American II Corps has taken part in battle on its own, I desire to convey to you, General Read, and all members of your staff, as well as to all ranks in the 30th Division, my hearty congratulations on your victory today. The gallantry of your infantry and the precision with which all staff arrangements have worked have filled me with admiration, and it has given me great pleasure to report your unqualified success to Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig.

HENRY RAWLINSON,
General, Commanding Fourth Army, B. E. F.

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AUSTRALIAN CORPS,
October 2, 1918.

My dear General:

As the American II Corps has now been withdrawn from the line and my official association with you and your troops has been for the time being suspended, I desire to express to you the great pleasure that it has been to me and to the troops of the Australian army corps to have been so closely allied to you in the recent very important battle operation which has resulted in the breaking through of the main Hindenburg Line on the front of the British Fourth Army.
Now that the fuller details of the work done by the American 27th and 30th Divisions have become available, the splendid gallantry and devotion of the troops in these operations have won the admiration of their Australian comrades. The tasks set were formidable, but the American troops overcame all obstacles and contributed in a very high degree to the ultimate capture of the whole tunnel system.

I shall be glad if you will convey to your divisional commanders my appreciation of and thanks for the work done, and to accept my best wishes for every possible success in the future.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN MONASH,
Lieut. General, Commanding.

Major General G. W. Read, N. A.
Commanding American II Corps.

II Corps: Fldr. 4: Operation Report

MEMORANDUM for A. C. of S., G-3

SUBJECT: Report on operations of American II Corps during engagement of September 29 - October 2

[Extract]

1. This report is based upon an extensive personal reconnaissance of the ground over which these operations were conducted and in substance is a compilation of the statements of fact and opinion made to me during personal interviews with:

   C. G. and C. of S., American II Corps
   C. G. and C. of S., American 27th and 30th Divisions
   C. G., Australian corps
   C. of S., British Fourth Army
   Brigade and regimental commanders of units engaged
   Various other officers.

2. The II Corps, which was being held in British G. H. Q. reserve, was on September 21, transferred to the British Fourth Army. The divisions were moved on September 22 to 24 into the Australian corps area and relieved that corps on the front opposite the tunnel of the St-QUENTIN---CAMBRAI Canal. The divisions were side by side - the 30th on the right and the 27th on the left.

3. An order from the British Fourth Army announced on Sept. 23 that the American II Corps would participate in the next series of operations then being planned, the purposes of these operations being:
   (a) To complete the demoralization of the enemy;
   (b) The destruction of enemy defenses and intrenched positions known as the main HINDENBURG Line, thereby enabling the British corps on the right and left of the Tunnel to effect a crossing of the Canal.
4. The two American divisions took over their new line on the night of September 25/26, relieving a part of the Australian corps and a part of the British III Corps. The order of battle from right to left in the British Fourth Army was then: British IX Corps, American II Corps, British III Corps.

5. The attack was scheduled for September 29. For several days prior to this date and prior to the taking over of the sector by the American II Corps, the Australian corps, and the British III Corps made vigorous efforts to force an enemy retirement in order to obtain a favorable jumping-off place for the contemplated attack. The Australian corps succeeded in accomplishing their part of the mission and when the American 30th Division relieved them they found themselves on the predetermined jumping-off line. On the left, however, the British III Corps had failed to accomplish their mission, though they had engaged in three determined efforts to push back the Boche an average depth of about 1,700 yards. Each effort succeeded in penetrating the enemy's position, but the British were unable to hold the ground gained by them and, in consequence, on three successive occasions were thrown back to their original starting line. Under these circumstances when the 27th Division took over their part of the line, it was necessary for them to undertake an important operation to attain their proper jumping-off position. This preliminary operation was ordered by the Fourth Army, and was carried out on the morning of September 27.

6. The part of the advance defense system of the HINDENBURG Line against which this preliminary operation was made was strongly held and organized to an exceptionally high degree. It was known that this part of the line could be and was being fed by reinforcements through an elaborate system of galleries and tunnels leading from the main canal tunnel. This tunnel is 5.7 kilometers long and is filled with barges transformed into barracks in sufficient numbers to house personnel equivalent to two Boche divisions. Many galleries and subterranean passages were known to exist, but the numerous intelligence reports on that subject had not disclosed more than a small percentage of such exits as were subsequently discovered.

7. This preliminary operation was conducted in accordance with army orders by one regiment of the 27th Division on a front of approximately 4,000 yards. The regiment succeeded in attaining all of its objectives. After having been repeatedly mopped up in holes, dugouts and tunnels, the Boche continued to reappear in new places in rear of the front lines held by this one regiment. As a result, the whole day of September 27 was devoted to a continuous mopping-up process, which developed into ceaseless fighting during the 24 hours in an effort to hang on to the objectives that had been gained. This effort was successful only to the degree that severe losses in killed and wounded and inflicted on the Boche.

8. The one regiment holding the front line in each division of the American II Corps was relieved in each instance on the night of September 27 by the Brigade which was to make the attack on the morning of the 29th. This relief in the 30th Division was accomplished without incident, but in the 27th Division, the relieving troops were continuously engaged in severe combat up to Zero hour.

9. Several hours before Zero it became apparent that the jumping-off line in front of the 27th Division was not cleanly held in all of its parts. As a result the question of altering the prearranged barrage line arose and was considered. It appeared that the hope was entertained that the 27th would succeed in reaching the jumping-off line prior to Zero hour. This, however, was not accomplished and at Zero hour when the barrage fell most of the elements of the 27th Division were at distances varying from 1,200 to 1,000 yards in the rear of their barrage.

10. The ground over which the 54th Infantry Brigade had to attack without artillery assistance was literally seething with machine-gun nests, and almost every square foot of ground was completely enfiladed with machine-gun fire. Three highly organized strong points, known as the KNOLL, GUILLEMONTE Farm and QUENNEMONT Farm, were the basis of the Boche defense system on this immediate front. From them the machine-gun nests in advance of this position were supplied with men and ammunition.
11. The preliminary operation, an effort to gain the proposed jumping-off line had clearly indicated to the Boche the intentions and methods of the attack to be launched against his position at this point. As a result, exceptional reinforcements of enemy troops were concentrated here and the supreme effort to stop the attack was made at this point. The map attached hereto shows dispositions of the two divisions in the American II Corps, and the tinted area on the map indicates that part of the ground over which the 54th Brigade was required to advance without artillery support in an effort to catch up with the rolling barrage.

12. Two days were spent by me in making an extensive reconnaissance of the ground over which this advance was made, and it is my opinion that the uncanny cunning with which the Boche had organized this position made it one of the strongest points in the entire HINDENBURG System. Three days after the fight, the dead Boche lying in and about the numerous machine-gun positions showed, almost without exception, that they had been killed by the bayonet. Very few of the enemy dead appeared to have been killed by rifle or shell fire.

13. The general plan of the main attack contemplated that after the II Corps had forced the HINDENBURG Line and crossed the Tunnel, it was to send a regiment of each division, one on the right flank of the corps, the other on the left flank, for the purpose of exploitation of the flanks and uncovering the canal, thereby assisting the British IX Corps on the right and III on the left in their crossing of the canal. In the meantime, the IX Corps was to attempt to construct bridges across the canal and effect a crossing without this assistance. The III Corps on the left was to make no attempt at crossing the canal until the crossings were covered by our troops. The ultimate objective of the American II Corps was the Green Line as shown on map, about 2,000 yards east of the tunnel. After reaching this objective, the Australian corps was to leapfrog the American II Corps and pass on to the Red Line as their ultimate objective.

14. At Zero hour, the attack started. The 30th Division advanced straight to their objective and reached it on schedule time. The British IX Corps on their right surprised the enemy's outposts along the canal and succeeded in getting their bridges across and got their troops over early in the attack, thus obviating the necessity of the American 30th Division clearing their front for them. That part of the operation covered by the American 30th Division and the British IX Corps was successful to a high degree and was accomplished according to schedule.

15. When the barrage was put down, the 27th Division on the left was fighting to hold its position. The advance elements of this division jumped off as per schedule and some of them succeeded, despite the lack of barrage protection, in crossing the machine-gun-swept space and eventually reached their final objective (the Green Line east of GOUY-Le CATELET). There had been attached to the left regiment of the 27th Division - the 107th Infantry - a battalion from the 106th Infantry for the special purpose of mopping up. This mopping-up battalion and the support battalion of the regiment soon became involved in severe fighting with large parties of the enemy who, after the first wave had advanced beyond them, poured through the underground passage and manned the machine-gun positions in the rear of the advancing line.

16. Realizing the exceptionally difficult task assigned to the 27th Division owing to its inability to reach the jumping-off line, 20 large British tanks manned by American personnel were assigned to the front of the division for the purpose of cutting wire and assisting in the advance. 17 of these tanks were destroyed by mines planted several months before by the British, the presence of which had not been made known to the tanks. This practically eliminated the tanks from the advance before they had progressed more than about 100 yards from the jump-off tape. The three remaining tanks were destroyed almost immediately after by direct artillery fire.

17. During the first morning of the attack, reports were received from airplanes, artillery observers, and other sources to the effect that the advance along the entire front was going as per schedule. The advance elements of the 27th Division having fought
their way across and through the strong points indicated on the map, crossed the canal tunnel in line with the 30th Division and on schedule time. Later in the day reports were no longer received from these advance elements except from the airplanes that reported them as being in about their proper positions. The maze of tunnels and underground galleries permitted the Boche to continue conveying troops to positions well in rear of these advanced elements in such great numbers that they were enabled to supply sufficient machine gunners and infantry to the west of the canal to hold up not only the support elements of the 27th Division, but also the Australian troops following in their rear.

18. About noon, reports were received from these Australian troops to the effect that their advance had been stopped. An extraordinary situation was presented: Reports from the air indicated that the advance was going on as scheduled, yet at the same time reports were being received to the effect that the enemy was still holding out in great force in positions only a short distance to the east of the original jumping-off line. Much to the mystification of all concerned this situation continued through the entire afternoon. An artillery liaison officer who had gone forward with the advance elements of the left regiment of the 27th Division worked his way back late in the afternoon from Le CATELET and verified the information that these troops had reached their objective. He explained that he had experienced great difficulty in returning to his own lines, owing to the numerous groups of enemy machine gunners that continued to appear between the attacking wave and the supporting troops following it. After reaching their objective the advance elements of the 27th Division held to their position during the night of September 29/30, notwithstanding the fact there was sufficient force between them and their rear supports to check the advance of the Australians. After two days of the severest fighting, the Australians and the rear elements of the 27th Division succeeded in reaching the Green Line, which had been attained and held by parts of the assaulting waves of the division in their first rush. During their progress, these advance troops captured numerous prisoners and upon reaching their objective, they had in their possession 144 Boche. Though completely surrounded for two days, they held all of these prisoners and when relieved by the Australians, brought all but two of the prisoners back with them. The two prisoners left behind had made an unsuccessful attempt to escape during which they were killed.

19. In the meanwhile, the British III Corps on the left of the 27th Division had failed completely to mop up their part of the ground west of the canal. Troops of the British V Corps which were supposed to cross the canal after it had been uncovered by the regiment of the 27th Division that was assigned for the purpose of exploiting that flank, were unable to cross because this exploiting regiment had been checked and did not itself get across. The effect of this caused the left flank of that part of the 27th Division to be left without protection, except that furnished by local dispositions of the few troops that were available from the advanced elements. The Commanding General of the 30th Division, on learning of the unsettled and obscure situation on his left, immediately took steps to protect his flank by using two battalions for that purpose. In this manner, he succeeded in connecting up, not with that part of the 27th which had gone ahead, but with that part which was still fighting in the HINDENBURG Line, and by that time was more or less mixed up with the Australians who had come up in rear. This was approximately the situation on the morning of September 30.

20. The proposition then became one of mopping up on a large scale. Numbers of Boche continued to come out of the galleries from the main tunnel and, as has been expressed by officers who were interviewed: “The Boche just seemed to ooze out of the ground.” Mopping-up parties would go over the ground and capture or kill everything in sight, exploring dugouts, shell holes and places that appeared to afford concealment, yet from other places other machine-gun detachments would appear and get into action.

21. In the meanwhile, the British IX Corps and the American 30th Division had obtained a secure footing west of the canal and the IX Corps was able to send forces in considerable numbers across. This resulted in a complete breach in a strong part of the
HINDENBURG Line; a considerable salient was established and the subsequent successful operations made possible.

22. The Australians and troops of the 27th Division continued throughout September 30 and October 1 to mop up the ground in their immediate front and extend the salient to the north, thereby eventually permitting the British V Corps of the British Third Army to cross the Canal on their front. The Australians, who had now replaced the supporting elements of the 27th Division, connected up with the British V Corps on their left. The Australians having thus accomplished that part of their mission in passing through the American II Corps and having established themselves, the American II Corps was withdrawn a short distance to the rear to refit and reorganize preparatory to their participation in operations now in progress. The British XIII Corps was put in on the left of the Australians and right of the British Third Army.

23. In viewing this operation in the light of information now at hand it appears that the 30th Division accomplished their mission exactly as planned. It is to be remembered that the accomplishing of the mission of the 30th Division was rendered somewhat easier by the fact that the Boche appeared to be taken by surprise by the British IX Corps, when they crossed the canal on bridges constructed by themselves. The American 30th Division was, therefore, relieved of the necessity of rendering assistance in this direction.

24. The problem confronting the 27th Division was infinitely more difficult. They were put in the line on the night of September 25, had to conduct a preliminary operation on the morning of the 27th in which the British III Corps had repeatedly failed. It is hardly proper to class this as a minor operation, as it was in reality a battle of great severity in itself. It is a significant fact that some of the advanced elements of the 27th Division succeeded in reaching GOUY, their ultimate objective, despite the seemingly insuperable opposition and obstacles over and through which they had to pass.

25. Early reports indicated that the 27th Division had failed to mop up properly in rear of the leading waves. Since the organization of the defense system which they attacked has become better known, it is apparent that to mop up this ground properly would have required all the troops that were in the attack. This is borne out by the fact that it required an Australian division and a part of the 27th Division most of two days to complete this mopping up.

26. It appeared at first that the impetuous advance of the leading elements of this division was a waste of men and caused undue casualties. It is now demonstrated that this is not the case, and the fact that these men pushed through and by keeping the enemy continuously engaged in violent combat throughout the entire depth of his highly organized position, he was prevented from taking any means to hold up the advance of the 30th Division and the British IX Corps farther to the right.

27. II Corps Headquarters was naturally placed in a quandry by the reports coming in to the effect that advanced elements had reached their objective while violent fighting continued in their rear. It appears, however, from statements of German officers captured that the German command was equally mystified in finding American troops in LE CATELET and GOUY and throughout the depth of their defense system, while reports from some of their units showed that the men being fed into the line through the tunnels and galleries were still holding their positions and checking the advance of the Australians.

28. The whole fight on this part of the front appears to have been a free-for-all, in which everybody was fighting everywhere throughout the width of the contested area without there being any well-defined front.

29. The losses at first reported appeared to be extraordinarily large. Subsequent reports, however, have fixed them at a more reasonable rate. The Australians in attempting to leapfrog this part of the line necessarily became intermingled with our troops whose willingness to fight impelled them to continue to advance with the Australians with the result that many of them were not accounted for until several days later when the situation began to be cleared up.
30. All evidence indicates that the men of this division put up a most determined fight, and while the organization of the advance was broken up, the detachments operating against the maze of machine-gun positions were handled with considerable success. Exceptional numbers of Boche machine-gun crews with their supports were completely wiped out and the number of enemy dead on the ground was greatly in excess of those of the American troops.

31. The necessity of impressing upon platoon commanders the importance of constantly keeping their men in hand and of sticking to the task to which they have been allotted was most clearly exemplified in this operation. In both the 30th and 27th Divisions the mopping-up parties failed to adhere sufficiently close to the role assigned to them. It is believed that some of the detachments detailed to do mopping up around the tunnel continued to advance with the leading elements. This is not advanced as an explanation of the situation on the 27th Division front because the system of defense there was so elaborate, what with its organization and numerous subterranean passages, that had all the troops in the attack devoted their attention to mopping up they never would have crossed the tunnel as they did, and the numerous enemy forces in support and reserve would have been free to operate at will elsewhere; whereas, as a matter of fact, they were kept constantly engaged on this immediate front in an effort to check the advance which was being made with such determination by the American troops.

32. Liaison was imperfect, and organization commanders appeared not to be sufficiently impressed with the necessity of getting information back to higher units by the use of every available means. As a result of this, the situation was so obscure on the afternoon of the 29th that it was difficult to determine what use should be made of the troops that were still in hand.

33. It is evident that the training our troops have received in the past few months as to the methods of advancing against strong points and machine-gun nests has been along correct lines. Reports received at II Corps Headquarters from staff officers sent to the front and from liaison officers from the British and Australian units attached to American units indicate clearly that many of our Lewis gun squads and machine-gun detachments which went forward with the infantry were handled with considerable skill. This is especially true of those detachments that remained to do mopping-up work. There is much evidence that they cleaned up many of these nests with a minimum loss to themselves and the obliteration of the enemy.

34. Aside from the feeling of international amity that exists between our troops and the British army in this sector, it would have been obvious to a most casual observer that the impression made upon the British by the men of the American II Corps was exceptionally favorable. In fact, I was at times greatly surprised at the unrestrained enthusiasm displayed by numerous British officers when speaking of what they considered to be the splendid accomplishments of the two American divisions.

35. The casualties sustained, as corrected to October 9, are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30th</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>1,827</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Corps headquarters did not have information as to how these casualties were divided, their request for a report having not been complied with at the time these figures were furnished.)
(It is believed that many of the officers and men shown as missing will be accounted for and found to be not casualties.)

36. Owing to the mixing of units, the number of prisoners actually captured by the II Corps is still in dispute. Indications are that the minimum will be 1,600.

37. Attached hereto are the following documents:

   * * * * *

   Enemy Order of Battle;
   Copy of report made by 1st Lt. W. O. Pasfield.

   * * * * *

The letters and reports of a more or less personal nature attached hereto were in each instance given to me by the writer with the request that they be called to the attention of these headquarters. The copy of clipping from the LONDON TIMES was supplied at the suggestion of the Chief of Staff of the British Fourth Army, who indicated his desire to have it made a part of this report.

WADE H. HAYES,
Lt. Col., Inf., G-3.

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ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

NORTH TO SOUTH

Sept. 27, 1918

153d I. R. 8th Division
Alexander Regt. )
Augusta Regt. ) 2d Guard Div. plus 1 regt.
) 232d Division
Franz Regt. )
447th I. R. )

56th R. I. R. ) 121st Division

161st R. I. R. ) (Reinf.)

In Reserve

Other elements of 121st Div.
" 185th Div.

(Disposition reported before engagement)
ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

NORTH TO SOUTH

Sept. 30, 1918

153d I. R.  )  8th Division---prisoner
84th I. R.  )
27th R. I. R.  )  54th Division---prisoners
90th R. I. R.  )

7th R. I. R.  )  121st Division---prisoners
60th I. R.  )
28th R. I. R.  )  185th Division---prisoners
161st I. R.  )
65th I. R.  )

Other units:

6th Battery 2d Guard F. A. Regt.---prisoners.
(Revised order identified during engagement.)

Notes on Report of 1st Lieutenant W. O. Pasfield, Australian 11th Field Artillery
Brigade in regard to the operations of the 27th Division

September 29, 1918

My orders were to report to Captain Bulkley in command of the 3d Battalion, 105th
Regiment, as Artillery Liaison Officer.

When I arrived I could not get a runner from this battalion, so I went ahead en-
deavoring to catch up with them. I caught up to the 107th Regiment and was told when
passing GUILLEMONT Farm that the 105th had gone straight ahead. I followed on and saw
Americans advancing in A-9 (a little after 8 a.m.). I followed them on to about A-17-A,
keeping well to the rear owing to the machine-gun fire. The machine-gun fire was so
heavy that I was obliged to take shelter. The Americans I was watching (about 100 strong)
were advancing in small groups in a northeastern direction. They had been charging
several machine-gun posts and groups of Boche with the bayonet. After taking shelter for
some minutes I looked for the advancing Americans, but could not find them. I saw many
Boche machine guns in action.

Most of the enemy machine gunners appeared to be well sheltered behind the tall
weeds to the east of the Canal which afforded them excellent cover. The could not be
noticed unless when moving about. After the American forces had passed in the direction
of A-11d, I was caused to take shelter for some time. When I again looked out in the
direction of the advancing Americans all I could see was enemy machine gunners, who ap-
ppeared to be in the northeast corner of A-11-d.

I had already been told that these advancing troops had been ordered not to mop up,
but to move forward toward their objective. My impression was that they were leaving be-
hind too many machine-gun nests and were in a dangerous situation on account of this. I
consider that between one and two hundred Americans passed east, south of Le CATELET
towards GOUY.

I saw several detachments of Americans charging with fixed bayonets what I considered
to be machine-gun nests. After these operations, the Americans seemed to go on, but I did
not see any German prisoners coming back.
The fighting qualities of the American troops are excellent. They were subjected to a great deal of opposition and extremely heavy machine-gun fire, and although they suffered very heavy casualties, these did not seem to delay the progress of those who were left to go forward. I saw more fighting on this day than I have seen during my experience.

Forward of A-10-d, I saw the American troops were between 500 to 800 yards behind the barrage. It seemed to me that between 9 and 10:30 a.m., hostile artillery fire on the forward area had practically ceased. Where I crossed the wire, it appeared to be well cut and offered little hindrance to attacking troops.

It took me about two hours to return from A-15-C and a to GUILLEMONT Farm. On my way back, I saw many American dead and very few German dead. I met a few detachments of American troops - small bodies consisting of 5 or 10 men, taking shelter in shell holes, from the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 107th Regiment. One detachment of the 105th Regiment consisting of 10 men (just south of the KNOLL) told me that they had been to their objective and were told to retire, that some of them obeyed this order and some did not.

Farther west two or three parties of the 2d and 3d Battalions said they had crossed the Tunnel and were south of the KNOLL at A-10. Coming farther back in a trench in A-8-c I met a detachment of 10 men from the 3d Battalion, 105th Regiment. They told me some of their battalion had gone off in different directions and they could not find any of them and they were coming back to find them as they had an idea they did not take their objective and the Boche were counter-attacking. They told me, as did other troops, that they had no orders to mop up. They said if they had had orders to mop up on the way they could have done so and gained their objective. I saw one American officer in A-9-D with two or three men who told me that he had lost most of his battalion. I think this officer was a captain wearing two silver bars. I finally worked my way back under difficulties and reached the Australian 3d Division in about two and one-half hours. I think it was about 12:30 p.m.

The Boche were advancing as far as I could make out west of the Canal, advancing south from the direction of VENDHUILE. The machine-gun fire was extremely heavy. Very heavy machine-gun fire also came from the south in the direction of BONY. I saw none of the enemy advancing from the direction of BONY. I think I saw about 150 of the enemy advancing from the north in groups of twos and threes, each group having a machine-gun.

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210.6: R. A. F. Flgr. 218: Reports

Operations American Air Service

REPORT OF AMERICAN AIR SERVICE UNITS AND PILOTS WITH B. E. F.

For month of September, 1918

SUMMARY OF SQUADRON ACTIVITIES

17th AERO SQUADRON, S. C.

ACTIVITIES: Sept. 1-30. Operating on front in CAMBRAI area, on offensive patrols and low strafing. During the entire month, this squadron has been operating in the offensive against CAMBRAI. On Sept. 24, fighting against great odds, they crashed 5 enemy aeroplanes, without loss to themselves. This fight was reported by an anti-aircraft battery as an engagement between 14 Camels and over 30 E. A. [Enemy Aircraft]. On the same date, Lieut. Knotts blew up a large enemy ammunition dump while on low strafing.
254 25-lb. bombs were dropped on infantry and ground targets during the month, and 9,200 rounds of ammunition were fired on troops and transport.

PATROLS CARRIED OUT THROUGH MONTH

30 offensive patrols and wireless interception
6 line patrols and balloon protection
5 bombing and offensive patrols

Number of hours war flying 739 hours, 45 minutes
Number of hours other flying 291 hours, 40 minutes
Total 1,031 hours, 25 minutes

MOVEMENTS: Sept. 20, from HESDIN to ARRAS area.

148th AERO SQUADRON, S. C.

ACTIVITIES: Sept. 1-30. Operating on front in CAMBRAI area, on offensive patrols and low strafing. This squadron has been operating in the advance on CAMBRAI during September. On September 24, they destroyed 5 E. A. and brought down another out of control, against great odds, with no loss to themselves. An antiaircraft battery reported this engagement as between 14 Camels and 33 enemy aeroplanes. 330 20-lb. bombs were dropped during the month and 22,075 rounds were fired at ground targets.

Number of hours war flying 682 hours, 10 minutes
Number of hours other flying 120 hours, 15 minutes
Total 820 hours, 25 minutes

MOVEMENTS: Sept. 20, from HESDIN to ALBERT area.

163d AERO SQUADRON FLIGHT

ACTIVITIES: Working with American II Corps, for infantry training purposes.

MOVEMENTS: September 14 - To Z of A American E. F. under authority telegraphic orders G. H. Q., A. E. F

PILOTS ATTACHED TO R. A. F. SQUADRONS

There were 44 American pilots available for duty during the month.
1. GENERAL PLAN:
The 4th Tank Brigade, consisting of:
1st Tank Battalion, B. E. F.
4th Tank Battalion, B. E. F.
301st Tank Battalion, A. E. F.
4th Tank Supply Company, B. E. F.

was allotted to the Australian Corps.***

The American II Corps affiliated with the Australian corps were to attack in the
general direction GOUY-NAUROY at 5:50, Sept. 29.

The American corps was to attack with two divisions (27th on the left, 30th on the
right) in the sectors shown on the maps attached hereto.

After the penetration of the HINDENBURG Line, the divisions were to push on to the
first objective indicated by the Green Line, east of the sector GOUY-NAUROY.

If the objective had been taken by the 27th and 30th Divisions, the Australian 3rd
Division on the left and the Australian 5th Division on the right were to pass through
the front line American divisions and capture the second objective indicated by the Red
Line.

The preliminary bombardment was to last for a considerable period. The British 18th
Division on the left of the 27th Division was to attack simultaneously as far as the
Canal.

The operation was divided into two phases, the boundaries and objectives being
shown on the accompanying map. The American corps was to complete the first phase, the
Australians the second phase.

First Phase: The American 54th Infantry Brigade, with part of the 53rd Infantry Bri-
gade following in the rear of its left flank, was to form up on a taped line prior to
Zero hour, and with tanks, were to attack under a creeping shrapnel, H. E., and 10% to
15% smoke barrage.

On the map the start line is shown in brown and the objective in a continuous Green
Line.

Upon gaining their objective, the infantry were to exploit their success to the
flanks under concealment of a flanking smoke barrage.

Second Phase: The Australian 3rd Division with its own artillery and tanks were to
pass through the 54th Infantry Brigade in open warfare formation at Zero 5. Their ob-
jective is shown in red on the map.

In order to secure the left flank of the operation and extend the base of the sal-
cient thus created, reserve troops of the 27th Division were to extend their operations to
the north and secure the objective shown in red on the map.

Tanks: 301st Battalion was allotted to the 27th Division
A Company, 15 tanks to 108th Infantry
B Company, 10 tanks to 105th Infantry
C Company, 15 tanks to 107th Infantry

Remaining 7 tanks were held in Australian corps reserve.
1st Tank Battalion, British, allotted to the 30th Division.

2. PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS: At a conference on the morning of Sept. 19, the G. O. C., 4th Tank Brigade, informed C. O. of the 301st Battalion of the general plan at a conference held at 301st Battalion Headquarters, which was also attended by company commanders. All reconnaissance officers were directed to prepare maps and obtain information of the operation area at once.

The time available for training with infantry was very curtailed and no arrangements were made. The 27th Division had a limited amount of training with British tanks before arrival in the Australian corps area.

On the morning of September 20, all tanks of the battalions were fit for action though wooden spuds and cribs had not been issued. Cribs were attached on the afternoon of X-day and spuds on Y-day (for Mark V tanks).

3. RECONNAISSANCE:

General: As in other operations, where surprise was the main factor, time for reconnaissance of the area was very limited. Reconnaissance started a week before the attack.

As soon as it was known that the 301st Battalion was to cooperate with the 27th Division, the plan of attack was communicated to the company commanders and reconnaissance officers.

Reconnaissance officers prepared the route up to the lying-up point and the starting point. The selection of the lying-up point and the rallying point was made by brigade headquarters.

Aeroplane photographs were carefully studied and all the obstacles, trenches, and enemy works discernible were pasted on a record map which was kept by battalion reconnaissance officer. All intelligence information was transferred to this map.

Layered route maps were prepared for each battalion, company, platoon, and tank commander. Oblique photographs of the sector and a map showing his route, obstacles, etc., were given to tank commanders 24 hours before the attack. In conference with the tank commanders, each company reconnaissance officer gave them all the information it was possible for him to obtain. One of the company reconnaissance officers made a set of notes for each tank commander in his company describing his particular route, landmarks, etc., he would find on it.

In this connection, it is strongly urged that in the future more information be given to the tank commanders and every officer concerned as soon as it is available. Secrecy is most important, but the longer a tank commander has to think and thoroughly understand exactly what he is to do, the better he will do it. In the present instance, officers of the battalion learned some of the details of the coming action from the infantry men before they were allowed to be given any information by our commanders.

It is also strongly urged that the battalion reconnaissance officers, whenever possible, attend conferences with their battalion commanders and the company reconnaissance officers attend conferences when the company commanders are present. This plan has been generally adopted in the British tank corps and is absolutely the best means of giving the reconnaissance and intelligence departments of units, first hand information necessary for them to carry out their work with the fullest understanding of the operation. In addition, the reconnaissance is present if he is needed to answer any question which may arise.

The reconnaissance officer is concerned mainly with the routes from the starting points to the objectives. Nearly all his time prior to the action must be devoted to this work and imparting this information to the tank commanders. As our organization does not provide for assistant reconnaissance officers, it is suggested that an officer from each company be detailed to reconnoiter and be responsible for rear area routes, i. e., routes from tankadromes to lying-up points and starting points. This should be an officer capable of taking up the work of the reconnaissance officer should he be injured.
Two of our tanks and several British tanks were blown up by running over mines which had been laid by the British forces last March just in front of the front line. The field extended across the front of Company A's sector and no notification of its existence was received before the attack.

The routes to the approximate front line were taped by the reconnaissance officers on the north of our sector. The battalion reconnaissance officer and Company A reconnaissance officer were wounded and a sergeant draughtsman killed laying tape on the south of the sector, and these tanks were led over the routes to the jumping-off point by a sergeant and corporal from the reconnaissance staff.

Each tank commander took into action one St-QUENTIN 1:10,000 map, one VALENCIENNES 1:100,000 map, one WIANCOURT 1:20,000 map, with routes, obstacles, barrage table, and objectives drawn on it and oblique photographs of his sector. In addition to this, a 1:20,000 layered map was given to each tank commander to study the day before the engagement. Company C tank commanders also carried notes on their routes. These route maps, photographs, etc., were practically useless due to the indefinite starting point and the thickness of the smoke.

In the future, it is advised that the tank commanders be given a 1:20,000 map of their sector to study at least four days before the attack.

One tank commander from each platoon was taken over the route from the lying-point to a point as near as possible to our front line. Observation from here was very poor, but under any condition, in the future, it is recommended that each tank commander be taken as far forward as possible some days before the engagement and everything which can be seen pointed out to him.

Reconnaissance within our lines: At the time information of the first operation was received, the battalion tankadrome was located 25 miles from the operation area. Section and tank commanders were occupied in repair and equipment of their tanks so that the reconnaissance officers had to do most of the reconnaissance.

Pooling of R. O.'s: Prior to Z day, company R. O.'s were withdrawn to battalion headquarters, where they and their draughtsmen worked with the battalion R. O. in his reconnaissance office.

This method is considered to be satisfactory, it also saves much duplication of work and insures the proper distribution of information.

Supply of Information: Maps were good and an abundant supply was available. The WIANCOURT 1:20,000 proved invaluable. In addition, the barrage map was issued on the same sheet.

Oblique photos were in good supply and found of great value when visibility was possible.

4. TANK EQUIPMENT: The battalion was equipped as follows with tanks:

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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company A</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Company C</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All Mark V tanks carried cribs.

In addition, one Renault tank was issued to battalion headquarters, but due to a broken track shortly before the battle, it was never used.
5. PRELIMINARY MOVEMENT BY RAIL: The battalion entrained at ACHIET-le-GRAND (G.10 central, sheet 57c) and detrained at EQUANCOURT (V.10 central, sheet 57c) as given in the following schedule.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Train No.</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1 p.m.</td>
<td>Sept. 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Sept. 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1 p.m.</td>
<td>Sept. 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3 p.m.</td>
<td>Sept. 22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ramps were provided at entraining and detraining points by railroad engineers and marches to and from tankadrome occurred without incident. In each case, detrainment at EQUANCOURT did not occur until after dusk.

6. FINAL ARRANGEMENTS: At a conference on the afternoon of Sept. 23, the G. O. C., 1st Tank Brigade gave final instructions to the C. O., 301st Battalion, for the operation. The 301st Battalion was allotted to the 27th Division, A. E. F., of which 30 tanks were to operate with the 53rd Infantry Brigade and 10 tanks with the 105th Infantry Regiment. The Battalion C. O. was directed to confer at once with the Commanding General, 27th Division, and make detailed arrangements for the plan of attack, also to submit a plan showing routes to start line and rallying point selected.

The battalion established a tankadrome at Nanancourt Mill (V9 c and d, sheet 57c). Motor transportation with supplies, rations, etc., traveled overland.

6. FINAL ARRANGEMENTS: At a conference on the afternoon of Sept. 23, the G. O. C., 1st Tank Brigade gave final instructions to the C. O., 301st Battalion, for the operation. The 301st Battalion was allotted to the 27th Division, A. E. F., of which 30 tanks were to operate with the 53rd Infantry Brigade and 10 tanks with the 105th Infantry Regiment. The Battalion C. O. was directed to confer at once with the Commanding General, 27th Division, and make detailed arrangements for the plan of attack, also to submit a plan showing routes to start line and rallying point selected.

Battalion commander conferred with the Commanding General, 27th Division, on the night of September 24 and the allotment of tanks was arranged as follows:

- Co. A 15 tanks to 107th Infantry
- Co. C 15 tanks to 108th Infantry
- Co. B 10 tanks to 105th Infantry

The remaining seven tanks were held in the Australian corps reserve. Due to the fact that the 27th Division had never had an actual operation with the tanks, the infantry commanders did not seem to grasp the idea of tanks cooperating with infantry.

On September 25, a conference was held at Headquarters 27th Division, attended by all tank officers down to and including section commanders. Upon completion of the conference they conferred with the Commanding General, 53d Infantry Brigade, and gained his approval of the plan of operation as submitted by the battalion commander.

From Sept. 25 until Z day, company commanders and section commanders conferred daily with corresponding infantry commanders. Final plan of operation shown on sheet attached. One section of tanks was to operate with each of the battalions of the 107th and 108th Infantry during the first phase, while 2 sections were to operate with the 105th Infantry during the second phase.

Arrangements were made with the surgeon of the 27th Division for the evacuation of our wounded, which Chief Engineer, 27th Division, was requested to ramp a railway to be crossed during the approach march. The A. P. M., 27th Division, was also notified of one road to be used on Y/Z night.

4th Tank Brigade assigned one wireless tank to the battalion for the operation and issued orders that it was to follow between A and C Companies during the attack.

7. APPROACH MARCHES: To maintain surprise, all movements took place under cover of darkness and the approach marches owing to numerous tracks existing were simple, took place as follows:

- Sept. 27/28: 15 tanks Company A, 10 tanks Co. B, and 15 tanks Co. C, from MANANCOURT Mill (V9 c and d, sheet 57c) to vicinity of VILLERS-FAUCON.
- Sept. 28/29: 15 tanks Co. A, 10 tanks Co. B, and 15 tanks Co. C, from VILLERS-FAUCON (E 21 b central, sheet 62c, to start line, see WIANCOURT map).
A supply dump had been established in the vicinity of VIILERS-FAUCON by the brigade and ten limbers were assigned to the battalion for hauling supplies from dump to the tankadrome. On the afternoon of Sept. 28 (Y day), all tanks were fully supplied with petrol, oil, and grease and in addition, carried one-half fill to be used at the start line before Zero.

The approach march on Y/Z night covered 850 yards, and tanks left the halfway house at 10 p.m. This march occurred under very trying circumstances. The latter part of the route was constantly shelled by H. E. and gas shells, but fortunately only a few casualties occurred. One crew was slightly gassed, one tank broke a track and another stripped its gears. With the exception of tanks shown on battlegraph sheet, all tanks crossed start line at Zero. Aeroplanes were to be used to cover the final stage of the approach march and drown the noise of the engines. Only one aeroplane was heard during the entire march and in several cases tanks were halted for over one-half hour. However, counter-battery work took place during the entire night and it is rather doubtful whether the enemy heard the tank engines before Zero.

The original plan arranged for the approach march on Y/Z night for tanks to leave halfway house at midnight. It is now conceded that if this plan had been carried out the tanks would not have crossed the line at Zero. On the afternoon of Y day, the plan was altered so that the tanks left for the lying-up place at 10 p.m. All routes were taped from lying-up place to start line, a distance of about 3,000 yards.

Infantry guides met the R. O.'s of Co. C and assisted in laying tape to our start line. Infantry guides were also arranged for Co. A, but did not appear. B Company used the same routes as C Company.

The tape routes were laid by the R. O.'s and their assistants under very hazardous condition, as it was afterward learned that the tape had been laid into the enemy's line. Two R. O's were wounded and one sergeant killed while laying the tape.

Hot food was not provided for the men before the battle although arrangements for same were to be made.

With exception of tanks failing to start due to mechanical trouble the remainder crossed the start line at Zero.

8. CONDITIONS:

Weather: On Z day, a light mist covered all valleys in the area of operation, which cleared by 7 a.m. The remainder of the day was fair and gave every prospect of excellent cooperation with the infantry.

Ground: On the whole, ground conditions were good and proved excellent going for tanks.

Previous to the German offensive of 1918, an antitank mine was laid in the MACQUIN-COURT Valley by the British forces as a defense against German tanks. At the time of the operation on Sept. 29, no one in the battalion was notified that the mine field was in existence. It proved disastrous to two of our tanks.

Though all Mark V tanks were equipped with cribs none were used to cross the HINDENBURG Line as the latter in this particular sector proved no obstacle for heavy tanks.

9. OPERATION: On September [sic] a preliminary attack by the 106th Infantry in the sector held by the 27th Division failed to establish the Brown Dotted Lines shown on the map attached. Plans for the operation of Sept. 29 were only changed to the extent that the attacking units of the 27th Division were to advance at such time before Zero that would insure placing them on the dotted line at Zero. The tactical officer with the 301st Battalion discussed this particular phase of the operation with the C. O. of the 107th Infantry at 5 a.m. on Z day and was informed by the latter that the 107th Infantry would not leave their present position until Zero. During the entire operation this particular unit was far behind its protective barrage and never gained contact with tanks or infantry on either flank.

Tanks of the 301st Battalion went forward in accordance with the original plan.
A Company cooperated with the 108th Infantry though C Company never gained contact with the infantry to which they were allotted. B Company followed until tanks were knocked out.

From Zero until 8 a.m., the wind was favorable and carried all smoke into enemy lines. For the remainder of the morning until 10:30, the entire battlefield was covered by a dense smoke created by our own barrage. Tanks could not see infantry and vice versa. Most of the tanks receiving direct hits were put out of action by 8 a.m. previous to change to an unfavorable wind.

No difficulty was experienced in crossing trenches where it was possible to see. In cases where tanks were ditched in trenches and sunken roads, the smoke was so thick that it was impossible to see the ground. The ground crossed was all good for tanks and would have offered no obstacles. One tank was unditched by stretching a wire cable across two opposite spuds on each track. Other badly ditched tanks were evacuated.

It was impossible to recognize any point on the ground due to the thickness of the smoke barrage. Tanks lost their way almost immediately after leaving the tape and had nothing to depend on except the compass. Nearly every tank commander declared his compass invaluable and those who had defective compasses report that their lack of them was a serious handicap.

A number of the crews report difficulty with Hotchkiss guns and belts. No difficulty with the 6-pdr. is reported.

Nearly every tank drew concentrated artillery fire. A great deal of this seemed to come from the neighborhood of Richmond Quarry. It has since been established that one enemy battery remained at Richmond Quarry all of Z day. Armour-piercing bullets and anti-tank rifles were extensively used and two tanks were hit by British 6-pdr. shells coming from the direction of Guillemont Farm. One tank commander reported an antitank fort in Le Catelet and another reported injury to conning-tower by grenade or bomb. No pits or tank traps were encountered, except the land mines previously referred to.

Several tank commanders on the north sector report evidence of signalling from infantry, machine gunners, and aeroplanes to enemy artillery relative to tanks. It is quite evident that some system was used to inform the artillery of the location of tanks as nearly every one drew a concentrated artillery fire.

One crew reported running out of 6-pdr. ammunition and one of running out of track oil after three or four hours' fighting, though all drew their full quota before starting. Nearly all the crews were seriously hampered by lack of pistols and in some cases this resulted in men being taken prisoners after having evacuated their tanks.

Several tanks signalled to the infantry shortly after starting with good results. Flags were used for this. Pigeons were not carried and could have been used to good advantage by several tank commanders.

The greatest casualties to tanks were caused by direct hits from artillery fire. Several tanks were able to go on after being pierced in several places by armour-piercing bullets and antitank bullets.

Some mechanical defects developed during action. One tank could not keep up its oil pressure, one stripped its gears, and several had autovac trouble. These tanks were all able to get back to the starting point.

Stores were not removed from tanks evacuated in our own territory, but those evacuated in enemy territory had machine guns removed and the 6-pdr. disabled where possible.

The dump supply was very unsatisfactory due to the fact that the rallying point selected was under heavy shell fire and machine-gun fire and untenable for any length of time. It would have been much better had each company rallied separately behind their respective starting points.

Cribs were found unnecessary in most cases, all trenches, including the Hindenburg Line, being crossed without their use. The tank which crossed the Escaut River at Le Catelet, however, used its crib and would not have been able to cross without it.
Nearly every man who took part in the action states that great benefit was derived from the ampules of ammonia furnished by the medical corps. These were constantly used and should be plentifully supplied in the future.

Tank commanders unite in the opinion that it was impossible to find their way about, pick targets, or work with any degree of effectiveness due to the thickness of the smoke barrage. The wind from the northeast blew the smoke back and enveloped the tanks with the result that in some cases, drivers could not even see the horns of their tanks and it was impossible to see what they were running into. Crews were very exhausted after three or four hours' fighting due to the long approach march and effects of gas.

The morale of the personnel of the tank corps was excellent. In a dense smoke barrage, it was necessary for someone to lead the tanks over difficult ground and invariably the tank commander. Crews went forward with machine guns after evacuating tanks. Infantry commanders with whom tanks cooperated expressed themselves in high terms to the part played by tanks throughout the battle. The attack was unsuccessful. At the end of Z day, the line had advanced in the sector of the 30th Division to the Green Line while the 27th Div. reached MACQUINCOURT Trench (A.2.c.2.3. WIANCOURT), BONY (A.15.a.central), and (A.27.b.9.9.).

Failure can be attributed to the following:
(a) Insufficient battery work.
(b) Failure of the 107th Infantry to advance at the proper time.
(c) Failure of infantry.
(d) Unfavorable wind for smoke barrage.
(e) Failure of tanks to cooperate with infantry.
(f) Failure to obtain a definite start line for tanks and infantry.

10. COMMUNICATIONS:
(a) Telephone
(b) Wireless
(c) Despatch Rider
(d) Aeroplanes
(e) Runners.

No pigeons or mounted orderlies were used.

Telephone: Battalion headquarters at Ste-EMILIE (E.24.central, sheet 62c) was in connection with 4th Tank Brigade Headquarters at TEMPLEUX-la-FOSSE.

Wireless: One wireless tank was assigned to the battalion and followed immediately in rear of A and C Companies. Communication was established with brigade headquarters.

Despatch Riders: Two despatch riders were stationed at battalion headquarters and eight at brigade headquarters.

Aeroplanes: Dropping stations were located at battalion and brigade headquarters. Battalions must lay their strips carefully on the ground and have a man permanently detailed to look out for messages.

Runners: Each company commander had two runners while several were stationed at battalion headquarters.

Due to the smoke barrage, observers were unable to see the attack of either tanks or infantry and very few messages were sent. It is believed that the operation was not a fair test of any system of communication.

11. TACTICS: In preparation for the operation, tank tactics were based on tactics for heavy tanks as employed by the British tank corps. Without a barrage, tanks are deployed in depth and, with a barrage, tanks keep close to the barrage. At the present time, the British use four tanks per section, while tables of organization for American tank corps give five per section. The C. O., 301st Battalion, decided that for this operation, with the barrage, he would use four tanks close up to the barrage with one tanks in reserve, maintaining the section of five tanks.

As the advanced tanks were rather limited, it was thought that the plan was not given a fair trial, as the success of the operation involved a number of other factors.
12. **SUPPLY:** Eight tanks of the 4th Tank Supply Company were allotted to the 301st Battalion. All supply tanks were loaded with four fills of petrol, oil, and grease, three fills of water, one fill of S. A. A., one-half fill of 6-pdr., and one-half fill of 6-pdr. case shot.

Supply tanks moved with battalion during approach marches and came under command of battalion commander at 12 noon, X day. Supply tanks dumped their fills at the battalion rallying point.

In addition, ten horse limbers were allotted to the battalion for hauling from dump to tankadrome. This method of transportation is considered invaluable.

13. **ARTILLERY:** The program for bombardments before Zero hour were as follows:

- Gas from Z-56 hours to Z-48 hours. Vigorous counterbattery work from Z-48 to Zero.
- Intense harassing fire from Z-48 to Zero. Cutting lines and hostile fire from Z-48 to Zero. The barrage came down on the artillery start line at Zero. Rate of barrage was 100 yards every four minutes. There was a halt for fifteen minutes on the line approximately 500 yards east of the [original copy incomplete].
- Final protective barrage at the end of the field artillery barrage continued for fifteen minutes (time shown on barrage table attached is not correct).

14. **SALVAGE OF TANK EQUIPMENT:** Unfortunately, the battalion did not start to salvage equipment from derelict tanks as soon as practicable after the operation, although ten horse limbers were at their disposal. Derelict tanks on a battlefield are subject to marauding parties of all kinds and valuable instruments are liable to be lost. It is suggested that in any future operation salvage of tanks commence as soon as possible upon the completion of the operation.

15. **ANTITANK DEFENSES:** It was evident in this operation that the enemy had been giving a good deal of consideration to the question of antitank defense. The principal types employed in their order of damage to tanks are:

- (1) Field and antitank guns firing over open sight at any tank target.
- (2) Antitank rifles. These were used extensively, but it is only where the men have been trained in their use that they are really dangerous. Several were found lying about the battlefields.
- (3) Armour-piercing bullets. All tanks gave evidence to the fact that armour-piercing bullets were fired during the operation as the sides of tanks had been punctured in many places resulting in several casualties to the personnel.
- (4) Stockades, deep holes, cuttings, or antitank aircraft were not encountered.

16. **LESSONS AND SUGGESTIONS:**

Tactical: The necessity for smoke protection for tanks operating in daylight was conclusively proved, though smoke created by an artillery barrage, when blown back up on advancing forces creates disorganization, loss of direction, and lack of cooperation between tanks and infantry. It is strongly recommended that all tanks be equipped with Commander Brock's smoke device enabling a smoke barrage to be created at will. In the meantime, proper use of smoke bombs will afford a certain amount of protection.

There was a marked tendency on the part of some tank commanders to get too far ahead of the infantry and therefore lose touch. Crews must be made to realize that the object of the tanks is to get the infantry to its objective. If infantry cannot get forward owing to the opposition, the first duty of the tanks is to overcome this opposition. To do this it will be necessary for tanks to come back to their infantry and to lead them forward again. In any case touch must not be lost.

In dealing with villages or localities comprising a series of dugouts, sufficient infantry must be detailed for mopping-up purposes. Tanks cannot clear dugouts. This was demonstrated throughout the front of the 27th Div. In several cases, the enemy kept reappearing from dugouts which had not been mopped up after tanks had passed them.

Tank commanders must be made to realize the importance of using local ground cover and avoiding sky lines.
Training: Previous training should always take place between tanks and infantry before the operation. Infantry who have been trained with tanks take advantage of fleeting opportunities created by tanks.

Compasses in all tanks have proven their value. Too much cannot be laid upon proper training with the compass.

The use of smoke grenades from tanks needs much more practice and training before becoming practicable in action.

Technical: All officers of the battalion concede that the Mark V Star tank is underpowered. Valve adjustment must be very carefully watched as well as the autovac system. As most of our tanks are new and the battalion had spent over three weeks in overhauling them and preparing them for action, only minor mechanical trouble was encountered.

Bullet splash is very bad, except at the flanges where the angle iron affords protection. Antitank rifle fire and armour-piercing bullets appear to necessitate the provision of thicker armour at least in belts. That is to say, not on the horns, but around the vital parts of the machine.

Increased speed and power of the machines will be the chief factor in overcoming antitank rifle fire and armour-piercing bullets.

General: Horse transports (limber wagons) proved to be essential. They should reach the battalion by Y day at the latest.

More light transport is required for the battalion during operation for company and section commanders to maintain liaison with the infantry units. Battalions often have to operate with two or more divisions and the distance between the various headquarters is great. It is further suggested that the tanks should have their own pigeons. While no pigeons were used in the present operation, it is believed that they are a valuable means of communication.

A tank unit to be successful must have intensive training by night and day, both with and without gas respirators.

I believe in Esprit de Corps.

R. I. SASSE,
Major, Tank Corps,
Tactical Officer.

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SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES: PERSONNEL

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Operations 2d Tank Brigade

2d TANK BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
ATTACHED 4th TANK BRIGADE, B. E. F.,

September 30, 1918.

Lieut. Colonel H. E. Mitchell,
Headquarters American Troops,

My dear Colonel Mitchell:

The battalion went into action at 3:50 a.m., September 29, cooperating with the 27th Division, A. E. F. Forty tanks were supposed to cross the line and at the present writing, it is believed that only thirty-four actually started. Due to terrific antitank defense, tanks as well as infantry never reached their final objective.

Lieutenants McKay and O'Kane were killed and Captain Varney and ten lieutenants wounded. Twenty-one other ranks were killed, sixty wounded, and approximately fifty men are either casualties or missing.

All tank commanders state that they inflicted heavy losses on the enemy and that opposition was exceedingly great. Antitank guns and antitank rifles were thick in this particular sector. In addition, one mine field had to be crossed. One tank in command of Lieut. Dunning crossed the HINDENBURG Line and the canal and into the village of Le CATELET, passed beyond and attempted to take what is since believed to be an antitank concrete fort. They were put out of action and the tank commander with the entire crew remained behind the enemy's lines until dusk and he, with one sergeant, succeeded in reaching our lines.

The morale of the battalion is excellent, but, due to bitter fighting, they seem somewhat shaken and need pulling together.

During the night of the approach march, we were constantly shelled by both gas and H. E., which necessitated wearing gas masks most of the way.

While laying tape, Lieutenant McCluskey and Lt. Naedele were wounded, the former rather seriously. Many of the tanks were put out of action in the vicinity of the starting line, while others received heavy antitank gun and rifle fire in practically every part of the sector.

Cases occurred where tanks after being hit were evacuated by the crews who went forward ahead of the infantry with their machine guns or fought their way through the enemy's lines back to our troops.

We are waiting word to go into action again at any moment and I consider the replacements called for as rather urgent.

Sincerely yours,

R. I. SASSE,
Major, U. S. Tank Corps.
INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION

Showing the effect of recent operations on the enemy, and his present intentions

Since September 27, the attacks on this front have been continuous and resulted in considerable success. On the 28th, a small attack was made near BELLENGLISE and secured the last line of trenches west of the main HINDENBURG Line in this area. On the 29th, this division and the 30th Division, together with British and Australian troops, stormed the HINDENBURG Line from BELLENGLISE to Le CATELET and this was also secured. On September 30 and October 1, an improvement was made in our line by the capture of THORIGNY Ridge, the TRONQUOY Tunnel, LEVERGIES, JONCOURT, SEQUEHART, ESTREES, FOLEMPRISE Farm and the MILL Ridge. The northern end of BELLOCOURT Tunnel was secured and BONY completely mopped up on this same date. On the 2d, the enemy counterattacked at SEQUEHART and drove out the Allied troops, but they immediately recaptured the village. On the 3d, besides securing the whole of the BEAUREVOIR Line from SEQUEHART to a line on the north immediately west of BEAUREVOIR, RAMICOURT, GOUY, and PROSPECT Hill were also captured. On the 4th, Allied troops progressed east and northeast of Le CATELET and GOUY.

On the 5th, BEAUREVOIR and MONTBREHAIN were taken and reports on this date indicate that the whole of GUISENECOURT Farm is now held by Allied troops. Considerable amount of fighting was necessary to carry on this advance, as enemy troops had undoubtedly been ordered to forestall the breaking of the HINDENBURG Line and to hold at all costs, the BEAUREVOIR Line, his last line of defense. Numerous counterattacks were carried out by the enemy in an endeavor to recapture the BEAUREVOIR Line and to prevent the forcing open of the gap made through the HINDENBURG Line. During these counterattacks SEQUEHART, MONTBREHAIN, part of the BEAUREVOIR Line, and PROSPECT Hill again passed into his hands, but all these places have now been recaptured. In these operations, 14,664 prisoners, including 307 officers, were captured (of this amount, the 27th Division captured 17 officers and 782 O. R's). In addition, about 120 guns and a large number of machine guns were captured by our troops. During this operation, the enemy reinforced this front by several divisions.

These divisions, however, were not fresh, but had been engaged several times during August and September. The present German Order of Battle shows that the units on this front are very disorganized and that the morale of the infantry remains poor. During these operations, hostile artillery appeared to be much disorganized. Their counterattacks by infantry were poorly supported by artillery fire. The air activity has been increased and it is quite possible that this front has been strengthened by fighting machines.

Previous to the break in the BEAUREVOIR Line, no information had been obtained showing that the enemy intended to retire. On the 2d instant, however, a prisoner stated that it was essential to hold the BEAUREVOIR Line at all costs, until the VALENCIENNES-GIVET Line was completed. Since that time, much evidence has been obtained to show that the enemy was arranging a retirement. In some cases artillery has been seen withdrawing from their emplacements. Prisoners also state that the civilian population was being evacuated. Numerous fires and explosions have been seen in the enemy's rear areas opposite this front. A special examination of 5 officers of the 30th I. R., 34th Division, captured yesterday, produced statements that the Germans are shortly to retire to a new line being constructed along the high ground on the east bank of the OISE Canal; that the exhausted divisions now in line, are to be kept here as long as possible to enable other
divisions which will hold the rear line, to refit. The rumor most current is that the
Germans will retire to the VALENCIENNES-RETHEL Line for the winter. This line is said to
be strong with concrete shelters, deep dugouts, and much wire.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: The present Enemy Order of Battle opposite this front from
BEAUREVOIR south, seems to be as follows:

60th I. R.       121st Division
(with elements of 2d Guard Div.)

473d I. R.       )
474th I. R.       ) 241st Division
472d I. R.       )
179th I. R.       )
139th I. R.       ) 24th Division
133d I. R.       )
30th I. R.        )
67th I. R.        ) 34th Division
145th I. R.      )

Prisoners of the 121st Division state that their division has suffered severe losses
and it is noteworthy that this division and the 2d Guard Division are presumed to be
holding one division front. The 2d Guard Division has been brought into battle on four
separate occasions since August 8, and on each occasion have lost extremely heavy. The
241st Division has received drafts as reinforcements from the Ersatz of several divisions.
The 34th Division is completely exhausted, according to prisoners' statements. In addition
to other causes, there is no doubt that the morale of German troops has been appreciably lowered by the series of defeats in recent weeks and that the overwhelming superiority in field guns and the apparent unlimited supply of ammunition of the Allies on this front has lessened the control of German officers over their troops and that they
will freely surrender if the opportunity presents itself.

W. T. STARR,
Major, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 27th Division: Fldr. 5: Operations Summary

PART II

September 23 to October 2, 1918

The division was still without its own artillery, ammunition train, supply train,
mobile ordnance repair shop, and part of the field hospitals, and ambulance companies.
The division moved by road and rail from the BEAQUESNE training area to the vicinity of
TINCOURT on September 23 and 24, being transferred from British G. H. Q. reserve to
the British Fourth Army.

On the night of September 24/25, the division relieved the British 18th and 74th Di-
visions in the line, the 53d Infantry Brigade placing the 106th Infantry in the front line
and the 105th Infantry in support.
BONY-HARGICOURT AREA
Looking west-northwest from atop St-Quentin Canal Tunnel, near Bony
The front line ran as indicated on maps showing the preliminary operation of September 27. The support line was approximately a north and south line through the east outskirts of RONSSOY.

Both lines were entrenched.

The 105th Machine Gun Battalion of the 53d Infantry Brigade, relieved the British machine guns in the line on the night of September 25/26 with three companies, the fourth company remaining in reserve.

The 54th Infantry Brigade was stationed in the TINCOURT-HAUT ALLAINES area in reserve. Division headquarters in the Bois de BUIRE, north of TINCOURT. The front taken over was a line facing, at about 1,000 yards distance, the outer defenses of the main HINDENBURG Line to the west of the BELLICOURT Tunnel, this division holding the northern half, 4,500 yards front, the American 30th Division holding the line on our right, both divisions being in the American II Corps, but affiliated with the Australian corps.

The enemy held small strong points and outposts close to our line and had repulsed several attempts to take them, made by the British divisions, which we had relieved.

The main features of the enemy outer line were those strong positions situated on high ground opposite our right, center, and left, called respectively, QUENNEMONT Farm, GUILLEMON Farm and The KNOLL.

From this outer line, which had lower ground running between the strong points nearly up to our line, the terrain sloped down, with ridges and hollows running northeast, toward the main HINDENBURG Line, about 1,500 yards to the east, rising again at BONY, which was included in the defensive system.

East of the HINDENBURG Line ran the BELLICOURT Canal Tunnel from which side tunnels and entrances had been dug affording unusual means of underground communication.

VENDHUILE, lying on the west bank of the Canal and just north of the division sector formed another strong point for enemy resistance, this and MACQUINCOURT Farm at the foot of the valley of the same name giving the troops, during the attack, much trouble from flanking fire on our left.

Beyond the Canal lay Le CATELET and GOUY, within the northern boundary of the division sector.

The following is an outline of the HINDENBURG defenses on the front.

Description of the Canal
1. The flow of the water is north to south.

Dimensions:
Average width at surface 39 feet
Average width at bottom 32' 10"
Depth 6' 6"

There is a towpath on both banks in the cuttings and on one side at least in the tunnels.

South of BELLICOURT, along both sides of the Canal, a bank has been thrown up to a height of about 10 feet at the tunnel entrance decreasing towards Riqueval Farm.

2. The Belficourt Tunnel: The Belficourt Tunnel runs for 5 3/4 kms. at a depth underground varying from 15 to 20 meters. It is 10 m. wide at the top by 18 m. wide at the water level, and strongly built of masonry.

A towpath runs all along the eastern side and another along at least part of the western side. There are reported to be air holes ever 300 meters, and also chambers out in the walls.

Early in 1918, there were 25 barges in the Tunnel north of the BELLICOURT block in G.16.a used as billets. According to recent prisoners, these barges are now broken up or sunk. There are footbridges across the water bed.

Prisoners in 1917 stated that there were 4-5 approach galleries about 30 meters apart with entrances 30 to 40 steps down on the W. side of the road about G.10.c.6.5.
The location of these lateral galleries is fixed by a captured German map, which shows a gallery from G.10.c.7.4. to exit at G.10.c.1.6. and other entrances at G.10.c.75.45., G.16.a.80.85., G.10.a.70.25, and G.10.a.84.35. to galleries leading down to the tunnel. Some of these are discernable on photographs.

The German map also shows 3 galleries into the canal cutting just south of RIQUEVAL exits at G.16.b.1.3., G.16.b.18.23, and G.16.d.22.88.

In addition, another prisoner reports another exit in the cellar of a villa at G.10.a.30.55, and with the shaft at G.10.c.45.60, as an exit on the BELLICOURT Road.

These galleries are confirmed by maps and by a prisoner of an electrical power company whose engine room was in one of the chambers cut in the east wall of the tunnel at BELLICOURT.

No German map is available for the main length of the Tunnel north of BELLICOURT to near VENDHUILE.

According to prisoners' statements in 1917, there were 15 underground galleries leading from the GOUY-BELLICOURT Road into the Tunnel. These would enable troops to enter or leave the tunnel unobserved. As far as can be gathered from a recent prisoner, he emerged from one of these lateral galleries close to the GOUY-BELLICOURT Road in G.22.c. There is little trace of such exits on photographs, as they are camouflaged with brushwood, according to prisoners' statements.

According to a prisoner, there are about 9 such galleries from the Tunnel between BELLICOURT and BONY.

Apart from the air shafts along the tunnel as shown on the maps, there is a series of dugouts cut into the eastern bank of a long spoil heap, which runs above the ground over the line of the Tunnel. It does not seem likely that these dugouts lead down into the Tunnel, as the latter is 15 to 20 meters below. It is possible that there are also galleries leading west from the tunnel to exits in the dugouts shown along the HINDENBURG support line.

In view of this, there are three important features which call for special attention in any attack made by our troops, and should be planned for accordingly:
(b) The dugouts along the top of the Tunnel.
(c) The entrances along the GOUY-BELLICOURT Road.

Measures will necessarily have to be taken in order to prevent the enemy from emerging from the Tunnel in rear of our men and cutting them off.

There is a block at each entrance of the Tunnel. These blocks are described by a prisoner as being a thick ferro-concrete containing an upper chamber over the water way with a platform. The blocks are provided with slits for two machine guns to command the entrance of the Tunnel, also with a ventilating shaft containing an electrical fan. The center block in G.4.c. in BELLICOURT appears to be similar, but with no machine-gun openings.

The blocks fill the entire tunnel from the water level to the roof and can be passed by means of a door on the towpath.

There is a large concrete machine-gun nest at the southern entry of the tunnel at the northwest corner of the cutting at G.16.a.7.6.

There are other machine-gun emplacements to enfilade the open canal.

3. QUARRIES: The quarry in G.16.d. contains important accommodations for troops, including in the northern face, a gallery capable of holding at least a battalion.

This gallery has 3 entrance shafts and 3 large rooms. There are also two dugouts in the western face, side by side, and several in the eastern face, probably capable of holding a large number of men.

There used to be two antiaircraft guns emplaced near the dugouts in the western face. The northeast corner contains a large dugout used in 1917 as a regimental battle headquarters.
This gallery is considered of great tactical importance, probably for troops intended to attack our troops in flank, should they succeed in crossing the Tunnel south of BELLICOURT.

4. BRIDGES: Bridges exist as indicated on the map. There are many footbridges at short intervals along the Canal. The bridges occur at narrowings of the canal and are raised about 3 to 4 meters above the water level. They are nearly all fixed from iron bridges on stone foundations; many have two spans, 20 meters long. The Pont de RIQUEVAL in G.22.d., however, is of solid masonry.

5. PRESENT CONDITION OF THE CANAL: The Canal is now practically empty between the locks in HONNECOURT and from the lock in S.13.d. to VENDHUILE to the northern end of the Tunnel near Le CATELET. South of the lock in S.13.d. to VENDHUILE the water consists mainly of small pools; the bottom appears very muddy.

Hindenburg Line: The HINDENBURG Line, as projected in 1917, was based on principles of defense, since obsolete. It was executed on these principles even up to March 1918, perhaps because the enemy felt reliance on its unusual strength and that it could not be attacked. The front line was provided with concrete dugouts at 40 to 60 yards interval; the captured maps show all the machine guns in the front support lines, and the artillery not disposed in depth.

Modifications must not be expected in these directions.

But even for the HINDENBURG Line, the enemy was careful to keep a series of forward positions to deny observation and in 1918 did much work on outpost lines.

Where the natural obstacle of the Canal is lacking, i.e., at the long tunnel between VENDHUILE and BELLICOURT and the shorter Le TRONQUOY tunnel, the enemy organized particularly strong and well wired trenches in the form of a slight salient. The wire is particularly strong, and forward belt being in the form of triangles characteristic also of the DROCOURT-QUEANT Line.

Recent work: Since we again approached the HINDENBURG Line, activity and work on trenches is visible, especially at BONY and BELLENGLISE. In general, the HINDENBURG Line was ready before and remained in good condition; the wire is excellent. Little or no work has been recently done on back lines behind the HINDENBURG Line, e.g., the Le CATELET---NAUROY---MAGNY Line, a single trench with dugouts, not very heavily wired.

On the other hand, the enemy evidently does not wish us to approach too close to the HINDENBURG Line, and he did a good deal of work on various outpost lines, e.g., GUILLEMONT Farm, QUENNEMONT Farm. In particular, the FRESNOY-FAYET Ridge was strongly organized with new trenches and considerable belts of wire.

An attack on the main HINDENBURG Line being contemplated, it was decided by the Army that a preliminary operation was necessary in order to occupy the outer line of the defenses including the 3 strong points of The KNOLL, GUILLEMONT, and QUENNEMONT Farms, from which to launch the main attack. The line taken over by the 30th Division on our right was further advanced than ours, and included much of the outer line of defenses, the line held by the British 12th Division on our left dropped back in a northwesterly direction, giving the 27th Division little support and leaving VENDHUILE (strongly occupied) free to threaten the left of any advance made by this division.

Orders were issued by the Australian corps (Battle Instructions, Series E, No. 7) for this preliminary operation to be carried out by the 27th Division in connection with a straightening out of their line by the 30th Division, the operation to commence at 5:30 a.m., September 27, assisted by a barrage and tanks.

Field Order No. 47, 27th Division, September 25, 1918, was accordingly issued.

Troops designated for attack:

53d Infantry Brigade
104th M. G. Battalion
106th M. G. Battalion
12 tanks of 4th Tank Brigade
9 brigades field artillery, British
Detachment 102d Engrs.
Detachment, 102d F. S. Batalion
Assisted by heavy artillery.

Attack to be carried out by the 106th Infantry, 3 battalions side by side, disposed in depth.

Objective, the rear most trenches of the outer line of the HINDENBURG System, distance about 1,100 yards from line occupied by our troops.

Objective to be reached in one advance, organized and consolidated, Lewis gun groups to be pushed out to the front. Left flank to be especially patrolled, using part of the 105th Infantry for this purpose.

Advance under barrage to be at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes, objective being reached in 36 minutes.

Barrage to halt 400 yards east of objective and continue for 39 minutes during consolidation.

The following instructions were issued by the division commander:

Instructions to 106th Infantry: The 106th Infantry will attack in the sector indicated as the front of the 27th Division, that is to say, from the Black Line on the map which indicates approximately the present front line of the British in that sector. The attack of the 106th Infantry will be supported by tanks and a rolling barrage. The men will be informed that they are not to depend upon the tanks. The tanks will be present simply to give such assistance as they can. No matter what happens to the tanks, the men must go forward. The tanks will return immediately after the objective is gained.

It is most essential that this be impressed upon the men. The front of the attack is roughly 4,000 yards. The objective is shown *** on the accompanying map. The ground to be taken therefore varies in depth from 500 yards to 1,500 yards. At the outset, it is essential that officers and non-commissioned officers study the maps furnished them in particular reference to the contours. Doing this it will be noted that the country to be operated over is hilly and that these hills as well as the roads and villages form prominent landmarks which will serve as ready references, thus making it simple for all to locate themselves, move in the right direction and correctly report their positions. All should particularly note the three ridges, all running northeasterly to the objective line, one being on the north end of our line, one in the center and one near the south end of our line. These three ridges with the valleys between them form excellent landmarks.

In this operation, the regiment will attack with all three battalions in line disposed in depth, and upon reaching its objective will consolidate in that manner. The leading elements will follow the barrage as closely as possible. It is essential to explain to the men the importance of this. This explanation will be made by captains and by platoon commanders as well. As the barrage clears enemy points of resistance during the advance, the leading elements will go through them without hesitation, for they must not lose ground behind the barrage. Assure the men that enemy soldiers in such places will surrender, but that whether they do or not the leading elements must go on, leaving to the mopping-up parties in the rear the task of dealing with them. Mopping-up parties will see that prisoners are disarmed and sent to the rear. Nominal guards only will be necessary. Prisoners will be taken over by the military police.

No matter what the success or no matter what inducements are offered, this attack of the 106th Infantry will not proceed beyond the objective indicated. The objective line will be consolidated with all speed and greatest thoroughness. Impress this on the men, for the enemy will undoubtedly counterattack. Having taken the objective, or secured the greatest advance practicable, every attention will be given to the preparation of the position repulse counterattack. Careful supervision will be given by officers of the regiment to the placing of machine guns and Lewis guns when the line is consoli-
dated so that the best fields of fire may be obtained. All ranks should be informed that heavy shelling and counterattack will not be considered as reasons for withdrawal. The line must be held irrespective of casualties or weather conditions. The job is a matter of fast and deep digging and the maintenance of good fields of fire.

Our men should be informed that British contact planes will fly over them sounding the letter A of the Morse alphabet on the Klaxon horn. The letter A is indicated by a short and long blast on the Klaxon. This signal is the demand for the men of the front line to show its flares and flash its tin discs so that the aviator may locate and report the location of the front line. Men in the support lines should not give these signals as such action would only serve to mislead the aviator. Officers of the regiment will see to it that all ranks of the regiment are provided with pieces of tin to be issued and sewed on the inside of the respirator flap for use in signalling to the contact aeroplanes as prescribed. The men will be cautioned not to fire on aeroplanes showing the British insignia. We are assured that no authentic case is recorded when an enemy aeroplane has carried Allied insignia.

All officers are charged with the duty of insuring the possession and readiness for use in each company, of rifle grenade rockets and flares, and with message rockets for the purpose of sending back messages.

The men will be warned to keep themselves fit by getting all the sleep they can before the commencement of the attack. Company and platoon commanders, if necessary, should literally put their men to bed as nothing makes greater drain upon physical fitness than lack of sleep. Men get along better with loss of food than with loss of sleep. The greatest attention should be given the matter of food and every attention given to getting up hot food to the men in the front.

Liaison will be from right to left, that is to say, units on the right will send a liaison agent to the unit on the left. Men will be cautioned to maintain their intervals and distances throughout the advance so as to avoid herding. In this way casualties will be kept at a minimum. Message maps will be furnished all officers and line sergeants. They will be used to indicate the line reached by each unit with the time marked thereon and sent back through battalion headquarters to regimental headquarters. Every effort should be made to send frequent messages by visual signal as well.

Every move in the operation has been planned and it should be a matter of honor with every man to play his part to the limit so as not to jeopardize the actions of other men and units of the team. The division commander is relying upon the 106th Infantry to successfully carry out this important operation.

Men will be warned that they must not be taken prisoners, but must fight to a finish. If any man is taken prisoner he will give only the following information:

That he left his billet in a rear area two or three days before, at which time he heard that the rest of the division was going south. How far south he did not know, but believes the move was made by rail. Since that time he has seen no other unit of his division in this area---British troops only.

The night of September 26/27, a gas and H. E. bombardment was fired by field and heavy artillery. This constituted the first occasion in this war wherein the British Army used mustard gas. The composition of the barrage was 10% smoke and the remainder one-half shrapnel and one-half H. E. shell.

The advance from a taped line which had been laid out on the night of September 26/27, with strong patrols pushed well out to the front while pegging and taping was in progress, was made as ordered, 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry on the right, Companies A, B, and C, in front line, Company D in support, 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry in center, Companies F and H in front line, Companies E and G in support, 3d Battalion, 106th Infantry on the left. The troops were lined up on the tape one hour before Zero. Overcoats, blankets and kits had been stored at company headquarters, each man carrying in addition to his fighting equipment, his raincoat and rations. 5 hand grenades per man were carried.
One platoon (4 guns) of machine gun company, 106th Infantry, moved forward with each battalion.

Mopping-up parties were designated.

Companies K and M, 106th Infantry, were designated to guard left flank by moving forward in rear of the left of 106th Infantry to occupy Crellin Trench and connect with left of 106th Infantry on objective.

The 106th Machine Gun Battalion and 3 companies, 105th Machine Gun Battalion firing the machine-gun barrage, 1 company, 105th Machine Gun Battalion placed in rear of left flank to protect this flank maintaining fire down TOMBOIS Valley.

Heavy artillery fired upon enemy artillery positions and selected points to the east of objective and 9 brigades field artillery, British, formed the barrage, firing 3 rounds per minute for 18-pounders and 2 rounds per minute for 4.5" Hows., until the last 20 minutes when rate was reduced to 1 round per minute for each. The 4.5" Hows. barrage was maintained 200 yards east of the 18-pounder barrage. The Australian 4th Divisional Artillery was directly attached to the 27th Division for support of the subsectors of the division front after the barrage ceased.

Progress of the attack September 27: Received division headquarters 6:46 a.m., telegram from 53d Infantry Brigade reporting success signal sent up by left battalion.

Received division headquarters 8:40 a.m., telegram from 53d Brigade sent 7:15 a.m., confirms success signal from left battalion and reports 125 to 150 prisoners coming in.

Message from 53d Brigade sent 6:25 a.m., reports message from O.P. in left of support line states enemy retaliation on 106th Infantry fairly heavy and came down soon after opening of our barrage.

Telephone from 53d Brigade, 9:20 a.m. Right seems to be on objective. Still fighting about farms. Center also seems to be on, but bombing continues.

From 53d Brigade, 9:25 a.m.---Report from left battalion says supply tank dumped its stores at front line. Returning tank officers report all O.K. there.


Telephone from 53d Brigade, sent 10:40 a.m. Situation around The Knoll very obscure. Have put down protective barrage around it. Chief trouble is shortage of officers forward. Some companies have apparently no officers at all. Expect definite information about center soon.

Telegram 53d Brigade, sent 8:45 a.m. Received division headquarters 10:45 a.m. Tanks report southern objective gained.

Telegram Australian 4th Divisional Artillery, sent 11:40 a.m. Boche in GUILLEMONT Farm and Cemetery and in some force in south GUILLEMONT trench.

Telephone from 53d Brigade, 12:02 p.m. Last report from center battalion states we occupy CLAYMORE Trench A.19.a. to A.20.a., but the GUILLEMONT Farm not cleaned up and enemy giving trouble. Have directed situation be dealt with by support companies battalion.

Telephone from 106th Infantry, sent 1:25 p.m. Enemy counterattacked on right battalion 20 minutes ago. Situation not clear.

Telegram from British 12th Division on our left, sent 1:25 p.m. At 12:20 p.m., Americans were counterattacked and turned off The Knoll, taking up a line in TOMBOIS Farm. Artillery fire was brought to bear on sunken road in F.12.a in cooperation with machine guns. Americans then counterattacked, driving enemy in Tombois Trench at about 12:50 p.m.

Telegram received division headquarters, 4:25 p.m. from intelligence, Australian corps. Airplane contact patrol called for flares 11:15 a.m. to 12:15 p.m., none seen. Then reports seeing troops in and somewhat in advance of our original jumping-off position.
Telegram received divisional headquarters, from British 12th Division, sent 3:50 p. m. Received 4:30 p. m. Report from a battalion commander, timed 2:35 p. m., says Americans withdrawn from The Knoll to F.11.a. FLEECALL Post, FAG Trench and about 150 men in TOMBOIS Road as far as F.6.c.0.5. Americans reorganizing on above line. Report from contact airplane, sent 6:20 p. m. Flares called for at 5:30 p. m. None seen and only one disc. Rifle fire and machine-gun fire along whole line. Intense enemy machine-gun fire from direction GUILLEMONT Farm. Reports troops seen in F.11.a and c., F.18.a. and c., F.24.a. and c., F.30.a. and c.

At 6:30 p. m., an officer reported verbally and definitely that he had returned from the front line at 5 p. m. and stated that The KNOLL, GUILLEMONT Farm and QUENNEMONT Farm were in our hands, pockets of the enemy remaining to be mopped up.

Message from Australian corps. Airplane contact patrol between 6:30 and 7 p. m., reports line A.26.d.7.5---A.26.b.3.7---A.26.a.3.0---A.14.a.21---A.13.b.7.7---F.12.c.6.8---F.11.b.4.5---F.4.b.9.5. Fighting reported to be going on around The KNOLL where situation is obscure owing to bad visibility.

From above reports and war diaries the following account of the operation is compiled

Four tanks were assigned to each battalion subsector, these to advance with first line, and one to follow in support loaded with wire and tools for consolidating the new position. The tanks with the right battalion failed to get into action. A few tanks in each of the other sectors accompanied the troops to the objective, moved around Gille­mont Farm and The Knoll and then returned. Only one supply tank succeeded in getting forward and dumped its load. On the whole, the tanks were not of much assistance.

The first line companies reached the objective under the barrage, getting well into the trenches in places, in some places reaching only the wire and gained a foothold in the farms and at The Knoll, but not sufficiently to mop them up. The enemy held these points in strength and with the aid of machine-gun fire from the rear gradually forced our line to withdraw, but not until after an all day fight in which the loss of many of the few officers with the companies made itself felt in depriving the units of leaders.

The right (1st) battalion, 106th Infantry reported at 9:25 a. m. as being in trenches in A.26.a and c., with hard fighting going on, was prevented by the QUENNEMONT Farm strong point from consolidating this objective, held on during the day and were counterattacked about 1 p. m. Later in the afternoon the battalion commander could get no information of the situation on his front, a heavy machine-gun fire being maintained by the enemy.

Co. B, 105th Inf., was ordered up in support and occupied the old front line trenches at 6 p. m., the personnel of battalion headquarters also went into these trenches. Four patrols were sent forward at 7:30 p. m., but failed to get in touch with any men of the 106th Infantry.

On the night previous to the operation, this battalion reported 6 officers and 491 men present for all duty (including rear echelon). On the morning of the 28th, it reported 4 officers and 198 men present for all duty.

The center (2d) Battalion, 106th Infantry, reached the objective and tanks circled GUILLEMONT Farm, but as was discovered in later operations this position was strongly held by the enemy with many dugouts and underground passages and ordinary mopping up was not sufficient as the enemy kept appearing from new points, and the position was strongly supported from the rear by machine-guns. Reports received about noon indicated that enemy still occupied the farm, GUILLEMONT Trench and the cemetery and was giving trouble, the support companies of the battalion being ordered to deal with this, the attack companies holding CLAYMORE Trench at this time.

One company, 105th Infantry, was ordered at 2:30 p. m. to move forward and report to commanding officer, 2d Battalion, 106th Infantry, as support, remaining in original front line trench.

On the night previous to the operation the 2d Battalion, 106th Inf. reported 10 officers and 515 men as present available for all duty (including rear echelon).
On the morning of Sept. 28, the battalion reported 5 officers and 241 men present for all duty.

The left (3d) Battalion, 106th Infantry, sent up signal that it had reached objective. Companies K and M, 106th Infantry followed in rear of the left of this battalion prepared to form along the line of CRELIN Trench to protect the left flank, Company M on the right and Company K on the left of the line, as it was to form. Company K reached its objective at 6:05 a.m. Company M reached its objective, but later lost both its officers, the 1st Sergeant and 3 platoon sergeants, failed to connect with the 3d Bn., 106th Infantry, because disorganized under the heavy fire and fell back, the survivors attaching themselves to Company K. Company K then withdrew somewhat to a position about 300 yards in front of the start line and connected with the British on the left.

At 10:40 a.m., the Commanding General, 53d Infantry Brigade, sent a message to division headquarters that situation around The KNOLL was obscure and that he had put down a protective barrage around it.

At 11:30 a.m., the C. G., 3d Bn., 106th Inf., left bn. hq. for the front line to reorganize the battalion.

At 12:20 p.m., this part of the line was counterattacked and driven off The KNOLL. With the aid of artillery and machine guns, the enemy was driven back to TOMBOIS Trench about 12:50 p.m. This counterattack by our troops in the attacking line was assisted by the arrival of Company I, 105th Infantry, one platoon of which had been sent forward about 11 a.m. as a reinforcement followed by the remainder of the company and by Co. I. At 4 p.m., Company G 105th Infantry, was placed in support about 400 yards in rear. Before dark the 3d Battalion, 105th Inf., took up position in the original front line trenches which formed the jumping-off line of the morning, as they were out of touch with the 3d Bn., 106th Inf., on their right.

The 3d Bn., 106th Inf., reported, previous to the operation, present for all duty (including rear echelon) 12 officers and 484 men, and on the morning of Sept. 28, 4 officers and 210 men present for all duty. Reports as to location of front line were conflicting during the latter part of the afternoon, but later airplane reports indicated that the line was about on objective on the right, dropping back nearly to our original line on the left, The KNOLL being in possession of the enemy.

Our casualties for this operation are included in report of main operation, and could only be generally estimated separately as follows, and these include, in the 106th Inf. men mixed with other commands and stragglers near the front lines:

105th Inf. No report.
106th Inf.--- 13 officers, 749 men.
102d Engrs.---1 man killed, 6 men wounded.
Hq. Troop---2 men killed.
105th Machine Gun Bn.---5 men killed, 34 men wounded.
106th Machine Gun Bn.---4 men killed, 19 men wounded.

Prisoners captured---8 officers, 259 men.

Subsequent inspection of the ground fought over disclosed a large number of enemy dead in and out of the trench, and gave evidence of the sanguinary character of the fighting. Enemy bodies were particularly thick about The KNOLL. Some of these casualties were inflicted the following day, by other units of the division and it is impossible to say what percentage was the result of this preliminary attack.

In preparation for the main operation, the attack on the Hindenburg Line, the 54th Infantry Brigade had, per Field Order No. 48, 27th Division, September 26, 1918, been ordered to relieve the 53d Infantry Brigade in the line on the night of September 27/28, the three machine gun battalions to remain in the line. The division sector to be held by the two infantry regiments, side by side, upon relief the 53d Infantry Brigade (less machine gun battalion) to proceed as follows:

The 105th Inf. to march to camps in area No. 6, which, roughly, included the squares F.7, 13, 14, 15.
One bn., 106th Inf., to withdraw to area No. 6 and be available for the C. G., 54th Inf. Brigade for use as support in the left regimental subsector. The remainder of the 106th Inf. to withdraw to area No. 10, which included the squares E.16.d.--E.17.c. and d.--E.23.--E.29.--K.4. 5, 10, and 11.

The 54th Inf. Brigade (less 106th M. G. Bn., already in the line) marched from the HAUT-ALLAINES--TINCOURT area at 11 a. m., September 27, and relieved the 53d Inf. Brigade (less 105th M. G. Bn.) in the front line, the relief commencing after dark, relief completed between 4 a. m. in some sections and 6:30 a. m. in others.

The regiments were directed by the Brigade commander to push forward strong combat patrols to relieve units of the 106th Inf. that might be holding forward positions; and to establish a line as near as possible to the objective given the 106th Inf. for the attack of September 27.

Telegram received at div. hq., 8:40 a. m., Sept. 28 from C. G., 54th Inf. Brigade: Relief progressing at 5:50 a. m. without incident. Combat patrols out in front endeavoring to get in touch with 106th Inf. Nothing new as to 106th Inf.

The front line was relieved by the 54th Inf. Brig. was practically the old front line held previous to Sept. 27.

The 54th Inf. Brig. occupied this line with two inf. regts. side by side, the 108th Inf. on the right, the 107th Inf. on the left, each with two bns. in the front line and one in support.

Upon relief the 105th Inf. was withdrawn to the position designated above; the 106th Inf. also withdrew and organized all available men of the rifle companies into a composite battalion prepared to report to the C. O., 107th Inf., for the operation on September 29 as directed.

Owing to the doubt on the evening of September 27 as to the position of the most advanced elements of the troops which attacked on September 27, the division commander had directed the C. G., 54th Inf. Brig., to relieve the line as far forward as the relieving troops could find it held, to send out patrols to gain touch with the elements of the 106th Inf., which were believed to be still holding advanced positions on or near the objective of the operation of September 27.

Patrols from the 2d Bn., 108th Inf., found 1 officer and 7 men of the 106th Inf. Several enemy strong points were located, the artillery was notified and fired upon them. The extreme right of the line was advanced about 200 yards to the position shown on map of operation of Sept. 29 of actual departure line.

The left bn., 107th Inf., also advanced its line as follows:

Telegram to div. hq. from 54th Inf. Brigade, 7:58 a. m., Sept. 28:

Left bn., 107th Inf. occupying trench extending from F.11.b.0.1. to F.11.d.8.2., thence southerly, in touch with British on our left. Two companies started from SUNKEN Road to above trench without opposition.

The enemy maintained an intermittent artillery and machine-gun fire throughout the day, the right regiment reporting unusual activity, with enemy barrage laid down from 3:30 p. m. to 4:40 p. m., with counterbarrage by our artillery.

The organizations of the 54th Inf. Brig. were also engaged in preparing for the operation of September 29.

Telegram received div. hq., 1:50 p. m., Sept. 28, sent 12:50 p. m. by Intelligence, Australian corps:

Contact patrol 35th (Air) Squadron reports 11:30 a. m., our troops seen in CRELLIN Trench and COCHRANE Avenue, TIGER Trench, KNOLL Trench to A.7.b.4.6. to west side of GUILLEMONT Farm at A.13.b.3.7., thence to A.13.d.6.9. Small party enemy apparently cut off north of GUILLEMONT Farm fired at plane. Contact machine of 3d Squadron 11 a. m., reports GUILLEMONT and QUENNEMONT Farms apparently deserted. Two Huns seen trench A.19.b.3.9. About 200 Huns living sunken road A.14.c. and d., and a few Huns seen A.13.b.8.3. Heavy machine-gun fire direction of trench system A.19--26.a.
Report by div. comdr. to Australian corps and Amer. II Corps, Sept. 28:
The situation on 27th Div. front is as follows: At 11 a. m., 106th Inf., after relief by the 54th Brigade, had present for duty at its camp area 9 officers, 252 men. They say there was stiff fighting in numerous places. After prisoners were evacuated enemy seemed to have reorganized points along front between leading and supporting elements. 54th Inf. Brig. regiments were, this morning, directed to patrol vigorously the front and connect with any advance parties of 106th Inf. on or about objective line.

After receipt of Australian corps decision that there would be no change in barrage programme for tomorrow and the aerial message confirming presence of 106th Inf. parties on yesterday's objective line, the 54th Inf. Brigade was informed and directed to patrol and infiltrate to support, mopping up intervening Boche.

At 6 p. m., 54th Inf. Brig. Commander reports that he has pushed forward and has already pegged out his line on the left in front of Egg Post and expects to be ready to jump off 400 yards behind the barrage line with a possibility of making the start on the prescribed line.

The Aust. corps decision referred to above was that the barrage on the front of the 27th Div. for the main operation on Sept. 29 would fall, as originally planned, on a line east of the objective laid down for Sept. 27, and not be brought back nearer to the line occupied by the 107th and 108th Infantry.

The main operation: The orders were those of the Aust. corps and American II Corps attached, and Field Order No. 49, 27th Div., Sept. 27, 1918.

The plan assumed that the line held by the 27th Division at the time of main attack would be the line laid down as the objective of the preliminary operation on September 27 and was not changed when this attack failed to hold the objective.

The plan was as follows: The American II Corps to attack on the morning of September 29, the 30th Division on the right, the 27th Division on the left, the British 18th Division on the left of the 27th Division, all to attack simultaneously as far as the canal.

Operation divided into two phases. Within the 27th Division sector the first phase to commence with the advance of the 54th Infantry Brigade, under a creeping barrage and accompanied by tanks. The barrage to move forward approximately 2,500 yards and halt for 15 minutes 400 yards east of the tunnel to facilitate mopping up and reorganization and to allow the 105th Infantry to cross the tunnels and form for attack to the north, then to continue east a further distance of 2,500 yards, halt and form a protective barrage.

The barrage was 10% smoke and the remainder one-half shrapnel and one-half H. E. shell. The 54th Infantry Brigade to halt on the Green Line (east of GOUY). To avoid the canal in the left of the div. sector, the extreme left battalion of the attacking line was to move around over the tunnel in rear of the attacking line on its right, then extend to the left to the north boundary of the division sector and continue east to the Green Line. One battalion of the 106th Infantry (ordered to report to the Commanding Officer, 107th Infantry, for instructions) was to follow in rear of the attacking line of the 107th Infantry to assist the 54th Infantry Brigade in mopping up the HINDENBURG Line tunnel and exits. The 105th Inf. was to follow in rear of the left regiment of the 54th Infantry Brigade, cross the canal tunnel, change direction to the left, deploy and halt in rear of that portion of the left regiment (107th Inf.) extended along the Dotted Green Line.

Second Phase: The Australian 3d Division to follow through the 27th Division sector as the attack progressed, and after the 54th Infantry Brigade was halted on the Green Line, to pass through the 54th Brigade (at 11 a. m.) and attack east to the Red Line. At the same time, the 105th Infantry supported by 3 brigades of British field artillery and one company of tanks, was to advance north beyond the Dotted Green Line to its objective, the Red Line from S.30.b. central to S.14.c.0.4. The regiment to consolidate on this line and establish contact with Australian 3d Division on its right and the British troops on its left at the canal. The 106th Infantry (less 1 bn.) had been directed in
the order to follow the Australian 3rd Division across the Canal Tunnel and then to act as ordered at the time, but on account of its losses in the preliminary operation it could only furnish one battalion from the entire regiment and that battalion was sent to assist the 54th Infantry Brigade in mopping-up, so this part of the plan was abandoned. It was further planned that later the American II Corps was to be assembled and act within a corps sector east of GOUY and north of the Aust. corps, the limits of which are indicated on attached map.

9 brigades of British artillery were allotted to the 27th Division sector for the barrage.

The 105th and 106th M. G. Battalions were to form the machine-gun barrage, the 105th M. G. Battalion in the left regimental subsector, the 106th M. G. Battalion in the right regimental subsector.

The 104th M. G. Battalion was assigned to support the left flank of the advance, one company (a) to move forward as the HINDENBURG Line was made good and form west of the Canal facing north in position on the spur running through A. central, 4 guns to watch the exit of the Canal Tunnel as well as the north flank.

Co. B, 104th Machine Gun Battalion to move out as soon as the infantry crossed the canal to a position east of the canal, facing north. Regimental machine gun companies to move forward with their regiments for immediate support. The 301st Tank Battalion was attached to the division for the operation; one company to operate with the 108th Infantry, one company with 107th Infantry. Two platoons (4 tanks each with 1 tank each in reserve) attached to the 105th Infantry for use in 2d phase.

Battle P. C.'s as follows:

- 27th Division Headquarters at Quarry, Ste-EMILIE.
- Headquarters 53d and 54th Brigades--RONSSOY.
- 108th Infantry, PIMPLE Post, F.28.c.
- 107th Infantry moved 7:30 a. m. to KENT Lane, later to SART Farm.

105th Infantry from RONSSOY at 8 a. m. to F.16.d.7.4., to DUNCAN Post at 11 a. m. and back to F.16.d. about 7:30 p. m.

About noon on September 28, a conference was held at 54th Infantry Brigade Headquarters attended by C. G., 27th Division, Brigadier General Brand, representing the Australian corps commander, Chief of Staff of 27th Division and C. G., 54th Infantry Brigade. It having become apparent that it would be impossible to form the troops close behind the first line of the artillery barrage, the proposition was made to adjust the artillery fire to a line farther in the rear in order that troops might advance under its protection from the start. After consultation with the artillery commander the conference was informed on account of the lack of time it would be impracticable to change barrage table. It was then suggested that the operation might be postponed a day in order that time might be gained for this. This suggestion was submitted to the commanding general, Australian corps and later the following telegrams were received:

Telegram received, 27th Div. Hq., 2:10 p. m., Sept. 28 from Aust. corps, sent 1:55 p. m.

In view of the uncertainty of the situation on the front of the American 27th Div., the army commander has decided that there will be no substantial alteration in the plan. The tanks will be reinforced as much as possible. The infantry will be formed up in attack order as far forward as the situation permits, one hour prior to Zero. The tanks will advance with the infantry who will be prepared to fight their way, if necessary, to the forming-up line. The barrage will come down as already arranged at Zero, and will remain for four minutes. It will then lift in accordance with the barrage map except that all lifts throughout will be of four minutes per 100 yards. The halt will be at the place and for the period already arranged.

The infantry was unable to push forward during the hours immediately preceding the attack, the report was made by C. G., 54th Inf. Brigade referred to in situation report.
on page 1,057, that he would be able to jump off within 400 yards of barrage line was not realized. The brigade formed up on a line established practically along the trenches occupied previous to September 27, an average of 1,000 yards behind the start line of the barrage.

It should be noticed that the artillery barrage started beyond the strong points of The KNOLL, GUILLEMONTE, and QUEENEMONT Farms and connecting trenches, therefore leaving any enemy occupying this line, free to go into action at once. It has not been found that any of the 106th Inf. still held, at the time of this attack, any of the positions which they reached for a time in the attack of September 27. Zero hour was 5:50 a.m., Sept. 29, at which time the attack started and the infantry advanced, the 54th Inf. Brig., in the attacking line, 108th Inf. in the right regimental sector, with 2d Bn. on the right, 3d Bn. on the left and 1st Bn. in support; the 107th Inf. in left regimental sector, 3d Bn. on the right, 1st Bn. on the left, the combined bn. of the 106th Infantry following the 3d Bn. as moppers up, 2d Bn., 107th Inf. in rear of the bn., 106th Inf. as support.

The 105th Inf. was in assembly area, YAK Post to LEMPIRE Post, in column of battalions in artillery formation, the 2d Battalion in attack, followed by the 1st Battalion, the 3d Battalion being last in column. This regiment was prepared to follow the attacking line until it passed the canal tunnel then form line to the north, etc., as described in the plan.

Progress of the attack: Message from 53d Inf. Brig., sent 6:05 a.m.: From reports available 107th Inf., Bn. 106th Inf. in position, when barrage came down at 5:50 a.m. Enemy promptly sent up S. O. S. flares. Situation seemed quite normal for one hour before Zero, prior to that enemy seemed nervous and displayed some extra activity.

Telegram to div. hq. sent 54th Brigade, 6:21 a.m.: 107th Inf. and 106th Bn. in position at Zero and 105th formed up. Tanks on hand and 107th Inf. got off to good start. No report from 108th Inf. yet.

Telephone message received from 54th Inf. Brigade, 8:04 a.m., Sept. 29, to div. hq.: 107th Inf. going well up to 2 a.m. and had very little opposition. Retaliation barrage was light and well back of our troops. Wounded officer reports 31 prisoners from the 84th I. R. and 27th I. R. Report talk with the tank officer who reported 8 tanks out of order. He talked with one officer of the 84th Inf. Regiment. Prisoner stated attack was a surprise and our troops doing well. Prisoners were taken in the area of the left battalion. He saw about 40 casualties which would indicate that opposition was not serious.

Telephone message received div. hq., 8:55 a.m., from 108th Infantry: 108th Infantry going well. Counterbarrage went chiefly over the heads of the center battalion. Have suffered only a few casualties. At 8:10 the regiment was reported as to have crossed the Hindenburg Line and on their way to the Tunnel. Opposition encountered had not been strong and casualties not unduly severe. Our right battalion has passed A.20.b.1.8. This at 8:10 a.m.

Telephone message received at 8:45 a.m., div. hq., from 53d Inf. Brig.: Wounded man from Co. I, 105th Inf., states that his intelligence officer told him that the trench he was in was the HINDENBURG Line. That means that the 106th Inf. are ahead of him and 107th and 108th Inf. must be very well ahead of the Hindenburg Line. The 54th Brigade was seen entering BONY in good order about 6:30 a.m.

Telephone message received div. hq., 9:45 a.m., from div. liaison officer, 53d Brigade: Message 9:10 a.m., from 108th Inf. reports 3d Bn. suffering heavy casualties at GUILLEMONTE Farm. Ran into machine guns, but continued to advance.

Telephone message received div. hq., 10:42 a.m., from Australian liaison officer: From questioning prisoners, Crowther and Salisbury (Australian officers) agree our troops are in the Canal Tunnel, 10:15 a.m.

Telegram received div. hq. from 53d Brigade, sent 9:05 a.m.
Major Gillette (106th Inf.) just back, wounded in arm by machine gun. His battalion in HINDENBURG Line when he left. He himself passed over two or three trenches before he was hit. His battalion in good control and everything going O.K. Had practically no trouble from Boche artillery. He had very heavy machine-gun fire where he was hit about one hour ago.

Telegram received div. hq., 11:02 a.m., from 53d Infantry Brigade.
Lieutenant back, wounded, reports being as far forward as A.8.d. Considerable number of machine guns that were passed over by first line giving trouble. Could not tell just where leading elements had gotten. Saw quite a few stragglers from tanks working on clearing up all machine guns. Australians well advanced. This about 8:30 a.m.

Radio message received 10:15 a.m., from 54th Inf. Brig.
108th Inf. jumped off on time to a good start with 1st Battalion in close support.

Australian 44th Battalion passed through the former line of 108th Inf. at 7 a.m.

Telegram received div. hq., 8:45 a.m., from British 18th Div. on our left, sent 8:35 a.m.
Brigade reports 8:20 a.m., machine-gun fire from MACQUINCOURT Farm and from trench 500 yards southwest of VENDHUILE.

Message received div. hq. from our liaison officer with British 18th Div., sent 12:50 p.m.
Advance of British 55th Brigade which went up Macquincourt Valley seems to be held up at Farm. Situation seems somewhat confused. Machine-gun fire appears to be the trouble.

Report received div. hq., sent from 54th Brig., 10:15 a.m.
One of my staff officers reports 10:06 a.m., that from a statement of wounded officer of the 107th Inf. that the casualties, especially officers, were heavy. That our troops (3d Battalion, 107th Inf.) had passed the HINDENBURG Line with the advance companies and reports following message from Commanding Officer, 107th Inf.: Report just came in that left battalion is falling back to F.17. No confirmation yet. Information practically nil. One battalion met with machine-gun fire---reports are conflicting. Wounded officers report that all objectives have been taken, but at 9:05 a.m., commanding officer, left battalion, sent a message that he was retiring at 8:50. Information here is that he will continue the advance. Several prisoners just brought in from Prussian 185th Div.,* 7th Regt. and Alsatian 121st Div.,* 10th Regt. These divisions called in early this morning as reserves. The attack was a complete surprise and these men did not know who were on the line when the attack began. At 9:25 a.m., message came that 2d Bn. crossed Hindenburg Line at 8:40 a.m. Still no confirmation of withdrawal of 3d Bn., believe 3d Bn. is advancing.

Message received over telephone 1:50 p.m., from Australian 10th Inf. Brigade, sent 11:50 a.m.:
The following has been sent to 38th, 39th and 40th Battalions at 11:45 a.m. Americans reported on line of Canal. You will send forward by means of patrols and mop up intervening country so as to get in touch with Americans advance line. Find out and report situation.

Message from Australian 3d Division, sent 1 p.m.:
Following from our 10th Brigade, at 12:10 p.m. Many Americans leaderless near Guillelent Trench and Willow Trench near Island Travis [Traverse]. About 10 a.m., antitank guns and machine guns in A.8.a., also machine guns in Claymore Valley. Machine-gun fire from northeast, evidently came from The Knoll F.12.a.

Message from Australian corps, received 2:35 p.m., Sept. 29, at division headquarters:

* German divisions.
American 30th Division has taken NAUROY. American 30th Division is mopping up HINDENBURG Line and is across line of Canal Tunnel, aeroplane reports indicate American 27th Division east of BONY and in GOUY. Nest of enemy apparently still in BONY. 200 prisoners reported taken in Canal Tunnel. American 30th Division in touch with British 46th Division and confirms report that 46th Division have crossed canal.

Telegram from Australian corps, sent 11:40 a.m.:
Contact air patrol 9:50 to 10:40 a.m., reports area west of grid line between A and B, G and H squares decidedly obscured by mist. East of that line visibility better, but no movements seen.

Received division headquarters, 3:47 p.m., sent 54th Infantry Brigade, 2:15 p.m.:
At 11 a.m., left battalion, 107th Infantry in a. and d. opposed by strong machine-gun nests. Are fighting there in conjunction with Australians. 4 tanks out of business.

Received div. hq., sent 54th Inf. Brig. at 10:30 a.m.:
Liet. of 108th Inf. wounded at HINDENBURG Line reports that at 7:15 not more than 20 to 30 casualties per company. Liaison established with 119th Infantry (30th Div.). No assistance from tanks. Little help from barrage, too far behind. Left battalion reported falling back, but nothing definite known.

Received div. hq., sent 54th Inf. Brig., 11:25 a.m.:
Liet. Brandt, 106th Inf. wounded, came back to 107th Inf. and reported line had halted A,8.d,2.6. Held up by machine-gun fire A,8.d,4.6. 107th Inf. reported straggler post being organized. Some troops seen moving back in vicinity of A,8.c,3.4. An officer sent to reorganize them and push forward. 108th Inf. reported right battalion going O.K. but left battalion ran into machine-gun fire, but continued to advance. C.O., 107th Inf., believes that from information received from wounded men and adjutant of adjoining battalion, that 3d Bn, 107th Inf., has gone through HINDENBURG Line. Unable to get location of 2d Battalion, but it is pushing up behind 3d Bn. Are not in touch with 108th Inf. Can only see machine-gun fire of enemy. No artillery fire. Time 9:45 a.m.

Received div. hq., sent 54th Inf. Brigade, 10:15 a.m.:
Right bn., 108th Inf., is past machine-gun post A,20.b,1.8. Machine-gun firing, but is advancing. Casualties light. Left bn., 108th Inf. reports suffering heavy casualties at GUILLEMONTE Farm, when it ran into machine-gun fire, but continued to advance. Saw men who were evidently lost and have been rallied and restored to line.

Received 27th Div., sent by Australian liaison officer with 54th Inf. Brig., sent 2 p.m.:
Capt. Owen with 108th Inf. reports 12 noon. Australian 11th Inf. Brigade reported halted in DIRK Valley, A,20.c, a. and b., and under heavy machine-gun fire from QUENNEWORT Farm.

Message from Capt. Tupper, liaison officer with 54th Inf. Brigade, sent 12:20 p.m.:
Capt. Crimmins, 102d Engrs., says he has just returned from Guillemont Farm and it has not yet been completely mopped up. Lt. McKay, Co., C, 107th Inf. wounded, reports his company much reduced and consolidated with Co. D, 108th Infantry.

Received div. hq., 11:27 a.m., sent III Corps (on our left), 10:40 a.m.:
Air report claims that we hold MACQUINCOURT Trench and FLANK Trench. Artillery observation group reports that our men are in A,9.a and c., and that a tank is in A,9.b. Prisoner captured states that they had orders to hold on at all costs to the HINDENBURG Outpost Line and that they have heard no rumors of withdrawal.

Received div. hq., sent 54th Inf. Brig., 2:15 p.m.:
Report from Australian 4th Div. artillery that enemy advancing from BONY to the southeast and that our forces are retiring from THE KNOLL and WILLOW Trench in F.11. and 12. I have directed 105th and 106th Machine Guns Bns. to take advantage of position to fire to the northeast.

Telegram received div. hq., repeated from Australian 3d Div. Art., dated 2:45 p.m.:
Message from General McNicoll, commanding Australian 10th Brigade to G. S. O. 1, Australian 3d Division.

Received div. hq., sent Australian corps.


Received div. hq., sent Aust. 3d Div., 4:30 p. m.:

Liaison with American 105th Regiment reports message from 3d Bn., 105th Inf., at regimental hq., says at 9 a. m., battalion in conjunction with British 18th Div., captured The KNOLL and MACQUINCOURT Trench, met heavy machine-gun fire, but pushed ahead. Flank of Australian 10th Brigade now at CAT Post. F.24.a. Advance DOG Trench about 100 yards from GUILLEMONT Farm northwest along trench as far as Valle St. F.12.c.7.2.

Message from Australian corps, sent 7:30 p. m.:

Contact patrol machine reports 3:50 p. m., our troops seen [in?] The KNOLL, KNOLL Trench, WILLOW Trench. 3:45 p. m., 200 infantry scattered across A.1.a. 4 p. m., trenches in A.7.a.9.9. to A.8.c.2.1 and HINDENBURG Line from BONY north to S.21.b., apparently held in strength. Very heavy machine-gun fire HINDENBURG System, BONY northwards.

Message Australian corps, sent 7:40 p. m.:

Contact patrol 5:50 to 6:40 p. m., reports flares seen A.29.c. Pilot reports line appears from shelling of ours and enemy guns north to south as follows: F.6.a.5.0---A.1.d.5.0---A.8.central---A.15.a.0.8.---BONY obscure---A.16.c.0.5---A.22.b.

Message from III Corps sent 3 p. m.:

18th Division have troops in A.1.d. and MACQUINCOURT Trench. Situation not clear and trouble is being experienced from Germans not mopped up around Guillenmont Farm.

Telegram sent from British III Corps, 11:15 p. m.:

British 18th Div. captured their objectives, which include MACQUINCOURT Trench and TINO Support. Very heavy machine-gun fire was directed on this position by the enemy from the east and south. During the afternoon, the div. had to evacuate MACQUINCOURT Trench in A.2.c. to conform with the movement on our right.

Telegram from 27th Div. to American II Corps, Sept. 27, 1918:

At 10:30 a. m., information indicates that elements of leading units appear to have followed barrage to finish over divisional front. Mopping up of HINDENBURG Line behind 107th Inf. seems to be progressing favorably. Report that 108th Inf. had losses passing GUILLEMONT Farm and that later 2d Battalion was having trouble in vicinity of A.21., but they were supported by Australians following them. At 10:15 a. m., 5 different prisoners reported our troops are on line of Canal. Prisoners' statement just received is that they were to hold line at all costs and that units of 106th Inf. reached their objective in the preliminary operation and held on. That the German casualties in their counter-attack were very heavy. The enemy on our front have many light machine guns, but not many heavy machine guns.

From the above, the war diaries, and reports, the following outline of the action is compiled:

The advance started at Zero hour. Visibility was poor during the morning, with an early morning mist and low clouds. Smoke from the barrage hung in the valleys and made the advance, keeping of direction and observation difficult all along the line. There were 23 tanks assigned to support the attack on the 27th Div. front, 17 of these were blown up by land mines in the line of wire. The mines, it was later ascertained, were British mines left there by the enemy when he took that position in earlier operations.
Some of the tanks were destroyed at the initiation of the advance and many of them deviated from the direction and obliqued across the front of the advancing infantry.

On the extreme right and the extreme left, opposition was met with from the start, the enemy holding outposts quite close to our line. The HINDENBURG defense line of trenches was strongly held, especial points being The KNOLL, LONE Tree Trench, GUILLEMONT Farm, and QUENNEMONT Farm. As will be seen in more detailed reports the enemy maintained a machine-gun fire throughout the day covering the whole territory of the advance, parts of the original jumping-off line being under this fire until later in the afternoon. Machine guns from the flank position at VENDHUILLE and to the east end of the MACQUINCI ROUNT Valley, the HINDENBURG Line and BONY enabled much enfilading fire to be brought to bear on our troops. The enemy had field pieces in BONY.

In the right (108th) regimental sector, the right (2d) battalion met opposition from QUENNEMONT Farm. Part of this battalion passed on and reached the HINDENBURG Line south of BONY. A detour to the south had to be made to get through the wire. The trenches were there occupied, prisoners captured and the trenches mopped up toward BONY.

Patrols sent to the front were killed by enemy sniper and machine-gun fire. The enemy several times counterattacked during the day by bombing down the trenches from the direction of BONY, but was driven off. This force of two officers and less than two hundred men, keeping in subjection their prisoners, beat off all counterattacks and maintained their position in the HINDENBURG Line throughout the day and evening, until the advance of the Australian corps reached them. The remainder of this battalion was held up at QUENNEMONT Farm and vicinity and by fire from BONY, the action being kept up until the farm was finally taken and mopped up, the approach of a brigade of the Australian 3d Div. after 11 a.m. assisting. The Australians came up to what was left of this battalion; and together with a number of the men of the 108th Inf., who were largely leaderless on account of lack of officers, a small advance was made during the afternoon.

Part of the left (3d) battalion, 108th Inf., passed GUILLEMONT Farm and was held up by fire from BONY when it reached the vicinity of A.14.central. The remainder of the battalion met much resistance from GUILLEMONT Farm and vicinity. Both parts of the battalion held on during the day and were joined by the Australians.

The 1st Battalion, 108th Infantry, the support battalion of the right regimental sector met with enemy resistance on its immediate front and right flank shortly after passing the jumping-off line. A number of casualties were incurred and the battalion, after advancing about 400 yards, remained in support in this position.

In the left regimental sector (107th Inf.), the right (3d) battalion formed on the tape with two companies on the line and two companies in support. The support companies took position about 60 yards in rear of front companies and deployed in combat groups and thin skirmish lines. The battalion was subjected to a heavy fire from the start. The battalion advanced steadily until it met with resistance from LONE TREE Trench and GUILLE MONT Farm. This fire stopped the 3d Bn. between WILLow and LONE TREE Trenches. Part of this battalion passed through and formed a portion of the force later described as passing the HINDENBURG Line. The remainder continued to fight at this point. A German plane was brought down near GUILLEMONT Farm by Lewis gun and rifle fire. At this point, 6 officers were killed and 3 wounded, including the battalion commander and adjutant. About 11:30 a.m., an officer went to the rear about 300 yards to get help from the trench mortars. An Australian tank captain was met and consented to use his tank against the strong point, but as they commenced their advance all were destroyed by mines or shell fire. When the tanks approached the men were organized into small groups by the 2 officers left with the battalion and led the tanks. When the tanks failed, men were seen retiring to the trenches in F.11.d. and F.18.a. The retirement was here stopped and the men prepared for holding the trench. They were reinforced in a few minutes by a company of the 105th Inf. In a half hour, the combined troops went forward under machine-gun fire to WILLow Trench A.7.b.6.a. to A.7.d.7.3., where they were soon reinforced by Australians. The enemy raided this trench several times from the left, using hand gre-
nades. A number of Boche were killed and the attacks driven off. About 6:30 p. m., the combined troops filtered forward on the left, but those on the right could not do so. The men who went forward were ordered to retire to WILLOW Trench about 9:30 a. m.

The 1st (left) Battalion, 107th Inf., formed with 2 companies in attacking line and 2 in support, the latter furnishing mopping-up groups, met many strong enemy machine-gun nests immediately after leaving the starting line. They succeeded in advancing in spite of heavy casualties as long as they could get fairly close to the positions and rush them, but on reaching the general line KNOLL Trench and WILLOW Trench (A.7.b. and d), with some units further in advance, they were stopped by heavy machine-gun fire from the vicinity of A.9.a. and along the top of the ridge to the right at ranges of from 600 to 1,000 yards. Machine guns and 60 prisoners were taken at FLEECEALL Post and enemy was also encountered in FAG Support, FAG Trench and ISLAND TRAVIS [Traverse]. Strong resistance was encountered on The KNOLL, especially in KNOLL SUPPORT Trench and in WILLOW and LONE TREE Trenches. The major part of this battalion advanced no further, but certain squads reached the HINDENBURG Line as described later. Tanks attempted to assist the line forward beyond WILLOW Trench, but were all disabled, a part of them by ground mines. The position at WILLOW Trench was maintained throughout the day.

The 2d Bn., 107th Inf., in support, went into action following the 3d Battalion, 107th Inf., going forward and taking position in WILLOW and GUILLEMON-CRESCENT Trenches. One tank accompanied a battalion. The battalion was stopped by very heavy machine-gun fire both from the north and from the front. Certain groups managed to break through and reached the HINDENBURG Line. They were unable to go further on account of machine-gun fire and worked their way back to WILLOW Trench. By this time all officers of this battalion had become casualties. The position was held during the day with the front line in shell holes about 200 yards west of LONE TREE and GUILLEMON-CRESCENT Trenches and an advance line in WILLOW Trench and SOUTH GUILLEMON Trench. Losses: 45 killed ---298 wounded---35 missing.

A composite battalion, 106th Inf. (14 officers---450 men), advanced in rear of the 3d Bn., 107th Inf., as mappers-up. As the attacking line of the 107th Inf. was held up in the vicinity of WILLOW Trench, this composite battalion advanced and entered into the fight with them, small parties advancing at some points to the HINDENBURG Line as later described. Out of 14 officers, 9, including the battalion commander, were killed or wounded.

The 105th Inf. was assembled in the vicinity of YAK Post and LEMPIRE Post in column of battalions in artillery formation, 2d Battalion leading, followed by the 1st Battalion, the 3d Battalion being the last in column, the duty of this regiment being to follow the attack until it had passed the Canal Tunnel, when it was to form to the north for attack. The leading battalion followed by the others moved off at Zero hour in artillery formation on a front of two companies, the leading battalion delaying 15 minutes in an attempt to secure contact with troops in front. The leading (2d) Bn. found a dense smoke screen at about F.11. central and attempted to stop in order not to close up too much on the attacking troops ahead.

Battalions were here subjected to exceptionally heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of The KNOLL, a number of casualties being caused by platoons advancing in the smoke and running into this machine-gun fire. On account of the smoke, it was impossible to hold all the platoons, some of which continued to advance, the remainder taking shelter in shell holes. After reconnaissance, the line of trenches running north from ISLAND TRAVIS [Traverse] was located and the battalion was led to this point. Part of the 2d Battalion, with companies of the other battalions, advanced to WILLOW Trench at about A.7.C.central. When the smoke screen lifted the troops along this line were organized as provisional companies and consolidated. Machine-gun fire was very active from the direction of VENDHUILE. This position was reached at approximately 7:15 a. m. At 10 a. m., a further advance was tried with patrols out ahead, but machine-gun fire was so severe that it was impossible. Enemy was observed to be advancing over the crest of the hill.
running from A8.b.5.5. to A8.b.5.7. Machine guns of the machine gun company, 105th Inf., were employed in sweeping the crest of this hill. The enemy was seen to be filtering over the hill and working down into LONE TREE Trench. Trenches were barricaded. By the use of grenades and Lewis guns, the enemy was prevented from further advance. The 1st and 3d Bns., 105th Inf., followed the 2d Bn., but in the smoke bore off to the left and advanced in the direction of The KNOLL. The left of the line extended north of the divisional boundary and some British troops were met in their own sector, their line, also on account of the smoke, extending into our sector. Parts of the leading troops reached MACQUINCOURT Trench, KNOLL Switch, and TOMBOIS Support, well to the east and north of The KNOLL, meeting with severe casualties from machine-gun fire as they advanced. What was left of the leading units filtrated back to KNOLL SUPPORT and KNOLL Trench, where the support companies were located.

Small groups of all battalions in this left regimental sector advanced in the smoke between the machine-gun nests of the enemy and passed through the HINDENBURG Line and reached the line of the Canal, including part of BONY. These isolated groups being unable to maintain the position or find support gradually fell back toward the line securely held by our troops, most of them being killed or wounded.

At 11 a. m., the line was held approximately as follows:

On the right, the 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry, was mopping up QUENNEMONT Farm. The 3d Battalion, 108th Infantry, had parts of two companies in the HINDENBURG Line south of BONY. The left of this battalion was held up in the vicinity of GUILLEMONT Farm. The 2d Battalion, 108th Infantry, was occupying a position in support in F.30. The 3d Battalion, 107th Infantry, with parts of the combined battalion of the 106th Infantry, holding position on the western edge of GUILLEMONT Farm in WILLOW Trench. The 2d Battalion was in WILLOW Trench and vicinity. The 1st Battalion, 107th Infantry, was intermingled with the 105th Infantry in WILLOW Trench and KNOLL Trench. The 2d Battalion, 107th Infantry, was somewhat to the left of the 3d Battalion, 107th Inf., in WILLOW Trench. The 105th Inf. was holding the line on KNOLL Switch, KNOLL Trench and the trenches just east of the crest of The KNOLL Organizations were somewhat intermingled, particularly on the left, with parts of the organizations in the trenches farther to the rear. All organizations had become depleted on account of the heavy casualties.

The above situation was not known, however, to higher commanding officers because of the different reports from the front line caused by portions of the division breaking through the HINDENBURG Line and reaching the Canal, while the main line was held up by the strength of the enemy machine-gun fire. Wounded officers and men came back with the information that they passed the HINDENBURG Line and airplane reports indicated that a line had passed through GOUY. Lt. McIntrye, 37-mm. platoon, 107th Inf., who returned to the division from Germany on December 19 states that he was taken prisoner on September 29, about 10 a. m., between the HINDENBURG Line and the Canal, where he had been halted from 7:15 a. m. until captured. The situation remained obscure until late in the afternoon.

The Australian 3d Division, had been assembled in rear of the left regimental sector of the division prepared to pass through the attacking line after the Red Line had been reached. At about 11 a. m., the leading brigades of this Australian division began to move forward. They first reached the lines of the 108th Infantry and about noon approached that portion of the attacking line which was held up around GUILLEMONT Farm. Later in the afternoon their lines extended somewhat farther west overlapping the 107th Infantry, only their first waves reaching our advance line during the afternoon of September 29.

This advance of the Australians enabled the troops in the right regimental sector to complete the mopping up of QUENNEMONT Farm and a further advance was made during the afternoon, pivoting the left on GUILLEMONT Farm still held by the enemy. In the left regimental sector no further advance was made during the day even with the assistance of the Australian troops. Machine-gun fire from BONY, GUILLEMONT Farm and the slope to the west, up MACQUINCOURT Valley from VENDHUILE and from the hill slopes east of the Canal.
and north of GOUY, brought such an enfilading and cross fire to bear that no advance was possible. The extreme left of the line at The KNOLL was very exposed, as the British 18th Division on our left connected up for only a short time and then were driven back west of TOMBOIS Road. A counterattack by the enemy in force from VENDHUILE and up MACQUINCOURT Valley was threatened, as numerous bodies of the enemy were seen advancing, but the attack did not develop in great strength, due to the destructive effect of our field artillery and machine-gun fire. The counterattacks made were local, but determined. About 2 p.m., it became apparent that there was a shortage of officers on the front line and such officers as were available were sent to organize and command the detachments, which had been driven back in the left regimental sector. About 4 p.m., it was decided by the div. comdr. to make arrangements for the night. From reports received up to that time, it was believed that our forward line occupied KNOLL Trench, WILLOW Trench, and trenches to the west of GUILLEMONT Farm, the line then extending through A.13.d., A.14.c., to A.21.Central, thence connecting up with the 30th Division to the south with other troops in LONDON Road, ISLAND TRAVIS [Traverse], thence south to A.25. The div. comdr. directed that Colonel Debevoise, commanding 107th Infantry, take command of and organize all troops of the 27th Division in KNOLL Trench and WILLOW Trench as an outpost line. That the C. G., 54th Infantry Brigade, remain in command of the right regimental sector and that the C. G., 53d Infantry Brigade take command of the left regimental sector, and the following order was sent:

9-29-18—5 p.m.

From: Commanding General, 27th Division.
To: Commanding Generals, 53d and 54th Inf. Brigades

To secure the left flank of our advance and to prepare a defensive line of support for the Australian division now attacking northeast on the general line The KNOLL---GUILLEMONT Farm---BONY, the C. G.'s, 53d and 54th Brigades, will organize all stragglers and available men and prepare a defensive line as follows:

Fleeceall Post (F.11.b.central)---EGG Post---DUNCAN Post---GUILLEMONT Road, exclusive, with outposts to front. Connect with British 18th Div. on north and Australian 3d on south. Our II Corps (American are sending some officers to assist.

O'RYAN.

It was decided that a reserve might be necessary on the left and 3 companies of the 102d Engrs. were ordered up to occupy a reserve position north of RONSSOY, and the following letter was sent to the C. G., 53d Inf. Brigade:

6:30 p.m.

3 companies of engrs. have been sent to you this evening for use, if necessary, in the defense of the divisional sector. It is not the idea of the C. G. that you should put them in the line, but to be used as reserve and kept in a secure place, where they may be available for such use, in case of necessity. A position in the neighborhood of your headquarters is suggested.

O'RYAN.

On the evening of September 29, the line ran approximately north to south as follows---KNOLL Trench (with outposts in KNOLL Switch)---WILLOW Trench---on the west edge of GUILLEMONT Farm, south GUILLEMONT Trench---CLAYMORE Trench---A.20 central---A.21 central---south along the HINDENBURG Line. This line in the left regimental sector was held by
troops of the 27th Division, with Australian units in the right portion. The above line in the right regimental sector was held by Australian troops with many groups of the 108th Infantry intermingled. Reorganized groups of the 105th, 106th, and 107th Infantry occupied FLEECALL Post, FAG Trench, ISLAND TRAVIS (Traverse), and EGG Post, trenches through DOLEFUL Post to DUNCAN Post, with 3 companies of the 102d Engrs. in reserve in ZEBRA Post and YAK Post. The support in the right regimental sector consisted of part of the 1st Battalion, 108th Infantry, with Australians. The Australian 3d Division attempted to organize and advance after 3 p.m., September 29, but it came to nothing as two of the brigades had already entered into the fight with our line and had been stopped. It was planned to send the Australian 5th Division through front of American 30th Division and the Australian 3d Division through our lines to attack under a barrage on the morning of September 30 and at 12:28 a.m., September 30, the following telegram was received from the Australian corps:

Command of right division front and area will pass to G. O. C., Australian 5th Division, forthwith. Command of left division front and area will pass to G. O. C., Australian 3d Division, forthwith.

The following extracts from reports (all written between October 1 and 5, 1918) on this operation, are inserted as giving a good idea of some of the details:

Report of Co. M, 105th Inf. (this battalion followed the leading battalion of the regiment, which in turn was following the 107th Inf.).

The company marched to its position in single file formation with about two paces between files on account of road congestion and to avoid casualties from shell fire, which was very heavy at that hour.

We reached the departure line between LEMPIRE and YAK Posts about 15 minutes before Zero hour and took up formation in line of platoon columns with about 25 pace interval between columns and with connecting files to keep the elements in touch with each other.

The company started its advance at Zero hour, following L. Co. at about 30 paces. After marching for about 10 minutes, it was found that due to darkness and smoke, the direction taken was too far to the left which brought us into the sector occupied by the British 18th Division on our left, who had not yet started forward.

We changed our direction and moved southeasterly across BIRD Lane over the ridge on the western edge of TOMBOIS Valley. Upon entering, the smoke screen was so dense that it was practically impossible to keep the different units in touch with each other, with the result that there was considerable confusion and mixing of units at this point.

The company remained intact and we entered TOMBOIS Road at a point about 300 yards north of TOMBOIS Farm. Here we met our first resistance from M. G. fire, which was sweeping the road from the direction of the KNOLL and EGG Post.

Parts of several units which had become separated in the advance were in the TOMBOIS Road, one company of British troops and a trench mortar battery, also British, the officers of which admitted they were lost and were out of their sector. There was also a platoon of the 107th Infantry here under command of a sergeant. These men at my direction joined the company and we moved by the flank behind the embankment on the road entering LONDON Road through TOMBOIS Farm.

I halted the company in LONDON Road and sent out runners to locate the other companies of the battalion. A machine gun platoon of the 105th Infantry, also occupied this position slightly in advance of my own. M. G. fire was still being encountered and I sent patrols through the trenches to the left of the road, from which point the resistance seemed to come, meanwhile the runners sent to locate the other units returned reporting no success. Upon getting a signal from the patrol sent to reconnoiter the trenches that all was clear, we entered FAG SUPPORT Trench in single file, halted, formed again into platoon columns and advanced easterly over the top of the trenches and up the slope of the KNOLL between CRELGIN Ave. and COCHRAN Ave. In our advance across this ground we identified dead and wounded of the 2d Battalion and believing that we were again gaining contact with the preceding unit, we continued to advance in the same direction.
We entered KNOLL Trench crossing it and KNOLL communicating trench entering KNOLL Switch and KNOLL SUPPORT Trench. Here it was reported to me that the M. G. platoon, which had been in sight and on our right flank up to a short time before, had lost contact and had taken another direction. There was considerable hostile M. G. activity encountered in this last position on account of which I had the company with the attached men take up position in line in The KNOLL SWITCH Trench and sent a patrol to the front and one to each flank for the purpose of locating and driving out machine-gun nests.

One of the men of the patrol sent out from my right flank returned with the information that there were groups of men of our preceding units occupying shell holes along the slope leading to the MACQUINCOURT Valley and that there were considerable dead and wounded around that point. I sent word to them by runner telling them of my position and instructed them to filter back gradually into The KNOLL SUPPORT Trench and join me in The KNOLL Switch. This was about 11 a. m. In about a half hour's time, several men had filtered back comprising all companies of the regiment (except D and H), and about 40 men of B and F Cos., 107th Inf., meanwhile, 5 its. from different companies of the regiment had joined me from shell holes out in front, and the bn. adjutant of the 3d Bn. also reported, stating that the bn. commander had been wounded and was in a shell hole about 100 yards in front of KNOLL SUPPORT trench operating a machine gun.

Operation report Headquarters Company, 107th Infantry.

Detachments A and B were formed in accordance with division liaison plan and three lines were laid from regimental hq. to regimental forward station the afternoon prior to the attack. These lines were shot to pieces within two hours after being completed. Our trench wireless set was tested immediately upon receipt and reported to brigade headquarters as being of no use. Another set was requested.

Shortly before midnight September 28, 1918, Detachment B with equipment moved out for regimental forward station which was then located near F.17.a.3.0. Linesmen were immediately sent out constructing new lines to regimental hq. This line was completed about 5:30 a. m. and lasted for about 15 minutes. In the meantime, linesmen were working on construction of two lines to brigade headquarters. These lines were repeatedly broken both by shell fire and traffic before completion, but we succeeded in establishing one line at about 6:45 a. m., September 29, 1918. Telephonic communication and communication by buzzer phone was continuous thereafter with the 54th Brigade, except for frequent breaks caused by shell fire and traffic, but such breaks were quickly repaired.

Continual touch was maintained with 1st and 2d Bn. Hq., but 3d Bn. Hq. was out of touch almost as soon as it moved forward. Visual stations were attempted from forward points, but smoke made them useless. The brigade visual station either did not open at the time or place appointed or was unable to observe our lamps signalling to them, as continual attempts were made by us to reach them during the period when our lines were down. We also again attempted to use wireless, but as we had received no action on our request for a set which would function we met with no success. T. P. S. was attempted.

We also established lateral telephonic communication to the 108th, 3d Battalion on our right and British 54th Brigade on our left. These lines gave us little or no trouble and were in constant operation.

Pigeons were not delivered to us until the evening of Sept. 29, 1918, and hence did not function in the attack.

It will be remembered that runners were used exclusively forward of battalion headquarters.

Report of Surgeon, 107th Inf.:

September 27, 1918. Left Ste-EMILIE bivouac 9 p. m. Regimental hq. established at 11 p. m. Map reference MONTBREHAIN addition 1.a.1: 20/000.
September 25, 1915. Relief started late and we took over battalion aid station of American 108th Inf., 5 a. m., in the following locations:

1st Bn. at F.10.c.2.5.
2d Bn. at F.15.d.8.8.
3d Bn. at F.16.c.3.3.

Casualties occurred frequently all night. Station taken over by 1st Bn. in sunken road in portion of long gallery dugout, was not adapted to satisfactory work because of overcrowding and was closed at 7 a. m., this date and combined with 2d Bn. station at the above map reference. The arrangement was very satisfactory and gave us stations which were in the direct lines of evacuation of wounded, and while the carry was long, the locations were so suitable that we continued their operation at these points. Approximately 100 casualties were treated on this date from the 105th, 106th and 107th Regiments.

Sept. 29, 1915. On the morning of the big attack immediately after the kick-off, the wounded streamed down the GUILLEMON and BELLI COURT Roads from all organizations in the line, our own battalion, 3d Battalion, 108th Infantry, tank corps, British and Australian; and the BELLI COURT Road was choked with litter cases, walking wounded, litter bearers and stragglers, the congestion being at the aid station located at F.16.c.3.3. Three hours before this congestion was relieved and the wounded evacuated to the ambulance head, located in RONSSOY F.21.a.8.4.

Forward station was established in BELLI COURT Road F.22.b.9.4 by Lt. Benedict, which remained open for two hours.

At 10 a.m., forward station opened by Lts. Gray and Bancel at F.17.c.5.3., in a shell hole which was used all day, more or less, under shell fire. This station was moved down into a dugout in a trench alongside road and remained in operation until 2 p.m., October 1, 1915.

At 4 p.m., Lt. Bull established a collecting point for wounded on LONDON Road near EGG Post, but was under a machine-gun fire and experienced difficulty in evacuating wounded. These wounded were eventually evacuated down POMPONIUS Lane through LEMPIRE Post to bn. aid station F.15.d.8.8.

At 5 p.m., secured a volunteer detail of 60 stretcher bearers and searched areas in F.16, F.17, F.18, F.19, from this point as a center (F.17.c.5.3.), and collected over 60 wounded which were evacuated down GUILLEMON Road.

Bn. aid station of 3d Bn. taken over by American 105th Inf. during afternoon.

September 30, 1915. On this date we were able to advance a station to a point C.3.b.4.2., and searching parties were sent out north and northeast.

Machine Guns, Sept. 29/30: The machine gun companies of the 105th, 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments went forward with their regiments.

Machine Gun Company, 108th Inf.: The company was divided into 3 platoons, one platoon to each battalion. The 1st Platoon became separated from the 2d Battalion during the smoke cloud. It attached itself to the Australians and remained attached to them during the remainder of the action. The 2d Platoon took position about 200 yards east of BENJAMIN Post, where guns were set up and placed in action to search out machine-gun nests. From this point, the platoon advanced, and after losing their way in the smoke and attempting to join the command, placed themselves under the command of the Australians until the afternoon of October 1. The 3d Platoon attached itself to the Australian 39th Battalion with which it continued to operate until the regiment went out of action.

Machine Gun Company, 107th Inf.: The machine gun company was attached to the 1st Battalion to assist in protecting its left flank. The company advanced close to the front wave over the rise of ground near LONDON Road and came under a hot machine-gun fire from the vicinity of GUILLEMON Farm and LONE TREE Trench. The company advanced to WILLOW Trench, part of one platoon moving to LONE TREE Trench, where the enemy was met.
in force and it was compelled to withdraw to WILLOW TRENCH. This position was organized about noon and 2 platoons withdrawn to CASTLE BAR Sap (F.12.a), where they took up position to command the MACQUINCOURT Valley.

Machine Gun Company, 105th Inf.: The company advanced with the regiment, but it came under machine-gun fire and took up position near FAG Trench, ISLAND TRAVES [Traverse], and continued in action during the day, some of the guns being moved forward to a position, with the leading battalion near KNOLL Trench.

104th Machine Gun Bn.: The battalion moved up passing south and east of RONSSOY at 8 a. m., took position in readiness at F.16.d.4.3. From there reconnaissance on GUILLEMONT Road showed road under heavy machine-gun fire from GUILLEMONT Farm. At 8:15 a. m., heavy shelling caused battalion to retire to RONSSOY (F.15.d.7.9.), where battalion awaited confirmation or consolidation of HINDENBURG Line.

105th Machine Gun Bn.: Battalion fired barrage. At 8:40 a. m., limbers were brought up and preparations made to advance. At 6:20 p. m., companies were ordered to establish a line to repel possible counterattacks. Fighting limbers were returned to transport lines at Ste-EMILIE. Companies placed guns in position at THISTLE Trench, LEMPIRE Post, St-PATRICK'S'S Lane, YAK Post, DUNCAN Post and guns in reserve. These guns in reserve could not be put in position intended for them at DOLEFUL Post, EGG Post, and FAG Support, as these positions were found to be crowded with English and Australian machine gunners. September 30, battalion remained in position all day and October 1, was withdrawn by noon.

106th Machine Gun Bn.: Battalion fired barrage. Several hours after completion of barrage, companies were slightly withdrawn and constant touch maintained with infantry so as to give immediate support wherever needed. For that purpose, the following dispositions were made. A Company, 1 platoon at 10:30 p. m., September 29, moved to VALLEY Post and remained there until the afternoon of September 30. No firing done. One platoon was located at 5:30 p. m., September 30, near ZOGDA Trench. B Company, 1 p. m., September 29, one platoon, returned to position F.29.d.4.0. and was withdrawn without having fired, on the afternoon of October 1. Company C, at 4 p. m., September 29, 1 platoon occupied position in rifle pit trench F.29.b.7.4., covering DIRK Valley. Withdrawn without having fired, 8 a. m., October 1. Company D, at 5 p. m., September 29, one platoon moved to F.24.b.0.6. to cover CLAYMORE Valley.

37-mm. Guns and Trench Mortars, Sept. 29:

105th Inf.: The Pioneer Platoon was assigned to the 3d Bn., 37-mm. guns, one to each battalion. The trench mortars to the 1st Battalion. Little use was made of the 37-mm. guns as the officer in command and the senior sergeant were killed soon after the operation began. The trench mortars followed for a long distance, but due to the density of the smoke could not get up, so the crews laid them aside, marking the places, and went forward attaching themselves to companies.

107th Inf.: One 37-mm. gun and 4 Stokes mortars were attached to the 1st Bn. Two 37-mm. guns and two Stokes mortars were attached to the 3d Bn. Pioneer platoon of 40 men divided as follows:

10 to regimental hq.
20 to Stokes mortars as ammunition carriers.
10 to 37-mm. guns as ammunition carriers.

The 37-mm. guns moving into position to accompany the 3d Battalion were delayed by machine-gun fire making advance slow. Contact was broken by squads entering infantry columns of files on the same road. This caused confusion added to by much enemy machine-gun fire. As guns were got up into position, a tank near GUILLEMONT Road was hit and caught fire. This drew artillery fire and machine-gun fire, which caused casualties. The infantry moved out with great dash and at a pace, in order to catch the barrage, which made it impossible for the 37-mm. guns to follow closely. The guns of the 1st Battalion reached the vicinity of WILLOW TRENCH and were held up by machine-gun fire from a nest in LONE TREE Trench. 3 Stokes mortars fired on this nest and obtained hits. One Stokes
mortar was put out of action by a hit on the base plate and another lost being run over by a tank.

On September 30, the troops in the rear line remained in support during the day in the same position as occupied on the evening of Sept. 29. Under an arrangement with the Australian 3d Division, those portions of the 27th Division which were on the front line moved forward with the Australians and continued the attack during the 30th, cleaning up the HINDENBURG Line in the right regimental sector, capturing the HINDENBURG Line in the left regimental sector, and capturing BONY, which place was not entirely mopped up until the following day. The front line groups of the 27th Division, amounting to over 1,000 men, continued with the Australians this day at their own desire, as well as in accordance with the wish of the Australian commanders, in order to strengthen the attack of the Australians. Some of these groups were organized under their own leaders and some fell in with Australian commands. Arrangements were made, under instructions from the Australian corps, with the C. G., Aust. 3d Div., to withdraw the 27th Div. from the support line in accordance with the following letter:

Reference relief of American 27th Div. by the Australian 3d Div. I concur in the former being withdrawn from support any time after 5 p. m. today. Details at present attached to units of the Australian 3d Div. will be sent to join their own units in their own areas at the earliest opportunity.

J. GELLIBRAND,
Major General, Comdg. Aust. 3d Div.

During Sept. 30, the troops in the support line reorganized, completed the evacuation of wounded, commenced the burial of the dead and salvage. At 3 p. m., the div. comdr. issued an order directing that the order of the previous night, dividing the divisional zone into subsectors and placing all troops within these sectors under the command of one officer in each sector, be revoked and that all organizations would at once revert to original command and administration. The 105th Inf. was withdrawn on the evening of September 30, in accordance with the following order:

C. G., 53d Inf. Brigade:

As the tactical situation does not necessitate the retaining of the 105th Inf. in their present overcrowded position in the support trenches, the C. G. directs that they be moved back this evening to any comfortable location in No. 6 area, the one the occupied on September 28, the day previous to the attack.

In accordance with Field Order No. 50, dated October 1, 1918, 1:30 a. m., the

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NAUROY-BELLICOURT AREA
Looking south-southeast from atop St-Quentin Canal Tunnel, near Bellericourt
division moved to the PERONNE area by road march on October 1 and 2. Detachments under
the divisional burial officer were left to arrange cemeteries, to collect and bury the
dead and other detachments were left behind for salvage purpose. Units still in the
front line with the Australian 3d Div. were relieved during the course of the next 36
hours and rejoined their commands. Division headquarters moved on October 1 to the Bois
de BUIRE.

The division and the II Corps were relieved from affiliation with the Australian
corps.

Prisoners captured September 29:

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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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Casualties:

September 27/28:

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<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Gassed</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Captured</th>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>218</td>
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September 29/30:

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<th>31</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>0</th>
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<td>27</td>
<td>1707</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>33</td>
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</table>

(x signifies, DIED OF WOUNDS, included also in wounded column.)

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 30th Div.: Fldr. 2: Operations Report

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 3, 1918.

September 27-September 30, 1918

1. PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS AND DISPOSITIONS: This division was ordered to move by
bus from BEAUQUESNE area to the TINCOURT area on September 22. On the night September
23/24, the 59th Brigade relieved the Australian 1st Division in the line, taking over
what was known as the GOUY-NAUROY sector, in front of the strongest part of the so-
called HINDENBURG System. The 118th Infantry took over the front line of approximately
3,750 yards with the 117th Infantry in support; the 60th Brigade was held in division reserve. During the interval between the night September 23/24 and night September 27/28, the 118th Infantry was subjected to constant harassing artillery fire and during that period repulsed two hostile raiding parties. In a minor operation on the night of September 27/28, this regiment extended the front line in several places with the object of improving the jumping-off line for the contemplated attack of the enemy line.

On X/Y night (September 27/28), the 59th Brigade was relieved by the 60th Brigade, the two regiments taking over the front held by the 118th Infantry; this latter regiment was withdrawn to divisional reserve, while the 117th Infantry remained in support, it having a special mission in the contemplated attack. Divisional headquarters during this period was in the Bois de BUIRE.

2. DESCRIPTION OF ENEMY'S POSITION: The position occupied by the enemy in front of the 30th Division was not only of great strength, but possessed many unique features. Begun in 1914 and improved further in more recent period, it formed one of the strongest portions of the famous HINDENBURG system. In addition to several heavy belts of wire and a very complete trench system, skillful advantage had been taken of the great natural obstacle of the St-QUENTIN Canal to make the position as nearly impregnable as was humanly possible. As this Canal had a most important influence on the plan of attack and upon the battle itself, it is believed that it merits some special description.

The cities of CAMBRAI and St-QUENTIN are connected by a continuous waterway. From CAMBRAI to Le CATELET this waterway is the Canal de l'ESCAUT; from Le CATELET to BELLICOURT it is the Canal SOUTERRAIN; from RIQUEVAL (just south of BELLICOURT) to St-QUENTIN it is the Canal de St-QUENTIN. From a point about 1,200 yards west of Le CATELET to RIQUEVAL, the waterway runs underground and is here generally known as the BELRICOURT Tunnel. This Tunnel runs for 5 3/4 kilometers, at a depth underground varying from 15 to 20 meters. It is 10 meters wide at the top, 18 meters wide at the water level and is strongly built of masonry. There are blocks on the center and each end of the canal, which in effect are special types of concrete machine-gun emplacement and contained two machine guns each. There were several lateral approach galleries with entrances 30 to 40 steps down on the road. About half of this tunnel, the southern mouth at RIQUEVAL and some 500 yards of the St-QUENTIN Canal, were in the 30th Division sector of attack.

The Canal and Tunnel together are of particular interest as an obstacle. The tunnel itself could provide absolutely safe shelter for a division, while many underground tunnels connect it with the various trench systems thus permitting reinforcement at any time of any portion of the trench system. A long spoil bank or heap runs above ground upon the line of the tunnel, which contained a series of dugouts and numerous concrete machine-gun emplacements. The canal, after leaving the tunnel, has banks from 75 to 100 feet high, the water being from 5 to 6 feet deep. The western bank furnished emplacements for numerous machine guns and minenwerfer.

In addition to the Canal and Tunnel, this portion of the HINDENBURG Line included a system of trenches, generally three, interlocked by communication and approach trenches placed at frequent intervals. Wide belts of strong German wire protected the entire system, even the communication trenches being heavily wired; forward belts were frequently in the form of deep triangles 50 to 150 yards in depth. Along the line of the Tunnel these communicating trenches led back into the tunnel exits while the entire front line system was provided with concrete dugouts at 40 to 60 yard intervals.

The outpost line was also strongly fortified by trenches and wire, particularly at BERGY Wood, SENTINEL Ridge, and Quarry Ravine. In the rear of the main HINDENBURG Line was the Le CATELET-NAUROY trench system also wired and well-organized. This trench system and the town of NAUROY were included in the objectives of the attack.

It is believed that there are few positions so well adapted for machine-gun defense as the sector just described. The enemy had taken full advantage of the natural features of the ground and during his four years' occupancy had improved them to such a degree as to render the position apparently impregnable to a front attack.
3. ORDERS FOR THE ATTACK: The orders for the attack of the division are appended hereto; they are based on orders and instructions from the Australian corps and the American II Corps. It will be observed that instead of the conventional field orders they consist of a series of battle instructions issued from time to time during the few days prior to the attack. This method of issuing orders was rendered necessary by the fact that orders from higher authority were constantly changing, and that it was of importance to get any information down to the troops at the earliest possible moment. Had the issue of orders waited until complete data were in the hands of division headquarters, it is most certain that it would have never reached the troops in time for execution; if by any chance it had reached them it would certainly have been too late for thorough explanation to the lower units and for the personal reconnaissance so necessary in such an operation.

Briefly, the plan of attack was as follows: From Zero minus 60 hours to Zero minus 48 hours, an artillery bombardment with gas; from Zero minus 48 hours to Zero minus one hour, a very powerful bombardment with shell and high explosive. This division was to attack with the British XIX Corps on the right and the American 27th Division on the left, with the assistance of tanks and under protection of a creeping barrage. After this division had captured the objective as shown on the map, the Australian 5th Division with its own artillery and tanks was to pass through and exploit the success to designated objective.

Within the division, the attack was made by the 60th Brigade with its two regiment in line, 120th Infantry on the right and the 119th Infantry on the left, each regiment with two battalions in front line and one in support. The support battalions were given definite mopping up missions in the HINDENBURG System and tunnel and the town of BELLCOURT, while the front line battalions were directed to detail certain companies for mopping up in their area. The 117th Infantry was allotted the special task of following the 120th Infantry across the tunnel, then to deploy, facing south at the conclusion of the creeping barrage. During the operation of the Australian division, this regiment was to resume its movement southward in order to protect the flanks of the Australian division. It was also expected that the advance of this regiment would facilitate the crossing of the canal by the British division on the right. One company of the 120th Infantry, assisted by a section of machine guns, was given the special mission of seizing and holding the southern exit of the tunnel at RIQUEVAL.

Especial stress had been laid in all orders and instructions upon the necessity of hugging the barrage, irrespective of the action of tanks. The success of the operation was due in a large measure to the fact that these orders were strictly obeyed.

4. THE ATTACK OF SEPTEMBER 29: At 5:50 a.m., September 29, the field artillery barrage fell on the barrage start line, remaining there four minutes and thereafter lifting 100 yards in four minutes. This 18-pounder field artillery barrage was further extended by the 4.2" howitzers, while the heavy artillery fired on selected targets in advance of the field artillery barrage. At the same time, the massed machine guns of the division put down a belt of fire on the main HINDENBURG Trench. The German barrage was not particularly heavy, but as it fell near our jumping-off line, it caused a number of casualties among the support troops.

The morning was very foggy; this mixed with the smoke shells of the barrage made it extremely difficult and often impossible to see more than a few feet in any direction. The infantry started off well from the tape, but had not progressed more than a few hundred yards before they began to experience difficulty in maintaining direction and contact; and during the remainder of the morning the fight was carried on by more or less mixed groups that had been picked up and reorganized by energetic officers. This series of isolated fights took place along the whole front; small groups of men acting on their own initiative would clean out troublesome machine-gun nests or mop up any trench encountered. On several occasions, small energetic groups with the assistance of a tank
which they found apparently lost in the obscurity, captured machine guns and minenwerfer
which were inflicting casualties upon our troops. In general, these groups particularly
in the right subsector, pushed on toward their objective.

While the fog was a very great hindrance to the maintenance of order and cohesion,
on the other hand, it was of great assistance in blinding the enemy’s machine guns and
field artillery. On a clear day and against a comparatively unshaken enemy behind broad
belts of comparatively uncut wire, against nests of machine guns and minenwerfer, it is
difficult to see how any troops could ever have taken the position.

The 120th Infantry on the right having only the enemy in their direct front to
contend with, were able to make steady progress toward their objective. The 119th
Infantry on the left early encountered heavy machine-gun fire from the sector on their
left, and were soon forced to form a defensive flank in that direction. A battalion of
the 117th Infantry was ordered to advance through the town of BELLICOURT, mopping it up as
they went, to the support of the left flank, which by this time was extended on a very
broad front. Later in the day, a battalion of the 118th Infantry was also sent to this
flank and rendered excellent service in connecting the left flank of the 119th Infantry
with the right flank of the division on the left. It was also able to render good service
as a support to the Australian division after the latter had passed through.

On the afternoon of September 29, at the time the Australian 5th Division passed
through this division, the 117th Infantry on the right was approximately on their objective,
facing south east and in touch with the 46th Division on their right; the 120th was in
NAUROY, elements having gone beyond there and reached their objective, but having been
forced to return on account of being out of touch with units on their flanks; the regiment,
in general, occupied the Le CATELET-NAUROY Line. The 119th Inf. had its right in the Le
CATELET-NAUROY Line. but had been forced to bend its line back to the tunnel on account of
fire from the sector on its left.

When the Australian 5th Division passed through the line held by this division, they
were joined and assisted by various groups from the different regiments. These groups
remained with the Australian division and were withdrawn during the night September 29/30.
After the occupancy of the Green Line by the Australian 5th Division, the troops of this
division were withdrawn slightly to the rear, where they remained in support until with­
drawn on night October 1/2.

5. ACTION OF ARTILLERY: For this operation there was assigned to the division,
twelve field artillery brigades, five heavy artillery brigades, and three siege batteries.

The mission allotted to the artillery prior to Zero hour was as follows:

(a) Special gas bombardment (from 10 p. m. on W day to 6 a. m. on X day).
(b) Vigorous counterbattery and harassing fire.
(c) Cutting lanes in hostile wire defenses.
(d) Bombardment of selected strong points and localities.

At 6 a. m. on X day, the artillery began mission (b), (c), and (d) and continued
until Z minus one hour on Zero day.

The amount of artillery assigned for this operation enabled a very full effective barrage to be
laid down at Zero hour. As this barrage consisted of 18-pounder, 4.2", and the heavy artillery
barrages, it was most effective in keeping down the enemy’s fire, thus facilitating the progress of
the infantry. In addition to the barrage proper, a smoke screen was laid down on the right flank
by a special field artillery brigade detailed for that purpose.

The broad belts of heavy German wires were not cut to any considerable degree in the
right subsector; in the left subsector the lanes were cut more effectively and the passage of
the 119th Infantry through the wire was greatly facilitated through the preliminary work
of the artillery. Commendable enterprise was also displayed in the prompt use of enemy
guns which had been captured by the infantry.

In general, the support rendered by the artillery was most effective and contributed
in a large measure to the success of the operation. Supporting batteries were moved
forward with great daring and skill. Close and effective liaison between artillery and infantry was maintained at all times.

6. TANKS: Thirty-four tanks from the British 4th Tank Brigade were assigned to the division for this operation; they were allotted to regiments as follows: 12 to the 117th Infantry, 12 to the 119th Infantry, and 10 to the 120th Infantry.

All were of the Mark V type. These tanks were further subdivided among battalions in order that a sufficient number might be available for the battalions detailed for mopping up the Tunnel and the HINDENBURG Line.

In order that close liaison might be maintained between infantry and tanks, each battalion detailed one enlisted man per tank whose sole duty it was to ride in the tank and watch for signals from the infantry. One officer was detailed from each battalion also to assist in conducting the tanks to the starting points.

The tanks detailed to the 117th and 120th Infantry arrived at their jumping-off line approximately on time; those detailed to the front line battalions, 119th Infantry, however, did not arrive in time, but came up about the time the infantry was crossing the tunnel.

The heavy fog and smoke made it extremely difficult for the tanks to maintain their direction. As one tank commander expressed it, "It was impossible to see one end of the tank from the other." Under such circumstances, liaison between infantry and the tanks was practically impossible. Groups of infantry would come across an isolated tank in the fog and with its assistance would clean out some troublesome machine-gun nest. Such incidents were common and showed excellent initiative on the part of both infantry and tanks.

The tanks were of very great assistance to the infantry in crossing the wire; in fact, there is no question but that the infantry, in many cases, would have been greatly delayed in getting through with consequently increased casualties, had it not been for the tanks. Many machine-gun nests were also destroyed by the tanks; while their devotion to their duty was clearly evidenced by their numerous casualties.

7. LIAISON:

(a) AGENTS: The prescribed agents were employed, but, as a general rule, were of no great value. Unless the liaison agent has a copy of the operation order of his unit and understands it fully, and unless he has some independent means of transportation either for himself or messengers, his field of usefulness will be quite limited. At each headquarters also, a separate phone in a separate room, if possible, should be provided for liaison agents so as not to tax the operations phone. Liaison agents should not be allowed to congregate in the room devoted to operations.

(b) MEANS: The telephone when working was the most satisfactory means of communication. During the operation, telephones were established as far down as regiments, and in some instances to battalions. Great difficulty was experienced in keeping lines open as the wires were frequently broken by tanks as well as by shell fire.

Wireless worked very well, but was very slow, due to some degree at least to the time necessary for encoding and decoding. Frequently, the messages handled were too long for rapid transmission. Wireless messages must be short and concise.

Only a very small number of motorcycles and bicycles were available, thus necessitating a wasteful use of runners.

No mounted messengers were available although they could have been used to good advantage down as far as regiments at least.

Runners, as usual, were used extensively. Relay posts were established between brigades and regiments, and between regiments and battalions. Within the battalion, even this means of communication failed at times due to runners getting lost in the fog.

Visual signalling was not practicable on account of the heavy fog.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS:

Ammunition: Each soldier carried 220 rounds of rifle ammunition and two MILLS 23 grenades. In addition, each regiment carried, distributed among its personnel, 600 27
smoke bombs, and 2,560 red ground flares. This amount proved ample for the operation. Smoke bombs were found to be very useful in clearing out dugouts. Ammunition for the division machine gun units was supplied direct from the division dump to machine gun units. For the 96 guns employed in barrage work, 1,248,000 rounds of ammunition was supplied, all of which was fired with the exception of 156,000 rounds.

Rations: Each soldier carried on his person one special assault ration in addition to the iron ration. Through the medium of well-organized and coordinated system of supply, hot food in hot food containers was served to the troops on the firing line on the evening of the battle. These rations contained fresh meat which is a most difficult component to handle on the battlefield. The work of the supply department in this regard is all the more meritorious when it is considered that it was necessary to transport these supplies entirely by horse transport through rain, mud, and fog over a single road which was also used by ammunition columns, ambulances, troops, and all forms of transportation to and from the battle line; and subject as well to constant shelling.

Medical: It is believed, the evacuation of the wounded during this operation was as nearly perfect as possible under the existing circumstances. Coincident with the advance of the troops aid stations and ambulance posts were pushed forward. At approximately one hour after Zero, the first cases began to appear at the advanced dressing station, having been brought by ambulances from the aid posts. At half an hour after, cases began to appear at the walking wounded station. Evacuation was quick and continuous to the aid station and from the aid station to the dressing station notwithstanding the congestion of roads throughout the period. By utilizing the services of prisoners to bring back wounded on stretchers and by the addition of 200 infantry stretcher bearers, the battlefield had been cleared of the wounded by nightfall. When it is considered that there [were] evacuated during this day 2,575 cases, the accomplishment of the medical service can be best appreciated.

While at the advanced and main dressing station, 5,000 meals consisting of hot soup, chocolate, coffee, and bread were served to patients and troops. The fact that evacuation was accomplished with little accumulation of patients and the field was cleared by evening was due to the untriring efforts of both the commissioned and enlisted personnel of the Medical Dept. of the division. The evacuation was accomplished under trying conditions; the men were not permitted to remain on the field over night and at no phase of the operation was the evacuation of the wounded not going well.

Provost Marshall: The Military Police were used for traffic control, establishment of straggler posts, and guards for prisoners of war. Traffic control was most difficult as there was a continuous two-way stream of traffic moving over it. As the road was shelled throughout the operation, blocks were prevented only by careful supervision of the police. Stationary stragglers posts extending across area of advance of the division were established and a line between these posts constantly patrolled by mounted men.

9. MACHINE GUNS: The machine guns of the division were distributed as follows:

113th Machine Gun Battalion (Div. M. G. Bn.) was assigned to the 117th Infantry. One company was assigned to the company of the 117th Infantry, designated to the special mission of cleaning up the triangle included between the southern divisional boundary, the northern boundary of the IX Corps and Canal. This battalion was of great assistance to the infantry to which it was assigned.

The 114th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions (Brigade M. G. Bns.) were grouped under the divisional machine gun officer for the purpose of delivering overhead covering fire. They delivered two bands of fire, the first on the HINDENBURG Line and the next on the Tunnel. After they had completed the barrage work, the battalions were assembled and came into divisional reserve. The barrage was very efficiently done under difficult conditions of enemy gas and H. E. shell. They were returned to their brigades on October 1.

The regimental machine gun companies were employed under the direction of the regimental commanders and were assigned to, and accompanied the front line battalions. Due
to their heavy loads and the thick fog they often had difficulty in keeping up; however, they found many opportunities of usefulness especially against hostile machine guns.

Infantry carrying parties detailed to the machine gun companies were found indispensable in action. They should be detailed some days in advance in order that they may become fully identified with the machine guns company.

10. USE OF STOKES MORTARS AND 37-mm. GUNS: These weapons were used under regimental direction, generally two mortars and one 37-mm. gun with each front line battalion. Both weapons were used to a limited degree; though difficulty in keeping up with the heavy loads in the thick fog prevented their more extended use. Both were used at times against enemy machine.

If the Stokes mortar and the 37 mm. guns are to be used effectively in semi-open warfare, the details of carrying parties for gun and ammunition must be carefully worked out well in advance of the operation.

11. USE OF ENGINEERS: On Y/Z night, a detachment from the 105th Engineers laid the jumping-off tape under difficult conditions resulting from the dark night and much machine-gun and shell fire. The work was well done and the troops found no difficulty in forming up properly.

During the operation, the 1st Battalion was used in road and water reconnaissance, examination of dugouts and search for booby traps.

The 2d Battalion was assigned to the corps for special work on roads with the Australian 5th Tunnelling Company and the 5th Pioneer Battalion. This battalion worked immediately behind the advancing infantry and in spite of the heavy hostile shelling performed its work in such a way as to receive most favorable comments from the commanding officers of the Australian units to which they were attached.

12. RESULT: In the operation against the HINDENBURG Line, the 30th Division advanced approximately 3,000 yards on a front of 3,750 yards against the strongest position on the western front. 47 officers and 1,432 O. R. were taken prisoners, together with many field guns, scores of machine guns and minenwerfer, several antitank rifles and large quantities of ammunition and other equipment.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Comdg.

