UNITED STATES ARMY
IN THE WORLD WAR
1917–1919

Military Operations
of the
American Expeditionary Forces

Volume 6

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1990
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
(Revised for vols. 4–6)
I. Center of Military History.
DS570.U55 1988 940.4'0973 88–600367

A new introduction has been added to Volume 1. Type has been reset, but original pagination has not been altered. Except for front matter, maps, illustrations, and some tables, camera-ready copy was produced by Susan Blair using optical scanning and laser printing technology.
UNITED STATES ARMY IN THE WORLD WAR, 1917–1919

Volume 1  Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 2  Policy-forming Documents of the American Expeditionary Forces
Volume 3  Training and Use of American Units With the British and French
Volume 4–9 Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces
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Volume 17 Bulletins, GHQ, AEF
FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss' intention to "record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . . [and] the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance." The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army's role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate: World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today's military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army's historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army's months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of "the war to end all wars." Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C. 1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
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Military Operations
of the
American Expeditionary Forces
THE OISE-AISNE OPERATION
August 7 - November 11, 1918

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Preface

The final actions of the AISNE-MARNE Operation carried the Allies to the VESLE River. Soon after the first crossings were effected, the Commanding General of the French Sixth Army was directed to consolidate his positions on the south bank of the river, to establish bridgeheads, and to await a general advance by all French armies on this front. Thus between August 4 and August 8, 1918, the VESLE front became stabilized.

On this latter date, the French Tenth, Sixth, and Fifth Armies were ordered to consolidate and organize the AISNE-VESLE line for defense, to hold the ground gained north of the river, and to make extensive preparations for renewing the advance. This order produced considerable sharp combat in the period between the AISNE-MARNE and OISE-AISNE Operations.

This development led General Pershing to form the American First Army in the St-MIHIEL area rather than on the VESLE as previously planned. The American III Corps remained on the VESLE under command of the French Sixth Army, crossed the VESLE on September 4, and participated in the series of battles called the OISE-AISNE Operation. So far as American actions are concerned, it would be more accurate geographically to designate these battles as the VESLE-AISNE Operation, as will appear from study of the documents herewith presented.

The American units involved were:

- III Corps Hq. and Corps Troops, 28th Division
- 32d Division
- 77th Division
- 370th Infantry Regiment

August 7 - September 9, 1918
August 7 - September 8, 1918
August 7 - September 9, 1918
August 11 - September 16, 1918
Sept. 15 - November 11, 1918

---

Allied Order of Battle*

[Left to right]

Allied Armies:
- Marshal Foch, Commanding
- General Weygand, Chief of Staff

Armies of the North and Northeast:
- General Petain, Commanding
- General Buat, Chief of Staff

American General Headquarters:
- General Pershing, Commanding
- Maj. Gen. McAndrew, Chief of Staff

* At outset of Operation.
Group of Armies of the Center:
  General Maistre, Commanding
  General Mollandin, Chief of Staff
Group of Armies of the Reserves:
  General Fayolle, Commanding
  General Paquette, Chief of Staff
French Tenth Army:
  General Mangin, Commanding
  Col. Hergault, Chief of Staff
French XXX Corps:
  General Penet, Commanding
    French 17th Division
    French 64th Division
    American 370th Infantry Regiment
French I Corps:
  General Lacapelle, Commanding
French Sixth Army:
  General Degoutte, Commanding
  Col. Brion, Chief of Staff
French III Corps:
  General Lebrun, Commanding
American III Corps:
  Maj. Gen. R. L. Bullard, Commanding
  Brig. Gen. A. W. Bjornstad, Chief of Staff
  American 77th Division
  American 28th Division
  American 32d Division
French Fifth Army:
  General Berthelot, Commanding
  Col. Belhague, Chief of Staff

ORDER OF BATTLE FOR AMERICAN DIVISIONS:

77th Division:
  Brig. Gen. Evan M. Johnson
    153d Infantry Brigade
    154th Infantry Brigade
    152d F. A. Brigade
Attached: 57th F. A. Brigade (less 121st F. A.) (32d Div.)
  French 10th Dragoons
28th Division:
  Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir, Commanding
  Lt. Col. Joe R. Brabson, Chief of Staff
  55th Infantry Brigade
  56th Infantry Brigade
  53d F. A. Brigade
Attached: 57th F. A. and 107th Ammunition Train (32d Div.)

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32d Division:
  Maj. Gen. William G. Haan, Commanding
  Lt. Col. Robert McC. Beck, Jr., Chief of Staff
  63d Infantry Brigade
  64th Infantry Brigade
  57th F. A. Brigade (detached)
Attached: Artillery of French 127th Division
Artillery of French 1st Moroccan Division
French 278th Aero Squadron
French 29th Bln. Company
Thirty tanks
French 1st Moroccan Cav. Div., 1 squadron
Detached: 57th F. A. and 109th Ammunition Train

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, Vol. 1, Annexes 1st Vol.: Memorandum

Plans for Attack to Drive Enemy North of Aisne

[Editorial Translation]


I. The battle now in progress between the OISE and the SOMME does not permit us to execute at present the powerful stroke which appears necessary to throw the enemy back from the heights north of the VESLE and force him to withdraw north of the AISNE. That result can, however, be obtained by a different maneuver.

Consequently, the French Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Armies will at once organize strongly the positions south of the VESLE described by my personal and Secret Instructions No. 5254 of August 4 [Printed in AISNE-MARNE compilation].

The bridgeheads secured north of the VESLE will be preserved, widened, and reinforced, not by increasing the forces occupying them, but by carefully coordinating the infantry and artillery fires and by suitable field works.

Furthermore the outposts will maintain contact with the enemy and make every effort to take prisoners.

II. This attitude of waiting will not prevent intensive study and preparation for a decisive blow which we may be called upon to deliver at any moment in order to drive the enemy back north of the AISNE.

The attack would be made by the Sixth Army. Its first objective would be the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE, from l’ARBRE de ROMAIN to Hill 175 (west of DHUIZEL). It would be covered on the right by the Fifth Army, driving toward the crest south of the VENTELAY---VAUX---VARENNES, on the left by the Tenth Army, which would seize the BRENELLE Plateau, between Hills 175 and 164.

The second objective would be the AISNE, from CONDE to CONCEVREUX (Tenth and Sixth Armies), while the Fifth Army, pushing its front to the heights of ROUCY and BOUФIGNEREUX, would develop its action toward the east by seizing successively the heights of ST-THIERRY, HERMONVILLE, and CORMICY.

III. Finally, the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve will study an offensive action between the OISE and the AISNE having for its purpose:

1. First, to throw the enemy back to the right bank of the OISE, between the present front and the mouth of the AILETTE, and to the other side of the AILETTE, from the OISE to the road from CHAUNY to SOISSONS;

2. Then, by an attack from west to east in the direction of BRAY-en-LAONNAIS, and covering its flank on the AILETTE to gain the plateaus between the AISNE and the Canal.
from the OISE to the AISNE, in order to force the enemy to abandon the lines of the VESLE and the AISNE.

The second operation will follow the first with as little delay as possible so not to give the enemy time to recover.

The results of this study, which is to be held absolutely secret, will reach me on August 14 at the latest.

PETAIN.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, Vol. 1, Annexes 1st Vol.: Telegram

American First Army Not to Replace French Sixth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1844/M

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

August 9, 1918—11:45 p. m.

General, Commander-in-Chief,

To Headquarters, BACON [Allied G. H. Q.]

LAMORLAYE [French Group of Armies of the Reserve]

CHATEAU-THIERRY [French Sixth Army]

1. By amendment to previous plans, the American First Army will not be substituted for the Sixth Army.

2. The American forces attached to the Sixth Army will comprise a single corps of 4 divisions, two of which will be on the front and two in second line. The American 77th Division will enter the front line as soon as possible. The three other American divisions will be moved to the French Group of Armies of the East at a date to be fixed later.

3. (For Sixth Army only) The mission of the Sixth Army remains as prescribed by my Instructions 13668 of the 8th instant.

By order:

BUAT,
Major General.
Instructions for Armies

[Editorial Translation]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FRENCH FIRST, THIRD, SIXTH, TENTH ARMIES

1. The enemy has abandoned some ground, in front of ROYE, on the front of the First Army. The latter has occupied GOYENCOURT, VILLERS-les-ROYE, ST-AUBIN, DANCOURT, POPINCOURT, Le CESSIER.

   It will continue to exert vigorous pressure on the forces opposite, capture ROYE by outflanking it on the north and south, and then advance to the CHAMPIEN Plateau.

II. The Third Army will move its front to the DIVETTE. It will remain in close contact with the First Army on the line: Les LOGES-SEBASTOPOL Farm.

   Its principal zones of action are still:
   1. The open ground which extends between Le Bois des LOGES and LASSIGNY; direction: ARBRE de CANNY---La POTIERE, so as to outflank LASSIGNY on the north;
   2. The ridges which start at l'ECOUVILLON and ATTICCHY Farm and leading respectively to St-AUBIN Chapel and LOERMONT; in addition, the spur which runs to the CHIRY-OURS CAMPS Tower. By occupation of the latter, the army will tie in its operation with that of the Tenth Army.

III. The Tenth Army will receive special instructions.

IV. The Sixth Army will continue to organize strongly its position on the plateaus south of the VESLE, all the while maintaining close contact with the enemy.

FAYOLLE,
General Commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve.

---------

Instructions

[Editorial Translation]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FRENCH TENTH ARMY

   The Tenth Army will continue energetically its preparation for the proposed operation. It will be ready to carry it out August 18. However the day cannot be fixed at this moment because of the necessity of coordinating it with the attacks the British Third Army is to make about the 20th, north of the SOMME.

   The additional artillery which has been assigned to the Tenth Army will be returned to the disposal of French G. H. Q. before August 25.
The General commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve invites the attention of the General commanding the Tenth Army to the special situation which results for that army from the presence on its front of a number of positions organized for defense. These make a formidable obstacle of the NAMPCEL---AUDIGNICOURT---VASSENS---MORSAIN Cut.

The surest way to overcome this would appear to be by organizing two principal attacks:

1. One on the left, by way of the plateau of Les LOGES Farm in the direction of BELLEFONTAINE and LOMBREAY. In that vicinity, by gaining a foothold in Bois de la MONTAGNE which dominates the clearing at CARLEPONT, the head of the NAMPCEL-AUDIGNICOURT Ravine is turned.

2. The other on the right, by way of the NOUVRON-VINGRE Plateau, in the direction of VEZAPONIN. Operating from that side the MORSAIN---VASSENS---AUDIGNICOURT Ravine is outflanked on the south.

Opposite these two zones powerful groups of batteries must therefore be massed, leaving no doubt as to the success of the operation. Moreover these two zones are best adapted to the employment of tanks.

FAYOLLE.

- - - - - - -

Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, Vol. 1, Annexes 2d Vol.: Telegram

Possibility of Enemy Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2244/M

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 20, 1918--11 p. m.

General, Commander-in Chief,

To Hq., LAMORLAYE [French Group of Armies of the Reserve]
AVIZE [French Group of Armies of the Center]
BACON [Allied G. H. Q.]

1. Exploitation of the success of the French Tenth Army may induce the enemy to withdraw rapidly north of the AISNE before the right of the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the left of the Group of Armies of the Center.

2. It is important that our armies be not surprised by that movement. They will therefore be ready to cross the VESLE at the first indication and pursue the retreating enemy vigorously.

3. All precautions already indicated will be taken against possible enemy traps and artful devices on the terrain and in the abandoned installations north of the VESLE.

PETAIN.

- - - - - - -

- 8 -
Pursuit of Enemy to Continue

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 6232

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
August 22, 1918.

[Extract]

Hq. LAMORLAYE [Group of Armies of the Reserve]

BRETEUIL [French First Army]

CLERMONT [French Third Army]

COYOLLES [French Tenth Army]

CHATEAU-THIERRY [French Sixth Army]

NIVILLERS [French Air Division]

PROVINS [FRENCH G. H. G.]

1. The Third Army is along the banks of the DIVETTE.
   The Tenth Army holds the banks of the OISE and the AILLETTE from SAMPIGNY to PONT-ST.
   MARD; farther south it has occupied MAREUIL Farm, BAGNEUX, VALPRIEZ Farm, VILLERS-la-
   FOSSE, VAUXREZIS, POMMIERS.

2. Covering itself toward the OISE and AILLETTE, the Tenth Army will continue the
   pursuit of the enemy between the AILLETTE and the AISNE, so as to form a pincers with the
   AISNE front and to open a passage for the right divisions of the French I and XX Corps.

   A special effort will be made on the left, south of the AILLETTE, in the direction of
   LAFFAUX Mill. In addition to the terrain being more favorable on that side, the desired
   result will be more surely obtained.

   The objective to be gained is first, to liberate SOISSONS, then to force the enemy to
   withdraw from the VESLE to the AISNE.

   * * * * *

   FAYOLLE.

Coded 9 p. m.

----------
Transfer of 32d Division to French Tenth Army

3d Section, General Staff

MEMORANDUM FOR

Assistant Chief of Staff G-1.
Assistant Chief of Staff G-4.
Assistant Chief of Staff G-5.

1. Following translation of a letter from French Mission, dated August 24, 1918, is furnished you for your information:

I have the honor of informing you that because of the development of the battle now in progress the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast has decided to transfer the 32d Division to the Tenth Army to be used on the front if necessary.

It will be transferred on the 24th instant.

By order: H. Leroy.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant Chief of Staff G-3.

Headquarters of the 32d Division

[Editorial Translation]

Lt. Colonel Linard, Chief of Staff of the French Military Mission with the American Army

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces (G-3)

In response to your request of the 26th instant, I have the honor to advise you that the headquarters of the American 32d Division will be at TARTIERS, VIC-sur-AISNE area (10 kms. northeast), effective August 27.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of 3d Section.
Instructions for operations

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 7039

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
August 29, 1918—8 p. m.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FRENCH FIRST, THIRD, TENTH, AND SIXTH ARMIES

[Extract]

I. Repulsing the enemy rearguards, the First and Third Armies have advanced to the SOMME and the Canal du NORD. NOYON has been reoccupied.

II. The enemy seems to intend to halt on that line. It is expedient first to force a crossing of the Canal. The most favorable points of attack are:

For the First Army:
   a. Spur 77, south of ROUY, which can be surrounded with converging fires;
   b. The portion where the Canal is tunneled (south of CACHY).

For the Third Army: The CHEVILLY Spur.

The points of general direction of the advance remain those indicated by Memorandum 6779 of August 27: [not printed]

First Army: HAM.
Third Army: GUISCARD, GUVRY.

III. In order to enable the Third Army to operate on both banks of the OISE, the French XVIII Corps is attached to it effective at midnight. However, the French 132d Div. will remain at the disposal of the Tenth Army until further orders.

IV. Tenth Army: The actions fought today on the Tenth Army front show that the enemy holds his front lines very strongly; besides, there is no longer hope of surprise effect.

Under those conditions, the Tenth Army will carry out a coordinated operation, prepared in every detail.

A short preparation would not produce sufficient results. We should take advantage of our artillery superiority to destroy systematically all obstacles which held up the infantry advance today, particularly the strong points at CRECY-au-MONT, JUVIGNY, CHAVIGNY, CUFFIES, etc.

The principal points against which attacks can debouch are: Plateau north of JUVIGNY (zone of action of the French XXX Corps) and that at PASLY.

The main effort will be concentrated on them; particularly, the PASLY Plateau, which can be covered with cross fire, will be made untenable for the enemy. Conquest of the LAFFAUX Plateau will be the main purpose, so as to force the enemy to evacuate the line of the VESLE.

FAYOLLE,
General Commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve.

---------
Plans to Rout Enemy from the Vesle

[Editorial Translation]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FRENCH FIRST, THIRD, SIXTH, AND TENTH ARMIES

[Extract]

1. The directives for the First and Third Armies remain the same:
   First Army: HAM, operating south of the SOMME, so as to surround the bend of the river.
   Third Army: GUISCARD, so as to take in reverse the hilly massif which extends between that city and the OISE, and to liberate NOYON.

2. The Tenth Army has captured CRECY-au-MONT. It has advanced to the SOISSONS-CHAUNY Road on both sides of TERNY-SORNY.
   The main objective to be gained is still to bring about the fall of the line of the VESLE. Consequently, the attacks will continue in the direction of LAFFAUX Mill.
   Direction of attack are:
   1. By way of Plateau 170 north of VREGNY (French I Corps);
   2. By way of Plateau 169 north of NEUVILLE-sur-MARGIVAL (French XXX Corps).
   Those directions are convergent and make it possible to turn MARGIVAL Ravine by maneuver on the north and south.
   The main effort, therefore, will be concentrated in those two directions.

---

Assignment of the III Corps

[Editorial Translation]

1068/01

Lt. Colonel Linard, Chief of French Military Mission with the American Army
To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces, G-3

Pursuant to my Communication No. 9854 of the 2d instant, I have the honor to advise you that the American III Army Corps will become a part of the French Fifth Army, effective at zero hour, September 4.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

---
Relief of the 32d Division from the Front

[Editorial Translation]


Lt. Colonel Linard, Chief of Staff of the French Military Mission with the American Army

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces G-3

I have the honor to advise you that the American 32d Division was withdrawn for several days from the front, on the night of September [August] 23.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

---

Pursuit of Enemy

[Editorial Translation]


INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FRENCH FIRST, THIRD, TENTH AND SIXTH ARMIES

[Extract]

As a result of the pressure exercised by the Third and Tenth Armies the enemy is in retreat before the right of the First Army and on the entire front of the Third and Sixth Armies.

Pursuit has started and will be carried out with the utmost energy.

General Directions:

First Army: HAM---ESSIGNY-le-GRAND;
Third Army: CHAUNY-TERGNIER, by operations particularly north of the OISE;
Tenth Army: LAFFAUX la MALMAISON.

The Sixth Army will move on its entire front from the VESLE to the AISNE, maintaining contact on the right with the French Fifth Army.
The Third Army will place in reserve the most tired divisions as its front becomes narrower, so as to expedite their reorganization.

* * * * *

FAYOLLE,
General Commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve.

--------

III Corps, Gen. File; Fldr. 312: Memorandum

Relief of the III Corps from the French Fifth Army

[Editorial Translation]

Military No. 2817/M

FRENCH GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,

Received 1 p. m., September 5, 1918

French General Headquarters to French Military Mission at CHAUMONT-Communique to all concerned

[Extract]

The American III Army Corps will be relieved on the front of the French Fifth Army by the Italian II Army Corps.

With a view to returning as early as possible the headquarters and nondivisional elements of the American III Corps to the control of the Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, the headquarters and nondivisional elements of the French XVI Army Corps will, as soon as unloaded, relieve these elements in the French Sixth Army. The headquarters and nondivisional elements of the XVI Corps will be later relieved by the headquarters and nondivisional elements of the Italian II Army Corps and then placed at the disposal of the French Group of Armies of the Reserve, in accordance with conditions prescribed in my Telegram No. 2744 of September 3.

* * * * *

The conditions under which the American 77th and 28th Divisions will be relieved by the Italian 3d and 8th Infantry Divisions will be indicated later.

The Reserve Group of Armies and the Group of Armies of the Center will make their respective reports on the dates of release and regrouping of the headquarters and nondivisional elements of the III Corps and the Italian II Corps.

Release of the American III Corps will be pushed vigorously.

For the officer on duty, Code Section:

MULLER.

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- 14 -
Pursuit of Enemy

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2861/3

FRENCH FIFTH ARMY.
September 5, 1918—8:30 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 70

I. The enemy still holds the heights north of the VESLE, between REIMS and Les VENTEAX.
   Farther to the left, units of the French V Corps have crossed the river at COURLANDON and in one place have reached Bois de VIGNEUX and COTE 180 at another point.
   On our left, the American units extend the line toward MERVAL.

II. If the enemy continues his withdrawal, all corps will pursue him closely by routing his rearguards and breaking their last remaining resistance. In order to maintain contact and to know every move of the enemy the French V and XIV Corps will send patrols north of the VESLE during the night.

III. In the event the enemy holds his ground north of the VESLE, the V Corps will continue, during the night of September 5/6 and the day of the 6th, the execution of the operation started the day of the 5th, which has as its object:
   1. To gain ground facing north, in the direction of ROMAIN, in conjunction with the right division of the American corps.
   2. Under the protection of troops which will hold the heights north of ROMAIN, to execute with reserve detachments a turn to the east, in order gradually to reduce the defenses of the north bank of the VESLE.

IV. Finally, if the American corps reaches its objectives on the AISNE during the day of the 6th, and the enemy continues to offer strong resistance on the general line: ST-THIERRY—TRIGNY—MONTIGNY—ROMAIN, the V Corps, in order to dislodge him, would have to put on an attack, following the axis: ARBRE de ROMAIN—GUYENCOURT. For this purpose, it has available the French 20th Inf. Div.
   Further orders will be issued if necessary.

BERTHELOT,
General Commanding the Fifth Army.
III Corps Transferred for Duty in French Second Army

3d Section, General Staff

FROM: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3

TO: Commanding General III Corps

[Extract]

1. Referring to Telegram 690 G-3 (September 6) the following is furnished for your information and guidance.

2. The entire III Corps will, under an agreement reached with the French G. H. Q., be transferred for duty in the French Second Army. For administrative purposes the corps will report to the Commanding General, First Army, headquarters at LIGNY-en-BARROIS. Arrangements for putting corps troops and divisions into the line will be made by you in conformity with orders from the Chief of Staff, First Army.

3. It is understood that your headquarters will be free to move on the 9th instant. Your first duty will probably be the command, under the Commanding General, French Second Army, of a corps in line comprising the American 33d Division and one French division.

4. The 32d Division is to begin entraining in the region of VILLERS-COTTERETS beginning at 6 o'clock September 9.

5. The 28th Division will begin entraining at about 6 o'clock September 12 in the region of GERMAINE---EPERNAY---AVIZE.

6. The 77th Division will begin entraining in the region of EPERNAY soon after the 28th Division, exact date to be fixed later.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Brigadier General, General Staff.
Instructions for Attack

[Editorial Translation]

FIELD ORDERS NO. 405

I. The Tenth Army, on August 17, at an H hour which will be fixed by special order, will make an attack to gain us complete possession of the enemy covering zone.

II. The front which is to be reached, set beyond the enemy outposts line, is outlined by the following points: Trench on the north slope of MONTAGNE des ROSETTES [not identified]---Le FOUR-a-VERRE---south edges of Bois de la MONTAGNE---crossroads on Cote 169---dominating ridges north and south of NAMPCEL---ridge of the Arbre-Observatoire [tree-observatory: Shown as: Arbre Obs. on French 1:20,000 map]---La GRANGE-aux- [des] MOINES Farm [Cretedu] Le FOUR-a-CHAUX---ridge one kilometer south of VASSENS---PALLOISE [FALLOISE] Farm---plateau north of NOUVRON-VINGRE---ridge south of NOUVRON-VINGRE---edge of ridge 800 meters west of MOULIN de FOUQUEROLLES [Anc. M.].

III. The respective boundaries of the attack zones of the corps will be as follows (plan directeur 20.000):

Between the French XVIII and French VII Corps: Point 2010---CARRIERE [Quarry] du TROU-HENRI---crossroads 300 meters northwest of CROISETTE Farm---Point 5051.05---ridge dominating Le FRESENE and BRESSON on the north. (Those points inclusive to the VII Corps.)

Between the VII and French XXX Corps: AUSTERLITZ Communication Trench---COULEUVRES Communication Trench---battery emplacement 7463---dominating ridge north of VASSENS---battery emplacement 9573 (those points inclusive to the VII Corps)---ARBRE-de-VASSENS Road---Cote 160---BALISE de la TOUR (1,200 meters southwest of SELENS), (these points inclusive to the XXX Corps).

Between the French XXX Corps and the French I Corps: GUILLET Communication Trench---Point 9029---COTE 150---LUMIGNON Communication Trench---bridge over the Ru HOZIEN [Creek], north of VEZAPONIN (these points incl. to the I Corps).

IV. The attack will be preceded by a preparation, for which, because of the preliminary demolition and, more especially, of the breaches which will have to be effected, the procedure will be prescribed by the corps commanders concerned.