30th Div. General File, Flrd. 165: Orders

Commendation of 30th Division

GENERAL ORDERS

No. 33

1. The division commander wishes to congratulate the 30th Division upon the success of its first divisional action, and to express appreciation of the courage, fortitude, and devotion displayed by its personnel.

2. To be given the task, in its initial effort, to play an important role in breaking through the HINDENBURG Line, the strongest defenses on the western front, was a great honor, and the fact that the breakthrough was actually made on the divisional front is ample evidence that the honor was not misplaced, and is a credit to the fighting efficiency of the division, of the command of which the undersigned has every reason to be proud.

3. The division retires temporarily for reorganization and well-earned rest, but with a feeling of satisfaction at a task well done and with augmented faith in itself.
4. There is deep and keen regret for the gallant comrades who have gloriously died, and an earnest intention of further perfection as a combat organization in order that the division may do to the fullest extent possible its share in bringing about the early success of the great cause in which they have fallen.

5. This order will be read to every organization at its first formation and be posted on bulletin boards.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.

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Location Units (American II Corps Attached)

AUSTRALIAN CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 1, 1918.

DISPOSITIONS---HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS
as at 6 a.m., October 2, 1918

Ref. Sheet 62 C

[Extract]

Australian Corps
N.16.c.

B. G. H. A.
J.12.d.7.9.

3d Sqdn. A. F. C.
BOUVINCOURT

13th A. L. H. Regt.
O.16.b.

Australian 1st Division
LONG (MAIRIE)

*

Australian 2d Division
F.27.c.8.4.

*

Australian 3d Division
F.26.c.8.8.

*

Australian 4th Division
CAVILLON

*

Australian 5th Division
K.23.d.3.2.

*
American II Corps
American 27th Division
American 30th Division
4th Tank Brigade
5th Tank Brigade

N.16.d.central
E.18.d.9.3.

ROISEL (Moving to HERBECOURT)

II Corps Journal of Operations: Fldr. 86: Telegram

FROM: II Corps
DATE: October 2, 1918
TO: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Situation 24 hours ending 0600 Oct. 2. Our troops continued mopping up, cooperating with Australians. Divisions now being withdrawn from line.

FRED E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G-3, Amer. II Corps.

182-33.3 Report

Intelligence Report

FROM: G-2, Amer. II Corps.
DATE: October 2, 1918.
HOUR: 9:35
TO: II Corps

Br. Intelligence Report: 9:25 a.m., October 2, 1918. Flares called for 7 a.m., but not good. Line runs apparently A26c45, A2a98, A2b92, A3d16, A3d11, A9b73, A10c53, A16d47, A17c80, A25a12, B19c07, B19c62, B25b05, B26c06, B26d01. Enemy seen in sunken road in B20d and B26a2, B26a95. Machine-gun fire from Le CATELET, A 11 a, and from trench system B14a and c, B27a. A. A. active, E. A. none seen. Weather fine, visib. good. Following squares deserted: A12, A18b and d., B7 a and c.
27th Division Replacements

FROM: G. H. Q., A. E. F.

DATE: October 2, 1918.

OFFICE: 18:25 m.

TO: Commanding General, II Corps

[Extract]

No. 3152 G-1. Relative your No. 4556-3. Orders have been issued for shipment of 1,000 infantry in replacements to 27th Division. ** 46 2d Lts. of inf. have been assigned to 27th Division. ** Balance enlisted and commissioned requested, cannot be furnished at this time.

AVERY D. ANDREWS,
Colonel, Asst. C. S., G-1.

Movement of 318th Field Signal Battalion

FROM: G. H. Q., A. E. F.

DATE: October 2, 1918

TO: Commanding General, American II Corps

No. 965. G-3. Following telegram sent this date repeated for your information.

"Commanding General, S. O. S. No. 963 G-3. Send the 318th Field Signal Battalion now at CLAMECY [NIEVRE] by rail via the British Expeditionary Forces to the American II Corps at La CHAPELLETTE, south of PERONNE. Acknowledge. By order: CONNER." Troop movement bureau TOURS will arrange for rail transportation and furnish information as to trains.

By order:

FOX CONNER,

---------
British Fourth Army Counterattacked

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 2, 1918.

Chief of Staff
Adv. G. H. Q.

G.227

The IX Corps have been counterattacked this morning at SEQUEHART and driven back out of the BEAUREVOIR Line near that place. It is evident that so long as the French First Army hangs back on the line of the Canal all the hostile pressure and any fresh reserves he can collect will be directed against the salient now formed by the IX Corps right. I have spoken to General Debeney on the telephone this morning, but I suggest that you again approach Marshal Foch with the object of insisting on the French First Army coming up into line on the right and capturing FONTAINE. The enemy have introduced a fresh div. 28 at SEQUEHART and will no doubt continue to direct his reserves against us if the French do not push forward energetically and at once.

URGENT OPERATIONS PRIORITY

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
M. G. G. S., Fourth Army.

British Fourth Army to Attack

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 2, 1918.

Fourth Army No. 20/28 (G)
No. 9

1. In continuation of Fourth Army No. 20/27 (G) of 1-10-18.

2. According to latest information received, the IX Corps has been counterattacked and pushed back from SEQUEHART and the BEAUREVOIR Line in the neighborhood of that place.

   The French First Army has gained the Canal and has been ordered to press forward vigorously to FONTAINE-UTERÊ.

3. Paras. 3 (a), 4 (b), and 5 (b) of the above-mentioned order will be modified as shown below, and Map A issued with the above order is cancelled:
   
   (a) The IX Corps will attack tomorrow morning with objectives approximately the Green Line shown on the attached map.

   It will exploit to the Blue Line and push cavalry and whippets beyond that line if opportunity offers.

   (b) The Australian corps will attack simultaneously with IX Corps, with objective the Green Line.
(c) The XIII Corps will conform with the left of the Australian corps, with a view to securing the Red Line shown on attached map.
(d) The Zero hour for the attack will be arranged direct between IX and Australian corps and communicated to XIII Corps as early as possible.

4. The cavalry corps will remain in its present billets ready to move at one hour’s notice from 0900 tomorrow.
5. The XIII Corps will move the 25th Division forward today in close support of the right of the 50th Division, with a view to being able to relieve the left of the Australian corps tomorrow night, should it be ordered to do so.
6. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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182-10.2: Telegram

Division Movements

FROM: II Corps
DATE: October 2, 1918
TO: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

461-G-3

27th Division Hq. moves October 3 to DOINGT.
30th Division Hq. moves today to HERBECOURT.

FRED E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G-3, American II Corps.

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182-12.4: Order

Transfer of Headquarters II Corps and 27th Division

FIELD ORDERS AMERICAN II CORPS, A. E. F.,
No. 18 October 2, 1918.

Amendment No. 2

1. In continuance of Field Orders No. 18, these headquarters, October 1, 1918, American 27th Division will move from PERONNE area to SUZANNE area on Oct. 4, 1918, via CLEARY, clearing PERONNE area by 11 o’clock, Oct. 4, 1918.
2. Headquarters American 27th Division will clear present quarters at J.11.c.4.9. by 12 o’clock, Oct. 4, and will move to SUZANNE Chateau direct and not to DOINGT.

GEORGE S. SIMONDS,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

182.33.3

27th Division in Peronne Area

FROM: 27th Div.
DATE: October 2, 1918  HOUR: 14
TO: II Corps

G-3-267: Division halts in PERONNE area, October 3 and moves Oct. 4 to SUZANNE area. Div. Hq. at Bois-de-BUIRE will not move to DOINGT, but opens 11 a.m., Oct. 4, at SUZANNE Chateau.

182-33.3: Message

27th Division Movement to Suzanne Area

FROM: Aust. corps
DATE: October 2, 1918  HOUR: 14:35 h.
TO: II Corps

G232: In continuation of this office G221 of October 1, Amer. 27th Div. will move from PERONNE area to SUZANNE area on 4th inst., via CLEARY, clearing PERONNE area by 11 a.m. on 4th inst. Hq. Amer. 27th Div. will clear present quarters at J11c4.9 by 12 noon on 4th, and will move to SUZANNE Chateau direct and not DOINGT. Aust. 3d Div. will move to PERONNE area on 4th inst., staging through HAUT-ALLAINES area and area north of COLOGNE and west TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD and RONSOY. Aust. 3d Div. will clear HAUT-ALLAINES area by 12 n. on 4th inst. Div. hq. at DOINGT is at disposal of Aust. 3d Div. from 9 a.m. tomorrow 3d inst., at which our 2d Div. rear hq. will be clear.
Movement of 105th Engineers

FROM: C. G., 30th Div.
DATE: October 2, 1918
TO: 105th Engineers

460 G-3 The 105th Engineers now in vicinity of TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD will move by road to the vicinity of HARGICOURT Oct. 2, to be employed on railway construction under orders of ADLR 4 until further orders. Accommodations from C. G., Aust. 2d Div., F.27.c. It is understood that two companies are to be employed at one time in order to afford ample time for rest and refitting.

Assignment of 102d Engineers

FROM: II Corps
DATE: October 2, 1918
TO: C. G., Amer. 27th

473 G-3 102d Regiment Engineers are to be placed temporarily at disposal Brit. XIII Corps for work on roads in forward area. They should remain in present location until receipt of definite instructions to be furnished later.

Movement 27th Division Headquarters

FROM: 27th Div.
DATE: October 2, 1918
HOUR: 11:10
TO: American II Corps

Div. Hq. will close at Ste-EMILIE Quarries at 1 p. m., October 2, and open at J11C 2.9 at same hour. On October 3, div. hq. will close at J11C 2.9 at 10 a. m., and open at DOINGT at the same hour.
Movement of 27th Division

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 2, 1918.

WARNING ORDER

The division will stay in the PERONNE area over October 3 and will move on the morning of October 4 to the SUZANNE area, which includes the territory CLERY (incl.) west to 1,000 yards beyond SUZANNE and from the SOMME north to a general line A.27.central--B.27.central--I.1.a.0.0.

Division headquarters at SUZANNE Chateau. Division hq. will remain at Bois de BUIRE until October 4.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

182-33.3 (No. 3): Operations Report

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

[Extract]

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY:

(a) 27th Division: Practically all detachments of division rejoined their units during day. This division withdrawn from line and proceeding to SUZANNE area.
(b) 30th Division: This division withdrawn from line and concentrated in MESNIL and HERBICOURT area.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Total casualties (estimated) during operations Sept. 28, 1918 to Oct. 1, 1918:

27th Division: 65 officers; 3,721 O. R.
30th Division: 1,500, all grades

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 14

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)
II Corps Headquarters (Rear)
412 Tel. Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
(Att. to 13th Wing
3d Bde. R. A. F.)

BRITISH UNITS TO BE TRANSFERRED
FROM III CORPS TO AMERICAN II CORPS

144th Army Troops Co. R. E.
288th Army Troops Co. R. E.
182d Tunnelling Co. R. E.
1st Siege Co. R. A. R. E.
1 Section 33d E and M Co.

27th Division

Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (Rear)
53d Infantry Bde. Hq.

54th Infantry Bde. Hq.

104th M. G. Bn. Hq.
102d Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
102d San. Train Hq.

30th Division

Division Headquarters
59th Brigade Hq.
59th Infantry Bde. Hq.

Location of other units of 30th Division will follow tomorrow.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, Asst. C. of S., G-3.
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 3, 1918.

Location of units at 6 a. m., October 3, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serial No.</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location of Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Division Headquarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Headquarters Troop</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>105th Train Hq. and Military Police</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>105th Field Signal Battalion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>59th Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>60th Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>HERBECOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>105th Sanitary Train Hq.</td>
<td>MESNIL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *

J. SHAPERT CALDWEEL, Major, Acting Adjutant,

HS Brt. File: Fldr. IX B II Corps: Letter

American II Corps to Relieve Australian Corps, October 5, 1918

No. 13
Fourth Army No. 20/29 (G)

[Extract]

1. (a) The XIII Corps will relieve Australian corps. * * * Relief will be completed and command pass to XIII Corps at 0600 on October 4.
   (b) At the same hour, the general reallocation of artillery laid down in para. 2 of Fourth Army No. 283 (G) of October 1 will come into force. Transfer of units in detail will be arranged between Australian and XIII Corps direct. The XIII Corps will report completion of artillery moves.
   (c) The 12th, 58th and 74th Divisional Artilleries will be withdrawn as they can be spared by arrangement between G. O. C. R. A., Fourth Army and XIII Corps.
2. Australian corps will take over the front from IX Corps, * * * as soon as the tactical situation permits. Arrangements will be made direct between Australian and IX Corps.
3. American II Corps will be prepared to commence the relief of the Australian corps on October 5. Detailed orders as regards this relief will be issued later.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,  
Lt. Col.,  
for  
Major General,  
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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182-33.3: Message

**Cancellation of Movement Orders**

FROM: Aust. corps  
DATE: October 3, 1918  
HOUR: 19:05

TO: II Corps

G265: Moves of Aust. 3d and Amer. 27th Divs. ordered in Aust. corps G232 of 2d inst. are cancelled. Aust. 3d Div. will remain in HAUT-ALLAINES area as at present with hq. at DOINGT. Amer. 27th Div. will remain in PERONNE area with hq. at J.11.c.4.9. Acknowledge.

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182-33.3 (No. 3): Operation Instructions

**Operations 27th and 30th Divisions**

MESSAGE  
No. 481 G-3

Commanding General, 30th Division

American II Corps Operations Instructions, Series A, No. 1

[Extract]

This corps is preparing to relieve the Australian corps on October 5. The American 30th Division will be prepared to relieve the Australian 2d Division, commencing on October 5.

The regiments of the 30th Division will move by bus, one regiment each, on the nights of Oct. 5, 6, 7 and 8. Command will pass to C. G., 30th Div., on October 6. The sector to be occupied is that at present held by the Australian corps. *** It will be held with the 30th Division in the line and the 27th Division in reserve. Orders for the movement of the 27th Division will be issued later.

SIMONDS,  
C. of S.

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182-32.11: Telegram

**Location Headquarters 27th Division**

*October 3, 1918.*

American 27th Division:

American 27th Division will remain in PERONNE area with headquarters at J 11 C 4 9 until further orders.

479-G-3, American II Corps.

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227-32.1: Orders

**27th Division Transferred from Peronne to Suzanne Area**

FIELD ORDER
No. 51

Map 62-c 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. The division (less 102d Engineers and Engineer Train) will move by road march on October 4 from the PERONNE area to the SUZANNE area, clearing to PERONNE area by 11 a. m.

* * * * *

7. Division headquarters will close at Bois de BUIRE at 10 a. m., October 4, and open at SUZANNE at the same hour.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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- 342 -
Transfer of 102d Engineers

FIELD ORDER
No. 52
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 3, 1918.

1. The 102d Engineers (less one company) and the 102d Engineer Train will proceed by road march, on October 4 to RONSSOY to be placed at the disposal of the C. R. E. XIII Corps, for work on roads in forward area.

By command of Major command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

Movement 27th Division

ORDERS
No. 98
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 3, 1918.

Reference Map: 62C 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. The movement directed by Field Orders No. 51, having been cancelled, the plan of supply by horse transport will be continued.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Medical Arrangements

From: Commanding General, American 27th Division
To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

1. In the recent operations of this division, the Medical Service was greatly hampered by lack of medical personnel to operate forward area. A detail of 200 men to act as bearers was made from the line, to assist in forward area thus decreasing our effective fighting strength.

2. The headquarters, two field hospitals, two ambulance companies and the divisional medical supply unit of the 102d Sanitary Train of this division are here in France and are not being used in operations.

3. It is requested that the Headquarters, 102d Sanitary Train, Field Hospitals Nos. 107 and 108, Ambulance Companies Nos. 105 and 108, and the divisional medical supply unit be ordered to report forthwith for duty with this division.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General, Commanding.

Medical Arrangements 30th Division

From: Office of the Division Surgeon
To: 30th Division, A. E. F.,
October 3, 1918.

MEMORANDUM 19

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR UNITS LOCATED IN MESNIL-HERBECOURT AREA

1. (a) The 118th Field Ambulance will establish camp hospital and furnish ambulance service for the troops located in Le MESNIL area. The units to be furnished this service are as follows: 59th Brigade, 118th Infantry, and 114th Machine Gun, located at Le MESNIL.

(b) The 118th Field Ambulance will also establish a hospital for the treatment of scabies and other skin diseases occurring in the division.

(c) The 119th Field Hospital will furnish camp hospital accommodations and ambulance service to the 117th Infantry, located at FEUILLERES.

(d) The 119th Field Hospital will also furnish ambulance to Division Headquarters, 60th Brigade, Headquarters Troop, 105th Military Police, and 105th Field Signal Battalion, located at HERBECOURT.

(e) The 132d Field Ambulance will operate a camp hospital for and furnish ambulance service to the 119th Infantry at BIACHES.

(f) The 134th Field Ambulance will operate a camp hospital for and furnish ambulance service to the 120th Infantry at ASSEVILLERS, the 113th Machine Gun Battalion at FLAUCOURT, and the 115th Machine Gun Battalion at FLAUCOURT.
2. CASUALTY CLEARING STATIONS:
Nos. 20, 41, and 55 located at DOINGT.
Nos. 12, 50, 53, and 58 located at TINCOURT.
No. 37 at MARICOURT (all SIW, dysentery, NYDN, NYD gas, and venereal cases will be sent direct to #37 C. C. S.).

3. STATIONARY HOSPITAL:
No. 41 at ASYLUM (for ophthalmic, dental, nose, ear, and throat).

4. ADVANCED DEPOT OF MEDICAL STORES:
No. 13 at RIBEMONT.
No. 18 at CHUIGNOLLES.

5. MOBILE LABORATORIES:
No. 12 (Hyg.) TINCOURT.
No. 17 (Bac.) MARICOURT.
No. 19 (Bac.) DOINGT.
No. 5 (Bac.) TINCOURT.

6. MOTOR AMBULANCE CONVOYS:
No. 3 (Australian) BUSSU.
No. 10 (III Corps) DRIENCOURT.
No. 44 (IX Corps) MISERY.
No. 11 (Army) Le MESNIL.
No. 24 (Army) COURCELLES (near DOINGT).

7. MOBILE X-RAY UNITS:
No. 2 Mobile X-Ray Unit., BRIE.
No. 4 Mobile X-Ray Unit., DOINGT.

8. ARMY OPHTHALMIC CENTER:
Ophthalmic center (attached to No. 41 Staty. Hp.) ASYLUM.

9. All cases of scabies will be treated within the division.

10. Acknowledge.

A. M. WHALEY,
Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.
182-33.3 (No. 3): Operations Report

G-3
485

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 3, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

[Extract]

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY:

(a) 27th Division resting in PERONNE area on way to SUZANNE area. Engineer regiment 27th Division withheld to work on roads in forward area.
(b) 30th Division in rest area (MESNIL and HERBECOURT). Engineer regiment 30th Division employed in railway construction in vicinity of TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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182-32.2: Location List

Location II Corps Units

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 4, 1918—10 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 15

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)
II Corps Headquarters (Rear)
412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
(Att. to 13th Wing
3d Bde. R. A. F.)

62C.N.15.d.central
MERICOURT-sur-SOMME
MERICOURT-sur-SOMME
Near SAULTY
BAIZIEUX

- 346 -
BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps R.  
Hq. VII Corps H. A.  

27th Division
Division Headquarters
53d Infantry Bde. Hq.  

54th Infantry Bde. Hq.  

102d Engineer Regt. Hq.  
104th M. G. Bn. Hq.  
102d Field Sign. Bn. Hq.  
102d Sanitary Train Hq.  

30th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv.)  
Division Headquarters (Rear)
59th Infantry Bde. Hq.  

60th Infantry Bde. Hq.  

105th Engineer Regt. Hq.  
113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.  
105th Field Signal Bn. Hq.  
105th Sanitary Train Hq.  

F. E. BUCHAN,  
Col., Asst. C. of S., G. S., G-3.  

British Fourth Army to Attack October 4, 1918

No. 18  
Fourth Army No. 20/30 (G)  

[Extract]

1. (a) The advance of the Fourth Army will be continued and the enemy given no rest or time to reorganize.

(b) The French are advancing on our right with objective FONTAINE-UTERTE.
(c) As soon as we are in possession of the high ground in S.29, the right division of V Corps will pass through the left of the XIII Corps and press forward in a north and northeasterly direction so as to clear a passage over the canal for the rest of the Third Army.

2. Tomorrow morning (October 5), conforming with the Australian corps on their left, the IX Corps will seize the high ground in I.2.d., I.8.b and d., and I.14.

3. (a) The Australian corps will capture MONTBREHAIN tomorrow morning.
(b) The hour of Zero for this attack will be decided by the Australian corps and communicated to IX Corps direct.

4. The XIII Corps as soon as they have secured BEAUREVOIR and the high ground in S.28 and S.29, and are thus relieved on their left flank by troops of the V Corps, will secure the high ground in T.26, T.27, T.28 and B.4, as early as possible, at the same time covering the right flank of the advance of the V Corps.

5. The cavalry corps will remain in present bivouacs tomorrow, ready to move at four hours' notice, and will keep in close touch with the situation.

6. All corps will push forward their artillery as far as possible, with a view to covering a further advance in a general easterly direction on October 6.

7. The boundaries for a further advance will come into force for administrative purposes and generally for tactical purposes, but they may be changed for the latter purpose from time to time to suit the situation as it develops.

8. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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182-33.3 (No. 3): No 10.276 (G): Report

Operations II Corps

Fourth Army No. 10.276 (G)

American II Corps

1. On the same hour and date that the Australian corps hand over the front to the American II Corps, the 4th Tank Battalion will come into army reserve and be available for employment with the XIII or American II Corps as required.

   The 4th Tank Bde. will be administered by the XIII Corps.

2. G. O. C., 4th Tank Bde., will keep in close touch with the hq. of both the American XIII and II Corps.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE.

[Signature Illegible],
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

----------
American II Corps to Begin Movement

Aust. corps
Adv. American II Corps
O. C. 18 Bus Park

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

October 4, 1918.

G.259

Reference Fourth Army 20/29.G of 3d instant, para. 3 American II Corps will move forward as follows. One Bde. group by bus on 5th instant as under. One regt., plus one M. G. bn. (strength 3,600), embussing 9:30 on DOINGT-BRUSLE Road, head of column facing north at Le MESNIL-CARTIGNY crossroads, debussing on TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD---RONSSOY Road, head of column facing north at south end RONSSOY.

Route: BRAY---PROYART---BRIE---BRUSLE---CARTIGNY---HANCOURT---ROISEL---TEMPLEUX---RONSSOY returning to park via LONGAVESNES---MOISLAINS---COMBLES---ALBERT. One regt. (strength 3,000) embussing 12 h. on MARICOURT-CLERY Road, head of column facing east at MAUREPAS-HEM crossroads, debussing as above. ROUTE: MARICOURT---PERONNE---DOINGT---CARTIGNY, thence as above. Transport of this bde. will move by road commencing night 4th/5th instant. One bde. and 2 M. G. bns. will move by road, commencing 6th instant, staging night 6th/7th in an area notified to American II Corps by Australian corps. Above moves will take place under Amer. II Corps orders in consultation with Australian corps and Os. C. Aux. Omnibus Cos. concerned, who will visit American II Corps Hq. (N.15.d. central), Sheet 62C, at once. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col., G. S.

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182-33.3: Movement Order

Troop Movements

FROM: Fourth Army, B. E. F.

DATE: October 4, 1918    HOUR: 20:25

TO: II Corps

G262: Ref. Fourth Army’s G259 of 4th, one infantry brigade and 2 machine gun bns. will now move by road, commencing 5th inst., staging night 5th/6th and not as stated.

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- 349 -
MOVEMENT ORDERS OF THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS ISSUED ON OCTOBER 4, 1918

182-33.3

DATE: October 4, 1918          HOUR: 19:40

TO: II Corps

G292: Reference Aust. corps s/5191 of today. B Brigade, American 30th Div., will move by road 5th inst. to TINCOURT area. Accommodation from area comdt. TINCOURT. Route: Fbg. de PARIS—PERONNE—Fbg. de BRETAGNE. To be clear of Fbg. de BRETAGNE by 10:30 a. m. Will move 6th inst. to support area between the line HARGICOURT—VILLERET and the Tunnel.

---

DATE: October 4, 1918          HOUR: 20:25

TO: II Corps

R241: Change of railhead from 6th incl. American 30th Division to ROISEL.

---

230.32.16

DATE: October 4, 1918            OFFICE: 23:35            RECD.: 23:42

TO: American 30th Division

Ref. Aust. corps G 292 of today. B Bde., American 30th Division, will be clear of Fbg. de BRETAGNE by 12:30 and not 10:30 a. m. as stated. ACK.

---

182-32.11: Operations Instruction

**Allotment and Distribution of Artillery**

R. A. British VII Corps No. RAO/36

**ALLOTMENT AND DISTRIBUTION OF ARTILLERY AS TAKEN OVER FROM AUSTRALIAN CORPS**

**FIELD ARTILLERY**

| In the line | 6 Brigades |
| In mobile reserve | 2 brigades |
| In rest in corps reserve | 2 brigades |
| **TOTAL** | **10 brigades** |

- 350 -
HEAVY ARTILLERY

In the line

5 brigades (3 mixed or mobile and
2 8" or 9.2" brigades)

2 6" gun batteries

In rest in corps reserve

2 brigades (1 mixed or mobile, and 1
8" or 9.2" brigades)

1 army brigade (less 2 6" gun batteries)

ARMY ARTILLERY

Under repair in workshops

1 12" gun battery

1 14" gun battery

[Illegible],
Major, G. S.,
R. A., VII (British) Corp.

October 4, 1918

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182.10.2: Telegram

Shortage of Officers

FROM: II Corps

DATE: October 4, 1918

TO: General Headquarters, A. E. F.

C. of S.-143

In view of nature of operations in which this corps is now engaged, recommend that all officers of the 27th Div. and 30th Div. now absent at schools, with the exception of those at school of line and staff class, be returned to their divisions. Considerable casualties and the fewness of replacements furnished have reduced the number of officers for duty with combatant units below what is considered prudent to lead into battle.

READ
American II Corps.

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- 351 -
Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 4, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A. No. 1

AMENDMENT NO. 2

Message No. 481 G-3 now known as - AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, Series A. No. 1, is amended as follows:

The 118th Infantry, the 117th Infantry, and the 114th Machine Gun Battalion will move by bus during the day of Oct. 5, one regiment in the morning and one regiment in the afternoon instead of at times shown in above-mentioned message. Detailed instructions will follow.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Col., G. S., C. of S.

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GHQ, AEF: G-3 (II Corps): Fldr. 2: Operation Order

Operations II Corps

AMERICAN II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 4, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 2

FIELD ORDERS

No. 19

MAPS: 1:40,000 62 B and 62 C

[Extract]

1. The American II Corps will relieve the Australian corps commencing October 5, 1918.

2. The American 30th Division will relieve the Australian 2d Division, beginning October 5, 1918. Details of relief will be arranged between commanding generals of the divisions concerned; the command passing to the C. G., American 30th Division October 6, 1918.

• • • • •

3. Moves as overleaf.
4. The command of the 105th Engineers will revert to the C. G., 30th Division on completion of their work today, October 4.
5. Detailed instructions relative to railhead, supply and evacuation will be issued later.
6. Corps headquarters will move to BUIRE Wood---October 6, 1918.
7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,

for

READ

Major General.

* * * * *

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182.33.3: Operations Instructions

Movement of 60th Brigade

FROM: II Corps
DATE: October 4, 1918
HOUR: 23:45
TO: American 30th Div.

[Extract]

501-G-3. Reference Field Order 19, columns 60th Brigade must clear Fbg. de BRETAGNE at 12:30 o'clock instead of 14 h. as stated therein.

* * * * *

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30th Div.: 230-32.1: Field Orders

30th Division Transferred to Tincourt Relieving Australian 2d

FIELD ORDERS
No. 23

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 4, 1918.

1. This division will move by bus and road on the 5th and 6th instant to the TINCOURT area and the front immediately east, relieving the Australian 2d Division.

59th Brig. Group

2. The 59th Brigade, plus certain designated elements of field
Brig. Hq.

ambulance units will embus on the 5th instant, as follows:
114th M. G. Bn.
117th Inf.
118th Inf.
Det. 500 men
Field Amb.
Cos.

9:30 a. m.: The 118th Infantry plus 114th M. G. Bn. embussing point (head of column) at crossroads O.12.c.5.0., bus accommodation for 3,700 men. Debussing point F.21.c.4.8 (TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD). Guides from Australian 2d Division will meet the regiment at debussing point and conduct it to its place in the line.
12 noon: The 117th Infantry - embussing point (head of column) -
H.3.a.4.8. Bus accommodation for 3,000 men. Debussing point F.21.c.4.8. Guides from the Australian 2d Division will meet the regiment at debussing point and conduct it to its position.

Arrangements will be made by the division surgeon direct with the Commanding General, 59th Brigade, concerning the embussing of approximately 500 men belonging to the 118th Field Ambulance, 132d Field Ambulance, and bearer section, 134th Field Ambulance.

Transport 59th Brigade will move night of October 4/5 TINCOURT area, under direction of brigade commander. Billeting accommodations from area commandant.

Transport field ambulances will move under orders of division surgeon.

No restrictions as to roads.

3. The 60th Brigade plus attached divisional troops will march by road on 5th instant to TINCOURT area, under command of the Commanding General, 60th Brigade.

Routes: (a) BELLOY---BARLEUX---Farm LEMPIRE---bridge at 0.15a.7.9.---Le Mesnil---CARTIGNY---TINCOURT area.

(b) BIACHES---N. W. to HALLE---Le QUINCONCE---St-DENIS Fbg. de BRETAGNE---main road through J.20.central to TINCOURT area.

4. The 59th Brigade group will carry two days' rations. Transport 60th Brigade will accompany the column. Usual billeting parties from 60th Brigade will proceed to new area, by lorry, leaving brigade headquarters at 9 a.m., October 5, reporting on arrival to area commandant, TINCOURT. Railhead in new area will be announced later.

5. All motor Transportation and 105th Mobile Veterinary Section will move under orders of G-1.

6. Time of closing division headquarters in present area and time and place of opening in new area will be announced later.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.

(F. O. 23)

Par. 3, Field Order No. 23 is amended as follows:

Routes: (a) BIACHES---Fbg. de PARIS---Fbg. de BRETAGNE---thence on road through J.20.central to TINCOURT.

(b) BARLEUX---BIACHES---Fbg. de PARIS---Fbg. de BRETAGNE---thence on road through J.20.central to TINCOURT.

Rear of both columns to clear Fbg. de BRETAGNE by 14 o'clock.

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230-32.16: Message

Corps and Brigade Boundaries

FROM: 30th Division

DATE: Oct. 4, 1918  HOUR: 11:15 p.m.

TO: Commanding General, 59th Brigade

Reference occupation new sector, your northern boundary is the southern boundary XIII Corps; southern boundary, the northern boundary IX Corps; suggested interregimental
boundary line, center BELICOURT, G.4.2.2. to center ESTREES, H.2.a.9.5. to crossroads B.29.c.9.7. Brigade headquarters NAUROY. Rear boundary, Canal and Tunnel---sector will be held by the two regiments side by side, disposed in depth, one battalion each in front line, one each in support and one each in reserve. Detail relief of infantry and machine-gun units will be arranged by you direct with Australian 2d Division. Your transport remains under your control.

Medical General: C 482-E, D 2, Flkr. 10: Memo

Medical Arrangements

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
October 4, 1918.

MEMO 23

1. Memo 22 is amended as follows:
   (a) This division will move by bus and road on the 5th to the TINCOURT area and front immediately east, relieving the Australian 2d Division. The 118th Field Ambulance, 132d Field Ambulance, and bearer section of 134th Field Ambulance will embus under arrangements of the C. O., 59th Brigade. The 132d F. A. will camp in area west of TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD, and will stand by ready to move forward and relieve the Australian 2d Division unit, which is operating the advanced dressing station at G.16.d.8.2. The 118th F. A., bearer section of the 134th F. A., and the 119th F. A. will occupy area at MARQUAIX. These organizations will stand by ready to move at one-half hour's notice to relieve units of the Australian 2d Division at TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD and area east of this place.
   (b) Billeting parties will be sent in advance to secure sites.
   (c) The provisions of Memo. 22 relative to ambulance service for the 59th and 60th Brigades in their moves will be complied with.

A. M. WHALEY,
Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.
The II Corps Takes Over Command of the Australian Corps
Sector and Operates under Command of the Fourth Army, B. E. F.,
October 6, 1918 to November 11, 1918

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II CORPS RELIEVES THE AUSTRALIAN CORPS

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182-32.2: Location List

Location II Corps Units

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 5, 1918—10 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 16

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)
II Corps Headquarters (Rear)
412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
   (Att. to 13th Wing
   3d Bde. R. A. F.)

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps R. A.
Hq. VII Corps H. A.
27th Division
   Division Headquarters
   53d Infantry Bde. Hq.
30th Division
   Division Headquarters (Adv.)
   Division Headquarters (Rear)
   59th Infantry Bde. Hq.

* * * * *

Moving to F.27.c.8.4.
HALLE
Moving new locations will follow

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Col., Asst. C. of S., G. S., G-3.

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- 356 -
British Fourth Army Continued the Attack

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 5, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Fourth Army will continue the attack on a date which has been communicated verbally to those concerned and at an hour to be notified later. This attack will be in conjunction with an attack by the Third Army on its left and the French First Army on its right.

* * * * *

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

--------

American II Corps to Relieve Australian Corps

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 5, 1918.

Reference Fourth Army No. 20/29 (G), dated October 3, paragraph 3.

1. The American II Corps will relieve the Australian corps in the line on the night October 5/6, and command will pass to the American II Corps at 0900, October 6.

Adv. Hq., American II Corps will be located in BUIRE Wood.

2. American II Corps will take over command of all units in the area in situ.

Detailed orders as regards transfer of units will follow.

3. On relief, the Australian corps will be withdrawn into army reserve.

4. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

--------
Units Australian Corps Transferred to American II Corps

Fourth Army No. 42/65/1 (G)

Reference Fourth Army No. 42/65 (G), para. 2, dated October 5, the following units will be transferred from Australian corps to American II Corps.

1. Artillery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Divnl.</th>
<th>Army Bdes.</th>
<th>Mob</th>
<th>8&quot;</th>
<th>9.2&quot;</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>6&quot; gun</th>
<th>12&quot; gun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Aust. 2d</td>
<td>Aust. 6th</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>68</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>222</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Aust. 3d</td>
<td>Aust. 12th</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>93</td>
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<td>494</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aust. 4th</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aust. 5th</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. R. A. F.: 3d Squadron A. F. C.
3. Administrative units will be notified by Fourth Army Q.
4. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

II Corps Relieves Australian Corps

Australian Corps Order

No. 173

1. The Australian corps will be relieved in the line by the American II Corps on October 6, 1918.
   Command of the front and area will pass from G. O. C., Australian corps to G. O. C., American II Corps, at 9 a. m. on October 6.
2. (a) The Australian corps will be withdrawn into Fourth Army reserve in relief.
   (b) Orders for the relief of the Aust. 2d Division by the American 30th Division and for the moves of Australian divisions to the rest area have been issued separately.
3. Artillery as under will be transferred to American II Corps on relief:
   4th " " (10th and 11th Bdes. A. F. A.)
   5th " " (13th and 14th Bdes. A. F. A.)
   6th Army Bde. A. F. A.
   12th " " A. F. A.
   (b) Heavy Artillery:
   9th Bde. R. G. A.
   18th " R. G. A.
   41st " R. G. A.
   51st " R. G. A.
   68th " R. G. A.
   71st " R. G. A.
   73d " R. G. A.
   93d " R. G. A.

4. Engineer units as under will be transferred to American II Corps on relief:
   1st and 2d Aust. Tunnelling Cos.
   1st Aust. Army Troops Co.
   146th and 238th Army Troops Cos. R. E.
   1 Sec. 353d E and M Cos. R. E.
   1 Sec. Aust. E and M, M and B Cos.
   The C. R. E. and Adjutant, Aust. corps troops will remain temporarily with American II Corps to administer the above units.

5. Administrative, medical and engineer instructions will be issued separately.

6. Advanced Headquarters American II Corps is opening at BUIRE Wood at 9 a. m. on 6th instant.
   Headquarters Australian corps will remain at N.16.a.5.0., temporarily.

7. ACKNOWLEDGE.

R. C. CASEY,
Major,
for
Brigadier General,
General Staff, Australian Corps.

----------

Med. Gen.: Fldr. 10: Memorandum

Medical Arrangements

AUSTRALIAN CORPS
MEDICAL INSTRUCTIONS
No. 61

[Extract]

In accordance with Australian corps G.305, D/5-10-18.
1. The A. D. M. S., Australian 2d Division, will hand over to Divisional Surgeon, 30th Division, the medical arrangements for the clearance of the divisional sector and area, which will include the divisional detraining post, TINCOURT.
Relief will be completed by 9 a.m., October 6, details being mutually arranged between administrative medical officers concerned. Medical units of the Australian 2d Division so relieved will be at the disposal of A. D. M. S., Australian 2d Division.

* * * * *

[Signature Illegible]
Colonel,
D. D. M. S., Australian Corps.

Headquarters
October 5, 1918

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230-32.7: Order

**Relief of Australian 6th Infantry Brigade by 59th Brigade**

ORDER No. 185

AUSTRALIAN 6th INFANTRY BRIGADE,

October 5, 1918.

Ref. Map Sheet WIANCOURT Edition 1.A. 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. The 6th A. I. Bde. Group will be relieved in the line on the night of the 5th/6th inst., by the American 59th Brigade of the American 30th Division * * *

* * * * *

FREDERICK SALE,
Captain,
for
Major,
Brigade Major, 6th Inf. Bde., A. I. F.

--------

182-33.3: Orders

**Attack Order British Corps on Right of II Corps**

IX CORPS ORDER No. 143

IX CORPS, B. E. F.,

October 5, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Fourth Army will attack in the early morning on a date communicated verbally.

* * * * *
2. The IX Corps attack will be directed to covering the right flank of the Fourth Army and connecting with the French First Army.

The French First Army are attacking tomorrow with a view to capturing FONTAINE-UTERTE and CRIOX-FONSOMME.

The American II Corps will be attacking on left of IX Corps.

• • • • •

A. R. CAMERON
Brigadier General, General Staff,
IX Corps.

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182-32.7: Telegram

Artillery Support

ADDENDUM NO. 1 to IX CORPS ORDER NO. 143

IX CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 6, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Artillery cooperation with the American II Corps has been arranged as follows:

The northern flank of IX Corps barrage will run I.7.b.0.2 ---300 yards south of BRANCOURT-le-GRAND Station---300 yards south of BRANCOUCOURT Farm.

Between I.7.b.0.2 and 300 yards south of BRANCOURT-le-GRAND Station, the barrage can be parallel to, but must not be less than 300 yards south of the railway.

IX Corps back barrage will be so arranged so to protect as far as possible the American right flank from enfilade fire.

The right flank of the American II Corps barrage falls at Zero at I.2.d.0.5.

The barrage of the American II Corps can overlap that of the IX Corps.

• • • • •

A. R. CAMERON,
Brig. Gen., Gen., Staff, IX Corps.

--------
Operations 30th Division

OPERATION ORDER
No. 366
Ref. Sheet 62b. N. W. 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. The 6th Division, in conjunction with the American 30th Division on the left, is attacking on a day and hour to be notified later, to secure a line running from I.16.c.60.25 --- C.28.c.89.40 as a final objective, and a line from I.16.c.60.25 to C.24.c.40.20 as the E. limit of exploitation area.

The French 47th Division on the right of the IX Corps is attacking tomorrow morning to take FONTAINE-UTERTE. The 139th Brigade, 46th Division, will be on the right of the 6th Division, but is not cooperating in the advance.

The 6th Division is attacking with the 71st Infantry Brigade on the left and the 16th Infantry Brigade on the right.

2. The 71st Infantry Brigade will attack with the 2d Sherwood Foresters on the right and the 9th Norfolk Regiment on the left.

The 1st Leicestershire Regiment will be in reserve.

* * * * *

J. HAMBLYN,
Captain, A/Brigade Major,
71st Infantry Brigade.

--------

Operations II Corps

ORDER
No. 62
Reference St-QUENTIN, 1/100,000
62.B., 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. The division (less heavy section divi. ammn. col. and light section reserve park), will move tomorrow to an area near Bois du GRAND-PRIEL * * *.

* * * * *
6. Brigade report centers will be approximately as follows:
   1st Cavalry Brigade       L.22.d.central.
   2d Cavalry Brigade        L.15.a.4.2.
   9th Cavalry Brigade       southern exit of VILLERET
7. Adv. report center will be established at G.18.a.3.3. at 17:30

   ******

   J. G. HOLLAND,
   Major, G. S.,
   1st Cavalry Division.

II Corps Journal Operations: Fldr. 86: Telegram

   Operations II Corps

FROM: II Corps
DATE: October 5, 1918      HOUR: 1:53 p.m.
TO: G. H. Q., A. E. F.

504 G-3, 5/10/18. Situation 24 hours ending 0600 October 5, one division in rest area. Other division moving forward in order to take over a part of front line.

   BUCHAN,
   G-3, Amer. II Corps, 9:50.

182-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 4                              II CORPS, A. E. F.,

   From 18 h. October 5 to 18 h October 6, 1918

   [Extract]

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: Quiet today.
   (b) Artillery: From 10:30 to 13 h., harassing fire on DOON Mill and Copse I-8.b., CHAMPIGNON Copse, SUNKEN Road and trenches in I-3.b. and d. During the night and early morning, heavy bursts of fire on C-25.a. and b, and C-26d. 27th fleeting targets engaged. Usual harassing fire on hostile battery areas and other targets.

   ******

   KERR T. RIGGS,

   -------

- 363 -
II Corps Assumes Command of Sector

AMERICAN II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 5, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 3

1. Command of the sector to be occupied by the American 30th Division will pass to C. G., American 30th Division at 0900, October 6, 1918.
2. Command of the Australian corps area will pass to C. G., American II Corps at 0900, October 6, 1918.
3. Headquarters American II Corps will close at N 15.d.central at 0900, October 6, and will open at Bois de BUIRE at the same date and hour.
4. Copies 6 and 7 to be acknowledged.

By command of Major General Read:

F. E. BUCHAN,
for
GEORGE S. SIMONDS,
Col., G. S., C. of S.

------------

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

G-3
508-G-3
II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 5, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS SERIES A, NO. 4

WARNING ORDER

[Extract]

1. (a) The Fourth Army will attack the enemy line at Zero hour on Z day; time and date to be notified later.
   (b) The British IX Corps will attack on the right, the American II Corps in the center, and the British XIII Corps on the left.
2. (a) The American 30th Division will attack on the front of the American II Corps sector.

* * * * *

3. The following troops will be allotted to the 30th Division:
   (a) Divisional artillery.
   (b) Tanks: 2 cos. light tanks.
            2 bns. heavy tanks.
4. The Australian 3d Squadron, R. A. F., will be allotted to the American II Corps.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Col., G. S., C. of S.

182-32.1: Order

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

622 G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 20

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 5

MAPS: 1:20,000 57B S. E. and S. W.; 62B N. E. and N. W.

[Extract]

1. GENERAL PLAN:
   (a) The American II Corps will attack the enemy on a date which has been communicated verbally to those concerned and at an hour to be notified later.
   (b) This corps will attack with the 30th Division in the first line and the 27th Division in reserve.
   (c) The British IX Corps will attack on our right and the British XIII Corps on our left.

2. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS:
   (a) The American 30th Division will attack with one brigade in the first line and one brigade in reserve.

6. HEADQUARTERS:
Headquarters American 30th Division: F.27.c.9.4.
Headquarters American 27th Division: J.11.c.4.9.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff,
for
GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.
American II Corps.
Troop Movements of 27th Division

October 5, 1918.

C. G., American 27th and 30th Divisions

One brigade of the 27th Division will march to the northeastern part of the TINCOURT area tomorrow afternoon Oct. 6. Accommodations from area commandant TINCOURT. As accommodations will be limited, it may be necessary for part of the command to bivouac.

60th Brigade, American 30th Division will move from TINCOURT to HARGICOURT-BELICOURT area tomorrow the 6th inst., by march route MARQUAIX---HAMELET---ROISEL---TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD---HARGICOURT. Head of column will not enter HARGICOURT before 12 h. and not later than 13:50.

BUCHAN,
509-G-3, American II Corps.

-------

INTEILIGENCE APPRECIATION

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 6, 1918.

Showing the effect of recent operations on the enemy, and his present intentions.

Since September 27, the attacks on this front have been continuous and resulted in considerable success. On the 28th, a small attack was made near BELLENGLISE and secured the east line of trenches west of the main HINDENBURG Line in this area. On the 29th, this division and the 30th Division together with British and Australian troops, stormed the HINDENBURG Line from BELLENGLISE to Le CATELET and this was also secured. On September 30 and October 1, an improvement was made in our line by the capture of THORIGNY Ridge, Le TRONQUOY Tunnel, LEVERGIES, JONCOURT, SEQUEHART, ESTREES, FOLEMPRISE Farm, and the MILL Ridge. The northern end of BELICOURT Tunnel was secured and BONY completely mopped up on this same date. On the 2d, the enemy counterattacked at SEQUEHART and drove out the Allied troops, but they immediately recaptured the village. On the 3d, besides securing the whole of the BEAUREVOIR Line from SEQUEHART to a line on the north immediately west of BEAUREVOIR, RAMICOURT, GOUY, and PROSPECT Hill were also captured. On the 4th, Allied troops progressed east and northeast of Le CATELET and GOUY. On the 5th, BEAUREVOIR and MONTBREHAIN were taken and reports on this date indicate that the whole of CISANCOURT Farm is now held by Allied troops. Considerable amount of fighting was necessary to carry on this advance, as enemy troops had undoubtedly been ordered to forestall the breaking of the HINDENBURG Line and to hold at all costs, the BEAUREVOIR Line - his last line of defense. Numerous counterattacks were carried out by the enemy in an endeavor to recapture the BEAUREVOIR Line and to prevent the forcing open of the gap made through the HINDENBURG Line. During these counterattacks, SEQUEHART, MONTBREHAIN, part of the BEAUREVOIR Line, and PROSPECT Hill, again passed into his hands, but all these places have now been recaptured. In these operations, 14,664 prisoners, including 307 officers, were captured (of this amount, the 27th Division captured 17 officers and 782 O. R.'s). In addition, about 120 guns and a large number of machine guns were captured by our troops. During this operation, the enemy reinforced this front by several divisions. These divisions, however, were not fresh, but have been engaged several times during August and
September. The present German Order of Battle shows that the units on this front are very disorganized and that the morale of the infantry remains poor. During these operations, hostile artillery appeared to be much disorganized. Their counterattacks by infantry were poorly supported by artillery fire. The air activity has been increased and it is quite possible that this front has been strengthened by fighting machines.

Previous to the break in the BEAUREVOIR Line, no information had been obtained showing that the enemy intended to retire. On the 2d instant, however, a prisoner stated that it was essential to hold the BEAUREVOIR Line at all costs, until the VALENCIENNES-GIVET Line was completed. Since that time, much evidence has been obtained to show that the enemy was arranging a retirement. In some cases, artillery has been seen withdrawing from their emplacements. Prisoners also state that the civilian population was being evacuated. Numerous fires and explosions have been seen in the enemy's road opposite this front. A special examination of 3 officers of the 30th Inf. Regt., 54th Division, captured yesterday, produced statements that the Germans are shortly to retire to a new line being constructed along the high ground on the east bank of the OISE Canal; that the exhausted divisions now in line, are to be kept here as long as possible to enable other divisions which will hold the rear line, to rest. The rumor most current is that the Germans will retire to the VALENCIENNES-RETHEL Line for the winter. This line is said to be strong with concrete shelters, deep dugouts, and much wire.

**ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE:** The present Enemy Order of Battle opposite this front from BEAUREVOIR south, seems to be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>60th I. R.</th>
<th>121st Division</th>
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<tr>
<td>(with elements of 2d Guard Div.)</td>
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<td>473d I. R.</td>
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<td>474th I. R.</td>
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<td>472d I. R.</td>
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<td>179th I. R.</td>
<td>241st Division</td>
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<td>139th I. R.</td>
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<td>133d I. R.</td>
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<td>30th I. R.</td>
<td>24th Division</td>
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<td>67th I. R.</td>
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<tr>
<td>145th I. R.</td>
<td>34th Division</td>
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</table>

Prisoners of the 121st Division state that their division has suffered severe losses and it is noteworthy that this division and the 2d Guard Division are presumed to be holding one division front. The 2d Guard Division has been brought into battle on four separate occasions since August 8 and on each occasion has lost extremely heavy. The 241st Division has received drafts as reinforcements from the Ersatz of several divisions. The 34th Division is completely exhausted, according to prisoners' statements. In addition to other causes, there is no doubt that the morale of German troops has been appreciably lowered by the series of defeats in recent weeks and that the overwhelming superiority in field guns and the apparent unlimited supply of ammunition of the Allies on this front has lessened the control of German officers over their troops and that they will freely surrender if the opportunity presents itself.

W. T. STARR,
Major, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

By
A. B. Peterson,
1st Lieut.,
Div. Intelligence Officer.
**Medical Arrangements**

MEMORANDUM 24

Ref. Maps 62 C and B 1:40,000

[Extract]

INFORMATION: It is intended on the night of October 5/6 that the 30th Division will take over the line occupied by the Australian 2d Division.

1. Field ambulances will be allotted as follows:

- Main dressing station and gas center - 118th Field Ambulance
- Advanced dressing station - 132d Field Ambulance
- Walking wounded dressing station - 134th Field Ambulance
- Relay posts - TINCOURT (Tent Division, 119th F. A.).

11. The Division Surgeon's office will close at HERBECOURT at 0900 October 6, 1918 and open same date and hour at TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD (F.27.c.8.5.).

---

A. M. WHALEY,
Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.

---

**Battle Instructions for 30th Division**

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1 Series B

[Extract]

1. The 30th Division will attack on Zed day, Zero hour. The British 6th Division will attack on our right and the British 25th Division on our left.

2. Boundaries:

- Southern boundary of division: H.12.central---I.2.central---BRANCOURT Station (inclusive)---C.24.c.3.4.

These boundaries and the normal and contingent objectives are shown on map furnished Commanding General, 59th Brigade.
Troops of the 118th Infantry, south of railway, will be withdrawn north of same at one-half hour before Zero, and the railroad will mark the right of their advance. One platoon will, however, advance along the southern side of railway and close to it. The barrage of the 6th Division on our right is in rear of our barrage, but will be of sufficient depth to reach a line in prolongation of our first wave to protect the right flank. A gap of 300 yards south of our boundary will not be fired on by the 6th Divisional Artillery, but will be covered by our barrage.

Boundary between regiments: B.24.d.7.8---C.14.b.6.6 (south of VAUX-le-PRETRE Chateau)---C.9.c.3.0---C.9.d.7.7 (south of farm)---C.10.a.4.0---C.10.b.9.9---C.5.d.7.7.

3. The attack will be made with the 117th Infantry on the left, with one battalion in the front line, one battalion in support, and one battalion as brigade reserve.

The 118th Infantry will attack on the right with two battalions in the front line and one battalion in support.

After the normal objective *** is taken by the front line troops advancing under barrage, the barrage will halt for 30 minutes, 200 yards beyond the objective, after which the support battalions will advance and exploit to the Green Line or contingent objective. Troops will consolidate their respective objectives.

4. TANKS: One battalion heavy tanks will advance with the front line. Two companies whippets will assist in exploitation to contingent objective, and will not go beyond. Commanding officer, tanks, will report to Commanding General, 59th Brigade, and C. O.'s of tank companies will arrange with the respective infantry commanders, all details concerning the time and place of starting.

5. OBJECTIVES:

Contingent objectives: U.22.c.7.9---PREMONT (inclusive)---C.5.b.5.5---C.5.d.9.0---C.12.c.4.0---C.24.c.6.4.

6. ARTILLERY: The light artillery 18-pounder barrage will come down at Zero hour 200 yards in front of the infantry start line as shown on map barrage table. The 4.5" barrage will come down 200 yards in front of the light artillery barrage. The 18-pounder barrage will fall on the line designated as the objective of the attack of October 7.

The light artillery barrage will remain stationary 3 minutes after Zero hour and will advance for 12 lifts at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes and thereafter at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes to the normal objective and will halt 200 yards beyond same for one-half hour.

The heavy artillery will fire on selected points during the barrage and thereafter as long as the safety of advancing troops will permit.

Light artillery will be moved up within one-half hour after cessation of barrage and will be available for fire on selected points. Definite artillery units will be assigned attacking battalions for use when progressing from the normal objective to the contingent objective.

7. One battalion, 60th Brigade, to be designated by C. G., 60th Brigade, will move to JONCOURT vicinity on Y/Z night and will be subject to call of the C. G., 59th Brigade, for flank protection or to repel counterattacks.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.
PERIODICAL REPORT

12 M., Oct. 5 to 12 M., Oct. 6, 1918

[Extract]

3. Intense shelling during the night 5th/6th, H. E. and gas, on B.26.d.8.2. and C.1.0.0; enemy M. G.’s displayed little activity; a few gas shells fired on H.12.d. this morning, together with some 5.9’s; E. A. active from 0100 to 0200 over right regiment.

6. 59th Brigade (less artillery and regtl. M. G. cos.) took over that part of the line formerly held by the Australian 6th Brigade.

7. Brigade on our left changed location to B.26.a.8.5.

8. Orders received from II Corps, right and left divisions and supporting artillery brigades regarding pending attack.

10. No noteworthy action during period. 22 prisoners taken by the 118th Regiment.


14. Morale of our troops is excellent. They have been adequately supplied with water and food. Ammunition is well forward and troops are familiar with locations of dumps, amounts on hand, and sources of replenishment.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

---

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 30th Div.: Fldr. 3: Instructions

Battle Instructions for 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 7, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No. 2, Series B

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 6, 1918.

1. On the morning of October 7, at a Zero hour to be communicated later, the 59th Brigade will advance its line to a line running through the points 1.2.d.8.5-B.18.a.0.1. within the divisional sector.

2. This advance will be made under the protection of an artillery barrage, and when reached will be consolidated and held. This line marks the position of the artillery
barrage for the operation to follow in the morning of the 8th inst.
Maps showing the objective and barrage table will be furnished the Commanding General, 59th Brigade.

3. The Commanding General, 59th Brigade, and the C. R. A., Australian 2d Divisional Artillery, will synchronize watches at division headquarters 3 p. m., October 6.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Cmdg.

---------

230-34.1: Memorandum Order

Operations 30th Division

60th INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

October 6, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The 60th Brigade, plus 113th M. G. Battalion, Headquarters Train and Military Police, will move today, October 6, 1918, by road to the HARGICOURT-BELICOURT area.

* * * * *

8. Headquarters this brigade will close in this area and open in the new area at a time and place to be announced later.

9. ACKNOWLEDGE.

S. L. FAISON
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

---------

30th Div.: War Diary

October 5, 1918.

[Extract]

In compliance with Field Order 23, these headquarters, the 59th Brigade proceeded from the MESNIL area to NAUROY by bus and relieved the Australian 6th Division [ERROR: Aust. 6th Inf. Brigade, Aust. 2d Div.] in the front line on night 5th/6th. 60th Brigade and other units of the division proceeded to TINCOURT area in compliance with same order.

Available for all duty ) Officers 524
) Men 17,204

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Col., G. S., G-3.

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- 371 -
Movement of II Corps Headquarters

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 5, 1918.

MEMORANDUM for the Corps Staff:

The first echelon of these headquarters, consisting of the personnel and materiel at this place, will move to Bois de BUIRE, the former headquarters of the American 30th Division, tomorrow morning, the 6th instant, as early as practicable.

The rear echelon of these headquarters will be moved from MERICOURT-sur-SOMME to this place tomorrow afternoon.

The camp commandant will issue the necessary instructions for the move of the first echelon. The Adjutant General will have charge of the details of the move of the rear echelon.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.

---------

HS Brit. File: II Corps: Fldr. 5: War Diary

IX CORPS.

Place Date Summary of Events and Information
POEUILLY Oct. Corps Order No. 143, was issued giving the objective for an attack Q.29.d.6.7 5 to take place on the morning of 7th inst., in conjunction with the American II Corps (who were relieving the Aust. corps night 5/6) on the north and French XV Corps on the south. The attack to be carried out by 6th Div. with one bde. of the 46th Div. (139th) to hold the front on the south of our attack and to maintain touch with the French if they were unable to make progress.

---------


Order Battle British Fourth Army

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 6, 1918.

1. Reference Fourth Army No. 273 (G) Instructions for Operations.
2. Herewith revised Order of Battle at Zero, for the forthcoming operations.
3. Please acknowledge.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.
FOURTH ARMY

ORDER OF BATTLE AT ZERO

(a) IX Corps: Cdr. Lieut. Gen. Sir W. P. Braithwaite
   1st Division: Cdr. Major Gen. E. P. Strickland
   6th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. T. O. Marden
   32d Division: Cdr. Major Gen. T. S. Lambert
   46th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. G. F. Boyd

ARTILLERY

FIELD ARTILLERY

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Mixed 79 83

SIEGE BATTERIES

5th Cavalry Bde.: Cdr. Brig. Gen. N. W. Haig, C. M. G.
9th Sqdn. R. A. F.

1 Co. 6th (Light) Tank Bn. (8 whippets)
5th Tank Bn. (10 Mk. V)
216, 221, 567 A. T. Cos. R. E.
4th Siege Co., R. A., R. E.
No. 1 Advanced Section 353d E and M Co.
253, 254, 256 (Y) Cos. R. E.

(b) XIII Corps: Cdr. Lieut. Gen. Sir T. L. N. Morland
   18th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. R. P. Lee
   25th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. J. R. E. Charles
   *50th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. H. O. Jackson
   *66th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. H. K. Bethell

*Less arty. which will join the division later.
## ARTILLERY

### FIELD ARTILLERY

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35th Squadron R. A. F.
3d (light) Tank Bn. (16 whippets)
1st Tank Bn. (Mk.V)
144th, 283d, 288th A. T. Cos. R. E.
180th, 182d (T) Cos., R. E.
1st Siege Co., R. A., R. E.
No. 2 Advanced Section 353d E and M Co.

(c) American II Corps: Cdr. Major Gen. G. W. Read.
*American 27th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. J. F. O'Ryan

*Less divisional artillery.

### ARTILLERY

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3d Squadron Aust. F. C.
Hq. 4th Tank Bde. (also serves XIII Corps): Cdr. Brig. Gen. E. B. Hankey
6th (light) Tank Bn. (less 1 co.) (16 whippets)
301st American Tank Bn. (20 Mk. V)
4th Tank Bn. (12 Mk. V)
146th, 238th A. T. Cos. R. E.
Australian No. 1 A. T. Co. R. E.
Australian 1st and 2d Tunnelling Cos. R. E.
Detachment Australian E and M Co., R. E.
(d) **Australian Corps. (Army Reserve):** Cdr. Lieut. Gen. Sir J. Monash

Australian 1st Division: Cdr. Major Gen. T. W. Glasgow

* Australian 2nd Division: Cdr. Major Gen. C. Rosenthal

* Australian 3rd Division: Cdr. Major Gen. J. Gellibrand

* Australian 4th Division: Cdr. Major Gen. E. G. Sinclair-Maclagan


*Less artillery*

**Australian 3rd A. F. A. Bde.**

(e) **Cavalry Corps:** Cdr. Lt. Gen. Sir C. T. McM Kavanagh

1st Cavalry Div.: Cdr. Major Gen. R. L. Mullens

3rd Cavalry Div.: Cdr. Major Gen. A. E. W. Harman


Household M. G. Bde.

6th Sqn. R. A. F.

17th Armoured Car Bn.

(f) **Army Troops:**


15th Wing: Cdr. Col. J. Chamier

8th Sqn. ) for work with tank units


22d Wing

Single Seater Scouts:

23d Squadron (Dolphin) )

24th " S. E. 5 )

84th " " )

85th " " ) Fighting

92d " " ) balloon destruction

46th " Camels ) low attack

80th " " )

208th " " )

Two Seater Fighter:

20th Squadron Bristol Fighter---Fighting, bombing, reconnaissance.

Army Two Seater:

206th Sqn. de H.9 (Liberty engine) Bombing, reconnaissance, and photography.

Balloon Wing: Cdr. Col. F. F. M. Roxby.

Artillery:

1/2 456th Siege Batt. (1-9.2'' gun)

1/2 471st do (1-14'' gun)

1/2 543d do (1-12'' gun)

574th and 213th A. T. Cos. R. E.

353d E and M Co. (less 2 adv. sections)

D and Z Special Cos., R. E. (projector)

No. 8 Pontoon Park

No. 11 Pontoon Park

648th Field Co. R. E.

224th Transportation Works Co.
F. A. A. Battery
G do
P do
Q do
50th Field Searchlight Co., R. E.
1, 7, 16, 17, 36, 69, 3 Can., 4 Can. Searchlight Sections, R. E.
6th A. A. Co. 43d Garrison Bn., Royal Fusiliers.

5th Field Survey Bn.: Cdr. Lt. Col. F. B. Legh, M. C., R. E.
2, 13, 14, 24 Observations Groups

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B (II Corps)

**Zero Hour for British Fourth Army Announced**

No. 22
Fourth Army No. 20/32 (G)

1. The hour of Zero for the forthcoming operations by Fourth Army will be 5:10 on October 8.
2. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B II Corps: Letter

**British Fourth Army Artillery Instructions**

Fourth Army No. 20/34 (G)

FOURTH ARMY ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS

Reference Fourth Army No. 20/31 (G), dated 5-10-18

1. During the period between now and Zero:
   (a) Vigorous counterbattery work will be carried on.
   (b) Important localities to be selected by corps will be bombarded by heavy howitzers.
   (c) Normal harassing fire will be continued.
   (d) 6" guns will be sited well forward to deal with distant objectives.
   (e) Counterpreparations and S. O. S. plans will be put into force on each corps front, especially for the defense of MONTBREHAIN, BEAUREVOIR, and GUISEANCOURT Farm.
Artillery orders must be issued to subordinate formations early and no alteration should be allowed subsequently unless absolutely necessary.

2. On the day of attack:
   (a) Important localities in the hostile rear defensive system on each corps front must be kept under fire from Zero, not only by 6" guns, but also by such other guns and howitzers as can be spared for the purpose.
   (b) The IX Corps will arrange the barrage on their left flank in depth so as to protect the right flank of the American corps.
   (c) Arrangements should be made for the continuance of vigorous counterbattery work after the final objectives have been gained, and counterpreparation and S. O. S. plans should be settled in advance as far as possible.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

--------

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B II Corps: Letter

Attack by British Fourth Army Postponed

Fourth Army No. 20/35 (G)

1. Reference Fourth Army No. 20/31 (G), dated October 5, para. 1, and in confirmation of telephone message of this morning, Z day is postponed 24 hours.

2. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

H. PRIESTMAN,
Major,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

--------

Operations British 6th Division

6th DIVISION INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES C

No. 1

[Extract]

I. GENERAL:
   1. (a) The 6th Division will attack in the early morning on a date which has already been communicated to all concerned.

       * * * * *

- 377 -
(b) The American 30th Division is attacking on the left of the 6th Division.

3. The French First Army is attacking on October 6 with a view to taking FONTAINE-UTERTE and CROIX-FONSONOMME.

* * * * *

T. T. GROVE,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff.

182-32.11: Telegram

**Division Movement**

*October 6, 1918.*

C. G., American 27th Division:

Move 53d Brigade, Oct. 7, from TINCOURT area to HERVILLE area; not to start before 12 h. No restrictions as to road accommodations from area commandant HERVILLE.

Move remainder of division, Oct. 7, from PERONNE area to TINCOURT area, not to start before 12 h. via road through J.20. central. Accommodations from area commandant TINCOURT.

528 G-3 American II Corps.

182-32.11: Telegram

**Movement Precautions**

*October 6, 1918—20 h.*

C. G., 30th Division:

In the event of enemy withdrawing from his positions on corps front, division in line will follow up, keep close contact with patrols and suitable advance guards.

527 G-3, American II Corps.

227-32.1: Order

**Transfer of Brigades**

FIELD ORDER
No. 54

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 6, 1918—11:30 p.m.

[Extract]

1. Brigades will move October 7 by road march as below.
2.  53d Infantry Brigade from TINCOURT area to HERVILLY area.  
54th Infantry Brigade from PERONNE area to northeastern part of TINCOURT area vacated by 53d Infantry Brigade.

* * * * * 

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,  
Colonel G. S.,  
Chief of Staff.

* * * * * 

230-33.1: Operations Report

59th INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,  
October 6, 1918.

Period 2:20 h. to 12 h., October 6

[Extract]

3.  Intense shelling during night 5th/6th, H. E. and gas, on B.26.d.8.2 and C.1.0.0; enemy M. G.'s displayed little activity; a few gas shells fired on H.12.d this morning, together with some 5.9's; E. A. active from 0100 to 0200 over right regiment.

* * * * * 

6.  59th Brigade (less artillery and regtl. M. G. cos.) took over that part of the line formerly held by the Australian 6th Brigade.

* * * * * 

14.  Morale of our troops is excellent. They have been adequately supplied with water and food. Ammunition is well forward and troops are familiar with locations of dumps, amounts on hand, and sources of replenishment. Some trouble and inconvenience resulted from sending troops so far ahead of transport, and putting them into the line at once, but these difficulties were overcome by detailing officers to stay up and direct water carts and limbers to their units.

T. J. WYRICK,  
Major, A. G., Adjutant.

* * * * * 

- 379 -
Operations 59th Brigade

FIELD ORDER

59th INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

No. 25

October 6, 1918.

Reference: Map 62-B N. W., 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. In conformity to orders by wire from Hq. 30th Division, a portion of 3rd Battalion, 118th Infantry, now occupying the line along facing S. E. from H.12.a.0.2 to about I.7.b.7.8, will be relieved by units of the British 6th Division.

2. The relief will take place tonight. The hour and the details not covered in this order will be arranged between the C. O., 118th Infantry and the C. O., British 6th Division.

T. J. WYRICK,
Major, A. G., Adjutant,

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, October 6, 1918

1. During the night October 5/6, the XIII Corps completed the capture of BEAUREVOIR and established the line north of GUISANCOURT Farm. An attack N. E. of GOUY realized an advance of about 2,000 yards on a front of 2,000 yards and the line finally established N. of GUISANCOURT Farm in the BEAUREVOIR Line. The enemy's artillery was comparatively quiet during the morning, but revived slightly in the afternoon. The BEAUREVOIR area received a little attention and the BELLENGLISE---MAGNY-la-FOSSE and LEVERGIES area were shelled with H. E. and gas for a short period. Our artillery maintained their usual activity.

2. IX CORPS: LEVERGIES and SEQUEHART areas were heavily bombarded during the afternoon in reply to the increased activity of our artillery.

AMERICAN II CORPS: Quiet day with no abnormal shelling.

XIII CORPS: During the night, the 25th Division completed the capture of BEAUREVOIR, and established the line E. and N. E. of the village. 120 prisoners were captured. In the early morning, this division also cleared up the situation in the vicinity of GUISANCOURT Farm, which had been obscure since the morning of October 5, when the enemy counterattacked.

In conjunction with V Corps, the 50th Division pursued the enemy who withdrew to the BEAUREVOIR Line and in addition, captured and occupied the BEAUREVOIR Line from T.26 cent. to T.20 cent.
3. THIRD ARMY: In consequence of the enemy's retirement on the MASNIERES-BEAUREVOIR Line, the V Corps continued to advance. Enemy rearguards offered some resistance at MONTECOUVEZ Farm and MORTHO Wood. By evening, the line was held E. of AUBENCHEUL---BONNEENFANCE Farm and patrols were in touch with the enemy who occupied the MASNIERES-BEAUREVOIR Line.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: French XXXI Corps attacked N. of St-QUENTIN on a front of 5 kilometers between MORCOURT and SEQUEHART. REMAUCOURT, TILLOY Farm, and LESDINS were captured, with several hundred prisoners.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 622 hours were flown by 251 pilots. 15 reconnaissances and 35 artillery patrols were carried out, and 187 zone calls were sent down.
   197 offensive patrols were made. 11 indecisive combats took place.
   During the day, 337 25-lb. bombs were dropped and 12,755 rounds were fired at suitable ground targets. Owing to unfavorable weather no night flying took place.
   (b) Hostile: Activity decreased and was somewhat below normal. A big decrease in the number of F. E. A. was observed.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through army cages - 32 officers, 960 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s - 4 officers, 140 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Low clouds - high wind.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: American II Corps relieved the Australian corps, American 30th Division, relieving the Australian 2d Division in the line.
   Australian 2d, 3d and 5th Divisions went into army reserve.
   American 27th Division went into corps reserve.
   6th Division relieved the 32d Division and 46th Division in the line.
   The French relieved the 1st Division in the line.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   Australian Corps: Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th Divisions (army reserve).
   IX Corps: 1st*, 6th, 32d*, 46th Divisions
   5th* Cavalry Brigade
   XIII Corps: 25th, 50th, 66th*, 18th* Divisions.
   Cavalry Corps: 1st, 3d Cavalry Divisions, 4th Guards Brigade (army reserve).
   American II Corps: American 27th*, 30th Divisions.

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13-pdr. A. A. H. E.</td>
<td>337</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
<td>323</td>
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<tr>
<td>13-pdr. R. H.A. H. E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
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<td>&quot; S.</td>
<td>20,068</td>
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<td>&quot; Smoke</td>
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<td>4.5&quot; How. H. E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6&quot; H. E.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6&quot; Mk. VII H. E.</td>
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<td>9.2&quot; How</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot; S.</td>
<td>166</td>
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<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>867</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Corps reserve.
For period ending noon Oct. 6, 1918

[Extract]

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Moving forward in order to take over part of front line.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Part of front line sector taken over at 0600. Command of Australian corps area passed to C. G., American II Corps at 0900.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: British IX Corps on our right; British XIII Corps on our left.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

---------

II Corps: War Diary

October 6, 1918.

[Extract]

Command of Australian corps area passed to C. G., American II Corps at 0900; 30th Division moving in front line; 27th moving in reserve.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

---------
Relief of the Australian 6th Division [should read Brigade] by the 59th Brigade completed 2:20; 118th Infantry on the right and the 117th Infantry on the left. Preparations were made for a small attack on morning of the 7th for the purpose of straightening out line preparation for a future attack on a much larger scale. Division headquarters moved from HERBICOURT to quarries at TEMPLLEUX-le-GUERARD. 60th Brigade moved by marching into reserve area HARGICOURT and BELLCOURT.

Available for all duty  
  Officers 519  
  Men 16,876

* * * * *

C. BURNETT,  
Lt. Colonel, G. T., G-3.

---

The enemy was very active on our new positions during the night. The relief of the Aust. 2d Division front (6th A. I. Bde.) by the American 59th Brigade was completed about 0200. At 0900, the command of the corps front passed to G. O. C., American II Corps. On relief, the Australian corps is withdrawn into Fourth Army reserve.

Moves: A Regt., A Bde., American 30th Division relieved front line troops of Aust. 2d Division. B. Regt., A Bde., American 30th Division to support vicinity ESTREES. Aust. 2d Division moved to HARGICOURT-BELLCOURT on relief. Hq. Aust. 2d Division moved to DOINGT. B Bde., American 30th Division moved from TINCOURT to HARGICOURT.
**Operations of the II Corps Against Hindenburg Line**

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182-32.2: Location List

**Locations II Corps Units**

II CORPS, A. E. F.,  
October 7, 1918—6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 17

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)  
J.16.b.0.5. (62C)

II Corps Headquarters (Rear)  
N.15.d.cent (62C)

412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.  
HAMEL

17th Aero Squadron  
Near SAULTY

148th Aero Squadron  
BAIZEUX  
(Att. to 13th Wing  
3d Bde. R. A. F.)

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps R. A.  
J.16.b.0.5. (62C)

* * * * * *

Right Group Hq. Aust. 6th Bde. A. F. A.  
H.15.a.85.70 (62B)

* * * * * *

Hq. Aust. 2d D. A.  
F.27.c.8.4. (62C)

Comdg. Left Group  
H.7.a.05.85 (62B)

Left Group Hq. Aust. 5th Bde. A. F. A.

* * * * * *

Hq. VII Corps H. A.  
J.12.d.7.9. (62C)

* * * * * *

Hq. C. R. E. (Australian corps)  
BELLICOURT G.10.a.9.9.

* * * * * *

27th Division  
Division Headquarters  
J.11.c.4.9.

* * * * * *

- 384 -
30th Division
Division Hq. (Adv.)
Division Hq. (Rear)

F.27.c.8.4.
HALLE

F. E. BUCHAN,
Col., Asst. C. of S.
G. S., G-3.

227-32.2: Location List

Location Units 27th Division

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 7, 1918.

LOCATION LIST NO. 10
As of 10 a. m., October 7

[Extract]

Headquarters 27th Division

J.11.c.2.9.

53d Infantry Brigade Headquarters

J.18.a.

54th Infantry Brigade Headquarters

I.36.b.0.5.--DOINGT

Headquarters 102d Engineers

E.18.c.0.0.

105th Field Hospital
106th Field Hospital
106th Field Ambulance
107th Field Ambulance
133d Field Ambulance

J.32.c.--COURCEILLES

105th Mobile Veterinary Section
Ordnance Dump
Division Engineer

I.21.central
PERONNE
J.11.c.2.9.

- 385 -
SPECIAL EXAMINATION OF A VIZEFELDWEBEL (OFFICER ASPIRANT) BELONGING 3d M. G. CO., 81st DIV., CAPTURED BETWEEN ESTREES AND BEAUREVOIR (ON WATLING STREET) ON OCTOBER 3, 1918

REAR POSITIONS: As far as prisoner knows there are no properly prepared positions behind the BEAUREVOIR Line.

2d GUARD DIV.: The 2d Guard Div., whom they relieved about Sept. 20, took part in the counterattack on Oct. 2.

RESERVES: There are no reserves on this front---with a strong attack, the British could break through.

MORALE: The nerves of the Germans have gone and the troops are unreliable. He himself had the greatest trouble with his men. They wanted to run away, but he managed to persuade them that running away was more dangerous than staying still. They, however, put up a poor fight.

STRENGTHS: The 3d M. G. Co. consisted of 1 officer, 2 N. C. O.'s and 8 men.
The 11th Co. only numbered 8 all told.
Both the 2d Guard and the 21st Div. are completely played out.

GERMAN ARTILLERY: The German artillery is doing very badly. The guns must be worn out. Not only did they shell their own front lines, but a battery of German field guns was shelled by a battery of German heavies whose shells were falling 2,000 meters short of their target.

SIGNAL FOR LENGTHEN RANGE: The present signal for lengthen range is a red star followed by a white star.
Prisoner fired these, but instead of the German artillery lengthening range, the only result was that the British field guns promptly opened on his section of trench.

OUR GAS: Prisoner did not notice more than a trace of our gas. It was not dangerous at all in his sector.

POLITICAL VIEWS: Prisoner when under ordinary examination posed as a loyal German, under special examination asked “What are we Germans carrying on this war for: Simply to save the KAISER and his family.

"Germans are sick of this. There will be a revolution in a very short time now---about a month or 6 weeks.

"The war is lost, and the French will get the left bank of the RHINE. The British army have won every other war and are winning this one.”

(N. B.: This man has been a good soldier. He has the Iron Cross, 1st Class, and has fought in RUSSIA, SERBIA, and on the Western Front since 1914. The failure of his morale is therefore interesting.)

Fourth Army (1).
October 7, 1918.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B (II Corps): Letter

Instructions for the Attack by British Fourth Army

Fourth Army No. 20/36 (G)

1. Reference Fourth Army No. 20/31 (G), dated 5-10-18.
PREMONT-BOIS DE FRAICOURT AREA
Looking east-northeast from Wiancourt, towards Fraicourt Farm
2. The following will be the arrangements for lifting artillery fire after the cavalry corps pass through:
   (a) The zone of action of the cavalry corps will be an area E. of our infantry line bounded on the south by the line C.28.central---V.24. central and on the north by the line U.21.central---0.34.central.
   (b) Within this area artillery fire will be lifted off as follows, after the cavalry have passed through:
      (i) The 14" guns will lift off BUSIGNY at Zero plus 5 hours.
      (ii) The 9.2" guns will cease firing.
      (iii) Fire of artillery under command of corps will be confined to targets engaged by direct observation or in answer to zone calls.
   (c) In order that all batteries may receive due warning of the advance of the cavalry through our infantry line, the following special measures will be taken in addition to the ordinary means of communications:
      (i) American II and XIII Corps will each detail a special contact aeroplane whose only duty will be to notify the passage of the cavalry through our infantry line, by wireless, to all artillery units in possession of a wireless mast.
      (ii) A special rocket "Golden Rain" will be sent from the hq. of the leading cav. bde. as the cavalry pass through our infantry line.
      The hq. of the leading cav. bde. will be located in vicinity of the ROMAN Road E. of BEAUREVOIR.
   (d) 5th Brigade, R. A. F., will take steps to ensure that all observers know the area in which the cavalry will be operating and will warn them of the danger of mistaking our cavalry and horse artillery for German transport or guns.

3. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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230-32.7: Order

Operations 30th Division

ORDER
No. 160

AUSTRALIAN 2d DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY,
October 7, 1918.

Reference Maps: Sheets 62B N. W., 62B N. E., 1/20,000
Barrage Map A (already issued to groups)

[Extract]

1. (a) INTENTION: The American 30th Division intends to attack on Z day with the assistance of tanks and under an artillery barrage. Z day and Zero hour will be communicated later.
   (b) The 6th Division (IX Corps) on the right and the 25th Division (XIII Corps) on the left are attacking in conjunction, the former's action being in the nature of a conforming movement to the American 30th Division advance.
(c) The attack of the American 30th Infantry Division is to be carried out as follows:

On the Left: American 117th Infantry Regiment with one battalion in the front line, one in support, and one in bde. reserve.

On the Right: American 118th Infantry Regiment with two battalions in the front line and one battalion in support.

Objectives are as follows:


(ii) Second Objective: (Green Line): The general line C.24.c.6.4---C.12.c.4.0---C.5.d.9.0---C.5.b.5.5---PREMONT (inclusive)---U.22.c.7.8.

(e) BOUNDARIES:


2. The field artillery covering the American 30th Div. operation will be under the command of the C. R. A., Aust. 2d Div., and will be grouped as follows:


6th Army Bde. A. F. A.
10th A. F. A. Bde.
11th " "
13th " "
14th " "

Left Group: (Under O. O. 5th A. F. A. Bde., Hq. H.8.d.1.5).

5th A. F. A. Bde.
4th A. F. A. Bde.
7th A. F. A. Bde.
8th A. F. A. Bde.
12th Army Bde. A. F. A.

3. FIELD ARTILLERY BARRAGE:

For Capture of the Red Line:

(a) The attack will be carried out under a field artillery barrage in accordance with Barrage Map A [not found], except when amended by the following:

(i) 18-pdrs. will open on the plus 9 line, rest there till plus 9 minutes and then lift to the plus 12 line, the barrage then moving as per Barrage Map A in lifts of 100 yards per 3 minutes to the plus 36 line, thence onwards the rate of advance will be 100 yards per 4 minutes until the protective line is reached. The barrage will rest there till plus 174 minutes and then cease.

(ii) 4.5" hows. will take part in the barrage, moving 200 yards in advance of 18-pdrs. throughout, paying special attention to selected points.

N. B. The infantry jumping-off line is being modified accordingly.

Times shown on Barrage Map A are times of lifting.

(b) Group commanders will superimpose the fire of exploiting brigades (see para. 4) in order to allow of their fire being taken off at plus 116 minutes.
(c) Rates of Fire:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rounds per gun per min.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pdrs. 4.5&quot; Hows.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In creeping barrage</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On protective line</td>
<td>1 1/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Ammunition: Ammunition will be used as follows:

18-pdrs.
- 50% "A"
- 44% "AX" with delay or 106 fuses
- 6% "AS"

4.5" Hows.
- "BX" with 106 fuses as far as supplies allow, then no restriction.

4. ACTION OF FIELD ARTILLERY DURING EXPLOITATION:

(a) To support the exploitation to the Green Line, F. A. brigades will be detailed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>6th Army Bde. A. F. A.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With the Am. 118th Inf. Regt.</td>
<td>12th Army Bde. A. F. A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instructions have already been issued for O. C.'s above F. A. brigades to arrange necessary details with the respective regiments.

(b) O. C.'s above F. A. brigades will keep close touch with their respective regimental commanders during the barrage. Exploiting F. A. brigades will move forward at plus 116 minutes and support the further advance of the infantry.

(c) Batteries of these F. A. brigades will pay special attention to the engagement of enemy guns which are holding up the tanks or infantry, and particularly in the case of 4.5" Hows., to counterbattery work, by engaging all NF calls possible. The wireless masts of these brigades will accompany the 4.5" Hows. battery.

(d) One section from each exploiting F. A. brigade will be detailed for close support of the infantry during exploitation.

5. F. O. O.'s:

(a) Special stress is laid on the necessity for obtaining and reporting information. Full use will be made of every means of communication possible.

* * * * *

(c) All normal O. P.'s will be manned from Zero hour onwards.

6. LIAISON: For liaison duty with the infantry, officers will be detailed as follows:

(a) With American 59th Brigade (Hq. G.17.b.55.65.), a senior officer from left group.

(b) With each of the American 118th Regiment and American 117th Regiment---an officer not below the rank of captain, from the right and left groups, respectively.

(c) With each attacking battalion---an officer from the group concerned.

7. HEAVY ARTILLERY ACTION: The Corps H. A. are cooperating in the barrage and with counterbattery work.

The 9th Brigade R. G. A. is affiliated to the American 30th Division for exploitation purposes.
8. PRECAUTIONS FOR ENSURING ACCURACY OF FIRE: The necessity for observing all the precautions laid down for previous operations for ensuring accuracy of fire, is again to be impressed on all concerned.

9. HARASSING FIRE PRIOR TO ZERO HOUR: Every effort will be made, by the selection of the most suitably placed F. A. Bdes., to maintain normal harassing fire up to Zero hour.

10. S. O. S. ARRANGEMENTS PRIOR TO ZERO HOUR: S. O. S. arrangements will be inoperative from Zero minus 15 minutes to Zero hour.

11. MOVES OF F. A. BRIGADES: Moves of F. A. brigades to their forward positions will be carried out in accordance with paragraph 3 of Aust. 2d D. A. Order No. 159. All guns will be in action in forward positions by Zero minus 1 hour.

12. ECHELONS: All echelons will be full at Zero hour.

13. ACKNOWLEDGE by wire.

C. A. CLOWE,
Major, Brigade Major,

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230-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

ORDER
No. 61

1st CAVALRY DIVISION,
October 7, 1918.

VALENCIENNES 1/100,000

[Extract]

1. All previous orders and instructions are cancelled, with the exception of Cavalry Corps Instructions No. 7 issued to brigadiers.

2. (a) The Third and Fourth Armies will attack the German armies opposed to them on Z day, as under:

   (i) Third Army in the general direction of CAUDRY.
   (ii) Fourth Army in the general direction of BOHAIN.

   * * * * *

   (c) The French First Army will attack with objective - the line ESSIGNY le PETIT---FONTAINE-UTERTE, and, if successful, will exploit east of that line.

3. The task of the cavalry corps is:

   (a) To move in the general direction of Le CATEAU, securing the railway junction at that place, and at BUSIGNY.

   (b) To operate against the flank and rear of the enemy opposing our Third and First Armies; during this stage the cavalry corps will work in close cooperation with the above-mentioned armies.

   (c) To cut the enemy's communications about VALENCIENNES.

   * * * * *
5. In consequence: The infantry (American and XIII Corps) advance to the line of exploitation (Green Line) will be closely followed by the advanced troops of the 9th Cavalry Brigade, who will report on the situation as required in 4 (a).

Instructions for the advance of the 1st Cavalry Division forward from their concentration area are issued separately.

* * * * *

1st BOUND:
9th Cavalry Brigade: Le TROU-aux-SOLDATS, valley slope V.2., P.31, L'EPINETTE; sending a special detachment to interrupt the railway junction southwest of HONNECHY as early as possible.
1st Cavalry Brigade: High ground west of La SABLIERE Bois, BUTRY Fm., east of wood, in touch with 9th Cav. Bde. on left about Le TROU aux SOLDATS.
2d Cavalry Brigade: High ground L'EPINETTE (exclusive), IRIS Farm, Bois de PINON, and covering east and southeast exits of ELINCOURT.

2d BOUND:
9th Cavalry Brigade: Ridge west of Le CATEAU, astride the CAMBRAI-Le CATEAU Road, Point 150, spurs commanding the crossings of SELLE River at MONTAY and SELLE Valley south of NEUVILLY to about RAMBOURLIEUX Fme.
Particular attention is to be paid to covering, with artillery and M. G. fire, the eastern road exits of Le CATEAU and the crossings at MONTAY.
1st Cavalry Brigade: Spurs overlooking valley between Le CATEAU (in touch with right of 9th Cavalry Brigade) and St-BENIN (inclusive).
The 1st Cavalry Brigade will send a special detachment as early as possible to secure and cut the railways about station between Le CATEAU---St-BENIN.
2d Cavalry Brigade: In touch with left of 9th Cavalry Brigade about RAMBOURLIEUX Fme, crossroads northeast of La SOTIERE and covering all approaches in an easterly and southeasterly direction from TROISVILLES.

7. Should the situation then permit, the high ground north and east of Le CATEAU will then be occupied and preparations made for a further advance on VALENCIENNES.
In consequence:
(a) 9th Cavalry Brigade will push their right forward on to the high ground east of Le CATEAU, north and inclusive of the main CATILLON Road, with outposts to BAZUEL---POMMEREUIL---FOREST---AMERVAL---NEUVILLY Station.
The railway lines southeast of Le CATEAU will be cut as soon as possible.
(b) 1st Cavalry Brigade will conform, and occupy the high ground southwest of BAZUEL, maintaining touch between right of 9th Cavalry Brigade and 3d Cavalry Division.
(c) 2d Cavalry Brigade will push forward on to spur northeast of, and high ground northwest and west of, TROISVILLES.

8. Approximate report centers, so far as can be foreseen, will be:
Representatives of 1st and 2d Cavalry Brigades will report at divisional hq. at zero minus 15 minutes.
(2) Div. hq. B.27.c.6.8

9. Instructions as to employment of armored cars are issued separately.
10. C-Flight, No. 6, Sqn. R. A. F., will cooperate with 1st Cavalry Division and will carry out special reconnaissances as under
   (i) To ascertain whether the high ground north, northeast, east, and south of Le CATEAU is clear of the enemy.
   (ii) To report on any enemy movement in or about Bols-l'ÉVEQUE.
   (iii) To ascertain the situation with regard to advanced troops of Third Army on our left.
11. Z day and Zero hour will be notified later.

Issued at 0800

[Signature Illegible]
Lt. Colonel,
General Staff,
1st Cavalry Division.

230-32.7: Operation Order

Operations II Corps

6th Division No. G.48/58 (385)

1. The hour of Zero for the forthcoming operations will be 5:10, October 8, 1918.
2. Acknowledge.

6th Division Hq.
October 7, 1918

182-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 5 II CORPS, A. E. F.

From 18 h., Oct. 6 to 18 h., Oct. 7, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS
   (a) Infantry: By a successful operation early this morning, the line was advanced slightly between MONTBREHAIN and BEAUREVOIR. A hostile attack on the left sector at 17 o'clock was repulsed and the situation completely restored.
   (b) Artillery: At request of the infantry, C.13.a and C.7.a., and C.1 were shelled. Harassing fire by heavy caliber guns on BRANCOURT, PIETY Farm, I.3.b, roads and woods. 14-inch gun fired on BUSIGNY and BOHAIN. Counterbattery work consisted of concentration and harassing fire during the night on C.9.a.9.5, C.24.c.5.7, C.22.c.8.2. C.8.b.7.4,
3. **HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:** Fairly active during period. Some increase in activity in the last 24 hours. Between 22:20 and 06:05, the following areas were shelled: H.9, H.2, H.8, and B.25. Field guns and howitzers lightly shelled H.1, and FOLEMPRISE Farm, G.4.a and H.10.c. During the night some gas around SWISS Cottage, L.2 and ESTREES shelled by 15-cm. gun during the night, and battery positions in JONCOURT by 15-cm. howitzer. Battery position in H.10.a harassed during the day.

4. **ENEMY DEFENSE:** French corps reports that 2 French prisoners who escaped the night of October 6 state that on the 5th instant, the enemy began a line of trenches east of BOHAN, REGNICOURT, and VAUX. Work was being done by prisoners of war and pioneers.

5. **ENEMY'S ATTITUDE:** Officer prisoner from 20th Division stated that there could be no counterattack made by that division on account of their weakness and general low morale. The fact that a counterattack was made would indicate that the line has been reinforced.

6. **MOVEMENT:** Low clouds and ground mist made visibility poor throughout the day. No movement was observed.

7. **FIRES:** At 15:35, there was an explosion followed by fire in PONCHAUX.

8. **AIRCRAFT:** Antiaircraft fire slight. Between 5:00 and 6:30, two formations of Fokker bi-planes were seen patrolling at 3,000 feet. One of our machines attacked without decisive results.

9. **SUMMARY OF PRISONERS' STATEMENTS:** 20th Division
   a. **ORDER OF BATTLE:** The order of battle is obscure, but appears to be from north to south: 92d Inf. Regt., 77th Inf. Regt., 79th Inf. Regt.
   b. **STRENGTH:** The division is very weak. The 2d Bn. of the 77th Inf. Regt. had a total strength of 56 men, composed principally of drafts from heavy transport. An officer states that the division is likely to be relieved immediately because of its weakness. The bns. of the division averaged 60 to 80 men in strength.
   c. **MOVEMENTS:** Division in line south of CAMBRAI. Withdrew to NAVES, September 27 to 28, 1918. Put in reserve along Canal de l'ESCAUT, between RAMILLIES and ESWARS, remaining in line one day and was withdrawn to RIEUX, where it remained four days. It then went into the line northwest of MONTBREHAIN. It traveled by St-HILAIRE, CAUDRY, CLARY and MARETZ. Division entered the line on the evening of the 6th instant.
   d. **MORALE:** 20th Division
      The morale of both officers and men of the 20th Division is very low. There is absolute lack of any offensive spirit. Officers expressed the opinion that Germany is beaten and their one wish is for peace.

   KERR T. RIGGS,
**Zero Hour Announced for II Corps Operations**

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 7, 1918.

**AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 6**

1. The hour of Zero for the forthcoming operations by the American II Corps will be 0510, Oct. 8.
2. Acknowledge by wire.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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182-10.2: Telegram

**Danger of Rumors**

From: G-1, American II Corps  
Date: October 7, 1918  
Hour: 1520  
To: Commanding General, 30th Division, A. E. F.

203/G1. You will publish following telegram from Fourth Army to your command. "There are indications that the attention of officers and men is in danger of being diverted by insidious rumors from their single task of defeating the enemy. Field Marshal, Commander-in-Chief, warns all ranks against the disturbing influence of such unfounded peace talk and wishes it to be clearly understood that at no time has there been a greater need of relentless effort or a fairer promise of great results. The army will concentrate its entire energy on bringing the operations in the field to a successful and decisive issue."

Lieut. Colonel, G. S.

---
II Corps Heavy Artillery Instructions

H. O./5
INSTRUCTIONS
No. 1

Reference sheet
62B N. W. Ed. 5b.
Local 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. An operation will be carried out on Z day by the American II Corps in cooperation with the IX and XIII Corps.
   Zero hour will be notified later.
2. The 30th Infantry Division’s objective will be the line C.2 central---C.29.a.5.2., followed by exploitation.
3. H. A. brigades will carry out a creeping barrage in lanes as per barrage map, special attention being paid to the areas marked in red (BRANCOURT to be engaged in depth).

   * * * * *

   T. I. CUNNINGHAM,
   Major, R. A.

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Operations II Corps

No. 563-G-3

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 8

American II Corps Operations Instructions, Series A, No. 7, paragraph one---artillery is cancelled.

The 18-pounder barrage will be put down at Zero hour, 200 yards in front of the infantry starting line and will proceed in accordance with American II Corps Operations Instructions, Series A, No. 5, and American II Corps Artillery Instructions No. 1, and barrage map A accompanying same.

By command of Major General Read:

   F. E. BUCHAN,
   for
   GEO. S. SIMONDS,
   Col., G. S., C. of S.

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- 396 -
Administrative Orders

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 7, 1918.

WARNING ORDER:

The American II Corps will attack on a date and hour to be notified later. The attack will be made with the 30th Division in the line and the 27th Division in reserve. No further duty has yet been assigned this division, but brigades will be prepared to move forward if called upon.

Headquarters 27th Division will be at J.11.c.4.9.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. A.,
Chief of Staff.

Movement 27th Division

ORDERS
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 7, 1918.

No. 101

Reference Map: 62C 1:40,000

1. The following in connection with operations directed by Field Orders No. 54.

2. Billeting: Billeting parties will precede their organizations, those of the 53d Brig., applying to Area Commandant at HERVILLY, and those of 54th Brig., to Area Commandant at TINCOURT, for accommodations. Advance parties will, on arrival of their units, conduct them to their quartering areas.

3. Extra Transportation: Property for which no regular transportation is provided will be left under suitable guard, properly rationed, until transportation is available. Lorries to move such property will probably be available as follows:

   1 to hq. each brigade
   2 to hq. each regt.

   The lorries assigned to regiments will make several trips.

4. Supply: Railhead from Oct. 7., KOISEL

5. Locations: Units on arrival in new areas, will make immediate report by runner to these hq. (G-1), giving the locations of their hq., and transport lines.

6. Water Supply: Locations of wells, horse troughs, and water points, as given in Par. 5, Orders 95.

7. Condition of Quarters: Medical officers of units concerned, will make an inspection of the locations occupied by their several organizations to ensure that the camp sites and quarters have been thoroughly policed and left in proper sanitary state. All
measures necessary to effect such conditions, will be taken prior to departure of units.

8. Ammunition: Small arms ammunition to complete mobile reserve of units, will be delivered today, vicinity J.18.a.

The 1st line transport of organizations of 53d Brig., will be refilled before moving to HERVILLY area. The same procedure will be followed on Oct. 8, by organizations of 54th Brigade.

By command of Major General O’Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 25 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

6 a. m., Oct. 6 to 6 a. m., Oct. 7, 1918

1. OPERATIONS: Indentifications: One prisoner from the 67th Regt., 34th Division was captured in I 7b about dawn October 7. He advised that he came into line opposite our front, Friday, after a four day tour opposite St-QUENTIN. Other prisoners: During the period, 15 wounded prisoners passed through aid stations.

(a) Hostile Activity. Artillery. Enemy shelled the following areas during the afternoon: Co. hq. in H 6 central with gas; crossroads in H 6c 4.3 with 5.9’s and crest in H 17a, our front lines in H 12c and d, with 77’s and I 7 a and b, with both gas and H. E. The villages of RAMICOURT and MONTBREHAIN were shelled continuously throughout the afternoon.

Machine Guns. Enemy M. G. located in I 13a 5.3 fired on our trenches at H 12d. M. G. located in I 7a, in vicinity of DOON Mill, was active against our planes and trenches in our left subsector of our right regiment.

Trench Mortars. Trench mortar in MANNEQUIN Hill, in I 13d, active against our trenches in I 7c and I 7a. There is believed to be a trench mortar in I 2d 6.3.

Aerial. Several E. A. flying low over our lines during the morning were driven back by our A. A. guns. Two British planes flying low over JONCOURT and vicinity at 3:30 p. m. were engaged by our M. G. when they failed to answer signals. It is believed they were manned by German flyers.

(b) Our Activity. Artillery. Our artillery active during the day on DOON Mill, firing a little short. At 5:05 p. m., our artillery laid down a heavy barrage on enemy lines opposite battalion on right of right regiment.


Trench Mortars. Nil.

Aerial. Our reconnaissance planes active during the day.

Patrols. Small patrols maintained lateral communications between companies in the front line and with units on our flanks.

A daylight patrol of one officer and three men left our lines at I 2 c 5.8, for the purpose of reconnoitering DOON Mill and vicinity. They worked up sunken road from I 2c 65.80 for about 450 yards, but were driven back by rifle fire from enemy positions along ridge north and south of DOON Mill.

2. HOSTILE MOVEMENT: Small working party seen digging at I 13a 6.2, wiring party of 25 men in I 13a and b. Movement observed along railway at I 2 b 3.2. Enemy observed
moving supplies northward from C 26b 2.2. About noon, 100 men seen in C 23, moving toward BRANCOURT. Snipers operating at I 7d and I 2b 3.2.

3. MISCELLANEOUS. When barrage was laid down by our artillery on enemy in front of the units on our right, numerous single white flares, single green flares, and triple orange flares were sent up by enemy in order named.

Our snipers were active throughout the period on enemy movement I 13c and I 8b.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S.,G-2.

NOTE: Only one regimental report has been received up to 6:40 p. m., but an annex will follow this report.
Operations II Corps

Fourth Army, B. E. F.

537 G-3, Oct. 7, 1918

Later situation report received from 30th Division at 0720: E. A. nil. Enemy arty. normal. Captures nil. Pushed forward at 0515 to jumping-off line. Thought to be taken without trouble. Will be confirmed later. The situation is quiet.

SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff, American II Corps.

American II Corps, 0800.

Operations II Corps

Fourth Army, B. E. F.

539 G-3, 7-10-18

30th Division straightened out their line this morning north of MONTBREHAIN. All their objectives taken. Captures: 160 prisoners, including 2 officers. Line runs as follows: B17 D10.10 B24 D10.8 B25 D10.6 12A4.0 12C2.2.

BUCHAN

American II Corps

0925

HS Brit. File: Fldr. 4 and 5 (30th Div.): Summary of Operations

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

October 7, 1918.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS, October 7, 1918

1. The American II Corps advanced the line slightly during the day N. W. of MONTBREHAIN and replused a counterattack.
   Local penetrations were made by the XIII Corps on the BEAUREVOIR Ridge and N. E. of GUISANCOURT Farm and a few prisoners captured.
   The enemy’s artillery was less active on the SEQUEHART area, but increased slightly in the vicinity of BEAUREVOIR. H. V. guns were very active on this area, shelling BONY
Special programmes of fire were arranged in support of our operations, and in addition, special harassing fire was directed on roads and areas of activity.

2. IX Corps: Fairly quiet day. No infantry operations were attempted. A few Green Cross gas shells were directed against the RAMICOURT area during the night.

AMERICAN II CORPS: Hostile attempts to regain MONTBREHAIN during the night were unsuccessful. The American 30th Div. carried out a minor operation in the morning, and realized an advance of 500 yards on a front of 1200 yards N. W. of MONTBREHAIN. 150 prisoners were captured. Enemy counterattacks during the afternoon were repulsed with loss.

XIII CORPS: N. W. of BEAUREVOIR, the 25th Division advanced the line 500 yards between the village and GUISANCOURT Farm.

Patrols of the 50th Division made some progress between GUISANCOURT and VILLERS Farms, capturing a few prisoners.

3. THIRD ARMY: Situation unchanged.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: As the result of a violent counterattack yesterday, the enemy captured TILLOY Farm.

At 1500, the French attacked BELLICOURT and TILLOY Farms. The attack on the latter was held up by machine-gun fire from the outskirts of the farm and very little progress was made. South of MORCOURT, OWL Alley N.35.c. was captured with 40 prisoners.

5. AIRCRAFT:

(a) British: 316 hours were flown by 217 pilots. 6 reconnaissances and 21 artillery patrols were carried out. 44 zone calls were sent down. 100 offensive patrols were made; 4 indecisive combats took place. 1 of our machines is missing.

9 112-lb. bombs and 108 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various targets by night, and during the day, 87 25-lb. bombs were dropped and 3310 machine-gun rounds fired at various ground targets.

(b) Hostile: Activity was very slight owing to unfavorable weather conditions.

9 F. E. A. and 4 A. E. A. crossed the line.

6. PRISONERS:

Through army cages 4 officers, 269 O. R.
Through C. C. S.’s 2 officers, 27 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Stormy

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: No moves of importance took place.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:

Australian Corps: 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th Aust. Divs. (army reserve).
IX Corps: 1st,* 6th, 32d,* 46th Divisions.

5th* Cavalry Brigade

XIII Corps: 25th, 50th, 66th,* 18th* Divisions.
American II Corps: 27th,* American 30th Divisions
Cavalry Corps: 1st, 3d Cavalry Divisions ) army reserve.

4th Guards Brig. )

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13-pdr. A. A. H. E.</td>
<td>1,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>” S.</td>
<td>768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3” 20-cwt. H. E.</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>” S.</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-pdr. H. E.</td>
<td>12,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>” S.</td>
<td>14,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>” Smoke</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Corps Reserve.
4.5" How. H. E. 8,454
60-pdr. H. E. 3,026
6" H. E. 11,400
6" Mk. VII H. E. 196
" S. 194
8" How. 1,727
9.2" How. 802
12" How. 25
14" Gun 17
60-pdr. S. 3,206

182-33.3: Operations Report

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 7, 1918.

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 7, 1918

[Extract]

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Prisoners captured by our 30th Division this morning state expected attack since morning October 6, that they have been slowly withdrawing their forces.

9. Action DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: ***30th Div. straightened out their line this morning north of MONTBREHAIN. All their objectives taken. Captures 160 prisoners, including 2 officers. Line runs as follows: B.17.d.10.10, B.24.d.10.8, B.25.d.10.6, I.2.a.4.0, I.2.0.2.2.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.
182-33.3: Message
Date: October 7, 1918
Hour: 12:50
To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

551-G-3: Situation 24 hours ending 0600, October 7. 30th Division completed relief of Australian 6th Brigade. E. A. nil. Enemy artillery normal. Line pushed forward at 0515, 500 yards on a front of 4,000 yards. * * *

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30th Div. War Diary

October 7, 1918.

[Extract]

The 59th Brigade holding the line advanced under an artillery barrage to a line running through I.2.d.8.5 and B.18.a.0.1. The 60th Brigade remained in the HARGICOURT-BELLICOURT areas, with exception of the 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry, which moved by marching to a point southeast of NAUROY to be 59th Brigade reserve.

Available for all duty  

  Officers  514

  Men  16,356

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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182-32.2: Location List

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

October 8, 1918--6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 18

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)    J.16.b.0.5. (62C)
II Corps Headquarters (Rear)    N.15.d.cent. (62C)
412th Tel. Bn. Hq.              HAMEL
17th Aero Squadron             Near SAULTY
148th Aero Squadron            BAIZEUX
   (Att. to 13th Wing
   3d Brig. R. A. F.)

- 403 -
BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps R. A. J.16.b.0.5 (62C)
Hq. Aust. 4th D. A. G.22.b.2.8. (62B)

Commdg. Right Group
Aust. Brig. A. F. A.

Right Group Hq. Sixth Army Brig. A. F. A. H.15.a.85.70 (62B)

Hq. Aust. 2d D. A. F.27.c.8.4 (62C)
Commdg. Left Group

Left Group Hq. 5th A. F. A. Brig. H.8.d.1.5. (62B)

Hq. VII Corps H. A. J.12.d.7.9. (62C)

Hq. 4th Tank Brigade D.28.central (62C)
3d Squadron A. F. C. BOUVINCOURT
15th Wing R. A. F. CARTIGNY moving to
5th Balloon Wing BERNES Q.4.a.7.2. (62C)
F.30.a.6.0

AMERICAN UNITS

27th Division
Division headquarters J.11.c.2.9. J.18.a.
53d Infantry Brig. Hq.

105th M. G. Bn. Hq. J.15.a.9.9. 1.36.b.0.5
54th Infantry Brig. Hq.

30th Division
Division Headquarters (adv.) F.27.c.8.4. HALLE
Division Headquarters (Rear) NAUROY
59th Infantry Brig. Hq.

60th Infantry Brig. Hq. G.16.a.7.6.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Col., Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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- 404 -
Dispositions on British Fourth Army Front

No. 28
Fourth Army No. 20/37 (G).

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 8, 1918.

1. The Fourth Army front according to latest reports received runs approximately MERICOURT (inclusive)---FRESNOY-le-GRAND (exclusive)---JONNECOURT Farm (exclusive)---BRANCOUCOURT (inclusive)---MIGNON Wood (exclusive)---PREMONT (inclusive)---SERAIN (inclusive)---ELINCOURT (exclusive), with patrols out in front of this line. Right of army in touch with French about 1.32 a., and left in touch with Third Army about U.7.b.

2. Approximate objectives for tomorrow's attack, together with the tactical boundaries between corps and neighboring armies are shown on attached map.

3. The Third Army are attacking on our left at the same hour; the French First Army are attacking on our right.

4. Tanks will be allotted tomorrow as follows:
   IX Corps - 1 bn. Mk. V (5th Brig.); 1 co. Whippets.
   American II Corps - 2 bns. Mk. V (4th and 301st Bns.);
                     2 cos. Whippets.
   XIII Corps - 1 bn. Mk. V (1st); 1 co. Whippets

5. Counterbattery boundaries will coincide with the tactical boundaries.

6. Cavalry corps will keep close touch with the situation and be prepared to take advantage of any break in the enemy's defense.

7. Zero hour for tomorrow will be 5:20 a.m.

8. Acknowledge by wire.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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Dispositions for Attack by British Fourth Army

No. 27
G.308

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 8, 1918—12:35 p.m.

Ref. 1 over 40,000 map. Corps will secure and hold ground as follows: XIII Corps. ELINCOURT high ground U.10.c. and d. U.16.a and b., and get touch with American corps at Copse in U.24.a. American II Corps. High ground U.24. and 30, MIGNON Wood in D.1 and C.12, Farm in D.7.a. High ground C.18, spur D.13 and get touch with IX Corps on high ground east of BRANCOUCOURT in D.19.a. Farm D.25.b., high ground overlooking FRESNOY in I.12, I.11, I.17 MERICOURT. French have been asked to push on to get touch at MERICOURT. Cav. corps to push on as already ordered. Ack.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col., G. S.
182-32.7: Message

Positions of British Units

From: XIII Corps, B. E. F.

Date: October 8, 1918  Hour: 1325

To: II Corps

G-448. The 25th Division will establish itself on Green Line and reorganize its leading brigade, ensuring close junction with American 30th Division. It will patrol forward and establish a strong post about MARCH Copse.

66th Division will secure its position on Green Line and endeavor to establish strong posts on high ground running through U.9.c. and feature in U. L. O. C. and D.

66th Division will reorganize its troops in Red Line, preparation for further advance.

50th Division will maintain its present protective positions on left flank of the 66th Division and will concentrate the remainder of their infantry in area N. E. of GOUY pending further orders.

Acknowledge.

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182-32.7: Fldr. 9

British IX Corps Operations

From: IX Corps, B. E. F.

Date: October 8, 1918  Hour: 18:04

To: II Corps

G-163, Ref. 40,000 map Fourth Army, direct corps to secure and hold ground as follows: American corps copses in U24a and 30 MIGNON Wood in D1 and C12, farm in D7a, high ground C18, spur in D13 and get touch with IX Corps on high ground E. of BRANCOUCOURT in D19. IX Corps high ground D19FM. high ground overlooking FRESNOY in I-12 and 11, I-17 and MERICOURT, 6th Div. will carry these objectives. It is particularly important that these on the left be gained in order not to keep back the American corps. Outflanking movement through American area should be carried out if necessary, MERICOURT will be attacked in accordance with our G158. 5th Cav. Brig. is placed on receipt of this order under 6th Division for mounted action. On objectives being gained, 46th Division will be pleased to take over corps front S. of MONTBREHAIN-FRESNOY Road, excl.

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Relief of American 30th Division Front

From: 25th Division A. D. M. S.

Date: October 8, 1918 Hour: 18:15

To: American 30th Division

7th Brigade will relieve portion of American 30th Division front tonight as soon as possible. The new right boundary of 25th Division will be U.29.a.3.7. up to which point 7th Brigade will take over the line on completion of relief and dispositions of 7th Brigade in new line will be forwarded to division as soon as possible. 75th Brigade will move up one battalion to SONIA Wood to relieve 9th Division who will be required in closer support by 7th Brigade. Name of battalion detailed and arrival at SONIA Wood will be reported to division. For purposes of future operations, the new right boundary of division will be continued as follows: U.29.a.3.7, U.33.b.8.4 MAY Copse (inclusive to 25th Division) around west edge of MARETZ Wood---V.8.c.6.8.--V.9.a.6.2 to V.5.a.0.0.

Continuation of British Fourth Army Attack

From: IX Corps, B. E. F.

Date: October 8, 1918 Hour: 19:45

To: II Corps

G-165. Fourth Army will continue offensive tomorrow of IX Corps. First, BOHAIN-FRESNOY Railway to 130B3.7 and thence connect with French. Secondly, BOHAIN, 46th Division will attack on right and 6th Div. on left. Dividing line center, grid line 10 cent.---L.12 cent. 46th Division will relieve 6th Division from right of corps front to above grid line as soon as G. O. C., 6th Division, considers it tactically possible.

Attack will be dependent as regards time and scope on situation tonight and progress of French. 1st Division will close up near Canal tomorrow. 5th Cav. Brig. will return to corps reserve and will send mounted patrols forward at dawn over whole corps front to ascertain situation.
Corps Boundaries

From: IX Corps, B. E. F.
Date: October 8, 1918 Hour: 19:45
To: II Corps.

G-166. In continuation of Corps No. 165 of today. Dividing line between American and IX Corps for this operation will be as follows: Farm on railway in C24 a, inclusive, to IX Corps, along railway to farm C18D90, inclusive, to IX Corps TILLEUL Quarries, inclusive, to IX Corps-D10c8.8 kink of road---D11a2.8-W.25 cent. Acknowledge.

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Fourth Army Advance for October 9

From: XIII Corps, B. E. F.
Date: October 8, 1918 Hour: 21:30
To: II Corps

B.459. Instructions No. 4, Series A. Ref. sheet 57B 1/40,000.
Northern boundary T.12.c.---wood O.34.c.4.6. (incl.) road and track junction P.25. A.1.9. Fme Jamaica. B.15.c.0.0. Road and track junction P.15.b.8.2. Interdivisional boundary Chaussee-ROMAINE [ROMAN Road], incl., to right division as far as crossroads U.1.A.2.0., thence straight line through HONNECHY Church to P.23.c.
Attack to be carried out by two divisions in line, 25th Division right, 66th Division left. Mobile artillery to each division, three brigades, R. F. A. and affiliated brigades R.9.A. Chaussee-ROMAINE for transport purposes, common both divisions.
66th Division will keep traffic as far as possible on roads north of this main route. Acknowledge---divisions by phone.

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- 409 -
British IX Corps Plan for October 9

From: IX Corps
Date: October 8, 1918 Hour: 21:40
To: II Corps

G-167. Advance will be continued on whole front 5:20 tomorrow. 6th Division will take over from American corps up to railway tonight, in accordance with boundary given in G-166, and will attack JONNECOURT and BRANCOUCOURT Farms at that hour if not already captured, and push their advance against the BOHAIN-FRESNOY Railway, the advances of the left flank of the corps line is particularly important.

46th Division will capture MERICOURT and reconnoiter FRESNOY with a view to attack later in the day if strongly occupied and push forward their left flank in touch with 6th Division on right 5th Cavalry Brigade.

5th Cavalry Brigade will be prepared to push forward patrols directly JONNECOURT and BRANCOUCOURT [Farms?] are taken and will assemble the brigade sufficiently far forward by 6:00 to take advantage of any opportunity which may arise.

5th Cavalry Brigade will place two troops at disposal of 46th Division for reconnaissance southwards.

ORDER NO. 144
IX CORPS, B. E. F., October 8, 1918.

[Extract]

2. The Third and Fourth Armies will continue the attack at 5:20 tomorrow. The French First Army, which is now in possession of FONTAINE-UTERTE, will continue the attack at 10:00 tomorrow.

3. The attack of the IX Corps will be carried out by the 46th and 6th Divisions. The 46th Division will take over the corps front from its southern boundary to the grid line 1.10, 11, 12.central. The 6th Division will take over from their present left to the new boundary with American II Corps.

4. The first task of the 46th and 6th Divisions will be the capture of MERICOURT and JONNECOURT Farms respectively. The 6th Division will then push towards the 1st objective. It is particularly important that the left flank of the corps keep level with the advance of the American II Corps.

The 46th Division will reconnoiter FRESNOY and prepare an attack should it appear to be strongly occupied.

5. The 5th Cavalry Brigade will push patrols forward at dawn on the corps front north of FRESNOY. The brigade by 6:30 will be in a position of readiness to take advantage of any opportunity that may offer in a northeasterly direction. Two troops will be placed at the disposal of the 46th Division for reconnaissance southwards.
6. The 1st Division will be assembled in the neighborhood of BELLENGLISE in accordance with orders separately issued.
7. Separate orders have been issued as regards the redistribution of artillery. Counterbattery boundaries coincide with the tactical boundaries.
8. Tanks are allotted as follows:

- 6th Division: 1 company of Whippets.
- 46th Division: 1 bn. Mk. (5th Bn.)

9. G. O. C., 6th Division, will retain hq. and 2 cos. 2d Life Guards M. G. bn., and will place 2 cos. at disposal of 46th Division.

10. Acknowledge.

Brig. General,
General Staff, IX Corps.

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230-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

AUSTRALIAN 4th DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

RIGHT GROUP FIELD ARTILLERY

October 8, 1918.

ORDER NO. 204

Reference Maps, 62 B N. W. and N. E. and 57 C, S. E.

[Extract]

1. INFORMATION: The American 30th Division will continue the attack of the morning of October 9, 1918, with the American 118th Inf. Regt., on the right and the American 117th Inf. Regt. on the left. (118th Regt. Headquarters—I 1 c 2 8).

The attack will be accompanied by tanks.
The infantry will halt for 30 minutes on first objective.
Zero hour will be 5:20 a. m.
The first objective will be

- V 9 a 0 5---V 15 Cent.---
- V 21 d 7570, thence along road
- V 27 b---D 9 Cent.---D 9 c 0 0---
- D 14 d Cent.

The second objective will be

- V 5 c 1 9---V 11 Cent.---V 18 a 0 0---
- D 5 Cent.---thence D 5 c 5 0.

2. RIGHT GROUP COOPERATION: The right group, with the Aust. 10th F. A. Brigade covering the right half, the 6th Army Brigade Aust. F. A. covering the left half, and the Aust. 11th F. A. Brigade (less 1 section) superimposed, will barrage S. O. S. line (i. e., 18-pdrs., a line 300 yards and 4.5" howitzers, 500 yards east of the Green Line objective of operation carried out on 7th instant) from Zero hour to Zero plus 4 minutes; from Zero plus 4 minutes onwards, brigades will search all woods, depressions and likely assembly areas within brigade zones, at the rate of 100 yards per 4 minutes up to extreme range of guns when the Aust. 11th F. A. Brigade will advance to closely support the further advance of the infantry with direct observation. 6th and 10th Brigades cease firing.
One section of the Aust. 11th F. A. Brigade will advance at Zero hour to support the infantry advance throughout with direct observation.

The Aust. 10th F. A. Brigade and 6th Army Brigade Aust. F. A. will not advance until ordered by right group headquarters.

Rate of Fire: 3 rounds per gun per min. during lifts providing
2 " how. " ammn. estab. will permit.

Ammunition: 50% A, 45% AX, and 5% AS, where available.

3. BOUNDARIES OF RIGHT GROUP; On the South---C24 b 0 6---road D 9 d 7 3, along road through D 10 c and D 10 b.
   On the north---C 12 a 6065---C 6 c 0 0---V 26 Cent.---V 18 c 0 0.
   Between 6th and 10th A. F. A. Brigs.  C 18 b 0065---V 29 b 0 3

4. D. A. C.: Sections of Aust. 4th D. A. C. will be affiliated to Aust. 10th and 11th F. A. Brigades and will move forward with full echelons at Zero hour to MONTBREHAIN.

*****
Major,
Brigade Major,
Australian 4th Divisional Artillery.

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230-32.7: Operation Order

Operations II Corps

6th DIVISIONAL ORDER NO. 259

1. The 6th Div. front will be reorganized tonight with a view to an advance on the whole front at 5:20 h. on October 9.

2. The 6th Div. will be relieved on the front south of the E. and W. grid line through I 9 central, I 11 cent., by the 46th Div. during the night October 8/9.

3. Details of above relief will be arranged direct between B. G. C.'s 16th and 138th Inf. Brigs.

4. The 6th Div. will relieve the American 30th Div. on the front as far north as the farm on railway in C 21 A, inclusive, to 6th Div.

5. Details of above relief will be arranged direct between B. G. C.'s British 71st and American 59th Inf. Brigs.

6. The 6th Div. front will be held by 16th Inf. Brig. on the right and 71st Inf. Brig. on the left, the 18th Inf. Brig. will be in div. reserve disposed in depth from MONTBREHAIN---FONTAINE-UTERTE Road, inclusive, westwards.

7. Boundaries after relief will be:
   Southern divisional boundary: I23C0.0---I 10A0.0, thence eastwards along grid line.
   Interbrigade boundary: I 7 C 7.5---I 5 a 0.0 (Doon Copse, inclusive, to right brigade)---thence eastwards along grid line through I 5 Cent.---I 6 Cent.
   Northern divisional boundary: C 28 Cent.---along railway to farm in C 24 A (inclusive to 6th Div.)---to farm C 18 d 9.0 (inclusive to 6th Div.)---Tilleul d'ARCHIES.

8. The 16th and 71st Inf. Brigs. with attached M. G. cos. as for today's operations will attack at 5:20 h. under a creeping barrage.

9. Barrage will open at Zero as above on the line I 11 a 0.0---C 29 Cent. It will remain on this line for 10 minutes and will then advance by lifts of 100 yards at the rate of 100 yds. in 3 minutes till it reaches a line 300 yards beyond the first objective. It will form a protective barrage on this line for 10 minutes and will then cease to admit of exploitation.
10. The first objective will be road I 12 a 8.0 through I 12 a and I 6 d to I 6 b 4.2, and thence up the spur in C 30 d to C 30 b 7.0. JONNECOURT Farm is to be occupied. 16th Inf. Brig. will form a defensive flank along the spur in I 11 and 12. After the protective barrage ceases brigades will exploit along their whole front as far as the line of the railway through J 8 a---J 2---D 26---20 and 14---16th Inf. Brig. maintaining a defensive flank north of FRESNOY-le-GRAND and 71st Inf. Brig. securing touch with American 30th Div., who are advancing on our left.

11. Arrangements are being made for artillery to form a smoke screen on the northern edge of FRESNOY and to bombard sunken roads leading north out of FRESNOY and the work at I 17 cent.

12. If it is found that the enemy is retreating the 5th Cav. Brig. will pass through and the 6th Div. will continue its advance in support of them. The advance in this case will be made on a one brigade front, 71st Inf. Brig. group leading. 16th Inf. Brig. will, if necessary, continue to watch the northern exits of FRESNOY to cover the flank of the advance and 18th Inf. Brig. will be prepared to move forward and follow 71st Inf. Brig.

This further advance will only take place on an order from div. hq.


T. L. GROVE,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, 6th Division.

8/10/18 [Oct. 8, 1918].

Issued at 21:15 h.

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182-33.3: Summary Intelligence

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 8, 1918.

From 18 h., October 7 to 18 h., October 8, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS:

(a) Infantry. The corps attacked at 5:10 in conjunction with corps on our right and left. Operation was very successful and met with only weak opposition. The line was advanced an average distance of 5,500 yards.

(b) Artillery. During the operations of today, barrages were carried out according to plan. Concentration on following batteries - C22a43, C18c75, C8a58, and C4b54. Long-range artillery fired on FRESNOY, SERAIN, and ELINCOURT. About 16:00 batteries answered S. O. S.

* * * * *

4. ENEMY DEFENSES: Two French prisoners of war just escaped from BOHAIN state that a few days ago they and other French and British prisoners of war and about 1300 civilians were working on a new line east of BOHAIN. This line is to guard against tanks and is four meters broad, and is protected by a deep belt of wire. It runs approximately from ESCAUFORT (northeast of BUSIGNY)---west of REGNICOURT through Bois de RIQUERVIAL---RETHEUIL Farm.
5. MINES: Escaped French prisoners state that the following places are mined. The railways running into BOHAIN. The mine at the bridge just west of the town, railway near SAMBRETON Road at LANDRECIES. Nearly all bridges in the back areas, including the bridge at J2a.

6. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: The French soldiers mentioned above state that they were told by their guards that if the Germans are defeated on this front, they intend to fall back to MAUBEUGE. This information is borne out by statement made the night of October 7 by two German officers of the 92d Regiment, 20th Division, who state that heavy transport is now on the Belgian frontier near MONS.

* * * * *

KERR T. RIGGS,

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II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 8, 1918.

AERIAL ANNEX—AMERICAN II CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Reports from dawn to 18 h.

SUMMARY

WEATHER: Low clouds and ground mists early this morning, becoming clear and allowing good visibility during the afternoon.

OPERATIONS: Acting in conjunction with operations carried out by II American Corps, cooperating with flank corps, 3 artillery, 2 counterattacks, 3 contact, and 2 special patrols (bomb dropping) were successfully carried out. Calls for flares and discs were generously answered by our infantry. Reports to 1800 our infantry holding approximate line, north to south: C5b.55., C11d.7.8., C11d.9.4., C18a.2.7., C24c.2.6., C23d.6.2., C29a.9.5., i5a.18., 110b.8.8. We hold railway line in C28b and c strongly; also sunken road in C24d and railway line in C23 and 24.

* * * * *

AMERICAN II CORPS, BRANCH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE.
Attached to 3d Squadron, A. F. C.

In the field.

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- 414 -
Orders

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

FIELD ORDERS
No. 21

MAPS: 1:40,000 57B and 62B

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 9

[Extract]

1. GENERAL PLAN: The Fourth Army will continue the advance tomorrow Oct. 9 at 0520. The IX Corps will attack on the right, the American II Corps in the center, and the XIII Corps on the left.

2. CORPS PLANS:
   (a) The American II Corps will attack in the general direction of St-SOUPELT, with the American 30th Division in the front line and the American 27th Division in reserve.
   (b) The corps boundaries are:
       Northern boundary: U 28 b 8.8---U 23 Central---U 24 a 0.9---U 18 b 5.0---V 7.d. 0.0---V 8 central---V 9 b 0.8---V 4 b 5.0---V 5 a 5.5--- the American II Corps will connect with the XIII Corps at U 28 b 8.8.
       Southern boundary: Farm on railway in C 24 a (exclusive)---along railway to farm C 18 d 9.0 (exclusive)---TILLEUL d'ARCHIES (exclusive)---D 10 c 8.8---kink in road---D 11 a 28---W 25 central.

3. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS:
   (a) The American 30th Division will attack with one brigade in the front line and one in reserve. The boundaries of the divisional sector will be the same as those of the corps.
   (b) The starting line of the American 30th Division will be the line of exploitation (Green Line) of operations of Oct. 8.
       The first objective is the line: V.8.b.2.7---V 15 central---V 22 a 0.0---south along road to D 9 central---D 9c.0.0.
       The line of exploitation: V 5 a 5.5---V 5 d 0.0---V 17 d 9.0---V 23 d 4.0---V 29 central---D 3 c.3.0.
   (c) Artillery: Artillery instructions will be issued later.
   (d) Tanks: The 4th Tank Battalion (approximately 8 heavy tanks) are allotted to the 30th Division. The C. O., 4th Tank Battalion will get in touch with 30th Division for instructions in connection with these operations.
       The C. O., 3d Aero Squadron will make arrangements for low-flying aeroplanes to cover with their noise the approach of the tanks. The tanks will be 4,000 yards behind the start line at Zero minus 4 hours. The planes are to work from that vicinity gradually forward and the tanks will reach the starting line at Zero hour.
       All infantry will be warned of the use of these planes for this purpose in order that they may not be mistaken for enemy planes.

* * * * *

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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- 415 -


Administration II Corps

G-4

[Extract]

(7) Locations.

American II Corps Headquarters.

Advanced echelon J.16.L.0.5. (sheet 62c)
Rear echelon N.15.d.central (sheet 62c)

American 30th Division Hq. F.27.c.8.4.

J. P. TERRELL,
Lt. Col., G. S.

Orders for Attack

October 8, 1918.

To: American 30th Division

The 30th Division will secure and hold high ground U.24 and 30 MIGNON Wood in D.1 and C.12 Farm in D.7.a. and high ground C.18 spur in D.13. Get in touch with IX Corps on high ground east of BRANCOCOURT in D.19.a. XIII Corps is to get in touch with 30th Division at copse in U.24.a.

595 G-3, AMERICAN II CORPS.

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Administrative Orders

ORDERS
No. 102

Reference Maps: 62B 1:40,000
62C 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. II Corps Area. Includes TINCOURT and HERVILLY areas.
   Area commandants are located at TINCOURT and HERVILLY.

2. COMMUNICATIONS.
   Railheads, broad gauge

   Ammunition
   Supplies
   Engineer stores
   Personnel

   TINCOURT (XU)
   ROISEL
   ROISEL
   La CHAPELETTE

   Plan of supply. By horse transport from railhead to refilling point. By horse
   transport from refilling point to units.

4. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS. Evacuation of sick and wounded, by sanitary train as at
   present, to Casualty Clearing Stations Nos. 50, 53, 58, and 12 at TINCOURT.
   Nos. 41 and 48 on ROISEL--TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD Road.
   No. 37, M. A. C. evacuates to the above from dressing stations.

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By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Movement 27th Division

FIELD ORDER
No. 56

1. Troops of the division will move by road march as follows:

2. 54th Infantry Brigade will march tonight from the TINCOURT area to the VILLERET-
   BELLCOURT area. Advance parties should be sent forward at once to arrange for camp sites.
   After arrival in the new areas, the 54th Infantry Brigade will be prepared to move forward
   on short notice.
3. 53d Infantry Brigade will remain in the HERVILLY area tonight, but will be prepared to move forward on short notice at any time after 9 a.m., October 9.

4. Divisional Troops: The following organizations will march from the TINCOURT to the HERVILLY area by road march on October 9, clearing their camps by 7:30 a.m:

- 102d Field Signal Bn.
- Co. B, 102d Engineers
- 104th Machine Gun Bn.
- 102d Engineer Train.

No restrictions as to route. Billeting parties will be sent in advance to report to area commandant HERVILLY for accommodations.

5. The military police, sanitary trains, and mobile veterinary section will remain in the HERVILLY area.

6. The location of the headquarters of brigade, regiments and separate units will be notified to these headquarters as soon as they are located.

7. Division headquarters will remain in the Bois de BUIRE until 12 noon, October 9, thereafter probably at the Quarry at TEMPLEUX le GRAND [GUERARD?], as to which orders will be issued later.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 26 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
6 a.m., October 7 to 6 a.m., October 8, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS: At 6 a.m., October 7, our troops, following an artillery barrage, attacked on a front of approximately 3,000 yards for the purpose of straightening out our line. The attack was successful and the line was straightened out as follows: Diagonally through B 17 d, B24a and d, C 25a and b, to the east outskirts of MONTBREHAIN.

Indentifications: During the period, 2 officers and 75 other ranks passed through the division cage unwounded, and 15 other ranks passed through the aid stations, making a total of 2 officers and 90 other ranks. The prisoners through the cage belonged to the following organizations:

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<td>24th</td>
<td>179th</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>20th</td>
<td>92d</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>92d</td>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
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<td>77th</td>
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<td>34th</td>
<td>67th</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>75</td>
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Battalion average strength: Prisoners stated strength of their battalions to be from 60 to 80 men.

(a) Hostile Activity. Artillery. MONTBREHAIN and vicinity heavily shelled during the entire day; the village and H 10a and d, and H18a being gassed in the afternoon. ESTREES was also subjected to shelling throughout the entire period.

(b) Our Activity. Artillery. Our artillery showed increased activity during the afternoon and night, firing on selected targets. A creeping barrage was laid down at 5:10 a.m., which was reported accurate. Our artillery fired on a line: C 22a 5.5 to C 15a 2.5, in response to an S. O. S. call from a battalion O. P. and the enemy troops in that vicinity were disbursed.

Machine Guns: M. G.'s were distributed among our attacking forces and followed the barrage at 5:10 a.m., covering the attack.

Aerial: Our planes very active during the period.

Patrols: The usual lateral communication patrols were sent out. A combat patrol of 1 officer and 15 men left our lines at I 7b 7.0 at 5 a.m. (Oct. 7), crept down sunken road for about 500 yards to I 7d 7.5, where it encountered a strong enemy patrol of 20 men. The enemy party was bombed and rushed. One prisoner was taken and the remainder killed. Patrol returned to our lines at point of departure (time not given).

2. ENEMY MOVEMENT: At 3 p.m., considerable movement observed on railroad in I 3a 3.7. This appeared to be a working party. At 3:50 p.m., men seen going south on road C 16 central; troops were massing at this point. At 4:10 p.m., an enemy platoon in artillery formation was seen moving N. W., east of hedge at C 15d central. Transport seen on road C 16b 2.9, going S.

3. MISCELLANEOUS: Throughout the day our snipers were active on German snipers.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

182-33.3: Instructions

Battle Instructions for 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 8, 1918.

NO. 1, SERIES C

1. The 30th Division will attack tomorrow at an hour to be designated later; the IX Corps attacking on our right and the XIII Corps on our left.

2. The 59th Brigade will attack and capture the first objective, marked on the attached map in Red, coordinates as follows: D.15.a.00.85---D.9.b.25.35---northerly along road to railway crossing in B.21.d---thence to V.9.c.37.0.---V.9.a.3.0---V.9.a.25.65.

3. The 60th Brigade will pass through immediately thereafter and will attack and capture the second objective, marked on the attached map in Green, coordinates as follows: D.5.c.3.0---V.24.a.1.0.---V.11.d.2.0---V.11.b.0.0.---V.5.a.5.0.
4. The C. B. A. will arrange such artillery support as can be given.
5. One battalion of heavy tanks will precede the attack.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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182-33.3: Instructions

**Operations 27th and 30th Divisions**

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 8, 1918.

NO. 2, SERIES C

1. Artillery barrage will come down 300 yards in advance of Green Line now occupied and will remain stationary for four minutes. Thereafter, it will advance at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes until the extreme range of the guns is reached. Thereafter, guns which have been moved up will fire on points in front of advancing infantry. Infantry must not stop when barrage ceases, but will continue on to objective.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

---


From: 30th Division

Date: October 8, 1918

To: General Headquarters, A. E. F.

[Extract]

A. Rain and mist during night; clearing up at noon.
B. Enemy M. G. strong points encountered along our front.
C. Enemy arty. active on our immediate front on advancing troops and captured village of BRANCOURT; our artillery covered advance at 15:10 this morning, by barrage, up to the objective of our first attack, and harrassing fire on strong points and roads during exploitation of success.
D. E. A. and balloons inactive.
E. Poor, except toward 12 noon.
F. 59th Brigade moving forward in attack; 60th Brigade following up as reserve. Captured German officer reported at 11, the 21st Div. and transport coming S. W. from St-SOUPLET through La HAIE-MENNERESSE.

G. Very favorable.

J. Yesterday, our enemy counterattack was replused north of MONTBREHAIN. The 59th Brig. at 5:10 today, with the 117th and 118th Regt. in the line, on a 4 kilos. front and in face of strong resistance, gained all first objectives by 9 a. m. and the contingent objectives by 12 noon; cavalry still exploiting the success of our first attack. Prisoners in today's attack still coming in freely at 14:50. Officers and 1056 O. R. have passed through this cage. Have advanced 4 to 5 kilos. capturing BRANCOURT, VAUX-le-PRETRE, BRONX Farm, FRAICOURT Hill, BETA Hill, PREMONT, FRAICOURT Farm, and part of BETA Copse.

L. Our line now runs N. to S. eastern outskirts PREMONT, C 5 B Cent., C 5 D 9 0, C 12 C 5 0 to C 24 C 6 4. 2 batteries 10.2 captured by 117th Reg.

Amer, 30th Div. 4:30 p. m.

----------------

230-32.16: Memo Order

Location Headquarters 59th Brigade

MEMORANDUM ORDER

59th INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

October 8, 1918--13:05.

No. 76

1. These headquarters will close at NAUROY (G.17.b.5.6) at 4 p. m., today, and open at H.10.a.2.3 at the same date and hour.

2. Lieut. Rye and some men will go forward at once to make preparations.

By command of Brigadier General Tyson:

T. J. WYRICK,
Major, A. G., Adjutant.

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230-32.15: Orders

Movement 60th Brigade

60th INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

October 8, 1918.

MEMORANDUM ORDERS:

1. This brigade (less 1st and 2d Battalions, 120th Infantry), will move by road this afternoon (October 8, 1918) from its present location to the area RAMICOURT---WIANCOURT---ESTREES---JONCOURT and BEAUREVOIR trench system.
2. Organizations will occupy areas as laid down in Message No. 4, this day, with the modification that the area of 120th Infantry is extended eastward to include RAMICOURT and the area of 119th Infantry is extended eastward to include WIANCOURT.

3. (a) Organizations will move into new areas as early as possible. 115th M. G. Battalion will precede 119th Infantry. Commanding Officer, 115th M. G. Battalion will arrange route and details of movement with Commanding Officer, 119th Infantry, and will move under his orders.

(b) The 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry is being used by 59th Brigade. Orders in reference to this unit will be issued later. Reservation in new area will be arranged for it by Commanding Officer, 120th Infantry.

2d Battalion, 120th Infantry is at disposal of Commanding General, 59th Brigade, and will probably remain in vicinity of MONTBREHAIN.

4. Administrative orders will be issued later.

5. These headquarters will close at present location and open in ESTREES at a time to be announced later.

6. Acknowledge.

S. L. FAISON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.
October 8, 1918

1. In conjunction with French First Army on the right and Third Army on the left operations were continued by the Fourth Army between SEQUEHART and AUBEN CHEUL-aux-BOIS.

The first objective, or Red Line, represented an advance of 3500 yards and included BRANCOUCourt. The final objective for the day was the Green Line E. of MERICOURT---BRANCOUCourt---E. of PREMONT---E. of SERAIN.

The troops engaged in the operation comprised:

(a) IX Corps: 1st,* 6th, 32d,* 46th Divisions.
American II Corps: American 27th,* 30th Divisions
XIII Corps: 18th,* 25th, 50th,* 66th Divisions.

Cavalry Corps:
1st, 3d,* Cavalry Divisions
4th Guards Brigade
Household M. G. Brigade

* corps reserve.

(b)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IX Corps</th>
<th>American II Corps</th>
<th>XIII Corps</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. F. A. Brigs.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. G. A. Brigs.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ungrouped siege batteries</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 422 -
(c) 3d Tank Brigade (allotted to IX Corps)

1 co. 6th Light Tank Bn. (8 whippets).

4th Tank Brigade

6th Light Tank Bn. (less 1 co.) (16 Whippets) ) Allotted to American II Corps

301st American Tank Bn. (20 Mark V) ) Allotted to American II Corps

4th Tank Bn. (12 Mark V)

3d Light Tank Bn. (16 Whippets) ) Allotted to XIII Corps

1st Tank Bn. (12 Mark V)

17th Armoured Car Bn. (attached to cav. corps)

5th Brigade R. A. F.

One squadron attached for special reconnaissance work to the cavalry corps.

* * * * *

48 hours prior to the attack, in addition to the normal harassing fire, vigorous counterbattery work was carried out and important localities bombarded with heavy howitzers. 6" guns were sited well forward to deal with distant objectives. On the day of the attack, the activity of our artillery was increased two-fold and long-range batteries engaged special targets incessantly.

It was anticipated that opportunity would occur for the cavalry to pass through the Green Line during the day. This necessitated special arrangements to be made for controlling the fire of the heavy artillery on the area to be exploited by the cavalry. This area embraced BOHAIN, BUSIGNY, and MARETZ, and as soon as the cavalry passed through the Green Line, the fire was to be lifted off this area, except that of field guns confined to targets engaged by direct observation.

Zero was at 5:10 a. m., at which hour the 18-pdr. barrage came down 200 yards in advance of the infantry starting line and the 4.5" barrage 200 yards beyond the 18-pdr. barrage. Lifts of 100 yards were made every three minutes, the first lift being at Zero plus 3 minutes. After the twelfth lift and until the Red Line was reached, lifts occurred at 4-minute intervals. A protective barrage was maintained on the Red Line for 30 minutes, after which the barrage ceased.

The enemy's reply to the artillery bombardment was very weak and towards the end of the day almost absent. The American II and XIII* Corps gained their objectives, which included BRANCOURT-le-GRAND, PREMONT, and SERAIN. The enemy were reported to be in full retreat in this sector. The IX Corps gained the Green Line on the left, but on account of the French being held up from the south were obliged to form a defensive flank from BEAUREGARD---W. of MERICOURT---FONTAINE-UTERTE.

* British.
The main centers of the enemy’s resistance were the localities of BRANCOURT-le-GRAND and SERAIN. These were strongly defended with machine guns which held up the infantry for a short period.

When the Green Line had been captured by the infantry, the 1st Cavalry Division, supported by Whippet tanks, attempted to pass through with the immediate object of securing the high ground west and N. W. of Le CATEAU. Heavy machine-gun fire was encountered S. W. of MARETZ and patrols were unable to make much progress.

The enemy appeared to be holding the line BOHAIN---BUSIGNY---MARETZ---ELINCOURT in strength. Consequently, the cavalry were withdrawn temporarily until a more favorable opportunity presented itself.

The success of the operation may be attributed in no small degree to the efficiency of the tank corps.

The 1st and 3d Tank Battalions operating with XIII Corps rendered invaluable assistance in dealing with machine-gun nests. The former battalion assisted in the capture of SERAIN, which held up the infantry advance for some time. The tanks supported the IX and American II Corps and also did good work, accounting for a considerable number of machine guns and on one occasion, the 6th Battalion Whippet tanks captured three batteries of field guns.

The tanks operating with the IX Corps encountered very heavy machine-gun fire when moving up the valley S. W. of SEQUEHART, resulting in the armour plating being pierced in several places and the engines damaged.

Enemy artillery fire, although considerable, did not cause many tank casualties as will be seen from the figures given below:

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mark V</th>
<th>Whippets</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks actually engaged in the operations</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks knocked out by artillery fire</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks temporarily disabled, ditched, etc.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

As the result of the operations, the enemy became very disorganized and is steadily retiring eastwards. Reconnaissance aeroplanes reported the roads converging on Le CATEAU blocked with troops and transport, which they engaged, and in addition, directed the fire of long-range batteries.

Captures for the day were: 3500 prisoners, 56 guns, and numerous machine guns.

2. IX CORPS: The attack was carried out by the 6th Division.

The Red Line was captured without difficulty, but the advance to the Green Line was held up for a short time by hostile artillery fire from the direction of JONNECOURT Farm. This was dealt with by heavy artillery and the advance was continued on the left to the Green Line. Progress on the right was very slow on account of the enemy holding up the French W. of FONTAINE-UTERTE.

Later, the French gained FONTAINE-UTERTE and the right of the 6th Division advanced towards MERICOURT.

Heavy fighting took place in the vicinity of MANNEQUIN and CERISE Woods, which were eventually captured, and also BEAUREGARD.

At the conclusion of the operations for the day, the line was held: BEAUREGARD with a defensive flank west of MERICOURT to the junction with the French at FONTAINE-UTERTE---thence along the Green Line in I.10.d.---I.5. and D.30.a
30 officers and 1089 O. R. were captured, also a few guns. Our casualties were light.

AMERICAN II CORPS: The American 30th Division attacked on a one-brigade front and at 1415 were established on the Green Line.

Enemy machine-gun nests held up the infantry for a short time in front of BRANCOURT-le-GRAND, but with the assistance of 1 battalion Mark V tanks the infantry captured the village after a little sharp fighting and pursued the enemy, who were retreating in disorder. Resistance was generally weak and there was no organized defense.

The line was held at the end of the day E. of BRANCOURT-le-GRAND---E. of PREMONT. 1500 prisoners were captured and 30 guns.

XIII CORPS: The attack was carried out by 25th Division on the right and 66th Division on the left, the former on a front of one brigade and the latter on a two-brigade front.

The advance to the Red Line was successfully accomplished. The 25th Division captured PONCHAUX, with 300 prisoners. The enemy stubbornly contested the advance on MARLICHES Farm, but the tanks intervened causing the enemy to retire in disorder.

The attack on the Green Line met very little resistance until the western outskirts of SERAIN were reached. Machine-gun fire prevented the infantry from moving forward at this point until the tanks arrived and quickly dealt with the situation. The Green Line was held E. of SERAIN by the infantry while the cavalry patrols passed through and exploited towards MARETZ and ELINCOURT, but were unable to make very much progress on account of heavy machine-gun fire from the ESTREES-MARETZ Road, southeast of MARETZ.

During the day's operations, over 1200 prisoners and some guns were captured.

3. THIRD ARMY: The Third Army renewed the advance in conjunction with the Fourth Army between VILLERS-OUTREAX and CAMBRAY. The advance made good progress, except at VILLERS-OUTREAX and west of MALINCOURT, where pockets of the enemy fought vigorously until surrounded and destroyed.

By evening a considerable advance was realized and the general line MALINCOURT---Bois de MOULIN---W. of MALINCOURT---S. E. of BRISSEUX Wood---ESNES---H.21.cent.---La TARGETTE (excl.)---SERANVILLE---H.3.cent.---thence west, including NIERGNIES along the southern outskirts of CAMBRAY.

The enemy counterattacked in some strength and were supported by 5 tanks between SERANVILLERS and NIERGNIES. The attack was repulsed and 3 tanks destroyed.

S. E. of CAMBRAY resistance was pronounced and fighting severe in the vicinity of FORENVILLE.

During the day, 26 officers and 2,732 O. R. were captured.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The French First Army attacked this morning E. and N. E. of ST-QUENTIN with FONSOMME and CROIX-FONSOMME as the objectives. REMAUCOURT was captured and slight progress made E. of MORCOURT.

The enemy resisted strongly N. of REMAUCOURT and W. of FONTAINE-UTERTE, and the French were unable to progress at this point during the morning. This opposition also affected the situation on the right of the IX Corps, who were held up E. and S. E. of SEQUEHART by heavy machine-gun fire from the spurs S. W. of FONTAINE-UTERTE.

An organized attack at 1300 gained FONTAINE-UTERTE and by evening, the line was established E. of the village and E. of ESSIGNY. Junction was effected with the IX Corps at 1.33.a.2.7.

Over 1200 prisoners were captured.

5. AIRCRAFT:

(a) British: 620 hours were flown by 287 pilots. 2 reconnaissances, 16 artillery and 33 contact patrols were made, and 35 zone calls sent down. 4 hostile batteries were successfully neutralized.

162 offensive patrols were carried out. 10 combats took place in the air, 3 of which were decisive; 2 E. A. were destroyed and one driven down out of control. 2 of our machines are missing.

3 enemy balloons were attacked, of which 2 were shot down in flames.
11 112-lb. bombs and 100 25-lb. bombs were dropped on MARETZ, BUSIGNY, PRE-MONT, and 2450 machine-gun rounds and 21 2-lb. Vickers shells were fired on roads, etc., by night. During the day, 16 112-lb. bombs were dropped on WASSIGNY, and 59 40-lb. phosphorous bombs, 264 25-lb. bombs, and 31,315 machine-gun rounds fired at various ground targets.

(b) Hostile: Activity showed an increase and was about normal, taking the weather conditions into consideration. 117 E. A. were seen, but were not very offensive, considering the operations in progress.

6. PRISONERS:

Through army cages 3 officers, 273 O. R.
Through C. C. S.'s 2 officers, 35 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Mostly fine; showers at intervals.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: The 66th Division went into line from corps reserve.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
Australian Corps: Aust. 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th Dvns. (army reserve).
IX Corps: 1st*, 6th, 32d, 46th Divisions
5th* Cavalry Brig.
XIII Corps: 25th, 50th, 66th, 18th Divisions
Cavalry Corps:

1st, 3d Cavalry Divisions )
4th Guards Brigade ) army reserve

American II Corps: American 27th* and 30th Divisions

* Corps reserve

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

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<td>745</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>70,022</td>
<td>35,276</td>
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<td>277</td>
<td>2,300</td>
<td>77,406</td>
<td>9,409</td>
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<td>&quot; S. Mk. VII H. E.</td>
<td>&quot; S. Mk. VII H. E.</td>
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<td>21,367</td>
<td>1,628</td>
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<td>485</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60-pdr. H. E.</td>
<td>6&quot; H. E.</td>
<td>8&quot; Howr.</td>
<td>14&quot; Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,254</td>
<td>21,367</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>S. Howr.</td>
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From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Subject: Operation report for period ending noon, Oct. 8, 1918

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The American 30th Division reported at 16:45, Oct. 7, enemy attack on 2-company front of our left regiment. S. O. S. sent up and barrage put down by our artillery. Our counterattack restored line.

   Enemy artillery active with heavy shelling of front and support line, 6:00, Oct. 8.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Prisoners captured identified enemy units as follows: 92d Regiment, 20th Division; 130th Regiment, 24th Division; 179th Regiment, 29th Division.

   Prisoners state an attack is not expected.

As escaped French prisoner of war states that a line has been dug from ESCAUFORT (N. E. of BUSIGNY), west of REGNICOURT through Bois de Riquerval-Retheuil Farm. The trenches are reported broad, with large belts of wire in front; also states that all bridges in back areas have been mined.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: Observation officer of the 30th Division at 10:55, Oct. 8, reported Huns retiring.

   * * * * *

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: 318th Field Signal Battalion has arrived at La Chapelette (S. of Peronne).

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The attack of the British Fourth Army between SEQUEHART and Aubenchel-aux-Bois has proceeded satisfactorily. The British IX Corps is reported to have taken objectives. The British XIII Corps reported the capture of MARLICHES Farm, Ponchaux and SERAIN, and the enemy in retreat northeast of latter village. Cavalry patrols reported to be passing through the infantry at 9:30, Oct. 8, in direction of MARETZ.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: Telegraphic order received from Fourth Army, 13:40, Oct. 8:

   Reference 1/40,000 map, corps will secure and hold ground as follows: High ground U 24 and 30; Mignon Wood in D 1 and C 12; farm in D 7 a; high ground c18; spur in D 13; and get in touch with IX Corps on high ground east of BRANCOUCOURT in D 19 a.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: The American II Corps, under orders of the British Fourth Army, attacked at 5:10, Oct. 8, in conjunction with the British IX Corps on the right and the XIII Corps on the left.

   The following order was issued by telegraph to the 30th Division at 14:35, Oct. 8:

   The 30th Division will secure and hold high ground U 24 and 30; Mignon Wood in D 1 and C 12; farm in D 7 a and high ground C 18; spur in D 13. Get in touch with IX Corps on high ground east of BRANCOUCOURT in D 19 a. XIII Corps is to get in touch with 30th Division at copse in U 24 a.
10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Reports received up to noon indicated attack proceeding well and all objectives taken. Our troops have taken BRANCOURT and PREMONT and are preparing for further advance.

Prisoners taken by the 30th Division in today's operation estimated at 891.

It is reported that two batteries of 10.5-cm. guns have been captured and turned against HEM.

Our casualties are reported as slight.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: It is apparently the intention of the enemy to fall back. It is the intention of the army commander to press forward, keeping in contact with the enemy and inflicting as much damage as possible.

13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: To exploit the ground in front of present objective, with view to pushing the attack farther to the front.

14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, etc.

Health, good; supplies, satisfactory.

F. E. BUCHAN,  
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

for  
G. W. READ,  
Major General, Commanding.

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From: American 30th Division

Date: October 8, 1918   Hour: 4:30 p.m.

To: G. H. Q., A. E. F.

3 officers and 1056 O. R. had passed through the cage. Have advanced 4 to 5 kilometers, capturing BRANCOCOURT, VAUX-le-PRETRE, BRONX Farm, FRAICOURT Hill, BETA Hill, PREMONT, FRAICOURT Farm and part of BETA Copse. K nil. Our line now runs N. to S. eastern outskirts PREMONT---C 5 B cent.---C 5 D 90---C 12 C 50 to C 24 C 64. 2 batteries 102 captured by 117th Regt.

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II Corps: War Diary

October 8, 1918.

[Extract]

102d Engrs. ordered released from duty with British XIII Corps. II Corps, under orders British Fourth Army, attacked in conjunction with IX and XIII Corps. Operation successful.

F. E. BUCHAN,  
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

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Extract

The 59th Brigade accompanied by tanks and under a heavy artillery barrage attacked the enemy at 5:10 a.m. and advanced their lines. The left regiment attained their objective on the Green Line. On account of the division on our right meeting strong resistance, the right regiment was forced to consolidate a line just west of VAUX-ANDIGNY. Two companies of the 1st Battalion, 120th Infantry, which was in 59th Brigade reserve, were attached to 117th Infantry to assist in the attack. One company was attached to 118th Infantry for the purpose of mopping up BRANCOURT. The remaining company stayed in reserve. The 60th Brigade moved from the BELLICOURT-VILLERET area to ESTREES-JONCOURT area.

Available for all duty: 526
Men: 16,097

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

Reference Maps: 1/20,000 Special

[Extract]

1. GENERAL PLAN
   Z day, October 8, 1918
   Zero hour 5:10 a.m.
   The 30th Division attacked on Z day, Zero hour.
   The British 6th Division attacked on the right and the British 25th Division on the left.

   * * * * *

3. The attack was made with the 117th Infantry on the left, with one battalion in support, and one battalion in brigade reserve.
   The 118th Infantry attacked on the right, with two battalions in the front line, and one battalion in support.
   The normal objective, or Red Line, was to be taken by front line troops advancing under a barrage. The barrage was to halt for 30 minutes, 200 yards beyond the objective after which the support battalions were to advance and exploit to the Green Line or contingent objective; troops were to consolidate their respective objectives.

4. Tanks: 301st Battalion were to advance with the front line of attack. Two companies of Whippets (British 6th Battalion) were to assist in exploitation to Green Line. Commanding Officers of 301st Battalion was to report to Commanding General, 59th Infantry Brigade, and C. O.'s of tank companies were to arrange with respective infantry commanders all details concerning the time and place of starting.

* * * * *
6. Artillery: The light artillery 18-pounder barrage was to come down at Zero hour 200 yards in front of the infantry start line, as shown on map barrage table. The 4.5" barrage was to come down 200 yards in front of the light artillery barrage. The 18-pounder barrage will fall on the line designated as the objective of the attack of October 7.

The light artillery barrage was to remain stationary 3 minutes after Zero hour and was to advance for 12 lifts at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes, thereafter at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes to the normal objective and then halt 200 yards beyond same for one-half hour.

The heavy artillery was to fire on selected points during the barrage and thereafter as long as the safety of the troops permitted.

Light artillery was to be moved up within one-half hour after cessation of barrage and were to be available for fire on selected points. Definite artillery units were assigned attacking battalions for use when progressing from the normal objective to the contingent objective.

7. One battalion, 60th Brigade, moved to vicinity of JONCOUR on Y/Z night and was subject to the call of G. O. C., 59th Infantry Brigade for flank protection or to repel counterattacks.

(2) PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS: On the evening of October 5, the Commanding Officer, 301st Battalion, was ordered to confer with Commanding General, American 30th Division, on plans for coming operation. Z day was to be October 7. Upon reporting to Commanding General, 30th Division, no information of the coming operation could be given. Brigades and regiments of the division could give no information. On the evening of the 6th, Z day was changed to October 8.

On the 7th instant, all tank unit commanders conferred with commanding officers of infantry units with whom they were to operate, and plans for cooperation between tanks and infantry in the two sectors were adopted accordingly. Signals were also arranged between tanks and infantry.

Due to the very limited amount of time before the operation, tanks did not train with the infantry. The 30th Division had one operation with tanks on September 29, which was not successful, and most infantry commanders were rather skeptical concerning the capabilities of tanks.

(3) RECONNAISSANCE: On October 5, all reconnaissance officers were given the general plan of the coming operation and began work on preparing approach marches and routes for tanks beyond the start line. Company R. O.'s were withdrawn and placed under the battalion R. O. at battalion headquarters, where they collaborated as in the preceding operation. Officers of the battalion agree that this plan gives satisfactory results.

Maps and air photos furnished by brigade headquarters were excellent and sufficient in quantity. The intelligence section of the tank battalion has proved to be far above intelligence sections of infantry divisions with whom they cooperated, and in one case furnished maps to infantry regiments for the attack.

(4) APPROACH MARCH: On the evening of October 5, 22 tanks were ready for action. The battalion tracked from vicinity of Ste-EMILIE to vicinity of BELLICOURT (G4 a59) the same evening. March was accomplished without incident. Distance traversed 9000 yards.

At 7 p.m., October 7, 23 tanks left halfway house at BELLICOURT for start line. The march was made very slowly due to extreme darkness, number of wide trenches and sunken road crossed. Part of route was taped, while remainder followed a telegraph line. At Zero minus 180, a halt was made at 2500 yards from our front line, where all tanks were refilled. During this interval, R. O.'s and section commanders went forward, returning in time to start with tanks. Total distance traversed - 9000 yards.

During the preliminary part of the approach march, no shelling was encountered, while from Zero minus 30 to Zero, enemy shelling and bombing aeroplanes harassed tanks. No casualties occurred.

During the latter part of the approach to the start line, all tanks went forward by
compass. Fortunately, an enemy searchlight was located in the rear of the center of our objective, and gave an excellent mark for directing our tanks until Zero.

Twenty tanks out of twenty-three started, three falling due to mechanical trouble.

The approach march reflects great credit on all R. O.'s.

(5) COMMUNICATIONS:
(a) Wireless: One wireless tank allotted to the battalion followed throughout the attack. One officer from the battalion was detailed in charge. The tank was in communication with brigade headquarters and a directing station.

Wireless seems to be very reliable, and our tank furnished information to infantry headquarters as well as tank headquarters.

(b) Telephone: The battalion located at BELLICOURT was in telephone communication with 4th Tank Brigade Headquarters, American 30th Division, and all trunk lines.

(c) Despatch Riders: Two despatch riders were stationed at battalion headquarters, while eight were located at brigade headquarters.

(d) Pigeons: Six pairs of pigeons were allotted to the battalion though none were used.

(e) Runners: Section commanders had two runners, as well as company commanders.

None were used.

(f) General: It is believed that many of the officers of the battalion fail to realize the importance of sending messages to the rear during a battle. The wireless tank furnished the only information received by rear headquarters until tanks rallied.

(6) RALLYING POINT: For the operation of September 29, the rallying point selected was too far in advance and due to proximity to the enemy lines, tanks were shelled when they rallied, which would not have taken place in case of a successful attack.

For the operation of October 8, a forward rallying point was selected east of JONCOURT at H 10 central, and a second point east of NAUROY at H 7 central. Upon the completion of the operation, tanks rallied at H 7 central and were subsequently moved to the rear at BELLICOURT (G.4.a.28).

It is believed that the battalion commander was influenced to a great extent in the selection of rallying points by the results of the operation of September 29. One unsuccessful operation should not be taken as the standard for future operations. By bringing tanks so far to the rear on October 8, the same tanks had to be moved forward two days later, causing at least 15,000 yards unnecessary tracking.