Everything will be done whereby, from the start our counterbattery can attain maximum power.

V. The attack will be carried out solely by those divisions which are actually in sector.

However, during the night following the attack, corps commanders will move up the divisions which are to be put into the front line in preparation for the attack against the principal position and which wherever this has been accomplished, will thus be placed immediately in rear of their future battle positions.

During the said night the support battalions of the units which have executed the attack will be available to the divisions thus brought into second line.
The battalions which are holding the front will only leave their most advanced elements in place and these will continue to provide front line security until the following night.

That same night, the generals commanding those divisions which are to participate in the attack of the principal position will proceed to occupy their respective C. P.'s. The generals commanding divisions which are to execute subsequent attacks from the front line, will assume command of their sectors at a time which will be fixed by the corps commander.

VI. Whenever the objectives have been reached, reconnaissance will be pushed forward for the purpose of maintaining contact with the enemy.

VII. The 17th and 127th Inf. Divs., which are placed respectively within the zones of the VII and III Corps are maintained in army reserve.

MANGIN.


Preparation for Attack

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1029/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,

FIELD ORDERS NO. 410

[Extract]

1. The day of the 19th will be devoted to the destruction of barbwire, the firing of concentrations on reserves, and to counterbattery.

II. August 20, the Tenth Army will pass to the attack of the enemy's principal position of resistance which extends in depth as far as the line: SAMPIGNY--CUTS--BLERANCOURT--MONT-du-CROCQ Farm--VEZAPONIN--TARTIERS--CUISY-en-ALMONT.

III. On reaching that front, the division, without halting, will pursue the enemy so as to reach:

French XVIII A. C.: The OISE and AILLETTE as far as the CHAMPS Bridge (excl.);
French VII A. C.: The AILLETTE from the CHAMPS Bridge to that of CRECY au MONT (incl.);
French XXX A. C.: The plateau from CRECY au MONT (incl.) to JUVIGNY (excl.);
French I A. C.: South edge of the JUVIGNY Plateau.

IV. The attack will start at 7:10 a. m.: It will be preceded by a powerful preparation, the duration of which will be fixed by each corps commander, and by counterbattery fire as strong as possible.

V. The attack will be supported, on the front of the XVIII, VII, and I Corps, by the tanks which will enter the line at the same time that the infantry moves forward.

* * * * *
VII. The participation of the air division (pursuit and day bombardments) will be the subject of a later order. 
All the rear areas of the battle front will be bombed during the nights preceding the attack.

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MANGIN.

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Continuation of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1035/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
August 20, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 415

[Extract]

I. Front reached at end of day: Line running as follows: PIMPREZ---CARLEPONT (excl.) ---CAISNES (excl.)---GIZANCOURT---BLERANCOURDELLE---area west of COTE 160---VEZAPONIN---BIEUXY---Les CAVES---CUISY-en-ALMONT---LAVAL (excl.)---COURTIL---POMMIERS Sugar Mill.
We have taken several thousand prisoners.
II. During the night direct contact will be maintained with the enemy and he will be subjected to continuous pressure. We will be prepared to pursue him if he withdraws. Units will be reorganized and reserves reconstituted.
III. Tomorrow, August 21, continuation of the attack in conformity with Order No. 410 of August 19, 1918.
Zones of action: No change.
The French I and XXX Army Corps *** will drive to the CRECY-au-MONT---TERNY-SORNY ---SOISSONS Road.
The French XVIII and VII Army Corps will occupy the villages at the foot of the slopes and will push their pursuit elements in the direction of the OISE and the AILETTE.

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MANGIN,
General Commanding the Tenth Army.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII. Vol. 1, Annexes 2d Vol.: Order
Transfer of the 32d Division to the French Tenth Army

[Contemporary Translation]

ORDER NO. 433

[Extract]

I. The American 32d Division will transport itself August 24 upon the AISNE (west of SOISSONS), where it will be in reserve of the army group and administered [supplied] by the Tenth Army.

Headquarters Tenth Army: COYOLLES.
P. C. Tenth Army: Chateau MONTAUBAN at HAUTE-FONTAINE.

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MANGIN.

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Corps Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

FIELD ORDERS NO. 437

[Extract]

Boundary between XVIII and VII Corps - BLERANcourt---La RUE de NOYON---La TUIlerie---Praast---Barisis (these points to VII Corps).

Boundary between VII and XXX Army Corps - VasseNs---Signal 158 (2,500 meters north of VEZAPONIN), these points to XXX A. C.; Bonnemaison Farm (to VII A. C.)--chateau 200 meters north of CRECy-au-MONT---bridge across the ailleTte on the main highway to CHAuny---then, Jumencourt---quIncY-bosse (these points to XXX A. C.).

Boundary between XXX and I Army Corps - NOuvron-vINGre---Tartiers---crossroads of road from Tartiers to JUVIGNY with road leading to ValPriez Farm---Hill 131 (2 kilometers north of CHAVIGNY), these points to I A. C.; Beaumont Farm---Terny-sorny (these points to XXX A. C.), sorny to I A. C.; Vauxaillon Road to point 2 kilometers from sorny to XXX A. C. CREute babylonE, wooded area 800 meters north of Bessy Farm to I A. C.
Whenever the advance of the I A. C. becomes pronounced, the boundary between the I and XXX Army Corps will be: the road TARTIERS---NOUVRON-VINGRE---BERNY-RIVIERE, said road to XXX A. C.

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MANGIN,
General Commanding the Tenth Army.

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HS Fr. Files: 420-30.1: Order

Missions of Army and Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1057 S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
August 25, 1918.

FIELD ORDERS NO. 443

[Extract]

1. The Tenth Army has been assigned the mission to break through the enemy front between the Aisne and FORET de ST-GOBAULT and to seize the Laffaux Plateau, then march towards the northeast, direction of advance TERNY-SORNY, LAON, effecting the fall, first, of the Aisne line and, second, the Ailette line.

* * * * * *

III. Mission of the Corps.*

French VII Corps, employing the French 48th, 33d and 2d Inf. Divs. (the French 33d at St-AUBIN to relieve the French 55th effective the morning of the 26th), has for its mission the covering of the left of the attack from the FORET de ST-GOBAULT side. For this purpose, it will first of all cross the canal and the AILETTE and throw the enemy back to the edges of the forest between BARISIIS and BRANCOURT inclusive.

French XXX Corps, employing in front line the French 17th, 64th and 127th Inf. Divs.; in second line the Moroccan 2d Div., French 66th Inf. Div. and American 32d Inf. Div. is charged with the direct attack.

It will assure the conquest of the plateau north of TERNY-SORNY, then, marching by way of both banks of the AILETTE, it will reach the front: Hill 188 - La MONTAGNE (2 kms. northeast of BRANCOURT)--ANIZY--ARBRE de MONTBAVIN.

Later direction of advance: ANIZY--FAUCOURT--MOLINCHARD.

French I Corps employing on the left, French 59th and 41st Inf. Divs. in front line, on the left, French 69th and 5th Inf. Divs. in front line and French 32d Inf. Div. in second line, will first of all reach Le MOULIN de LAFFAUX, advancing on its left to LEURY-CLAMECY Ridge, on its right to VREGNY Ridge.

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* The French 132d Inf. Div. of the French XVIII A. C. south of the OISE will fall in with the attack of the VII Corps.

Objective: PIERREMANDE.
It is charged then with seizing Le PLATEAU de La MALMAISON as well as the debouches north of the AILETTE:

1. Heights of MONTBAVIN
2. Heights of MONAMPTEUIL

Later direction of advance: CHAVIGNON-CHIVY

French XX Corps employing French 12th, 25th and 29th Inf. Divs. (the latter beginning the evening of the 29th), will cross the AISNE down stream from CONDE, by neutralizing the heights north of CHASSEMY. Movement dependent on advance of the right in the I Corps.

First objective: La ROYERE Plateau north of VAILLY.

Later the XX Corps will be charged with mopping up Le CHEMIN des DAMES in conjunction with the French Sixth Army, covering on the right the movement of the I Corps.

IV. Crossing of the AISNE (I, XX A. C.'s) and the AILETTE (XXX, VII A. C.'s) to be effected first of all by the greatest possible number of footbridges for the infantry crossing.

The pontoon bridges will be thrown as soon as the advance will permit. That operation will be prepared in advance in every detail.

V. The date of the operations will be announced by further orders. They will specify, in the case of the attack of the right of the I Corps (VREGNY Plateau), the time of departure, dependent, of course, upon the advance of the left, particularly on the front TERNY-SORNY---LEUR-CROUY.

VI. Tanks.

The XXX Corps will employ the 502d Regt. (3 bns.)
The I Corps will employ the 503d Regt. (3 bns.)
The 12th Bn., 504th Regt., army reserve.

The action of the battalions in depth will be so regulated as to have large available manpower every day. Each battalion will be employed only every other day.

Artillery: Distribution already prescribed.

Air Service: Further orders.

Remarks: The distribution of the infantry divisions indicated in Paragraph III above may be changed because of events which might occur before the attack.

The method of attack will depend also on the advance which might still be made.

MANGIN.

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232-32.7: Order

**Units at Disposal of French XXX Corps**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1072/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
August 25, 1918.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 448

[Extract]

I. The following units will be at the disposal of the XXX Army Corps beginning at 8 h., August 26, 1918:

(1) The Moroccan 2d Division in the region of the Ferme MONT-du-CROCQ---BOUT-de-VAUX.
(2) The 66th Infantry Division in the zone RETHONDES (Q.G.)---St-CREPIN-aux-BOIS, CARREFOUR du PUITs-d'ORLEANS.

(3) The American 32d Division in the zone TROSLY-BREUIL---COURTIEUX---MONTIGNY-LENGRAIN---CHELLES---PIERREFONDS.
Q. G.: CHATEAU La CHENOYE

* * * * * *

MANGIN.

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232-32.7: Order

Corps Boundaries of French Tenth Army Defined

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 1081/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
August 26, 1918.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 452

Modifying Order No. 437 of August 24, 1918

In order to extend the rear areas of the XXX Army Corps, the following modifications are made, to take effect from noon, August 27, in the limits of the zones of action of the army corps as fixed by Order No. 437.

Limit between the VII Army Corps and XVIII Army Corps: This is carried more to the northwest so as to give to the VII Army Corps the use of the road NAMPCEL---Fme de QUENNEVIERES---MORENVAL Fme.

Limit between the VII Army Corps and XXX Army Corps: Cote 160 (3 km. northeast of VASSENS)---VEZIN (to the XXX C. A.)---Le BOUT-de-VAUX (to VII Army Corps)---crossroads: VIC-sur-AISNE---CARLEPONT main highway and from AUTRECHES---MOULIN-sous-TOUVENT [secondary] Road [thence]---ARBRE-de-BITRY---railroad grade crossing 500 meters north of JAULZY.

Limit between the XXX C. A. and the I C. A.: This is carried more to the south so as to leave to the XXX C. A. the disposal of the road VEZAPONIN---NOUVRON-VINGRE---VINGRE---St-CHRISTOPHE-a-BERRY.

MANGIN.

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INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE ARMY CORPS

[Extract]

I. The battle must be won. The battle will have been won if we attain the heights which dominate the LAON Plain, thus assuring for us the outlet to the plain and the exploitation. In order to reach this objective, the progress should be given the greatest rapidity possible, so that the enemy will not have a chance to reform under the repeated blows which we will strike. The battle will have to be won in one day. The means put in operation, the tactical situation, the morale of the enemy permit our obtaining this result.

* * * * * *

III. During the period preceding the battle, the I A. C. will take care to assure for itself a good base of departure. On the whole front, the enemy must be prevented from reforming; annoying his reliefs, make difficult his bringing up supplies, his organization, inflict as heavy losses upon him as possible. To this end, the harassing fires should be kept up methodically, and concentration fires should be effected whenever an occasion presents itself. The artillery will proceed with the location and destruction of the enemy’s battery emplacements, particularly those of St-GOBAIN. Everything should be ready for a short and powerful preparation.

IV. The army corps will dispose for the battle of the divisions of 1st and of 2d line, enumerated in the Order of Operations No. 443, of August 25. (a) The advance of the first line divisions will be rapid. It can attain at the outset 100 m. in two minutes. Later, the progress will be less rapid by reason of the fatigue of the men and the necessity of accord­ ing them short pauses to get their breath and the necessity of read­ justing the barrages. The first line divisions should be able to carry the attack to a depth of 10 km. or thereabouts. The effort should correspond about to the front: BRANCOURT---PINON---plateau of La MALMAISON. (b) The second line divisions will follow in the footsteps of the first line divisions in accordance with the orders of the commanders of the A. C.’s and at a distance, at the outset of 3 to 4 km. The passing will take place without there being any stop to the advance of the 1st line divisions, the distance between the 1st and the 2d line divisions diminishing in the course of the progress by reason of the difference in gait. (c) After having been passed, the divisions having become 2d line divisions will
reform in such manner as to constitute a new echelon of the maneuver, available for the exploitation.

This latter will be done, depending upon the conditions of the troops, either, by alternating between the 1st and the 2d line divisions, or by the continuous action of the leading divisions. It should not be forgotten that the enemy divisions have kept up the pursuit for a week without being relieved.

The alternation will usually be regulated by understanding between the commanders of the 1st and of the 2d line divisions, whose P. C.'s are known, as the A. C. cannot be informed in time to regulate this movement.

The headquarters of the divisions should be as mobile as possible - on horseback - the liaison with the rear being insured at all times by the axis of liaison (telephonic, optic, wireless, ground telegraphy, mounted orderlies, runners), the establishing and the functioning of which should be very closely watched by the command. Insist that the reports bear the hour at which the occurrence reported took place.

V. Lightened equipment (no pack, nor overcoat, nor blankets - the shelter-half taking the place of both), the pushing forward of the rations and ammunition supplies, the regulation of the march of the combat trains, the order in the traffic, are also all important factors in the rapidity of the advance.

Material taken from the enemy should be made use of (rations, machine guns, cannon) wherever possible, so as to reduce the necessities of the supply.

VI. In resume, the maneuver has as a basis, the ardent desire to gain ground. Nothing is done as long as it still remains to be done. This principle should be thought of by all. Victory is at the end of the effort.

MANGIN.

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Relief of French Division by American 32d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1090/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
August 27, 1918---4:25 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 457

[Extract]

I. The American 32d Infantry Division, at the disposal of the French XXX A. C., will relieve the French 127th Infantry Division the night of 27/28.

MANGIN.

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Instructions for Air Bombardment

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1097/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
August 27, 1918--21:05 h.

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 460
for Aviation

[Extract]

I. PURSUIT: Large patrols as soon as daybreak; destruction of drachen at the time of attack.

One hour after departure, the major portion of the D. Ae. [Air Division] will intervene to assure the mastery of the air. Combat troops will be machine-gunned.

Between 10 and 6 h. aerial operations will stress protection of army corps activities. From 16 h. to nightfall, renewed intervention in forces, in order to repulse and to maintain the enemy aviation far back into their lines.

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MANGIN.

Pursuit of Retreating Enemy to Continue

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1115/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
August 30, 1918--3 p. m.

FIELD ORDERS NO. 470

I. The enemy is withdrawing on the front of the French I Corps.

We have occupied CHAVIGNY, CUFFIES, CROUY and reached the road: LEURY-underground quarries on the plateau of HILL 159 south of LEURY.

II. The I Corps will vigorously continue the pursuit already begun with the front line units, which will be followed by the main body.

The entire French 69th Infantry Division will be moved to the plateaus north of the AISNE, followed by the French 5th Infantry Division, which will be deployed on its right. The French XX Corps, the French 29th Infantry Division leading, will take the necessary measures to begin its movement behind the right of the I Corps.

The French XXX Corps, maneuvering its right, will push out to the TERNY-SORYN Plateau.

MANGIN.
SPECIAL ORDER NO. 499

As of August [September?] 5, 1918, inclusive, the American 370th Inf. Regt., which is now stationed in the region MAREUIL-sur-OURCQ—VILLENUEVE-sous-THURY—AUTHEUIL-en-VALOIS—BOURNEVILLE, is placed at the disposal of the 59th Inf. Div. in conformity with provisions contained in Memorandum No. 48. 557, General Headquarters, of August 31, 1918. The regiment in question should proceed to and bivouac within the zone occupied by the aforementioned infantry division as soon as practicable.

* * * * *

By order:

Chief of Staff.

FIELD ORDER NO. 504

I. The enemy is beating a retreat on the entire army front. We have occupied FOLEMBRAY, COUCY-la-VILLE, COUCY-le-CHATEAU, the ANTOICHE Plateau, MARGIVAL, BREGNY, CHIVRES, and have reached the AISNE upstream from the confluence of the VESLE.

II. The pursuit will continue without cessation by brushing aside the enemy rearguards with a view to passing to the attack as soon as we have determined the front on which the enemy has decided to halt.

* * * * *

General direction: LAON.

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CH. MANGIN.
Movement of American 32d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1149/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
September 5, 1918.

ORDER NO. 509

I. The American 32d Division, to be returned very shortly to the disposal of General Pershing, will move on September 6 to the zone: BERNEUIL---ATTICHy---BITRY---COURTIEUX---MONTIGNY-LENGRAIN---CHELLES---St-ETIENNE---La CHENOYE---BREUIL (HAUTE-FONTAINE excl.).

C. P.: La CHENOYE. The artillery will, as soon as possible, rejoin the division in that zone.

II. The American 32d Division will pass to army reserve, effective at 6 p. m., September 6.

MANGIN.

Postponement of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1159/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
September 7, 1918---10:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 524

[Extract]

The attack planned for September 8 by General Orders No. 521 is postponed to September 9.

MANGIN.

- 28 -
**Combat Instructions**
[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 438/3

XXX ARMY CORPS,
August 26, 1918.

**OPERATION ORDER NO. 101**

[Extract]

I. In execution of the orders of the Tenth Army, the Moroccan 2d Division, the 66th Infantry Division, and the American 32d Division, put at the disposal of the General commanding the XXX A. C., will station themselves during the night of August 26/27 * * *

* * * * * *

The American 32d Division - TARTIERS (placed alongside the P. C. of the 127th Infantry Division).

H. PENET,
The General Cmdg. the XXX A. C.

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**Disposition of Artillery**
[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 447/3

XXX ARMY CORPS,
August 27, 1918--10:15 h.

**OPERATION ORDER NO. 103**

[Extract]

I. MISSION: The mission of the XXX A. C. is fixed in an extract of Order No. 443, from the general commanding the army [Aug. 25, 1918]* which is addressed to the generals commanding the infantry division and to the colonel commanding the artillery.

* Printed in Tenth Army.
II. The XXX A. C. will have at its disposal for attack: The three divisions in first line: 17th D. I.--64th D. I.--American 32d Division.
The three divisions in second line: Moroccan 2d Division--66th Inf. Div.--Moroccan 1st Div.

III. ZONE OF ACTION OF THE INFANTRY DIVISIONS: * * * The infantry divisions will maneuver, each in its zone, in order to turn any obstacles which may obstruct their march, running over, if necessary, momentarily into neighboring zones if such a movement is found to be necessary to assure the continuity of the advance.

IV. DISTRIBUTION OF THE ARTILLERY:
(a) Artillery at the disposal of the infantry divisions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Heavy Artillery (short)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17th D. I.</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64th D. I.</td>
<td>3 btrys. 155 short Sch. (A. D./64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American 32 D.</td>
<td>3 btrys. 155 short Sch. (A. D./127)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American 32 D.</td>
<td>4 btrys. 155 short Sch. (A. D./1st D. M.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American 32 D.</td>
<td>2 batteries 220 T. R.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American 32 D.</td>
<td>6 batteries 220 - 1901.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Artillery of the army corps:
The heavy artillery (long) of the army corps comprises:

- 3 batteries of 105 long
- 9 batteries of 155 long - Model 1877 - 1914
- 5 batteries of 155 long - Model 1877
- 4 batteries of 145
- 6 batteries of 155 G. P. F.

IX. CAVALRY: The use of the cavalry will be regulated by special order.

XI. AERONAUTICS:
(a) Distribution of means:
Squadron No. 18 Command
" " 278 64th D. I. and Am. 32d Div.
" " 259 17th D. I.
" " 216 Heavy Art. of XXX Corp
" " 203 Group Mussel
Balloon 29 17th D. I. and heavy artillery.
Balloon 87 64th D. I. Am. 32d D. I. and H. A.
(b) One avion will be reserve to accompany the tanks.

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XII. SUCCESSIVE P. C.'s:

XXX C. A.: Ferme FORETS---MONTECOUVE---MONT-de-LEUILLY.
Advanced information center of the A. C.: MONTECOUVE---MONT-de-LEUILLY---MONT-de-SINGES.

17th D. I. and 2d D. M.: Fme FORETS---Fme MAREUIL.
64th and 66th D. I.: VEZAPONIN---MONTECOUVE---MONT de LEUILLY.
American 32d Div. and 1st D. M.: TARTIERS---JUVINGY---FONTAINE-St-REMY.

• • • • • •

H. PENET.

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232-32.7: Order

Relief of French Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 448/3
XXX ARMY CORPS,
No. 31

OPERATION ORDER NO. 104

[Extract]

I. The American 32d Division will relieve during the night of August 27/28, 1918, the 127th Infantry Division in the zone of action given over to this latter division.

II. The details of the operation will be regulated by the General commanding the 127th Infantry Division after an understanding with the General commanding the 32d Division.

• • • • • •

VI. TAKING OVER OF COMMAND - by the General commanding the American 32d Division at 7 a. m., August 28, 1918.

• • • • • •

VII. Since the American units are in greater strength than the French units they will not relieve number for number the units of the 127th Infantry Division. The General commanding the 127th Division will give his relief orders with this situation in mind.

PENET,
General Cmdg. the XXX Army Corps.

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- 31 -
DATE OF ATTACK

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 477/3

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 112

[Extract]

I. The attack planned by Order of Operations No. 443 issued by the commanding general of the army will take place on the 29th in the morning; the hour will be fixed by a special order.

II. The artillery preparation preceding the attack will have a duration of 25 minutes and will be effected with the maximum violence.

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PENET,
The General Cmdg. the XXX Army Corps.

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PROVISIONS FOR EXPLOITING ADVANCE MADE BY AMERICANS

No. 117

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 489/3

By order of the general commanding the army, to exploit the advance made by the Americans, who have attained TERNY-SORNY with their regiment of the right:

(a) The Moroccan 1st Div. following the rear brigade of the American 32d Div. will move up in between the 64th Div. and the 32d Div. with a view of spreading out beyond the CRECY-au-MONT Road in order to act in the zone formerly given over to the 64th Division.

A company of tanks is put at the disposal of the 1st Div. which will have at its disposal, from the beginning, its own artillery, which artillery will later be reinforced.

(b) The 17th Div., and the 64th Div., will act facing toward the northeast, guarding the flank of the principal action, carried on by the 32d Div., and the Moroccan 1st Division.

(c) After the passage (or passing by) of the 1st Div., the 66th Div. will move in behind the 32d Div. and will follow its movement as second line. The Moroccan 2d Div., also leaning or pressing more to the south will place itself back of the 1st Div. and follow its movement as a division of the second line.

H. PENET,
The General Cmdg. the XXX A. C.
The general commanding the 1st Div. will make known the hour at which he will be in a position to intervene on the plateau to the northeast of JUVIGNY, so as to allow the 17th Div. and the 64th Div. to stop the fire upon this region being carried out by them.

H. PENET.

232-32.7: Telephone Message

**Combat Instructions**

[Contemporary Translation]

*August 29, 1918—10:45 o'clock.*

From: PENET (XXX Corps)
To: HAAN (American 32d Div.)

On account of the success obtained by your leading brigade, activate as much as possible the movement of your 2d Brigade, prescribing it to act in the northern part of your sector, even by outflanking on this side in order to widen the gap already made.

This will allow one regiment of the 64th Div., which I am pushing toward your zone to advance toward the northeast, in liaison with you. If necessary, push your 2d Brigade to the south of JUVIGNY in order to execute the movement prescribed above.

Moreover, I am taking action so that the Moroccan division follows your movement very closely and that it may move in to prolong your left and act in the zone of the 64th Div. in case the regiment in question in the movement referred to above does not advance rapidly enough.