(7) SUPPLIES: A supply dump was located at the battalion tankadrome at BELLICOURT G.4.a.28. Before going forward on Y/Z night, all tanks were completely filled, and, in addition, carried one-half fill. With the exception of one tank during operation, supplies were found to be adequate. All tanks were completely filled before proceeding beyond start line.

Supply tanks were available for the battalion, but were not used.

In general supplies were adequate.

(8) CONDITIONS:
(a) Ground: The operation area proved to be ideal for tanks. There were no trenches and very few sunken roads. Two railways were crossed during Z day with no damage to tracks of tanks. While the barrage and a terrific bombardment affected the ground to a certain extent, it did not hamper tanks.

(b) Weather: Atmospheric conditions were favorable throughout the day. A slight wind drove all smoke towards the enemy lines.

The approach march took place during a slight rain, though it did not hamper the progress of tanks.

(9) OPERATION: The attack was successful, and all branches of the service as well as enemy prisoners give great credit to the tanks.

Twenty out of twenty-three tanks started while eleven reached final objectives. All tank commanders expended great quantities of ammunition with good effect on the enemy.
The light railway at B.18.c central proved to contain many enemy machine-gun nests. Our tanks cleared the railway before the advance of the infantry. Infantry could not have taken the railway without the assistance of tanks.

BRANCOURT was attacked by tanks coming in from the northern and southern flanks. Machine-gun nests were encountered at many points. One tank captured an enemy battery by approaching it from the rear of the enemy lines. Sufficient enemy dead on the field containing case shot give evidence to the splendid part played by the tanks.

Upon reaching the first objective, several of our tanks crossed for exploitation beyond. It is believed that any tank commander who crossed this line exhibited poor sense of judgement. Whippets were detailed for exploitation. It is an example of failure on the part of an officer to carry out a definite order. Tanks signalled infantry and in several cases infantry signalled tanks for assistance. Cooperation was excellent. The infantry fought well.

* * * * *

(11) LESSONS AND SUGGESTIONS:
1. The following mechanical defects developed during action.
   (a) Poor operation of auto-vac system.
   (b) Broken exhaust springs.
   (c) Leakage in gear box.
   (d) Dirty screen in oil cannister.
   (e) Excessive heating of friction plates.
   (f) Poor packing in packing glands.
2. It is recommended that at least 50% of 6-pdr. ammunition be case shot.
3. Tank commanders report trouble in operation of machine guns, and several recommend use of strips instead of belts. I believe trouble is due to insufficient training with machine guns.
4. With a section of five tanks working with a barrage, three should be in advance and two in reserve.
5. If the tank commander sits in a front seat, he should have one man stand in rear of him to communicate with the crew.
6. More ampules of ammonia should be carried. Practically all crews used them.
7. The compass should be moved farther between or forward of the seats, and be provided with a special light.
8. Compass training has proved invaluable.
9. The field of vision of the present periscope is too small.
10. Some system should be used to prevent bullet splash coming in through sides of 6-pounder turrets.
11. Tank commanders should be given every opportunity to study the forward area.
12. The present system of ventilation is very poor.

* * * * *

R. I. Sasse,
Major, U. S. Tank Corps,
Tactical Officer.
The attack commenced at 5:10 a.m., the order of battle being as follows: The 71st Inf. Brig. attacked in the northern sector and the 16th Inf. Brig. on the south. The 139th Inf. Brig. maintained touch between us and the French. Under cover of a heavy barrage and assisted by some Whippet tanks, both brigades rapidly reached the Red Line, or first objective, which entailed an advance of 2000 yards. The 71st Inf. Brig. met with little opposition, but the 16th Brig. was held up on its right flank for some time by machine guns in MANNEQUIN Wood and the village of MERICOURT. The French XV Corps made excellent progress on its right, but considerable difficulty was experienced on its left flank, where it joined the IX Corps, the main obstacle being a nest of enemy machine guns in CERISE Wood. By 12 noon, MANNEQUIN and DOON Hills had been captured, also BEAUREGARD Farm. The 5th Cav. Brig. who had been ordered to push through the infantry as an opportunity occurred, attempted to break through just S. of BRANCOURT Village, with the intention of rushing some enemy field guns in BELLICOURT Fme, which were hampering our advance, but owing to hostile machine-gun fire the attempt was abandoned. Early in the afternoon, CERISE Wood was captured by the 16th Inf. Brig. after severe bomb fighting in the trenches of the Fonsomme Line E. of SEQUEHART. The enemy, who had resisted strongly all morning, suddenly collapsed and about 3 officers and 190 O. Rs. surrendered in the wood. At the same time, the enemy in MERICOURT began to retire and this village was rushed and several prisoners captured. After the capture of CERISE Wood, the French were enabled to advance and by 3:30 p.m. had captured FONTAINE-UTERTE. MANNEQUIN Wood was also mopped up by 2d Bn. of the York and Lancaster Regts., who captured 5 officers and 193 O. Rs. in the woods, and by nightfall, the Green Line, or line of exploitation, was reached along the whole corps front.

Our line at night ran as follows: 1.23. central—where we were in touch with the French—thence just W. of FRESNOY-le-GRAND through 1.17. central—1.11. and 5 central to the junction with the American II Corps in C.29. Orders were issued in the evening for the advance to be continued in the morning and for the 46th Div. to take over the southern portion of the corps front. The 139th Inf. Brig. which was very...
weak was withdrawn and the 138th Inf. Brig. came into the line on the south. The total prisoners captured during the day's operations amounted to about 1200 which included 30 officers, one being a bn. commander, 4 field guns, and about 35 machine guns were also captured.

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182-32.2: Location List

**Location II Corps Unit**

II Corps, A. E. F.,

October 9, 1918—6:00.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 19

[Extract]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)</th>
<th>J.16.b.0.5, (62C)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II Corps Headquarters (Rear)</td>
<td>N.15.d.central (62C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>Hamel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th F. S. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>La Chapellette S. of PERONNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>Near SAULTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>BAIZIEUX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Att. to 13th Wing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Brig. R. A. F.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

| Hq. VII Corps R. A.       | J.16.b.0.5, (62C)          |
| Hq. Aust. 4th D. A.       | G.23.b.2.8, (62B)          |

* * * * *

| Right Group Hq. 6th Army  | H.61.d.3.3, (62B)           |
| Brig. A. F.              |                             |

* * * * *

| Hq. Aust. 2d D. A.       | F.27.c.8.4, (62C)           |
| Comdg. Left Group        |                             |
| Left Group Hq. 5th A. F. | H.8.d.1.5, (62B)            |
| A. Brig.                 |                             |

* * * * *

| Hq. VII Corps H. A.      | J.12.d.7.9, (62C)           |

* * * * *

| Hq. 4th Tank Brig.        | D.28.cent.                 |

- 434 -
1. SITUATION OCTOBER 8 AND NIGHT 8/9TH INST.: At 5:10 a.m., this morning, the Fourth Army attacked along its whole front. By the evening, it had captured the whole of its objectives, including the WALINCOURT-ANDIGNY Line, and gained ground some little distance beyond. The average depth of the advance is about 5,000 yards. The localities captured include the villages of SERAIN, PREMONT, BRANCOURT, and in addition important farms such as BEAUREGARD, BRANCOURT, and FRAICOURT. Cavalry patrols pushed forward beyond PREMONT and SERAIN, but machine-gun fire from either side of the main MARETZ Road prevented further progress. Our armoured cars were also stopped by a huge crater blown in U.21.d.

During the day, a counterattack carried out by the 34th Div. in the SEQUEHART area was repulsed, while north of FRESNOY men seen massing, probably for an attack, were dispersed by our artillery. These were the only counterattacks reported during the day.

The disorganization of the German units was extreme, as is shown by the fact that during the fighting prisoners belonging to 69 different battalions of 31 regiments of 17 different divisions were captured.
These divisions were 30th, 8th, 21st Res., 121st, 38th, 204th, 119th, 208th, 2d Gd., 21st, 20th Jaeger, 24th, 241st, 34th, 221st, 84th and 2d Cyclist Brig. Of these, the bulk of the Jaeger and 208th Divs. were thrown against the Third Army. The 204th had just arrived from LORRAINE. The 2d Cyclist Brig. was hurried up on the night of the 7th/8th to BOHAIN in anticipation of our attack, with the object of carrying out a counterattack, as were also two battalions of the Jaeger Div. These attacks, however, were frustrated by our operations this morning.

The number of prisoners captured is rapidly approaching 4,000, while the Americans alone captured over 30 guns.

A large amount of movement of transport in an E. and N. E. direction was seen during the day, while fires were observed in BOHAIN, SEBONCOURT, FRESNOY ESCAUFORT, BUSIGNY, LE CATEAU, VAUX-ANDIGNY, MARETZ, AVELUY.

From prisoners' statements, there seems little doubt that a retirement on a large scale was planned, but it also appears certain that our attack will considerably hasten the date.

There was no change in the situation during the night.

The right and center corps report heavy bombing in the forward areas. Our attacks have continued this morning at 5:20 a. m.

2. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS:

(a) Prisoners of the 34th Div. saw material of all sorts being evacuated in BOHAIN about October 1.

(b) An Alsatian belonging to the 30th Div. stated his company commander told the men of the company that they were to resist to the utmost and inflict as many casualties as possible and that they would later retire to a distance of about 30 kilometers, to VALENCIENNES.

(c) Escaped French prisoners of war state that a new line was commenced on Oct. 5, about 4 feet deep and over 8 feet wide. They were working on this line. It runs E. of VAUX-ANDIGNY—thence along the high ground W. of REGNIOUR---thence through the Bois de RIQUERVAL, where trees are felled to make an abattis. It is defended by a belt of wire (completed on the 5th only near VAUX-ANDIGNY). About 1,000 prisoners of war and 1,300 civilians were employed on it.

(d) Other French prisoners of war state that the roads and railway bridges across the Canal at BOUE are mined.

(e) The Third Army reports prisoners state infantry and labor units are constructing dugouts along the railway embankment between SOLESMES and BUSIGNY.

(f) Yesterday afternoon, fires were seen burning in many villages.

To sum up: From the above it is apparent that since the beginning of the month, the enemy has been engaged on preparing to withdraw, but it is extremely probable that our operations have prevented him from evacuating much material.

3. RESERVES:

(a) The 2d Guard Div., thought to have been withdrawn, was still in line south of BEAUREVOIR.

(b) The 204th Div., fresh from reserve after resting about 5 weeks in LORRAINE, reinforced the BEAUREVOIR area. Only one regiment has apparently arrived up to yesterday. It was engaged once by the Fourth Army since August 8, and lost about 350 prisoners.

(c) Elements of the Jaeger and 208th Divs., both withdrawn into reserve during the last few days from line opposite the Third Army, reinforced this front. The bulk of these divisions was engaged yesterday by the Third Army.

(d) Elements of the 221st (M. G. Co.) and 241st Div. (art.) are still in line. The infantry was withdrawn about the 4th inst.

(e) Four battalions of the 2d Cyclist Brig. reinforced the front on the night of the 7th/8th inst. They were hurried up from La CAPELLE in anticipation of our attack.
(f) From prisoners' statements, the 79th Res. Div. (resting seven days) was reported to be resting in the FRESNOY-le-GRAND area a few days ago. It was not identified in the fighting yesterday.

(g) The 25th Res. Div. (resting two days) reinforced the line opposite the left flank of the French First Army yesterday.

(h) The 87th Div. and Alpine corps were reported to be in close support in the WALINCOURT area on the 3d inst. They were not identified yesterday. It is thought that the Alpine corps has left the area.

(i) The 29th Div. from line south of the OISE, reinforced the left flank of the French First Army yesterday.

(j) The Gd. Ers., 195th and 242d Divs. (fresh from reserve) have reinforced the line in other parts of the front.

(k) The 12th Ldw. Div. has been reconstituted, while the 183d Div. has been disbanded.

The number of enemy divisions in the western theater remains unchanged at 195 (183 German infantry divisions), but the number of battalions disbanded since the beginning of 1918 is raised to 207, the equivalent of 23 divisions.

To sum up: The Fourth Army front was reinforced yesterday by elements of two exhausted divisions and one fresh division, in addition to a cyclist brigade.

It is probable that the remainder of the fresh division (204th) will be identified today, together with other units of the cyclist brigade. Beyond this there would appear no division in reserve other than tired divisions recently relieved from the line.

There would now appear to be only 1 fresh division (27th) in reserve between the sea and the OISE.


(a) Aircraft: Enemy aeroplane activity showed an increase, and was about normal taking the weather conditions into consideration.

117th F. E. A. were seen, but were not very aggressive considering the operations in progress. Most activity was again shown over the northern sector.

Up to 4 p. m., 10 combats took place, as a result of which 2 E. A. were destroyed and one driven down out of control. Two of our machines are missing. In addition, two E. K. B. were destroyed.

(b) Artillery: Up to 3 p. m., Oct. 8, 1918.

Between SEQUEHART and MONTBREHAIN, artillery fire was below normal prior to our attack.

There was no response to our barrage until half an hour after Zero, when light shelling was experienced, chiefly in the SEQUEHART-LEVERGIES and PRESELLES area and on our newly-won positions.

The enemy's batteries held on to their forward positions for some time. A new group formed in the valley N. E. of CROIX-FONSOMME.

Between MONTBREHAIN and BEAUREVOIR, strong harassing fire was directed against forward areas during the night. Shelling at Zero was practically nil, but later light scattered shelling in the forward areas was experienced.

Between BEAUREVOIR and VILLERS-OUTREAUX, the barrage fired by the left corps at 1 a. m. provoked considerable retaliation on our left flank.

Up to 3 a. m., hostile fire was heavy, but died down afterwards, the reply to our barrage being light.

The bulk of the enemy's fire was chiefly on the area immediately south of VILLERS-OUTREAUX and AUBENCHEUL-aux-BOIS.

Hostile shelling was comparatively light after 7:40 a. m. A light barrage at 11:20 a. m. was put down S. E. of VILLERS-OUTREAUX.

(c) Movements: Yesterday's operations caused a great increase in road traffic in the MAUROIS, VAUX-ANDIGNY, CROUGIS, and FIEULAINE areas. All transport traffic and troops seen were moving east and northeast with the exception of one battalion of infantry
and a convoy of about 100 M. T. moving S. W. between Le CATEAU and MAUROIS. MARETZ was apparently avoided by transport, probably on account of the roads there being mined.

Railways in the Le CATEAU area were active, the chief trend being southward on the Le CATEAU-BUSIGNY and Le CATEAU-WASSIGNY lines.

Dawn Reconnaissance (today): There was a fair amount of railway activity around Le CATEAU and WASSIGNY, between 7:30 and 9:30 this morning, including movement of 5 trains east from Le CATEAU on the LANDRECIES Line. About 200 infantry were seen going E. from ETAVES to AISONVILLE. No important convoys seen on roads. Visibility fair.

Movement, taken in conjunction with fires, etc., indicates that material is being evacuated and the remainder is being burnt.

5. CIVILIANS: About 500 civilians were found in villages captured, chiefly in SERAIN. This morning's air reconnaissance reports the presence of civilians in MARETZ.

6. FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: Yesterday morning in C.17.c. (N. E. BRANCOURT), an explosion was reported, followed by a fire. At 10 a.m., a large fire broke out N. E. of BOHAIN and 3:30 around BOHAIN Station, the latter blaze appearing to cover some acres. Large explosions were also reported in C.24.a. (N. of BRANCOURT) and in V.1.b., thought to be an oil dump. Fires were seen in MARETZ, AVELUY, V.10.b. (BUSIGNY), V.b.a. (N. E. BUSIGNY), D.19.b. (dump), MENNEVRET, Le CATEAU, CROIX-FONSOMME, and VAUX-ANDIGNY.

7. MINES: Escaped French prisoners state that the following places are mined: (1) The railways running into BOHAIN. One mine at the bridge just west of the town. (2) Railway near SAMBRETON Road at LANDRECIES. (3) Nearly all bridges in the back areas including the bridge at J.2.a. (4) The road and railway bridges over the canal at BOUE (10 miles N. E. of GUISE).

A prisoner states that there are mines on the Roman Road 200 to 300 yds. southwest of MARETZ, and also about U.20.A.21.50.

The crossroads in PREMONT and SERAIN are reported to be blown.

8. ENEMY DEFENSES: Escaped French prisoners state that the new defense line E. of BOHAIN, begun on Oct. 5, consists of a single trench about 4 feet deep and exceptionally wide (about 3 meters). It runs from just behind VAUX-ANDIGNY along the high ground through E.1.d., E.7.b. and D. to 800 meters west of REGNICOURT, and then enters the Bois de RIGUERVAL, where the trees are felled to make an abattis. There is a belt of wire 4 to 5 meters wide; this was completed on Oct. 5 for a kilometer only S. of VAUX, but was being pushed on especially in the Bois de RIGUERVAL. About 1,000 prisoners and 1,300 civilians were employed.

The two photographs available (205 V. 4007 of Oct. 8) are very indistinct, and show only a short length of trench in E.7.b., and some work just S. of VAUX (see also 3975); north of VAUX the line is distinctly shown running from the road at W.20.b. through W.14.d. to the road at W.15.a. (205 V.4023, 3975).

Photographs show a trench line, new since the end of Sept., running just W. of Le CATEAU Station through Q.10.a.c. (205 V. 4002, 4021, op. 3837). Photographs are very indistinct, but there seems to be elements of trenches in Q.16.b.d. and behind St.SOUPLET at Q.34.d. (205.v. 4021, 4023).

These indications seem to point to a line of defense along the Le CATEAU-St-SOUPLET Railway and then past VAUX to the Bois de RIGUERVAL. Photos of Oct. 8 (very indistinct) do not show any new trenches E. of the OISE Canal near MACQUIGNY (205. V. 4016, 4012).

9. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aerodromes</th>
<th>Sheds</th>
<th>Hangars</th>
<th>Photo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Near aerodrome</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td>205 V 4011</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

E. of WASSIGNY, at ARROUAISE Farm, X.29.a.
BOUE Station - Rolling stock for 4 trains.

Small material dump (205. V. 4008, 4009). These photographs do not show the very large dump at the water station on the SAMBRE-OISE Canal at A.10.d.; shown to be very active on French photographs. Escaped French prisoners report that this was being evacuated on Oct. 4. Much barge traffic is still shown on the canal (4009).

WASSIGNY - Rolling stock for 6 trains, 205. V. 4004. Escaped French prisoners say the very large coal dump here was being moved.

Le CATEAU - Considerable rolling stock (about 10 trains) in station. 205. V. 4021. The new light railway reported running E. from BOHAIN to REGNICOURT is shown connected up with the new line reported running south from VAUX-ANDIGNY (205. V. 4006, 4007). Hospitals - New hospitals at GROUGIS, K.14.d.5.0. (205. V. 4020).

Activity - Escaped French prisoners report a large camp and refilling point at the west end of REGNICOURT, E.14.b. and a camp in the Bois de RIVIERVAL about E.13.d.

10. PRISONERS - The number of prisoners which passed through corps cages and C. C. S. up to 6 p.m., Oct. 8, is 65,774, of which 1,557 are officers.

The American corps captured about 30 guns, including two 10.5-cm. how. batteries.
The number of guns captured by the two flank corps has not yet been received.

11. COMMAND - (From G. H. Q. summary).

According to a captured German order, General der Kavallerie von der MARWITZ relinquished the command of the German Second Army on Sept. 23 to take up another appointment. General von der MARITZ had been in command of the Second Army for over 1 1/2 years.

12. WATER: A prisoner states there are wells for watering horses in MARETZ and HONNECHY and a pump with good water in MARETZ.

13. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES: Identifications obtained during our operations of 8th inst., in the presumed order of battle from N. to S., at 6 p.m.:

(a) 30th Div: 99th Inf. Regt., I Bn. - N. of VILLERS-OUTREAUX - PRIS.
(b) 8th Div: 153d Inf. Regt., III - VILLERS Farm, T.14.d. (E. of AUBENCHEUL) - PRIS.
The army on our left identified 93d Inf. Regt. at ANGLE Wood, W. of MALINCOURT.
(c) 21st Res. Div.
80th Res. Inf. Regt.)
87th " " all 3 bns. - S. of VILLERS-OUTREAUX - PRIS.
80th and 88th Res.Inf. Regts. also identified in this same area by the army on our left.

(d) 4th Cyclist (Saxon) Bn.
2d Co. - N. E. (of BEAUREVOIR and area S. of VILLERS-OUTREAUX) - PRIS.
This bn. came from RUSSIA at the beginning of Sept. and reinforced the sector of 21st Res. Div. this morning (8th inst.)
Co. is about 150 strong, and the brig. consists of 2 bns. Cycles were left at Solesmes.
(e) 121st Div.
7th Res. Inf. Regt.) all 3 bns. - N. E. of)
60th Inf. Regt.) } BEAUREVOIR - PRIS.
56th Res. Inf. Regt., all 3 bns. - E. of
Prisoners state that each regiment has been reduced to one bn., and later prisoners state that the whole division now consists of one battalion of about 500 strong only.
(f) 204th Div.
413th Inf. Regt. - all 3 bns. - N. E. and E. of BEAUREVOIR - PRIS.
Prisoners state that this is the only regiment of the division that has come up to this front from LORRAINE so far.

Some of the prisoners formerly belong to the 246th Res. Inf. Regt., 54th Res. Div. On Aug. 25, this latter regiment was sent to LORRAINE with 204th Div., and it was then split up, one bn. going to each regiment of the 204th Div.
Pris.

413th Inf. Regt. left LORRAINE on 5th inst.

(g) 38th Div.

96th Inf. Regt., all 3 bns. area S. of VILLERS-OUTREWAUX and E. of BEAUREVOIR---Pris.

This regiment has been milked from its division, the other two regiments of which were identified during the fighting yesterday, east of LESDAIN [Nord], by the army on our left. Prisoners taken there state that the 96th Inf. Regt. had been in special reserve for some days. It was also identified by the army on the left in the same area.

(h) 119th Div.

46th Inf. Regt., I and II )

---N. E. of BEAUREVOIR---Pris.

58th Inf. Regt., all 3 bns. )

46th Res. Inf. Regt. all 3 bns )

---E. of

237th Fld. Arty. Regt., 7th Bty. )

237th and 273d Pion. Cos.---PONCHAUX---Pris.

(i) 2d Gd. Div.

1st Cd. Gren. ) all 3 bns.

4th " " ) of each---near PONCHAUX---Pris

2d " " ) Regt.

This division had not been withdrawn on 4th/5th inst., as previously supposed, and has been in line in the BEAUREVOIR south sector since Oct. 3. The division has suffered exceedingly heavy losses.

(k) 208th Div.

25th Inf. Regt., I and II---near PONCHAUX---Pris.

This regiment has been detached from its division, which has been engaged yesterday near NIERGNIES (S. E. of CAMBRAI) against the army on our left, the 185th Inf. Regt. having been identified by prisoners who state the 65th Res. Inf. Regt. is in line to the N. of them. The division came from St-QUENTIN to the CAMBRAI area on the 4th inst., and remained there two days. At 7 p. m. on 6th, the 25th Inf. Regt. was taken by bus to ELINCOURT, the other two regiments remaining behind.

Three cos. per bn.---7th Co. only 20 strong.

(l) 21st Div.

80th Fusiliers. ) all 3 bns.)

81st Inf. Regt. )

---MONTBREHAIN---Pris.

87th Inf. Regt., I and III )


(m) 20th Div.

77th Inf. Regt., III

79th Inf. Regt.) all 3 bns---N. of MONTBREHAIN---Pris.

92d Inf. Regt.)


(n) Jaeger Div.

7th Jaeger Bn.

---BRANCOURT---Pris

8th Res. Jaeger Bn.

These are "milked bns." from the division, which has been indentified today in line (all other bns.) W. of WALINCOURT. The division came into line there on 6th/7th inst. and is now reported to be not more than 600 strong.

(o) Cyclist Brig.

75th, 77th and

2d Cyc. Regt.---MONTBREHAIN---BRANCOURT

86th Cos., 7th Cyc. Bn. ) area---Pris
The 86th Co. formerly belonged to the 86th Div., but some reorganization has taken place.

This brig. was in reserve on the night 7th/8th at Le CATEAU, and was alarmed at 11 p. m. and rushed up to counterattack on the morning of 8th, but was forestalled by our operations. The cos. were then sent in reserve to BOHAIN, and later put into line to reinforce.

Cos. about 100 strong. 6 cos. to a bn., and 2 bns. to a brig. Cycles were left near BRANCOURT and the heavy baggage at MONS.

(p) 24th Div.
139th Inf. Regt.
(179th Inf. Regt. )
(all 3 bns. ---Doon Mill,
179th Inf. Regt. ) (S. E. of MONTBREHAIN)---Pris
133d Inf. Regt. ---identified later during the afternoon in the SEQUEHART area.
19th Hussars.
24th Div., according to some prisoners, had been relieved in the St-GOBAIN sector by 103d Div., the 32d Inf. Regt. of the latter relieving the 179th Inf. Regt.

Other prisoners say they were relieved by mixed troops, men of the 38th and 51st Inf. Regts. (11th Div.) having been seen.

(q) 241st Div.
Elements of this division are still attached to 24th Div.

(r) 34th Div.
30th Inf. Regt., II and III )
67th Inf. Regt., all 3 bns. ) ---N. E. of )
Dvts. 1 prisoners ) ) SEQUEHART---Pris.
145th Inf. Regt., III. ) ---E. of )
70th Fld. Arty. Regt.
I and II Bns. of 145th I. R. also stated to be in line. 145th Inf. Regt. was not identified until late during the fighting today.
Average co. strength of 67th Inf. Regt.---30-40.
That of 30th I. R. slightly stronger.
II Bn., 67th Inf. Regt. was, however, only 80 strong last night.

(s) 221st Div.
41st Inf. Regt., III M. G. Co. )---N. E. of SEQUEHART---Pris.
Elements (gunners and artillerymen only) are still in line with 34th Div.
The 3d M. G. Co. of 41st Inf. Regt. is now 30 strong, with 6 M. G.'s.

(t) 84th Div.
336th Inf. Regt., II---SEQUEHART area---Pris.
Prisoners state that they came into line at 4 a. m. this morning and had been told to expect an attack by cavalry.

(B) The army on our right identified yesterday:
84th Div.---423d Inf. Regt.---ESSIGNY-le-PETIT---Pris.
25th Res. Div.---all 3 regts.---REMAUCOURT area---Pris.
232d Div.---447th Inf. Regt.---LESDAIN area---Pris.
29th Div.---all 3 regts.---TILLOY Farm (N. E. of MORCOURT)---Pris.
197th Div. (7th Jaeger Regt. (13th Jaeger Bn. ) Pris.
(90th Res. Pion Co. )
(Prisoners include O. C. of a bn. of the disbanded 456th Inf. Regt. 235th Div., which was drafted to 272d Res. Inf. Regt.)
24th Pion. Bn. was again identified between MORCOURT and TILLOY Farm, night 7th/8th inst.

All these identifications are normal with the exception of 29th Div., which was engaged yesterday in this sector for the first time.

The division came up by rail from LAON on 5th inst., and thence by lorry to FRESNOY. It was engaged in the ESSIGNY region on 6th, men of 142d Inf. Regt. were seen by prisoner at SEBONCOURT on 5th.

(C) The army on our left identified (presumed order, from N. to S.):


Jaeger Div.---(all bns. of all 3 regts.)
(Except 7th Jaeger and 8th)---W. of (Res. Jaeger bns. detached) WALINCOURT---Pris
(to reinforce the BRANCOURT sector)

38th Div.---95th Inf. Regt.---E. of LESDAIN---Pris

96th Inf. Regt.---S. of VILLERS-OUTREUX

The 96th Inf. Regt. was also identified by Fourth Army yesterday in this same sector.


206th Div.---395th Inf. Regt., just S. of CAMBRAI


394th Inf. Regt. 265th Fld. Arty. Regt.---N. E. of RUMILLY

208th Div.---185th Inf. Regt.---near NIERGNIES---Pris.

(65th Inf. Regt. stated to be in line N. of 185th Inf. Regt.)

This division came up to reinforce the line about 3/4 inst. from St.-QUENTIN (BERTHENCOURT sector)---see also under 208th Div., 25th Inf. Regt., mentioned above.


This division has recently been withdrawn to reserve.

(D) The following odd units have so far been reported:

37th M. G. Marksman Detachment---BRANCOURT area---Pris. 75th M. G. Marksman Detachment---PONCHAUX.

67th Pion. Bn.---N. E. of SEQUEHART---Pris.

Wireless detachment 21st Fld. Arty. Regt. (8th Bty.)---MONTBREHAIN area---Pris., and
the following reported by prisoners' statements:

29th Pion Bn.

4th, 9th and 28th Pioneers)---at camp S. of SOLESMES (E.14.d.)

22d Foot Artillery)---on 5th inst.
GENERAL

The enemy, after the severe defeat inflicted on him yesterday is in full retreat. Our troops are already entering BOHAIN. The enemy will probably attempt to make a stand on the VAUX-ANDIGNY line, probably with rearguards. Trenches have been constructed along the E. bank of the SELLE, near St-SOUPLET.

[Signature Illegible], Capt.,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

230-20.22: Summary Information

ANNEX TO FOURTH ARMY SUMMARY, DATE OCTOBER 9, 1918---EXTRACTS FROM G. H. Q.

SUMMARY NO. 645, DATED OCTOBER 7, 1918

1. RECONSTITUTION OF THE 12th LDW. DIV: In March, 1918, the infantry regiments of the 12th Ldw. Div. were brought to the western front and were employed independently at various points of the front on duty behind the lines. The staff of the division was apparently sent to Finland.

The 56th Ldw., 87th Ldw., and 436th Ldw. Inf. Regts. which belonged to the division, have recently been identified together in ALSACE, so that it can be assumed that the staff of the 12th Ldw. Div. has returned from the east and has again taken over command of its original regiments.

2. AUSTRIAN FORCES IN WESTERN THEATER: From the latest identifications, it appears that the 38th Honved Div., reported in the METZ area, is still on the Italian front. On the other hand, the 37th Honved Div. is now reported to be in the western theater, which leaves the total number of Austro-Hungarian divisions considered to be in the western theater unchanged at 8.

3. ANTITANK DEFENSE: The following is an extract from an order of the Bav. 5th Div., dated 10/9/18, regarding antitank defense:

10. Divisional Antitank Officer:---Capt. V. Pigenot.

The Bav. 16th Pion. Co. is placed under the orders of the pioneer battalion for completing the construction of tank barricades and minefields.

A map showing the areas impassable for tanks and the proposed tank barricades and minefields, must be submitted to the division by the 14th inst. Tank Forts must be constructed between the 1st and the 2d main lines of resistance at commanding points, and, as far as possible, at points whence enfilade fire can be brought to bear.

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B, II Corps: Telegram

Progress of Attack by British Fourth Army

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 9, 1918--7:30 p. m.

G.322

Fourth Army front according to latest reports received runs approximately Bois d'ETAVES (excl.), where in touch with French First Army---BOHAIN (incl.)---VAUX-ANDIGNY (excl.)---ESCAUFORT (excl.)---HONNECHY (incl.)---MAUROIS (incl.). In touch with Third
Army between MAUROIS and BERTRY. Cav. corps hold REUMONT and TROISVILLES with patrols approaching Le CATEAU. Objectives allotted to IX, American II, XIII and Cav. Corps in G.319 today will stand for tomorrow. Advance will commence at 5:30. On reaching their objectives, XIII and American II Corps will push forward advanced troops across the SELLE to cover the passages over that river. Ack.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
M. G. G. S.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B: II Corps: Telegram

Progress of Attack by British Fourth Army

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 9, 1918.

Little opposition is being met with on Fourth Army front and a rapid advance has been made. Blue Line has already been passed on most of the front. Corps will continue the advance forthwith, with object of reaching the following objectives. XIII Corps, Le CATEAU. American II Corps, MOLAIN---ST-SOUPLER---ST.-BENIN and crossings over the River SELLE at these places. IX Corps, high ground N. and S. of ANDIGNY-les-fermes. Tactical boundaries between corps will be same as administrative boundaries laid down in map B issued with Fourth Army No. 20/27 (G) of 1/10/18. Cav. corps will push forward as rapidly as possible on Le CATEAU and after reaching that place will carry out mission already allotted to them by C-in-C. Ack.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
M. G. G. S.

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HS Brit. Files: Fldr. IV B, II Corps: Telegram

Boundaries British Fourth Army Defined

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 9, 1918--10:55 p. m.

Ref. Fourth Army 20/37 (G), dated Oct. 8. Counterbattery boundaries will be continued N. E. from the eastern points of boundaries shown on map attached thereto. Ack.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.
for
M. G. G. S.

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Medical Arrangements

D. M. S., Fourth Army No. C.42.

SITUATION OF MEDICAL UNITS, FOURTH ARMY

1. STATIONARY HOSPITAL
   No. 41 Stationary Hospital ASYLUM (Sh. 62 E.R.27.b.)

2. CASUALTY CLEARING STATIONS
   No. 5 BIHECOURT No. 48 ROISEL
   No. 12 TINCOURT No. 50 TINCOURT
   No. 20 DOINGT No. 53 ROISEL
   No. 37 (S.H.) MARICOURT No. 55 DOINGT
   No. 41 ROISEL No. 58 TINCOURT
   No. 47 BIHECOURT No. 61 BIHECOURT

3. ADVANCED DEPOTS OF MEDICAL STORES
   No. 13 ROISEL
   No. 14 DOINGT
   No. 18 BIHECOURT

4. MOBILE LABORATORIES
   No. 12 (Hyg.) TINCOURT No. 19 (Bac.) DOINGT
   No. 17 (Bac.) MARICOURT No. 5 Cdn. (Bac.) TINCOURT

5. MOTOR AMBULANCE CONVOYS
   No. 3 (army and Aust. Cps.) BUSSU No. 37 (Amer. II) MARQUAIX
   No. 10 (XIII Corps.) DRIENCOURT No. 24 (army) COURCELLES (near DOINGT)
   No. 11 (army and cav. cps.) Le MESNIL No. 44 (IX corps) ESTREES-EN-CHAUSSEE

6. MOBILE X-RAY UNITS
   No. 2 Mobile X-Ray Unit TINCOURT
   No. 4 Mobile X-Ray Unit DOINGT

7. ARMY MECHANICAL DENTAL CENTER
   No. 2 Mobile Dental Unit ASYLUM

8. ARMY OPHTHALMIC CENTER
   Ophthalmic Center, Fourth Army (Att: No. 41 Sty. Hp.) ASYLUM

9. SANITARY SECTIONS
   No. 9 (Cav. Corps) Sh. 62C, B.12.Cent.
   No. 12 (Cav. Corps) POEUILLY
   No. 16 (XIII Corps) HARGICOURT
   No. 23 (Army) CORBIE
   No. 48 (XIII Corps) TEMPLEUX la FOSSE
   No. 50 (XIII Corps) NURLU
   No. 58 (IX Corps) VAIGNES
   No. 59 (XIII Corps) MOISLAINS
   No. 61 (Army) RIVERY
   No. 77 (IX Corps) VERM RAND
   Aust. 1st Div. BELLO Y
   Aust. 2d Div. LONG
   Aust. 3d Div. HALLENCOURT
   Aust. 4th Div. BREILLY
   Aust. 5th Div. HUPPY

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10. **SANITARY SQUADS**

Nos. 15, 17, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, and 62 Sanitary Squads are serving at railheads in Fourth Army area.

[signature illegible],
Major General,
Director of Medical Services.

Hq Fourth Army
October 9, 1918

182-33.3: Message

*Heavy Artillery of 27th and 30th Divisions*

VII CORPS, B. E. F.,
October 9, 1918.

No. O. 102.3

G. C. Heavy Artillery

1. The 8" and 9.2"-How. Brigades will be brought at once into corps reserve, together with the 9.2"-batteries detached from mixed brigades, detached sections of batteries of mobile and mixed brigades, and one 6"-gun battery, under orders of B. G. H. Q., but will not be moved forward except by order of G. O. C., R. A. corps.

2. The B. G. H. A. will detail a brigade commander to command this corps reserve and arrange for parking the batteries near ESTREES.

This brigade commander will keep in close touch with this office.

3. The rest of the heavy artillery will be distributed, as follows:

   1 mobile brigade (4 gun batteries) will be attached to each division; the one detailed for American 27th Division will, however, for the present remain with American 30th Division. The 2 mixed brigades (4 gun batteries), less 9.2"-batteries and 2 6"-gun batteries, will form a mobile reserve and move forward under orders of B. G. H. A.

4. The counterbattery staff officer will move with heavy artillery headquarters, and as far as possible one of the officers of his staff with each mobile brigade to supervise counterbattery work for the division.

5. The corps observation group should be attached to the mobile brigades, which move with the leading division.

Major, G. S.,
R. A., VII (British) Corps.

182-33.3: Letter

*Artillery Assigned to 27th Division*

No. O.102/2

The Australian 3d and 5th Divisional Artilleries will be brought into corps reserve under orders of C. R. A., Australian 5th Division. All arrangements will be made direct between C. R. A.’s, Australian 2d and 5th D. A.’s.
2. C. R. A., 5th D. A., will wire locations selected to this office.

3. The following field artillery is allotted to American 27th Division:
   Australian 4th Divl. Artillery.
   6th Army Brigade, Australian Field Artillery.
   They will, however, for the present remain attached to American 30th Division.

Major, G. S.,

October 9, 1918

182-33.3: Message

Placement of Australian Artillery

From: Aust. Corps
Date: October 9, 1918 Hour: 16:40
To: II Corps

Aust. 3d and 5th Div. Arty. will remain and will come under the orders of the American
II Corps forthwith. Ack.

230-32.16: Message

Resumption of Advance

From: 6th Division
Date: October 9, 1918 Received: 12:55 a. m.
To: American 30th Division

Reference 6th Division Order 260 of this date. The advance will be resumed at
5:30 tomorrow, 10th.

230-32.16: Message

Mopping up of Bohain

From: Herr
Date: October 9, 1918 Hour: 1:50 p. m.
To: C. G., 60th Brigade

The Commanding General, 6th Division, states that they will clean up BOHAIN as you
request.

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Col., G. S.
Orders for 5th Cavalry Brigade

From: IX Corps
Date: October 9, 1918  Hour: 17:05
To: II Corps

G-189: 5th Cavalry Brigade will if not already done, move detachments through American corps. In order to turn BOHAIN from north and endeavor to gain ground in that direction.

British Occupation of Corps Front

From: XIII Corps
Date: October 9, 1918
To: II Corps

Following forecast for future:

66th and 25th Divisions to occupy objectives in G-474 of date. If occupied tonight, the 50th Division to move by route march and bus to point to be notified later and take over corps front night Oct. 10/11.

If occupied tomorrow, 50th Division, will take over night Oct. 11/12.

25th and 66th Divisions will be withdrawn into reserve under instructions which will follow.

Operations 30th Division

R. A. M. C. OPERATION ORDER NO. 104

by

COLONEL H. W. GRATTAN, 6th DIVISION

Ref. Maps

Sheet 62B N. W. 1/20,000
Sheet 62B S. W. 1/20,000

Extracts from 6th Division Order 259

[Extract]

1. The 6th Division front will be reorganized tonight with a view to an advance on the whole front at 5:20 h. on October 9.

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2. The 6th Division will be relieved south of the east and west grid line through I.9.central, I.11.central, by the 46th Division during the night October 8/9.

3. The 6th Division will relieve the American 30th Division on the front as far north as the farm railway in C.24.a., inclusive, to 6th Division.

4. The 6th Division front will be held by 16th Infantry Brigade on the right and 71st Infantry Brigade on the left. The 18th Infantry Brigade will be in divisional reserve disposed in depth from MONTBREHAIN---FONTAINE-UTERTE Road, inclusive, westwards.

5. Boundaries after relief will be:
   Southern Divisional Boundary: I.13.c.0.0- - I.10.a.0.0---thence eastwards along grid line. Interbrigade boundary: I.7.c.7.5--I.5.a.0.0 (DOON Copse, inclusive, to right brigade)---thence eastwards along grid line through I.5.central-- I.6.central.
   Northern Divisional Boundary: C.28.c.central along railway to Farm to C.24.a. (inclusive to 6th Division to farm C.18.d.9.0 (inclusive to 6th Division)---Tilleul d'ARCHIES.

6. The 16th and 71st Infantry Brigades will attack at 5:20 h. under a creeping barrage.

7. The first objective will be I.12.a.8.0 through I.12.a. and I.6.d. to I.6.b.4.2. and thence up the spur in C.30.d. to C.30.b.7.0. JONNECOURT Farm is to be occupied.

   16th Infantry Brigade will form a defensive flank along the spur in I.11. and 12. After the protecting barrage ceases, the brigades will exploit along their whole front as far as the line of the railway through J.8.a.--J.2.--D.26.--20. and 14. 16th Infantry Brigade maintaining a defensive flank north of FRESNOY-le-GRAND and 71st Infantry Brigade securing touch with American 30th Division who are advancing on our left.

8. If it is found that the enemy is retreating the 5th Cavalry Brigade will pass through, and the 6th Division will continue its advance in support of them. The advance in this case will be made on a brigade front, 71st Infantry Brigade Group leading. 16th Infantry Brigade will, if necessary, continue to watch the northern exits of FRESNOY to cover the flank of the advance, and 18th Infantry Brigade will be prepared to move forward and follow 71st Infantry Brigade. This further advance will only take place on an order from divisional headquarters.

* * * * *

H. W. GRATTAN,
Colonel, A. M. S.,
A. D. M. S., 6th Division.

Issued at 4:45

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230-32.7: Operation Order

Operations II Corps

6th DIVISIONAL ORDER NO. 260

October 9, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The enemy appears to be retiring along the whole of the Third and Fourth Army fronts, leaving out a few M. G.’s to delay our advance.

2. The cavalry corps, supported by the left corps of the Fourth Army, are moving on Le CATEAU and are reported to have already taken REUMONT.

The American II and IX Corps have been given as objectives St-SOUPLET and ANDIGNY les FERMES, respectively
3. The objectives for the 6th Division for October 10 will be:
First Objective: Capture of BOHAIN, if not already effected, and the lines---railway
crossing J.2.a.---canal bridge D.22.d.15.40.---D.11.a.


T. L. GROVE,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 18:45 h.

182-33.3: Summary Intelligence

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 9, 1918

From 18 h., October 8 to 18 h., October 9, 1918

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: The corps attacked again this morning at 5:10 in conjunction with
   the corps on our right and left. Enemy offered less resistance today than yesterday. The
   infantry line at 15:30 ran approximately V26a and C-V18c-V24a-V23b and d, east of
   BECQUIGNY---east of BOHAIN. The line was advanced approximately 7,000 yards.
   (b) Artillery: Infantry attack was supported according to program. Harassing
   fire carried out on suitable targets, including St-SOUPLET, St-MARTIN-RIVIERE, VAUX-
   ANDIGNY. Calls from air forces answered.
   (c) Prisoners: 2 officers and 166 other ranks passed through corps cages during
   the period. These men were captured the 8th inst. Total through cage since October 5, 35
   officers and 1,244 other ranks. In addition to the above, the captures today are esti-
   mated at 150 all ranks.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES: No new units were identified on the corps front
   during the past 24 hours. The accompanying situation map shows the battle order as it
   appears at the close of the day's fighting, the 8th inst. Prisoners were captured on the
   9th inst., from the:
   208th Division
   20th Division
   24th Division.
   These confirmatory identifications and further questioning of prisoners captured the 8th
   inst. furnished the basis for grouping the units as shown on situation map.

3. HOSTILE ARTILLERY:
   Activity: Activity less than normal. This afternoon our cavalry was shelled in
   P23b and d, and driven back.

4. ENEMY'S ATTITUDE: The enemy retreated without offering much resistance. Until
   near the close of the day's fighting, at which time air reports showed his line to be
   near the supposed location of the ESCAUFOUR-REGNICOUR Line. Indications are that the
   enemy will at least fight a rearguard action on this line.

5. MOVEMENT: At 12:15, motor transport, horse transport, and infantry were in full
   retreat toward the northeast on the road between MAUROIS-REUMONT. At 11:45, there was
   much movement of transport going east on road in E14b.

6. FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: 9:00 Fire in BOHAIN and fire and explosion in St.-SOUPLET;
   9:10, large explosion at V10c---thought to be a dump; 9:32, large fire in MAUROIS; 10:00,
   large fire at V9d17---10:20, large explosions P8d and V15c---10:25, explosion in V15c---
   10:25, explosion in P29c---10:35, explosion in D15b---10:40, many fires burning in BOHAIN.
7. SUMMARY OF PRISONERS’ STATEMENTS:

21st RESERVE DIVISION: A prisoner of the 87th Inf. Regt., 21st Div., states that the
21st Res. Div. has been disbanded. The prisoner and about 100 other men of the 21st Res.
Div. were sent to the 87th Inf. Regt. about the 15th inst.

38th DIVISION: 4 prisoners of the 96th Inf. Regt., 38th Div., captured near
ELINCOURT, state that their entire division is in the vicinity of our front, but do not
know the exact location of the other two regiments.

MOVEMENTS: This division was in reserve at ESNES on Oct. 6. The 96th Regiment was
alarmed on the 6th and ordered to relieve the 87th Inf. Regt. (21st Div.). That regiment,
however, sideslipped to the south and its sector was taken over by the 96th.

MORALE: The morale of the men of the 96th Inf. Regt. appears to be somewhat above the
average divisions on this front. However, its morale cannot be considered as better than
fair.

29th DIVISION  The 29th Division left LAON on Oct. 5, arriving in BRANCOURT the
following day. Prisoners state that on the 5th inst., the divisional artillery had not
left LAON.

204th DIVISION:

MOVEMENTS: On Oct. 5, the division left LORRAINE (where it had been at rest since
the beginning of September). Division detrained at BERTRY October 7. The same day the
413th Regiment was alarmed and put into support at BUSIGNY.

DRAFTS: When the 54th Res. Div. was disbanded all 3 regiments (246th, 247th, 248th)
appear to have been sent to the 413th Regiment, 204th Div. Strength of 1st Company, 413th
Regiment, 100 men.

KERR T. RIGGS,

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182-32.11: Telegram

Disposition of Tanks

October 9, 1918.

301st Tank Brigade (American)

5th Tank Brigade

American 30th Division

Move all available tanks forward not later than 8:00 inst. Get in touch with
American 30th Division for instructions. These tanks will be at disposal of American
30th Division for operations on 10th instant.

623 G-3, American II Corps.
23:15

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- 451 -
Movement of 54th Brigade

October 9, 1918.

American 27th Division

Move 54th Brigade to area between BRANCOURT and RAMICOURT. No elements of division to pass east of BRANCOURT, except on orders from these headquarters. Route via NAUROY crossroads G 18 A---H I D O O JONCOURT, RAMICOURT, MONTBREHAIN. Avoid shelled areas and keep roads clear after reaching destination.

Move remainder of division to BELLCOURT area vacated by 54th Brigade. Route HERBECOURT---crossroads L.15 A and B, VILLERET, BELLCOURT. Movement to commence 10:00, 9th inst.

American II Corps, 9:40

Movements Orders

October 9, 1918.

American 30th Division

This corps occupies the approximate front D.5.central, V 23 and 24, BUSIGNY, inclusive.

The IX Corps has taken BOHAIN. The line of the XIII Corps is in front of NAUROY and HONNECHY.

The general plan laid down in paragraph two our Field Orders No. 22 will be carried out. Advance will be started at 5:30, 10th inst.

On reaching designated objective, the 30th Division will push forward advanced troops across La SELLE River to cover the passage over that river.

630 G-3, American II Corps. 22:40

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

612 G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 21

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 9---APPENDIX NO. 1

ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS

1. The infantry will attack under an 18-pdr. barrage which will move at a rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes throughout. There will, however, be a pause of 30 minutes in front of the first objective.
4.5"-hows. will engage selected points, lifting in conformity with the 18-pdr. barrage and 200 yds. east of it.

Heavy artillery will engage selected points, lifting in conformity with 18-pdr. barrage and at no time less than 600 yds. east of the infantry.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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182-32.1: Order

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

No. 623 G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 22

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES A, NO. 10

1. INFORMATION:
   (a) Little opposition is being met with and the Fourth Army will continue the advance with the object of reaching the line Le CHATEAU---St-SOUPLÉT---ANDIGNY and seizing the crossings over the La SELLÉ River.
   (b) The IX Corps will advance on the right, the American II Corps in the center, and the XIII Corps on the left.
   (c) Objectives of neighboring units will be as follows:
      XIII Corps, Le CHATEAU.
      IX Corps, high ground north and south of ANDIGNY-les-FERMES.
      Cavalry corps will push forward as rapidly as possible on Le CHATEAU and after reaching that place, on special mission already allotted.

2. THE GENERAL PLAN:
   (a) The American II Corps will continue the advance in the general direction of Le SOUPLÉT.
   (b) Tactical boundaries between corps will be the same as administrative boundaries laid down in map Fourth Army 20/37 G, dated 8/10/18.
   (c) The objective will be the line of La SELLÉ River---St-BENIN---St-SOUPLÉT---MOLAIN (all inclusive) and the crossings over La SELLÉ River.
   (d) The 30th Division will be in front and the 27th Division in reserve.

3. DISPOSITIONS: The American 27th Division will move to and remain in reserve in the BRANCOURT-BELLICOURT area and no elements of the divisions will advance east of BRANCOURT, except on orders from Headquarters American II Corps.

4. Headquarters no change.
5. Acknowledge by wire.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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II Corps: Field Message

**Movement of Medical Units**

From: Conner  
Office: 20:10  
Date: Oct. 9, 1918  
To: Commanding General, American II Army Corps

Number 1529C3 telegraphic orders issued this date directing movement by rail of following units to 27th Division: Ambulance Company 105, Field Hospital Companies 107, 108, Ambulance Company 108, and train headquarters, headquarters of field hospital section, headquarters of ambulance section, and divisional medical supply unit, all of 102d Sanitary Train.

By order:

CONNER,  
G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

182-12.4: Fldr. 2: Letter

**Railheads**

II CORPS, A. E. F.,  
October 9, 1918.

From: G-4, American II Corps  
To: Distribution Officer, Noisy-le-Sec, American E. F., c/o Regulating Officer. Depot Q. M. Le Havre. Depot Q. M. Gievres.

1. The railheads of American II Corps Headquarters and 27th and 30th Divisions are at present changing so rapidly that it will be impossible to notify you of every change. Trains of material shipped via PERONNE can be rerouted through that station to the existing railhead of these units. Personnel should continue to be routed to the replacement battalion camp at EU.

2. If you will please inform me of the name of any code which may be in your possession, I shall endeavor to keep you informed by wire of important changes of positions of these units.

3. Present corps headquarters is at TINCOURT-BOUCLY.

By command:

J. P. TERRELL,  

- 454 -
Division to Move at Once Continuing to Act as Corps Reserve

FIELD ORDER
No. 57
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 9, 1918—10:15 a. m.

1. The division will move at once as below by road march, continuing to act as reserve of the corps.
2. 54th Infantry Brigade will march to the area between BRANCOURT and RAMICOURT. No elements of the brigade to pass east of BRANCOURT, except on orders from these headquarters. The route via NAUROY—crossroads G.18.a.—crossroads H.1.d.0.0.—JONCOURT. RAMICOURT must be avoided, shelled area, and keep road clear after reaching destination.
3. 53d Infantry Brigade will march from the HERVILLY area to the BELLCOURT area in the district east of the canal and northwest of NAUROY, exclusive. The main route from HESBECOURT—crossroads L.15.a. or b.—VILLERET—BELLCOURT.
4. Divisional troops will march to the BELLCOURT area after the 54th Brigade has moved forward, following the route described in Paragraph 3.
5. Advance parties (of par. 3 and 4) will be sent forward to arrange camp sites with the area commandant, BELLCOURT.
6. Infantry will march off the main road as far as practicable.
7. Move of division headquarters will be notified later.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

Administrative Orders

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 9, 1918.

No. 105

Reference Maps: 62B
62C 1:40,000

1. The following in connection with operations directed by Field Orders No. 57.
2. SUPPLY: Railhead, Oct. 9, ROISEL.
Refilling point, Oct. 9, G.11.a.2.3.

(southeast of BELLCOURT)

Railheads from Oct. 10:

Broad gauge at ROISEL.
Narrow gauge at JONCOURT.

Railhead detail will tranship supplies at ROISEL, and necessary personnel will accompany rations on narrow gauge railway for purposes of issue at JONCOURT, returning on empty cars to ROISEL.
Any change in refilling point from Oct. 10. will be notified to units by division quartermaster.

3. TRANSPORT: G. S. wagons and personnel as heretofore used for supply purposes, with two days' rations and forage, will report on Oct. 10. to Capt. Harry G. Pearson, C. O. Provisional Division Train, in the usual proportion, to narrow gauge railhead, at JONCOURT and at refilling point G.11.a.2.3., respectively.

4. EXTRA TRANSPORTATION: Lorries as available, will move property for which no other transportation is provided. Such property will be left under suitable guard, properly rationed.

5. ORDNANCE: Div. ordnance dump is located at HARGICOURT.

6. POLICE: Military police are stationed at BELLCOURT.

7. VETERINARY ARRANGEMENTS: 105th M. V. S., is located at ROISEL, K.17.a.2.2.

8. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS: 102d Sanitary Train is located at WIANCOURT (H.4.b.).

9. AMMUNITION: S. A. A. Sec., Aust. 4th D. A. C., will move to vicinity of ESTREES.

10. LOCATIONS: Units will notify G-1, these headquarters (advanced echelon at JONCOURT), the locations of their headquarters and transport lines.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
Chief of Staff.

230-32.1: Order

Disposition of Units

FIELD ORDER  
No. 24  
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
October 9, 1918.

1. The 60th Brigade will continue to advance to include the objective of the La SELLE River, east of St-SOUPLET from O.15.d.8.8.--W.16.c.5.0.

2. The 59th Brigade will be disposed about BUSIGNY in Squares V.9, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23, 28, and 29.

3. The 113th Machine Gun Battalion will move to MIGNON Wood or vicinity.

4. The 105th Engineers will be moved forward as far as practicable to point selected by the division engineer officer.

5. The military police will move forward as directed by G-1.

6. Medical units and signal battalion will move forward under direction of chief surgeon and division signal officer, respectively, to areas in the zone of advance.

7. All brigade and regimental commanders will move their P. C.'s forward to suitable points and report coordinates of same to division headquarters.

8. Division headquarters will close at TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD this date, at a time to be notified later, and will open at MONTBREHAIN (C.14.b.). Rear echelon, division headquarters, will move to NAUROY.

E. M. LEWIS,  
Major General, Commanding.
Operations 30th Division

From: Lewis (30th Div.)
Date: Oct. 9
To: 59th Brigade

The 60th Brigade continues the attack at daybreak tomorrow, with orders to advance to the SELLE River. Keep your brigade well in hand as you will probably receive orders before noon tomorrow to move it up to a position in the vicinity of the BECQUIGNY-BUSIGNY line.

In a moving warfare on which we are now engaged require your regimental commanders to move their headquarters as the advance progresses, never remaining more than 3,000 yards in rear of the main advance. Your own headquarters must move in conformity and should keep within 2500 yards of regimental headquarters. Staff officers should be sent ahead to select the best place available in your area and move on your own initiative, reporting in advance when possible. Your communications should be arranged in advance.

---------


FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 9, 1918.

1. The advance was continued today in conjunction with the French First Army and Third Army, the final objective for the day being the general line east of FRESNOY—east of BOHAIN—east of BUSIGNY—east of HONNECHY and MAUROIS, or the Brown Line, with an Intermediate objective or Blue Line west of BOHAIN and east of MARETZ.

The attack progressed so favorably that a further objective was allotted. This involved the capture of the high ground north and south of ANDIGNY-les-FERMES, ST-SOUPLET and LE CATEAU and the crossings over the SELLE River between these places being secured.

The role of the cavalry corps was to push forward as rapidly as possible into LE CATEAU and subsequently to exploit north and N. E. with a view to working against the flank and rear of the enemy opposing the Third and First Armies, and, if possible, to cut the enemy's communications about VALENCIENNES.

Corps were allotted tanks as follows for the day's operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Tanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| IX Corps       | 1 bn. Mk. V (5th Bn.)
|                | 1 co. Whippets. |
| American II Corps | 2 bns. Mk. V (4th and 301st Bns.)
|                | 2 cos. Whippets. |
| XIII Corps     | 1 bn. Mk. V (1st Bn.)
|                | 1 co. Whippets. |

Zero was at 5:20 a. m., at which hour the infantry advanced under cover of barrage fire from field guns and howitzers. Heavy howitzers and long-range batteries searched roads and villages for as far east as SEBONCOURT, VAUX-ANDIGNY, and ST-SOUPLET and maintained intense harassing fire against hostile battery areas. Throughout the advance the artillery moved forward in close support of the infantry and engaged fleeting targets, and in addition materially assisted to break down the enemy's resistance.
At first the enemy's resistance was slight and the Blue Line was reached very quickly. East of this line resistance became more pronounced and the Brown Line was gained only after stiff fighting in which the tanks rendered yeoman service.

The cavalry attempted to get through on several occasions, but each time were unable to progress owing to heavy machine-gun fire. Finally, however, they pushed through the infantry when the latter had reached the Brown Line, and captured REUMONT and TROISVILLES, pushing forward patrols in the direction of the CAMBRAI-Le-CATEAU Road to within 2,000 yds. of Le CATEAU. Further attempts to exploit towards Le CATEAU were unsuccessful.

As the result of the day's fighting the infantry held the line east of BOHAIN, BUSIGNY, HONNECHY, MAUROIS. 130 prisoners and a few guns were captured, making the total number of guns captured since October 8, 62.

During the day, very little hostile shelling was experienced until 5 p.m. when the area east of FRESNOY was subjected to concentrations of H. E. and gas shell for a period of 35 minutes.

2. IX CORPS: The attack was carried out by the 46th and 6th Divisions each operating on a one brigade front. MERICOURT, JONNECOURT Farm, FRESNOY-le-GRAND, and BOHAIN were captured and the line established east of FRESNOY along railway in D.20 and D.26---eastern outskirts of BOHAIN.

The enemy's resistance was weak at first but stiffened east of FRESNOY and BOHAIN. Attempts to exploit east of these villages were unsuccessful, on account of heavy machine-gun fire.

AMERICAN II CORPS: The advance was continued by the American 30th Division. The Blue Line was secured, very little resistance being encountered. Small parties of the enemy opposed the advance west of BUSIGNY, but were easily overcome. The village was captured and the advance continued beyond.

By evening, the line was held west of VAUX-ANDIGNY---ESCAUFORT (inclusive). The enemy evacuated the latter village without fighting.

A few prisoners and two guns were captured during the day.

XIII CORPS: The 25th and 66th Divisions continued the advance, meeting some resistance S. W. of MARETZ, which delayed the 66th Division for a short time. On pressure being maintained, the enemy withdrew rapidly and the advance was continued to the Brown Line without opposition. HONNECHY and MAUROIS were captured and the line established east of these villages.

3. THIRD ARMY: The attack was continued by the Third and First Armies from MARETZ to the River SENSKE in conjunction with Fourth Army operations. Considerable progress was made during the day. Resistance stiffened during the afternoon and towards evening progress was slow.

The line at the close of the day was held BERTRY (incl.)---CAUDRY (exclusive)---FONTaine-le-PIRE---east of CATTENIERES, west of IGNIEL-dit-les-FRISETTES---west of CARNIERES, 277 prisoners were captured.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The attack was successfully resumed and a considerable advance realized. On this part of the front resistance was much more severe and in consequence, the fighting was heavier. As the result of the day's operations, 2,000 prisoners were secured and the line established east of MEZIERES-sur-OISE, west of REGNY---east of MARCY---west of FONTAINE-NOIRE-DAME---west of BEAULTROUX---ETAUVE Wood.

5. AIRCRAFT:

(a) British: 778 hours were flown by 268 pilots. 18 reconnaissances, 19 artillery, and 39 contact patrols were carried out, and 49 zone calls sent down.

Eight photographic flights were made in the course of which 206 plates were exposed.

244 offensive patrols were carried out and 12 combats took place, five of which were decisive. Five E. A. were destroyed. Three of our machines are missing.

During the day, 28 112-lb. bombs were dropped on WASSIGNY and 501 25-lb. bombs were dropped and 30,670 machine-gun rounds fired at various ground targets.
The chief feature of today’s operations was the engagement of ground targets. In the afternoon, signs of a considerable enemy withdrawal were noticed and every available machine was put on ground strafing. Very many targets were successfully engaged and considerable confusion and casualties were caused among retreating troops and transport.

(b) Hostile: Activity was below normal in view of the operations in progress. 22 F. E. A., 3 A. E. A., and 2 R. E. A. crossed the line.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through army cages 86 officers, 2,274 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s 9 officers, 319 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Fair, but misty.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: 50th Division to corps reserve from line.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:

   * corps reserve

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>13-pdr.</th>
<th>18-pdr.</th>
<th>4.5&quot; How.</th>
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<td>H. E.</td>
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**Combat Position of Units**

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

October 9, 1918.

OPERATION MESSAGES RECEIVED AND ISSUED

From American II Corps

6:25. Morning situation. E. A. bombing on forward areas. Enemy artillery normal shelling on back areas. General situation slightly above normal. Captures 50 officers, 1,050 O. R.

11:45. American 30th Division reports following information from aeroplanes: 7:50, one tank moving east of BUTRY Fme. One tank seen to reach railway and return to farm. 8:10, three tanks moving east at U.30.4. One went south around PREMONT Wood, other two cut across woods D.1.a. One moving across V.25.c. 8:25, one tank moving out of farm V.13.b., moving east around woods V.7.d. 8:27, one tank moving N. E. at U.18.b.9.3. Woods taken. Cavalry going up. No tanks seem damaged.

17:24. Special aeroplane report: Flares called for at 14:20 to 15:00 show our troops very strong in V.4, V.10., V.16., and through BUSIGNY moving in open order in V.24.a. and

18:45. Our troops have secured BUSIGNY and BECQUIGNY. They are approaching VAUX-ANDIGNY on the right and pushing beyond BUSIGNY on the left, accompanied by cavalry. Aircraft reported 16:30, ESCAUFORT deserted. St-SOUPLET and MOLAIN still held by enemy. Two field guns reported taken, but few prisoners.

From 5th Brigade, R. A. F.

6:10 By day, two E. A. crashed, one out of control, two balloons in flames. 32 112-lb. bombs and 376 25-lb. and 55 40-lb. bombs. By night nil.

From XIII Corps

6:50. Fairly quiet night, except for active E. A. dropping bombs on forward area especially BEAUREVOIR. Line of departure this morning was north of PREMONT U.22.a.4.7.---U.15 central---windmill U.8.d.9.3.---U.8.b.0.5.---U.7.cent.---La LAMPE Farm, inclusive. Contact with corps on right established. Contact with corps on left not reported. Confirmed estimated prisoners yesterday more than 1,000 including 2 battalion commanders.

16:20. Air reports show troops east of HONNECHY and MAUROIS and in P.17.a. and d., also our infantry in force in P.34.c.2.B. Our advance on right is being interfered with owing to enemy fire from BUSIGNY.

From IX Corps


13:10. 6th Division on line C.30.d and east of JONNECOURT Farm J.12.b. and d. Unconfirmed report from F. O. O. states our troops along railway in D.14.d.2.0, and D.14.d.2.6. held up by machine-gun fire from outskirts BOHAIN. BOHAIN burning. FRESNOY clear of enemy. Railway east of FRESNOY believed held by enemy. 46th Division held MERICOURT and our troops seen 1020 advancing east of village unopposed. Contact plane reports French at 10:30 holding railway or just west of it from FRESNOY to CROIX-PONSOMME. 18:27. Evening report. In today's operations, IX Corps has captured MERICOURT, FRESNOY-le-GRAND, JONNECOURT Farm and BOHAIN. Line now runs approximately as follows: Our troops established east of BOHAIN in D.16.c. and 22.a. along railway in D.20-26, J.2---B, J.13.a. and c.---I.14.b in touch with French at I.30 central.

To G. H. Q.


15:45. IX Corps held FRESNOY-le-GRAND. Held up by machine-gun fire from railway J.2 and J.8. BOHAIN doubtful. American II Corps have taken BECQUIGNY and BUSIGNY, and continuing advance. Opposition slight and artillery practically nil. XIII Corps report HONNECHY, MAUROIS, and BERTRY taken and infantry pushing on. Air reports great confusion on roads N. E. and S. E. of Le CATEAU and our low-flying scouts shooting at record targets.

19:55. Advance was continued this morning at 5:20. Enemy resistance slight at first and our troops reached their first objective on general line FRESNOY---railway west of BOHAIN---MARETZ without much difficulty. Enemy's resistance stiffened considerably east of this line. After some fighting, our troops have now occupied and are east of BOHAIN, BUSIGNY, HONNECHY, MAUROIS. Cavalry have tried to get through all day, but were held up by machine-gun fire till this afternoon, when they captured REUMONT and TROISVILLEs and have pushed patrols towards Le CATEAU and the Le CATEAU-CAMBRAI Road. All reports indicate a rapid retreat of the enemy and the roads east of Le CATEAU blocked by troops and transport. Estimated prisoners 130 today. Guns taken since yesterday morning 59. Between Oct. 1 and 8 through army cages, 136 officers, 7,529 O. R.; through C. C. S.'s, 47 officers, 1139 O. R. Total 8,851.
1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF DAY: 30th Division reports enemy aeroplanes fairly active dropping bombs in forward area, especially BEAUREVOIR. At 8:25, October 9, enemy artillery was reported by the 30th Division to be practically nil.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Aeroplanes' messages at 10:30, October 9, report fires in BERTRY, MAUROIS, BUSIGNY, HONNECHY, and several bridges blown up. Explosions and fires were seen at ESCAFOPURT. A fair amount of rail activity was reported around Le CATEAU and WASSIGNY between 7:30 and 9:30, October 9. Otherwise, no abnormal movement was observed. According to report of escaped French prisoners new line was begun by the enemy on October 5 running east of VAUX-ANDIGNY, along high ground to 800 meters west of REGNICOURT, thence entering Bois de Riquerval, where trees have been felled to make an abattis. About 1000 prisoners and 1,300 civilians were observed constructing this line.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: The enemy is retiring in front of our advance.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: At 21:00, October 8, our lines had been advanced about 8,000 yards on a front of 5,000 yards, and we were holding PREMONT and BRANCOURT. At 6:00, October 9, situation on 30th Division front was reported slightly above normal.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Lines established in operations yesterday were being consolidated for further operations.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The IX Corps operating on our right report a quiet night. The British XIII Corps operating on our left report heavy bombing of forward areas during the night. The cavalry corps operating in conjunction with our troops pushed forward patrols beyond PREMONT and SERAIN during the afternoon October 8, but heavy machine-gun fire from both sides of the main MARETZ Road prevented further progress. At 20:50, October 8, the IX Corps reported the capture of MANNEQUIN Wood and junction with our troops 200 yards southeast of BRANCOURT Cemetery. The British XIII Corps pushed patrols well forward during the day northeast of SERAIN, and in the vicinity of the main MARETZ Road.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: At 5:20, October 9, the American II Corps, under orders of the Fourth Army, continued the advance in conjunction with the British IX Corps on the right, and the XIII Corps on the left. Progress up to 21:00, October 9, was satisfactory.

Field Order No. 21 issued.

The 54th Brigade, 27th Division, was ordered to area between BRANCOURT-le-GRAND and RAMICOURT. The balance of the 27th Division was ordered to BELLOCOURT area, just vacated by the 54th Brigade.

10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: At 12:00, October 9, the day's operation had progressed entirely satisfactorily, little opposition met with on the entire Fourth Army front, and a rapid advance had been made. The first objectives had been passed on
most of the front. Estimated prisoners by our troops up to 12:00, October 9, 50 officers, 1250 O. R.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.
12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy, fighting rearguard actions, is withdrawing apparently beyond the La SELLE River, where he will probably make his next stand.
13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: To advance to the line of the La SELLE River, seize the crossings, and push patrols east of the river.
14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC: Morale, high; health, good; supply, satisfactory.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3,
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

182-10.2: Field Message
Hour: 1:10 October 9, 1918
To: C. G., Amer. 30th Div.

636-G3: Operations of the IX Corps has just informed me that the final objective of that corps is in continuation of ours covering the high ground north and south of ANDIGNY-les-FERMES. I called his attention to what you state are in the operations orders of the 6th Division and he stated that the matter would be adjusted. Acknowledge.

230-32.16: Field Message
From: Col. George S. Simonds, C. S., II Corps.
Hour: 8:40 a.m. Sent by: Telephone Oct. 9, 1918
To: 30th Division.

XIII Corps is now in MARETZ and are out of touch with 30th Division.

230-32.16: Field Message
Hour: 23:00
To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

631-G3: Report advanced headquarters 27th Division at JONCOURT, advanced headquarters 30th Division, MONTBREHAIN.
230-32.16: Field Message

Hour: 11:47 Oct. 9, 1918

To: 30th Division

621 G-3. Ref. 1/40,000 map, 57B, American 30th Division will continue the advance beyond today's objectives to line of La SELLE River through St-BENIN---St-SOUPLET---MOLAIN, inclusive. Division boundaries will be administrative boundaries of the corps. Flank corps ordered by Fourth army to conform.

182-32.7: Telegram

Operations II Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 9, 1918.

From British XIII Corps. 11:30 a. m. Report line as follows:


Branch Intelligence Report: 3 p. m.

Cavalry on road V4d. Infantry advancing V10b and d, going through BUSIGNY---also in squares V17b and d. Many infantry in open order in files through the woods. Bois de BUSIGNY, in square 6, V24a, c, and d. Also V29a and b. advancing across the road in D4b and d, D10a and c, D9d, D15b. An isolated post few men. D16b. It was uncertain whether our men were in BOHAIN or not. The enemy hold a line southeast of BOHAIN, D22b and d, D28a and b, D27b and d. About a regiment and a half of cavalry in V2. About 3 patrols of ten men in each, leading northeast through V4. Contact Patrol 15:45 to 17:20.

14:15 Enemy shelling P32 and 33, causing casualties among cavalry there. Our cavalry seen at P22 and 23, V10a and c, V11c, P23b and d. Enemy seen at St-BENIN, also at St-SOUPLET, MOLAIN, apparently the main line of defense. The following squares appear to be deserted: P36 Q31 V6 W1.

16:25. Two trains with steam up, railroad siding, St-SOUPLET.

16:30. Large fire St-SOUPLET.

16:30. Large fire unloading point V9 central.

17:00 Fires at seven Pfalz aircraft. At 2500 feet over Le CATEAU [probably should read: Fired at seven Pfalz aircraft at 2500 feet over Le CATEAU]. At same time, antiaircraft active over Le CATEAU.
102d Engrs.: War Diary

[Extract]

October 9, 1918.

Adv. regt. hq. from 62B G.10.a.9.8. to BELLICOURT. Rear regt. hq. from 62C F.18.c.0.0 to St-EMILIE. The regiment less Co. B continued work on road repair and maintenance BELLICOURT and HARGICOURT. Co. F. construction of water supply line.

Available for all duty

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1557</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *

THOMAS CRIMMINS,
Capt., 102d Engrs.,
Regt. Adj.

II Corps: War Diary

[Extract]

October 9, 1918.

Advance continued with IX B Corps on our right, XIII B Corps on left. Operation successful.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

30th Div.: War Diary

[Extract]

October 9, 1918.

On the morning of this date, in accordance with instructions from these headquarters, the 59th continued attack and upon reaching the objective set for them, the 60th Brigade leapfrogged through them and continued advance to line marked on operation map and consolidated their position.

Available for all duty

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<th>Men</th>
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<tr>
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<td>528</td>
<td>16,076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.
DAILY FRONT LINES
AMERICAN 30th DIVISION
8 OCT - 9 OCT 1918
ALL LINES ARE AS OF MIDNIGHT UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED

MAP No 100

Compiled by American Battle Monuments Commission 1938
The advance was resumed at 5:20 a.m. and hostile resistance was found to be very slight. FRESNOY was captured by the 46th Div. and BELLOCOURT Fme by the 6th Div. The enemy had apparently retired to the line of the railway running just E. of FRESNOY and W. of BOHAIN. Large fires and explosions were observed all day which indicated that the enemy was retiring on an extensive scale and by 3 p.m., we had occupied the line of the railway on both div. fronts. By this time the hostile retirement had developed into the nature of a rout and very little opposition was met with at all, and later in the evening the 6th Div. occupied BOHAIN. The French on our right had captured CROIX-FONSOMME and gained a footing in ETAVES Wood.

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182-32.2: Location List

G-3

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 20

[Extract]

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)
II Corps Headquarters (Rear)
412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.
318th F. S. Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
(Att. to 13th Wing 3d Brig. R. A. F.)

Hq. VII Corps R. A.
Hq. Aust. 4th D. A.
(Comdg. right group)
Hq. Aust. 2d D. A.
(Comdg. left group)
Aust. 5th D. A. Hq.
Aust. 3d D. A. Hq.
Hq. VII Corps H. A.
Hq. C. R. E. (Aust. corps)
Hq. 4th Tank Brig.

H.16.b.0.5. (62C)
G.23.b.2.8. (62C)
I.1.a.95.10 (62B)
HERVILLY
DOINGT
BELLOCOURT G.10.a.9.9.
D.28.cent. (62C)
27th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (Rear)

53d Inf. Brigade Hq.
54th Inf. Brigade Hq.


30th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (Rear)
59th Infantry Brig. Hq.

60th Infantry Brig. Hq.


F. E. BUCHAN,
Col., Asst. C. of S., G-3.

230-20.22: Summary Information

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 10, 1918.

[Extract]

1. SITUATION OCTOBER 9 AND NIGHT 9/10 INST.: The advance of the Fourth Army was continued at 5:20 a.m. yesterday morning. The enemy’s resistance was slight at first and our troops reached the first objective on the general line Fresnoy---railway W. of
BOHAIN---MARETZ without much difficulty. East of this line, the enemy's resistance considerably stiffened, but after some fighting our troops drove the enemy back and are now established east of BOHAIN---BUSIGNY---HONNECHY---BERTRY. This constitutes an advance of 6,000 and, on the northern flank, 8,000 yards, during the day. Cavalry after being held up by machine-gun fire until the afternoon succeeded in capturing REUMONT and TROISVILLES and pushed patrols towards Le CATEAU and the Le CATEAU-CAMBRAI Road.

From reports received from the air, the enemy is retiring in apparent confusion and many of the villages and roads leading east are blocked with troops and transport.

Identifications today were, for the most part, normal. Prisoners were taken belonging to the 24th, 221st, 29th, 121st, 8th, 21st Res., 21st, 119th, 2d Gd., 38th, 204th and 20th Divisions. Of the above, two regiments of the 204th Div., which arrived on the 6th/7th inst., from LORRAINE, have now been identified, while elements of two regiments belonging to the 29th Div., which reinforced the front opposite the French yesterday, were identified by our troops in the FRESNOY area. Prisoners belonging to several companies of different battalions of the 2d Cyclist Brigade were captured in various parts of the front.

A number of men were taken prisoner while asleep during the morning, who apparently had not received the orders for retirement.

It is estimated that the number of prisoners captured during the day was about 300, while the guns captured since yesterday morning now amount to 59.

At an early hour this morning, our advance continued, and from reports received one of our cavalry brigades is astride the Le CATEAU-CAMBRAI Road on the line K.13., K.19., and K.31.

From reports received from the Third Army, prisoners belonging to hostile tanks were captured yesterday; apparently two tank Abteilungen [sections] were engaged. Much movement was seen in the LAON area, the direction being northwards. LAON itself and the villages in the vicinity are reported by the French to be burning, hence a retirement in that area must be anticipated.

2. **ENEMY'S INTENTIONS:**

(a) The prisoners captured during the last two days had received orders to hold on to the last, but a general report was current that they were to retire to a line near VALENCIENNES.

(b) An officer of the 204th Div. stated that the second line transport was moving back, on the night 8th/9th, he believes to VALENCIENNES.

(c) Prisoners captured by the Third Army stated that many civilians and soldiers were seen working on a new trench between SOLESMES and ESCARMAIN.

(d) Prisoners captured yesterday near CAUDRY state that it was the intention of the Germans to withdraw to a line about 10 kilometers east of CAUDRY.

*Note:* This indicates the Le CATEAU area.

Prisoners had been working on a line near BAZUEL, S. E. of Le CATEAU.

(e) A pioneer stated that a line was being dug from VALENCIENNES to Le CATEAU, and he thinks a retirement was to be made thither. Some prisoners had heard that work was proceeding on the HERMANN Stellung, west of VALENCIENNES, mostly by civilians, and that the evacuation of VALENCIENNES, started three weeks ago.

(f) A captured order, dated Oct. 5, states that the inquiry office for troops returning from leave, hitherto located in Le CATEAU, is to be moved back to MAUBEUGE.

(g) A French prisoner of war, who escaped from WASSIGNY, on the 8th inst., reports that a very large number of guns, mostly field guns, passed through WASSIGNY from the direction of La VALLEE-MULATRE and RIBEAUVILLE, a few days ago.

The above, read in conjunction with information received during the last few days, indicates that the Germans are falling back on to a line which has been commenced and which runs probably as follows:

Along the main road from VALENCIENNES to VENDEGIES---E. of the River ECAILLON to the high ground E. of BERMERAIN---the high ground between ESCARMAIN and SOLESMES ---thence along high ground E. of River SELLE---E. of Le CATEAU to MOLAIN---thence east of
ANDIGNY---west of REGNICOURT---through the Bois de RICHERVAL---RETHEUIL Farm---thence possibly S. W. to VADENCOURT on the OISE.

Portions of this line have been confirmed by air photographs.

In view of the field guns reported to be going east through WASSIGNY it is possible that the enemy only intend to make a temporary stand on the VALENCIENNES-Le-CATEAU Line.

3. MORALE OF THE ENEMY AND RUMORS OF AN ARMISTICE: During the last two days' operations, the resistance offered by the enemy has been, for the most part, slight. Isolated cases have occurred where men fought well. At the commencement of our attack on the 8th inst., about 70 men in the support line at once surrendered to our troops.

During the fighting yesterday, cavalry report that a number of Germans were captured in GATTIGNY Wood, who surrendered without opposition, as they were under the impression that an armistice had been signed.

A division belonging to our northern corps state that some of the men of the 8th Division captured by them offered no resistance, in view of a telegram received from the Kaiser on the 9th inst., referring to an armistice having been asked for.

From the above, it will be seen that peace talk is adversely affecting the morale of elements of the German army, and it will possibly have the effect of inducing men to surrender who might otherwise not have done so.

4. RESERVES:

(a) As was anticipated, another regiment of the 204th Div. was identified yesterday near MARETZ. The whole division has now apparently arrived from LORRAINE.

(b) Elements of 27th Div. (123d Inf. Regt.) were reported by prisoners to have been east of WALINCOURT on 6th inst., and other reports indicate that 120th Inf. Regt. was due to arrive in the MARETZ area yesterday, 9th inst. The division is, therefore, probably in this area. It was engaged once against this army in the MORLANCOURT sector, and withdrawn on Aug. 28., after losing over 1,400 prisoners.

(c) 48th Res. Div. was engaged on 8th inst. in the sector N. W. of WALINCOURT, by the army on our left, and identified again yesterday, 9th inst., in the NIERGNIES area.

(d) 185th Div., relieved in the BELLICOURT sector about 1st/2d inst., was engaged yesterday, also by the Third Army, at LIGNY-en-CAMBRESIS, S. E. of CAMBRAI. This division was engaged three times against this army, when it lost over 2,000 prisoners.

(e) Owing to the disbanding of the 108th Div., the number of enemy divisions in the western theater was reduced to 194, of which 182 are German infantry divisions, 4 are German dismounted cavalry divisions, and 8 are Austro-Hungarian infantry divisions.

The number of German infantry battalions disbanded since the beginning of 1918 now amounts to 210, the equivalent of over 23 divisions.

A total of 109 divisions has been engaged since the commencement of the Allied offensive on September 26.

To sum up: None of the prisoners captured yesterday knows of any fresh reserves in back areas. It would appear, therefore, that the 27th Div., which was twice reported yesterday by prisoners captured by Third Army, is now the only fresh division likely to reinforce this front.

5. ENEMY ACTIVITY: Weather: Fair, but misty.

(a) Aircraft: Hostile aeroplane activity was below normal in view of the operations in progress.


The noticeable decrease in activity during the last two days, and the general tactics employed, may indicate the withdrawal of the strong reinforcing squadrons which were recently operating on this front.

Most activity again centered over the northern sector. F. E. A. were not aggressive, and only one fairly strong patrol was seen.

A. E. A. were active over the forward area, and 2 R. E. A., at 20,000 feet, reconnoitered the ESTREES---ATHIES---VERMAND area.
Up to 4 p. m., 12 combats took place, as a result of which 5 E. A. were
destroyed.

Three of our planes are missing.

(b) Artillery (up to 3 p. m., Oct. 9, 1918).

Between MERICOURT and BRANCOURT: During the evening of the 9th, hostile artil-
leriy was fairly active. The night was quiet.

Little shelling was experienced during the day until 5 p. m., when heavy fire
with H. E. and gas shells was directed against the outskirts of FRESNOY for 35 minutes.

Enemy batteries were firing from FIEULAINE and from the vicinity of roads near
MONTIGNY-le-COURT and GROUGIS.

Between BRANCOURT and PREMONT: Very little shelling was experienced during the
period. Desultory shelling in the vicinities of MONTBREHAIN and WIANCOURT, and on the
newly-won ground only was reported.

Between PREMONT and the Northern Boundary: Artillery fire war practically nil.

A few rounds were fired into PREMONT, and an H. V. gun lightly harassed roads in the
forward area.

One or two batteries were firing from the SELLE Valley, near St-BENIN.

(c) Movement: Visibility good most of yesterday.

A universal retirement on all roads in the army area was seen throughout the
day. In the afternoon, many large convoys, and much scattered mixed transport and troops
were reported on roads leading east in the BAZUEL, MAZINGHIEN, CATILLON, WASSIGNY
and AISONVILLE districts, with congestion in villages. Troop movement included 600 infantry
going S. E. from Le CATEAU to ARBRE de GUISE, about 800 going east from MONTIGNY to
NOYALES, and smaller columns retiring on AISONVILLE, OISY, and CATILLON.

Railways were fairly active, train movement being also mainly east, with par-
ticular activity in WASSIGNY, ETREUX and VADENCOURT.

Night reconnaissance abandoned owing to bad weather conditions.

6. BOMBING RAIDS: By day: 28 112-lb. bombs were dropped on WASSIGNY; many bursts
were seen on the village and sidings.

In addition, 222 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various ground targets with good
effect.

Troops in REUMONT and Le CATEAU, transport E. of BERTRY, and batteries were attacked
from a low altitude. Many casualties were observed, and considerable confusion caused.

Four bombs were dropped on a train in BUSIGNY.

7. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS: • • •

(a) Aerodromes abandoned

<table>
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<tr>
<th>SHEDS</th>
<th>HANGARS</th>
<th>PHOTOGRAPHS</th>
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<tr>
<td>Le PETIT VERLY.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since Oct. 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATILLON</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Since Sept. 16</td>
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<td>Changes of accommodation</td>
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<td>GUISE Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUISE N. E.</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Since 3d in the part shown.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUPIGNY</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Minus 2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 3d. Now 5 hangars.</td>
<td>4051.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LESQUIELLES</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Minus 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 3d. Now 9 sheds and 2 hangars.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
ETREUX.—Only extreme southern group shown.
No change since Sept. 26

GUISE North.—No change
(4 large and 2 small sheds)

VILLERS-les-GUISE.—No change since Sept. 16 3 sheds and 6 hangars

WIEGE-et-FATY.—Slight decrease
62 A. N. 21.d.27.a.
Accommodation seems 2 hangars, 10 small sheds and 1 large shed.

Le CATEAU Area

BAZUEL
Only W. group shown.
Minus 5

Villiers
Hangars Since Sept. 16

(b) Railways and Dumps: New light railway being made north from a siding at BOHERIES Station to 62. B. [S. E.] R.1.a.0.4 (205. V. 4049).

New work at canal loop S. of TUPIGNY L.15.a.——probably runs along canal to join new line reported E. of VERLY (205. V. 4050, 3982).

Light railway from north of ORS shown running S. as far as R.17.a.25; new since Sept. 16 (205. V. 4058).

Siding being made from east end of ETREUX Station as far as A.10.c.36. (205. V. 4036).

VADENCOURT: Rolling stock for 8 to 10 trains. New sidings south of Lock 18.
Two or three trains at Le GRAND-VERLY. Some activity at old ammunition dump W. of VADENCOURT Station (205. V. 4050, 4049).

FLAVIGNY-le-GRAND: Rolling stock for 8 or 10 trains in station and sidings.
Considerable material dump with 4 sidings south of station at M.32.b.33.a. (205. V. 4075).

ETREUX: 8 to 10 trains in station and 3 in BOUE Station. Large amount of material still left at the dump at A.10.d. between ETREUX and BOUE and much large traffic on the canal (205. V. 4036).

(c) Activity: The streets of WASSIGNY, especially at N. E. end, are crowded with transport. Much transport going E. on WASSIGNY-OISY Road (205. V. 4031, 4034).

Much transport leaving GUISE on the La CAPELLE Road (205. V. 4044).

(d) Hospitals: New hospitals shown at LONGCHAMPS Q.6.c. and at GUISE (FAUBOURG de VILLERS). (205. V. 4049, 4044).

9. ENEMY DEFENSES: Except for a gap between ETREUX and HANNAPPES the whole line of the SAMBRE-OISE Canal has now been photographed from ORS (E. of Le CATEAU) to LONGCHAMPS (W. of GUISE). There is no sign of any new trench line along the canal or on the high ground E. of it in the area FESMY—BOUE—DORENGT. (205. V. 4049, 4050, 4051, 4057, 4058, 4065, 4066, 4054, 4053, 4038. All of Oct. 9)

The VAUX-ANDIGNY Line is now shown in detail by photographs of Oct. 9. The trench already reported as running from west of MOLAIN W.15.a.8.8. through W.14.d.5.6. to east of VAUX-ANDIGNY at W.20.b.6.3. is shown continued through W.20.d.5.5.—d.7.0.—
W.26.b.4.5.—b. 3. 0. to W.26.d.2.0. After a gap there are elements of trenches from E.3.c.5.0 to E.2.d.8.0. and behind this from E.3.c.3.5. to E.3.c.11. No trench is yet dug between this and REGNICOURT in E.8.b.d. (205. V. 4062, 4064). The wire reported by French prisoners is not visible.

Corps photographs of 9th are reported to show this line continuing through the Bois de RICUERVAL in E.13.b.d., E.19.a.c. and new trenches are shown S. E. of BOHAIN in D.30.a.b. with much movement along west edge of RICUERVAL Wood. No wire is reported to be visible (but op. escaped prisoners' recent statements) and the trenches are very shallow. (9 AE A 272, 273, 275, 276, 277, 281.)
A further photograph shows the trench continued south of Riquerval Wood from E.25.c.9.6. to west of Rethelieu Farm at K.1.a.8.6. and thence through K.1.b.5.0. to west of Forte Farm at K.1.d.5.0. across Bohain-Aisonville Road at K.7.b.2.2. to K.7.c.5.5. (limit of photography) (205. V. 4060).

10. FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: There were large fires and explosions at Etaubes and at St-Souplet. Explosions at Seboncourt and on the road at D.11.b.7.3.

Fires were reported in several villages east of the present line: those E. of Le Cateau had the appearance of burning dumps rather than of villages being destroyed.

11. CIVILIANS: Wassigny is said to be full of civilians.

12. PRISONERS: The number of prisoners which passed through corps cages and C. C. S., up to 6 p. m., Oct. 9, is 67,342, of which 1,581 are officers. During the fighting on Oct. 8 and 9, the approximate number of prisoners captured is 4,277, together with 59 guns.

******

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B, II Corps: Telegram

**Cavalry Corps, British Fourth Army to Withdraw its Divisions**

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 10, 1918—4 p. m.

ADV. CAVALRY CORPS (BY WIRELESS IN CODE)

G.336

Unless tactical situation prevents, you will withdraw one div. this evening to the valley of the Ruisseau de l'Erclain between Maurois and Inchy and the other to the woods about Becquigny in V.21, V.22, V.23, V.24, V.27. 4th Gds. Brig. remain about Maretz and keep roads clear as much as possible. Ack.

[Illegible],
for
Lt. Col., G. S.

******

HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B, II Corps: Telegram

**Dispositions of Units of British Fourth Army**

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 10, 1918—8:30 p. m.

Objectives given for today if not already reached will be gained tomorrow. Zero hour to be arranged by corps. Cav. corps will be held at 4 hours' notice from 8:00 4th
Gde Brig. will be withdrawn tomorrow to vicinity GOUY under arrangements between cavalry corps and XIII Corps. Ack.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col., G. S.

230-32.16: Field Message

Orders for Attack on October 11, 1918

From: 6th Division, B. E. F.
Date: October 10, 1918 Hour: 20:30
To: American 30th Division

The advance will be continued tomorrow, the 71st Infantry Brigade group leading. Objective: Line of the road ANDIGNY-les-FERMES, inclusive—ANGIN Farm—BOIS ST-PIERRE, to northern division boundary. 71st Infantry Brigade will secure this line, using if necessary all means at its disposal, establish touch with American 30th Division at southern end of MOLAIN, and form a defensive flank on the approximate line of the ANDIGNY-les-FERMES—REGNICAOURT Road and north of Bois de RIQUERVAL until the left of 46th Division is able to come up in line with its right. Brig. Gen. Comdg. 71st Infantry Brigade will report to divisional headquarters what additional artillery or machine-gun assistance be required if any. 18th Infantry Brigade group will move forward in readiness either to relieve 71st Infantry Brigade group on the night 11th/12th or attack through them on the morning of the 12th. The leading battalion with two sections of the machine gun company will be moved up close to and east of BOHAIN by 5 h. in readiness to move forward and occupy the approximate line D.18.Central—D.16.Central—VALLEE-HASARD as soon as it is known that the 71st Infantry Brigade has secured its objective. The remainder of the group will move at the time selected by Brig. Gen. Comdg., 18th Infantry Brigade. Acknowledge.

182-20.1 - II Corps: Intelligence Summary

No. 8

FROM 18 H., Oct. 9 to 18 h., Oct. 10, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: The corps, in conjunction with the corps on our right and left, continued the attack at 5:30. Enemy resistance light at first; but increased somewhat later in the day. At 18 h., the line ran approximately as follows: North to south: Railroad line in Q16 and Q22—Q27b.5.2—Q34c.1.9—Q33c.3.2—W3a.1.9—W1b.5.4—W7a.4.4—W7c.7.5—Q34c.1.9—W13d.6.4—W13c.9.2—W19a.7.6—W25c.9.0.
   (b) Artillery: Our artillery was engaged in support of infantry operations. The rapidity of advance restricted our harassing fire.
Prisoners: During the period, the following unwounded prisoners passed through the corps cage: 5 offs. and 177 O.R. Total through corps cage since October 5: 46 offs. and 1,752 O.R.

* * * * *

3. HOSTILE ARTILLERY: The enemy's artillery was more active during the period, particularly during the day. ESCAUFORT, St-SOUPLET and V17 heavily shelled after occupation by our troops. Our cavalry and guns moving up west of BOHAIN were shelled with observed fire. Field guns firing over open sights were observed firing in Q21d.

4. ENEMY DEFENSES: Information has been received from British Fourth Army that on the afternoon of the 10th inst., shell holes or pits in W4a were occupied by the enemy with two machine guns. The road in Q6a was strongly held. Trench line from Q5d to Q6c was occupied by the enemy. Q34b and d, were occupied by the enemy in force, with three machine-gun nests.

5. ENEMY'S ATTITUDE: The enemy opposed strong resistance to our advance in the afternoon. It is probable that he will make a stand on his present front line.

6. SUMMARY OF PRISONERS' STATEMENTS:

BAVARIAN INFANTRY GESCHUTZ BATTERY, NO. 50

Formation: This battery was formed about July 8. It is composed of men from various artillery units, among which are the following:

(a) Battery No. 897, which had been on the Russian front; the older men of this battery were taken out, younger men put in and the battery, as such, disbanded. The new battery was then sent to the western front.
(b) 1st Res. Fld. Arty. Regt. (1st Res. Div.)
(c) Gebirgs Abteilung, 2 and 4.
(d) 7th Fld. Arty. Regt.
(e) 1st Ersatz Fld. Arty. Regt.
(f) About 60 men from Bavarian Cavalry Div., which was disbanded on eastern front.

Strength: Four Austrian 7.5 mountain guns, 130 men.

Other Units of same type: There are 51 of these infantry Geschutz batteries that have been formed and equipped.

Movements: The battery was formed July 8, at JENLAIN; remained there until about Sept. 13, then to near MAUBEUGE, where it was exercised and trained. It marched Sept. 25 to BUSIGNY, where it arrived Sept. 26; it entered line south of ESTREES September 27. The battery was in support of the 20th Div., and remained in position when that division was relieved about Oct. 5, by the 21st Division.

General: These batteries are placed in or near the front line as infantry support against tanks, machine guns, and hostile infantry.

Prisoners were captured in V2 Central. Their main line of resistance had been withdrawn unknown to them, and they found themselves outflanked by our men advancing along the railway west of BOHAIN.

KERR T. RIGGS,
WEATHER: Low clouds and drizzling rain throughout the morning made contact with our infantry impossible. Weather fine, visibility good during afternoon.

OPERATIONS: Acting in conjunction with operations carried out by American II Corps, cooperating with flank corps, 2 artillery, 2 counterattacks, and 2 contact patrols were successfully carried out. Reports to 18:00 our infantry holding the approximate line: Q15a.4.4---Q15c.4.7---Q15c.5.4---Q21a.6.5---Q21c.2.8---Q21c.3.2---Q27a.7.4---Q27b.5.2---Q33b.5.5---Q34c.1.9---Q33c.3.3---W3a.1.9---W1b.5.4---W7a.4.4---W7c.7.5---W13d.6.4---W13c.9.2---W19a.7.6---W19c.8.3---W25a.9.0. Enemy were seen in trenches W3 and 4, W26a.8.3., also line of trenches east of VAUX-ANDIGNY, from W14d to W26d.

MOVEMENT, ROAD: 15:45---2 transports east on road in Q36c.; 14:47---about 40 enemy retreating R5, 11 and 17; 16:20---much of our own transport going into ESCAUFORT.

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: Many fires and explosions observed in the area throughout the day, as follows: 13:25---fire in BEAUVOIS and SOLESMES; 13:35 to 14:02---many small explosions at VIESLY; 14:12---fire in building at Q28c.3.3.; 15:50---fire in St-SOUPLET; 15:50---many small fires north of Le CATEAU; 18:00---4 fires in SOLESMES. Many fires during afternoon in VAUX-ANDIGNY. All bridges across La SELLE River between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET blown up. Railway bridges at Q20b.8.6. and Q15b.4.1. blown up.

A. A.: Active over entire corps front, particularly over Le CATEAU and vicinity east of BOHAIN. Considerable enemy rifle and machine-gun fire encountered from the ground.

E. A.: Below normal.

BALLOONS: 15:5---1 enemy kite balloon at low altitude east of VAUX-ANDIGNY.

GENERAL: Throughout the afternoon our planes again rendered valued assistance to the advancing troops by attacking enemy strong posts, infantry and transport with machine-gun fire, inflicting many casualties.

BRANCH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,
AMERICAN II CORPS,
Attached Australian 3d F. C.

In the field.

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ANNEX TO AMERICAN II CORPS SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE, NO. 8

INFORMATION REGARDING THE RIVER SELLE

[Extract]

Source: The SELLE rises near MOLAIN (57.B., W.15) follows a winding course in a northwesterly direction and discharges into the ESCAUT River above the Lock de DENAIN (sic.).

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DIMENSIONS

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>AVERAGE WIDTH</th>
<th>DEPTH</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At course (MOLAIN)</td>
<td>10 ft., 0 in.</td>
<td>2 ft., 0 in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At mill at 57.B. W.4.c.d.</td>
<td>19 &quot; 9 &quot;</td>
<td>3 &quot; 3 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At mouth at DENAIN</td>
<td>49 &quot; 6 &quot;</td>
<td>6 &quot; 6 &quot;</td>
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General: The river is used essentially for industrial purposes, providing motive power to more than fifty factories by means of about forty weirs. The water is clear.

Banks and Bed: The bed is strong with slightly sloping banks averaging 3 ft., 0 in. high, bordered by poplars, alders, and willows.

Valley: The sides of the valley are steep, the breadth averaging 1 kilometer.

The above is an extract from "Notes on the Country East of the Third Army Front between the St-QUENTIN Canal (exclusive) and the SAMBRE-a-l'OISE Canal (inclusive)."

Details of bridges across the SELLE are given in an appendix in the above-mentioned notes which are in possession of corps.

* * * * *

230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 27 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

6 a. m., Oct. 9 to 6 a. m., Oct. 10, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS: At 5:20 a. m., our troops, following a thin barrage, attacked on a front of approximately 4,000 yards. The final line of advance was approximately V 5c 4.9, V 11a 9.9, V 11d 2.0, V 17b 2.9, V 17d 3.9, V 23b 7.9, V 24a 2.2, D 5b 0.2, D 5c 5.0.

The enemy lines were very lightly held and the only resistance encountered was in the woods, from a few machine guns and riflemen.

The enemy artillery did not respond to our barrage, to any great extent, and his artillery during the day's operations was limited to very weak harassing fire, by small caliber guns.

About 1,000 civilians were found in BUSIGNY who were very much surprised to know that Americans were in this sector.

Identifications: During the period, 2 officers and 155 other ranks passed through the divisional cage and 91 other ranks passed through C. C. S., making a grand total captured since this operations, 41 officers and 1,468 men.

* * * * *

Prisoners advised that they were not expecting an attack on the morning of the 9th. The 2d Bn. of 25th Inf. Regt. was almost wiped out on October 8 and was taken out of line and the 1st and 3d Bns. of that regiment put in. Their most recent moves were as follows: From ALAINCOURT on the OISE to CAMBRAL, then to BRANCOURT and BOHAIN.

(a) Hostile Activity. Artillery: Below normal, consisting of harassing fire by small caliber guns. Artillery reply to our barrage was very weak. FRAICOURT Farm and FRAICOURT Woods in C 17 were shelled with 77's and 4.2's between 5 and 8 a. m. Eastern edge of BRANCOURT was shelled between 6 and 8:30 a. m. by long-range guns. Woods in V 27 and D 3 were heavily shelled by enemy field guns all afternoon, from direction of E 7, E 13, and E 19. Several enemy field guns observed during afternoon on ridge east and northeast of BOHAIN firing point blank at our troops, under direct observation. It is
believed that these guns were between our infantry and the retiring enemy infantry. 11:25 a. m., enemy artillery was firing on our horse transport in I 1d. 12:05 to 2:30 p. m., I 1a 1.9 and H 6b were being shelled by long-range guns at intervals of 10 minutes. 3 p. m. to 4:30. p. m., area C 28c and the road in I 2c and I 8 b lightly shelled by 5.9's.

Machine Guns: Active on our troops from BOHAIN and vicinity; also from V 21c 8.0 and in MIGNON Woods and La SABLIERE Bois.

Trench Mortars: Enemy trench mortars harassed our front lines between 12 noon and 2:30 p. m., along road and in woods from D 9 central to V 27 central.

Aerial: Few enemy scouts flying low over our front lines. One brought down at 11:40 a. m. 11:45 a. m. to 1:50 p. m. and again from 2:10 p. m. to 3:45 p. m., O. B. up at 82 degrees grid from I 1a 36.15.

Patrols: Nil.

(b) Our Activity. Artillery: Our artillery put down a barrage, to cover advance of our troops, at 5:20 a. m. The necessary forward movement of artillery was made during day and night. Selected targets in advance of our troops were fired on.

Machine Guns: Our machine guns protected our right flank towards BOHAIN and carried out both direct and indirect fire on enemy field artillery and retreating enemy troops.

Trench Mortars: Nil.

Aerial: One of our scout planes brought down an enemy plane at 11:40 a. m. in C 18b 8.8.

Patrols: Active along front covering advance of and consolidation of our troops; also protecting flanks and maintaining liaison between units in line and flanking units.

2. ENEMY MOVEMENT: Visibility 5 a. m. to 9:30 a. m., poor; 9:30 to 4 p. m., good; 4 to 6 p. m., poor. Enemy observed retreating from BOHAIN and BECQUIGNY all afternoon.

3. MISCELLANEOUS: 11:40 a. m., fires started in BOHAIN. 1 p. m., explosion at D 11c. All afternoon, villages were being fired by retreating enemy.

B. Y. READ,  
Major, U. S. A.,  
A. C. of S., G-2.

182-40.4: Order

Administration II Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,  
October 10, 1918.

ADMINISTRATION SUMMARY, AMERICAN II CORPS:

[Extract]

(11) Railheads, until further notice, will be as follows:  
Supplies for American 27th and 30th Divisions:  
ROISEL for transshipment to JONCOURT.  
Supplies for Australian 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th Divisional Artillery to ROISEL for transshipment to JONCOURT.  
Ammunition  
Heavy and siege artillery---TINCOURT for transshipment to NAUROY.
Field artillery and S. A. A.—TINCOURT for transshipment to BELLICOURT.

(12) Changes in location:
American 30th Division to MONTBREHAIN.
American 27th Division to TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD.
M. D. S. for American 30th Division to JONCOURT.
17 O. M. W. (light)

Divisional
16th Army Auxiliary H. Co. to BELLICOURT.
18th " " " " " " (on 11th inst.)
305th Road Construction Co. to MARQUAIX.
708th Labor Co. to MONTIGNY Farm.
11th Sect., 68th Aux. Petrol Co. to MARQUAIX.
23d Sec., 75th Aux. Petrol Co. to ROISEL.
24th Sec., 75th Aux. Petrol Co. to DOINGT.

(13) Arrivals:
456th Siege Battery.

(14) No horses are to be clipped in Fourth Army area until further notice, except for veterinary reasons on authority from a veterinary officer.

(15) British units attached to American II Corps, as shown in Fourth Army A and Q Summaries of October 5 and 7, will be administered as under, for all A matters, i. e., Discipline, Courts Martial, Honors and Awards, Leave, Postings and Transfers, Promotions, etc.

* * * * *
J. P. TERRELL,
Lt. Col., G. S.

182-12.4: Telegram

American 27th Division
R. S. O. ROISEL
R. T. O. ROISEL

G-4 186

Supply arrangement for your division tomorrow will be as follows:
Your supply railhead will remain at ROISEL, but your pack train will be off loaded in bulk by Decauville [portable light railway] by army labor. No issuers or loaders are required at ROISEL, but must be in readiness at JONCOURT. No issuers or off loaders required at ROISEL. Must be moved up tomorrow morning by Decauville. Personnel train will be in readiness at ROISEL at 8 a. m., 11th, to bring up any of your issuers or loaders at ROISEL. Instruct your S. S. O. to take over the train from R. S. O. at ROISEL then proceed to JONCOURT to superintend of loading and distribution. Acknowledge.

American II Corps, G-4.
230-32.16: Field Message

From: Buchan, G-3, American II Corps
Office: 4:17 Received: 4:25 a.m.
To: C. G., American 30th Division.

After obtaining objective laid down in F. O. 22, send patrols to get in touch with right of 25th Division at Q 6 central.

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230-32.16: Field Message

Hour: 23:35
To: C. G., American 30th Division

660 G-3

Objectives given in Field Orders No. 22, paragraph 2, subparagraph C, dated October 9, will be gained tomorrow, 11th inst. Zero hour will be 5:30. IX Corps is attacking at same hour, objective ANDIGNY-les-FERMES and high ground north and west. Acknowledge by wire.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding II Corps.

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182-32.11: Order

Time Sent: 23:50
To: C. G., American 27th Division

661 G-3.

Move 54th Brigade at dawn to BUTRY Wood and La SABLIERE Bois. No elements to pass east of railroad V 14 central, V 20 central, V 26 B 8.0---D. 2 B 8.0---D 8 B 90. Move remainder of division, less 102d Engineers, to PREMONT area now occupied by 54th Brigade. No restrictions as to roads. Be prepared to relieve 30th Division night 11th/12th inst. Acknowledge.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding
American II Corps.

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182-10.2: Order

Sent: 12:05   Received 12:22

To: C. G., American 27th Division

642 G-3

Move 54th Brigade forthwith to vicinity of PREMONT. Move remainder of division to BRANCOURT-MONTBREHAIN area. No troops will pass beyond tactical boundaries of corps nor east of line U.30. Central---C.6 Central, except on orders from these headquarters. Northern corps tactical boundary runs approximately B.18.A.0.0---U.22. Central---U.23 Central---U.18 Central, no restriction as to roads. Important to preserve good march discipline. Acknowledge.

GEO. W. READ
Major General, Commanding
Amer. II Corps.

227-32.1: Order

Brigade Locations

FIELD ORDER 27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 58 October 10, 1918---12:15 p. m.

1. The division will move at once as below:
2. The 54th Infantry Brigade to camp just south and east of PREMONT, remaining within the corps boundary and not going east of a line through U.30.c.central.
3. The 53rd Infantry Brigade will move to MONTBREHAIN-BRANCOURT area, taking the place of the 54th Infantry Brigade which is now located:

   Brigade headquarters  I.1.a.1.5
   1 regiment            C.30.d.
   1 regiment            C.27.a.    Hq. just east in edge of town.
   M. G. Battalion       H.6.c.

4. Both brigades will be further prepared to move further forward into action at one hour's notice.
5. Divisional troops will move to the vicinity of MONTBREHAIN-BRANCOURT, not locating in MONTBREHAIN.
6. Division headquarters will remain at JONCOURT.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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- 480 -
227-40.1: Order

Administrative Orders

ORDERS
No. 106

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 10, 1918.

Reference map: 62B 1:40,000

1. The following in connection with operations directed by Field Orders No. 58.
2. SUPPLY: Ration refilling point from Oct. 11---1.2.e.7.5. (east of MONTBREHAIN).
3. MEDICAL: Main dressing station PREMONT
   Advance dressing station BUSIGNY
6. Notify all concerned, your command.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Medical Arrangements

27th Division, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF DIVISION SURGEON,
October 10, 1918.

1. Field Hospital Co. No. 105, less one medical officer, one corporal and two
   privates, will proceed by marching at 6 a. m., October 11, 1918, to PREMONT, C.28.b.5.5.,
   where they will prepare to open main dressing station.
2. Field Hospital Co. No. 106 will proceed by marching to BUSIGNY on October 11,
   1918, and stand by ready to take over the advanced dressing station of the American 30th
   Division.
3. The Commanding Officer, Field Hospital Co. No. 106, will detail two officers,
   and six other ranks, and such equipment as may be necessary to operate temporarily the
   main dressing station of the American 30th Division at MONTBREHAIN. They will stand by
   ready to take over on orders from the division surgeon, American 27th Division.
4. The director of ambulance companies, American 27th Division, will have charge of
   the evacuation of the forward area.
5. The O. C., 133d Field Ambulance, will furnish such officers, bearers, and trans-
   portation as called for by the director of ambulance companies.
6. The Commanding Officer, Field Hospital Co. No. 105, will detail one medical
   officer, one corporal, and two privates to take over entraining point for walking wounded
   at JONCOURT, H.8.d. This detachment will take two bell tents, one marquee, and necessary
dixies for cooking, also medical equipment sufficient to redress cases when necessary. Medical cards will be made for all cases evacuated that have not been carded. They will stand by ready to take over on receipt of orders.

WALTER C. MONTGOMERY,
Lieut. Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.

30th Division Situation

From: 30th Division

Date: October 10, 1918 Hour Sent: 4:25 a. m., Oct. 11

To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

A. Weather fair.
B. Infantry advancing against strong enemy M. G. fire.
C. Enemy artillery active on forward areas; BRANCOURT shelled with long-range guns 20:00 to 22:00 and today 10:00 to 12:00.
D. E. A. very active reconnoitering line.
E. Scout planes were flying low, shooting into our advancing lines. One E. balloon was up in p. m. yesterday and a. m. today. Our airplanes very active afternoon and morning; balloons up during same.
F. Fair.
G. Favorable.
H. Very light. 80 passed through clearing station this a. m.
I. The 119th and 120th Infantry of 60th Brigade after taking up the advance yesterday morning between BOHAIN and BUSIGNY continued the advance today and at this time have reached La SELLE River, the cavalry having gone ahead and are reported to be in BAZUEL. Prisoners are coming in freely. Total passed through cages at 6 p. m. yesterday, 41 officers, 1387 O. R. Ten villages have been captured by this division since yesterday morning, including BUSIGNY, Le VERT-DONJON, Le VENT-de-BISE, EXCAUFOURT, BECQUIGNY, Le PETIT-CAMBRESIS, VAUX-ANDIGNY, St-SOUPLET, St-BENIN, La HAIE-MENNERESSE, many guns captured. Advance today 6 kilometers on whole front K N L enemy line now runs approximately along east bank of La SELLE.
From: 30th Division
Date: October 10, 1918 Hour: 6:10 p.m.
To: C. G., 60th Brigade

G-3/65

General Lewis directs that both your regiments dig in on approximately the line held by them without making any effort to advance further tonight. Connection with the British on both flanks and between regiments themselves must be assured.

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From: E. M. LEWIS, [Major General, Comdg., 30th Division]
At: Headquarters, 30th Division
Date: October 10, 1918 Hour: 18:02 Sent By: Phoned by Skinner at 18:05 and read back by Capt. Workman
To: Commanding General, 60th Brigade

Pursuant to instructions from Hq. II Corps, your brigade will remain in possession of the position held at the termination of the operation today. Tomorrow at daybreak you will push on to the objective given you today on the SELLE River.

Divisions on our flanks have similar order.

Artillery will follow up the attack and be subject to call as it was today.

BOHAIN has been cleared up.

Your battalion and regimental commanders will, of course, keep within controlling distance of their units.

It is not known what tanks, if any, will be available.

E. M. LEWIS.

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FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 10, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The advance was contained along the whole of the Fourth Army front and at the end of the day the line was established along west edge of Bois de Riquerval---Vaux-Andigny---La Haie-Meneresse---western portion of St-Souplet---railway east of St-Benin---western portion of Le Cateau.

The cavalry endeavored to cross the La Selle between Le Cateau and Neuilly, but when moving over the ridge west of Le Cateau they encountered heavy machine-gun fire from the
outskirts of Le CATEAU and were heavily shelled. The enemy's resistance was found to be much too vigorous to allow the cavalry to get through and eventually they withdrew west of the ridge in K.13, 19 and 20.

The enemy's artillery increased considerably in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET and in the valley of the SELLE River. On other parts of the front, activity was chiefly displayed by H. V. guns, firing on roads and villages.

2. IX CORPS: The 6th and 46th Divisions continued the advance at 3:20 a. m. and by evening had established the line along the western edge of Bois de RIQUEVAL, representing an advance of about 1,000 yards. The enemy defended the wood very strongly with machine guns and further efforts to advance were unsuccessful.

AMERICAN II CORPS: In conjunction with the IX and XIII Corps, the American 30th Division attacked at 5:20 a.m. and captured VAUX-ANDIGNY----La HAIE-MENNERESSE and St-BENIN and established the general line east of VAUX-ANDIGNY----La HAIE-MENNERESSE----St-SOUPLET (exclusive)----railway east of St-BENIN. A few prisoners were captured. Vigorous machine gun fire from the vicinity of St-SOUPLET and along the river bank prevented further progress being made.

XIII CORPS: The advance was continued by the 25th and 66th Divisions. REUMONT was captured early in the morning and by evening patrols of the 66th Division had entered Le CATEAU, but were unable to cross the river running through the town. The 25th Division was held up on the high ground in Q.3.d. and Q.8.b. and d. by artillery fire from the valley of the SELLE.

The enemy were entrenched along the railway on the eastern bank of the SELLE, with machine guns pushed forward across the river and so held up any attempts of the 25th Division to advance.

3. THIRD ARMY: The advance was continued along the whole of the Third Army front with some success, and 8 officers and 326 O. R. were captured. At the close of the day, the line was held west of NEUVILLY----VIESLY (inclusive)----BRIAISTRE (exclusive)----QUIEvy (exclusive)----St-HILAIRE (exclusive)----west of St-AUBERT.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The advance was resumed at 3 a.m. BEAUXROUX and FONTAINE-NOTRE-DAME were captured. Later in the morning, FIEULAINE and SEBONCOURT were captured and the advance continued on BERNOT and MONTIGNY. By evening, the general line was established along the OISE Canal as far north as BERNOT (inclusive)----west of MONTIGNY----west of BERNOVILLE.

68 officers and 2600 O. R. have been captured by the French First Army since September 30.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 321 hours were flown by 194 pilots. Eight reconnaissances and 5 artillery patrols were carried out and 29 zone calls sent down.

   Two photographic flights were made during which 20 plates were exposed.

   147 offensive patrols were carried out and 16 combats in the air took place, of which 3 were decisive. Three E. A. were destroyed. All of our machines returned safely.

   During the day, seven 112-lb. bombs, 618 25-lb. bombs were dropped and 48,370 machine-gun rounds fired at troops and transport in the battle area. No night flying was attempted owing to the unfavorable weather.

   (b) Hostile: Activity was again below normal, weather conditions partially accounting for this decrease. One strong patrol of 31 F. E. A. was reported operating over REUMONT.

6. PRISONERS:

   | Army Cages | 11 officers, | 1,247 O. R. |
   | C. C. S.   | 10 officers, | 369 O. R.  |

7. WEATHER: Low clouds and rain, clearing later.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: No reliefs or moves of importance took place.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:

   IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d, and 46th Divisions, 5th Cav. Brig.*
XIII Corps: 25th, 50th, * 66th, 18th* Divisions.
Cavalry Corps: 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions, 4th Guards Brig. (army reserve).
American II Corps: American 27th* and 30th Divisions.
Australian Corps: Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Divs. (army reserve).

* corps reserve.

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 10, 1918.

From American II Corps:
6:45. Morning situation report. E. A. very active surveying our forward area all p. m. Enemy artillery shelled forward area with 77-mm. and heavy shrapnel throughout the afternoon and evening, but quieter now. Some gas shelling p. m. General situation quiet. No counterattack reported. All objectives reached.
15:25. American 30th Division reported at 13:00 that our troops were seen advancing north and south on VAUX-ANDIGNY at about 11:50, following an artillery preparation by us.
19:33. Latest reports indicate St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET have been taken. Not fully confirmed. Situation on our right not clear. Line probably runs S. W. from St-SOUPLET along road through W.22 central---IMBERFAYT Farm---La HAIE-MENNERESSE---VAUX-ANDIGNY, inclusive. Enemy reported to be holding trench edge MOLAIN. Endeavoring to clear up situation. Prisoners nil.

From IX Corps:
6:30. Situation unchanged. Hostile artillery active on FRESNOY and MERICOURT, also considerable harassing fire right division area.
18:25. Evening report. Corps line now runs approximately as follows: J.6.b.---D.30 central---D.24 central---D.18.b and d---D.6.d and b. to W.25.c., where in touch with Americans. 4,000 civilians rescued in BOHAIN, who are said to have been without food for three days.

From XIII Corps:
66th Division mopping up Le CATEAU, but heavy machine-gun fire from spur in K.36 and in Q.5.a and c. Touch with Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders in K.20 central, but situation farther north obscure.

19:20. Our troops and 2 armoured cars reported in streets of Le CATEAU at K.34.a.8.7. We have captured St-BENIN and our line now runs as follows: Railway line in Q.22 and Q.16, thence through Q.9. central. Enemy still hold station in Q.10.

From 5th Brigade, R. A. F.:
To G. H. Q.:
6:40. Report received by cavalry corps at 20:00 states Canadian Cavalry Brigade astride Le CATEAU-CAMBRAI Road on line K.13---K.19---K.31. Some shelling FRESNOY and MERICOURT and considerable harassing fire on forward area of right corps. Otherwise quiet night.
12:00. Cavalry corps report time 8:50. Cavalry have tried to cross River SELLE between Le CATEAU and NEUILLI, but directly they get over ridge in K.13, 19, and 20, are met with heavy shell fire and machine-gun fire. Advanced cavalry have been losing heavily. Have ordered withdrawal to south side of crest. Am sure cannot force crossing at present. Reconnaissance being pushed toward BRIASTRE to find out situation on river. Cannot get within one kilometer of Le CATEAU. 33rd Division now advancing with 17th Division on their left.

13:30. Advance continued this morning at 5:30 and met slight opposition only at first. Approximate line now reached runs as follows: IX Corps approaching RIQUERVAL Wood, east of Guyot Farm (D.12). American II Corps in VAUX-ANDIGNY---east of ESCAUFORT and in Q.21 and 27, fired on by machine guns from east bank of SELLE River. XIII Corps on high ground Q.8 and Q.3 and in western outskirts of Le CATEAU.

19:25. Advance has been continued today along whole army front. Enemy resistance slight, being chiefly machine-gun nests. IX Corps attacked Bois de RIQUERVAL this afternoon. Attack believed progressing well. American II Corps reports capture of St-SOUPLET, but awaits confirmation. XIII Corps reports our troops and 2 armoured cars have entered Le CATEAU. About 4,000 civilians released in BOHAIN stated to have been 3 days without food. Cavalry captured 400 prisoners and 12 guns yesterday. Former passed back through infantry units. Our troops occupy west edge of Bois de RIQUERVAL---VAUX-ANDIGNY---Le HAIE-MENNERESSE---W. portion of St-SOUPLET---railway east of St-BENIN---west portion of Le CATEAU. No reports regarding prisoners, but believed very few captured.

182-33.3: Operations Report

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 10, 1918.

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, Oct. 10, 1918

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Enemy aircraft was reported active in forward areas during afternoon and evening October 9. Enemy artillery was active, shelling forward areas with shrapnel throughout the same period. Fires were reported at 12:55, October 9, in area three miles east of BUSIGNY and BOHAIN.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Air reports show considerable confusion on roads northeast and southeast of Le CATEAU. At 13:00, October 9, infantry was seen moving from Le CATEAU to l'ARBRE-de-GUISE and several large convoys were seen going east in the BAZUEL-MAZINGHIEN-CATILLON area. Scattered eastward movement was observed on all small roads in this vicinity. Large explosion was observed at St-BENIN and fires at St-SOUPLET, SEBONCOURT, and MAUROIS. According to the reports from refugees, civilians were sent to NEUILLI to dig a trench on the northeastern slope of the valley between Le CATEAU-SOLESMES. Refugees also state that this line is not very strong and weakly wired. Evidence points to a line of defense Le CATEAU----ST-SOUPLET railway---west of MOLAIN---east of VAUX-ANDIGNY---east of RAMICOURT----Bois de RIQUERVAL----RETIEUIL Farm.

An enemy officer of the 144th I. R. captured by the IX Corps stated that they had received secret orders on the evening of the 7th to vacate very shortly.
3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: The enemy is being forced back steadily in front of our continued advance.

At 11:45, October 10, 30th Division reported heavy machine-gun fire on right regiment and enemy artillery firing over open sights from ridge east of VAUX-ANDIGNY.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: At 17:00, October 9, our corps front embraced BECQUIGNY and BUSIGNY, slight opposition had been met with, and enemy artillery practically nil.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: In the present operation, our troops have captured BECQUIGNY and BUSIGNY, and have pushed forward to just west of VAUX-ANDIGNY and into La HAIE-MENNERESSEE, and have also captured ESCAUFOURT. Line is being pushed forward toward ST-SOUPLET and La SELLE River.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: At 17:00, October 9, the British IX Corps operating on our right had secured FRESNOY-le-GRAND. The XIII Corps operating on our left reports a number of prisoners taken to 18:00, October 9, 200 all ranks. The XIII Corps reports night of October 9/10 quiet. At 17:00, October 9, the XIII Corps reported the capture of HONNECHY, MAUROIS, and BERTRY, and their infantry pushing forward.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: At 5:30, October 10, the 30th Division in the front and the 27th Division in reserve continued the advance in conjunction with the British IX Corps on the right, and the XIII Corps on the left, under orders of the Fourth Army. The objective of the II Corps was the line of La SELLE River---ST-BENIN---ST-SOUPLET---MOLAIN, and the crossings over La SELLE River.

   F. O. 22 issued, copy attached. At 4:00, October 10, the following telegraphic orders were issued to the 30th Division:
   After obtaining objective laid down in F. O. 22, send patrols to get in touch with the right of 25th Division.
   The following telegraphic orders sent to the American 301st Tank Bn., at 23:15, October 9:
   Move all available tanks forward not later than 8:00, 10th inst. Get in touch with American 30th Division for instructions. These tanks will be at disposal of the American 30th division for operations on 10th inst.
   At 11:30, October 10, the following telegraphic orders were sent to the 27th Division:
   Move 54th Brigade forthwith to the vicinity of PREMONT. Move remainder of division to BRANCOURT-MONTBREHAIN area. No troops will pass beyond tactical boundaries of corps, except on orders from these hq.

10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Up to noon, October 10, progress was satisfactory along the entire front. Our troops had advanced east of ESCAUFOURT, and apparently little opposition was being met with.

   *****

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Enemy is retiring, fighting rearguard actions. Will probably make a stand on east bank of La SELLE River.

13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: To advance to the line of the La SELLE River, seize the crossings and push patrols east of the river to cover crossings.

14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale, high; health, good; supply, satisfactory.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3,
for
G. W. READ,
Maj. Gen., Comdg.

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**Operations of 30th Division, October 8-10, 1918**

G-3

*From:* 30th Division

*Date:* October 10, 1918  
*Hour:* 6 p.m.  
*Sent By:* Telegram

*To:* G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

In operations October 8-10, 30th Division has advanced 17 kilometers on a 5-kilometer front. Villages PREMONT, BRANCOURT, BUSIGNY, VAUX-ANDIGNY, ST-SOUPLET captured, hundreds civilians liberated. Prisoners counted up to 18:00, October 9, 50 officers, 1800 other ranks. 32 cannons captured, several pieces used against enemy during advance. Many machine guns and other booty taken. Information furnished 8th and 9th not yet appeared in communique.

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**II Corps: War Diary**

*October 10, 1918.*

[Extract]

* * * * *

Advance continued this a.m. 5:30, 30th Division in line, 27th Division in reserve. Adv. Headquarters II Corps moved to WIANCOURT.

J. E. BUCHAN,  
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

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**27th Div: War Diary**

*October 10, 1918.*

[Extract]

* * * * *

Headquarters at JONCOURT.

Available for all duty  
) Officers 418  
) Men 10,701

STANLEY H. FORD,  
Colonel, G. S., Chief of Staff.

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The 60th Brigade continued attack on this date at 5:30 a. m. and after heavy fighting pushed the enemy back across La SELLE River. At this point, our troops met with exceedingly strong resistance from enemy's artillery and machine-gun nests situated on the east bank of the river. In accordance with orders from these headquarters, all territory west of La SELLE River was mopped up and a position on the west bank of the river consolidated. The 59th Brigade remained in reserve. Division headquarters moved from TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD to MONTBREHAIN; the rear echelon moved to NAUROY.

Available for all duty 2 Officer 526
                      ) Men 15,986

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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Date                  Summary of Events and Information
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Oct. 10                The advance was resumed at dawn (5:30 a. m.) and the infantry assisted by cavalry patrols from the 5th Cav. Brig. met very little resistance for the first 2,000 yards, but later machine-gun fire was encountered all along the line, the enemy having taken up a temporary position along the W. edge of the RIQUERVAL Wood. At night, our line ran as follows:
                      J.6. central, where we were in touch with the French---then along the W. edge of RIQUERVAL Wood and along the N. edge to E.13.a.central---thence to D.6. central---and from there round the E. edge of VAUX-ANDIGNY, which had been captured by the American 30th Div. 4500 civilians were rescued in BOHAIN, some of them having been three days without food. The 46th Div. Hq. moved to FRENOY and the 6th Div. Hq. to Presselles Farm.

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182-33.3: Location List

No. 22

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

6:00, October 11, 1918

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.) J.16.b.0.5. (62C)
II Corps Headquarters (rear) N.15.G.Central (62C)
412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.
318th F. Signal Bn.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
(Att. to 13th Wing
3rd Brig., R. A. F.)

HAMEL
Near HAMEL
Near SAULTY
BAIZIEUX

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps, R. A.
Hq. Aust. 4th D. A.
(Comdg. Right Group)
Right Group, 6th Army Brig., A. F. A.
10th A. F. A. Brig.
11th A. F. A. Brig.
13th A. F. A. Brig.
14th A. F. A. Brig.

Hq. Aust. 2d D. A.
(Comdg. Left Group)
Left Group 5th F. A. Brigade
4th A. F. A. Brig.
7th A. F. A. Brig.
8th A. F. A. Brig.
12th Army Brig. A. F. A.

Aust. 5th D. A. Hq.
Aust. 3d D. A. Hq.
Hq. VIII Corps H. A.

93d Brig. R. G. A.
41st Brig. R. G. A.
9th Brig. R. G. A.
68th Brig. R. G. A.
51st Brig. R. G. A.
71st Brig. R. G. A.
18th Brig. R. G. A.
73d Brig. R. G. A.

Hq. C. R. E. (Aust. Corps)
Hq. 4th Tank Brig.
3d Squadron A. F. C.
15th Wing, R. A. F.
5th Balloon Wing
Cavalry Corps

27th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (Rear)
53d Infantry Brigade Hq.
54th Infantry Brigade Hq.

27th Division
JONCOURT
F.27.c.8.4. (62C)
1.1.a.1.5.
(Between BRANCOURT and PREMONT
MONTBREHAIN and BRANCOURT area)

30th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (Rear)

MONTBREHAIN
NAUROY

- 490 -
59th Infantry Brig. Hq.
60th Infantry Brig. Hq.

JONCOURT
VAUX-le-PRETLRE
MONTBREHAIN

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, Asst. C. of S.,
G-3.

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230-20.22: Summary of Information

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 11, 1918.

CONTENTS:

[Extract]

1. SITUATION: Our advance continues. Yesterday evening our line ran along W.
outskirts of Le CATEAU---E. bank of River SELLE---St-SOUPLET---E. of La HAIE-MENNERESSE
---VAUX-ANDIGNY (inclusive)---western outskirts of Bois de RIQUERVAL.
2. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: The enemy will probably attempt to make a stand along the
River SELLE.
3. RESERVES: A fresh division from reserve has reinforced the Le CATEAU area.
Eastward movement, including troops in AISONVILLE, WASSIGNY, and CATILLON area. No un­
usual railway movement.
5. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES: All 3 regiments of the 204th Div. now
identified.
6. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS
7. ENEMY DEFENSES: The enemy occupies a line S. E. Le CATEAU to E. of St-BENIN and
along railway to St-SOUPLET---through W.11. and 17.---E.22. and 28 to K.14---west of
GROUGIS.
8. PRISONERS: 67,791, of which 1,591 are officers.
9. BRIDGES DESTROYED: All bridges between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET. ANNEX:
Captured Order (From G. H. Q. Summary).
1. SITUATION OCTOBER 10 AND NIGHT 10th/11th INST: The advance was continued
today along the whole army front, and by the evening, our line ran along the western outskirts
of Le CATEAU---E. bank of River SELLE---St-SOUPLET---E. of La HAIE-MENNERESSE---VAUX-
ANDIGNY (inclusive)---western outskirts of Bois de RIQUERVAL, practically the whole op­
position experienced was from machine-gun fire, but on approaching the SELLE, a number of
German field guns fired from open sights from the high ground S. E. of Le CATEAU. Our
troops were unable to enter RIQUERVAL Wood owing to machine-gun fire. It seems very
probable that the enemy intend to make a stand, though probably a temporary one, along
the line given in yesterday's summary. An Officer, whose statements may be considered as
reliable, spoke of a BAVAI---MAUBEUGE---NAMUR Line, which is apparently in course of
construction.
Identifications today were normal, and consisted of the 204th Div., all three regi­
ments of which have now been identified, 8th, 29th, 38th, 21st Res., 119th, and Jaeger
Div. The cavalry captured about 400 prisoners and 12 guns yesterday.
About 4,000 civilians were found in BOHAIN.
During the night, there was no change in the situation, Fighting is reported to be
still in progress in Le CATEAU.
From an early reconnaissance this morning, the enemy appear to be holding the following line: High ground on E. bank of R. SELLE from Le CATEAU to St-SOUPLET Station---E. ST-MARTIN-RIVIERE---W. LA VALLEE MULATRE---immediately W. ANDIGNY-Les-FERMES---W. of MENNEVRET---GROUGIS (incl.). In Le CATEAU, a fresh division from reserve was identified last night---(17th Res. from METZ area).

2. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS:
   (a) French civilians found in CAUDRY state that the enemy mean to offer resistance along the River SELLE, but that their main line of resistance was at MAUBEUGE.
   (b) Prisoners of the 8th Div. stated that they had orders to withdraw to Le CATEAU, there to take up a position.
   (c) An officer whose statements may be considered as reliable spoke, under interrogation, of a line which is apparently being constructed running via BAVAI---MAUBEUGE---NAMUR. It is possible that this line commences at VALENCIENNES.

   A prisoner of the 1st Cyclist Company captured by the Third Army had heard that the retirement was to be continued to MAUBEUGE.

   To sum up: It seems very probable that the enemy will attempt to make a stand along the River SELLE, but it is anticipated that their resistance will only be sufficiently prolonged to enable them to evacuate to the rear as much material as possible.

3. RESERVES:
   (a) 17th Res. Div. identified by two regiments early this morning in the Le CATEAU area. This division is now fresh from reserve. It was engaged three times against the French in the CANNY-sur-MATZ and ROYE areas since the beginning of August, and withdrawn about the middle of September to rest between METZ and VERDUN. It is recruited from the IX Corps area, SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and MECKLENBERG.
   (b) The army on our right have identified the 81st Res. Div. in the SEBONCOUR area. This division came into line in this sector on the 8th instant. It was in line in ALSACE on the 2d of this month and has just come up from COLMAR. It is a fresh division and is recruited from POMERANIA (2 regts.) and BRANDENBURG (1 regt.). It was engaged in FLANDERS from April to July, 1918.
   (c) All 3 regiments of the 204th Div. from LORRAINE have now been identified on the Fourth Army front.
   (d) On the CHAMPAGNE-ARGONNE battle front, the 14th Res. Div., a fresh division which has been resting in ALSACE since it was withdrawn on Sept. 4, from the SOMME battle front, where it lost over 1,300 prisoners, has reinforced near MACHAULT.

   To sum up: The Fourth Army front has been reinforced by 1 fresh division from G. H. Q. reserve, and increase resistance must be expected in the Le CATEAU area. Excluding 31 divisions withdrawn after suffering severe casualties during the past two weeks and 6 Austro-Hungarian divisions, there are 14 enemy divisions in reserve in the western theater, of which 6 are fresh.

4. ENEMY ACTIVITY: Weather: Low clouds and rain---clearing later.
   (a) Aircraft: Hostile aeroplane activity was again below normal---weather conditions partially accounting for this decrease.

   Most activity was seen over the northern part of the army front.
   One strong patrol of 31 F. E. A. was reported operating over REUMONT.
   Up to 4 p. m., 3 E. A. were destroyed. None of our planes are missing.
   (b) Artillery: (up to 3 p. m., Oct. 10, 1918).

   Little activity was reported on the northern and southern corps fronts.
   Hostile artillery was, however, more active on the center corps front. ESCAUFORT, ST-SOUPLET, and the area E. of BUSIGNY were shelled after occupation by our troops.

   Cavalry and guns moving forward west of BOHAIN were shelled with observed fire.

   Enemy forward guns near St-SOUPLET put down a fairly heavy barrage, which was thought to be in conjunction with an enemy counterattack that did not materialize.
   (c) Movement: Eastward movement, including several fairly large bodies of infantry, was seen on roads in the AISNOVILLE, WASSIGNY, and CATILLON areas.
No abnormal railway movement was reported by the army wing, but observation was intermittent only. VADENCOURT and WASSIGNY Stations were reported empty at 3 p.m., and ETREUX Dump appeared quiet. The VAUX-WASSIGNY Line appeared cut in two places near La VALLEE-MULAIRE, but the WASSIGNY-VERLY Line was in use. The French reported stations on the SOLESMES-VALENCIENNES Line on fire in the evening.

Night reconnaissance abandoned.

Dawn Reconnaissance (today): GUISE Station was full of rolling stock, and abnormally active between 7:15 and 8:15 this morning. Four trains were seen in the station with steam up, and two moving east towards ROMERY. 500-700 troops with a little M. T. going S. E. from MENNEVRET to TUPIGNY. Reconnaissance carried out in rain.

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6. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS:
   Aerodromes: Arrouaise Farm. Near WASSIGNY. Total accommodation shown to be 8 hangars. 205. V. 4011 showed only part (French photo. of 8th).
   Most of the aerodromes in the GUISE area and west of the OISE Canal, south or ORS, are now probably in process of evacuation.

7. ENEMY DEFENSES: An air reconnaissance this morning reports the enemy occupying a line from S. E. of Le CATEAU at Q.5.c. to E. of St-BENIN at Q.22.B.---then along railway to St-SOUPLET---through W.11 and 17---east of MOLAIN---W. edge of ANDIGNY-les-FERMES---through wood and E.22 and 28---west of MENNEVRET to K.14.---west of GROUGIS.
   The pilot states that there is a practically continuous trench along this line with portions of support line between St-SOUPLET and GROUGIS. No photographs are yet available. This line must have been very rapidly dug and implies considerable work by reserve troops.

8. PRISONERS: The number of prisoners which passed through corps cages and C. C. S. since August 8 is 67,791, of which 1,591 are officers.

9. BRIDGES DESTROYED: The railway bridges in K.22.b. and K.35.c. have been demolished, but the bridge in Le CATEAU at K.34.d.4.6. is reported intact.
   All the bridges across the SELLE River between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET have been blown.

GENERAL: The pursuit of the enemy continued yesterday and Le CATEAU was captured. The enemy are now holding the general line: E. bank of the SELLE to St-MARTIN-RIVIERE---thence ANDIGNY-les-FERMES---MINNEVRET---GROUGIS. A fresh div. from reserve has reinforced the Le CATEAU area. It is anticipated that the enemy will make a stand on the above-mentioned line.

[Signature Illegible]
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

230-20.22: Summary Information

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 11, 1918.

ANNEX TO FOURTH ARMY SUMMARY, DATED OCTOBER 11, 1918

Captured Order (From G. H. Q. Summary, dated 9/10/18).

The following extracts from an order of the 11th Div., dated 24/8/18 (the division was heavily engaged south of MONTDIDIER from August 8-12), give a clear idea of the con-
CONDITIONS OF REST OVER THE WEEKEND

I am sending this order to all officers of the British Fourth Army, and it is my intention to review the situation on this front with all the commanders and staff officers on the line of appointment on Saturday morning. It is important that we maintain a high level of morale and discipline among our troops, and I believe this order will help to achieve this.

The enemy has shown signs of weakening in recent days, but we must remain vigilant and be prepared to react quickly if necessary. I have ordered a strengthening of the defense on our northern flank to counter any potential threat from that direction.

The supplies of ammunition and food are running low, and I have requested that all available resources be directed to replenishing these reserves. It is essential that we maintain our fighting strength to continue the offensive.

I have instructed the various corps commanders to ensure that all troops are in good physical condition and that they are prepared to move rapidly if required. The time for resting and recuperation has passed, and we must now focus on achieving our objectives.

Please review this order carefully and ensure that it is understood and carried out by all personnel under your command. I look forward to your reports on the progress of the operations.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

Commander, British Fourth Army
Disposition Tank Units British Fourth Army

Fourth Army No. 20/38 (G)

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

October 11, 1918.

1. Tank situation and instructions regarding future of tank units.
   (1) IX Corps.
      (a) 3d Tank Brigade Hq. will be withdrawn.
      (b) 5th Tank Bn. will remain with IX Corps and battalion commander will deal direct with corps hq. This battalion has about 10-12 tanks available for action and will probably be capable of one more fight after which it will be withdrawn to refit.
   (2) American II Corps.
      (a) 6th Tank Battalion (about 30 Whippets) will be withdrawn into army reserve, remaining under 4th Tank Brigade, and will be allotted to corps as the situation demands.
      (b) American 301st Tank Battalion has about 16-20 tanks available for action and will remain at disposal of American II Corps under 4th Tank Brigade.
      (c) 4th Tank Battalion will be withdrawn forthwith to refit under arrangements which will be made by hq. tank corps.
      (d) 16th Tank Battalion has about 14 tanks and will remain under 4th Tank Brigade in army reserve. It will be allotted to corps as the situation demands.
   (3) XIII Corps.
      (a) 3d Tank Battalion (Whippets) will be withdrawn forthwith to refit under arrangements which will be made by hq. tank corps.
      (b) 1st Tank Battalion has about 12 tanks available for action and is probably capable of one more fight, after which it will be withdrawn to refit.
      (c) 10th Tank Battalion has about 20-24 tanks available for action and will remain in army reserve under 4th Tank Brigade. It will be allotted to corps as the situation demands.

2. Summary.
   (a) To be withdrawn at once to refit:
      3d Tank Brigade Hq.
      4th Tank Battalion
      3d Tank Battalion

   (b) Fit for one more fight after which they will be withdrawn to refit:
      5th Tank Battalion (IX Corps) - working direct with corps hq.
      1st Tank Battalion (XIII Corps) - working direct under 4th Tank Brig.

   (c) Allotted to corps:
      301st Tank Battalion to American II Corps - working under 4th Tank Brig.

   (d) In army reserve available to be allotted to corps as situation demands:
      5th Tank Battalion (30 Whippets) Under
      16th Tank Battalion (14 Mk. V) 4th Tank
      10th Tank Battalion (20-24 Mk. V) Brigade

- 495 -
(e) 4th Tank Brigade Hq. will deal with XIII and American II Corps and also, when 5th Tank Battalion is withdrawn, with IX Corps.

3. Acknowledge by wire.

A. A. MONTGOMERY,
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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230-32.7: Orders

Operations II Corps

October 11, 1918.

6TH DIVISION ORDER NO. 261

1. The 18th Infantry Brigade group will relieve the 71st Infantry Brigade group tonight, arrangements to be made direct between B. G. C.'s concerned.

All artillery will remain in position.

2. On relief, the 71st Infantry Brigade group will be withdrawn to an area just west of BOHAIN.

Hq. 71st Infantry Brigade may be established in the first place at BRANCOURT Farm. This will shortly be required for divisional hq. and the brigade should, therefore, reconnoiter for another hq. Possibly one could be obtained in BRANCOURT Village.

3. Acknowledge.

[Signature Illegible],
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff.

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230-32.7: Order

Operations British 25th Division

October 11, 1918.

25TH DIVISION ORDER NO. 316

Ref. Map: 1/40,000, Sheet 57B

1. 25th Division will be relieved tonight, night October 11/12, in the line by 50th Division.

2. On completion of relief, troops will march back to billeting areas allotted. March will be continued to PREMONT---SERAIN---ELINCOURT area on October 12, under orders which will be issued later.

3. All details of relief will be made direct between G. O. C., 150th Infantry Brigade and G. O. C.'s 7th, 74th and 75th Infantry Brigades.

4. Completion of relief will be wired to divisional headquarters.
5. Command of the sector will pass to G. O. C., 50th Division at 8:00, October 12, at which hour divisional headquarters will close at Le TROU aux SOLDATS, reopening at the same hour at SERAIN.

Acknowledge.

G. R. DUBS,
Major,
for
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, 25th Division.

Issued through signals at [14:15]

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182-33.3: Summary Intelligence

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 11, 1918.

From 18 h., Oct. 10 to 18 h., October 11, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: The corps continued its advance today at 5:30. At 18:00, line appeared to run as follows: St-BENIN (incl.)---St-SOUPLET (incl.)---southwest to W14b---east of VAUX-ANDIGNY (incl.)---to W27a22.
   (b) Artillery: Barrage in support of infantry laid down at 5:30. Infantry operations during day supported by fire on targets of opportunity.
   (c) Prisoners and Material: During the period the following unwounded prisoners passed through the corps cage, 6 O. R. Total through the cage since October 5, 46 officers and 1,758 O. R. A few machine guns and 3 field pieces were captured 9/10/18.

2. HOSTILE ARTILLERY: Aggressive throughout the night, on both forward and rear areas. ESCAUFORT and roads through St-SOUPLET shelled by light calibers from directions of R25.

4. ENEMY'S DEFENSES: Army air service reports enemy trench line with no wire visible Q5c55-Q11a55-Q11c92-Q17c55-Q23a55-Q28b55-Q28d55-Q35c32-W5d55-W17 central-W28b35-E4 central. Elements of the second line started in rear of main line. XIII Corps air reports new trenches and rifle pits from Q16c through Q16a, Q16b, to Q1096. Also west of buildings in Q29c and b, in Q15b is mined on both ends. The canal lock at CATILLON is also mined. The Boche is there waiting for the Allies on the Canal de la SAMBRE. There are dugouts in Q6a50. The stream from R20 to the west edge of BAZUEL is from 8 to 10 feet wide, but with practically no depth.

5. ENEMY'S ATTITUDE: The enemy's resistance today has greatly strengthened and it would seem that he is intending to make (at least temporarily), an organized resistance east of La SELLE River.

6. SUMMARY OF PRISONERS' STATEMENTS: Information concerning 26th Pioneer Bn. Composition 2d Reserve Company, 4th Field Company, 1st Res. Co., Pioneer Co. 388. This battalion when in the field is known as Field Pioneer Battalion 218. They were formed about a month ago to be used as infantry.
Information concerning 1st M. G. Co., 46th Res. Inf. Regt., 119th Div. Entered line October 4, 1918, with 230 men and 12 heavy machine guns, strength on October 8, 1918, 20 men and 2 heavy machine guns. The company was completely routed and the above losses inflicted by the attack of the cavalry and tanks on Oct. 7, 1918.

It appears from prisoners' statements that there was an army order issued by the German command that the Kaiser's peace proposal to President Wilson was to be read by company commanders to the troops. Prisoners stated that it was understood that among the proposals was the concession of the left bank of the Rhine as the boundary between France and Germany and expressed the hope that the peace proposals would be accepted. Several prisoners also spoke of a possible abdication by the Kaiser and there was a general opinion that a much more democratic form of government would follow.

7. AMERICAN OFFICIAL: This evening, the First Army is advancing slowly on its own front, meeting with much opposition from machine guns and artillery. St-JUVIN is still held by the enemy. To the east, our troops have crossed the St-GEORGES Road. Farther to the east, American troops are advancing and have reached the northern edge of the Bois de FOREST. The V Corps reports 200 prisoners.

BRITISH OFFICIAL: In the angle between the SELLE River and the SCHELDT Canal, we captured IWUY this morning, and made progress on rising ground east of that village. Later in the day, strong counterattacks delivered by the enemy in this area with the assistance of tanks were successfully repulsed. West of the ESCAUT Canal, we have captured the village of FRESSIES. Following our advance south of the River SENSEE, the enemy is hastening his withdrawal from his strongly fortified positions north of that river. Our troops have driven the enemy rearguards from the northern portion of the DROUCOURT-QUEANT Line between the SCARPE River and VITRY, and have captured the villages of SAILLY-en-OSTREVENT, VITRY-en-ARTOIS, IZEL-les-EQUERCHIN, DROUCOURT, and FOUQUIERES.

FRENCH OFFICIAL: East of St-QUENTIN, the French have reached the OISE and are south of BERNOT and have made an appreciable advance north of the AISNE in the region south of LAON. In CHAMPAGNE, the enemy is retreating in front of the French Army. The French have reached the outskirts of MONT-ST-MARTIN and ST-MOREL and hold the station of GRANDPRE.

KERR T. RIGGS,

AERIAL ANNEX---AMERICAN II CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Reports from Dawn to 18 h. October 11, 1918.

No. 4

WEATHER: Fair during the morning with poor visibility. Rain during the afternoon made flying impossible.

OPERATIONS: Acting in conjunction with operations carried out by American II Corps, cooperating with flank corps, 3 counterattacks, 4 artillery and 2 contact patrols were successfully carried out. Owing to the weather it was impossible to obtain contact with our infantry after 14:30, at which time the approximate line held by our troops was reported as follows: N. to S.: Q3b35, Q2955, Q8b5.5., Q.8.d.9.7, Q15a5.2., Q.15.a.2.0., Q.21.b.1.4., Q.21.c.8.3., Q.27.a.9.3., Q.27.a.d.0.4., Q.33.b.4.5., Q.33.d.4.5., W3b.3.3., W3c.9.4., W9a.6.5., W9c.10.5., W14b.7.4., W14d.1.3., W20a.7.a., W20c.3.5., W25b.7.9., W25.c.9.9., E 1 a.1.9. Our men appeared to be dug in in 2-hole rifle pits between St-BENIN and ST-SOUPLET.

At the same time, the enemy were reported holding a newly-dug, shallow, unwired trench system interspersed with strong points, which runs just east of the La SELLE River between St-BENIN, ST-SOUPLET and MOLAIN. This appears to be his main line of defense, but
is reported to be weakly held. He is also holding wired trench system running from west of MOLAIN and south and east of VAUX-ANDIGNY.

MOVEMENT RAIL: Rolling stock for 2 trains and 1 engine on sidings in Q34a and b.
ROAD: 7:00, scattered movement east on road in Q22b; 11:25, transport going S. E. in R15a.

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: 8:20, Fire at WASSIGNY; 8:25, fire at St-MARTIN RIVIERE; 8:30-9:30, several fires in Le CATEAU; 9:10, fire in W10b; 9:50, fire in SOLESMES; 10:10, fire in TUPIGNY; 10:30, large fire at W10a 5.9; 12:00, fire in W4.d.5.0.; 13:00 explosion at Q16a; railway bridge south of St-SOUPLET at Q34d.2.7. blown up. Railway bridge at Q 22 a.8.a. blown up.

ENEMY ARTILLERY: 9:10, shelling La HAIE-MENNERESSE in W7d and W8c; 10:05, shelling W3a and W2b; 10:15, shelling W2a and c.

A. A.: Active, especially over Le CATEAU, St-SOUPLET, and MOLAIN. Machine-gun fire from eastern edge of Le CATEAU and from many points along the corps front.

E. A.: Normal.

BALLOONS: 8:44, 1 enemy kite balloon at X 29.

BOMBS: Four 25-lb. bombs were dropped on transport in R15a, with good results.

GENERAL: During the day, our planes attacked enemy infantry with machine-gun fire at many places along the line.

BRANCH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE,
AMERICAN II CORPS,
ATTACHED 3d SQUADRON, A. F. C.

182-12.4: Fldr. 2: Memorandum

Changes in Station

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 11, 1918.

MEMORANDUM TO: G-1, G-3, G-4

Following changes in stations of corps troops:
102d Engineers (less 2d Battalion and Company B) from BELLICOURT to RAMICOURT.
146th A. T. Co. to BUSIGNY, October 12.
238th A. T. Co. to RAMICOURT, H.11.b.7.6.
No. 1 Water Tank Co., 62b/H.2.b.2.8.
II Corps Water Column, NAUROY, G.11.c.5.3.
Australian 1st Tunneling Co., BELLICOURT, C.10.a.9.9.

EDW. W. MYERS,
Major, Engineers, U. S. A.,
for
Corps Engineer.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE CORPS STAFF:

[Extract]

1. The advance echelon of these headquarters will move to WIANCOURT

* * * * *

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.

227-12.8: Telegram

Sent: 11:15       Recd. 12:02

To: C. G., American 27th Division

668 G-3

The American 27th Division, less artillery and engineers, will relieve the American 30th Division, less artillery and engineers, on the night of October 11/12. Details of relief will be arranged between commanding generals of the divisions concerned, command passing to the 27th Division at 10:00, Oct. 12. The 30th Division on relief will move to BUTRY Wood, La SABLIERE Bois and PREMONT areas now occupied by 27th Division. Acknowledge.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding II Corps.
F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

230-32.16: Message

Hour: 15:00

To: 27th Division, 30th Division.

675 G-3.

Ref. 668 G-3. Command will pass to 27th Division on completion of relief instead of as stated in telegram referred to. Acknowledge.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding II Corps.
230-32.16: Message
No. 683-G-3
To: American 30th Division

On completion of the relief of the 30th Division, the 27th Division will gain as objective if not already reached, St-BENIN, St-SOUPLET, MOLAIN, and the western bank of La SELLE River within the tactical boundaries of the corps. If crossing of La SELLE River meets with strong resistance, line will be established on west bank and the enemy cleared out up to the river. Patrols will be pushed across the river and a footing gained on the east bank, but an attempt to cross the river in force in face of strong resistance will not be made. A further attack in force upon the enemy at a date to be announced later is contemplated and every effort will be made to locate the exact position of enemy’s defenses and to establish satisfactory line from which attack may be launched. Acknowledge.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding II Corps.

From: Hq. 30th Div.
Hour: 18:02 Sent By: Phoned by Skinner at 18:05 and read back by Capt. Workman
To: C. G., 60th Brigade

Pursuant to instructions from Hq. II Corps, your brigade will remain in possession of the position held at the termination of the operation today. Tomorrow at daybreak you will push on to the objective given you today on the SELLE River.
Divisions on our flanks have similar order.
Artillery will follow up the attack and be subject to call as it was today.
BOHAIN has been cleared up.
Your battalion and regimental commanders will, of course, keep within controlling distance of their units.
It is not known what tanks if any will be available.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Comdg., 30th Division.

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182-33.3: Order

**Movement 27th Division to Relieve 30th Division**

FIELD ORDER
No. 59

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 11, 1918--1 a. m.

1. The division will move at daylight this morning as below, and will be prepared to relieve the 30th Division in the line on the night of October 11/12.

2. The 54th Infantry Brigade will march to the area east of PREMONT in the BUTRY and La SABLIERE Woods, but not to go east of the railroad in V.20 and V.26 central.
3. The 53rd Infantry Brigade will march to PREMONT and vicinity not to go north of that town, moving to the camps now occupied by 54th Brigade.
4. Division troops will march to PREMONT, not to go north of the town.
5. Division engineer, signal, and machine gun officers and surgeon will arrange for the relief of their opposites in the line.
6. Division headquarters will close at JONCOURT to be notified later.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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182-33.3: Order

Relief of 30th Division by 27th Division

FIELD ORDER  27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 60  October 11, 1918--10:45 p. m.

1. The 27th Division (less artillery and engineers) will relieve the 30th Division in the line on the night of October 11/12.
2. (a) The 54th Brigade, reinforced by one battalion 105th Infantry, which will report to the Commanding Officer, 107th Infantry, will take over the front line.
   (b) The 53d Brigade (less 1 bn., 105th Infantry), will be in support and will move to camps west and northwest of BUSIGNY, as arranged.
   (c) Divisional troops will be stationed near PREMONT as arranged.
3. Details of relief will be arranged by brigade commanders and division machine gun, engineer, signal officer and surgeon, with their opposite numbers.
4. Rear echelon of division headquarters will move to JONCOURT.
5. Command will pass to Commanding General, 27th Division, upon completion of relief, unit commanders reporting promptly the completion of relief to Headquarters 30th Division.
6. On relief of 30th Division, Companies F and D, 105th Engineers, will come under command of the 27th Division.
7. 27th Division Headquarters will be located in south part of PREMONT after 9 a. m., October 12.

By Command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Instructions Regarding Ammunition, Supply and Evacuation

No. 107 27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 11, 1918.

Reference Maps: 57B) 62B) 1:40,000
62C)

1. AMMUNITION: Organizations will carry their complete establishment of small arms ammunition, grenades and tools in their D. G. S. wagons. Such ammunition will be used in the earlier stages of operations and will be refilled from the S. A. A. Section of the Australian 4th D. A. C., now located at 62B/C.7.a.5.0.

Guides from units will be sent to this point and report to Divisional Ammunition Officer, Capt. R. T. Moniz, who will see that they are informed of any change in location of divisional S. A. A. dump, and who will fill all demands for ammunition.

Owing to the nature of the operations, the location of the S. A. A. dump is likely to be advanced from time to time. It is, therefore, essential that guides from the units are always in liaison with the dump and their organization.

Grenades: Those in the battalion limbers will be detonated by the personnel of the battalion and carried that way until further orders. All grenades sent forward will be detonated at divisional dump.

Commanding Officers, 107th and 108th Infantry Regiments will each detail from the Band Section of the Hq. Co., 20 men, with 2 days' rations, who will report at divisional ammunition dump, 62B/C.7.a.5.0., Oct 12, at 10 a. m., for such duty.

2. SUPPLY: Railheads, broad gauge---ROISEL Unchanged
   narrow gauge---JONCOURT

   ration refilling point---I.2.c.7.5. (east of MONTBREHAIN).

   Plan of Supply: Supplies will be drawn from the narrow gauge railhead to refilling point by mechanical transport, thence by animal-drawn transport to units.

3. TRANSPORT: G. S. wagons at present used for supply will be returned to the transport lines of their respective organizations, and will be at their disposal until further orders.

4. EVACUATION OF SICK AND WOUNDED: Main dressing station---PREMONT

   Advance dressing station---BUSIGNY

5. EVACUATION OF SICK AND INJURED ANIMALS: Through 105th Mobile Veterinary Section, which will locate on Oct. 12, at JONCOURT.

6. PRISONERS OF WAR: A. P. M. will be responsible for the collection of prisoners of war, behind the lines. Military police will take over prisoners of war as far forward as possible and escort them to the prisoners of war cage, located at C.22.c. (N. E. of BRANCOURT).

7. STRAGGLERS: A. P. M. will, under instructions of II Corps A. P. M., establish suitable straggler posts along the general line of those now maintained by 30th Division, this line to be successively established as conditions may require.

8. TRAFFIC: A. P. M. will provide the necessary details of military police for the control of traffic and general police purposes in the area taken over from the 30th Division.

9. WATER SUPPLY: Water in sufficient quantities is available throughout the area. Organizations will take every opportunity to fill water carts and cans.

10. ROADS, REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE: An officer and 20 men from the 102d Engr., will be detailed for road repair and maintenance in the forward portion of the area. Divisional
engineer will be responsible that the party is detailed and will give every assistance to the repair of roads.

11. ENGINEER MATERIAL: Corps dump at---ROISEL.
   Units will indent for engineer stores, on G-1, by whom indent will be forwarded to G-4, II Corps, for necessary action.
   Divisional engineer will establish forward dump as necessary, location to be given later.

12. ORDNANCE: Ordnance dump will be at JONCOURT from Oct. 12, ordnance officer will deliver ordnance supplies to organizations.
   Hot food containers are available for issue to front line units on request to ordnance officer. They will be carefully used and turned over on relief, to succeeding units.

13. BURIALS: Each organization will be responsible for clearing the battlefield and conducting the burial of its own dead.
   Regimental chaplains will supervise details.
   Each regiment will detail 2 sergeants and 6 squads as burial party. These parties will operate under direction of division burials officer.
   Details of Graves Registration Service, will arrange for the establishment of cemeteries in suitable localities and in accordance with regulations.

14. CAPTURED TROPHIES: Organizations making captures are responsible for the designation of their unit being marked on same and for their early return to division ordnance dump for transmission to base. It is essential that all such trophies of war be removed from forward areas as soon as possible.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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AEF Medical Gen. File: Fldr. 10: Memorandum

Relief of American 30th Division

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
October 11, 1918.

MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS

[Extract]

1. The American 27th Division will relieve the American 30th Division on the night of October 11/12, 1918.

2. The main dressing station of the American 30th Division will be taken over by Field Hospital Company No. 106, midnight, October 11, 1918, and will close at that hour.

3. The main dressing station at PREMONT, C.28.b.5.5., Field Hospital Co. No. 105, will open midnight, October 11, 1918.
4. The advanced dressing station of the American 30th Division at BUSIGNY will be taken over by Field Hospital Company No. 106, midnight, October 11, 1918.

* * * * *

WALTER C. MONTGOMERY,
Lieut. Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF (27th Div.): Fldr. 1: Message

Relief of 30th Division

From: 27th Division

Date: October 11, 1918

To: American II Corps

Relief of 30th Division now in progress. 30th Division holding line with eight battalions. Six battalions designated for relief, but owing to situation on right flank, where line is reported to run along southern edge of VAUX-ANDIGNY and through W.25.central, have directed an additional battalion to be placed at disposition of brigade commander. Have requested divisional artillery fire on high ground W.14.d. and W.20.b., where opposition and activity are reported.

STANLEY H. FORD,
Chief of Staff.

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30th Division Fldr. 165: Journal of Operations

From: 30th Division

Date: October 11, 1918 Hour: Recd. 2:07, October 12.

To: General Headquarters, A. E. F.

[Extract]

A. Weather: Raining.
B. Infantry and machine gun activity: Enemy machine-gun activity at strong points on heights between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET, east of La SELLE and on high ground W. of La SELLE and S. of St-SOUPLET. Own machine guns very active in the progress of the infantry.
C. Artillery activity: Enemy: Below normal. Harassing fire on back area.
D. Aeroplane and Balloon Activity: Enemy aircraft nil. Our airplanes made 2 reconnaissances of front line, balloon activity nil.
E. Visibility: Poor.
F. Troop Movements: No troop movements observed.
Own: 27th Division moving into our sector.
Enemy:

G. General impression of day: Favorable, our attack has been slackened because of reaching heights held by strong enemy machine-gun nests.

• • • • •

J. Success of our troops: Attack was continued today, but with less force, to establish our line along west bank of La SELLE. Since Sept. 30, this division has advanced its line 32 kilometers, taking 15 large villages, liberating 300 French inhabitants, capturing more than 1900 prisoners, including 50 officers and many guns and machine guns, including 2 batteries of 105's, 2,000 tons of coal, 500 bales of hay, large quantities of artillery and 2,000 feet lumber, a sawmill and other war material.

L. Any change in location of the lines held by our troops or enemy: Our line is as follows: West bank La SELLE River from St-BENIN to St-SOUPLET, both inclusive, S. W. to W 14B, VAUX-ANDIGNY, inclusive, to W 27 A 22.

230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 28

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

6 a.m., October 10 to 6 a.m., October 11, 1918

1. OPERATIONS: At 5:30 a.m., our troops, following an artillery barrage, continued their advance. M. G. nests and artillery firing over open sights, were encountered through the day. Desperate fighting took place in and around VAUX-ANDIGNY. Our patrols entered this town in the afternoon and were forced to retire to the western limits, owing to artillery and M. G. fire from the heights east and northeast of it. The situation in this locality was uncertain at 6 a.m. today (11th). Our right flank was enfiladed by M. G.'s from the front of the division on our right, which was advancing in a line approximately 1500 yards in rear of our line. Our troops also suffered casualties from the low flying E. A.'s.

At 6 a.m., October 11, our line ran approximately from N. to S. as follows: Along La SELLE River to east of St-SOUPLET---through W 3b---south along road through W 3d---W 9a---thence through VAUX-ANDIGNY.

Identifications: Normal. During the period, 4 officers and 179 other ranks passed through the division cage, and 7 other ranks passed though C. C. The grand total of prisoners through the cage, since the beginning of this operation (up to 4 p.m., October 11) was 41 officers and 1480 other ranks.

(a) Hostile Activity: Artillery. Enemy batteries were very active throughout the period, firing from ridges east of VAUX-ANDIGNY. In some cases, our men were fired on point blank from ridges in W 15c, W 21a and c, and W 27a and c. VAUX-ANDIGNY was heavily shelled the entire period. All crossroads in forward area, on which traffic was seen during the day, were shelled throughout the night, as well as intermittently during the day. Crossroads in forward area were shelled with all caliber guns while our troops were advancing.

Machine Guns: Enemy M. G.'s were very active on ridges east of VAUX-ANDIGNY, harassing our troops as they moved up to the new positions. The ridges in W 15c, W 21a and c, and W 27 a and c were thick with M. G.'s. M. G.'s were very active on our front lines during the night also.

Trench Mortars: Trench mortars were especially active from ridges in W 15c, and W 21a and c, and W 27a and c, firing with the M. G.'s.
Aerial: During the advance and consolidation of our new positions, our troops suffered casualties from low flying planes. Only a few E. A. were over our back areas, and our A. A. fire drove them back. One E. A. was shot down by one of our planes at 11:20 a.m., in C 18c. One O. B. was up 99 degrees grid from C 17b 3.2, from 12:55 to 1:30 p.m.

Patrols: Nil.

(b) Our Activity: Artillery: In the morning, the infantry advance was assisted by artillery. During the afternoon, the artillery fire was intermittent. Batteries were moved forward during the day.

Machine Guns: Our M. G.'s kept up their usual sweeping fire, keeping enemy well under cover and preventing him from strengthening his position.

Trench Mortars: T. M.'s covering our troops, kept the enemy down and enabled us to consolidate our new positions.

Aerial: In the morning, our planes gave practically no assistance. In the afternoon, they predominated, flying frequently over enemy territory, drawing antiaircraft and M. G. fire.

Patrols: The usual liaison patrols were sent out to maintain communication between our companies and flank units. A few fighting patrols, in charge of N. C. O.'s moved along the front, but encountered no enemy. Owing to the sweeping M. G. fire of the enemy, these patrols had to move about with caution.

2. HOSTILE MOVEMENT: Visibility fair. Enemy was seen moving about near VAUX-ANDIGNY, in new trenches.

3. MISCELLANEOUS: The Boche mine, near the church in BOHAIN, which was reported by a prisoner, was exploded yesterday morning (10th) by a direct hit, causing an immense crater. Fires were seen in ESCAUFORT at 1 p.m. and MINNEVRET at 5:30 p.m. Enemy Very lights were below normal. His bombing planes were not conspicuous during the night. To the east of BOHAIN, in the direction of E 14, a dump, apparently, was seen burning at 4 p.m., October 11, and a little north of this vicinity, at about the same time, a large column of black smoke was observed, which continued over one hour.

Escape civilians, who came through the town of BAZUEL on the 10th, have given the following information: W and N. E. of that town, a system of new trenches have been constructed, extending from Q 12 b central to R 4 a 50.95. These trenches are wired, with heavy wire on wooden stakes, 6 feet high and 40 meters wide. There are also trenches in the east edge of that town, from R 2d 2.0., south to R 8d 5.7. A line of pits, 50 meters apart and 5 feet deep, have been dug, from Q 6c 6.9 (on R. R.), S. W. to St.-BENIN (Q 16c). The railroad siding at Q 10 central is also mined. The canal lock at the town of CATILLON is mined. They heard Boche say: "We are waiting for the Allies at Canal de la SAMBRE." There are dugouts at Q 6a 5.0. The stream (DEMER) [Rau du JONC-de-MER] from R 20 to west edge of BAZUEL is from 8 to 10 feet wide and has no depth.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.
Relief of 30th Division by 27th Division

FIELD ORDER
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 25
October 11, 1918.

1. The 30th Division, less engineers and artillery, will be relieved on night October 11/12 by the 27th Division. Details of relief will be arranged directly between commanding officers of units concerned. The front line will be taken over by the 54th Brigade.

2. (a) Upon its relief, this division will occupy BUTRY Wood, La SABLIERE Bois and PREMONT areas, now occupied by the 27th Division.
   (b) The 59th Brigade is assigned within divisional boundaries, area west of the railroad running north and south through Squares V.9., V.14., V.20., D.2., D.8 and as far west as the grid line running north and south between U.24 and V.19.
   The 60th Brigade is assigned to the area west of above line, as far west as PREMONT, inclusive.
   (c) The 113th Machine Gun Battalion is assigned the MIGNON Wood.
   (d) Movement of present brigade and regimental headquarters within this area may be made the subject of mutual arrangement between Commanding Generals, 59th and 60th Brigades.

3. Brigades, regiments, and separate units will forward location of headquarters, as soon as selected, to these headquarters.

4. The command passes to the Commanding General, 27th Division, upon completion of relief. Unit commanders will report promptly the completion of relief to these headquarters.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding.

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Medical Arrangements, 30th Division

MEMORANDUM
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 28
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
October 11, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Field Orders 25, this division, less engineers and artillery, will be relieved on night October 11/12 by the 27th Division.

2. The 132d Field Ambulance, which is operating advanced dressing station and forward areas at BUSIGNY (V.10.d.central), will be relieved by the 106th Field Hospital of the 27th Division. The commanding officers concerned will arrange details of transfer. Relief will be completed by 3:00 (?), October 12.
3. The 119th Field Hospital, operating main dressing station and gas center at MONTBREHAIN (I.1.c.3.9.), will be relieved by detachment of Field Hospital 106 of the 27th Division. The commanding officers concerned will arrange details of transfer. Relief will be completed by 0001 [?] on the 12th.

4. The 134th Field Ambulance, which is operating walking wounded post at JONCOURT (h.9.b.9.2.) will be relieved by the 105th Field Hospital of the 27th Division. The commanding officers concerned will arrange details of transfer. Relief will be completed by 0001 on the 12th.

5. The 118th Field Ambulance in reserve at JONCOURT, will be relieved by the [sic] Field Hospital of the 27th Division. Details of relief will be arranged by the commanding officers concerned. Relief will be completed by 0001 on the 12th.

6. MAC cars and lorries of the 37th MAC Company will evacuate sick and wounded of the 27th Division when relief of the 30th Division is completed.

* * * * *

A. M. WHALEY,
Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 30th Div.: Fldr. 3: Message

**Operations 30th Division**

From: 30th Division
Date: October 11, 1918 Hour: 1 a. m.
To: C. G., 60th Brigade

G-3/67

The following telegram from the II Corps is repeated for compliance by you with your brigade to which the 118th Infantry has been added: "Objective given in Field Orders No. 22, paragraph 2, subparagraph (c), dated October 9, will be gained tomorrow, 11th inst. Zero hour will be 5:30. IX Corps is attacking at same hour. Objective ANDIGNY-les-FERMES and high ground north and west. Acknowledge by wire. Signed Read."

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding 30th Division.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. 4 and 5: 30th Div.: Operations Report

**FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,**
**October 11, 1918.**

[Extract]

1. The IX Corps advanced the line slightly in N. W. portion of BOIS de RIQUERVAL and the American II Corps advanced a few hundred yards between VAUX-ANDIGNY and St-SOUPLET. The enemy’s opposition strengthened along the whole army front.

- 509 -
Hostile artillery activity was confined to harassing fire on the forward areas and observed shoots on fleeting targets.

Our artillery fired in support of minor operations of the IX and American II Corps, and carried out special bombardment of railway cuttings and embankments east of La SELLE River.

2. IX CORPS: The 6th and 46th Divisions attempted to advance in the vicinity of Bois de Riquerval, but were unable to make much progress. The enemy resisted strongly with heavy machine-gun fire supported by heavy artillery action. Slight progress was made in the N.W. portion of the wood and a few prisoners secured.

AMERICAN II CORPS: The American 30th Division attacked between Vaux-Andigny and St-Souplet and advanced the line to the road in W.14.d and W.9.c.—W.10.a.—W.4.a. During the night, St-Souplet was captured and a few prisoners secured.

XIII CORPS: With the exception of patrol encounters in Le Cateau no infantry operations were undertaken. The situation was fairly quiet all day.

3. THIRD ARMY: No material change in the situation.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: During the day, the French First Army completed the capture of Montigny and the quarries south of the village with 20 prisoners. Bernot was occupied without encountering resistance and the line advanced to the southern outskirts of Hauteville. Towards evening, resistance stiffened and further progress was out of the question.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 448 hours were flown by 225 pilots. Seven reconnaissances, 16 artillery and 23 contact patrols were carried out and 25 zone calls sent down.
   179 offensive patrols were made and 14 indecisive combats took place. One of our planes failed to return.
   Nine 112-lb. and 404 25-lb. bombs were dropped and 29,705 rounds fired at suitable ground targets during the day. Owing to bad weather conditions, no night flying was attempted.
   (b) Hostile: Activity was very slight owing to the weather.

6. WEATHER: Low clouds and rain.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: No reliefs or moves of importance took place.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   IX Corps: 1st,* 6th, 32d,* 46th Divisions, 5th Cav. Brig.*
   XIII Corps: 25th,* 50th, 66th, 18th* Divisions.
   Cavalry Corps: 1st and 3d Cavalry Divisions, 4th Guards Brig. (army reserve).
   American II Corps: American 27th* and 30th Divisions.
   Australian Corps: Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions (army reserve).

   * corps reserve

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

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- 510 -
182-33.3: Operations Report

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, October 11, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF DAY: On our front, the enemy held the high
ground east of La SELLE River, in force, and the villages of St-BENIN, St-SOUPLET and
VAUX-ANDIGNY west of the river.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Air reports show that the
enemy was seen in trenches west of St-SOUPLET and MOLAIN, and that three railway bridges
east of La SELLE River on our front blown up. Artillery and machine guns from the direction of
BELLEVUE W.28.b. and Angin Fme W.28.a., were active and delayed our right flank.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: The enemy
continued to fall back, but his resistance has been stiffening due to the fact that the front held
by this corps is at the point of the salient being driven into his lines.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: At 12h., October 10, our line ran west
of St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET---thence southwest along road through IMBERFAYT Fme---La
HAIE-MENNERESSE, and VAUX-ANDIGNY, exclusive.

During the night Oct. 10/11, the 30th Division reports enemy aircraft less active and
hostile artillery active over forward areas, and the usual harassing fire on back areas
during afternoon October 10, diminishing at night. General situation quiet.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Our troops (in
conjunction with the British 25th Division, XIII Corps, on our left) captured St-BENIN and took
St-SOUPLET and VAUX-ANDIGNY. They did not advance to the river and the enemy held
heights beyond in force, and we could not attack until the IX Corps on our right had pushed
their attack farther to the front.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The XIII Corps on our left had reached the west
bank of La SELLE River to Le CATEAU, exclusive, and were fighting in Le CATEAU. The IX
Corps on our right were in front with our right flank south of VAUX-ANDIGNY. They had
taken BOHAIN and released 4,000 civilians.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: Fourth Army order that operations on the 11th to be continued
in order to secure objectives that has not been reached in preceding 24 hours.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: Operations were
continued in accordance with previous plan.
10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: The following telegraph order was issued to the 27th Division:

Move 54th Brigade at dawn to BUTRY Wood and La SABLIERE Bois. Move remainder of division, less 102d Engineers to PREMONT area, now occupied by 54th Brigade. Be prepared to relieve 30th Division night 11/12 inst. Acknowledge.

Up to 12 h., October 18, progress was satisfactory though slower than on previous days of present operation. The 30th Division captured a few scattered prisoners, several machine guns, and three field pieces.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: Enemy continued to retire, fighting rearguard actions with machine guns and artillery. He is expected to make a stand on the high ground east of the La SELLE River.

13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: To continue the advance and insure the crossings of La SELLE River.

14. REMARKS, MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale, excellent, though troops of the 30th Division have become tired due to the difficulties of continued fighting over ruined country during inclement weather. Health, good; supplies, satisfactory.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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II Corps, AEF: War Diary

[Extract]

October 11, 1918.

30th division still in line, 27th in reserve.

F. E. BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

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30th Div., AEF: War Diary

[Extract]

Field Order 25 issued for the relief of the division by the 27th Division on night October 11/12. The 118th Infantry relieved the 1st Battalion of the 120th Infantry and advanced line about 150 yards completing the consolidation of a line along west bank of La SELLE River.

Available for all duty ) Officers 531
 ) Men 15,976

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

At 5:00, October 12, 1918

[Extract]

Fourth Army
IX Corps

0.19.b. (62C) ETERPIGNY
POEUILLY (Q.29.d.6.7.) (62C)

* * * * *

XIII Corps

RONSSOY

* * * * *

Australian Corps

EU

* * * * *

American II Corps

(Adv.)
Bois de BUIRE (J.16.b.0.5.) (62C)
N.15.d. central (62C)
American 27th Div. (Adv.)
JONCOURT moving to BUSIGNY (62C)
American 30th Div. (Adv.)
MONTBREHAIN (62C)
American 27th Div. (Rear)
F.27.c.8.9 (62C)
American 30th Div. (Rear)
NAUROY

Cavalry Corps

(Adv.)
P.14.b.9.5. (57B)
GURLU Wood D.22.a.2.4. (62C)
(Rear)

* * * * *

5th Brig., R. A. F.

ESTREES-en-CHAUSSEE

Tank Corps

FEUILLERES

* * * * *

Fourth Army A. A. D. C.

BRIE, O.33.b.3.5. (62C)

For Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Hq. Fourth Army
October 11, 1918

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Operations II Corps

No. 0/101/9

R. A., BRITISH VII CORPS,

G. O. C., Heavy Artillery

[Extract]

1. In view of further operations to take place at an early date, the heavy artillery in the line will be reinforced as follows:

(a) The 3 brigades, R. G. A., and one 6" gun battery in corps reserve, will move up tonight (Oct. 12/13), to advanced wagon lines, and will on night Oct. 13/14, move into action in positions already selected.

(b) The batteries will in all cases be 4-gun batteries. The 3rd sections of these batteries will remain in corps reserve in present billets.

(c) The detached sections of mobile and mixed brigades and the 9.2" How. batteries of mixed brigades will remain in corps reserve in present billets.

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

Major, G. S.,

R. A., British VII Corps

October 12, 1918

Operations II Corps

No. 0/101/19

R. A. BRITISH VII CORPS

1. In view of further operations to take place at an early date, the field artillery now in the line will be reinforced as follows:

(a) On the night of Oct. 13/14, 1918, the Australian 3rd D. A. (less D. A. Hq.) and Australian 5th Artillery will reinforce the line, the 3rd D. A. on the right and 5th D. A. on the left.

One brigade from each D. A. will be put into action, the remaining brigades being kept in mobile reserve to move up in close support of the infantry as they advance.

(b) All details will be arranged direct between C. R. A.'s, 4th and 5th D. A.'s.

(c) The following ammunition will be at the guns at Zero hour:

| 18-pdrs | 400 rds. per gun. |
| 4.5" Hows. | 300 rds. per gun. |

2. As soon after the operations as arrangements can be made, the Australians 5th D. A. will relieve Australian 2nd D. A., and Australian 3rd D. A. (less D. A. H. A.), will relieve 6th and 12th Army Brigades, Australian Field Artillery.


Major, G. S.,


October 12, 1918
182-32.7: Telegram

**British 6th Division takes over American Front**

*October 13, 1918.*

To: American II Corps

G260: 6th Div. will, tonight or tomorrow night, by direct arrangements with American 27th Division, take over the American front up to the grid line between W14 and W20. Following area will be taken over at same time as a forming-up place from front line: W14c00 to road junction W19a30---W19c06---thence due south along the grid line to our present boundary. 6th Div. to Ack.

IX Corps.

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182-20.1: Intelligence Summary

No. 10 II CORPS, A. E. F.

*From 18h., October 11 to 18h., October 12, 1918*

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: The front has been quiet for the past 24 hours. Gains already made have been consolidated.
   (b) Artillery: Harassing and concentrated fire was carried out on known hostile targets.
   (c) Prisoners and Material: There were no captures reported.

II. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY'S FORCES: No identifications were secured on the corps front during the period. The army has received information that the 243d Division has now come up from Alsace and may be engaged on this front. Also that the Alpine corps has been withdrawn from this front and transferred to Serbia.

Reserves (From army summary): 17th Reserve Division identified by two regiments, the 10th inst., in the Le CATEAU area. This division is now fresh from reserve. It was engaged three times against the French in the CANNY-sur-MATZ and ROYE areas since the beginning of August and withdrawn about the middle of September to rest between METZ and VERDUN. It is recruited from the IX Corps area, SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and MECKLENBERG.

III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY: From 20:30 throughout the night, the enemy intermittently shelled BUSIGNY and ESAUFOURT. Also shelled the roads in Q 32 and 26, and the front area in Q 27 and W 9 with light guns and howitzers.

IV. ENEMY'S DEFENSES: Escaped French civilians give the following information about enemy's defenses:

St-SOUPLET: East of St-SOUPLET at Q 34 b 90, a cart track running north and south crosses the main road. To the north of the road is a steep cutting fifteen feet deep at its junction with the main road and gradually becoming shallower toward the north. To the south this cutting has been continued as a trench, which joins the railway in W 4 b. The brick railway bridge in Q 34 d has been mined. In this vicinity, there is barbed wire on both sides of the railway, both north and south of the bridge (the civilian crossed this ground October 3).

Le CATEAU-BAZUEL Road: In Q 6, about ten to twelve yards from the south side of and along the Le CATEAU-BAZUEL Road, gun emplacements were under construction on the 3d inst.

- 516 -
ORS: A light railway emplacement crosses the road at R 5 c 54, but no rails had been laid on the 3d inst. Near the canal bridge in R 5 is a wheat depot containing 1,000 sacks of wheat. This depot is on the east bank of the canal and there is a mill on the west bank.

V. MOVEMENT: Poor visibility prevented observation by our aircraft.

* * * * * *

KERR T. RIGGS,

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 302: Letter

Replacements

3d Section, General Staff

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

To: Chief of Staff, II Army Corps

My dear Simonds:

We have not forgotten your necessities in the way of replacements. I have been trying to see my way clear to ask G-1 to send you at least a limited number. I, of course, realize the danger to the morale of divisions in letting them go too long without receiving much needed replacements. However, the situation at present with reference to our troops attacking between the MEUSE and the ARGONNE, and with reference to available replacements, is such that everything must be devoted to maintaining our power to attack the essential pivot of the Boche army. As you know, this pivot lies between the MEUSE and the ARGONNE.

We have sent urgent cables to Washington, and we hope the replacement situation will be cleared up within the next few weeks. We will do everything possible for you the moment that the possibility exists.

Everyone here is very enthusiastic about the way the II Corps carried out its very difficult task. We are especially enthusiastic to hear that the morale of the 27th Division, which has such a serious shortage in personnel, is still very high.

Yours truly,

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, General Staff.

- 517 -
**Location Headquarters II Corps**

From: G. W. READ, Commanding General, II Corps

Date: October 12, 1918

To: Adjutant General, G. H. Q., American E. F.


G. W. READ,
Commanding General.

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**Replacements**

*October 12, 1918.*

Commanding General, 27th Division

Arrange to move your divisional reception camp from ROISEL to JONCOURT on the 14th instant. Approximately fifty tents will be sent to JONCOURT railhead on that date. Site for camp should be selected at once.

G-1, American II Corps,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.

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**Location of Advanced Headquarters II Corps**

*II CORPS, A. E. F., October 12, 1918.*

Advanced Headquarters American II Corps will open at 16:00 today, October 12, at WIANCOURT, H.4.b. (62B), where all communications for Chief of Staff, operations, royal artillery and intelligence will be addressed. All communications on A and Q matters will be addressed to old advanced headquarters in Bois de BUIRE, J.16.b.0.5. (62C), until 9:00, October 13, and thereafter to WIANCOURT. Rear echelon will remain at N.15.d. central (62C) until further orders.

GEORGE S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

---
Artillery Operations Instructions

October 12, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS HEAVY ARTILLERY

INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3

For operations at an early date, the H. A. in the line will be reinforced by 3
brigades R. G. A. - two 8" and one 9.2" and 440 siege battery.
Above detail will move to positions sufficiently far forward tonight so as to move
to positions and be in action on night 13/14.
All will be 4 gun batteries.
Detached sections to remain in present positions.
Detached sections of mobile and mixed brigades and 9.2" How. batteries remain in
corps reserve in present positions.
AMMUNITION: Guns now in action:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrel Type</th>
<th>Rounds per Gun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>60-pdrs.</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; How.</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; gun</td>
<td>200</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

If time permits this is to be increased.
For batteries reinforcing the line:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barrel Type</th>
<th>Rounds per Gun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; How.</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2&quot; How.</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; gun</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tractor-drawn batteries will move into position in daylight and other batteries may.
Brigades will arrange for the resection of positions.
A forward exchange to corps H. A. is at V.22.a.1.4., where brigades will hook in.
Brigades will arrange to report their latest locations by D. R. or telephone.

Major, R. A.,
for
Brig. Major, R. A., Amer. II Corps H. A.

227-40.1: Orders

Movement 27th Division

ORDERS
No. 108

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 12, 1918.

Reference Maps: 57B) 1:40,000
62B)

1. SUPPLY: Ration refilling point from Oct. 13---At C.10.b.3.5.
2. PRISONERS OF WAR: Prisoners of War enclosure---At crossroads 57B/V.27.b.7.9.
Division engineer will construct a small cage to be used as a collecting station for prisoners of war, at the crossroads (vicinity of) V.27.b.7.9.

3. STRAGGLERS: Posts established along the general line BUSIGNY-BOHAIN.

4. MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS:

Main dressing station  PREMONT  ) Unchanged
Advanced dressing station  BUSIGNY  )

Commanding Officer, 105th Inf., will detail 100 men, under an officer, to report to commanding officer, advance dressing station, to act as reserve stretcher bearers, at 10 a.m., Oct. 13.

5. MECHANICAL TRANSPORT: M.T.O. is located at lorry park, JONCOURT.
The following daily details of lorries will be made:

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mail</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above in addition to the technical vehicles operated by 102d F. Sig. Bn., and 102d Engrs.


7. SUPPLEMENTAL MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS:

Car Posts   V.28.b.9.2.
            V.24.a.2.8.

Car Visiting Posts  Q.31.c.central
                    W.7.d.3.6.
                    W.13.b.9.9

By command of Major General O'Ryan

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.

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230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 29  30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

6:00, October 11 to 6:00, October 12, 1918

1. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Hostile Activity.

   Artillery: Our front and support lines were heavily shelled with 77's and 4.2's, almost constantly throughout the period. The shooting was very accurate and apparently the enemy had direct observation from high ground northeast and northwest of VAUX-ANDIGNY. His fire was also directed by observation from O.B.'s La HAIE-MENNESSERE and VAUX-ANDIGNY were harassed constantly throughout the day and night. Other areas shelled were IMBERFAYT Farm W 7d, Le ROND-POINT V 24a, eastern outskirts of BECQUIGNY V18c and d, W19a and c. Enemy artillery is located in La SELLE Valley and the slopes to the eastward, some of the smaller calibers coming from the direction of E 5, eastward of ANDIGNY-les-FERMES. BOHAIN, MONTBREHAIN, BUSIGNY, and PREMONT were also shelled during the period. The transport routes leading into PREMONT and BUSIGNY were harassed at frequent intervals.

   Machine Guns: Enemy M. G.'s poured a direct frontal and flanking fire into our front and support lines. The fire was copious and well aimed from concealed positions.

- 520 -
along the ridge from W 9b 4.3, W 15a central, W 14d 2.7, W14d 5.0, W 21a 1.7, also from positions on railway in W 20 and W 21 and from the trenches on the hill in W 27. Several emplacements were located by regimental observers in a small hedge about 14b 8.2. Considerable machine-gun fire came from vicinity of W 10 central.

Trench Mortars: Nil.

Aerial: Far less active than on previous days. There was no bombing in our area during the night.

Patrols: Nil.

Snipers: Snipers located in W 14 b, gave some trouble during the day. Their positions were cleverly camouflaged.

(b) Our Activity: During the late afternoon, our line was advanced on the right so as to include the greater part of VAUX-ANDIGNY. From here it runs to the east and north of La HAIE-MENNERESSE, through W 9 central to the river.

Artillery: Our heavies shelled machine-gun positions in W 14b and d, W 20b and d, W 15a and c. In the afternoon, a barrage was laid down in front of our lines in W 9b and d, but it was impossible to advance behind this barrage on account of flanking fire of machine guns on our right in W 14b and W 15a. This barrage was carried on into W 10 and W 11.

Machine Guns: Our M. G.'s in positions on outskirts of La HAIE-MENNERESSE, in hedge at W 2b 8.2 and W 13b, carried out harassing fire on the enemy positions on the opposite ridge.

Trench Mortars: Nil.

Aerial: Our planes were very active during the day. Scouts flying low poured M. G. fire into the enemy trenches.

Patrols: Liaison patrols maintained lateral communication fairly well, but were hindered in their work by direct observation from enemy machine-gun positions. Daylight patrols along our whole front took advantage of all cover and pushed as far forward as possible. The hedges east of VAUX-ANDIGNY and southeast of La HAIE-MENNERESSE were covered thoroughly and found to be untenable by infantry until the hills in front were taken.

2. HOSTILE MOVEMENT: Visibility was very poor throughout the day and little movement could be observed. In the afternoon, about 50 men were seen going along road in Q 35 toward St-SOUPLET, in columns of two's. During the morning, machine-gun positions in W 14b were reinforced by 25 men.

3. ENEMY DEFENSES: Enemy trenches with old wire in front reported on about the line along ridge W 9d 7.5, W 9d 4.3, W 15a central, W 14d central, W 21a central. Machine-gun emplacements with fresh dirt in front observed at about W 14b 3.2.

4. PRISONERS: Total prisoners taken between Oct. 7 and Oct. 12, 1918, is 45 officers and 1,748 men.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.
MEMORANDUM ORDERS:

1. The following area has been assigned this division for accommodations, while the division is in reserve:
   The northern and southern boundaries are the boundaries as shown on the administrative map [not found]. It will be noted that these boundaries exclude PREMONT and include part of BOHAIN.
   Eastern boundary: The railroad running approximately north and south through squares V.14, V.20, V.26, D.3, D.8, and including a part of BOHAIN already referred to.
   Western boundary: North and south grid line through C.5.central, C.29.central, C.23.central, including RAMICOURT.
   Interbrigade boundary: The BRANCOURT-PREMONT Road, BRANCOURT to the 60th Brigade.
2. The town of MONTBREHAIN is reserved for division headquarters and certain divisional troops.
3. The above assignment of areas amends paragraph 2 (a) and (b) of Field Order No. 25.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 12, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The IX Corps advanced the line slightly S. W. of Bois de RIQUERVAL in conjunction with operations of the French First Army. No other operations were carried out. Forward areas were harassed intermittently, but not heavily. Our artillery carried out an intermittent bombardment of the enemy's defenses and harassed roads and communications incessantly.
2. IX CORPS: S. W. of the Bois de RIQUERVAL, the 46th Division advanced the line a few hundred yards. Heavy machine-gun fire was encountered and enemy snipers were very active.
   AMERICAN II CORPS: Quiet day. No change in the situation.
   XIII CORPS: Enemy machine guns and snipers were active, otherwise the situation was quiet and unchanged.
3. THIRD ARMY: Heavy fighting took place along the whole army front and some progress was made. The V Corps succeeded in crossing La SELLE between MONTAY and NEUVILLY,
but were forced to withdraw to the original line on the western bank of the river in consequence of a heavy counterattack.

The enemy counterattacked vigorously along the whole front under cover of a heavy bombardment and gained a little ground in parts. The line was held at the end of the day, MONTAY (exclusive)--NEUVILLY (exclusive)--BRIASTRE--St-PYTHON--HAUSSY (all exclusive).

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The French attacked south of Bois de RIQUERVAL at 12:00, but were stopped by the enemy's barrage and machine-gun fire from FORTE Farm after the advance had progressed about 400 yards. On the OISE Canal, the attack met with more success and BERNOT was captured. 100 prisoners were secured.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 174 hours were flown by 107 pilots. Three successful reconnaissance and 8 artillery patrols were carried out. During the latter, 17 zone calls were sent down and one hostile battery successfully neutralized.
       Our aircraft were not very active on account of the weather, 49 offensive patrols were maintained and three air combats took place, one of which was decisive, resulting in the destruction of one E. A.
       There was no night flying. By day, 54 24-lb. bombs were dropped on various ground targets
   (b) Hostile: Enemy aircraft still remained inactive. Activity was chiefly confined to the vicinity of Le CATEAU.

* * * * *

7. WEATHER: Low clouds, mist, rain. Poor visibility.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: 5th Cavalry Brigade was transferred from IX Corps to cavalry corps (G. H. Q. reserve).
   50th Division relieved the 25th Division in the line, the latter going into corps reserve.
   Cavalry corps was transferred from army reserve to G. H. Q. reserve.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32, 46th Divisions.
   XIII Corps: 25th, 50th, 66th, 18th Divisions.
   American II Corps: American 27th and 30th Divisions.
   Australian Corps: Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th and 5th Divisions (army reserve).
   Cavalry Corps: 1st, and 3d Cavalry Divisions (G. H. Q. reserve).
   5th Cavalry Brigade (army reserve)

* corps reserve

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From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, October 12, 1918

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The enemy held the ground east of La SELLE River in force.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Small groups were seen at W19B30. Enemy were holding railway running east of St-BENIN and St-SOUPLE, also holding trench system strongly east of VAUX-ANDIGNY. Heavy M. G. and rifle fire was reported from these trenches.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: The enemy continued to fall back in front of our advance.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Situation normal. Line ran approximately: St-BENIN---St-SOUPLE---St-MARTIN RIVIERE, excl.--La HAIE-MENNERESSE---VAUX-ANDIGNY.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The 27th Division relieved the 30th Division in the line night of October 11/12.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The right division, IX Corps, operating on our right, advanced slightly at 12:00, in conjunction with French, but were held back by M. G. fire. The situation on our left was unchanged.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

Operations October 5-11, 1918, American II Corps

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 12, 1918.

For Period from Oct. 5 to 11 (inclusive)

1. OPERATIONS: Throughout the week, our operations continued and were again uniformly successful. From the 5th to the 7th, our efforts were directed to the capture of the high ground at MONTBREHAIN and BEAUREVOIR, and the widening of the gap made through the HINDENBURG Line on the northern flank of the army. The latter operation succeeded in
compelling the enemy to fall back from the salient lying between CREVECOEUR and GOUY, and thus aided the Third Army in forcing the passage of the St-QUENTIN Canal in the HONNECOURT area.

On the 8th inst., an attack on a wide front was commenced by the Allied Armies, which resulted in the enemy being driven in confusion across the SELLE.

As a result of the week's operations, our army advanced on a front of 7 1/2 miles to an average depth of 10 1/2 miles. Twenty villages fell into our hands; amongst others, the important towns of BOHAIN and Le CATEAU, while over 8,000 civilians were liberated; 6,566 prisoners, and 59 guns were also captured.

A few hostile counterattacks carried out between the 5th and 7th were very feeble and ineffective, except N. of MONTBREHAIN where, on the 5th inst., our troops were driven back to a distance of 400 yards. Since the 5th inst., no counterattacks were delivered by the enemy.

From captured documents, it was the intention of the enemy to withdraw on the 8th inst., to a line being constructed near Le CATEAU. This withdrawal was frustrated by our attack. The disorganization created was extreme as is shown by the fact that on the 8th inst., the Fourth Army alone captured prisoners belonging to 76 battalions of 17 different divisions.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES: During the week, the enemy reinforced his line opposite the Fourth Army front by 3 fresh divisions from G. H. Q. reserve, 3 battalions of the cyclist brig., elements of 2 fresh divisions from the line in other parts of the front (the bulk of which reinforced the left flank of the French First Army), as well as 6 exhausted divisions already several times engaged by our own or neighboring armies.

Since arriving on the SELLE, the order of battle has not been definitely established. It is certain, however, that the Germans are reorganizing their forces and withdrawing shattered divisions. It is estimated at the present time the army is confronted by 3 fresh divisions and elements of 5 exhausted ones.

3. RESERVES: Owing to the success of our armies, the number of reserves of any fighting value in rear of the line has been very considerably reduced. The Alpine corps has left for Serbia while it is considered that the 27th Division has also left the area, as it has not been identified since August 12. The number of reserves which would therefore be available to reinforce this front is reduced to 1 division resting one month, 4 divisions resting 10 days, and 7 divisions resting 4 days. It is also possible that one or two divisions have probably been relieved from quiet parts of the front and may be identified during the week.

On the whole of the western front, however, it is a significant fact that there are only 8 divisions considered fit for active operations now in reserve.

4. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: As has been stated above, it was ascertained from captured documents that the enemy intended to withdraw to the Le CATEAU Line on the 8th inst. During the week, evidence has been accumulating indicating that a line of defense is being constructed in the MAUBEUGE area. It would, therefore, appear that two lines of defense are being worked on opposite this front:

(a) A line running south from VALENCIENNES via Le CATEAU to AISONVILLE.
(b) A line probably running from VALENCIENNES via BAVAI to MAUBEUGE.

Owing to the inclement weather, photographs have been difficult to obtain, and only portions of the VALENCIENNES-Le CATEAU Line have been photographed. No photographs have yet been obtained of any lines of defense east of the lines above mentioned.

From the statements of German prisoners, escaped French prisoners of war and civilians who have been liberated, it would appear that the German main line of resistance is probably the line near MAUBEUGE. A German officer on Sept. 25 informed some refugees rescued during the last two days, that as the Germans were not sufficiently strong to
stand the combined assaults of the British and American troops, they intend to fall back in three stages:

(a) A line near Le CATEAU.
(b) A line near MAUBEUGE.
(c) The German frontier.

On October 5, he further stated that as the Germans did not consider they would be able to hold up the attacks on the Le CATEAU Line, work on it had been discontinued. From the fact, however, that the enemy have reinforced the army front by three fresh divisions during the last few days, it is considered that it is his intention to resist an advance at all costs for the time being, but that he will finally fall back on a line of trenches being constructed near MAUBEUGE.

5. AIR ACTIVITY: Hostile aeroplanes were very active on the 4th, 5th, and 6th insts.; large numbers of fighting machines were seen and were very aggressive. The numbers considerably decreased on the 9th inst. The increase corresponds with the period immediately preceding the date fixed by the enemy for his retirement. Now that the retirement has been completed, for the time being, the reinforcing squadrons have probably been withdrawn.

6. ARTILLERY: Owing to our successful operations, hostile artillery has been much disorganized. There is little doubt that a number of batteries had been withdrawn owing to the contemplated German retirement. This accounts for the small number of guns (59) captured by our troops on the 8th and 9th inst., when compared with the depth of our advance. On reaching the line of the SELLE, a number of single guns opened from positions on the eastern bank, firing over open sights.

Hostile fire shows signs of increasing and points to a stand being made on the line of the SELLE River.

7. MOVEMENT: Hostile movement by road and rail has been abnormally active during the week. It is accounted for by the evacuation of material from forward dumps prior to the contemplated German retirement. Reserves have been in nearly every instance brought up by road, except the fresh divisions from G. H. Q. reserves, which have arrived by rail during the last few days. It is considered that the great activity at GUISE between the 7th and the 9th is accounted for by the arrival of the 5th Res. Div.

8. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS:

(a) Aerodromes: A new temporary aerodrome appeared east of WASSIGNY. All aerodromes west of the OISE Canal from LANDRECIES to GUISE are now being evacuated. The units displaced east of CAMBRAI are at new aerodromes in the Le QUESNOY area and two new aerodromes have been photographed near AVESNES.

(b) Railways and Dumps: Most stations and dumps west of the OISE Canal were being evacuated before our attack. BOUE is still very active. Some work was in process on light railways near ORS, ETREUX, and VANDENCOURT, but has now probably been suspended.

9. GENERAL: The enemy has been driven back in confusion across the SELLE as he was on the point of withdrawing thither. From the fact that he has reinforced his front opposite the Fourth Army by fresh divisions from G. H. Q. reserves and that artillery fire has increased, it is considered that he will resist a further advance by our troops. From the statements of prisoners, escaped Allied P. of W., and refugees, it appears that a line of defense is being constructed in the vicinity of MAUBEUGE. This line probably runs from VALENCIENNES—BAVAI—MAUBEUGE, and thence in a southeasterly direction towards HIRSON. No photos showing this line are at present available. A retirement on a large scale has commenced in the LENS and LAON area.

Until this retirement is completed it is considered that no further retirement will be voluntarily carried out on this front by the enemy, but that at a later date his retirement will be continued to the MAUBEUGE Line. The reason for his withdrawal is his inability to hold with safety his present extended line of defense owing to his lack of re-
serve, heavy losses, and the bad morale of his troops. At the present time, when he requires every man possible, he has been forced to send to Serbia two divisions, and is left with only six divisions on the western front considered fit for offensive operations.

V. VIVIAN,
Lieut. Col.,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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II Corps, AEF: War Diary

October 12, 1918.

[Extract]

The 27th Division relieved the 30th Division in the line night of October 11/12.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

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27th Div., AEF: War Diary

October 12, 1918.

[Extract]

Advanced headquarters established at PREMONT.
Available for all duty  ) Officers  420
 ) Men  10,690

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STANLEY H. FORD,
Col., G. S., Chief of Staff.
30th Div., AEF: War Diary

October 12, 1918.

[Extract]

Relief of the division by the 27th Division was completed about daylight. Our troops upon being relieved proceeded by marching to areas allotted them in the vicinity of PREMONT and BRANCOURT. The 105th Engineers remains temporarily attached to the 27th Division being engaged in engineering work in forward area.

Available for all duty ) Officers 531
) Men 15,976

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B, II Corps: Letter

Location Headquarters British Fourth Army with American II Corps Attached

Fourth Army
No. 297 (G) No. 11

Fourth Army, B. E. F.,
October 13, 1918.

1. The advanced echelon of A.H.Q., composed as under, will open at MONTIGNY Farm, Sheet 62C, K.36, at 17:00 tomorrow, October 14, and be accommodated in a railway train:

Army Commander
General Staff (Operations and Intelligence)
D. A. and Q. M. G. with D. A. Q. M. G. (b) and Staff Captain
(Ammunition) only. (Remainder of Q will remain at rear A. H. Q.)
R. A.
C. E.
French Mission
Camp Commandant.

2. All communications for the above officers will be addressed "Advanced Fourth Army."

3. The rear echelon will remain at ETERPIGNY.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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- 528 -
Artillery Instructions for Attack by British Fourth Army

Fourth Army
No. 20/39 (G)

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 13, 1918.

1. Herewith artillery instructions for the forthcoming operations.
2. Further instructions will be issued regarding the action of the artillery immediately previous to Zero and during day of attack.
3. Please acknowledge by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Issued with Fourth Army No. 20/39 (G), dated 13/10/18

FOURTH ARMY ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS

1. During the period between now and Zero:
   (i) Vigorous counterbattery work will be carried out.
   (ii) The bombardment by heavy howitzers of important localities to be selected by corps will be commenced forthwith.
   (iii) Normal harassing fire will be continued on the enemy’s communications, approaches to villages, and important crossroads.

   The following roads or railways should be engaged in enfilade:

   REGNICOURT-WASSIGNY  
   MOLAIN-WASSIGNY  
   VAUX-ANDIGNY---WASSIGNY Rly.  
   St-MARTIN---MAZINGHIEN  
   St-SOUPLET---MAZINGHIEN  
   Le CATEAU-CATILLON  
   Le CATEAU-POMMEREUIL  
   Le CATEAU-FONTAINE-au-BOIS  
   MONTAY-FOREST-ENGLEFONTAINE  
   Le CATEAU-LANDRECIES Rly.

Against roads only shrapnel or H. E. with instantaneous fuse is to be used.

(iv) 6" guns will be sited well forward to deal with distant objectives, including: (a) Canal crossings and approaches at

   OISY  
   S.9.c.  
   CATILLON---American II Corps

   ORS  
   LANDRECIES  

   IX Corps
   American II Corps
   XIII Corps

- 529 -
(b) Approaches to villages of

WASSIGNY  )  IX Corps
OISY       )

MAZINGHIEN---American II Corps

FONTAINE-au-BOIS  )  XIII Corps
BOURSIES       )

(c) Railway station and sidings N. W. of ORS, by XIII Corps.

2. Attention is again drawn to the necessity for the early issue of orders to subordinate formations. Once orders are issued no alterations should be allowed subsequently, unless absolutely necessary.

3. Orders for artillery action on the day of attack will be issued later.

4. (a) Corps are authorized to maintain ammunition per gun as stated below: At least 1/4 of this ammunition should be held in corps reserve.

   In addition, all echelons will be kept full.

   18-pdr. guns  400 rounds
   4.5" How.     400 "
   60-pdr. gun 300 "
   6" How.      300 "
   8" How.      200 "
   9.2" How.   200 "
   6" gun      200 "
   12" How.    100 "

   (b) As large a proportion as possible of 18-pdr. ammunition should be kept boxed.

   (c) The amount of ammunition per gun to be maintained in army reserve will be 100 rounds for all natures of guns.

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182-12.4: Fl dr. 2: Memorandum

Replacements

No. 5223

R. A. BRITISH VII CORPS.

The American II Corps R. A. Reception Camp is being moved from La CHAPELETTE, PERONNE to ROISEL on Tuesday, October 15.

As a temporary measure until the R. A. camp is installed at ROISEL, all personnel arriving by train will be accommodated at American II Corps Reception Camp.

Please arrange to notify officer in charge American II Corps Reception Camp by 9 a.m. on Tuesday, October 15, full instructions as to location of units.

Every effort should be made to provide means of transporting personnel to their units.

[Signature Illegible]

Captain, R. A.,
Staff Captain R. A., VII Corps,
Attached American II Corps.

October 13, 1918

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PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 1

SERIES B

1. To maintain the pressure on the enemy, and to increase the difficulties of his withdrawal, the Fourth Army will carry out a further operation at an early date.

2. The attack will be carried out by 50th Division on the right and 66th Division on the left.

3. The tactical boundaries of the corps and the dividing line between divisions are shown on the attached map.

The objectives of the XIII and American corps are those shown on the attached map [not found]. It is not known at present whether the Third Army will cooperated on the north. We must, therefore, legislate for providing our own protection on the northern flank.

4. The necessary adjustment of line between the 50th Division and American 27th Division and between the 50th Division and 66th Division will be made during the night October 14/15, in order to bring divisions on to their forming-up places for the attack. Arrangements for this adjustment will be made direct between divisions concerned.

5. The 100th Machine Gun Battalion will relieve the 25th Machine Gun Battalion in the 66th Divisional Sector by 6 a.m., October 15, from which hour the 25th Machine Gun Battalion is placed at the disposal of G.O.C., 50th Division for barrage.

6. One brigade of 25th Division will be required as reserve behind the 50th Division. Instructions as to the movement of the brigade will be issued later.

7. C.E., XIII Corps, will arrange to have the necessary material for the rapid repair of certain bridges of River SELLÉ, to be ready to move to site as soon as work is possible, namely bridges at K.34.b.1.2., K.34.d.0.0., Q.9.b.4.0., Q.22.a.2.1.

8. Acknowledge.

Brigadier General,
General Staff.

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182-33.3, No. 3: Summary

No. 11

From 18h., October 12 to 18 h., October 13, 1918

[Extract]

1. Operations:
   (a) Infantry: No major operation on corps front.
(b) Artillery: Activity consisted chiefly in harassing fire on suspected battery positions, roads, and woods. Long-range guns have shelled bridges and villages in back areas. In response to shelling of BUSIGNY, a concentration was placed on suspected batteries.

(c) Patrols: Patrol sent out to reconnoiter the SELLE River reports no water in same. (This requires further confirmation, as air observers report small stream running in river bed.) Small working parties of enemy were discovered by patrol along the river apparently digging and wiring.

(d) Prisoners and Material: No prisoners during the period.

DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES: No new identifications on corps front. Corps on our right reports identification of two new divisions, 15th reserve Division and 5th Division. Corps on our left reports identification of 44th Reserve Division.

Enemy's order of battle opposite this corps is obscure, but shows no change.

HOSTILE ARTILLERY:

Activity: The enemy's artillery has again been fairly active with harassing fire. Areas chiefly affected have been BUSIGNY---VAUX-ANDIGNY---ST-SOUPLET, and ESCAUFORT. At 4:35, in reply to a barrage in support of infantry advancing on our right, heavy counterpreparation was dropped on VAUX-ANDIGNY and on the railway. During the night, a heavy gas concentration was put down on VAUX-ANDIGNY and LA HAIE-MENNERESSE.

4. ENEMY DEFENSES: Our air observers report a new system of rifle pits connected by a shallow trench system, which apparently runs as follows: Q11a55, Q10d96, Q16c90, Q22a47, Q22a35, Q22a30, Q22c38, Q22c75, Q28a77, Q28a63, Q28c47, Q28c40, Q34a73, Q34a70, Q34d08, W4b28. Communication trench at Q22c73 to railway at Q22c85. Communication trench at Q24c47 to railway at Q28c97. Communication trench at Q34d03 to Q34d54 into sunken road. Ground observers report: Machine-gun emplacements near BELLEVUE. Enemy O. P. in church at St-MARTIN RIVIERE, W10a.

Ground observers report work being done at farms at Q29b28 and Q29c66, it is probable that these two farms are being organized for defense.

Trench mortars are reported on eastern slope of knoll at W14d97 and W14d95, also at W15c31, and W15c14.

5. ENEMY'S INFANTRY ACTIVITY: At 8:00, a small force of the enemy attempted to establish a post at Q27b34, this force was driven off without loss to us.

6. MOVEMENT: Low clouds and rain prevented aerial observation during most of the day and no movement was reported.

Ground observers report parties of the enemy seen along east side of railroad from Q22 central to Q34 central.

7. AIRCRAFT: One E. A. was reported over our lines at St-SOULPLET at 18:30, 12th inst.

8. ENEMY INTENTIONS: (From Fourth Army Summary.) The Germans are at present holding the HERMANN STELLUNG [position] in Le CATEAU Line. Owing to the fact that two fresh divisions from G. H. Q. reserve have reinforced the front and a German retirement in the CHEMIN-des-DAMES and the LENS areas has apparently commenced, it is considered that the Germans will oppose any further advance by our armies, for the time being, with all the strength at their disposal, while retirements will be carried out elsewhere.

It is probably the intention of the enemy, however, to evacuate Le CATEAU Line in due course and to fall back on a line running probably from VALENCIENNES to MAUBEUGE, and thence probably in a southeasterly direction.

9. NEWS:

AMERICAN: East of the MEUSE, there has been heavy fighting in the Bois CAURES. On both sides of the river, our troops have gained all their objectives. Total number of prisoners captured in this sector since September 26, 17,659.
The French are advancing through the St-GOBAIN Forest. They are about two kilometers from LAON.

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KERR T. RIGGS,

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182-33.3, No. 3: Artillery Instructions

Operations II Corps Artillery

H. O. 20
No. 4

INSTRUCTIONS No. 4

[Extract]

The 18th, 51st, 68th, 71st and 93rd Brigades will engage the following points and areas on the 14th instant as visibility permits, with one battery, as detailed by phone.

Ammunition to be expended in bombardment - 200 rounds per brigade.

OBSERVATION: Should be carried out from the ground, by balloon or aeroplane.

Brigade commanders may arrange the two latter direct if required.

DEFENSES: Around farms are generally some little distance in front of them and fire will be so directed.

CRASHES: Will be ordered from corps H. A., giving the number or letter opposite the coordinates of each target. Additional to bombardment.

HARASSING FIRE: As usual, will be placed on targets 2000 yards beyond our outpost line.

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Acknowledge by wire

T. CUNNINGHAM,
Brig. Major, R. A.,
American II Corps H. A., P. T. C.

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182-10.2: Telegram

Movements 105th and 102d Engineers

From: Headquarters II Corps, A. E. F.

Date: October 12, 1918

Hour: 6:30 p. m.

To: 27th Division

695-G-3. The 105th Engineers are placed temporarily under command of C. E., American II Corps---one battalion will move to vicinity of PREMONT, regimental headquarters and
remaining battalion to MONTBREHAIN, both movements to be made Oct. 13. Company B, 102d Engineers, is placed temporarily under command C. E., American II Corps, and those not now at WIANCOURT, will proceed there, Oct. 13. Addressed American 27th and 30th Divisions, repeated to 105th Engineers, 102d Engineers, Fourth Army.

G. W. READ,
Maj. Gen., Comdg., II Corps.

A. W. COPP,
Major, Asst. G-3.

182-32.7: Fldr. 9: Telegram

Operations II Corps

From: IX Corps
Date: October 13, 1918 Hour: 14:15
To: II Corps

G260: 6th Division will, tonight or tomorrow night, by direct arrangements with American 27th Division, take over the American front up to the grid line between W14 and W20. Following area will be taken over at same time as a forming-up place from front line W14c00 to road junction W19a30, W19c06, thence due south along the grid line to our present boundary. 6th Div. to ack.

182-10.2: Message

Relief of Australian Tunnelling Companies

From: American II Corps
Date: October 13, 1918 Hour: 18:00
To: Australian 2d Tunnelling Co.

Under orders Fourth Army, Australian 2d Tunnelling Company and Australian 1st A. T. Company, are relieved from command American II Corps and will proceed to TINCOURT, where they will entrain for FLORIVILLE-GAMACHES area. Arrangements will be made by G-4 with traffic PERONNE.

SIMONDS.
British and American Division Junction Points

From: II Corps
Date: October 13, 1918 Hour: 17:35
To: 27th Div.

G-3/675. In preparation for future operations, point of junction between Amer. 27th Div. and neighboring British divisions will be changed. Junction point with div. on right vicinity of W 14 d 5 0, with div. on left vicinity of Q 28 e. Arrange with C. G.'s neighboring divisions, details of necessary changes in front occupied by your troops and accurate locations of points of junction, also time at which changes in junction points will go into effect.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding II Corps.

Junction Point Time Assigned

From: 27th Div.
Date: October 13, 1918 Hour: 22:00 Received: 1:38 [Oct.14]
To: II Corps

Refer memorandum Chief of Staff [G-3/675, 17:35 h., Oct 13,1918], upon result of communication with division on left, change on point of junction therewith will not be effected tonight.

Location Headquarters II Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 13, 1918—7 p. m.

G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Advanced headquarters of II Corps WIANCOURT and rear headquarters N 15 d central, map 62C. 27th Division Headquarters BUSIGNY. 30th Division Headquarters at MONTBREHAIN.

F. E. BUCHAN,
G. S., G-3.
Administration Regarding 102d Engineers

II CORPS, A.E.F.,
October 13, 1918--1 p. m.

G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

705 G-3

Morning situation report. Night quiet, situation unchanged. Our line runs St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET, inclusive, thence along west bank Lë SELLÉ River as far as St-MARTIN RIVIERE, thence to VAUX-ANDIGNY, inclusive.

F. E. BUCHAN,
G. S., G-3.

182-10.2: Flr. 7: Field Message

Orders for Replacements


Date: Oct. 13, 1918  Received: 17:13

To: Comdg. General, American II Corps, A. E. F.

Number 3348 G-1. Reference your C. of S./155/12.

Following replacements ordered sent, to RITA [27th Div.]: 900 infantry, 100 machine gunners. To EVA [30th Div.]: 700 infantry, 150 machine gunners. These should arrive within a few days. No further replacements can be expected for the present.

230-13: Order

Instructions to Reorganize Units

MEMORANDUM ORDERS:

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 13, 1918.

1. Unit commanders will take the necessary steps to reorganize and refit their organizations at once. Any delay in procuring clothing, arms, or equipment will be reported to these hq. at once. All commanding officers will be held to strict accountability in this regard and in event of failure to secure such supplies promptly must be able to show that they have exhausted all means to secure such supplies.

2. Particular attention will be paid to the organization of specialists squads, including intelligence personnel. All regiments must have at all times a regimental intelligence officer.
3. The division commander will inspect the division by regiments commencing the 14th instant, at hours to be designated later. Regimental commanders will select in the vicinity of their organization a suitable place for such inspection.

4. Instruction during the week, October 14-19, in addition to inspection referred to, will include close order disciplinary drills, instructions in use of rifle grenades, use of compasses by platoon and company, maintenance of direction, and platoon and company instruction in the attack of strong points and machine-gun nests.

5. Special attention will be paid by organization commanders to the training of any replacements who may join them during the week, and every endeavor made to impress upon them the lessons learned in our recent operations.

6. The instruction utilized herein is not to prevent any special instruction which organization commanders may desire to give their commands for the purpose of impressing upon them the lessons learned during the past week.

7. Regimental commanders will submit to these hq. daily the name of organization training, a location of their training ground, and the nature of the instruction to be given the following day.

8. Bathing arrangements will be improvised to the extent, at least, of supplying facilities for heating water so that every man may wash his person, and his underclothing.

By Command of Major General Lewis:

C. Burnett,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.

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FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 13, 1918.

[Extract]

1. There was a slight increase in hostile shelling north of VAUX-ANDIGNY. During the night, a fairly heavy gas concentration was placed in VAUX-ANDIGNY and La HAIEMENNERESSE. Our artillery maintained strong harassing fire on the enemy's communications and battery areas by night and day.

2. IX CORPS: No infantry operations were undertaken. BOHAIN was lightly shelled with H. E. and gas during the night, and a 15-cm. gun fired on FRESNOY on two occasions.

AMERICAN II CORPS: Enemy snipers were fairly active, otherwise the situation remained unchanged. During the night, VAUX-ANDIGNY was subjected to fairly heavy gas concentrations. BUSIGNY was fairly heavily shelled between 13:00 and 14:00 with H. V. guns.

XIII CORPS: Situation quiet. CLARY, BERTHY and REUMONT were shelled at intervals during the day and field artillery was active against various points in our front line.

3. THIRD ARMY: SOLESMES was captured and the line advanced along the whole of the army front north of NEUVILLY.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: Patrols crossed the OISE Canal in the vicinity of MONT-d'ORIGNY.

5. AIRCRAFT:
(a) British: 101 hours were flown by 99 pilots. Eight successful reconnais-sances and five artillery patrols were carried out. During the latter, three zone calls
were sent down, but no success resulted.

Our aircraft were less active than usual owing to the weather. 20 offensive patrols were maintained and one indecisive combat took place.

80 25-lb. and 10 112-lb. bombs were dropped and 1550 machine-gun rounds fired by night on AULNOYE Station from a height of from 1800 to 2000 feet.

By day, two 25-lb. bombs and one 40-lb. phosphorous bomb were dropped on suitable ground targets.

(b) Hostile: Activity was still very slight owing to the weather. Activity was confined to the vicinity of Le CATEAU.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through army cages 54 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s Nil.

7. WEATHER: Low clouds, mist and rain.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: Nil.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   IX Corps: 1st,* 6th, 32d,* 46th Divisions
   XIII Corps: 25th,* 50th, 66th, 18th* Divisions
   American II Corps: 27th and 30th* Divisions.
   Australian Corps: Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions (army reserve).
   Cavalry Corps: 1st Cavalry Division (G. H. Q. reserve), 5th Cavalry Brigade (army reserve).

* corps reserve.

182-33.3: No. 3: Operations Report

G-3 II CORPS, A. E. F.,

October 13, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period Ending noon, October 13, 1918

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: No change.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: None received.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: 27th Division report considerable shelling of back areas by enemy artillery. Constant sniping by enemy along R. R. opposite St-SOUPLET.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Situation quiet and unchanged.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The 27th Division is in the line, having relieved the 30th Division night of Oct 10/11. At 4:30 h., Oct 13, we laid down a harassing M. G. barrage on selected targets.
7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The British 6th Division fired on same targets mentioned in Paragraph 6. Enemy retaliated with considerable artillery fire including gas.

          F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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27th Div., AEF: War Diary

[Extract]

Left PREMONT closing headquarters there and opened same at BUSIGNY.
Available for all duty ) Officers 448
) Men 10,670

          STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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30th Div., AEF: War Diary

[Extract]

All organizations spent day resting, bathing, and cleaning up. Details were engaged in burying the dead and the gathering up of captured material.
Available for all duty ) Officers 527
) Men 15,374

          C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.
Summary of Events and Information

The corps commander and the B. G. G. S. attended an army conference at Army Hq. ETERPIGNY at 10:30 a.m., and later, a corps conference was held at MAGNY-la-FOSSE, which was attended by the G. O. C.'s, 1st, 6th, and 46th Divs. The 5th Cav. Brig. had been broken up during the last two days, one regiment of cav. (the Scots Greys) being allotted to IX Corps, one regiment to XIII Corps and one to the American II Corps, the 5th Cav. Brig. Hq. and their artillery remaining under IX Corps with Hq. at BOHAIN. The situation on the corps front remained quiet and unchanged throughout the day.

II Corps Report Troop Movements: Fldr. 310: Location List

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 14, 1918—6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)
II Corps Headquarters (Rear)
412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
(Att. to 13th Wing
3d Brig. R. A. F.)

WIANCOURT
N.15.d.cent. (62C)
MONTBREHAIN
HAMEL
Near SAULTY
BAIZIEUX

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps R. A.
Hq. Aust. IV D. A.

Hq. 6th Army Brig. A. F. A.
(Comdg. Right Group)

Right Group
6th Army Brig. A. F. A.
10th Brig. A. F. A.
11th Brig. A. F. A.

Hq. Aust. 2d D. A.
(Comdg. Left Group)

Left Group
5th A. F. A. Brig.
4th A. F. A. Brig.
12th A. F. A. Brig.
Hq. Aust. 5th D. A.

7th A. F. A. Brig.
8th A. F. A. Brig.
13th A. F. A. Brig.
14th A. F. A. Brig.

Hq. Aust. 3d D. A.

Hq. VII Corps H. A.

93d Brig. R. G. A.
41st Brig. R. G. A.
9th Brig. R. G. A.
69th Brig. R. G. A.
51st Brig. R. G. A.
71st Brig. R. G. A.
18th Brig. R. G. A.
73d Brig. R. G. A.

Hq. C. R. E. Aust. Corps
Hq. 4th Tank Brig.
3d Squadron A. F. C.
15th Wing, R. A. F.
5th Balloon Wing
Cavalry Corps
20th Regt. Hussars

27th Division

Division Hq. (Adv.)
Division Hq. (Rear)
53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
105th Infantry Hq.
106th Infantry Hq.
105th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.

54th Infantry Brig. Hq.
107th Infantry Hq.
108th Infantry Hq.
106th M. G. Bn. Hq.

104th M. G. Bn. Hq.
102d F. S. Bn. Hq.
102d San. Train Hq.

30th Division

Division Hq. (Adv.)
Division Hq. (Rear)
59th Infantry Brig. Hq.
117th Infantry Hq.
118th Infantry Hq.
114th M. G. Bn. Hq.

- 541 -
1. SITUATION OCTOBER 13 AND NIGHT 13/14 INST.: The situation remained unchanged, and except for a considerable amount of shelling of the back areas of the center corps, and constant sniping opposite St-SOUPLET and along the railway line from Le CATEAU southwards, the day has been quiet. No identifications were made. During the night, hostile machine guns were active from the railway east of St-BENIN, and patrols met with opposition.

2. ENEMY’S INTENTIONS: Prisoners taken by the First Army stated that the line is about to be withdrawn in successive stages to a line immediately west of VALENCIENNES. The withdrawal of guns near ARLEUX began on the 11th inst. From the above, it will be seen that the enemy apparently intends to straighten out his line from N. of Le CATEAU towards VALENCIENNES at an early date.

3. RESERVES:
   (a) No further fresh divisions from reserve were identified yesterday on this army front.
   (b) The presence of Hungarian troops opposite the army on our right, on the OISE, N. of Mont d’ORIGNY, was indicated by the German wireless last night.
   (c) 2d Div., withdrawn from the JONCOURT sector at the beginning of the month, after losing in all over 1,500 prisoners, has now been engaged against the French at THENELLES, S. of Mont d’ORIGNY, while the 232d Div. has apparently now been brought into line again, farther south, in the SERY---HAMEGICOURT---ACHERY sector.
   (d) The reported arrival of the 93d Div. in the VIRTON area from the Russian front, raises the total number of enemy divisions in the western theater to 124, of which 182 [sic] are German infantry divisions.

4. ENEMY ACTIVITY: Weather: Low clouds, mist and rain.
   (a) Aircraft: Rain and mist throughout the day prevented flying. As a con-
sequence, aeroplane activity was again very slight. One indecisive combat took place. None of our planes are missing.

(b) Artillery (up to 3 p.m., Oct. 13, 1918): Slightly increased artillery activity was reported on the northern portion of the army front, especially against villages in the forward areas.

At 6:30 p.m., a fairly heavy barrage lasting 30 minutes was put down on our front line W. of Le CATEAU, probably in retaliation for the bombardment carried out by the corps on our left.

Artillery fire at 4:15 a.m., in support of a minor operation N. of the Bois de Riquerval, provoked heavy fire on VAUX-ANDIGNY and vicinity.

A fairly heavy gas concentration was placed on VAUX-ANDIGNY and La HAIEMENNERESSE during the night, and H. E. and gas shells were fired into BOHAIN.

Forward and battery areas were harassed, H. V. guns being responsible for the greater part of the fire.

(c) Movement: Observation of activity on roads and railways in enemy back areas again failed owing to bad weather and low visibility.

Dawn Reconnaissance (today): Movement of trains on the MAUBEUGE-AULNOYE-LANDRECIES Line, between 7:15 and 7:30 showed a southwest trend, but was not abnormal. Six trains were seen in AULNOYE with steam up. Railway activity was generally slight.

No road movement of importance was detected, but a thick ground mist made observation difficult. 150 infantry were seen going south from BAZUEL to MAZINGHIEN. DOUAI was seen to be in flames, and big fires in MONT d'ORIGNY.

5. ENEMY DEFENSES: Air reconnaissance on 13th reported the new trench line occupied N. E. and S. E. of VAUX-ANDIGNY, and machine-gun fire from this line at Riquerval Wood. In the area between these points, short trenches are now reported to have been dug in E. 1. d., E.7.b.d., and E.13.B., where a gap is shown on photographs of Oct. 9.

French civilians report belts of wire on both sides of the railway north and south of the St-SOUPLET Bridge at Q.34.d.

Rear Lines: According to prisoners captured by the French army, work is proceeding on trenches in front of HIRSON and considerable wire and isolated trenches were seen along the SEDAN-HIRSON Railway. Work is reported near AULNOYE and in the MORMAL Forest and on wire and concrete dugouts near MAUBEUGE.

6. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES:

(a) No identifications were obtained on this army front during the period under review.

It is thought that the sector of the 44th Res. Div. extends farther S. than was at first the case, and that the whole division will be opposite our left flank.

17th Res. Div. was resting 8 weeks near CONFLANS and one week at MEULEBEKE near Le THIETL.

One regiment (163d Inf. Regt.) entrained at MEULEBEKE On 9th inst., arriving near QUESNOY on 10th.

(b) The army on our right identified the following units yesterday:

81st Res. Div., all 3 regts.–N. E. of SEBONCOURT--Pris.

231st Div., 442d I. R.--HAUTEVILLE area--Pris.
All 3 regts. were in the VADENCOURT area on Oct. 11; on 12th inst., 442d Inf. Regt. was to have relieved Bav. 13th Inf. Regt., Bav. 6th Div., in the BERNOT area, but the relief did not take place owing to the French attack.

2d Div., 33d Fusiliers--THENELLES--Pris.
237th Div., all 3 regts.--E. of La FERE--Pris.
From prisoners' statements, it appears that the 232d Div. is now probably in line between the 1st Res. Div. and 237th Div., the sector being from between SERY and HAMEGICOURT to ACHERY, inclusive.

(c) The army on our left identified:
A draft of 600 joined the division on 12th inst.
All 3 regts. are in line.
161st Inf. Regt., 185th Div. said to have been on right of 6th Res. Inf. Regt.
on 11th inst.
Reserves: Both 26th and 49th Res. Divs. were identified yesterday N. of the
SCARPE and the 111th and 22d Divs. withdrawn. 18th Res. Div. was also withdrawn through
48th Res. Div. to about 2,000 yards in rear.

7. FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: Large fire at LANDRECIES in center of town, and a dump exploded about 3 miles east of the town.

GENERAL

The situation remains unchanged
The enemy are evidently withdrawing in the LENS and LAON areas.
The last-named place was captured by the French yesterday.

V. VIVIAN,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

ANNEX TO FOURTH ARMY SUMMARY, DATED OCTOBER 14, 1918

INFANTRY ORGANIZATION (From G. H. Q. Summary)

The following translation of an order issued by German G. H. Q. shows the proposed reorganization of the German infantry and light machine-gun groups. Prisoners and captured documents should be examined regarding this reorganization and further details obtained:

C. G. S. of the Field Army
No. 1a/10075.

G. H. Q.
20-9-18.

It is the intention to amend the Manual of Infantry Training During War in such a way as to abolish the idea of the light machine gun group, and the light machine gun with a single team will be merged into the infantry group as an essential constituent part. In close order, the group will form up in three ranks, one of these consisting of the machine-gun team. The strength of the group will, in consequence, be correspondingly increased.

The revision and reprinting of the Manual of Infantry Training During War will take a few weeks. I desire that it be left to regimental commanders to apply the new ideas at once, both in action and during training, should they consider the change desirable at the moment and practicable under the prevailing conditions. In view of the frequent movements of divisions, I do not wish army groups, armies, and corps to issue instructions for the execution of this order.

LUDENDORFF.
FURTHER NOTES ON VILLAGES OPPOSITE FOURTH ARMY FRONT

(1) CATILLON:
Mining. Canal lock reported mined (Oct. 11, 1918).
Aerodrome. 6 hangars. Abandoned Oct. 10, 1918.
Electricity Works. 500 meters from station, M.20.a.5.7; erected by the Germans (June 20, 1917).
Power Station. Erected by the Germans on southern side of La GROISE Road at fork at HAUTREPE Road (M.20.a.8.8); thick cables run from electric works at JEUMONT, passing NOYELLES and MAROILLES, and running on to CATILLON; thence one branch leads towards VALENCIENNES, and one towards St-QUENTIN (November 1917).
Hospital. Large hospital of at least 50 sheds reported by rapatrie [returned refugee], January 14, 1917.
Motor Parks. (a) Just west of canal bridge (January 28, 1917); (b) At back of church (July 23, 1917); on the Place de l'Eglise (June 18, 1918).
Petrol Dump. (a) With lorry park at R24.d.2.8.; petrol in huts (June 15, 1918); (b) Important petrol depot in cellars of some houses 100 m. north of church (March 1, 1918).
Telephone Exchange. At R 10.d.8.5.
Underground Passage. From square at M.19.b.0.2. towards REJET-de-BEAULIEU; to hold 300 men.
Wireless. (a) On BAZUEL Road at R.23.a.9.9. (January 28, 1917); (b) at R.23.b.5.8. (Sept. 9, 1917).
Remount Depot. 200 horses in distillery 800 meters N. W. of church (June 23, 1917).
Church. 25 m. high, highest point of village; no cellars.
Sawmill. At M.14.c.1.9.
Large Farm. At R.28.b.4.8., with cellar. Building hidden from view.

(2) MENNEVRET:
Material dump and pioneer park at station; trench material unloaded here (escaped P. of W., Oct. 5, 1918).

(3) REGNICOURT:
Population 1,500 civilians, working in the neighborhood (Oct. 5, 1918).
Arty. Wagon and Horse Lines. E. of Riquerval Wood and N. of Honnechy Fme (Oct. 5, 1918).

(4) WASSIGNY:
Reported still full of civilians (Oct. 10, 1918).
Large Coal Dump. Reported being evacuated Oct. 8, 1918 (escaped P. of W.).
Sawmill. 200 yds. S. W. of station, with good timber store, tunnelling frames, etc., wood from ANDIGNY Forest (October 8, 1918).
P. W. Camp. (a) 900 prisoners, 50 meters N. W. of church; (b) 200 prisoners, at TUPIGNY Farm (both Oct. 5, 1918, escaped P. of W.).
Aerodrome. At ARROUAISE Fme; 4 hangars (Oct. 9, 1918).
Entraining Platform. At station (June 23, 1917).
Ammunition Depot. At station (Feb. 1, 1917).

(5) BAZUEL:
Telephone Exchange. (12 lines) at angle of roads La GROISE and CHAPELLE de la BRIQUE (M.20.a.4.8) (Feb. 15, 1917).
Telephone exchanges at N. E. angle of POMMEREUIL and ORS roadfork; and at M. Deauissy’s, 50 meters W. of station (June 15, 1917).
Power Stations. Reported in construction Jan./Feb., 1917; (a) near Laiterie [Dairy] east of level crossing. (b) On main road 30 yards east of canal (M.20.a.).
Aerodrome for Bombing Squadron. 16 hangars (Oct. 8, 1918).

ORS: (700-800 inhabitants.)

Ammunition Depots. (a) Between church and canal at R.5.b.8.2. (Feb. 15, 1917). (b) In dugout south of cemetery with entrance at Calvary surrounded by fir trees and second entrance about 200 meters farther east; important (June 15, 1917). (c) In Boise-l'EVEQUE, 1 km. N. W. of station (June 15, 1917).

Sawmill. Beside canal, wood from Boise-l'EVEQUE, at which 400 men were at work, March 2, 1917.

Timber Yard. Large. Just N. E. of station, fed by sidings from AULNOYE-Le CATEAU main line, with light railway through sawmill, up to Boise-l'EVEQUE, (photo of March 31, 1918).

Shelters. At station. These fill up with water as soon as dug; the whole country very marshy, and no trenches can be dug here (June 20, 1917).

Telephone Exchange. At M. Lefebvre's on LANDRECIES Road 1 km. east of church, M.I. b. 5, lines running towards MAUBEUGE (Feb. 15, 1917).

Church. Small, built of brick, with tower (?) 17 m. high.

Brewery. Near station, with important well and cellar. Fourth Army (1).

Oct. 12, 1918

EXAMINATION OF PRISONERS
INFORMATION CONCERNING GERMAN DIVISION

(1) 20th Division:

Strength. The division is very weak. The 2d Bn. of the 77th Inf. Regt. had a total strength of 56 men composed principally of drafts from heavy transport. An officer states that the division was likely to be relieved immediately because of its weakness. The bns. of the division averaged 60 to 80 men in strength (Oct. 7).

Movements. Division in line south of CAMBRAI.

Withdrawed to NAVES Sept. 27 to 28, 1918, put in reserve along Canal de l'ESCAUT between RAMILLIES and ESWARS, remaining in line one day and was withdrawn to RIEUX, where it remained four days. It then went into the line northwest of MONTBREHAIN. It travelled by St-HILAIRE, CAUDRY, CLARY, and MARETZ. Divisions entered the line on the evening of the 6th instant.

Morale. The morale of both officers and men of the 20th Division is very low. There is absolute lack of any offensive spirit. Officers expressed the opinion that Germany is beaten and their own wish is for peace.

Drafts. On 25.9.18, an Ersatz regt. left of the MUNSTER Lager (HANOVER) for the 20th Div. The regiment was about 150 strong, and was called the 74th Ers. Regt. They detrained at RIEUX, 28.9.18; remained at RIEUX 4 days; then to south of CAMBRAI, three days; then behind MARETZ two days; then moved in front of MARETZ as reserves. This 74th Ersatz Regt. was to have been divided among the three regiments of the 20th Div., but prisoner was captured before this could be done. The 10th Pion. Bn. of the 20th Div. was employed as infantry. The battalion consisted of two companies, strength about 60 men each.

(2) 29th DIVISION: The 29th Division left LAON on Oct. 5, arriving in BRANCOURT the following day. Prisoners state that on the 5th inst., the divisional artillery had not left LAON.

The 142d Inf. Regt. came to BRANCOURT 6.10.18 (probably in close support of the 24th Div.). Regiment was put into line near BRANCOURT 8.10.18. Shortly after the attack started, the whole regiment retreated in disorder.

Strength. Each battalion consists of three companies and a machine gun company. Company strength about 50 men. Prisoner on the 10th stated that the battalions of this regiment had been reduced to 3 cos., with a total battalion strength of about 100 men.

113th Inf. Regt. Prisoners state that they were relieved in the LAON sector on Oct. 2.
They left the area on the 6th. On the 7th, all bns. came into support near FRESNOY. They had orders to hold on at all costs.

There were 4 companies, and prisoners state ration strength was 150 all told.

On Sept. 28, a draft of 30 per company was received.

(3) 38th DIVISION:
Movements. 4 prisoners of the 96th Inf. Regt., 38th Div. captured near ELINCOURT state that this division was in reserve at ESNES on Oct. 6. The 96th Regt. was alarmed on the 6th and ordered to relieve the 37th Inf. Regt. (21st Div.). That regiment, however, side-slipped to the south, and its sector was taken over by the 96th.

Morale. The morale of men of the 96th Inf. Regt. appears to be somewhat above the average divisions on this front. However, its morale cannot be considered as better than fair.

(4) 204th DIVISION:
Movements. On October 5, the division left LORRAINE (where it had been at rest since the beginning of September). Division detrained at BERTRY Oct. 7. The same day, the 413th Regt. was alarmed and put into support at BUSIGNY.

Drafts. When the 54th Res. Div. was disbanded, all 3 regts. (246th, 247th, 248th) appear to have been sent to the 413th Regt., 204th Div. Strength of 1st Co., 413th Regt., 100 men.


414th Inf. Regt. (M. W. Co.)

Movements. Left LORRAINE 11 p.m., 6.10.18, via NAMUR to NEUVILLY, arriving 9 a.m., 8.10.18. 1st Bn. came with M. W. Co.

On 8th, marched to MARETZ, where received orders to retire to farm behind, but was too late to carry out owing to our barrage. Captured about 7 a.m.


Movements of II/120 Res. Inf. Regt. From LUPINGEN (LORRAINE) through NAMUR. Arrived NEUVILLY 4 a.m., 8.10.18.

Strength. 60/80 (?) and 5 L. M. G.'s.

Drafts. 18.9.18. 4 men to company from STUTTGART.

Morale. Moderate.

(5) 208th DIVISION:
25th Inf. Regt.

Movements. 28.9.18. Relieved in MOY sector by Saxons (241st Div.).

Sept. 28/29, rested BERTHENICOURT.

Sept. 29, marched to FONTAINE and lorried to BUSIGNY.

30th, marched to BERTRY and lorried to village behind CAMBRAI, where remained till 2.10.18. Lorried to ELINCOURT.

3.10.18, marched to SERAIN, but remained in sunken road behind village owing to shell fire and aeroplanes.

3d/4th, remained in SERAIN.

4th/7th, in USIGNY Ravine, near PONCHAUX, in support of 2d Guard Div.

Only 1 regt. of division in this sector. The other two north of CAMBRAI (in Bereitschaft?).

Strength. 30 men and 2 L. M. G.'s.

Drafts. 24.9.18. - 7 men to co. (54 in all to div.); 30.9.18, 4 men to company.

(6) 34th DIVISION:

Prisoners of the II/30th Inf. Regt. state they relieved a battalion of the 41st Inf. Regt. (221st Div.) Oct. 6.7. The 3d Bn. has been in line some days.

Prisoners I/67th Inf. Regt. state they are very weak, 4th Co. 2-21. Losses last days 50 per cent. 1st M. G. Co. 45 strong, with 6 M. G.'s.

Prisoners II/67 Inf. Regt. state co. strength average 60.

- 547 -
A number of prisoners of this regiment state the regiment has now been formed into a
composite battalion. They also state that they have heard that all recruit depots are
being moved into Belgium.
145th Inf. Regt. There are 4 cos. per bn. 6th Co. is 50 strong. No recent drafts
have been received.
The 2d Bn. came into line Oct. 2/3. Prisoners state 1st and 2d Bns. were in line S.
of 336th Inf. Regt., 84th Div.
(7) 24th DIVISION: Prisoners of II/179th Inf. Regt. state average co. strength
50-60. 2d M. G. Co. is 24 strong and had 6 M. G.'s.
Prisoners III/179 state they reinforced Oct. 5/6. They have 3 cos., each 70 strong.
Were relieved in St-BOBAIN sector by 32d Inf. Regt. 103d Div. State they saw men of 141st
Inf. Regt., 35th Div. in that area. One prisoner states he saw men of 51st and 38th Fus.
Regts., 11th Div. Prisoners of both regiments state 133d Inf. Regt. in close support.
133d Inf. Regt.: Prisoners of 3d M. G. Co. state they came into line Oct. 3/4, near
FONTAINE-UTERTE.
Co. strengths are estimated at 60. Believes there are now 4 cos. per bn. Prisoners
came with draft of 600 from recruit depot at GIVRY on Sept. 28. When they left there
were 1,000 men still in the depot, all of the 1920 class.
NOTES ON ARTILLERY
(1) 30th F. A. R., 29th Div.: A prisoner belonging to the 6th Battery states the
29th Div. left the LAON area on the 6th instant, after having been in line there 15 days.
On the 7th, the 142d was put into line and the 2d Abteilung, 30th Fld. Art. Regt.
The rest of the F. A. regiment and the 112th and 113th Inf. Regts. remained in close
reserve.
Prisoner was sent up to do F. O. O. work with a sergeant major of the battery morning
of the 9th inst. He then deserted.
Prisoner has no liking for Germany and only longs for peace, which he thinks must
come soon, as Germany is done for.
Strength: Prisoner states his battery is much below strength and that in the whole
regiment only two guns per battery are in action.
(2) 2d Gd. Fld. Art. Regt. (2d Gd. Div.):
3d Battery. 4 x 7.7-cm. guns.
Position was in SERAIN (E. exit) on Oct. 8. Fired at 5900/6100 meters range. Three
days in line. Prisoners captured noon 8th in cellar of house, near guns. Two guns in
working order---2 destroyed. Remainder of gunners fled. Officers all killed.
2d Gd. Fld. Art. Regt. has been 5 weeks in rest in NAMPCELLES-AUBENCHEUL area until
23.8.18. One prisoner had received a letter dated Sept. 29, from a friend in the artil-
leriy of the 3d Gd. Div. stating that the div. was in NAMPCELLES-AUBENCHEUL area and
were expecting to relieve 2d Gd. Div.
Losses on 8th inst. 3d Battery. 1st 3 Lieuts. and 3 gunners killed; 8 gunners
wounded; 8 gunners prisoners, out of a strength at battery position of 25 (ration strength
51 in all).
Prisoner thought the enemy had much artillery in line on the 8th, though probably
farther back than normal.
Horses. None kept at position. Only 2 horses per gun in all. This battery fired
200 rounds H. E., 300 rds. (106 fuze) and 100 rds. Blue Cross on 8th.
4th Btry. 2 x 7.7-cm. guns.
Night 7th/8th moved to SERAIN U.14.c.
Prisoner captured about 8 a. m. SERAIN, by tank.
Both guns in good condition.
Strength. 4th Battery---117 ration strength.
Morale. In this battery, very poor.
(4) BAVARIAN INF. GESCHUTZ BATTERY NO. 50:

Formation. This battery was formed about July 8. It is composed of men from various artillery units, among which are the following:

(a) Battery No. 897, which had been on the Russian front. The older men of this battery were taken out, younger men put in, and the battery, as such, disbanded. The new battery was then sent to the western front.

(b) 1st Res. Fld. Art. Regt. (1st Res. Div.).
(c) Gebirgs Abteilung, 2 and 4.
(d) 7th Fld. Art. Regt.
(e) 1st Ersatz Fld. Art. Regt.
(f) About 60 men from Bavarian cav. div., which was disbanded on eastern front.

Strength. Four Austrian 7.5-mountain guns, 130 men. Other units of same type. There are 51 of these infantry geschutz batteries that have been formed and equipped.

Movements. The battery was formed July 8 at IENAIN; remained there until about Sept. 17, then to near MAUBEUGE, where it was exercised and trained. It marched Sept. 25 to BUSIGNY, where it arrived Sept. 26. It entered line south of ESTRES, Sept. 27. The battery was in support of the 20th Div., and remained in position when that division was relieved about Oct. 5 by the 21st Div.

General. These batteries are placed in or near the front line as infantry support against tanks, machine guns and hostile infantry.

(5) Bav. 23d Fld. Art. Regt. (army reserve):

7th Battery. 4 x 7.7-cm. guns.
8th Battery. 4 x 7.7-cm. guns.

I and III Abteilung 7.7-cm. guns.
II Abteilung 10.5-cm. Hows.

Movements. Regiment was at rest for a month in AUDREGNIES area (east of VALENCIENNES). Came into line by 2 days' road march, arriving in line on the afternoon of the 8th (battery position on W. and E. outskirts of BUSIGNY).

Strength. 7th Battery - 100/120 ration.
Losses. Slight.
Drafts. 30 men to battery while at rest (from Ers. Abt. AUGSBURG and 2d and 3d MUNCHEN).

Morale. Fairly good.

SUNDRIES:

(1) Reported Disbanding of 21st RESERVE DIVISION: A prisoner of the 87th Inf. Regt., 21st Div., states that the 21st Res. Div. has been disbanded. The prisoner and about 100 other men of the 21st Res. Div. were sent to the 87th Inf. Regt. about the 15th instant.

(2) 24th Pion. Bn. (from French sources):

[Illegible] disposal of German G. H. Q.

It was engaged on pioneer work (trenches, wiring, etc., also bridge building) at DORMANS on the MARNE on July 15 for some time. After resting for one month (Aug. 5-Sept. 5) at DEVILLE (12 km. N. of CHARLEVILLE), the battalion was transported in two detachments from MOUZON in the ARDENNES to CAMBRAI, travelling via NAMUR---CHARLEBOI---MONS---VALENCIENNES, arriving on Sept. 7. On Sept. 25, it received orders to stop work on the HINDENBURG Line, and was sent up into reserve near LEVERGIES. Shortly after, it went into line and relieved elements of the 118th Res. Inf. Regt. (25th Res. Div.). On Sept. 28, it was relieved and after a few days' rest went up into line again and relieved elements of 272d Res. Inf. Regt. (82d Res. Div.) (see Fourth Army Summary No. 291 of Oct. 5).

Prisoners state that every German infantry battalion is now to have a pioneer co. attached to it as a combatant unit.

(3) 28th Pioneer Bn:

Composition. 2d Reserve Co., 4th Field Co., 1st Res. Co., Pioneer Co. 388. This
battalion when in the field is known as Field Pioneer Bn. 218. They were formed about a month ago to be used as infantry.

(4) 1st M. G. Co., 46th Res. Inf. Regt., 119th Div: Entered line October 4, 1918, with 230 men and 12 heavy machine guns. Strength on October 8, 1918, 20 men and 2 heavy M. G.’s. The company was completely routed and the above lesson inflicted by the attack of the cavalry and tanks on October 7, 1918.

SPECIAL EXAMINATION OF 3 OFFICERS OF 25th RES. INF. REGT., 208th DIVISION, AND 1 OFFICER OF 72d INF. REGT., 8th DIVISION

Captured at BUSIGNY:

25th Res. Inf. Regt. was detached from 208th Div. The C. O. offered to stop in line for our attack, which was expected on Oct. 8. The result was the 25th Res. Inf. Regt. was practically wiped out. The regiment was to have been relieved by the 413th Inf. Regt., 204th Div., which was fresh. The cos. of 25th Res. Inf. Regt. were about 70 strong. The 413th Inf. Regt. now probably holds position held by 25th Res. Inf. Regt. To the south of the 25th Res. Inf. Regt. there was a 1,000 meter sector held by men only. The 72d Inf. Regt. was only 150 strong and were ordered to retire 3 km. E. of Le CATEAU. Another regiment of the division had only 2 cos. each, 20 men strong. Officers think either there are no reserves on the front or that some surprise may be expected—possibly wounded men being retained in hospital when fit as a nucleus for fresh reserve formations. They know of no position in rear approaching the strength of the SIEGFRIED Line, and now this is broken do not see how they can hold us.

Fourth Army, I,

October 14, 1918.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B, II Corps: Letter

**British Fourth Army to Continue the Attack**

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

*October 14, 1918.*

Fourth Army No. 20/40 (G)

1. The Fourth Army will continue the attack on a date which has been communicated verbally to those concerned and at an hour which will be notified later. This attack will be in conjunction with an attack by the French First Army on the right.

2. Objectives and boundaries between corps and between Fourth Army and neighboring armies are shown on the attached map [not found].

3. The IX and XIII Corps will take over a portion of the American corps front on night October 14/15, as follows:
   - IX Corps as far north as W.14.c.0.2.
   - XIII Corps as far south as Q.28.d.0.0.

4. The infantry attack will be preceded by a bombardment of the enemy’s defenses commencing at 8:00 on X day and continuing until Zero.

5. (a) The 18-pdr. barrage will come down at Zero 200 yards in front of the infant start line.
The 4.5" howitzer barrage will come down 200 yards beyond the 18-pdr. barrage.

(b) Lifts will be 100 yards.
   The first lift will be at 0 plus 3.
   Lifts will be at 3 minute intervals throughout.
(c) The barrage will become protective 200 yards in front of the red dotted line
   for 30 minutes, during this period, the barrage will search east to a depth of 1,000 yards.
   The protective barrage in front of the red dotted line will move forward at Zero
   plus 132 minutes.
   Corps will arrange for the last few minutes of the protective barrage on the red
   dotted line to be marked in some way as a signal to the infantry that the barrage is
   about to move on.
(d) There will be a protective barrage on the red line as required by corps.

6. The advance from the red line will be made at Zero plus 363 minutes and will be
   covered by artillery specially detailed for the purpose.

7. (a) Tanks are allotted as follows:

   IX Corps 16th Tank Bn.
   6th Tank Bn. (Whippets)
   American II Corps American 301st Tank Bn.
   XIII Corps 1st Tank Bn.
   (b) 5th Brigade, R. A. F., will arrange direct with corps for covering the
   advance of the tanks to their starting line.

8. Red flares will be employed by all corps.

9. Watches will be synchronized by the General Staff, A. H. Q. with Corps Hq., 5th
   Brigade, R. A. F., and French First Army on the telephone at 12:00 and 18:00 on Y day.

10. Acknowledge by wire.

   R. M. LUCKOCK,
   Lt. Col.,
   for
   Major General,
   General Staff, Fourth Army.

Artillery Instructions for Attack

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

October 14, 1918.

Fourth Army No. 20/41 (G)

The following artillery instructions are forwarded in continuation of those issued
with Fourth Army No. 20/39 (G), dated 13-10-18.

1. PRELIMINARY BOMBARDMENT: A bombardment of the enemy’s defense system will
   commence at 8:00 on X day and be continued intermittently until Zero.
   Free use should be made of gas shells.
   Details of this bombardment as regards objectives and times will be arranged by corps.
   This bombardment will be combined with continuous strong harassing fire, more
   especially at night.
Wire cutting will be carried out as required by corps.

2. BARRAGE: During the barrage, heavy artillery not engaged in counterbattery work will engage localities selected by corps.

3. C. B. WORK AND HARASSING FIRE AFTER ZERO: From Zero hour on, counterbattery work and harassing of rear communications will be as vigorous as possible.

4. AMMUNITION:
   (a) In the barrage
   Shrapnel or H. E. with 106 fuses or a mixture of those two.
   (b) In the bombardment
   101 fuses without delay.
   (c) Harassing fire
   Shrapnel or H. E. with 106 fuses.

5. Acknowledge by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 27th Div.: Fldr. 1: Orders

Orders for 27th Division Attack

From: Aust. 4th A. A. (by D. R. L. S.)
Date: October 14, 1918
To: 27th Division

Confirming telephone message. 27th Div. will cross river at Q 34 c 35 95 and raid area between river and railway line in Q 34 a and c. Zero hour 16 h., 14th inst. Left group will support as follows: 1 brig. on start line Q 34 c 40--Q 28 c 00, remain for 3 mins, and lift 100 yards per 3 mins. for 6 lifts then remain for 20 mins. 2 additional batteries barrage Q 28 d 60--Q 28 c 19 from Zero to plus 28 mins. Right group will cooperate 2 batteries barrage X 4 a 7 1, Q 34 d 60 and 1 how. btry. bombard hedges and houses in lower half of W 4 d. Rate of fire 3 rds. per gun per min. during creeper, 1 round per gun and how. in flank barrage and during stand on final line. H. A. are cooperating on back area. Acknowledge.

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INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3, SERIES B

[Extract]

2. ARTILLERY:

(a) The bombardment will be spread over 48 hours previous to the attack and will
be accompanied by strong harassing fire. There will be no hurricane bombardment immediately preceding the assault. The barrage will come down at Zero on a line 200 yards in front of the infantry forming-up place.

On the intercorps boundary the starting point of the barrage will be Q.28.c.0.0.
The barrage will rest for 3 minutes on the initial line and will then advance by
lifts of 100 yards every 6 minutes to a point 200 yards in front of the red dotted line.

There will be a pause of half hour on this line when it will again advance by
lifts of 100 yards in 3 minutes to a point 200 yards in front of the red dotted line.

There will be a pause of 3 hours on the red line when the barrage will again
advance in lifts of 100 yards in 4 minutes until it arrives 200 yards beyond the second objective.
The 4.5" howitzer barrage will come down 200 yards beyond the 18-pounder barrage.
The heavy artillery not engaged in counterbattery work will engage selected
localities within safety limits.

(b) From Zero hour onwards, counterbattery work and harassing of communications
will be as vigorous as possible.

(c) During the pause on the Red line sufficient artillery will be moved forward
to ensure an adequate barrage to cover the infantry advance to second objective.

3. COOPERATION OF LEFT FLANK CORPS: V Corps will be asked to cooperate by neutralizing
the spurs in squares K.16 and 17 and the high ground in K.18 and by carrying out
active counterbattery work on the northern flank of the XIII Corps.

4. COOPERATION BY 35th SQUADRON, R. A. F.: The 35th Squadron, R. A. F., will
 cooperate as follows:

(a) Send out contact patrols at the following hours:

(i) At Zero plus 1 hour 36 minutes to call for flares on the Red Dotted Line.
(ii) At Zero plus 3 hours 10 minutes to call for flares on the Red Line.
(iii) At Zero plus 4 hours and 10 minutes to verify (ii) above.
(iv) At Zero plus 5 hours and 10 minutes to observe and report whether the
troops have started for the second objective.
(v) At Zero plus 7 hours to call for flares on the second objective.
(vi) At Zero plus 8 hours to verify (v) above.
(vii) At the latest time before dusk to obtain final dispositions at the end of the day.

(b) Have a counterattack patrol up continuously throughout the day. Should a
counterattack develop, this plane will drop white parachute lights immediately over the
counterattacking troops.
(c) Smoke with phosphorus bombs, the forward edges of the following features from which hostile observation over the attack could be obtained:

(i) High ground in squares L.19.c. and d. 
    L.25.a. 
    L.26.b. 

(ii) High ground in L.26.c. 
     L.32.a. and c. 

(iii) High ground in squares R.8 and 14. This smoke should be maintained during the whole advance up to the first objective and is especially important during the pause on the Red Dotted Line.

5. The 1st Battalion Tank Corps is placed at the disposal of the 50th Division, with a view to cooperating in the breaking down of the resistance in the area about the railway in squares Q.5. and 10., during the first phase and in the reduction of BAZUEL in the second phase.

The G. O. C., R. A., XIII Corps, will arrange direct with G. O. C., 50th Division and O. C. Tank Battalion, to place an adequate smoke barrage on Ridge Q.12, R.13., during the first phase and on high ground in R.14., R.20, during the second phase, in order to cover the advance of the tanks.

Acknowledge.

Brigadier General, 
General Staff.

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II Corps, AEF: War Diary

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 14, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

SERIES B, NO. 1

PRELIMINARY ORDER

1. The Fourth Army will continue the attack on a date which has been communicated verbally to those concerned, and at an hour to be notified later. This attack will be in conjunction with an attack by the French First Army on the right.

2. Objectives and boundaries between corps and divisions are shown on map attached.

3. The IX and XIII Corps will take over a portion of the American II Corps front on the night of Oct. 13/14, as follows:
   IX Corps as far south as W.14.D.5.0.
   XIII Corps as far north as Q.28.C.0.0.

4. The American II Corps will attack with two divisions in the line, the American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left. The American 30th Division will take over the right divisional sector of the corps area on the night of Oct. 15/16. Detailed arrangements of this operation will be made direct between C. G. 's, divisions concerned.

5. Artillery:
   (a) There will be no hurricane bombardment, but a general bombardment will be kept up throughout the night.
(b) The 18-pdr. barrage will come down at Zero on the Green Line 200 yards in front of the infantry start line. The 4.5" howitzer barrage will come down 200 yards beyond the 18-pdr. barrage. 
(c) Lifts will be 100 yards. 
The first lift will be at 0 plus 3.
Lifts will be at 3 minute intervals throughout.
(d) The barrage will become protective 200 yards in front of the Red Dotted Line for 30 minutes. During this period, the barrage will search east to a depth of 1,000 yards.
(e) There will be a protective barrage 200 yards in front of the Red Line for 30 minutes. The barrage will then search eastward for a period of 2 hours and 30 minutes. Divisions will pass reserve troops through during this period. The barrages will then cease and the further advance of the infantry and tanks will be covered by specially detailed brigades of mobile field artillery.
The advance from the Red Line will be made immediately thereafter.
Further detailed instructions for artillery will be issued separately.

6. (a) Tanks are allotted as follows: 
American II Corps
American 301st Tank Bn.
(b) 5th Brigade, R. A. F., will arrange direct with II Corps for covering the advance of the tanks to starting line.
7. Red flares will be employed by both divisions.
8. Acknowledge by wire.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General.

II Corps, AEF: War Diary

October 14, 1918

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

SERIES B, NO. 2

1. Herewith artillery instructions for the forthcoming operations.
2. Further instructions will be issued regarding the action of the artillery immediately previous to Zero and during day of attack.
3. Please acknowledge by wire.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

AMERICAN II CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS

1. During the period between now and Zero:
   (a) Vigorous counterbattery work will be carried out.
   (b) The bombardment by heavy howitzers of important localities will be commenced forthwith.
   (c) Normal harassing fire will be continued on the enemy's communications, approaches to villages and important crossroads.
The following roads or railways should be engaged in enfilade:
St-MARTIN---MAZINGHIEN.
St-SOUPLET---MAZINGHIEN.
Against roads only shrapnel or H. E. with instantaneous fuze is to be used.
(d) 6" guns will be sited well forward to deal with distant objectives, including:

(1) Canal crossings and approaches at CATILLON.
(2) Approaches to village of MAZINGHIEN.

2. Attention is again drawn to the necessity for the early issue of orders to subordinate formations. Once orders are issued, no alteration should be allowed subsequently unless absolutely necessary.

3. Orders for artillery action on the day of attack will be issued later.

4. (a) Corps is authorized to maintain ammunition per gun as stated below. At least 1/4 of this ammunition should be held in corps reserve.

   In addition, all echelons will be kept full.

   18-pdr. guns  400 rounds
   4.5" How.      400 "
   60-pdr. gun    300 "
   6" How.        300 "
   8" How.        200 "
   9.2" How.      200 "
   6" gun         200 "
   12" How.       100 "

   (b) As large a proportion as possible of 18-pdr. ammunition should be kept boxed.
   (c) The amount of ammunition per gun to be maintained in army reserve will be 100 rounds for all natures of guns.

182-33.3, No. 3: Artillery Instructions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 14, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS ARTILLERY INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2*

1. At Zero hour on Z day, which will be notified later, the Fourth Army is continuing the advance.

2. From now onwards to Zero hour:
   (a) FIELD ARTILLERY: Field artillery will put frequent concentration on all M. G. posts, trench mortar emplacements, strong points, localities where work is going on within their zone, and also keep them under harassing fire. Lanes will be cut through any wire which can be located. All observed movement will be engaged at once.
   (b) HEAVY ARTILLERY: B. G. H. A. will arrange to bombard strong points and defended localities shown on the map already forwarded. Bombardments will invariably commence with crashes embracing the locality.

* This order is in continuation of II Corps Series B, No. 2 and is issued by the R. A. attached to the II Corps.
C. R. A., American 27th Division, will detail a brigade of field artillery from each group to cooperate with the heavy artillery in these concentrations up to limit of range.

The B. G. H. A. will consult with G. O. C., American 27th Division, as to any other points he would wish specially treated during the preliminary bombardment.

If any wire is located by observation or air photographs beyond the effective range of field artillery, the B. G. H. A. will arrange for it to be cut with 6-inch How.

(c) HARASSING FIRE: Normal harassing fire will be continued on enemy's communications, approaches, villages, and important crossroads. The following roads should be engaged in enfilade fire, field and heavy guns being sited, if necessary, for the purpose:

St-MARTIN---MAZINGHIEN
St-SOUPLET---MAZINGHIEN,
and these should be kept under frequent fire.

On roads, only shrapnel or H. E. fuze 106 will be used.
Fire on roads should be put down on ladder system, which will be varied in application.

The ammunition to be expended by field artillery in harassing fire is 100 rounds per battery per day.

(d) 6-INCH GUNS: 6-inch guns will be sited well forward to deal with distant objectives, including:

Crossroads and approaches at CATILLON.
Approaches to MAZINGHIEN.

(c) COUNTERBATTERY WORK: Vigorous counterbattery work will be carried out under orders of C. B. S. O. Battery areas should be treated with gas by night when the weather is favorable.

3. TRENCH MORTARS: Such medium and heavy trench mortars will be brought into action as can be usefully employed in the preliminary bombardment and harassing fire.

4. The following amount of ammunition will be maintained at guns and in corps reserve respectively:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>At guns</th>
<th>In corps reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pdr.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5&quot; How.</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-pdr.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; How.</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; How.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.2' How.</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; gun</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12&quot; How.</td>
<td>Nil</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, all echelons will be kept full.

As large a proportion as possible of 18-pdr. ammunition will be kept boxed.

Ammunition at the guns at Zero hour will be notified later.

5. Further instructions will be issued shortly with regard to the action of the artillery immediately before Zero hour and during Z day.

6. Divisional artillery and heavy artillery to acknowledge.

E. W. GOYCE,
Major, G. S.,
R. A., American II Corps.

Issued to signals at 19:30
II Corps: 182-33.3, No. 3: Summary of Intelligence

No. 12

From 18 h., October 13 to 18 h., October 14, 1918

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS:
(a) Infantry: The day was generally quiet on the corps front. At 16 h., under cover of an artillery barrage, a small raid was carried out east of St-SOUPLET for the purpose of obtaining identifications.
(b) Artillery: Field artillery was engaged in harassing fire during the period on roads and known M.G. emplacements, the railway from St-BENIN to St-SOUPLET receiving special attention. A barrage was put down in afternoon to cover a minor infantry operation east of St-SOUPLET. The heavy artillery has put concentrations on suspected battery positions and has subjected those areas to harassing fire at frequent intervals. Crashes were put down on RIBEAUVILLE---MAZINGHIEN---CATILLON---ADVANTAGE Farm and neighborhood. Many calls from the air were received and answered.
(c) Patrols: Five patrols were sent out during the night covering approximately the entire front.
(d) Prisoners: 1 officer and 29 O. R. were captured on the corps front during the period.

II. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES:

204th D.  
east of St-SOUPLET  
1 Off.  
29 O. R.  
I, III, 414th I. R.  
Normal  
Reserves. (From Fourth Army Summary, October 14, 1918)
(a) No further fresh divisions from reserves were identified yesterday on this army front.
(b) The presence of Hungarian troops opposite the army on our right, on the OISE, N. of MONT-d'ORIGNY, was indicated by the German wireless last night.
(c) 2d Div., withdrawn from the JONCOURT sector at the beginning of the month, after losing in all over 1,500 prisoners, has now been engaged against the French at THENELLES, S. of MONT-d'ORIGNY, while the 232d Div. has apparently now been brought into line again, farther south, in the SERY---HAMEGICOURT---ACHERY sector.
(d) The reported arrival of the 93d Div. in the VIRTON area from the RUSSIAN front, raises the total number of enemy divisions in the western theater to 194, of which 182 are German infantry divisions.
Excluding 27 divisions withdrawn after suffering severe casualties during the past two weeks and 5 Austro-Hungarian Divs., there are 14 enemy divisions in reserve in the western theater, of which 5 are fresh.

III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: The enemy's artillery was again active throughout the day, during the night, ESCAUFORT was submitted to a severe gas bombardment of Blue Cross shells. St-SOUPLET area was constantly shelled with H. E. and some gas. PROYARD Wood and BUSIGNY and neighborhood also received considerable attention. Enemy retaliation to operations this afternoon was at first feeble; but later increased in intensity, St-SOUPLET being severely shelled.

IV. ENEMY'S DEFENSES: Defenses which have been reported are shown on the accompanying map. Bad weather has prevented verification by photographs; consequently, locations can be considered as only approximate.

V. CONDITION OF La SELLE RIVER:
(See also annex to Corps Summary No. 8.)
Railway bridge at Q 15 b 31 has been demolished and has dammed up the river, causing a lagoon about 150 yards long and 100 yards wide to form north of the railway. Water is now running through a small passage. There is also a very small lagoon where the river crosses the road at Q22 a 03.

No obstacles have been discovered in the river, which appears to be only about 6 ft. wide south of Q 34 c.

Patrols sent out during the night report that the river is a serious obstacle north of St-SOUPLET.

VI. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: The corps on our right reports many indications that the enemy opposite our front is about to retire.

(From Fourth Army Summary.) Prisoners taken by the First Army stated that the line is about to be withdrawn in successive stages to a line immediately west of VALENCIENNES. The withdrawal of guns near ARLEUX began on the 11th inst.

From the above, it will be seen that the enemy apparently intends to straighten out his line from N. of Le CATEAU towards VALENCIENNES, at an early date.

PRISONERS' STATEMENTS

204th D.

Examination of prisoners captured east of St-SOUPLET in raid at 16 h., 14-10-18.
Prisoners examined, 18 out of 30. No officers examined. 17 are from the 3d Bn. of 414th Inf. Regt.; 1 is from 1st Bn. Order of battle, north to south:

413th Inf. Regt.
414th Inf. Regt., 3d Bn., 9th Co.
12th Co. (N. of bridge E. of St-SOUPLET)
3d Bn. (Not certain)
1st Bn. (about to relieve 3d Bn.).

Prisoners believe that 2 cos. per bn. are in support. 3d Co. is now relieving 12th Co.

120th Res. Inf. Regt. seems to be divisional reserve.
Strength---about 50 men per co.
Morale---low.

Enemy Defenses and Intentions---prisoners believed that their main line of defense is the railway east of St-SOUPLET which has been worked on only since the division has been in line (8 days). They have orders to hold this position; but prisoners think that this will be difficult because of lack of artillery. They, therefore, consider a withdrawal certain. Where and when, they do not know.

* * * * *

KERR T. RIGGS,

II Corps, AEF: Intelligence Summary

October 14, 1918.

No. 5 AERIAL ANNEX

Reports from dawn to 18 h.

WEATHER: Fine, but visibility poor throughout the day, due to slight ground mist.
OPERATIONS: 3 contact, 5 artillery, 4 counterattack patrols, and 3 photographic and
1 special reconnaissance were successfully carried out. Our artillery patrols located 6 hostile battery positions, one of which was silenced by shooting observed from the plane. The special reconnaissance reported that enemy trench system reported by army air service in II Corps Summary No. 9, Paragraph 4, is not a series of organized defenses, but shell holes (unfortified), the result of our artillery barrage. Another patrol reported that La SELLE River has been dammed at Q 4 c 44, resulting in a flooded area about 200 yards wide and 200 yards long south as far as Q 9 b 88. Also dammed where railway crosses river and bridge was blown up at Q 15 b 31. Water is now running over top of debris. The river is also dammed at Q21 b 92, at road. Also flooded, causing a shallow marsh about 50 yards wide between Q 28 a 39, Q 28 a 78 and Q 28 a 33. The river is slightly wider (about 20 yards) at Weaving Mill, from W 4 a 95 to W 4 b 14 to W 4 a 09.

E. A.: Many scout formations observed over the line, and several combats reported.
A. A.: Normal. Hostile machine-gun fire encountered from trenches W. of MOLAIN and E. of VAUX-ANDIGNY.

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: Many explosions and several fires reported, resulting from our artillery fire.

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227-32.1: Order

Front of Division Reduced

FIELD ORDER
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 61
October 14, 1918.

1. The front to be held by this division will be reduced to the sector between W 14, d.5.0. on the south and Q 28 c 0.0. on the north.
2. The 54th Infantry Brigade will be relieved in the remainder of the present division sector on the night of October 14/15, as follows:
   By the British 6th Division on the south,
   By the British 50th Division on the north, as arranged.
3. Completion of relief will be reported to these headquarters.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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230-32.15: Memorandum

Tactical Instructions

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 14, 1918.

The following extracts from a report of a brigade commander in our First Army, are published for the information of this command. Commanding officers of all grades will find many valuable points worthy of careful study in this report.

- 560 -
1. ASSEMBLY AREAS: The assembly areas for each battalion had about a kilometer frontage and a half kilometer in depth, enabling all units to be in trenches or protected places immediately before H hour, thus being protected in case of counter-preparation fire by the enemy. At H hour, minus 15 minutes, the support battalion of each regiment was required to close up on first battalion; the third battalion remaining in place.

This was done in order that first and second battalions would, as soon as possible, reach the shelter of German front lines, where second battalion would remain until the lead battalion had obtained their distance. The third battalion, or reserve battalion, of each regiment was to follow when first battalion had obtained its distance from second battalion, officers being cautioned to observe shelled areas so third battalion could pick their way through the enemy's barrage with small as possible loss.

2. INITIAL DISPOSITIONS: Regiments were formed abreast, one battalion in front line, one battalion in support, one battalion in reserve; one company from each of reserve battalions was taken as brigade reserve following the brigade commander at about 200 meters. Companies in first line were formed with two platoons in first wave, followed by two platoons at about 100 meters. This was done to avoid crowding in either interval or depth so as to avoid loss by machine-gun fire.

By means of this formation platoons at the tail of companies could be sent around machine-gun nests when leading platoons were held up, and, when the sector became too wide to be covered by one battalion in the lead, the second battalion was easily thrown in to extend the line to cover the frontage, leaving the third battalion in support.

3. FIRE ACTION: Rifle fire was used to its utmost; the men had been taught to fire as they advanced, stopping momentarily to fire while the line advanced continuously. This was found to be of great use.

Automatic rifles were kept well to the front, small groups with automatic rifles penetrated between machine-gun nests taking them from the flank or rear. Rifle grenades were effectively used to break up machine-gun nests.

A machine gun company was attached to each battalion as a fifth company of that battalion. Overhead fire by machine guns was used to cover the infantry advance whenever the terrain permitted. Machine guns were in several cases effectively used against machine-gun nests and in at least one case brought effective fire on an enemy battery which was using direct fire against our troops.

After the final objective was taken, machine guns were distributed in depth to cover the organized position of the command, position being organized in three lines.

Four Stokes mortars and two 37-mm. guns were assigned to each leading battalion and two Stokes mortars and one 37-mm. gun to each second battalion. When the second battalion passed through the lead battalion, it took its Stokes mortars and 37-mm. guns with it and two Stokes mortars and one 37-mm. gun from the lead battalion was immediately attached to the battalion passing through; thus at all times each lead battalion had with it four Stokes mortars and two 37-mm. guns and the support battalion two Stokes mortars and one 37 mm. Stokes mortars on several occasions reduced machine-gun nests and the 37-mm. guns also brought fire not only on machine-gun nests, but at least in one case, killed horses of enemy artillery attempting to get away.

4. PASSAGE OF OBSTACLES: In order to cut the wire, four engineer soldiers, three with heavy wire cutters and one with an ax, followed each half platoon of the lead battalion, in addition, seven hundred heavy wire cutters were issued to each regiment and men were detailed to carry same and practiced beforehand in cutting wire with them. When wire was encountered, which had to be cut, the wire cutters would be covered by fire of our advanced troops while they cut the wire. The troops then passed through, the wire cutting details following in the rear.

A body of woods was not passed through by large numbers of troops, but in accordance with instructions, the troops circled the woods keeping in the edge for protection and sent patrols into the woods, and having passed the wood, moppers-up were sent back to take machine-gun nests in the rear.
In order to cross a river orders were given to occupy the ridges overlooking the river in order therefrom to cover by rifle, machine-gun, trench mortar, 37-mm. gun, and rifle grenade fire the crossing of the stream.

5. MOPPING-UP TRENCHES: Instructions were given that while portions of the command must follow and keep up the barrage, columns should be driven through the lines and mopping-up columns then mop to right and left after the trenches had been pierced, thus avoiding machine-gun fire expected from the trenches.

6. THE ATTACK ON MACHINE-GUN NESTS, STRONG POINTS, CENTERS OF RESISTANCE AND HOW BEST ACCOMPLISHED: Machine-gun nests, strong points and centers of resistance were held by fire from the front from very thin lines while Lewis gun sections, rifle grenadiers and, in some cases, trench mortars were pushed to the flank and attacked these points from the flank and rear. It is believed that this is the most practical method to reduce such points with a minimum of loss.

7. ORGANIZATION OF CONQUERED GROUND: Under the cover of small outposts, consolidation was begun as soon as final objective had been obtained. On account of the exhaustion of the troops not a very great amount of actual digging was done by this brigade, the men consolidating shell holes and digging small sections of trench which would hold a Lewis gun section of three or four men. Where one battalion was in the front line, one in support and one in reserve, the first battalion organized the advance line of defense, the second battalion the support line and the third battalion the reserve. Machine guns were placed to cover the front and flank of all three lines, and were distributed in depth so that it was difficult for the enemy artillery to materially injure them. The value of occupying old German trenches is problematical as the range might be so well determined that the enemy's trench mortars, artillery and machine guns would soon render the position untenable. It might be found that the exact position of the line designated as the final objective is not the best for final consolidation and that the line may have to be pushed materially forward in order to select the most suitable ground for defense.

8. LIAISON: Telephones and runners were found to be the most reliable means of communication. It is believed that the position of brigade and regimental headquarters could be readily found at all times if brigade and regimental orders specified in advance the probable location of such headquarters which should be in all cases as near as practicable to the axis of liaison and always near a good observation post. In this case, it was announced that the brigade headquarters would always be found near the reserve battalions of the regiments. When officers are sent as liaison officers to brigades on the right and left, they should be supplied with a copy of the brigade order. This applies also to regimental liaison agents.

Liaison officers sent from the division or brigade to divisions or brigades on either flank should take with them the order of the division or the brigade to which they belong. This will enable much more effective liaison to be maintained with flank organizations.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM ORDERS:

In accordance with orders received from G. H. Q., A. E. F., one major and one captain will be sent to army candidates' school to command respectively a battalion and a company of candidates. Both of these officers must have had service at the front and must be a graduate of a corps school or one of the army schools at LANGRES. Each brigade will submit by noon today, October 14, the names of two officers qualified as described above. From these four names submitted one officer will be selected from each brigade for this detail.

By command of Major General Lewis:

J. K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.

Hq. 60th Inf. Brigade, A. E. F., October 14, 1918 - To C. G., 30th Division Returned.

1. Major W. A. Graham, 120th Infantry, is the only major in this brigade who is eligible or competent to perform the duties above outlined. He is also the only major on duty with this regiment. It would be almost suicidal to send him away at this time.

2. Captain John J. Conway, 119th Infantry and Captain A. G. Poorman, 120th Infantry, are eligible and competent for this detail and are recommended, provided it can be arranged not to detail Major Graham.

3. I cannot bring too strongly to the attention of the division commander the grave situation developed not only in this brigade, but throughout the division, by the constant drains being made upon it for officers and N. C. O.'s personnel to be sent to school. The fighting power of the division has been most seriously reduced by this policy which has now reached a positively dangerous point and something should be done to lay the matter before the proper authorities before it is too late.

S. L. FAISON,
Brig. Gen., U. S. A.,
Commanding.
FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 14, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The American II Corps carried out a successful raid between St-SOUPLET and St-BENIN, and captured 1 officer and 29 O. R.

There was a general increase in the enemy's artillery activity. Intermittent concentrations of H. E. and gas shells were directed against valleys and battery areas in the forward zone.

Our artillery maintained harassing fire on the enemy's communications by day and night.

2. IX CORPS: No infantry operations took place. The batteries in the BECQUIGNY area were shelled intermittently with H. E. guns and gas, and FRESNOY Station received considerable attention from H. V. guns.

AMERICAN II CORPS: The American 27th Division carried out a small raid against the enemy's defenses north of St-SOUPLET. The La SELLE was crossed for the first time by troops of the Fourth Army and 1 officer and 29 men were secured. Our casualties were two O. R.

XIII CORPS: During the night, the REUMONT-MAUROIS Road and the TROISVILLES area were harassed with H. E. and a few Yellow Cross gas shell. H. V. guns were active against BERTRY and the MARETZ-MAUROIS Road.

3. THIRD ARMY: No material change in the general situation.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: Operations were continued by the French in the vicinity of MONT d'ORIGNY with varying success. MONCEAU-les-LEUPS was captured after a hard struggle.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 657 hours were flown by 290 pilots. 13 successful reconnaissances and 14 artillery patrols were carried out. During the latter four zone calls were sent down, but without success. One of our machines is missing. Rain and mist handicapped flying. 154 offensive patrols were maintained and three indecisive combats took place.

   By day, 77 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various ground targets. There was no night flying.

   (b) Hostile: Enemy activity was still very slight.

   * * * * * * *

7. WEATHER: Fine, mist developing.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: Nil.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d, and 46th Divisions.
   American II Corps: American 27th and 30th* Divisions.
   XIII Corps: 18th, 25th*, 50th, 66th Divisions.
   Australian Corps: Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Divs. (army reserve).
   Cavalry Corps: 1st Cavalry Div. (G. H. Q. reserve), 5th Cavalry Brigade (army reserve).

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* corps reserve
AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

13-pdr. R H. A. H. E.  47
   " S.  79
18-pdr. H. E.  4,214
   " S.  4,789
   " Smoke  72
4.5" How. H. E.  2,284
60-pdr. H. E.  1,993
   " S.  2,845
6" H. E.  2,995
   " S. K.  111
6" Mk. VII H. E.  714
   " S.  249
8" How. H. E.  146
9.2" How. H. E.  84

11. GENERAL: Advanced echelon of army headquarters accommodated on a railway train, moved to MONTIGNY Farm, K.35.b.8.2. (62C), opening at the latter place at 17 h.

182-33.3, No. 3: Operations Report

G-3

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 14, 1918

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The enemy holds the ground east of La SELLE River in force.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Air report states that in area between BAZUEL and railway no trace of work or wires can be seen, except disconnected series of pits which could be quickly connected to form trench. Immediately west of railway from Faubourg-de-FRANCE to FASSIAUX continuous line of trench is reported occupied and work proceeding. Considerable machine-gun fire was reported from north of Le CATEAU-BAZUEL Road. Enemy parties were seen along north side of railway from FASSIAUX northward.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: Considerable shelling was reported 23 h., October 13, on back areas of our sector. Also constant sniping opposite St-SOUPLET and along railway. At 19 h., October 13, the headquarters of the 27th Division at BUSIGNY were shelled, and at 1:45, October 14, enemy put in crash of about 25 high velocity shells in BUSIGNY, striking in vicinity of 27th Division Headquarters. At 15 h., small enemy raid on our front was repulsed without loss to us.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Normal. Enemy artillery was reported fairly active.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The 102d Engineers have reported at BUSIGNY to Commanding General, 54th Brigade. Otherwise nothing to report.
7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: At 12:20 h., the IX Corps operating on our right reported much new trench work completed on western, northern and southern outskirts of VAUX-ANDIGNY. The situation on both our right and left was normal and unchanged.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None received.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: Quiet day.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: As a result of the shelling of headquarters of the 27th Division, mentioned in paragraph three, above, one officer and five enlisted men were wounded.

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F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3,
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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30th Div., AEF: War Diary

October 14, 1918.

[Extract]

All troops of the division resting in PREMONT---BRANCOURT---MONTBREHAIN areas. Warning order issued for the 59th Brigade to take over the II Corps right divisional sector night 15/16; 60th Brigade to be divisional reserve.

Available for all duty ) Officers 532
) Men 15,246

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C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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Battle of the Selle River

On October 15 and 16, the 30th Division moves into the line between the 27th Division and the British IX Corps. On October 17, the II Corps with divisions abreast attacks and crosses the SELLE River.

182-32.2: Location List

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918—0600.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 25

II Corps Headquarters (Adv.)
II Corps Headquarters (rear)
412th Telegraph Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
(Att. to 13th Wing
3d Bde. R. A. F.)

WIANCOURT
N. 15. d. cent. (62C)

MONTBREHAIN
HAMEL
Near SAULTY
BAIZIEUX

BRITISH UNITS
WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hdqrs. VII Corps R. A.
Hdqrs. Aust. IV D. A.
Hdqrs. 6th Army Bde. A. F. A.
[Comdg. Right Group]

Right Group
6th Army Bde. A. F. A.
10th Bde. A. F. A.
11th Bde. A. F. A.

Hdqrs. Aust. 2d D. A.
[Comdg. Left Group]

Left Group
5th A. F. A. Bde.
4th A. F. A. Bde.
12th A. F. A. Bde.

VIANCOURT
C.6.d.5.0. (62B)
V.11.d.5.6.

V.9.c.25.80 (57B)
Hdqurs. Aust. 5th D. A.

7th A. F. A. Bde.
8th A. F. A. Bde.
13th A. F. A. Bde.
14th A. F. A. Bde.

Hdqurs. Aust. 3d D. A.

Hdqurs. VII Corps H. A.

Hdqurs. C. R. E. Aust. Corps
Hdqurs. 4th Tank Bde.
3d Squadron A. F. C.
15th Wing, R. A. F.
5th Balloon Wing
Cavalry Corps
20th Regt. Hussars

AMERICAN UNITS

27th Division
Division Hdqrs. (Adv.)
Division Hdqrs. (Rear)

53d Infantry Bde. Hq.
54th Infantry Bde. Hq.

30th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (Rear)

59th Infantry Bde. Hq.
60th Infantry Bde. Hq.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Col., Asst. Chief of Staff,
G. S., G-3.

- 568 -
1. SITUATION OCTOBER 14 and NIGHT 14/15 INST.

The situation yesterday remained unchanged.
The forward areas were lightly shelled. A patrol of an officer and 20 O. R. belonging to the American II Corps crossed the SELLE River in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET during the afternoon and captured one officer and 29 men belonging to the 204th Div. (normal). In this portion of the line there appeared to be no Germans west of the SELLE River.

From reports received by a special reconnaissance there were indications that the enemy might be contemplating a withdrawal in the WASSIGNY sector. Active patrolling was therefore carried out during the night, but touch was maintained with the enemy along the whole front. Four men belonging to the 81st Res. Div. (normal) were captured near RETHEUIL Farm. During the night, back areas of the center corps were heavily shelled.

2. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS:

(a) Four prisoners belonging to the 81st Res. Div. who were captured north of RETHEUIL Farm last night state that MENNEVRET is evacuated, they anticipate an attack, and that an early withdrawal is expected elsewhere. They have no knowledge, however, of the intentions of the Germans in their sector.

(b) A special reconnaissance over the WASSIGNY---ETREUX---HANNAPPS---MENNEVRET area yesterday afternoon reported that the stone bridge at ETREUX (A.10) was blown up yesterday afternoon; that a mine went up in MENNEVRET (confirms prisoner's statement that MENNEVRET is being cleared); that there was a noticeable lack of M. G. and A. A. fire in the WASSIGNY area; that field batteries were emplaced near roads; and that much transport was seen going east from WASSIGNY.

(c) A large number of footbridges over the OISE Canal east and north of OISY have been constructed during the last few days.

To sum up: The above indicates that preparations are being made by the Germans to withdraw, and it is possible that they will retire across the OISE if attacked in strength. This, however, requires further confirmation.

3. RESERVES:

(a) No further fresh divisions have been identified on this army front. Prisoners of 267th Res. Inf. Regt., 81st Res. Div., state they relieved the 48th Res. Inf. Regt., 29th Div., about the 10th, and that units of the 5th Res. Div. are on their right. This would indicate that the 29th Div. has been withdrawn to reserve after a tour of only 3 days in line opposite the Fourth Army. Previous to this they were in line S. of LAON for a considerable period.

(b) The army on our right have identified the 82d Res. Div. E. of BERNOT. This division, after a short rest, has returned to the line to reinforce. It was thought to have been withdrawn about the 10th. This makes its third engagement. This division lost over 350 prisoners against this army in August.
4. ENEMY ACTIVITY:

(a) Aircraft. Hostile activity was rather below normal, taking into consideration that the day was fine and visibility better after several bad flying days. Activity was evenly distributed over the whole front. During the morning several high-flying machines reconnoitered the forward areas and penetrated as far as the line RONSSOY--CHAULNES--MONCHY-LAGACHE.

(b) Movement. Observation yesterday was intermittent and visibility fair. Movement of at least ten trains was reported between 6:30 and 7:30 a.m. in a S. W. direction between CHARLEROI and AULNOYE, with abnormal activity in the latter station. During the afternoon, westerly movement was also seen along the La CAPELLE--ETREUX--WASSIGNY Line. This movement may be connected with the bringing up of reinforcements, or, as seems more likely, with the fetching away of material from forward areas. With the exception of a good deal of M. T. traffic on roads in the MAZINGHIEN and OISY areas, no road movement of importance was observed. The only troop movement seen was 150 infantry going south between BAZUEL and MAZINGHIEN at 7:30 a.m.

Night flying abandoned.

Dawn Reconnaissance. (today) Corps squadron reconnaissance reports a considerable amount of rolling stock at 6:45 a.m. in LANDRECIES station (shown empty on yesterday's photographs).

(c) Artillery. Hostile artillery showed greater activity. Concentrations of both H. E. and gas were put down on our battery areas near BECQUIGNY.

St-SOUPLET was constantly shelled yesterday with both H. E. and gas, but the reply to our operations during the afternoon was weak. It increased in intensity later in the afternoon.

Field batteries were employed on sniping movement in the northern corps area.

5. 1921 CLASS:

Prisoner of a draft intended for the 25th Res. Jaeger Bn. (7th Jaeger Regt., 197th Div.), captured in Le CATEAU on the 10th/11th instant by our northern corps, states that the 1921 Class was called up in the middle of August in the XII and XIX Army Corps districts.

This, however, would require further confirmation, as the Saxon units, generally speaking, have not suffered heavy casualties recently, and they are therefore probably in a better position as regards manpower than the other German states.

6. DEMOLITIONS:

The bridge in Le CATEAU over the main road running east - west is reported to have been destroyed.

A large explosion took place in Le CATEAU at K.35.c.20.20 yesterday afternoon.

Large fires were reported in SOLESMES sidings, PETIT-VERLY, S. of Le CATEAU, and in GUISE.

7. MINES:

The brick railway bridge in Q.34.d. has been mined (French civilians).

A prisoner states that the railway, where it crosses the road at R.1.c.90.30, has been prepared for demolition.

Mines are stated by French civilians to have been placed under the bridges Q.4.a.90.40 (now destroyed), K.25.c., K.23.d.


(a) Aerodromes: New aerodromes at FLAUMONT (E. of AVESNES) and west of La CAPELLE.
Aerodromes abandoned at ARROUAISE Farm, TUPIGNY, and La MOTTE Farm and, though a few sheds remain, GUISE north, GUISE northeast, ESTREUX, and LESQUIELLES appear inactive. Increase at BACHY, S. W. of TOURNAI.

(b) Stations and Dumps: WASSIGNY Station empty and line damaged. Rolling stock for 9 trains in ETREUX, 4 in BOUE, 6 at AVESNES, 12 in stations and sidings at MAUBEUGE, 6 at BUIRONSOSSE, 12 at La CAPELLE, 8 at Le QUESNOY. LANDRECIES nearly empty. Still much material at BOUE.

(c) Hospitals: New hospitals at BERLAIMONT, REJET-de-BEAULIEU, JOLIMETZ, MORMAL Wood S.24.d., BACHY, MAUBEUGE and AVESNES.

(d) Activity: OISE Canal clear of barges from ETREUX to CATILLON. Much barge traffic near AULNOYE and HAUTMONT.

(e) Bridges: Road and railway bridges at ETREUX not blown up at 10 a. m.
Over a dozen footbridges, new since Oct. 9 over OISE Canal near OISY and REJET.

Those examined covering a large area (LE CATEAU---LANDRECIES---LE QUESNOY---MAUBEUGE), show very little sign of any new continuous trench or defense line or of the work recently reported near MAUBEUGE.

Photographs do not confirm the trenches recently reported between St-SOUPLET and BAZUEL or the support line reported from E. of MOLAIN to W. of MENNEVRET behind the VAUX-ANDIGNY Line. The front line along the LE CATEAU---St-SOUPLET Railway is confirmed, and a line of shell holes in pairs behind this at Q.10.d., Q.16.b.

GENERAL: The situation remains unchanged. According to prisoners MENNEVRET is being evacuated. There are indications that a further withdrawal across the OISE is contemplated by the enemy in the near future, but confirmation of this required.

J. F. SANDON,
Capt.,
for
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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227-32.1: Order

**Advance to be Resumed**

ORDER

AUSTRALIAN FOURTH DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY,
October 15, 1918.

No. 211

Reference Maps (57 B, S. E., 57 A, N. W., 1/20,000.
(57 A and B, 1/40,000.

[Extract]

1. INFORMATION:

At a time and date to be notified, the advance will be resumed by the American II Corps with the American 30th Div. on the right and the American 27th Division on the left. The advance will be made in conjunction with the British IX Corps on the right and the British 50th Division, XIII Corps, on the left.

* * * * *
2. INTENTION:
   (a) The 1st phase of the advance by the American 27th Division will be covered by a
   creeping barrage, supported by the field artillery brigade, under the command of the
   C. R. A., Aust. 4th Division. 

   H. J. CRANFFORD,
   Major, Brigade Major,

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**American II Corps Will Attack**

Appendix No. 229

ORDER No. 145

[Extract]

1. The IX Corps will attack in conjunction with the rest of the Fourth Army at a
date which has been given out verbally. American II Corps will be on left of IX Corps.
The French XV Corps on right of IX Corps is attacking on the same day.

A. R. CAMERON,
Brigadier General,
General Staff, IX Corps.

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182-32.7: Order

**Operations II Corps**

No. G. 364/305/453.

To all recipients of IX Corps Order No. 145, dated 15-10-18.
Reference IX Corps Order No. 145, dated October 15, 1918.

1. The hour of Zero for the forthcoming operations by IX Corps will be 0520 on
   October 17, 1918.
2. ACKNOWLEDGE.

Brigadier General,
General Staff, IX Corps.

October 16, 1918.

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Operations II Corps

1st DIVISION BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES D

No. 1

[Extract]

In conformation and continuation of verbal instructions issued to all concerned at conference on October 14, 1918:

1. IX Corps is attacking on a date Z which has been given out verbally. American II Corps and French XV Corps will be attacking on left and right respectively.

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Operations II Corps

October 15, 1918.

Ref.: Sheets 57 B, S. E. and 62 B, N. E.

6th M. G. BATTALION ORDER NO. 92

[Extract]

1. The British 6th Division with the American 30th Division on its left and British 46th Division on its right, will attack on October 17 at a time to be notified later.

* * * * *

J. W. BRIGGS,
Captain and Adjutant,
No. 6 Battalion, M. G. Corps.

Issued at 23 h.

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From 18:00, 14 October to 18:00, October 15, 1918

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry. The situation on the corps front has been quiet.
   (b) Artillery. Field artillery - M. G. emplacements have been engaged and direct hits obtained. Hostile battery in Q. 18.c.45 has been silenced. Harassing fire has been kept up as usual and movement during the day has been actively engaged.
   Heavy artillery - During the night, harassing fire has been placed on back areas. Today, strong points, centers of activity, and entrances to villages have been bombarded with crashes and harassed at intervals.
   Bad weather has hindered observation from the rear, but several concentrations on positions previously located have been carried out.
   (c) Patrols. Reconnaissance patrols were sent out on the corps front to obtain information concerning La SELLE River north of St-SOUPLET.
   (d) Prisoners. 22 O. R. passed through the corps cage during the period (captured previously).

II. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES:
   No new identifications were obtained during the period.

III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
   The early part of the night was quiet, except for shelling St-SOUPLET, ESCAUFOURT, and Le VERT-DONJON by long-range guns. At 02:15, heavy gas bombardment was opened on ESCAUFOURT. This fire ceased at 05:00, but continued spasmodically on road in Q.31.d.
   This afternoon, area shoot was placed on the high ground at IMBERFAY Farm; other places shelled during the period include BUSIGNY, V.10.d. (21 cm. h.), X.1.d., I'HERMITAGE, crossroads in W.2, St-SOUPLET and vicinity, and VAUX-ANDIGNY.

IV. ENEMY'S DEFENSES:
   (From Fourth Army Summary.) Photographs examined covering a large area (Le CATEAU---LANDRECIES---Le QUESNOY---MAUBEUGE) show very little sign of any new continuous trench or defense line or of the work recently reported near MAUBEUGE.
   Photographs do not confirm the trenches recently reported between St-SOUPLET and BAZUEL or the support line reported from E. of MOLAIN to W. of MENNEVRET behind the VAUX-ANDIGNY Line. The front line along the Le CATEAU---St-SOUPLET railway is confirmed, and a line of shellholes in pairs behind this at Q.10.d., Q.16.b.

V. FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING La SELLE RIVER:
   Infantry patrols report that from Q.23.d.33 to Q.34.a.30, banks average 5 to 6 feet and are steeper on the east side of the river than on the west. The stream is from 10 to 20 feet wide and from 3 to 4 feet deep. The body of the stream near the edge is soft mud, in the center of the stream gravel. From the river to the railroad there is a gradual slope.

VI. PRISONER'S STATEMENTS:
   Movements: The 414th Inf. Regt. left BADEN HOFEN-LORRAINE, 5/10/18, detrained at SOLESMES 8/10/18, travelling via lorry to St-SOUPLET, where they entered line 9/16/18.
Rest Billets: The reserve battalion is quartered at La BOURGIES (Stc) (Q.36.d.).

Effects of our artillery fire: 3d Coy., 414th Inf. Regt., had 2 men killed and 7 severely wounded by our shelling of Q.36d on the nights of 12-13-10/18. The first battalion was at the time in reserve.

Relief Route: In moving troops into position, the St-SOUPLET Road is always avoided and crossfield route taken.

* * * * *

KERR T. RIGGS,

NO. 6 AERIAL ANNEX, AMERICAN II CORPS, INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Reports from dawn to 18:00

October 15, 1918.

WEATHER: Fair during morning. Visibility poor. No flying in afternoon due to low clouds and mist.

OPERATIONS: 1 contact plane, 1 counterattack, 2 artillery, and 1 special reconnaissance patrols were successfully carried out. Report of special reconnaissance carried out by two of our machines from 0625 to 0735, height 2000 feet, route followed: Le CATEAU---FOREST---BOUSIES---FONTAINE---LANDRECIES---CATILLON---MAZINGHIEN---St-SOUPLET. Movement: Transport: 0645, 4 limbers N. W. on BAZUEL-CATILLON Road in R16. 0645, 6 limbers S. E. same place. Train movement: LANDRECIES: Rolling stock for about 20 trains, about 600 for 3 trains in yard. Bridges: Following were intact and appeared to be in good condition: LANDRECIES (G25a), ORS (R6a), CATILLON (M19b). S9c also appears intact.

Roads: Roads in vicinity of BOUSIES---FONTAINE---LANDRECIES (particularly noted to be in good condition, not blown up). Remainder of road apparently in good condition. The Bois l'EVEQUE is felled, but considerable undergrowth can be seen. Canal appears full of water, but no barges were seen. Balloons: Balloons on the ground at L17c. (57E), and R6a. E. A.: None seen. A. A.: Unusually active over ORS---CATILLON---MAZINGHIEN.

Machine-gun fire: Very heavy from BAZUEL---ORS---CATILLON---MAZINGHIEN---ADVANTAGE Farm. At the latter place, guns were fired through roof of the house. Smoke denoting occupation of houses could be seen in various villages. River at Q15b. appears to be wider at this point than it was yesterday.

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: 0730 - large cordite fire in SOLESMES. 0740 - series of explosions (red flashes with heavy black smoke) about 12 miles N. E. of Le CATEAU. 0800 - large explosion followed by fire about 2000 yards N. W. of SOLESMES. 0810 - large fire N. E. of SOLESMES. 0900 - fire in N. of Le CATEAU. 0900 - fire in MAZINGHIEN.

BALLOONS: 0815 - 1 enemy kite balloon ascended X15; 0905 - 1 enemy kite balloon ascended X18.

A. A.: Normal.

E. A.: Normal.

GENERAL: Our planes attacked enemy infantry in trenches W. of MOLAIN, E. of VAUX-ANDIGNY, and along eastern edge of railway between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET.

BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SECTION,
II AMERICAN CORPS.

In the field. Attached 3d Squadron, A. F. C.
1. The taking over of that part of the American 27th Divisional Sector allotted to the American 30th Division will be carried out by the latter on the night Oct. 15/16.
2. Machine guns will, during the coming operations, be under the command of the divisions to which they belong.
3. Tanks are allotted as follows from the 301st Tank Battalion:
   - To the American 27th Division: 10 heavy tanks.
   - To the American 30th Division: 12 heavy tanks.
Any additional tanks that may be repaired over those mentioned above will be allotted to the American 30th Division.
Tank commander will make necessary arrangements direct with division commanders for the use of these tanks.
4. Cavalry will be allotted as follows from 20th Hussars:
   - One squadron to American 27th Division.
   - One squadron to American 30th Division.
   - One squadron to be held in corps reserve.
Arrangements will be made direct between O. C., commanding 20th Hussars, and the units to which the squadrons are allotted.
5. Liaison. Upon cessation of the protective barrage on the red line, an aeroplane will call by Klaxon horn for locations of most advanced units. Flares will then be lighted and wherever practicable discs on respirators will be shown.
6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. W. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

II AMERICAN CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

SERIES B, NO. 4

ENGINEERS

[Extract]

The divisional engineer regiments will be under the orders of their divisional commanders. They are charged with the following specific duties:
(a) Examination of all roads, railroads, and bridges for mines, with special attention being given to delayed-action mines.

(b) Searching for wells, sampling water, and installing or repairing windlasses.

Opening of major water points on St-SOUPLET River (Stc) will be undertaken by corps.

(c) Opening roads (1) to horse-drawn and (2) to motor traffic.

Roads are assigned to division engineers as follows:

To the 102d Engineers: Road from La HAIE-MENNERESSE to St-SOUPLET; road ESCAUFORT to St-SOUPLET; road St-SOUPLET to ARBRE-GUERNON; road St-SOUPLET to St-MARTIN RIVIERE; road from ARBRE-GUERNON northward through Q.30 central to corps boundary; road from MAZINGHIEN towards BAZUEL to corps boundary; road BAZUEL to CATILLON, and the main route through St-SOUPLET.

To the 105th Engineers are assigned the road from MOLAIN to St-MARTIN RIVIERE to ARBRE-GUERNON, including road to crossroads at W.6.b.6.9.: thence to MAZINGHIEN; road from ARBRE-GUERNON to RIBEAVILLE; road from MAZINGHIEN to CATILLON; road from MAZINGHIEN to REJET-de-BEAULIEU. Also take over the road between VAUX-ANDIGNY and MOLAIN in case the latter is not taken over by the IX Corps.

The following troops will be detached from the engineer regiments for the special missions stated:

(a) The 102d Engineers will detach two platoons, each under an officer, for duty with the Australian 13th Field Artillery Brigade, to prepare artillery crossings at La SELLE River.

(b) The 105th Engineers will detach two platoons, each under an officer, for the same duty with the Australian 14th Field Artillery Brigade.

The Australian 1st Tunnelling Company will be held in reserve under the C. R. E., Corps, at BUSIGNY, to meet such special situations as may arise. Requests for assistance will be sent direct and passed on by him.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S., C. of S.

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II Corps AEF: War Diary

744-G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

SERIES B, NO. 5

HEADQUARTERS

[Extract]

1. Headquarters and Liaison.
   Headquarters of formations for the proposed operations will be as follows:

   American II Corps Hq. (Adv.)  WIANCOURT
   American II Corps Hq. (rear)   W.14.d.cent. (62C)
   VII Corps R. A. Hq.            WIANCOURT
   VII Corps H. A. Hq.            C.22.a.2.2. (62B)
   American 30th Div. Hq.        MONTBREHAIN
   American 27th Div. Hq.         BUSIGNY
   4th Tank Brigade               U.21.a.8.6. (57B)
   3d Aero Squadron               Q.5.a.1.2.
   20th Hussars                   VAUX-le-PRETRE

   * * * * * * *

   By command of Major General Read:

   GEO. S. SIMONDS,
   Brig. Gen., G. S., C. of S.

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II Corps, AEF: War Diary

745-G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS ORDERS

SERIES B, NO. 6

INTELLIGENCE AND DISPOSAL OF PRISONERS OF WAR

[Extract]

7. PRISONERS OF WAR CAGE: The advanced corps cage will be situated at BRANCOURT, 62B, C22 a.5.5.
   Intelligence officers and personnel will be stationed here and will carry out a more detailed interrogation and sort out captured documents.

   - 578 -
The advanced corps cage will be connected by telephone to corps H. Q.

8. PRISONERS:

The following procedure will be adopted for the disposal of prisoners:

After capture they will be escorted to the advanced divisional collecting cage, for examination by the divisional intelligence officer, who, after he has finished with them, will send them back to the advanced corps cage.

The sending back of prisoners should be carried out as quickly as possible, and several escorts should be arranged for them to be passed back without any unusual delay. Instructions should be issued to ensure that too many men are not employed on escort duty.

In the forward area, directing notices should be placed to show the route to be taken to the advanced divisional collecting cage.

Traffic control personnel should be conversant with the method of disposing of prisoners.

9. IDENTIFICATIONS: The importance of passing on all identifications as speedily as possible to I Corps cannot be too strongly impressed on all concerned. It is essential that special efforts be made to wire, at once, as soon as identifications are made and the locality in which obtained.

10. 30th and 27th Divisions to acknowledge.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S., C. of S.

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182-33.3, No. 3: Artillery Instructions

Operations II Corps Artillery

II CORPS, A. E. F.

October 15, 1918.

Reference American II Corps Operations Instructions, Series B, No. 1, and in continuation of Corps Artillery Instructions No. 2 of 14/10/18.

1. The artillery bombardment and harassing fire will be intensified during the 48 hours before Zero, but there will be no bursts of fire during the hour immediately preceding Zero. A similar lull in the bombardment will be made between 04:30 and 05:30 on Y day. Harassing fire on villages will be directed on the exits and not on the village itself.

The S. O. S. signal will be inoperative from Zero minus 15 minutes to Zero.

2. Gas shells should be freely used for bombardments within safe limits.

3. On October 17, at a Zero hour (to be notified later), the infantry will attack under a field artillery barrage as far as the first objective. The 18-pdr. barrage will be put down on a line 200 yds. in advance of the infantry start line, and the 4.5"-How. barrage 200 yds. east of the 18-pdr. barrage. One 18-pdr. battery in each brigade will be superimposed in the barrage.

The barrage will open at Zero, and at Zero plus 3 minutes, will lift and move forward 100 yds. in 3 minutes, as far as the protector to the Dotted Red Line, where it will remain till Zero plus 132 minutes. During the halt on the protector covering the Red Line, the superimposed 18-pdr. batteries will search and sweep over their brigade front to a depth of 500 yds., special attention being paid to the ground in R.31.c. and X.1.a.

At 2 minutes before the barrage begins to move forward again, i.e., at plus 130 minutes, fire will be increased to RAPID rate, in order to give a signal to the infantry
that the barrage is about to move.

At Zero plus 132 minutes, the barrage will again move forward at the same rate as far as the protector to the Red Line, where it will remain till Zero plus 222 minutes, and then cease.

4. Field batteries which cannot reach the protector line from their present positions will move to more forward positions by Y night and remain silent till Zero.

5. Two brigades of field artillery will move forward to positions near the river as soon as possible after the infantry advance from the Dotted Red Line, so as to search the eastern slopes of the ridge west of the River St-MAURICE, while the infantry are halted on the first objective.

6. Exploitation beyond the Red Line will be carried out by the infantry at Zero plus 6 h., 3 mins., in support of which two brigades of field artillery, one brigade of mobile heavy artillery and two mobile sections of 6-inch T. M.'s, will be pushed forward across the River SELLE by each division as soon after the first objective is reached as bridges or crossings can be prepared.

7. The heavy artillery will put down a barrage on selected localities and points of assembly, etc., the lifts conforming as to time with the 18-pdr. barrage, so that there is at no time H. A. fire within 600 yds. of the infantry.

After the field artillery barrage ceases at Zero plus 222 minutes, heavy artillery will continue bursts of fire up to Zero plus 6 h. on MAZINGHIEN, La JONQUIERE, La HAIE-TONNOILE.

8. Barrage maps are being issued.

9. Counterbattery S. O. will draw up a scheme for neutralizing fire at Zero on known active battery positions and harassing fire on the rear communications will be vigorous.

10. (i) Rates of fire for all natures of guns and Howrs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>During creeping barrage</th>
<th>-rapid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During protective barrage</td>
<td>-slow.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ii) Ammunition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>18-pdrs.</th>
<th>-50% shrapnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-44% H. E. X fuze 106 6% smoke throughout.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5&quot; Howrs.</td>
<td>-H. E. Fuze 106.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-pdrs.</td>
<td>-50% shrapnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-50% H. E. 106 Fuze.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(iii) Ammunition at Zero hour.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At guns</th>
<th>In corps reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-pdrs.</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5&quot; Hows.</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other natures, as laid down in Para. 4, Artillery Instructions No. 2 of 14/10/18. In addition, all echelons will be full.

11. Attention is drawn to previous orders about the use of the most suitable fuzes for heavy howitzer fire, and the precautions to be taken to secure accuracy of fire.

12. All GF and NF calls will be replied to.


E. W. GOYCE,
Major, G. S.,
R. A., II American Corps.

Issued to signals at 16:00.
182-33.3, No. 3: Operations Instructions

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

R. A., American II Corps
No. 0/101/13.

II CORPS, A. E. F.
October 15, 1918.

With reference to para. 4 of American II Corps Operations Instructions, Series B, No. 1, dated 14/10/18.


2. The artillery covering American 30th Division will consist of the present right group together with 9th Mobile Brigade, R. G. A., attached.

3. Australian 2d Hq. Divnl. Artillery will move into corps reserve.

E. W. GOYCE,
Major, G. S.,
R. A., American II Corps.

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182-33.3, No. 3: Artillery Instructions

Operations II Corps Artillery

H. A.
K.15/7.

DISTRIBUTION

II CORPS, A. E. F.
October 15, 1918.

Reference this office No. K.15, dated 9/10/18.

Brigade commanders will ensure that the personnel of sections in corps reserve are not depleted by their batteries in the line.

They will change the complete personnel of sections between the battery and reserve section when necessary. Training should continue in the reserve sections.

Brigades acknowledge.

W. J. GILPIN,
Major, R. A.,
for
Bde. Major, R. A., American II Corps H. A.

Copies to all recipients of K. 15.

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Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

R. A. American II Corps No. 0/101/14.

October 15, 1918.

Two cases have occurred lately of the Boche counterattacking with tanks (G. H. Q. Summary 10/10/18).

In order to be prepared for such contingencies, single guns will be pushed forward on each division front by the exploiting artillery, to act as antitank guns. Further, these guns are eminently suitable for engaging hostile antitank guns, which are frequently used with effect against our infantry.

E. W. GOYCE,
Major, G. S.,
R. A., American II Corps.

Artillery Attached to British 20th Hussars

R. A. American II Corps No. 0/101/15.

October 15, 1918.

One battery on each divisional front will be told off to be prepared to give the corps cavalry (20th Hussars) any artillery assistance they may require.

Batteries should not be detailed from the exploiting artillery.

E. W. GOYCE,
Major, G. S.,
R. A., American II Corps.

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105th Engineers Come Under Command 30th Division

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

October 15, 1918.

MOVEMENT ORDERS NO. 2

1. The 105th Regiment of Engineers will come under the command of the American 30th Division at 1800 h., 15 Oct.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Division Front Reduced

FIELD ORDER

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 62
October 15, 1918.

1. In preparation for future operation, the front line to be held by this division will be reduced as follows:
   - Northern boundary Q.28.c.0.0.
   - Southern boundary W.9.b.0.5., W.5.cent.
   - The boundary between the brigades will be at Q.34.c.0.0.

2. Reliefs will be carried out as follows:
   (a) The 30th Division will relieve that portion of the 54th Infantry Brigade holding the sector south of southern boundary described above. Detailed arrangements will be made between the Commanding General, 54th Infantry Brigade and the Commanding General, 59th Brigade, 30th Division.
   (b) The 53d Infantry Brigade will relieve the 54th Infantry Brigade in the right brigade subsector between Q.34.c.0.0. and W.9.b.0.5. - W.5. central. Details of this relief will be made by the brigade commanders concerned.

3. These reliefs will all be carried out during the night of October 15/16. The completion of reliefs will be communicated immediately to these headquarters.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Objective of Offensive

FIELD ORDER
No. 63

MAPS: 57D, S.W.
Barrage 1:20,000
Special

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

1. GENERAL OBJECT OF OFFENSIVE: The American II Corps, in connection with the IX Corps on the right and the XIII Corps on the left, will attack in the general direction of CATILLON, on a date and hour to be specified later. The II Corps will attack with two divisions (27th Division on the left and the 30th Division on the right), in the sectors shown on the map attached hereto.

2. GENERAL PLAN:
   (a) A creeping barrage will come down at Zero * * * west of ARBRE-GUERNON, where a halt of barrage and infantry will be made to reorganize and mop up.
   (b) The first line infantry will again advance under a creeping barrage to the first objective (the Red Line), east of the JONC-de-MER Farm. Here, the first line will organize a line of resistance, the troops designated for the 2d objective will advance and prepare to take up the attack, while the artillery will first maintain a protective barrage, then lift and search the ground eastward.
   (c) At a time (designated below), the troops to attack the 2d objective will advance through the troops holding the first objective, and continue to the second objective (Brown Line) accompanied by tanks and supported by specially detailed brigades of mobile field artillery, but without a creeping barrage. Upon reaching the second objective, troops will be immediately sent forward to exploit to the Green Line, and the second objective will be organized as a line of resistance.

3. BOUNDARIES: * * *
   Zone of the division:

   South boundary: W.9.b.0.6, W.6.a. central, thence including ARBRE-GUERNON to R.31.d.0.4,---
                   R.24.a.0.8.
   Boundary between brigades: Q.34.c.0.0---Q.36.a.9.4,---
                             R.20.c.0.0---R.16 central

4. OBJECTIVES:
   Artillery start line: Q.28.c.0.0---Q.34.c.0.0---W.6.a. central.
   Line of first halt: (Red Dotted Line) halt from Z plus 102 to Z plus 132 min. Q.23.d.9.4---Q.30.d.0.8.
                    ---Q.36.d.0.0---W.6.c.5.0.
   First objective (Red Line) halt for about 3 hours. R.15.d.5.7---
       R.20.c.0.0---R.32.c.0.0.

- 584 -
5. DETAILED ORDERS OF UNITS:

(a) The division will attack with two brigades side by side, the 53d Infantry Brigade on the right and the 54th Infantry Brigade on the left, each brigade with one regiment covering the brigade sector, the remaining regiment in support, regiments disposed in depth. At one hour before Zero, the front line battalions will be formed up 200 yards in rear of the artillery start line, and all other units will be in their assigned places as arranged by brigade commanders. Start line will be taped the evening preceding the attack. At Zero, the artillery barrage will fall on the start line and remain for three minutes, at the end of which time will go forward at the rate of 100 yards in three minutes to beyond the Red Dotted Line, where it will halt from Z 102 until Z plus 132 minutes and form a protective barrage at 200 yards from the infantry line. The infantry will reorganize and finish mopping up.

(b) Two minutes before the advance is resumed, the artillery barrage will increase in intensity, with an increase of smoke to serve as a signal for the troops to be ready to advance. At 2 plus 132 minutes, the creeping barrage will again advance at the same rate as before (100 yards in 3 minutes), until 200 yards beyond the first objective (Red Line), when it will halt at Z plus 192 minutes and form a protective barrage until 2 plus 222, after which it will lift and search special locations eastward until 2 plus 372. The infantry line will halt on the first objective Z plus 192 to Z plus 372 (3 hours), and organize the position for defense.

Troops will not go forward of the first objective until the expiration of three hours from the commencement of the halt on this line.

During this period, the battalions designated by brigade commanders to continue the advance will move up to the first objective and the tanks assigned to the division will arrive and be prepared to assist in the next advance.

(c) At Z plus 372, the second line battalion will continue the advance under cover of the tanks supported by batteries cooperating directly with them, but without creeping barrage. The advance will be made in open warfare formation to the second objective, where the infantry line will halt, immediately exploit to the Green Line, and organize the objective line as a line of resistance.

(d) Special units will be designated as mopping-up parties to follow in rear and clear up thoroughly behind each advance, those parties to be given special missions.

(e) The successive advances of the 27th Division are to be coordinated with similar advances on the right by the American 30th Division and on the left by the British 50th Division.

6. DIVISIONAL RESERVE: The 102d Engineers (less 1 Co.), the 104th M. G. Bn., and 1 squadron cavalry (less detachments), will constitute the division reserve.

7. MACHINE GUNS: All regimental machine gun companies will remain at the disposal of their respective regimental commanders.

Task for barrage machine guns will be as shown on the machine-gun barrage map.

(a) The 105th Machine Gun Battalion on the south half of the division sector; the 106th Machine Gun Battalion on the north half of the division sector.

(b) Time for lift to be notified later.

Barrage will be fired by 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions, under the direction of the division machine-gun officer.

On completion of barrage, machine gun battalions will move in accordance with instructions of their brigade commanders, at whose disposal they will be.

(c) On receipt of this order, they will report to their brigade commanders for advance instructions.

The 104th Machine Gun Battalion will remain in divisional reserve, taking up a position south of BUSIGNY about B.22.a.4.5.

8. ENGINEERS: Two companies will establish footbridges across the SELLE River immediately after the first infantry line has crossed the stream following the barrage.
Thereafter, the engineers will act in accordance with plan as instructed by the division commander.

9. TANKS: See Plan. 10 heavy tanks of the 301st Tank Battalion have been assigned to the division. These will cross the SELLE River as soon as practicable after the infantry have crossed, and will assist the advance as soon as practicable thereafter. They will, in any event, reach the Red Line (1st objective) in time to accompany the troops to the final objective.

10. CAVALRY: One squadron of the 20th Hussars has been attached to this division. One detachment will report to the 54th Brigade and a similar detachment to the 53d Brigade on the morning of the 16th Instant. The remainder will be held under the orders of the division commander.

* * * * *

TIMETABLE:

Zero minus one hour

All units will be in their places of assembly and ready for the attack.

Zero - artillery barrage commences:

Z plus 8

Barrage commences to lift in accordance with barrage map, at the rate of 100 yards in 3 minutes and the attack line starts. Leading elements will follow barrage as closely as possible.

Z plus 81 to Z plus 102

According to the part of the line it is in front of, artillery halts beyond Dotted Red Line.

Z plus 130

Barrage increases in intensity and increased smoke.

Z plus 132

Barrage commences advance to 1st objective.

Z plus 183 to Z plus 192

According to part of line barrage halts beyond first objective.

Z plus 222

Barrage lifts and searches eastwards. Infantry remains on first objective.

Z plus 372

Battalions designated to attack 2d objective commence their advance without creeping barrage.