On the other hand, the general commanding the army has given orders to the 59th Div. and the 41st Div. to push forward as far as possible in their zones in order to support on the right the movement of the 32d Div.

232-32.7: Order

**Change in Orders**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 502/3

XXX ARMY CORPS,
*August 30, 1918—17:10 h.*

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 123 FOR THE AMERICAN 32D DIVISION

On account of the withdrawal which is taking place in front of the I Army Corps, the General commanding the XXX Army Corps recalls the directions given by him yesterday:

It is necessary to keep in the very closest contact with the enemy. Very active patrols should be sent out, tonight particularly, before the front, and all measures taken in advance to pursue the enemy without the least delay. This is a matter for the
commanders of battalions, and colonels commanding regiments in certain cases but not for higher commands, who, if the opportunity presents itself, should not hesitate to push their troops forward on the heels of the enemy without waiting for orders from higher commands.

In this latter case move forward and send a report that one has pushed forward.

H. PENET,
General Cmdg. the XXX Army Corps.

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232-32.7: Order

Resumption of Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 507/5

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 507/5

XXX ARMY CORPS,
August 31, 1918--8 h.

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 124

[Extract]

1. The XXX A. C. will, on August 31, at an hour which will be fixed later, resume the attack of the plateaus to the south of the AILETTE.

The XXX A. C. will attack with:
In first line, Moroccan 2d Div., 66th Div., American 32d Div.
In second line, 17th I. D., 64th Div., Moroccan 1st Div.

2. The 1st objective to be attained is the following: ••• PONT de la GLORIE---BETHANCOURT---northern edge of the Bois de LEUILLY---the MONT de LEUILLY---TOUTVENT---FONTAINE-St-REMY---Point 4246---eastern edge and southern edge of TERNY-SORNY.

Liaison: At the canal about 800 meters west of the PONT de la GLORIE, with the VII A. C. At 800 meters southeast of TERNY-SORNY, with I A. C.

A special order will fix the later objectives of each of the divisions.

3. MANEUVER TO BE EXECUTED, to attain the 1st objective: The efforts of the A. C. facing the east will be executed with two divisions, the 32d Division and the 66th Infantry Division operating on the heights of the plateau.

The Moroccan 2d Division will spread out in its zone facing the northeast in order to guard the flank of the action, while occupying the Bois de LEUILLY and the side of Hill 143 facing LEUILLY-sous-COUCY.

4. LIMITS OF THE ZONES OF ACTION: Between the Moroccan 2d Division and the 66th Div: The limits formerly fixed as far as 0665, then 2965 - 3070.

Between the 66th Div., and the 32d Division: Limits previously fixed as far as 0245, then crossroads at Hill 151.2 (to the 66th Div.) crossroads 4047.

* * * * *

8. SPECIAL PRESCRIPTIONS: Enemy tanks having been reported during the day of the 30th, the infantry will be accompanied by a certain number of field pieces, who will, if need be, intervene against these tanks.
9. DISTRIBUTION OF THE TANKS:
The A. S. (special artillery) [Tank Formations] of the XXX A. C. will place at the
disposal:
of the M. 2d D. 1 company of tanks.
of the 66th I. D. 2 companies of tanks.
of the 32d D. 2 companies of tanks.

10. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) Distribution of the means: Without change.
   (b) Marking out of the line: An obligatory marking out will be made at the
       hour H plus forty-five minutes and at the hour H plus one hour and thirty-five minutes.
   (c) An avion will be designated to accompany the tanks.

11. SECOND LINE DIVISIONS: The second line divisions will hold themselves in readi­
    ness to move upon the order of the general commanding the A. C.
    The 17th Div. will push ahead in the footsteps of the 2d M. D. [Moroccan 2d Division]
    one of its regiments which will stop, until further orders, in the trenches of BELLA­
    DONNE and of LE BELIER.


PENET,
The General Cmdg. the XXX A. C.

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232-32.7: Order

**H - Hour**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff          P. C. XXX ARMY CORPS,
No. 511/3                        August 31, 1918—12:15.

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 125

(Confirmation of phoned message between 11:15 and 11:25 h.)

[Extract]

* * * * *

II.
In consequence:
1. Operation Order No. 124 should no longer be considered as a project, but as
   an order to be executed without modifications.
2. H hour - 16 (sixteen).

By order of the Chief of Staff:

[Signature illegible]
The General Cmdg. the XXX A. C.

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- 35 -
ORDER OF OPERATIONS NO. 126

1. The general commanding the army prescribes as follows:

   Once the first resistance has been broken, the army will continue its advance without leaving time for the enemy to reform and will attack without respite until it finds itself in the presence of a new position of resistance, solidly organized, and necessitating a preparation of ensemble.

2. In consequence, as soon as the 1st objective fixed by Order No. 124 has been attained:

   The American 32d Division will continue the pursuit in the zone previously fixed for the division of the right of the A. C.

   The 66th Division and the Moroccan 2d Division will likewise engage in the pursuit in the zones previously indicated, with the modification that their common limits will pass through the Points 2965, northern exit of COURSON, point where the COURSON-ANIZY Road enters the eastern edge of the Bois du MORTIER, then the former limit.

3. The division will take all measures to be followed with the least possible delay by the means of passage which have been prepared for the crossing of the canal and of the AILETTE.

4. During the attack, the 2d line division beginning at the hour H will follow in the footsteps of the 1st line divisions. The 2d line divisions leading elements will not go beyond the general line CRECY-au-MONT---JUVIGNY, until further orders.

   Nothing is changed as regards the regiment of the 17th Division which is to follow the 2d Division as closely as possible and stop near the trenches of BELLADONNE and of Le BELIER.

5. A supplementary company of tanks is placed at the disposal of the General commanding the 66th Division to intensify, at the hour H, the action of the two companies already assigned to the division.

   In the event of this company not having arrived in proximity of the base of departure at the hour H, it will be placed as a tank reserve at the disposal of the General commanding the 66th Division.

   PENET,
   The General Commanding the XXX A. C.
Relief of American 32d Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 518/3

ORDER OF OPERATIONS NO. 130

[Extract]

1. During the night of September 1/2:
   (a) The 64th Div. will be introduced on the front between the Moroccan 2d Div. and the 66th Division.
   (b) The Moroccan 1st Division will relieve on the front the American 32d Division.

   * * * * *

III. 32d Division: The 32d Division after being relieved by the Moroccan 1st Div. will reassemble in the region west of JUVIGNY, with its forward elements on the line MONTECOUVE---8340---Hill 162.8

   * * * * *

VI. TAKING OVER OF THE COMMAND: The generals commanding the 1st line division will take over the command of their respective sectors on September 2 at 4 o'clock.

VII. DIVISIONAL P. C.'s:

   Moroccan 2d Division - Cave north of EPAGNY.
   17th Division - Fme FORETS (cave north of EPAGNY at the time of the operation)
   64th Division - Cave of VEZAPONIN
   66th Division - Cave of MONTECOUVE
   1st Div. ) - Cave at TARFERS.
   32d Div. ) " " "

PENET,
The General Cmdg., the XXX A. C.
Continuation of Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 529/3

OPERATION ORDER NO. 131

[Extract]

1. The XXX Army Corps will continue its attack tomorrow, Sept. 2, at an hour H which will be fixed later, with:
   4 divs. in first line - Moroccan 2d Div.-64th Div.-66th Div. -1st D. I.
   2 divs. in second line - 17th Div. -Am. 32d Div.
   Liaison:
   With the VII Army Corps: On the canal near 08/91 and to the north of the Bois de MONTIZEL.
   With the I Army Corps: Near the Cote 74/30 to the north of the station of MARGIVAL.
   Axis of direction:

   2d Div. crossroads 600 meters west of JUMENCOURT
   64th Div. Bois des BICHES
   66th Div. VAUXAILLON
   1st Div. MONT de LAFFAUX

* * * * *

10. DIVISION OF THE 2d LINE:
The division of the 2d line will be assembled respectively in the following zones:
17th Div.: La CROIX-BLANCHE [roadside shrine]---MAREUIL---Tr. de CARDIFF.
17th Div. will hold itself ready to follow in the wake of the 64th D. I.
American 32d Division: By brigades side by side, to the west of the line MONTECOUVE-JUVIGNY, in the zone: MONTECOUVE---JUVIGNY---VALPRIEZ Fme.
Each brigade of the American 32d Division will hold itself ready to follow in the wake, one in that of the 66th Div. and the other in that of the Moroccan 1st Division.
They will not enter into movement until further orders.

* * * * *

H. PENET,
The General Cmdg. the XXX A. C.
Position of Divisions

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 532/3

XXX ARMY CORPS,
September 1, 1918—19:20 h.

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 135

The 2d Line division - 17th Div. and American 32d Division (beginning with the night of September 1/2) are charged, in case of general alert, with the occupation of a withdrawal position on the line: ORME de MONTECOUVE, the railway, with advance positions for the 17th Div. in the CARDIFF Trench.

Limit between the two divisions: Line marked by Hill 159 (CRECY-au-MONT---JUVIGNY Road)---Coord. 0256---BALISE [beacon] 300 m. southeast of MAREUIL.

Reconnaissances will be effected immediately, with a view to determining the means and routes of access and the mode of occupation of the position, making plans, of course, for a defense in depth with combat groups and machine-gun nests.

PENET.

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232-32.7: Operation Order

Combat Instructions

[Contemporary Translation]

P. C. September 2, 1918.

From: General Commanding XXX Army Corps
To: General Commanding American 32d Division

Received: 18 h. by phone through French Mission

General Penet prescribes that the American brigade which has been pushed into the wake of the Moroccan 1st Division, shall stop when it reaches La RAPERIE and that it shall make arrangements when it reaches there to face toward the south, and to replace, facing in this direction, the two battalions in reserve of the Moroccan division.

These two battalions have been stopped momentarily near TERNY-SORYN in order to cover the right flank of the army corps against any enemy attack coming from the south, since the Bois de BEAUMONT has not been completely cleared and since the 59th Div. has not yet crossed the SOISSONS Road.

The American brigade as soon as it stops, should take a covering position facing to the south and replace number for number, in their emplacements, the units of the battalions of reserve of the Moroccan division who will thus be rendered available.

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The above order will be complied with in connection with the order to move forward previously issued. The brigade commander will establish combat liaison as soon as possible with the left flank of the French 59th Division and also with the advancing Moroccan 1st Division. If found necessary in properly organizing in depth the brigade commander is not confined to the sector laid down, north and south.

Attention is invited to the necessity that might arise of prolonging the left of the brigade toward the east. The brigade commander will establish his advance P. C. beside the P. C. of the Moroccan 1st Division at VALPRIEZ Farm in order to be in close liaison with the commander of that division.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-32.7: Field Message

[Contemporary Translation]

FROM: French XXX A. C.

AT: P. C.

DATE: 2/9/18. HOUR: 17:30 HOW SENT: Phone, through Fr. Mission

TO: C. G. American 32d Division

The General commanding the 32d Div. will move forward, upon receipt of this present order; his brigade on the right into the wake of the Moroccan division; the head of this brigade following, always at a distance 1 kilometer, the rear battalions of the Moroccan division.

The brigade will remain under the orders of the General commanding the 32d Division.

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1st Ind.
232-32.7: Field Message

FROM: Chief of Staff, Moroccan 1st Division
AT: P. C. Moroccan 1st Division
DATE: Sept. 2, 1918. HOUR: 18:50
TO: C. of S., 32d Division

Stop the head of the brigade moving forward at VALPRIEZ Farm. These orders are transmitted from the corps commander through the Moroccan 1st Division.
To Commanding General, 63d Brigade: Transmitted for compliance.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-32.7: Field Message

[Contemporary Translation]

FROM: General Penet
AT: XXX Army Corps
DATE: 9/2/18. HOUR: 19:10
TO: French Mission, for 32d Division

The head of the American brigade has to stop at VALPRIEZ Farm until further orders. It is understood that this brigade is under orders of General Haan but will move forward according to instructions given later by General commanding the Moroccan Division. This does not cancel previous orders.
To Commanding General, 63d Brigade: Transmitted for information and guidance.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Continuation of Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

ORDER OF OPERATIONS NO. 141

XXX ARMY CORPS,
September 3, 1918.

I. The XXX Corps will continue the attacks tomorrow September 4 at an hour which will be fixed later, with:
   4 inf. divs. in first line: 31st, 64th, 66th, Moroccan 1st Div.

II. OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACK:
   Crest of Hill 105 east of QUINCY-BASSE---Point 6005---[Brook] Ru de BASSE as far as 6192---La RAQUE---CHAMP-VAILLY---7167---Crests west and south of MOISY Farm---crest of Les VAUCELLES---Le BESSY---7945---7538---7030.
   On the left of the Army Corps the VII Corps will continue its operation in the direction of COUCY-le-CHATEAU.
   On the right, the I Corps will continue its attacks in the direction of MARGIVAL and the plateau to the east.

V. ARTILLERY:
   (a) Distribution: Without change.
      The div. art. /31 will enter in line in the sector of its division.
   (b) In order to facilitate the taking of the MONT des TOMBES and of the plateau of ANTOCHE, one battery (two if possible) drawn from the field artillery under the orders of the 31st Inf. Div., will be placed during the night of September 3/4 near the south horn of the Bois de MONTIHIZEL, so as to get an oblique fire on the resistances of the enemy on these heights.
      This artillery will be entirely at the disposal of the General commanding the 66th Inf. Div., and will get its orders from him.

X. SECOND LINE DIVISION:
   The second line divisions will be assembled in the following zones (movements to commence only at hour H):
   XVII. I. D.: La CROIX-BLANCHE---MAREUIL---CARDIFF Trench ready to follow the movement of the 31st or of the 64th Inf. Divs.
   American 32d Division: By brigades, side by side, west of the line: MONTECOUVE-JUVIGNY, ready to follow the movement of the Moroccan 1st Div. or the 66th Inf. Div.; one brigade to follow in the wake of each of these Inf. divs.
   These two divisions are under the orders of the general commanding the army corps, and will move only by his order.

31st Inf. Div. : Cave north of EPAGNY
17th Inf. Div. : Cave north of EPAGNY
64th Inf. Div. : Cave of VEZAPONIN
66th Inf. Div. : Cave of MONTECOUVE
Moroccan 1st Div. : VALPRIEZ Farm
32d Div. : Cave at TARTIERS

PENET,
The General Cmdg. the XXX A. C.

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232-32.7: Order

Instructions for Continuing Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 566/3

XXX ARMY CORPS,
September 4, 1918—9:05 h.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 143

1. The divisions will continue during the day of September 4 the artillery preparation as set down in the conditions provided for in the Projected Order of Operations No. 141 of September 3, with a view to the general action arranged for the afternoon of September 5.

The harassing fire will be continued without interruption and will follow a well-defined program, avoiding all needless use of munitions.

2. The 31st Inf. Div. whose situation on the north bank of the AILETTE does not permit it to carry out a methodic preparation, will endeavor during the course of the day to widen its bridgehead on this bank. This division will therefore extend its occupation toward the railroad to the north and east towards the Bois de JUMENCOURT, after the capture of the Ferme GRAND-CHAMP, if this Ferme still remains in the hands of the enemy.

The 64th Inf. Div. should absolutely occupy today the front: ANCIEN MOULIN—Point 3975, so as to assure its liaison with the 66th Ind. Div. - its elements which are on the canal should continue the infiltration toward the east so as to allow fire upon the northeast slope of the MONT des TOMBES.

The 66th Div. Inf. should hurry the capture of MONT des TOMBES.

The Moroccan 1st Div. will continue the capture of the EPERON [spur] de SORNY.

3. The generals commanding the divisions, after an understanding, if necessary, with the neighboring divisions, will propose to the general commanding the army corps the hour chosen for their local operations, in order to allow the cooperation of the army corps artillery and the aeronautic service.

H. PENET,
The General Commanding the XXX A. C.

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Disposition of Units

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 144
3d Section, General Staff

No. 572/3

XXX ARMY CORPS,
September 4, 1918.

I. By Order No. 495 of September 4, 1918 [not printed], the army has fixed the limits of the XXX A. C., as follows:

On the west: A line running east of the localities: MONT-du-CROCQ Farm—VASSENS—AUTRECHES—St-PIERRE-les-BITRY (these localities exclusive).

On the east: A line passing west of the localities: VILLERS-la-FOSSE—CUISY-en-ALMONT—OSLY-COURTIL—PERNANT—RAPERIE—(CROIX—) of Ste-CREAUDE (these localities exclusive).

IV. The American 32d Division will be stationed in the zones of the Moroccan 1st Div. and of the 66th Inf. Div.

The 77th Inf. Div. will be stationed in the zones of the 31st and 64th Inf. Divs.

V. The divisions will bring all their elements within the zone assigned to them, which may not be therein already; this to be completed on the evening of September 5.

The divisions may leave in the zone of the corps (south of the rear limit fixed under paragraph III) the rear elements which they may not be able to station within their zone, but a report is to be furnished thereon.

VI. A rough sketch of the stationing of the divisions on the evening of September 5 will be forwarded to the commanding general of the A. C. This sketch to reach the commanding general on September 5 at 19 o’clock.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

[Signature illegible]
The General Cmdg. the XXX A. C.

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Provisions for Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 575/3
XXX ARMY CORPS,
September 4, 1918—23:55 h.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 146

[Extract]

I. The XXX A. C. will continue the attack the morning of September 6, at an hour H which will be fixed later, with:

4 divisions in first line: 31st---64th---66th---Moroccan 1st.
2 divisions in second line: 17th---American 32d.

II. OBJECTIVE OF THE ATTACK: Crest 105 to the east of QUINCY-BASSE---Point 6005---Ru [Rusisseau] de BASSE up to 6192---La RAQUE---eastern edge of the two woods, respectively 100 meters and 300 meters south of the Ferme GUILLERMINET---Bois du MANGNIER [not identified]---trench immediately to the east of the parallel de LORIENT---9051---CHATEAU de la MOTTE---TRANCHEE de FRUTY.

To the left of the Corps, the VII A. C. will take FOLEMBRAY and COUCY-le-CHATEAU, carrying out its principal effort in liaison with the XXX Corps.

To the right, the I corps will develop its attack on the plateau of VREGNY in the direction of MOULIN de LAFFAUX.

III. ZONES OF ACTION OF THE DIVISIONS: Each division has for its objective the part of the objective fixed above included in its zone of action.

V. ARTILLERY:
(a) Distribution: Without change.

XI. DIVISIONS OF THE SECOND LINE:
The divisions of the second line will be assembled respectively in the following zones (movement to begin only at H hour):

17th Div.: La CROIX-BLANCHE [roadside shrine]---MAREUIL---Tr. de CARDIFF, ready to follow the movement of the 31st or the 64th Divs.

American 32d Division - by brigades, side by side, to the west of the line: MONTE-COUVE-JUVIGNY, ready to follow the movement of the Moroccan 1st Div. or the 66th Div.; one brigade being oriented in the wake of each of these divisions.

These two divisions are under the orders of the general commanding the army corps, and will not commence movement except under his orders.

XII. P. C.'s OF THE DIVISIONS:

31st Div. - Cave north of d'EPAGNY
17th Div. - Cave Fme FORETS
64th Div. - Cave at VEZAPONIN
66th Div. - Cave at MONTECOUVE
Moroccan 1st Div. - Ferme VALPRIEZ
Am. 32d Div. - Cave at TARTIERS

II. PENET,
The General Cmfdg. the XXX A. C.
**Arrival of 370th Infantry at Training Center**

[Editorial Translation]

No. 598

Lt. Col. Grobert, Commanding the Divisional Training Center

To the General Commanding the 59th Infantry Division

I have the honor to report to you that the American 370th Infantry arrived at DUYY at 3 p.m., September 16, 1918.

Installation is completed.

Training will begin September 20.

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**Duties of Battalions of 370th Infantry**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 160/S

FRENCH 59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 19, 1918.

[Extract]

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II. The units of the American 370th Infantry and division and divisional infantry reserve, will be charged with repair and maintenance of the communication trenches of the ANTIOCHE Plateau (BOYAU LEPAGE, TRANCHEE de VANNES, BOYAU d'ANTIOCHE, TRANCHEE de JAFFA and TRANCHEE PETIT) and of the BOYAU [TRANCHEE] de MOISY from ANTIOCHE Farm to MOISY Farm.

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- 46 -
III. Preparation, repair, and maintenance of works and trenches to the east of the VAUXAILLON Railroad and in the AILETTE Valley will be accomplished by the companies of the American 370th Infantry detailed to the battalion commander under the latter's orders and in their charge.

General RONDEAU,
Commanding the Divisional Infantry.

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HS Fr. Files: 529-30.1: Memorandum

370th Infantry to be Used in Combat

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1879/3

59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 20, 1918.

Paragraph III of Memorandum No. 160/S of September 19 of the divisional infantry discussed the execution of various work by the companies of the American 370th Infantry. It is expedient to spare the feelings of our Allies, to employ them as combatants and not to restrict them to work details. Moreover, provisions will be made for regrouping on short notice of the units of the 370th Infantry.

General Commanding the 59th Division.

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HS Fr. Files: 529-30.1: Letter

Need for Interpreters

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 178/S

FRENCH 59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 21, 1918.

General Rondeau, Commanding Division Infantry

To the General Commanding the 59th Division

[Extract]

Experience of the last few days have proved that the execution of orders and daily relations were made particularly difficult by inability to be understood owing to lack of interpreters in the American 370th Infantry. As the 370th Infantry will take over a sector very soon, I have the honor to make the following suggestions for assigning to each battalion 1 French officer and noncommissioned
officer and transferring interpreters to the principal chiefs of service of regimental headquarters.

* * * * * *

In addition since the American 370th Inf., is responsible for the organization of a sector, construction of bridges, and maintenance of various works, it seems necessary to place with the regiment a number of engineer instructors to act as their guides. * * *

* * * * * *

General RONDEAU, Commanding Divisional Infantry.

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HS Fr. Files: 529-30.9: Letter

Advisability of Negro Officers for Negro Troops

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff No. 234/S

FRENCH 59th INFANTRY DIVISION, September 24, 1918.

General Rondeau, Commanding Divisional Infantry

To the General Commanding the 59th Division

I have the honor to return to you herewith the memorandum which you submitted to me on the subject of the complement of officers and noncommissioned officers of the American 370th Inf., and to propose some changes which without doubt should be made in view of observations made by Colonel Roberts.

That field officer has given me to understand that for reasons of nationality it is of the greatest importance to leave the command of the units to Negro officers, free to make selections from among the officers now present and to ask the return of those who were said to lack control or military knowledge.

Colonel Roberts has further invited my attention to the following point: He is afraid that the French officers who would be detailed to his units would assume, little by little, too much importance and would end by substituting themselves in the command of the unit to which they are attached. Now, Colonel Roberts is strongly of the opinion that the Negro officers only should command since they alone have the responsibility of the troops placed to facilitate the command in all echelons.

As for the distribution of French officers, your plan conforms with the one I myself had in mind.

General RONDEAU, Commanding Division Infantry.

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General Staff

59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 24, 1918.

[Extract]

The American 370th Inf. effects relief of the 325th Inf. in front line between ECLUSE [canal lock] and CHAMP-VAILLY.

[no signature]

Employment of 370th Infantry

3d Section, General Staff

No. 1905/3

59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 25, 1918.

General Vincendon, Commanding the 59th Division

To the General Commanding the XXX Corps (1st and 3d Sections)

[Extract]

The American 370th Inf. is not sufficiently trained to permit its being employed as an independent regiment in a difficult sector or in active operations.

However, it is certain that the regiment can become a good combat organization. It is for the American command to decide if, by judicious selection, it is possible to find suitable Negro officers in all ranks and positions or if more of the American white element will have to take over.

Be that as it may, it seems necessary to place at the disposal of Colonel Roberts a rather large number of French officers and men, considering that the officers and non-commissioned officers will not exercise command but will be employed according to directives issued by the Colonel commanding the 370th Inf., to assist the command and improve relations with the adjoining French units.