* * * * *

15. COMBAT LIAISON: Combat liaison between the 27th Division and 30th Division will be furnished by the 30th Division.

The 53d Infantry Brigade will furnish combat liaison between 53d Infantry Brigade and 54th Infantry Brigade.

The 54th Infantry Brigade will be held responsible for combat liaison with the division on its left and will be prepared to guard its left flank in case it is exposed.
Through combat liaison will be established between the different units of brigades, both laterally and to the rear.

16. SYNCHRONIZATION. Watches will be synchronized from II Corps to division headquarters at 1200 and 1800 on the day before attack, and time will be immediately transmitted by division to brigade commanders, who will arrange to synchronize the watches of their commands. Not to be given over the telephone.

17. AXIS OF LIAISON: BUSIGNY--ESCAUFORT--St-SOUPLET--ADVANTAGE Farm--JONC-de-MER Farm.

18. COMMAND POSTS will be located as follows:
27th Division BUSIGNY
53d Inf. Bde., first P. C. BUSIGNY
   second P. C. ESCAUFORT
54th Inf. Bde., first P. C. BUSIGNY
   second P. C. ESCAUFORT

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

182-33.3, No. 3: Memorandum

Combat Instructions

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

To be read by regimental, battalion, company, and platoon commanders.

COMBAT INSTRUCTIONS No. 1348, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. The following extracts of combat instructions are issued for the purpose of directing especial attention of officers who are to be engaged in future operations. The division commander directs that the principles herein enunciated be fully grasped by all concerned.

   In the next operation, there will be 2 phases, viz: (a) First phase, in which troops advance under a barrage, and follow the principles prescribed for a "set-piece" attack; (b) second phase, in which the troops advance without a barrage and in which the principles of warfare in the open are followed.

   The second phase begins when the advance from the first objective is renewed.

EXTRACT

2. The principles expounded in Bulletin No. 30, May 23, 1918. Memorandum for corps and division commanders, August 5, 1918, and notes on Recent Operations, No. 1, August 7, 1918, are not yet receiving due application. Attack formations of platoons, companies, and battalions, are everywhere too dense and follow too rigidly the illustrations contained in the offensive combats of small units. Waves are too close together, individuals therein have too little interval. Lines are frequently seen with the men almost elbow to elbow, and seldom with intervals greater than two or three paces. Columns, when used, are too long in first line companies. They should rarely have a greater depth
than ten files. All formations are habitually lacking in elasticity; there is almost
never an attempt to maneuver, that is to throw supports and reserves to the flanks for
envelopment. Scouts, if used, are frequently only a few yards in front of the leading
waves, where the only purpose they can serve is to blanket or cover the fire of the men
behind them. Subordinate officers display little appreciation of the assumed situation
and how best to meet its requirements. It is necessary, therefore, to repeat once more a
few fundamental principles which must be impressed upon all concerned.

3. The essential difference between open and trench warfare, so far as effect upon
formations is concerned, is characterized by the presence or absence of the rolling
barrage ahead of the infantry. From a tactical point of view, the method of combat in
trench warfare presents a marked contrast to that employed in open warfare, and the
attempt by assaulting infantry to use French warfare methods in the open warfare combat
will be successful only at a great cost. Trench warfare is marked by uniform formations,
the regulation of space and time by higher command down to the smallest details, absence
of scouts preceding the first wave, fixed distances and intervals between units and
individuals, voluminous orders, careful rehearsals, little initiative upon the part of the
individual soldier. Open warfare is marked by scouts who precede the first wave,
irregularity of formation, comparatively little regulation of space and time by the higher
demand, the greatest possible use of the infantry's own power to enable it to get forward,
variable distances and intervals between units and individuals, use of every form of
cover, and accident of the ground during the advance, brief orders and the greatest
possible use of individuals' initiative by all troops engaged in the action.

4. The following principles deal chiefly with the warfare in the open. In trench-to-
trench attack, where a moving barrage is to be followed closely, uniform formations are
generally expedient until the enemy's first line trenches have been entered. Thereafter,
the principles outlined below should be applied.

5. SCOUTS: When closely following a moving barrage there is seldom room for scouts.
When the barrage has been lost or does not exist, as is ordinarily the case in the open
field, scouts should precede the first line companies. They should deploy with wide and
irregular intervals 10 to 50 paces, to present a poor target to hostile machine guns.
They should take every possible advantage of the ground to obtain cover, provided their
advance is not thereby unduly delayed. Exposed ground should be crossed at a run. Their
distance in front of the main bodies of their platoons should follow no set rule, but
should constantly vary with the ground and with the anticipated position of the enemy.
One moment they may be 500 meters ahead of their platoons, a few minutes later they may be
absorbed therein. Their purpose is to compel the enemy machine guns to open fire and so
disclose their location or be run over by the scouts. When the hostile machine guns have
been located, the scouts should at once open fire.

6. PLATOONS: Under cover of the fire of the scouts, enough men from the platoon
behind work forward individually or in small groups to this thin and very irregular line
of scouts, in order to give it sufficient fire power to pin the machine-gun crew to the
ground. If the scouts are low on ground, it will sometimes be advisable for the platoon
to open fire over their heads from commanding ground behind. But the firing line,
however formed, must remain a thin one, with two men never less than five meters apart,
and in the usual case preferably at much greater interval. The first reinforcements for
the scouts should contain one or more automatic rifle teams. At the same time, riflemen
and bombers, and, if the ground favors it, automatics also, begin work from the second
wave around one or both flanks of the firing line to get at the flanks of the machine guns
and then close in on its crew. All detachments or units attempting such an attack must
take proper measures to secure their own flanks. If the hostile gun is shifted to meet
the new attack, a whole or part of the firing line should take prompt advantage of that
change in position or direction of fire to rush directly forward, as soon as the scouts
have located the machine guns, the rifle grenadiers assist the advance of everyone by
heavy fire from suitable positions behind the first lines. The ability of the platoon
leader is displayed by prompt reconnaissance of the ground; by a rapid estimate of what it offers toward facilitating the advance of his men, and by immediate decision upon a single plan for the use of his combined weapons and of the ground to enable him to close with the enemy. His plans should habitually include pinning the enemy to the ground by nightly flanking fire, under cover of which some portions of the platoons, usually those sent against the hostile flanks, can close by short rushes with the enemy.

The training and discipline of the platoon are shown by the skill with which the men carry out the plan of the leader. A platoon should by itself be able to capture one, or even a pair, of hostile machine guns.

7. COMPANY: The capture of a nest of machine guns will probably be beyond the capacity of a platoon, and will require the company to send its support platoons to the flanks to develop the encircle.

8. MACHINE GUNS: Every first line battalion should habitually be reinforced by a machine gun company, which reports to, and is under the orders of the battalion commander. He should not in turn pass the company on by platoons to his rifle companies, but should command it as a fifth company. The company should ordinarily work by platoons, one supporting each front line company while one, if two rifle companies only are in first line, is charged with defense against hostile aircraft, with replacements for first line platoons, and with the scouting of the flanks of the battalion.

By command of Major General O’Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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227-32.12: Order

Task for Machine Guns

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
DIVISION MACHINE GUN OFFICE,
October 15, 1918.

1. All regimental machine gun companies will remain at the disposal of their regiments.

2. Task for barrage machine guns will be as shown on the attached map.
   (a) The 105th Machine Gun Battalion on the south half of the division sector; the 106th Machine Gun Battalion on the north half of the division sector.
   (b) Time for lift to be notified later.

3. Barrage will be fired by 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions, under the direction of the division machine-gun officer.

4. On completion of barrage, machine gun battalions will move in accordance with instructions of their brigade commanders, at whose disposal they will be.

5. Division machine gun battalion will remain in reserve, taking up a position south of BUSIGNY about B22-a-4-5.

EDWARD McLEER, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, D. M. G. O.
Instructions for Brigade Commanders

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

The following is a memorandum of points which should have special attention in the coming operations. As the time is short and as these points should have careful attention of the regimental and battalion commanders as well, six copies are furnished each brigade commander for prompt distribution to those concerned if such action is deemed desirable.

1. The location of the barrage starting line indicates the necessity for a withdrawal of units of the 53d Brigade which now hold positions in advance of that line. This situation should make easy the accurate taping of the start line of the 53d Brigade. Outposts beyond the barrage start line should not be entirely withdrawn until fifteen or twenty minutes before Zero hour, in order to prevent hostile patrols or enemy light machine gunners from advancing inside our barrage line.

2. In the 54th Brigade Sector, the buildings of St-SOUPLET should aid materially in locating the precise start line.

3. In both brigades the line should not be taped until after dusk of the evening preceding the attack, but the line for the tape should be pegged in advance by competent officers and this checked by the battalion commanders concerned. Much of the success of a barrage operation depends upon the start.

4. The first obstacle to be met is the La SELLE River. The leading battalions, in order to keep up with the barrage will have to cross this river by wading it. Simultaneously with this advance, engineer detachments will endeavor to place footbridges at the rate of four on each brigade front, more or less evenly distributed, for the convenient passage of following troops. It should be borne in mind however, by all concerned, and particularly by the battalion commanders of the next battalions to cross, that the essential thing is to cross at the time prescribed by brigade or regimental orders. Therefore, if the footbridges are not ready they must cross by wading. If possible, as an insurance against men falling into holes in the stream bottom, it would be well to provide hand ropes to be passed across the stream and either secured to some fixed object on the other side of [stream], held by three or four men, so that men crossing may maintain a hold on the rope, using it as a handrail. The engineers have undertaken to provide such assistance.

5. Some enemy machine gunners may be encountered on the line of the railroad and in the sunken road immediately east of it in the sector of the 54th Brigade. Men in the leading battalions should not be permitted to do more than disarm enemy soldiers who surrender and turn them over to supports immediately following who in turn should wave them to the rear. Such detailed instructions should be given to all the men of the battalions in relation to this matter that the strength of companies will not be frittered away by men going back with prisoners. There will be Military Police in St-SOUPLET and many troops following the leading battalions, so that there will be no occasion for concern that prisoners will get away or act badly so early in the event.

6. If the enemy is to offer serious resistance in the beginning of the attack, it is believed that this resistance will be offered on the line of new intrenchments prepared by him along the ridge 400 yards east of and parallel to the railroad. The leading elements should pass quickly over these intrenchments so as not to lose the barrage, leaving to mopping-up details the duty of securing the occupants of these trenches. The same comments made in relation to the handling of prisoners that may be taken on the line or the railroad, hold in relation to this trench line, for it is essential that the strength of the leading units be not impaired at this stage of the advance.
7. Upon reaching this line, the advance will have covered a distance of 900 yards on the left and about 1,500 yards on the right of the divisional sector. This line of intrenchments appear to constitute a desirable trace for a position facing east. About the time our line arrives on the general line of this trench, there may be cause for concern in relation to our flanks. For that reason, it might be well to consider placing at least one and perhaps two Lewis guns from the reserve battalion in those trenches at either end of our sector line. These parties should be provided with bombs for defensive purposes. At the north end of our sector from this point, it will be seen from this map that such a position affords excellent flank field of fire and should provide effective flank security until it is assured that the British division on our left has covered up to that line. A position in this trench at or near the top of this knoll would seem to be an excellent location for one or more Stokes mortars and rest place for one or more of the one-pounders which are to accompany the advance of the 108th Infantry. From this position these weapons could deal effectively with possible resistance in the sunken road and farm in the hollow near Q.29.cent. Similar comment applies in a measure to the use of these weapons by the 105th Infantry Regiment from the same trench system at the southern divisional boundary. From such position, the one-pounders could deal with targets in the village at W.8.b. and the Stokes mortars with targets within the limits of their range. With the adjoining divisions in possession of this trench system on our flanks, it should be a matter of honor with these detachments to hurry on to engage in other and similar missions farther forward.

8. Between the trench system referred to and the pause line, it is not believed that much resistance will be encountered, except possibly from BAUDIVAL Farm in the hollow near Q.29.cent., the hedge shown by the Red Dotted Line in parallelogram form extending northwest from the orchard in Q.36.a.9.7., and the sunken roads in the valley 600 yards north of BAUDIVAL Farm. To secure the left flank of the 108th Regiment during the 30 minutes' pause, it might be well to provide for a special flank protection on the nose of the ridge at Q.29.b.3.7. A Stokes mortar advancing from the first flank position to BAUDIVAL Farm after that place is occupied, should be in good position to deal with opposition from the sunken roads referred to. These also could effectively be dealt with by the one-pounder from the first flank position.

9. The 30 minutes pause will enable leading troops to organize these matters. It will also enable them to dig in to some extent along the road extending northwest from Q.30. and south through the copse on the inter-brigade boundary line. It will also enable supporting and reserve troops to readjust their units and to orient themselves.

10. In spite of timetables, it is probable that troops will not know what time they arrive on the pause line. They will pause because the barrage will stop and then it is hoped they will recognize the road and copse referred to and dig in, providing for the security of their flanks. It is important, however, that they do remember that the sudden increase of the intensity of the protective barrage constitutes the warning signal that in two minutes, the barrage will again move forward. Therefore, they should be ready to move with the barrage.

11. From a study of the map, it would not seem that there is much resistance to be expected in the 54th Brigade area until its arrival on the line of the first objective. Some resistance may be offered by machine-gun fire from Le QUENNELET Farm in Q.24.a. Again, it would seem to be desirable to provide special flank security in this location by provision for a special party to occupy the ridge at Q.24. central, until the British division on our left secures Le QUENNELET Farm. Some resistance may also be encountered at Le ROUX Farm in R. 13.d., as well as from JONCIDE Farm and copse in R.25.b.

12. In the case of the 53rd Brigade, greater resistance is to be expected, for there is a village of ARBRE-GUERNON to be taken and occupied. It may be that the resistance here may not be strongest from the village itself, but rather from the edges of hedges about the road leading north and west from the village. The mopping-up parties should be warned of such possibility. One or two Lewis guns quickly gotten into the upper floors of
buildings on the southern outskirts of this village should provide excellent flank security for the 53d Brigade at this stage of the advance.

13. Upon reaching the first objective, the leading elements should not endeavor with their low strength to consolidate a line of resistance. The line of resistance should be organized in groups and in depth, each group digging in, and several positions having the best possible fields of fire. In the 54th Brigade, the remains of Le ROUX Farm and the copse should constitute the means for organizing a local strong point and it will be noted that its field of fire is good. The detachments to occupy and hold this place should be warned to observe sharply the valley running north toward BAZUEL, for it is up such valley that the enemy usually trickles his forces to assemble for counterattack purposes. During the three-hour halt on this line, the heavy artillery will bombard this valley as well as the next valley to the east thereof. Similar comment applies to JONCIDE Farm and copse on the interbrigade boundary. It might be well to organize this as a local strong point in establishing the line of resistance. Farther to the right in the 53d Brigade sector, excellent fields of fire are to be had on the hedges shown by the Red Dotted Line at R.31.b.9.8. Right now it should be emphasized that upon obtaining this line, a red flare should be burned by each squad as a signal to observe that the line has been obtained. Later, if called for by aeroplanes sounding A on the Klaxon horn and dropping a white light, the flare signal should be repeated on this line. Flares should not be burned for any reason during thirty minutes’ pause prior to obtaining the first objective, unless specially called for by the aeroplane. In any event, sufficient flares should be maintained for use on the line of the final objective.

14. In proceeding beyond the first objective, practically all the operations conditions change. for as stated at the conference the division then goes into open warfare. From this point on, there will be no barrage. The heavy artillery will shoot special targets well in advance and will engage hostile batteries’ locations. The troops designated to engage in this open warfare advance will have been brought up during the three hour halt, as directed by the brigade commander and at the termination of the three hour halt, will, without further signalling or warning, take open warfare formation and continue the advance to final objective.

15. I know from observation the tendency is toward insufficient elasticity of movement in such operations, particularly in the terrain of the character by the area to be covered. By that I mean that patrols should be in the first instance proceeding well up in advance of their elements so that, in the case of 54th Brigade sector, they may gain the ridge 1000 yards in front of the first objective. If these patrols signal the ridge clear, the distance between elements may be reduced until the ridge is gained and held with proper dispositions in depth. Similar principles would apply to the 53d Brigade sector, but additional precautions in relation to the strong point at La JONQUIERE Farm and copse, which I suspect may turn out to be a serious obstacle in view of its approaches on the enemy’s side, its commanding position for purposes of observation and fire, and the cover afforded in the vicinity. A one-pounder advanced to JONCIDE Farm and the supporting fire of the two light batteries directly attached to the regiment, together with the possible assistance to be afforded by the tanks, should furnish means necessary to overcome resistance.

16. With possession of La JONQUIERE Farm, I believe the only remaining difficulties of a serious nature will be fire from La HAIE TONNOILE Farm in L.28 central, from CATILLON, and from the road leading northwest from the latter place with the copse about it. At this point, I should say that in relation to all of these obstacles, I have arranged tonight for heavy destructive shots against all of them, by both light and heavy artillery throughout the day, tomorrow and tomorrow night as well.

17. With the attainment of the final objective, the line should be intrenched as speedily as possible and preparations made to stand off possible counterattacks. The danger point I think will be from the north, and I believe that not only should the
commanding position at R.9. central be well organized, but that there should be, if possible, machine-gun supports to that position and machine guns also placed so as to cover the two draws on either side of that ridge leading to the north. Field artillery and trench mortars should so be placed as to effectively cover these two draws. Liaison with the units on the north will fix the limits of their line and the location and character of their points of resistance.

18. The area of exploitation beyond the final objective should be covered by patrols with the least practicable delay, with a view to contact with the enemy and ascertaining the extent of his retirement. Information from these patrols should be sent back with the least delay. The quickest means of communication will probably be by wireless.

The foregoing are suggested and are not intended as specific directions which might hamper those charged with carrying on the local operations. They are not needed by the regimental and brigade commanders, but will doubtless prove of value as a guide at least in coordinating the work of the two brigades and in aiding the work of the battalion commanders.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

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230-32.1: Order

30th Division Takes Over Sector

FIELD ORDER
No. 26

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

MAP: 57B, 1/40,000.

1. The 30th Division will take over the right divisional sector of the II Corps area on the night of October 15/16. ***

2. (a) The 59th Brigade will take over the front line and will arrange directly all details of advance parties, reliefs, etc., with the Commanding General, 54th Brigade.
   (b) Details of signal, medical, and other administrative reliefs will be arranged directly between commanding officers concerned.
   (c) The 60th Brigade and the 113th Machine Gun Battalion will remain in their present location until further orders.

3. The location of division headquarters and 60th Brigade Headquarters will not change. 59th Brigade Headquarters will move to D.3.b.7.6.

ACKNOWLEDGE.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.

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Battle Instructions, 27th Division Adjoining

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS No. 1, SERIES D

[Extract]

1. Our II Corps will continue the attack on a two-division front on a date which has been communicated verbally to those concerned, and at an hour to be notified later. The IX Corps will attack at the same time on our right and the XIII Corps on the left.

2. This division will attack with the 59th Brigade in the front line and the 60th Brigade in the second line.

The 27th Division will attack on our left and the British 6th Division on our right.

After the dotted line marked "Barrage halts 30 minutes" is reached, the British 1st Division passes through the British 6th Division and continues the attack.

3. Boundaries and Objectives: *** It will be observed that MOLAIN is inclusive to this division.

Objectives: The objectives are noted on the map furnished as first objective, second objective, and exploitation. The dotted line marked "Barrage halts 30 minutes" is only for the purpose of allowing reorganization of units after the advance across the river, up the hill and capture of trench on the hill. The first objective marks the point where the 60th Brigade passes through the 59th Brigade. This objective will not be consolidated. The first objective also marks the limit of artillery barrage. The second objective will be consolidated and from there patrols will be pushed out to the exploitation line.

4. (a) The Australian 5th Divisional Artillery, General Russell Browne, consisting of five field artillery brigades and one heavy artillery brigade, are assigned to this division.

(b) There will be no hurricane bombardment, but a general bombardment will be kept up from X day to one hour before Zero. This allotment of guns allows one gun for 25 yards on front for the creeping barrage.

(c) The 18-pounder barrage will come down at Zero on the line marked "Artillery start line" on map furnished. The infantry start line will be 200 yards in rear of that line.

The 4.5"-howitzer barrage will come down 200 yards beyond the 18-pounder barrage.

(d) The 18-pounder barrage will remain on the artillery start line from Zero to Zero plus three minutes. Each lift will be 100 yards at three minutes interval throughout. This marks the rate of progress of infantry at 100 yards in three minutes.

(e) The barrage will become protective 200 yards in front of the Red Dotted Line for 30 minutes. During this period, the barrage will search east to a depth of 1000 yards. It will be noted that the line marked "Barrage halts 30 minutes" on the map is the point where the infantry halts, the barrage itself being 200 yards farther eastward.

During the last two minutes of this 30 minutes protective barrage, the rate of fire will be greatly increased in order to warn the infantry of the resumption of the advance.

(f) There will be a protective barrage 200 yards in front of the first objective for 30 minutes. The barrage will then search eastward for a period of 2 hours and 30 minutes. During this period, the brigades will leap-frog and the mobile artillery will be brought up in order to be used during further progress eastward. The barrage will then cease, and the further advance of the infantry and tanks will be covered by especially detailed brigades of mobile field artillery.
5. TANKS: A minimum of 12 heavy tanks from the American 301st Tank Battalion are allotted this division for this operation. As it may be necessary for the tanks to make a detour to the right of the sector in order to avoid the obstacle of the SELLE River, infantry are warned to keep their direction and remain well close up on the barrage irrespective of the movement of tanks. The tanks will continue to assist the infantry in their advance to the line of exploitation.

6. INFANTRY: The attack up to and including the first objective will be made by the 59th Brigade. This brigade will attack with its two regiments side by side, each regiment with one battalion in the front line, one in support, and one in reserve. Companies from the reserve. Companies from the reserve battalion are available at the discretion of the brigade commander for brigade reserves. The infantry start line 200 yards in rear of the artillery start line will be taped out on Y/Z night, under the supervision of the division engineer. The 60th Brigade will follow the 59th Brigade at the expiration of the 3 hours' halt on the first objective, and will take and consolidate the second objective, sending forward patrols to the line of exploitation. Should conditions warrant, this line of exploitation will be held.

In its movement from the first objective eastward, the 60th Brigade will be guided in its conduct by the principles laid down in "Combat Instructions" issued by our G. H. Q., American Expeditionary Forces. Attention is particularly directed to the necessity for the use of scouts and patrols and regimental auxiliary weapons. They will be further assisted during this advance by the action of mobile field artillery and tanks, but they will not be protected by a barrage.

7. ASSEMBLY PLACES FOR INFANTRY: The assembly places for both brigades will be communicated later. Due to slightly different directions of the attack, more or less congestion may result from the necessity of forming the British 1st and 6th Divisions and this division within a restricted area. Commanding officers are warned of this probable congestion and will take necessary steps to reduce it to a minimum.

8. CALVARY: One squadron of cavalry has been assigned this division for duty during this operation. A small number of mounted men will be sent to each brigade and regimental headquarters on Y day for liaison purposes. The great bulk, however, will be kept intact for possible use on the flanks.

9. LIAISON: Special instructions on this subject will be issued later. The principles of the corps liaison order especially in its reference to liaison agents will be followed. Any liaison officer or noncommissioned officer detailed for duty from one brigade or regiment to a corresponding flank unit will take with him a copy of the brigade or regimental order of his own unit.

The division signal officer will establish a line on the division axis of liaison to which brigades may hitch. The most forward point of this so-called trunk line will be the advance message center. This message center will be operated under the division signal officer, and will receive and send to the rear properly worded messages. In this connection, attention is directed to the fact that the body of all messages should contain the hour at which the event described occurred as well as the location.

A limited number of motorcycles will be available at brigade and division headquarters for liaison purposes.

10. AEROPLANES: The 5th Brigade, R. A. F., will furnish infantry contact planes for use with this division. The signal for marking out the line by means of red flares, tin discs, white cloths, or any other available means is the letter A sounded by the Klaxon horn, and the dropping of a white Very light from the aeroplane. The front-line troops will be ready to signal their positions when called for by aeroplane at the end of the protective barrage on the first objective. Prompt response to the call of the aeroplane is imperative at all times.

11. The number of engineers allotted and their use will follow in additional instructions.
12. MACHINE GUNS: Special mission assigned machine guns in this operation will be communicated in later instructions.

13. SYNCHRONIZATION OF WATCHES. Watches will be synchronized at 1200 and 1800 o'clock under the direction of the division signal officer.

14. ACKNOWLEDGE BY WIRE.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.

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182-33.3, No. 3: Instructions

Battle Instructions

G-3-50

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918

NO. 2, SERIES D

1. ASSEMBLY AREAS: (a) 59th Brigade: The southern boundary of the assembly area of the 59th Brigade will run as follows: From western end of southern tactical boundary as shown on map already issued to point W.13.d.3.0. From to northern point of enclosure at about W.19.a.6.7., to southern edge of enclosure at V.24.a.9.5., to grid between squares in V.23 and V.24, at about V.23.a.0.2.

No troops of the 59th Brigade will assemble south of this line. The 16th Infantry Brigade (British 6th Division) will be forming up in the area immediately south of above line, and will advance on the right of the 59th Brigade. The 18th Infantry Brigade (British 6th Division) will be on the right of the 16th Infantry Brigade (British 6th Division). Headquarters of the 16th and 18th British Infantry Brigades will be in the quarry in W.19.a. Northern boundary: As shown on map issued, being a prolongation of the northern divisional boundary line.

(b) 60th Brigade. The British 1st Division will pass through the British 6th Division on the 30 minutes halt line, therefore, in order to simplify their forming-up for this operation, they will on Y/Z night have three battalions bivouacked in Squares D.2 and 3, within the 30th Divisional area. They will have no troops north of the grid line between squares D.2. and V.26 and D.3. and V.27. Similarly, the 60th Brigade will on that night have no troops south of that line. Unit commanders concerned must take particular care to insure that no confusion arises between their units and those of the British 1st Division when moving off on the morning of Zero day. It is expected that the troops of the British 1st Division will be clear of the 60th Brigade area by Z-60 minutes on Red Day.

2. INFORMATION: The following information of the enemy's defenses on our immediate front is compiled from aerial photographs, information received from patrols, German prisoners of war, and French inhabitants.

(a) TRENCHES: There appears to be a line of trenches running from W.26.c.3.1. to W.20.d.7.6. and from the road in W.20.b.9.0., northwest of W.14.d. central. There is also a line of what appears to be organized shell holes, running from W.28.d.0.5., northeast to W.17.c.9.6., thence north to W.5. central, continuing northwest to Q.35.a.0.1. There is a line of rifle pits commencing in W.4.b.3.9. and running almost due north to Q.22.a.3.0., and from this point northeast. There is also a line of trenches in W.4.b.3.0. to W.4.b. central. The village ARBRE-GUERNON is shown to be intrenched and there are trenches to
the west and northwest of this village in W.6.a. and Q.36.c. and d. A line of rifle pits extends from W.5.a.4.2. to W.5.a.40.lD.

(b) MACHINE GUNS: There are indications that there are machine guns in W.27.a., probably a machine-gun nest in W.14. central.

(c) TRENCH MORTARS: There are suspected trench mortars located in W.15.a. and b.

(d) OBSERVATION POSTS: There is an O. P. located at W.10.a.9.8.

(e) La SELLE RIVER: The bridge crossing La SELLE River in the eastern part of St-SOUPLET, Q.34.c.7.9., is intact and reported mined. The bridges in Q.29.c.9.a. have been destroyed. The bridge crossing in W.5.c.5.6. has been destroyed. The river from St-SOUPLET, (Q.34.c.9.5.) south, is reported to be, at no point, more than six feet wide and in no place does it afford an obstacle for infantry.

BANKS AND BED: The bed is strong with slightly sloping banks, averaging 3 feet high, bordered by poplars, alders, and willows.

(f) It is expected that the above information will be shown on maps to be furnished unit commanders.

3. BANDS: All organizations will send their bands to report to the division surgeon at MONTBREHAIN, for work at main dressing station. These bands will report not later than Zero hour, Zero day, and carry with them the unexpired portion of the day's rations and two days' rations in addition.

4. USE OF ENGINEERS:
   (a) Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion is charged with the proper and accurate laying of the tape on the jumping-off line, which will be done on the night Y/Z day.
   Commanding officer of this battalion will confer with the Commanding Officer of the 59th Brigade in regard to the location of the line to be taped. When this work has been completed, a report will be made at once to the division engineers that the task of laying the tape has been accomplished. The Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion will detail:
   (i) Two platoons, each under an officer, to report for duty to the Australian 14th Field Artillery Brigade to prepare artillery crossings at La SELLE River. The platoon commanders will report in person to the Commanding Officer of the Australian 14th Field Artillery Brigade not later than 1 p. m. on Y day. After the field artillery has passed it will be followed later by the heavy artillery (6-inch howitzers and 60-pounders). These platoons will construct these bridges in the first place or later after the passage of the light artillery so that they will carry the heavy artillery.
   (ii) One company, less one platoon, for duty under the corps water officer in establishing water points in the St-SOUPLET Valley. The company commander will report to the corps water officer on Y day for detailed instructions.
   (iii) One platoon for duty at the engineer dump near BUSIGNY (V.22.d.7.4.).
   (iv) One company, less two platoons, to the 59th Brigade to take up such engineering work as may be required and to meet any emergency that may arise. The company commander will report to the Commanding Officer of the 59th Brigade and arrange for one platoon to be assigned to the two units in the line. When the 59th Brigade halts on its objective, the commanding officer of this company will report to the Commanding Officer of the 60th Brigade, and the two platoons will follow through the 59th Brigade with the 60th Brigade, and be assigned to the two units of the 60th Brigade in the line, and continue similar work as before.

5. (a) One company to search for wells, sample water, install or repair windlasses; search for booby traps and mines; search for engineer stores; and examine railroads and bridges for mines, giving special attention to delayed-action mines.
   (b) The Commanding Officer of the 2d Battalion will detail:
   (i) One company which will follow at a reasonable distance behind the
advancing infantry, and repair and make possible for horse-drawn transport for the following roads:

Road from MOLAIN to St-MARTIN RIVIERE to ARBRE-GUERNON, including road to crossroads at W.6.b.9.6., thence to MAZINGHIEN; road from ARBRE-GUERNON to RIBEAUVILLE; road from MAZINGHIEN to CATILLON; road from MAZINGHIEN to REJET-de-BEAULIEU. Also take over the road between VAUX-ANDIGNY and MOLAIN, in case the latter is not taken over by the IX Corps.

(ii) Two companies to be held in reserve for opening to double-motor traffic, the roads mentioned above as far forward as the ridge to the east of St-SOUPLET Valley. Progress reports on the conditions of each road under construction will be rendered every two hours to the division engineer through 2d Battalion Headquarters.

(c) (1) The advanced engineer dump has been established at V.22.d.7.4.

(2) An advanced road timber dump has been established at V.11.c.8.1.

(3) A mobile dump of water supply material, bridge and road timber, loaded on lorries will be held in readiness at the northeastern outskirts of BUSIGNY (V.11.c.8.1).

On Zero day, the engineer train will hold itself in readiness to send forward wagons of engineer stores as they may be called for.

(4) Two wagons loaded with picks, shovels, axes, and sandbags will be held in readiness at V.11.c.8.1. to be used as a mobile engineer dump.

(d) On Zero day, men will carry the following equipment and supplies:

Haversack pack
Shelter half, raincoat, one or two changes of socks, mask and helmet, 100 rounds of ammunition in belt rifle, full canteen, the unconsumed portion of the day's ration, one assault ration, and one iron ration.

(e) The division engineer will be at V.21.d.8.6.

(f) Reports will be sent every two hours through battalion commanders' headquarters to division engineer. Where possible reports will be sent by telegram as well as by runner. Each report will state time and place in addition to other information. As far as possible, regularly prepared forms will be used for this purpose.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.

182-33.3, No. 3: Instructions

Battle Instructions

G-3/52
No. 4, Series D

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

MACHINE GUNS

1. Regimental machine gun companies will be under the control of their respective regimental commanders during the attack.

2. The Commanding Officer, 114th Machine Gun Battalion, will under the direction of the brigade commander, 59th Brigade, designate one machine gun company of his battalion to follow the assault battalions of the 117th Infantry, and also one machine gun company to follow the assault battalions of the 118th Infantry at distances, ordinarily not greater than 1200 yards. The purpose of these intermediate companies is to protect the flanks; to fire on enemy targets from commanding positions; to assist in the reduction of enemy
machine-gun nests; to replace the forward machine gun companies when the latter have become exhausted; and in cases of emergency to temporarily fill gaps in the line.

The remaining two companies of the battalion will move forward by limber, as support companies, under direction of the brigade commander.

3. The 113th and 115th Machine Gun Battalions will under command of the D. M. G. O., occupy fire positions near Imberfayt Fne (57/W.8.a.0.0.), and in vicinity of La HAIE-MENNERESSE (57b/W7.c. and 13.b.), and will deliver from Zero to Zero plus 24 minutes, strong harassing fire on villages of St-MARTIN RIVIERE and MOLAIN and roads connecting those villages.

At Zero plus 21 minutes, these battalions will clean and oil guns and limber up at assembly places, which will be designated later.

4. Upon completion of task outlined in Par. 2, the 115th Machine Gun Battalion will move forward to positions in vicinity of 57b/X.1.b. and will reach these positions in time to lay down strong harassing fire on MAZINGHIEN and roads leading thereto from the east. This battalion will assemble under cover in the vicinity, report their location to division headquarters through the nearest message center and will revert to division headquarters.

Machine-gun ammunition dump at V.21.d.8.3.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.


FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

1. No infantry operations were undertaken. The enemy's artillery activity continued particularly against the forward areas north of SEBONCOURT.

Concentrated shoots and bombardments of selected areas were carried out by our artillery in preparation for future operations.

2. IX CORPS: Battery areas south of BECQUIGNY and the vicinity of BOHAIN were subjected to sharp bursts of fire. H. V. guns fired at intervals on roads east of BOHAIN.

AMERICAN II CORPS: BUSIGNY was shelled during the night and a mixed concentration of gas and H. E. was directed against the area N. W. of VAUX-ANDIGNY. Activity by day was confined to harassing fire on the forward area.

XIII CORPS: During the night, the enemy paid considerable attention to battery areas, but by day transferred his fire to REUMONT, St-BENIN, and Le CATEAU.

3. THIRD ARMY: No change.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: A minor operation was carried out in the vicinity of BERNAVILLE, where 200 prisoners were captured and a slight advance realized.

One French division crossed the OISE in the vicinity of MONT-d'ORIGNY, but were unable to make much progress on account of stubborn resistance.

5. AIRCRAFT:
(a) British: 253 hours were flown by 143 pilots. Eleven successful reconnais-sances and 18 artillery patrols were carried out during which 27 zone calls were sent down, with the result that two hostile batteries were neutralized.

13 combats took place of which three were decisive, resulting in three E. A. crashing.
By day, 71 25-lb. bombs were dropped on suitable ground targets. There was no night flying.

(b) Hostile: Enemy activity was slightly below normal considering the weather.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through army cages 2 officers, 2 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s 1 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Fine early, much mist later with rain.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: Nil.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d, 46th Divisions.
   American II Corps: American 27th and 30th Divisions.
   XIII Corps: 18th, 25th, 50th, and 66th Divisions.
   Australian Corps: 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Australian Divisions (army reserve).
   Cavalry Corps: 1st Cavalry Division (G. H. Q. reserve), 5th Cavalry Brigade (army reserve).

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:
    13-pdr. A. A. H. E. 705
    " S. 124
    13-pdr. R. H. A. H. E. 225 NX
    3" 20-cwt. H. E. 160
    " S. 33
    18-pdr. H. E. 5,240
    " S. 5,766
    " Smoke 242
    4.5" How. H. E. 3,992
    60-pdr. H. E. 2,448
    " S. 3,237
    6" H. E. 7,850
    6" Mk. VII H. E. 370
    " S. 399
    " Smoke 25 AP
    8" How. H. E. 792
    9.2" How. H. E. 239

182-33.3, No. 3: Operation Report

G-3 II CORPS, A. E. F., October 15, 1918.

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period ending noon, Oct. 15, 1918

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The line remained unchanged during the past twenty-four hours. The 27th Division reports heavy shelling, in back areas during night Oct. 14/15.
2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING DAY: At 20:15 h., patrols sent out by the 27th Division reported no enemy seen west of the river in their sector. Much transport was observed during the afternoon October 14 on roads in MAZINGHIEN area. WASSIGNY is reported empty.

Prisoners captured by the corps operating on our right state that on October 14 they have information that all troops and guns had gone back from MENNEVRET and civilians already evacuated. The prisoners also state that an early German retreat was expected and that attack on their present positions was looked for. Much transport was observed going east from WASSIGNY.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: Patrols sent out by the 27th Division afternoon, October 14 were met by machine-gun fire just east of VAUX-ANDIGNY. Later patrols met gas and machine-gun fire from same vicinity.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Situation afternoon October 14 was quiet and unchanged. During night October 14/15, our back areas were shelled, otherwise situation normal.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Patrols were pushed out by the 27th Division during the night October 14/15 to establish contact.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The IX Corps on our right and the XIII Corps on our left report quiet night. The XIII Corps reported slight shelling of REUMONT-Le CATEAU Road and intermittent artillery fire along line.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: Fourth Army Order No. 20/40 (G) received, containing instructions for continuing the attack ordered in our Operations Instructions, Series B, No. 1, attached.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: Reconnaissance patrols were sent out by the 27th Division for the purpose of obtaining intelligence of enemy opposite our sector.

Movement Order No. 1, dated October 14 and Movement Orders Nos. 2 and 3, dated October 15, issued, copies attached.


10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Patrols sent out returned with information set forth in preceding paragraphs.

* * * * *

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The front held by this corps and the British on the right and left is practically in touch with the VALENCIENNES-GUISE Line. It is, therefore, probable that the enemy will put up strong resistance on the ridge opposite our front in order to cover his withdrawal from the LENS and ST-QUENTIN salients.

13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: To act in accordance with attached orders issued.

14. REMARKS, MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale, high; health, good; supplies, satisfactory; weather, cloudy and cool.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

for

G. W. READ
Major General,
Commanding.

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- 601 -
Orders issued for relief of the 54th Brigade of the 27th Division by the 59th Brigade in right divisional sector night 15/16th. The 60th Brigade remained at its present location.

Available for all duty

- Officers: 535
- Men: 15,200

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.
AMERICAN UNITS

27th Division
Division Hq. (Adv.)
Division Hq. (rear)

53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
54th Infantry Brig. Hq.

27th Division
DMsion Hq. (Adv.)
DMsion Hq. (rear)

53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
54th Infantry Brig. Hq.

30th Division
Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (rear)

59th Infantry Brig. Hq.
60th Infantry Brig. Hq.

30th Division
DMsion Headquarters (Adv.)
DMsion Headquarters (rear)

59th Infantry Brig. Hq.
60th Infantry Brig. Hq.

AMERICAN UNITS

Br. Fourth Army Orders, II Corps: 182-32.7: Fl dr. 3: Order

Operations II Corps

Fourth Army No. 20/42 (G)

Adv. American II Corps

1. The hour of zero for the forthcoming operations by the Fourth Army will be 5:20 a. m. on October 17.
2. Acknowledge.

Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Adv. Hq. Fourth Army

October 16, 1918

230-20.22: Summary of Information

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

1. SITUATION OCTOBER 15 and NIGHT 15/16 INST.: The situation remains unchanged. No identifications were obtained.
From prisoners of the 204th Div., captured on the 14th inst., it is possible that the 3d Naval Div. is holding the line between St-SOUPLET and Le CATEAU. This requires confirmation.
There was nothing to report during the night.

2. ENEMY’S INTENTIONS: Deserters who surrendered to the French on 14th inst. stated that their division was to have retired to a line near La FERTE-CHEVRESIS, where trenches were being prepared.

Another prisoner, belonging to the 82d Res. Div., stated that he understood his division was to have retired to prepared positions near HIRSON, but that, on the 13th inst., orders arrived for them to go into the line.

3. RESERVES:
   (a) Prisoners of 414th I. R., 204th Div., captured 14th inst., state that the 2d Marine Inf. Regt. were in line near St-SOUPLET. This would indicate that the 3d Nav. Div. has come into line in the sector between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET. Confirmation is required.

   This division has been engaged three times against the army on our left since Aug. 8. It lost over 500 prisoners in the GREVILLERS area before being withdrawn Aug. 18. It has the reputation of being a good fighting division, but was very badly handled recently at MARCOING. It has been resting since 4th inst.

   (b) Prisoners of 81st Res. Div., captured by the army on our right, state that they were relieved in LORRAINE, prior to their coming up to the AISONVILLE sector, by 87th Div., withdrawn from GOUZEAUCOURT Sept. 11.

   (c) 75th Res. Div., withdrawn from ESTREES at the beginning of the month, is reported by prisoners to have been in reserve N. E. of CAMBRAI on 13th inst., and 79th Res. Div., withdrawn from PONTRUET on Sept. 30, in the HASPRES area Oct. 8.

   (d) The 7th Cav. Div., which was withdrawn on Sept. 30, from the battle west of CAMBRAI after losing over 2,200 prisoners, is reported to be in reserve near MENIN.

   (e) The 27th Div., a fresh division from reserve north of VERDUN, has reinforced at FLABAS, east of the MEUSE.

   The 7th Res. Div. appears to have been withdrawn from line on the east bank of the MEUSE.

   (f) The 365th Inf. Regt., an independent unit from the Russian front, is reported to have arrived at VALENCIENNES.

   (g) Excluding 30 divisions withdrawn after suffering severe casualties during the past two weeks and 5 Austro-Hungarian divisions, there are 15 enemy divisions in reserve in the western theater, of which 4 are fresh.

   There is no news of any further fresh divisions in reserve opposite this army.

4. ENEMY ACTIVITY: Weather: Fair early; much mist with rain later.

   (a) Aircraft: General activity was slight. The few E. A. seen are working almost entirely in the northern and central sectors of the front.

   Three enemy planes were destroyed. None of our machines are missing.

   (b) Artillery (up to 6 p. m., 15th inst.): Hostile artillery was fairly active against the forward areas of our southern sector, the guns directed on the SEBONCOURT area firing mostly from the S. E.

   Though quieter in the northern sector, activity showed an increase in harassing fire on our battery positions.

   From 2:15 a. m. to 5 a. m., a heavy gas bombardment was carried out on ESCAUFOURT.

   (c) Movement: With the exception of some movement of transport and troops S. W. through GUISE towards the MONT-d'ORIGNY front, and several fairly large convoys going both ways on roads in the MORMAL Forest area, no road activity was reported yesterday.

   The railway movement seen was slight; it showed a westward trend.

   The above reports are inconclusive, as flying was only possible for a short period of the morning.

5. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS:

   (a) Aerodromes: Photographs of Oct. 14 show about a score of new aerodromes, the chief groups being north of BAVAI and north of MAUBEUGE. South of MAUBEUGE there are
three new aerodromes at BEAUFORT, BACHANT and BOUSSIERES, and there is a new forward aerodrome at Le GRAND-PAYE east of LANDRECIES.

(b) Hospitals: New one at Le QUESNOY.

(c) Activity: Considerable body of troops entering CAPELLE (51.A.Q.36 N. E. of SOLESMES) from east on 14th (57 M D 646).

6. ENEMY DEFENSES: Photographs taken by Third Army on Oct. 14, are reported to show work on elements of trenches and lines of organized shell holes on the continuation northwards of the Le CATEAU Line on the general line of the Le CATEAU—SOLESMES—VALENCEIENNES Road. These trenches are west of that road between SOMMAING and MAING and east of it along the HARPIES River near VERTAIN and east of the SOLESMES-Le CATEAU railway near AMERVAL.

Further photographs of Oct. 14 show the Le CATEAU Line to St-SOUPLET (A3, Ae, A1, 3, 4, 5). East of St-BENIN, there is wire in front of pairs of organized shell holes in Q.16.c. (A3, Ae, A6).

7. BRIDGES MINED: The bridges over the railway at W.21.b.90.45 and W.22.a.30.45, E. of VAUX-ANDIGNY area, mined. The road and railway bridges at ETREUX were intact at 10 a.m. yesterday. The bridge at K.34.b.46 (Le CATEAU), is reported from the air to be destroyed.

8. FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: A series of explosions were seen about 12 miles N. E. of Le CATEAU. Large explosions were seen also about 2,000 yards N. W. of SOLESMES and at WASSIGNY near the station. Fires were reported N. E. of SOLESMES, in MAZINGHIEN, LANDRECIES, and ETREUX.

GENERAL

The situation remains unchanged. Opposite the French First Army, prisoners state that a withdrawal to a line near La FERTE-CHEVRESIS is probable. In view of the fact that, owing to the big advance made by the French in the LAON area, a salient has been formed with its apex near MOY, it is extremely probable, therefore, that this withdrawal will take place in the near future.

[Signature Illegible],
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

ANNEX TO FOURTH ARMY SUMMARY, DATED OCTOBER 16, 1918

EXTRACTS FROM G. H. Q. SUMMARY NO. 651, DATED OCTOBER 13, 1918

1. EXAMINATION OF BRITISH PRISONERS: The following extract from a captured order of the Bav. 28th Inf. Regts., dated 21/9/18 indicates the difficulty experienced by the enemy in obtaining information from British prisoners:

(a) Method of Capture: The prisoners belong to a strong patrol (of the 12th Bn., Norfolk Regt.), which was sent out for the purpose of discovering the strength of the garrison of a farm (apparently Hos Ostermelle (sic), near PLOEGSTEERT), and to put out of action the machine guns conjectured to be there.

Among the 21 prisoners were 4 N. C. O.'s, who had all taken off their distinguishing marks and could not or would not give a satisfactory reason for doing so.

(b) Personnel: The great majority of the prisoners belong to the working class; they make a good military impression, but in their statements they are so extraordinarily reticent that one must assume that, as stated in numerous
captured orders, their superior officers have instructed them clearly and warned them how to behave when taken prisoner.

2. CAPTURED ORDER:
   Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht.
   Hq.
   Ia. No. 9190
   22.8.18.

   Army Order

   Our enemies are making preparations to throw us back by a general assault. They will not succeed. We are holding strong reserves in readiness everywhere behind the army fronts. We await the battle with complete confidence. The army group of von Boehn held its ground in the face of the enemy's onslaught. The British attacks against the Army Group of Crown Prince Rupprecht must be similarly shattered.

   We shall yield unfavorable ground here and there, in accordance with a well thought-out plan, in order to concentrate our forces for resistance in localities where we may strive for the decision under favorable conditions. Every man in the army, however, must be imbued with the conviction that he must defend to the last, on the spot where he is put into the battle, the ground entrusted to him. He will know that there are reserves behind him ready to deliver counterattacks. Let every man remain at his post. Then will victory rest with our arms.

   For Army Group Commander:
   Sixth von ARMIN,
   General of Infantry.

3. GERMAN MORALE: The following is an extract from an order of the Bav. 28th Inf. Regt. (Bav. 12th Div.), dated 11/9/18:

   In almost every battalion situation report, the following occurs:
   Hostile raiding party with machine gun at such and such a place.
   Apparently fire is opened at random in such cases, otherwise the enemy would suffer casualties and identifications would be obtained through dead, wounded, or prisoners.

   I call upon every single man to act more energetically. We must employ every possible means to inflict casualties on the enemy.

   The fact that the enemy continues to attempt raids against our posts shows that he considers himself superior to us; we must get this idea out of his head once and for all.

   On this point, also, the men must be thoroughly instructed. The offensive spirit must always be kept alive.

   Reports of stragglers and missing have increased of late. The troops must be informed that, when a man gets separated for any reason, he must do his best to get back to his unit; if he joins another unit, he must report to the commander of this unit and make his presence known.

   I will take the strongest action against men who absent themselves and only turn up again when the danger is over.

   It is a point of honor for the regiment that such shameless conduct should be stamped out.

4. EFFECT OF OUR LOW-FLYING MACHINES: A captured order (extracts below) of the 38th Div., dated Sept. 12, contains evidence of the effect in battle of our low-flying machines. The division was in line on the SOMME Front (PERONNE area) at the time mentioned. The participation in fighting on the ground of low-flying enemy machines, both singly and in formations, has on many occasions had decisive effect on the battle, during
the recent operations. It is, therefore, essential that all troops be thoroughly
instructed regarding these enemy tactics in order to eliminate the bad effect which the
element of the unknown in such low-flying surprise attacks exercises on the battle
discipline of the troops.

The following extract from this order is also of interest:

According to reports from the infantry, an enemy aeroplane recently
succeeded in deceiving our antiaircraft defenses by carrying streamers
attached to the planes, which caused troops to mistake the machine for a
German contact patrol aeroplane. The enemy airman was able to fly very low
without being fired upon.

1. EXTRACTS FROM G. H. Q. SUMMARY NO. 652, DATED 14/10/18

CHANGES IN THE HIGHER COMMAND.

(i) According to the German official communiqué of October 12, the German
formations in line between the River SCHELDT and ST-VAST belonged to Crown Prince
Rupprecht's Group of Armies, while those engaged in the BOHAIN area formed part of the
German Crown Prince's Group of Armies.

The above shows that General von Boehm's Group of Armies has been broken up
and that the 2 armies in it have returned to the Group of Armies to which they belonged
prior to Aug. 15. Thus, the German Second Army now again forms part of the Crown Prince
Rupprecht's Group of Armies and the Eighteenth Army again comes under the German Crown
Prince's Group of Armies.

(ii) A captured document shows that Gen. von der Marwitz, who left the command
of the German Second Army on Sept. 23, is now in command of the German Fifth Army.
Another document, dated Oct. 6, shows that Gen. von Carlowitz, who until recently was
in command of the German Fifth Army, has replaced Gen. von der Marwitz, in command of
the German Second Army.

Gen. of Inf. v. Carlowitz, who has now taken over the command of the German
Second Army in the Le CATEAU area, succeeded General Oberst von Hausen as Saxon Minister
of War in May 1914. He held this post until Oct. 1915, when he took a command in the
field. In July 1917, when Gen. von Laffert died, Gen. v. Carlowitz was placed in command of
the XIX Corps, with which he distinguished himself at ARMENTIERES in April 1918, in
the battle of LYS. In September, he replaced Gen. von Eben in command of the German
Ninth Army, and when this army was broken up at the end of September, he took over the
command of the German Fifth Army from Gen. v. Gallwitz. Now he has changed places with
Gen. der Kavallerie von der Marwitz, taking over the command of the German Second Army
from the latter.

(iii) A document shows that Lieut. Gen. Leuthold (Saxon) is now in command
of Army Detachment C in the WOEVRE. This detachment was previously commanded by Lt.
General Fuchs.

Prior to taking over this command, Gen. Leuthold has commanded the 53d Res. Div.
and the XII Res. Corps.

2. CAPTURED ORDER: The following extract from an order of the 1st R. D., dated
16/9/18 (the division was then in line near BELLENGISE), was issued down to companies in
the 59th Res. I. R.:

At the present moment, the enemy has gained the initiative. He must and
will continue his attacks. In cases where he does not aim at far-reaching
objectives, he will attack in order to keep us in a state of uncertainty and
to tie down our forces.

The enemy will not consider that the wire and trenches in the SIEGFRIED
Line constitute any extraordinary obstacle to his further advance, as his
great successes have strengthened his consciousness of superiority, while
the strength and condition of our troops cannot be unknown to him.
An attack on our front, even on a large scale is, therefore, quite possible and by no means improbable. If the enemy is actually planning such an attack, his endeavor can only be to carry it out as soon as possible, before we have settled down in our old system of trenches and to enable him to get the SIEGFRIED Line behind him. There can be no doubt that he possesses the means to overcome the difficulties which confront him.

We must, therefore, count on a hostile attack, and also that it may be delivered at any time.

We must also make up our minds that, in view of our general situation and to prevent further harm being done to the morale of the troops, the attack, when it comes, must be completely repulsed.

It is, therefore, the more necessary that all arms and auxiliary services should be employed and utilized to their fullest extent in view of the fact that the infantry needs all the support imaginable.

In these circumstances, the defense cannot now be organized, systematically, step by step, so as to secure careful and thorough work, but the organization must rather be carried out simultaneously in all spheres, and so rapidly that we are able, at all times, to meet any attack with confidence.

To secure this, the utmost exertions are required, especially on the part of the commanders whose duty it is to make preparations for operations, and energetic measures are necessary.

Wherever the defenses, in consequence of this fact, are at first only of a temporary nature, they must if the enemy leaves us sufficient time, continually be improved and strengthened in accordance with the principles laid down for the defensive battle.

I expect that full justice will be done to these considerations, and I draw attention to the fact that, here too, negligence and omissions have more serious results than mistakes in the choice of material.

Count von WALDERSEE.

3. EFFECT OF OUR AIR OPERATIONS:

(a) Extract from a letter written by a man of the 36th Fus. Regt., 113th Div., on Aug. 28:

Our division got it in the neck near AMIENS when Tommy attacked on the 8th. We were pulled out on the 15th and were in reserve for a few days and then moved to HAM. We remained there for four days and were to have entrained there, but the wretched airmen would not allow it; the railway station was bombed by them day and night, with the result that we had to march 20 kilometers to ST-QUENTIN and were entrained there.

(b) A reliable prisoner states that our raid on AULNOY in the early part of October caused an ammunition train to blow up in the neighborhood of a leave train. The station was wrecked, and 900 casualties are said to have been caused.

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- 608 -
Operations II Corps

1st DIVISION BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES D

No. 9

Information as regards neighboring formations:

1. 6th Div., which attacking inf. brigs. follow, are attacking with 2 inf. brigs.: 18th Inf. Brig. on the right; 16th Inf. Brig. on the left.
   Interbrigade boundary: Road from VAUX-ANDIGNY Station to W.19.d.3.8., thence straight line to W.24.c.0.5.
   Hq. at Zero: 6th Div.---farm on BRANCOURT-BOHAIN Road C.24.a.3.3. 16th and 18th Inf. Brigs.---quarry in W.19.a.8.7.
2. On the right of 6th Div., the 46th Div. is capturing the Red Dotted Line from ANDIGNY-les-FERMES, inclusive; the 138th Inf. Brig. being on the left.
3. On the left of the 6th Div., the American 30th Div. is capturing objectives in prolongation of IX Corps Red Dotted, Red and Green Lines, respectively. Halts on the Red Dotted and Red Lines conform to those of the IX Corps.
   The American 59th Brig. (117th and 118th Regts.), attacks on the right up to the Red Line, inclusive.
   The American 60th Brig. (119th and 120th Regts) of the American 30th Div., leap-frogs the 59th Brig. on the Red Line.
   The American 60th Brig. is to consolidate the objective which corresponds to our Green Line, and also to exploit to the Canal de la SAMBRE.
   Hq. American 30th Div.---MONTBREHAIN.
   Hq. American 59th and 60th Brigs.---Farm in D.3.b.8.5.
4. Acknowledge.

E. L. TANDY,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, 1st Division.

October 16, 1918
Issued at 13:00
Operations II Corps

British 2d Infantry Brigade Order No. 232

October 16, 1918.

Ref. Maps Sheet 57B, S. E., 1/20,000
62B, N. E., 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. GENERAL:
   (a) The 2d Infantry Brigade group will attack under a barrage on Z day * * *.
   (b) The 1st Infantry Brigade group will attack on our right, and the American
       30th Division on our left.

   * * * * *

7. SPECIAL TASKS:
   (a) 1 squadron (less 1 troop) Royal Scots Greys.
       1 section 5th Cavalry Brigade M. G. Squadron.
       (Commander---O. C. Squadron Royal Scots Greys)
       (i) This cavalry detachment is entrusted with maintaining touch with the
           American 30th Division on the left of the 1st Infantry Brigade at all stages of the
           battle, from the Red Dotted Line to the Green Line, inclusive. O. C. detachment will
           keep in close touch throughout with the O. C. left battalion; will maintain liaison parties
           both with him and the right of the Americans, and will be prepared to employ his force,
           either to bridge a gap between our left and the Americans' right, or to form a defensive
           left flank, if required. In this connection, he will act in accordance with any instructions
           he may receive during the progress of the battle from O. C. left battalion.
       (ii) Once definite touch with the Americans on the Green Line has been
           assured by the infantry, the cavalry detachment will facilitate exploitation. For this
           purpose, the O. C. detachment will work in conjunction with O. C. left battalion, so far
           as exploitation of the high ground in X.5-central is concerned, and with the reserve
           battalion so far as exploitation through squares 11, 17, and 23 is concerned.

   * * * * *
   Captain, Brigade Major,
   2d Infantry Brigade.

II Corps, AEF: Summary of Intelligence

No. 14

From 18 h., October 15 to 18 h., October 16, 1918

I. OPERATIONS:
   (a) Infantry: Situation has been quiet on the corps front.
(b) Field Artillery: From 0800 to 0900, synchronized shoot was delivered on centers of activity and M. G. emplacements. During the day, trenches, trench mortars, and machine-gun emplacements were bombarded.

Heavy Artillery: Has continued its destructive shoots on all strong points with harassing fire at intervals, no observations having been received from the air owing to bad weather, but hostile batteries have again been submitted to heavy concentrations.

c) Patrols: Normal patrolling along the corps front.

d) Prisoners: No captures.

II. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES: No identifications during period.

(From Fourth Army Summary.)---Reserves.

Prisoners of 414th Inf. Regt., 204th Div., captured 14th inst., state that the 2d Marine Inf. Regt. was in line near ST-SOUPLET. This would indicate that the 3d Nav. Div. has come into line in the sector between ST-BENIN and ST-SOUPLET. Confirmation is required.

This division has been engaged three times against the army on our left since Aug. 8. It lost over 500 prisoners in the GREVILLERS area before being withdrawn Aug. 18. It has the reputation of being a good fighting division, but was very badly handled recently at MARCOING. It has been resting since 4th inst.

Excluding 30 divisions withdrawn after suffering severe casualties during the past two weeks and 5 Austro-Hungarian divisions, there are 15 enemy divisions in reserve in the western theater, of which 4 are fresh.

III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Enemy artillery has continued active throughout the night. Heavy bombardment by all calibers was carried out between 0200 and 0400 over a large area running from ESCAUFORT through PROYART Wood to I'HERMITAGE, and east of these points. This fire was continued at intervals until early morning. H. E. and gas being used. No reports of heavy shelling have been received during the day, though movement on the ridge in V.18.central, Imberfay Farm, and W.7.b., was shelled. Fire was spasmodically dropped on battery areas in and around BECQUIGNY. Harassing fire has been normal over the front.

IV. ENEMY'S DEFENSES: Photographs taken 14/10/18 show: R 9 B---Many tracks and signs of work west and southwest of BAZUEL. Tracks and signs of work in the orchard.

R 10 A to R H C---Much activity on road south of railway from wood (R. 10 A) to R H C. Lorries parked along the road and a possible dump (piles of material along the roadside). R 9 B---There is well-defined points leading from road south of railway to R 9 B 7040 (field surrounded by hedge). Signs of work and movement:

R 9 D
R 10 C
R 15 B
R 16 A---Possible shelters and small hutsments among the trees and under hedges. Many tracks in R 9 D, 10 C, 15 B, and 16 A. They appear to connect a series of holes, possibly rifle and M. G. pits. In R 16 A, much work in progress. Possible battery positions in orchards.

V. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: (From Fourth Army Summary) The general situation remains unchanged. Opposite the French First Army, prisoners state that a withdrawal to a line near LA FERTE-CHEVRESIS is probable. In view of the fact that, owing to the big advance made by the French in the LAON area, a salient has been formed with its apex near MOY, it is extremely probable, therefore, that this withdrawal will take place in the near future.
VI. AIRCRAFT: Unfavorable weather prevented aerial observation.

KERR T. RIGGS,

182-33.3, No. 3: Instructions

Air Support II Corps

746 G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.  
October 16, 1918.

OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS SERIES B, NO. 7

AIRCRAFT

1. The 3d Aero Squadron A. F. C., will cooperate as follows:
   Send out contact patrols at the following hours:
   (a) At Zero plus 1 hr., 35 minutes, to call for flares on the Dotted Red Line.
   (b) At Zero plus 3 hrs., 10 minutes, to call for flares on the Red Line.
   (c) At Zero plus 4 hrs., 10 minutes, to verify (b) above.
   (d) At Zero plus 6 hrs., 10 minutes, to observe and report whether the troops have started for the second objective.
   (e) At Zero plus 8 hrs., to call for flares on the second objective.
   (f) At Zero plus 9 hrs., to verify (e) above.
   (g) At the latest time before dusk, to obtain final dispositions at the end of the day.

2. Have a counterattack patrol up continuously throughout the day.
   Should a counterattack develop, this plane will drop white parachute lights immediately over the counterattack troops. All troops should be warned to keep a sharp lookout for this signal.

3. Smoke with phosphorous bombs, the near edges of the following features from which hostile observation over the attack could be obtained.
   (a) High ground in squares R.25.c., R.31.a. and c, village of ARBRE-GUERNON, W.6.b. and along road W.6.d. and W.12.b. and d. This smoke should be maintained during the whole advance up to the Dotted Red Line and is especially important during the 30 minutes’ halt on the Dotted Red Line.
   (b) High ground in squares R.20.b and d, R.26.b. and d., R.32.b. and d., and village of MAZINGHIEN.
   This smoke should be maintained for 2 1/2 hours during halt on Red Line after cessation of 30 min. protective barrage.

4. Acknowledge.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

- 612 -
OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS SERIES B, NO. 8

SIGNAL INSTRUCTIONS

[Extract]

1. Locations:
   American II Corps forward message center, Le ROND Point.
   Hq. Fourth Army (advance), ROISEL.
   IX Corps, MAGNY-la-FOSSE, H-25.a.central.
   XIII Corps, U.3.c. central.
   27th Division, BUSIGNY.
   30th Division, MONTBREHAIN.
   VII Corps R. A. Hq., C.22.a.2.2.
   Australian IV D. A., C.6.d.5.0.
   Australian 2d D. A., V.g.c.2.8.
   Australian 5th D. A., G.23.52.8.
   Aust. 3d Squadron F. C., Q.5.a.1.2. (62C).
   Aust. 3d Squadron F. C. (advance), C.4.b. central.
   15th Balloon Co., V.20.d.central.
   20th Hussars Regt., C.14.b.4.9.

2. Means of Communication:
   Telephone and Telegraph
   Radio and T. P. S. (earth telegraphy)
   Dispatch riders, mounted orderlies, runners
   Visual, including panels
   Message rockets
   Pigeons

3. (a) Telegraph: Corps to army, flank corps, corps advance message center, 27th and 30th Divisions, corps H. A., and divisions to brigades.
   (b) Telephone: Corps to all of (a) above, P. O. W. cage, balloon wing, Aust.

4. Radio and T. P. S.:
   Radio control station at corps hq.
   Corps advance message center, Wilson set
   Stations at corps H. A., divisions, brigades, and regiments.
   Each front-line regiment to provide one trench set station for regimental forward message center.

5. (a) Dispatch riders (motorcyclists) army to corps, corps to H. A., divisions,
flank corps, aero squadron, balloon wing and Hussar Regt. Divisions to prescribe and maintain D. R. service within their area.

6. Visual: To be arranged for between all units forward of brigades. Attention is invited to the importance of this means of communication, especially lamp signalling; central receiving stations must be selected in advance of operations as far as possible and notified to all concerned. Popham panels are issued to brigades, regiments and battalions for communication with aeroplanes.

7. Message Rockets: Supplied to forward divisions. These should be reserved for use as a last resort, or to cover barrage-swept area. All units in rear of front line platoons to arrange for lookouts to be constantly on the alert.

8. Pigeons: A limited supply may be available. 4 pairs (8 birds) are allotted to each forward regiment. These will be delivered to brigade hq. about 4 p. m., Y day. Further deliveries will be notified later, if required and available.

9. Circuits: (a) Permanent pole line routes have been built to corps H. A., divisions, P. O. W. cage and flank corps, aero squadron, advanced message center and Hussar Regiment. These are under corps for maintenance. No lines will be given nor taped thereon except by express permission of C. S. O., corps. These routes are under construction for extension towards St-SOUPLET. All division signal officers are directed to forward promptly any information regarding enemy pole routes to C. S. O., corps.

(b) Divisions will extend their wire line system with twisted pair, to be poled wherever possible. All are warned that tanks will operate in the present operations.

10. Corps forward message center will be equipped to handle telegrams, radiograms, or phone messages. Forward message report centers to be installed for divisions, brigades, and regiments, and notification sent to each flank unit of location of same.

11. Dumps: Corps wire and stores dump is located at WIANCOURT. Issues will be made on telegraphic request by division or other separate unit signal officers to C. S. O., corps. Division wire dump should be pushed well forward. Divisional artillery will indent for stores through C. S. O’s, divisions. Attention is called to the limited supply of wire. All should exercise the greatest economy and save wherever possible.

12. Corps accumulator charging plant is located at WIANCOURT. Divisions should push their charging plants well forward. Brigade P. C.’s are suggested.

13. Popham panel code calls for forward divisions are as follows: 27th Division, 53d Brig. A; 105th Inf. Hq. AA.; 1st Bn. AT; 2d Bn. AU; 3d Bn. AW; 106th Inf. Hq. AB; 1st Bn. AX; 2d Bn. AY; 3d Bn. AZ; 54th Brig. B; 107th Inf. Hq. BB; 1st Bn. BT; 2d Bn. BU; 3d Bn. BW; 108th Inf. BC; 1st Bn. BX; 2d Bn. BY; 3d Bn. BZ; 30th Divisions, 59th Brig. K: 117th Inf. KA; 1st Bn. KT; 2d Bn. KV; 3d Bn. KW; 118th Inf. KB; 1st Bn. KX; 2d Bn. KY; 3d Bn. KZ; 60th Brig. L; 119th Inf. LA; 1st Bn. LT; 2d Bn. LV; 3d Bn. LW; 120th Inf. LB; 1st Bn. LX; 2d Bn. LY; 3d Bn. LZ.

14. Aeroplane message dropping stations will be established by forward divisions and indicated with white X. Corps dropping station located at H.4.d.7.8. will be indicated with XII. Lookouts will be left posted from dawn to dark on Z day.

15. Carrying parties should be arranged for through division, brigade and regimental signal officers concerned.

16. Four-letter station code calls remain as previously issued. Field cipher code words are issued direct to radio officers concerned.

17. Photographic sections are attached to forward troops for pictorial record.

18. C. S. O’s of division will arrange with forward regimental message center to give prompt service by radio or wire to corps scouts and intelligence reports addressed to corps G-2.
19. Synchronization of time will be arranged as follows: Upon receipt of time from Fourth Army, advance corps message center will repeat same by telegraph to division and H. A. at 12:00, 12:30, 18:00, and 18:30 on Y day. Divisions will arrange for synchronization to brigade and artillery units attached, who will in turn arrange for transmission by standardized watch to subordinate units. At these headquarters, a rated watch will be sent to all staff officers about 12:45 and 18:45 o'clock on Y day.

20. Acknowledge.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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182-33.3, No. 3: Letter

**Operations II Corps**

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

R. A. American II Corps No. 0/101/16
American II Corps H. A.

Should an S. O. S. signal be received by the artillery between the time fire ceases and the time the infantry advances for the exploitation, the S. O. S. barrage will be put down on the Red Line protective barrage line.

E. W. GOYCE,
Major, G. S.,
R. A., American II Corps.

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Medical Gen. Surgeon II Corps: Memorandum

**Medical Arrangements**

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CORPS SURGEON.

AMERICAN II CORPS MEDICAL ARRANGEMENTS

Memorandum Series No. 2

Map. Ref.: Sheets 62B and 57B

1. **EVACUATION OF WOUNDED:**
   Left sector: Advanced Dressing Station (27th Division)-BUSIGNY
   Walking Wounded Dressing Station (27th Division)-BUSIGNY
   Main Dressing Station (27th Division)-PREMONT

- 615 -
Administrative Boundaries

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

October 16, 1918.

From: The Adjutant General

To: Commanding Generals, 27th and 30th Divisions

1. The administrative boundaries between the divisions of this corps will be as follows:

   West boundary --- C.3.c.0.3. to I.3.a.0.0.

   Dividing line --- C.15.c.0.0.
   D.7.a.0.0.
   D.22.c.0.0.
   V.18.central
   W.9.a.0.0.

   Then as shown on map issued with American II Corps Operations Instructions, Series B, No. 1, dated 14/10/18.

   By command of Major General Read:

   RICHARD K. HALE,
   Lieut. Colonel, G. S.
   for
   Stephen C. CLARK,
   Adjutant General.

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- 616 -
Reference to Aust. 4th Div. Artillery Order No. 211, page 2, 2d phase. As mentioned therein, the Aust. 10th Field Artillery Brigade will support the advanced guard artillery brigade (Aust. 11th Field Artillery Brigade) in support of the battalions of the American 27th Division (left divisional front) in their attack.

The American 27th Division is attacking on a two-brigade front (54th on the left and 53d on right).

One battalion of each regiment (106th of the 53d and 107th of the 54th), will push forward after taking of Green Line to exploit towards Canal de la SAMBRE.

The 39th Battery will support the artillery covering the 107th Battalion and keep in touch with B. H. Q.

The 37th Battery will closely support the artillery covering the 106th Battalion and keep in close touch with B. H. Q.

The 38th and 110th Batteries will form brigade reserve and be prepared to support either flank of the 27th Division if required.

Each battery will detail an officers' patrol and forward reconnaissance party to move with the infantry battalion headquarters, keeping battery and B. H. Q. in close touch with the situation.

Batteries will notify brigade when they have crossed the river and their locations from time to time. The brigade will take up final positions, if the exploitation is successful, in vicinity of areas R-21 and R-27, and be prepared to cover the final protective line.

Brigade headquarters centers will be as follows:

IMBERFAY Farm
ADVANTAGE Farm
JONC-de-MER Farm

Brigade headquarters will move to WEAVING Mill at W-4-a-4.7 after taking first objective.

Each battery will draw from A. R. P., one bridge and eight fascines for crossings. One platoon pioneers is attached to brigade and will be subdivided and attached to batteries. They will be returned to their unit via B. H. Q. as soon as their assistance is no longer required.

Acknowledgement.

C. W. BURKE,
Lieut. and Adjutant.
for
MEMORANDUM

Headquarters of Units in the Line:

27th Div. Hq.  
Douglas Camp  
27/L-14-a-2.0

53d Brig. Hq.  
Die Drei Goen  
28/G-24-b-5.8

54th Brig. Hq.  
N. of Cairn Copse  
27/L-20-c-2.6

In case of action in 2d Position---i.e., East POPERINGHE Line---the headquarters in the 2d Position will be:

54th Brig. Hq.  
N. of Abeele  
27/L-26-a-7.7

Ammunition dumps for infantry in 2d Position are located at bn. headquarters in East POPERINGHE Line.

ACCOMMODATION OF HQ. AMERICAN II CORPS AND AMERICAN 27TH DIVISION

Corps Hq. and Field Ambulances
Divisional Hq. and Hq. Troop
No. 4 Regt. Hq. and Regt. Group

No. 1 Regt. Hq. and Regt. Group
No. 2 Regt. Hq. and Regt. Group
No. 3 Regt. Hq. and Regt. Group

Engineer Battalion
A. Brig. M. G. Bn.

Dvl. M. G. Bn.
B Brigade M. G. Bn.
A Brigade
B Brigade

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Med. Gen. Surgeon 27th Div.: Memorandum

Medical Arrangements

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

Sheet 57B

Battalion Aid Stations

105th Infantry V.11.c.6.4.
106th Infantry V.5.d.2.2.
V.11.a.8.1.
Plan of Liaison

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Liaison Agents:
   (a) The following will be detailed from division headquarters:
       To 30th Division, Captain Tristram Tupper,
       To British 50th Division, Lt. Col. J. M. Wainwright. Agents will report to
       above headquarters by 4 o'clock, October 16.
   (b) Infantry brigades will arrange for interchange of necessary liaison agents.

2. Axis of liaison will be BUSIGNY---ESCAUFOURT---ST-SOULET---ADVANTAGE Farm---
   JONC-de-MER Farm.

3. Command Posts:
   Division headquarters - BUSIGNY.
   53d Brigade Headquarters - 1st P. C. BUSIGNY - 2d P. C. ESCAUFOURT.
   54th Brigade Headquarters - 1st P. C. BUSIGNY - 2d P. C. ESCAUFOURT.

4. MEANS OF COMMUNICATION:
   (a) Telephone and telegraph.
   (b) Radio and T. P. S. (earth telegraphy).
   (c) Despatch riders, mounted orderlies, runners and cyclists.
   (d) Visual.
   (e) Message-carrying rockets.
   (f) Pigeons.

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227-32.1: Annex to F. O. No. 63

WALTER C. MONTGOMERY,
Lieut. Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.
Plan for Aircraft

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918--5:25 p. m.

PLAN FOR AIRCRAFT

Annex to F. O. 63 - 27th Division, 1918

1. The 3d Aero Squadron A. F. C., will cooperate as follows:
Send out contact patrols at the following hours:
(a) At Zero plus 1 hr., 36 minutes, to call for flares on the Dotted Red Line.
(b) At Zero plus 3 hrs., 10 minutes, to call for flares on the Red Line.
(c) At Zero plus 4 hrs., 10 minutes, to verify (b) above.
(d) At Zero plus 6 hrs., 10 minutes, to observe and report whether the troops have started for the second objective.
(e) At Zero plus 6 hrs., to call for flares on the second objective.
(f) At Zero plus 9 hrs., to verify (e) above.
(g) At the latest time before dusk, to obtain final dispositions at the end of the day.

2. Have a counterattack patrol up continuously throughout the day. Should a counterattack develop, this plane will drop white parachute lights immediately over the counterattack troops. All troops should be warned to keep a sharp lookout for this signal.

3. Smoke with phosphorus bombs the near edges of the following features from which hostile observation over the attack could be obtained:
(a) High ground in squares R.25.c., R.31.a. and c, Village of ARBRE-GUERNON, W.6.b., and along road W.6.D. and W.12.b. and d. This smoke should be maintained during the whole advance up to the Dotted Red Line, and is especially important during the 30 min. halt on the Dotted Red Line.
(b) High ground in squares R.20.b. and d., R.26.b. and d., R.32.b. and d., and village of MAZINGHIEN.

This smoke should be maintained for 2 1/2 hours during halt on Red Line after cessation of 30 min. protective barrage.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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- 620 -
Engineer Plan

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

Attached to F. O. No. 63: 27th Division, 1918

1. One company attached to II Corps.
2. Two and one-half companies of engineers to be held in reserve, under division engineer, for opening to double-motor traffic road from La HAIE-MENNERESSE to St-SOUPLET; Road ESCAUFOURT to St-SOUPLET; Road St-SOUPLET to ARBRE-GUERNON; Road St-SOUPLET to St-MARTIN RIVIERE; road from ARBRE-GUERNON northward through Q.30-central to corps boundary; road from MAZINGHIEN toward BAZUEL to corps boundary; road BAZUEL to CATILLON and main routes through St-SOUPLET.
3. Two platoons of engineers, each under an officer, will be attached for duty to the Australian 13th Field Artillery Brigade to prepare artillery crossings at La SELLE River.

Platoon commanders will report in person to the field artillery brigade commander not later than 1 p.m. on Y day. These platoons will rejoin their regiment as soon as the field artillery has crossed the river.
4. One company of engineers will work in rear of each of the advancing brigades, charged with the following specific duties:
   (a) The primary and most important duties of these two companies will be the preparation of and placing light bridges for crossing the SELLE River by the infantry.
   (b) Examination of all roads, railroads and bridges for mines, special attention being given to delayed-action mines.
   (c) Searching for wells, sampling water, and installing and repairing windlasses.
   (d) Opening roads (1) to horse-drawn and (2) to motor traffic.
5. One captain will be detailed to each infantry brigade headquarters; he will report to the division engineer any work desired by the brigade commander.
6. Reports will be submitted to advance message center every hour, or more frequently if necessary. Location of advance message center will be announced later.

Operations and Location of Attached Tanks

ADDENDUM TO FIELD ORDER 63, 27th DIVISION

The tanks have found a crossing just south of St-MARTIN RIVIERE and expect to be on the ground in time to advance with the infantry at the end of the first 30 minutes halt. If they arrive previous to this advance, they will remain in the hollow near Q.30.c.0.0.
until it is time for them to move forward with the line. During the three hours' halt, they will again return to the hollow in Q.30, central and come up in time to advance to the second objective.

227-32.1: Order

**Line of Exploitation**

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

*October 16, 1918.*

Addendum to Field Order No. 63

The line of exploitation will extend only to the west bank of the canal and not across to the east bank as shown on map.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

227-40.1: Orders

**Movement 27th Division**

ORDERS
No. 111

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

*October 16, 1918.*

PLAN OF COMMUNICATION, SUPPLY AND EVACUATION

In connection with Field Orders No. 63

Reference Maps: 57D---62B---62C, 1:40,000

[Extract]

I. COMMUNICATIONS:
1. Railroads: Broad gauge, supply ROISEL
   Narrow gauge, supply MONTBREHAIN
   Personnel JONCOURT
2. Roads:
   (a) Main road for supply of the division by M. T. (two-way road) MONTBREHAIN---BRANCOURT---BOHAIN---BUSIGNY.
   (b) Road BUSIGNY-MAREIZ is a one-way road in the direction of BUSIGNY-MARETZ.
   (c) Mine craters on important roads having been repaired, road conditions in corps area are generally good and present no particular difficulties to traffic.
3. Traffic Control: Responsibility for control of traffic in the divisional area rests with A. P. M., who will make suitable disposition of M. P. at his disposal, to enforce observance of all traffic regulations.

II. SUPPLY:
1. Railheads:
   - Broad gauge: ROISEL
   - Narrow gauge: MONTBREHAIN
   Ration refilling point---57B/V.22.a.4.9.
   Means of transport---By M. T. from narrow gauge railhead to refilling point, by H. T. (G. S. wagons of 2d line transport) from refilling point to units.
2. Ammunition:

   • • • • •

4. Engineer Material:
   - Advance Dump: BECQUIGNY (57B/V.22.d.7.4.)
   - Rear Dump: MONTBREHAIN
   - Bridge material: ESCAUFOURT (57B/Q.31.).

   • • • • •

III. EVACUATIONS:
1. Medical Arrangements:
   - Advance dressing station: BUSIGNY
   - Main dressing station: PREMONT
   - Car posts, relay and visiting: V.28.b.7.4., Q.31.a.4.1., V.11.b.2.8, V.24.a.2.8.
   - Battalion Aid Posts:
     - 105th Inf. 57B/V.11.c.6.4.
     - 106th Inf. V.5.b.2.2., V.11.a.8.1., V.11.b.2.8.
     - 108th Inf. Q.33.b.8.1., Q.31.a.4.1., W.7.c.2.1.
   - Entraining point for walking wounded, narrow-gauge railway at MONTBREHAIN.

2. Veterinary Arrangements:
   - Advance collecting station: C. 27.central (western outskirts of BRANCOURT)
   - 105th Mobile Veterinary Section at JONCOURT
   - Upon evacuation of animals to above station, conducting parties will rejoin their units.

3. Prisoners of War:
   - Collecting station: St-SOUPLLET Church (Q.33.d.cent.)
   - Divisional cage: V.27.d.7.9. (crossroads 2000 yds. S. of BUSIGNY)
Corps cage C.22.c. (northeast of BRANCOURT)

4. Provost Arrangements:
   (a) A. P. M. will establish suitable straggler posts along the line ESCAUFORT -- W.7.d.5.2., to return stragglers to their units, direct walking wounded to dressing station, regulate traffic and other usual functions of the A. P. M. on such duty.

5. Burials: Div. burial officer at advance dressing station, BUSIGNY (V.10.b.9.4.).

9. Antigas Measures: Each man taking part in operations will be provided with two teaspoonsful of bicarbonate of soda which will be added to the water in his canteen. This process should be carried out under the supervision of officers, who will impress upon their men that the use of this substance in no way effects water for drinking or cooking purposes.
   Bicarbonate of soda may be obtained from battalion aid posts.
   The division surgeon is arranging for additional supplies of the above commodity as needed to meet requirements.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

182-33.3, No. 3: Memorandum

Preliminary Arrangements for the Attack

SUPPLEMENTARY MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADE COMMANDERS

1. Zero hour will be communicated to you by a division staff officer.
2. Synchronization of watches will be effected upon the arrival of a division staff officer, as soon as proper time is received from the corps.
3. Compass bearing should be taken on boundaries and prominent points to serve as a means of accurate identification of position.
4. Mopping-up parties should be assigned special tasks.
5. In addition to flank protection, liaison should be maintained from rear forward.
6. Means of Communication:
   Signal lamps: It has been found in recent operations that the most successful means of maintaining communication has been by use of signal lamps.
The terrain over which this operation will take place affords excellent opportunity for their successful use. Station should be established in advance, and operators fully informed of their positions.

Telephone, buzzer and wireless - message rockets - runners - routes for runners should be selected as far as practicable before the operation. Such routes, in order to reduce casualties, should avoid shelled areas most likely to be shelled.

Mounted orderlies.

7. Supplies:
   - Battle stores
   - Grenades
   - Flares
   - Discs
   - Rockets
   - Hot food - necessary arrangements for: Rations Rum

8. Dressing Stations: Information concerning them should reach all concerned.

9. Information: Send back frequently even if negative. Be accurate.
   - Quote time in body of message as well as time sent.
   - Determine exact locations.
   - Send staff officers to secure information as an additional means.
   - Observe the roads for men returning from the front, and question them for purposes of ascertaining duties upon which they are engaged - get their estimate of the situation if they have returned from the front line.

10. Correct false impressions. It has been found that in recent operations, men returning from the front line frequently bear wild tales as to losses and conditions in the front line. The impressions are usually based on local conditions within a limited area, and their discussions deemed to be general.

11. Wounded should be accompanied only when absolutely necessary, and then by the least possible number.

12. Prisoners: Guards should be small and should return immediately to the line. Prisoners should be treated with the consideration imposed by regulations (Reference G. O. 159).

13. Stragglers: This subject is of especial importance now, in view of the present strength of organizations. Use all available means to prevent stragglers from reaching the rear.

   - Watch your headquarters to see that there are no unauthorized men present.

14. Roll Call: After the operation, a roll call should be made immediately to determine the actual number of men present and as far as practicable to fix the number of casualties.

   - Even during the operations, constant effort should be made to ascertain the strength of the unit under your command.
   - This applies particularly to company and platoon commanders and commanders of small units.

15. Police of battlefield. Upon conclusion of the operation, it is important to determine the number of machine guns and other arms captured, and thus identify their locations, and if practicable to secure such captures, however, this does not contemplate that troops be sent to the rear for the purpose.

   - Plans will be issued for the evacuation of wounded and dead.

By command of Major General O’Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
From 12 noon, Oct. 15 to 12 noon, Oct. 16, 1918

1. Hostile situation at the beginning of the day quiet.
2. No special information received of the enemy during the day.
3. No hostile movements or changes observed during the period of the day.
4. Nil.
5. This division took over the right divisional sector of the American II Corps on the night of October 15/16, with one brigade and two regiments in the line and one brigade in reserve. The relief was completed at 6:25 a.m., October 16.
6. After the relief was completed, there was no change in the line or movement of troops.
7. No important information was received from neighboring units.
8. The II Corps order of attack was received.
10. Situation remained unchanged.
11. Nil.
12. General situation favorable and quiet.
13. It is planned to carry out an attack in liaison with the 27th on our left and the British 6th and 1st Divisions on our right.
14. Morale very good. Supplies are adequate, but the troops are tired from their long period in the line.

C. Burnett,
Lieut. Col., G-3.

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Battle Instructions No. 5, Series D

G-3/54

1. The 59th Brigade will advance its line on Y/Z night to the infantry start line designated for Zero hour, ZED day. This will be accomplished by advancing troops under cover of darkness after special artillery preparation during afternoon and evening. Commanding General, 59th Brigade, will arrange direct with the C. R. A. for this artillery preparation.

E. M. Lewis,
Major General, Commanding.

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FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,  
October 16, 1918.  

[Extract]

1. Hostile artillery activity showed a marked increase during the night and con­tinued throughout the day.  
   Our artillery maintained harassing fire on roads, woods, and railways, and 60-pdr.s. and 6" guns shelled dumps south of WASSIGNY-OISY Road.

2. IX CORPS: No infantry operations were carried out. Artillery was generally less active. Considerable shelling was experienced in the SEBONCOURT area in the evening of October 15, after which only normal harassing fire was reported.

   AMERICAN II CORPS: Hostile artillery was active during the night and early morning. Shelling by day was slight and confined to harassing fire. Between 2 a.m. and 4 a.m., a heavy bombardment with H. E. and gas was experienced in the ESCAUFORT-PROYART Wood area. St-SOUPLLET was shelled with heavy howitzers during the morning.

   XIII CORPS: The REUMONT area was heavily gas shelled during the afternoon. Battery positions east of TROISVILLES were harassed by guns of all calibers during the night.

3. THIRD ARMY: During the morning, the XVII CORPS captured HAUSSY. Two hostile counterattacks were repulsed in the afternoon. As the result of these operations, 300 prisoners were captured and 1,000 civilians liberated.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The enemy attempted two counterattacks on FORTE [not identified], but were repulsed with heavy losses.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 54 hours were flown by 70 pilots.

   Two successful reconnaissances were carried out and also 4 artillery patrols.

   No flying by night.

   (b) Hostile: General activity slight. Few E. A. seen were working almost entirely in the northern and central sectors of the front.

   * * * * *

7. WEATHER: Mist, rain and low clouds.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: Nil.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   IX CORPS: 1st,* 6th, 32d,* 46th Divisions.
   AMERICAN II CORPS: American 27th and 30th* Divisions.
   XIII CORPS: 18th,* 25th,* 50th and 66th Divisions.

   *corps reserve

   AUSTRALIAN CORPS: Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions (army reserve)
   CAVALRY CORPS: 1st Cavalry Division (G. H. Q. reserve), 5th Cavalry Brigade

   (army reserve).

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:
    13-pdr. A. A. H. E.  1,032
    " S.  266
    13-pdr. R. H. A. H. E.  230
    " S.  242
    18-pdr. H. E.  6,749
    " S.  4,743
    " Smoke  87
182-33.3, No. 3: Operation Report

G-3

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Period Ending Noon, Oct. 16, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF DAY: No change.
2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Enemy continues to blow up bridges in his back area. Small fires observed enemy back area.
4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.
5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Quiet.
6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: 30th Division took right half of our sector.
7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: IX Corps situation quiet and unchanged. XIII Corps situation unchanged, considerable shelling by light guns, of their forward area.
8. ORDERS RECEIVED: To attack at Zero hour, October 17, 1918 (see Fourth Army No. 20/40 (G)), forwarded with operation report Oct. 15.
10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Nothing to report.
11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.
12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: No change.
13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: No change.
14. REMARKS, MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale good, health good, supplies satisfactory; weather cool and rainy.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.
WAR DIARY 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

October 16, 1918

[Extract]

Relief of the 54th Brigade of the 27th Division by the 59th Brigade completed. In accordance with instructions from these headquarters, the 59th Brigade successfully advanced their lines during night of 16/17th to a line designated as the start line for an attack to begin on morning of the 17th. 113th Machine Gun Battalion was placed under the command of the Commanding General, 59th Brigade, for the forthcoming attack.

Available for all duty  
) Officers 515
) Men 14,622

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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182-32.3: List

G-3 II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 17, 1918—0600.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 27

[Extract]

WIANCOURT
N.15.d.cent. (62C)
MONTBREHAIN
HAMEL
Near SAULTY
BAIZIEUX

BRITISH UNITS WITH
AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps R. A.

WIANCOURT

AMERICAN UNITS

27th Division
Division Hq. (Adv.)
Division Hq. (rear)
53d Infantry Bde. Hq.
54th Infantry Bde. Hq.

BUSIGNY
BUSIGNY V.16.b.4.9.
BUSIGNY V.16.b.2.5.
BUSIGNY
104th M. G. Bn. Hq.  
102d F. S. Bn. Hq.  
102d San. Train Hq.  

30th Division  
Division Hq. (Adv.)  
Division Hq. (rear)  

59th Infantry Bde. Hq.  
60th Infantry Bde. Hq.  
113th M. G. Bn. Hq.  
105th F. S. Bn. Hq.  
108th San. Train Hq.  

D.9.d.2.0.  
BUSIGNY  
BUSIGNY  

Montbrehain  
NAUROY  

D.3.b.9.6. (62B)  
V.18.d.6.0. (62B)  
MONTBREHAIN  
MONTBREHAIN  
MONTBREHAIN  
JONCOURT  

F. E. BUCHAN,  
Col., Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.  

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230-20.22: Summary of Information

No. 303

[Extract]

1. SITUATION OCTOBER 16 AND NIGHT 16/17 INST.
The situation yesterday remained quiet and unchanged. The Le CATEAU-REUMONT Road was shelled intermittently. The 17th Res. Div. was identified by prisoner captured in Le CATEAU (normal). From his statements, it appears that the Germans are in daily anticipation of attack.

The night was quiet.

The Fourth Army attacked this morning soon after 5 o’clock. No. details have yet been received.

2. ENEMY’S INTENTIONS:
   (a) An Alsatian deserter, captured by the Third Army E. of BRIASTRE on the night 15/16th, states the men had orders to hold the railway embankment in that area. This line appears to be the main line of resistance as far south as St-MARTIN---RIVIERE.
   (b) Prisoners and civilians secured by the French army on our right in the MONT-d’ORIGNY sector, confirm information already received that the positions at present occupied by the enemy are only of temporary nature, and that a progressive retirement will shortly be carried out.
   (c) Prisoners belonging to the 204th Div., captured this morning in the St-SOUPLET area, state there are no reserves in rear, and expect that no counterattacks will be made by them. They think withdrawal probable.

3. RESERVES:
   (a) No further reports or identifications obtained on this army front yesterday.
   (b) The army on our left identified 25th Div., E. of BRIASTRE. This division, fresh from reserve in ALSACE and FLANDERS, came into line on Oct. 11/12, relieving cyclists and jaegers elements. This division is considered an assault division, its coys. appear
well up to strength, having received many new drafts.

It was engaged S. E. of ALBERT, at MEAULTE, and BRAY, in August, where it lost about 900 prisoners, and at BOUCHAUVESNES at the beginning of Sept., but since then has been resting.

(c) The army on our right also identified a new division, the 238th, in the MONT-d'ORIGNY area. This division was formerly in the St-GOBAIN Forest, which they left on the 14th inst., arriving at MONT-d'ORIGNY, in lorries on the next day. They relieved elements of the 82d and 51st Res. Divs. in this sector, but further elements of these two divisions are still in line apparently.

(d) Excluding 23 divisions withdrawn after suffering severe casualties during the past two weeks and 5 Austro-Hungarian divisions, there are 19 enemy divisions in reserve in the western theater, of which 4 are fresh.

4. ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Weather: Mist - rain; low clouds.
(a) Aircraft: There was no flying yesterday.
(b) Movement: Air reconnaissance work was impossible yesterday; no movement was reported by ground observers.

(c) Artillery (up to 6 p. m., Oct. 16, 1918): There was an increase in hostile artillery fire during the night on the northern and center corps fronts, about 1,000 rounds of H. E. and Yellow Cross being fired on the area S. E. of REUMONT, and a heavy bombardment by all caliber on the ESCAUFORT---PROYART Wd.---TERMITAGE area.

5. ENEMY REAR ORGANIZATIONS: Escaped French prisoner of war says much of the machinery of the sawmills in MORMAL Forest was moved back some days ago to the MAUBEUGE area.

6. ENEMY DEFENSES: According to a German map, captured by the French, the Hermann Stellung runs as follows, south of the OISE: Eastern outskirts of MONT-d'ORIGNY and ORIGNY---Ste-BENOITE Road, thence to LUCY---thence to RIBEMONT SUCRERIE---S. end of VILLERS-le-SEC---along road to west of La FERTE [CHEVRESIS]---then due south to east of RIBEMONT [etc]---thence along north bank of the SERRE to CRECY. Behind this is the OISE-HUNDING Riegel, a straight line between BERTAIGNEMONT Farm and FAUCOUZY.


7. DELAYED-ACTION MINES UNDER DESTROYED BRIDGES: A case has been reported on our front of a delayed-action mine going up about 16 days after our occupation, under a bridge which had been destroyed prior to our advance. This form of trap may have been employed elsewhere also and destroyed bridges and crossroads, etc., should be examined for signs of a further demolition arrangement.

GENERAL

The Fourth Army attacked along the entire front early this morning, and from reports received the attack is progressing favorably.

Prisoners from 6 different divisions have already been identified. They state the attack has been expected for some days past. The majority of the prisoners appear to have had orders to hold the line at all costs. There appear to be no reserves in rear other than local ones. Some prisoners considered that a withdrawal was probable.
 Identifications are normal, except that the 243d Div., fresh from reserve, is relieving a tired division in the St-BENIN area, while the 24th Div., recently withdrawn, has again reinforced the line.

V. VIVIAN,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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ANNEX TO FOURTH ARMY SUMMARY, DATED OCT. 17, 1918.

EXTRACTS FROM G. H. Q. SUMMARY NO. 653, DATED 15.10.18

1. DISCIPLINE: The lack of discipline shown by drafts leaving for the front has been several times indicated by reports, and large numbers of desertions are known to have taken place en route. The following are three specific instances:

(i) A draft for the Body Inf. Regt. (Alpine Corps) from MUNICH at the beginning of June, 1915, mutinied, fired off their rifles and severely wounded a major. They were taken back to the depot, and sent to the front in small batches (from prisoners' statements).

(ii) On August 11, 1915, a draft mutinied at NEUSS Station (VIII Corps district). When the Landsturm were called out, the mutineers showed themselves ready to shoot. Thereupon the Landsturm went away. The train did not leave till the following day (from captured letter).

(iii) A march battalion of 500 men was formed from depots in the XI Corps district in May. A number of men from the depot of the 11th Jaeger Bn. had their area [arms?] taken from them and were marched under escort to the station. Their arms were returned to them without ammunition when they were in the train. They had, however, secreted ammunition on them and opened fire on the training ground from the train when leaving. Of this draft, 55 were absent when paraded for entraining, and a further 25 deserted on the journey to the front (from prisoner's statement).

The following war Ministry Order, dated 22.7.18 shows that the German Command admits the seriousness of the situation:

Acts of insubordination committed during the transportation of drafts.

The excesses committed during the transportation of reinforcements to the line have increased, in spite of the numerous instructions which have been issued, and have led to conduct which it is our imperative duty to suppress. The most rigorous measures must be imposed. From all quarters, cases of insubordination have occurred towards those in charge of drafts, escorts, railway officials and sentries. The troops obey neither orders nor instructions, and they have often even offered resistance and have assaulted their superiors.

Amongst some of the principles laid down to remedy the situation are the following:

No man of the draft is allowed to carry ball ammunition.
Closed wagons (goods wagons*) will be detailed for use as cells; the supervision of these will be entrusted to energetic N. C. O.'s.

The essential point is that no man shall at any time feel free from all supervision. If necessary, resistance may be broken by force of arms (requests for assistance to be sent by wire).

von STEIN.

- 632 -
2. STRENGTHS: The following is a translation of an order of the 201st Div. The order is not dated, but it was probably issued about Sept. 19 or 20, 1918:

Divisional Order
By telephone from division to brigade

1. The total casualties of the division amount in round figures to 2,000 up to date. On the basis of an average field strength of 600 per battalion, the division came into action 5,400 strong. About 400 sick must be deducted from this total, leaving 5,000, a further deduction of 2,000 casualties leaves 3,000. From this total, at most, 200 per battalion may be deducted as not belonging to the fighting strength - 1,800. This leaves 1,200 men. A further deduction of 200 men on leave and other causes. The division must accordingly be able to find 1,000 rifles.

The brigade, by means of the most drastic measures, must attain this number in the course of today. During the night of the 21st inst., at the latest, the men will have to be brought up to the regiments in line. By 6 a.m., on the 21st, the brigade will report by telephone that no regiment has more than 600 men out of the line; men on leave are to be included in this total.

2. The brigade will further send out officers to search all farms, villages, and dugouts as far as RANCOURT Farm (exclusive), but including BANTOUZELIE and BANTEUX. Regiments will take similar steps in the case of their transport.

BACHELIN.

Addition by Brigade: Above divisional order for your information. Necessary action to be taken forthwith. Reports will be handed in by 5 a.m. tomorrow, to the effect that not more than 600 men are with the transport. At the same time, the number of men (excluding M. G. Coys.) in line should be stated. It should be noted that in the strength return of yesterday, signalers, runners, and in some cases, light M. G. teams were not included. The measures contained in the above orders with reference to the rounding-up of stragglers will be strictly carried out.

NOTE: On the back of the original document, the following state is given for the

402d Inf. Regt.:

| 1st Bn. | 15 plus 14 plus 2 plus 9 = 40 |
| 2d Bn. | 13 plus 12 plus 6 plus 11 = 42 |
| 3d Bn. | 19 " 13 " 6 minus 3 = 35 Report |

Signalers 36 = 36) at 15:15 a.m.
Staff 17 = 17) 170 men in line

170) 65 M. G. Coy.

M. G. Coys 5 plus 49 plus 11 = 65

235)

36

The 201st Div. came into line near HEUDICOURT on the night of Sept. 6/7, and remained in this area until about Sept. 28, when it was withdrawn after losing 2,133 men as prisoners alone.

According to the divisional estimate, this regiment, with a field strength of 1,800 men, went into line with a fighting strength of 1,000 rifles.

As the regiments of this division lost an average 711 men each, in prisoners, the casualties deducted (1,000 - 235 = 765) are not exaggerated.

* [Probably means freight cars.]
The difficulties of the German Higher Command are demonstrated by the fact that, owing to the low strengths at which battalions are put into line (field strength of 600 men compared with an establishment of 880), they can be reduced to an average of under 40 rifles each in line in a fortnight's fighting. With the same infantry casualties (about 2,300 for the division), battalions going into line up to strength would still have 320 rifles available.

30th Division, Journal of Operations: Fl dr. 165: Telegram

[Extract]

FROM: American 30th Division

DATE: October 17, 1918

TO: General Headquarters, A. E. F.

A. Weather: Cloudy, becoming clear.
B. Infantry and machine-gun activity: Our own and enemy: M. G. very active.
C. Artillery activity: Our artillery supported our infantry with a creeping barrage in an attack which began at 0620.

Enemy artillery put down barrage 12 minutes later behind our front line and since then has been active on our advancing troops and our own and enemy aeroplanes and balloons active. Contact aeroplanes making good reports.

E. Visibility: Fair.
F. Troops Movements: Own: Our troops moving forward in the attack. The enemy's 3d Marines have been sent into the line since the attack began the fight. 3d Marines, 25th Inf. Regt., 26th Inf. Regt., and the 179th Inf. Regt. have been identified on our front.

G. General impression of day: Progress of attack favorable.

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J. Success of our troops: This division attacked at 0520 with one brigade, two regiments in line. Have advanced three and a half kilometers, captured St-MARTIN-RIVIERE, MOLAIN, MARAIS Hill. Prisoners coming in freely and attack progressing favorably.

K. Nil.

L. Any change in location of the lines held by our troops or enemy: Our line runs approximately last report R 31 0 0, X 1 0 0, W 12 Central, W A 55.

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British Fourth Army to Continue Attack October 18, 1918

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,

October 17, 1918—7:30 p. m.

Fourth Army will continue the attack tomorrow morning, 18th inst., together with the French First Army on our right, as follows: IX Corps will attack in conjunction with right of American II Corps as early as possible, at an hour which will be arranged between
IX and American II Corps direct. XIII Corps in conjunction with left of American II Corps will attack at 0530. Fourth Army objective WASSIGNY---X.16.cent.---R34.cent.---R.21. cent.---R.8.cent.---R.1.a. After reaching objective, corps will exploit to the Blue Line as shown on map issued with Fourth Army 20/40 (g), dated 14th inst. Boundaries will remain the same. Ack. by wire.

S. E. HOLLAND, B. G.,
for
M. G. G. S.

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227-32.1: Instructions

Advance of the 27th Division to be Resumed

AUSTRALIAN 4th DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY,
October 17, 1918.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2
Issued under Aust. 4th D. A. Order No. 211

[Extract]

1. INFORMATION: On the 18th instant, at an hour to be notified, the advance will be resumed by the American 27th Division in conjunction with the British 50th Division on the left and the American 30th Division on the right.

2. INTENTION: The advance will be covered by a creeping barrage up to extreme range of guns and thereafter in open warfare formation, supported by the advance guard artillery (Aust. 11th F. A. Brigade), as detailed in Australian 4th Divisional Artillery Order No. 211.

The objective is the CANAL de la SAMBRE-a-l'OISE.

* * * * *

H. J. STAFFORD,
Major, Brigade Major.

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230-32.16: Field Message

Attack Orders for October 18

FROM: 1st Div.

DATE: October 17, 1918 HOUR: 19:40


Whatever line is gained by attack this evening will be held during night by 1st and 2d Inf. Bdes. 3d Inf. Bde. will halt for night S. of VAUX-ANDIGNY hq. with 1st and 2d
Inf. Bdes. Forecast of intentions for 18th as follows:

American 30th Div. propose to exploit forward in early morning without barrage. If this would bring American right in advance of 2d Bde., latter would fight forward with Americans and keep touch. In any case, C. R. A. will arrange for strong arty. preparation of 1/2 an hour at 5:30 a.m. on area S. of RIBEAVILLE and E. of RIBEAVILLE---Le REGRET Rd. 1st Inf. Bde. will probably be relieved early in morning on front ANDIGNY-les-FERMES eastwards to as far as E.6.b.8.2., if front extends so far. Meanwhile, arrangements will be made for organized attack on div. front by 3d and 1st Inf. Bdes., during forenoon. Interbrigade boundary would for this attack be E. and W. grid line through X.19 and 25. To facilitate above if ordered, 3d Inf. Bde. will move at dawn to valley about W.22 and arrange reconnaissances. All formations to cooperate in ascertaining the exact situation as early as possible and report to div. hq. in order that jumping-off line and organized barrage can be settled early. O. C., M. G. Bn., to arrange at same time to be able to cooperate with barrages from all available M. G.'s. For information. 16th and 18th Bdes. of 6th Div. are consolidating Red Dotted Line tonight.

N. N. TANDY,
Lt. Col.

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182-33.3 (No. 3): Summary Intelligence

II CORPS, A. E. F.

From 18, October 16 to 18, October 17, 1918

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS:
(a) Infantry - The corps attacked at 0520 in conjunction with the corps on the right and left. The enemy offered considerable resistance. The left division repulsed a strong counterattack about 1600. Our line at 1800 appeared to run as follows: N. to S., Q23b95-Q23d26-Q29b68-Q30c99-Q30d23-Q36b65-Q36d46-R31c04-R31c52-X1a65-X1a21-X1c43-X7c75-X13b43.

(b) Artillery - During the night, harassing fire. Support to today's operation was given according to program.

* * * * *

III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Enemy artillery repeated counterpreparation bombardment last night over the greater part of our front in H. E. and gas. Harassing fire was normal during the period. It does not appear to have been great. Very poor visibility during the morning. At noon, an artillery patrol failed to locate any hostile battery during the flight. Activity increased during the afternoon and developed into general harassing fire over the whole front. BUSIGNY was shelled at intervals by 15-cm. guns, and ST-SOUPLET area was considerably shelled.

IV. ENEMY'S DEFENSES: Several prisoners refer to a 2d line of trenches from 1 to 4 kilometers east of MOLAIN. They state that they were ordered to hold the line of this morning until the rear line could be prepared, but are unable to locate this rear line accurately.

- 636 -
V. ENEMY'S ATTITUDE: There is no indication that the enemy intends to fall back without further hard fighting.

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KERR T. RIGGS,

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No. 7

AERIAL ANNEX - AMERICAN II CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Reports from dawn to 1800. October 17, 1918.

WEATHER: Thick fog until 1100 made observation impossible. 1100 to 1530, weather misty, visibility poor, with thick fog 1530 after.

OPERATIONS: In spite of weather conditions which made observation difficult in conjunction with operations carried out by the American II Corps, cooperating with flank corps, 4 contact, 2 bombing, 2 counterattack, and 1 artillery patrol were successfully carried out. Owing to weather it was impossible to obtain contact with the infantry after 1530, at which time the approximate line held by our troops was reported as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
Q5d.07, & \quad Q.11.b.0.1, & \quad Q17b.1.5, & \quad Q17d.4.5, & \quad Q23b.9.5, & \quad Q23d.2.6, & \quad Q29b.68, & \quad Q30c.9.9, & \\
Q30d.2.3, & \quad Q.36b.6.5, & \quad Q36d.4.6, & \quad R31c.0.4, & \quad R31c.5.3, & \quad X1a.6.5, & \quad X1a.2.1, & \quad X1c.4.3, \\
X7a.6.5, & \quad X7c.7.5, & \quad X13b.4.3, & & & & & \\
W18d.6.1, & \quad W24a.3.8, & \quad W23b.1.2, & \quad W30a.9.1. (line of flank corps reported by other squadrons).
\end{align*}
\]

MOVEMENT: 1525 - Enemy battery retreating from R20b.

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: 1410 - 2 small fires in A28c.

ENEMY ARTILLERY: 1100 to 1235 - Enemy shelling St-SOUPLLET and area immediately W. of La SELLÉ River between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLLET; 1405 - 1510, shelling MOLAIN, Q29 and Q36; 1525 - Gun reported firing from R20c.4.3.

A. A.: Slight M. G. fire encountered from X7a.5.8., Q18a and b, and X7c.

E. A.: None seen.

BOMBS: 0630 - 2 40-lb. phosphorus bombs dropped on R8 and R 14.

GENERAL: 1235 - S. O. S. sent on counterattack forming in Q24b and d., and R25, about 2 enemy battalions advancing in open order. Flare dropped over the location and message dropped to 18-pounder battery N. W. of St-SOUPLLET. Scout planes together with our own machines attacked these formations inflicting casualties.

BRANCH INTELLIGENCE OFFICE, AMERICAN II CORPS, Attached 3d Squadron, A. F. C.

In the field.

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- 637 -
Operations 30th Division

FROM: American II Corps
DATE: 17th/HOUR: 8 p.m.
TO: American 30th Division
G-3/782.

Our Telegram 782/G-3. Fourth Army will continue its advance tomorrow, October 18. American II Corps will continue its attack at 0530 under the protection of artillery barrage. Objectives R.8.d.6.0-R.14.B.9.0-R.15.c.2.0-R.21.c.7.0-R.27.a.9.0-R.33.b.8.0.-X.3.b.7.0-X.3.d.7.0. The corps interdivisional boundary of today stands. Details of barrage to be arranged by G. O. C. R. A., II Corps, direct with division commanders. Commanding General, 30th Division, will arrange to keep in touch with IX Corps on his right during his advance, disposing troops in echelon on his right and flanks, if necessary.

SIMONDS.

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Operations 30th Division

FROM: Simonds, Chief of Staff
DATE: 17th
TO: Commanding General, American 30th Division
C. of S. 166.

In continuation of our 782 G-3, the corps commander directs that upon reaching objective exploitation be continued to the line of exploitation set for today.

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182-10.2: G-1: Telegram

Need for Replacements

Commanding General, S. O. S., G-1,
American E. F.
242/G-1. Oct. 17

The following replacements needed immediately to fill existing and anticipated losses American 30th Division: Four majors, 28 captains, 84 1st Lieuts., 49 2d Lieuts., 5,000 men, all infantry. Two captains, 2 1st Lieuts., 4 2d Lieuts., 350 men, machine gunners. 1 2d Lieut., 25 switchboard operators, lineman, telegraphers and radio operators, all Signal Corps. 1 captain, 2 1st Lieuts., 2 2d Lieuts., 98 men, all engineers. 11 1st
182-33.3: (No. 3): Order

27th Division Continues the Attack

FIELD ORDER No. 64

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 17, 1918.

1. The army will continue its advance tomorrow, October 18, the II Corps continuing its attack.

2. The 27th Division will attack at 0530 under a creeping barrage, and advance to the following objective, R.8.d.6.0 - R.14.b.9.0. -- R.15.c.2.0. - R.27.a.9.0. - R.33.b.8.0.

3. (a) The 53d and 54th Brigade will continue the advance in the same subsectors as today, leading troops following the barrage closely, and careful arrangements being made for mopping up.

(b) The division reserve will consist of

104th Machine Gun Bn.
102d Engineers (less 1 bn.)
1 Squadron 20th Hussars.

The engineers and 104th Machine Gun Battalion will move at dawn to a position on the east side of the SELLE River on the general line of the railroad near St-SOUPLET, keeping clear of the roads and remain under the orders of the division commander.

(c) The 105th and 106th Machine Gun Battalions will be under the direction of the division machine-gun officer for the barrage. On completion of the barrage, these battalions will be at the disposal of their respective brigade commanders who will arrange for their use.

4. The line upon which the barrage will fall at the Zero hour, 0530, will be announced on addenda sent herewith.

5. Division headquarters - BUSIGNY.

53d Brigade Headquarters - ESCAUFORT.
54th Brigade Headquarters - ESCAUFORT.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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ADDENDA TO FIELD ORDER NO. 64.

The barrage start line will be as follows:

Q.24.c.4.8. due south to and including the Le CATEAU Road, thence southeast on the road to Q.36.b.7.1., thence in a straight line to X.1.a.07.95.
Shortly before Zero, patrols east of the infantry start line which is 250 yards west of above line, should withdraw thereto.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.

No. 30

600, October 16 to 600 October 17, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS: Following a creeping barrage, our troops attacked this morning, at 5:20, on a front of 2,000 yards. In the face of heavy fire from artillery and machine guns, the first objective was reached at 9:20 by the right regiment, and 10:44 by the left regiment.

Identifications. It would appear from identifications that the German divisions are being broken up and separate battalions are being pushed into line wherever required.

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B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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230-33.1: Operations Report

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.
October 18, 1918

From 12 noon, Oct. 16 to 12 noon, Oct. 17, 1918

[Extract]

1. Hostile situation at the beginning of the day normal.
2. No hostile movements observed during the day.
3. The 1st and 2d Marine Reserve Divisions were identified on our front.
4. Nil.
5. The 59th Brigade attacked with two regiments in the line at 0520.
6. The 59th Brigade attacked and by noon had advanced about 3 kilometers, capturing the cities of MOLAIN and St-MARTIN-RIVIERE.

- 640 -
7. The enemy put up a strong resistance, making progress somewhat slow. On our right, the British 6th Division began the attack which was continued later in the day by the British 1st Division, both of the IX Corps. **

* * * * *

9. This division attacked at 5:20 with one brigade, two regiments in the line, and at noon had advanced 3 kilometers, capturing St-MARTIN-RIVIERE and MOLAIN; 9 officers and 200 O. R.

10. Enemy put up strong resistance by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, stopping the progress of our attack before we reached our final objectives.

* * * * *

12. The 59th Brigade tired from fighting all day is to be relieved the night of October 17/18, by the 60th Brigade, which will continue the attack on the morning of the 18th.

* * * * *

14. Morale very good, supplies adequate. The morale of the enemy very low.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Col., G-3.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 30th Div.: Fldr. 3: Instruction

Use of 113th Machine Gun Battalion

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 17, 1918.

BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS NO. 6, SERIES D

1. The 113th Machine Gun Battalion is placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, 60th Brigade, for operations 18th inst. This battalion will move tonight to a point designated by the division machine gun officer, who will report its location to the Commanding General, 60th Brigade.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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- 641 -
Necessary Support for 59th Field Artillery Brigade

FROM: 30th Division
DATE: October 17, 1918
TO: Commanding General, 60th Brigade
87/G-3

Our artillery reports at 15:20 o’clock that the German artillery is putting down a smoke screen west of RIBEAUVILLE, and that some of our artillery was falling back toward railway. Take necessary steps to support 59th Brigade and secure flank in case serious attack develops from that direction. Acknowledge.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Comdg. 30th Division.

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Relief of 59th Brigade

FROM: General Lewis, Commanding American 30th Division
DATE: October 17, 1918
HOUR: 19 h. SENT BY: Telegram
TO: American II Corps

If at dusk this evening, the 60th Brigade has not passed through the 59th Brigade, it will relieve the latter on the line then held by it. The 59th Brigade, when passed through or relieved, will be held in reserve with foremost elements about 2,000 yards in rear of line; brigade to be disposed in depth, sheltered as much as possible and arranged to support line if necessary and protect both flanks.

60th Brigade will rectify line to connect with flank divisions and will patrol well to front. Orders for tomorrow will be sent during night. Reports showing dispositions and locations both brigades, will be forwarded as soon as possible by all means available.

General LEWIS,
Commanding American 30th Division.

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Operations 30th Division

FROM: 30th Division
DATE: 17th
HOUR: 23:30
NO.: G3/91

TO: C. G., 59th Brigade, C. G., 60th Brigade

G-3/91. Warning Order. Division continues attack under artillery barrage, 18th instant, Zero hour 0530 o'clock. 60th Brigade attacking line, 59th Brigade division reserve. C. G., 59th Brigade, will place two battalions under C. G., 60th Brigade, for flank protection, one battalion on either flank to follow 1,000 yards in rear of 60th Brigade. Objective: R 27 a 9.0 to R33 b 8.0 to X 3 b 7.0 to X 3 d 7.0. Start line is road in W 12 b and d, and 100 yards east of same road in 6d and W 12 b. The barrage starts on 147 minute line on barrage map of 17th instant, remains three minutes and lifts 100 yards every three minutes. The British 1st Division will not move before 10 o'clock, therefore attacking line must be pivoted on right, keeping contact with British 1st Division on right, and 27th Division on left. This requires no movement on extreme right, but considerable movement on left in order to keep touch with 27th. When British 1st Division moves forward, our right will move with them. Acknowledge.

Lt. Col., G. S.


FORTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 17, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Fourth Army resumed operations between SEBONCOURT and Le CATEAU in connection with the French First Army attacking from MONT-d'ORIGNY---SEBONCOURT. * * *

The first objective, or Red Line, included ANDIGNY-les-FERMES, LA VALLEE-MULATRE, west of RIBEAUVILLE, west of BAZUEL, N. E. of Le CATEAU, with an intermediate objective (Red Dotted Line) running approximately ANDIGNY-les-FERMES---west of La VALLEE MULATRE---west of l'ARBRE-de-GUISE-station south of Le CATEAU.

The second objective represented by a Green Line embraced WASSIGNY, MAZINGHIEIN, and BAZUEL. When this line had been secured the intention was to exploit success towards the OISE Canal to ensure protection for the right flank of the attack.

* * * * *

A bombardment of the enemy's defensive system commenced at 0800 on October 15 and continued intermittently until Zero on October 17. Gas shells were employed freely and vigorous counterbattery work was carried out. 6" guns sited well forward engaged distant objectives, including canal crossings and approaches at OISY, CATILLON, LANDRECIES, ORS, and BOUSIES.

Zero was at 5:20 a. m., at which hour the infantry advanced to the assault under cover of a creeping barrage which came down 200 yards in front of the infantry start line.
This barrage was formed by 18-pdrs. firing shrapnel and 4.5" Hows. using 106 fuzes. The first lift occurred at Zero plus 3 minutes. Subsequent lifts of 100 yards took place at 3-minute intervals throughout. There was a halt of 30 minutes for a protective barrage 300 yards in front of the Red Dotted Line, on conclusion of which the barrage moved forward.

The enemy's reply to our barrage was fairly light south of St-SOUPLET, but heavy north of the village, chiefly in the valleys in rear of our front line. The enemy fired a heavy counterpreparation programme along the ESSARTS Valley about an hour before Zero, but retaliatory fire after the commencement of the attack was weak.

Although all the objectives were not gained, some progress was made along the whole of the front. North of St-SOUPLET, La SELLE River formed a formidable obstacle and considerable was experienced in clearing Le CATEAU of the enemy.

The IX Corps realized an advance of approximately 5,000 yards reaching the Red Line, east of ANDIGNY and La VALLEE-MULATRE. Fighting was severe all day, the enemy making repeated counterattacks in consequence of which progress was slow.

Strong counterattacks were directed against RIBEAUVILLE and La VALLEE-MULATRE. The former was at one time held by the IX Corps who were unable to maintain it. A counterattack in the vicinity of Le QUENNELET Farm at the junction of the American II and XIII Corps forced our troops back about 1,000 yards, but the ground lost was regained later. La VALLEE-MULATRE changed hands once, but was eventually occupied by us.

As the result of the day's operations, the line was established along the northern edge of ANDIGNY Wood---ANDIGNY-les-FERMES (inclusive)---La VALLEE-MULATRE (inclusive)---l'ARBRE-de-GUISE---Le QUENNELET Farm---along road to Le CATEAU---thence to BAILLON Farm (inclusive).

4,000 prisoners were captured and 42 guns, including 2 complete batteries.

2. IX CORPS: The attack was carried out by the 46th Division on a one-brigade front on the right and by the 6th Division on the left operating on a two-brigade front. The 1st Division was concentrated in the vicinity of VAUX-ANDIGNY, in support of the 6th Division. The original intention was for the 6th Division to capture the Red Line and the 1st Division to pass through and gain the Green Line or second objective.

The 46th Division captured REGNICOURT and gained the Red Dotted Line along the northern outskirts of ANDIGNY Wood without much trouble, except at ANDIGNY-les-FERMES, which the enemy held in considerable strength. After hard fighting, the village was captured and mopped up; and in order to assist the French exploitation commenced towards MENNEVRET. Progress was made as far as E.17 north of MENNEVRET, where junction was effected with the French who had reached the northern outskirts of the village.

The attack of the 6th Division east of VAUX-ANDIGNY received a check from the outset chiefly on account of strong machine-gun nests in the vicinity of BELLEVUE in W.26.d. This opposition was overcome and the advance continued to the Red Dotted Line without serious opposition.

At this time, the 1st Division, who were following in support of the 6th Division, encountered resistance from isolated enemy machine guns which apparently had been overlooked by the moppers-up of the 6th Division on account of the ground mist combined with the smoke and dust. These machine guns impeded the progress of the 1st Division and were not mopped up for some considerable time.

Meanwhile, the 6th Division was held up on the Red Dotted Line and unable to proceed. The barrage had moved on and the enemy held La VALLEE-MULATRE in strength.

The 1st Division moved through the 6th Division capturing La VALLEE-MULATRE and gained the Red Line, entering RIBEAUVILLE, but were obliged to withdraw from the latter village on account of a vigorous counterattack. Late in the afternoon, the enemy counterattacked La VALLEE-MULATRE with some success, but the 1st Division regained the ground lost in a determined attack later in the afternoon.

Fighting was very heavy all day. The tanks suffered heavy casualties early in the
operations and were unable to render much assistance owing to the enemy's destructive
day, 2,000 prisoners and 30 guns were captured.

AMERICAN II CORPS: The American 30th and 27th Divisions attacked, each on a one-
notwithstanding this disadvantage the infantry gained the Red Dotted Line and
Considerable opposition was encountered from l'ARBRE-de-GUISE and Q.23.d. and Q.29. d., where a hostile counterattack drove the American 27th Division almost back to the railway. However, pressure was maintained and the line reestablished along the road in Q.23. and Q.30.a.
l'ARBRE-de-GUISE was eventually captured and held in spite of vigorous attempts of the enemy to recapture it.

During the day, 1,600 prisoners were secured and 12 guns captured.

In view of the heavy fighting experienced, it is considered that a large number of the enemy were killed.

XIII CORPS: The task of the XIII Corps in view of the difficulties presented by La SELLE River north of St-BENIN was no mean one. Between St-BENIN and Le CATEAU, the river is very deep and wide and impassable to all arms.

50th Division attacked with one brigade, with the remaining brigades in support and in reserve.

The attacking brigade crossed the river between St-SOUPLET and St-BENIN and deploying to the left, attacked the railway under cover of the artillery barrage combined with a smoke barrage provided by 4" Stokes mortars.
The enemy defended the railway vigorously with machine guns and the progress was slow. Consequently, the support brigade after crossing the river, became slightly disorganized, and, hampered by the ground mist, became involved in the fight for the possession of the railway.
The railway was finally cleared as far north as the station in Q.10.b. Later, this was captured and the line advanced to the road in Q.23 and Q.17, but the enemy still held the railway triangle in Q.5 with machine guns and supported by numerous trench mortars.

Meanwhile, the 66th Division, which had attacked north of Le CATEAU, and was also engaged in mopping up the eastern portion of the town, crossed La SELLE, but were held up by a strong belt of wire immediately east of the river. Attempts were made to surmount this obstacle, but were prevented by heavy machine-gun fire.
The troops were temporarily withdrawn and again attacked under cover of a revised artillery programme, and eventually gained the line of the railway from K.35.central to K.29. central. Further attempts to proceed were unsuccessful.

As the result of the day's fighting, the line was established along the road from Le QUENNELET Farm to Le CATEAU, through the eastern outskirts of Le CATEAU---K.35. central---K.29. central.
The fighting was exceptionally severe on this front and our casualties fairly heavy.
600 prisoners were captured

3. THIRD ARMY: Situation quiet and unchanged.
4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: French First Army attacked between MONT-d'ORIGNY and SEBONCOURT, with the OISE Canal as the objective.
The enemy offered a determined resistance and counterattacked several times during the day.
As the result of the day's operations, 1,200 prisoners were secured and the line established west of HAUTEVILLE---western outskirts of AISONVILLE and GROUGIS---west and N. W. of MENNEVRET.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 252 hours were flown by 229 pilots. Ten successful reconnaissances were carried out and 7 artillery patrols during which two zone calls were sent down without success. One indecisive combat took place.
   86 25-lb. bombs and 32 40-lb. phosphorus bombs were dropped on suitable ground targets.
   (b) Hostile: No flying.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through Army cages 50 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s 3 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Low clouds and mist.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: 1st Division passed through 6th Division at Zero and took over the front, 6th Division being drawn into reserve.
   46th Division moved into reserve.
   American 27th and 30th Divisions shared the front, American 30th Division being moved up from reserve.

9. COMPOSITION OF FOURTH ARMY:
   IX Corps. 1st*, 6th, 32d*, 46th Divisions.
   American II Corps. American 27th and 30th Divisions.
   XIII Corps. 18th*, 25th*, 50th, 66th Divisions.
   Australian Corps. Australian 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 5th Divisions (army reserve).
   Cavalry Corps (G. H. Q. reserve). 1st Cavalry Division (G. H. Q. reserve). 5th Cavalry Brigade (army reserve).

*Corps reserve.

10. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE:

   13-pdr. A. A. H. E. 60
   13-pdr. R. H. A. H. E. 1,380
     " S. 1,865
   18-pdr. H. E. 61,210
     " S 80,913
     " Smoke 7,552
   4.5" How. H. E. 25,054
     " C. G. 497
   60-pdr. H. E. 4,918
   4.5" How. Smoke 3,076
   60-pdr. S. 6,102
   6" How. H. E. 28,368
   6" Mk. VII H. E. 663
     " S. 513
   8" How. H. E. 2,711
   9.2" How. H. E. 2,522

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ST-SOUPLET--ARBRE-DE-GUISE AREA
Looking east from St-Souplet
FROM: Commanding General
TO: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 17, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING THE DAY: No change.
2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF THE ENEMY DURING THE DAY: That he has been reinforced by another division and will probably offer a stubborn resistance. Prisoners state that they had been expecting an attack for the previous three nights, but our attack was a surprise as they had been told that an armistice would be declared on the 18th instant.
3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: Enemy put up stiff resistance to our advance, counterattacking severely on both our right and left flanks.
4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.
5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Unchanged. Back areas shelled during night. Line now occupied by both divisions, 30th Division on right.
6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Our corps attacked at 0520 h., preceded by artillery barrage.
7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: IX Corps on right, XIII Corps on left attacked simultaneously.
8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None.
10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: The enemy's main line of resistance on high ground east of La SELLE River was penetrated. Prisoners estimated at 2500.
11. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy will probably continue to offer stiff resistance to our further progress as his line has been reinforced.
12. PLANS FOR FUTURE: The attack will be continued, assisted by artillery barrage at 0520 h. on the 18th instant.
13. REMARKS, MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale high, health good, supplies satisfactory; weather cool and rainy.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

30th Div.: War Diary

[Extract]

At 5:20 a. m., under cover of a heavy artillery barrage, the 59th Brigade attacked the enemy and advanced across La SELLE River. The 118th Infantry at 9:40 a. m. had taken
St-MARTIN-RIVIERE. The 117th Infantry at 8:10 a. m. were reported in MOLAIN. During the progress of the day's fighting, enemy strongly counterattacked from direction of RIBEAUVILLE and forced our troops back along railway in squares W.12.a and c. At the end of day's heavy fighting, the line ran approximately along road in W.12.b and d., and 100 yards east of the same road in W.6.d and W.12.b, which line was designated as a start line for attack to begin on morning of 18th inst. All during day, the 60th Brigade followed closely behind the 59th Brigade, and was ordered to pass through them during the night.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Available for all duty</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>506</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>14,430</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

59th Brig., 30th Div.: War Diary

[Extract] October 17, 1918.

At 5:20 a. m., under cover of heavy fog and creeping barrage, an attack was launched by this brigade on La SELLE River front, in conjunction with the 16th Brigade of the British 6th Division on the right and the 53d Brigade of the 27th Division on the left. The two regiments of the brigade side by side. 117th on right and 118th on left, each with one bn. in line, one in support and one (less 2 cos.) in reserve, the four companies held out being formed into a brigade reserve under command of the senior C. O. of the 4 companies. All objectives were taken, but the 117th experienced delay on account of strength of opposition met in MOLAIN, which was defended by German marines who had been sent down from CAMBRAI front. Our casualties were not especially heavy in proportion to the losses inflicted upon the enemy, and were practically all due to enemy shelling and M. G.'s.

On the night of 17/18, the 59th Brigade was relieved by the 60th Brigade and its troops retired to positions about 2,000 yards behind front line, and dug in to protect against hostile fire.

General Tyson, Major Wyrick, Lt. Rye, and Lt. Frazee very busy all day getting news from the front and directing the battle. All went well and the advance made was considered quite remarkable, considering how badly crippled we were in numbers. Major Wyrick out quite late at night seeing to the relief of the brigade.

T. J. WYRICK,
Major, A. G., Adjutant.
60th Brig., 30th Div.: War Diary

October 17, 1918.

[Extract]

119th Inf. from BUSIGNY area to VAUX-ANDIGNY area.
120th Inf. from V.20.d. to V.18.d.7.0.
115th M. G. Bn. from PORTS Farm to support line.
119th Inf. attacked enemy at 5:45 a.m., passing through 117th Inf. and assisted in taking 117th objective. 120th moved forward in support, awaiting 118th Inf. to take their objective.
115th M. G. Bn. moved to support lines to assist in attack.

Available for all duty

<table>
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<th>Officers</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>149</td>
<td>4,554</td>
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</table>

C. A. GOSNEY, 1st Lieut.


301st TANK BATTALION, A. E. F.,

October 17, 1918.

Reference) 57B, 1/40,000 Z day---October 17, 1918
Maps: ) 57A, 1/40,000 Zero hour---5:10 h.

[Extract]

(1) GENERAL PLAN: The 4th Tank Brigade, consisting of units as listed below, was allotted as follows:

6th Tank Battalion (Whippets) to IX Corps
16th Tank Battalion to IX Corps
301st Tank Battalion to American II Corps
1st Tank Battalion to XIII Corps
10th Tank Battalion to Fourth Army Reserve

The 301st Battalion was assigned to the American II Corps for the operation on the 17th instant.

10 tanks under Captain Ralli were assigned to operate with the 27th Division on the left, and 15 tanks under Captain Clark were assigned to operate with the 30th Division on the right.

Due to the fact that the SELLE River was on an average of five hundred yards in front of the infantry jumping-off line, the infantry were told not to expect any aid from the tanks until after the river had been crossed. The tanks were to cross the river as soon as crossings could be located and catch up with the infantry and follow the barrage. On the extreme right of the 30th Division sector where the jumping-off line was one thousand yards from the river and where Hun strongpoints were known to exist, four tanks to jump off with the infantry at Zero and were to assist them in reaching the river.
INFANTRY: The offensive was to be resumed by the entire Fourth Army with the British
XIII Corps on the left, the American II Corps in the center, and the British IX Corps on
the right.

After an advance of 2,500 yards (to the Red Dotted Line), there was to be a halt of
thirty minutes to allow the infantry to rest and reorganize, after which the advance was to
be resumed to the first objective (the Red Line). Here the infantry were to halt for
three hours and then push on to the second objective (the Blue Line). The advance from the
first to the second objective was to be made according to the principles of open warfare.
The second objective was to be consolidated and, if possible, patrols were to be pushed on
to the line of exploitation (the Green Line).

Tanks were to advance as far as the second objective and then rally.

ARTILLERY: The artillery was to conduct a general bombardment from Zero minus forty-
eight hours until Zero minus one hour. All known strongpoints and battery positions were
to receive special attention and gas was to be used freely.

The general scheme of the artillery was as follows:
1. Counterbattery work.
2. Harassing fire.
3. Bombarding known strongpoint
4. Cutting wire.

(2) PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS:

LIAISON WITH THE INFANTRY: At 10 a.m., October 15, the battalion commander attended
a conference at corps headquarters. The commanders of infantry, artillery, cavalry,
R. A. F., and tanks were present at this conference, and the arrangements for the opera-
tion were made.

At 2:30 p.m., the commanding officer of the company that was to operate with the
27th Division, attended a conference at 27th Division Headquarters.

At 4 p.m., the commander of the company that was to operate with the 30th Division,
attended a conference at 30th Division Headquarters.

At both of these conferences the plan of the operations was communicated to the regi-
mental commanders concerned and the details of the tank operations were arranged.

LIAISON WITH THE R. A. F.: Arrangements were made with the R. A. F. for the follow-
ing:
1. Noise planes from Zero minus four hours until Zero.
2. Contact planes during the action.
3. Antitank gun planes.
4. Smoke bombs from planes.

The 8th Squadron, R. A. F., were asked to make a low-flying reconnaissance of the
SELLE River.

(3) RECONNAISSANCE: All tank and platoon commanders were taken over the forward
areas and were shown all of the prominent landmarks from observation posts.

The battalion reconnaissance officer made a special reconnaissance of the SELLE
River. To make this reconnaissance, he went out with an infantry patrol behind the Hun
lines and brought back valuable information concerning the river crossings.

The 8th Squadron, R. A. F., were asked to make a low-flying reconnaissance of the
SELLE River, and the following day they furnished the battalion R. Q. with a map showing
the river from its source to a point well out of our sector. On this map were marked (a)
all probable crossings for tanks, (b) all points where tanks would probably have difficul-
ty in crossing, (c) all points where the banks were marshy, (d) all points where bridges
had been blown up and tank obstacles erected.

Each tank commander was furnished a map of the sector in which he was to operate.
Tape was laid by the company reconnaissance officers.

(4) APPROACH MARCHES: At 4:30 on the afternoon of the 15th, the tanks left the
tankadrome at SERAIN and moved up behind the railroad bank near BUSIGNY. The distance
travelled was 4,500 yards and all tanks arrived in good condition.

The tanks laid up here all day (the 16th), and a kitchen was brought up to provide hot food for the men.

About midnight on the night of 16/17, the tanks left their lying-up place and moved forward. They halted in rear of PROYART Wood and filled up with petrol, after which the two companies followed different routes, B Company going north and C Company going south of La HAIE-MENNERESSE. The tanks were heavily shelled while they were in the vicinity of PROYART Wood, and one man was wounded, but no damage was done to the tanks.

The distance travelled on this march was 5,500 yards.
20 tanks started. Of these that did not start, all five had mechanical trouble.

(5) COMMUNICATIONS:

PIGEONS: No pigeons were used in this operation.

RUNNERS: Each company and platoon commander had two runners, but these were of little value due to the difficulty of finding one's way in the fog.

WIRELESS: The wireless tank furnished this battalion for this operation burned out on the approach march and another tank that was not mechanically fit was substituted. Only one message was received from the wireless tank as the observer was unable to see anything of the progress of the battle due to the heavy fog.

AIRPLANES: Planes were unable to fly all morning due to the heavy fog. Three messages were dropped in the afternoon, the first one arriving at 1:30.

Communication was maintained between battalion and companies by runner. Battalion headquarters was located about 100 yards from 27th Division Hq. and the communication was maintained by runner.

(6) RALLYING POINTS: Before the operation, an advance rallying point was selected in the vicinity of ADVANTAGE Farm. The tanks were to assemble here and fill up with petrol after which they were to proceed back to the original lying-up place near BUSIGNY, and the following day they were to proceed to SERAIN.

Due to the failure of the operation to make the expected progress, the tanks actually rallied near PROYART Wood and were then brought back to BUSIGNY. Hot coffee was served to the men at the rallying point.

(7) SUPPLIES: Eighteen fills were dumped at the railroad track near BUSIGNY on the morning of the 17th, and these were loaded on limbers and were to be sent to ADVANTAGE Farm. Some of these fills were sent to PROYART Wood and two were sent forward from there to tanks that had run out of petrol.

Supply tanks could have been used to good advantage as several tanks used up their petrol and ammunition supplies, and were forced to withdraw from action.

(8) CONDITIONS: The SELLE River proved to be a very slight obstacle to the tanks. Two tanks were ditched in the river, but one of these was lost and attempted to cross above the designated crossing limit, and the other was ditched in marshy ground near the banks of the river.

The ground was excellent for tank operations and was very little affected by the bombardment and barrage.

The weather was exceedingly poor for tank operations and was largely responsible for the poor showing made by the tanks. From Zero until noon (5:20 until 12), there was a fog and it was practically impossible for the drivers to see where they were going. Many got lost in the fog and by the time the fog had lifted their supplies of petrol were used up and they were forced to withdraw from the action. In my opinion, it would have been much better to have held the tanks out of action until after the fog had lifted.

(9) OPERATIONS: Nineteen tanks went into action, three of which reached their first objectives. All of the tanks went over the top and engaged with the enemy and had varying targets. Four tanks report having used up all of their ammunition.

Tanks rendered excellent assistance to the infantry in aiding them to reach the river. Due to the individual effort of several tank commanders, valuable assistance was rendered to the infantry after crossing the river. Although the attack was not going according to
plan, these tank commanders went to the aid of the infantry wherever they saw them hung up and put out many machine-gun nests and helped the infantry to advance.

(10) CASUALTIES: Casualties both to personnel and tanks were slight in this operation.

* * * * *

(11) REORGANIZATION: Seventeen tanks rallied. None of these tanks were fit for further operation until they could have a complete overhauling.

(12) LESSONS: It is practically useless to employ tanks under weather conditions such as existed this date. Tanks have extreme difficulty in keeping their courses and are unable to fire their guns effectively in heavy fog.

Tank commanders must be impressed with the fact that it is their duty to aid the infantry in every possible manner and at every possible moment. They must be impressed with the fact that it is their duty to carry on the fight as long as their tank is mechanically fit and they have the necessary supplies. If the attack is not progressing according to schedule they must continue the fight and do everything in their power to aid the infantry, and place them on their objectives.

R. B. HARRISON,
Major, Tank Corps,
Commanding.

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HS Brit. File: II Corps: Fldr. 5: War Diary

IX CORPS, B. E. F.

Place: POEUILLY

Date: Oct. 17.

Summary of Events and Information

The attack commenced at 5:20 a. m. The corps commander, the B. G. G. S., and Colonel Burritt left POEUILLY at about 7 a. m., and proceeded to the corps advanced headquarters at MAGNY-la-FOSSE. The corps attacked with two divisions in the line, the 46th Division being on the right and the 6th Division on the left, each of these divisions had two brigades in the line and one in support. The order from left to right being---16th Inf. Brig., 18th Inf. Brig., 138th Inf. Brig., and 139th Inf. Brig.

The 71st Inf. Brig. was in support to the 6th Division just N. of BOHAIN. The 137th Inf. Brig. was to hold the line just W. of the RIQUERVAL Wood, which was not being attacked frontally, and if the attack of the 138th and 139th Inf. Brig. was a success, could then withdraw into support.

The 1st Division, which had moved forward during the evening of the 16th inst. by march route from the BELLENGLISE area to assembly positions just N. and W. of BOHAIN, was to leap-frog through the 6th and 46th Divisions on the Dotted Red Line being reached and to continue the attack. The French XV Corps were cooperating on the south and the American II Corps and British XIII Corps were also attacking on the north. The general idea was for the IX Corps to attack north of the Forêt Domanial [d'ANDIGNY] and the French XV Corps to attack along the southern edge and thus pinch out the wood.

The role of the 46th Division was to maintain touch between the right of the IX Corps and the left of the French corps, also to mop up the RIQUERVAL and DOMINIAL Woods, if the attack progressed successfully. The attack was launched under a heavy barrage and
supported by tanks and in spite of the weather being dull and misty, good progress was made, and the first objective or Dotted Red Line was reached by the 16th, 18th and 138th Inf. Brig. at an early hour. The 16th Brig. completed the capture of VAUX-ANDIGNY and pushed forward through the BOIS-St-PIERRE to the western outskirts of La VALLEE-MULATRE. The 18th Inf. Brig. captured BELLEVUE Ridge and Les GOBELETS. The 138th Brig. advanced very rapidly and captured ANDIGNY-les-FERMES by 11:30 a.m., meanwhile the 139th Brig. had heavy fighting around REGNICOURT, which was strongly contested by the enemy who delivered a heavy counterattack in this quarter at 11:20 a.m., this attack was completely repulsed by M. G. and artillery fire. As soon as the Dotted Red Line was reached, the 1st Division passed through the 6th Division towards the Red Line, the 2d Inf. Brig. being on the north, and the 1st Inf. Brig. on the south. Very strong resistance was encountered all along the line and heavy fighting took place, especially in the village of La VALLEE-MULATRE which after being penetrated by our troops at about 2 p.m., was immediately counterattacked in force by the enemy who temporarily succeeded in regaining the village, but subsequently an attack delivered at 5:30 p.m., the whole of the village was once more retaken and at night, our troops had gained the Red Line. The 46th Division had by this time mopped up the RIOUSERVAL Wood and by pushing forward through the Forêt Domanial [d'ANDIGNY] established touch with the French at a point on the south edge of the wood just N. W. of MENNEVRET. The French corps on our right and the American corps on our left had also experienced heavy fighting and considerable resistance all day. The total prisoners captured by the IX Corps during this day's operations amounted to about 150 officers and 1500 other ranks, amongst these were prisoners from 31 different battalions of 13 different regiments of 6 different divisions, showing that the enemy, although he had greatly reinforced this portion of his front, was in a bad state of disorganization. Orders were issued by telegram (G.11) at about 7 p.m. for the 6th Division to consolidate the Red Dotted Line and for the attack to be continued by the 1st Division in the morning in conjunction with the French and American corps.

The 32d Division was ordered to proceed by march route, in the morning from their present locations round BOUVINCOURT and Le CATELET to the BELLENGUER-PONTRUET area. The corps commander, the B. G. G., and G. S. O., II Operations, returned to corps near hq. at 7:30 p.m.

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On October 18, the II Corps occupies Ribeauville, Jonc de Mer Farm, and La Roue Farm. On October 19, the British 1st Division relieves the 30th Division and on October 20, the latter moves to QUERIEU as corps reserve and, on October 21, passes to army reserve. On October 21, the British 6th Division relieves the 27th Division, which passes to corps and then army reserve. II Corps Headquarters is relieved by British IX Corps Headquarters and moves into army reserve.

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- 654 -
Location II Corps Units

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 18, 1918—6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LIST NO. 28

Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)
Headquarters II Corps (rear)
412th Tel. Bn. Hq.
318th Field Signal Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron
(Att. to 13th Wing
3d Brig. R. A. F.)

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. VII Corps R. A.
Hq. Aust. 4th D. A.
Hq. Aust. 3d D. A.
Hq. C. R. E. Aust. Corps
Hq. 4th Tank Brig.
301st Tank Bn. (American)
5th Brigade, R. A. F.
15th Wing, R. A. F.
3d Squadron, A. F. C.
5th Balloon Wing
Cavalry Corps
20th Regt. Hussars

AMERICAN UNITS

27th Division

Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (rear)

53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
54th Infantry Brigade Hq.
104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
102d Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
102d San. Train Hq.

WIANCOURT
N.15.d.cent. (62C)
MONTBREHAIN
WIANCOURT
Near SAULTRY
BAIZIEUX

WIANCOURT
V.9.c.25.80 (57B)
DOINGT
C.22.a.2.2. (62B)
BELLCOURT G.10.a.9.9.
U.21.a.8.6. (57B)
SERAINE
ESTREES-en-CHAUSSEE
ELINCOURT (Billet 35)
PREMONT C.d.4.
F.18. (62C)
J.1.c.9.0. (62C)
VAUX-le-PRETRE

BUSIGNY
JONCOURT

ESCAUFOURT
ESCAUFOURT
BUSIGNY
BUSIGNY
BUSIGNY
BUSIGNY
30th Division

Division Headquarters (Adv.)
Division Headquarters (rear)
59th Infantry Brig. Hq.
60th Infantry Brig. Hq.
113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
105th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
105th San. Train Hq.

MONTBREHAIN
NAUROY
D.3.b.9.6. (62B)
V.18.d.6.0.
MONTBREHAIN
C.12.d.3.5. (62B)
MONTBREHAIN
JONCOURT

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. IV B, II Corps: Telegram

Advance of British Fourth Army Units Ordered

ADVANCED HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 18, 1918—10:15 p. m.

G.420

Fourth Army have today captured all their objectives. Corps will exploit tomorrow to the Blue Line as issued with Fourth Army No. 20/40 (G), dated Oct. 14. Ack. by wire.

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182-32.16: Telegram

Operations II Corps

From: IX Corps, B. E. F.
Date: October 18, 1918 Hour 22 h.
To: American II Corps

G 832. Reference Message G 630 of today. 1st Division will continue advance tomorrow at 5:30. Acknowledge.

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- 656 -
Operations II Corps

AUSTRALIAN 5th DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY

INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES F, NO. 3

LIAISON

[Extract]

1. The success of the artillery action in the forthcoming operation will to a very large extent depend on close liaison with the attacking infantry both before and during the operation.
2. The following instructions refer to those exploitation groups which function after the capture of the first objective.
3. (a) The right and left groups will each send an officer, of the rank of major, to the exploiting infantry brigade. If a major cannot be spared a senior captain will be sent.
   (b) The right and left groups will each send an officer to each of the exploiting battalions they will support.
4. The officers to be detailed in accordance with the above will report to the respective headquarters by 18 h., October 16, 1918.
5. The officers commanding the exploiting sections and mobile trench mortars will get in personal touch, as soon as possible, with the battalions they will support. Groups will report to this office as soon as these instructions have been carried out.

* * * * *

Captain,
Brigade Major,
Aust. 5th Divl. Artillery.

Issued at MONTBREHAIN H.6.b.8.2., at 2330, Oct. 15, 1918.

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182-33.3, No. 3: Telegram from Br. IX to Am. II Corps

Operations Adjoining II Corps

IX CORPS, B. E. F.,
October 18, 1918.

American II Corps:

1st Division have occupied WASSIGNY and have posts at BLOCUS-d' en-BAS. Thence line runs N. N. W. by X 21 - X.15 to X 14 B, thence westward to BELLEVUE in X 13.

Situation at RIEBEUVILLE uncertain. 46th Division have detachment at F 8 central in touch with French. 1st Division will, tomorrow, continue their advance and establish themselves on high ground overlooking canal in X 18 and 24, establishing touch with French XV Corps, who are resuming their advance on OISY at 5:30.
1st Division left to be pushed forward on REJET-de-BEAULIEU in conjunction with any attack made by American corps on MAZINGHIEN.

46th Division will keep one battalion of 137th Brigade to maintain touch between 1st Division and French XV Corps until G. O. C., 1st Division, is satisfied that the 1st Division has firmly established touch with left of French XV Corps. Detachment of 46th Division will then be withdrawn.

On withdrawal, detachments of Royal Scots Greys and 9th Cyclist with 46th Division will return to their units. 6th Division will keep one brigade between Dotted Red Line and line VAUX-ANDIGNY---REGNICOURF, both inclusive, as support to be called on by 1st Division on emergency.

Other brigade 6th Division at present on Red Dotted Line can be withdrawn to BOHAIN. Acknowledge.

G-230 IX Corps.

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182-10.2: Report

Situation Report

From II Corps

Date: October 18, 1918 Hour: 1315

To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

794 G-3: Situation report 24 hours ending 6 h., October 18. Our line well established during night. Enemy activity above normal. Attack resumed at 5:30 this morning progressing favorably.

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182-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 16 AMERICAN II CORPS.

From 18 h., October 17 to 18 h., October 1918

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS:

(a) INFANTRY: The attack begun yesterday was resumed this morning. The left division, in conjunction with the corps on the left, attacked at 5:30, and advanced its line about 2500 yards. The right division, in conjunction with the corps on the right, attacked at 11:30, and advanced its line about 2500 yards. All advances were made against strong enemy resistance.

(b) ARTILLERY: Usual harassing fire. Targets of opportunity were engaged. During the operations in the morning, our infantry was supported according to programme.

(c) PRISONERS: During the twenty-four hours ending 12:00, 18/10/18, the following unwounded prisoners passed through the corps cage: 31 officers and 1,275 O. R. Total since October 5: 77 officers and 2,917 O. R.

* * * * *
III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: The shelling during the period has been light, with temporary increases at noon and 14 h. Reports indicate that single guns have been used while the batteries were being withdrawn. Air reports show that the batteries are withdrawing to CATILLON area. Of the locations received from the air, one-half were across the canal. During the morning, BUSIGNY was intermittently shelled with high velocity guns and during the afternoon the area east of St-SOUPLET and along the river.

IV. ENEMY'S DEFENSES: A sketch map taken from a prisoner of the 204th Div. shows a line marked HERMANN STELLUNG II, just east of CATILLON, apparently indicating a trench line along the east bank of the canal. The map also shows a line marked ART. ST. from LA GROISE to LANDRECIES, about 800 yds. west of the La GROISE-LANDRECIES Road.

Canal: Prisoners of the 2d Marine Regt. and the 113th I. R. (29th D.) state that the heavy bridges over the canal have been destroyed and light bridges 50 meters apart have been built across the canal. These light bridges have been mined and connected by electric wires.

V. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: Prisoner of the 1st Res. Co., 24th Pioneer Bn., 3d Naval Div., states that a few days ago he was told by the commander of the 9th F. A. R. (which is now near MAZINGHIEN), that if the situation became desperate, every available man would be put into the firing line in order to make a stand west of the canal. He further states that about 3 days ago all of the villages west of the canal were cleared of civilians. Prisoner saw many civilians assembled in the village near VALENCIENNES and heard that all civilians had been evacuated from VALENCIENNES and MAUBEUGE.

Prisoners of the 17th Res. Div. and the 243d Div. also state that they had orders to hold the position at all costs.

The above statements, taken in connection with the indication on captured map (see ENEMY'S DEFENSES), that the HERMANN STELLUNG runs along the east side of the canal in this sector, indicate that further stubborn resistance is to be expected.

* * * * *

KERR T. RIGGS,

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182-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 8 October 18, 1918.

AERIAL ANNEX---AMERICAN II CORPS INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Reports from dawn to 18 h.

WEATHER: Misty with poor visibility early in the morning, becoming fair with good visibility throughout the rest of the day.

OPERATIONS: Acting in conjunction with operations carried out by American II Corps, cooperating with flank corps, 3 contact, 3 counterattack, and 4 artillery patrols, together with 1 photographic reconnaissance, were successfully carried out. At 16:30, our troops were reported to have reached the approximate line as follows: R.8.b.19, R.8.c.99, R.8.c.73, R.14.a.55, R.14.c.20, R.20.c.38, R.20.c.33, R.25.b.93, R.25.d.94, R.32.a.24, R.32.c.38, R.32.c.33, X.2.a.31, X.2.c.67, X.2.c.43, X.8.a.34, X.8.c.58, X.8.b.10, X.14.b.83, X.14.c.80, X.21.c.35, X.27.a.29, X.26.a.20.

MOVEMENT: 15:45---1 train S. into ETREUX (sheet 62A)

FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS: 12:45---Fire at BAZUEL, 14:00---fire in MAZINGHIEN; 13:30 -
14:30---fire in RIBEAUVILLE; 14:30---fire in BAZUEL; 16:10---fire L.35.c.52; 14:17---fire in ORS; 15:30---fire in MAZINGHIEN; 15:45-17:00---fire P. 8.d.85; 16:00---fire X.2.b.59; 13:15---fire X.7.b.99; 14:30---explosion in ORS.

ENEMY ARTILLERY: 9:15---enemy shelling Q.29.b; 9:10---enemy shelling Q.30; 10:00---shelling Q.30.b, R.25.a. and c; 12:50---shelling Le CATEAU; 13:45---shelling W6c and W12b; 17:00---shelling W.5.d.05 to W.6.b.99 (road); 16:30---St-SOUPLLET: 16:45---shelling BAZUEL.

Many enemy artillery flashes were spotted although none in corps area E. of canal.

A. A.: Normal.
E. A.: Fairly active throughout the day.

BALLOONS: 9:10---1 enemy kite balloon MAZINGHIEN.

GENERAL: Our planes attacked with M. G. fire enemy infantry and strong points, inflicting casualties. Contact with the infantry was successfully obtained throughout the day.

PHOTOGRAPHS: 13:45-15:45---17 plates exposed (oblique).

BRANCH INTELLIGENCE SECTION,
AMERICAN II CORPS
Attd. 3d Squadron, A. F. C.

In the field.

Units for Service with 27th Division

October 18, 1918.

Commanding General, American II Army Corps

Number 1621 G-3. It is understood that 27th Division desires following elements now in this region sent to division for duty: Small arms section, ammunition train, equipment section, mobile ordnance repair shop, supply train, sanitary train. Ammunition train is now functioning in active service and cannot be withdrawn at present time. You will be informed very shortly regarding equipment section, mobile ordnance repair shop, which is not at this time equipped. Entire personnel of sanitary train was ordered to rejoin division some days ago. Supply train cannot be equipped with trucks by A. E. F. at present time. Wire whether or not you desire personnel sent with view to equipping train from British sources.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Brig. General,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, A. E. F.
Medical Arrangements

AMERICAN II CORPS, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CORPS SURGEON.

Medical Arrangements
Office of the Corps Surgeon, American II Corps
Amendment No. 2 to Memorandum Series No. 2

1. Advanced dressing station, 27th Division, will close at BUSIGNY and open at ESCAUFORT, Q.31.c., at 8:00 this date.
   Walking wounded collecting station at A. D. S., ESCAUFORT.
2. The advanced dressing station, 30th Division, will change to MOLAIN, W.16.a.22., at 8:00 this date.
   The walking wounded post, 30th Division, will change to W.19.d.1.9., at 8:00, this date.

By direction:

W. L. MOORE,
1st Lt., Sanitary Corps, U. S. A.

October 18, 1918.

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182-32.16: Field Message

Movement of Units

From: R. A. American II Corps
Date: October 18, 1918 Hour: 20:44
To: Aust. 2d Div. Arty.

Aust. 2d D. A. will be transferred to corps reserve under C. R. A., Aust. 2d D. A., forthwith. Two army brigades also transferred to corps reserve forthwith, but will remain in action in present positions on west side of river at call of C. R. A., whose front they cover in case of emergency. One brigade Aust. 3d D. A., will be transferred tonight to command of C. R. A., Aust. 4th D. A., to cover American 27th Division front. Aust. 4th and 5th D. A. S. [divisional artilleries] acknowledge.

E. BOYCE,
Major.

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FIELD ORDER  
No. 64  
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
October 18, 1918.

The barrage start line will be as follows:  
Q.24.c.4.8. due south to and including the Le CATEAU Road---thence southeast on the  
road to Q.36.b.7.1.---thence in a straight line to X.1.a.07.25.  

Shortly before Zero, patrols east of the infantry start line which is 250 yards  
west of above line should withdraw thereto.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
Chief of Staff.

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Traffic Instructions

ORDERS  
No. 112  
27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
October 18, 1918.

[112 1/2]

Reference Maps: 57B and 62B, 1:40,000

1. ROADS: Owing to present condition of roads in corps area and to facilitate move-  
ment of traffic, the following routes will be used as one-way roads in the direction in-  
dicated until further notice:  

BUSIGNY to VAUX-ANDIGNY (east), VAUX-ANDIGNY to MOLAIN (east), MOLAIN to La HAIE  
MENNERESSE (west), La HAIE-MENNERESSE to St-SOUPLET (northeast), St-SOUPLET to  
ESCAUFOURT (west), ESCAUFOURT to road junction W.7.d.2.5. (south) to BUSIGNY (southwest  
and northwest) road from VAUX-ANDIGNY to Junction W.7.d.2.5 (north).  

That portion of prescribed route in La HAIE-MENNERESSE (W.13.b.9.5. to 9.8) is a two-  
way road.  

A. P. M. is charged with control of traffic in accordance with above.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
Chief of Staff.

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1. OPERATIONS: Following a creeping barrage, our troops attacked at 5:20, October 17, on a front of approximately 2,000 yards. Throughout the attack our troops were hampered greatly by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. At night, they consolidated a line approximately as follows: W 6b 7.5 along road to W 12b 2.0, W 12d 6.0.

   Identifications: In the day's operation, men from 14 different regiments were captured, in addition to 2 attached battalions, viz. pioneers and heavy machine gunners. The order of battle was covered by yesterday's Summary of Intelligence, with one exception, the 29th Division, which replaced the 24th Division.

   Prisoners: Up to 8 o'clock today (18th), the total prisoners through the divisional cage were 3 officers and 269 other ranks; but, in addition to this, 3 officers and 20 other ranks passed through aid stations, making a grand total of 6 officers and 289 other ranks.

   (a) Hostile Activity. Artillery: Immediately after our barrage started (17th), the Boche put down a heavy counterbarrage, using a considerable amount of Yellow Cross gas; but after this, activity ceased, enemy artillery was about normal the rest of the day. W 13 was shelled heavily with H. V. for about half an hour. H. E. shells fell, at intervals of 10 minutes, in V 18c during the afternoon. There was considerable shelling of St-SOUPLET, St-MARTIN RIVIERE, and VAUX-ANDIGNY with H. V. Guns of various calibers were apparently located in X 2 and 8.

   Machine Guns: Very active throughout the attack. Strongly organized nests are in RIBEAUVILLE, ECAILLON, and MAZINGHIEN, and they resisted our advance. Night activity was also above normal. Heavy machine-gun fire came from W 12c.

   Trench Mortars: Active throughout the attack.

   Patrols: Nil.

   Aerial: Normal. Today (18th), E. A. active over our lines, flying low.

   Snipers: Active along entire divisional front.

   (b) Our Activity. Artillery: Our artillery fire slackened two hours after Zero hour yesterday and batteries began moving forward. After new locations had been made, it carried out a programme of harassing fire.

   Machine Guns: Our M. G.'s were active throughout the period, especially during the advance of our troops.

   Trench Mortars: Nil.

   Aerial: Normal.

   Patrols: The usual liaison patrols for lateral communication and forward patrols to cover our troops after halting and during consolidation of the new line.

   Snipers: Active throughout the night.

3. MISCELLANEOUS: Visibility poor. Large number of heavy and light M. G. captured.

   Photographs taken 14/10/18 show:

   R 9b---Many tracks and signs of work west and southwest of BAZUEL. Tracks and signs of work in the orchard.