At present the General commanding the 59th Division has detailed to the 370th Infantry: (In addition to the French captain customarily assigned to the regiment)
1 field officer and 2 lieutenants or 2d lieutenants at regimental headquarters (liaison, supply) with 1 noncommissioned officer 2 lieutenants and two 2d lieutenants in the battalions. 8 sappers of the French 8th Engrs.

* * * * *

VINCENDON.

* * * * *

**Role of 370th Inf. in Pursuit of Enemy**

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH 59th INFANTRY DIVISION,

*September 28, 1918--11 a. m.*

FIELD ORDERS No. 14

[Extract]

I. The enemy is withdrawing before the front of the division and before the right division.

II. Pursuit began at 8 o'clock this morning. The right division seems to be advancing easily, likewise the 232d Inf.

III. The advance will be made with the three regiments abreast in their present formation.

The American 370th Inf., continuing to march in echelon formation in rear and to the left of the 325th Inf., is charged with protecting the left flank of the division against any attack springing from FORET de St-GOBAIN.

* * * * *

V. SUCCESSIVE OBJECTIVES:

American 370th Inf.: The Canal [OISE-AISNE Canal], between the watergate and the east bend at La RIVIERE Farm, Bois du MORTIER, CHATEAU de LOCQ, ANCIEN MOULIN BORDET.

VI. DIVISIONAL INFANTRY RESERVE

The Stokes bn. of the 370th Infantry.

* * * * *

X. INITIAL C. P.'s:

C. P., 370th Inf.: Point 55-67

General...
77th

28th

SITUATION
AMERICAN III CORPS
24 AUGUST 1918
Training
[Editorial Translation]

IN THE FIELD,
TRAINING CENTER, 59th DIVISION,
October 2, 1918.

Subject: Instruction of Recruits of American 370th Infantry

Lieut. Colonel Grobert, Commanding the Divisional Training Center

To the General commanding the 59th Infantry Division

I have the honor to report to you that the last contingent received by the American 370th Infantry is made up of men not only without equipment and arms, as I have already reported to you, but even without any military training.

These men, drafted in August and sent almost immediately to France, will therefore have to start from the beginning: lack of arms and equipment will not make the task any easier. Instructors being very scarce, the trained men will be employed first of all to put these recruits in shape.

In order that some of them may be capable of line duty as soon as possible, my intention is to use the selective system, to form a number of categories at the end of a fixed period, and to push training of those best fitted as rapidly as possible without waiting for the less intelligent to reach the same level.

The tests for the recruits of the 370th Infantry will take place from 7:30 a. m. to 10:30 a. m. and from . . . . to 4:30 p. m. in the vicinity of COTE 145 . . . . . southeast of the church at RESSONS (Map 1/80,000).

Officers Needed for 370th Infantry
[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1941/3

59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
October 2, 1918.

[Extract]

I. PRESENT MISSION OF THE DIVISION:
The 59th Infantry Division (232d Infantry, 325th Infantry, American 370th Infantry), at the disposal of the XXX Army Corps since September 16, has at present the mission to continue pursuit of the enemy, to gain a foothold north of the AiLETTÉ, and to capture ANIZY-le-CHATEAU.
II. GENERAL SITUATION:
   a. Personnel

   Strength Sept. 16:  

   REGIMENTS

   

   American 370th:  

   Infantry

   

   71 : 2568  

   68 : 2349  

   : 29  3 : 230

   c. Physical condition and state of morale

   In the case of the American 370th Infantry the following is the opinion I
   expressed on the subject yesterday to the General commanding the XXX A. C.:

   Colonel Roberts is an excellent unit commander; no one is better qualified to
   command the 370th Infantry. The men are well behaved; whenever they are employed under
   the orders of French personnel they render valuable services. Between the colonel and
   the men there is nothing [i.e. Roberts did not have available any competent officers to
   assist him.]. As a result the commander is swamped and the men, left to themselves,
   cannot, in spite of their willingness, be utilized as they should be.

   Conclusion: Give them the personnel fitting to command them, or merge them with the
   French regiments.

   General Commanding the 59th Inf. Div.

   HS Fr. Files: 529-30.1: Order

   Disposition of Battalions of 370th Infantry

   [Editorial Translation]

   3d Section, General Staff
   No. s. c. 328 c/1

   59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
   October 27, 1918.

   GENERAL ORDERS No. 2020/3

   [Extract]

   I. The 59th Infantry Division (artillery included) is placed at the disposal of
   the French XVIII Army Corps effective noon, October 27 in order to assure relief of the
French 127th Infantry Division. It will be replaced in the zone by the French 29th Infantry Division, army reserve.

III. MOVEMENTS:

One battalion of the American 370th Infantry (Patton) will move forward the night of October 27/28 and will station at the end of the march, before day: ALLEMAGNE Farm and COUDEAU [Farm]. Headquarters and the other 2 battalions of the 370th Infantry will move the night of 28/29 in conformity with orders which will be forwarded to them later.

VICENDON,
General Commanding the
59th Infantry Division.

Location of Battalions, 370th Infantry

[Editorial Translation]

59th INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 8, 1918---10 p. m.

[Extract]

II. * * *
At 8 p. m. the Americans hold the north edges of LOGNY. We hold the south edges of AUBENTON [Railway] Station.

III. Formation at end of day:

INFANTRY

To the left, groupment commanded by Colonel commanding the 232d Inf.
) PATTON Bn. (American 370th Inf.) in line
) * * *

To the right, groupment commanded by Colonel commanding the 325th Inf.
) MOCHON Bn. (325th Inf.) in line
) DUNCAN Bn. (370th Inf.) in support
) HURTEBISE region
) MICHEL Bn. (325th) in divisional inf. reserve,
   Le Bois-CARBONNET
Groupment commanded by the Colonel commanding 1) DILLEMANN Bn (325th) COINGT
the 370th Inf., divisional inf. reserve 2) PRONT Bn. (370th) MONPLAISIR
1) CORNET Bn. (232d) Le BOURRELIER

* * * * * *

General Commanding the 59th Division.

By order:

Chief of Staff.

* * * * * *

--

General Staff

59th INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 10, 1918.

[Extract]

The 59th Inf. Div., having reached the objectives assigned, passes to the control of
the General commanding the French XVI A. C. in order to continue the pursuit toward the
MEUSE and therefore will continue its advance.

* * * * * *

[no signature]

--

General Staff

59th INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 11, 1918.

[Extract]

The advance will continue the day of the 11th as the division objective was not
reached on the 10th.

* * * * * *
The advance of the 59th Division is halted at 11 a.m. in conformity with the order of Marshall Foch.

* * * * *

[no signature]

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American 370th Infantry Regiment

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293-32.1: Order

Transfer of Regiment to a French Area

FIELD ORDERS
No. 3
370th INFANTRY, A. E. F.,
September 1, 1918—1 a.m.

BAR-le-DUC and WASSY Maps

[Extract]

1. In compliance with telegraphic instructions headquarters, French Second Army, dated August 31, 1918, the regiment will change station.

* * * * *

T. A. ROBERTS,
Colonel of Cavalry,
Commanding.

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293-32.1: Order

Orders to Clear Enemy from Bois de MORTIER

FIELD ORDERS
No. 4
P. C. WASHINGTON [370th INFANTRY REGIMENT, A. E. F.],
October 11, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Recent information indicates that the enemy intends to withdraw on our front tonight. Should this be the case, pursuit will be taken up at once.

2. The mission of this regiment will be to clear the Bois de MORTIER of the enemy. The 1st Battalion (Stokes) will be assigned the task of clearing the woods.

* * * * *

6. The Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion, will move his P. C., to La FOLIE as soon as the movement is started.

7. The 2d Battalion (Patton) is the reverse of the Inf. Div., and will receive orders from the commanding general. It will cross the Canal on footbridges to the east.
of Ferme de la RIVIERE and, on reaching the neighborhood of REMANCOURT [PENANCOURT?] will again come under the orders of the regimental commander as reserve of the Inf. Div. The Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, will detach one company and one section of machine gun company with the support battalion of the 325th Inf. Regt. A company of the 325th Inf. Regt. will join the 2d Battalion.

8. The 3d Battalion (Duncan) is the reserve of the division - it will act under the orders of the Commanding General, Inf. Div.

* * * * *

15. The successive P. C.'s will be:
   232d Regt. (Station at ANIZY
   (ANIZY Cemetery
   325th Regt. (Point 93-81
   (DESBOIRES Trench
   (Hill 158 (N.E. of WISSIGNICOURT)
   Inf. Div. (Cave on Hill 154
   (CHATEAU de LOCQ
   (north of FAUCAUCOURT
   Am. 370th Regt. (Present P.C.
   (CHATEAU de LOCQ

16. This movement will begin on receipt of orders from the commanding general.

By order of Colonel Roberts:

GEORGE MURPHY,
1st Lieut. and B. A., 370th U. S. Inf.,
Acting Adjutant.

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293-11.4: Letter

Operations of 370th Infantry Regiment

370th INFANTRY, A.E. F.,
Le Mans [Sarthe], January 2, 1919.

From: C. O., 370th Infantry

To: The Commanding General, American Expeditionary Forces

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in letter from Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, dated December 3, 1918, which letter was received today, the following is submitted:
   (a) From arrival in France in April to August 31, this regiment was attached the French 73d, 10th, 34th and 36th Divisions; practically all the period was spent in training and in quiet sectors. Officers and men, especially the latter, made excellent progress under their instructors and were, on numerous occasions, complimented on the work done. The undersigned joined the regiment in the sector CLERMONT-en-ARGONNE. Except for one raid in which only the Stokes mortar platoon participated actively, no operations were taken part in except the usual routine in sector.
September 15, the regiment went into the VAUXAILLON area with the 59th Division; four rifle companies were detached with the two French regiments and took part in the fighting that resulted in the taking of MONT des SINGES and adjacent works. This fighting was severe - the American troops were usually in close support but also participated in several attacks in all of which the objective was gained. Until September 22, no detailed reports of operations are available; orders from the division required all reports from detached companies to be submitted through the French, and, in spite of repeated and persistent efforts, nothing was obtainable beyond occasional reports of casualties.

On September 22, the regiment was given a sector extending from l'ECLUSE [canal lock] in front of the point of the Bois de MORTIER - to be a point on the Canal 300 meters west of the crossing of the PINON-BRANCOURT Road; some elements of the enemy still occupied l'ECLUSE and Ferme de la RIVIERE on the south side of the Canal.

September 27, while in the midst of a relief of the front line battalion, an attack on l'ECLUSE was ordered at dawn; by the extreme of effort, the relief was completed and the designated battalion attacked, the fighting continued for three days; during the intense darkness of the night of the 27th there was considerable mixing of units; one company lost its liaison with adjoining units, advanced far beyond our line and suffered severely, especially in missing, though all were accounted for within a few days and one was captured by the enemy.

September 30, another battalion (3d) was ordered to attack along the Canal from MONT des SINGES to the PINON-BRANCOURT Road. Again the fighting continued and it was not until October 4 that it was certain that the enemy were all across the Canal.

As it is not unusual with new troops during night operations, many men were separated from their commands and a rumor was circulated that the regiment as a whole was demoralized; this was not the case; the assigned objectives were gained and the morale of the men in the front line was very good.

Until October 12, there were nightly patrols around l'ECLUSE and along the Canal and some severe fighting resulted at l'ECLUSE, where the railway embankment road and Canal formed a triangle easily accessible to the enemy and in which, they could and did drive the enemy therefrom repeatedly; the American troops could not remain, as it was exposed to enfilade from two directions.

October 12, a general advance was made following the retreat of the enemy, the 1st and 2d Battalions were complimented by the commanding general - the 1st for its passage of the exceedingly strong position in the Bois de MORTIER and the 2d for a well conducted march in pursuit via ANIZY-le-CHATEAU.

After the arrival at CESSIERES, late the night of October 12, the divisions went into rest for twelve days; ten days were spent in hard work on the roads but the two last were given to clean the men and supply them with much needed clothing.

October 24, the division again went into the front line, the 1st and 2d Battalions near GRANDLUP-et-FAYS in support and the 3d in reserve near CHAMBRY; nothing of importance occurred as to operations, except on November 3 a shell of large caliber fell in the midst of Company A at CHANTRUD Ferme, where they had gathered around the kitchen in violation of orders; thirty-four men were killed and fifty-two wounded. This was made the subject of a special report of date of November 19, 1918.

November 5, the enemy withdrew again closely followed by the French - all three battalions of this regiment alternated in the front lines: Company C took an enemy battery at VAL-ST-PIERRE, for which it was proposed for an army citation; the 2d Battalion participated in the taking of BEAUME and AUBENTON and the 3d Battalion was, at the taking effect of the Armistice, across the Belgian frontier northwest of ROCROI.

* * * * * *

T. A. ROBERTS,
Colonel, Cavalry,
Commanding.
American 77th Division Attached to I Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,535/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, August 6, 1918--5:45 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,710

Part 1

[Extract]

I. The American 77th Division, coming from the French Group of Armies of the East, will begin detraining at 4 a.m., August 7, in the zone of the French Sixth Army, at whose disposal it will be placed to be attached to the American I Army Corps.

* * * * *

(d) Headquarters of the 77th Div. at COULOMMIERS.

* * * * *

General DEGOUTTE.

* * * * *

HS Fr. Files: 416-30.6: Journal of Operations

Patrol Action

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, August 6, 1918.

FERE-en-TARDENOIS

Noon

The American 4th Div. yesterday, August 5, sent eight patrols north of the VESLE, and one company in the evening. These elements engaged in a successful struggle with enemy elements, between the river and the highway, but, fearing a night counterattack, the American elements withdrew to the south bank.

At present, all of the American division is south of the VESLE and along the river. Our artillery has been very active all night and all morning. In the French 62d Inf. Div., no change . . . . . [sic] 5 cos. north of the VESLE.
The American I Army Corps yesterday issued an order for the operations in progress this afternoon, but it contains only general instructions. It is almost the translation of the army order. The division commanders have prescribed all dispositions.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**French 164th Infantry Brigade Attached to III Corps**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 2,553/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

August 7, 1918—3:30 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,719

(Confirmation of the message telephoned at 8:25 a. m.
August 7, to Headquarters GAUCHER at NEUILLY-St-FRONT.)

[Extract]

The French 164th Inf. Div. (headquarters at NEUILLY-St-FRONT) is placed at the disposal of the American III Army Corps to relieve:

(a) The French 4th Inf. Div.

(b) The brigade of the American 3d Div. at present in the front line.

After relief, the 4th Div. will be withdrawn in its entirety to the rear zone of the American III Corps, which will report its location and the date this division may be transferred. The brigade of the American 3d Div. will return to its division.

* * * * *

By order:

[Signature illegible]

Chief of Staff.

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181-32.7: Operations Memo

**Interdiction Fire**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 2,558/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

August 7, 1918.

[Extract]

I. It is of the very greatest importance rigorously to interdict to the enemy the crossings of the AISNE and circulation on the plateau between the AISNE and the VESLE in
such a manner as to wear out the enemy, and to demoralize him by hindering all his supply operations (rations, ammunition, miscellaneous materiel) and his evacuation.

II. Therefore, there will be carried out by army corps and by the artillery of the army, with all calibers, both day and night, very heavy interdiction fires on the following points: 

(PONT-ARCY
BOURG-et-COMIN
VILLERS-en-PRAYERES
MERVAL
LONGUEVAL
(Crossroads 2 km. west of DHUIZEL
Zones of the American I Army Corps
Zones of the American III Army Corps
(GLENNES
(MAIZY
(CUIRY-les-CHAUDARDES

and TRIBOUT Groupment

Boundary between the two Army Corps: REVILLON---MERVAL---BLANZY-les-FISMES Highway (this highway to the American I Corps).

* * * * *

DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Orders

Organization of Defenses of the VESLE Sector

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2, 563/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
August 7, 1918---11 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,724

[Extract]

* * * * *

II. The American III Army Corps will endeavor to seize new bridgeheads on the right bank of the VESLE. The points selected will be those at which it is easiest to establish crossings and to resist enemy counterattacks from positions on the far bank. The new bridgeheads will cover the construction of these crossings.

The American I Army Corps, by small local operations, will improve its position on the right bank of the river and will establish good communication between the two banks.

The XI Corps will strongly organize the front which it now holds.

* * * * *

General DEGOUTTE.

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Modification of Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,718

I. Beginning at noon, August 9, the boundary between the Tenth and Sixth Armies will be modified as follows: OSTE---PRESLES et BOVES---BRENELLE---BRAINE---CERSEUIL---LESGES---CUIRY-HOUSSE---BEUGNEUX---OLCHY-la-VILLE---MONTGRU-St-HILAIRE---LATILLY---SOMMELANS, (these localities to the Tenth Army) thence the old boundary to the south. On the same date the XI Army Corps (C. P. in ARCY-Ste-RESTITUE) and the 68th Inf. Div. (C. P. in JOUAIIGNE) will pass to the control of the Sixth Army; the zone of the XI Corps will be that included between the old boundary of the Sixth Army and the new.

II. Beginning at midnight August 8/9 the localities of MONTMIRAIL, MECRINGES, RIEUX, l'ECHELLE-le-FRANC will pass to the Sixth Army.

III. Beginning at midnight August 11/12 the Sixth Army will relinquish the localities of BAULINE, La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON, DORMANS, VERNEUIL, PASSY-GREGNY and the hamlet of CHAVENTAY.

Disposition of III Corps Units

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,743

I. At 8 a.m., August 13, the French Sixth Army will hold its front with two corps.

On the right: American III Corps (C. P. Bois de ROGNAC southeast of COULONGES), employing the American 77th, 32d and 28th Divisions.

On the left: French XI Army Corps (C. P. FERE-en-TARDENOIS at a date to be indicated later), employing the French 68th, 62d and 164th Divisions (the last division while waiting until it can be relieved in the III Corps sector, temporarily represented by only 2 bns. of Chasseurs).

II. The boundary between the two corps will be as follows: PONT-ARCY---VIEIL-ARCH---DHUIZEL---HILL 175 (1,200 meters south of DHUIZEL)---Hill 159.4 on the plan directeur (1 km. east of VAVXIN)---Les WATTEES---Bois de la BRUYERE (these points to the XI Corps)---northwest tip of l'ETANG de la GRAVIERE (American III Corps)---MONT-NOTRE-DAME---MONTBANI Farm (XI Corps)---MAREUIL-en-DOLE---SERINGES-et-NESLES (III Corps)---FERE-en-TARDENOIS---PREAUX Farm---BEUVARDES---COURPOIL---TRUGNY---VERDILLY---BRASLES (to the XI Corps).
For the boundaries on the right and left of the army, as well as for the rear boundary of the two corps, refer to Order No. 3,718 dated August 9.

III. Each corps will have two divisions in line, the third in corps reserve.

If a fourth American division is assigned to the army, it will be held in army reserve.

IV. MISSIONS OF THE ARMY CORPS: To push north of the VESLE bridgeheads, making every effort to enlarge them progressively, in order to facilitate the subsequent crossing of the river.

To conduct offensive reconnaissances over the plateaus north of the river.

To stabilize south of the VESLE so as to be able to resist any enemy counter-offensive, while conforming to the dispositions of General Orders No. 3,724 of August 7 concerning the organization of the outpost area, zone of resistance, and security position, and the echelonnement of means in all those zones of defense.

V. EXECUTION MEASURES: The American 77th Division (LOUPEIGNE---MAREUIL-en-DOLE area) is placed immediately at the disposal of the General commanding the American I Corps to relieve the elements on the right of the 62d Inf. Div. and the American 4th Division within the boundary prescribed above.

The 164th Inf. Div. will be relieved by the American 28th Division.

General DEGOUTTE.

HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

Transfer of 3d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,649/3

C. P. FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
August 12, 1918---5 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 3,752

[Extract]

PART I

I. The American 3d Division will entrain by rail with another army area as destination.

* * * * *

General DEGOUTTE.
Instructions for Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2576/3

C. P. FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
August 14, 1918.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING INTERDICTION FIRE

The interdiction fire prescribed by Memorandum No. 2,558-3, August 7, 1918, at the request of the American I Corps, American III Corps and the Tribout Groupment will be executed by the French XI Corps and the III Corps as follows:

XI Corps:
On PONT-ARCY and the crossroad 2 kilometers west of DHUIZEL.

III Corps and Tribout Groupment:
On BOURG-et-COMIN, VILLERS-en-PRAYERES, LONGUEVAL, MERVIAL, GLENNES, MAIZY, CUIRY-les-CHAUDARDES.

2. Whatever the number of rounds allotted daily it will be divided equally between the 5 distant interdiction points which can be reached only these 2 calibers: PONT-ARCY, BOURG-et-COMIN, VILLERS-en-PRAYERES, MAIZY, CUIRY-les-CHAUDARDES, which it is all important to cover in a continuous manner.

By order:

G. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

Sector Activities of the III Corps South of the VESLE River

[Contemporary Translation]

SIXTH ARMY,
August 19, 1918.

FIELD ORDER No. 3,787

Before attempting new operations north of the VESLE River, it is of the utmost importance to be in possession of the whole ground south of this river. Consequently, all the hostile islets of resistance which might still be on this side of the river, will be reduced without delay and it will be proceeded to the entire cleaning up of the southern bank of the VESLE.

General DEGOUTTE.

The foregoing translation respectfully submitted

Major de BERTIER de SAUVIGNY,
Liaison Officer, III A. C. U. S.
Transfer of the 32d Division

August 23, 1918---11:50 h.

Telephone Message from CHATEAU-THIERRY
3d Bureau [French Sixth Army]

[Extract]

On August 24, the reserve units of your corps at CIERGES (32d Division) will be sent to General Mangin's Army.

* * * * *

HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

Transfer of the 32d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,830/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
August 23, 1918---5 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,806

[Extract]

PART I

I. The American 32d Division (hq. at CIERGES) will be sent on August 24 to the Tenth Army area (west of SOISSONS) where it will be reserved for the French Reserve Group of Armies, under the administration of the Tenth Army.

* * * * *

General LEBRUN.

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- 65 -
Combat Instruction

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,858/3
FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
August 25, 1918.

Instruction No. 3,812 for the Commanders of the French III Corps and the American III Corps.

The successes won in the preceding days of the Tenth Army on the right bank of the AISNE will be exploited by a general advance of that army in an eastern direction.

It is reasonable to expect that the success of that advance will result in a withdrawal of the enemy north of the AISNE in front of the Sixth Army and perhaps even north of the AILETTE.

Under the circumstances, the Sixth Army must be ready to push back the enemy rear-guards at the first signal and each army corps will make all necessary preparations for a quick crossing of the VESLE and of the AISNE.

To that effect the following is put at the disposal of the American V [III?] Corps which does not possess bridge trains of its own.

a. An army bridge train with teams furnished by the 19th Co., 14th Bn., at present in MEZY.

b. The 6th Co., 3d Bn., Engineers in COURTHIEZY.

Moreover, on the morning of August 28, the army will have at its disposal a supplementary bridge train at the rear of each army corps on a general line with FERE-en-TARDENEOIS.

No boat bridge will be thrown over the VESLE. The crossing of this river will be effected on emergency bridges and improvised footbridges. The material necessary for building these crossings will be delivered immediately by the army engineers at points to be determined before noon August 26 by the commanders of the corps concerned.

The bridge train assigned to the American III Corps will halt during the night of August 26/27 with the 6th Co., 3d Bn, Engineers in compliance with orders to be issued directly by the commander of this corps to the army engineer commander. It will halt sufficiently near the front while remaining carefully concealed from the view of the enemy.

The crossings of the lateral canal and of the AISNE will be effected in conformity with the following directives:

* * * * *

The extension of the army front toward the west, ordered August 9, the shrinking of the reserves at the disposal of the army to a single infantry division and the present military situation of the Tenth Army do not allow to contemplate the crossing of the AISNE as determined in personal and secret Instruction No. 2572/3 August 8.

Therefore, each division in line will advance in the zone which will be assigned to it by its corps commander.

All measures will be taken to maintain a permanent and close contact with the enemy and to have the plan for advance carefully covered by advance-guards and constantly supported by the artillery.

- 66 -
The boundary between the French III Corps and the American III Corps is extended toward the north on the line PONT-ARCY-Road---VERNEUIL-COURTONNE (to the French corps) ---BEAULNE-et-CHIVY---TILLEUL de COURTECON---COLLIGIS (to the American III Corps).

LEBRUN.

HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Memorandum

Corps Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2867/3

FRENCH SIXTII ARMY, August 26, 1918.

In case of an advance north of the VESLE, the boundary between the French III Corps and the American III Corps is specified as follows: Le POTEAU Farm---Hill 152 northeast of PAARS (to the French III Corps)---township limit following the crest of the spur south of the EPINE de VAUXCERE from Hill 152 to the DHUIZEL-VAUXCERE Road---crossroad of unimproved roads 600 meters northeast of the EPINE de VAUXCERE---Le LOUVRE to the American III Corps, then to the north without change.

By order:

G. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

Directions for Pursuit when Possible

[Contemporary Translation]

SIXTH ARMY, A. E. F., Chateau-Thierry, August 29, 1918---10:30 a. m.

FIELD ORDER NO. 3,830

I. As a result of the attacks of the armies operating on our left, the enemy will possibly retreat on the front of the Sixth Army, in a northerly direction as far as the AISNE, or the AILETTE and even beyond it.

II. The mission of the Sixth Army is to watch closely every sign of withdrawal and eventually to follow up the retreating enemy, without waiting for new order to overthrow its rearguards with a view of preventing the main body to establish itself on a chosen position.

III. Successive objectives:

1. The AISNE - The advance guards to hold the river banks, the main bodies of the army hidden from the northern heights views.
2. The AILETTE - The advance guards on the river, the main of the army, south of the CHEMIN-des-DAMES Ridge.

IV. Limits of the Army Zone of action.

A) The limit between the eventual zone of action of the Tenth and Sixth Armies is modified as follows by the General commanding the G. A. R. (Group of Armies in Reserve Reserve.) -- BRAINE (Tenth) -- BRENNELLE (Tenth) -- CHAVONNE (Sixth) -- OSTEL (Tenth) -- FROIDMONT (Sixth) -- TRUCY (Tenth) -- CRANDELAIN (CRANDELAIN-et-MALVAL) (Sixth) -- BRUYERES (Tenth) -- CHERET (Sixth).


V. Liaison Axis:

Army and American III C. A. -- Jaulgonne -- Courmont -- CoULONGES -- St-Gilles -- MERVAL -- MAIZY -- BEAUVEUX -- ARBRE de PAISSY.

III C. A. -- FERE -- LOUPEIGNE -- LIME -- COURCELLES -- VIEL-ARY -- BRAYE.

First Transfer of Army Corps P. C.

American III C. A.: St-Gilles.

French III C. A.: LIME.

VI. Private and secret Instruction No. 3,287 of 8/29/18 to general commanding the army corps specifies the conditions ruling the progression.

DEGOUTTE.

General.

183-32.7: Memorandum

Instructions for Crossing the Vesle

Contemporary Translation]

G-3
No. 2891/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY.
August 29, 1918.

INSTRUCTION NO. 3,827

For Generals commanding the French III A. C. and American III C. A.
(This instruction cancels those dated August 8, No. 3,727, [attached] and August 25, No. 3,812.) [Published previously herein].

The success the Tenth Army has just won on the right bank of the AISNE will be the starting point of a general progression for this army eastward.

It is probable that the success of this progression will impel the enemy to withdraw in front of the Sixth Army, north of the AISNE and perhaps even north of the AILETTE.

Consequently, the Sixth Army must be in readiness to drive back the enemy’s rear-guards, northward as far as possible.
Therefore, all bridgeheads gained, north of the VESLE as ordered in private and secret instruction, dated August 7, No. 3,723, of which copy is enclosed, must be kept everywhere, and local actions carried out in order to realize the advanced line as appointed in this instruction in adding to them the FISMETIE bridgehead.

For the same purpose, in each army corps, offensive reconnaissances should be held in readiness in order to be launched when ordered by the commander of the army corps or the army, as soon as there will be signs of an enemy withdrawal.

It is the rapid pursuit of the enemy that will enable us to get on the AISNE in the best circumstances in time to cross this river on the heels of the enemy. It will thus be necessary to push back the enemy's rearguards and cross the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE as quickly as possible, without however, neglecting the precautions pointed out in the General Field Order No. 3,700, copy of which is enclosed.

If however, the Sixth Army met on the AISNE and enemy decided to hold and not broken up [i.e., an enemy intact and determined], it would be necessary to try a crossing over the AISNE by main force in order to attack the CHEMIN-des-DAMES Plateau and help, as fully as possible, the eastward progress of the Tenth Army.

The operation will first consist, in forcing the river, between PONT-ARCY excluded and CUIRY-les-CHAUDARDES with a view to gain a footing on the first spur N. of the AISNE between VERNEUIL-COURTONNE and Bois des COULEUVRES [not identified]. A bridgehead will be formed which allow the passage of the main body of the army and to push up to the AILETTE and beyond.

This first operation will be effected under the command of the Comdg. General of the III A. C., A. E. F., by an army advanceguard including a French Division (62d) - an American Infantry Brigade (28th Div., A. E. F.) - a division artillery of support (Division Artillery/62 reinforced by 2 battalions of Division Artillery/28th Div., A. E. F.) - a regiment of American engineers.

All the means of the army artillery, except the Division Artillery/52 [62?] will be placed at the disposal of the Comdg. General of the III A. C., A. E. F., to support this operation.

The general commanding the artillery of the army will have the command under the direction of the Commanding General of the III A. C., A. E. F., of the entire artillery in charge of the operation.

The principal action will take place on the heights N. of OEUILLY and PARGNAN; it will be conducted, in principle, by a French regiment, one American regiment and 2 battalions of Division Artillery/62.

Two secondary actions will be effected, one to the W. on the height N. of BOURG-et-COMIN (1 French regiment and 1 battalion Division Artillery/62, the other to the east, on the heights of BEAURIEUX (1 American regiment and 2 battalions of Division Artillery/28th Div., A. E. F.).

First objectives to be attained: The brook that runs at VERNEUIL and VENDRESSE-et-TROYAN--PAISSY--VASSOGNE--Le CHAMP-d'ASILE--CHAUDARDES.

These objectives attained, the advanceguard will lose no time in pushing detachments on the CHEMIN-des-DAMES and on the AILETTE.

The III A. C., A. E. F., will, during this time, cross the AISNE and, as soon as his first units have reached the CHEMIN-des-DAMES, will continue beyond the AILETTE to gain a foothold on the heights N. of NEUVILLE, CHERMIZY, BOUCONVILLE.

The III A. C. now recovering the disposition of its A. C. artillery and of the artillery of its two divisions will cross the AISNE at the same time as the III A. C., A. E. F., either directly or by crossing infantry advanceguards on passages established below the road included BOURG-et-COMIN railroad depot passages which it can use in priority to the 77th Div., A. E. F.

In the event of the army advanceguard not being able to capture the CHEMIN-des-DAMES, the III A. C., A. E. F., will organize with all possible speed, an attack on that
position, and after having carried off same, will take charge of the progression on the AILETTE and beyond. The 62d Division will then form again in a second line position at the disposal of the commanding general of the army.

The American III C. A. will have at its disposal to cross the River AISNE, apart from the bridge train which was attached to it by Private and Secret Order No. 3,812 of August 25, 1918, two army bridge trains now stationed at TRUGNY and VILLERS-sur-FERE.

The French III Army Corps will only have at its disposal its organic bridge train. To cross the AISNE River by main strength it is necessary to make careful preparations as regards the installation of the artillery and the supply of ammunition as well as the gathering and conveyance in the neighborhood of all materiel necessary to cross the river.

From the beginning of this operation a certain number of long-range batteries must prevent the enemy from reaching the CHEMIN-des-DAMES Plateau by heavily firing on all approaches of the AILETTE to this plateau.

From this date on, it is necessary to carefully prepare the crossing of the AISNE River.

An annex to this order, issued by the officer commanding the army artillery will be forwarded later on.

DEGOUTTE.

[4 Encls.]

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3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,485/3

FIELD ORDERS NO. 3,690 *

I. Today we succeeded in crossing the VESLE at certain points.
   It does not seem that the enemy intends to offer serious resistance between the VESLE and the AISNE, but rather wishes to reorganize north of the AISNE.

II. Tomorrow, August 5, continuation of the pursuit.
   The advance guards will gain a foothold on the plateaus north of the VESLE, initially to create a bridgehead and to assure the passage of the troops necessary to continue the pursuit. They then will move toward the AISNE.

   The main body, once its debouchment is covered, will cross the VESLE and will establish itself on the general line: VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES---woods north of GRAND-HAMEAU---BEAUGILET Farm.

   The field artillery and heavy howitzers will be put in position south of the VESLE so as to support the army corps as far as possible.

   This artillery will cross the VESLE only when the army corps have reached the northern slopes of the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE.

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* This and three following enclosures are out of order chronologically but are kept in the position to amplify and make understandable instruction No. 3,827 to which they are attached.
The heavy artillery will be pushed forward as far as it can be supplied, so as to fire upon the principal crossings of the AISNE.

III. To establish ourselves on the plateaus between the VESLE and the AISNE, use will be made, if possible, of the old defensive system which is located there and which is indicated on the plans directeur, ten copies of which are sent herewith to both the American I and III Army Corps.

IV. The French 52d and French 73d Inf. Divs., in army reserve, will conform to the forward movement of the front line divisions and, as soon as the main body of these divisions has crossed the VESLE, will take up position on the general line: BRUYS---CHERY-CHARTREUVE---COURVILLE, in the respective sectors of the French 62d and French 4th Inf. Divs. The second line American units will occupy the rest of this position.

The movements of these divisions, although they are in army reserve, will be regulated by the General commanding the American III Army Corps in the case of the 73d Div.

V. The French 164th and 63d Inf. Divs. will be held in army reserve in their present positions.

VI. The C. P. of the army is at CHATEAU-THIERRY.

Headquarters French II Army Corps will move to REBAIS.

Headquarters French III Army Corps will be established at DORMANS (forward echelon) and at CONDE-en-BRIE.

GENERAL DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. File: 416-30.1: Order

Pursuit to Continue

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,509/3
FRENCH SIXTH ARMY.
August 5, 1918--8:20 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 3,700

Same dispositions for the day of August 6, as those contained in Field Orders No. 3,690, with the following exceptions:

Paragraph II of Order No. 3,690 is revoked and is replaced by the following, which is to be pasted on the aforesaid order.

The advance guards will seize a foothold on the plateaus north of the VESLE, initially to create a bridgehead and to assure the passage of the troops necessary to continue the pursuit.

They will organize and occupy that position.

The main body, echeloned in depth, will cross the VESLE successively and by bounds, and will effect passage of lines of the troops guarding the bridgehead. They will establish themselves on the general line: VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES---wood north of GRAND-HAMEAU---BEAUGILET Farm.

The main body will immediately push forward new advance guards to the northern slopes of the plateau, taking while crossing them every precaution against the fire of enemy artillery. During these operations, the field artillery and heavy howitzers will be placed in position south of the VESLE.
As soon as these advance guards have crossed the plateau, the VESLE will be crossed by such artillery as is necessary to support their advance.

The heavy long artillery will at once be pushed forward as fast as it can be supplied so as to fire upon the principal crossings of the AISNE.

General DEGOUTTE.

[Encl. 2]

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183-32.17: Operations Order

Suspension of the Offensive

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, August 7, 1918.

PERSONAL AND SECRET INSTRUCTIONS No. 3,723

The enemy is offering rather strong resistance north of the VESLE.

Furthermore, the condition of the troops does not permit uninterrupted continuance of large scale attacks in full force to seize the plateaus between the VESLE and the AISNE.

Therefore, the high command orders for the present only the establishment of bridgeheads north of the VESLE, to permit the construction of footbridges across that river, for the later continuation of the offensive which it intends ordering for the combined armies.

Therefore, the front line will run as follows:

(a) American I Army Corps: The railroad between SOISSONS and REIMS---north of La GRAVIERE---BAZOCHES (inclusive)---the ROUEN-REIMS Road.

(b) American III Army Corps: That road, from the boundary between the two army corps to the confluence with the ARDRE, thence the VESLE, with small bridgeheads beyond the river at points best suited for resistance by the advance elements and for the establishment of footbridges.

These bridgeheads should be seized by local actions entailing no very large employment of artillery and especially of infantry, which last must be used sparingly. They will be occupied only by such troops as are absolutely necessary.

Combat patrols of approximately one company should be pushed forward from these bridgeheads. Their action will be preceded by an artillery preparation and their advance will likewise be covered by artillery.

The mission of these patrols is to feel out the enemy positions and to see whether a withdrawal is in progress and whether the enemy is opposing us merely with a line of machine guns.

The attached field order gives the details of the occupation of the sectors.

DEGOUTTE.

[Encl. 3]

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Future Crossing of the AISNE

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,572/3

SECRET AND PERSONAL INSTRUCTION No. 3,727

To the Generals Commanding the Army Corps.

[Extract]

I. After the occupation of the heights between the VESLE and the AISNE, the crossing of the AISNE will be the next problem, if the high command orders the pursuit of the enemy beyond that river. It is therefore necessary to plan this operation now, along with the means to apply to it.

II. The operation will consist in a forced attack to gain a foothold on the first foothills north of the AISNE, between VERNEUIL, COURTONNE and CHAUDARDES, and to establish there a bridgehead enabling the main body to cross and push to the ALLETT.

This operation will be carried out by an army advance guard including an infantry division, an accompanying divisional artillery, an engineer regiment, under the direct control of the General commanding the American III Army Corps.

The main action will be directed to the heights north of OEUILLY and of PARGNAN and of BEAURIEUX; secondary engagements will be executed on the heights north of BOURG-et-COMIN and west of CHAUDARDES.

The first objectives to be reached will be, from west to east: The stream passing through VENDRESSE and VERNEUIL---MOULINS---VASSOGNE---CHAMP-d'ASILE---CHAUDARDES.

III. The success of the crossing of the AISNE depends essentially on the means of artillery and on their employment.

For this operation the entire army artillery means will be placed at the disposal of the General commanding the American III Corps.

The General commanding the army artillery will have, under the control of the General commanding the III Corps, the command of the entire artillery in charge of the operation.

IV. All means of river crossing at the disposal of the army will also be employed to that effect.

The colonel commanding the army engineers, placed under the direct control of the General commanding the American III Corps, will make use of all the means and will take all the necessary dispositions to assure their movements into position.

V. The operation necessitates a careful preparation for the artillery installation on the plateaus between the VESLE and the AISNE and for ammunition supplies, as well as for the assembling and transportation, where it is needed, of all the materiel necessary to the forced crossing of the AISNE.

From the start of this operation a certain number of long-range batteries will positively bar the enemy from access to the CHEMIN-des-DAMES Plateau, keeping under continuous fire the main approaches to that plateau.

VI. The day and hour of the attack will be determined by the general commanding the army.
VII. Effective now theoretic studies will be made for the moving into position of the infantry, artillery and engineer means, and the constitution of the necessary crossing material: boat bridges, pile bridges, footbridges, barges, will be prepared and executed. This preparation will hasten considerably the realization of the operation which will be all the easier for the quickness with which it is executed.

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DEGOUTTE,
General.

Annull by E. M. 3d Section 2,891/3, August 29.
[Encl. 4]

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Orders

Relief of the III Corps

[Editorial Translation]

G-3
2,990/3

SIXTH ARMY,
September 6, 1918---10:15 a. m.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 3,852

[Extract]

PART I

I. Headquarters and nondivisional elements of XVI Corps will be from September 6, placed at the disposal of Sixth Army, to relieve the Hq. and Hq. Troops of III Corps, A. E. F., which will be replaced at the disposal of the General Commander-in-Chief of A. E. F.

* * * * *

PELLEGRIN.
Transfer of the 28th Division

[Contemporary Translation]

SIXTH ARMY,

September 7, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 3,859

[Extract]

PART I

1. Pursuant to Telephone Message No. 2,986/3 of Sept. 5, the American 28th D. I. will be entrained in the region of EPERNAY-AVIZE beginning September 12, about 6 a.m.

General DEGOUTTE.

Relief of III Corps Postponed

[Contemporary Translation]

SIXTH ARMY,

September 8, 1918—10:30 a.m.

ORDER No. 3,861 to III Corps, A. E. F.

Telephone Message No. 2,999 dated September 6, 22 h. 5 (Special order 3,854) had stated the conditions in which the pressure of the III Corps, A. E. F., was to be executed in view of bringing down the last enemy resistance still existing in front of the army sector on the left bank of the AISNE River.

The relief of the American 28th Div. by the French 62d Div. has delayed the realization of this action.

The General commanding the III Corps, A. E. F., is requested to carry out this action during the afternoon and evening of September 8.

A preliminary action must give us possession of the GLENES Ravine; a combined action of the French 62d Div. with the right of the American 77th Div. carried out at dayfall will have the aim of capturing the height west of MUSCOURT, MAIZY, from the BEAUREGARD Farm to HAUT de CUCHERY included, and to establish our first line on the front MUSCOURT, MAIZY and Canal to the west. During the execution of that action the right of the French 62d Div. will help and cover facing east the progression on the plateau of Hangar de BEAUREGARD.

When these objectives are reached, we shall have a good basis of departure to
progress eastwards and gain the CUVEITE [Hollow) de VENTELAY, in accordance with an action carried out north of the VESLE by the left A. C. of the Fifth Army.

DEGOUTTE.

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Transfer of the III Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 3.019/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
September 8, 1918---1:45 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,863

[Extract]

PART 1

I. Headquarters and the nondivisional elements of the American III Army Corps will entrain by rail (with the exception of motorized elements) effective the evening of September 9.

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General DEGOUTTE.

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SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,864

I. Amendment to Special Orders No. 3,863 of September 8 concerning the entraining of the nondivisional units of the American III Corps:
   - Entraining railroad station: DORMANS (instead of CHATEAU-THIERRY and MEZY).
   - The rest without change.

II. Amendment to Special Orders No. 3,859 of September 7 concerning the entraining of the American 28th Inf. Div.:
   - Date of the beginning of the entraining: 9 p. m. September 13 (instead of 6 a. m. September 12).
   - The rest without change.

  General DEGOUTTE.
III Army Corps
August 7 - September 9, 1918

[The American III Corps, engaged in the AISNE-MARNE Operation, took over the sector of the French III Corps at 8 h., August 5. Orders from the French Sixth Army were to push across the VESLE to form bridgeheads.]

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183-33.1: Telephone Message

**Situation Report**

III CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 7, 1918.

[Extract]

Chief of Staff, 28th Division, by phone, at 3:22 p. m., stated as follows:

Reference our conversation this morning, three companies have crossed the river. They have built themselves a footbridge for crossing. One company and machine-gun company covering the advance of these three companies. They are under shell fire and have sustained some casualties. Right battalion held up in FISMES by machine-gun fire and shell fire, sustaining some casualties. General Weigel has ordered other troops to take the place of those leaving support position.

The Commanding General, III Corps, directed the Commanding General, 28th Division to push the attack strongly at once, fixing his own zero hour, and that he had the whole thing in his own hands now.

* * * * *

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.

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183-10.2: Telegram

**Location of Headquarters of 28th and 32d Divisions**

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 7, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q.

Number 385, G-3. At 14 o'clock this date Headquarters 32d Division opens at CIERGES. 28th Division now at DRAVEGNY.

BULLARD.

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183-32.1: Message

**H Hour Designated**

387/G-3

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 7, 1918.

MESSAGE FOR: Commanding General, 32d Division

1. H hour set under Field Order No. 10 [printed in AISNE-MARNE Operation] is 4:30 p.m., August 7.

   By command of Major General Bullard:

   F. W. CLARK,
   Lieut. Col., G. S.,
   G-3.

183-33.1: Operations Report

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Coulonces, August 7, 1918--7 a. m.

G-3 1

I. Owing to present condition of telephone communications this report is submitted in writing.

II. One-half of the 32d Division was relieved last night by the 28th Division (one-half of the 28th Division). Effort is being made by units of this division to cross combat patrols to the north side of the VESLE River near CHATEAU du DIABLE for liaison with the right of American I Corps.

   The American 6th Brigade reports building one bridge across the VESLE to the east of FISMES, construction of another was stopped by machine-gun fire. The French 4th Div. held the positions in the small woods northeast of MAGNEUX, captured last night.

III. Heavy enemy artillery fire upon our batteries during the night. Our batteries active.

   By command of Major General Bullard:

   F. W. CLARK,
   Lt. Colonel, Gen. Staff,
   G-3.

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Transfer of III Corps Headquarters

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 8, 1918.

III Corps Headquarters moves at 7 p. m., August 8, 1918, to farm houses in ROGNAC Wood on road from COULONGES to VIEUX-VEZILLY, 1 3/4 kilometers southeast of COULONGES. (Coordinate 2939) BULLARD.

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Relief of 6th Brigade (3d Division) from Vesle Sector

G-3 Orders
No. 3

III CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 8, 1918--2:45 p. m.

[Extract]

I. Pursuant to Order No. 2553/3 of the Sixth Army, the 6th Inf. Brigade will be relieved by a part of the 164th Division; this relief will be completed by noon on August 10.

* * * * *

IV. After relief, the 6th Inf. Brig. will be reassembled in the following area:

VILLERS-AGRON (Hq. tr.)

Area: Le Bois-DORMONT---VEZILLY---GOUSSAUCOURT---VILLERS-AGRON for units of the 6th Brigade and units of 3d Division * * *

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.

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- 79 -
III Corps Reverts to Defensive Occupation

FIELD ORDER
No. 11

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 8, 1918--6:45 o'clock.

Map: PLAN DIRECTEUR, 1:20,000

[Extract]

2. In conformity with orders from Sixth Army, III Corps will hold its present position, without further attack, until ordered.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

Establishment of Bridgeheads

FIELD ORDER
No. 12

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 9, 1918--9 a. m.

Map: PLAN DIRECTEUR, 1:20,000

[Extract]

2. Without engaging in a general attack, the III Corps will establish small bridgeheads on the north side of the VESLE and from these bridgeheads will send strong reconnoitering parties toward selected points under cover of box barrage • • •

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Relief Postponed

G-3 Orders
No. 6

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 9, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The relief of the 6th Inf. Brigade and units of the American 3d Division attached thereto, ordered to take place on the night of August 9/10, is postponed twenty-four hours

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, Gen. Staff,
G-3.

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183-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 1

III CORPS, A. E. F.,

From 12 h., Aug. 8 to 12 h., Aug. 9.

[Extract]

I. Weather: Cloudy.
II. Visibility: Poor.
III. General Impression of the day: Active on left. Quiet on right of our front.
IV. Infantry Activity: The 28th Division, to the left, advanced during the night in the vicinity of FISMETTE. This division now has four companies holding region of CHATEAU du DIABLE, and four companies with machine-gun platoon and 37-mm. section between the VESLE and FISMETTE and the town itself. Advanced troops of this battalion hold the nose of the high ground north of FISMETTE. The 6th Brigade and the French 164th Division are holding along the SOISSONS-REIMS Highway with outposts as far as the south bank of the VESLE. They are covering several footbridges they have constructed across the river.
V. Artillery Activity: Our artillery acting with harassing concentration, and interdiction fire. Harrassing fire by enemy along valley of the VESLE and our areas back to bridge P. C.'s with some counterbattery; since daylight today there has been a diminution in his fire. COULONGES and vicinity bombarded yesterday afternoon by 150 L. or 170 marine gun.
VI. Aviation: Active on both sides. Enemy has superiority in the air on our front, especially as regards pursuit planes. One French balloon brought down near LONGEVILLE at 16:22 o'clock by enemy plane. Two Boche planes shot down at 10:50 near LONGEVILLE.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

- - - - -
Assignment of Artillery

G-3 ORDERS
No. 14

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

August 10, 1918.

[Extract]

G-3 Orders No. 7 is revoked and the following substituted.

1. The Commanding General, 53d Field Artillery Brigade, will designate one regiment of his brigade to the 32d Division Artillery (now in sector with the 28th Division) and one regiment to be attached by batteries to the 164th Division Artillery.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Col., Gen. Staff,
A. C. of S., G-3.

Assignment of Infantry Brigade

G-3
No. 15

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

Bois de Rognac, August 10, 1918.