   R 10a to R 11c---Much activity on road south of railway from wood (R 10a) to R 11c. Lorries parked along the road and a possible dump (piles of material along the roadside).

   R 9b---There are well-defined points leading from road south of railway to R 9b 70/40 (field surrounded by hedge). Signs of work and movement.

   R 9d
   R 10c
   R 15b
   R 16a---Possible shelters and small huts among the trees and under hedges. Many
tracks in R 9d, 10c, 15b, and 16a. They appear to connect a series of holes, possibly rifle and M. G. pits. In R 16a, much work in progress. Possible battery positions in orchards.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

FORECAST: Wind light northerly becoming N. E. or E. 10 to 15 m. p. h. Strong on coast. Cloudy and misty at first, becoming fair, inland fog at night. Mild day. Cool night. Visibility indifferent early; fair later. Temperature day 58, night 45.

Note: Indications of a spell of fair weather developing.

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30th Division: Fldr. 165: Journal of Operations: Telegram

Situation Report

[30th DIVISION]

From: American 30th Division

Date: October 18, 1918 Hour: 11:05 p. m.

To: General Headquarters, A. E. F.

A. Weather: Fair.
B. Infantry and machine-gun activity: Ours and enemy very active.
C. Artillery activity: Ours very active, with harassing fire during the afternoon and evening, and this morning supported the infantry with a creeping barrage and intermittent fire on selected points. Enemy artillery active with harassing fire on our forward area and this morning our advancing troops as they progressed in the attack.
D. Aeroplane and balloon activity: Own and enemy aircraft and balloons very active.
E. Visibility: Fair.
F. Troop Movements: Own: No troop movements seen, either own or enemy.
G. General impression of day: Enemy is putting in a large number of reserve troops to stop our advance. His resistance has become stronger than yesterday. General impression of the day favorable.
H. Known casualties:
I. Officers-----25 casualties.
   Soldiers-----909 casualties.
J. Success of our troops: The 60th Brigade attacked this morning at 5:30. Our right flank did not progress to its objective as division on right remained in position. The left advanced about 500 yards and there rested to await a general advance in conjunction with division on right at 11:30.
K. Repulse or misfortune of our troops: At 11:30, advance continued, but at one o'clock, the enemy counterattacked and stopped temporarily further progress.
L. Any change in location of the lines held by our troops or enemy: Our line now runs: R 32 A 20---R 32 C 30---X 1 A 20---X 7 A 62---X 7 C 87---X 7 C 60.

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230-33.1: Operations Report

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

12 noon, Oct. 17 to 12 noon, Oct. 18, 1918

MAP: Sheet 57B, S. E. --- 1/20,000

1. Enemy fighting strong rearguard action along entire front, heavy M. G. and artillery fire being encountered from BELLEVUE (X.13.b.), RIBEAUVILLE, and hedges to north, and from MAZINGHIEN.

2. Prisoners captured on division front indicate that certain regiments or divisions have been disbanded to furnish drafts for other units; accurate details not yet available.

3. No unusual hostile movement observed during the day, nor did the enemy's conduct change in this period.

4. Nil.

5. At 12 noon, October 17, the 60th Brigade was following the 59th Brigade at approximately two thousand yards, ready to pass through 59th Brigade when it reached its objective. The 59th Brigade was meeting strong rearguard resistance, and progress was slow.

6. On 17th instant, 59th Brigade did not reach its objective, or if any elements reached it could not hold it, and the 60th Brigade did not pass through 59th Brigade, but relieved 59th Brigade in line it held on night of 17/18th, relief being reported complete about 0400, 18th. The 60th Brigade attacked at 0530 h., 18th, as ordered.

7. Information received indicates that the 105th Infantry Regiment (American), on left flank this brigade, has not advanced; it appears that the British 3d Brigade on right flank has advanced, but its line at 12 noon, 18th, was uncertain; at 16 o'clock, 18th, they are reported to be along road through X.7.b.---X.13.b. and d. No new identifications were made.

8. II Corps orders received for continuation of the attack.

9. Orders issued for the attack of this date; orders issued for 60th Brigade not to advance its right flank further than British brigade on right, but to keep liaison with them.

At 1715, October 17, orders were issued for 119th Infantry to give support to 117th Inf. Regiment if needed, to repel enemy counterattack. At same hour, orders were issued for the artillery which was to support 60th Brigade when it passed through 59th Infantry Brigade, to give necessary support to 59th Brigade.

10. Results of the day's action are uncertain. Very stubborn resistance has been encountered from M. G. and artillery fire from immediate front and both flanks. Enemy field artillery reported firing at point-blank ranges. While some advance was realized, as indicated by various situation reports rendered to II Corps, these advances could not be maintained, and at 12 noon, October 18, our line was approximately the same taken over from 59th Brigade, as follows: X.6.b.8.5.---X.6.b.7.0.---X.6.b.7.0.---X.6.d.25.00---X.12.b.1.0.---X.12.c.7.0.---X.18.a.7.8.

At 9 o'clock, regiments ordered to cease efforts to advance, hold line then occupied until 11:30, at which time British 3d Brigade on right was attacking behind an artillery barrage, and for the attack to be renewed at that hour and advance made at same time as British brigade on right.

11. Attached.

12. At noon, 18th instant, the situation was unchanged.

13. Continuance of the advance and seizing of objective assigned by II Corps followed by such exploitation as is practicable.
14. Morale is excellent, but units are much below strength and troops are tired. Supplies are adequate and feeding of troops during action has improved since our engagement of 29th ultimo.

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Col., G.S., G-3.

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182-33.3: Fldr. 3: Order

Orders for Exploitation

From: 30th Division
Date: October 18, 1918 Hour: 0400
To: 59th Brigade---60th Brigade

G-3/92

In continuation of our G-3/91 [October 17, 1918], the divisional commander directs that upon reaching the objective exploitation be continued to the line of exploitation set for the attack of October 17; marked by the Green Line on the maps issued with the battle instructions for yesterday's operations.

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30th Div.: Order

Replacements

GENERAL ORDERS 30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 35 
October 18, 1918

1. We are now passing through a crisis of the war great with possibilities for the Allied cause. There has been no period in the war's history when the utmost devotion of troops can accomplish more important results.

2. High commanders are counting upon this division which has already so distinguished itself, manifesting that devotion to the final limits of its ability and the division commander feels confident that such reliance will not be in vain. Success in our immediate front will have results most far reaching in the destruction of the enemy forces and may be directly responsible for the early end of the war.

3. It is most important that until replacements can be received and incorporated, every available man be placed in the ranks to augment the strength of organizations. Brigade, regimental, battalion, and company commanders will comb their organizations for the purpose of finding all officers and enlisted men who can possibly be spared from their present duties and incorporate them without delay in the fighting strength of their units, until such time as they can properly be returned to their former duties.
4. Reports will be submitted by all unit commanders, twenty-four hours after receipt of this order, showing by name all officers and enlisted men not actually present for combat purposes and a brief statement of the duty upon which engaged that prevents his being so employed.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.

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Reports Surgeon 30th Division: Fldr. 11: Orders

Medical Arrangements

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE DIVISION SURGEON,
October 18, 1918.

Amendment 2 to Memorandum 30 (Medical Arrangements) this office, dated October 15, 1918

1. A. D. S. changed to MOLAIN (W.16.a.2.2.).
3. Both changes effective 8 o’clock this date.

A. M. WHALEY,
Colonel, Medical Corps, U. S. A.,
Division Surgeon.

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FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 18, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Le CATEAU was completely mopped up during the night. The attack was resumed in the morning and progress made along the whole of the army front. WASSIGNY, RIBEAUVILLE, and JONC-de-MER Farm were captured after hard fighting, and a footing established in BAZUEL. About 1200 prisoners and 10 guns were captured.

The enemy’s artillery was very active and showed a considerable increase in comparison with yesterday. St-SOUPLET and St-BENIN received considerable attention and the valley of La SELLE and the ESSARTS Valley were intermittently shelled throughout the day. H. V. guns were active in the vicinity of REUMONT and BOHAIN.

Our artillery carried out special barrage programmes in support of operations. Heavy artillery shelled the valleys N. E. of Le CATEAU and directed a concentration against the railway triangle S. E. of Le CATEAU during the night.
2. IX CORPS: At 11:30, the 46th and 1st Divisions in conjunction with the American 30th Division of the American II Corps, attacked with WASSIGNY and MAZINGHIEN as the objectives.

After severe fighting, the 46th Division captured WASSIGNY and established a post at BLOCUS-d'en-BAS in touch with the French. The enemy resisted strongly, but were unable to check our advance. The 1st Division made a corresponding advance to the S. E. outskirts of RIBEAVILLE.

AMERICAN II CORPS: The American 30th Division attacking in conjunction with the IX Corps captured RIBEAVILLE, but were unable to drive the enemy out of MAZINGHIEN.

The American 27th Division cooperated with XIII Corps attacking at 0520, and capturing JONC-de-MER Farm, eventually pushing forward to the western bank of the JONC-de-MER Stream. Fighting was exceptionally severe in the vicinity of JONC-de-MER Farm, and many of the enemy were killed.

XIII CORPS: The attack was resumed at 0520 by the 50th and 66th Divisions and a considerable advance realized.

The railway triangle was captured and also the greater portion of BAZUEL. Progress was also made 2000 yards east of Le CATEAU.

3. THIRD ARMY: Situation quiet and unchanged.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: The advance was continued this morning with success.

MENNEVRET was captured and by evening the line advanced to the east of AISONVILLE-east of GROUGIS---east of Le PONT-VERLY [PETIT VERLY] ---east of ANDIGNY Wood. Considerably over 1000 prisoners were captured.

5. AIRCRAFT:

(a) British: 362 hours were flown by 233 pilots. Eleven artillery patrols were carried out, during which 15 zone calls were sent down, but without success. Five combats took place, one of which was decisive resulting in the destruction of one E. A. One of our machines is missing.

140 25-lb. bombs were dropped on suitable targets by day.

No night flying.

(b) Hostile: Hostile aircraft activity was very slight owing to the weather.

At 1350, a group of 10 E. A. flying low dropped bombs on the western outskirts of Le CATEAU.

6. PRISONERS:

Through army cages - - - 41 officers, 300 O. R.

Through C. C. S.'s - - - 12 officers 266 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Fine but very misty, clearing later. Visibility poor.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES:

6th Division went into corps reserve.

25th Division relieved 50th Division in the line night 18/19th, the latter moving into reserve.
From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 18, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Enemy occupies organized system of shell holes, running approximately from R 14a along the east bank of the Rau de JONC-de-MER through R.32.a, X.1.b, I.d.7.b and d.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF THE ENEMY DURING THE DAY: That he is preparing to retire to a position east of the Rau de St-MAURICE River, line running approximately R.15a, 15c, 21a, 21c, 27a, 27c, 32b, 32d, X.2a, 2c, 8a, 8c.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: Enemy's resistance to our advance very stiff. Numerous counterattacks were made by him, all of which were repulsed.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Our line extended approximately from north to south as follows: Q 30a, Q20c, Q36b, Q36d, W6a, W6c, W12a, W12c. During the night, the enemy artillery was active on forward areas. Intermittent shelling in back areas.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Our divisions continued to attack on the afternoon of October 17 and on the morning of October 18 the attack was resumed. The left division in conjunction with the corps on their right attacked at 1130 h.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: IX Corps on right and XIII Corps on left kept abreast of our advance very stiff.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: Following telegraphic orders received: Fourth Army will continue the attack tomorrow morning, 18th instant, together with the French First Army on our right as follows: IX Corps will attack in conjunction with right of American II Corps as early as possible, at an hour which will be arranged between IX and American II Corps direct. XIII Corps in conjunction with left of American II Corps will attack at 0530. Fourth Army objective WASSIGNY X16 central. R.34 central, R.21 central, R.2 central, R1a. After reaching objective corps will exploit to the Blue Line as shown on the map issued with Fourth Army 20/40G, dated 14th instant, boundaries will remain the same.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: We advanced about 1500 yards on a front of 4000 yards, occupying a line running approximately north to south from La ROUE Farm---JONC-de-MER Farm---R31B---R31D---X1A---X7C.

10. RESULT OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Enemy was pushed back on whole front, but held a strong point at RIBEAUVILLE, which required special artillery preparation to overcome. An attack was launched against this place in conjunction with artillery at 1130 h.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The enemy will continue his retirement behind the Canal de la SAMBRE, meanwhile fighting strong rearguard actions.

13. PLANS FOR FUTURE: To continue the attack in accordance with Paragraph 8 above.
14. REMARKS: MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale high; health good; supply satisfactory; weather cool and overcast; observation poor.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3,
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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182-42.2:Fldr. 3: Report

Engineer Operations

105th ENGINEER REGIMENT, A. E. F.,
October 18, 1918—17:30 o'clock.

To Corps Engineer, American II Corps

1. In the absence of the division engineer who is at road report center, where he has been since 0800, the following report is submitted:
   (a) No additional advance on Red and Black Roads has been reported. The following information with regard to the Black Road was submitted last night:
       From A to A plus 500 yards, 16 feet wide, block pavement with curb.
       A plus 500 to A plus 1200, 10 feet wide, block pavement.
       A plus 1200 to B, 14 feet wide, metal.
       Road not badly shelled, but considerably worn, with small holes.
       B to C, 14 feet wide, good.
       C to E, 20 feet wide, good.
       No further reports on condition of roads have been received at this office.
   (b) Attached hereto is a copy of reports on water reconnaissance, and well repairs.
   (c) Attached sheet shows list of enemy material reported captured.
   (d) The latest information in regard to the tactical situation was sent to this office from W.21.a.3.6 at 1020, as follows:
       Intelligence officer of the 119th Infantry informs me that 59th Brigade fell back last evening to an approximate line W.6.a.8.0 to W.12.c.7.3. Line at about 0930 this morning was halted at W.6.a.8.0 to W.6.d.3.0, then south along dotted line.
       English on right pushed out a little last night, but not this morning, and fire from the right is bothering our line.
   (e) It is reported that approximately 150 bus loads of British infantry passed through MONTBREHAIN this afternoon, travelling eastward.

WILLARD P. SULLIVAN,
Capt., Engr., U. S. A.,
for
JOSEPH HYDE PRATT,
Col., Engrs., U. S. A.,
Div. Engineer.

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[Extract]

Relief of the 59th Brigade by the 60th Brigade completed at 3:30 a.m. During morning, two attempts were made to advance, but our troops were driven back each time to a line designated on the operation map as the second objective, on account of heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire. At 11:30 a.m., our troops advanced under heavy artillery barrage in conjunction with the division on our right, and late in the afternoon succeeded in passing through the town of RIBEAUVILLE. Our troops were subject to intense enemy artillery and machine-gun fire during entire day. Late in the evening, our line ran approximately along road in X.1.a. and d., and X.2.c., east of ECAILLON; thence southeast along road in X.8.b. to corps boundary.

Available for all duty) Officers 502
Men 14,157

* * * * *
C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

HS Brit. File: II Corps: Fldr. 5: War Diary

IX CORPS.

Place: POEUILLY

Date: Oct. 18

Summary of Events and Information:

During the night, the 3d Inf. Brig. relieved the 2d Inf. Brig. in the line. The 46th Division by pushing strong patrols down the road from ANDIGNY-les-FERMES assisted the French to capture the village of MENNEVRET and Le MEPAS in the early morning. At 5:30 a.m., the 3d Brig. in the north renewed the attack in conjunction with the American corps and at 11:30 a.m., the 1st Brig. also attacked. Considerable resistance was encountered and little progress was made on the north during the morning, but as the resistance of the enemy divisions had been badly crippled by our attacks of the previous day, resistance in the afternoon gradually decreased and the 1st Brig. by nightfall had captured WASSIGNY, the 3d Brig. completely mopped up La VALLEE-MULATRE, and by 5 p.m., had advanced their line in conjunction with the American corps to the western outskirts of RIBEAUVILLE. The French XV Corps on our immediate south made good progress and at 6 p.m. had established their line along the WASSIGNY-HANNAPPS Road, being in touch with our troops at BLOCUS-d'en-BAS. The prisoners captured by the IX Corps amounted to well over 300 during the day.

The corps commander, the B. G. G. S., and G. S. O., II Operations, spent the day at corps Adv. Hq. MAGNY-la-FOSSE.

The following orders were issued by telegram G.830 at 7:45 p.m., being orders for the advance to be resumed in the morning and for the detachments of the 46th Division to be withdrawn from the line as soon as touch was definitely established between the French and the 1st Division, etc.
G.832 issued at 10 p. m., giving 5:30 a. m. as the hour for the attack to commence in
the morning.

Late at night, the American corps made further progress and captured MAZINGHIEN,
which enabled the 3d Brig. to penetrate RIBEAUVILLE, and as touch had been definitely
established between the 1st Brig. and the left of the French XV Corps, the remainder of
the 137th Inf. Brig. (46th Division) was withdrawn during the early hours of the morning
19th inst., thus the whole of this division was now out of the line and concentrated in
and about FRENOY. The 6th Division was also out of the line, with two inf. brigs. in
and about BOHAIN and one brig. in the VAUX-ANDIGNY-REGNICOURT area. The 32d Division
during the day moved by march route from the Le CATELET area to billets around BELLENGLISE,
but divisional hqs. remained at Le CATELET.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. 4, IV B, II Corps: Weekly Appreciation

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 19, 1918

Period from October 12 to 18, 1918 (Inclusive)

1. OPERATIONS: The situation from the 12th to 16th remained unchanged, the time
being occupied in ascertaining the exact positions held by the enemy E. of the SELLE, and
in making preparations for a further attack. On the 17th inst., this attack was carried
out on the front Le CATEAU-RICQUERVAL Wood by all three corps of the army. Our attack was
successful in that we gained a considerable amount of ground, and caused heavy losses to
the enemy, but we did not capture all our objectives. The enemy resisted our advance with
energy and heavy fighting took place along the entire front. His resistance, however, was
completely broken, as was shown by the subsequent day's fighting, which resulted in the
enemy being driven beyond a line running roughly E. of WASSIGNY and BAZUEL. During the
night 18/19, he withdrew across the OISE.

The sum total of the last two day has, therefore, been an advance by the Fourth
Army, on a front of 13,000 yards to a depth of 9,000 yards. The villages of ANDIGNY-les
FERMES, WASSIGNY, La VALLEE-MULATRE, RIBEAUVILLE, MOLAIN, l'ARBRE-de-GUISE,
MAZINGHIEN, REJEC-de-BEAULIEU BAZUEL, and Le CATEAU were captured, in addition to
about 5,000 prisoners and 20 guns.

2. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENEMY'S FORCES: During the week, the enemy reinforced his
line, previous to our attack on the 17th inst., by one fresh division (243d) from G. H. Q.
reserve, and two tired divisions (24th [Inf.] and 3d Naval). Owing to his heavy losses, he was forced to further reinforce his line by 3 exhausted divisions (29th, 121st, 221st)
and elements of two other exhausted divisions (54th and 22d Res.), the greater part of
last-named division was engaged against the French.

The Fourth Army is, therefore, for the present, opposed by the equivalent of 7 divi-
sions, of which 2 have probably suffered no casualties, having reinforced the line yes-
terday evening.

3. RESERVES: There are 16 divisions which can reinforce the army front. All of
these divisions have been recently engaged by our own or neighboring armies. They have
been resting for periods as specified below:

2 divisions between 3 weeks and a fortnight.
8 " 14 days and a week.
6 " under 1 week.

They have all suffered heavy losses, and with the exception of the cyclist brig.,
will require a considerable amount of rest before they can be regarded as of much fighting
value.
On the western front, there are now considered to be only 3 fresh divisions in
reserve.

4. ENEMY'S INTENTIONS: Prisoners captured by this army during the last week have
all received orders to hold the line to the last, and had heard no rumors of a further
withdrawal. On the evening of the 18th, however, prisoners of the 121st Div. on arriving
in the line were informed that they were to act as a rearguard as the Germans intended to
cross to the eastern bank of the OISE Canal that night. Prisoners captured by the Third
Army stated that a line of defense had been commenced W. of LANDRECIES, and that they
understood that a withdrawal in successive stages to a line in the VALENCIENNES area would
shortly take place.

Prisoners captured by the French First Army stated that a withdrawal to a line of
trenches in the area La FERTE-CHEVRESIS was about to commence. Air photographs show a
line of trenches in this vicinity. It is extremely probable, in view of the acute salient
jutting into the French lines in the neighborhood of MOY, that the enemy will retire almost
immediately to this line.

Now that the main body of the enemy have crossed the OISE Canal, it is not considered
that they are likely to carry out any further retirement for the present opposite the
Fourth Army front, but will hold this front as a defensive flank while further retirements
in a N. E. direction from LAON take place.

5. AIR ACTIVITY: The weather has been very unfavorable throughout the period. When
flying was possible, hostile activity was generally normal and calls for no comments.

6. ARTILLERY: Our artillery fire has increased during the week and a considerable
amount of gas shell has been used. On several occasions, hostile fire was directed on our
battery areas. In view of our expected attack, it is probable that a number of guns were
withdrawn E. of the canal, prior to the 17th Inst. This is borne out by the few guns
captured by us during our very successful operations on the 17th and 18th Inst.

7. MOVEMENT: Observation of activity on the enemy's railways and roads, has
throughout the week been limited to short intermittent periods and reports are inconclusive.
The only important railway movement seen was on the morning of the 15th, when an
abnormal number of trains were reported moving S. W. from CHARLEROI through AULNOYE---
probably the arrival behind this front of one of the divisions since identified.

Apparently, a great deal of road traffic has been going on during the last few days,
owing to evacuations, but little has been actually observed.

8. REAR ORGANIZATIONS:
(a) Aerodromes: Photographs of Oct. 14 showed about a score of new aerodromes,
the chief groups being north of BAVAI, and north of MAUBEUGE. There are 6 aerodromes
between MAUBEUGE and AVESNES, and three in the La CHAPELLE area. There is an absence of
forward aerodromes, the nearest being at Le GRAND-FAYT; this is partly due to the close-
ness of the country and to the existence of the Forest of MORMAL. All aerodromes in the
ETREUX-GUISE area are probably abandoned, though a few sheds are left in some cases.

(b) Railways: A few new sidings are reported. Activity is visible at MAUBEUGE,
AULNOYE, Le QUESNOY, and AVESNES Stations. LANDRECIES was empty on the 14th.

(c) Hospitals: Many new hospitals have been erected, especially near AULNOYE
and MAUBEUGE.

(d) General: Barge traffic south of LANDRECIES has been discontinued. A dozen
new footbridges across the OISE Canal have been constructed near OISY and PETIT-CAMBRESIS.

9. ENEMY DEFENSES: Photographs of the 14th inst., covering a large area (Le
CATEAU, LANDRECIES, MAUBEUGE, Le QUESNOY), showed no new trenches or defense lines of
importance. There is no sign of any trench line E. of the OISE Canal (14th). Little new
work was done on the Le CATEAU---VAUX-ANDIGNY Lines or between them and the canal. A
feature of the defenses has been the appearance of lines of organized shell holes in pairs
(as E. and S. E. of Le CATEAU).

A captured map, dated the 13th inst., shows the projected defense line (a) HERMANN
STELLUNG-I consisting of main line of resistance along the canal E. of Le CATEAU---St-
SOPLET---with artillery protective line W. of BAZUEL---E. of ARBRE-de-GUISE; and (b) HERMANN STELLUNG-II, consisting of main line of resistance along the canal E. of CATILLON, with artillery protective line from W. end of LANDRECIES---E. end of La GROISE. The further line of resistance on to which, according to the coordinated statements of prisoners, civilians, and escaped P. of W., the enemy is likely to retire is the HAGEN Stellung reported to pass through the VALENCIENNES, HIRSON, and MEZIERES area, although of the important defense works said to exist, those in the MORMAL Forest and AULNOYE districts are not confirmed by air photos.

Behind this line lies MAUBEUGE, where work is reported to have commenced 10 days ago.

It is reported that a new position, the HUNSRUCK Stellung, has been commenced on the German-Belgian frontier, in the neighborhood of the line AIX-la-CHAPELLE---LIEGE (confirmation required).

10. GENERAL: Owing to the great advance made by the Fourth Army during the last fortnight, menacing as it does the important junction of AULNOYE, through which runs the great lateral railway route SEDAN---HIRSON---VALENCIENNES---TOURNAI, the enemy reinforced his front from Le CATEAU southwards by the freshest divisions at his disposal. These divisions were heavily defeated by our troops on the 17th and 18th inst., and the enemy has been forced to retire across the OISE Canal. This canal offers a serious obstacle as far north as the Bois-l'EVEQUE, to a further advance eastwards. Here, however, it turns in a northeasterly direction to MAUBEUGE. North of Bois-l'EVEQUE, AULNOYE Station can be reached by our long-range guns should further ground be gained towards the Forest de MORMAL. It is considered, therefore, that the enemy is likely to reinforce his front north of Le CATEAU and there offer as much resistance as possible to prevent any further advance by our troops towards AULNOYE.

By withdrawing to his present line N. of LAON he has already been able to add to his reserves. These will further be augmented by retirement from the salient in the MOY area, as well as by the fact that he will be able to hold the line on the OISE Canal with fewer divisions. He should, therefore, be in a position to have a number of divisions ready to counterattack in case a further advance is made by the Allies.

North of Le CATEAU, however, these counterattacks are likely to be impeded by the enclosed nature of the country and the Forest of Mormal. It seems extremely probable that a retirement will eventually be made to some line of defense probably being constructed approximately from VALENCIENNES by HIRSON to MEZIERES, but it is not likely that this can be effected for the present, as the Germans will require time to evacuate material, etc., to the rear of this line.

V. VIVIAN,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
Fourth Army
**Location II Corps Units**

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

_October 19, 1918—0600 h._

**HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS**

**LOCATION LIST NO. 29**

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<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (rear)</td>
<td>N.15.d.cent. (62C)</td>
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<tr>
<td>412th Tel. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>MONTBREHAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th Field Signal Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>Near SAULTY</td>
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<td>148th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>BAIZEUX</td>
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<td>(Att. to 13th Wing 3d Brig. R. A. F.)</td>
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**BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS**

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<td>Hq. Aust. 4th D. A.</td>
<td>V.9.c.25.80 (57B)</td>
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<td>Hq. Aust. 3d D. A.</td>
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<td>Hq. VII Corps. H. A.</td>
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**AMERICAN UNITS**

**27th Division**

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<td>Division Headquarters (rear)</td>
<td>JONCOURT</td>
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<tr>
<td>53d Infantry Brig. Hq.</td>
<td>ESCAUFORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>54th Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>ESCAUFORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>102d Engr. Regt. Hq.</td>
<td>BUSIGNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>102d Field Sign. Bn. Hq.</td>
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<tr>
<td>102d San. Train Hq.</td>
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**30th Division**

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<td>Division Headquarters (rear)</td>
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<tr>
<td>105th San. Train Hq.</td>
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F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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1. SITUATION OCTOBER 18 AND NIGHT 18/19 INST.: Our attacks were resumed yesterday morning, and a considerable advance was made along the entire front. As the result of the day’s fighting, WASSIGNY, RIBEAUVILLE, and BAZUEL were captured. Posts were also established S. of WASSIGNY at the BLOCUS-d’en-BAS. The enemy’s resistance has considerably weakened, thanks to the defeat inflicted on him on the 17th inst. The only locality where severe fighting was reported was at RIBEAUVILLE and JONC-de-MER Farm. No counterattacks took place during the day.

The following divisions were identified:


Of the above, the 29th Div., reported in back areas on the 17th inst., has reinforced the line, as have also the 22d Res. and 54th Divisions, the former in the WASSIGNY area, and the latter probably S. of BAZUEL.

From air reports received during the afternoon, much transport and movement of troops was seen in the CATILYON area, proceeding east. Taken in conjunction with the last two days’ fighting, it would appear that the enemy’s resistance has been broken, and it is probable that his main body crossed the OISE Canal during the night.

The number of prisoners captured in the day’s fighting is estimated at 1,600. A few guns, including one entire battery captured in BAZUEL, also fell into our hands.

During the night, apart from intermittent artillery and machine-gun fire, there is nothing to report.

The 221st Div. was, however, identified in the WASSIGNY area. This division was recently withdrawn, and is now engaged for the fifth time. Little resistance need be expected from it.

2. ENEMY’S INTENTIONS:

(a) Prisoners are unanimous in declaring that they have received no orders to withdraw.

(b) Civilians who escaped to our lines on 17th inst., state that they saw a large amount of transport and troops proceeding in an easterly direction.

(c) A captured sketch shows that the enemy’s main line of resistance, called the HERMANN Stellung, runs along the E. bank of the OISE Canal, S. of CATILON. No trenches have, however, apparently been dug in this area.

(d) Hostile movement seen during the afternoon indicated a retirement across the canal.

To sum up: Although prisoners have received no orders to retire, it would certainly appear that a retirement commenced during yesterday afternoon, and it is considered extremely probable that only rearguards will be encountered between our present front line and the OISE Canal today.

3. RESERVES: The enemy opposite this army front has reinforced his line with three exhausted divisions, the 54th, 221st and 22d Res. Divisions, all recently withdrawn from the line.

(a) Presence of the 54th Div. was indicated in the WASSIGNY area yesterday. It was withdrawn from the sector N. of Le CATEAU about 9/10th inst., having lost 2,200 prisoners. This makes its fifth engagement since August 8; it is very exhausted and the morale very poor.
(b) 221st Div., withdrawn from FRESONY on 9th inst., after a loss of 2,100 men, has reinforced the line in the WASSIGNY area, and is also now engaged for the fifth time.

(c) 22d Res. Div., relieved opposite the army on our right in the sector N. of AISONVILLE, by the 18th Div., on 15th inst., is also reinforcing the WASSIGNY area. This is its fourth engagement since Aug. 8. It is a fairly good division and it is reported to have lost about one-third of its effectives.

(d) The 7th Cav. Div., which was twice engaged on the CAMBRAI battlefront during September and lost nearly 2,300 prisoners, reinforced the front near HEULE on Oct. 17.

(e) Excluding 35 divisions withdrawn after suffering severe casualties during the past two weeks and 6 Austro-Hungarian divisions, there are 14 enemy divisions in reserve in the western theater, of which 3 are fresh.

To sum up: The Germans have reinforced their front line opposite the Fourth Army, during the last two days, with one fresh and 5 tired divisions. It would appear, therefore, that the enemy has only exhausted divisions available as reserves.

There are no indications of any other reserves in back areas.

4. ENEMY ACTIVITY:

   Weather: Fine, misty, clearing later.

   (a) Aircraft: Slight. There was a marked increase in artillery machines, the majority of which worked in the Le CATEAU area.

      There were 5 combats, resulting in the destruction of one E. A. One of our machines is missing.

   (b) Artillery (up to 3 p. m., Oct. 18, 1918): Between WASSIGNY and RIBEAUVILLE, the enemy artillery showed considerable activity, the bulk of the shelling coming from an easterly direction. A heavy concentration of all calibers was put down on our new battery areas between MOLAIN and ANDIGNY-les-Fermes, in reply to our barrages.

      Between RIBEAUVILLE and BAZUEL, the activity was generally slight. The majority of the hostile fire appeared to come from east of the canal, in the vicinity of ORS, and the eastern side of the Bois l'EVEQUE. From reports received, single guns were being used against the center corps while batteries were withdrawing.

      North of BAZUEL, shelling was heavy at times, but there was no evidence of any increase in the number of batteries employed.

   (c) Movement: Repeated attempts were made to reconnoiter roads and railways behind the enemy's line, but the weather conditions were very bad. A reconnaissance at dusk reported the roads in and east of CATILLON full of transport, with some infantry, going east; there was also considerable scattered movement through the Bois l'EVEQUE. It is not clear whether the movement was connected with reliefs, or with a partial evacuation of the area west of the canal.

5. ENEMY DEFENSES:

   (a) A captured tracing, dated 13th inst., shows (i) the HERMANN Stellung-I to consist of a main line of resistance E. of Le CATEAU, St-BENIN, and St-SOUPLET, with an artillery protection line W. of BAZUEL and E. of ARBRE-de-GUISE; (ii) the HERMANN Stellung-II to consist of a line of resistance along the canal E. of CATILLON, with an artillery protection line running from the western end of LANDRECIES due south to the eastern end of La GROISE.

   (b) French aerial reconnaissance reports a continuous line of trenches, wired in places, on the line CHEVRESIS-les-DAMES---FERRIERE Fme---VILLERS-le-SEC.

6. SUCCESSIVE LINES OF ENEMY RESISTANCE: The lines of resistance on to which, according to the coordinated statements of prisoners, civilians, and escaped P. O. W., the enemy is likely to retire, are as follows:

   (a) HAGEN STELLUNG - a position passing through the VALENCIENNES, HIRSON, and MEZIERES area.

      Important defense works are said to exist in the Mormal Forest (not confirmed by air photos).
AULNOYE (not confirmed), HIRSON, St-MICHEL Forest, and along the HIRSON-SEDAN Railway; behind which MAUBEUGE has been strongly fortified during the last two years.

(b) HUNSRUCK-Stellung, a new position commenced on the German-Belgian frontier, in the neighborhood of the line AIX-la-CHAPELLE---LIEGE (confirmation required).

The impression is that the enemy will retire on to the HAGEN Stellung with halts on two or three hastily organized positions.

7. SECTOR HELD BY 204th DIV.: Captured tracing, dated Oct. 13, shows the 204th Div. to hold the southern sector of the (? IV Res.) Corps front, as follows:


The (IV Res.) Corps presumably now holds the front from just N. E. of Le CATEAU to MAZINGHIEN Cemetery.

8. MINES:

(a) A prisoner of the 8th Pioneer Bn., 15th Res. Div. taken west of WASSIGNY on the afternoon of the 18th, states that minefields have been laid between the railway and would apparently be about F.2.a. (or possibly F.3.c.). It consisted of 2 rows of mines about 100 in each row with an interval of 3.6 meters between the mines and of 2 meters between each row. These are contact mines.

(b) Tank trap contact mines are also stated to have been laid on roads from WASSIGNY on railway and canal bridges.

(c) Prisoners state that the heavy bridges over the OISE Canal have been destroyed, and light bridges 50 m. apart have been built. These light bridges have been mined, and have been connected by electric wires.

A number of light bridges found, on aeroplane photographs, have already been reported. Destruction of the heavy bridges has not yet been confirmed by photos.

9. COMMAND: (From G. H. Q. Summary)

(a) Captured documents, dated October 6 and 7, show that the XIV Res. Corps, comprising the 9th Res., Bav. 208th and 5th Divs., is now in the German Second Army.

From the above, it now appears that the northern boundary of the German Second Army now runs along the SAULZOIR-WARGNIES Road.

(b) According to a document, the LIV Corps was still in the BUSIGNY area on October 4.

GENERAL

As a result of the last two days’ fighting, the enemy’s resistance appears to have been broken for the time being, and it is anticipated that only rearguards will be opposed to us today, the main body having crossed to the E. bank of the OISE Canal.

V. VIVIAN,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

(L) LATER: Prisoners of the 121st Div., withdrawn from BUSIGNY ten days ago, reinforced the line N. of MAZINGHIEN this morning. They state that, as soon as they arrived in line last night, orders were issued for a retirement across the OISE, except for rearguard.

* * * * *

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American II Corps Relieved by British IX Corps

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.

October 19, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The IX Corps will take over the front now held by the American II Corps under arrangements to be made between IX and American II Corps direct. Relief to be complete by the morning of October 21, and command pass at an hour to be decided by the corps concerned and reported to A. H. Q.

2. On relief, the American II Corps will be withdrawn into army reserve and be accommodated as follows:

   Corps Hq. - BERTANGLES and VILLERS BOCAGE
   1 division - QUERRIEU training area
   1 division - CORBIE training area.

Orders for this move will be issued later.

3. Corps areas and boundaries are shown on the attached maps.

4. ** The counterbattery boundary between the IX and XIII Corps will be extended from point G.15.C.O.O. due E. to the canal at G.17.C.3.O, and thence N. E. along the canal.

5. The units to be transferred from American II Corps to IX Corps and from American II Corps to XIII Corps are shown on attached appendix.

6. Acknowledge by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

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(issued with Fourth Army No. 20/43 (G), dated 19/10/18)

LIST OF TRANSFERS

APPENDIX

1. From American II Corps to IX Corps:
   1 regt. 5th Cav. Brig. (20th Hussars)
   Artillery:
   Aust. 2d D. A.
   " 3d "
   " 4th "
   " 5th "
   " 6th Army Brigade
   " 12th "
   " 9th Brigade R. G. A.
   " 18th "
   " 41st "
   " 51st "
   " 68th "
   " 71st "

- 679 -
LIST OF TRANSFERS (Cont.)

Aust. 93d Brigade R. G. A.

222d Siege Battery R. G. A.

494th

NOTE: The Aust. 2d D. A. and Aust. 12th Army Brigade will be withdrawn from the line under orders to be issued later.

146th, 216th, 238th A. T. Cos., R. E.
Australian 1st (T) Co.
Detachment Australian E. and M Co.

2. From American II Corps to XIII Corps

73d Army Brigade, R. G. A.

449th Siege Battery, R. G. A.

504th

3. Transfer of labor and other administrative units will be notified later by Q.

4. Aust. 3d Squadron F. C. will come under direct orders of 5th Brigade, R. A. F.

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182-33.3: Order

**British IX Corps to Relieve American II Corps**

From: Fourth Army

Date: October 19, 1918 Hour: 21:30

To: II Corps

QB 28: IX Corps will take over all administrative units from American II Corps until distribution between IX Corps and XIII Corps can be made. Date of taking over to be arranged direct between IX Corps and American II Corps and notified G. H. Q.

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182-33.3: No. 3: Order

**Operations 27th and 30th Divisions**

ORDER

IX CORPS, B. E. F.,

No. 146

*October 19, 1918—4:15 p. m.*

1. The IX Corps will take over the front at present held by the American II Corps, who are being withdrawn into reserve.

   The regiment of the 5th Cavalry Brigade at present at disposal of American II Corps passes to command of IX Corps.

   List of other units coming under IX Corps will be issued later.

2. IX Corps northern boundary on relief will run - BAZUEL (R.8,b.0.6.)—BAZUEL—St-BENIN Road, inclusive, to XIII Corps, R.13.c.5.2.—Q.28 central—Q.32 central—crossroads V.10.d.1.9., inclusive, to XIII Corps, road junction V.9.d.6.0., inclusive, to IX Corps, thence straight to MONTIGNY Farm.

3. IX Corps front will be lightly held as a defense front from present right to R.17. central, thence to corps left it will be occupied with a view to an offensive operations to be carried out shortly.
The 1st Division will hold the defensive front; the offensive operation will be carried out by the 6th Division.

Adjustment of divisional boundaries in this connection will be carried out after relief of American II Corps.

The 46th Division will be held in reserve behind the right of the corps, and the 32d Division in reserve behind the left of the corps.

Further orders for the movement of these divisions will be issued later.

4. Relief of American II Corps will be carried out as follows:

   (a) 1st Division will relieve American 30th Division tonight 19/20th, under mutual arrangements between divisions concerned.

   Following troops will be attached to 1st Division:
   - 5th Cavalry Brigade (less 1 regiment with XIII Corps, 1 troop Royal Scots Greys with 6th Division, 1 troop Royal Scots Greys with A. D. Signals).
   - 2d Life Guards Machine Gun Battalion.
   - IX Corps Cyclist Battalion (less one officer and 30 men with 6th Division).

   Troops of the American 30th Division are being withdrawn to St-SOUPLET on relief and will clear St-SOUPLET, moving on BUSIGNY by 12:00 on 20th instant.

   (b) 6th Division will relieve American 27th Division on night 20th/21st, under mutual arrangements between divisions concerned.

   Two brigade groups of 6th Division will proceed by lorry to St-SOUPLET on 20th instant.

   ROUTE: VAUX-ANDIGNY and MOLAIN.

   Further instructions as regards time, bussing and debussing points will be issued.

   American 27th Division on relief are withdrawing to St-SOUPLET and will be clear of St-SOUPLET by 12:00, 21st instant.

   Remaining brigade group of 6th Division will proceed by march route on 20th or 21st instant, under orders of G. O. C., 6th Division.

   (c) In case of both above reliefs, time of passing of command will be arranged by divisional commanders concerned and reported to corps headquarters.

   (d) Command of corps front will pass at the same time.

   (e) Separate instructions will be issued as regards artillery reliefs.

5. Further information as to movement of American II Corps will be issued when received.

6. Acknowledge.

Brigadier General,
General Staff, IX Corps.

XIII Corps will have access on St-BENIN—BAZUEL Road to crossroads at R.8.f.7.7., which will be administered by IX Corps.

[Addendum]

182-33.3

From: IX Corps

Date: October 19, 1918 Hour: 20:15

To: II Corps

G 841. Ref. IX Corps Order 146. 6th Division in addition to taking over the front of American 27th Div. night 20/21st, will take over the front of CXLVI (XIII) Corps from
left of American 27th Div. to northern boundary of IX Corps as given in paragraph 2 of
order 14th [IX Corps Order No. 146, Oct. 19, 1918]. Relief to be arranged direct with
26th Div. Addsd. all recipients of IX Corps Order No. 146.

[Addendum]

IX Corps No. G.364/305/512.

Reference IX Corps Order No. 146 of today.
1. The 32d Division will move to BOHAIN and BRANCOURT as accommodation becomes
available by the withdrawal of 6th Division and American II Corps.
   Route via SEQUEHART and FRESNOY-le-GRAND.
2. Dividing line between 1st and 6th Divisions will be CATILLON. Halte R.23.a.9.9.
   ---W.6.c.0.0.---W.9.c.5.0.
3. Back boundary of divisions in line will be Q.32.central---W.19.c.0.0---E.25.c.0.0.
4. Acknowledge.

Brigadier General,
General Staff, IX Corps.

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230-32.16

Relief of 30th Division

From: 1st Division [IX Corps, B. E. F.]
Date: October 19, 1918   Hour: 20:30
To: American 30th Division

1st Div. is extending its front to the north tonight, relieving American 30th Div.
After relief forward interdivisional boundary on left will be from R.31.d.2.6. to M.13.d.0.0.
American 27th Div. will be on left Hq. BUSIGNY. American 59th Brig. remains for present
in support in new sector 118th Regt. about St-MARTIN-RIVIERE, 117th Regt. about La HAIE-
MENNERESSE. New front will be taken over by 2d Inf. Brig. under orders already issued
verbally by div. comdr. Approximate front will be from X.4.central to R.27.d.2.6. Dis-
positions after relief as follows: Right brig. group on 2 bn. front, Hq. Farm du MOULIN
Left brig. group on 2d Bn. front Hq. MOLAIN. Troops 2d Inf. Brig., 24 guns 1st Bn. M. G.
C., and 3 arty. brigs., Australian 5th D. A., which remain in sector for the present.
Divisional reserves: 1st Inf. Brig. in area La VALLEE-MULATRE---WASSIGNY. Field cos.,
less 1 section, with each inf. brig. and pioneer bn., under C. R. E. 1st Bn. M. G. C.,
less 3 cos., La VALLEE-MULATRE. 2d Life Guards M. G. Bn. west and south of VAUX-ANDIGNY.
Arty. under C. R. A., 2 groups each of 2 R. A. A. brigs. and the 83d Brig. R. G. A. De-
tachment 5th Cav. Brig. S. and S. E. of La VALLEE-MULATRE. Div. Hq. VAUX-ANDIGNY
W.19.c.6.9.

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Relief of 54th Brigade by British 71st Brigade

OPERATION ORDER
No. 378

Ref. Sheet 57B, S. E. )
62B, N. E. ) 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. The 71st Infantry Brigade will relieve the American 54th Brigade, American 30th Division, and the 75th Infantry Brigade, 25th Division, on the front approx. R.15.b.1.8 to R.8.a.7.5., on the night of October 20/21, 1918.

The 9th Norfolk Regt. will relieve the American 54th Brigade.
The 1st Leicestershire R. will relieve the 75th Infantry Brigade, who are holding their front with one battalion.
2d Sherwood Foresters will be in brigade reserve.

G. HAMBLYN,
Captain,
A/Brigade Major, 71st Inf. Brigade.

Issued at 2240 h.

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182-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 17

From 18 h., Oct. 18 to 18 h., Oct. 19, 1918

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS:
(a) INFANTRY: The corps continued to exploit the success of yesterday, and advanced the line an average distance of 1,000 yards.
(b) ARTILLERY - Field Artillery: The principal fire has been delivered on requests from the infantry.

Heavy Artillery: Fire has been directed only on targets east of the canal, this had denied fire to all but long-range artillery and has consisted chiefly of harassing fire.
(c) PRISONERS: During the 24 hours ending 12:00, 19/10/18, the following unwounded prisoners passed through the corps cage: 16 officers and 436 O. R. Total since October 5, 93 officers, 3,353 O. R.

* * * * *
III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Activity during the period was below normal. H. V. guns have shelled back areas and field guns and howitzers have harassed, with searching fire, roads and possible assembly places in the forward area. Among the areas affected are BUSIGNY and BAZUEL; at 13 h., the latter was submitted to a short, but heavy burst of fire. Owing to the continued poor visibility no locations have been received from the air.

IV. ENEMY’S DEFENSES: A prisoner of the 113th Inf. Regt., 29th Div., states that while his regiment was at rest in FESMY he saw Landsturm battalions working on a defense line west of the OISE Canal. He crossed the canal by the iron bridge in S.9.c., wire was being put down about 100 meters from the bridge and extending northwest and southwest of the road (Route Nationale No. 45). The wire was about 3 meters broad.

V. AIRCRAFT: On account of bad weather, observation from the air was impossible.

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KERR T. RIGGS,

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182-33.3, No. 3: Operations Instructions

Operations 27th and 30th Divisions

815 G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

SERIES B, NO. 9

1. The American 30th Division will be relieved by the British 1st Division tonight, Oct. 19/20.

2. The 60th Brigade on relief will be withdrawn and assembled in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET tonight, Oct. 19/20. The 59th Brigade will remain in support until the arrival of the supporting troops of the 1st Division and then be withdrawn and assembled in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET.

The American 30th Division will move from the vicinity of St-SOUPLET to the BUSIGNY and BRANCOURT areas, all troops of the division to be clear of the crossroads in St-SOUPLET (Q.34.c.4.9.) by 12 h., Oct. 20.

3. The American 27th Division will be relieved by the British 6th Division on night Oct. 20/21. On relief, this division will be withdrawn and assembled in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET, moving later to the BUSIGNY and BRANCOURT areas, so as to clear crossroads in St-SOUPLET (Q.34.c.4.9.) by 12 h., Oct. 21. Division headquarters will move to JONCOURT, clearing BUSIGNY by 12 h., Oct. 21.

4. Details of relief will be arranged between commanding generals of the divisions concerned; the command passing on completion of the reliefs.

5. All roads within corps administrative area are available, except VAUX-ANDIGNY---MOLAIN---St-SOUPLET Road.

6. Troops will be moved by light railway from BRANCOURT to ROISEL and from ROISEL...
to detraining point by broad gauge. Instruction relative to entrainment will be issued later.

7. Acknowledge.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
C. of S.,
for
GEO. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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182-10.2: Letter

Commendation

From: II Corps
Date: October 19, 1918 Hour: 9:30
To: 27th and 30th Divisions

811 G-3. Following reported for your information. Number 1605 G-3. The commander in chief desires you to convey to the officers and soldiers of your corps his appreciation of the magnificent qualities which have enabled them, against powerful resistance, to advance more than ten miles and to take more than six thousand prisoners since September 27.

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182-10.2: Fldr. 4: Field Message

Relief of American II Corps

From: American II Corps
Date: Oct. 19, 1918 Hour: 1330 No.: 813 G-3
To: C. G., American 27th Division

American II Corps will be relieved by the IX Corps as under: British 1st Division to relieve 30th Division night October 19/20. 59th Brigade to remain in close support until approach of support troops 1st Division. Brigade on relief will assemble in vicinity of St-SOUPLET, thence by road march to BUSIGNY and BRANCOURT areas. Road crossing in Q.34.c.4.9 will be cleared by 12 h., Oct. 20. Road VAUX-ANDIGNY---MOLAIN---St-MARTIN-RIVIERE---St-SOUPLET is reserved for use of British troops. British 6th Division to relieve 27th Division night Oct. 20/21. 27th Division to assemble vicinity St-SOUPLET, thence by road march to BUSIGNY-BRANCOURT area. Road crossing Q.34.c.4.9 will be cleared by 12 h., Oct. 21. 27th Division Headquarters to JONCOURT, clearing BUSIGNY by 12 h., Oct. 21. Road restrictions as above, details of relief to be arranged by division com-
manders concerned. Troops will be conveyed from BRANCOURT by light railway to ROISEL, thence by broad gauge to detraining point. Details later.

I. L. HUNT,
for
F. E. BUCHAN
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

182-12.4: Fldr. 2: Telegrams

Areas Allotted to 27th and 30th Divisions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

C. G., 30th Division
252/G-1

QUERRIEU area allotted to your division, with headquarters at QUERRIEU. Area maps forwarded this date.

G-1, American II Corps

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182-12.4: Fldr. 2: Telegrams

Areas Allotted to 27th and 30th Divisions

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

C. G., 27th Division
251/G-1

The CORBIE area is allotted your division, with headquarters at CORBIE. Area maps forwarded this date.

G-1, American II Corps

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WARNING ORDER

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.

October 19, 1918.

The division will be relieved on the night of October 20/21 by the British 6th Division, which will send one battalion to relieve each brigade in the front line. On relief, troops will be assembled west of St-SOUPLET and rested, and will later move to the vicinity of BRANCOURT; thereafter, troops will be moved by light railway to ROISEL and by broad gauge railroad to a back area. Corps orders require that St-SOUPLET be cleared by 12 o'clock, October 21.

Details will be published in orders later.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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230-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

No. 32

6 h., Oct. 18 to 18 h., Oct. 19, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS: Heavy fighting continued all day and well into the night. Our troops were opposed by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire. Twice during the day, the Boche, in reply to our artillery fire, put down artillery barrages. During the day's operation, RIEBAUVILLE and MAZINGHIEN were captured, in the face of heavy resistance.

(a) Enemy Intentions: Prisoner of the 1st Res. Co., 24th Pioneer Bn., 3d Naval Div., states that a few days ago he was told by the commander of the 9th F. A. R. (which was then near MAZINGHIEN), that if the situation became desperate, every available man would be put into the firing line in order to make a stand west of the canal. He further states that about 3 days ago all of the villages west of the canal were cleared of civilians. Prisoner saw many civilians assembled in the villages near VALENCEINNES, and heard that all civilians had been evacuated from VALENCEINNES and MAUBEUGE.

Prisoners of the 17th Res. Div. and the 243d Div. also state that they had orders to hold the position at all costs.

The above statements, taken in connection with the indication on captured map, that the Hermann Stellung runs along the east side of the canal in this sector, indicate that further stubborn resistance is to be expected.

(b) Our Activity. Artillery: Active during attacks at 600 and 1130. Long-range guns delivered greater part of harassing fire during late afternoon and throughout
night. Short-range guns not so active during this latter period, because of uncertainty as to location of our infantry.

Machine Guns: Active during attacks. The usual harassing fire later, during consolidation of our positions.

Trench Mortars: Nil.

Aerial: Below normal during morning.

Patrols: The usual liaison patrols for communication between units in line and forward patrols to assist in consolidation of line.

2. MISCELLANEOUS: A Boche ambulance, in good working order, was captured by one of our units yesterday.

B. Y. READ,
Major, U. S. A.
A. C. of S., G-2.


**Situation Report**

From: 30th Division

Date: October 19, 1918

To: General Headquarters, A. E. F.

[Extract]

Weather cloudy and foggy.

Infantry active in attack. Enemy machine guns very active during the progress of our attack. Our machine guns effectively used.

Artillery: Ours effectively employed during our attack and being brought forward to deal with machine-gun emplacements; active on villages and important points in enemy rear. Enemy artillery heavy shelling of MAZINGHIEN, RIBEAUVILLE, and important roads and cross-roads with 250's and 77's; active on advancing troops.

Aeronautics: Enemy aeros and balloons nil. Our balloons were up at a low height during the day.

Visibility poor.

Troop Movements: None seen, except the retreat of the enemy front line during progress of our attack. Our troop movements normal.

General impression of the day favorable; the enemy has made the progress of our attack slow by strongly entrenched machine-gun positions.

* * * * *

The attack was continued today in spite of strong machine-gun emplacements and heavy artillery fire. Our troops advanced, capturing ECAILLON and MAZINGHIEN, killing many of the enemy. Total prisoners since the beginning of our attack on Oct. 17: 6 officers and 412 other ranks.

Our front line is now being consolidated 2,000 yards west of Canal de la SAMBRE, southwest of CATILLON, along road R 28 D23 to X 4 D 46.

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- 688 -
PERIODICAL REPORT: 12 noon, Oct. 18 to 12 noon, Oct. 19

[Extract]

1. Hostile situation at the beginning of the day remained unchanged. The enemy keeping up his rearguard fighting and making our progress slow by well chosen strongly entrenched machine-gun emplacements, which had to be dealt with and reduced separately.

2. No information of value was received from the enemy with the exception that it became known he had moved all his field pieces east of the Canal de la Sambre et l'Oise. Prisoners of the 17th Res. Div. and the 243d Division state they had orders to hold the position at all cost. Prisoners of the 3d Naval Division stated orders were issued for every available man to be used to make a stand west of the canal, that three days ago, civilians were assembled at Valenciennes and Maubeuge, that had been evacuated from west of the canal.

3. Enemy continued to offer strong rearguard defense. At 17 o'clock, retired to a general line 500 yards east of Mazinghien, leaving only a few machine-gun nests in the intervening area.

4. Nil.

5. At the beginning of the day, the 60th Brigade was carrying out its offensive along the entire front, renewed at 11:30, October 18.

6. The advance was continued successfully to the line shown on attached map. Two companies of the 3d Battalion, 117th Infantry, were filtered into the line of the 119th Infantry on the morning of October 18. The 113th Machine Gun Bn. assisted the infantry in their advance. Regimental trench mortars and one-pounder cannons and field artillery were brought forward and employed in reducing the machine-gun nests of the enemy.

7. Information for the 1st Division on the right and the 27th on the left indicate that the enemy was making a determined stand along the whole corps front. No new identifications were reported.

8. Corps warning order was received by telephone and later confirmed by telegraph pertaining to the relief of the 30th Division from the line on the night of October 19/20.

9. Instructions were issued to the 60th Brigade to continue its advance up to the objective given for the operation which began the previous day (October 18). Warning order given by telephone and confirmed by telegraph of the relief of this division on the night October 19/20.

10. The enemy was driven back up to the line shown on attached map. 97 O. R.'s were captured, bringing the total number of prisoners for October 17/18/19 up to 9 officers and 444 other ranks. All bridges over the canal have been destroyed and only a screen of machine guns now lies between our front line and the canal, east of which the enemy evidently intends to make his next stand.

* * * * *

12. The enemy is holding up our advance from rapid progress by well chosen and strongly entrenched machine-gun emplacements, which must be dealt with and reduced separately. This fact together with the fact that our troops are tired after nearly a month of
fighting, and heavy casualties, has necessarily made our progress slow. The next stand to be made by the enemy will be east of the canal.

13. The division will move to a back area to be given a rest and reorganized with new replacements. The advance now being made is to continue up to the objective given, and there the line consolidated and patrols sent forward.

14. Morale very good, supplies adequate. Troops badly in need of rest, a bath, and clean clothes.

C. BURNETT,

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230-32.15: Telegram

Relief of 30th Division

WARNING ORDER

109/G3

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

This division will be relieved night October 19/20 by British 1st Division. 59th Brigade will remain in close support until approach support troops. Brigades upon relief will assemble in vicinity St-SOUPLET, thence road march to BUSIGNY and BRANCOURT areas, 60th Brigade and 113th Machine Gun Battalion to BUSIGNY and vicinity, 59th Brigade to BRANCOURT and vicinity. Road crossing Q.34.c.4.9. will be cleared by 12:00, October 20. Road VAUX-ANDIGNY---MOLAIN---St-MARTIN-RIVIERE---St-SOUPLET reserved for British troops. Troops will be conveyed from BRANCOURT by light railway to ROISEL, then by broad gauge to detraining point probably on 20th inst. Transport probably go by road march. Organizations submit entraining strength to G-1 at once, deducting transport. Acknowledge.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Comdg. 30th Division.

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230-32.1: Orders

Operations 60th Brigade

FIELD ORDERS

No. 26

60th INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

MAP: 57B, S. E.--1/20,000

1. The 30th Division will continue its attack on October 19, 1918, at an hour which has been separately announced. The British 3d Brigade on our right and the American 27th Division on our left continue the attack at the same time.

2. The 60th Brigade, plus 113th M. G. Battalion, 1st Battalion, 118th Infantry, 3d Battalion, 117th Infantry, and support cavalry and artillery will continue the attack at Zero hour on October 19, 1918.
3. (a) The relative disposition of the attacking troops remains unchanged.
   The objective is the 2d objective as marked on the operation map as issued for
   the attack of October 17, 1918, approximately north and south grid line through R.28.central---R.34.central---X.4.central. Exploitation will continue as ordered in Field Order
   No. 24, October 16, 1918, these headquarters, for the attack of October 17, 1918.
   Divisional boundary remains unchanged. Interregimental boundary as originally
   ordered in attack of October 17, 1918.
   (b) Cavalry: As soon as MAZINGHIEN has been passed by our infantry, cavalry
   patrols will push forward and if the situation permits, the cavalry squadron will exploit
   immediately to the west bank of the canal.
   4. Administration arrangements unchanged.
   5. (a) Plan of liaison unchanged.
      (b) P. C. of brigade unchanged until further notice.
   6. Acknowledge.

S. L. FAISON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Commanding

230-32.1: Orders

Operations 60th Brigade

FIELD ORDERS 60th INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
No. 27 October 19, 1918.

MAP: 57B, S. E.---1/20,000

[Extract]

1. The American 30th Division is being relieved by the British 1st Division.
2. The American 60th Infantry Brigade, plus the 1st Battalion, 118th Infantry Regiment,
   the 3d Battalion, 117th Infantry Regiment, and the 113th M. G. Battalion, will be
   relieved on the night of October 19/20, by the British 2d Brigade. All details will be
   arranged between the commanding officers concerned. Trench stores, maps, and defence
   schemes will be listed and receipted for.
3. Upon completion of relief, the 120th Infantry Regiment, plus the 1st Battalion,
   118th Infantry Regiment, will march to and stage night of October 19/20 in and in vicinity
   of St-SOUPLLET, north of road leading from Q.34.c., west through St-SOUPLLET, and through
   Q.33.a. The 119th Infantry Regiment, plus 3d Battalion, 117th Infantry Regiment, will
   march to and stage night of October 19/20 in and in immediate vicinity of St-SOUPLLET,
   south of road above mentioned and east of north and south grid line through Q.33.central.
   The 115th M. G. Battalion and 113th M. G. Battalion will stage night October 19/20 in and
   in vicinity of St-SOUPLLET, south of road and west of grid line above mentioned.
4. Regiments and machine gun battalions will notify these headquarters immediately
   of completion of relief, and also location of headquarters in staging area.
5. Road VAUX-ANDIGNY---MOLAIN---ST-MARTIN-RIVIERE---ST-SOUPLLET is reserved for
   British troops, and will not be used by troops of this brigade.

* * * * *
ST-MARTIN-RIVIERE—ARBRE-DE-GUISE AREA
Looking east from St-Martin-Riviere, across the valley of the Selle
7. On October 20, the 60th Brigade, plus 113th M. G. Battalion, will march by road to BUSIGNY and vicinity, clearing road crossing Q.34.c.4.9. by 12 noon, October 20. Orders for this move will be issued later.

8. Upon completion of relief, command passes to Commanding General, British 2d Brigade.

9. Headquarters this brigade remains unchanged for the present.

10. Acknowledge.

S. L. FAISON,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.


FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

[Extract]

1. As was anticipated, the enemy's main body retired across the OISE Canal during the night, the withdrawal being covered by rearguards holding woods and tactical features. Exploitation of yesterday's success continued, little opposition being encountered. MAZINGHIEN, REJET-de-BEAULIEU, JONC-de-MER Farm, and BAZUEL were captured. Large quantities of war material, including five lorries were captured in Le CATEAU. The enemy’s artillery activity was slight, except for H. V. guns harassing roads in the back areas. During the night, Le CATEAU was shelled with H. E. and gas.

In addition to the normal harassing fire, our artillery supported the infantry operations with bombardments on machine-gun nests and other points of resistance.

2. IX CORPS: The line was advanced without opposition to the high ground overlooking the canal between OISY and REJET-de-BEAULIEU.

AMERICAN II CORPS: The American 30th Division captured MAZINGHIEN and REJET-de-BEAULIEU. Progress towards CATILLON was held up by machine-gun fire from woods and tactical features occupied by enemy rearguards. The divisions of the American II Corps were very weak and tired, and dug in on the high ground overlooking the OISE Canal.

XIII CORPS: BAZUEL was occupied without resistance. One brigade of the 25th Division, which had been brought into the line, established the line on the high ground south of the Richemont Stream with patrols pushed forward to the southern bank between BAZUEL and MONTAY.

3. THIRD ARMY: Situation unchanged.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: During the night, the enemy withdrew across the OISE Canal. The French followed the retreating enemy and by evening occupied the western bank of the OISE Canal from MONT-d'ORIGNY to OISY. Attempts were made to cross the canal between TUPIGNY and NOYALES, but were unsuccessful owing to hostile machine-gun fire.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 190 hours were flown by 160 pilots. Three successful reconnais­sances were carried out and 12 artillery patrols, during which 16 zone calls were sent down, but without success. Seven combats in the air took place, one of which was decisive and resulted in one E. A. falling to the ground out of control.
   175 25-lb. bombs were dropped by day on suitable targets.
   No night flying.
(b) Hostile: The weather has been very unfavorable throughout the day. When flying was possible hostile activity was generally normal.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through army cages - officers, 850 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s 5 officers, 275 O. R.


8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: American 30th Division was relieved by 1st Division night 19/20, and moved into corps reserve.
   IX Corps extended their front to the right by taking over from American 30th Division.

* * * *

182-33.3, No. 3: Operations Report

G-3

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 19, 1918


2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF THE ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Rearguard actions were fought by the enemy during the day, but his withdrawal before our advance was practically complete by 12 h., Oct. 19.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES, and CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: E. A. active during afternoon Oct. 18, flying low over our advancing infantry. Enemy artillery was active and effective on the 30th Division front afternoon Oct. 18.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Our artillery is active against strong machine-gun nests. Our line extended approximately north to south from La ROUE Farm---JONC-de-MER Farm---R 31 b---R 31 d---X 1 a---X 7 c. During the night Oct 18/19, enemy artillery was active in both forward and back areas. E. A. also active in back areas.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS, AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The advance was continued, and by noon Oct. 19, our right division had reached the high ground overlooking CATILLON, and our left division was on the high ground on the west bank of the St-MAURICE River. Our troops had reached MAZINGHIEN at 2030 h., Oct. 18, and patrols were being pushed forward. Cavalry reached the front line, but was prevented from going farther by rearguard machine-gun activity.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The IX Corps on our right had taken WASSIGNY; the XIII Corps on our left had reached the western edge of BAZUEL; we were in touch with both.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: Received British Fourth Army Order No. 20/43 (G), ordering the relief of the II Corps by the IX Corps, under arrangements to be made between the corps concerned.
9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: RIBEAVILLE and MAZINGHIEN were taken by our troops, and our line was being consolidated. Operations In structions, Series B, No. 9 were issued.

10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: As a result of the offensive which began at 0520 h., Oct. 17, by the II Corps, the line on this front was advanced approximately 6,000 yards on a front of about 4,000 yards. Prisoners through corps cages, from Sept. 27 to 6 p.m., Oct. 19, 153 officers, 5,742 O. R.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: With the attainment of objectives on our corps front, the enemy has been forced to retire to the east of the SAMBRE Canal.

13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: The two divisions of the corps are to be relieved beginning night of Oct. 19/20, by the British IX Corps, our corps passing into army reserve for a rest period, with corps headquarters at BERTANGLES and VILLERS-BOCAGE.

14. REMARKS, MORALE, SUPPLIES, ETC.: Morale, troops tired from continued heavy fighting; supplies, satisfactory; health, generally good; weather, cool and overcast.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

182-42.2: Fldr. 3: Report

Engineer Operations

DIVISION ENGINEER, A. E. F.,
October 19, 1918.

From: Division Engineer, 27th Division

To: C. E., American II Corps

[Extract]

1. Attached report on construction of emergency bridge at Q 34 c 5.4., with sketch showing details of construction.

Report being prepared on the construction of temporary bridge near Q 34 c 35.95. Necessary materials for construction can be salvaged in St-SOUPLET. Full details tomorrow noon. Bridge at W 4 d 0 5 not repaired.

2. Road from R.19 a 0.9 to R.32 a 9.5 good condition, metalled, good for one-way lorry to two-way wagon traffic.

Road from R 27 a 0.8 to R 20 d 0.5 good, metalled, two-way traffic. R 20 d 0.5 to R 32 a 9.8 metalled, good for two-way traffic, except in four places, where large shell holes are. Material for filling holes nearby. The above road reconnaissance made before 12:00, October 19, 1918.

3. Booby traps. Village of ARBRE-GUERNON completely inspected, all road crossings and JONC-de-MER and JONQUIERE Farms inspected, no indications of mines found.
Along railroad south of St-SOUPLET Bridge, a quantity of tank mines were found, especially near railroad station. All were marked mined or do not touch. A number of mine casings collected along railroad banks and near roads.

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A. H. ACKER,
Colonel,
27th Div. Engineer.

THOMAS CRIMMINS,
Captain, 102d Engineers,
Adjutant.

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II Corps, AEF: War Diary

October 19, 1918.

[Extract]

Relief of the 30th Div. in the line by the British 1st Div. completed night October 19/20.

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F. E. BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

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HS Brit. File: II Corps: Fldr. 5: War Diary

IX CORPS, B. E. F.,

Place: POEUILLY
Date: October 19

Summary of Events and Information

The advance was resumed at 5:30 a. m., the enemy offering very little resistance, having withdrawn most of his troops to the eastern bank of the OISE-SAMBRE Canal during the night. TUPIGNY and HANNAPPS had been occupied by the French during the early hours of the morning and by 12 noon, the troops of the 1st Division had fully occupied WASSIGNY and had entered REJET-de-BEAULIEU, the only opposition which was met with being from a few isolated M. G.'s, which had been left by the enemy on the west bank of the canal. By nightfall, the 1st Division had reached a line along the high ground overlooking the canal along the REJET-OISY Road, the 1st Inf. Brig. being in touch with the French just N. of OISY and the 3d Inf. Brig. being in touch with the American corps just N. of REJET. Any attempt on the part of our troops to push forward to the canal was met with heavy M. G. fire from the eastern bank, also the hostile gun fire had increased, which bore out prisoners' statements that the enemy intended if possible to hold a line along the high ground to the east of the canal.
The following orders were issued today:
Corps Order No. 146 - in which it was arranged that the IX Corps should take over the whole of the American corps front commencing on the night 19th/20th.
No. G. 364/305/512---ordering the 32d Division to move to BOHAIN and BRANCOURT.
No. G 841---with reference to Corps Order No. 146, stating that in addition to the American corps front, the IX Corps would take over a portion of the XIII Corps front as well.

182-32.2: List

**Location II Corps Units**

G-3

**HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS**

LOCATION LIST NO. 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)</th>
<th>WIANCOURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (rear)</td>
<td>N.15.d.cent. (62C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412th Tel. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>MONTBREHAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th Field Signal Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>Near SAULTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148th Aero Squadron (Att. to 13th Wing 3d Brig. R. A. F.)</td>
<td>BAIZIEUX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS**

| Hq. VII Corps R. A.          | WIANCOURT |
| Hq. Aust. 4th D. A.          | V.9.c.25.80 (57B) |
| Hq. Aust. 3d D. A.           | DOINGT |
| Hq. VII Corps H. A.          | C.22.a.2.2. (62B) |

**AMERICAN UNITS**

27th Division

| Division Headquarters (Adv.) | BUSIGNY |
| Division Headquarters (rear) | JONCOURT |
| 53d Infantry Brig. Hq.       | ESCAUFORT |
| 54th Infantry Brigade Hq.    | ESCAUFORT |
| 102d Engr. Regt. Hq.         | BUSIGNY |
| 104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.    | BUSIGNY |
| 102d Field Sig. Bn. Hq.      | BUSIGNY |
| 102d San. Train Hq.          | BUSIGNY |
1. **SITUATION OCTOBER 19 AND NIGHT 19/20 INST.:** As anticipated, the main body of the enemy retired across the OISE Canal during the night 18th/19th, leaving rearguards on the west bank. In conjunction with the French we again advanced for a considerable distance, and by the evening gained the high ground overlooking the OISE Canal on the line OISY -- REJET-de-BEAULIEU (incl.) -- BAZUEL -- RICHEMONT Ravine. RIBEAUCOURT, MAZINGHIEN, and BAZUEL were heavily shelled. A considerable amount of material, including 5 lorries, was found in Le CATEAU, as well as 1,200 inhabitants.

A few prisoners were taken. They belonged to the 17th Res., 243d, 121st, and 221st Divs. Of the above, the 121st and 221st Divs. (both recently withdrawn from the line) reinforced the MAZINGHIEN and WASSIGNY areas respectively, probably replacing tired divisions.

During the night, the situation remained unchanged.

2. **ENEMY'S INTENTIONS:**
   (a) Prisoners of the 121st Div., captured during the night 18/19th inst., stated that as soon as they arrived in the line they were ordered to withdraw E. of the OISE Canal, leaving rearguards.

   (b) Three civilians who escaped to our lines, having left MAUBEUGE ten days ago, state that, on their way to Le CATEAU, they saw continuous movement of troops retiring eastwards. They understood, from conversations they overheard, and from the statements of other French civilians they had met, that the troops were withdrawing towards NAMUR. They further state that they saw no trenches between MAUBEUGE and BAZUEL, but around MAUBEUGE digging commenced ten days ago.

   (c) The Third Army captured a map, probably dating from the beginning of October, which shows a projected line of resistance, capable of holding 3 divisions, along the west bank of the RHONELLE River, S. W. of ORSINVAL, to FRANC-ALLOUT Farm. It is possible that this line will continue through the Forest of MORMAL, and join up with the HERMANN Stellung-II, running along the east bank of the canal.
4. **PRISONERS:** The number of prisoners which passed through corps cages and C. C. S., since the commencement of our operations on Aug. 8, has now reached the total of 70,599, of which 1,885 are officers.

5. **ENEMY ACTIVITY:** Weather: Very misty all day.
   (a) Aircraft: Owing to weather conditions, there was practically no flying.
   (b) Artillery (up to 3 p. m., Oct. 19, 1918): Hostile artillery showed little activity. Between OISY and MAZINGHIEN, also north of BAZUEL, the bulk of the shelling came from H. V. guns.
   At 6 p. m., a fairly heavy barrage was put down on our forward line for an hour, the fire coming from a northeasterly direction.
   An H. V. gun, probably a 24-cm., firing from the railway near GUISE, shelled BOHAIN, WASSIGNY, and BECQUIGNY, and a 15-cm., H. V. gun, firing from the S. E., harassed FRESNOY.
   (c) Movement: Bad weather prevented all observation of rail and road activity yesterday. Night operations were abandoned.

6. **ENEMY DEFENSES:** According to a prisoner of the 113th Inf. Regt. 29th Div., whose regiment was recently resting in FESMY, Landsturm battalions were working on a defense line west of the OISE Canal; wire about 3 meters broad was being erected about 100 meters from the iron bridge in S.9.c., and extending northwest and southwest of the road (Route Nationale No. 45).

7. **BRIDGES:** Cavalry patrols reported that bridges in S.9.c., and at OISY are blown up.

8. **CIVILIANS:** Prisoners state that civilians were evacuated from FESMY eight days ago, and everything was being cleared from the town.

**GENERAL**

It is considered that a further retirement is likely to be carried out by the Germans from Le CATEAU southwards for the time being, and that any attempt made by us to gain ground towards Bois l'Eveque and the Forest of Mormal will meet with strenuous resistance.

By evacuating the salient N. W. of LAON, the Germans will be able to add to the number of their divisions in reserve. It is probable that a large number of these will be employed on the construction of rear lines of defense.

V. VIVIAN,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

**ANNEX TO FOURTH ARMY SUMMARY, DATED OCTOBER 20, 1918**

1. **CAPTURED ORDER (from G. H. Q. Summary):** The following extract from an order of the 21st Res. Div., dated 1/10/18 (the division was then in line near Le CATELET), shows that the divisions in this area were so much under strength that only half the normal allotment of travelling kitchens and supply wagons was required.

   The assembly of numerous divisions with small fighting strengths in a narrow space results in a collection of baggage which is in proportion neither to the fighting value of the units nor to the available billeting facilities.

   The first line transport must be cut down, and in such a manner that only one travelling kitchen and one supply wagon remain for every two companies.

2. **ENEMY'S DEFENSES:** A sketch map taken from a prisoner of the 204th Div. shows a line marked Hermann Stellung-II, just east of CATILLON, apparently indicating a trench line along the east bank of the canal. The map also shows a line marked ART. SCH. ST.
from La GROISE to LANDRECIES, about 800 yards west of the La GROISE-LANDRECIES Road.

Note: HERMANN Stellung-I was the line of defense running immediately E. of the SELLE River. Owing to the misty weather, it has not been possible to obtain information as to whether any line of trenches exists E. of the OISE. No trenches were seen in this area prior to the 14th inst.

3. GAS: (from statements of prisoners captured on 17th inst.).

A prisoner of the 25th R. I. R. captured near REGNICOURT, states that when our barrage commenced on the morning of the 17th, the men in his neighborhood were forced to put on their masks owing to our gas.

(Note: C. G. gas was employed in the barrage.)

182-20.1: Summary of Intelligence.

No. 18

From 18 h., Oct. 19 to 18 h., Oct. 20, 1918

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS:

(a) INFANTRY: The day was quiet.

(b) OUR ARTILLERY: Fire of heavy artillery has been kept east of the canal and has consisted of harassing fire on roads and communications.

(c) PRISONERS: No captures.

II. DISTRIBUTION OF ENEMY FORCES: No new identifications.

RESERVES: There are 16 divisions which can reinforce the army front. All of these divisions have been recently engaged by neighboring armies. They have been resting for periods as specified below.

2 divisions between 3 weeks and a fortnight.

8 " 14 days and a week.

6 " under 1 week.

They have all suffered heavy losses, and with the exception of the cyclist brig, will require a considerable amount of rest before they can be regarded as of much fighting value.

On the western front, there are now considered to be only 3 fresh divisions in reserve (Fourth Army summary).

III. HOSTILE ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Activity has continued below normal during the 24 hours. The front line has been shelled with Blue Cross and during the night St-SOUPLET and MAZINGHIEN were submitted to heavy bursts of fire. Other areas shelled include A.2 and 3, which have been considerably harassed.

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V. MORALE IN GERMANY: The following extract is from a letter dated October 12 to a prisoner. It is written by the prisoner's brother, a resident of Hamburg:

My dear Ludvig: The war is going to end now, is it not so? We have declared that we would evacuate the occupied territory so that we could enter upon an armistice and peace negotiations with the enemy. According to my opinion, we shall have an armistice this Thursday. Then at least, the killing will cease. It is very clear, anyhow, that we must finally have peace, inasmuch as we cannot oppose such a number of enemies. I pray to God every day that the good Lord will protect you, for if we should soon have peace, and we should lose you, it would be the finish
of our lives. Therefore, I advise you again---take good care of yourself, especially in these last days. I always hope that you may be captured so that nothing can happen to you in these last moments. I am always so anxious and at the same time, so happy that the terrible war is coming to an end. I can scarcely wait the time till you come to the German border, for then at least, your life will be safe. We shall soon have peace. That is certain, for we must have peace. As I have already told you, you will be back to us this Christmas to stay, that is, if nothing should happen to you in these last days. Take good care, for on this Thursday, we will have an armistice; on that you can depend.

KERR T. RIGGS,

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HS Brit. File: Flrd. IV B, II Corps: Letter

British Fourth Army Continues the Attack - American II Corps in Reserve

ADVANCE HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Fourth Army will continue the attack on a date which has been communicated verbally to those concerned and at an hour which will be notified later. This attack will be in conjunction with an attack by the Third Army on the left.

* * * * *

XIII Corps will arrange to meet V Corps at the points of junction marked on attached map.

3. There will be no preliminary organized bombardment. From now up till Zero, corps will:
   (a) Maintain vigorous counterbattery work.
   (b) Continue to harass the enemy's approaches.
   (c) Bombard localities to be selected by corps.

4. The barrage will move at the rate of 100 yards in 4 minutes. Further instructions as regards length of halts on the different objectives and as regards protective barrages will be issued later.

5. (a) Tanks are allotted as follows:
   IX Corps---American 301st Tank Bn. (15 Mk. V) organized in 3 sections of 5 tanks each. One section will be held in corps reserve.
   XIII Corps---10th Tank Bn. (24 tanks) organized in 3 companies of 8 tanks each. One company will be held in corps reserve.
   O.C., 2d Tank Brigade, will get into touch forthwith with both IX and XIII Corps.
   (b) 5th Brigade, R. A. F., will arrange direct with corps for covering the advance of the tanks to their starting points.

6. Red flares will be employed by all corps.
7. Watches will be synchronized by the general staff with corps hq. and 5th Brigade, R. A. F., at 1200 and 1800 on Y day.

8. Acknowledge by wire.

R. M. LUCKOCK,
Lt. Col.,
for
Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

HS Brit. Fie: Fldr. V, II Corps: Telegram

British IX Corps Relieves American II Corps

APPENDIX NO. 244
G.854

IX CORPS, B. E. F.,
October 20, 1918.

MESSAGES AND SIGNALS

Command of American II Corps front from IX Corps northern boundary to R.27, central passed from G. O. C., American II Corps, to G. O. C., IX Corps, at 11:30 p. m. on October 19.

R. BURRITT,
Col., G. S.

Operations II Corps

October 20, 1918.

6th DIVISION ORDER NO. 266

1. Tonight, October 20/21, the 6th Division (less division artillery), will relieve the American 27th Division and part of the British 25th Division.

2. The relief will be carried out as follows:
   (a) The 18th Infantry Brigade will relieve the American 53d Infantry Brigade in the right section of the American 27th Division front.
   (b) The 71st Infantry Brigade will relieve the American 54th Infantry Brigade in the left section of the American 27th Division front and the 75th Infantry Brigade (British 25th Division) in the front as far north as R.8.b.0.6.
   (c) B Co., 6th Bn. M. G. Corps, is placed at the disposal of the 18th Infantry Brigade, and C and D Cos. at the disposal of the 71st Infantry Brigade for the defense of the sectors being taken over by them. C Co. consists of only 2 sections.
   (d) Details of reliefs will be arranged between brigadier generals concerned on the lines already communicated verbally to B. G. C.'s, 18th and 71st Infantry Brigades.
   (e) Command will pass in each case on completion of relief.
   (f) Headquarters of units being relieved are situated as follows:
3. G. O. C., 6th Division, will take over command from G. O. C.'s, British 25th and American 27th Divisions, on completion of relief in the sectors concerned.

4. On completion of relief, boundaries will be as follows:
   - Between 1st and 6th Divisions: CATILLON-HALTE (R.23.a.9.9)---W.6.c.0.0.---W.9.c.5.0.
   - Between infantry brigades: Present interbrigade boundary of American 27th Division.
   - Back boundary of forward divisions: Q.32. central---W.19.c.0.0.
   - Field Ambulance, and bearer division, 91st Field Ambulance, will move by bus from BOHAIN to ST-SOUPLET, under instructions being issued separately.

6. Transport will move by road as follows:
   - (a) Route: BOHAIN---BECQUIGNY---La ROND-POINT---road junction in W.7.c.---La HAIE-MENNERESSE.
     Starting Point: Crossroads .15.c.9.8.
     Destination: Square W.2.
     Above applies for all transport unless otherwise stated.
   - (b) Transport of 71st Infantry Brigade and C and D Cos., 6th Bn. M. G. Corps:
     To be clear of starting point by 0900 h., under orders of 71st Infantry Brigade.
   - (c) Transport of 18th Infantry Brigade and B Co., 6th Bn., M. G. Corps: Head to pass starting point at 1130 h., under orders of 18th Infantry Brigade.
     (d) Transport of 17th Field Ambulance: Pass starting point 1200 h.
     (f) 91st Field Ambulance (less bearer division):
        Route: BOHAIN-BUSIGNY, destination BUSIGNY. Not to enter BOHAIN before 1445 h.

7. 16th Infantry Brigade and 16th Field Ambulance will march on October 21, under orders of B. G. C., 16th Infantry Brigade, from present locations to ST-SOUPLET---ST-MARTIN-RIVIERE, and area east of them to the railway line in Q.34---W.4. and 5, inclusive. No restrictions as to route. Not to enter ST-SOUPLET before 12 h.

8. Orders have already been issued for the march of field cos. and 11th Leicester Regt. (Pioneers).

9. Division headquarters and units not provided for in this order will move under orders of 6th Division Q.

10. As soon as possible, in any case, not later than immediately after dusk on October 21, the interbrigade boundary will be adjusted to:
    Railway from L.35.c.5.3---R.4.b.13.00---R.15.b.1.8---JONC-de-MER Farm (inclusive to right brigade)---road junction Q.30.d.35.15---Le NOUVEAU-MONDE, W.4.a.70.45. Details to be arranged between brigadier generals, 18th and 71st Infantry Brigades.

11. The field artillery now covering the front of the American 27th Division will continue to cover the front and will come under the command of G. O. C., 6th Division.
    It will be commanded by the C. R. A., 6th Division.
    Details regarding artillery support will be notified later.

12. Division hq. will close at their present location at 16 h., today, October 20, and reopen at BUSIGNY at the same hour.

13. Completion of all reliefs to be notified by wire to division hq., using the code words:
WILSON to denote relief of American infantry brigade completed. GEORGE to denote relief of portion of 75th Division completed.


T. L. GROVE,
Lieut. Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 0415 h.

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182-20.1: War Diary

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 20, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

SERIES B, NO. 10

1. The front now held by the American II Corps will be taken over by the IX Corps. Relief will be complete by the morning of October 21 and command will pass to the IX Corps at 1000 h., October 21, 1918.

2. On relief, the American II Corps will be withdrawn into army reserve and be accommodated as follows:

   Corps hq. - BERTANGLES and VILLERS-BOCAGE
   30th Division - QUERRIEU training area.
   27th Division - CORBIE training area.

   The move will be by road march to entraining point TINCOURT-ROISEL area, and thence by rail. Instructions relative to entrainment will be issued later.

3. (a) The American 30th Division (less 1 bn. of engineers) will march by road from the assembling points in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET to TINCOURT-ROISEL area as follows:

   Oct. 20 March to BUSIGNY-BRANCOURT area.
   Oct. 20/21 Stage in BUSIGNY-BRANCOURT area.
   Oct. 21 March to BELLICOURT area.
   Oct. 21/22 Stage in BELLICOURT area.
   Oct. 22 March to TINCOURT-ROISEL area.
   Oct. 22/23 Stage in TINCOURT-ROISEL area.
   Oct. 23 Entrain for QUERRIEU area

   1 bn. engineers will march to BUSIGNY, coming under orders C. R. E., Fourth Army. Transport will move by road with 30th Division to TINCOURT-ROISEL area, and by road from there Oct. 23, to QUERRIEU area, staging night of 23/24 at SUZANNE.

   No restrictions as to roads for troops or transport.

   Headquarters 30th Division will be located at QUERRIEU.

   (b) The American 27th Division (less 2 cos. and hq. 1 bn. engineers), will march by road from the assembling points in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET to TINCOURT-ROISEL area, as follows:

   Oct. 21 March to BUSIGNY-BRANCOURT area.
   Oct. 21/22 Stage in BUSIGNY-BRANCOURT area.
   Oct. 22 March to BELLICOURT area.
Oct. 22/23  Stage in BELLICOURT area.
Oct. 23  March to TINCOURT-ROISEL area.
Oct. 23/24  Stage in TINCOURT-ROISEL area.
Oct. 24  Entrain for CORBIE area.

1 bn., less 1 co. 102d Engineers, will march to BUSIGNY, coming under orders C. R. E., Fourth Army.

Transport will move by road with 27th Division to TINCOURT-ROISEL area, and by road from there Oct. 24 to CORBIE area, staging night Oct. 24/25 at CAPPY.

No restrictions as to roads for troops or transport.

Headquarters 27th Division will clear BUSIGNY by 1200 h., Oct. 21, moving to CATELET p.8.b.9.6. (62C), and thence to CORBIE.

4. Headquarters American II Corps will move to BERTANGLES.

Horses and Horse Transport Hq. II Corps will move by road to BELLICOURT area Oct. 22 and thence Oct. 23 with transport 27th Division.

Corps troops will entrain in TINCOURT-ROISEL area Oct. 24. Detailed instructions relative to movement of these troops to TINCOURT-ROISEL area will be issued later.

5. Distances will be maintained between units on the march as laid down in Fourth Army standing orders.

6. Detailed instructions relative to supply, railheads, and evacuations, will be issued later.

7. The units to be transferred from American II Corps to the IX and XIII Corps are shown in attached appendix.

8. Acknowledge.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

ISSUED WITH AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, SERIES B, NO. 10

OCT. 20, 1918

LIST OF TRANSFER:

1. From American II Corps to IX Corps.
   1 regt. 5th Cav. Brig. (20th Hussars).
   Artillery:
   Aust. 2d D. A.
     " 3d  "
     "  4th  "
     "  5th  "
     "  6th Army Brigade
     " 12th Army Brigade
   9th Brigade R. G. A.
   18th "
   41st "
   51st "
   68th "
   93d Brigade R. G. A.
   71st Brigade R. G. A.
   222d Siege Battery R. G. A.
   494th Siege Battery R. G. A.

APPENDIX
NOTE: The Aust. 2d D. A. and Aust. 12th Army Brigade will be withdrawn from the line under orders to be issued later.

146th, 216th, 238th A. T. Cos., R. E.
Australian 1st (T) Co.
Detachment Australian E and M Cos.

2. From American II Corps to XIII Corps:
73d Army Brigade, R. G. A.
449th Siege Battery, R. G. A.
504th " "

3. Transfer of labor and other administrative units will be notified in orders to be issued later.

4. Aust. 3d Squadron F. C. will come under direct orders of 5th Brigade, R. A. F.

182-12.4: Fldr. 2: Message

Designation of Railheads

PRIORITY
American 27th Division
American 30th Division
G-4 412 Oct. 20 Hour: 1906
Following will be railhead arrangements for the move. American 30th Division will draw by M. T. from ROISEL on the 21st and 22d. Railhead changes to CORBIE on the 23d. American 27th Division will draw by M. T. from MONTBREHAIN on the 21st. By mechanical transport from ROISEL on the 22d and 23d. By mechanical transport from CORBIE on the 24th. G-4, American II Corps.

227-32.1: Order

British 6th Division Relieves 27th Division Night October 20/21

FIELD ORDER
No. 65

1. The British 6th Division (less artillery) will relieve the 27th Division (less artillery) in the division sector on the night of October 20/21.

2. (a) Details of reliefs will be arranged by the Commanding Generals, 53d and 54th Infantry Brigades, with the relieving organizations.

(b) The division signal officer, surgeon, and division engineer officer will arrange the details of relief in those services with like organizations of the British 6th Division.

(c) The 2d Battalion, 102d Engineers, will return to the command of their regimental commander after relief in the support position in the line.

One battalion 102d Engineers (less one company), will march to BUSIGNY on October 21, where it will come under the orders of the C. R. E., Fourth Army.

(d) All troops of the division will clear St-SOUPLÉT by 12 h., October 21.

(e) Command of sectors in the front line will pass on the completion of infantry relief.

- 706 -
3. Upon being relieved, the 53d and 54th Infantry Brigades will march to position just west of St-SOUPLET, where they will be assembled and when practicable march to camp southwest of BUSIGNY. Brigade commanders will arrange locations west of St-SOUPLET for assembly and the march to camps so that columns will not interfere.

4. (a) The division will move by road march to the TINCOURT-ROISEL area, from which area troops will be moved by train on October 24 to the CORBIE area where they will go into billets.
   (b) Brigade commanders will reconnoiter and send infantry across country where practicable to avoid traffic and congested towns and to shorten the marches.
   (c) Prescribed road distances to be maintained.
   (d) Advance parties will be sent to arrange for camp site and billets.
   (e) Arrangements for move by train will be announced in later orders.
   (f) Location of brigade, regimental, and separate unit headquarters will be reported promptly to division headquarters each day.

5. Division headquarters will close at BUSIGNY at 11:00, October 21 and open at JONCOURT at the same hour. Further changes will be announced later.

6. (a) C Squadron, 20th Hussars, is relieved from attachment to this division and attached to the IX Corps.
   (b) Commanders in the division sector will pass to the 8th [6th] Division upon completion of relief.

By command of Major General O’Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

230-32.1: Order

30th Division to March from St-Souplet to Tincourt-Roisel Area

55 G-3  
FIELD ORDERS  
No. 27  

1. The American 30th Division (less one battalion of engineers) will march by road from the assembling points in the vicinity of St-SOUPLET to TINCOURT-ROISEL area, as follows:
   Oct. 20 60th Brigade group to BUSIGNY; 59th Brigade to BRANCOURT area.
   Oct. 20/21 Stage in BUSIGNY-BRANCOURT area.
   Oct. 21 March to BELLICOURT area. Brigade areas will be assigned later.
   Oct. 21/22 Stage in BELLICOURT area.
   Oct. 22 March to TINCOURT-ROISEL area. Brigade areas will be announced later.
   Oct. 22/23 Stage in TINCOURT-ROISEL area.
   Oct. 23 Entrain for QUERRIEU area.

2. (a) 105th Engineers, less one battalion, will move under directions of division engineer to TINCOURT-ROISEL area in time to entrain on the 23d inst.
(b) One battalion, 105th Engineers, will march to BUSIGNY, coming under orders of C. R. E., Fourth Army.
(c) 113th Machine Gun Battalion is attached to the 60th Brigade for the march to the TINCOURT-ROISEL area, and will come under the command of the Commanding General, 60th Brigade, during that period.
(d) 105th Field Signal Battalion, less detachments now with brigades and regiments, will move to the TINCOURT-ROISEL area, under the directions of the division signal officer, in time to entrain on the 23d inst.

3. Transport will move by road with the units to TINCOURT-ROISEL area and by road from there October 23 to QUERRIEU area, staging night October 23/24 at SUZANNE.
4. No restrictions as to roads for troops or transport. Distances will be maintained between units on the march as laid down in Fourth Army standing orders.
5. The usual billeting parties will leave by lorry on the 22d inst., for the QUERRIEU area, under orders G-1.

In marching to the TINCOURT-ROISEL area, billeting parties will be sent ahead to the staging area under directions of brigade commanders.
6. Detailed instructions relative to supply, railheads and evacuation will be issued later.
7. Instructions relative to entrainment will be issued later.
8. Division headquarters will close at MONTBREHAIN and open at QUERRIEU at a time to be announced later. Location of brigade headquarters in new area will be announced later.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Comdg.

230-32.15: Memorandum

Area Assignments 30th Division

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADE COMMANDERS:

1. The following assignment of billeting districts for staging night October 21/22:
   To the 60th Brigade Group---RAMICOURT---JONCOURT---ETRICOURT---NAUROY. Officer in charge of advance billeting party should get in touch with Lt. Grasse, Office G-1, II Corps.
   To the 59th Brigade---BELLICOURT---RIQUERVAL, and if desired VILLERET.
2. Attention is directed to the necessity of advance billeting parties exercising considerable initiative and energy if proper accommodations are to be secured for their commands.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.

----------
FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The XIII Corps pushed forward patrols N. E. of BAZUEL to the southern bank of the RICHEMONT Stream. Farther north our advanced posts were obliged to fall back to the main line south of the stream owing to heavy machine-gun fire and trench mortar fire.

In consequence of our operations N. E. of BAZUEL, the enemy's artillery were active in this area, remaining fairly quiet along the rest of the front.

2. IX CORPS: Situation quiet and unchanged. WASSIGNY was shelled intermittently during the night, and La VALLEE MULATRE shelled with H.V. guns.

AMERICAN II CORPS: Quiet day. No material change in the situation.

XIII CORPS: Patrols of the 25th Division operated N. E. of BAZUEL during the day and advanced the line to the southern bank of the RICHEMONT. The advanced posts of the 18th Division were withdrawn to the high ground south of the stream on account of heavy machine-gun and trench mortar fire. 25th Division captured 56 prisoners.

3. THIRD ARMY: In conjunction with the First Army, the Third Army attacked this morning early between Le CATEAU and the SCHELDT, advancing the line to an average depth of 2,000 yards. A number of villages, including SOLESMES, were captured and 2,000 prisoners secured.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: Situation unchanged.

5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 30 hours were flown by 36 pilots. General activity nil. No bombing, reconnaissances, patrols, or night flying could be carried out.
   (b) Hostile: Owing to weather conditions, there was practically no flying.

6. PRISONERS:
   Through army cages 52 officers, 2,388 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s 2 officers, 27 O. R.

7. WEATHER: Low clouds, rain and mist.

8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: 6th Division relieved American 27th Division in line, the American 27th Division being withdrawn into reserve.

   The IX Corps extended its front to XIII Corps.
   18th Division relieved 66th Division in the line, the latter being withdrawn into reserve.

* * * * *
From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 20, 1918

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: E. A. nil. Enemy artillery active on forward areas. RIBEAUVILLE and MAZINGHIEN were shelled during afternoon Oct. 19 and strong machine-gun fire was coming from R.28 central and from woods east of R 35. There was some Blue Cross shelling during same period on our right front.

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF THE ENEMY DURING THE DAY: The retreat of the enemy, covered by intermittent rearguard machine-gun actions, was consistent.

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES, AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: The enemy has apparently taken position on the west bank of the SAMBRE Canal.

4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: Our line extended approximately R 14 b 5 6---R 27 central---R 28 1 5 8---X 11 b central. Artillery was dealing with the enemy machine-gun nests.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS, AND ACTION DURING DAY: During the afternoon Oct. 19, our 1-pdrs. and trench mortars moved up to take care of enemy machine guns. At dusk, Oct. 19, the 1st Division, B. E. F., began relief of the 30th Division, continued to exploit their line pending relief by the British 6th Division night of October 20/21. The command of our corps front, from IX Corps northern boundary to R 27 central, passed to G. O. C., IX Corps, at 2350 h., Oct. 19.

7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The IX Corps on our right were in touch with French north of OISY. The XIII Corps on our left report heavy shelling of BAZUEL by 4.2's during afternoon Oct. 19.

8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None.

9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: Our troops continued the consolidation of positions already gained.

10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Our successes have been consolidated.

11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: Maps enclosed showing line as of noon today, the front of the 30th Division having been turned over to the British 1st Division.

12. ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION: The 27th Division continued to hold the ridge west of CATILLON. With the relief of the 30th Division last night and of the 27th Division tonight, this corps will pass into army reserve, and will be accommodated in the QUERRIEU and CORBIE areas for a period of rest and training.

13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: To enter into a rest period.


F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.
II Corps: War Diary

October 20, 1918.

[Extract]

Relief of 27th Division in the line by British 6th Div. completed night 20/21.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

---------

30th Div.: War Diary

October 20, 1918.

[Extract]

Troops of the 59th Brigade proceeded to BRANCOURT area; 60th Brigade and 113th Machine Gun Battalion to BRANCOURT area from the assembling point in vicinity of St-SOUPLET.

Orders issued for move of division to QUERRIEU area for rest and reorganization.

Available for all duty  ) Officers 474
 ) Men 12,954

* * * * *

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

---------

HS Brit. File: II Corps: Fldr. 5: War Diary

IX CORPS.

Place: POUEILLY
Date: Oct. 20

Summary of Events and Information

During the night, the British 1st Division relieved the American 30th Division in the line, by extending their front northwards to R.27.cent., just N. of MAZINGHIEN. The 2d Brig. holding the northern portion from R.27.central to X.4.central and 3d Brig. from X.4.central to the old southern corps boundary just N. of OISY. The 18th and 71st Inf. Brigs. (6th Division) moved by bus route from the BOHAIN area to St-SOUPLET prior to relieving the American 27th Division in the line at night, divisional hq. moving to BUSIGNY. The 14th and 96th Inf. Brigs. (32d Division) moved by march route into the BOHAIN area, also divisional hq.
The day remained quiet on the corps front, slight harassing fire only being carried out by the enemy in reply to our shelling. The following orders were issued:

IX Corps Arty. Order No. 38, giving the distribution of artillery and arrangements for relief of American 30th Division.


182-32.2: List

### Location II Corps Units

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>II CORPS, A. E. F.,</th>
<th>October 21, 1918—6 h.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCATION LIST NO. 31</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)</th>
<th>WIANCOURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (rear)</td>
<td>N.15.d.cent. (62C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412th Tel. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>MONTBREHAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th Field Signal Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>Near SAULTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>BEUGNATRE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hq. VII Corps R. A.</th>
<th>WIANCOURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq. VII Corps H. A.</td>
<td>C.22.a.2.2. (62B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq. C. R. E. American II Corps</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq. 2d Tank Brig.</td>
<td>SERAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>301st Tank Bn. (American)</td>
<td>SERAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Brigade, R. A. F.</td>
<td>ESTREES-en-CHAUSSEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Wing, R. A. F.</td>
<td>ELINCOURT (Billet 35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Squadron A. F. C.</td>
<td>C.5.d.4.5. (62B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Balloon Wing</td>
<td>P.23.c.2.0. (57B)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27th Division:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Headquarters (Adv.)</th>
<th>BUSIGNY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Division Headquarters (rear)</td>
<td>JONCOURT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 102d Engr. Regt. Hq.         | BUSIGNY |
| 104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.    | "      |
| 102d Field Sig. Bn. Hq.      | "      |
| 102d San. Train Hq.          | "      |
DAILY FRONT LINES
AMERICAN 27th and 30th DIVISIONS
12 OCT - 20 OCT 1918
ALL LINES ARE AS OF MIDNIGHT UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED

Compiled by American Battle Monuments Commission 1938

MAP REF: FRENCH 1:20000 LANDRECIES
30th Division:
  Division Headquarters (Adv.)
  Division Headquarters (rear)
  113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
  105th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
  105th San. Train Hq.

MONTBREHAIN
NAUROY

MONTBREHAIN
V.16.b.5.1.
MONTBREHAIN

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., Asst. C. of S., G-3.

182-12.4: Report

Report of Troop Movements

MOVES AND TRANSFERS

| Date   | Formation or Unit      | From       | To         | Road or Rail | ADMINISTERED
|--------|------------------------|------------|------------|--------------|---------------
| Oct. 23 | American 30th Division | TINCOURT area | QUERRIEU area | Road Amer. II and rail | As at present
| Oct. 24 | American 27th Division | do         | CORBIE area | do           | do            |
| Oct. 24 | American II Corps Hq.  | do         | BERTANGLES  | do           | do            |

for
Major Gen.
D. A. and Q. M. G., Fourth Army.

Hq. Fourth Army Adv.
22/10/18

182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

Fourth Army No. 10/309 (G) AMERICAN II CORPS.

1. The American 30th Division will move by road and rail from the TINCOURT area to the QUERRIEU training area, commencing October 23.
2. Dismounted personnel and a proportion of transport will move by tactical train (to include four omnibus trains, if required), entraining at TINCOURT and ROISEL. Detrainment will take place at ALBERT, EDGEHILL (sic), and HEILLY. All details to be arranged direct by American II Corps with traffic, PERONNE.
3. There will be no restrictions for march to entraining and from detraining stations.
4. Remainder of transport will move by road under orders of American II Corps, staging night October 23/24 in the SUZANNE area. Route: October 23 BUSSU---ALLAINES---CLERY. No restrictions for march on October 24.

- 714 -
5. Details of accommodation in the QUERRIEU training and the SUZANNE areas will be obtained from the Comdt. AMIENS, and the Area Comdt. SUZANNE, respectively.

6. M. T. will move by road on October 23, under arrangements of Fourth Army Q.

7. Acknowledge.

Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Adv. Hq. Fourth Army
October 21, 1918

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182-32.7: Order

Operations II Corps

Fourth Army No. 10/310 (G)

AMERICAN II CORPS

1. The American II Corps Hq. and the 27th Division will move by road and rail from the TINCOURT area to BERTANGLES and the CORBIE training area, respectively, commencing October 24.

2. Dismounted personnel and a proportion of transport will move by tactical train (to include four omnibus trains, if required) entraining at TINCOURT and ROISEL. Detrainment will take place at VILLERS-BRETONNEUX, CORBIE, and LONGUEAU. All details to be arranged by American II Corps with traffic, PERONNE.

3. There will be no restrictions for the march to entraining and from detraining stations.


5. Details of accommodation in the CORBIE training and the CAPPY areas will be obtained from the Comdt. AMIENS and the Area Comdt. CAPPY, respectively.

6. M. T. will move by road, under arrangements of Fourth Army Q.

7. Acknowledge.

Major General,
General Staff, Fourth Army.

Adv. Hq. Fourth Army
October 21, 1918

--------
II Corps: War Diary

862 G3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 21, 1918.

AMERICAN II CORPS OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS

SERIES B, NO. 11

Supplementing American II Corps Operations Instructions,
Series B, No. 10

1. Headquarters American II Corps and American troops will move as follows to the BERTANGLES area:
   (a) Mounted personnel of headquarters troop will move by road and join the transport of the American 27th Division in the BELICOURT area on Oct. 22, staging in the following areas:
       TINCOURT area Oct. 23/24
       BRAY area Oct. 24/25
       BERTANGLES area Oct. 25/26
       C. O., headquarters troop, will ration the above personnel on the 23rd inst. to the 25th inst., inclusive.
   (b) 318th Field Signal Battalion, American II Corps Vet. Evac. Sect., and such personnel of the 412th Telegraph Battalion as the corps signal officer may require, will move by rail (empty supply train) from ROISEL on Oct. 24. Detraining station will be POULAINVILLE. Hour for entraining will be communicated later.
       Sufficient number of covered vans will be provided on this train for heavy baggage of corps headquarters and American corps troops. Entraining will take place under orders of the C. O., 318th Signal Battalion. Rations to include Oct. 25 will be taken.
   (c) Corps headquarters, remainder of headquarters troop, headquarters R. A., headquarters H. A., will move in two echelons.
       (i) First echelon will move morning Oct. 24
       (ii) Second echelon will move morning Oct. 25.
       C. O., headquarters troop, will issue necessary orders for the move of corps headquarters and R. A., American II Corps.
   (d) Rations for corps headquarters and all corps troops to include Oct. 26 will be drawn from R. S. O., AILLY-sur-SOMME on Oct. 25.

2. Acknowledge.

By command of Major General Read:

   GEO. S. SIMONDS,
   Brig. Gen., G. S.,
   Chief of Staff.

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Replacements

MEMORANDUM TO II CORPS RECEPTION CAMP:

The 30th Division will stage through from the BELLICOURT to the TINCOURT area on October 22, remaining in TINCOURT area on night of October 22. Direct all replacements at your camp for 30th Division to join their division when staged in the TINCOURT area.

The 27th Division stages through same areas 24 hours after 30th Division. Give similar instructions for all officers and men in your camp belonging to the 27th Division.

RICHARD K. HALE,
Lieut. Colonel, C. S.

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Movement of Engineer Troops

MEMORANDUM TO G-3, II CORPS:

The following orders to engineer troops have been issued by the corps engineer:
To C. O., 102d Engineers:

In accordance with S.426, Fourth Army, one battalion, 102d Engineers will proceed to BOHAIN this date, and report to Major McNamara, Canadian 6th R. T. Bn., at D.14.c.3.2, for transportation to MONTBREHAIN---on arrival at MONTBREHAIN, arrangements will be made with Major McNamara, MONTBREHAIN, for transportation the following day to BELLICOURT for duty, after bathing.

One bn., 105th Engineers, to report to Major McNamara, 6th C. R. T., MONTBREHAIN, for duty on light R. R.

Please issue necessary movement orders to confirm.

EDW. W. MYERS,
Major, Engineers, U. S. A.
for
Corps engineer.

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AMERICAN II CORPS MOVEMENT ORDERS NO. 10

1. The battalion, 105th Engineers, now at MONTBREHAIN will remain there, coming under orders C. R. E., Fourth Army instead of proceeding to BUSIGNY as ordered, American II Corps Operations Instructions, Series B, No. 10.

2. Two companies, 102d Engineers, will proceed to BELLICOURT via light railway, starting afternoon Oct. 21. They will stage at MONTBREHAIN for one day.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.


30th Division Changing Station

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 21, 1918.

Received at G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

F. This division relieved from line night 19/20th, are proceeding by marching today from BUSIGNY-BRANCOURT area to ROISEL-TINCOURT area, where they will entrain 22d for QUERRIEU rest area.

American 30th Division 4 p. m.
230-32.1: Order

30th Division to Continue March on October 22

G-3/57
FIELD ORDER

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 21, 1918.

No. 28

MAP: 62B---1/40,000
57A---1/40,000

1. This division will continue its march on 22d inst. as follows:
   (a) 59th Brigade---From BELLICOURT area to ROISEL area.
   (b) 60th Brigade plus 113th M. G. Bn.---From JONCOURT and NAUROY to TINCOURT area.
   (c) 105th Engineers (less 1 bn.)---From present locations to ROISEL area, under direction division engineer.
   (d) 105th F. S. Bn. will move under direction division signal officer, so as to arrive in ROISEL area by night Oct. 22/23.
   (e) 105th Sanitary Train will move under direction division surgeon so as to arrive at entraining areas by night October 22/23---units now attached to organizations will entrain with the organization.
   (f) Hq. troop, div. hq. and hq. tr., and 105th Military Police will move under direction G-1, so as to arrive in TINCOURT area by night Oct. 22/23.

2. (a) Units ordered to ROISEL area under Par. 1 above, will entrain at ROISEL; those ordered to TINCOURT area, at TINCOURT on October 23, in accordance with attached entraining schedule. The Commanding General, 59th Brigade, will be in charge of entraining at ROISEL, and the Commanding General, 60th Brigade, at TINCOURT. Major G. K. Freeman, Asst. G-1, will be representative of these headquarters at entraining points.
   (b) Trains will be assembled on the morning of October 23 and will proceed by road march to new area, under direction G-1.
   (c) Upon arrival in the new area, the 59th Brigade will be assigned the BAIZEUX subarea, and the HEILLY subarea, for billeting purposes. The 60th Brigade and divisional troops are assigned the CONTAY subarea, and PONT-NOYELLES subarea.

3. Entraining troops will carry one day’s rations plus unconsumed portion of the day’s rations, in addition to the iron ration. Railheads as follows: Oct. 21 and 22, ROISEL; Oct. 23, CORBIE.

4. Division headquarters will close at MONTBREHAIN at 15 h., Oct. 22, and open at QUERRIEU at same day and hour.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General, Commanding.

---------
Operations 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 21, 1918.

AMENDMENT TO FIELD ORDER NO. 28:

Paragraph 2 (a): All personnel will entrain at TINCOURT; certain transport to be designated by G-1 will be loaded at ROISEL. Entrainment at TINCOURT will be under charge of Major G. K. Freeman; at ROISEL under charge of Colonel H. B. Springs.

Paragraph 2 (c): Upon arrival in new area, this division will be located as follows:

Division Hq., Hq. Trains and Military Police QUERRIEU
59th Brig. Hq., 117th Inf., 114th M. G. Bn HEILLY
118th Infantry BAIZIEUX
60th Brigade Hq., 119th Infantry CONTAY
120th Infantry MONTIGNY
115th Machine Gun Battalion BONNAY
113th Machine Gun Battalion RIBEMONT
105th Engineers LAHOUSSOYE
105th Sanitary Train FRANVILLERS
118th Field Hospital and Ambulance BAIZIEUX
119th Field Hospital and Ambulance CONTAY
132d Field Ambulance BONNAY
134th Field Ambulance WARLOY

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding.

230-32.1: Administrative Instructions

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 21, 1918.

To Accompany Field Orders No. 28:

[Extract]

The following regulations will govern the move of this division by tactical train
October 23, 1918:

* * * * *
(b) Railhead on and after October 23, CORBIE. Motor transport will be employed to transport rations from the CORBIE Railhead to the refilling points to be designated by the division quartermaster. Such portions of the horse transport carried on the omnibus train will be utilized to convey rations from refilling points to the troops, as may be necessary. The normal system will be resumed on October 25.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.

---------

182-33.3, No. 3: Operations Report

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 21, 1918

2. INFORMATION RECEIVED OF THE ENEMY DURING THE DAY: Enemy is apparently maintaining machine-gun positions on the west bank of the SAMBRE Canal.
3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES, AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: No change.
4. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.
5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The 27th Division finished the consolidating of its recent successes. The situation was quiet and unchanged.
6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS, AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: At 0250 Oct. 21, the relief of the 27th Division by the British 6th Division was completed and the command of the balance of our corps front passed to the British IX Corps at the same hour.
7. INFORMATION NEIGHBORING UNITS: The XIII Corps, operating on our left, report that advance patrols on Richemont Stream were withdrawn owing to heavy machine-gun and trench mortar fire from the northern bank.
8. ORDERS RECEIVED: None.
9. ACTION DURING DAY AND ORDERS ISSUED AND RECEIVED: None.
10. RESULTS OF ACTION, BOTH OWN AND ENEMY: Nothing to report.
11. MAPS ILLUSTRATING THE ABOVE: None to submit.
13. PLANS FOR THE FUTURE: To enter into a period of rest and training.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
GEO. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

----------

II Corps: War Diary

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 21, 1918.

[Extract]

Headquarters closed at BUSIGNY and opened at CORBIE. Division being relieved by the British 6th Division, less artillery. Available for all duty 1 Officers 498

   Men 9,917

********

STANLEY H. FORD,
Col., G. S., Chief of Staff.

----------

30th Div.: War Diary

October 21, 1918.

[Extract]

All units of the division proceeded by road march from BUSIGNY and BRANCOURT areas to BELLICOURT area, where they staged for the night 21/22. Orders issued for continuance of march on 22d to TINCOURT and ROISEL areas. Available for all duty 1 Officers 449

   Men 12,638

********

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Colonel, G. S., G-3.

----------
From: Commanding General, II Corps

To: Commander-in-Chief, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Operations Sept. 27-Oct. 21, 1918

The following report on the operations of this corps between the above-mentioned
mentioned dates is submitted.

1. Situation at Beginning of Operations: The March drive of the enemy had carried
his lines down the valley of the Somme River and across the Avre, thereby cutting our
lines of communications running through Amiens and Montdidier, and making lateral commu­
cnication between the British and French armies very difficult. On August 8, the British
Fourth Army, under command of General Rawlinson, in conjunction with the French on their
right, began an attack up the SOMME Valley for the purpose of relieving the pressure on
the Allied lateral communications. By the middle of September, the British army was ap­
proaching the heavily fortified defense system, known as the HINDENBURG Line, which on the
front of the Fourth Army followed the general line of the St-QUENTIN Canal. The salient
feature of the defense of this system on the front occupied by the Australian corps
(which front was to be taken over by this corps) was the tunnel through which the canal
runs from a point near BELLICOURT to a point southeast of VENDHUILE, a distance of 6,000
yards.

On September 21, this corps was transferred from the G. H. Q. reserve to the Fourth
Army, in order to take part in the attack on the HINDENBURG System along the front just
mentioned.

2. Objectives: The operations from September 27 to October 21 consisted of four
phases as follows:

1st Phase, Sept. 27-29: Preliminary operation in front of the HINDENBURG system to
secure a jumping-off line.

2d Phase, Sept. 29-30: Attack on the main HINDENBURG Line.

3d Phase, Oct. 7-11: Advance from vicinity of Montbrehain to line of La Selle River.

4th Phase, Oct. 17-20: Advance from La Selle River to high ground west of Sambre
Canal overlooking Catillon.

3. Main Features of Operations: The advance day by day as outlined in the Journal
of Operations * * *

The second phase, which resulted in breaking through the HINDENBURG Line, was the
vital operation on which all subsequent action on the part of the British Fourth Army
depended. This attack was made during a very heavy fog which assisted our tanks, but
made mopping up of machine-gun nests a very difficult operation. The enemy had numerous
sunken roads and carefully camouflaged tunnels, running to the canal tunnel from which
his men fairly oozed from the ground so that our troops never could be sure when their
work of mopping up was completed. The result was that our left division (the 27th) which
had very bad ground in its front, was unable to reach its first objective. The right
division (the 30th) in whose front the ground was less broken was more successful and
broke through both the HINDENBURG and Le CATELET-NAUROY Lines.

On September 30, according to original plan, the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions
passed through this corps and continued the mopping up of the HINDENBURG and Le CATELET-
NAUROY Lines. These two divisions attacked and broke through the last of the heavily fortified lines of the HINDENBURG System (known as the BEAUREVOIR Line).

At 9 h., October 6, this corps took over the command of the corps sector from the Australian Corps, the 30th Division taking over the front line, which at that time ran just west of MONTBREHAIN. From October 6 to October 11, the 30th Division carried the attack forward until our patrols had reached La SELLE River, where serious opposition was met. The 30th Division was here relieved by the 27th Division. At this time, this corps was at the point of a salient extending approximately fifteen miles into the enemy's territory, and he had decided to make his next determined stand on the high ground east of La SELLE River. On October 16, the 30th Division again took over the right half of the corps sector and, preceded by a careful artillery preparation, the line of La SELLE River was penetrated, and the attack continued daily until October 20, at which time the 30th Division had reached the high ground overlooking the SAMBRE Canal in the vicinity of CATILLON, the 27th being on the line of the St-MAURICE River and connecting with the XIII Corps at BAZUEL.

At this time, both divisions being very tired after practically three weeks of continuous fighting, and having suffered considerable casualties, the corps front was taken over by the IX Corps, the British 1st Division relieving the 30th, and the British 6th Division relieving the 27th.

4. Results of Operations:
   (a) The immediate result of the operations was the loss to the enemy of lines of defense on which he had expended years of labor while the salient driven into his lines helped in large measure to force his withdrawal from Cambrai on the north, with its important communications and St-QUENTIN on the south. Many French villages were captured and a considerable number of civilian refuges were thereby released.
   (b) From Sept. 27 to Oct. 21, prisoners of war were captured as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Through Corps cage</th>
<th>Through dressing station</th>
<th>Aggregate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>O. R.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>5,134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>660</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>5,794</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,946</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Materiel: A partial report on materiel shows 34 field guns, 10 guns and howitzers over 77-mm., 26 trench mortars and 409 machine guns captured. Final reports will show a considerable increase in these figures.

5. Attached British Units: A list of British units attached to this corps during the operations is appended [omitted]. Their experience was of the greatest value to the corps commander and their cheerful cooperation was much appreciated. Too much credit cannot be given to Brig. General K. K. Knapp, C. M. G., R. A., and his staff of the VII Corps, R. A. The work of the artillery left nothing to be desired, and their close support of our infantry minimized losses which might, under other conditions, have been formidable.

6. Commendations: [Listing omitted].

7. Comments:
   (a) Considering that this was the first major operation in which the 27th and 30th Divisions had participated the results obtained are deemed very satisfactory. They were called upon to break through defenses upon which years of work had been expended and which were considered impregnable, at a point where the enemy was absolutely certain to
expect an attack. The resolution with which they carried through the tasks allotted them fully justified the commendation bestowed upon them by high commanders.

(b) In order to carry through these operations it was necessary to place under the command of this corps not only British artillery, cavalry, tanks, and air units, but also more than 30,000 administrative corps troops. The close cooperation with the British army which this involved has greatly increased the mutual respect of these forces for each other, a fact which cannot fail to have its influence upon the future relations of the respective countries.

GEORGE W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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182-33.6: Operations Report

Operations II Corps

APPENDIX NO. 2

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY

BY FIELD MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG,

Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France.

The following messages are published for the information of all ranks:

From Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig to General Read, American II Corps.

October 20, 1918

I wish to express to you personally and to all the officers and men serving under you my warm appreciation of the very valuable and gallant services rendered by you throughout the recent operations with the British Fourth Army. Called upon to attack positions of great strength held by a determined enemy, all ranks of the American 27th and 30th Divisions under your command displayed an energy, courage, and determination in attack which proved irresistible. It does not need me to tell you that in the heavy fighting of the past three weeks you have earned the lasting esteem and admiration of your British comrades in arms, whose successes you have so nobly shared.

D. HAIG, F. M.,
Commander-in-Chief,
British Armies in France.

General Headquarters
October 26, 1918

-------

- 725 -
HS Brit. File: II Corps: Fltr. 5: War Diary

IX CORPS.

Place: POEUILLY
Date: October 21

Summary of Events and Information

Situation during night quiet. The line on the right of the 1st Division was pushed forward slightly. IX Corps Hq. (advanced) moved to BRANCOUCOURT, opening there at 11:00---IX Corps took over command of the American II Corps front at 0250---on completion of relief by 6th Division.

---

Location II Corps Units

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

October 22, 1918--6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 32

Headquarters II Corps (Adv.) WIANCOURT
Headquarters II Corps (rear) N.15.d.cent. (62C)
412 Tel. Bn. Hq. MONTBREHAIN
318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq. WIANCOURT
17th Aero Squadron Near SAULTY
148th Aero Squadron BEUGNATRE.

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. R. A. VII Corps WIANCOURT
Hq. H. A. VII Corps C.22.a.2.2. (62B)
Hq. C. R. E. American II Corps WIANCOURT

27th Division:
Advanced Headquarters CORBIE
Rear Headquarters JONCOURT

53d Infantry Brig. Hq. Moving
54th Infantry Brig. Hq. Moving
104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq. ) BELLICOURT area.
102d Field Signal Bn. ) Moving to ROISEL
102d Sanitary Tr. Hq. ) BUSIGNY

30th Division:
Advanced Headquarters
Rear Hq.

59th Infantry Brig. Hq. ) Moving
60th Infantry Brig. Hq. ) Moving

105th Engr. Regt. Hq. ) Moving to
113th M. Gun Bn. Hq. ) QUERRIEU
105th F. Sign. Bn. Hq. )
105th San. Tr. Hq. )

Closes MONTBREHAIN and opens
QUERRIEU 1500, 22/10/18
NAUROY

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., Asst. C. of S., G-3

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182-12.4: Fldr. 2: Letter

**Railheads**

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 22, 1918.

From: G-4, American II Corps

To: Dist. Officer, NOISY-le-SEC, American E. F., c/o Regt. Officer
Depot Q. M. Le HAVRE       Depot Q. M. CALAIS Ord. Depot GIEVRES

1. Headquarters American II Corps changes on October 25 to BERTANGLES.
2. Supply railheads as follows:
   30th Division, CORBIE on the 23d
   27th Division, CORBIE on the 24th
Personnel railhead VILLERS-BRETONNEUX
American II Corps replacement at EU as of present.

   By command of Major General Read:

   J. P. TERRELL,

----------
Turning Over of Area

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 22, 1918.

From: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

To: Area Commandant, TINCOURT

[Extract]

1. In accordance with Fourth Army No. 3/542, dated October 20, 1918, the TINCOURT subarea is taken over by army as of 12 noon, October 21, and will be administered by the administrative commandant, army forward areas. Hereafter, all returns will be made to him.

* * * * *

RICHARD K. HALE,
Lieut, Colonel, G. S.

---------

II Corps: War Diary

October 22, 1918.

[Extract]

Divisions en route to rest area in QUERRIEU and CORBIE areas.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
G-3, II Corps, A. E. F.

---------
27th Div.: War Diary

October 22, 1918.

[Extract]

Location: CORBIE. Divisional troops on move to this area.
Available for all duty  
  Officers     458
  Men          9,917

* * * * * *

STANLEY H. FORD,
Col., G. S., Chief of Staff.

---------

30th Div.: War Diary

October 22, 1918.

[Extract]

All organizations proceeded by road march to TINCOURT and ROISEL areas in accordance
with Field Order No. 28. Division headquarters closed at MONTBREHAIN at 15 h. and opened
at QUERRIEU at the same hour.
Available for all duty  
  Officers     459
  Men          12,506

* * * * * *

C. BURNETT,
Lt. Col., G. S., G-3.

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182-33.3, No. 3: Operation Report

G-3 II CORPS, A. E. F.,

From: Commanding General

To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, October 22, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * * *

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS, AND ACTION DURING THE DAY. Headquarters 27th Division
closed at BUSIGNY and opened at CORBIE 11 h., October 21. Headquarters 30th Division continues at MONTBREHAIN until 1500 today.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

---------

182-32.2: List

**Location II Corps Units**

G-3 [865] II CORPS, A. E. F.,

*October 23, 1918—6 h.*

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 33

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)</th>
<th>WIANCOURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (rear)</td>
<td>N.15.d.cent. (62C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412th Tel. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>MONTBREHAIN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>Near SAULTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>BEUGNATRE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hq. R. A., VII Corps</th>
<th>WIANCOURT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq. H. A., VII Corps</td>
<td>C.22.a.2.2. (62B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq. C. R. E., American II Corps</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27th Division:

| Advanced Headquarters          | CORBIE |
| Rear Headquarters              | JONCOURT |
| 53d Infantry Brig. Hq.          | Moving |
| 54th Infantry Brig. Hq.        | Moving |
| 102d Engr. Regt. Hq.           | Moving, stages night 23/24 |
| 104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.      | BOUCLY and HAMELET |
| 102d Field Signal Bn.          | Moving, stages night 23/24 |
| 102d Sanitary Train Hq.        | HERVILLY |
|                               | ROisel |
|                               | Moving, stages night 23/24 |
|                               | ROisel |
30th Division Headquarters
59th Infantry Brig. Hq. QUERRIEU
60th Infantry Brig. Hq. Moving

105th Engr. Regt. Hq. )
113th M. Gun Bn. Hq. ) Moving to QUERRIEU
105th F. Sig. Bn. Hq. ) area
105th Sanitary Train Hq. )

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

227-12.8: Order

**Relief of 52d Field Artillery Brigade**

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 475

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
October 23, 1918—12 h.

1. The following telegraphic order, having been issued this date, is herein embodied for record.

Commanding General, 33d Division
G-3 number 589. The 52d Field Artillery Brigade is detached from 33d Division and attached to 79th Division. The 55th Field Artillery Brigade is detached from the 79th Division and will be attached to the 33d Division. This involved no change of station.

By command of Major General Liggett:

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

322.02: II Corps Gen. File: Memorandum

**Movement Headquarters II Corps**

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 23, 1918.

Memorandum for corps staff:

1. This echelon will move to new headquarters at BERTANGLES and VILLERS-BOCAGE as follows:
   2. To move the 24th instant: G-3, except an officer representative to remain on duty in the Chief of Staff's Office.
      G-2, except such personnel as is considered necessary by the chief of section to remain back.
G-4, an officer representative and such personnel as is considered necessary to estab-
lish an office at the new headquarters.
Signal personnel and material, as directed by the chief signal officer.
G-2 and G-3 messes.
3. To move the 25th instant: The remainder of this echelon.
4. Operations will be taken over by the Office of the Chief of Staff on the 24th,
until an hour to be designated later, which will be about noon the 25th. The Chief of
Staff’s Office will be taken over by G-3, at about noon the 25th until the arrival of the
Chief of Staff at new headquarters. All officers will cease to function at this place at
the designated hour. Those officers whose functions should under present conditions be
continuing, should make arrangements similar to the above. Others will open at the new
headquarters as soon as practicable after arrival.
5. The billeting officer now established at BERTANGLES will make the necessary as-
signment of offices and billets in accordance with instructions already issued by the
Chief of Staff.
6. The necessary administrative instructions will be issued by the camp commandant.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.

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227-65.1: Order Battle

Order Battle 27th Division

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 23, 1918.

ADJUTANT GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT

STATISTICAL DIVISION

WEEKLY ROSTER OF OFFICERS

COMMANDING:


A. D. C.:

Capt. Hugo F. Jeeckel, Jr., Inf., U. S. A.

A. D. C.:

1st Lieut. Joseph D. Eddy, Inf., U. S. A.

CHIEF OF STAFF:

Col. Stanley H. Ford, G. S., U. S. A.
G-1:
Capt. R. W. Hanna (British) attd.
1st Lieut. Edward B. King, Inf., U. S. A.

G-2:
1st Lieut. Herbert Forsch, Intr. C., U. S. A.
1st Lieut. Leon Dabo, Intr. C., U. S. A.

G-3:
Col. Theodore B. Taylor, G. S., U. S. A.
1st Lieut. George W. Hinckley, Inf., U. S. A., attd.

ADJUTANT:

STAT. OFFICERS:
Capt. William J. Grange, A. G. D., U. S. A.

INSPECTOR:

JUDGE ADVOCATE:

QUARTERMASTER:
Lieut. Col. Henry S. Sternberger, Q. M. C., U. S. A.
Major Joseph W. Farrell, Q. M. C., U. S. A. (Disbursing Officer)
Capt. Raymond T. Meniz, Q. M. C., U. S. A.
Capt. I. R. Gindrat, Q. M. C., U. S. A.
Capt. George W. Peppard, Q. M. C., U. S. A.

MEDICAL CORPS (INCLUDE DENTAL VETERINARY CORPS):
Major Lefferts Hutton, M. C., U. S. A., Div. Surgeon
Capt. J. I. Jenkins (British army) attd.

ENGINEER DEPT.:
Col. Albert H. Acker, Engrs., U. S. A., (Comdg. 102d Engrs.)
ORDNANCE DEPT.:

Major Joseph J. Daly, Ord., U. S. A.

SIGNAL CORPS:


C. W. S.:

Capt. Harry W. Terry, C. W. S., U. S. A.

ASST. PROVOST MARSHAL:


HQ. TROOP:

Capt. William W. Acker, Inf., U. S. A.
2d Lieut. James H. Doyle, Cav., U. S. A.

DIV. M. G. OFFICER:

Lieut. Col. Edward McLeer, Inf., U. S. A.

MOTOR TRANSPORT OFFICERS:


ADDITIONAL OFFICERS ON DUTY AT HEADQUARTERS:

2d Lieut. Walter J. Ward, Inf., U. S. A., attd. (Baths Off.)
Major William E. McCord, U. S. A., Senior Chaplain
1st Lieut. Lee J. Levinger, U. S. A., Chaplain
1st Lieut. Archer D. Bass, U. S. A., Chaplain

REMARKS: OFFICERS ON DETACHED SERVICE:

Capt. Charles P. Franchot, Inf., U. S. A., aide
Capt. Pancoast Kidder, Inf., U. S. A., B. O.
1st Lt. Fred E. Wagner, B. O., U. S. A.
1st Lt. John Kerr, B. O., U. S. A.
1st Lt. Louis P. Sanger, B. O., U. S. A.
1st Lt. Robt. W. Bowman, B. O., U. S. A.
1st Lt. Paul F. Mann, B. O., U. S. A.
2d Lt. Albert H. Hooker, Jr., C. W. S., U. S. A.
2d Lt. Archer D. Odom, F. A., U. S. A.
2d Lt. John H. Shepherd, Jr., F. A., U. S. A.
53d INFANTRY BRIGADE

COMMANDING BRIGADE:
AIDE-de-CAMP:
    1st Lieut. Iver M. Hanson, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 105th REGT.:
    Col. James M. Andrews, Inf., U. S. A.

2d IN COMMAND:
    Lieut. Col. Charles W. Berry, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 1st BN.:
    Capt. George F. Bradshaw, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 2d BN.:
    Capt. Charles A. MacArthur, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 3d BN.:
    1st Lieut. Charles R. Whipple, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 105th MACHINE GUN BATTALION:
    Maj. Kenneth Gardner, Inf., U. S. A.

ADJUTANT:
    Capt. Davis T. Dunbar, Cav., U. S. A., attd.
AIDE-de-CAMP:

COMDG. 106th REGT.:
    Col. Franklin W. Ward, Inf., U. S. A.

2d IN COMMAND:
    Lieut. Col. John M. True, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 1st BN.:
    1st Lieut. Ames T. Brown, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 2d BN.:
    Capt. Rutherford Ireland, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 3d BN.:
    Capt. Robert M. Dashtiell, Inf., U. S. A.

ADJUTANT:
    1st Lieut. John J. Fleming, Inf., U. S. A.
54th INFANTRY BRIGADE

COMDG. BRIG.:  
Brig. Gen. Palmer E. Pierce, U. S. A.

AIDE-de-CAMP:  
1st Lt. Roland J. Easton, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 107th REGT.:  
Lt. Col. Mortimer D. Bryant, Inf., U. S. A.

2d IN COMMAND:  
Major Nicholas Engel, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 1st BN.:  
Capt. Harry Stratton, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 2d BN.:  
Capt. Rowland W. Tompkins, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 3d BN.:  
1st Lt. George D. Bragdon, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 106th MACHINE GUN BATTALION:  
Capt. Abner H. Platt, Inf., U. S. A.

ADJUTANT:  
Maj. Thomas M. Sherman, Inf., U. S. A.

AIDE-de-CAMP:  
1st Lieut. Earl D. Grimm, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 108th REGT.:  
Col. Edgar S. Jennings, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 1st BN.:  
Maj. Fred'k. S. Couchmann, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 2d BN.:  
Maj. John S. Thompson, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 3d BN.:  
Capt. Samuel H. Merrill, Inf., U. S. A.

ADJUTANT:  
1st Lieut. Nich. E. Devereux, Jr., Inf., U. S. A.
104th MACHINE GUN BATTALION

COMMANDING:
   Capt. Robert R. Molyneux, Inf., U. S. A.

ADJUTANT:
   1st Lieut. John C. Brodsky, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 102d REGIMENT OF ENGINEERS:
   Col. Albert H. Acker, Engrs., U. S. A.

COMDG. 102d FIELD SIGNAL BN., S. C.:
   Major Arthur I. Howe, Sig. C., U. S. A.

COMDG. 102d Hq. TRAIN AND MILITARY POLICE:
   Col. William A. Taylor, Inf., U. S. A.

COMDG. 102d ENGINEER TRAIN:
   1st Lieut. Edward J. Fagan, Engrs., U. S. A.

COMDG. 102d SANITARY TRAIN (in this area):
   Major Edmund P. Fowler, M. C., U. S. A.

REMARKS:
   Units not listed are detached from this division.

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227-32.1: Field Order

* * * * *

Operations 53d Brigade

FIELD ORDERS 53d INFANTRY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
No. 24
October 23, 1918.

[Extract]

1. This brigade will move from the ROISEL-HERVILLY area to the CORBIE training area in compliance with Field Order 65, Hq. 27th Div., October 20, 1918, to be quartered in the DAOURS subarea.

* * * * *

6. Brigade headquarters will close at HERVILLY at 14:30 h., October 24, 1918, and open at DAOURS at a time and place to be announced later.

By command of Brigadier General Blanding:

D. T. DUNBAR,
Captain, Acting Brigade Adjutant.

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The British Fourth Army Resumed Operations between
Rejet-de-Beaulieu and Le Cateau

FORTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 23, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Fourth Army resumed operations between REJET-de-BEAULIEU and Le CATEAU. The attack was carried out in conjunction with an attack of the Third Army between Le CATEAU and VERCHAIN. Objectives, and boundaries between corps, and between the Fourth and neighboring armies are shown in Appendix 1. The final objective for the day was the general line along the high ground overlooking the OISE Canal from OISY to ORS, thence along the southeastern edge of Bois-LEVEQUE to FONTAINE (inclusive), along road running N. E. to ENGLEFONTAINE.

The troops engaged in the operation comprised:
(a) IX Corps: 1st, 6th, 32d*, and 46th* Divisions.
XIII Corps: 18th, 25th, 50th* and 66th* Divisions.
*corps reserve
(b) Artillery:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IX Corps</th>
<th>XIII Corps</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R. F. A. Briggs</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. G. A. Briggs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siege Btys.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(c) 2d Tank Brigade:
American 301st Tank Bn. - 15 Mk. V - allotted to IX Corps
10th Tank Bn. - 24 Mk. V - allotted to XIII Corps
(d) 5th Brigade, R. A. F.: There was no preliminary organized bombardment. The artillery preparation consisted of vigorous counterbattery work, harassing fire, and bombardments of localities under arrangements of corps.

Zero was at 0120, at which hour the infantry advanced to attack under cover of a creeping barrage, advancing at the rate of 100 yards every 4 minutes, except through the Bois-LEVEQUE, where the barrage moved forward at the rate of 100 yards in 6 minutes.

A few minutes before Zero, the enemy put down a heavy counterpreparation in the vicinity of BAZUEL and on the area east of Le CATEAU, using H. E. and a large quantity of gas shell which considerably interfered with the assembly of the infantry, and, in addition, put about 14 guns out of action. This counterpreparation was undoubtedly the result of insufficient counterbattery work. During the few days prior to October 23, the weather was unsuitable for flying and observation was difficult, consequently few hostile batteries were located and counterbattery work was restricted.

The IX Corps gained their objectives on the right without difficulty, but encountered considerable opposition from machine-gun nests N. E. of BAZUEL. This was due to the enemy's counterpreparation, which caused a certain amount of disorganization, resulting in the infantry being unable to keep up with the creeping barrage.

The XIII Corps made good progress, capturing POMMEREUIL in the initial stages of the operation. The Bois-LEVEQUE presented considerable difficulties and was the scene of exceptionally hard fighting, but, with the combined assistance of the artillery and tanks, the major portion of the wood was captured and mopped up. The enemy offered stubborn resistance in the vicinity of BOUSIES, but the village was captured with the assistance of the tanks and slight progress made beyond. Later in the afternoon, a strong counterattack developed from the N. E. and S. E., converging on BOUSIES, but was repulsed with machine-gun and rifle fire.
As the result of the day's fighting, over 1,000 prisoners and 40 guns were captured and the line established along the general line REJET-de-BEAULIEU---La LOUVIERE---GIMBREMONT Farm---L.33.d.---road junction L.24.a---along N. E. edge of Bois-l'EVEQUE---BOUSIES (inclusive).

2. IX CORPS: The attack was carried out by the 1st and 6th Divisions operating on the right and left respectively.

The 1st Division gained the Red Line and pushed beyond it to La LOUVIERE, which was captured with little opposition. Slight resistance was offered at GIMBREMONT Farm, but was quickly overcome.

The task of the 6th Division was more difficult, namely, to work through the Bois-l'EVEQUE and establish the line along the S. E. edge, thus forming a protective flank for the XIII Corps.

The enemy's counterpreparation caused considerable confusion in the initial stages of the advance with the result that the infantry lost touch with the creeping barrage and experienced some difficulty from machine guns concealed in the woods in R.3 and 4. These held up the advance all day, but were finally mopped up by the infantry of the 6th Division moving through the XIII Corps area and attacking from.

During the day, 100 prisoners were secured and many enemy killed.

XIII CORPS: The attack was carried out by the 25th and 18th Divisions, each employing one brigade in the attack on the first objective or Red Line, with one brigade in support and reserve, detailed for the capturing of the Green and Brown Lines, respectively.

The 25th Division made good progress, but met resistance from POMMEREUIL. Enemy machine guns concealed in small orchards and hedges hampered the progress of the infantry. Many of these machine-gun nests were overlooked by the moppers-up on account of the mist and darkness, and gave a little trouble to the supporting brigade.

When POMMEREUIL had been cleared, the support brigade moved around the northern edge of the Bois-l'EVEQUE and secured the N. E. edge as far as road junction in L.24.a. The northern entrances to the wood were covered by machine guns, distributed along the northern edge. Meanwhile, the brigade employed in the initial attack against POMMEREUIL moved through the Bois-l'EVEQUE preceded by the artillery barrage, advancing at the rate of 100 yards every 6 minutes, but owing to the 6th Division being held up in R.3 and 4, were obliged to establish a defensive flank along the BAZUEL-FONTAINE Road.

Attempts to capture MALGARNI were unsuccessful.

The advance of the 18th Division on to the Red Line was carried out in schedule time and the Red Dotted Line was secured after hard fighting in the vicinity of l'EPINETTE.

The enemy held BOUSIES in considerable strength and offered a stubborn resistance, but were eventually driven out of the village, leaving a number of prisoners and a few guns in our possession.

The Mk. V tanks operating with the 18th Division were of great assistance in this fighting and rendered invaluable service in mopping up the village.

A little progress was made N. E. of the village, but strong enemy resistance was encountered from the north and S. E. of BOUSIES, developing later into a counterattack. This counterattack was repulsed and eventually the line was consolidated and held in spite of enemy efforts to recapture BOUSIES.

During the day, over 1,000 prisoners and 40 guns were captured.

3. THIRD ARMY: In conjunction with the Fourth Army, the V Corps attacked at 0120 and the IV, VI, and XVII Corps at 0320.

Although all objectives were not gained, a considerable advance was realized and the villages FOREST---BEAURAIN---VENDEGIES---ROMERIES---VERTAIN---ESCARMAIN---ST-MARTIN and NEUVILLE captured. Fighting was fairly severe in the vicinity of VENDEGIES-au-BOIS and east of BEAURAIN, and the enemy stubbornly contested the advance to the River HARPIES.

As the result of the day's operations, 3,400 prisoners and several guns were captured.

4. FRENCH FIRST ARMY: Situation unchanged.
5. AIRCRAFT:
   (a) British: 602 hours were flown by 275 pilots.
       Six successful reconnaissances were carried out and 17 artillery patrols during
       which 26 zone calls were sent down with the result that 5 hostile batteries were neutral-
       ized.
       30 combats in the air took place, of which 4 were decisive; 4 E. A. crashed and
       4 of our machines are missing.
       By day, 72 25-lb. bombs were dropped on various targets.
       No night flying.
   (b) Hostile: Hostile aircraft was very active, chiefly in the northern sector,
       where nearly two-thirds of the E. A. seen were working. Two strong patrols of F. E. A.
       were seen, but the general tendency was not aggressive, most of the flying behind the
       enemy's line.
6. PRISONERS:
   Through army cages   2 O. R.
   Through C. C. S.'s    2 O. R.
7. WEATHER: Fine with mist.
8. RELIEFS AND MOVES: Nil.

*****

182-33.3, No. 3: Operations Report

G-3

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 23, 1918

[Extract]

*****

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS, AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: Hq. 30th Div. opened
   at QUERRIEU 15 h., Oct. 22.

*****

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. Read,
Major General,
Commanding.

------
Operations II Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 23, 1918.

[Extract]

HOUR TO CONTENTS

2250 Fourth Army 863-G3: Headquarters 27th Division closed
21st BUSIGNY 11 h. today, opened CORBIE same hour.
A. E. F. Divisions moving to rest area.
Gen. Bliss

---

HS Brit. File: Fldr. II (301st Tank Bn.) (Br.) 2d Tank Operations Report

Operations American 301st Tank Battalions with British IX Corps

2d TANK BRIGADE, B. E. F.,
October 23, 1918.

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON OPERATIONS OF 10th TANK BATTALION AND AMERICAN 301st TANK BATTALION WITH THE IX AND XIII CORPS

GENERAL PLAN: The general plan of the attack of the Fourth Army in conjunction with the Third Army on the left was to establish a line on the western edge of Mormal Forest and along the western bank of the SAMBRE-OISE Canal.

ALLOTMENT OF TANKS: Tanks of the 2d Tank Brigade were allotted as follows for this operation:

XIII CORPS:
18th Div. - 2 cos. (15 tanks) 10th Tank Bn.
25th Div. - 1 co. ( 8 tanks) 10th Tank Bn.

IX CORPS:
6th Div. - 2 sections (6 Tanks) Amer. 301st Tank Bn.
1st and 6th - 1 section (3 tanks) ---

- 741 -
Divs. 1 section of American 301st Tank Bn. was held in reserve

SPECIAL TASKS:

(a) The task of B Co., 10th Tank Bn., with the 18th Division, was to assist the infantry in the capture of the Red and Red Dotted Lines, that is, from Le CATEAU up to BOUSIES, exclusive.

(b) The task of C Co., 10th Tank Bn., was to assist the infantry of the 25th Division, first of all in the capture of the Red Dotted Line, and then in the capture of the final objective - the Brown Line.

(c) The task of A Co., 10 Tank Bn., was to assist the infantry of the 55th Infantry Brigade (18th Division) in the capture of the 3d, 4th, and 5th objectives, including the villages of BOUSIES and ROBERSART.

If the 2d objective was not taken on the first day and the advance from the 2d objective to the final objective could, therefore, not take place, then this tank company was not to be employed, but was to be held in reserve for use in any further attack which might be ordered, with a view to the capture of the final objective.

(d) The 2 sections with the 6th Division were to assist primarily in the capture of the enclosures in R.15.b. and R.16.a (Le PLANTY), and then to proceed along the eastern edge of EVEQUE Wood.

(e) The task of the section of the 301st Tank Bn., allotted to the 1st and 6th Divisions was to assist in the capture of La HAIE-TONNOLLE Farm in the 1st Divisional sector and then proceed to GIMBREMONT Farm in 6th Divisional sector.

APPROACH MARCHES: The approach marches were rendered somewhat simpler by the clear night and tanks reached their starting points without any particular difficulty.

On Y/Z night, there was a lot of hostile gas shelling in which tank crews suffered a number of gas casualties.

SHORT ACCOUNT OF ACTION: Zero hour was at 0120 on October 23. The moon was about full and the night clear.

The section of B Co., 10th Tank Bn. (3 tanks) which had lain up N. E. of MONTAY during Y day, started on time. One tank was knocked out by fire from a trench mortar when in K.17; one tank reached first objective and then proceeded to the vicinity of the village of FOREST; the third tank was in action W. of FOREST and CROIX, operating with the Buffs.

The second section started from S. E. of Le CATEAU, and information is not yet available as to its movements. One tank, however, is known to have ditched in the RICHEMONT River in K.30, afterwards succeeding in unditching itself.

The company operating with the 55th Infantry Brigade between the Red Dotted Line and the Brown Line had considerable fighting in the BOUSIES area. 6 tanks were reported at various times in this locality. The infantry advance was held up for a short time in the copse in L.9.a., and an aeroplane reported that it had seen the infantry signalling to the tanks to come to their aid, whereupon 3 tanks appeared and the advance continued. About noon, a counterattack developed from the area north of EVEQUE Wood in L.5., 6., and 12. The O. C., 10th Tank Bn., detached one tank to assist in breaking up this counterattack. This tank reported knocking out several enemy machine guns, but was ultimately itself knocked out by a direct hit from a field gun from the north of EVEQUE Wood.

The 2 sections of the American 301st Tank Bn., operating with the 1st Division, started at Zero and the majority of the tanks reached their objectives without encountering very serious opposition. In quite a number of cases they got ahead of the infantry and had to return in order to pick these up. An observer who saw these tanks in action reported that they practically cleared the whole of the ground between R.10 and the BAZUEL-CATILLON Road. After they had temporarily rallied, 2 of the tanks went out again in the direction of R.9.a and R.10.a, in order to clear up the situation at this point.

The other section of the American 301st Tank Bn., operating with the 1st Division, started at Zero. One tank became ditched within 400 yards of its objective, one came into action satisfactorily, and the other lost direction shortly after crossing the front line.
The actual casualties and experiences of tanks are shown below:

**10th Tank Battalion:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks intended for action</td>
<td>23 and 1 wireless</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks actually started</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks ditched</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks which had mechanical trouble during operations</td>
<td>No. not known</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks knocked out</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks missing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual number of tanks of the 10th Tank Bn., which rallied on the evening of the 23d inst., was 9 tanks which had taken part in the operations and 2 which had been unable to start owing to mechanical trouble, making a total of 11 tanks.

**American 301st Tank Battalion:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks intended to start</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks actually started</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks ditched</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks with mechanical trouble in action</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks knocked out</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks missing</td>
<td>Nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks rallied</td>
<td>9 and 3 reserve, total 12.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Except for some cases of gassing, there were no casualties to personnel in the American 301st Tank Bn.

Casualties to personnel of 10th Tank Bn. have not yet been ascertained.

**SUPPLY TANKS:** No. 4 Tank Supply Company was allotted to XIII Corps and their tanks were suballotted as follows:

- XIII Corps Artillery: 2 tanks
- 18th Division: 6 tanks
- 25th Division: 5 tanks

The section attached to 25th Division reached the regulating point at L.20. central at 1100 and reported to the divisional representative, but was not employed.

The section attached to the 18th Division delivered all supplies correctly on time and has now rallied at P.21.d.9.2. One tank is still out laying cable. On the morning of the battle, this tank was reported at having successfully laid cable and opened an office at L.14.c.

The section attached to the 104th Brigade, R. F. A., dumped 1500 rounds of 18-pdr., 450 rounds of 4.5, and 450 rounds 4.5 charges.

The tank laying cable is still working.

H. A. WOODS,
Lieut. Col.,
Commanding 2d Tank Brig.
Operations of the 301st Battalion Tanks on October 23, 1918.

Reference 1/40,000 Map, Sheets 57A and 57B. Z day---October 23
Zero hour---1:20 a. m.

I. GENERAL PLAN:
1. Three sections of four tanks each of the American 301st Tank Battalion, attached to the British 2d Tank Brigade, were placed at the disposal of the British 6th Division.
2. On October 23, the 6th Division renewed the attack on the enemy, in conjunction with the 1st Division on its right, and the 25th Division on its left.
3. (a) The attack of the 6th Division was carried out by the 18th Infantry Brigade on the right, and the 71st Infantry Brigade on the left. The 16th Infantry Brigade was in divisional reserve.
   (b) The 2d Infantry Brigade attacked on our immediate right.
   (c) On our left, the 7th Infantry Brigade attacked the first objective (Red Line), the 71st Infantry Brigade, the Dotted Red Line, and the 74th Infantry Brigade the Green Line.
4. This attack was a swinging movement to protect the right flank of forces, engaged in a major attack to the north.
5. There was no intense bombardment along the whole front immediately preceding the attack, but selected targets which were thought likely to prove an obstacle to the advance of the infantry, were bombarded by high explosives until the last possible minute.
6. (a) The attack was made under cover of a creeping barrage as far as the Dotted Red Line at Zero.
   (b) The barrage opened on the start, at the line shown on attached map, and remained there for four minutes.
   (c) It then advanced by lifts at the rate of 100 yards in four minutes, until it formed a protective barrage behind the Red Line.
   (d) There was a pause on this line until Zero plus 180.
   (e) From this line the barrage moved forward at the rate of 100 yards in 6 minutes and halted immediately in advance of Brown Line, forming a protective barrage at this point for a period of 30 minutes, when it stopped.
7. The 18th Infantry Brigade operating on the right attacked in a general northeast direction to a line approximately 500 yards west of the SOMME Canal between the towns of CATILLON and ORS.
8. The 71st Infantry Brigade operating on the left, attacked in a general northeast direction including the town of BAZUEL and thence along the north of the Le CATEAU-LANDRECIES Railway, including the southern half of the Bois l'EVEQUE to the eastern edge of the wood.
9. Contrary to established practice, Zero hour was set for 1:20 a. m., in order to take advantage of the darkness for cover, surprise, and moral effect.
10. This departure from the ordinary procedure of attacking at dawn proved to be successful, in that no heavy shelling, nor dense bombard- [original copy examined but no connective line appears] concentrations of gas were encountered.

II. ALLOTMENT OF TANKS:
1. The twelve tanks available from the battalion were allotted as follows:
   4 (1 in reserve) to (a) left battalion, 1st Division, and (b) right battalion, 18th Infantry Brigade, 6th Division.
   4 (1 in reserve) to 18th Infantry Brigade.
   4 (1 in reserve) to 71st Infantry Brigade.
III. PRELIMINARY PREPARATIONS:

1. On October 20, the battalion was resting and reorganizing at Busigny, after three actions. Owing to a large loss of tanks and personnel sustained in three former actions, after which little chance for reorganization had been given, the commanding officers and sections were hopelessly intermixed, as it had been necessary to form a composite company in order to keep the tanks that remained fit for action in touch within the general advance and within striking radius of the enemy.

2. The practice of intermixing companies is reprehensible and unless the exigencies of the operations absolutely demand such a course, it is to be avoided.

At 6 p. m. on the evening of October 20, word was conveyed to the commanding officer, provisional company, of an action to take place on the night of October 22 and 23. At this time, all hands were busy putting as many tanks as possible in condition of action; tanks were in poor repair and many items of equipment defective or missing. Three provisional sections of four tanks each were immediately formed and on the afternoon of the 21st, twelve tanks trekked to the lying-up point.

On the afternoon of the 21st, section commanders reported at the headquarters of the 6th Division, 71st Infantry Brigade, and 18th Infantry Brigade, where they were instructed to return on the 22d inst., as detailed operation orders had not yet been published. In accordance with these instructions, section commanders reported to the infantry brigades with which they were to operate on the 22d and received final instructions from the brigade commanders.

As the weather was favorable, permission was granted by the brigade to move the tanks by daylight, and accordingly the twelve tanks left Busigny, at 2:30 p. m., on the afternoon of October 21, and trekked at 57B, W.16.b.10.80, a distance of [?] yards, arriving at the latter location at 5:30 p. m.

A field range, rations, tents, and one and one-half fills per tank were carried to the lying-up point by the eight limbers attached to the battalion.

The tremendous value of limbers for cross-country work and to reach points prohibitive for motor transport was again proven in this instance.

Extreme difficulty and loss of much valuable time was caused to all section commanders on account of the lack of transportation of any kind. Headquarters of infantry units are habitually situated a number of miles apart, and it is essential that section commanders visit these headquarters at frequent intervals. Therefore, it is strongly recommended that section commander be mounted, as this would enable them to negotiate any kind of terrain, and allow them proper time and means to coordinate their units with the infantry and also perform the necessary reconnaissance, which in this case was entirely neglected.

IV. RECONNAISSANCE:

General.

1. The battalion R. O. and two company R. O.'s were at the disposal of the commanding officer, provisional company. As the line was constantly changed and as the operation orders were not published until the evening of the 22d, little opportunity was given for reconnaissance. The R. O.'s confined themselves to securing and issuing maps and taping the forward routes.

Sources of Information.

2. Maps were poor. Each tank commander was issued a combination map composed of portions of 57A and 57B--1/40,000. In addition, section commanders were issued 1/20,000--57B, S. E., which did not include the entire operation area. The details shown on both these maps were found to be considerably in error.

No aerial photos of our immediate sector were issued.

3. The fact that time was lacking for tank or section commanders to familiarize themselves with landmarks or visit O. P.'s was detrimental to the operation, particularly as the attack was carried out in darkness.
4. All section commanders were hampered in the distribution of necessary information to their various tank commanders, as the entire lack of transportation prohibited them from returning to the lying-up point until two hours prior to the start of the final approach march.

V. TANK EQUIPMENT:
1. (a) Left section.
2. Center section.
   3 Mark V star, male
   1 Mark V, male.
3. Right section.
   2 Mark V star, male.
   1 Mark V star, composite.
   1 Mark V, male.

VI. FINAL ARRANGEMENTS:
1. Owing to the proximity of the lying-up point to the scene of operations, it was decided to use this as the rallying point.
2. The battalion was instructed to be present at the rallying point on the morning of October 23, at 6 a.m., and arrangements were made to evacuate all slightly wounded to the dressing station at St-MARTIN.
3. A hot and substantial meal was served all crews at the lying-up point just prior to the start of the final approach march. Moreover, a petrol tin of coffee was wired to the muffler on the top of each tank, which enabled the crews to have hot coffee at the filling up point immediately before Zero hour.
4. Each tank carried one-half fill of petrol, oil and grease to the refilling point.

VII. GENERAL OPERATIONS: Owing to the widely different missions of the three sections engaged, it seemed best to discuss their operations separately, particularly as it was necessary to have two separate routes, necessitating the laying of two lines of tape.

Operations:
Left and center sections.
1. The left and center sections whose duty it was to place the left battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade and the 71st Infantry Brigade in the trenches Pt. Gard left the jumping-off point (57B---R 14 C 39) at Zero, 1:20 a.m. For this operation, three tanks of each section were used and a fourth in reserve. One tank of the center section met slight opposition between Le PLANTY and BAZUEL, but cleared the ground and proceeded as ordered to the crossroads at 10 a 36. The other two tanks of this section reached their objectives, but were forced to return and pick up the infantry who were constantly lagging behind. Eighteen prisoners were taken by these two tanks and turned over to the infantry. The left and center sections rallied at Bazuel for further orders.
2. As the infantry had not succeeded in consolidating the line, two tanks were ordered to accompany additional infantry at 9:30 a.m. over the same ground. This was done, and all positions consolidated.
3. Section commanders reported to the infantry commanders and were ordered to withdraw their tanks to the rallying point. All tanks of these two sections rallied at 4 p.m. on the afternoon of October 23.
4. Enemy machine-gun fire and artillery fire in this region was weak, while much help was given by the friendly barrage.

General Operations:
Right Section.
1. The original plan for this section provided for the capture of La HAIE-TON-NOLLE Farm (N 28 central), and the establishment of the infantry at that point, working in conjunction with the left battalion of the first division. Thence to GIMBREMONT Farm (R 17 c), where the tanks were to pick up the right battalion of the 18th Infantry Brigade
and establish them in and around GIMBREMONT Farm. Thence to R 3 d to await orders from the commanding officer of the 71st Infantry Brigade.

2. At 7 p. m., October 22, orders were issued from tank corps headquarters cancelling the third mission.

3. The left section operating independently, left the lying-up point at 9 p. m., and proceeded to the refilling point at Q 36 b. Tape had been laid by the reconnaissance officers to the crossroads in R 32 a.

4. All tanks refilled with petrol, oil and grease at the refilling point and crews were issued hot coffee. At 11:35 p. m., two illuminating shells burst near the refilling point, silhouetting the tanks. They were moved out immediately as the area was subjected to short but intense bombardment. The 2,000 yards to the jumping-off point was covered slowly in second speed, the tanks making little noise and reaching the barrage start line at Zero plus two.

Action:
1. Three tanks were used with a fourth in reserve. An intense enemy barrage consisting of H. E. opened two minutes before Zero. One of the tanks was ditched within 300 yards of the objective, one lost direction as its compass was stuck and rendered useless. The third patrolled the entire objective without meeting enemy forces and finally withdrawn by order of the infantry commander.

Artillery:
1. Artillery support was poor in this region and evidently proper orders had not been issued as one battery located at R 13 a, only fired when tank section commander furnished it with a barrage map and the necessary information.

Infantry:
1. The infantry support in this area was poor. They showed little desire to move forward and were slow to consolidate positions. Moreover, they suffered heavy casualties from gas.

Weather:
1. The night was bright, but dawn brought with it a heavy mist that made the picking out of the landmarks and routes almost impossible.

Rallying of Section:
1. All tanks of this section rallied by 3:30 p. m., on the afternoon of October 23, save one which was ditched. This was dug out and rallied the morning following the action.

Lessons and Suggestions:
1. Compasses again proved invaluable and too much stress cannot be laid on proper care and adjustment of these instruments.
2. The lack of forward reconnaissance was a great handicap. Reconnaissance officers should devote their entire time to the forward area leaving the work of selecting routes to the section commanders.
3. The plan of assigning one section to two or more infantry units with a number of objectives is a poor one.
4. This action proved that the tanks can clear ground by themselves, but the positions cannot be consolidated without proper coordination between tanks and infantry.
The II Corps in Army Reserve

The II Corps resumes training which is continued until November 11, 1918.

---

182-32.2: List

**Location II Corps Units**

G-3 870  
II CORPS, A. E. F.,  
October 24, 1918—6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarter/Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (rear)</td>
<td>N.15.d.cent. (62C)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412th Tel. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>Moving to QUERRIEU area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>Near SAULTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>BEUGNATRE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq. R. A., VII Corps</td>
<td>Moving to BERTANGLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq. H. A., VII Corps</td>
<td>Moving to VILLERS BOCAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq. C. R. E., American II Corps</td>
<td>WIANCOURT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27th Division

Advanced Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53d Infantry Brig. Hq.</td>
<td>CORBIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Infantry Brig. Hq.</td>
<td>CORBIE area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102d Engr. Regt. Hq.</td>
<td>CORBIE area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>CORBIE area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102d Field Signal Bn.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102d Sanitary Train Hq.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30th Division Headquarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59th Infantry Brig. Hq.</td>
<td>QUERRIEU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Infantry Brig. Hq.</td>
<td>QUERRIEU area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113th M. Gun Bn. Hq.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105th F. Sig. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>QUERRIEU area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105th Sanitary Train Hq.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

F. E. BUCHAN,  
Colonel, G. S.,  
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

----------

- 748 -
Reorganization of 30th Division

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 24, 1918.

MEMORANDUM ORDERS:

1. The duration of the present rest period being uncertain, unit commanders will take the necessary steps to reorganize and refit organizations at once. Any delay in procuring clothing, arms or equipment will be promptly reported to these headquarters; in the event of failure to procure such supplies, unit commanders must be prepared to show that they have exhausted all means in their power to secure them.

2. (a) Early and particular attention will be paid to the reorganization of specialists squads, including intelligence personnel.
   (b) Close order, disciplinary drills carried out with snap and precision will be held at every available opportunity. At least the 2d and 3d in command of any unit will be given an opportunity to drill the organization at every drill.
   (c) Any slackness in saluting or carelessness in personal appearance will be corrected when encountered, by officers of all grades.

3. The week October 28-November 1, will be largely given to athletic sports and games in addition to the work outlined in Par. 1 and 2. The division athletic meet will be held on November 1, and the corps meet on November 4 and 5. The cooperation of all officers is enjoined in order that these days may be made interesting and enjoyable to the whole command.

4. Instructions for engineer and machine-gun units will take place under the direct control of the division engineer and the division machine gun officer, respectively.

5. Special attention will be paid by organization commanders to the training of any replacements who may join them during the week, and every endeavor made to impress upon them the lessons learned in our recent operations.

6. The instruction called for herein is not to prevent any special training which organization commanders may desire to give their commands with a view to correcting deficiencies observed during the past few weeks.

7. Regimental and separate unit commanders will submit to these headquarters daily, by telephone if desired, location of the training ground and the nature of the instruction being given the following day.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.
From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 24, 1918

[Extract]

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The troops of this corps having been relieved in the line, there is nothing to report.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

---

From: Commanding General
To: G-3, G. H. Q., American E. F.

For period ending noon, Oct. 25, 1918

[Extract]


* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G 3.
for
G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

---
Location II Corps Units

G-3 874

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 26, 1918—6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 35

Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)
Headquarters II Corps (rear)
412th Tel. Bn. Hq.
318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron

BERTANGLES
N.15.d.central (62C)
VILLERS-BOCAGE
Moving
Near SAULTY
BEUGNATRE

BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. R. A., VII Corps
Hq. H. A., VII Corps

BERTANGLES
VILLERS-BOCAGE

27th Division

Division Headquarters

53d Infantry Brigade Hq.
54th Infantry Brigade Hq.
104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
102d Field Signal Bn. Hq.
102d Sanitary Train Hq.

CORBIE
N.12.d.5.5. (62D)
VILLERS-BRETONNEUX
HAMELET
CORBIE
CORBIE
La NEUVILLE

30th Division

Division Headquarters

59th Infantry Brigade Hq.
60th Infantry Brigade Hq.
113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
105th Sanitary Train Hq.

QUERRIEU
HEILLY
CONTAY
La HOUSSOYE
RIBEMONT
PONT-NOYELLES
FRANVILLERS

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.
Administrative Orders

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 26, 1918.

From: Commanding General
To: C-in-C, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. During the operations in which the II Corps was engaged, from September 26 to October 21, inclusive, the casualties, not including officers, amounted to more than 10,500. During training and operations in the YPRES sector in August and the first part of September, the casualties among enlisted men amounted to 1,600. The 27th Division arrived in France 2,500 below strength. Besides casualties, the ordinary wastage has continued for five months.

2. From the above causes, the strength of the 27th and 30th Divisions is insufficient to enable them to engage effectively in operations at present. Both divisions are now resting in suitable areas near AMIENS. Their active training is to begin at once.

3. This information is furnished to show the great need for replacements. While it is realized that the number required is large, it is believed that 5,000 men, for assignment to infantry regiments, in addition to the replacements heretofore ordered, would meet immediate necessities, in view of the anticipated early return of the slightly wounded.

4. The addition of one of two combat divisions would be greatly appreciated. It is understood that the 37th and 91st Divisions are now in the northern area. If both, or even one, of these divisions could be assigned to the II Corps, it would be possible to maintain that corps continuously in a corps sector at the front. With only two divisions, the relief of the front line at suitable intervals is extremely difficult. If great losses occur, such relief is practically impossible.

5. During recent operations, the British furnished this corps with divisional and corps artillery, 18-pounders and heavy artillery, with a corps artillery staff; a flying squadron, a regiment of cavalry; corps engineers; and various detachments of labor troops all sufficient in numbers and equipment to enable the corps to function as such, and all under the administrative and tactical command of the corps commander. They stand ready to continue this in future operations, as soon as the combat divisions are in condition for a continuance of operations.

G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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Commendatory Messages Regarding Conduct of 27th and 30th Divisions

SPECIAL ORDER OF THE DAY BY FIELD MARSHAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG.


Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France

The following messages are published for the information of all ranks:

From Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to General Read, American II Corps, October 20, 1918.

I wish to express to you personally and to all the officers and men serving under you, my warm appreciation of the very valuable and gallant services rendered by you throughout the recent operations with the British Fourth Army. Called upon to attack positions of great strength held by a determined enemy, all ranks of the American 27th and 30th Divisions under your command displayed an energy, courage, and determination in attack which proved irresistible. It does not need me to tell you that in the heavy fighting of the past three weeks you have earned the lasting esteem and admiration of your British comrades in arms, whose successes you have so nobly shared.

To Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig from General Read, American II Corps, October 20, 1918.

In acknowledging receipt of your telegram of this date, permit me to say that every officer and other soldier of the American II Corps will always remember with great pride your generous commendation of the services rendered in the important operations of the past three weeks, during which time we have had the honor to be in action as a part of your superb Fourth Army. We are under the greatest obligation to all British units attached to us. Their splendid cooperation, especially that of the VII Corps Royal Artillery, insured at all times, the success of our operations.

General Headquarters.
October 26, 1918

Replacements

From: The Commanding General
To: Commanding General, 6th Depot Division

1. Reference telegram from G. H. Q., No. 3509/G-1, dated October 24, and telegram 778/G-1, dated October 25, from C. G., S. O. S. The 159th Infantry and the 143d Machine Gun
Battalion will be billeted in what is known as the DURY area, comprising the following towns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enl. Men</th>
<th>Horses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SALEUX</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SALOUEL</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PONT-de-METZ</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RENANCUORT</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETIT-St-JEAN</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Billeting parties should be forwarded as soon as possible, reporting to the area commandant at SALEUX, who has full information in regard to this area. These towns are situated about 5 kilometers southwest of AMIENS. Train loads of reinforcements can be sent to SALEUX as a detraining station, but small bodies of men will probably detrain at AMIENS.

3. It is requested that the transport, equipment, and strength of these units be wired to these headquarters at the earliest possible moment.

G. W. READ,
Major General, N. A.,
Commanding.

182-10.2: Messages

Operations II Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 26, 1918.

[Extract]

HOUR: 1010
TO: G-3, G. H. Q., and Gen. Tasker H. Bliss


* * * * *

HOUR: 1220
TO: G-3, G. H. Q.


* * * * *

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Transfer of Personnel

GENERAL ORDERS 39
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 27, 1918.

1. After its recent battle experiences, the line organizations of the division are found with depleted ranks, while other organizations have suffered less. Replacements may be expected, but, probably it will be some time before they are received in sufficient number to raise the units to their former strength.

2. Headquarters and supply companies are more nearly at the authorized strength for a full regiment, and it would appear that some of their members might, with advantage, be transferred to line companies for present training.

3. Regimental, battalion, and company commanders will carefully go over their respective commands, with a view to securing for duty in the fighting strength of their organizations, not only all individuals who are absent therefrom without authority, but also all individuals who can be spared from their present duties. Brigade commanders will make frequent inspections and checks and give suitable orders in the premises. The fighting strength of organizations as recently reported was much at variance with the actual strength so as to indicate that there is a considerable field for the action above indicated, and the aim of all officers must be to speedily effect a reorganization with training that will produce fighting efficiency at maximum strength.

4. Reports will be submitted on October 30 by all regimental commanders showing the names of all officers and enlisted men—except members of headquarters and supply companies—who are present for duty, but not incorporated in their respective units for training and for combat purposes, with a brief statement of duties upon which engaged which prevents their being so incorporated.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.

--------

182-32.2: List

Location II Corps Units

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 28, 1918—6 h.

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 36

| Headquarters II Corps (Adv.) | BERTANGLES |
| Headquarters II Corps (rear) | N.15.d.central (62C) |
| 412th Tel. Bn. Hq. | VILLERS BOCAGE |
| 318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq. | BERTANGLES |

- 755 -
BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. R. A. VII Corps
Hq. H. A. VII Corps

27th Division
Division Headquarters
53d Infantry Brigade Hq.
54th Infantry Brigade Hq.
104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
102d Field Signal Bn. Hq.
102d Sanitary Train Hq.

30th Division
Division Headquarters
59th Infantry Brigade Hq.
60th Infantry Brigade Hq.
113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
105th Field Signal Bn. Hq.
105th Sanitary Train Hq.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

----------

182-32.2: List

Location II Corps Units

G-3

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 37

Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)
Headquarters II Corps (rear)
412th Tel. Bn. Hq.
318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
17th Aero Squadron
148th Aero Squadron

BERTANGLES
VILLERS BOCAGE
BERTANGLES
N.15.d.central (62C)
VILLERS BOCAGE
BERTANGLES
Near SAULTY
BEUGNATRE
BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS

Hq. R. A., VII Corps
Hq. H. A., VII Corps

BERTANGLES
VILLERS BOCAGE

27th Division
Division Headquarters
53d Infantry Brigade Hq.
54th Infantry Brigade Hq.

CORBIE
N.12.d.5.5 (62D)
N.21.a.9.2.

104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
102d Field Signal Bn. Hq.
102d Sanitary Train Hq.

HAMELET
CORBIE
CORBIE
La NEUVILLE

30th Division
Division Headquarters
59th Infantry Brigade Hq.
60th Infantry Brigade Hq.

QUERRIEU
HEILLY
CONTAY

113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
105th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
105th Sanitary Train Hq.

LAHOUSSOYE
RIBEMONT
PONT-NOYELLES
FRANVILLERS

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

--------

182-32.16: Order

Engineer Units to Rejoin their Divisions

From: Advance Fourth Army, B. E. F.
Date: November 1, 1918 Hour: 1830

To: II Corps

The 2 bns. of Amer. II Corps Engr. Regts. now working under O. C., 6th Bn., Canadian Bly. troops, will rejoin their divisions by returning supply train on Nov. 3, as follows:

Entrain ROISEL under arrangements to be made by O. C., 6th Bn. Canadian Bly. troops, with Tfc. PERONNE. Detrain CORBIE under arrangements to be made by American II Corps with Traffic PERONNE. Rations for 4th inst. will be taken. Completion of move will be reported to Fourth Army by American II Corps. Ack.

--------
**Location II Corps Units**

G-3

II CORPS, A. E. F.,

*November 5, 1918—6 h.*

**HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS**

**LIST NO. 38**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)</th>
<th>BERTANGLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (rear)</td>
<td>VILLERS BOCAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412th Tel. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>VILLERS BOCAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>BERTANGLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159th Inf. Replacement Regt.</td>
<td>PONT-de-METZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147th M. G. Replacement Bn.</td>
<td>PONT-de-METZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>345th Labor Company</td>
<td>St-EMILIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>Near SAULTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>BEUGNATRE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS**

| Hq. R. A., VII Corps      | BERTANGLES |
| Hq. H. A., VII Corps      | VILLERS BOCAGE |

**27th Division**

- Division Headquarters
  - 53d Infantry Brigade Hq.
  - 54th Infantry Brigade Hq.
- 104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
- 102d Field Signal Bn. Hq.
- 102d Sanitary Train Hq.

**30th Division**

- Division Headquarters
  - 59th Infantry Brigade Hq.
  - 60th Infantry Brigade Hq.
- 113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.
- 105th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.
- 105th Sanitary Train Hq.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

---

- 758 -
105th Engineers Transferred

FIELD ORDER
No. 30

MAP: 57B, 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. The 105th Engineer Regiment (less Company A), will move tomorrow by bus, light railway, and marching • • •

2. The regiment will work on railways as directed by the A. D. L. R., British Fourth Army.

* * * * *

4. Advance party will be sent by the Commanding Officer of the 105th Engineer Regiment in lorries at 8 h., tomorrow, to proceed to destination and establish the camp. 105 tents are to be furnished by the Fourth Army.

5. Rations will be taken both by the regiment and transport personnel for the 9th and 10th, and rations will be drawn on the 10th for consumption on the 11th from the R. S. O. at BELLICOURT.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Chief of Staff.

----------

Location II Corps Units

HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS

LOCATION LIST NO. 39

Headquarters II Corps (Adv.) BERTANGLES
Headquarters II Corps (rear) VILLERS-BOCAGE
412th Tel. Bn. Hq. VILLERS-BOCAGE
318th Field Sg. Bn. Hq. BERTANGLES
159th Inf. Replacement Regt. PONT-de-METZ
147th M. G. Replacement Bn. PONT-de-METZ
345th Labor Company Ste-EMILIE
17th Aero Squadron Near SAULTY
148th Aero Squadron BEUGNATURE
From: The Commanding General

To: C-in-C, G. H. Q., American E. F.

Subject: Change of location of replacement camp

1. A regiment of infantry and a machine gun battalion have been attached to this command to form a regional replacement depot, with headquarters at PONT-de-METZ, and detraining station at SALEUX (Dept. SOMME). This depot will be ready to receive personnel on November 12, 1918. This organization will absorb the present replacement battalion at EU, which will close on November 12.

2. It is requested that hereafter all replacements, casuals, stragglers, and personnel evacuated from hospitals as of Class A intended for units of this command be sent to the American replacement depot, SALEUX, and not to the II Corps replacement battalion, EU, as heretofore.

3. It is the function of this depot to receive, equip, train, and forward these re-
placements to American II Corps personnel railhead (at present VILLERS-BRETONNEUX) for distribution to the divisions. This depot is not a rest or convalescent camp, and personnel unfit for duty with combat troops should not be sent to it.

4. The telegraphic address of this depot will be American replacement depot, PONT-de-METZ, SOMME.

5. It is requested that all concerned be notified.

G. W. READ,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

--------

II Corps Gen. File 370.9: Fldr. 2: Telegram

Replacement Camp Moved to Saleux

From: II Corps [G-1]
Date: November 11, 1918 No. 359-G-1
To: Fourth Army, B. E. F.

American II Corps replacement camp closes at EU on November 12, and opens at SALEUX same date. Request all evacuations from hospitals be forwarded to SALEUX and not to EU as heretofore.

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182-10.2: Fldr. 115: Messages Received

Armistice

II ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
November 11, 1918.

RECORD OF MESSAGES RECEIVED

[Extract]

* * * * *

HOUR: 0915

FROM: Adv. Fourth Army

G-609---Hostilities will cease at 11 h., today, Nov. 11. Troops will stand fast on line reached at that hour which will be reported by wire to adv. army headquarters as soon as possible. Defensive precautions will be maintained. There will be no intercourse of any description with the enemy until receipt of instructions from army hq. Further instructions follow. Ack.

* * * * *

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- 761 -
**Location II Corps**

**HEADQUARTERS OF FORMATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Headquarters II Corps (Adv.)</th>
<th>BERTANGLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters II Corps (rear)</td>
<td>VILLERS-BOCAGE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>412th Tel. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>VILLERS-BOCAGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>318th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>BERTANGLES</td>
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<td>PONT-de-METZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143d M. G. Replacement Bn.</td>
<td>PONT-de-METZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>345th Labor Company</td>
<td>JONCOURT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>TOURS) Out of this area, will no longer be reported with this corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148th Aero Squadron</td>
<td>TOURS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**BRITISH UNITS WITH AMERICAN II CORPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hq. R. A., VII Corps</th>
<th>BERTANGLES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hq. H. A., VII Corps</td>
<td>VILLERS-BOCAGE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**27th Division**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Headquarters</th>
<th>CORBIE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>53d Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>N.12.d.5.5. (62D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54th Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>GLISY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>102d Engr. Regt. Hq.</th>
<th>SERAIN (with Fourth Army, B. E. F.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>104th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>CORBIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102d Field Signal Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>CORBIE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102d Sanitary Train Hq.</td>
<td>La NEUVILLE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**30th Division**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division Headquarters</th>
<th>QUERRIEU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59th Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>HEILLY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60th Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>CONTAY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>105th Engr. Regt. Hq.</th>
<th>MARETZ (with Fourth Army, B. E. F.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>113th Machine Gun Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>RIBEMONT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105th Field Sig. Bn. Hq.</td>
<td>PONT-NOYELLES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105th Sanitary Train Hq.</td>
<td>FRANVILLERS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.
Casualties British Fourth Army, American II Corps Attached, October 11-18, 1918

FOURTH ARMY, B. E. F.,
October 18, 1918.

SUMMARY OF CASUALTIES REPORTED BETWEEN
18 h., Friday, Oct. 11 and 18 h., Friday, Oct. 18, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>O. R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total casualties</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AMERICAN CASUALTIES

From 18 h., Friday, Oct. 11 to 18 h., Friday, Oct. 18, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>O. R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wounded</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total casualties</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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AUSTRALIAN CORPS.

Place: Sheet (62C) N.16.c.near BARLEUX

Hour: Oct. 5

Summary of Events and Information

Moves: Aust. 3d Division move by tactical train from PERONNE and TINCOURT to the HALLENCOURT area. A Brigade of American 30th Division by bus to forward area, debussing on TEMPLEUX-RONSSOY Road and proceed by march route to BELLOCOURT-NAUROY area. B Brigade of American 30th Division by march route from HERBECOURT to TINCOURT. 14th and 15th A. I. Brigs. by march route from HERVILLY area to Le MESNIL area preparatory to entraining.

Oct. 6 - The enemy was very active on our new positions during the night. The relief of the Aust. 2d Division front (6th A. I. Brig.) by the American 59th Brig. was completed about 0200. At 0900, the command of the corps front passed to G. O. C., American II Corps. On relief, the Australian corps is withdrawn into Fourth Army reserve.

2d Division moved to HARGICOURT-BELLIĆOURT area on relief. Hq. Aust. 2d Div. moved to DOINGT. B Brig., American 30th Division moved from TINCOURT to HARGICOURT.

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HS Brit. File: Fldr. V, II Corps: War Diary

IX CORPS.

Summary of Events and Information

Place: POEUILLY, Q.29.d.6.7
Date: Oct. 5

Corps Order No. 143, was issued giving the objectives for an attack to take place on the morning of 7th inst., in conjunction with the American II Corps (who were relieving the Aust. corps night 5/6th) on the north and French XV Corps on the south. The attack to be carried out by 6th Div. with one brig. of the 46th Div. (139th) to hold the front on the south of our attack and to maintain touch with the French if they were unable to make progress.

Oct. 6 - Addendum No. 1 to Order No. 143. Artillery cooperation with American II Corps.

Oct. 8 - The attack commenced at 5:10 a.m., the order of battle being as follows:
The 71st Inf. Brig. attacked in the northern sector and the 16th Inf. Brig. on the south. The 139th Inf. Brig. maintained touch between us and the French. Under cover of a heavy barrage and assisted by some Whippet tanks, both brigs. rapidly reached the Red Line, or first objective, which entailed an advance of 2,000 yards. The 71st Inf. Brig. met with little opposition, but the 16th Brig. was held up on its right flank for some time by machine guns in MANNEQUIN Wood and the village of MERICOURT. The French XV Corps made excellent progress on its right, but considerable difficulty was experienced on its left flank, where it joined the IX Corps, the main obstacle being a nest of enemy machine guns in CERISE Wood. By 12 noon, MANNEQUIN and DOON Hills had been captured, also BEAUREGARD Farm. The 5th Cav. Brig. who had been ordered to push through the infantry as an opportunity occurred, attempted to break through just S. of BRANCOURT Village, with the intention of rushing some enemy field guns in BELLIĆOURT Fme, which were hampering our advance, but owing to hostile machine-gun fire, the attempt was abandoned.

Early in the afternoon, CERISE Wood was captured by the 16th Inf. Brig., after severe bomb fighting in the trenches of the FONSOMME Line, E. of SEQUEHART. The enemy, who had resisted strongly all morning, suddenly collapsed and about 3 officers and 190 O. R. surrendered in this wood. At the same time, the enemy in MERICOURT began to retire and this village was rushed and several prisoners captured. After the capture of CERISE Wood, the French were enabled to advance and by 3:30 p.m., had captured FONTAINE-UTERTE. MANNEQUIN Wood was also mopped up by 2d Bn. of the York and Lancaster Regt., who captured 5 officers and 193 O. R. in the wood, and by nightfall, the Green Line or line of exploitation was reached along the whole corps front. Our line at night ran as follows: I.23.central, where we were in touch with the French---thence just W. of FRESNOY-le-GRAND through I.17. central---I.11, and 5 central to the junction with the American II Corps in C.29.

Orders were issued in the evening for the advance to be continued in the morning and for the 46th Div. to take over the southern portion of the corps front. The 39th Inf. Brig. which was very weak was withdrawn and the 138th Inf. Brig. came into the line on the south. The total prisoners captured during the day's operations amounted to about 1200, which included 30 officers, one being a bn. commander. 4 field guns and about 35 machine guns were also captured.
Oct. 9 - The advance was resumed at 5:20 a.m., and hostile resistance was found to be very slight. FRESNOY was captured by the 46th Div. and BELLICOURT Fme by the 6th Div. The enemy had apparently retired to the line of the rly. running just E. of FRESNOY and W. of BOHAIN. Large fires and explosions were observed all day, which indicated that the enemy was retiring on an extensive scale and by 3 p.m., we had occupied the line of the rly. on both div. fronts. By this time, the hostile retirement had developed into the nature of a rout and very little opposition was met with at all, and later in the evening, the 6th Div. occupied BOHAIN. The French on our right had captured CROIX-FONSOMME and gained a footing in ETAVES Wood.

Oct. 10 - The advance was resumed at dawn (5:30 a.m.) and the infantry assisted by cavalry patrols from the 5th Cav. Brig. met very little resistance for the first 2,000 yards, but later machine-gun fire was encountered all along the line, the enemy having taken up a temporary position along the W. edge of the RIQUERVAL Wood. At night, our line ran as follows: J.6.central, where we were in touch with the French--then along the W. edge of RIQUERVAL Wood and along the N. edge to E.13.a. central, thence to D.6.central---and from there round the E. edge of VAUX-ANDIGNY, which had been captured by the American 30th Div. 4500 civilians were rescued in BOHAIN, some of them having been three days without food. The 46th Div. Hq. moved to FRESNOY and the 6th Div. Hq. to Presselles Farm.

Oct. 11 - The following orders were issued: No. G.238 being a copy of a Fourth Army message warning the corps to be ready to carry out another concerted attack with the XIII Corps and American II Corps, about October 14 or 15 next.

Oct. 13 - The corps commander and the B. G. G. S attended an army conference at army hq. ETERPIGNY at 10:30 a.m., and later a corps conference was held at MAGNY-la-FOSSE, which was attended by the G. O. C.'s, 1st, 6th, and 46th Divs. The 5th Cav. Brig. had been broken up during the last two days, one regiment of cav. (the Scots Greys) being allotted to IX Corps, one regiment to XIII Corps and one to the American II Corps, the 5th Cav. Brig. Hq. and their artillery remaining under IX Corps with hq. at BOHAIN. The situation on the corps front remained quiet and unchanged throughout the day.

Oct. 17 - The attack commenced at 5:20 a.m. The corps commander, the B. G. G. S., and Colonel Burritt left POEUILLY at about 7 a.m., and proceeded to the corps advance hq. at MAGNY-la-FOSSE. The corps attacked with two divisions in the line, the 46th Division being on the right and the 6th Division on the left, each of these divisions had two brigades in the line and one in support. The order from left to right being---16th Inf. Brig., 18th Inf. Brig., 138th Inf. Brig., 139th Inf. Brig. The 71st Inf. Brig. was in support to the 6th Division just N. of BOHAIN.

The 137th Inf. Brig. was to hold the line just W. of the RIQUERVAL Wood, which was not being attacked frontally, and if the attack of the 138th and 139th Inf. Brig. was a success, could then withdraw into support. The 1st Division, which had moved forward during the evening of the 16th inst. by march route from the BELLENGLISE area to assembly positions just N. and W. of BOHAIN, was to leap-frog through the 6th and 46th Divisions on the Dotted Red Line being reached and to continue the attack. The French XV Corps were cooperating on the south and the American II Corps and British XIII Corps were also attacking on the north. The general idea was for the IX Corps to attack north of the Foret DOMANIALE and the French XV Corps to attack along the southern edge and thus pinch out the wood.

The role of the 46th Division was to maintain touch between the right of the IX Corps and the left of the French corps, also to mop up the RIQUERVAL and DOMANIALE Woods [part of ANDIGNY Forest] if the attack progressed successfully.

The attack was launched under a heavy barrage and supported by tanks and in spite of the weather being dull and misty good progress was made, and the first objective or Dotted Red Line was reached by the 16th, 18th, and 138th Inf. Brig. at an early hour. The 16th Brig. completed the capture of VAUX-ANDIGNY and pushed forward through the Bois St-PIERRE to the western outskirts of La VALLEE-MULATRE.

The 18th Inf. Brig. captured BELLEVUE Ridge and Les GOBELETS. The 138th Brig. ad-
vanced very rapidly and captured ANDIGNY-les-FERMES by 11:30 a. m., meanwhile, the 139th Brig. had heavy fighting around REGNICOURT, which was strongly contested by the enemy, who delivered a heavy counterattack in this quarter at 11:20 a. m., this attack was completely repulsed by M. G. and artillery fire. As soon as the Red Dotted Line was reached, the 1st Division passed through the 6th Division towards the Red Line, the 2d Inf. Brig. being on the north and the 1st Inf. Brig. on the south. Very strong resistance was encountered all along the line and heavy fighting took place especially in the village of La-VALLEE-MULATRE, which often, after being penetrated by our troops at about 2 p. m. was immediately counterattacked in force by the enemy who temporarily succeeded in regaining the village, but subsequently an attack delivered at 5:30 p. m., the whole of the village was once more retaken and at night, our troops had gained the Red Line. The 46th Division had by this time mopped up the RIQUEVAL Wood and by pushing forward through the Foret DOMANIALE established touch with the French at a point on the south edge of the wood, just N. W. of MENNEVRET. The French corps on our right and the American corps on our left had also experienced heavy fighting and considerable resistance all day. The total prisoners captured by the IX Corps during this day's operations amounted to about 150 officers and 1500 other ranks, amongst these were prisoners from 31 different battalions of 13 different regiments of 6 different divisions, showing that the enemy, although he had greatly reinforced this portion of his front, was in a bad state of disorganization.

Orders were issued by telegram (G. 11) at about 7 p. m. for the 6th Division to consolidate the Red Dotted Line and for the attack to be continued by the 1st Division in the morning, in conjunction with the French and American corps.

The 32d Division was ordered to proceed by march route, in the morning, from their present locations round BOUVINCOURT and Le CATELET to the BELLENGLISE-PONTRUET area.

The corps commander, the B. G. G. S., and G. S. O., II Operations, returned to corps rear hq. at 7:30 p. m.

Oct. 18 - During the night the 3d Inf. Brig. relieved the 2d Inf. Brig. in the line. The 46th Division pushing strong patrols down the road from ANDIGNY-les-FERMES, assisted the French to capture the village of MENNEVRET and Le MEPAS in the early morning. At 5:30 a. m., the 3d Brig. in the north renewed the attack in conjunction with the American corps and at 11:30 a. m. the 1st Brig. also attacked. Considerable resistance was encountered and little progress was made on the north during the morning, but as the resistance of the enemy divisions had been badly crippled by our attacks of the previous day, resistance in the afternoon gradually decreased and the 1st Brig. by nightfall had captured WASSIGNY, the 3d Brig. completely mopped up La VALLEE-MULATRE, and by 5 p. m., had advanced their line in conjunction with the American corps to the western outskirts of RIBEAUVILLE. The French XV Corps on our immediate south made good progress and at 6 p. m., had established their line along the WASSIGNY-HANNAPPES Road, being in touch with our troops at BLOCUS-d'en-BAS. The prisoners captured by the IX Corps amounted to well over 300 during the day.

The corps commander, the B. G. G. S., and G. S. O., II Operations, spent the day at corps adv. hq. MAGNY-la-FOSSE.

The following orders were issued by telegram: G.830 at 7:45 p. m., being orders for the advance to be resumed in the morning and for the detachments of the 46th Division to be withdrawn from the line as soon as touch was definitely established between the French and the 1st Division, etc.

G.832 issued at 10 p. m., giving 5:30 a. m. as the hour for the attack to commence in the morning.

Late at night, the American corps made further progress and captured MAZINGHIEN, which enabled the 3d Brig. to penetrate RIBEAUVILLE, and as touch had been definitely established between the 1st Brig. and the left of the French XV Corps, the remainder of the 137th Inf. Brig. (46th Division) was withdrawn during the early hours of the morning 19th inst., thus the whole of this division was now out of the line and concentrated in
and about FRESNOY. The 6th Division was also out of the line, with two inf. brigs. in and about BOHAIN, and one brig. in the VAUX-ANDIGNY-REGNICOURT area. The 32d Division during the day moved by march route from the CATELET area to billets around BELLENGLISE, but divisional hq. remained at CATELET.

Oct. 19 - The advance was resumed at 5:30 a.m., the enemy offering very little resistance, having withdrawn most of his troops to the eastern bank of the OISE-SAMBRE Canal during the night. TUPIGNY and HANNAPPE had been occupied by the French during the early hours of the morning and by 12 noon, the troops of the 1st Division had fully occupied WASSIGNY and had entered REJET-de-BEAULIEU, the only opposition which was met with being from a few isolated M. G.'s, which had been left by the enemy on the west bank of the canal. By nightfall, the 1st Division had reached a line along the high ground overlooking the canal along the REJET-OISY Road, the 1st Inf. Brig. being in touch with the French just N. of OISY, and the 3d Inf. Brig. being in touch with the American corps just N. of REJET. Any attempt on the part of our troops to push forward to the canal was met with heavy M. G. fire from the eastern bank, also the hostile gun fire had increased which bore out prisoners' statements that the enemy intended if possible to hold a line along the high ground to the east of the canal.

The following orders were issued today: Corps Order No. 146---in which it was arranged that the IX Corps should take over the whole of the American corps front, commencing on night 19/20.

No. G.364/305/512---ordering the 32d Division to move to BOHAIN and BRANCOURT.

No. G.841---with reference to Corps Order No. 146 stating that in addition to the American corps front, the IX Corps would take over a portion of the XIII Corps front as well.

Oct. 20 - During the night, the 1st Division relieved the American 30th Division in the line by extending their front northwards to R.27.cent., just N. of MAZINGHIEN. The 2d Brig. holding the northern portion from R.27.central to X.4.central and the 3d Brig. from X.4.central to the old southern corps boundary just N. of OISY. The 18th and 71st Inf. Brigs. (6th Division) moved by bus route from the BOHAIN area to St-SOUPLET prior to reliving the American 27th Division in the line at night, divisional hq. moving to BUSIGNY. The 14th and 96th Inf. Brigs. (32d Division) moved by march route into the BOHAIN area, also divisional hq.

The day remained quiet on the corps front, slight harassing fire only being carried out by the enemy in reply to our shelling.

The following orders were issued: IX Corps Arty. Order No. 38 giving the distribution of artillery and arrangements for relief of American 30th Division.

No. G.854. Stating that command of American II Corps front as far north as R.27.central passed to G. O. C., IX Corps, at 23.50 on October 19.

Oct. 21 - Situation during night quiet. The line on the right of the 1st Division was pushed forward slightly. IX Corps Hq. (advanced) moved to BRANCOURCOURT, opening there at 11---IX Corps took over command of the American II Corps front at 0250---on completion of relief by 6th Division.
230-32.7: War Diary

Place: JONCOURT, A8d 10.50, Sheet (WIANCOURT)

Date: Oct. 7, 1918

Hour: 5:15 a. m.

Extract from War Diary of 5th A. F. A. Brigade

We operated in a minor operation to help the infantry straighten out their line for jumping-off purposes between MONTBREHAIN and PONCHAUX. The weather shows signs of breaking at 7 a.m., a slight rain began to fall. All batteries have moved forward to the battle positions preparatory to the big advance on PREMONT to be made by American 30th Div. on the morrow. The locations are as follows: 13th Battery B4b8.5., 14th Btry. B4b9.4, 15th B4d2.8, 105th B4b6.8. Sheet 62B, 1/40,000.

Oct. 8 - The right lined up and beautiful weather prevailed. The attack all along the line was entirely successful and our troops advanced after an initial fight, with considerable ease. The English on the right were particularly successful. As the advance is to continue, our batteries had to move forward to keep in touch with the infantry though we were not actually the exploiting brigade for the day. For the night, positions were taken up by the batteries near the Chateau VAUX-le-PRETRE, G. H. Q. going to PONCHAUX.

Oct. 9 - At 2:30 a.m. Orders were received at G. H. Q. for the batteries to take part in a creeping barrage at 6 a.m. It was close running, but the communicators held the batteries were able to function. We were the exploiting brigade and the 14th Btry. moved forward in close touch with the infantry co. commanders and dealt with machine-gun nests as they appeared. The advance again was a big one and little opposition was met with by the infantry. The 14th Battery was of great assistance in shelling the M. G. nests, defending the enemy's rearguards. The enemy's artillery fire was light being confined to long-range guns which shelled towns and woods intermittently. Officers patrols as usual kept in close touch with the infantry's movements and at nightfall acting on their reconnaissance, the C. O. was able to detail to the group a protective S. O. S. for the hours of darkness.

Oct. 9 - The advance being good on both sides, our flanks were fully protected.

G. H. Q. billeted for the night in one of the eastern outskirt houses PREMONT. The batteries kept in close touch with the infantry outposts and were distributed as follows for the night: 13th Battery V8d 10.70, 14th Btry. V26C5.5., 15th Btry. V26b3.7, 105th Btry. V8d7.4. Sheet 57B, 1/40,000. The hours of darkness were undisturbed by hostile actions though our guns were able to harass known strongholds, such as PROYART Wood.

Oct. 10 - At dawn, the infantry supported by our light barrage, moved forward and cleared up the country as far forward as the River SELLE between St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET. Here strong opposition was met, the enemy evidently meant to make a stand along the river guarded as it is on the east by a big railway embankment. Had this railway been rushed immediately on arrival of the infantry, our positions in this section would have been strong, but unfortunately the infantry orders were definite. The River SELLE being given as the objective---and so at nightfall, we found ourselves in an unsatisfactory position. As no order had been received to the contrary, it was necessary to bring the batteries into action in such a position as to give the infantry the fullest advantage of range in a creeping barrage should one be needed to secure the River SELLE and the high ground east of it. The infantry reported the river was held, also the villages of St-BENIN, ST-SOUPLET, and MOLAIN. The brigade was located as follows: G. H. Q. V5do.o., 13th Btry. P36d 70.20, 14th Btry. V6b8.3., 15th Btry W1a4.8., 105th Btry. W1a1.4., Sheet 57B, 1.40,000. Had the situation been as represented by the infantry all would have been well.
but a reconnaissance by F. O. O. showed that the German Inf. had penetrated our lines on the N. E. to within 9,000 yards of the guns and on the S. E. to within 1500 yds., holding the village of La HAIE-MENNERESSE.

Oct. 11 - Fortunately the American 30th Div. Infantry restored the line in the morning. We harassed the railway and high ground east of it during the night and day. The enemy does not appear to be in force, but is well supplied with machine guns, which he used to considerable advantage against our infantry. It is evident the whole line is being held up here and we will not be continuing the advance for some days. The enemy's shell fire has not been heavy, though his light shelling has been consistent over all areas. A little gas in the village of ESCAUFORT during the night, while it caused no casualties to our men, inflicted a few of the French with painful eyes and throats.

Oct. 12 - The situation is unchanged. We harassed the enemy as usual, but infantry have not been able to improve their positions. The enemy's shelling increased during the 24 hours. A noticeable feature is that the enemy's bombing planes have been absolutely inactive.

Oct. 17 - The weather though very misty in the morning is very favorable to an attacking force. 15th and 105th Btry's. moved forward without casualties.

Oct. 18 - At 5:30 a.m., the barrage commenced to cover the attack by the American 27th Infantry Div. The attack on our immediate front was very successful, but the troops on the left had an extremely difficult and arduous task and after heavy fighting managed to form up in advance of the River SELLE. The American Inf. conformed to their movements.

Oct. 19: At 5:30 a.m. the attack was again renewed and the advance continued beyond range of the brigade guns. Our orders were to remain in position, although the guns were unable to cover the infantry towards right.

Oct. 19 - Our batteries were withdrawn to wagon lines.

Oct. 20 - As per 5th A. F. A. Brigade Order No. 1. The brigade was ordered to march to a rest area.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Records II Corps: Flrd. 5: Letter

Battle Record of II Army Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
January 4, 1919.

From: Commanding General, II Corps
To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Under the provisions of A. R. 244, there is submitted herewith: First, a partial list setting forth the battles and engagements of the II Army Corps, A. E. F., and second, a tabulation of the organizations which took part therein.

2. It will be noted that the operations are grouped in four phases: First [omitted as not pertinent to this study] * * * second, the Battle of BELICOURT, September 27-30, in which the great HINDENBURG Line at one of its most impregnable points was successfully attacked; third, the Battle of MONTBREHAIN, which carried our advancing lines to La SELLE River; and fourth, the Battle of La SELLE River, which finally placed our lines on the heights of CATILLON, overlooking the valley of the SAMBRE. During the last three battles,
the II Army Corps operated as an integral part of the British Fourth Army. Under each battle are arranged in order the several decisive engagements which contributed to the success of the major operation.

* * * * *

GEO. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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II. BATTLE OF BEL LICOURT

September 27-30, 1918

II Army Corps
27th Division
30th Division

(a) Preparatory Engagements

1. The Knoll. Units Participating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>September 27, 1918</th>
<th>Division Hq. and Hq. Troop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102d Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53d Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106th Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>102d Engineers, 2d Bn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>104th M. G. Bn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105th M. G. Bn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106th M. G. Bn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105th Field Hospital Co.</td>
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<td>106th Field Hospital Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105th Field Ambulance Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106th Field Ambulance Co.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A preliminary operation against one of the strong points in the HINDENBURG Outpost Line designed to secure a more favorable jumping-off line for the major operation of September 29. This strong point was taken and retaken four times.

2. GUILLEMON T Farm Units Participating

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>September 27, 1918</th>
<th>Division Hq. and Hq. Troop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>102d Military Police</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105th Field Hospital Co.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>105th Field Ambulance Co.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>106th Field Ambulance Co.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another phase of preliminary operation against a strongly organized position in the HINDENBURG Outpost Line to secure a more favorable position for the major operation to follow on the 29th.

3. **QUENEMONT Farm**
   Units Participating
   
   **September 27, 1918**
   Division Hq. and Hq. Troop
   102d Military Police
   53d Infantry Brigade Hq.
   105th Infantry
   106th Infantry
   102d Engineers, 2d Bn.
   104th M. G. Bn.
   105th M. G. Bn.
   106th M. G. Bn.
   105th Field Hospital Co.
   106th Field Hospital Co.
   105th Field Ambulance Co.
   106th Field Ambulance Co.

Another phase of the preliminary operation conducted against the line of strong points in the HINDENBURG Outpost Line to secure a more favorable position from which to launch the major operation planned for September 29.

(b) **Final Attack.**

**September 29-30, 1918**

II Army Corps
27th Division
30th Division

1. **Canal Tunnel**
   Units Participating
   
   **September 29-30, 1918**
   113th M. G. Bn.
   117th Infantry
   118th Infantry

An exploitation to the right flank against the Canal Tunnel and to assist the attack of the British IX Corps on our right.

2. **BELLCOURT**
   Units Participating
   
   **September 29-30, 1918**
   30th Division Hq.
   59th Infantry Brigade Hq.
   117th Infantry
   118th Infantry
   114th M. G. Bn.
   60th Infantry Brigade Hq.
   119th Infantry
   120th Infantry
   115th M. G. Bn.
   113th M. G. Bn.
   105th Engineers
   105th Engineer Train
   105th Field Signal Bn.
Part of the major operations against the HINDENBURG Line, so called because of the strongly organized town of BELLICOURT, just east of HINDENBURG Line and near the center of the division sector.

3. **NAUROY**

   **Units Participating**
   
   | September 29-30, 1918 | 30th Division Hq. |
   | 99th Infantry Brigade Hq. |
   | 117th Infantry |
   | 118th Infantry (2d Bn.) |
   | 114th M. G. Bn. |
   | 60th Infantry Brigade Hq. |
   | 119th Infantry |
   | 120th Infantry |
   | 115th M. G. Bn. |
   | 105th Engineers |
   | 105th Field Signal Bn. |

Part of the major operation against the HINDENBURG Line. The strongly organized town of NAUROY in the right divisional sector offered stubborn resistance.

4. **CABARET Wood Farm**

   **Units Participating**
   
   | September 29-30, 1918 | 105th Engineers (1st Bn.) |

Special and important work carried out at this point under very difficult circumstances under heavy hostile machine-gun and shell fire. Part of major operation.

5. **BONY**

   **Units Participating**
   
   | September 29-30, 1918 | 27th Division Hq. and Hq. Troop |
   | 102d Military Police |
   | 102d Field Signal Bn. |
   | 102d Engineers |
   | 102d Engineer Train |
   | 104th M. G. Bn. |
   | 53d Infantry Brigade Hq. |
   | 105th Infantry |
   | 106th Infantry |
   | 105th M. G. Bn. |
   | 54th Infantry Brigade Hq. |
   | 107th Infantry |
   | 108th Infantry |
   | 106th M. G. Bn. |
   | 105th Field Hospital Co. |
   | 106th Field Hospital Co. |
   | 106th Field Ambulance Co. |
   | 107th Field Ambulance Co. |

Very heavy fighting occurred at BONY, which was a strongly organized position in the HINDENBURG Line, and near the center of the divisional sector. Here occurred continuous fighting throughout the 30th. Part of the major operation.
III. BATTLE OF MONTBREHAIN

October 6-17, 1918

II Army Corps
27th Division
30th Division

1. MONTBREHAIN

October 6-7, 1918

Units participating
30th Division Hq.
59th Infantry Brigade Hq.
118th Infantry
105th Engineers
105th Engineer Train
105th Field Signal Bn.
114th M. G. Bn.

At this time, the 59th Brigade relieved the Australian division with the 60th Brigade in support, and the 27th Division in reserve. There was considerable fighting before the strongly defended town of MONTBREHAIN was captured and a favorable footing secured at this point for continuing the attack on the 7th.

2. PONCHAUX

October 7, 1918

Units participating
117th Infantry
114th M. G. Bn.

Exploitation for purpose of protecting left flank. Part of major operation.

3. GENEVE

October 7, 1918

Units participating
117th Infantry

Exploitation for protection of left flank and to straighten line. Part of major operation.

4. VAUX-le-PRETRE

October 8, 1918

Units participating
117th Infantry

Continuation of main attack. This point, left half of divisional sector, offered very strong resistance.

5. BRANCOURT

October 8-9, 1918

Units participating
30th Div. Hq.
60th Brig. Hq.
118th Infantry
120th Infantry
114th M. G. Bn.
105th Engineers
105th Field Signal Bn.

Very heavy fighting encountered in capture and cleaning up of town, situated in right half of divisional sector. Part of main attack.
6. PREMONT  
October 8/9, 1918  
Units participating  
30th Div. Hq.  
59th Brig. Hq.  
117th Infantry  
114th M. G. Bn.  
60th Brig. Hq.  
119th Infantry  
120th Infantry  
115th M. G. Bn.  
105th Engineers (1st Bn.)  
105th Field Signal Bn.  

Heavy fighting encountered in capture and cleaning up this strongly organized town in left half of divisional sector. Part of main attack.

7. BUSIGNY  
October 9, 1918  
Units participating  
30th Div. Hq.  
59th Inf. Brig. Hq.  
117th Infantry  
114th M. G. Bn.  
60th Inf. Brig.  
119th Infantry  
115th M. G. Bn.  
105th Field Signal Bn.  

The 60th Brig. passed through the 59th in the afternoon and completed the capture and cleaning up of this town. Part of main attack, along left divisional front.

8. BECQUIGNY  
October 9, 1918  
Units participating  
120th Infantry  
105th Engineers  

In continuation of main attack, captured and held this town on right of divisional front.

9. BOHAIN  
October 9, 1918  
Units participating  
118th Infantry  
120th Infantry  
115th M. G. Bn.  

Assisted the British division on the right in the capture of this city, cleaning up the northern half of the city. Main operation.

10. VAUX-ANDIGNY  
October 10/11, 1918  
Units participating  
30th Div. Hq.  
118th Infantry  
114th M. G. Bn.  
120th Infantry  
115th M. G. Bn.  
105th Engineers  
105th Field Signal Bn.  

- 774 -
Strongly organized town on right flank where sharp resistance was encountered, due to failure of British division on right to advance. Part of main operation.

11. ESCAUFORT Units participating

   October 10, 1918
   119th Infantry
   115th M. G. Bn.
   105th Field Sig. Bn.

Carrying out main operation by capture of town on left flank of divisional sector.

12. La HAIE-MENNERESSE Units participating

   October 10/11, 1918
   120th Infantry
   115th M. G. Bn.
   105th Engineers (1st Bn.)

Carried organized position in right half of divisional sector during main operation.

13. St-BENIN Units participating

   October 11-17, 1918
   119th Infantry
   115th M. G. Bn.
   105th Engineers (1st Bn.)

Cooperated with British in capture of this town in face of very heavy fire in course of major operation.

14. St-SOUPLET Units participating

   October 11-17, 1918
   114th M. G. Bn.
   115th M. G. Bn.
   119th Infantry
   105th Engineers
   105th Engineer Train
   105th Field Signal Bn.

In course of operation, left elements of division assisted in the capture of part of this town in face of very heavy stiff opposition, and on night of October 11/12, was relieved by the 27th Division and remained in position until October 17, consolidating and fighting for captured ground.

IV. BATTLE OF La SELLE RIVER

October 17-21, 1918

II Army Corps
27th Division
30th Division

1. St-SOUPLET Units participating

   October 17, 1918
   27th Div. Hq. and Hq. Troop
   102d Military Police
102d Field Signal
102d Engineers
102d Engineer Train
104th M. G. Bn.
53d Inf. Brig. Hq.
105th Infantry
106th Infantry
105th M. G. Bn.
54th Inf. Brig. Hq.
107th Infantry
108th Infantry
106th M. G. Bn.
105th Field Hospital Co.
106th Field Hospital Co.
106th Field Ambulance Co.
107th Field Ambulance Co.

On the night of October 11/12, the 27th Division relieved the 30th, and the next five days were spent in fighting for and consolidating captured ground. Heavy casualties were suffered during this period.

The operation of the 17th resulted in the final capture of the town and secured a good position for continued operations.

2. St-MARTIN-RIVIERE

October 17, 1918
30th Division Hq.
118th Infantry
120th Infantry
115th M. G. Bn.
105th Engineers
105th Engineer Train

This town was in the 30th Division sector on the right and offered stubborn resistance to the progress of the general attack of this date, causing considerable delay.

3. l'ARBRE-de-GUISE

October 17, 1918
118th Infantry

This organized defense was on left of the 30th Divisional sector, and was reduced by this regiment in the course of the operation of this date.

4. RIBEAUVILLE

October 17, 1918
30th Divisional Hq.
59th Infantry Brigade Hq.
3d Bn., 117th Infantry
118th Infantry
114th M. G. Bn.
60th Infantry Brig. Hq.
119th Infantry
115th M. G. Bn.
113th M. G. Bn.
105th Engineers (2d Bn.)
105th Field Signal Bn.
Serious opposition was encountered by the 30th Division on the right of its sector, due to the failure of the division on its right to maintain the rate of advance, and as a result was forced to exploit to the flank and capture and consolidate this strongly organized position.

5. **MOLAIN**

   **Units participating**
   
   October 17, 1918
   117th Infantry
   114th M. G. Bn.
   115th M. G. Bn.
   105th Engineers (1st Bn.)

Reduced in course of the progress of the main attack.

6. **JONC de MER RIDGE**

   **Units participating**
   
   October 18, 1918
   27th Div. Hq. and Hq. Troop
   102d Military Police
   102d Engineers
   102d Engineer Train
   104th M. G. Bn.
   53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
   105th Infantry
   106th Infantry
   105th M. G. Bn.
   54th Infantry Brig. Hq.
   107th Infantry
   108th Infantry
   105th M. G. Bn.
   105th Field Hospital Co.
   106th Field Hospital Co.
   106th Field Ambulance Co.
   107th Field Ambulance Co.

This high ridge in the 27th Division sector was of great tactical importance. After heavy fighting it was captured. It was strongly organized with machine-gun positions.

7. **ARBRE GUERNON**

   **Units participating**
   
   October 18, 1918
   27th Div. Hq. and Hq. Troop
   102d Military Police
   102d Field Signal Bn.
   102d Engineers
   102d Engineer Train
   104th M. G. Bn.
   53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
   105th Infantry
   106th Infantry
   105th M. G. Bn.
   54th Infantry Brig. Hq.
   107th Infantry
   108th Infantry
   106th M. G. Bn.
   105th Field Hospital Co.
   106th Field Hospital Co.
One of a series of carefully arranged attacks against strong points in the enemy line. Part of major operation.

8. MAZINGHIEN

October 18/19, 1918

Units participating

30th Division Hq.
114th M. G. Bn.
60th Inf. Brig. Hq.
119th Inf.
120th Inf.
115th M. G. Bn.
113th M. G. Bn.
105th Engineers
105th Field Signal Bn.

Difficult terrain and position strongly organized for defense. Taken by assault on morning of 19th, after offering stubborn resistance.

9. St-MAURICE RIVER

October 19/20, 1918

Units participating

27th Div. Hq. and Hq. Troop
102d Military Police
102d Field Signal Bn.
102d Engineers
102d Engineer Train
104th M. G. Bn.
53d Infantry Brig. Hq.
105th Infantry
106th Infantry
105th M. G. Bn.
54th Infantry Brig. Hq.
107th Infantry
108th Infantry
106th M. G. Bn.
105th Field Hospital Co.
106th Field Hospital Co.
106th Field Ambulance Co.
107th Field Ambulance Co.

A carefully arranged attack in force to effect a crossing of this river and capture the strongly organized positions beyond. One of a series of engagements in carrying out main attack.

10. HEIGHTS OF CATILLON

October 19/20, 1918

Units participating

120th Infantry

Operation carried forward for purpose of securing high ground overlooking CATILLON and SAMBRE Canal, where stubborn resistance was encountered.

During the progress of the above operations, the artillery support and other auxiliary troops were furnished by the British. No American artillery was ever present in this sector.
The following units were present with the corps during the progress of these operations:

II A. C. Headquarters
II A. C. Headquarters Troop
  412th Telegraph Battalion
II A. C. Mobile Veterinary Hospital
II A. C. Military Police
318th Field Signal Battalion
  (joined corps October 13, 1918)

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(52d F. A. Brigade)

The 52d F. A. Brigade was separated from the 27th Division upon arrival in France, for training purposes, and when ready for active operations was sent to the American sector, where it participated in operations of the American First Army in the VERDUN sector, during which time it was attached to the American 33d and 79th Divisions.

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(55th F. A. Brigade)

The 55th F. A. Brigade was detached from the 30th Division for training and did not rejoin until after the division was concentrated in the Le MANS Embarkation Center, preparatory to its return to the United States.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 8: Report

II Corps in France

II CORPS, A. E. F.

REPORT FOR HISTORICAL RECORD
OF THE
II ARMY CORPS

[Extract]

A. * * *

II Army Corps was formally organized by G. O. No. 102, G. H. Q., A. E. F., dated June 25, 1918.

Prior to the above-mentioned date, Lieut. Col. George S. Simonds, G. S., was appointed Chief of Staff by letter of instructions from the Chief of Staff, G. H. Q., A. E. F., dated Feb. 22, 1918.
Subsequent instructions from the same source added G-1, G-4, ordnance officer, quartermaster, and chief surgeon. With this personnel Headquarters II Army Corps conducted preliminary negotiations with G. H. Q., British E. F., at MONTREUIL and preformed its duties as such until the official announcement of its organization.

* * * * *

182-33.3: Journal of Operations

APPENDIX 1

Map Ref: ETAVE and WASSIGNY Sheets
Scale---1:40,000

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
October 22, 1918.

From Sept. 24 to Oct. 22, 1918

Sept. 24 - The 30th Division completed relief of the Australian 1st Division at 10 h.
Sept. 25 - The 27th Division completed relief of the British 74th and 18th Divisions at 10 h.
Sept. 27 - The 27th and 30th Divisions attacked the HINDENBURG Line in a successful preliminary operation. The start was along the line F.11.central, F.18.a., F.23.d., G.1.b., G.2.central, G.8.c., G.14.a. and c., G.20.central; the objective was A.7.a., A.14.a., A.20.c., A.26.central, G.2.central, G.8.central, G.14.d.8.0., which was carried with slight casualties. The 46th Division of the British IX Corps was on our right, and the 18th Division of the British III Corps was on our left.
Sept. 28 - Positions were consolidated and preparations made for major operations.
Sept. 29 - Attack began 0550 h. Very heavy fighting was encountered around GUILLEMONT, QUENNEMONT Farm, and GOUY. The 107th Infantry encountered especially stubborn opposition in mopping up the HINDENBURG Line. Before noon, our troops had taken the following positions: NAUROY, BELLICOURT, CABARET Wood, and RAILWAY Bridge.
Sept. 30 - Our line ran as follows: Knoll, A.7.d.7.0---A.15.c.5.0---A.22.d.5.3---G.5.central---NAUROY (incl.)---G.24.a.2., and 1 battalion of the 107th Inf. in GOUY. The day was consumed in mopping up captured areas and in consolidating new positions. Orders were received from the Fourth Army for the relief of the 27th and 30th Divisions and preliminary steps were taken towards this end. Our captures included that portion of the main HINDENBURG Line running from the southern outskirts of BONY to G.22.b.8.0. The failure on the part of the 27th Division to mop up quickly the area in the vicinity of Canal Tunnel, and the enemy's action in taking advantage of this, resulted in holding up the support regiments of the 27th Division and the isolation of 1 battalion of the 107th Infantry, which had advanced to the extreme line of consolidation. The 30th Division which had advanced to this line, was forced subsequently to draw in its left flank to conform to the position of the 27th.
Today, the Australian 3d and 5th Divisions passed through the 27th and 30th Divisions, respectively, to exploit the forward territory.
The action is considered successful. The main HINDENBURG defenses have been broken, and a bridgehead of 4,500 yards has been established by our troops.
Oct. 1 - On our left, the British III Corps has been relieved by the XIII Corps. Our casualties at this time are estimated at 4,000.
Oct. 2 - The 27th Division has retired to repose in the SUZANNE area. The 30th Division has retired and is concentrated in the MESNIL [Le MESNIL-BRUNTEL] and HERBECOURT areas.
Oct. 3 - Troops in rear.
Oct. 4 - Troops in rear.
Oct. 5 - Our troops beginning to move forward in order to take over the Australian corps.

Oct. 6 - Part of the front line sector was taken over at 6 h., and command of the Australian corps area passed to the C. G., American II Corps, at 9 h.

The British IX Corps is on our right and the British XIII Corps on our left.

Oct. 7 - The 30th Division straightened out its line north of and in front of MONT-BREHAIN, the line running at this time as follows: B.17.d.10.10, B.24.d.10.8., B.25.d.10.6., I.2.a.4.0., I.2.c.2.2.

Oct. 8 - This corps attacked at 5:10 h., in conjunction with British IX Corps on the right and the British XIII Corps on our left.

Later in the day, the 30th Division was ordered to secure and hold the high ground, U.24. and 30. MIGNON Wood, in D.12. Farm in D.7.a., and high ground C.18 and spur in D.13., and to get in touch with the IX Corps on the high ground east of BRANCOURT in D.19.a.

Up to noon, our troops had taken BRANCOURT and PREMONT, and were preparing for a further advance.

Oct. 9 - Up to 21 h., Oct. 8, our line had been advanced about 8,000 yards on a front of approximately 5,000 yards. The lines established in operations yesterday were being consolidated for further operations.

At 0520, the attack was continued; little opposition was met with and a rapid advance made. The enemy offering rearguard actions was withdrawing along the whole front. During the day, we took BECQUIGNY and BUSIGNY.

Oct. 10 - The 30th Division, with the 27th Division in reserve, continued the advance this morning. Our objectives was the line, La SELLE River, St-BENIN, St-SOUPLET, MOLAIN, and the crossings over La SELLE River.

The 30th Division had orders to send out patrols immediately upon obtaining its objective.

The American 301st Tank Bn. participated in the attack, under orders of the American 30th Division.

At noon, our line ran west of St-BENIN and St-SOUPLET---thence southwest along road through IMBERFAYT Farm---La HAIE-MENNERESSE---VAUX-ANDIGNY, excl.

Oct. 11 - Our troops captured St-SOUPLET, and in conjunction with the XIII Corps, took St-BENIN, and with the IX Corps, VAUX-ANDIGNY.

The advance to the river was delayed as the enemy was holding the heights in force.

Oct. 12 - The 27th Division relieved the 30th Division in the front during the night.

Oct. 13 - Early in the morning, a harassing machine-gun barrage was laid down on selected targets.

Oct. 14 - Situation unchanged.

Oct. 15 - Reconnaissance patrols were sent out by the 27th Division.

Oct. 16 - The 30th Division took over right half of corps sector.

Oct. 17 - Preceded by an artillery barrage, our troops attacked at 0520 h.

We advanced 3,000 yards on a front of approximately 4,000 yards, occupying the line running approximately as follows: Q.30.a., Q.30.c., Q.36.b and d., W.6.a. and c., W.12.a. and c.

Oct. 18 - The advance was continued by our troops.

Oct. 19 - The advance was continued and our right division reached the high ground overlooking CATILLON; our left division was on the high ground upon the west bank of the Rau St-MAURICE, MAZINGHIEN and RIBEAUVILLE were taken by our troops, and our line was being consolidated.


The British 1st Division began relief of the 30th Division; the 27th Division continued to exploit line.
Oct. 21 - The relief of the 27th Division by the British 6th Division was completed today.
Oct. 22 - The two divisions of this corps went to back areas for period of rest and training.

II Corps Gen. File: Fldr. 7: Operations

Operations II Corps

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
December 18, 1918.

From: Commanding General
To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter of December 10, 1918, from G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F., relative to the above subject, the following report is submitted of the operations of the II Corps, as a unit in the British Fourth Army.

3. The special points on which information is required in the letter calling for this report are covered under the heading Conclusions.

4. Attached are appendixes giving information with regard to casualties, prisoners, and captured materiel, which although furnished before, have been repeated here as there have been some alterations made after more complete information was obtained.

G. H. Q. RESERVE

From September 3 to September 22, 1918, the II Corps formed part of the British G. H. Q. reserve. It occupied training areas in the vicinity of DOULLENS with corps headquarters at BEAUVAL. Information was received from British G. H. Q. that the corps would be later used in operations then in contemplation and the prescribed program of training was entered upon with this in view.

ATTACK ON THE HINDENBURG LINE

In compliance with Secret Orders, dated September 20, 1918, the II Corps was released from G. H. Q. reserve and transferred to the British Fourth Army, with a view to its employment in contemplated operations against the HINDENBURG Line in the sector east of PERONNE. The movement took place during the period of September 22-24.

On the night of September 23/24, the 30th Division relieved the Australian 1st Division in the line west of BELLICOURT, taking over what was known as the NAUROY sector, a front of approximately 3,750 yards. In the sector taken over by the 30th Division, the British had, during recent operations, captured most of the advance trench system which ran about 1,000 yards west of the main HINDENBURG Line. The front line of the division, accordingly, occupied approximately what had been known as the HINDENBURG Outpost Line. The division was disposed with the 59th Brigade holding the sector (118th Infantry in
front line, 117th Infantry in support), and the 60th Brigade in division reserve. Division headquarters were established in BOIS-de-BUIRE north of TINCOURT.

On the night of September 24/25, the 27th Division relieved the British 18th and 74th Divisions in the line, taking over what was known as the GOUY sector, a front of approximately 4,500 yards, connecting with the 30th Division on its right. On this front, the British divisions had never succeeded in gaining the advance defenses of the HINDENBURG System. These defenses were particularly strong and comprised three very troublesome strong points known as the KNOLL, QUENMEMONT Farm, and GUILLEMEONT Farm. The front line of the 27th Division occupied approximately the old British front line trenches which were very close to the HINDENBURG Outpost Line. The line was taken over by the 53d Brigade, with the 106th Infantry in front line and the 105th Infantry in support. The 54th Brigade was held in division reserve in the TINCOURT--HAUT-ALLAINES area, with division headquarters in BOIS-de-BUIRE.

II Corps Headquarters were established in BELLOY Wood near Australian Corps Headquarters. The British IX Corps held the sector to the right of the II Corps and the British III Corps held the sector to the left. The troops of the Australian corps were held in the corps sector as they were to be affiliated with the II Corps in the contemplated operations.

THE GERMAN POSITION

Opposite the sector occupied by the corps, the country is gently rolling and open, with a fairly well-defined ridge running from near VENDHUILE at the northern limit of the sector to BELLICOURT near the southern limit. This ridge roughly paralleled our front line at a distance of 2,000 yards. Through it, longitudinally, the CAMBRAI-St-QUENTIN Canal passed by means of a deep tunnel, generally known as the BELLICOURT Tunnel. The main HINDENBURG Line, consisting of a complicated system of trenches, all heavily wired, ran along this ridge two to four hundred yards west of the tunnel, which passes under the eastern slope of the ridge. The main line included the village of BONY, situated on a high point opposite the sector of the 27th Division and forming a very strong point. Parallel to the main defensive line and about 1,000 yards in front of it, was the HINDENBURG Outpost Line, consisting of two to three trenches, well wired, with many strong points and machine-gun nests. The outpost line was connected to the main line by many ravines and well-concealed communication trenches. Both lines and the country between them contained numerous deep dugouts, well camouflaged, and exceedingly difficult to mop up. As previously mentioned, the portion of the outpost line opposite the 30th Division had already been taken by the British, except in a few places. The British had never succeeded in holding the portion opposite the 27th Division. The KNOLL and GUILLEMEONT Farms had proved too strong to take without a prepared attack in force. Once taken, they would have been difficult to hold as a front line because of the numerous concealed approaches from the main German position.

The tunnel added tremendously to the natural strength of the position. From a point about 1,500 yards southeast of VENDHUILE it runs slightly east of south, passes under the town of BELLICOURT and emerges at RIQUERVAL about 1,000 yards south of Bélicourt. Its length is 6,000 yards, its depth below the surface of the ground is 45 to 65 feet. It is 10 meters wide at the top, 18 meters wide at the water level and is strongly built of masonry. There are blocks in the center and at each end of the tunnel, which in effect are special types of concrete machine-gun emplacements. Each contained two machine guns. On the canal inside the tunnel were numerous barges used for quartering troops. It is probable that an entire division could have been quartered inside the tunnel. There are several lateral approach galleries from the rear and numerous underground passages connecting the tunnel with all parts of the main position, thus permitting any part of the line to be easily reinforced, even under the heaviest fire. Along the ground above the
tunnel is a high spoil heap, which contained numerous dugouts and concrete machine-gun emplacements.

The canal outside the tunnel has banks from 75 to 100 feet high, the water being 5 or 6 feet deep. The western bank contains emplacements for numerous machine guns and minenwerfer.

Roughly parallel to the main HINDENBURG Line and from one to two thousand yards east of it, was a support line adjoining the towns of Le CATELET and NAUROY. This line consisted of a single trench protected by wire and connected with the defenses in front by communication trenches.

Four to five thousand yards still farther to the east, was the last prepared defensive line, known as the BEAUREVOIR Line. It extended south from VILLERS-OUTREAUx, passing about 2,000 yards west of BEAUREVOIR, just east of ESTREES, west of WIANCOURT and east of JONCOURT.

The sector assigned to the II Corps consisted of that part of the line directly opposite the tunnel and extended slightly beyond it at each end. The German position in this sector not only had great natural strength, to which the tunnel added greatly, but also had been improved, strengthened and organized in accordance with the latest principles of defense. Begun in 1914, it had been made to conform to the changing methods of defensive warfare. It formed one of the strongest portions of the famous HINDENBURG System.

Plan of Operation, September 29-30

To break this strong portion of the German Line, it was necessary to utilize every available means of inflicting loss on the enemy and of breaking up his defensive arrangements. In order that the attack might be carried on by fresh troops after the line had been once penetrated, the Australian corps was affiliated with the II Corps for the attack. The II Corps having no American artillery assigned to it, the entire operation was supported by British and Australian artillery.

The plan in brief was as follows: From Zero minus 60 hours to Zero minus 48 hours, an artillery bombardment with gas; from Zero minus 48 hours to Zero, a very heavy bombardment with shell and high explosives. The object of the bombardment was to complete the demoralization of the enemy and to destroy his defenses, including wire, dugouts, etc.

Attack was to be carried out on the frontage of the II Corps sector. The British II Corps on the right was to attack simultaneously, carrying the bridges of the canal if possible, and gaining objectives east of the canal. The British III Corps was to attack on the left and advance as far as the canal. The attack on II Corps front was to be divided into two phases, boundaries, and objectives as shown on map accompanying "Battle Instructions," referred to above.

(a) First Phase: The American 30th Division on the right and the American 27th Division on the left to form up on a taped line prior to Zero hour (5:50 a.m., Sept. 29) and attack with tanks under a creeping artillery barrage. Barrage to include a considerable proportion of smoke shells. *** The start line was slightly to the east of the HINDENBURG Outpost Line and the objective was east of GOUY and NAUROY.

The tanks of the attack were to be protected by the smoke screen provided by one field artillery brigade on each flank. The smoke screen was to be lifted outwards as soon as the barrage programme was completed, in order to permit exploitation to the north and south.

(b) Second Phase: As soon as the 30th and 27th Divisions had reached their objectives, the Australian 5th Division on the right and the Australian 3d Division on the left, were to pass through the 30th and 27th Divisions, respectively, and continue the advance to the Red Line, which included the towns of BEAUREVOIR and WIANCOURT.
In order to secure the flanks of this operation and to extend the base of the salient created by this advance, the reserve troops of the 30th and 27th Divisions were to extend their operations to the south and north, respectively.

The prescribed start line ran about 1,000 yards east of the line taken over by the 27th Division and in a few places slightly to the east of the line taken over by the 30th Division. A preliminary operation was, therefore, necessary to gain the start line. This operation was scheduled from 5:30 a.m., September 27.

**Preliminary Operation**

The 30th Division gained its objective by minor local operations, straightening out its line and consolidating its position with little difficulty.

The 27th Division had what proved to be a formidable task. A regular set operation was necessary. The attack was made at 5:20 a.m., Sept. 27, by the 53d Infantry Brigade, following a rolling barrage and supported by tanks. The objective was the start line for the contemplated major operation and coincided roughly with the rearmost trenches of the HINDENBURG Outpost Line, a distance to be gained of about 1,100 yards.

The attack was made at Zero hour, the attacking line consisting of the 106th Infantry with all three battalions in line. Four tanks accompanied each battalion. The leading companies, following the barrage, reached their objectives in most places, but found great difficulty in consolidating because of heavy resistance encountered at strong points on The KNOLL, GUILLEMONT Farm, and QUENNEMONT Farm, and because of counterattacks by strong parties of the enemy, filtering down the numerous ravines and communication trenches from the main HINDENBURG position into these strong points. The strong points were held by the enemy in force concealed in numerous deep dugouts and underground passages. Ordinary mopping-up methods proved inadequate. The fighting continued throughout the day with varying success. It was a day of continual attacking and counterattacking by small parties in which the utmost determination and initiative were displayed by detachments of the 27th Division and the enemy opposed to them. By the night of the 27th, the 27th Division had advance detachments on their objectives, and had approximately the right third of their line fairly well consolidated. On the left, however, the enemy continued to contest with varying success the ground which the 27th Division was endeavoring to hold.

The losses of the 106th Infantry in this fighting were heavy, but it is believed that the losses of the enemy were heavier. German prisoners captured were 8 officers and 259 other ranks.

**Main Operations**

In preparation for the main operation, each division on the night of September 27/28 relieved the brigade in line by the brigade which had been in reserve. This change resulted in the following dispositions:

- **30th Division (right) sector** --- 60th Brigade in line, with 120th Infantry on the right and 119th Infantry on the left. The 117th Infantry was assigned the special task of following the 120th Infantry across the tunnel, then to deploy facing south at the conclusion of the creeping barrage.

- **27th Division (left) sector** --- 54th Brigade in line, with 108th Infantry on the right and 107th Infantry on the left. The 105th Infantry was to following rear of the 107th Infantry and after crossing the tunnel to deploy faced to the north.

The 30th Division was on the start line. The 27th Division was still fighting to maintain the ground taken on the 27th and was not holding it cleanly throughout. The situation in front of this division remained obscure during the day of the 28th, many isolated groups being still out in front. The line fixed for the start of the barrage was about 1,100 yards in front of a part of the line held by the 27th Division and east of the
three strong points which had caused so much trouble. Due to the limited time remaining and to the fact that many men of the 106th Infantry were still out in front, it was found to be impracticable to alter the barrage arrangements so as to have it start immediately in front of the infantry of the 27th Division. This state of affairs greatly increased the task of this division, since it made it necessary for the attacking line to cross 1,100 yards of ground containing very strong defenses without the protection of a barrage.

The attack started at 5:50 a.m., September 29. The field artillery barrage fell on the barrage start line, remained there four minutes, and thereafter lifted 100 yards in four minutes. This 18-pounder field artillery barrage was further extended by 4.2 Howitzers, while the heavy artillery fired on selected targets in advance of the field artillery barrage. At the same time, the massed machine guns in both divisions put down a belt of fire in front of the attacking line. The German barrage was not heavy, but inflicted a number of casualties, especially on the supporting troops.

The morning was very foggy, this mixed with the smoke of the barrage made it extremely difficult to see more than a few feet in any direction. Almost from the start, the infantry and tanks experienced great difficulty in maintaining direction and contact. During the entire morning, the fight was carried on by more or less mixed groups which had been picked up and reorganized by energetic officers. A series of isolated fights took place along the entire front. Small groups of men, acting on their own initiative cleaned out machine-gun nests and mopped up any trenches encountered. On several occasions such groups with the assistance of a tank, found apparently lost in the fog, captured machine guns and minenwerfer, which were inflicting casualties on our troops. While the fog was a very great hindrance to the maintenance of order and cohesion, on the other hand, it was great assistance in blinding the enemy's machine gun and field artillery. On a clear day and against a comparatively unshaken enemy behind broad belts of wire, defending himself in nests of machine guns and using minenwerfer, it is difficult to see how any troops could ever have taken [the] position.

Due to the conditions described above, it is impossible to construct a connected account of the battle and describe with any exactness the movement of the various units as they moved toward their objectives.

On the right flank of the II Corps, the British IX Corps seems to have taken the enemy completely by surprise. The attackers were able in the fog to seize bridges over the canal and cross without great difficulty. This added greatly to the security of our flank. On the left flank, the British III Corps met with heavy opposition and was unable to advance to the canal as planned. This state of affairs on the two flanks undoubtedly had a great influence on the final position of the corps front at the end of the day.

MACQUINCOURT Valley, a ravine leading from the canal south of VENDEHUILE toward our left flank, was particularly troublesome by furnishing cover to enemy parties filtering in to counterattack.

In the right division sector of the II Corps, the advance was made against heavy resistance, but without serious mishap. On the afternoon of September 29, the 30th Division being approximately on its objective, the Green Line, the Australian 5th Division pushed through as planned. At this time, the 117th Infantry on the right was approximately on its objective, facing southeast and in touch with the British 46th Division to the right. The 120th Infantry was in NAUROY. Elements of this regiment had gone beyond NAUROY and reached the Green Line; but being out of touch with units to the right and left had been forced to return. The regiment, in general, occupied the Le CATELET-NAUROY Line, but had been forced to bend its line back to the tunnel on account of fire from the sector on its left.

Groups of men of the different regiments joined and assisted the Australian Division after it passed through and were withdrawn during the night September 29/30. The division remained in support of the Australian division until withdrawn, to the rear on the night of October 1/2.
In the left division sector, grave difficulties were encountered from the start. Apparently expecting the attack in this sector, the enemy pushed out strong parties through the underground passages, communication trenches and ravines, and succeeded in getting considerable forces on our side of the barrage line. The tanks encountered mines and tank traps and nearly all were put out of action early in the day. The advance was opposed by heavy machine-gun fire along the whole front. The right of the line in this sector succeeded in getting forward to the edge of BONY in the main HINDENBURG Line. Along other parts of the line elements pressed forward in spite of the heavy opposition and detached groups reached their objectives at various points throughout its extent. QUENNEMONT Farm and various other strong points held out. Elements which had passed through between the main points of resistance thus found themselves between two fires. The mopping-up of the many concealed and camouflaged centers of resistance proved too difficult to be thoroughly accomplished in the fog. The Australian 3d Division which had been designated to pass through the 27th Division assisted and supported that division during the latter part of the advance. At dusk, September 29, the line ran from right to left approximately as follows: From the interdivisional boundary along the main HINDENBURG Line for about 1,000 yards, thence west to the HINDENBURG Outpost Line at a point about 500 yards north of QUENNEMONT Farm, thence along the western trenches of HINDENBURG Outpost Line.

The situation at this time in front of the 27th Division was most obscure. It was known from air reports and from an artillery observer with the 107th Infantry who had returned that we had considerable detachments well to the front in and near the objectives, and at the same time strong forces of the enemy continued to appear from the tunnel and to filter in from the northwest and to engage the supporting troops.

It was afterwards learned from a German officer prisoner that the enemy command was equally mystified as to what was actually occurring. As a matter of fact, these advance detachments of the 27th Division established themselves in the defenses of the HINDENBURG Line and maintained themselves there although constantly fighting to do it, and held on to the many prisoners which they had captured throughout the night of the 29th. This situation prevented the passage through the 27th Division of the Australian 3d Division according to plan, and on the night of the 29th/30th, the Australian division took over from them as they stood. The ground won was maintained only by continuous fighting and throughout the day of the 30th, the 27th Division remained in close support and detachments of it assisted the Australians in mopping-up the defenses. On the night of September 30/October 1, the division was withdrawn, the Australian divisions which had relieved the organization of this corps completed the consolidation of what had been gained, and our troops were withdrawn to prepare for the next phase in the operation.

ATTACK ON THE II CORPS FRONT OCTOBER 7 to 11

From October 1 to 5, the Australian corps improved the positions obtained as a result of the attack on the HINDENBURG Line, and advanced to a line running from MONTBREHAIN northwest to BEAUREVOIR, shown on the *** map as the front line of October 7 and 8. On the night of October 5 and 6, the II Corps relieved the Australian corps, which was withdrawn to a back area and the command of the corps sector passed to the Commanding General, American II Corps at 0900 hours, October 6. Headquarters II Corps opened at BOIS-de-BUIRE at the same day and hour.

The corps sector was held by the 59th Brigade in the front line, the 60th Brigade in support, and the 27th Division in reserve. As can be seen by reference to the map, the corps front was well out in the nose of a salient. The condition of the front on October 6 was unsettled, the Australians having captured MONTBREHAIN on the evening of October 6, and considerable fighting was still going on in that vicinity. For the purpose of advancing its left flank and obtaining a more favorable jumping-off line, the 117th Infantry started a main operation at 0515 h., on October 7 with partial success. Owing to the lack
of information as to the positive positions of the advance units, the covering barrage was not laid as close to the attacking troops as would have been the case had there been time for more complete preparation of this minor operation.

On October 8, at 05:15 h., an attack was launched along the entire army front with the object as far as concerned the corps of capturing BRANCOURT and PREMONT and advancing the line a distance of about 6,000 yards. The 59th Brigade made the assault, the 60th Brigade in support. A powerful field artillery barrage was maintained to the normal objective, and heavy artillery carried out destructive fire on selected points as long as the safety of the attacking troops permitted. One battalion of heavy tanks and two companies of Whippets supported the front line troops. The British cavalry corps was held in reserve under army command in expectation of an opportunity to push through the enemy lines after the capture of PREMONT and exploit beyond. From the start heavy fighting was encountered, the enemy's machine guns being capably and determinedly manned; but all objectives were attained by the close of the day. At no time, however, did an opportunity develop permitting the cavalry to pass through. Mounted patrols were invariably routed by sharp machine-gun fire.

On 05:20 h. on October 9, the attack was resumed by the 59th Brigade through which the 60th Brigade passed in the early afternoon of the 8th, and captured the towns of BUSIGNY and BECQUIGNY. On October 10, at 05:30 h., the attack began again to secure La Selle River and the high ground beyond. The country at this point was thickly scattered with villages, farms, and woods, and the enemy took full advantage of these to use his machine guns very effectively. The left regiment, however, captured ESCAUFORT and ST-SOUPLET and, with the British, St-BENIN in the face of heavy fire. On the right, the 120th Infantry encountered sharp resistance from VAUX-ANDIGNY and were subjected to enfilading fire from the southeast, where the British division on their right was considerably in the rear. Accordingly, this regiment was forced to establish a defensive flank just west of VAUX-ANDIGNY, connecting with the British on the south and on the north with the 119th Infantry, which held the western bank of La Selle River. At 05:30 h. on October 11, the attack proceeded, the 118th Infantry passing through the 120th Infantry, which by that time was distributed over a front of nearly 5,000 yards and had already suffered heavy casualties. The 119th Infantry on the left was directed not to advance until the line on the right sector had been straightened out, but to assist the 118th Infantry in every possible way with supporting fire. Stubborn resistance was still encountered as during the day before, but the towns of VAUX-ANDIGNY and La HAIE-MENNERESSE were taken by assault and the line of the 118th Infantry advanced about 1,000 yards. The left sector remained stationary.

On the night of October 11/12, the 30th Division which had been continuously attacking since October 7, and had advanced over 15,000 yards on a 7,000 yard front was relieved by the 27th Division. The 30th Division was withdrawn to the vicinity of PREMONT and BUTRY Wood, where it remained in support for five days.

OPERATIONS OF II CORPS OCTOBER 12-16

On the night of October 11/12, the 27th Division relieved the 30th Division along the west bank of La Selle River from midway between St-BENIN and ST-SOUPLET to the eastern outskirts of VAUX-ANDIGNY, the 54th Brigade taking over the front line with the 53d Brigade in support. With a view to readjusting corps boundaries in accordance with the strength of the different units of the army, this sector was narrowed on the night of October 14/15 so as to be between Q.28.c.0.0. and W.15.central, the British 50th Division (XIII Corps) occupying the remainder on the north, and the British 6th Division (IX Corps) the remainder on the south. Headquarters II Corps moved to WIANCOURT in two echelons on October 12 and October 13.

During the period between the relief of the 30th Division and the next attack, the 27th Division continually sent out strong patrols and frequent air reconnaissances were
made, for the purpose of securing all possible information of the enemy's defenses. The German divisions on this front were all tired and reduced in strength, but their machine guns were exceptionally numerous, and the character of the terrain was peculiarly adapted to this means of warfare. Artillery on both sides was very active during these days. On the night of October 15/16, the river was carefully reconnoitered and found to be fordable, except for occasional deep holes. The reconnaissance carried out during this period by the 27th Division was especially well conducted and much valuable information with regard to the enemy and his position obtained.

The enemy held the east bank of the river, with outposts in St-SOUPLET on the north, while on the south, they occupied the village of MOLAIN. Across the river and parallel to it was a railway. Opposite St-SOUPLET, this ran over a thirty foot embankment, through which crossed the only east and west road in the left sector. East of the railway ran a low ridge, behind which lay a valley, at the northern end of which was located BAUDIVAL Farm. Opposite the right of the corps sector high ground rose between the river and the railroad, which at this point was separated by from one to two thousand yards.

During the night of October 16/17, the 30th Division took over the right half of the sector from the 27th Division on a line that was practically the same as that turned over by it five days earlier. These five days had been utilized by the corps in consolidating the stretch of captured territory over which it had advanced and in preparing for the next attack which was scheduled by the Fourth Army to open on October 17.

ATTACK OF THE II CORPS, OCTOBER 17

On October 17, the Fourth Army attacked along its whole front. The II Corps attacked with both the 27th and 30th Divisions in the line, under a creeping barrage and reinforced by the American 301st Tank Battalion. A squadron of the 20th Hussars was assigned to each division, the remaining squadron being held in the corps reserve.

A creeping barrage was to come down at Zero hour and lift 100 yards every three minutes until reaching the main ARBRE GUERNON-Le CATEAU Road, where it was to remain stationary for 30 minutes, in order to give the infantry time to mop up and reform on the dotted line. At Zero plus 132 minutes, the barrage moved forward to the first objective, just east of JONC-de-MER Farm and the outskirts of MAZINGHIEN, where it again became stationary for 30 minutes. Thereafter, the artillery was to search out the country east of the first objective for a space of two and a half hours, while the supporting troops passed through, preparatory to advancing in open warfare formations on the second objective 2,500 yards farther east, and thence to the line of exploitation. Throughout this second advance the artillery was ordered to provide every support possible; and, to this end, two brigades of field artillery and one of mobile heavy artillery for each division were designated to push across the river as soon after the reaching of the first objective as bridges or crossings could be prepared.

The 27th Division attacked with both brigades side by side in the line, each having one regiment in support. The 30th Division started with the two regiments of the 59th Brigade covering the entire divisional sector, the 60th Brigade being held in support.

The attack began at 05:20 h. on October 17. Vigorous resistance, greatly assisted by the natural defenses of the terrain, was met from the start. Part of the jumping-off line of the 27th Division ran through the partially destroyed village of St-SOUPLET, where even unimpeded progress would have been slow. The passage of the stream did not present any special difficulty, but the high railway embankment was a considerable obstacle. The attacking troops fell, accordingly, behind their barrage and suffered for lack of its assistance in cleaning out the machine-gun nests on the ridge just beyond. A thick fog made observation very poor throughout the morning. On the left of the divisional sector, BAUDIVAL Farm was found to be well-fortified with machine guns, but it eventually succumbed to the attacking infantry.
Largely due to the mist, the first waves passed a machine-gun nest on the ridge without discovering it and considerable delay was experienced before this obstacle was finally mopped up by the supporting troops. The right brigade made better progress and was reported to have captured Arbre Guernon by 0845 h. The tanks allotted to the 27th Division had to cross the stream below the divisional boundary on the south, for lack of a shallow enough ford, but they expected to turn north after the passage and rejoin the division. However, in the fog the tanks lost their way, and most of them joined the 30th Division, only two reaching the 27th Division at ARBRE-GUERNON, and both of these were soon after destroyed by shell fire. When the advancing regiments of the 27th Division reached the line just west of the Le CATEAU--ARBRE-GUERNON Road, they were too far in front of both flanking divisions to permit continuing on until those came up, and accordingly the advance halted on this line.

The 30th Division in the right half of the corps sector started promptly at Zero, encountering stiff resistance almost immediately in the villages of St-MARTIN-RIVIERE and MOULAIN. Machine-gun fire from these two points delayed the crossing of the river and rendered the infantry incapable of following closely behind the barrage. The ridge across the river was well defended, and, after capturing the two towns just mentioned progress in the face of heavy fire and without the close protection of artillery barrage was very slow. The task of the 30th Division was made particularly difficult due to the necessity of forming a defensive flank to maintain touch with the British division on its right which was experiencing the same difficulty still farther to the right. As sufficient troops were not available to do this with facility, progress for this reason was somewhat impeded.

As the result of the day's fighting, the line was advanced another four thousand yards, a considerable quantity of enemy materiel in the way of machine guns, rifles, and some artillery fell into our hands, and the number of prisoners captured during the day amounted to 34 officers and 1,325 other ranks.

ATTACK OF II CORPS, OCTOBER 18-20

On October 17, the following telegraphic order was received from the British army:

Fourth Army will continue the attack tomorrow morning, 18th instant, together with the French First Army on our right as follows: IX Corps will attack in conjunction with right of American II Corps as early as possible at an hour which will be arranged between IX and American II Corps direct. XIII Corps will attack at 05:30 h. Fourth Army objective WASSIGNY, X.16, central, R.34.central, R.21.central R.8.central, R.1.a. After reaching the objective, corps will exploit to the Blue Line as shown on map issued with Fourth Army 20/40 G, dated 14th instant; boundaries will remain the same.

The XIII Corps, which was the left corps of the Fourth Army, had by 23:00 h., October 17, reached Le CATEAU on the left and La VALLEE-MULATRE on the right, so that the II Corps was no longer in the exposed position it had occupied earlier in the day.

The left division jumped off at 05:30 h., October 18, under a barrage. The enemy's counterbarrage was very weak and did little harm, but distinct opposition was met at JONC-de-MER Farm and La Roue Farm. On the right half of the corps sector, the 30th Division was prevented from making an early start due to difficulties in keeping touch on the right. This difficulty gradually extended to the left until it reached the 27th Division and retarded to some extent its right brigade.

The 30th Division attacked with the 60th Brigade in the line. The IX Corps had been experiencing delay all through the operation in its right sector, where touch had to be maintained with the French whose advance was not so far advanced as the Fourth Army. Accordingly, on the morning of October 18, it had to swing forward the southern end of its line before the left division could advance. Therefore, the British 1st Division did not start till 10 h. and the 30th Division was compelled to conform. However, the attack got
under way in the right sector before noon, but the day was already half over. The terrain was especially difficult containing the strong positions of RIBEUVILLE, ECAILLON, and MAZINGHIEN. The first two of these towns were captured before nightfall, and after an advance of about 1,500 yards, the line halted in a position encircling the town of MAZINGHIEN with patrols in the outskirts of the town.

By the morning of October 19, the XIII Corps had entered BAZUEL and the IX Corps had captured WASSIGNY. The II Corps was in touch with both. The 30th Division made a determined attack at 05:30 h., October 19, on MAZINGHIEN and took the town by assault, pressing vigorously onto La HAIE-TONNOILLE Farm, a distance of nearly 3,000 yards. The 60th Brigade was still in the line, reinforced by two battalions of the 59th Brigade, which were utilized as reserves, one on each flank. The objective of this day's attack was the high ground overlooking the canal, and by night the west slope of this ridge had been reached all along divisional front.

Meanwhile, the 27th Division had pushed out strong patrols behind which the line advanced slowly to the next ridge. Here the strong point of JONQUIERE Farm was captured at 10 h., giving the 27th Division complete command of the high ground while patrols advanced across the St-MAURICE River. The ridge beyond, behind which lay CATILLON, was strongly fortified by machine guns.

This was the situation by nightfall on October 19: The commanding ground overlooking CATILLON and the SAMBRE Canal had been reached and a pause on this part of the front was ordered pending movements on other parts of the front. Both divisions had been strongly attacking with but little rest since September 29. The losses had been heavy and no replacements received. The army commander, therefore, gave instructions for the withdrawal of the corps for a period of rest, refitting, and assimilating of replacements which were then en route. This period was to be from two to three weeks.

The 30th Division was relieved on the night of October 19 and 20, and the 27th Division on the night of October 20 and 21, the corps sector being taken over by the British IX and XIII Corps. Both divisions were marched to ROISEL and entrained the 27th for the Corbie area, the 30th for the QUERRIEU area. On October 25, corps headquarters moved from WIANCOURT to BERTANGLES. Before the completion of the rest period ordered, the Armistice was signed, and on November 19, began the movement of the corps to the Le MANS area.

SUMMARY

In the operations extending from September 27 until the handing over of the corps sector on October 21, the II Corps advanced by fighting about 17 miles, on a front averaging about 5,000 yards; capturing the towns of BELLICOURT, NAUROY, BRANCOURT, PREMONT, BUSIGNY, BECQUIGNY, ECAUFORT, ST-SOUPLET, ECAILLON, RIBEUVILLE, MAZINGHIEN, and numerous smaller villages, and with the British, VAUX-ANDIGNY and ST-BENIN. The corps took about 6,000 prisoners, 9 heavy guns, 73 field pieces, a railway train, and considerable quantities of supplies. Further detailed information is given in the appendixes.

CONCLUSION

The following conclusions have been formed with reference to the matters touched upon in paragraph 1 (a) (b) (c) and (d), in the letter calling for this report:

(a) The relations that prevailed between the units of this corps and the units with whom we were serving:

From the time the II Corps was assigned to the British Fourth Army until it was transferred, after the signing of the Armistice, to the British Third Army, relations between the corps and the army were always excellent. It cannot be said that General Rawlinson or his staff ever gave more favor to the American corps than to the British corps, nor, on the other hand, did they demand more. The amalgamation was complete, and founded on a
spirit of mutual esteem and profound good will. Army headquarters never failed to attach to the II Corps any corps troops that were demanded, and willingly supplied additional officer personnel for the various functions of administration and supplying in order that our troops might experience no trouble in adapting British methods to their formations. All officers at both headquarters seemed determined that good feeling and cooperation should surmount every natural difficulty, and the relations at no time were other than most satisfactory.

The flank corps were invariably ready to grant any assistance requested by the Americans and did not, in turn, desist from asking for the same when necessary. The taking of St-BENIN on October 11, accomplished by elements of the 30th Division operating in close conjunction with the British 25th (XIII Corps) on their left, was an example of this solid cooperation along the whole front.

The same relations as existed between corps and army were found between the II Corps and the fifty-six thousand British corps troops at this time serving under its command. The orders of the corps commander to such units as the artillery, aviation, tanks, and cavalry were eagerly responded to, the liaison between the attacking American units and these supporting arms was very close and their cohesion excellent. Throughout the operations, British and American troops fought side by side in complete unanimity and singleness of purpose. The support rendered the infantry by the attached artillery was especially noted---General K. K. Knapp, G. O. C., of the Royal Artillery attached to the corps, expended his forces freely to give the American troops every possible advantage of cover; S. O. S. signals were invariably answered promptly and effectively; barrages were ample and accurately timed; and, in spite of the rapid advance of our troops, the artillery followed closely. In this connection, there should be noted the case of the artillery commander, who, during the exploitation of the HINDENBURG Line attack, after the Australians had leap-frogged through our lines, refused artillery support to these troops in order to avoid the possibility of destroying by his fire scattered American units reported to be still out in front of the Australians. Infantry in many instances remarked upon the able support of the British artillery and the relations between the two were notably friendly and free from recriminations.

There was sometimes heard what might be termed soldier talk in which complaints were made by our men that units on their right or left failed to carry out their part of the mission, and there were two incidents brought to the knowledge of these headquarters in which there was friction in regard to the use of certain towns which had captured for shelter for various headquarters and organizations. One case was that of a town which had been captured by our troops being turned over for administrative purposes to the British by orders from army headquarters, and the other was the reverse, a town captured by the British was turned over to us by similar authority. In both cases, the action taken was for valid military reasons which perhaps might not have been apparent to tired soldiers seeking shelter, and in both cases did the army headquarters show a spirit of being absolutely fair in the matter.

In general, it appeared to be the established policy of the Fourth Army to supply the II Corps with every possible assistance and to protect American lives every whit as carefully as the lives of the British troops. In its turn, the II Corps was anxious to attain the fullest cooperation for the mutual end of defeating the Germans. On these foundations rested the friendly and successful relations that existed between the II Corps and the British Fourth Army.

(b) The relative importance of the part played by American units as compared with that of the foreign unit:

During the operations of the British Fourth Army from October 5 to October 21, the army front was held by three corps, the XIII, IX, and American II, with the Australian corps in reserve. The XIII Corps had the left sector, the IX the right, and the American II occupied the center. Accordingly, the II Corps was in the pivotal position of the succes-
sive attacks of the army and, through this period, it was continually in the nose of the salient and in advance of the flank corps.

The XIII Corps on the left was delayed in the advance of October 17 by strong defenses in the neighborhood of Le CATEAU, while after the breaking of the HINDENBURG Line, the IX was held back by the necessity of conforming its line to connect on the right with the French First Army, whose progress was not so rapid. However, there is no doubt that, after the continued progress of the Fourth Army throughout the months of August and September, its divisions were tired and below strength. The presence of the Americans at the assault on the HINDENBURG Line and during the subsequent attacks, in the face of determined resistance, was of great importance, and, largely because of having the II Corps' two highly trained and active divisions, composed entirely of fresh and vigorous troops, the army was able to push on. If the II Corps had not been available, only two courses would have been open, either the Australian corps, which had been in action since August 8 and was badly in need of rest and refitting, must have been retained in the line, or, the army front must have been divided between the remaining two corps, thereby considerably diminishing the reserves. In either case, it does not appear that the advance could have been carried out on the scale or with the success of the operations in which the II Corps took part.

It is a fact that upon the withdrawal of this corps on October 21, the Fourth Army continued to advance, but the situation at that time was not analogous to the one encountered in the previous three weeks, during which stiff fighting was met continually. But, by the time the SAMBRE Canal had been reached, the opposition of the enemy forces on that front had been completely broken down. After that, they began to carry out the general withdrawal to the line of the MEUSE and enabled the Fourth Army to pursue in spite of the limited number of divisions then available. It was during the period from the attack on the HINDENBURG Line to the time the SAMBRE Canal was reached that the question of the final rout of the enemy opposite the Fourth Army hung in the balance, and the part then played by the II Corps was an important factor in the victorious decision achieved along that front.

(c) The relative efficiency of our troops as compared with those with whom serving:

During the operations of the II Corps subsequent to the breaking of the HINDENBURG Line, it was found that our men compared favorably with the British troops serving on their flanks. These, though veterans and experienced fighters after four years' participation in the war, had not the dash nor the initiative of the Americans. The extent of the British effort had left its mark, in that, for the most part, they were very young men, new drafts from England since March, and men of thirty years or over. The units of the 27th and 30th Divisions, on the other hand, were composed of men between twenty and thirty, well trained in the principles of fighting in comparatively open country, and with whom trench warfare had not become a habit. Consequently, they were apt to display a considerable amount of initiative in dealing with the problems of an enemy delivering stiff rearguard actions and to take advantage of natural rather than artificial cover; and, flushed with victory over the enemy in their first real encounter with the Germans, they had no memories of previous defeats to instill in them a caution that was no longer necessary. But, aside from this, they had no advantage over the British, whose extensive experience kept units well in hand, and whose liaison was excellent where the Americans tended to become too scattered and to neglect at times, in the heat of battle, to keep the higher command closely informed of the chain of minor developments. Some of this failing was, however, undoubtedly due to the shortage of company officers, the average of which was, in several regiments, less than two per company, which shortage was caused by the lack of replacements.

Mopping up requires a training that only actual combat and bitter experience can successfully teach, and some trouble occurred in the first phases of the operations due to the failure of certain units to thoroughly perform this work. However, the lesson was quickly learned, and, after the first few days, mopping up was effectively carried out; but in this particular, the British troops were superior.
The bravery of the American troops was remarkable and brought many praises from both Australians and British, and the junior officers displayed a zeal and leadership that was gallant as well as commendable in the highest degree. But, had the II Corps participated in further operations, as successful results would have been obtained in many instances at a smaller sacrifice of lives. Objectives were consistently gained, but only at the end of the phase were battalion and company commanders generally using their auxiliary arms to the fullest extent and to the most economical saving of men and junior officers.

Lack of experience was the chief failing of the regimental and higher command. While the staffs as a rule functioned efficiently and handled the tactical situations with skill, there was a tendency for them to lose the remarkably close touch with the combatant units that all British Headquarters maintained. This was partly due to a disposition to fail to locate P. C.'s at points sufficiently far front to allow for close liaison after a successful advance and to a failure to move P. C.'s frequently, as well as to a disposition of the front line troops to neglect returning information, as referred to above. Much, however, was learned along the lines from experience and from the British, and a remarkable improvement was noticeable toward the close of the operations.

The American transport did excellent work, but the men had yet to learn the necessity of conserving horses and motor vehicles to the greatest possible extent, in which respect the British excel. But this never resulted in any lack of food or ammunition in spite of the rapid advances and all troops were invariably well supplied. British methods of ammunition and supply were used throughout, and these were found to be amply satisfactory in every particular.

(d) Any difficulties which arose which were due to a difference of language:

No essential difference in language existing, no difficulties arose in that source. The II Corps, from its long stay in the British area, had a thorough knowledge of all technical terms employed by the British, and, for service with them, had adopted such as were necessary for a complete understanding throughout the various channels of administration and supply.

G. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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APPENDIX

No. 1

Consolidated report on prisoners of war passed through II Corps cage,

September 27 to October 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Captured between noon and noon</th>
<th>Off.</th>
<th>O. R.</th>
<th>Off.</th>
<th>O.R.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 27-28 Through corps cage</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>242</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>288</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Off.</td>
<td>O. R.</td>
<td>Off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 28/29</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>97</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 29/30</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>96</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sept. 30/</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1/2</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 2/3</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 6/7</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 7/8</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 8/9</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>152</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 9/10</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>45</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 10/11</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 11/12</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 12/13</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 13/14</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 14/15</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,275</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 15/16</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 16/17</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 17/18</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 18/19</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 19/20</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 20/21</td>
<td>Through corps cage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. C. S.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Captured between noon and noon

Oct. 21 p. m. Through corps cage

O. R. Off. 51

C. C. S. 152 Off. 5,794 O. R.

Total

No. 2

Materiel captured by the II Corps in the operations, September 27, October 21, 1918

Heavy guns 9
Field pieces 73
Machine guns 741
Trench mortars 47
Rifles 2,406
Antitank rifles 41
German locomotive 1
Railway trucks 18
Stationary engines (mounted on wheels) 2

No. 3

Casualties of II Corps, September 27-October 21, 1918

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Prisoners</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th Division</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>4,889</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>30th Division</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>4,999</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corps Troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(American)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. 4

Tactical Units        | Strength | Guns |
----------------------|----------|------|
VII Corps, R. A., Hq. | 29       |      |
VII Corps, H. A., Hq. | 52       |      |
Aust. 2d Dtvl. Arty.  | 2271 36-18-pdrs | 12 4.5" Hows. |
" 3d "                | 2271 36-18 | 12 4.5" " |
" 4th "               | 2271 36-18 | 12 4.5" " |
" 5th "               | 2271 36-18 | 12 4.5" " |
6th Army Brig., Aust. F. A.  | 1011 18-18 | 6 4.5" " |
12th "                | 1011 18-18 | 6 4.5" " |
9th (Mobile) Brig., R. G. A. | 1102 12-60 | 12 6" " |
41st (Mobile) Brig., R. G. A. | 1102 12-60 | 12 6" " |
51st (Mixed) Brig., R. G. A. | 1744 12-60 | 6 8" " |

- 796 -
Tactical Units | Strength | Guns
--- | --- | ---
93d (Mixed) Brig., R. G. A. | 1744 12-60-pdrs | 12 6" Hows.
 | | 6 8" "
 | | 6 9.2" "
68th (8") Brig., R. G. A. | 1076 16-6" | 6 8" "
71st (8") Brig., R. G. A. | 1076 16-6" | 6 8" "
18th (9.2") Brig., R. G. A. | 1104 16-6" | 4 9.2" "
73d Army Brig., R. G. A. H. A. | 22 | |
222d (6" gun) Bty. R. G. A. | 225 4-6" | (Mk. VII) guns
449th (6" gun) Bty, R. G. A. | 225 4-6" | (" XIX) "
504th (6" gun) Bty, R. G. A. | 225 4-6" | (Mk. XIX) "
494th (12" How.) Bty. R. G. A. | 236 2-12" | |
Total | 21,068 438 Guns | |

Summary of Guns

4th Tank Brigade | 700 | |
2d Antiaircraft Searchlight Section | 230 | 180 18-pdrs.
3d Squadron, A. F. C. | 191 | 48 16 "
F and G Antiaircraft Btys | 612 | 12 6" guns
5th Balloon Wing (2 companies and detachments) | 128 | 60 4.5" How.
 | | 84 6" "
20th Regiment Hussars | 545 | 24 8" "
 | | 2 12" "
Total | 2,406 | 16 9.2" "

Total strength of tactical units | 23,474 | |
Labor and Administrative Troops | 33,060 | |
Total number of attached troops | 56,534 | |
## BRITISH UNITS ATTACHED TO AMERICAN II CORPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TACTICAL UNITS</th>
<th>STRENGTH</th>
<th>GUNS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VII Corps R. A., Hq.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12 4.5&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII Corps H. A., Hq.</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>6 4.5&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 3d &quot;</td>
<td>2271 36</td>
<td>18-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 4th &quot;</td>
<td>2271 36</td>
<td>18-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 5th &quot;</td>
<td>2271 38</td>
<td>18-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12th &quot;</td>
<td>1011 18</td>
<td>18-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th (Mobile) Brig. R. G. A.</td>
<td>1102 12</td>
<td>60-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41st &quot;</td>
<td>1102 12</td>
<td>60-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51st (Mixed) &quot;</td>
<td>1744 12</td>
<td>60-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93d (Mixed) Brig. R. G. A.</td>
<td>1744 12</td>
<td>60-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68th (8&quot;) Brig. R. G. A.</td>
<td>1076 16</td>
<td>6&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71st (8&quot;) &quot;</td>
<td>1076 16</td>
<td>6&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th (9.2&quot;) Brig. R. G. A.</td>
<td>1104 16</td>
<td>6&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73d Army Brig. R. G. A. Hq.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4 6&quot; (Mk. VII) Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>222 (6&quot; gun) Bty. R. G. A.</td>
<td>225 4</td>
<td>6&quot; (Mk. XIX) Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>449 (6&quot; gun) &quot;</td>
<td>225 4</td>
<td>6&quot; (Mk. XIX) Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504 (6&quot; gun) &quot;</td>
<td>225 4</td>
<td>6&quot; (Mk. XIX) Guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>494 (12&quot; gun) &quot;</td>
<td>236 2</td>
<td>12&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total artillery</strong></td>
<td><strong>21,068</strong></td>
<td><strong>438 guns</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SUMMARY

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2d Antiaircraft Searchlight Sec.</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>180 18-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Squadron A. F. C.</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>48 60-pdrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F and Q antiaircraft batteries</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>12 6&quot; guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Balloon Wing (2 companies and detachment)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>84 6&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th Regiment Hussars</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>24 8&quot; Hows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,706</strong></td>
<td><strong>169 2&quot; Hows.</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total strength of tactical units</td>
<td><strong>22,774</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor and administrative troops</td>
<td><strong>33,060</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of attached troops</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,834</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
British Artillery Attached to II Corps

APPENDIX:

The 52d Field Artillery Brigade (27th Division), the 53d Field Artillery Brigade (28th Division), and the 55th Field Artillery Brigade (30th Division), were not attached to the II Army Corps until its arrival in Le MANS area in preparation for embarkation.

There were, however, assigned to the II Army Corps, British artillery and troops during the operations Sept. 29 to Oct. 20, from the HINDENBURG Line to the SAMBRE Canal, as shown in the following table:

- VII Corps, R. A. Hq.
- VII Corps, H. A. Hq.
- Australian 2d Divisional Artillery
- Australian 3d Divisional Artillery
- Australian 4th Divisional Artillery
- Australian 5th Divisional Artillery
- 6th Army Brigade, Australian F. A.
- 12th Army Brigade, Australian F. A.
- 9th (Mobile) Brigade R. G. A.
- 41st (Mobile) Brigade R. G. A.
- 51st (Mixed) Brigade R. G. A.
- 93d (Mixed) Brigade R. G. A.
- 68th (8") Brigade R. G. A.
- 71st (8") Brigade R. G. A.
- 18th (9.2") Brigade R. G. A.
- 73d Army Brigade R. G. A. H. A.
- 222d (6" Gun) Battery R. G. A.
- 449th (6" Gun) Battery R. G. A.
- 504th (6" Gun) Battery R. G. A.
- 494th (12" How.) Battery R. G. A.
- 4th Tank Brigade
- 2d Antiaircraft Searchlight Section
- 3d Squadron A. F. C.
- F and Q Antiaircraft Batteries
- 5th Balloon Wing (2 companies and detachments)
- 20th Regiment Hussars

Labor and administrative troops

---------
From: The Corps Engineer, II Corps
To: The Commanding General, II Corps

From Oct. 6 to Oct. 21, 1918

1. The American II Corps took over the corps sector of the Australian corps at 0900 h., October 6, 1918.

2. ENGINEER STAFF: On October 6, the engineer staff of the corps consisted of:
   Corps engineer (colonel, U. S. Army)
   Asst. to corps engineer (major, U. S. Army)
   C. R. E. (Commanding attached British troops)
   (Lieut. Colonel, British Army with
   (staff captain, British Army)
   Water supply 1 captain, U. S. Army
   1 lieutenant, British Army
   Bridging 1 lieutenant, U. S. Army
   Hutting 1 lieutenant, U. S. Army
   Stores (1 captain, U. S. Army
   (1 captain, British Army

A deputy assistant director of roads (D. A. D. Roads), major, British army, with captain as staff officer was subsequently attached. This officer deals with roads under army control. He is attached to the office of the corps engineer for liaison purpose.

The bridging officer was relieved during the course of the operation as it appeared that his functions could be otherwise performed under the conditions existing.

3. ENGINEER TROOPS ON OCTOBER 6: 102d Engineers (divisional regiment, 27th Division). Co. B and engineer train, with division, on miscellaneous work at division headquarters, etc. Regiment (less Co. B) detached from corps at RONSSOY, acting as corps troops under XIII Corps (British).

105th Engineers (divisional regiment, 30th Division). On duty with division.

Attached British troops:
   Aust. 1st A. T. Co. (attached to corps heavy artillery)
   146th A. T. Co., R. E. (rear area, bridging and hutting)
   238th A. T. Co., R. E. (forward water supply)
   Aust. 1st Tunn. Co. (forward roads)
   Aust. 2d Tunn. Co. (forward roads)
   No. 2 section 353d E and M Co. R. E. (Erection and
   No. 1 section Aust. E and M. M. and B Co. (operation of pumping
   plants.)
   74th Labor Co. (forward roads)
   90th Labor Co. 
   713th Labor Co.

4. CONDITION OF CORPS SECTOR ON OCTOBER 6: Front line of troops---N. W. through MONTBREHAIN.

Roads---The D. G. T. line, separating army and corps road work, ran through ROISEL. The main supply road of the corps ran from ROISEL through TEMPLEUX-le-GUERARD and HARGICOURT
to BELLICOURT and NAUROY and easterly by the main road northeast through ESTREES and by the NAUROY---JONCOURT---RAMICOURT Road. All these roads, except the link between HARGICOURT and BELLICOURT, were excellent metalled roads, of ample width for double-motor traffic, and undamaged, except for occasional shell holes. The road from HARGICOURT to BELLICOURT, however, crossed the badly shelltorn area between the opposing lines in 1917. It was a plank road, in a very poor condition, and had to carry an extremely heavy traffic.

Water Supply: The corps administered water supply points as far to the rear as BRAY-sur-SOMME. Fifteen small power pumping plants were established and in operation, four of which were bore holes (driven wells), operated by air lifts supplied by compressor lorries. These plants amply supplied the rear areas. The supply of the newly conquered area east of ROISEL was, however, not so satisfactory. The only immediately available supply of water was the ST-QUENTIN Canal, as it emerged from the tunnel at BELLICOURT. Springs in the tunnel supplied an abundant, though somewhat polluted, supply of water. The canal is, however, in a deep cut within the limits of corps area. At the time of taking over, the supply for horses was in part by hand-pump to horse troughs on the tow path, to which access was had by a ramp down the side of the cut; and in part by troughs on the narrow strip between the top of the cutting and the BELLICOURT-BELLENGLEISE Road, latter supplied by a power pump installed on the tow path. There was a very great concentration of artillery, cavalry, and transport animals near BELLICOURT, and the capacity of the water point was strained to the utmost. It is believed conservative to estimate that 25,000 head per day were being watered at this point. Water for drinking was furnished by 3 sterilizing lorries supplied by the same pump.

Bridges: There were a few bridges in the rear of the corps area, all in reasonable satisfactory condition.

Stores: A very complete corps dump, with extensive workshop, was operative at BRAY-TOURBIERE. A detail of 100 men from the divisional regiments and a company of 250 prisoners of war were required to operate this plant.

5. OPERATIONS TO OCTOBER 8: Corps engineer operations during this period were directed principally toward the maintenance of the HARGICOURT-BELLICOURT Road, and the improvement of the water point at BELLICOURT. The D. G. T. line was moved forward to HARGICOURT on Oct. 7.

The 102d Engineers were returned to the corps on October 8, and assigned to duty as corps troops, their division being in reserve.

The 105th Engineers were on duty with their division, one company with the infantry regiment in line, the remainder in reserve or moving to their stations.

6. ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 8-11: The attack was made by the 30th Division, 27th Division in reserve. The front line was advanced about 7 miles, to a position just west of La SELLE River.

Initial Disposition of Engineer Troops: The 105th Engineers as divisional engineer troops, 1 officer and 20 O. R., Aust. 1st Tunn. Co., attached to search for mines.

Remaining corps troops in territory behind starting line, as follows:

**Water**
- 238th A. T. Co. R. E.
- 90th Labor Co.

**Roads**
- 1st and Aust 2d Tunn. Cos.
- 74th and 713th Labor Cos.

Changes in dispositions: The 102d Engineers arrived in BELLICOURT on Oct. 8, and were assigned to the maintenance of the BELLICOURT-HARGICOURT Road, which they took over on the morning of Oct. 9. Urgent demand for the service of this regiment on forward light railroad work required their relief after Oct. 10. It was also necessary to utilize one company of this regiment to expedite the work of putting the water point at BELLICOURT in satisfactory condition. Maintenance of the HARGICOURT-BELLICOURT Road was then taken over by 74th Labor Co.

Roads: The main supply road of the corps was BELLICOURT---NAUROY---JONCOURT---RAMICOURT---MONTBREHAIN---BRANCOURT---thence to PREMONT and BUSIGNY; and to BOHAIN and BUSIGNY.
As far as BRANCOURT and the outskirts of PREMONT this road was wide, well metalled, and little damaged by shell fire. Enemy demolitions obstructed the forward roads as follows:

2 large mine craters at PREMONT, at the northern and southern entrances of the town respectively.

Church blown across main street in PREMONT.

2 mine craters between PREMONT and the main highway to the north.

3 mine craters between BRANCOURT and BOHAIN and numerous craters in BOHAIN.

1 mine crater in road between PREMONT and BOHAIN.

3 smaller mine craters in BUSIGNY.

Highway bridge over railroad just south of BUSIGNY destroyed.

The Road PREMONT-BUSIGNY could not be depended upon as a supply road, as it was but thinly metalled, and could not carry heavy motor traffic in wet weather.

The construction of by-passes around the craters at PREMONT was undertaken by advance parties of the 105th Engineers on October 9, and continued by such forces of this regiment as could be made available for the purpose. By the afternoon of Oct. 10, a one-way by-pass, accommodating lorries (with difficulty) had been opened, at each, and a passage cleared through the debris of the church across the main street. By the afternoon of the 11th, one of the craters was in fairly good condition for passing traffic; the other had a reasonably good one-way by-pass, but was the scene of considerable traffic congestion.

The craters north of PREMONT were taken over by the XIII Corps; those between BRANCOURT and BOHAIN, and the latter town, by the IX Corps.

The craters in BUSIGNY were made passable for horse transport on the 11th. A dry weather detour to a level crossing near the demolished railroad bridge south of BUSIGNY was opened the same date.

Water: The area covered by the advance contained a considerable number of villages and numerous wells were in existence, none of which had been seriously injured by the enemy. Their investigation, testing, and repair was actively prosecuted by the divisional engineers. Sufficient supply with desirable distribution, was thereby obtained. The improvement of the water point at BELLICOURT was continued during this period.

Stores: A very large enemy dump of engineer material was captured just north of BOHAIN.

7. (PERIOD OCTOBER 12-17): During this period, the first line remained west of La SELLE River. The 27th Division relieved the 30th Division on night of October 11/12. The 30th Division took over the southern half of the corps front on Oct. 15, in preparation for further advance.

Movement of Engineer Troops: The 2d Bn., 102d Engineers, was returned to the 27th Division and relieved the companies of the 105th Engineers in the line on October 12. Regimental headquarters and 1st Bn., 102d Engineers (less Co. B) were returned to 27th Division on October 14. The 105th Engineers were placed under orders of the corps engineer on Oct. 12, and were again returned to division on Oct. 15 at 18 h., in preparation for a further advance. The Aust. 2d Tunn. Co. was relieved from duty with the corps on Oct. 14 and the 216th A. T. Co. was assigned to the corps on the same date. It was assigned the duty of completing rear water points.

Disposition of Engineer Troops: The 1st Bn., 102d Engineers, continued work on light railroad to Oct. 13, inclusive, when it was relieved by the 1st Bn. of the 105th Engineers. The latter battalion worked but one day on this duty. Co. B., 102d Engineers was engaged in preparing corps headquarters at WIANCOURT. One battalion, 105th Engineers, was engaged on craters at PREMONT, BUSIGNY, and on PREMONT-BOHAIN Road from Oct. 12 to Oct. 15, inclusive.

Attached British troops were engaged in the following work:

Aust. 1st Tunn. Co.--Filling craters in BUSIGNY, and metalling by-pass at railroads bridge south of BUSIGNY.

74th and 713th Labor Cos.--Clearing and repairing roads between the D. G. T. line and BUSIGNY-BOHAIN Road.
238th A. T. Co. and 90th Labor Co.—On water supply.
146th A. T. Co.—On corps headquarters, WIANCOURT.
216th A. T. Co.—Completing rear water points.

Roads: The D. G. T. line moved forward to the N. and S. road through BELLICOURT on Oct. 12, and again to MONTBREHAIN on Oct. 16. With these advances, two labor companies were able to keep the roads in good condition. The last mine craters at PREMONT were placed in satisfactory condition for traffic by October 15, the work being much hampered and delayed by the heavy traffic past this spot. The mine crater on the PREMONT-BOHAIN Road was filled in two days, the work being completed on Oct. 14. The craters in BUSIGNY were filled by the night of Oct. 13.

Water: During this period, band pumps, supplying horse troughs, etc., were established at 6 points in the forward area. A bore hole was put down near the St-QUENTIN Canal and considerable trenching for pipe lines for an extensive distributing system done. Lack of transportation for the pipe delayed the completion of the work, no longer of urgency, as all troops were well in front of this area.

Stores: The workshops at BRAY-TOURBIERE dump were taken over by the Fourth Army. The transfer of material for the establishment of a new corps dump at ROISEL was begun.

8. ADVANCE OF OCTOBER 17-20: The attack was made by the two divisions in line; the front line was advanced across La SELLE River to total gain of about 5 miles.

Disposition of troops: Each divisional regiment was with its division. The roads to be opened by each were specifically prescribed. It was also prescribed that at least 2 1/2 companies of each regiment would be reserved for opening to double-motor traffic the roads as far forward as the ST-SOUPLET Valley, inclusive, until it became definitely known that task could be adequately handled by less troops. Following troops were detached on special missions:

102d Engineers:
1 co. at corps headquarters.
2 platoons for duty with Aust. 13th F. A. Brigade to prepare crossings over La SELLE River.

105th Engineers:
1 co. (less 1 platoon) for duty under corps water supply.
Officer establishing forward water points.
1 platoon at engineer dump.
2 platoons for duty with Aust. 14th F. A. Brigade to prepare crossings over La SELLE River.

The Aust. 1st Tunn. Co. was held in reserve under the C. R. E. corps, at BUSIGNY, to meet special situations.

A. T. cos. and labor cos. continued allotted tasks in rear areas.

Bridges: The SELLE River is a small stream within the corps area. It was crossed by 2 bridges on main forward arteries; one at ST-SOUPLET (20-foot span) and one between ST-MARTIN-RIVIERE and MOLAIN. There was also a bridge on a lateral road between ST-MARTIN-RIVIERE and ST-SOUPLET and two other local bridges across the river, not leading to through roads.

All bridges were destroyed by the enemy. The abutments of the ST-SOUPLET Bridge were left intact; as were the haunches of the arch bridge between ST-SOUPLET and ST-MARTIN and the abutments of the local bridges.

Plank for bridges and detours was accumulated at a dump in the eastern outskirts of BUSIGNY before the day of the attack, and was pushed forward immediately behind the advance, under heavy fire.

The 102d Engineers constructed 5-foot bridges across La SELLE River within their sector of advance, working immediately behind the advanced wave of infantry. The construction of a bridge across the river at ST-SOUPLET was promptly undertaken by the same regiment, and was open to lorries at 10:30 a.m. Both these operations were gallantly done, under heavy shell and machine-gun fire, and with heavy loss.
The 105th Engineers had the bridge between MOLAIN and St-MARTIN-RIVIERE open to motor traffic at 1630 h., October 17.

On October 18, the 102d Engineers constructed the local bridges across the river between St-MARTIN and St-SOUPLET, but for some unaccountable reason, the bridge on the lateral road between these towns was not undertaken. The construction of the latter bridge was begun by the Aust. 1st Tunn. Co. on Oct. 19 and completed on the 20th. A deviation bridge to permit the replacement of the temporary bridge at St-SOUPLET by a structure to take all traffic was commenced by the Aust. 1st Tunn. Co. on the 20th.

Roads: The roads from BUSIGNY east to La SELLE River were narrow, with high crown and deep ditches, generally suitable for one-way traffic only. Delay in establishing circuits led to very bad traffic blocks. East of La Selle River, the same conditions held, but traffic did not become heavy during the period of corps occupation.

The only serious road obstruction was the debris of brick arch viaduct which had carried the railroad over the road running east from St-SOUPLET, and which was blown down by the enemy. Work on removing this obstruction was begun on the late afternoon of Oct. 17 by the 102d Engineers. A one-way passage for all traffic was opened by 15 h., Oct. 18.

Water: The SELLE River furnished an abundant supply of good water. Horse water troughs supplied by hand pumps were installed on Oct. 18; but the conditions as to shell fire were such that it was not deemed advisable to move forward the sterilizing lorries at this time.

Stores: There was no demand for engineer stores, except road planking and bridge material, which was secured from the captured enemy dump at BOHAIN and from a dump of captured mine timber at MONTBREHAIN.

9. RELIEF OF CORPS, OCTOBER 20-22: The IX Corps took over the American II Corps sector October 20-22 and all engineer operations and supplies were duly turned over to them. Attached British troops remained on duty with the IX Corps. The 2d Bn. (less 1 Co.) of the 102d Engineers, and the 1st Bn. of the 105th Engineers, were assigned to duty under the C. R. C. E., Fourth Army, on light railroad construction and maintenance, BELLICOURT to BOHAIN. The remainder of the engineer staff and troops moved to a rest area.

10. COMMENTS: The American engineer troops displayed the expected gallantry and devotion to duty under stress of fatigue on numerous occasions during these operations. The attached British staff and personnel were invaluable.

All necessary engineer work was carried out, and the progress of the operations was not delayed by lack of roads, water supply, or stores.

In reviewing the operations, however, the corps engineer is conscious of the fact that had the weather been less favorable at certain critical periods, or the advance more rapid, operations might well have been seriously hampered by road conditions, particularly as concerns the obstacles created by enemy demolitions. On a number of occasions, there was notable slacking up of work on such obstructions on the second day, due to the fact that a large part of the divisional engineer troops were exhausted by the first day's operations, while the reports sent back were not sufficiently clear to permit the bringing up of the reserve engineer forces of the corps; a reserve which, moreover, would not have existed in unfavorable weather conditions, as under such conditions a large part of the corps engineer troops would have been required to keep the back roads open. No serious results arose for the reason that the weather was such that the first emergency by-passes stood the traffic which came over them and the advance was not so rapid that the delay in providing further facilities was of moment. Nevertheless, the lesson is very clear that engineer troops must be conserved to meet the demands following an engagement, and that only the number absolutely necessary be employed with the advance. There is an
undoubted tendency to use engineer troops in an engagement for various technical tasks not of vital importance, merely because such troops are available at the time.

G. B. PILLSBURY,
Colonel, Engineers, U. S. A.,
Corps Engineer.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 302: Order

**Commentary Letter, Sir Douglas Haig**

**GENERAL ORDER**
No. 44

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
*November 18, 1918.*

The following letter from the Commander-in-Chief of the British armies to the Commanding General, II Corps, is published for the information of the officers and soldiers of this command:

Now that the American II Corps is leaving the British zone, I wish once more to thank you and all officers, noncommissioned officers and men under your command, on behalf both of myself and all ranks of the British armies in France and Flanders, for the very gallant and efficient service you have rendered during the period of your operations with the British Fourth Army.

On September 29, you took part with distinction in the great and critical attack which shattered the enemy's resistance in the HINDENBURG Line and opened the road to final victory. The deeds of the American 27th and 30th Divisions who on that day took BELICOURT and NAUROY and so gallantly sustained the desperate struggle for BONY, will rank with the highest achievements of this war. They will always be remembered by the British regiments that fought beside you.

Since that date, through three weeks of almost continuous fighting, you advanced from one success to another, overcoming all resistance beating off numerous counterattacks, and capturing several thousand prisoners and many guns. The names of BRANCOURT, PREMONT, BUSIGNY, VAUX-ANDIGNY, ST-SOUPLET, and MAZINGHIEN testify to the dash and energy of your attacks.

I rejoice at the success which has attended your efforts and I am proud to have had you under my command.

D. HAIG,
Field Marshal.

By command of Major General Read:

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.

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Tank Data

[Extract]

The first official recognition of this brigade is contained in the following letter from the Chief of Tank Corps, American E. F., to the Commanding Officer, 301st Center, Tank Corps, and from the Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3), American E. F., to the Chief of the British Military Mission:

WORGRET CAMP, WAREHAM, DORSET,
ENGLAND, August 9, 1918.

From: Chief of Tank Corps, American E. F.
To: C. O., 301st Center, Tank Corps, American E. F.
Subject: Command of American Brigade attached to B. E. F.

1. In addition to your duties as Commanding Officer of the 301st Center, Tank Corps, you are assigned to command of American Tank Brigade, one battalion of which is attached for equipment, supplies, and service as a unit with the British Tank Corps and will carry out the instructions for the brigade commander as outlined in Paragraph B, letter of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F., July 31, 1918.

By command of Brigadier General Rockenbach:

F. T. MURPHY
2d Lieut., T. C., N. A.,
Acting Aide-de-Camp.

---

3d Section

From: Assistant Chief of Staff (G-3)
To: The Chief of British Military Mission
Subject: Attachment of 301st Tank Battalion to British E. F.

1. In connection with your letter dated July 30, 1918, addressed to the Chief of Tank Corps, A. E. F., conveying the assurance that the necessary arrangements have been completed regarding the attachment of the 301st Tank Battalion to the British Expeditionary Forces for training, I am directed to convey to you the following, and to request, on the part of the Commander-in-Chief, that you communicate the contents of this letter to the proper British military authorities:

(a) Pursuant to agreement between G. H. Q., B. E. F., and G. H. Q., A. E. F., the American 301st Tank Battalion is attached to the B. E. F., for equipment, supply, and service, as a unit, with the British tank brigade in France until the first American tank brigade is equipped and ready for service.

- 806 -
(b) The commanding officer, American tank brigade, with suitable personnel, will be attached under direction of the commander of the British tank corps to the British tank brigade to which his battalion may be attached for its supervision and for the purpose of maintaining liaison with the British and American tank headquarters.

(c) The chief of the American tank corps, in cooperation with the commander of the British tank corps, will maintain supervision of this battalion by necessary inspections and through the American tank brigade commander.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff (G-3).

Copies to G-1, G-4, G-5, and Chief of Tank Corps.

At this time there was but one other tank brigade [battalion] organized, the present 304th, which was then designated the 1st Tank Brigade. This brigade [battalion] was, therefore, designated the 2d Tank Brigade, and kept that designation until October 1918.

In compliance with above letter from the Chief of Tank Corps, the brigade headquarters was organized by the following order:

General Orders
No. 1
2d TANK BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
August 10, 1918.

1. In compliance with instructions contained in letter from the Chief of Tank Corps, dated August 9, 1918, the nucleus of the Headquarters 2d Tank Brigade, A. E. F., is organized as indicated hereafter, to take effect August 10, 1918.

Commander: Lieut. Col. H. E. Mitchell, T. C., N. A.
Tactical Officer: Major R. I. Sasse, T. C., N. A.
Adjutant: 2d Lieut. James Taylor, F. A.

* * * * *

By order of Lieut. Colonel Mitchell:

JAMES TAYLOR,
2d Lieut., F. A.,
Adjutant.

The brigade at this time consisted of * * * staff and the 301st Battalion all stationed at the British tank center, Wareham, England, and training in the British tank schools. All the theoretical training and practical work in the schools had been furnished by this time and the entire brigade was under canvas in their adjacent camps; concentrating on tank driving, 6-pounder and machine-gun firing, and day and night maneuvers. Orders for France were expected daily, the command had been reported by the British authorities as ready for battle and we were only waiting for our motor transportation to be furnished us.

The morale and training of the battalion was of the highest. The British authorities stated that they considered the 301st Battalion to be the best-trained that had ever left their schools. This reputation was well upheld by the battalion in the trying days that followed.

On August 15, the motor transport arrived, and the brigade was reported mobilized.

On August 22, 3 officers and 55 men from the 301st Battalion left for SOUTHAMPTON, and on the next day, brigade headquarters and the remainder of the battalion left for the same port.
Brigade headquarters and the 301st Battalion were attached to British tank brigades, British tanks: Mark IV’s, V’s and V star were issued, and the battalion started immediately preparing for battle.

The battalion had its first engagement with the enemy on September 29, acting with the American 27th and 30th Divisions. The battalion fought gallantly in spite of severe losses and inflicted heavy casualties. From this time until the Armistice, the following engagements were fought:

BRIANCOURT---FRESNOY---La HAIE-MENNERESSE---St-SOUPLET---CATILLON-et-GIMBRAMONT Farm---Le CATELET---BONY.

* * * * *

In addition to these honors the battalion received many complimentary letters, * * *

* * * * *

From the date of the Armistice until February 1919, the battalion remained attached to the British Tank Corps, reorganizing, equipping, and holding extensive training in all tank subjects.

In the meantime, sufficient personnel had arrived from the United States to admit of forming the two light battalions of the brigade, the 329th and 330th. These were accordingly formed at the tank center at BOURG, France, the former commanded by Major Daniel W. Colhoun, and the latter by Major Myron G. Browne.

Brigade headquarters were ordered from the British front to BOURG, and reorganized as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commander:</th>
<th>Col. H. E. Mitchell, Tank Corps.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant:</td>
<td>Capt. Douglas C. Hawley, Tank Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Officer:</td>
<td>Capt. F. V. Tenkenchoy, Tank Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance Officer:</td>
<td>Capt. Carleton Reynell, Tank Corps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Officer:</td>
<td>Capt. Louis K. Burns, Tank Corps.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tanks were issued to the light battalions; intensive training immediately started in the tank corps schools, and at the date of the Armistice the two battalions were ready for action.

Early in February, the 301st Battalion, under Major R. I. Sasse, Tank Corps, joined the brigade at BOURG and we left for MARSEILLES on February 11, en route for the United States.

After a very delightful trip via MARSEILLES and GIBRALTAR, the brigade arrived at NEW YORK on March 13, stayed at Camp MILLS for a week and then took permanent station at Camp MEADE, Maryland.

Demobilization started immediately, and was completed on May 5, 1919.

* * * * *

H. E. MITCHELL,  
Major, Cavalry.  
Commanding.
Command of Division

30th DIVISION,
December 6, 1918.

[Extract]

The commanders of the 30th Division, in the order named were:

Major General J. F. Morrison
Major General W. S. Scott
Major General C. P. Townsley
Brig. General S. L. Fatson
Major General Geo. W. Read
Major General E. M. Lewis

The following is a list of supporting artillery, both light and heavy, which supported this division in the battles set forth below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle of BELLICOURT</th>
<th>Light Artillery</th>
<th>Heavy Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Field Artillery</td>
<td>5th 7th 8th 10th 12th 13th 14th</td>
<td>18th 41st 51st 71st 93d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle of MONTBREHAIN</th>
<th>Light Artillery</th>
<th>Heavy Artillery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4th Field Artillery</td>
<td>5th 7th 8th 10th 13th 14th</td>
<td>18th 41st 51st 71st 93d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Army Brig., Aust. Field Art. 12th</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battle of La SELLE River</th>
<th>Light Artillery</th>
<th>9th Mobile Brig., R. G. A.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7th Field Artillery</td>
<td>8th 10th 11th 13th 14th</td>
<td>9th Mobile Brig., R. G. A.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is a list of general officers, British E. F., with whom the division served or was affiliated:

Field Marshal Sir D. Haig, C-in-C, British Armies in France
General Horne, Commanding General, British First Army
General Plumer, Commanding General, British Second Army
General Byng, Commanding General, British Third Army
General Rawlinson, Commanding General, British Fourth Army
General Birdwood, Commanding General, British Fifth Army
General Hollander, Commanding General, British I Corps
Major General Jacobs, Commanding General, British II Corps
Brig. General Wilson, Chief of Staff, British II Corps
General Monash, Commanding General, Australian Corps
General Malden, Commanding General, British 6th Division
General Skinner, Commanding General, British 14th Division
Major General Fleming, Commanding General, British 32d Division
Major General Penny, Commanding General, British 33d Division
General Nickerson, Commanding General, British 34th Division
Major General Boyd, Commanding General, British 46th Division
Major General N. J. G. Cameron, Commanding General, British 49th Div.
Major General Lambert, Commanding General, (? British Division
Major General J. W. Glasgow, Commanding General, Aust. 1st Division
Brig. General McKay, Aust. 1st Div. Liaison Officer
General Rosenthal, Commanding General, Aust. 2d Division
General McIlwaine, Commanding General, Aust. 4th Division
Major General Howe, Commanding General, Aust. 5th Division
Brig. General Bissel Brown, Commanding General, Aust. 5th Div. Art.

30th Div.: Order

Achievements of 30th Division

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 38

1. The 30th Division again retires for rest and reorganization after adding another chapter to its already glorious record.
2. With the exception of three days---October 12, 13, and 14---when it was in reserve, the division attacked every day from October 8 to October 19, inclusive, defeating the enemy and making material gains each day. During this period, the lines were advanced by the division from MONTBREHAIN to beyond MAZINGHIEN, a distance of more than thirteen miles, and the towns of BRANCOURT, PREMONT, BUSIGNY, VAUX-ANDIGNY, ESCAUPOUR, St-BENIN, ST-BOUPELET, RIBEAUVILLE, and MAZINGHIEN, as well as many villages and farms, were taken.
3. During this period, 45 officers and 1,889 other ranks were taken prisoners and nearly forty cannon, a large number of machine guns and an immense amount of stores of all kinds were captured by the division.
4. The skill, courage, fortitude and endurance displayed by the division have won the admiration of all and the commendation of high commanders.
5. Holding in affectionate memory the comrades who have fallen, justly proud of its glorious achievements already accomplished, the Division will devote itself untiringly to reorganization and rehabilitation in the confidence that when again called upon it will, as in the past, be found equal to any task that may be assigned to it.

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding

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Annex to Somme Offensive Operations

Translated German Documents

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GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE
(Left to right)

Second Army (von der Marwitz)

Eighteenth Army (von Hutier)

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, Foreign Armies
No. 9875

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
August 18, 1918.

THE SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON AUGUST 18, 1918

[Extract]

1. Somme-Oise Combat Area: The British and Australians have not renewed their attacks on either side of the SOMME. The construction of positions and obstacles indicates that for the time being they are content with the objectives reached here. On the other hand, the Canadians and the French attacking, recklessly, continued the offensive between the AMIENS-CHAULNES Railroad and the OISE without being able to realize material success. In this operation the main effort was directed against the right wing and the center of the Eighteenth Army. These attacks may be expected to continue. It is probable that they will extend to the left wing of the Eighteenth Army. Toward evening of August 18, heavy attacks began against the center and the right half of the Ninth Army.

Although several new divisions were put in line on the French front of attack and more fresh troops are believed to be in reserve on the front of the Eighteenth and the Ninth Armies, there has been no substantial change in the occupation of the front of attack held by the British. Furthermore, no information regarding the presence of fresh reserves has been received.

2. British-Belgian Front from ALBERT to the Sea: According to prisoners' statements and information gained by agents another comparatively large-scale attack is planned in the KEMMEL area. The attacks beginning August 18 in the vicinity of BAILLEUL and southwest thereof may be the opening phases of this fighting. Substance is lent to this interpretation inasmuch as reliable information confirms the presence of French troops behind that portion of the front and also because of the increased activity of the airfields southwest of St-OMER.

In connection with this attack, which could perhaps be designed solely as a diversion; there remains the probability of a similar one being made in the region of Bethune or against the ARRAS-ALBERT portion of the front. The report of a reliable agent and other signs point to an attack on a rather wide front against this sector.

Since on the one hand few forces have thus far been employed in the fighting on the SOMME and divisions which are said to have been dissolved have apparently been reconsti-
tuted, the British have 14 reserve divisions in reserve at the present time. There are 4 or 5 American divisions in addition to this. Furthermore, the sector divisions, as experience has shown, are capable of participating in an offense even after having been in the line for a comparatively long period of time. Therefore, if the British give up their attack against the Second Army they would be able to engage at least 20 divisions in a rather large attack somewhere else.

The distribution of the reserves at this time affords no clue as to enemy plans. A concentration is not noted anywhere. Nevertheless, we must remember that the present whereabouts of 7 British divisions is not clear.

Therefore, one must take into account both of the attack possibilities that have been mentioned.

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By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
August 21, 1918.

SUMMARY OF REPORTS CONCERNING THE SITUATION ON AUGUST 20, 1918

(Compiled from Reports Received at this Headquarters by 10:30 a. m.,
August 21, 1918)

[Extract]

I. Tactical Events: * * * Full-scale battle in the Ninth Army. The tactical situation arising in the course of the battle led to the withdrawal of the right wing of the Ninth Army to the line BRETIIGNY---CAMELIN-et-le-FRESNE---VEZAPONIN---west of VAUXREZIS.

The III Army Corps, formerly charged by the Eighteenth Army with organizing the CANAL Position (FLAVY-NOYON), received orders to cover the left wing of the army and the withdrawal of the 223d Infantry Division (right flank division of the Ninth Army) by occupying the OISE Canal and the OISE crossings with the 206th, 11th, and 84th Infantry Divisions. * * *

With respect to the left wing of the Eighteenth Army, withdrawal of the main line of resistance was ordered for the night into the Rhenanen Position from east of FRESNIERES on. The withdrawal was executed as planned and without interference from the enemy.

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FISCHER,
1st Lieutenant.

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- 812 -
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

Last week the expected heavy attacks against the front of the Group of Armies were made by the British and French, usually after a rather long and very heavy barrage on positions and rear areas. ** The Ninth Army had to be withdrawn behind the AILETTE and the AILETTE-AISNE Switch Position, as we did not succeed in repulsing the enemy forces that had broken into our positions, so that the grave danger existed that the right half of the army would be forced back against the OISE and AILETTE. In its new position the Ninth Army repulsed a powerful attack between the AILETTE and AISNE, in the afternoon of August 23.

Although the enemy suffered heavy losses too, nevertheless he can be expected for a certainty to continue his attacks on a large scale. The possibility remains that the British, after effecting reliefs or reinforcement on their front will open a new drive on both sides of the SOMME, a direction for their attack which is strategically very effective. In connection with these attacks, no doubt, the British intention is to push us away from the SOMME by continuing the attacks against the Seventeenth Army in the direction of BAUPAUME and beyond.

Several possibilities for an attack from their new front between the OISE and the AISNE are open to the French. One of them is the attack across the OISE in strategic cooperation with the British to cut off our front west of the line PERONNE-NOYON from the south; another is the continuation of the attack in the general direction of JUVIGNY to threaten the front of the Seventh Army. This latter attack can be assisted considerably by an advance of strong enemy forces across the AISNE between CONDE and SOISSONS.

We must also take into account that the enemy can exert his main pressure against the hilly country around COUCY-le-CHATEAU, thereby compelling the front of the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies to give way at the same time.

The Group of Armies therefore infers from the picture which the strategic situation represents that the English attack will be continued against the Second Army (in conjunction with the Seventeenth Army), and the French attack against the left flank of the Eighteenth Army and against the Ninth Army. On the front of the Eighteenth Army the enemy will be content to contain German reserves by local holding attacks. Of course, the strong forces still standing in front of the army also make a frontal attack against the Eighteenth Army possible.

The events of the last few days prove that the Entente is employing all its available forces against the center of the German west front—that is, particularly the front of the Group of Armies Boehn and the Seventeenth Army—in order to deliver the decisive blow against the German army.

The mission of the Group of Armies consequently is to repulse the enemy assault, to prevent any enemy penetration, and as soon as the available forces permit, to make a concentric attack on whatever enemy forces may have advanced between the OISE and the AISNE in such a direction as to constitute a threat.

As a result of the continuous fighting, the expenditure of forces is considerable, therefore a steady stream of fresh forces is necessary. If this is not possible, then a
drastic strategic decision will have to be made to shorten the front. The enemy also will reap an advantage from this, as he will be saving troops required to occupy the front. A possibility to be considered is the withdrawal of the Second Army and the Eighteenth Army into the general line the organization of which has just been started: BAZENTIN---MARICOURT---St-CHRIST---Canal as far as NOYON.


[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, Foreign Armies

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

August 25, 1918.

SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON AUGUST 25, 1918

[Extract]

1. British-Belgian Front: On August 21 a large-scale British attack began on the front west and northwest of BAPAUME. It was continued during the subsequent days, during which time the front of attack was widened. It has not yet terminated. Furthermore, the enemy again revived his offensive between ALBERT and the region south of the SOMME.

Again numerous tanks were used during the fighting. On the other hand relatively few reserves were employed. No new divisions were identified on the battlefield south of Albert; up to this time 5 to 6 fresh divisions north of the Ancre.

The appearance of the Canadian divisions which had been relieved by the French in the region southeast of Arras points to further extension of the attacks to the north.

Almost the entire front continues to receive information concerning the enemy's intentions to attack. Prisoners' statements and also reconnaissance point especially to the KEMMEL front, the BETHUNE region and the LENS-ARRAS sector. Tanks are reported behind these fronts.

The number of reserves still available for attacks between YPRES and the SCARPE is small at present (5 to 7 divisions). However, if we are to judge by recent experience, they can be considered ample for a new large-scale attack, since the Britisher taxes his sector divisions to the utmost.

The British may be expected to make reckless use of all their forces in order to exploit the present situation. The existence of 18 tank battalions in France, for whose equipment with replacements and materiel excellent provision has reportedly been made, renders plausible a rapid succession of enemy attacks.

No confirmation has yet been received concerning the arrival of French reserves on the British front. No change in the distribution of the American divisions was established.

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By order:

LUDENDORFF.
GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,  
_Auroir, August 27, 1918._

[Extract]

Conference held by Chiefs of Staff concerning new rear positions which may have to be occupied.

During the night August 26-27 withdrawal to the position PERTAIN---CURCHY---ETALON---SEPT-FOURS---BALATRE---ROIGLISE---ARMY [AMY?] and thence as on preceding day (intermediate position to Canal Position) according to plan and unnoticed by the enemy.

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GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,  
_Leschelle, August 28, 1918._

[Extract]

During the night August 27/28 the army withdrew to the Canal Position FALY---ROUY---BUVERCHY---LIBERMONT---BUSSY---GENVRY---north of NOYON unnoticed and without much interference from the enemy. During the day the enemy pursued violently.

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GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,  
_August 31, 1918._

ESTIMATE OF SITUATION

[Extract]

Last week the enemy continued to attack the right half of the Second Army and the Ninth Army in heavy force. In hard fighting our line was held in general. Our expendi-
ture of forces continued to be considerable. Opposite the Eighteenth Army the enemy contented himself with rather heavy local attacks. To effect economy in force the front of the Second and Eighteenth Armies was withdrawn into the general line Le TRANSLOY--PERONNE--NOYON (excl.).

The number of the enemy front line divisions, the extension of the French front toward the north, the widening of the sector of the French Tenth Army opposite the center of the Group of Armies, and the disappearance of French airplanes on the front of the Eighteenth Army make it seem probable that the enemy is reinforcing himself opposite the two flanks of the Group of Armies and is weakening himself at the center.

Therefore, as stated in the estimate of the situation of August 24, we must look for a continuation of the main effort of the enemy attack on the flanks, by the English against the Seventeenth and Second Armies north of the SOMME, by the French against the Ninth Army.

Opposite the Ninth Army it cannot yet be stated with certainty whether the French will continue to direct their main blow as before only over the land front between the AILETTE and AISNE against the flank of the Seventh Army, or whether—as can be inferred from the attack of August 29 and the construction of numerous footbridges by way of preparation—their aim is to push forward across the Ailette, gain the hilly country of COUCY-le-CHATEAU, thereby causing the fronts of the Eighteenth, Ninth, and Seventh Armies to be shaken.

This attack against the wooded and hilly region of COUCY is not easy for the enemy. Besides, his forward thrust leads more and more into a pocket. Therefore, it is possible that the enemy will at the same time endeavor to attack the German salients north of NOYON and SOISSONS, in order to eliminate any threat to the flanks of his attack. The massing of enemy forces observed in front of these sectors and the attacks of the last few days may have this purpose.


Operations Section, Foreign Armies No. 10120

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, September 1, 1918

THE SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1918

[Extract]

2. Details: British-Belgian Front: As was expected, the British front of attack has extended as far north as the SCARPE. Of late the main effort of the attacks no longer has been in the region of BAPAUME, but southeast of ARRAS. We may expect the offensive to continue with the main effort on both sides of the Arras-CAMBRAI Road, and possibly north of the SOMME too. An extension of the offensive to the sector north of the SCARPE as far as LENS must be taken into account.

Recent information has confirmed the enemy's intentions to attack between YPRES
and the La BASSEE Canal. It remains to be seen how much these plans will be influenced by the withdrawal of the German front.

The number of reserves was increased by the taking over of a portion of the British front by the French as well as by reducing the density of divisions on the BAILLEUL-BETHUNE front.

The fact that no tired divisions have yet appeared on the inactive front likewise indicates that attacks are contemplated at this point.

To refill with replacements seems to have caused no difficulty up to now.

According to information received from agents it is thought that the British, Belgians, and Americans are also planning an attack on the northern half of the Belgian front. There are no indications of this. It is possible that the information is based on misleading reports that have been circulated.

* * * *

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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Preparations to Resist Enemy Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 835

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN, September 4, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The position now selected along the entire front of the army group will be held at all costs. Commanders and troops must understand this. * * *

The main line of resistance will be clearly defined. If the enemy attacks, the troops must be in full possession at the close of the fighting, if need be, by counterattack executed by local reserves. A gratuitous yielding of ground for the purpose of shortening the front is out of the question. The establishment of a refused flank is only an emergency expedient. If the enemy penetrates into the outpost area and cannot be driven out again, an outpost in the battle position will have to be abandoned for the time. The question will then have to be decided whether the outpost shall be reestablished by a coordinated counterattack.

2. The organization of the position will proceed in conformity with the principles enunciated under Operations in the Regulations for Position Warfare for all Arms of August 10, 1918. Measures for antitank defense gain increased importance. Combat and living conditions for the troops should be improved as a result of shifting the position to the rear. Consequently all available labor will be employed to this end. Not until the construction of the battle position with its main line of resistance and artillery protective position has reached a certain stage of completion, will the construction of the rearward positions be begun. * * *
3. Considering the entire situation, it is certain that the enemy will continue his attacks on the west front. The armies will therefore take the necessary steps to ascertain in time the portions of the front of the army group against which the enemy attacks will be continued and whether heavy troop movements by rail indicate rather extensive enemy regroupings of a strategic nature. Whatever is noted will be brought to the attention the army high command and the army group in the routine daily reports. * * *

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Additional Rearward Preparations Considered

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 10181

Written by an officer.

To: Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht, Boehn, and German Crown Prince.

[Extract]

1. After the armies of the Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and Boehn, as well as the right flank of the Seventh Army occupy the new positions, on which a decisive battle must be fought (Order No. 10145, Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section, September 3), the organization or rather the restoration of a new strategic position, lying farther to the rear, will become a matter of necessity. For this purpose the following lines are considered. On some of them work has been done in places, but for the most part they have only been reconnoitered on the ground.

For the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht:
- The Flanders II - Wotan III Position as far as BOUCHAIN; thence as far as the boundary of the Group of Armies, the Siegfried IV Position;
For the Group of Armies Boehn:
- The Siegfried IV and Hunding Position;
For the Group of Armies German Crown Prince:
- The Hunding---Brunehlle---Argonne Position.

These positions will be organized with all available labor forces, under the direction of the construction staffs assigned to the Groups of Armies. I request that the steps taken be reported to me and that I be kept informed concerning the progress of the work.

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2. For a strategic withdrawal between the OISE and the ARGONNE the Gudrun movements were worked out in full detail last year, and suitable preparations (installations of dumps of all kinds) have been made.

For the future conduct of the war Supreme Headquarters must have the definite
assurance that it will always be possible to execute the Gudrun movement. Therefore the preliminary work that has been completed must be checked over and, if necessary, redone. The preparatory installations in the sector of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, which more or less disappeared during the offensive operations, must be repaired. Therefore, in every army headquarters a general staff officer who is already familiar with this work will be put in charge, or an experienced general staff officer will be assigned this mission by the army.

In the event that the Gudrun movement should be executed at any time to its full extent, as planned, the Ninth Army would have to be placed under the control of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, in order to assure coordination of the movement according to the preparations made.

Therefore, the provision is made that the Ninth Army will be subject to the orders of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince for the preparatory work.

I request the Group of Armies German Crown Prince to formulate the basic principles for the restudy of the Gudrun movement in the sense of the above, and to submit to me recommendations for the preparation and the execution of the movement itself. In this connection I request that a report be made as to how early Supreme Headquarters could probably count on executing the Gudrun movement according to plan, once the preliminary work has been completed. ***

3. Simultaneously with the construction of the strategic position in rear of the Groups of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht and Boehn as far as the OISE (see Paragraph 1), a systematic withdrawal movement by sector, within the armies, to a location in rear of the above line, will be worked out, similar to the Gudrun movement.

4. The three groups of armies must gradually move back in rear of the strategic position mentioned in Paragraph 1, the main depots of all kinds and allow only those installations to remain farther to the front which are indispensable for the combat and living conditions of the troops.

In addition I recommend that not more than the required amount of any kind of supplies be moved beyond the line indicated, as long as the combat situation remains unclarified.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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HS Ger. File: Groups of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Flrd. II: Order

Analysis of Probable Enemy Intentions

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,

September 7, 1918.

[Extract]

The condition of the front line divisions and the lack of reserves fit for offensive action necessitated a withdrawal of the front of the Group of Armies to the old Siegfried Position. The armies have reached the new position with the main body of their forces; rearguards remain in contact with the enemy and are at present on the approximate line: METZ-en-COUTURE---GUENCOURT---ROISEL---east of CAULAINCOURT---St-SIMON---CROZAT Canal---hills west of AMIGNY---BARISIS.
The enemy pursued on the entire front at first only hesitatingly. Only against the left flank of the Ninth Army in the direction of the land bridge between the AILETTE and the AISNE did he exert strong pressure.

In view of the general situation, the enemy can be expected to continue his attacks using all his available forces, despite considerable losses. There still are strong reserves opposite the Eighteenth Army. Nevertheless, a large-scale attack against that army is improbable at present. On the other hand the Second and Ninth Armies will continue to be the targets of large-scale enemy attacks. Cambrai remains a very effective direction for an attack by the English. If they succeed in making a deep penetration, then the Siegfried Position is taken in the flank and our front is threatened. Since an enemy attack against the center and south flank of the Seventeenth Army is flanked by the SAILLY-ARLEUX sector, and as the hilly country around Bourlon makes an attack by the enemy difficult, it can be expected with certainty that the enemy will direct his attack mainly against the boundary between the Seventeenth and Second Armies. To be sure, according to reports available, at present only English divisions, which have been fighting for weeks, stand opposite the Second Army. A large-scale attack will not be opened until they have been relieved by fresh troops. But it can be expected beyond a doubt.

The French and Americans still have at their disposal considerable reserves that are fit for offensive action. The above-mentioned facts indicate that they are continuing their attack at present against the left flank of the Ninth Army, in order to roll up the CHEMIN-des-DAMES Position from the flank.

However, their aims may go still farther. If they succeed in pushing forward via LAON, then this advance, in addition to the advance of the English on CAMBRAI, will threaten the entire front of the Group of Armies and that of adjacent armies. After our shortening of the front, the French are sure to expect that we will check this thrust with our reserves. Therefore, they will try to draw our reserves to a different location, to contain them there and use them up. In view of these considerations, aside from all political reasons, it is highly probable that the British, Belgians, and Americans will strike in Alsace-Lorraine. If their objective, removal of our reserves to those areas, is gained, then the possibility of an enemy attack against the Group of Armies Boehn on a broader scale increases.

THE SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1918

[Extract]

After the withdrawal of our front the British and French advance between the SCARPE and the OISE was in general slow. It was checked by our rear guards. However, strong British forces already stand in front of our new positions on both sides of the ARRAS-CAMBRAI and the BAPAUME-CAMBRAI Roads.
The distribution of the enemy's forces and his further intentions have not yet been clarified. It is to be expected that the British, after moving up their artillery and bringing their tanks to full strength, will continue the offensive in the direction of CAMBRAI and also north of the SOMME and that farther south as far as the OISE, British and French troops will attempt to contain our forces by means of heavy local attacks.

Several reports have been received indicating the extension of the British attacks to the front north of the SCARPE as far as the La BASSEE Canal. More attacks must be expected here.

Heavy demands continue to be made on the British forces on the battle front. Not one of the divisions which has been fighting between the SCARPE and the south flank since August 8 has yet been moved away. Divisions requiring rest are moved back into the second line for a short time, filled up with replacements and put in line again. The men are told that they must remain at the front until the Siegfried Position is reached.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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Reasons for Recent German Withdrawals

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,

September 9, 1918.

[Extract]

In a conference held by the Chief of Staff of the field army and the 1st quartermaster general with the commanders of the army groups, attention was called to the following points, which I desire to be considered by the army commanders in measures taken by them.

1. The German army on the west front was compelled to give up the greater part of the ground gained in the last offensive. The decision for the withdrawal was reached in order to shorten the front, effect economy of force by relying on prepared positions and thereby create reserves. Withdrawal to rearward positions is not the German style, but was necessary in this case in view of the general situation and the condition of the German army. Commanders and troops must know that the present position entrusted to them must be held unconditionally.

2. In the opinion of the supreme command, our failures in the various battles were due more to the mass employment of tanks that enabled the enemy to gain extensive initial successes, than to the enemy's numerical superiority resulting from the advent of the American army. For combat against tanks detailed instructions are given. During their training troops must become thoroughly accustomed to the mass appearance of tanks (constructing of tank models) and of low flying planes.

Von BOEHN,
Col. General.

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From: Ludendorff
At: Supreme Headquarters Operations Section
Date: Received for transmission: September 10, 1918: 1:40 a.m.
No. 10181, II [Addendum No. 1]
To: Group of Armies Boehn

In conformity with Order No. 10181, Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section, dated September 6, 1918, the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht has submitted a recommendation for a change in the trace of the strategic position. The Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht has reported to me by telephone that it sent the Group of Armies Boehn a copy of the recommendation submitted to Supreme Headquarters. The Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht was notified by wire as follows:

After checking the recommendation of the Group of Armies by the Chief of the Railway Service, I concur in the opinion and recommendation of the Group of Armies. The strategic line as far as VALENCIENNES recommended by the Group of Armies will be organized now. Concerning continuation of the line south of VALENCIENNES, the Group of Armies Boehn has received appropriate instructions. The result will be reported. I am requesting the Group of Armies to submit to me a recommendation concerning the trace of the line south of VALENCIENNES. In view of the indispensable character of the line: VALENCIENNES---SOLESMES---LE CATEAU---in front of and beyond WASSIGNY---GUISE. Wherever there is any chance of damming, special consideration must be given to this possibility from the outset. [Marginal note:] (This has already been anticipated.) I recommend that the Group of Armies German Crown Prince be contacted concerning this matter, as they gained special experience when preparing the Hunding-Brunehilde Position.

Moreover, it will be necessary to organize a switch position on the east bank of the OISE from VADENCOURT to HAMEGICOURT. [Marginal note:] (A Lt. Hansa of the Group of Armies Crown Prince is an authority on damming operations.) The new construction of damming installations on the OISE north of La FERE must also be given consideration.

[Marginal note:] (The recommendation of the Group of Armies Rupprecht is with the Gudrun records.)

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GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,
September 10, 1918.

RECONNAISSANCE OF THE SOLESMES-LE CATEAU SECTOR

[Extract]

The railroad runs first from SOLESMES half-way to BRIASTRE in the valley and here is exposed to observation from the west. It then climbs the slope and runs along it as far as 500 meters southeast of NEUVILLY. From BELLEVUE to MONTAY the roadbed is bordered by
hedges about 3/4 the height of a man, and often traverses the hilly terrain in cuts 4 to 5 meters deep. From 500 meters southeast of Neuvilly the railroad runs on a raised embankment, 4 to 6 meters high. Tanks cannot scale this railroad embankment. However, in other respects the roadbed hardly represents a tank obstacle.

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The SELLE is almost throughout only 2 to 3 meters wide; just in front of MONTAY it widens in some places to 4 to 5 meters, and at those points represents an obstacle for all arms, including tanks. The banks are not swampy at present, so that the SELLE can be crossed by tanks at several places with the aid of auxiliary equipment. Some hedges and inequalities of the terrain probably can make the passage of tanks difficult, but everywhere in the forward area there are open spaces where tanks can advance unhindered.

The depth of the SELLE seems unimportant, 1 to 2 meters; however the creek bottom is swampy to a great extent.

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By damming the SELLE can be made into a practicable tank obstacle.

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von WULFFEN.

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von WULFFEN.

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von WULFFEN.

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By damming the SELLE can be made into a practicable tank obstacle.

* * * * *

von WULFFEN.
bank of the SERRE to CRECY-sur-SERRE.