1. One infantry brigade of the 32d Division, to be designated by the division commander, is placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, 164th Division, to be used only in case of serious attack by the enemy.

One regiment of the brigade will be stationed in the Bois de REIMS and one regiment in the Bois de VEZILLY.

The brigade will proceed to these stations at 7 o'clock a. m., August 11. Brigade P. C. VEZILLY.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.
Relief of French 164th Division by the 28th Division

G-3
No. 20

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 11, 1918—21:30 h.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Order No. 3743, Sixth Army, dated August 7, 1918, the French 164th Division, less its artillery, will be relieved by a part of the American 28th Division, during the night of August 12/13.

3. The relief will be completed by 8 a.m., August 13, and the command will pass at that hour.

6. The divisional artillery of the 164th Division, will be relieved by part of the divisional artillery of the 32d and 28th Divisions on the nights of August 11/12 and August 12/13; * * *

7. The relief of the artillery of the 164th Division will be completed by 8 a.m., August 13, and when relieved, will be assembled on its rear echelons.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
G-3.

Plans for Holding Line

FIELD ORDER
No. 13

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 12, 1918—10 a. m.

MAPS: SOISSONS )
REIMS ) 1:50,000
PLAN DIRECTEUR, 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy is holding the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE with machine-guns, light artillery, and at least sufficient infantry to make frequent local counter-attacks. He has scattered machine-gun nests in the low country between the river and the south slopes of the plateau and still holds a few isolated posts between the railroad and
the river north of MAGNEUX. His heavy artillery and main defensive position is undoubtedly north of the AISNE.

Our front line runs along the north side of the R. R. from BAZOCHES through the woods of the CHATEAU du DIABLE, thence eastwards to the northern outskirts of FISMETTE, thence along the R. R. track on the southern bank of the VESLE.

Our Sixth Army will advance to the AISNE in due time, pending which time it will hold the line of the VESLE, with aggressive and strong reconnaissance towards the plateau north of the VESLE, establishing bridgeheads in accordance with the principles set forth in Paragraph 4.

2. The III Corps will:
   (a) Hold and organize the position described hereafter; and
   (b) Meantime conduct aggressive reconnaissances and establish bridgeheads with a view to a further advance.
   (c) Boundaries of corps sector:
       Western limit: PONT-ARCY—VIEL-ARCY—DHUIZEL—HILL 175 (1200 m. south of DHUIZEL)—HILL 159.4 of the P. D. (1,000 m. east of VAUXTIN)—Les WATTES—le Bois de la BRUYERE (all above points to the XI Corps)—northwest edge of ETANG de la GRAVIERE (to III Corps)—MONT-NOTRE-DAME—Fme MONTBANI (to XI Corps)—MAREUIL-en-DOLE—SERINGES-et-NESELS (to III Corps)—FERE-en-TARDENOIS—PREAUX Ferme—BEUVARDES—COURPOIL—TRUGNY—VERDILLY—BRASLES (to XI Corps).
       Eastern limit: BOUCONVILLE (to III Corps)—CRAONNELLE (to V Corps)—CONCEVREUX—MEURIVAL—Le GRAND-HAMEAU—crossroads 300 m. west of HUIT-VOISINS—COURLANDON—MAGNEUX—La BONNE-MAISON Fme—COURVILLE—ARCIS-le-PONSART (all of the above to the III Corps)—AUGNY (to V Corps)—VILLERS-AGRÓN-ALGUÍZY (to III Corps)—PASSY—VERNEUIL (to V Corps).

The corps sector is divided into a right and left sector.

4. (a) Each sector commander will prepare a plan of works for his sector and push the work to completion. Attention is invited to the necessity for careful concealment. A plan of works, with map, will be submitted to the corps commander, and thereafter daily report of progress.

The enemy will not be permitted to get away from the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE without our instant knowledge of his action.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Assignments of Artillery and Engineer Units

G-3 Orders
No. 23
III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Bois de Rognac Fme, August 12, 1918---4:30 p. m.

1. That part of the divisional artillery of the 62d Division now in action in the left portion of the sector of the 77th Division will remain there until further orders.
2. The divisional artillery of the 4th Division will remain in action until relieved by the divisional artillery of the 77th Division. This relief will not take place until the divisional artillery of the 77th Division has become familiar with the sector.
3. The divisional artillery of the 77th Division, upon its arrival in the corps area, will proceed to its firing positions in the left sector.
4. All the above artillery is assigned to the left sector under the command of Major General Duncan, as established in F. O. No. 13 these headquarters, dated August 12, 1918.
5. The 308th F. Signal Battalion now stationed at CHARTEVES will proceed to COULONGES for station on August 13, 1918.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

Active Reconnaissance Directed

G-3 Orders
No. 29
III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Bois de Rognac Fme, August 13, 1918---7 p. m.

1. It is believed that the enemy is occupying the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE with only a small force.
2. Each front line division (28th and 77th) will prepare at once a reconnaissance by approximately a company, with artillery preparation and box barrage, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the enemy still holds the north bank of the VESLE in force.
3. A successful advance of the reconnoitering party will be followed by a widening of the bridgehead.
4. Each division will report the earliest hour which it can adopt as H hour. H hour will be the same for both reconnaissances and will be fixed by these headquarters.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.
183-32.13: Order

**Relief of 4th Division Artillery**

G-3
No. 31

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 14, 1918--4 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The divisional artillery of the 4th Division will be relieved by the divisional artillery of the 77th Division on the nights of August 15/16 and 16/17. * * *

2. Upon the completion of the relief, that fact will be reported to these headquarters with a sketch showing location of the batteries. P. C. of 77th Division Artillery - FERE-Ancien Chateau.

* * * * * *

5. The passing of command in batteries, battalions and regiments * * * The command of the divisional artillery will pass at 8 a. m., August 17, 1918.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
G-3.

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183-10.2: Telegram

**Transfer of 28th and 77th Division Headquarters**

G-3 G. H. Q.

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 14, 1918.

Number 429 G-3. Post of command 28th Division closes at DRAVEGNY at 16 h. today and opens same hour and date at ARCIS-le-PONSART. P. C. 77th Division at FERE-Ancien Chateau 3 kilometers northeast of FERE-en-TARDENOIS since 10 a. m.

BULLARD.

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Patrol Reports

III CORPS, A. E. F.,
Bois de Rognac Fme, August 14, 1918--10:10-11:15 h.

At 4 p. m. August 13, the 28th Division was directed to send out small patrols of four or five men immediately along their front. The same instructions were sent to the 77th Division at 4:45 p. m. The following reports from these patrols were received:

The 28th Division reports that three patrols were sent out yesterday. One toward ROLAND (Usine) Factory got in contact with the enemy and was fired on by rifle and machine guns. Probably between 6 and 7 p. m. Two men wounded. Two other patrols were sent out from FISMETTE, each one with an officer. Both report that they ran into machine-gun fire, probably about 8 p. m., and then returned.

The 77th Division reported at 6:55 p. m., August 13, the following message from the 153d Brigade: The center company of the 305th Infantry sent out three patrols. They were all driven back by machine-gun fire • • • No rifle or artillery fire. A later report from the 77th Division is: "One of our patrols sent out this afternoon across the river was caught by machine-gun and artillery fire and has not returned. They have taken cover and will try to return after dark."

The activity of the enemy artillery yesterday afternoon was materially less than the day before, and the ordering out of these patrols was made in consequence to determine the situation in our front. Both divisions are now organizing an operation of greater strength and with artillery support in order to determine accurately the situation. There has been no change in the location of our front lines during yesterday and last night.

During the night the enemy’s bombing planes were exceedingly active in our rear areas in the vicinity of DRAVEGY, COULONGES, and ARCIS and VEZILLY. There was some slight artillery harassing fire by the enemy during the night.

XI Corps on our left reports no bombing.

No report from V Corps on our right.

Our antiaircraft defenses are inadequate.

[Written in ink]

Report received from V Corps 11:15 a. m. August 14

The activity of enemy airplanes has been great during the night specially in the region of CRUGNY. A raid upon the R. R. station 500 meters S. W. of BREUIL-sur-VESLE was prepared by bombing from airplanes. (The Hq. Chief Liaison Officer)
**Transfer of III Corps Headquarters**

G-3 Orders
No. 41

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 18, 1918---4 p. m.

1. The P. C. III Army Corps and corps artillery in the Bois de ROGNAC will close at 5 p. m., August 19, and open same hour and date as follows:
   - P. C. III Corps: CHATEAU de FRESNES
   - P. C. Corps Artillery: La CENSE Fme.

   The rear echelon III Corps Headquarters at COULONGES will close at 12 noon, August 19, and open same hour and date at FRESNES.

   By command of Major General Bullard:

     F. W. CLARK,
     Lt. Col., G. S.,
     A. C. of S., G-3.

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183-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 13

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 20, 1918.

From 20 h., Aug. 19 to 20 h., Aug. 20

[Extract]

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IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Allied: At 1 a. m., a projector and 4" Stokes mortar shoot was made on BAZOCHES and machine-gun nests south of the town. The town burned until 2:30 a. m. as a result. Some reconnaissance patrols out reporting enemy patrols crossed VESLE at ROLAND-Usine by footbridge which is in good condition. Little activity otherwise.

   Enemy: Quiet. An enemy patrol of seven men came across railroad to east of BAZOCHES, was routed by our fire and one prisoner captured belonging to 75th Regiment of 17th Division. Order of battle confirmed.

* * * * * *

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Withdrawal from the Line

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 23, 1918—11:30 a. m.

[Extract]

1. The 57th F. A. Brigade will be withdrawn from action on the nights of August 23/24 and 24/25, under arrangements to be made by the commanding general of that brigade.

2. Upon completion of the withdrawal the 57th F. A. will pass under the command of the Commanding General, 32d Division, who will be kept informed of the movement.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

Transfer of 32d Division

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 23, 1918—2:30 a. m.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to telephonic orders from the Sixth Army, the American 32d Div. will be relieved from duty in this sector and sent elsewhere.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.
Situation of the III Corps

TELEPHONIC REPORT
at 17 h.
To French Sixth Army

No. 24 August 24, 1918.

After artillery preparation the 77th Division executed a local action in the vicinity of CHATEAU du DIABLE, early this morning. The operation was successful. Our line in that vicinity now runs east to west: Along REIMS-SOISSONS Highway past the TANNERIE, the road crossing 203.8-286.9 to the edge of the woods at 203.3-287.1, then southwest to the railroad along same to 202.4-286.6, then southwest to the river. Our line unchanged in other portions of the front. In Les GRANDS-Bois we have patrols this afternoon north of the REIMS Road. Many patrols out today have been stopped by machine-gun and rifle fire at many points on whole corps front. At 14:20 a patrol sent toward COURLANDON did not advance far north of the REIMS Road before they ran into heavy machine-gun fire from direction of COURLANDON.

All evening artillery fire seems to be from long-range guns, No. 77's. There are some trench mortars between PERLES and CHATEAU du DIABLE.

B. H. WITHERSPOON,
1st Lieut. Arty., A. D. C.,
G-3.

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183-33.1: Operations Report

G-3 III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
No. 17 August 24, 1918.

From 20 h., Aug 23 to 20 h., Aug 24

[Extract]

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VIII. CHANGES IN DISPOSITION OF TROOPS: The 32d Division received march orders and and passed from the command of this corps.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Headquarters
Headquarters Troop

**DIVISIONS comprising III Army Corps**

- 28th Division (combat)
- 32d Division (combat) Detached with French Tenth Army
- 77th Division (combat)

**CORPS TROOPS**

**INFANTRY**

- 1st Regiment Pioneer Infantry
- Provisional Replacement Bn.

**CAVALRY**

- Troops I, 2d Cavalry

**ARTILLERY**

- 31st Artillery Brigade
  - Headquarters
  - 55th Artillery C. A. C. (155 G. P. F. Tractor)
  - 56th Artillery C. A. C. (155 G. P. F. Tractor)

- Corps Artillery Park
  - 501st Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop

**ENGINEERS**

- 308th Engineers (less 2 companies)

**SIGNAL CORPS**

- 52d Telegraph Bn.
- 308th Field Signal Bn.

**AVIATION**

- 88th Aero Squadron
- 4th Balloon Co.

**TRAINS**

- 332d Field Hospital
- 332d Ambulance Co.
CORPS TROOPS - Cont.

REMOUNT SERVICE

Mobile Veterinary Hospital 1
Troop K, 3d Cavalry (dismounted)

ARMY TROOPS (ATTACHED TO CORPS)

ENGINEERS

14th Regiment Engineers
Co. A, 23d Engineers and Truck Co. 10
Co. D, 26th Engineers (Water Service)
Co. C, 27th Engineers
Detachment 40th Engineers (Camouflage)
Co. B, 1st Gas Regiment

REMOUNT

Remount Squadron 302
Mobile Vet. Hospitals 103

Sales Commissary Unit 33. (attached from S. O. S.)

FRENCH UNITS (ATTACHED)

AVIATION

Corps Aviation Staff
Balloon Co. 47
Balloon Co. 54
Squadron 239
Squadron 284

28th DIVISION

Headquarters
Headquarters Troop

INFANTRY

55th Infantry Brigade
Headquarters
109th Infantry
110th Infantry
108th M. G. Bn.

56th Infantry Brigade
Headquarters
111th Infantry
112th Infantry
109th M. G. Bn.
28th DIVISION - Cont.

ARTILLERY

53d Artillery Brigade
   Headquarters
   107th Field Artillery
   108th Field Artillery
   109th Field Artillery
   103d Trench Mortar Battery

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

DIVISIONAL M. G. Bn.

   107th Machine Gun Bn.

ENGINEERS

   103d Engineers

SIGNAL CORPS

   103d Signal Corps

TRAINS

   103d Train Headquarters and M. P.
   103d Ammunition Train
   103d Engineer Train
   103d Supply Train
   103d Sanitary Train
      Field Hospital 109, 110, 111 and 112
      Ambulance Co. 109, 110, 111 and 112
   103d Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop (Shown under Amn. Train on Graphic Sheet)

ATTACHED TO DIVISION

   Mobile Vet. Section 106

77th DIVISION

   Headquarters
   Headquarters Troop

INFANTRY

153d Infantry Brigade
   Headquarters
   305th Infantry
   306th Infantry
   305th Machine Gun Bn.
77th DIVISION - Cont.

INFANTRY - Cont.

154th Infantry Brigade
   Headquarters
   307th Infantry
   308th Infantry
   306th Machine Gun Bn.

ARTILLERY

152d Artillery Brigade
   Headquarters
   304th Field Artillery
   305th Field Artillery
   306th Field Artillery
   302d Trench Mortar Battery

DIVISIONAL TROOPS

DIVISION M. G. Bn.

304th Machine Gun Bn.

ENGINEERS

302d Engineers

SIGNAL CORPS

302d Field Signal Bn.

TRAINS

302d Train Headquarters and Military Police
302d Ammunition
302d Supply Train
302d Sanitary Train
302d Engineer Train
   Field Hospitals 305, 306, 307 and 308
   Ambulance Co. 305, 306, 307 and 308
   Sanitary Squads No. 12 and 13
302d Mobile Ordnance Repair Shop

ATTACHED TO DIVISION

335th Machine Shop Truck Unit
Mobile Laboratory
S. S. U. Section 611
S. S. U. Section 578

HEADQUARTERS III ARMY CORPS, G-1
SITUATION
AMERICAN 32d DIVISION
29 AUGUST 1918

NOTE AT 2230, THE 64TH BRIG BEGAN RELIEF OF
THE 63D BRIG WHICH WAS IN PROGRESS AT
2400 O'CLOCK.
32d Division Remains Under Administrative Control of III Corps

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 27, 1918.

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, 32d Division

The commanding general directs me to advise you that the 32d Division is still under administrative control of this corps and all matters pertaining thereto will be forwarded to these headquarters as heretofore.

DAVID O'KEEFE,
Acting Adjutant General.

Operations of the III Corps

August 27, 1918.

REPORT at 8 a. m. to FRENCH SIXTH ARMY

At 4 o'clock this morning, under cover of artillery preparation, we took the town of BAZOCHE, which we now hold. Enemy is now counterattacking with a small force. We also made an attempt to capture the crossings of the railroad and the ROUEN-REIMS Road, but so far no reports have come in.

The 28th Division sector is quiet.

Action at Fismette

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
A. P. O. 754, August 28, 1918.

General J. W. McAndrew,
G. H. Q., A. E. F.

My dear General:

I am informed that today's German communique (which I have not seen) states that the Germans captured at FISMETTE yesterday 250 Americans. A part of my command until yesterday occupied FISMETTE. I had there some 190 officers and men altogether, infantry.
you will look upon the map you will see the position of FISMES, a large village on the south bank of the VESLE. Just opposite FISMES on the north bank is the small village of FISMETTE. Opposite FISMES, the village of FISMETTE and no more was occupied by us. Ten days ago, after a German attack upon FISMETTE which almost succeeded, I saw that FISMETTE could not be held by us against any real attempt by the Germans to take it and that to attempt to continue to hold it would, on account of the lay of the surrounding terrain, involve the sure sacrifice of its garrison, to which help could not be sent except by driblets at night. I, therefore, decided and began to withdraw the garrison of FISMETTE some 300 meters back across the VESLE River into FISMES. Before this was finished the French General commanding the Sixth Army, to which I belong, arrived at my headquarters and learning of my orders for withdrawal from FISMETTE, himself, in person, directed me to continue to hold FISMETTE and how to hold it. My orders were changed in his presence and his orders were obeyed. Yesterday morning the Germans made a strong attack upon FISMETTE from two directions, taking the village and killing or capturing almost all of our men who were in it.

I request that the Commander-in-Chief be acquainted with the facts in this case.

R. L. BULLARD,
Major General, N. A.,
Commanding III Army Corps.

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183-11.4: Extract from III Corps History

**Enemy Attack Against Fismette**

August 27, 1918.

I. SITUATION: On the night of August 26/27, 1918, the village of FISMETTE was held by Companies G and H, 112th Infantry. These two companies totalled six officers and 200 men. This garrison relieved the previous garrison at 2 a.m., August 27.

II. OPERATION: At 4 a.m. on the same day a heavy enemy barrage was placed in and around the town of FISMETTE. After 20 minutes the barrage lifted and the enemy attacked with a force estimated at about one battalion. The attacking troops were evidently picked troops, being referred to in the German communiqué as "Baden troops." The attacking forces were apparently divided into three columns, one attacking from the northeast, another from the northwest, and the third from the north of the town. The attack followed immediately upon the lifting of the heavy bombardment, and caught our troops while they were more or less demoralized as a result of same. The platoon occupying the east edge of the town put up a good resistance, but the platoons to the north and west gave way with feeble resistance, resulting in the enemy practically enveloping the remaining defenders of the town, some of whom escaped to the south and crossed the VESLE. The enemy attack was accompanied by low-flying airplanes, which dropped bombs and fired machine guns. There is a report that a soldier in an American uniform ran through the streets shouting that the lieutenant in command said resistance was useless and had ordered his men to surrender. It is not definitely settled as to whether or not this man was an American soldier or any enemy in disguise.

III. RESULT: The result of the enemy operation was the loss of the village of FISMETTE by our troops and the loss of four officers and 161 men missing. These figures include our killed and wounded as well as prisoners who were left in the village when it was captured.

IV. CONCLUSION: The following conclusions are drawn:

1) The attack, following immediately after relief, caught our troops before they had become familiar with the positions occupied.
(2) The possibility of utter demoralization caused by an enemy in our uniform or a cowardly soldier of our own creating a panic among our men.

(3) Our troops apparently assumed that the bombardment was a usual one, and consequently were not on the alert to repel an attack.

(4) There was culpable negligence in not requesting artillery support.

(5) There was not the spirit among the garrison holding the west and north of the town to fight to the last man.

(6) The effectiveness of accompanying even a local attack by airplanes is shown. It is not so much a question of actual damage done by the airplane, but its effect upon the morale of the troops attacked.

(7) Our defensive organization of the village itself was doubtless faulty, as no provision was made for the defense of the village in case flank attacks should occur, and no provisions were made to properly deploy our machine guns and rifle fire for the protection of the rear and flanks of the platoons in position.

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183-32.1: Order

Sector Activities of the III Corps

FIELD ORDER
No. 14

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 4, 1918—12h.

1. The advance of patrols of 77th Division and other signs during the past twenty-four hours indicate that the enemy has evacuated the plateau between the AISNE and the VESLE except possibly for small parties of machinegunners.

2. The tentative field order providing for the crossing of the VESLE is adopted and goes into effect. It becomes an annex to this order. D day: September 4. H hour: 3 p. m.

3. Minor operations in progress prior to H hour, will not be interrupted. The purpose of prescribing H hour under present conditions is to insure aggressive action along the whole front at a uniform time.

Attention is called to the vital necessity of accurate information as to location of advance elements, and the resulting preparations by divisional artillery for artillery support upon call.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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1. The Tenth Army on our left, advancing to the east on the plateau immediately north of SOISSONS, has reached (X). It is believed the enemy in front of our army (Sixth Army) is retiring to the north.

The Sixth Army will advance on D day at H hour, destroying or driving back the enemy rearguards and by vigorous pursuit preventing the enemy from establishing himself on the CHEMIN-des-DAMES.

2. (a) This corps will advance with 2 divisions (less 1 brigade), in line, in conformity with the mission of the Sixth Army.

(b) Boundaries of corps sector:

Right: COURLANDON (incl.)---Crossroads 300 m. west of HUITVOISINS (incl.)---Le GRAND-HAMEAU (incl.)---MEURIVAL (incl.)---CONCEVREUX (incl.)---CRAONNELLE (incl.)---BOUCONVILLE (incl.)---(No change.)

Left: [Le] POTEAU Fme (excl.)---Hill 152 (N. E. of PAARS)---Crossroads (201.8-292.3) [S. E. of DHUIZEL]---Point 201.9-293.2 [E. of DHUIZEL]---VIEIL-ARCY (excl.)---BOURG-et-COMIN (incl.)---COURTONNE (incl.)---VERNEUIL-COURTONNE (excl.)---Carrières [Quarries] (500 m. S. E. of CHIVY) TROYON (incl.)---CERNY (incl.)---NEUVILLE (incl.)---BIEVRES (excl.)

Dividing line between Division: FISMES (to 77th)---Rau [Ruisseau] Ste-MARIE---La COURBEAUCHE---CLENNES (to 28th)---MAIZY (to 28th).

(c) The advance to the AISNE will be governed by the following principles prescribed by Sixth Army:

Advance guards of columns will seize the plateau north of the VESLE to establish bridgeheads and assure the crossing of troops necessary for the pursuit. They will establish themselves and remain in this position.

Main bodies of columns, echeloned in depth, will cross the VESLE successively and will pass, by bounds, the troops guarding the bridgeheads, and will establish themselves on the general line VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES---woods north of the GRAND-HAMEAU---Fme BEAUGILET. These main bodies will push out new advance guards to the first slopes north of the plateau, taking every precaution, during the march, against the fire of enemy artillery. During these operations the field artillery and the heavy artillery (short), will be emplaced south of the VESLE.

As soon as these new advance guards have reached the plateau, the VESLE will be crossed by the necessary artillery to support the movement of the advance guards.

The heavy artillery (long) will be pushed forward to the limit to which it can be supplied with ammunition, in order to fire on the principal points of passage of the AISNE.

3. (a) The right division will advance with its two infantry regiments (55th Brig.) abreast, each with an advance guard. The 28th Division will hold its present sector until the advance begins. The 55th Brig. will then advance in such manner that, taken in conjunction with the advance of the left division, the entire 56th Brig. can be assembled and placed in reserve. As soon as its advance guards shall have crossed the VESLE the right division will construct 7-ton bridges at ROLAND-Usine and COURLANDON, and as many foot bridges as practicable.
(b) The left division will advance with its two brigades abreast, each brigade
with its two regiments abreast, each regiment with an advance guard. The 77th Division
will hold its present sector until the advance begins. It will then advance in its new
sector and in such manner as to permit the prompt assembly of the 56th Brigade. As soon
as its advance guards shall have crossed the VESLE the left division will construct 7-ton
brigades at St-THIBAUT, TANNERIE, and west of FISMES, and as many foot brigades as prac-
ticable.