The following changes or amplifications in this line will be checked by the armies concerned:
(a) MONCHEAUX---east banks of the ECAILLON and of HARPIES Creeks as far as ROMERIES---ridge to SOLESMES.
(b) Bridgehead west and southwest of SOLESMES to avoid outflanking on the north and south.
(c) ANDIGNY-les-FERMES---TUPIGNY---VADENCOURT.
A deep outpost zone before the dry land front: RIBEMONT---La FERTE---as far as SERY-les-MEZIERES (incl.)---RENANSART---CATILLON-du-TEMPLE.
In addition a switch position will be reconnoitered in the direction of Le CATEAU---BAZUEL---CATILLON---east bank of the SAMBRE-OISE Canal as far as VADENCOURT.
3. In establishing the line the main point for consideration is the utilization of all water features which would serve as tank obstacles.

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Von BOEHN,
Col. General, Commanding.

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[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,
September 11, 1918.

ESTIMATE OF THE LE CATEAU---St-SOUPLET POSITION

[Extract]

1. The SELLE River running generally from south to north gives the entire terrain its character.
The river bed is 3 to 4 meters wide, the banks are mostly firm. The stream is about 50 to 75 cm. deep with a rapid current. At present the river does not represent an absolute tank obstacle; inundations possible, in my estimation.
2. The rather steep hills paralleling the river to the east and west fall off rapidly to the river (dead angle), and prevent observation (artillery) into the valley proper from the higher hills lying behind on either side.
3. Our Position:
   (a) Infantry: The main line of resistance must be pushed up close to the river valley. The railroad embankment which is piled up high in many places, affords good cover (dugouts, trench-mortar emplacements) and constitutes a tank obstacle to some extent. The terrain east of the main line of resistance, about as far as the Le CATEAU---l'ARBRE-de-Guise Highway, is almost entirely bare; there is no cover from airplanes anywhere. However the many draws, and particularly the deep and dry cut between VAUDIVAL Farm and Fassiaux afford very good cover and means of approach, at the same time constituting a tank obstacle. Nevertheless many approach trenches must be dug from east of the Le CATEAU---l'ARBRE-de-Guise Highway to the main line of resistance. Numerous small undulations of the terrain on the hill slopes offer a good opportunity for the construction of

- 824 -
concealed machine gun nests and strong points, and for assembly areas for counterattack.

(b) Artillery: Battery positions exist in abundance in the many draws; ob-
ervation into the SELLE Valley probably possible only from the main line of resistance.

4. Enemy Position:
   (a) Infantry: Similar to our own position. Disadvantage: On the bank, which
is even steeper than on our side, there is lacking the cover afforded by the railroad
embankment. Advantage: The terrain affords more cover (villages of St-BENIN and St-
SOUPLE). The north-south draw running from west of St-BENIN to the northwest exit of
St-SOUPLE offers good cover for troops forming up for attack.
   (b) Artillery: Similar to our own position. From Hill 151 north of Escaufourt
no observation into the Selle Valley; approximately the upper half of the steeple in St-
SOUPLE is visible.

5. In Conclusion: The position is usable but not especially favorable.

von STORCH.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Field Message

[Editorial Translation]

From: Operations Section
At: Hq. German Second Army
Date: Received for transmission: September 12, 1918: 4:50 p. m.
Sent: September 12, 1918: 12 midnight
To: Group of Armies Boehn No. 504/Sept.

Result of the preliminary reconnaissance of the Hermann Position:
A position exactly at VALENCIENNES, to take advantage of the tank obstacle of the SCHELDE,
is not possible owing to the multitude of houses in that town and its suburbs, concerning
which nothing can be done.

The following possibilities for the trace of the position should be considered:
(a) SELLE Creek---DOUCHY---OISY---RAISMES.
(b) SELLE Creek---HASPRES---railroad to THIANT---HERIN---RAISMES.
(c) SELLE Creek---HASPRES---MONCHAUX---THIANT---RAISMES.
All three lines to run from RAISMES through the FORET de RAISMES in the direction
of Bruille.

In the case of Boc, the Chateau of HERIN would facilitate a good flanking of the
land and water front HASPRES---MONCHAUX---THIANT, thereby protecting a sensitive point
of the Hermann Position.

The line running north of DOUCHY to THIANT that is planned, with the sector just be-
hind the front is not favorable. [Apparently added as a comment on the message.]

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- 825 -
Army to Begin Organization of Hermann Position Immediately

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Intelligence Sections
No. 7617

Written by an Officer

[Extract]

1. Supreme headquarters orders the immediate organization of the Hermann-Hunding Position as a rear strategic position.
   In order to avoid all doubts, it is especially emphasized that a withdrawal into that position is not being considered at present. However, the organization of the position and the preparation of the withdrawal movement into the position are necessary. Basic instructions for the withdrawal movement follow.

   • • • • •

6. For the reconnaissance and organization of the position, Part 1a, General Instructions for Organization of Positions, dated August 10, 1918, (Regulations for Position Warfare for all Arms) will govern.
   All reconnaissances for the work will be started immediately, and the locations for the installations to be constructed on the terrain will be indicated (markers). The reconnaissances will also cover the measures to be taken for the destruction of all important installations in the enemy territory, which may be of value to the enemy infantry or artillery. At the same time that the infantry organization of the position is being carried out, all the preliminary preparations for the deployment of the artillery will be made. (The artillery positions will be surveyed and revetted with stone, observation posts will be selected, etc.) Command posts, the signal communication net, and landing fields will be prepared, and any necessary surveying in our territory and in that of the enemy will be completed.
   The principles governing the conduct of the defense, as laid down in Part 8 of the Regulations for Position Warfare for All Arms, will apply for the deployment of the artillery. For calculating the artillery requirements, the following will be taken as a general guide:

   Field artillery: 5 batteries per kilometer
   Foot artillery: 3 to 4 batteries per kilometer

   The organization of the position will begin immediately after the basic reconnaissances have been completed.

   • • • • •

For the Army Commander:

BURKNER,
Lt. Col. Chief of Staff.

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- 826 -
Relationship between Hermann and Siegfried Positions

[Editorial Translation]

Operations and Map Sections
No. 7627

Written by an Officer

To: Group of Armies Boehn

Map of the Position system 1:300,000

[Extract]

1. On account of the trace of the Hermann Position, the Siegfried II and Siegfried III Positions have lost their importance as continuous positions. They merely form switch positions to be used in case the Eighteenth Army has to abandon the position on both sides of St-QUENTIN because of an enemy penetration in the sector of that army or in the sector of the Second Army. They make direct connection respectively with the Hermann Position or with the south portion of the St-QUENTIN---La FERE Position east of the OISE, by means of the OISE Switch Position from RIBEMONT to HAMEGICOURT. Map 1:50,000.

If the left flank of the army (XIV Army Corps) is forced back or is compelled to withdraw on account of a penetration in the sector of the Ninth Army, then it will find its first delaying position in the St-NICOLAS Position, making it still possible to hold La FERE.

If the line has to be withdrawn still farther, and if the St-NICHOLAS switch position can no longer be held either, then contact must be sought with the DIETRICH Position of the Ninth Army.

Any further retirement would lead into the Hunding Position connecting up with the QUENTIN---La FERE Position at ACHERY, or into the SERRE Switch Position, abandoning the sharply projecting salient at ACHERY.

By order of the Army Commander:

BURKNER,
Lt. Col., Chief of Staff.

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SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1918

[Extract]

1. British-Belgian Front: The British have renewed their attacks on the former front line south of the SCARPE. It is possible that they were endeavoring to improve the jump-off positions for further attacks, since apparently they have not yet completed their preparation for a fresh large-scale attack.

A new general offensive between the SCARPE and the OMIGNON is still the most likely operation the British may be expected to undertake. The forces occupying the front have been strengthened by reliefs. A rather large number of divisions was withdrawn after the last major attacks. Their present whereabouts is not definite. However, we may assume that they are resting in the rear area and are being refilled. The appearance of fresh divisions on the front has not yet been noted.

For the present the enemy can be expected to make his main effort in any new attack in the sector of the British Third Army. The condition of the enemy's rearward communications will be of paramount importance during this operation. Nevertheless, the shifting of forces into the zone of the British Fourth Army indicates that further attacks are also planned here.

Numerous reports have again been received concerning attacks on the rest of the British front. A clear picture of the situation cannot be obtained. The possibility that the enemy is building up a new attack front north of the Scarpe continues to exist. According to reports submitted by agents and the statements of prisoners the region of the La BASSEE Canal merits special attention.

The occupation of the front between the La BASSEE Canal and the LYS has been reduced by one division. The same thing has taken place north of the LYS. There are no signs of major attacks here. Reports submitted by agents speak of an enveloping attack on LILLE and the extension of the offensive to the coast, combined with naval attacks and landing operations. The enemy may be expected to execute attacks for the purpose of containing German forces on that portion of the front.

The present location of the American divisions which were formerly on the British front is not clear. Rumors are current that the Americans will participate in the coming British offensive, but considering the fact that the Americans are attacking on the French front there is little probability of their employment in it.

* * * * *

By order:

LUDENDORFF.
In the opinion of this headquarters, 2 lines can be considered for the continuation of the strategic position contemplated by the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht.

1. The general line VALENCIENNES---MAING---THIANT---MONCHAUX---HASPRES---SELLÉ Creek.

This position has the special advantage that, taken with the CONDE-VALENCIENNES Position, it permits an extensive utilization of the SCHELDE a tank obstacle. On the other hand there exist numerous disadvantages. Aside from the difficult conditions affecting artillery observation and selection of the lines, on account of the sea of dwellings in VALENCIENNES, the important hills west of VALENCIENNES would be abandoned to the enemy. These hills would allow him an extensive view into the flank and rear of the position running from MAING via THIANT to HASPRES-SOLESMES, all the more so since there exist numerous coal piles. Furthermore, the enemy would be able to use the hills around CROIX-STE-MARIE as a favorable artillery position. This makes the position unsuited for fighting on a large scale. It would have no tank obstacle on the line MONCHAUX-HASPRES, and would appear to be exposed to the flanking and frontal effect of enemy artillery in such a manner as almost to preclude making a counterattack over the wide glacis-like plains west of the VALENCIENNES---QUERENAING---VENDEGIES Road, which are entirely open to observation. Consequently, a line running thus, in plain language invites the enemy, who would not make a frontal attack on VALENCIENNES, to attack south of the SCHELDE.

This headquarters therefore is of the opinion that, if connection must be made near VALENCIENNES, it should be sought via Chateau FONTENELLE---QUERENAING---ROMERIES toward SOLESMES. In this manner a land front with no tank obstacles whatsoever would be created between Chateau FONTENELLE and VENDEGIES. The weakness of the position would have to be compensated for by a strong occupation of the front at the expense of economy in forces. However, if the enemy succeeds in affecting a penetration here, then he will stand in rear of the tank obstacles of the SCHELDE and SELLE and be able to roll up the entire Hermann Position to the north, in the direction of VALENCIENNES, as well as to the south, in the direction of Le CATEAU.

Based on these determinations, the Group of Armies recommends for the continuation of the Hermann Position the following 2d possibility:

The SCHELDE as far as MORTAGNE-du-NORD---the SCARPE as far as RUE-du-MONTHEL---west edge of the Forêt de VICOGNE---hills east of HELESMES---west edge of DENAIN---SELLÉ Creek via DOUCHY to HASPRES---SOLESMES.

This position offers the following advantages:

The trace of line is shorter than that via CONDE-VALENCIENNES. Along the entire front, except the stretch Forêt de VICOGNE---HELESMES---DENAIN there is a tank obstacle, which can be improved by damming operations. Between the Forêt de VICOGNE and HELESMES the lowland is little suited to the approach of tanks. The SELLE, particularly, could be
dammed much better by using the water of the SCHELDE, if the mouth of the SELLE is held in our possession. The entire extent of the front from DENAIN to MOLAIN (south of Le CATEAU) would be materially strengthened thereby. The possibility of being exposed to flanking operations noted above and the wide-open view into our rear areas would be eliminated, and the rear area north of the SCHELDE, which is well covered with buildings and vegetation, especially the region around VALENCIENNES, would remain available for shelter purposes.

The disadvantages of the bridgehead in front of the SCHELDE could be eliminated by giving depth to the position. A penetration on the land front HELESMES-DENAIN would not necessitate abandonment of especially large portions of the position, but could be checked effectively by counterattacks and flanking artillery fire. Furthermore, the troops fighting here would possess a strong rearward position in the SCHELDE line around VALENCIENNES.

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von BOEHN,
General, Commander-in-Chief,

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Memorandum

Study of Defense Positions

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 681/Sept.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 18, 1918.

Reference: Order No. 995, Opns. Sect., Group of Armies Boehn

Subject: Hermann Position

[Extract]

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1. The SELLE Position is particularly suited to being organized for a stubborn defense.

The land bridge between HAUSSY and VERCHAIN has been selected to connect up the Ecaillon and Selle sectors, as the terrain there is tactically more favorable than a connection on the line THIANT--MONCHAUX--HASPRES or MONCHAUX--SAULZOIR. Junction at VERCHAIN is assured by the extremely favorable fire protection possible from the artillery positions and observation posts north of SOMMAING and VENDEGIES. The almost straight trace of the line precludes flanking by the enemy. The disadvantage that the 5-km. land bridge is not tank-proof, is lessened by the fact that an enemy tank penetration can be checked in the tank-proof Harpies sector, lying 2 to 3 km. to the east in its rear. (Marginal note: Eliminated if junction is made at DOUCHY.)

2. The HARPES Position is less suited to being organized for a stubborn defense than the SELLE Position. On account of the fact that the defensive line runs in several large curves, an unnecessarily large number of troops is used in the front line. The flanking fire of enemy artillery against the salients of the position at Monchaux and south of Solesmes is very strong.
The advantage of the Harpies Position lies in the fact that it is tank-proof, if the bed of the creek and either the cut or embankment of the railroad from ROMERIES to SOLESMES are utilized. It would be valuable as a rear position for the SELLE Position.

3. The army does not concur in the selection of a bridgehead west and southwest of SOLESMES. The dominating heights---ARBRE-de-la-FEMME, FONTAINE-au-TERRE Ferme, VIESLY---are initially included in the outpost, in order to keep them from the enemy as long as possible. Also, if the line of the SELLE Position is adopted as recommended, it will be practically impossible to outflank these heights. However, in any large-scale attack by the enemy the bridgehead, due to its sharp salient to the west, would soon be enveloped from the north and south. To avoid this, all the hills from ARBRE-de-la-FEMME via VIESLY ---RAMBOURLIEUX Farm as far as MONTAY would have to be included in the bridgehead. The advantages derived from this would not warrant the number of troops needed. (Marginal note: Would still be outflanked.)

4. The switch position on the line Le CATEAU---BAZUEL---CATILLON---east bank of the SAMBRE-OISE Canal is not unfavorable for a stubborn defense.

   To be sure, it is only between MONTAY and M. du GARDE, 1 km. west of POMMEREUIL that RICHEMONT Creek with its marsh banks represents a tank-proof obstacle. However, the terrain between BAZUEL and the canal shows numerous bends, which would make it very difficult to use tanks on the terrain and particularly to maintain their proper direction; it would considerably affect artillery observation on both sides. On the other hand, they would facilitate the organization of centers of resistance. (Marginal note: Main line of resistance at ORS again to be extended to the canal; line too long.)

By order of the Army Commander:

von der MARWITZ,
Lt. Col., Chief of Staff.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Field Message

[Editorial Translation]

From: Operations and Intelligence Sections
At: Hq. Group of Armies Boehn
Date: September 19, 1918 By: Teletype
To: German Second Army No. 1186

The Eighteenth Army has recommended for the right, Hermann boundary, the line: West edge of ESCAUFOUR---east edge of BUSIGNY---east edge of BECQUIGNY---Hill 145, east of BOHAIN---west edge of SEBONCOURT---southwest edge of AISONVILLE---hills west of NOYALES as the dominating hills at BECQUIGNY offer the enemy excellent observation of the terrain to the east, and as the St-SOUPLET---VAUX-ANDIGNY sector is unfavorable for infantry defense.

Your reaction, with a 1:80,000 map, is requested to the proposition of a junction at ESCAUFOUR and north thereof, utilizing SELLE River north of Le CATEAU.

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- 831 -
GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,  
September 20, 1918.

[Extract]

2. The Rivierette des Esserts [creek] is no tank obstacle, not even after damming; however steep slopes and in many places the railroad embankment act as substitutes. The hills directly west of the creek to a large extent dominate those directly east of the creek; therefore inclusion in outpost zone desirable.

Good artillery observation posts for us, sometimes with a very deep view into the enemy rear area; artillery observation of the narrow valley in front of the main line of resistance is difficult; in some places, only from the flank.

General Estimate: I consider the position more favorable than the one on the SELLE Creek Le CATEAU-MOLAIN; our artillery observation better; covered approaches; absence of villages in front of the main line of resistance; worse conditions for the enemy.

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GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,  
September 20, 1918.

ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

It must be expected that the enemy will, within the very near future, continue the large-scale attack which he reopened on September 18, with the mission of pushing through the Siegfried Position north of St-QUENTIN, as stated in a captured order. The increased density of occupation of the front between HAVRINCOURT and GOUZEACOURT, movements of large bodies of artillery and infantry near EPEHY and HARGICOURT, prisoners' statements that an attack would be made here within the near future, and, in addition, the report that several American divisions are located at BAPAUME - all these facts justify the inference that the main effort of the next large-scale attack by the English [British] will be made in the direction of CAMBRAI, that is against the boundary between the Seventeenth and Second Armies, approximately against the XIV Res. Corps, the 54th Army Corps, and the IV Res. Corps.

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- 832 -
Renewal of Enemy Offensive in Bois d'Havrincourt Region

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, Foreign Armies
No. 10436

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 22, 1918.

SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1918

[Extract]

1. British-Belgian Front: On September 18 the British resumed their offensive between the Bois d'HAVRINCOURT and their south flank on the old battle front. 13 British divisions were employed in this action, all of which had already taken part in previous attacks. The British have not fully attained their objective—to press us back into the SIEGFRIED Position. They may be expected to continue the offensive and to extend the attack to the north.

The over-all situation on the rest of the front is unchanged. Reports contain increasing indications that the attacks will be extended north of the SENSEE. Apparently Canadians are to be employed here. Furthermore, statements of prisoners, observations at the front, and reports submitted by agents again point to the region of the La BASSEE Canal and the YPRES-ARMENTIERES sector. It might be possible that in these sectors only the sector divisions are to execute the attacks with limited objectives. In the meantime, the British reserves are sufficient to sustain a major attack at one of these points, even while the fighting is continued against the left wing of the Seventeenth Army and the Second Army. There are no indications of the participation of French or American forces.

By order:

LUENDORFF.

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From: Operations Section
To: Group of Armies Boehn

Reference: Order No. 1186, Opns. and Int. Sects.
Subject: Hermann Position

If the line were to run via ESCAUFORT, as recommended by the Eighteenth Army, the junction via ESCAUFORT-Le CATEAU would be made as shown on the map [not printed].
The St-BENIN---ESCAFOURT position is a favorable one on the whole, but it has the following disadvantages:
1. Lack of tank obstacle.
2. The artillery observation of the outpost and the main battle position is not possible from rear observation posts.
3. The lengthening of the position increases the requirements in troops.
4. The salient at Escaufourt draws the enemy.

The army is of the opinion that shifting the main line of resistance to ESCAFOURT-BECQUIGNY would be to no advantage. If the St-SOUPLET---VAUX-ANDIGNY sector is unfavorable for infantry defense, then an improvement could perhaps be made by withdrawing the main line of resistance still farther. The high ground around BECQUIGNY does not seem important enough to necessitate deviation from a straight trace of the line. The wide swinging curve of the line means a considerable increase in the number of troops required and entails tactical disadvantages, which are not compensated for by possession of the high ground at BECQUIGNY.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Order

**Trace of Hermann Position**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations and Intelligence Sections

No. 1323

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN, September 23, 1918.

To: Second and Eighteenth Armies

[Extract]

In connection with the reconnaissance carried out by the armies, the following trace of line is selected for the Hermann Position (map 1:80,000), subject to approval of Supreme Headquarters:

Schede front from VALENCIENNES as far as FONTENELLE Chateau---land front over the hills west of QUERENAING---VENDEGIES---HARPIES Creek as far as ROMERIES---across country to SOLESMES---SEILLE Creek as far as MOLAIN---east of VAUX-ANDIGNY---REGNICOURT---Hill 155 southwest of HENNECHIES---Point 133, 2 km. northwest of AISONVILLE---west edge of BERNOVILLE---Hill 153 south of BERNOVILLE---hills west of NOYALES---OISE front from MACQUIGNY as far as RIBEMONT---Hills 119 and 129 south of VILLERS-le-SEC---Hills 120 southwest and southeast of FERRIERE Farm---CATILLON-du-TEMPLE---SERRE front from MESBRECOURT as far as CRECY-sur-SERRE.

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- 834 -
**Location of Troops**

[Editorial Translation]

**Army Order No. 23/September**

[Extract]

1. ***

(b) In the sector of the IV Reserve Corps 1/3 of the 2d Guard Division will be placed in the vicinity of Le CATELET, 1/3 in VILLERSOUTREAX, 1/3 in the vicinity of CLARY. For the last, provision must be made for the fastest transportation by truck possible.

The division will be given instructions on its counterattack mission in the IV Reserve Corps and in the 51st Army Corps for counterattack in a southwesterly direction. It must be given precise directions concerning the switch and rear positions of the SIEGFRIED-I Zone, particularly in the area where the canal [ST-QUENTIN Canal] is underground.

(c) The 51st Corps will assemble 1/3 of the 21st Infantry Division (counterattack division) on the boundary between the IV Reserve Corps and the 51st Corps east of the Le CATELET-BELLICOURT Highway; 2/3 will be billeted in Premont, from which point provision must be made for the fastest motor transportation that can be arranged.

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**Estimate of the Situation**

The English attack launched on September 27 against the left flank of the Seventeenth Army and against the right flank and center of the Second Army was in accordance with the assumptions voiced in the last estimate of the situation. Since the left half of the 54th Army Corps was left out today, it can be assumed that the attack against the IV Reserve Corps had the objective of driving us across the canal there, in order to push farther forward against the left flank of the 54th Army Corps.

Since the enemy has about double the number of batteries in front of the 54th Army Corps and IV Res. Corps we have, and they are pushed well forward, and moreover as three fresh American divisions have been put in line, a continuation of these attacks must be expected. The heavy rail movements via PERONNE that have recently been observed, are probably connected with the movement of Americans to the front or the relief of the Australians.
The position of the Second Army just in front of the Canal is not favorable at present for a full-scale battle, the more so as it is necessary to refuse the right flank as far as Le VACQUERIE in view of the situation. There elements of our artillery must still remain on the west bank of the Canal, with the canal obstacle close behind the front.

We also must expect a continuation of the Anglo-French attacks on the interior flanks of the Second and Eighteenth Armies, even though approximately six French divisions, which have thus far been assumed to be in reserve opposite this front, may have been moved away without replacement recently. Perhaps the enemy only intends to contain forces on these portions of the front in order to keep them away from the fighting in the sector of the Seventeenth Army and the right flank of the Second Army or from the fighting in CHAMPAGNE. However, the artillery opposite the interior flanks of the Second and Eighteenth Armies is disposed in such heavy force and so unmistakably for the attack that an attempt to break through north of St-QUENTIN must also be taken into account. It can be assumed that the Australian Corps that is now withdrawn will be committed for this purpose after it has received its full quota of replacements.

Opposite the center and left flank of the Eighteenth Army there are no indications that a large-scale attack is imminent.

The reconnaissance of the enemy rear areas is made very difficult by the weakness of our air force, and our resistance in the defense is very much impaired by the reduced combat strength and exhausted condition of the divisions. In the Second Army only 3 divisions can be called completely fit for action, and in the Eighteenth Army only 1, that is a total of 4 divisions.

von BOEHN,
General Commanding.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 27, 1918.

NOON REPORT

[Extract]

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In the meantime, since 6:30 a. m., the IV Res. Corps had repulsed a tank attack of fresh American troops. Behind a dense smoke screen and employing numerous tanks, the main thrust was directed against the salient position at TOMBOIS Farm, which was driven in. In a dashing counterattack the 84th Schleswig-Holstein inf. Regt. drove the Americans back beyond their line of departure. Pursuing as far as Lempire, it encountered a body of enemy troops in assembled formation which took to flight, streaming to the rear in the fire of our artillery * * *

The enemy assault was repulsed on both corps flanks. QUENNEMONT Farm which was lost temporarily, was recaptured by an immediate counterattack. Here and on the left flank of the 54th Inf. Div., where a local penetration was also immediately eliminated, a considerable number of prisoners of the American 27th Div. remained in our hands. Several tanks were demolished. The enemy suffered heavy losses. A thrust against the right flank of
the 185th Inf. Div. was repulsed. At present reinforcements are reported to be coming up
by motor from Heudicourt.

In front of the IV Res. Corps there are bodies of enemy troops under our fire. A
continuation of the attack must be taken into account. * * *

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Positions Held Against Enemy Attacks

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. Today the army has held all its positions against heavy enemy attacks. It is evacuating GOUZEAUCOURT, which it has bravely defended, only by order.

I desire to express my deep appreciation to the brave defenders, particularly to the German Jaeger Division and the 84th Infantry of the 54th Infantry Division, whose superb achievements I have reported to Supreme Headquarters by name.

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von CARLOWITZ,
General of Infantry,
Commanding.

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American Tanks

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 970/September

GERMAN SECOND ARMY.  
September 27, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 25/SEPTEMBER

[Extract]

According to reports of agents, 1,000 American tanks with smoke-developing apparatus arrived in France in the middle of September.* These are to be used for surprise attacks. The crew is stated to be 4 men.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,  
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Enemy Attacks Repulsed

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 975/Sept.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY.  
September 27, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. Today the army victoriously repulsed all enemy attacks, executed against its right flank and center, with numerous tanks participating. The main line of resistance is everywhere in our possession unchanged.

3. The general situation requires a withdrawal of the right flank of the army (German Jaeger Division and 21st Reserve Division).

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* The Germans must have been throwing this statement out as bait to secure information.
4. During the night of September 27/28, the 54th Army Corps will shift its main line of resistance into the line: Hill halfway between VILLERS-PLOUICH and La VACQUERIE---west edge of GONNELIEU---west edge of VILLERS-GUISLAIN (Main Line of Resistance 2 b). Boundary between Second and Seventeenth Armies: Intersection of the main line of resistance 2 b with the northern one of the two roads leading from VILLERS-PLOUICH to La VACQUERIE. (Road to the 54th Army Corps.)

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5. The movement will be executed under the cover of rear guards. Beginning of the movement of the main body of the infantry at 12 midnight, of the rear guards at 3 a. m.

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von CARLOWITZ,
General of Infantry, Commanding.

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**Enemy Activity**

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,

September 27, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

The enemy infantry remained quiet on the entire front. The enemy artillery was active only on the right flank of the army; otherwise it limited itself to moderate harassing fire, vigorous only sporadically. Our artillery neutralized observed movements with concentration bursts and executed fire for effect several times against enemy batteries.

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From: Operations Section
At: Hq. Group of Armies German Crown Prince
Date: September 28, 1918: 10:45 p.m.
Sent By: Telephone No. 6804
To: First, Third, and Seventh Armies

Supreme Headquarters wires [No. 10532]:

The Entente is attacking in FLANDERS, around CAMBRAI, northeast of VAILLY, in the CHAMPAGNE and between the ARGONNE and the MEUSE. Further attacks on other portions of the front, perhaps even against German territory are possible.

In view of the lack of fresh reserves and the critical situation of the railways, the groups of armies cannot count on receiving reinforcements.

In general the groups of armies must bear in mind the following principles in directing the conduct of the battle:

1. The first position will be defended. If it is lost, the counterattack divisions frequently need only to establish a switch line. The judged opinion as to whether a switch position or a counterattack best fits the situation is principally the province of the divisions. For the most part, the actual decision must be made by higher authority taking into consideration the over-all situation and the principle of economy of force. Reserves must be kept close to the front.

2. The decision to fall back ought to be made only after calm deliberation. If a withdrawal is ordered and executed too hastily, the morale of the troops is lowered and the enemy's disposition to attack increased. Lately, on several occasions, withdrawal movements have been ordered on the basis of alarming reports which subsequently proved to be false.

3. On the fronts not yet attacked the groups of armies must as soon as possible relieve divisions that are at all fit for combat with tired divisions in order to constitute reserves for themselves.

4. Attention is directed to the necessity for close cooperation on the boundaries of the group of armies. Liaison officers must make provisions for the adjacent units to be informed concerning activities on adjacent fronts at all times. Mutual assistance will frequently be necessary in the interest of the whole.

5. The armies must insure rapid shifting of reserves by preparing truck columns; trains must be held ready insofar as the railway situation permits.

6. If the enemy breaks through on a wide front the main thing then, as has already been emphasized repeatedly, is to support the shoulders. Moreover, weak reserves with machine guns and batteries disposed in depth will also be able to check the frontal penetration on some prescribed line. In such a situation it is a serious error to throw weak reserves against the enemy in an uncoordinated attack.

7. The higher headquarters must give the subordinate headquarters complete freedom in the details of the conduct of battle.

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Withdrawal of Troops

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 993/Sept.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 28, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

4. The IV Reserve Corps will withdraw 2/3 of the 2d Guard Division during the night of September 28/29 to CLARY; one-third will remain in the vicinity west of Le CATELET.

5. The 51st Army Corps will withdraw 2/3 of the 21st Infantry Division during the night of September 28/29 to PREMONT; one counterattack group (1/3) will remain northeast of BELLICOURT.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 28, 1918.

[Extract]

The movements on the right flank of the 54th Army Corps were executed according to plan. Enemy patrols feeling their way forward toward GOUZEACOURT and VILLERS-PLOUICH were driven off.

After the main line of resistance at the TOMBOIS Farm was withdrawn, heavy artillery fire lay on TOMBOIS Nose [ridge near TOMBOIS Farm], without infantry attacks following.

The 54th Infantry Division drove off several patrol thrusts, preceded by a short burst of fire. In the vicinity of TOMBOIS Farm the outpost fighting continued into the night. * * *
GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
September 28, 1918.

[Extract]

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EVENING REPORT

In the course of the day the enemy harassing fire increased in intensity on the entire army front. On the right flank of the army it increased in the afternoon hours to considerable intensity, in conjunction with the operations of the Second Army and fell, mixed with some gas, mostly on battery positions and rear localities. The long-range fire continued. At different points of our army front the enemy infantry felt its way forward toward our outpost. *** Our artillery replied vigorously to the enemy harassing fire and placed supporting fire in front of the left flank of the Second Army. ***

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BAVARIAN I ARMY CORPS,
September 28, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

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In connection with the actions in the Second Army sector, heavy harassing fire of all calibers is continuously falling on the north half of the corps sector, particularly on rear areas, rear villages, canal crossings, and approaches. The battery positions on the right flank of the 79th Reserve Division are being gassed at present. Long-range fire fell on the area west of Etaves and on the town itself. Inspection of splinters and the effect of the projectiles seem to indicate that guns of different calibers are used for the shelling, the largest of which is estimated to be 36-cm. In the south sector the enemy fire became temporarily more vigorous in the noon hours only.

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
September 29, 1918.

SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON SEPTEMBER 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. British-Belgian Front: The attack which prisoners' statements and numerous reports led us to expect began in FLANDERS on September 28. It was accompanied by a simultaneous bombardment of the coast.

On the old battle front on both sides of CAMBRAI the British opened a new large-scale attack between La SENSEE and GOUZEAUCOURT on September 27. At the same time heavy attacks occurred in the region adjacent on the south.

We may definitely anticipate the continuation of the offensive in FLANDERS, between La SENSEE and St-QUENTIN and possibly on the front north of the SCARPE.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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GERMAN SECOND AND EIGHTEENTH ARMIES,
September 29, 1918.

[Extract]

Morning Report: Second Army

The outpost fighting at TOMBOIS Farm also continued. The enemy who had penetrated here, was driven back again and again.

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Morning Report: Eighteenth Army

On the right flank of the army vigorous enemy artillery activity continued until morning. The railroad station at FRESNOY was shelled with very heavy caliber.

Rather heavy detachments of the enemy felt their way forward toward the center and left flank of the XXVI Res. Corps in the afternoon and evening hours. Only temporarily did he
SITUATION
ELEMENTS IV CORPS AND GENKDO 51
GERMAN SECOND ARMY
28 SEPTEMBER 1918

MAP No 103

MAP REF GERMAN II 25000 GOUEAUCOURT WEST
succeed in penetrating into our outpost on the left flank of the 231st Inf. Div., otherwise he was repulsed everywhere by our outguards and the defensive fires of the artillery which opened quickly. At some points artillery annihilation fire fell. During the night the enemy infantry remained quiet.

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Noon Report: Second Army

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The enemy penetrated into VILLERS-GUISLAIN with numerous tanks. They were destroyed by artillery fire here, and the village was regained in a counterattack. The assault of the enemy collapsed in front of the divisions of the IV Res. Corps. Numerous tanks were put out of action, and the remainder was forced to return to the rear.

The troops of the 51st Army Corps were forced back across the canal after stubborn resistance. BALLENGOUR was lost. Fighting is in progress on the east bank of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal]. One regiment of the 21st Inf. Div. has been committed in a counterthrust; the other regiments have been put in line to support the artillery protective position.

After a fresh increase in the fire, a second attack was launched against the IV Res. Corps. Although the enemy employed massed troops, the main line of resistance was held. Only on the boundary between the 8th and 54th Inf. Divs. did a slight penetration occur. The left flank of the 121st Inf. Div. had to be refused to maintain contact with the 51st Army Corps.

At 11:20 a.m. strong columns are reported to be advancing from VILLERS-PLOUICH on La VAQUERIE, and about 10 tanks from BEAUCAMP on VILLERS-PLOUICH. Large bodies of troops assembled in Bois d'HAVRINCOURT. Many batteries east of EPEHY firing out in the open. Columns advancing in a southeasterly direction from MALAKOFF Farm are under our fire.

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Noon Report: Eighteenth Army

In conjunction with the operations in the Second Army the vigorous enemy fire on the entire front of the Bav. I Army Corps increased to the greatest intensity in the forenoon hours. The infantry positions were smoked. At 8:30 a.m. the enemy advanced to the attack against the sector of the 79th Res. Div.; he was repulsed. Likewise a second attack executed at 9:30 a.m. was broken up in front of our lines. The enemy is continuing his attacks. At 10:30 a.m. heavy enemy fire opened on the sectors of the Bav. 6th and 231st Inf. Divisions. The enemy has been attacking here too since 10:50 a.m. * * *

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Evening Report: Second Army

The army has repulsed strong attacks throughout the entire day. * * * The enemy assault against the troops of the IV Res. Corps continued uninterruptedly all day long. The 8th Inf. Div. held out against all enemy attacks. The enemy forces that had penetrated our positions on the boundary between the 8th and 54th Inf. Divs., were thrown back by a counterattack of elements of both divisions; the second line was reached about 100 meters east of the main line of resistance. The 54th and 121st Inf. Divs. are standing their
ground in a bitter fluctuating struggle in the second trench. Counterattacks to regain
the main line of resistance were checked.

The left flank of the 121st Inf. Div. was bent back, in the face of the flanking
action by the enemy who was debouching from the draw northwest of Bellicourt in superior
force and with flame throwers. The commander of the 56th Inf., Major von Loebbecke, per-
sonally led his regiment in the counterattack. The 87th Inf. of the 21st Inf. Div. joined
in this attack. The enemy was driven back into the draw again. Even infantry thrown for-
ward in armored trucks as far as our front line was unable to shake the 121st Inf. Div.
At present new attacks against the IV Res. Corps are in progress. * * *

Evening Report:

The enemy continued his attacks against the sector of the 79th Res. Div. throughout
the day. This battle-seasoned division has repulsed all enemy attacks in stubborn fight-
ing, has held its position completely despite the threat of envelopment, and in a counter-
attack has driven back the enemy who was advancing against the right flank. Not until the
enemy swung his attack north around MAGNY [MAGNY-la-FOSSE], was the right flank bent back
somewhat, while a switch position along the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal] was established at
the same time. A counterattack is in progress against the enemy who had penetrated into
LEHAUCOURT. All forces available have been assembled and are being moved forward north of
LEVERGIES, in order to close the gap between the two armies. The left flank of the Second
Army is located just southwest of JONCOURT, according to a report by the Second Army.

The artillery of the 79th Res. Div. and 197th Inf. Div. intervened in the action,
supporting the left flank of the Second Army and neutralized in some instances by direct
fire, marching columns, cavalry and tanks advancing there. * * *

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 29, 1918.

[Extract]

In the morning of September 29 the army received the report that from 3:30 to 4:30
a. m. the sector of the 54th Army Corps and the sector adjacent on the right were under
very heavy fire and that at 5:45 a. m. barrage fire opened against almost the entire army
front. Toward 8 a. m. the first reports about enemy attacks came in, stating that the
enemy had broken through in the 113th Infantry division, the division adjacent on the right,
and that he was advancing from the north against the flank and rear of the German Jaeger Division.

The 201st Infantry Division was placed at the disposal of the 54th Army Corps. * * *

The 2d Guard Division was placed at the disposal of the IV Reserve Corps. The corps
was instructed that if under heavy enemy pressure withdrawal of the line of the 54th Army

- 846 -
Corps should become necessary, the IV Reserve Corps with the 8th Infantry Division would have to conform to this movement. South of VENDHUILE the old position would have to be held.

The 21st Infantry Division was placed under the command of the 51st Army Corps.

* * * * *

At 4:30 a.m. a barrage lasting one hour was followed by a heavy tank attack against the right half of the 54th Army Corps and the sector north thereof. In the Seventeenth Army the enemy penetrated as far as Le PAVE and came into the flank and rear of the German Jaeger Division. The 21st Reserve Division held its position in bitter fighting.

At 7 a.m. the enemy opened a coordinated full-scale attack against the entire front of the army. A barrage lasting 1-1/2 hours had prepared the attack; it was accompanied by squadrons of tanks and airplanes.

* * * * *

All attempts of the enemy to gain ground against the IV Reserve Corps, even into the late afternoon, failed. A tank attack in some force against CABARET Farm [Ferme du BOIS du CABARET] collapsed entirely.

Toward noon the enemy launched a coordinated attack against the divisions of the 51st Army Corps standing in the artillery protective position. At first he succeeded only in penetrating into the sector of the 2d Infantry Division and breaking through as far as Etricourt. Renewed attacks resulted in his taking NAUROY. Numerous tanks that had broken through were destroyed on the entire front of the corps.

At 6 p.m. a fresh tank attack on JONCOURT and LEVERGIES from MAGNY-la-FOSSE was checked by the counterattack division, the 21st Infantry Division, at the west edge of JONCOURT and on the hills south of the village.

* * * * *

By Army Order No. 1038/Sept., Secret, the main line of resistance was ordered withdrawn tonight in rear of the canal. The time for the beginning of the movement was set at 9 p.m. for the mass of the infantry, and at 12 midnight for the rearguards. Patrols remained in contact with the enemy. * * *

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Front Line to be Withdrawn

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1038/Sept.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 29, 1918—6:30 p.m.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The general situation forces us to withdraw the front line to the rear of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal] during the night of September 29/30.
2. The main body of the infantry will begin the movement at 9 p.m., the rearguards at 12 midnight. Patrols will remain in contact with the enemy.

3. The following must be held: Canal line from south of CREVECOEUR to HARGIVAL Farm, connecting up at that point with the SIEGFRIED-I Position and thence as far as BONY, thence dependent upon the combat situation, via CABARET Farm [Ferme du BOIS du CABARET] in the direction west of JONCOURT. The 51st Army Corps will hold its position of today.

4. * * * Boundary between the IV Reserve Corps and the 51st Army Corps: Left flank Regiment Alexander at CABARET Farm----north edge of BEAUREVOIR, then the old boundary. The 87th Inf. will remain under the command of the IV Reserve Corps for the present.

* * * * *

The boundary toward the Eighteenth Army will be determined according to the combat situation and will be reported by the 51st Army Corps.

5. The 54th Army Corps will withdraw the 21st Reserve Division (less 1/3) and will assemble it as army reserve at VILLERS-OUTREAUX and west thereof. Orders will be transmitted to VILLERS-OUTREAUX through the IV Reserve Corps.

* * * * *

6. After the canal position has been occupied, the IV Reserve Corps will constitute strong reserves and will place them in readiness in rear of the left flank.

* * * * *

8. All canal bridges must be blown up without fail.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

* * * * *

Troops Attached to 51st Corps

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1033/Sept.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 29, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 27/SEPTEMBER

[Extract]

* * * * *

The 119th and 241st Infantry Division, coming from the Eighteenth Army, are placed at the disposal of the 51st Army Corps. (Detailed orders will be transmitted by telephone in advance.)

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

* * * * *
Principles Governing Evacuation of French and Belgian Territories

[Editorial Translation]

Quartermaster General
No. 3452

To all Groups of Armies, etc.

[Extract]

*When the front is withdrawn, the following general principles will govern the evacuation of abandoned French and Belgian territories:

5. At least those civilians capable of bearing arms and of working will be displaced as the evacuation progresses.
   The rest of the population will remain behind if possible, as it is desirable that these people be left to the enemy. The manner as to how they are left behind, while observing all humane principles, will be determined by the existing situation in each instance.

6. All horses belonging to civilians and all cattle will be at the disposal of the army headquarters at the time of evacuation.

By order:

Name [Illegible]

Construction of German Positions

[Editorial Translation]

[FIELD MESSAGE]

From: von Hindenburg, Operations Section No. 10552 Secret

At: Station, Telephone Detachment 203, Group of Armies Boehn

Date: September 30, 1918

Received at: 10:05 a.m. by Edor, Group Hq.

To: Group of Armies Boehn

No more reserves can be expected from the High Command. Nevertheless, an enemy breakthrough must under all circumstances be prevented. The groups of armies will therefore

* Paragraphs 1 to 4 not available.
conduct operations in such manner that where the situation definitely demands it, they can withdraw according to plan and by section of the front, maintaining contact with adjacent units. The purpose is to gain time, inflict heavy losses on the enemy, constitute fresh reserves, remove our artillery to the rear, and to destroy the railway and telephone installations completely. This work must be started immediately. The construction of the Lys-Hermann and Gudrun Positions as the intended permanent position must be expedited with all available means. I am fully aware that this directive imposes heavy demands on the morale of the troops and on the time and energy of the command. The German army must solve this problem also. The firm resolve to repel the enemy onset and not yield too hastily is enjoined upon all. The intention to yield on a considerable front will be reported to the High Command beforehand.

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Supplement of the Army Group (Boehn):

The above will not be transmitted to battalions; detailed orders will follow.

von BOEHN.

Operations and Intelligence Sect. No. 1503 op. Secret

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,
September 30, 1918.

HERMANN ORDER NO. 2

[Extract]

1. With the means at our disposal, which cannot be increased, the main things required, if we are to prevent an enemy breakthrough, are that all movements be executed in an orderly and systematic manner, that units be shifted as necessary and reserves be constituted speedily. A withdrawal without fighting requires the approval of the Group of Armies. Only if telephone connections with the Group of Armies are cut, will the decision be with the headquarters of the armies.

2. The trace of the HERMANN Position is fixed as follows:

South of VENDEGIES (contact with the Seventeenth Army)---east of HARPIES Creek as far as VERTAIN---cross-country to SOLESMES---SEILLE River as far as MOLAIN---east of VAUX-ANDIGNY ---REGNICOURT---Hill 155 southwest of HENNECHIES---Point 133, 2 km. northwest of AISONVILLE---west edge of BERNOVILLE---Hill 153 south of BERNOVILLE---hills west of NOYALES---the OISE front from MACQUIGNY as far as southwest of MONT d'ORIGNY---Hills 119 and 129 south of VILLERS-le-SEC---Hills 120 southwest and south of FERIERE Farm---RICHECOURT or CATILLON-de-TEMPLE respectively---the SERRE front from MESBRECOURT as far as CRECY-sur-SERRE.

• • • • •

4. It is important that the HERMANN Position be put as soon as possible in condition for defense on its entire line, employing all available materials and personnel (labor
companies, pioneer companies, Landsturm companies, trench-mortar battalions, flame-thrower companies, mining companies, prisoners of war, civilian laborers, etc.) The HERMANN Position becomes fundamentally a permanent position. No kind of special labor troops will be used any longer on the forward positions. Rear divisions lying in the vicinity of the HERMANN Position may be used to a limited extent.

5. We must count on occupying the position in the very near future. A definite date cannot yet be designated, as that will depend on how the situation develops. However, the movement may start within a few days.

6. Evacuation of the wounded and removal of all our installations and supplies to a point in rear of the HERMANN Position must be expedited. Only those supplies will remain in front that are necessary to care for the troops until the HERMANN Position is occupied. Those items that cannot be moved to the rear must be prepared for destruction. Special provision must be made for the evacuation of the wounded during the movement.

7. All improvements of railroad installations forward of the HERMANN Position will cease. Instead thereof, the rearward extension of narrow gauge and field railroad line beyond the HERMANN Position, for the transportation of engineer materials, will be pushed vigorously in agreement with the railroad authorities. At the front, the most important railroad installations (depots, bridges, culverts, towers, and the like) and all telephone installations will be prepared for thorough destruction. Dismantling and demolition of tracks will depend on the time available.

8. Evacuation of civilians in the vicinity of the present front will be started immediately. Preparations for this will be made further to the rear so that it can be carried out at any time. Primarily these civilian inhabitants who are able to work will be moved in rear of the HERMANN Position, while those that are unable to work and cannot be moved back, will be assembled in certain villages, supplied with rations, and left to the enemy.

10. So far as time and forces are available, preparations will be made to destroy everything that might possibly be of any use to the enemy in the territory to be evacuated. However, discipline must be maintained in this work; this principle is paramount to demolition. In some cases it will be sufficient for special detachments to burn down the villages when moving to the rear.

12. In organizing the position, the main line of resistance with wire entanglements, dugouts, and tank obstacles will be constructed first, the outpost will be prepared, and the dams will be quickly constructed. At the same time the battery positions will be surveyed. These activities will be accomplished by the selection of the C. P.'s and observation posts. Sufficient bridges must be built in rear of the position. Surveys to form the basis for the studies concerned with soil and water conditions and to bring maps up to date will be expedited. Installations for taking ground panoramic pictures and for producing maps of terrain exposed to observation, as well as for photographic check of all installations, will be prepared.

13. Building material, tree trunks, obstacle posts, and brushwood will be taken from the nearer forward terrain, in order to clear the field of fire and to deprive the enemy terrain of cover against aerial observation. First of all it is necessary definitively to fix the exact trace of the various lines of the position, so that no useless work will be done.
15. Before beginning of the movement into the HERMANN Position, that portion of the Second Army between the army's right flank and the general vicinity southwest of BEAUREVOIR will be withdrawn into the SIEGFRIED-II Position. The HARALD Movement will then be executed in one bound back into the HERMANN Position.

The rearguard lines will be as follows:

(a) The line SERANVILLERS---east of MALASSISE Farm---west of VILLERS-OUTREAUX ---WIANCOURT---west of SEQUEHART---LESINS---ITANCOURT---BERTHENICOURT and
(b) The line WAMBAIX---MALINCOURI'---PREMONT---FONSOMME---RIBEMONT-

The withdrawal north and south of the OISE will be effected in proportion to the enemy pressure. Therefore, the Eighteenth Army will prepare the withdrawal north of the OISE, while the front south of the river will hold, and vice versa. In addition, the armies will check the terrain for available positions, portions of positions, and switch positions between the present position and the HERMANN Position, which would favor a withdrawal of certain portions of the front under enemy pressure.

* * * * *

von BOEHN,
General Commanding.

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GERMAN SECOND AND EIGHTEENTH ARMIES,
September 30, 1918.

[Extracts]

Morning Report: Second Army

All attempts of the enemy into the late afternoon to gain around from the IV Res. Corps, failed. A powerful tank attack against the Cabaret farm [Ferme duBOIS-du-CABARET] collapsed entirely. The enemy artillery activity was very vigorous and did not diminish in intensity until toward midnight.

According to troop reports, Australians apparently attacked yesterday in the sector of the IV Res. Corps. ***

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Morning Report: Eighteenth Army

In general the enemy remained quiet during the night even opposite the front of the Bav. I Army Corps. Apparently he did not press forward farther there. The situation on the right flank of the army is not yet quite clear. It has been impossible so far to ascertain whether contact with the Second Army has been established. Movements for regrouping the right flank of the army have been initiated. No reports have been received so far concerning their progress. ***

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Noon Report: Second Army

The movements into the Canal Position have been completed according to plan. On the right flank the enemy pursued as far as RUES-des-VIGNES and to the hills northwest of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal]. West of Banteux 2 battalions were involved in stubborn hand-to-hand fighting, during which they reached the east bank.

In front of the IV Res. Corps the enemy started at 9:10 a.m. to feel his way forward with tanks and infantry. Numerous tanks appeared in successive waves; some were destroyed by artillery fire. The remainder turned back. The enemy is bringing up infantry in many armored cars and is unloading them in the draws in rear of his front line, under our annihilation fire. Constant pressure of the enemy from BELLICOURT toward the northwest led to desperate hand-grenade fighting. CABARET Farm [FERME du BOIS-du-CABARET] was lost during an enemy assault.

No combat activity in the sector of the 51st Army Corps. Troops assembled in NAUROY and moving in force from MAGNY-la-FOSSE on JONCOURT and ETRICOURT are shelled by our artillery. Enemy artillery activity is moderate. Prisoners captured in an armored car state that yesterday 10 armored cars accompanied by small tanks were to break through and destroy three railroad crossings between BUSIGNY and BOHAIN. They did not get through our fire.

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Noon Report: Eighteenth Army

The situation on the right flank of the army is unchanged. So far the enemy infantry has remained quiet, with the exception of a thrust against right flank of 79th Res. Div., which was repulsed with losses. The movements for the regrouping of the flank have been completed. Contact with the Second Army has been established.

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Evening Report: Second Army

Moderate harassing fire against the sector of the 54th Army Corps. The fighting in front of the left flank of the IV Res. Corps fluctuated throughout the day. The enemy continuously attempted to roll up our flank to the north. The enemy attack against the hill west of MONT-St-MARTIN was repulsed by a counterattack. In the pursuit the draw southwest of the hill was cleared of the enemy. CABARET Farm was recaptured, but later had to be evacuated again in the face of excessive pressure.

Throughout the day enemy troops, some of them in strong columns, marched to the front opposite the center and particularly the left flank of the army. Considerable traffic of horse-drawn and motor trains. A tank squadron southwest of NAUROY and enemy cavalry east of MAGNY-la-FOSSE were effectively shelled by our artillery and successfully attacked by the 17th Attack Flight.

Toward 4:30 p.m., after a short but violent fire preparation, the enemy advanced to the attack between the NAUROY railroad station and JONCOURT. He was repulsed, and several tanks were destroyed by shell fire. Since 5:30 p.m. an enemy attack has also been in progress just to the north, between VENDHUILE and Ferme du BOIS-du-CABARET.

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Evening Report: Eighteenth Army

During the attack reported this noon the enemy advanced against our position west of LEVERGIES and south thereof as far as the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal], employing strong in-
fantry forces and tanks. In the concentrated fire of our infantry and artillery the first assault collapsed in front of our lines, with the exception of a small penetration, where a counterattack, immediately initiated, threw the enemy out of our lines again. Another heavy attack executed in the afternoon hours also met with no success. The enemy is moving up new reinforcements and tanks from the direction of BELLICOURT. * * *

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Main Line of Resistance to be Moved

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1062

ARMY ORDER

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
September 30, 1918---7:40 p. m.

1. During the night September 30/October 1, the main line of resistance of the left flank of the IV Reserve Corps and the 51st Army Corps will be moved.
2. New Line: HARGIVAL Farm---GOUY---LORMISSET Farm---SIEGFRIED-II Position---east of ESTREES---west of RAMICOURT---PRESELLES, where contact will be established with the Eighteenth Army. (PRESELLES to Eighteenth Army.) Boundary between the IV Reserve Corps and the 51st Army Corps: North edge of LORMISSET Farm, northwest edge of BEAUREVOIR.
3. The movement will start with the infantry at 12 midnight.
4. In the former position, outposts will be left behind, which will be very active in order to mislead the enemy into believing that it is still normally occupied.
5. The 21st Reserve Division (less 1/3) will remain in army reserve and will be placed in readiness north and northeast of BEAUREVOIR. It may be considered for employment as counterattack division in a westerly as well as a southerly direction.
6. As the troops of the 119th and 241st Infantry Divisions arrive, the 51st Army Corps will relieve the 185th and 2d Infantry Divisions from the front.

The 185th Infantry Division will be withdrawn into area C and the 2d Infantry Division into area D, east of the line AMERVAL-BAZUEL (localities inclusive). Quartering will be arranged with the Inspector General of the Army Communications Zone.

The divisions are under the control of the Inspector General for administrative purposes only, and under the tactical control of the army.

von CARLOWITZ,
General of Infantry,
Commanding.

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- 854 -
ORDER OF BATTLE
GERMAN SECOND ARMY
30 SEPT 1918 TO 19 OCT 1918
Heavy enemy attacks against the Bavarian I Army Corps and XXVI Reserve Corps were frustrated. During the night September 30/October 1 the troops of these corps were withdrawn into the Siegfried-I Position---Quentin-II Position without interference from the enemy.

MORNING REPORT

[Extract]

During the night the enemy also remained generally quiet opposite the front of the Bavarian I Army Corps. Apparently he did not continue to press forward there. The situation on the right wing of the army is not yet entirely clear. So far contact with the Second Army could not be ascertained with certainty.

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EVENING REPORT

During the attack reported today noon the enemy, employing strong infantry forces and tanks, advanced against our position west of LEVERGIES and the territory adjacent on the south as far as the canal. The first assault collapsed in front of our lines in our concentrated infantry and artillery fire, with the exception of a small point of penetration where the enemy was driven out by an immediate counterattack.

A renewed attack executed in the afternoon hours was also successful. The enemy is bringing up fresh reinforcements and tanks from the direction of Bellicourt.

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The enemy's attack of last evening between VENDHUILE and CABARET Farm [Ferme du BOIS-du-CABARET] was completely repulsed. During the night enemy harassing fire in general moderate; our harassing fire vigorous. Since 6:15 a. m. the enemy has been smoking our positions at Le CATELET and farther south; the H. E. fire there is falling on our lines as vigorous harassing fire.

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Morning Report: Eighteenth Army

[Extract]

Repeated attempts of the enemy to force our right flank farther back in the evening hours, failed. * * * During the night the enemy remained generally quiet. The disengagement from the enemy in order to occupy the new position was executed everywhere according to plan and unnoticed by the enemy. No reports are available so far concerning the completion of the movements. * * *

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Noon Report: Second Army

In the sectors of the two northern corps moderate artillery fire. At CREVECOEUR-sur-l'ESCAUT rearward movements of the enemy were observed, and at Honnecourt troop concentrations were reported. The movements ordered in the left half of the army were executed as planned and unnoticed by the enemy. In the sector VENDHUILE-CABARET Farm the enemy did not feel his way forward until the morning hours, after heavy shelling with smoke, and he slowly forced our rearguards back. Adjacent to the south infantry and tank attacks developed at 7:30 a.m. after a heavy and sudden burst of fire against the sector FOLEMPRISE Farm---ESTREES---JONCOURT. The main effort was made at ESTREES, where the enemy infantry, accompanied by numerous tanks, jumped off to the attack in dense masses. The attack was broken up in our artillery fire. The enemy retreated, effectively pursued by our fire. He is assembling again in the sunken road line, MONT-St-MARTIN---ESTREES---JONCOURT, upon which the annihilation fire of all available batteries is falling.

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Noon Report: Eighteenth Army

[Extract]

The movements of the right half of the army have been executed as planned and without interference from the enemy. Liaison has been established everywhere. In the morning hours the enemy apparently had not yet noted our disengagement. * * *

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Evening Report: Second Army

[Extract]

The enemy retreating in our fire at CREVECOEUR-sur-l'ESCAUT suffered heavy losses. In the sector of the 54th Army Corps and IV Res. Corps the enemy pursued everywhere. The artillery remained moderately active. In the 51st Army Corps the 119th Inf. Div. has taken over the command in the right sector, the 21st Inf. Div. in the center, and the 241st Inf. Div. in the left sector. After a heavy shelling with smoke and a sudden brief burst of fire the enemy moved to the attack at 4 p.m. in dense infantry waves, tanks and attack flights against the 21st and 241st Inf. Divs. and farther south. The enemy was repulsed by the 21st Inf. Div. and streamed in disorder to the rear through Joncourt. In the sector of the 241st Inf.
Div. he took the hill 1 km. southwest of Ramicourt. There he remained for the time being under our fire. At present he is again continuing his attack in the direction of RAMICOURT. A counterattack is in progress.

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Evening Report: Eighteenth Army

[Extract]

In the course of the day the enemy felt his way forward close to our new lines overcoming the resistance of the rearguards which were forced to fall back. In the afternoon after artillery preparation, enemy infantry advanced in force to the attack against the front north of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal]. The attack was repulsed. Only in the west portion of SEQUEHART was the enemy able to gain a foothold. A counterattack is in progress there. * * *

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Present Position to be Held

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 17/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 1, 1918—2:35 p. m.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The group of armies has decided that the present position will be held.
2. The main weight of the enemy attacks will be directed against the left [right?] flank of the Seventeenth [Eighteenth?] Army and against the 51st Army Corps.

* * * * *

By Order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Withdrawal to Hermann Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8006
GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The situation may require additional withdrawal movements as far as the HERMANN Position.

2. This headquarters assumes that the withdrawal movements will be effected in such a manner that the Bavarian I Army Corps and XXVI Reserve Corps will be withdrawn first into the HERMANN Position and that the XVIII Reserve Corps and XIV Army Corps will follow later.

Two tired divisions of the Bavarian I Army Corps will be assigned to occupy the Oise switch when the right wing of the army is being withdrawn. They will be moved into the OISE bottom land as soon as they are relieved.

A temporary stop will be made in the Siegfried-II Position.

While a stop is being made in the Siegfried-III Position, the two right flank divisions of the Bavarian I Army Corps will immediately be moved through into the HERMANN Position.

von HUTIER,
General of Infantry, Commanding.

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,
October 2, 1918.

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1590
To: Second Army
Eighteenth Army

1. The boundary between the Second and Eighteenth Armies is fixed as follows, effective October 3, 1918:

Present boundary that has been agreed upon between the armies on the main line of resistance---south and east edge of BOHAIN---northwest comer of La HAIE-MENNERESSE (Eighteenth Army will retain the right of joint use of the direct road FRENOY-le-GRAND---BOHAIN ---VAUX-ANDIGNY as before)---north edge of St-MARTIN-RIVIERE.

3. Upon occupying the HERMANN Position, the following boundaries will go into effect:

- 859 -
(b) Between the Second and Eighteenth Armies: North edge of St-MARTIN-RIVIERE---crossroads in l'ARBRE-de-GUISE---crossroads in MAZINGHIEN---south edge of CATILLON---south-east exit of La GROISE---TEMPLE Farm (Second) [Ferme du TEMPLE-d'en BAS]---FAVRIL (Second)---TAISNIERES---St-REMY-CHAUSSEE (Second)---ECUELIN (Second)---ECLAIBES (Second)---ROCQ (Second) then old boundary. The boundaries are effective as tactical boundaries; the municipal boundaries will continue to act as administrative boundaries.


Transfer of Troops from Eighteenth to Second Army

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 44/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 2, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 2/OCT.

[Extract]

The 24th Infantry Division will pass from the control of the Eighteenth Army to the Second Army. The infantry will be moved partly by trucks, mounted troops by marching. The division will be in army reserve and is attached to the 51st Army Corps. One-third will be placed in readiness at BRANCOURT-le-GRAND under a special commander; the remainder will be quartered at BOHAIN. Accompanying artillery will be attached to the counterattack echelon by the 51st Corps. As the division arrives, it will be held in alert in its quarters. The division headquarters will establish connection with army headquarters through the 51st Army Corps. (Advance information by telephone.)

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 2, 1918.

[Extract]

At 8:50 a.m. the enemy, supported by attack planes, attacked the front of the 241st Infantry Division in heavy force, after a brief but very violent artillery preparation, gassing and smoking the entire south sector of the corps, as far as beyond RAMICOURT. He got into GRISON Mill temporarily but was immediately driven back by a counterattack. Elsewhere the enemy was repulsed, at some points in hand-to-hand fights.

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Throughout the day there was considerable traffic in rear of the enemy lines. On the entire army front movements to the front were observed, infantry companies and squads and guns coming up. Large bodies of troops in assembly areas on both sides of the BELLCOURT-BELLENGISE Road. On the east side of the canal numerous bivouacs, including a large artillery bivouac. 1 1/2 km. west of LEVERGIES, troops unloading. Northeast of MAGNY-la-FOSSE tanks advancing.

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Operations Section
GERMAN SECOND AND EIGHTEENTH ARMIES,
October 2, 1918.

[Excerpts]

Yesterday's counterattack for the recapture of SEQUEHART met with complete success. At 8 p.m. the town was recaptured in a spirited attack by two battalions of the 335th Inf. and elements of the veteran East-Prussian 41st and 45th Regts. under the personal leadership of the commander of the 221st Inf. Div., Lt. General de la Chevallerie. * * *

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Noon Report: Second Army

Moderate enemy harassing fire. Toward 8:50 a.m., after a brief but very heavy artillery preparation and after gassing and smoking the entire sector of the 51st Army Corps as far as a point beyond RAMICOURT, the enemy attacked the front of the 241st Inf. Div. in heavy force, supported by attack squadrons. He penetrated into GRISON Mill temporarily. A counterattack drove him back immediately. Elsewhere the enemy was repulsed, in some cases in hand-to-hand fighting. * * *

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Noon Report: Eighteenth Army

In the morning hours the enemy again attacked the front north of the canal after a brief but heavy burst of fire, employing numerous attack squadrons. He succeeded in driving our line south of SEQUEHART temporarily and penetrating into SEQUEHART and CHARDONVERT. A counterattack was launched immediately and has returned the main line of resistance south of SEQUEHART entirely to our possession again. * * * SEQUEHART has been partially recaptured. An enemy detachment that pushed across the canal [ST-QUENTIN Canal] at MORCOURT by surprise, was attacked immediately. MORCOURT as far as the railway is again clear of the enemy. The counterattack is still in progress. * * *

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Evening Report: Second Army

* * * Opposite the entire army front very lively circulation toward the front. Infantry companies and troops observed advancing today and guns being moved forward. Very large bodies of troops assembled on both sides of the BELICOURT-BELLENSLEISE Road; on the east side of the canal [ST-QUENTIN Canal] numerous bivouacs, including a large artillery bivouac. 1 1/2 km. west of LEVERGIES unloading of troops, northeast of MAGNY-la-FOSSE tanks advancing according to photographic reconnaissance. Since October 1 considerable increase in quartering troops around ROISEL, a slight increase around PERONNE. Very heavy motor traffic on the roads around PERONNE and on the PERONNE-La-TRANSLOY Road in a decidedly northern direction. In the railroad stations of the AMIENS---CHAULNES---ROISEL Line considerable handling of trains; at MARCHELEPOT, PERONNE, and MARQUAIX loading activity; in the PERONNE Railroad station 17 tank transport cars, and in the ROISEL Railroad station 10 tank transport cars; the standard gauge railroad between PERONNE and ETRICOURT is in operation.

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Evening Report: Eighteenth Army

The counterattack launched in the morning hours against SEQUEHART has brought the town again entirely into our possession. The old line has been reached everywhere. The enemy continued his attacks against the 221st Inf. Div. and 25th Res. Div. into the afternoon hours, but they all collapsed under our effective defensive fires, which caused losses to the enemy. The enemy forces which had advanced across the canal at MORCOURT were driven back across the canal in a dashing attack by elements of the 197th Inf. Div. and 82d Res. Div. * * *
24th Infantry Division to the Control of the Second Army

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN EIGHTEENTII ARMY,
October 2, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 2/OCTOBER

[Extract]

1. The 24th Infantry Division will pass to the control of the Second Army. The 3 battalions that have arrived in SEBONCOURT will be transported by the Second Army in trucks from SEBONCOURT to BRANCOURT, where they will establish communication with the 51st Army Corps in LE CATEAU.

The XIV Army Corps will set the remaining elements of the division in march to BOHAIN in such a manner that the infantry will be moved in trucks before the end of the day so far as this is possible without relief; the rest will be set in march immediately after being relieved.

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von HUTIER,
General of Infantry, Commanding.

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The other divisions are to fight in a position in which not less than 12 to 14 days from now a weak obstacle will be available, nothing else. If battle is to be accepted in such a position, then the army must have assigned to it 5 divisions equal in value to those still usable at the present moment. Three of these could be taken from the left flank of the Second Army and transferred during the movement, while two would have to be assigned before the movement starts. If that is not done, then the condition of the army, which
recently has already given up 4 of its best divisions, will deteriorate to such a degree on moving into the HERMANN Position, that no responsibility can be assumed for even temporarily holding the position.

According to the information possessed by the army, the Armies of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince will come during the withdrawal movement into improved positions secured to a great extent by important water obstacles, so that in the opinion of the army, divisions there can be released, in order to strengthen the badly organized land front of the Eighteenth Army.

In the present position the army can for the time being resist largescale attacks, if no other forces are taken away from it.

Since the right flank is threatened, a division fit for action is constantly required there as counterattack division. * * *

von HUTIER,
General of Infantry, Commanding.

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The organization of the HERMANN Position was started in the afternoon of September 30.

Situation on October 2 as follows:

Detailed reconnaissance and selection of the main line of resistance, reconnaissance of all battery positions with the exception of 2 division sectors. Clearing of the field of fire and organization of the outpost, as well as damming of the SELLE River and HARPIES Creek in several places has been started. Beginning of dugouts at average intervals of 50 meters along and in rear of the main line of resistance on the entire front; beginning of the construction of the wire obstacle.

The following will be completed in four days:

Reconnaissance and staking of the artillery protective positions; reconnaissance of the remainder of the battery positions, command posts and observation posts; posting of signs, marking of installations on the terrain. Selection of sites for antitank pill boxes and beginning of their construction of dugouts (each of 12 frames) at each of 24 artillery command posts and running the survey of most of the battery positions.

In four more days the following will be completed:

All dugouts that have been started will be carried to a depth of 3 meters (27 frames), and machine-gun nests and command posts to a depth of 2 meters (20 frames); completion of half of the communication trenches; survey of all battery positions; at every firing posi-
tion one dugout (12 frames) and at every observation post, one dugout will be started;com-
pletion of the signal communications system between the command posts and the corps head-
quarters.

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By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major.

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**Troops Attached**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 74

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 3, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 3/OCT.

[Extract]

1. The 2d Guard Division and 20th Infantry Division are attached to the 51st Army
Corps. The latter will remain in army reserve in the region of PREMONT.

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By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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**Enemy Attack Repulsed**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 79/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 3, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

Today the army repulsed the enemy attempt to break through the left half of the front
in vastly superior force. After an obstinate resistance on the line on which the enemy's
breakthrough was checked, our initial reserves were followed by a powerful counterattack which drove the enemy off the field.

I desire to express my gratitude and profound appreciation to the IV Reserve Corps and 51st Army Corps, their commanders and all their brave officers and men.

Tomorrow and the days following it will also be of greatest importance not to let the enemy pass. I am confident that the Second Army will continue to hold out unfalteringly.

von CARLOWITZ,
General of Infantry,
Commanding.

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[Editorial Translation]

G. H. Q. Intelligence Officer
No. 3832

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 3, 1918.

For the period September 26 to morning of October 3, 1918

[Extract]

I. Front: In the enemy attack on September 29 there were seven divisions (the 5th, 21st, 33d, 12th, 46th and American 27th and 30th Divisions) in the first line opposite the front of the army. In the course of the day 4 additional divisions were put in line, some of them by passage of lines. (The New Zealand, the Australian 3d and 5th and the 32d Divisions.)

How the front is occupied at present is not clear, but it is to be assumed that some divisions, which were leapfrogged, still have elements in the front line or are immediately behind the front, in the second line. Therefore it is to be assumed that 7 1/2 divisions are occupying the front line and 3 to 4 divisions the second line.

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The following divisions can be assumed as being immediately in rear of the above front line units:

The American 27th and 30th Divisions, the 46th and possibly also the 42d Division.

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III. Estimate of the Situation: The recommitment of the rested Australian army corps in place of the Americans opposite the south portion of the army, and the replacement of two tired British divisions opposite the north portion of the Eighteenth Army by two good French divisions which have been in rest for a long time, indicate that the attack which started today on the south half of the army is to be executed with the greatest vigor. Its objective may be to bring about the abandonment of the canal position. In this case, in order to exert vigorous pressure even on the north half of the army, the divisions that can be assumed to be still in rear of the front would suffice.

von B.,
Captain.
Army, Corps, and Division Activities

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN SECOND AND EIGHTEENTH ARMIES,
October 3, 1918.

[Extract]

Morning Report: Eighteenth Army

Yesterday evening, after a brief artillery preparation, the enemy again moved to an attack against the front north of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal], but our annihilation fire prevented him from developing except against the right flank and just north of the canal. On the right flank he was repulsed in front of our lines. * * *

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Noon Report: Second Army

Toward 7:30 a. m., after an artillery preparation lasting about 1 1/2 hours and an unusual expenditure of ammunition, the enemy attack was launched on a line south from the canal tunnel entrance west of Le CATELET. The enemy put strong masses of infantry, a great many tanks and pursuit planes, into the fight.

On the right flank he penetrated as far as the north portion of Le CATELET and GOUY. Farther south LORMISSEt Farm was lost. Here the enemy advanced farther to BELLEVUE Farm. Attempts to extend these initial successes by committing large masses of men, broke down under the counterattacks launched everywhere under the reliable leadership of the IV Res. Corps. Under our fire the enemy retired in disorder. Le CATELET was recaptured. BELLEVUE Farm was recaptured by the 1st Bn., 87th Inf., under its commander, Capt. Freyer.

Against the 51st Army Corps the enemy attacks penetrated beyond the artillery protective position. In BEAUREVOIR the enemy gained a foothold. A counterattack drove him out again. Farther south the enemy reached the PONCHAUX-MONTBREHAIN Road. Fighting is in progress in MONTBREHAIN. A composite regiment of the 24th Inf. Div. has been committed in a counterthrust north and south of MONTBREHAIN. The 2d Guard Div. is moving up via SERAIN to be committed astride the ROMAN Road.

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Noon Report: Eighteenth Army

The heavy artillery fire opening at 6 a. m. was followed by an attack at 7 a. m. with numerous tanks and attack aviation against the entire front north of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal]. Infantry waves joined in the attack. In the first onset the enemy succeeded in penetrating into the main line of resistance in and on both sides of SEQUEHART, which however was again in our hands as early as 10 a. m., after a counterattack which was launched immediately. * * *
When the enemy penetrated into RAMICOURT and MONTBREHAIN with infantry and tanks, after the division on the right had been forced back, the right flank was refused back to Bois de SENENCOURT [not identified], and 2 regiments of the 34th Inf. Div. were committed in a counterthrust against the line MONTBREHAIN-RAMICOURT to relieve the pressure on the left flank of the 51st Army Corps. Report concerning the progress of the attack has not yet been received.

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Evening Report

Second Army

Our counterattacks led everywhere to success. The IV Res. Corps is again completely in possession of its main line of resistance, with the exception of LORMISSET Farm. The troops of the 54th Inf. Div. pursued the enemy forces that were falling back in disorder before our counterattack and drove them back to BONY. ** In a fresh tank attack against Le CATELET, the enemy attempted at noon to drive the victorious troops back. He was repulsed, and several tanks were put out of action by shell fire.

In the sector of the 21st Res. Div. the British also pushed their troops forward to the attack against BELLEVUE Farm, after a violent fire preparation. This thrust also failed. The troops of the 51st Army Corps likewise repulsed the enemy in counterattacks. There was hot fighting for the La MOTTE Farm which changed hands several times. At present it is in the possession of the enemy. L'ESPAHNE Farm and MONTBREHAIN were recaptured by the 241st Inf. Div. and elements of the 24th Inf. Div. The counterattack on RAMICOURT executed jointly with troops of the Eighteenth Army came to a standstill halfway between MONTBREHAIN and RAMICOURT, owing to an enemy counterattack debouching from RAMICOURT and south thereof. Cavalry employed by the British for the attack was completely annihilated opposite the right flank of the corps concentrations of troops have also been reported.

The enemy employed a great many planes. Low-flying planes in particular inflicted losses on our troops. Our combined attack flights, 4, 11, and 17, in the afternoon machine-gunned and bombed enemy reinforcements advancing along the ROMAN Road and the MAGNY-la-FOSSE Road. Visual reconnaissance showed 46 batteries in action east of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal]. The enemy artillery is grouped mainly around the sugar refinery east of NAUROY and MAGNY-la-FOSSE. ** According to reliable reports, the presence of an American corps at BELLOY-en-SANTERRE southwest of PERONNE was established.**

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Evening Report:

Eighteenth Army

The enemy continued his attacks throughout the entire day, committing fresh forces and numerous tanks. The counterattack executed to relieve the pressure on the left flank of the 51st Army Corps exerted its effect about noontime. Advancing rapidly, the 30th and 67th Inf. Regts. forced the enemy back and at 4 p.m. had reached the line: Railroad station west of MONTBREHAIN---300 meters east of RAMICOURT. Especially bitter fighting took place on the right flank of the 221st Inf. Div., as well as for the possession of SEQUEHART. SEQUEHART changed hands several times and is now again in possession of the enemy, while stiff fighting is still in progress. **
Our distant reconnaissance disclosed considerable railroad traffic on the CHAULNES-PERONNE Line; trains being loaded in NESLES. * * *

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 3, 1918.

[Extract]

On the morning of October 3 the first reports were received at army headquarters that extending from the canal-tunnel entrance as far as the Eighteenth Army, our positions were being shelled by drum fire. Toward 8 a.m. the first reports were received concerning the opening of the enemy attack, stating that the enemy had broken through on the boundary between the IV Reserve Corps and the 51st Army Corps at LORMISSET Farm, as well as on the left flank of the 51st Corps. Shortly thereafter it was reported that fighting was taking place in BEAUREVOIR and that farther south a breakthrough had also taken place on a broad front.

In view of this situation, the 121st Infantry Division was placed at the disposal of the IV Reserve Corps to establish a refuse flank at BEAUREVOIR.

The 41st Corps received orders to move up 1/3 of the 24th Infantry Division to MONT-BREHAIN to restore the situation at that point. The 2d Guard Division was moved up by trucks and placed at the disposal of the 51st Corps to form a refused flank at GENEVE Farm.

The 54th Army Corps was instructed to alert the 20th Infantry Division immediately and to put it in march to PREMONT. Trucks were supplied. The division remained army reserve.

A counterattack of the 34th Infantry Division in s northwest direction was arranged with the Eighteenth Army.

On receiving further unfavorable reports concerning the situation in the 51st Corps, the 54th Corps was issued orders to release all elements of the 38th Infantry Division that could be spared and to move them by trucks as close to the front as possible, in the direction of ESTREES, where they would be at the disposal of the 51st Army Corps.

The recommendation was made to the group of armies, if the situation did not improve, to withdraw the 54th Corps and the IV Reserve Corps into the Siegfried-I Position, possibly speeding up of the HERMANN Movement. The recommendation was not accepted. Later the army received the report that Supreme Headquarters required that they continue to hold their present positions.

The 54th Corps and the IV Reserve Corps were instructed that the present position was to be held. If the situation nevertheless required a withdrawal, the next line was designated as follows: BANTOUZELLE---BONABUS Farm, west of AUBENCHEUL, thence the line: West of LESDAIN---BELLE-ASISSE Farm---west of VILLERS-OUTREAUX.

From the IV Reserve Corps reports had already been received in the course of the morning, concerning the favorable progress of counterattacks at Le CATELET and BELLEVUE Farm, while the reports concerning the fighting in the 51st Corps did not clarify the situation until the afternoon.

The progress of the day's action was as follows:

After a 1 1/2 hour artillery preparation with an extraordinary expenditure of ammunition, the infantry battle began toward 7:30 a.m. from the cannal-tunnel entrance west of Le CATELET toward the south.
In order to break through the front, the enemy put large masses of troops, a great many tanks and pursuit planes into the fight.

On the right flank the freshly committed British 50th Division penetrated the north portion of Le CATELET and GOUY. Farther south LORMISSET Farm was lost. Here the enemy pushed forward as far as BELLEVUE Farm.

The attacks against portions of the front held by the 51st Corps penetrated beyond the artillery protective position. The enemy gained a foothold in BEAUREVOIR. Farther south he reached the PONCHAUX-MONTBREHAIN Road and penetrated into MONTBREHAIN.

In the sector of the IV Reserve Corps the enemy using masses of troops attempted to broaden his initial successes. These came to naught owing to the counterthrusts launched under the reliable command of the IV Reserve Corps. The enemy fled the field in our fire. The reserves of the 90th Res. Inf. and of the 27th Res. Inf. recaptured Le CATELET. In the pursuit the troops of the 54th Inf. Div. drove the enemy back to BONY. In this operation the headquarters officers of the 2d Bn., 2d Guard F. A., themselves served the guns following heavy losses in men.

Farther to the left the 1st Bn., 87th Res. Inf. had recaptured BELLEVUE Farm.

After a very heavy artillery fire the British attempted in the afternoon by a fresh tank attack on Le CATELET to throw back our victorious troops. They were repulsed, and several of their tanks were shelled out of action. A strong enemy counterthrust against BELLEVUE Farm shared the same fate.

The counterattacks of the troops of the 51st Corps were also successful. BEAUREVOIR was recaptured. A hot fight developed for LORMISSET Farm, which changed hands several times and finally remained in the possession of the enemy.

The 2d Guard Division had been put in line on both sides of the ROMAN Road. It restored the situation.

L'ESPAGNE Farm and MONTBREHAIN were recaptured by the 241st Inf. Div. and elements of the 24th Inf. Div.

A counterattack on RAMICOURT conducted jointly with troops of the Eighteenth Army was brought to a standstill at 5:40 p. m. halfway between MONTBREHAIN-RAMICOURT by an enemy counterattack that debouched from RAMICOURT and south thereof.

In view of the favorable outcome of the counterattacks, the order was issued at 6 p. m. for the 54th Corps and IV Reserve Corps to hold their positions. The 51st Corps was to gain possession of its main line of resistance.

The IV Reserve Corps received orders to constitute reserves in rear of its left flank, while the 51st Corps was to reorganize the units of its front divisions. The 2d Guard Division and 1/3 of the 24th Inf. Div. remained at the disposal of the corps.

Toward 7 p. m. the enemy again attacked the right half of the 51st Corps after a short surprise burst. He succeeded in penetrating in two places, so that the main line of resistance had to be withdrawn into the general line BELLEVUE Farm--west edge of BEAUREVOIR--MONTBREHAIN.

The 51st Corps reported gaps in the infantry occupation of the position. In order to close these, the following troops were placed at the disposal of the corps:

1/3 of the 121st Inf. Div. for BEAUREVOIR.

1/3 of the 30th Inf. Div. as reserves south of the Roman Road in the line PONCHAUX--east edge MONTBREHAIN. The remainder of the division was to be moved up as army reserve as far as Chateau VAUX-le-PRETRE.
According to reliable reports, an American corps was identified at BELLOY southwest of PERONNE. • • •

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**Boundary between Second and Eighteenth Armies**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8088

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 3, 1918.

**ARMY ORDER NO. 3/OCTOBER**

[Extract]

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5. Effective October 3, 1918, the boundary between the Second and Eighteenth Armies is fixed as follows:

Present boundary in the main line of resistance---south and east edge of BOHAIN---northwest edge of La HAIE-MENNERESSE (the Eighteenth Army retains the right to the joint use of the direct road FRESNOY-le-GRAND---BOHAIN---VAUX-ANDIGNY as before)---north edge ST-MARTIN-RIVIERE.

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von HUTIER,
General of Infantry, Commanding.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1646

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,
October 4, 1918.

[Extract]

The Group of Armies is expecting that the enemy attacks are certain to be continued and that the main effort will be made against the interior flanks of the Second and Eighteenth Armies. Judging by the deployment of the enemy artillery, the attacks will be continued against the south half of the IV Res. Corps, the entire 51st Army Corps and the Bav. I Army Corps. Apparently the attacks thus far against the south half of the IV Res. Corps and the north half of the 51st Army Corps were designed to cut off the salient at the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal] by an assault in a northeasterly direction. The withdrawal
of the front line of the 54th Corps and IV Res. Corps into the Siegfried-II Position necessitated by the loss of ground at Le CATELET, GOUY and east thereof, effects only a small economy of force, despite the shortening of the front. The new position has no tank obstacle to its front and is not organized. Therefore this front of the Second Army, which only has been thinly held so far must also be occupied in greater force and must be supplied with reserves, as the enemy will very soon push across the canal and attack.

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von BOEHN,
General Commanding.

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[Extract]

Morning Report: Second Army

Toward 7 p. m. after a sudden but brief burst of fire, the enemy made a surprise attack against the right half of the 51st Army Corps. He penetrated at two points, so that the main line of resistance had to be withdrawn into the general line BELLEVUE Farm ---west edge of BEAUREVOIR---MONTBREHAIN.

Since 6 a. m. heavy enemy fire from VENDHUILE south overlapping into the sector of the Eighteenth Army.

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Morning Report: Eighteenth Army

The counterattack on the right flank of the army to recapture the main line of resistance gained only very little ground until evening, owing to the strong hostile counteraction. A counterattack executed from RAMICOURT against the front of the 67th Inf. was repulsed after bitter fighting. SEQUEHART remained in the hands of the enemy. Although he committed fresh troops and tanks, all his attempts, continued into the night, to break through our front north of the canal [St-QUENTIN Canal], were repulsed, at some points in hand-to-hand fighting. * * *

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Noon Report:  

Second Army

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*** According to reliable reports, an American corp headquarters was identified southeast of BAPAUME. A radio station with a new type of equipment was heard southwest of CAMBRAI. Americans can be expected to be placed in line in the CAMBRAI region.

Noon Report:  

Eighteenth Army

The first onslaught on the entire front of the Bavarian I Army Corps following the heavy artillery preparation this morning, was neutralized to a great extent by the annihilation fire of our artillery. Only in LESDINS and MORCOURT did the enemy succeed in establishing himself. Since 9:15 a.m. heavy fighting has blazed up again on the entire front of the Bav. I Army Corps. The enemy has penetrated into our position south of SEQUEHART and succeeded in gaining ground in MORCOURT beyond the railroad. The last available reserves have been put in line for a counterattack.

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Evening Report:  

Second Army

On Hill 153 [not identified] northwest of Le CATELET bitter hand-to-hand fighting took place throughout the day for our centers of resistance that were holding out there. The enemy pressure was relieved by a powerful counterattack of the 8th Inf. Div. which drove enemy back to the south slopes, and checked his reserves that had just been moved up. *** The enemy who had pushed forward up the draw from GOUY to AUBENCHEUL, was so checked by our artillery and machine-gun fire that he made no attempt to widen his penetration. Hostile attempts to attack east of Le CATELET failed to develop owing to our artillery fire.

Toward Beaurevoir troops of the 121st Inf. Div. moved to the counterattack on their own initiative. The 119th Inf. Div. on the right flank entered the fight. BEAUREVOIR was recaptured, and the main line of resistance west and south of the village was regained. Bodies of enemy troops assembled opposite the 21st Inf. Div. and the right flank of the 241st Inf. Div. have been taken under our annihilation fire. Opposite the 54th Army Corps a fresh attempt to cross at BANTEUX was foiled.

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Evening Report:  

Eighteenth Army

From the attack directed against the front of the Bav. I Army Corps this morning, numerous local actions developed which assumed particular violence south of SEQUEHART as well as at LESDINS and MORCOURT and lasted until evening. South of SEQUEHART the enemy was checked at the west edge of FONTAINE Hill [hill between FONTAINE-UTERTE and BELLECOURT Farm] and was driven back against the SEQUEHART-LESDINS Road. After a fresh and vigorous artillery preparation the enemy penetrated into LESDINS at 6:16 p.m. Our flank is being refused there. In violent fighting MORCOURT has been cleared of the enemy as far as the railroad.

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- 873 -
Antitank Defense

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  
No. 110/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,  
October 4, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

For the local defense of important railroad and bridge installations against tanks and armored cars that break through, the corps will immediately employ machine guns with armor-piercing ammunition and antiaircraft guns. The 54th Army Corps particularly will take steps to defend the SAULZOIR-SOLESMES Railway against breakthrough from the vicinity of CAMBRAI.

Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  
No. 111/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,  
October 4, 1918—5 p. m.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The 54th Army Corps and the IV Reserve Corps will be withdrawing during the night of October 4/5 into the position: West of LESDINS---BEL-ASISSE Farm---ARDISSART Farm---Siegfried-II Position west of VILLERS-OUTREAUX---BELLEVUE Farm (Liaison at the last named point with the 51st Army Corps).

4. As the IV Reserve Corps withdraws, it will relieve the 54th Infantry Division and will put it in march to Sector 5, in rear of the HERMANN Position. The IV Reserve Corps will constitute reserves from its own troops to be placed in rear of the left flank. One-third of the 38th Infantry Division will remain with the IV Reserve Corps as reserve, but will not be put into the front line if this can be avoided, so that it can rejoin the 38th Infantry Division in the Sector 2 of the HERMANN Position. One-third of the 21st Infantry Division will remain with the IV Reserve Corps for the present.

5. The 51st Corps will remain in its present position. It will retain control of the 119th, 21st and 241st Infantry Divisions, 2d Guard Division and one-third of the 24th Infantry Division.

The 121st Infantry Division will be relieved again if at all possible and be placed in corps reserve behind the right flank.

Every possible effort will be made to effect the relief also of the 2d Guard Infantry Division.
6. Army Reserves: One infantry regiment of the 208th Infantry Division around DE-HERIES, attached to the IV Reserve Corps which will provide it with an accompanying battery. The 20th Infantry Division around Chateau VAUX-le-PRETre, with one-third pushed well forward.

7. Beginning of the movement in the 54th Corps and IV Reserve Corps: 8 p.m.; rear-guards, 12 midnight.
   Outposts will be left in the present positions until dawn to screen the movement.

9. The occupation for the HERMANN Position is planned as follows:

   IV Reserve Corps
   4 German Jaeger Div.
   5 54th Inf. Div.
   6 8th Inf. Div.
   Counterattack Div. 121st

   51st Army Corps:
   7 21st Res. Div.
   8 ? (will be designated by Group of Armies)

   Group of Armies Reserve:
   2d Guard Division

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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[Editorial Translation]

Intelligence Section

MORNING REPORT

[Extract]

A station with a new type of equipment was heard and identified southwest of CAMBRAI. American Morse code was heard for the first time. We must look for the entrance into line of Americans opposite CAMBRAI.

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After a one-hour barrage, the enemy moved to the attack at 7 a. m. from west of Le CATELET to the center of the 51st Army Corps.

He succeeded in capturing Le CATELET and in pushing forward in the draw halfway to AUBENCHEUL. Hill 153 (sic) northwest of Le CATELET also fell partially into the hands of the enemy.

The hill east of Le CATELET and BELLEVUE Farm was held against all attacks. Beaurevoir was lost in a powerful tank attack.

On both sides of the ROMAN Road the 2d Guard Division repulsed the enemy.

In order to restore the situation at Le CATELET, 1/3 of the 38th Inf. Div. was brought up by trucks to the IV Reserve Corps.

The 208th Infantry Division coming from the Seventeenth Army was to be directed by trucks to SERAIN and ELINCOURT. It was attached to the IV Res. Corps as army reserve. Toward noon the report was received that only one regiment would be sent to the army. It was placed in readiness in DEHERIES.

The 121st Infantry Division was placed at the disposal of the 51st Corps with instruction to hold BEAUREVOIR and the hills east thereof at all costs.

In the meantime our counterattacks had opened. They developed into bitter hand-to-hand fighting lasting throughout the day, on Hill 153 (sic) northwest of Le CATELET. Our pockets of resistance holding out there were disengaged by a powerful counterthrust of the 8th Infantry Division. The enemy was forced back to the south slopes, and the fresh reserves that had just moved up were checked.

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Troops of the 121st Inf. Div. had moved to the counterattack against BEAUREVOIR on their own initiative. The 119th Infantry Division extended its flank to the right to maintain contact. BEAUREVOIR was recaptured, and the main line of resistance west and south of the village was reoccupied.

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At 8 p. m. the 54th Army Corps and the IV Reserve Corps were withdrawn into the line: West of LESDINS---BEL-ASISSE Farm---Siegfried-II Position, from ARDISSART Farm to GUISANCOU RT Farm---BELLEVUE Farm. The rearguards started the movement at 12 midnight. Posts remained in the old position until daybreak. * * * *

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Position of Main Line of Resistance

[Editorial Translation]

Operations and Intelligence Sections
No. 1644

Subject: Hermann Position

Reference: Second Army, Operations Section No. 18/October

To: Second Army

According to the map [not found] attached to the communication of the Second Army, Operations Section No. 18/Oct., of October 3, 1918, the main line of resistance is located too far from SELLE River.

The trace of the line must be changed without delay so that the tank obstacle will be directly dominated by infantry fire from the front trench of the main battle position.

By order of the Group of Armies:

von LOSSBERG,
Major General and General à la suite,
Chief of Staff.

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[Extract]

In the sector of the 54th Army Corps and IV Reserve Corps the movements were carried out as planned and unnoticed by the enemy. ***

At 7:15 a. m. the enemy moved to the attack against the sector of the 21st Reserve Division and the 51st Army Corps behind a rolling barrage and under the protection of a dense fog.

Toward 8 a. m. the corps reported that the enemy attacks were very violent; between 9 and 10 a. m. they reported that GUISANCOURT Farm and MONTBREHAIN were lost, while the situation at the center was still unclarified.

The Chief of Staff of the army requested authority from the Group of Armies to move the regiment of the 208th Infantry Division nearer the front, and called attention to the weakness of the counterattack divisions.

Thereupon 1/3 of the 29th Infantry Division was sent by trucks to BRANCOURT for the army; in addition, the 204th Infantry Division was assigned to it.

As it had been planned, according to our understanding here, to employ the 204th and
208th Infantry Divisions as complete units, the 1/3 of the 208th Inf. Div. was not to be put in line if possible.

According to reports received later, the enemy attack on the right flank had led to the loss of GUIRANCOURT Farm. A strong thrust from this farm collapsed completely in our fire and the farm was recaptured in a local counterattack.

At the center, the 119th and 21st Infantry Divisions had repulsed all enemy attacks. Against BEAUREVOIR alone, the British attacked three times with the freshly committed British 25th Division, supported by numerous tanks. The assaults all collapsed with heavy losses for the enemy. • • •

A particularly strong thrust with many tanks and dense infantry masses was executed at MONTBREHAIN. The enemy penetrated as far as the northeast and east edges of the village. Here the attack was checked, and all attempts to advance beyond the village were repulsed. Our counterthrust at first penetrated as far as the church. Here it encountered most obstinate enemy resistance. A bitter house-to-house fight against greatly superior numbers of the enemy developed, which continued throughout the day until nightfall, in the course of which MONTBREHAIN finally had to be abandoned again.

In the meantime fresh fighting had also broken out farther north.

At 2:45 p.m. a local attack against the BEAUREVOIR railroad station, supported by tanks, was repulsed.

At 6 p.m., after a very heavy fire preparation, the enemy again launched an attack against the 119th and 121st Infantry Division, debouching in dense masses. A bitter struggle developed. Despite the most vigorous resistance—the loyal commander of the 56th Res. Inf., Major von Luebbecke, personally fought at the head of his regiment—BEAUREVOIR could not be held. The assault of the enemy was repelled in front of the 21st Infantry Division.

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Through reliable information several stations with new types of equipment were identified, one of them at LAGNICOURT and another one, which was sending out messages in American Morse Code, southwest of CAMBRAI.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Reports of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN SECOND AND EIGHTEENTH ARMIES,
October 5, 1918.

[Extracts]

Morning Report: Second Army

The sector of the 51st Army Corps lay under vigorous enemy fire from 5 p.m. until nightfall. During the night moderate artillery activity by both sides on the entire front. Toward 6 a.m. heavy fire opened from Le CATELET as far as the left boundary of the army. At MONTBREHAIN a heavy attack with tanks in progress; the enemy is also working his way forward in the sectors of the other divisions. The movements in the 54th Army Corps and
IV Res. Corps seem to have been carried out according to plan. Final reports have not yet been received.

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Morning Report: Eighteenth Army

The violent local actions in LESDINS and MORCOURT continued into the night. The enemy was driven out of LESDINS, but MORCOURT remained in his possession at the close of the fighting. The place is surrounded on 3 sides.

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Noon Report: Second Army

At 7:15 a. m., after a preparation lasting one hour and under the cover of a dense fog and behind a rolling box barrage, the enemy moved to the attack against the 21st Res. Div. and 51st Army Corps. GUISANCOURT Farm on the right flank was lost. A powerful thrust from this farm was completely broken up by our fire. The farm was recaptured by counterattack.

At the center, the 119th and 21st Inf. Divs. repulsed all enemy attacks. Against BEAUREVOIR alone the British rushed three times, supported by tanks. All assaults collapsed with heavy losses for the enemy. Only at the boundary of the IV Res. Corps a tank broken through and dropped a machine gun at the northeast edge of BEAUREVOIR. Measures are being taken to destroy it.

A particularly powerful thrust with numerous tanks and masses of infantry was made at MONTBREHAIN: the enemy broke through to the east and northeast edge of the village. The attempt to advance farther from the village was foiled. Our counterattack apparently has reached the church in MONTBREHAIN and is continuing to make progress.

In the north half of the army the movements took place as planned. No reports have been received so far about a pursuit by the enemy. Officer patrols are still at the canal. ** ** A radio station with a new type of equipment, sending in American Morse code, was identified southwest of CAMBRAI.

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Noon Report: Eighteenth Army

The attack expected for this morning was launched at 6 a. m. against the front north of the canal [ST-QUENTIN Canal], following a very powerful artillery fire in which smoke was employed against the front lines and gas against the rear area.

Opposite the 221st and 81st Inf. Divs. the attack was beaten off by our accurate annihilation fire and consequently developed only to a very limited extent there. However, against the 34th Inf. Div. the enemy advanced in a powerful attack, supported by tanks. The brave regiments repulsed all frontal attacks, inflicting heavy losses. Not until the enemy had succeeded in penetrating on the left flank of the Second Army at MONTBREHAIN and advancing from there against the flank of the division, was the right flank somewhat withdrawn. The division will join in a counterattack by reserves of the Second Army. Local fighting developed again at LESDINS. A rather strong enemy detachment which had pressed forward across the canal south of MORCOURT was repulsed with losses.

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- 879 -
Evening Report: Second Army

** At 4 p.m. tanks and infantry advanced in a northeast direction from Le CATELET.
** At 2:45 p.m. an attack supported by tanks against the BEAUREVOIR railroad station was repulsed. ** Throughout the afternoon heavy house-to-house fighting for MONTBREHAIN took place with varying results. At present we are on the north and east edges of the village; the railroad station is again in the hands of the enemy. Since 6 p.m. heavy artillery fire on the entire front of the 51st Army Corps, followed by an attack of dense masses on BEAUREVOIR. Outcome not yet reported. **

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Evening Report: Eighteenth Army

Attacking again and again the enemy attempted throughout the day to break through our lines. Violent local attacks developed on the entire battle front in the course of which our positions were held everywhere by the stubbornly resisting infantry. The right flank of the army has joined the counterattack of the left flank of the Second Army against MONTBREHAIN and has reached the region south of MONTBREHAIN. Special mention is due to the artillery which effectively supported the infantry in its heavy fighting, at times with direct fire.

The fighting is still in progress in LESDINS; measures are being taken to free the village of the enemy. **

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Army Order

Establishment of Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8127

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 5, 1918.

Reference: Hermann Order No. 3, Paragraph 9

[Extract]

On occupation of the HERMANN Position, the following tactical boundaries will be in force:

(a) Between Second and Eighteenth Armies: North edge of St-MARTIN-RIVIERE---crossroads in l'ARBRE-de-GUISE---crossroads in MAZINGHIEN---south edge of CATillon---southeast exit of La GROISE---TEMPLE Farm (Second) [Ferme du TEMPLE-d'en-BAS]---FAVRIL (Second) ---CROIX-HAINAU (Second)---La BASSE MAROILLES (Second)---TAISNIERES (Second)---ST-REMYCHAUSSÉE (Second)---ECUELIN (Second)---ECLAIBES (Second)---BEAUFORT (Second)---FERRIERE-la-PETITE (Eighteenth)---CERFONTAINE (Second)---ROCQ (Second)---then the old boundary.
Continuation of Enemy Attacks; Fresh Reserves

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, Foreign Armies
No. 10697

SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON OCTOBER 6, 1918

[Extract]

1. British-Belgian Front: Enemy attacks are still in progress north of St-QUENTIN. There has been a lull in the fighting in FLANDERS and south of the SCARPE. Despite their expenditure of forces the British are expected to continue their offensive, especially on both sides of CAMBRAI. The possibility of an attack in the vicinity of NIEUPORT and of operations against the Belgian coast continues to exist.

After we withdrew our lines the enemy pursued between the LYS and the SCARPE. 2 divisions which had been moved up from the front south of the SCARPE were recently identified in this sector. However, the front does not seem to have been materially strengthened.

2. French corps and French cavalry have been identified northeast of YPRES. On the British south wing 2 British divisions were relieved by French.

It is probable that the British still have 3 fresh divisions in reserve at their disposal. 2 more divisions, which are in process of reorganization after temporary relief can be ready for employment in a short time. Moreover, the transport of reinforcements from Italy and the Balkans is possible.

The relieved British divisions can be ready for employment on an attack front again after they have been filled up with replacements and have rested several days.

Henceforth, the combat value of the Belgians will be regarded as slight.

The Americans seem to have been withdrawn from the British front. We anticipate the reemployment of these forces plus American reinforcements on this front.

By order:

LUEDENDORFF.

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- 881 -
Army Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

Operations and Intelligence Sections
No. 1682

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,
October 6, 1918.

T E L E T Y P E T O S E C O N D A N D E I G H T E E N T H A R M I E S

Boundary between Second and Eighteenth Armies is fixed as follows:
PRESELLES (Eighteenth Army)---crossroads Ancien MOULIN de l'ARBRE-HAUT---
JONNECOURT Farm (Second Army)---south edge of BOHAIN, thence in conformity with Order No. 1590.

Tank Guard

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 194/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 6, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 6/OCT.

[Extract]

1. To points within about 12 km. in rear of the front line, the town majors will
assign a special tank guard in every village. Their mission will be as follows:
Transmitting tank alert by bugle call, megaphone; timely barricading of the road by
agricultural implements (bulky iron articles, harrows, etc.); in case of emergency, co-
operating with the single pieces of the counterattack divisions posted at the village
exits.

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von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 6, 1918.

[Extract]

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In the morning the enemy advanced on the entire front with patrols, and at some points in rather heavy force. He attempted to determine the trace of our front line. For this purpose he launched an infantry attack against the front of the 30th Infantry Division. In front of the center of the division his thrust failed to develop on account of our annihilation fire; on the flanks it collapsed in our infantry and machine-gun fire.

GUISCOURT Farm was lost in a surprise attack. Two counterattacks to recapture the farm remained without success, owing to the very heavy enemy counteraction.

Between La SABLONNIERE and PONCHAUX the enemy advanced numerous large sized patrols between 6 and 8 a.m., after a short concentration. They were allowed to come close and were then annihilated.

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Operations Section
GERMAN SECOND AND EIGHTEENTH ARMIES,
October 6, 1918.

[Extracts]

Second Army

The enemy has pushed forward on the entire front with patrols, at some points in rather heavy force. He is attempting to determine the location of our front line. The attack against the left flank of the 30th Inf. Div. to which he committed his infantry for this purpose collapsed in our fire. Opposite the center of the division his thrust failed to develop. GUISCOURT Farm was lost in a surprise attack. A counterattack is in progress. Between La-SABLONNIERE and PONCHAUX the enemy sent forward numerous large patrols between 6 and 8 a.m., after a sudden and brief concentration. The annihilation fire of our artillery is falling on BEAUREVOIR, the north and east edges of which are heavily occupied. A resumption of the attacks can be expected here. * * *
Noon Report: Eighteenth Army

After the heavy losses of yesterday, the enemy jumped off to an attack only from LESDINS, under a heavy protective barrage. The bodies of enemy troops which were observed in time forming up in LESDINS, were taken under vigorous annihilation fire, so that the attack which was only weakly executed, collapsed in our infantry and machine-gun fire. New troop formations were observed and shelled with concentrated annihilation fire. Otherwise the forenoon on the battle front passed with vigorous harassing fire which at times increased to great violence, but without any particular combat activity. * * *

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Evening Report: Second Army

As subsequently reported, the enemy this morning also attacked the right regiment of the 30th Inf. Div. and was repulsed. Likewise an attack collapsed that was launched from Bois de MORTHO at 11:30 a. m., following a brief and sudden concentration. The counterattack to recapture GUISENCOURT Farm met with no success owing to the very heavy hostile counteraction. Movements on the hills at MONTCOUVEZ Farm and AUBENCHEUL, troop formations at RANCOURT Farm, tanks and automobiles advancing from that place in the direction of AUBENCHEUL, as well as large numbers of motor vehicles, apparently tanks, at the church in ESTREES were taken under fire.

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Evening Report: Eighteenth Army

After a violent artillery preparation, a heavy infantry attack was made at 11:30 a. m. against the 84th and 197th Inf. Divs. The weak force which had been fighting untiringly for weeks, repulsed the first thrust partly by their annihilation fire and partly by violent hand-to-hand fighting. At 2:30 p. m. the enemy artillery fire increased to great violence and also overlapped into the adjacent sectors. In conjunction with this another heavy attack was launched under the cover of smoke and gas against the 84th and 197th Inf. Divs. REMAUCOURT was one point where the enemy main effort struck. In obstinate hand-to-hand fighting a struggle took place for the main line of resistance. Boldly committing fresh forces disposed in depth and constantly reinforcing his line, the enemy succeeded toward 5 p. m. in breaking through our line between LESDINS and MORCOURT. Contesting every step, our troops withdraw toward ESSIGNY-le-PETIT and the hill south thereof. The enemy pursues vigorously. * * *

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Eighteenth Army and Second Army Transfer

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  
No. 2829  

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,  
October 7, 1918—10:30 p. m.  

To Eighteenth Army

[Extract]

1. Effective at noon, October 8, the Eighteenth Army will pass to the control of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, and the Second Army to the control of the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht.

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Operations Section  
GERMAN SECOND AND EIGHTEENTH ARMIES,  
October 7, 1918.

Morning Report:  
Second Army

After a violent fire action the enemy attacked the right flank of the 21st Res. Div. Thanks to the obstinate resistance of our troops he met with no success. Apart from moderate enemy harassing fire reaching deep into the rear area, the night passed without special incident. Since 6:15 a.m. heavy enemy fire against the south portion of the IV Res. Corps and the sector of the 51st Army Corps. On the right flank of the 21st Res. Div. a small penetration seems to have been made, against which a counterattack with local reserves is in progress. No further attacks have been reported so far. The 20th Inf. Div. has assumed command in the sector of the 21st Inf. Div. and the 24th Inf. Div. in the sector of the 241st Inf.

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Morning Report:  
Eighteenth Army

[Extract]

Yesterday’s heavy attack was brought to a standstill in the evening by committing local reserves on the west slope of hill between FONTAINE-UTERTE and BELLICOURT Farm. The main thrust was checked halfway between ESSIGNY-le-PETIT and REMAUCOURT by committing two battalions of the 29th Inf. Div., which regained some ground in the counterattack. From there our line extends via TILLOY Farms to the Canal Position south of MORCOURT, which did not need to be abandoned.

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Evening Report: Second Army

[Extract]

Although the enemy attempted to attack the 20th Inf. Div. four times today, he made only very little progress this afternoon, as our vigorous annihilation fire was able to check him when he was still in his assembly positions. Our line was forced back only by about 300 meters, then his thrust was checked. A counterattack to recapture our old position is in progress.

On the remaining front the enemy fire at times has become considerably more vigorous since noon. At 1:30 p.m. a thrust by the enemy from Bois de MORTHO was repulsed; farther south, as far as AUBENCHEUL, his assembly positions were neutralized by concentrated annihilation fire.

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Evening Report: Eighteenth Army

[Extract]

The fighting at QUENTIN blazed out again this morning. Following heavy concentrated bursts of fire, the enemy attacked the hill at BELLECOURT Farm twice in the afternoon hours. Both attacks collapsed in our annihilation fire. Again at 4 p.m. very heavy fire opened against the sector of the front from SEQUEHART to MORCOURT. In conjunction with it waves of the enemy attacked the sector of the 84th Inf. Div. in close succession. In stiff fighting this attack was also repulsed by the severely weakened 83d and 423d Inf. Regts., and the position was held. At 5 p.m., after renewal of the very heavy fire, the enemy moved to the attack for the fourth time against the line: Hill at BELLECOURT Farm---TILLOY Farms. Heavy fighting blazed out on that line; its outcome is still uncertain.

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Troops for Relief

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 7, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. (a) The 185th Infantry Division is placed at the disposal of the 54th Army Corps to relieve elements of the 30th Infantry Division. The corps will issue the necessary orders for the movement.

- 886 -
2. The 4th Cyclist Bn. is placed at the disposal of the IV Reserve Corps for a few days to relieve the one-third of the 38th Infantry Division during the night of October 7/8.

3. The 51st Army Corps will move the 241st Infantry Division to positions in rear of the Hermann Position, together with all elements of the 21st and 121st Infantry Divisions and 2d Guard Division that can be spared on the front line.

4. The 204th Infantry Division is placed at the disposal of the 51st Corps. It will effect the relief of the third of the 208th Infantry Division (army reserve) during the night October 7/8 and then begin the relief of the troops located in the sector of the 119th Infantry Division.

5. The 5th and 6th Bns. of the 2d Infantry Cyclist Brigade will be moved up to Bohain as army reserve until one-third of the 30th Infantry Division is moved to the rear of the 24th Infantry Division.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Relief of 121st Division

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 236/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 7, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 7/OCT.

[Extract]

8. Upon completion of its relief from the front, the 121st Infantry Division is attached to the IV Reserve Corps and will be quartered by the latter east of the HERMANN Position. (Advance information by telephone.)

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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- 887 -
**Enemy Attacks**

[Editorial Translation]

**GERMAN SECOND ARMY**
**October 7, 1916**

[Extract]

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In the sector of the 51st Army Corps the enemy artillery fire soon increased to the greatest intensity. At 6:30 a.m. the enemy attacked under the protection of the morning fog from north of the ROMAN Road as far as MONTBREHAIN. At 7:30 a.m. the enemy attack extended as far as the boundary between the IV Reserve Corps and the 51st Corps.

The assault of the enemy infantry, which debouched in dense masses, was checked with heavy losses to the enemy. The enemy stormed three times the front of the 20th Infantry Division. Finally he succeeded in effecting a penetration at the center of the division. An immediate counterattack restored the situation, with the exception of a few British points of resistance which remained. The American 30th Division in the order of battle was confirmed by prisoners.

Toward noon the enemy again resumed his attacks against the 20th Infantry Division. Its front was forced back about 300 meters, then the thrust was checked. The losses of the enemy were heavy; numerous dead bodies lay in front of our position.

When the enemy had his troops attack the front of the 20th Infantry Division for the fifth time at 6:20 p.m., he was unable to gain even a foot of ground.

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**Change of Boundary**

[Editorial Translation]

[Extract]

From: Operations Section
At: Supreme Headquarters
Date: October 8, 1918 Hour: 4:55 p.m. Sent by: Telephone No. 10722
To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

Change of boundary between Second and Eighteenth Armies: BOHAIN (Second)---REGNICOURT (Second)---WASSIGNY (Eighteenth)---La GROISE (Eighteenth).

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- 888 -
Assignment of Unit

[Editorial Translation]

From: Operations Section

At: Group of Armies Boehn

Date: Received for transmission: October 8, 1918: 12:12 p.m. No. 1755

To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The following order was issued to the Eighteenth Army at 11:55 a.m.:

As the 81st Reserve Division arrives, the Eighteenth Army will move it to the right wing of the army in the region of BOHAIN and will use this division to prevent a breakthrough on the south wing of the Second Army.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 8, 1918.

[Extract]

October 8 was a day of the heaviest kind of fighting for the Second Army.

At 2 p.m. the severe harassing fire of the night before increased suddenly to greatest intensity from the left flank of the German Jaeger Division as far as the Roman Road. After a fire action of about half an hour, the enemy debouched from Bois de MORTHO and moved to the attack against the entire front of the IV Reserve Corps.

He succeeded in penetrating the left flank of the 54th Army Corps. A local counter-attack in the sector of the 8th Infantry Division contributed to the complete repulse of the enemy. In the sector of the 21st Reserve Division our line was forced back somewhat north of GUISANCOURT Farm.

The artillery duel between the opposing artilleries was maintained vigorously even after the enemy attack was repulsed.

At 5:30 a.m. drum fire suddenly opened against the sector of the 54th Army Corps and IV Reserve Corps, extending toward 6:15 to the front of the 51st Army Corps and south thereof.

Toward 7:45 a.m. the first reports concerning the beginning of the infantry action came in. The enemy was attacking in force on the entire army front.

At first the right flank and the center of the army reported successes the enemy had been able to obtain in his first assault.

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The 54th Infantry Division was placed at the disposal of the IV Reserve Corps. It was to be brought up to CLARY.
Gradually more precise reports came in from the left flank of the army also. It became apparent
that here the situation was the most serious, and that an enemy breakthrough was threatening.
The IV Reserve Corps received orders to move the 54th Infantry Division to MARETZ. The 1st and 5th Cyclist Bns. on the march to HAUCOURT, were diverted to BUSIGNY, where they
passed to the control of the 51st Army Corps. The 25th Inf. of the 208th Inf. Div., placed
at the disposal of the 51st Army Corps, was to be moved up from the vicinity of ELINCOURT;
likewise the elements of the artillery of the 204th Inf. Div. which had unloaded at SALESCHES.
The 185th Infantry Division was placed under the control of the 54th Army Corps. This
corps, together with the XIV Reserve Corps, intended to execute a counterattack on the army
boundary at 2 p.m. At the same time the air forces of the Second and Eighteenth Armies
were launched in an attack on the left flank.
The mass attack was launched by the enemy behind a powerful barrage that began to creep after
lasting one hour. It was marked by a reckless employment of tanks and an unprecedented use of
low-flying planes. By noon it had forced the army back into the following line: Hill 126, north of
ESNES---ESNES---west edge of Bois du MOULIN---DEHERIES---hills west of ELINCOURT---
crossroads on the ROMAN Road 1 km. south of AVELU---east of PREMONT---BRANCOUCOURT
Farm---JONNECOURT Farm.
The penetration of the enemy had progressed so far that it became impossible to hold the
enemy in this line for any length of time. East of PREMONT in the direction of BOHAIN the situation
was entirely unclarified. The right flank of the army seemed seriously threatened. It was
necessary to withdraw into the HERMANN Position. The Army decided not to put the 54th
Infantry Division in line but to place it in readiness at MONTAY and FOREST, to be moved by trucks
on call. The 3d Naval Division and 15th Res. Division moved up in trucks by the Seventeenth Army
were not thrown into the battle. The 3d Naval Division was assembled in the area of ARBRE-de-
GUISE, MAZINGHIEN, RIBEAVUILLE, and the 15th Reserve Division in the VAUX-ANDIGNY region.
At 12 noon the army passed under the command of the Group of Armies Crown Prince
Rupprecht.

Farther south, in SERAIN, elements of the 4th Cyclist Bn. had been offering a most
obstinate resistance against an enemy tank attack echeloned in depth, launched at 10:30
a.m. The weak detachment holding the place had to withdraw finally. Hesse-Nassau Reserve
regiments checked the attack in the line. Southwest edge of ELINCOURT---crossroads on the
ROMAN Road 1 km. south of AVELU. 6 tanks were shelled out of action by batteries of the
21st Reserve Field Artillery. In the afternoon a few more local attacks were repulsed here.

On the front of the 51st Army Corps the enemy had assembled the entire English Cavalry
Corps. According to captured documents, the corps was to break through as far as Le CATEAU
and destroy the railroad to VALENCIENNES.

Cavalry debouching from SERAIN, PREMONT and BRANCOUCOURT was dispersed by our defensive
artillery fire. Masses of cavalry assembled west of PREMONT and horse-drawn batteries
were scattered by our attack planes and artillery fire.

During the night the army was withdrawn into a rearward position in the line:
BEAUVOIS-en-CAMBRESIS---west of MONTIGNY---east of MARETZ---rail triangle west of BUSIGNY
---standard-gauge railway west of BOHAIN. This position was to be held until nightfall, October 9.

For the night continuation of the movement into the HERMANN Position had been planned.
At 11 p.m. the main body of the divisions in line started to move; the rearguards followed
at 2:30 a.m. Posts remained in contact with the enemy. * * *

* * * * *-* * *
Withdrawal of Front

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 296/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 8, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The front will be withdrawn into a rearguard position during the night of October 8/9, and into the HERMANN Position during the night of October 9/19.
2. New boundaries:

* * * * *

(b) Toward the Eighteenth Army: South edge of BOHAIN—south edge of REGNICOURT—north edge of WASSIGNY.

3. Boundary between the 54th Army Corps and IV Reserve Corps:
   North edge Bois du MOULIN—center of CLARY—northwest corner of TROISVILLES—crossroads 1.5 km. southeast of INCHY on the main highway—sugar mill 1/2 km. north of MONTAY—northwest edge of CROIX—Forest.

4. Boundary between the IV Reserve Corps and the 51st Army Corps:
   South edge of MARETZ—north edge of ESCAUFORT—St-CREPIN—1/2 km. south of St-BENIN—south edge of BAZUEL.

The extension of the boundaries toward the rear will be designated in later orders.

5. The present position will be held occupied by outposts.

6. On October 9 strong rearguards, well provided with artillery and machine guns, will be left behind on the line: BEAUVOIS-en-CAMBRESIS—west of MONTIGNY—east of MARETZ—rail triangle west of BUSIGNY—standard-gauge railway west of BOHAIN. Cyclist battalions will be employed for this purpose. Exact points of liaison will be arranged by the corps.

The rearguard positions will be held until nightfall October 9.

7. The main body of the troops (troops not needed for rearguards and reserves that have just been moved up) will be moved back in rear of the HERMANN Position at once.

8. The movement will begin during the night October 8/9. Troops not in line will start to move at nightfall, the main body of the divisions in line at 11:30 p.m., and the rearguards at 2:30 a.m.

* * * * *

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.
Withdrawal into Siegfried-II Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8206

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 8, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The enemy has broken into the left wing of the Second Army and is advancing via BRANCOURT in an easterly direction.

2. During the night October 8/9 the Eighteenth Army with the Bavarian I Army Corps and XXVI Reserve Corps will withdraw into the general line: Railroad Bohain---FRESNOY-le-GRD. as far as the railroad station FRESNOY-le-GRAND---west edge of woods of ETAVES---small woods west of BEAUTROUX---west edge of Fontaine NOTRE DAME---Siegfried II Position.

10. In order to secure the organization of the units in the HERMANN Position, it will be necessary that strong rearguards remain for the time being west of the HERMANN Position in the line BECQUIGNY---SEBONCOURT---MONTIGNY---HAUTEVILLE, the withdrawal of which will be ordered by this headquarters.

11. The execution of the order together with the time of the beginning of the movement will be ordered by means of the code word HERMANN. All preparatory measures will be taken.

Continuance of Retrograde Movement

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 347/oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 9, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The Second Army and the south flank of the Seventeenth Army will continue the retrograde movement into the position IWUY---St-AUBERT---SOLESMES---HERMANN Position during the night October 9/10.

2. Rearguards will be left behind in the line AVESNES-les-AUBERT---QUIEY---BETHENCOURT---INCHY---hills west of Le CATEAU---St-BENIN.

The left flank of the 51st Army Corps (24th Infantry Division, 3d Naval Division, 15th Reserve Division) will withdraw entirely into the HERMANN Position.
6. At 6 a.m., October 10, the 51st Army Corps will transfer sectors 10, 11 and 12 to the Bavarian I Army Corps.

The 51st Army Corps will take the necessary measures to ensure that the divisions assigned to these sectors are completely assembled by that time, and that the occupation of the position is executed according to plan.

6. At 6 a.m., October 10, the following transfers will be made:
Sectors 4 and 5 from the 54th Army Corps to the IV Reserve Corps
Sectors 7 and 8 from the IV Reserve Corps to the 51st Army Corps.

8. Distribution of forces after the transfer of command has been effected will be as follows:

(a) 54th Army Corps: Sectors 1 - 3: 208th Inf. Div.;
9th Res. Div. and 185th Inf. Div.;
in rear thereof: German Jaeger Div.,
201st Inf. Div.

(b) IV Res. Corps: Sectors 4 - 6: 38th, 30th, and 8th Inf. Divisions;

(c) 51st Army Corps: Sectors 7 - 9: 54th Inf. Div., 21st Res.
Div., and 204th Inf. Div.;

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY
October 9, 1918.

[Extract]

In the course of the forenoon the enemy pursued vigorously on the entire front against the line MARETZ-BOHAIN.
In the 21st Reserve Division and at BOHAIN he forced our rearguards back somewhat; elsewhere, the rearguards held the prescribed line until noon.
Toward the center of the army the enemy pursued vigorously along the ROMAN Road. A strong force of cavalry, accompanied by light tanks, pressed our rearguards back into the line: TROISVILLES---hills just east of REUMONT---ESCAFOURT. Cavalry and tanks of the enemy suffered considerable losses. At 5:30 p. m. after a powerful artillery action, our weak forces again had to with draw in the face of an infantry attack made from BERTRY. In the meantime at 3 p. m. a rather heavy attack against ESCAFOURT executed in several waves with closely following reserves, had been repulsed.

The enemy pressure also increased against the left flank until the rearguards withdrawing by sector checked it in the line: West edge of Bois PROYART---Bois les FAUX-VIVIERS---GUYOT Farm---west edge Bois de Riquerval.

* * * * * *

During the night the movement was continued, beginning at 10 p. m. with the main body of the infantry; the rearguards followed at 12:30 a. m.

* * * * * 

Army Order No. 9/Oct.

Troop Movements

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 359/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 10, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 9/OCT.

[Extract]

1. The following divisions are moving to the army by rail:
   (a) 17th Reserve Division: Detraining stations: SALESCHES, Le QUESNOY, ORS, LANDRECIES. The division remains in army reserve. It is attached to the 51st Army Corps and will be quartered by the latter in the area: POMMEREUIL---ORS---LANDRECIES---FAVRIL ---CATILLON---BAZUEL. Division headquarters LANDRECIES.
   (b) 44th Reserve Division: Detaining stations: AVESNES, SAINS-du-NORD. The division remains in army reserve. It is attached to the IV reserve Corps and will be quartered by the latter in the area: ENGLEFONATE---HECQ---FONTAINE-au-BOIS---BOUSIES---POIX-du-NORD. Division headquarters POIX-du-NORD.

* * * * * 

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

* * *
Transfer of Troops

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 371/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 10, 1918.

ARcUY ORDER NO. 10/OCT.

[Extract]

1. The 1st Guard Reserve Division is transferred to the army. It is attached to the IV Reserve Corps, which will issue the necessary orders for the movement and will place it in readiness as army reserve in the area OVILLERS---CROIX---FOREST (advance information by telephone).

2. The 243d Infantry Division is being directed to the army. Detraining stations: SALESCHES, LE QUESNOY, LANDRECIES, AULNOYE. It is attached to the 51st Army Corps and will be quartered by the latter as army reserve in the area ORS---LANDRECIES, FONTAINE-au-BOIS. Division headquarters TAISNIERES (advance information by telephone).

7. According to Order No. 10753 of Supreme Headquarters, dated October 9, a systematic destruction of towns by us, where not absolutely required by military considerations, is not to our interests at present. Therefore it will be discontinued. However, report will be made whenever French or Belgian localities, particularly the larger towns, which so far have been undamaged or damaged only a little, are damaged or destroyed by enemy fire.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.
HERMANN POSITION

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 377/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 10, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

2. Strong reinforcements, including artillery, having been conducted to the army, the Hermann Position must be held unconditionally. The corps will work on the improvement of the position with all available forces.

3. The 44th Res. Div. stands at the disposal of the IV Reserve Corps for the relief of the 8th Inf. Div.

4. The 51st Army Corps will immediately relieve the 54th Inf. Div. with the 17th Res. Div.

5. Counterattack divisions and at the same time army reserves:
   - German Jaeger Division at BEAUDIGNIES for the 54th Army Corps
   - 1st Guard Res. Div. at BEAURAIN-OVILLERS for the IV Res. Corps
   They may also be considered for employment in the direction of Le CATEAU.
   - The relieved elements of the 8th Inf. Div. will be placed in readiness at POIX-du-NORD and ROBERSART, those of the 54th Inf. Div. at BAZUEL.

6. As soon at the 51st Army Corps has reserves in rear of the 21st Res. Div., the one-third of the 208th Inf. Div. will rejoin its division without delay.

7. The 243d Inf. Div. which is arriving after the 17th Res. Div., is designated for the 51st Army Corps for the relief of the 21st Res. Div.
   The arrival of additional divisions is expected.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 10, 1918.

[Extract]

The movement into the HERMANN Position was completed according to plan.

* * * * *
Opposite the center and left flank of the army the enemy pursued vigorously. At 9 a.m. he moved to the attack in considerable force from NEUVILLY as far as south of Le CATEAU. He was repulsed. A second attack against NEUVILLY at 11 a.m. also failed, while at Le CATEAU the enemy succeeded by a fresh attack in gaining a foothold in the western portion of the town.

Farther south the enemy, pursuing vigorously, succeeded in penetrating the west portion of St-BENIN, St-SOUPLET and VAUX-ANDIGNY. In counterthrusts the villages were again cleared of the enemy.

* * * * *

In the meantime the enemy had worked his way forward in draws and ravines against the front of the IV Reserve Corps. At 5:30 a.m. an intense barrage opened by numerous batteries which had been moved forward with astonishing speed. Closely following the barrage, dense masses of troops stormed down the slopes to the SELLE Valley and attacked our positions from north of NEUVILLY as far as beyond Le CATEAU. North of NEUVILLY the enemy broke into our main line of resistance in a narrow area. Farther south he was repulsed everywhere, suffering very heavy losses. Only in Le CATEAU did he gain any success but this was counter-balanced by counterattacks, except for a small group of British, which continued to hold out.

At St-Benin the enemy also succeeded at 4:30 p.m. gaining a foothold in the village in a fresh attack.

South of St-Benin our outpost line ran in the evening past the west edge of St-SOUPLET via the crossroads 1 km. west of St-MARTIN RIVIERE---east of La HAIE-MENNERESSE to the west edge of VAUX-ANDIGNY.

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Bavarian I Army Corps will Assume Command and XXVI Reserve Corps take over a Sector

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8264 II [Addendum No. 1]

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 10, 1918.

To Bavarian I Army Corps and XXVI Reserve Corps

[Extract]

1. Today at 6 p.m. the Bavarian I Army Corps will assume command over the 15th Reserve Division, 24th Infantry Division, and 3d Naval Division.

* * * * *

3. Since the enemy exerts vigorous pressure against the sector which is to be taken over, the following measures will be necessary to strengthen this sector:
   (a) During the night October 10/11 the 29th Infantry Division will be withdrawn and quartered in the area MAZINGHIEN---RIBEAUVILLE---REJET as counterattack division. * * *

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- 898 -
Withdrawal to Nicolas and Hunding Positions

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8288

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 10, 1918.

To all Corps

[Extract]

1. In conjunction with the right wing of the Seventh Army the elements of the Eighteenth Army located south of the SERRE will withdraw into the Nicolas Position during the night October 11/12 and into the HUNDING Position during the night October 12/13.

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Estimate of Successful Defensive Action

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2065

BAVARIAN I ARMY CORPS,
October 10, 1918.

[Extract]

To the Commanding General of the Eighteenth Army

According to report made by the commander of the 221st Inf. Div., based on his own personal impressions and supplemented by numerous troop reports of all kinds, the French and British infantry do not withstand a German attack. For the most part our opponents owe their present successes to the fact that we are constantly on the defensive, which rests on existing or proposed position lines. This enables the enemy to bring his tanks and superior artillery to bear. All observations indicate that an attack on a rather large scale will be successful even though a great deal of territory has to be surrendered.

* * * * *

von ENDRES.
Operations Section
No. 8313
GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 11, 1918.

To Group of Armies German Crown Prince

I am in complete accord with what you have stated. Furthermore, an assault executed by some of our divisions from the present front with the objective of taking, forcing back, or destroying the enemy artillery, would doubtless meet with success and raise the morale of the troops to a marked degree. Of course, this is conditional upon the retention of a few divisions on the line prepared to continue the defense so that the attack divisions can rest behind the front for 2 to 3 days. Divisions already in line that are fit to participate in the operation would have to be designated for the attack, as they are familiar with the sector.

The artillery necessary for a brief and powerful concentration is available and could be quickly strengthened by the artillery of the reserve divisions.

In the Hermann Position the sector of the 15th, 5th, and 81st Res. Dvs. was proposed for such a thrust. Objective: The railway line BUSIGNY---BOHAIN---FRESNOY-Le GRAND.

Time of attack: 2 p. m., after 1/4 hour of artillery preparation. The troops to be withdrawn at nightfall.

von HUTIER.

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Operations Section
No. 2853
GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
October 13, 1918.

To Headquarters Eighteenth Army

Reference your No. 8313

I am also of the opinion that we must conduct the defense in an offensive manner. The difficulty lies in the fact that the group of armies only has extremely few reserves at its disposal. These are just barely sufficient to fill up the existing gaps even if they are alerted and conducted with the utmost dispatch to the desired point.

3 divisions could be placed at the disposal of the Eighteenth Army today. I doubt that the situation will permit them to be employed for the attack exclusively. It just happens that the 238th Inf. Div. is earmarked with the offensive mission of restoring the situation in the vicinity of ORIGNY. Whether the 19th Res. Div. and the 18th Inf. Div. can be assigned to employment in an offensive depends on whether the army can abandon any idea of relieving front line divisions.

In any case it is desirable not to employ these two divisions prematurely so as to have them available for counterattack in case of enemy attack.

More reserves for the Eighteenth Army can only be moved up slowly and after the release of tired divisions.

I request that the text of this letter not be communicated to others.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of the
German Empire and Prussia.

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- 900 -
Attacks Repulsed

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8310

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 11, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 10/OCTOBER

[Extract]

An American, British, and French division each attacked the sectors of the 15th, 5th, 81st, and 22d Res. Divs. several times today after brief and heavy bursts of fire, and employing tanks to some extent.

All attacks have been repulsed with heavy losses for the enemy, as pursuing detachments were able to ascertain. Our losses are rather light. The outpost zone is again occupied by us.

Rather heavy attacks must be expected there. These attacks also must and will prove to the enemy that our brave infantry, excellently supported by strong artillery, is superior to his. Wherever the chance is offered, we must pursue.

An enemy force that is treated in this way will soon lose its power of attack.

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von HUTIER,
General of Infantry, Commanding.

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Relief of Units

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 437/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 12, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The IV Reserve Corps will relieve:

   30th Inf. Div. with the 1st Guard Res. Div.
   38th Inf. Div. with the 25th Inf. Div.

   At the same time the elements still in line of the 2d Infantry (Cyclist) Brigade and the German Jaeger Division will be relieved.

2. The following divisions are designated as counterattack divisions and at the same time army reserves:

* * * * *
(c) For the sector of the 51st Army Corps:
   54th Infantry Division at BAZUEL.

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4. After completion of the relief the divisions will be quartered as follows:
   (a) The 38th Inf. Div. by the IV Res. Corps in the east portion of the corps
       zone; the exact location to be reported.
   (b) The 21st Res. Div. by the 51st Corps in the region northeast of LANDRECIES:
       the exact location to be reported.

The 38th Infantry Division and 21st Reserve Division will be in army reserve.

5. The 21st Infantry Division will pass to the control of the Seventeenth Army.
   The 2d Squadron, 6th Dragoons, will be put in march by the 51st Corps to the 21st
   Infantry Division. March destination on October 13 WARGNIES-le-GRAND; at that point in-
   formation concerning the march destination for October 14 will be obtained from the XIV
   Reserve Corps.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 12, 1918.

[Extract]

At 6 a. m. the artillery preparation for the expected enemy attack opened, reaching
as far as the left boundary of the army. After a very heavy bombardment including smoke
and lasting about one hour, the enemy advanced to the attack against the front of the IV
Reserve Corps in dense masses and great depth. At times there were as many as 7 waves
one after the other, with company commanders mounted on horseback.

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Continuation of Enemy Pressure between the Sencee and the Oise

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, Foreign Armies

No. 10824

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

October 13, 1918.

SITUATION ON WESTERN FRONT ON OCTOBER 13, 1918.

[Extract]

Fresh divisions were freed for use between ARMENTIERES and the SCARPE by replacing tired divisions and eliminating some of the division sector. Some of them have already appeared on the front line northeast of CAMBRAI. There is little likelihood that attacks in any great force will be executed against the LILLE-SOUAI front from the west. Apparently the British conclude that our evacuation of his sector is imminent.

Strong enemy pressure has continued in the zone between the SENSEE and the OISE. During the major attack on October 8 the British and French exerted great efforts to effect a strategic break through, for whose exploitation they had employed cavalry divisions. We may expect the offensive to be continued to the northeast and east. The British forces are still sufficient for this operation despite considerable losses. The French have already strengthened their front north of the OISE.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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GERMAN SECOND ARMY,

October 14, 1918.

[Extract]

Renewed enemy attempts to cross the SELLE, in rather heavy force opposite the right flank of the army and with patrols at Le CATEAU, failed in our fire, as did also a heavy enemy attack at St-SOUPLET. * * *
Counterattack Groupings

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section No. 511/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 14, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. Counterattack division will be held in readiness to assemble on notice. Transition to alert condition will in each instance be ordered by army. *** In urgent cases the corps may issue the order.

   * * * * *

3. ***

   * * * * *

(b) The 54th Infantry Division will be quartered in the area BAZUEL (excl.)---CATILLON---La GROISE---CROIX-HAINAUT---Le PONTONNIER---LANDRECIES---ORS. One counter-attack group will be placed in readiness west of the SAMBRE Canal.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Large-Scale Attack Expected

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section No. 530/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 15, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

1. The large-scale attack by the enemy which has been expected for the last few days against the Second Army and adjoining armies seems to be about to be launched.

2. The corps will order increased combat alert beginning at 6 a. m., October 16.

3. The counterattack divisions (including the 2d Infantry Brigade) will be alerted from 7 a. m., October 16 on, in compliance with detailed instructions by the corps. One-
third of the 2d Infantry Cyclist Brigade will be brought up to ESCARMAIN in conformity with detailed instructions by the 54th Army Corps.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI.

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GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 16, 1918.

Operations Section
No. 559/Oct.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

2. At 6 a.m., October 17, increased combat alert for the divisions in the position. The counterattack divisions will be alerted from 7 a.m. on.

To bring up the foot troops of the divisions of the 2d Line, the 51st Army Corps will have trucks ready beginning at 8 a.m. for the transport of the rear elements of the 54th Infantry Division.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 17, 1918.

[Extract]

The artillery activity remained vigorous throughout the night and increased from 6 a.m. on to considerable intensity on the entire front NEUVILLY to St-SOUPLET, ex-
clusive of Le CATEAU. At 8:30 a.m., a powerful Anglo-American attack opened against the left flank of the IV Reserve Corps, the entire front of the 51st Army Corps and the Eighteenth Army, as far as AISONVILLE [not identified]. Our fire for destruction neutralized troops assembling opposite the left flank of the 1st Guard Reserve Division. In front of the 44th Res. Div. the attacker was annihilated by our shelling. The 17th Res. Div. and the 243d Inf. Div. also repulsed the enemy at first. In a fresh attack slight penetrations were made on both sides of Le CATEAU.

Attempts of the enemy to widen the point of breakthrough north of Le CATEAU toward the north, were smothered by an energetic counterattack by local reserves of the 44th Res. Div., and our line on both sides of Le CATEAU was recaptured, with the exception of a group of British on the right flank of the 17th Res. Div.

The main blow struck the 204th Infantry Division; it was forced back into the line QUENNELET Farm—ARCRE-de-GUISE. The 243d Infantry Division refused its flank facing south and moved the third of the division that lay at FONTAINE-au-BOIS, up to BAZUEL.

A counterthrust of the 54th Infantry Division immediately launched on the left flank of the army, coordinated with that of the Eighteenth Army, at first gained ground in the direction of St-SOUPLET but encountered in its further advance a powerful enemy attack. The initial success was again lost.

In the afternoon the 243d Infantry Division was forced back to the Le CATEAU—ARCRE-de-GUISE Road by another heavy attack.

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**Enemy Attacks**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 580/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,

October 17, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

1. Today the enemy attacked the front of the army from NEUVILLY (excl.) to St-SOUPLET and the adjacent front of the Eighteenth Army as far as ORIGNY. The attacks were generally repulsed on the right flank as far as Le CATEAU (incl.). South of Le CATEAU the 243d and 204th Infantry Divisions were forced back to the line: Le CATEAU Railroad Station—LA ROUE Farm—east edge of L'ARCRE-de-GUISE. Farther south the enemy has likewise gained ground as far as the west edge of RIBEAUVILLE—east edge of Le VALLEE-MULATURE.

2. We must look for resumption of the attack on October 18. The 51st Army Corps will report the main line of resistance selected to meet the situation created by the counterattack of the 478th Infantry. This main line of resistance will be held on October 18.

3. The corps will be at increased combat alert beginning at 6 a.m., October 18. The counterattack divisions will be alerted beginning at 7 a.m., and the 21st Reserve Division in readiness to assemble on notice beginning at 7 a.m.

4. The infantry and pioneers of the 121st Infantry Division will be moved up to LANDRECIES by trucks and will be placed in readiness by the 51st Corps in the vicinity of ORS in such a manner as to insure that they can be shifted north through the Bois-l'EVEQUE.
as well as be employed in the zone of the 51st Corps. The division is army reserve under the command of its general. Departure of trucks at 4 a. m. From the southeast exit of LANDRECIES the 51st Corps will take charge. The 51st Corps will detail the accompanying artillery.

5. Between 4 and 7 a. m. the corps will place waves of annihilation fire on suspected assembly areas of the enemy.

The IV Reserve Corps will furnish artillery support to the right flank of the 51st Corps at Le CATEAU. Details will be arranged with the 51st Corps.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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*Explanation of Withdrawal of Eighteenth Army behind Canal Position*

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7021, 1st Addendum

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,

October 18, 1918---6:24 p. m.

To the Eighteenth Army

It is of far-reaching strategic importance to the front of this group of armies that the Canal Position be held.

I must give explicit expression to the expectation that the army will hold its new position. The reserves assigned to the army will be moved forward and employed in accordance with this mission.

I ask all commanders to realize clearly that we can only force the enemy to terminate his attacks by holding out to the last.

I direct special attention to the necessity of liberally reinforcing the Canal Front with machine-gun organizations.

I emphasize that my consent must be secured before any rearward movement is initiated.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince.

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Operations Section
No. 10903

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

October 19, 1918---12:50 a. m.

To Group Armies German Crown Prince

Reference: Your No. 7021

I regret that the direction was made today to withdraw the Eighteenth Army behind the Canal and was even carried out in the daytime. The evening report of the Eighteenth Army
shows that the enemy, in superior force, gained only a little ground in his attack. I request a check be made as to whether the responsible authorities maintained the proper composure in evaluating the reports received.

von HINDENBURG.

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Operations Section
No. 7021, 2d Addendum

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
October 19, 1918---9:33 a.m.

To the Eighteenth Army

Supreme Headquarters requests a report stating what reasons led to the withdrawal of the army on October 18 and when the initial orders for the withdrawal were issued. I request an answer by wire.

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Operations Section
No. 7021, Addendum No. 1

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
October 21, 1918.

Reference No. 10903, Supreme Headquarters, the attached report of the Eighteenth Army is submitted.

On the morning of October 18, the situation in the army was depicted to the group of armies in such a way that if the area in front of the canal continued to be held it was probable that a breakthrough would be effected on the front in view of the lack of reserves. It was further reported that in all probability all available forces which the army could lay its hands on could not hold the canal position for 48 hours. The chief of staff on making the report received orders to verify the estimate of the army commander once again and to indicate the strategic significance of a withdrawal of the entire Eighteenth Army. An inquiry by the group of armies in the sector of the Second Army disclosed that the 204th Inf. Div. claimed to have contact with the Eighteenth Army on its left flank and to have suffered a breakthrough on its right. However, the Second Army believed its front to have been restored. This belief is opposed by the statement of the Eighteenth Army that no contact existed. This statement has been repeated with as much force as possible and substantiated by the report of the general staff officer of the 204th Inf. Div. Thereupon Supreme Headquarters was asked to approve the withdrawal of the right wing of the Eighteenth Army behind the canal---if necessary the whole Eighteenth Army into the Hermann II Position. Supreme Headquarters gave authorization for the withdrawal of the right wing and ordered the rest of the army front to hold out as long as the situation at all permitted.

The order issued to the Eighteenth Army was submitted to Supreme Headquarters. Without previous report to the group of armies the army ordered the artillery to be regrouped by echelon before night. Until noon the group of armies thought that the withdrawal was to take place by night. The mistake has been censured.

Although at times the situation was judged too unfavorably on the part of the Eighteenth Army, the army can not be reproached with having lost control of its nerves of having acted too hastily. According to its report the army still holds to the opinion that the withdrawal of the artillery was ordered. This headquarters is of the opinion that a powerful fire protection should not be taken away from the infantry as long as they are heavily engaged even at the risk of losing the artillery. After the order to conduct the battle
in such a way that a breakthrough would be avoided at all costs, the army had to act as it considered necessary according to its interpretation of the situation.

Count SCHULENBURG,
Major General.

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**Enemy Intention to Break Through**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 603/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 18, 1918.

[ARMY ORDER]

[Extract]

In the fighting that has taken place since moving into the Hermann Position the enemy has been unable to realize his repeatedly displayed intention to break through under all circumstances.

* * * * *

On October 17 and 18 his attacks, though executed in superior force, were unable to break through the 51st Army Corps. On both days the brave divisions of this corps succeeded in checking the enemy mass assault after a short distance.

This success is attributable to the obstinate and unshakable resistance of all those participating in the fighting, as well as to the firm and prudent command by the three corps. I desire to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to all of them.

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von CARLOWITZ,
General of Infantry, Commanding.
Enemy Attacks Continued

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 604/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 18, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The enemy continued his attacks against the front of the 51st Army Corps and the adjacent front of the Eighteenth Army. The 51st Corps will hold as main line of resistance the line: Northeast edge of Le CATEAU---north and east edge of BAZUEL---La HAIE-TONNOILE Farm---north of La LOUVIERE: at that point contact with the Eighteenth Army, which will withdraw during the course of the night with its right flank behind the SAMBRE Canal southeast of La LOUVIERE---FESMY and south thereof.

BAZUEL and La JONQUIERE Farm lie in our outpost zone.

* * * * *

3. We must expect the enemy to continue his attack on the left flank of the army on October 19 and also to exert stiff pressure against the right flank as soon as he has recognized the withdrawal to ECAILLON Creek.* Flank corps will prepare their defense accordingly. Flanking artillery support will be arranged with the IV Reserve Corps.

* * * * *

9. The improvement of the POMMEREUIL Switch Position and adjacent to it, the Canal Position ORS-CATILLON must be expedited with all available means. The 54th Infantry Division will occupy the canal line with security detachments.

By order:

Von MIAKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

* No stream at village of ECAILLON
During the night patrol fights which ended in our favor occurred in the sectors of the right and center corps. A surprise night attack against the 243d Infantry Division was checked on the Le CATEAU---ARBRE-de-GUISE Road.

Between 5 and 6 a. m. the enemy fire increased against the entire army front and to special intensity against the 51st Army Corps. Our artillery retaliated with annihilation fire. While the enemy fire gradually diminished in intensity in the 54th Army Corps and IV Reserve Corps, infantry attacks echeloned in depth and accompanied by tanks were launched under the protection of the morning fog against the front from Le CATEAU to the left boundary of the army and overlapping into the Eighteenth Army. The main effort was made against the BAZUEL-MAZINGHIEN front. The enemy gained ground toward both localities. The 17th Reserve Division on the right flank held out very bravely against the heavy attacks which continued until the noon hours. Not until the British has penetrated BAZUEL, did the division with draw---its left flank seriously threatened---to the BAILLON Farm---BAZUEL Road. BAZUEL itself was retaken by storm from the defender, who offered bitter resistance. The 204th Infantry Division checked the enemy assault in the approximate line: South of BAZUEL---west of JONQUIERE Farm---halfway between ARBRE-de-GUISE and MAZINGHIEN.

As early as before noon the Eighteenth Army reported that it would withdraw in the coming night behind the SAMBRE Canal and that the movement would start while it was still daylight. Consequently army ordered the 51st Corps to shift the main line of resistance during the night to the line: North of Le CATEAU---BAZUEL---La LOUVIERE.

The withdrawal of the right flank of the army into the HERMANN Position and the refusal of the left flank back to the Eighteenth Army were effected in accordance to plan. The enemy did not feel his way forward toward the north flank during the day, however he exerted vigorous pressure against the front of the 51st Army Corps. His thrusts were repulsed. * * *
Withdrawal into Hermann-II Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
8529
October 18, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The army will withdraw during the night October 18/19 into the Hermann-II Position (line CATILLON---ETREUX---LESQUIESLLES---GUISE---La HERIE---FAUCOUZY---southwest tip of the woods of BERJAUMONT). Rearguards on the west bank of the canal, thence to the line VADENCOURT---MACQUIGNY---TERCY [TORCY Fme]---PARGNY-les-BOIS---CRECY.

4. All reserves of the Bavarian I Army Corps and XXVI Reserve Corps will be put in line only to the extent required to prevent a breakthrough and protect the artillery. They will hence assume a covering position forward of the artillery, which will be withdrawn behind the OISE-SAMBRE Canal before nightfall, so far as the combat situation permits.

6. Special attention is directed to the importance of close communication, firm contacts, and protection of the boundary of the Second Army, so that envelopment will be prevented.

7. Occupation of the rearguard line VADENCOURT---MACQUIGNY---JONQUEUSE Farm---Hill 121 east of the VIERMONT Estate by reserves of the XXVI Reserve Corps and elements of the 82d Reserve Division will be started now.

Canal Position Must Be Held

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
No. 8542
October 18, 1918.

To Bavarian I Army Corps, XXVI Reserve Corps

[Extract]

The Canal Position must be held at all costs and with all means at our command. This order will speedily be made known to all troops.

- 912 -
51st Army Corps Captured Bazuel in Counterattack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8543

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY,
October 18, 1918.

To Bavarian I Army Corps

The 51st Army Corps has captured BAZUEL in a counterattack and is holding the line, hills southwest of BAZUEL---JONQUIERE Farm---direction north edge La LOUVIERE. The front portion of the Bavarian I Army Corps west of the canal adjacent to this line will be strongly supported by artillery and held firmly, so that the left wing of the Second Army will not be forced to withdraw if that portion of the front withdraws.

Withdrawal Movements

[Editorial Translation]

Operation Section
No. 635/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 19, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The withdrawal movements on the right and left flanks of the army progressed according to plan during the night October 18/19. While they have not yet been detected by the enemy at front of the 54th Army Corps, in front of the left flank of the army and the right flank of the Eighteenth Army the enemy pursued vigorously. Otherwise, no special combat activities during the day. A resumption of the enemy attacks on October 20 must be expected.

2. In future it will be left to the discretion of the corps to order increased combat alert.

On October 20 the counterattack divisions will be alerted from 8 a. m. on.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.
At 3 p.m., October 17, the right wing of the Eighteenth Army, after repulsing very heavy attacks, was located in the line: 500 meters east of ARBRE de GUISE—west edge of RIBEAUVILLE—west edge La VALLEE-MULAIRE—west edge MENNEVRET—west edge Le Pt. VERLY—west edge GRAND THIOLET—north edge GROUGIS—north edge AISONVILLE.

The right wing had no contact with the left wing of the Second Army and therefore secured itself by pushing reserves across the army boundary.

Concurring in the view held by the XXVI Reserve Corps, this headquarters was of the opinion that the situation on the right flank of the XXVI Reserve Corps located only 4 km. west of the OISE-SAMBRE Canal, which was under heavy fire, could be maintained for any length of time only if the right flank of the XXVI Reserve Corps and with it also the left flank of the Bavarian I Army Corps were again pushed forward in a westerly and northwesterly direction by a counterattack past GROUGIS.

Consequently the 19th Reserve Division, which had been brought up in trucks by the left wing of the army, was conducted behind the center of the XXVI Reserve Corps and the order was issued to prepare the proposed counterattack for the morning of October 18.

The Second Army was requested to execute an attack on its left wing at the same time.

At 8 p.m. the Bavarian I Army Corps reported that the 3d Naval Division had only 400 rifles at the front, the 24th Infantry Division only 50, the 15th Infantry Division, which had gone through a tank attack for the first time, only 205.

At the same time the Second Army reported that no troops were available for offensive employment on its left wing, but that the 54th Infantry Division would be placed on the army boundary east of MAZINGHIEN. This division, however, had only 400 rifles left.

This headquarters was therefore obliged to abandon the intention of a counterattack, since two-thirds of the 19th Reserve Division (5 battalions) had to be placed at the disposal of the Bavarian I Army Corps, which had only two-thirds of the 221st Infantry Division (a total of 350 rifles) left, while the XXVI Reserve Corps had only one-third of the 19th Reserve Division left, besides small local reserves (1 regiment of the 231st Infantry Division and 2 battalions of the 18th Infantry Division) available as reserves.

In addition to local assaults, two heavy attacks were made on the morning of October 18 against the right flank of the Bavarian I Army Corps and the left wing of the Second Army, as well as against the left flank of the Bavarian I Army Corps and right flank of the XXVI Reserve Corps. The left wing of the Second Army was driven in and, according to a report from the general staff officer of the 204th Infantry Division to the 3d Naval Division, fell back on Catillon. This caused the right wing of the army to hang in the air almost without reserves. The situation on this wing was all the more threatening when the enemy penetration had a certain width (BAZUEL had also been captured by the enemy) and it was known that the Second Army had only weak counterattack forces available for its left wing. The right flank of the XXVI Reserve Corps and left flank of the Bavarian I Army Corps, which were attacked by 4 divisions (123d, 126th, 66th, and 46th) as shown by a captured French corps order, were forced back to the line, road northwest exit WASSIGNY—Estate du BOIS-de-TUPIGNY—Estate SANIERE—Estate La DEMILIEUE, that is, within 2 km. of the canal.
This situation caused [this headquarters] at 9 a.m. to recommend to the Group of Armies that the front be withdrawn into the HERMANN-II Position, as the situation west of the canal was untenable without reserves if additional heavy attacks were made—which actually did take place in the afternoon. This headquarters reported that, if the situation of the Seventh Army made it seem desirable, the HERMANN Position could be held on the south half, but that the Canal Position could not be held for any length of time without fresh forces.

The recommendation was approved. With respect to the left half of the army the approval was withdrawn soon thereafter, with a promise of fresh reserves.

Immediately following the approval (10 a.m.) this headquarters had issued the order shown in Annex 1 and later, when the approval was withdrawn as far as the left half of the army was concerned, the order shown in Annex 2. The order for a withdrawal of the artillery behind the canal by echelon before the end of the day and the promise pledging the employment of the weak reserves still available was held to be necessary, in order to have as soon as possible a comparatively strong artillery ready for action east of the canal and to secure the protection of the artillery without fail.

A counterattack on the left wing of the Second Army reported after the order had been issued, the effects of which did not become apparent until the late afternoon and which reached the line BAZUEL-Canal line, was able to stabilize the situation there, but did not succeed in giving direct support to our own right wing west of MAZINGHIEN. As the enemy continued to press forward into the free area north of the army boundary, the right flank of the Bavarian I Army Corps was seriously threatened for hours.

Two heavy attacks executed about 1 p.m. against the center of the Bavarian I Army Corps and the right flank of the XXVI Reserve Corps were checked in the covering position of the last reserves in the line east of WASSIGNY---Road WASSIGNY---HANNAPPES---Estade de BOIS-de-TUPIGNY---Estade La DEMLIEUE---east edge GROUGIS (green line), whereby the artillery already located east of the canal was able to give very effective support.

Since the XXVI Reserve Corps was justified in assuming that in case of a breakthrough of the extended flank the Bavarian 6th Infantry Division, located far in front, would be rolled up from the southeast tip of the Foret DOMANIALE d'ANDIGNY via Estate Du BOIS de TUPIGNY as far as GROUGIS and would be cut off, it issued the order in agreement with this headquarters that the infantry of the Bavarian 6th Infantry Division was to withdraw beginning at 4 p.m.

This was possible because the Bavarian 6th Infantry Division had repulsed front attacks and soon reached the protection of the hills of AISONVILLE affording cover toward the west and northwest. That this decision was correct is evident from the fact that the right flank of the XXVI Reserve Corps was again attacked with tanks in the late afternoon and had to fall back step by step after sacrificing a battery which had been fighting in the front line.

Looking back upon the events, this headquarters is firmly convinced that, if further attacks had been received by nightfall on the west bank of the canal, a breakthrough, which was to be avoided at all costs, would have taken place and the Canal Position would have become untenable. According to reliable reports, 2 American, 3 British and 9 French divisions participated in the attack on October 18 against the Bavarian I Army Corps and XXVI Reserve Corps and the right flank of the XVIII Reserve Corps. The enemy also had additional reserves available.

I request that this report be transmitted to Supreme Headquarters.

von HUTIER,
General of Infantry, Commanding.
Measures Against Enemy Attacks

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 669/Oct.

GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 20, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. After a brief but powerful artillery preparation the enemy in heavy force attacked the line St-PYTHON---NEUVILLY---Le CATEAU toward 3 a. m. Later the enemy also pushed forward against our right flank across the SELLE and against the 17th Reserve Division east of Le CATEAU. Throughout the day bitter fighting took place on a front of almost 20 km. On the right flank the rearguards withdrew to the HERMANN-I line. Adjacent to it the corps are holding the line 800 meters southwest of VERTAIN---AMERVAL---RICHEMONT Mill---east edge of BAZUEL---La HAIE-TONNOILE Farm.

2. The line occupied today must be held against the enemy attacks to be expected on October 21. During the second half of the night, sporadic waves of annihilation fire will be delivered on suspected assembly areas of the enemy.

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7. During the next few days, weather permitting, a shelling with gas (Yellow Cross, mustard gas, or Bunt* type) will be executed at different times every morning, as ordered by the corps. In general the shelling will be completely by 5 a. m. If possible, the corps will arrange the same times and durations of fire by direct agreement in order to conceal the firing positions. Attention is directed to the importance of insuring that the areas gassed adjoin each other at the corps and division boundaries. The increments and reduced charges which may be required for this shelling will be requisitioned by the ammunition sections of the corps in time so that they may be brought up to the firing positions before the firing starts.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

* Bunt—particolored, blue (lachrymatory) and green (toxic) gases mixed.
GERMAN SECOND ARMY,
October 21, 1918.

[Extract]

The 51st Army Corps received orders to bend back its main line of resistance tonight from the north edge of BAZUEL toward the canal south of ORS to the southern boundary of the army in rear of the SAMBRE Canal, and to occupy the terrain lying between the old and new main lines of resistance as an outpost.

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ARMY ORDER

[Extract]

1. The general situation demands that the army execute the missions assigned to it with the forces at present allotted it. Reinforcements cannot be expected. Therefore necessary measures must be taken to enable tired divisions to rest and fill up with replacements, so that they can again be used for relief at the battle front after a short time.

5. The 51st Army Corps will withdraw two-thirds of the 121st Infantry Division behind its left flank. Quartering area will be reported. The 51st Corps will bend the main line of resistance back from the north edge of BAZUEL to the canal south of ORS (POMMEREUIL Position), connecting up with the SAMBRE Canal at the southern boundary of the army. The terrain still occupied forward of this new main line of resistance will be the outpost and will be evacuated according to plan in case of a heavy enemy attack. Concerning the withdrawal of the main line of resistance of Bavarian I Army Corps, arrangements will be made with the latter direct. The work of a strengthening the canal line will be expedited, and the field of fire cleared. The conditions favoring flanking fire by the artillery in the corps sector must be fully exploited.
6. Special attention of the corps is directed to the necessity of the making liberal use of the heavy artillery available to annihilate enemy troop concentrations. Mortars, for which plentiful ammunition is on hand, will also be used for this purpose.

By order:

von MIASKOWSKI,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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All Men Suitable for the Front to be Employed at the Front

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8651

GERMAN EIGHTEENTH ARMY, October 21, 1918.

To all corps

[Extract]

The present front must be held. Reserves are not available. Therefore it is strictly in the interest of the divisions to increase their front strengths. All recruits fit for assignment to unit must be brought up with dispatch and put in line. All men trained to use arms, regardless of whether they are fit for garrison duty and for labor in the field, belong at the front. It is not permissible to detach and hold back headquarters reserves at present.

Officers of higher headquarters, if possible general staff officers, will inspect on October 23 the combat trains and field trains of all divisions as well as all units organic to the division. All men suitable for the front according to their training will be taken to the front.

It is recommended that the division commanders assemble these men before they are put in the line, call attention to the seriousness of the situation, and instruct them as to their duties.

The increase will also be of advantage to the front, inasmuch as it will allow the detailing of local reserves at all points and facilitate the relief of front line troops.

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THE SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON OCTOBER 27, 1918.

[Extract]

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The British have been attacking in heavy force between the SCHELDE and the OISE since October 23. The employment of numerous fresh divisions and the stubborness of the attacks indicate that the enemy was prepared to use every means within his power to force the break through. He will doubtless continue his efforts. The forces necessary for this purpose are still at his disposal. Reemployment of the fresh Australian corps is especially to be expected.

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By order:

von STULPNAGEL.

THE SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FRONT ON NOVEMBER 2, 1918.

[Extract]

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On November 1 strong British forces renewed their attack south of VALENCIENNES. It is definite that the offensive will be continued in a northeasterly direction and extended as far as the Bois de MORMAL. According to prisoners' statements Australian troops may be expected to be employed between VALENCIENNES and QUESNOY.

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By order:

[Signature illegible]
INSTRUCTIONS AS TO THE USE OF THE SQUARES

1. The large rectangles on the map, lettered A, B, C, etc., are divided into squares of 1,000 yards side, which are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc. Each of these squares is subdivided into four minor squares of 500 yards side. These minor squares are considered as lettered a, b, c, d. (See Square No. 6 in each rectangle).

2. To locate a point within a small square, consider the sides divided into tenths, and define the point by taking as many tenths from N. to S. along Southern side, and as many from E. to W. along Western side; the S. W. corner always being taken as origin, and the distance along the Southern side being always given by the first figure. Thus the point 2 would be 63; i.e. 6 divisions East and 3 divisions North from origin.