* * * * * *

(e) The movements of reserve elements will be regulated by the corps commander.
Pioneer and engineer units (less those assigned by C. of E. to technical work and labor
connected with the advance) will proceed to their alert positions (see G-3 Order No. 53)
at H hour. As soon as the infantry of the main bodies of right division have cleared the
roads south of the VESLE the 56th Brigade will assemble with one-half between FISMES and
VILLETTE and one-half in the covered region between St-GILLES and La CENSE Fme. The
cavalry will take station at St-GILLES at H hour. Until required elsewhere it will be
employed by advance center of information for courier and patrol service. The cavalry
commander will take charge of advance center of information until corps P. C. is estab-
lished at that point.

(x) In the advance, foot troops will not use main roads. The plateau between
the VESLE and the AISNE should be crossed in a column of thin lines (for example column
of platoons, each platoon in a staggered line of required columns with increased inter-
vals). Troops will be warned against explosives, traps, and gassed dugouts left by the
enemy.

* * * * * *

5. (a) First transfers of P. C.'s will be as follows:

American III Corps - St-Gilles
French III Corps - LIME
28th Div. - VILLETTE
77th Div. - BAZOCHES
62d Div. - To be selected later
56th Brig. - ARCIS-le-PONSART

(b) Advanced corps center of information at St-GILLES (future corps P. C.)
beginning at H hour.

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ANNEX 2 to No. [14]

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 4, 1918--12 noon.

AIR SERVICE PLAN

1. The __ squadron will be assigned to the 28th Division (less one brigade),
the __ squadron to the 77th Division, the __ squadron to corps.

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* The French 239th, 280th and 284th Aero Squadrons were assigned to the American III Corps in this period.
However, no record is available showing their individual assignments to divisions.
Corps Operations

FIELD ORDER

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 4, 1918--11 p. m.

1. Our troops are now holding the general line DHUIZE--VAUXCERE--BLANZY--point 1 km. north of BASLIEUX--Ridge 1-1/2 km. N. E. of COURLANDON, with advanced elements on the plateau north of this line.

2. Progression will continue on September 5 in accordance with the provisions of F. O. No. 14 (the III Corps order covering operations of September 4).

3. Heads of columns will seize crossings of the AISNE Canal and AISNE River and establish bridgeheads wherever this may be done without seriously engaging more than a company.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Instructions for Advance of the Corps

G-3

H III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Chateau de Fresnes, September 5, 1918--5 p. m.

1. On our left the enemy has been pressed back across the AISNE Canal and the AISNE.

2. No change in the mission of this corps during September 6. Operations will continue under Field Order 14 and Field Order 15.

3. The 28th Division will keep in intimate touch with the progress of the French 9th Division on its right and be prepared:
   (a) To assist an advance of the 9th Division; and
   (b) Be deployed and ready at all times to meet a possible counterattack from the east and northeast until such time as the 9th Division affords ample protection by advancing.

4. The establishment of artillery north of the VESLE will be given special attention. It is important to bring under artillery fire enemy troops, trains and sensitive points along the CHEMIN-des-DAMES region and in the front of the French 9th Division. For the next thirty-six hours there will be no serious risk in pushing divisional artillery close to our forward lines, particularly at night. It must be borne in mind that this corps must assist the progression of the French Tenth Army as well as the French 9th Division.

5. Attention is once more called to the vital necessity of more definite results and better understanding with respect to liaison between the infantry and airplanes. Division commanders will make a special effort tonight to see that some satisfactory understanding is arrived at among the men of their front line battalions. This matter will be hammered at daily until respectable results are obtained.

- 101 -
6. The following changes in P. C.’s.
The first echelon, III Corps P. C., opens at MONTAON Fme at noon, September 6.
The second echelon, III Corps P. C., opens at DRAVEGNY September 8.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

183-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 29

From 20 h., September 4 to 20 h., September 5, 1918

I. WEATHER: Fair.
II. VISIBILITY: Good
III. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Active
IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

Allied

During the period of this report our troops advanced and now occupy the general line:
DHUIZEL---LONGUEVAL---BARBONVAL---
Merval---GLENNES (exclusive)---CROIX-
ROUGE---Le GRAND-HANEAU---with patrols out towards the AISNE Canal and in the direction of MUSCOURT and MEURIVAL.

V. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Interdiction fire on bridges across the AISNE at PONT ARCY - 155 rounds of 155 G.P. F. The forward move of our infantry practically suspended divisional artillery fire. One battalion across the VESLE to the west of FISMES and in action against M. G. nests region of BLANZY. Other battalions hindered by conditions of roads and bridges across the VESLE.

VI. AVIATION: Increased activity in infantry patrols. Five infantry contact patrols, seven reconnaissances, two miscellaneous. Balloons less active. One balloon made three ascensions.

Enemy

Some machine-gun and rifle fire from enemy rearguards has been encountered.

Enemy actively shelled the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE Rivers during the day, especially at the heads of the ravines and the towns of VAUXCERE, PERLES, and BASLIEUX, ROLAND-Usine and La CENNE Fme were harrassed. FISMES was also shelled during the night of this report and this afternoon. The enemy shelling consisted of both H. E. and mustard gas. Two or three large caliber shells were also reported. A decreased activity was noticed as compared with the two preceding days, though reports from forward areas are lacking. In the early afternoon an allied plane was forced to land in our lines.

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By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Relief of 28th Division

G-3 Order
No. 65

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to order from Sixth Army, the French 62d Div. will relieve the American 28th Division, the night of September 6/7, 1918, and September 7/8, 1918.
2. The relief will be completed by 8 a.m., September 8, 1918, at which hour the command will pass to the Commanding General, French 62d Div.

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By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Relief of III Corps Headquarters

G-3
Order No. 66

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Special Orders No. 3852, Sixth Army, the American III Corps Headquarters and Corps Troops will be relieved by the French XVI Corps Headquarters and Troops.
2. ARTILLERY: On the night of September 6/7, 1918, two battalions of the 56th C. A. C. will be withdrawn from the line and proceed by night march to the woods near CHALET VILLARDELLE [Farm] (on the COURMONT-TRELOUP Road). * * * On the night of September 8/9, the 55th C. A. C. will be relieved by the corps artillery of the French XVI Army Corps and, together with the remaining battalion of the 56th C. A. C., will be withdrawn and proceed by night march to CHALET VILLARDELLE [Farm].

* * * * *

5. Relief will be completed by the night of September 8/9, 1918, and units assembled in the region of DORMANS by the night of September 9, 1918.

* * * * *
7. The command of each unit will pass on relief of the unit. Command will pass to Commanding General, XVI Corps, at 9 a.m., September 9, 1918.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

183-32.1: Orders

**Corps Operations**

FIELD ORDERS

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Montaon Fme, September 8, 1918—11:45 o'clock.

MAP: CHEMIN-des-DAMES Sud 1:20,000

1. Dividing line between divisions is changed to the following: Le CHATEAU---La BOSSETTE---MAIZY (to 77th Div.).
2. The advance previously ordered will continue to the objective REVILLON (incl.)---southern edge of the plateau from La ROCHE to CUCHERY---line of the railroad CUCHERY---PISSEVIN---CROIX-ROUGE. This objective will be attained by 19:30 o'clock.
3. At 19:30 o'clock divisions will attack. Objective: The lateral Canal of the AISNE to MAIZY (incl.)---MUSCOURT (incl.)---HANGAR de BEAUREGARD (incl.).
4. Artillery preparation will continue to the hour of attack. The corps artillery will take as objective the center of resistance: La PETITE-MONTAGNE.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

183-32.1: Order

**Transfer of the III Corps**

FIELD ORDER

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 8, 1918—5:30 p. m.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to telegraphic instructions from the Sixth Army, the III Corps Headquarters and III Corps troops, except motorized units, will proceed by train to another area.
2. Entraining will take place at DORMANS, commencing at 9 p. m., September 9, • • •

* * * * *

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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183-32.13: Order

Transfer of the 28th Division

G-3 Order
No. 69

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 8, 1918—16:30 h.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Telephonic Message No. 2986/3, of September 5, the 28th Division will be entrained in the region of EPERNAY-AVISE, beginning September 12, about 6 a. m.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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132-32.1: Order

Transfer of 31st Heavy Artillery Brigade

FIELD ORDERS
No. 22

31st HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
September 8, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. Both regiments will move out at 8 p. m., September 8. Guns will be kept in firing position until 7:15 p. m.

* * * * *

8. Both regimental P. C.'s will function in CHALET de VILLARDELLE at 9 a. m., September 9.

- 105 -
9. Brigade headquarters will remain at COULONGES until further orders. Each regiment will report by courier at brigade headquarters at 8:30 a.m., and 4:30 p.m., daily.

By order of Colonel Burgess:

W. S. DOWD,
Lieut. Colonel, C. A. C.,
Adjutant.

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183-32.13: Order

Modification of Previous Order

G-3
No. 70

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Montaon Fme, September 8, 1918---9:45 p.m.

1. Paragraph 1, G-3 Order No. 69, these headquarters, pursuant to instructions from the Sixth Army, is modified as follows: Date of the beginning of the entraining September 13 at 9 p.m. instead of September 12 about 6 a.m. All other instructions remain unchanged.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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183-33.1: Operations Report

G-3
No. 32

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

September 8, 1918.

From 20 h., Sept. 7 to 20 h., Sept. 8

[Extract]

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IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Allied: Little change in the front line during the period of this report. Patrols from the right of the 77th Division met rifle and M. G. resistance from Ravin MARION, LAVIELLE FONTAINE, and HAUTERIVE - Chee [Cheminee]. The French 62d Division relieved the American 28th Division and established good liaison with the 77th Division on its left. At 7:30 p.m., an attack, with artillery preparation was launched
by these two divisions. At the closing of this report, no information had been received regarding the result of this operation.

Enemy: Activity confined to machine-gun fire and some sniping.

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By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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183-11.4: Report

Operations of III Corps in Vesle Sector

HISTORY OF THE III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.

Second Epoch

From 8 a. m., August 4, 1918, to 9 a. m., September 9, 1918

Operations on the VESLE River, FISMES Sector

MAPS:  SOISSONS  1:100,000
        FISMES  1:20,000
        CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud  1:20,000

[Extract]

* * * * *

August 8: At 2 h., Instructions No. 3723, Sixth Army, were received which prescribed that attacks in force cease and that the corps confine itself to holding the line of the VESLE with small bridgeheads on the north bank. In consequence, F. O. 11 *** was issued at 6:45 h., and no inspection made as had been contemplated at conference on the 7th.

Reports received during the morning showed that the 28th Division was able to maintain only four companies on the north bank in the western edge of their sector which were in liaison with the I Corps troops and that the 6th Brigade had been unable to maintain their footing on the north bank in their sector.

At 9 h., Sixth Army Order No. 3724 received *** prescribing defensive lines and works to be constructed; F. O. No. 12 issued *** in consequence.

Later in the day, Order No. 2553/3 of Sixth Army was received directing that the French 4th Division and the 6th Brigade be relieved by the French 164th Division. The relief of the 4th Division was ordered for the night August 8/9 and of the 6th Brigade for the night of August 9/10. The front line held at the close of the day was as follows from west to east: Point 300 m. north of CHATEAU du DIABLE, thence east to R. R. crossing, thence along the south bank of the river. In the western part of the 28th Division sector there were four companies of the 112th Infantry north of the river and in liaison with the American 4th Division of the I Corps. The other troops that had occupied the position in the vicinity of La FONTAINE-QUI-BRULE were driven back to the south bank during the night
August 7/8. It was reported that the enemy was holding strongly the north bank of the VESLE. Enemy concentrated artillery fire mostly on FISMES with some harassing fire on COULONGES. Enemy aviators were very active, as were ours, but the supremacy of the air was held by the enemy. Corps P. C. moved from COULONGES to a farm about 1 1/2 km. east in the Bois de Rognac.

August 9: The 28th Division advanced one battalion during the early morning across the VESLE and seized FISMETTE with outposts occupying the nose of the heights to the north. Another front line battalion held the north bank of the VESLE in the vicinity of CHATEAU du DIABLE. The 164th Division relieved the French 4th Division and, in consequence, no advance was made in this sector. At 9 h., F.O. 12 ** was issued which prescribed an advance to discover whether the enemy was still holding in force and to deepen and widen bridgeheads. This order divided the corps sector into two subsectors with the left under the Commanding General, 28th Division, and the right under the Commanding General, 164th Division.

The relief of the 6th Brigade was postponed 24 hours in order that it might obtain a bridgehead in the right sector and the brigade placed under the orders of the commanding general, right sector.

The companies of the 112th Regiment across the VESLE were counterattacked about 16 h., from two directions, one on the left from a northwesterly direction against the battalion occupying woods north of CHATEAU du DIABLE and the other from a northeasterly direction against the battalion occupying FISMETTE. Both were repulsed, the latter mainly by artillery.

Later in the day, about 22:45 h., another counterattack was made against troops in FISMETTE which was likewise repulsed. The 88th Aero Squadron carried on active reconnaissance in spite of the enemy holding the supremacy. Three reports were made by this air service verifying the line north of the river. There was no change in the front of the 6th Brigade and the French 164th Division.

August 10: At 4:30 h., the attacks to broaden bridgeheads prescribed in Field Order No. 12 were launched. The left column from the 28th Division advanced from 500 to 600 meters north of FISMETTE, but was forced to fall back to the town on account of flanking fire.

In the vicinity of CHATEAU du DIABLE a slight advance was made, but could not be held, due to machine-gun fire. The right column, led by troops from the 6th Brigade, also attacked at this hour and succeeded in getting two platoons across the VESLE, but after repeated attempts to advance farther these elements were forced to withdraw to the south bank of the river. The 164th Division cleared their front as far as the VESLE River.

The situation from then on along the front of the 164th Division and 6th Brigade remained the same for the rest of the day.

About 16 h., the 28th Division cleared the woods to the west of CHATEAU du DIABLE and connected with the troops on our left, capturing 30 machine guns. The line at that time held by our troops from left to right was along the National Highway No. 31, north of CHATEAU du DIABLE, all of FISMETTE, and FISMES, thence along the railroad east of FISMES to VILLETTE, then along the national highway.

Casualties reported in both the 28th Division and 6th Brigade as being heavy in the front line companies.

The corps troops pertaining to the French III Corps, with the exception of aviation and artillery, were relieved during the night of August 9/10.

August 11: During the night of August 10/11, the 6th Brigade was relieved by a part of the French 164th Division. There was practically no activity in the right sector of the corps during this day. Late in the afternoon the 28th Division pushed out combat patrols; one along the west slopes of the ridge northeast of FISMETTE, covered by a barrage, advanced about 100 meters. Another followed the valley east of the same ridge and advanced about 300 meters. Both patrols met severe resistance from machine guns and reported heavy casualties. Enemy chasse planes were exceedingly active.
During the night of August 10/11, the 11th R. A. L., the 1st Bn., 103d R. A. L., the 1st Bn., 138th R. A. L., and the 214th G. P. F., all French, were withdrawn and passed from this command.

On this day, Order No. 3742, Sixth Army, was received which prescribed that this corps would, in addition to its present sector, take over part of the sector held by the American corps on the left. This order assigned the 28th, 77th, and 32d Divisions to the corps, directed the relief of the French 164th Division, from the line, and withdrew the American 3d Division and 164th Division from the III Corps command. The command of the additional area and American 77th Division to pass to the III Corps at 8 h., August 13.

Under this order the eastern boundary of the corps remained unchanged, but the western boundary was changed [See F. O. 13 herein]

Orders issued for the relief of the infantry of the French 164th Division, during the night of August 12/13.

No change occurred in our front lines during this day.

August 12: During the early morning, the enemy made attacks against the left battalion of the 164th Division between FISMES and VILLETTE and upon the right of the 28th Division in FISMETTE. In the former the enemy attacked the line along the railroad and were driven back by a counterattack, our troops keeping their old positions. In the latter the enemy was repulsed, although his attack was supported by flame projectors and machine guns. The front line at the close of this day was the same as that of yesterday.

Field Order No. 13* ** was issued at 10 h., and prescribed the new boundaries of the corps sector, the troops assigned thereto, and their missions. G. O. 16 was issued * * * directing the organization of a scout platoon in each infantry rifle battalion.

August 13: At 8 h., this day, the corps took command of its new sector and of the troops therein and such additional corps troops and army troops as were assigned to it with the turning over of part of the I Corps area.

During the night of August 12/13, the 164th Division was relieved by a portion of the 28th Division and a portion of the 28th Division relieved by part of the 77th Division. The resulting disposition of troops was as follows:

Front line from left to right: 77th Division, 28th Division, Reserve, 32d Division.

During the afternoon an unusual quiet pervaded our front line, which aroused suspicion, and corps artillery was directed to fire on sensitive points, with a view to finding out whether the enemy would react. There was very little reply to the artillery, and in consequence, each front line division was directed, by phone, to send out three small patrols to feel out the enemy's line. The patrols of the left sector were driven back by machine-gun fire and the patrols in the right sector were driven back by rifle and machine-gun fire. In consequence, orders were issued directing one company, supported by artillery, to determine whether the enemy held the north bank of the VESLE in force. Our line remains unchanged.

The amount of enemy munitions left by the enemy in this corps sector was tremendous; dumps of ammunition were found in every woods through which there was a road, and frequently in ditches along roadsides where there was only a thin screen of hedge. The corps made strenuous efforts to salvage this and had organized details for this purpose throughout the area. From the amount it was evident that the enemy intended to repeat his drive of the latter part of May at the earliest opportunity.

August 14: The reconnaissance made pursuant to the order issued August 13 reported that the enemy was still holding the left bank of the VESLE in strength. General situation along the front quiet during the day, and our line reported unchanged, although the 77th Division was in doubt as to the exact location of its front line in the left of its sector.

August 15: The day as a whole was very quiet. There was some patrolling undertaken
particularly in the vicinity of FISMETTE. Patels all report that the north bank of the VESLE is held in sufficient force to make its capture a major operation. Both divisions were again cautioned to keep up active patrolling.

August 16: There were no operations undertaken this day of any importance. Patrolling was carried on just enough to make sure that the enemy had not been withdrawn. Front line divisions were also actively engaged in carrying on construction of defensive works.

August 17: The situation remained unchanged. Patrols sent out by the 77th Division were handicapped by gas in ravines, and patrols from the 28th Division were unable to get north of FISMETTE owing to heavy machine-gun fire.

August 18: The situation on this day remained unchanged, there being no activity on the part of either the enemy or ourselves. The General commanding the Sixth Army visited corps headquarters this day and gave the following verbal instructions:
1. To clean out all enemy opposition up to the VESLE River.
2. To thoroughly organize the defense of the corps sector.

The enemy artillery appeared to be more active than usual during the night of August 17/18.

August 19: No activity of any importance occurred on this day. At 16 h., the P. C. of the corps moved from the Bois de ROGNAC to the CHATEAU de FRESNES.

August 20: Very little activity on the part of either our troops or the enemy. About 1 h., a company of chemical warfare troops made a projector and 4-inch Stokes mortar shoot upon BAZOCHES. The town burned for about an hour. Our patrols report that the enemy has been sending patrols south across the VESLE at the ROLAND-Usine and that the bridge is in good condition.

August 21: A slight increase in enemy activity noticed in the vicinity of FISMETTE. The 28th Division reported capturing a few prisoners in that vicinity.

August 22: At 5 h., after one hour artillery preparation, the enemy attacked the lines of the right sector of the 77th Division in the vicinity of CHATEAU du DIABLE forcing some retirement by our troops. Intermittent fighting continued during the morning and until late in the afternoon. The exact location of our front line could not be ascertained during the day. Our line now from left to right is believed to be as follows:
La GRAVIERE Pond to southeast end; thence southeast to the VESLE River; along the VESLE River to the BAZOCHES—St-THIBAUT Road, thence east along the foot of the bluffs in general following the foot of the bluffs to the woods north of the VILLESAVOYE, thence north to the railroad at a point about 202.6-286.6, thence along the railroad to eastern edge of wood, thence south to south bank, thence along river to TANNERIE, thence along the highway to the western exits of FISMES, thence north, including the greater part of FISMETTE, to its eastern exit, thence south across the VESLE River to the railroad, thence along the railroad to about point 206.2-286.9, thence southeast to the national highway, thence along the highway to the eastern boundary of the corps.

General quiet prevailed throughout the sector except for the above noted raid.

August 23: During the night of August 22/23, patrols sent out by the 28th Division, preceded by heavy artillery preparation for 20 minutes, succeeded in capturing four prisoners, one from the 4th Guard Division and three from the 216th Division. Troops on the right front of the 77th Division, where they were held up yesterday, attacked early on this day and made some slight advance. They captured one prisoner belonging to the 17th Division. Our own artillery was exceedingly active during the day. The enemy’s artillery showed a decided decrease in its activity.

Order received this date withdrawing the 32d Division from the corps and ordering it elsewhere.

August 24: After artillery preparation the 77th Division executed a local action in the vicinity of CHATEAU du DIABLE early this day. The operation was successful and our front line advanced in that vicinity so that at the close of the day it was as follows:
From east to west along the REIMS-SOISSONS Highway past the TANNERIE and the railroad crossing to the edge of the woods at 203.3-287.1, thence along the railroad to point
202.4-286.6, thence southwest to the river. Later reports developed that the line was not so far advanced as thus given.

The line remained unchanged in other portions of the front.

Patrols were sent out at various points along the entire front and felt out the enemy throughout the sector. All reported encountering resistance consisting mostly of heavy machine-gun fire, in some cases rifle fire and grenades. During the night of August 23/24, the 32d Division embussed and passed from the command for the corps.

August 25: Active patrolling was carried on by our troops during the day and night; otherwise not much change in the situation. The 55th Infantry Brigade in the right sub-sector of the 28th Division advanced its line to the railroad during the night of August 24-25, but was forced to withdraw during the day and reported late in the evening as having regained the railroad. All patrols report that enemy is still holding the north bank of the VESLE in force.

August 26: Usual patrolling carried on; otherwise situation unchanged. Patrols report no change in enemy's forces on the north bank. Confidential letter from Sixth Army received concerning an advance in case the enemy retires.

August 27: The 77th Division made a local attack to capture the railroad and highway crossing east of CHATEAU du DIABLE. This attack was not successful. One company of the division after artillery preparation attacked BAZOCHES at 4 h. The village was captured, but was not thoroughly mopped up so that later the enemy counterattacked and assisted by troops that had remained hidden in cellars drove our troops back across the VESLE.

The enemy attacked FISMETTE at 4:20 h. from the northwest and from the northeast. Reports from the 28th Division state that they believed there were some small details still holding the town but they could not verify this until nightfall.

The enemy's artillery showed increased activity this day.

August 28: Reports from 28th Division received early in the morning state that FISMETTE now held by the enemy and that we lost a number of men.

This day passed with very little activity on either our side or the enemy's so that the situation remained the same. Patrols sent out by each division report that the enemy is on the qui vive and that they are discovered as soon as they reach his outpost line. Our line now runs between FISMETTE and FISMES, otherwise no change. It is probable that the enemy in his attacks on FISMETTE and BAZOCHES captured over 100 of our men yesterday.

August 29: A small operation with artillery preparation was attempted early in the morning along the front of the right subsector of the 28th Division with the railroad as objective. On account of strong resistance the railroad was not reached except by the left flank which established liaison with the unit on its left. Otherwise, the day was quiet and the line remains unchanged. The comments of the corps commander on our attacks on CHATEAU du DIABLE and BAZOCHES August 27, and upon the enemy attack on FISMETTE of same date are hereto attached.

August 30: This day passed quietly with no change in the front lines. Our patrols kept close contact with the enemy, who appeared somewhat more active in his outpost positions. Sixth Army Order No. 3830 received this date.* * *

August 31: A small operation early in the morning extended our line slightly in the vicinity of the CHATEAU du DIABLE Woods. G-3 Order No. 56 was issued today * * * which informed the command of how an enemy in our uniform had circulated among our troops during the attack on FISMETTE advising them that resistance was useless and that one of our officers had advised them to surrender.

The tentative order for proposed crossing of the VESLE was issued * * *.

This order was drawn as shown because it was the intention of the army that, with the crossing of the VESLE and seizure of the plateau south of the AISNE, the latter river would be crossed by first establishing bridgeheads, and then pushing over and up on the CHEMIN-des-DAMES ridge the Fr. 62d Division, and the American 56th Brigade, in three
Columns; it was expected that the enemy would probably make a stand on that ridge. In the meantime, the corps was not to try to force the crossing of the VESLE by a major operation.

September 1: Our patrols were active during the night of August 31 - September 1, and reported that they had failed to draw machine-gun fire from points where patrols formerly had been fired upon. The enemy was reported noticeably quiet. Our G-2 Section reported that there was less enemy activity than during any previous report since the corps had occupied the sector.

Our line was reported unchanged. In order to experiment with the use of smoke, the gas troops put down a smoke screen on part of the front of the 28th Division. This drew an enemy barrage and machine-gun fire.

September 2: Prior to midnight, September 1/2, our infantry with the aid of a barrage repulsed two small enemy attacks on our positions near the railroad tracks south of CHATEAU du DIABLE. A daylight patrol in the morning was driven out of BAZOCHES. There was no change in the situation of our front lines. During the night, great use of flares by the enemy along the front was particularly noticeable. The enemy artillery activity was slightly decreased in front of our right sector and distinctly so in front of our left sector. It became more and more apparent that the enemy was withdrawing from the front.

September 3: During the day our patrols continued active and in contact with the enemy, and drew machine-gun fire at various points along our front. Our line was reported unchanged. A considerably increased enemy movement was observed most of which was moving north. Late in the afternoon a decrease in the enemy's artillery fire indicated his withdrawal. Artillery fire was directed upon his sensitive points with a view of finding out whether he would retaliate, but drew scarcely any return artillery fire. Divisions were again cautioned to keep up constant and active patrolling so as to keep in contact.

September 4: During the night, our patrols which were quite active encountered machine-gun fire at several points. This fire ceased early on the morning of September 4 and the patrols were able to push across the VESLE and meeting with no resistance advanced onward to the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE. At noon, Field Order No. 14 was issued directing that the tentative field order for the crossing of the VESLE go into effect at 15 h. * * *

Instructions were given that patrols then out were to keep on pushing forward and to maintain contact with the enemy. Late in the evening of the 4th, these patrols were reported on the plateau north of the VESLE along the general line VAUXTN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY---ROMAIN, and still advancing. At 23 h., Field Order No. 15 (here attached) was issued directing the advance to continue in accordance with the provisions of Field Order 14. Later information received on this day indicated that the left of the line was in the vicinity of DHUIZEL. The advance which took place on this day marks the beginning of the corps' participation in the OISE-AISNE offensive.

September 5: Reports received from patrols made during the night and early morning of September 5 indicated that the enemy was withdrawing extensively opposite our left sector and much less so opposite our right. The enemy's withdrawal occurred among troops along this corps front and to the northwestward and was pivoted in the vicinity of HUIT-VOISINS. This retirement was due to the threatening of his right flank by General Mangin's attack farther to our left. During this day our troops advanced, and late in the evening were reported as occupying the general line: DHUIZEL---LONGUEVAL---BARBONVAL---MERVAL---ridge south of GLENNES---CROIS-ROUGE---Le GRAND-HAMEAU, with patrols out toward the AISNE Canal and in the direction of MUSCOURT and MEURIVAL. The enemy opposition increased during the day and he contested our advance by machine-gun and rifle fire. Machine-gun fire was particularly aggravating as the guns were located in well chosen positions possessing excellent fields of fire across the plateau and were particularly in evidence in front of our right sector. The right of the 28th Division was not able to advance to any great extent in consequence. At 17 h., G-3 Order No. 64 * * * was issued.
directing the continuance of the advance for September 6 under the provisions of Field Orders 14 and 15.

September 6: The enemy's resistance increased during the day, especially along the lines REVILLON—GLENNES—MUSCOURT—MEURIVAL and on the plateau south of the last two places. At 20 h., our line was reported as follows: Along the AISNE Canal from a point north of VIEIL-ARCY to and including VILLERS-en-PRAYERES, thence southeast down to and including REVILLON, thence south toward GLENNES. All of the above was held by the 77th Division which had established liaison with the French 164th Division on their left. The 28th Division continued the line from a point in the vicinity of GLENNES (Exact location not known but probably on the ridge south of it), thence east to the Hangar de BEAUREGARD, thence south and east to a point west of Le GRAND-HAMEAU. They established liaison with the French 9th Division, south of Le GRAND-HAMEAU. The 28th Division reported that they repelled two counterattacks during the day and during the afternoon assisted the attack of the French 9th Division. It is probable that while patrols may have reached the HANGAR de BEAUREGARD and perhaps pushed farther northward that they were forced to retire and that the line held by the 28th Division was in rear of that reported above. Our casualties during the day, particularly in the 28th Division, were heavy. At noon, corps headquarters moved from CHATEAU de FRESNES to MONTAON Farm about 2 kilometers north of DRAVEGNY. Orders were received from the Sixth Army directing relief of the American 28th Division, during the night of September 6/7 and 7/8 by the French 62d Division. The relief was to be completed by 8 h. on September 8, at which hour the command would pass.

Special Orders No. 3852 of the Sixth Army were also received on this day which prescribed that the II Corps Headquarters and corps troops would be relieved by the French XVI Corps Headquarters and corps troops and that the command would pass to the Commanding General, French XVI Corps, at 9 h., September 9.

G-3 Orders No. 66 directing the relief of corps troops and of headquarters was issued in consequence. * * *

September 7: There was little change in the situation of our front line this day with the exception of a slight withdrawal at various points in order to take positions that could be readily held. Moreover, the partial relief of the 28th Division made any advance in this sector impracticable. The enemy strongly opposed in front of the right of our line and held the north bank of the AISNE Canal. Our line at the close of the day was reported as follows: VIEL-ARCY—VILLERS-en-PRAYERES—La BUTTE-de-BOURMONT—Le MARAIS-MINARD—ridge east of MERVIAL, thence across the ravine to the GLENNES—Le GRAND-HAMEAU Road in the vicinity of its junction with the GLENNES-BASLIEUX Road, thence along the road to the western exits of Le GRAND-HAMEAU. The enemy held REVILLON, GLENNES, and the plateau south of MUSCOURT and MEURIVAL in force so that with the long line held by the corps it was impossible to advance on this front. The enemy also controlled the south bank of the AISNE Canal from his position along the north as far as the line above given.

September 8: The relief of the 28th Division by the French 62d Division was completed at 8 h. on this day. There was little change in the front line. Patrols from the right of the 77th Division met rifle and machine-gun fire, from HAUTERIVE-Cheer [CHEMINEE] and from points in the vicinity of REVILLON and GLENNES. Field Order No. 16 * * * was issued in the morning and directed that the 77th Division and the French 62d Division attack at 19:30 h. Late in the evening, Field Order No. 17 * * * was issued directing the entrainment and move of corps headquarters and corps troops.

September 9: The attack made at 19:30 h. on September 8 was not successful and no change resulted therefrom in our front lines. At 9 h. on this day, the command passed from the II Corps Headquarters, Major General Bullard commanding, to the French XVI Corps, Major General Deville commanding.

This ends the participation of the II Corps in the OISE-AISNE offensive. While it is believed that the resistance offered by the enemy in his withdrawal was not very
strong and that the advance made by our troops was not as great as perhaps might have been expected, the following points should be taken into consideration:

1st: That the front held by these two divisions was approximately 11 kilometers long, so that in advance the necessary driving power obtained by an echelonment in depth was not possible.

2d: That fact that both these divisions had been in the line for some time and that the front which they held during this time was not a quiet one.

3d: That the advance from a stabilized position into a war of movement was a difficult maneuver for troops with as small an amount of training in open warfare as these had had.

4th: The difficulty in crossing the flat open plateau between the AISNE and the VESLE which lent itself readily to artillery defense.

Notwithstanding the above difficulties these two divisions crossed the VESLE and advanced to a point where the patrols from the 77th Division had reached the AISNE Canal in La CENDRIERE Woods. The advance from the heights north of the VESLE River was seriously opposed and entailed heavy fighting for from four to five days. The casualties in the two divisions during these five days numbered 3,417. The progress made despite this opposition was about 8 kilometers on the left and about 3 kilometers on the right of the line. Attached hereto is a brief summary of the aviation activities during the VESLE operations.

This ends the history of the III Corps during the time it held the FISMES sector.

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28th Division
August 17 - September 8, 1918

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228-32: Letter

Plan for Crossing the Vesle

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Dravegny, August 7, 1918.

Commanding General, American III Corps -

At present the information is that it would be suicidal to attempt the crossing as first contemplated in division order. Reconnaissances show that the places selected for the crossing cannot be bridged in the daytime; the bridge material cannot be taken through the artillery fire, which is now going on, during the daytime. There is nothing to indicate that the stream can be forded there, and on the near side of the stream is a flat exposed marsh.

General Weigel has already directed the battalion that was selected for the assault to move slightly to the left in the ground that was left vacant between our own left and the right of the 4th Division, and to attempt the crossing of the river in this new position piecemeal. The troops who succeed in crossing to take shelter on the south side of the raised roadway between SOISSONS and REIMS.

It is my own impression that it would be wise to delay the zero hour until 4:15 tomorrow morning, as I do not believe it wise to attempt to force the crossing until reconnaissance has shown what will be apt to be the least costly method of making the same.
BLANZY-FISMES AREA
Looking north-northeast from vicinity of Villegavoye
It is the intention to start building passereles with the coming of night. Whether this succeeds or not, if the troops cannot wade across, it is then my intention that a few shall swim across, carrying ropes or cable wire, by which the remainder of the assaulting troops can pull themselves across hand-over-hand.

CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major General, N. A.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Orders

**Vesle River Crossing**

FIELD ORDERS

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Drawegny, August 8, 1918—9:30 h.

MAP: (FISMES)
(CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud)
1:20,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy continues to put up a strong resistance to the crossing of the VESLE River along the front. Elements of the Sixth Army have succeeded in crossing the VESLE River and establishing themselves on the slopes leading down to the VESLE from the north. The American I and III Corps have established bridgeheads north of the VESLE preparatory to the crossing of the remainder of our forces.

2. In conformity with orders from the Sixth Army, the III Corps will hold its present position without further attack until orders to that effect are received.

3. (a) In conformity to the above order, the battalion of the 28th Division now across the VESLE River will hold the position it now occupies and will proceed to dig in and consolidate them further.

* * * * *

8. The 55th Brigade will hold itself in readiness, prepared to march upon the receipt of orders.

9. Orders for the organization of our main position south of the VESLE River will follow:

10. P. C. 55th Brigade, main road, DRAVEGNY—St-GILLES, 1 1/2 kilometers north of MONTAON Fme.

P. C. 56th Brigade, MONTAON Fme.

P. C. 28th Division, DRAVEGNY.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.

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28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 8, 1918.

Adjutant General, A. E. F., Attention G-3.

From 0 to 24 o'clock, August 7: Bridges constructed and crossings of the VESLE River effected by the 112 Infantry. Three companies of this regiment are up the slope and the remainder are holding along the railroad ready to cross the river. The 111th Infantry have moved up ready to cross the river. They are connected up on the left with 8th Brigade, but 6th Brigade on our right has failed to cross river. Enemy putting up strong resistance. Casualties light considering very severe artillery and machine-gun fire troops have been under. A great deal of gas around FISMES. Enemy airplanes active, destroyed two balloons in this sector. Weather clear; visibility fair.

W. B. MORGAN,
Captain, F. A., N. G.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fl dr. 2: Orders

* * * Necessity for Establishment of Bridgeheads*

FIELD ORDERS
No. 16

FISMES 1:20,000
CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud

[Extract]

1. * * * The village of FISMETTE has been captured by the 28th Division.
2. (a) Orders of the III Corps for these battalions, without bringing about a general engagement, to push-on strong reconnoitering parties within their sector, under cover of a barrage, for the following purpose:
   (1) To discover with certainty whether the enemy is still holding in force.
   (2) With a view of deepening and broadening the bridgeheads and increasing the garrison as progress is made.
   (b) The troops of the III Corps are divided into two columns, a left and a right column, and reserve consisting of a provisional regiment of cavalry, 32d Division, and 3d Division (less 6th Brigade). The left column, Major General Muir, Commanding, consists of the 28th Division, division artillery of the 32d Division (less one battalion of the 130th Field Artillery), 107th Engineers (less one battalion), one air squadron (observation), and one balloon company. The right column, Brigadier General Goucher, Commanding, consists of the French 164th Division, American 6th Brigade, with attached troops.
   (c) Column commanders are directed to continue progression with their respective sectors. The right column has been directed to organize attacks at once to establish bridgeheads north of the VESLE.
3. In conformity to the above, the 56th Brigade will attack, at an hour to be designated later, in the general direction of the tongue of land between PERLES and
BLANZY-les-FISMES on which La PETITE-LOGETTE and La GRANDE-LOGETTE are located, for the purpose of finding out the strength of the enemy and establishing themselves along the general line: southern edge of PERLES---La PETITE-LOGETTE---Les OLIVATS. (Zone of attack bounded roughly by the lines 203.8---205.3. **).

* * * * *

4. OBJECTIVES OF ATTACK: The first objective will be an east and west line, Bois de PERLES-Le TORDOIR, where the first line will halt and reform preparatory to making a further advance. **

The second objective, east and west line through La MONTAGNE de VAILLY---Le VIVIER, where the first line will halt and reform preparatory to making a further advance. **

Third and final objective: southern outskirts of PERLES---La PETITE-LOGETTE---Les OLIVATS. This final objective will hold, consolidated and reinforced. **

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By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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228-32: Memorandum

Plans for Attack

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 10, 1918.

The following information from III Army Corps Headquarters is furnished for your information and guidance:

* * * * *

Commanding General, 28th Division

1. A field order is in course of preparation. In the meantime this advance memorandum will guide you.

2. The army commander desires the following policy to be pursued on our front:
   (1) The enemy will not be attacked in force except in pursuance of a plan to be prescribed by the army commander himself.
   (2) The enemy will not be permitted to get away from the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE without our instant knowledge of his action.
   (3) In order to conserve our strength and at the same time keep that close contact with the enemy which is necessary, we should hold on our front small bridgeheads. From these bridgeheads we should push forward strong aggressive patrols covered by box barrages. If these patrols (strength 1 company or less) reach their selected objectives with little or no opposition, we have the evidence that we are
looking for, and the broadening of the bridgehead then becomes our duty. If on the contrary the opposition is strong, it is evidence that the enemy still holds the plateau with some strength and determination and the situation then demands a general attack, which will not be undertaken by us until the army commander so directs. Therefore each aggressive patrol sent out by you is authorized and expected to feel the enemy's line with determination but not to attack with determination if the enemy is holding strongly, but to retire to the bridgehead. A succession of such strong patrols, each afforded adequate artillery support, must be carried out at various points and at various times.

(4) Pursuant to the above policy and in view of the opposition encountered today, the further advance of the 28th Division today is unnecessary. Its present bridgeheads should be organized in such manner as to avoid undue exposure to hostile artillery and machine guns, but it must be understood that some bridgeheads are necessary as a base of departure for the aggressive patrols which must be sent out.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brig. General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to C. G., 164th Division who will be guided by the principles stated above.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.

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28th Div. Gen.: Fldr. 1: Telegram

Operations of the 28th Division

G-3 28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 10, 1918.

Adjutant General, A. E. F., Attention G-3.

From 0 to 24 h., August 9: One battalion, 112th Infantry, holding FISMETTE on right of our sector; one battalion, same regiment, holding line along National Highway [No. 31] at left of sector. Meeting strong resistance from enemy machine-gun fire. Three counter-attacks by enemy were repulsed by this regiment. Commanding General, 53d Field Artillery Brigade, and staff, reported to division commander; organizations of this brigade have not arrived. Friendly artillery very active. Intermittent enemy artillery fire throughout entire area, harassing nature, gas, and H. E. Friendly aircraft active, enemy aircraft active. Weather clear. Visibility fair.

MUIR.

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Relief of French Unit

FIELD ORDERS
No. 19

MAP: (FISMES (CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud ) 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. In compliance with orders from the III Corps, the 55th Brigade will relieve the French 164th Division in the sector it occupies just east of the 56th Brigade. This relief to take place during the night of August 12/13. Following the relief of the 164th Division by the 55th Brigade, the 56th Brigade will sideslip to the right, occupying that portion of the old 164th Division sector indicated on the attached map [not found]. This relief will take place the night of August 13/14. • • •

2. The boundary limits of the divisional sector are as follows:
   On the west JAULGONNE, exclusive---RONCHERES, inclusive---CIERGES, inclusive---DRAVEGNY, inclusive---Hill 213.0 to 204.1---BERGERIE, inclusive---MONT-St-MARTIN, exclusive---road fork coordinates 204.7 to 286.4---FISMETTE, inclusive---HILL 175.8, inclusive---MAIZY, inclusive.
   On the east GOUSSENCOURT, inclusive---ARCIS-el-PONSART, inclusive---COURVILLE, inclusive---ORMONT Fme, exclusive---ROMAIN, exclusive.
   The boundary line between brigades is as follows:
   RARAY Fme to the 55th Brigade; Bois de la MUETTE to the 56th Brigade. MONT-sur-COURVILLE to the 55th Brigade; crossroads 500 meters west of VILLETTE-BASLIEUX to the 56th. MUSCOURT to the 55th Brigade.

3. The divisional sector will be held by one regiment up in the line and one regiment in reserve, in each brigade sector.

4. Elements of the 57th Artillery Brigade, now attached to the 28th Division, will relieve the artillery of the 164th Division during the nights of August 11/12, 12/13, under orders to be issued by the Commanding General, 57th Brigade, after a conference with the Divisional Artillery Commander of the 164th Division.

5. The Commanding General, 28th Division, will take over command of the new sector at 8 h., August 13.

6. P. C., 28th Division, DRAVEGNY: P. C., 56th Brigade, MONTAON Fme: P. C., 55th Brigade, MONT-sur-COURVILLE.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Operations of the 28th Division

G-3

Adjutant General, A. E. F., Attention G-3

From 0 to 24 o'clock, August 12: No activity or troop movements to report. Enemy artillery very active shelling FISMES and FISMETTE constantly. Friendly artillery fairly active. Enemy aircraft active dropping bombs on FISMES, also on troops and battery positions in the vicinity of 203.4-283.5, and penetrating our back area at will, locating battery positions after which enemy batteries fired on this point. Friendly aircraft fairly active. Weather clear. Visibility good.

By direction of Chief of Staff:

W. B. MORGAN,
Captain, F. A.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

Opening of New Division Headquarters

FIELD ORDERS
No. 20

MAPS: (FISMES) 1:20,000
       (CHEMIN-des-DAMES, Sud)

1. Pursuant to verbal orders, corps commander, the post of command, of this division will close at DRAVEGNY at 4 p. m., and open the same hour, same date, at the Chateau at ARCIS-le-PONSART.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
From noon August 14 to noon August 15

[Extract]

1. WEATHER: Clear.
2. VISIBILITY: Good.
3. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Enemy artillery still active in our forward areas, harassing fire being concentrated in the vicinity between St-GILLES and COURVILLE; few shells fell in the vicinity of ARCIS-le-PONSART morning of August 15. Friendly artillery fairly active. Preparation fire from 20:30 to 20:40 h., August 14 on enemy machine-gun nests and sniper posts located in the houses in FISMETTE.
4. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: No marked enemy or friendly infantry activity to report.
5. AEROPLANE and BALLOON ACTIVITY: Enemy aircraft still very active over our front line positions with marked decrease in activity in our rear areas. No enemy balloon activity observed during period. Friendly aircraft active for observation purposes.
6. TROOP MOVEMENTS: None to report.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Quiet.

* * * * *

9. SUCCESS OF OUR TROOPS IN PATROLLING: At 20:50 o'clock, August 14, two strong combat patrols sent to eastern and western edge of FISMETTE after 10 minute artillery preparation to attack machine-gun nests. Some machine guns were located and several enemy bodies, but the patrols were not able to drive them out.

* * * * *

13. CHANGE IN LOCATION OF LINES HELD BY OUR TROOPS OR THE ENEMY: Our troops now hold the entire town of FISMETTE. No further information on line held by enemy.

By direction Chief of Staff:

W. B. MORGAN,
Captain, F. A.,
A. C. of S., G-3.
Change in Post of Command

FIELD ORDERS
No. 24
28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Arcts-le-Ponsart, August 19, 1918—19:30 h.

MAP: (FISMES 1:20,000)
(CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud )

1. Pursuant to verbal orders, corps commander, the post of command of this division will close at ARCIS-le-PONSART at 10 a.m., August 20, 1918, and open the same hour, same date, at Bois de ROGNAC, 3 1/2 kilometers east of COULONGES, (old P. C., III Corps).

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

228-33.1: Operations Report

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Bois de Rognac, August 21, 1918.

From noon August 20 to noon August 21

[Extract]

IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

ALLIED

Troops of the 56th Brigade carried out a raid on FISMETTE during night of Aug. 20/21, and it is reported that it has been successful and some prisoners taken. Unable to get detailed reports up to this time owing to severity of machine-gun fire on the bridge leading out of FISMETTE. Expect detailed reports and prisoners to be brought out tonight under cover of darkness.

ENEMY

Enemy machine gunners and snipers continue active in FISMETTE and vicinity.

By direction of Chief of Staff:

W. B. MORGAN,
G-3.
Operations of the 28th Division

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 24, 1918.

Adjutant General, A. E. F., Attention G-3.

From 0 to 24 h., August 23: Relief of the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, by 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, in FISMES and FISMETTE completed at 2 h. No other troop movements to report. Increase in number of mustard gas shells used by enemy on our front lines, but decrease noted in general artillery activity. Friendly aircraft continues active reducing enemy activity around entire sector. Weather clear, Visibility good.

MUIR.

228-33.1: Operations Report

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Bois de Rognac, August 27, 1918.

From noon August 26 to noon August 27

I. WEATHER: Cloudy.

II. VISIBILITY: Poor.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

ALLIED

Slight decrease noted. Some counter-battery fire on 207.6---290.0; also some interdiction fire. Barrage in vicinity of FISMETTE from 4:48 to 5:25.

ENEMY

Harassing fire on front line and rear area in the right subsector with increased activity during early morning hours. In left subsector heavy barrage on FISMETTE about 4 h. Harassing fire on back areas with 210-cal. shells throughout the period. At 19:10 h., 7-210's were dropped upon position of 1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, in vicinity of Le BONNE-MAISON. 14 H. E. shells fell in ARCIS-le-PONSART at 4 h., cal.- 160. A Battery, 109th Field Artillery, was shelled from 16:20 to 19:05 h., 220 H. E. shells falling at about three minute intervals.

IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

2d Battalion, 112 Infantry, repulsed strong enemy attack about 4:30 h. in FISMETTE.

After heavy artillery preparation enemy launched heavy raiding parties on east and west flanks of FISMETTE. It has
been reported that some liquid fire was used, but unable to verify statements at this time.

V. AEROPLANE AND BALLOON ACTIVITY

Several reconnaissance flights made but general decrease noted in activity owing to atmospheric conditions. Several bombing planes (exact number unknown) pass over DRAVEGY, ARGIS-le-PONSART, COHAN and COULONGES between 23 and 24 h. and dropped number of bombs along the whole route. At 4:50 h. enemy plane flew low over A Battery, 107th Field Artillery, using machine guns. Several planes making reconnaissance flights over our front line early this morning. At 10 h. enemy planes bombing FISMETTE heavily and firing upon any men who were not under cover with machine guns. No balloon activity reported.

VII. TROOP MOVEMENTS:

In the left subsector the relief of 3d Battalion, 112th Inf., by 2d Battalion, 112th Inf., in FISMES and FISMETTE completed at 2:05 h., Aug. 27. In the right subsector, Cos. E and F, 110th Inf., relieved Co. L and M respectively, on the front line, relief completed at 3:40 h. The 37-mm. gun platoon of the 109th Inf., took station during the night with the 37-mm. platoon of the 110th Inf. in the out-guard zone MAGNEUX sector. 2d Battalion, 111th Inf., moved to the ravine at 203.9 ---282.9

Nothing to report except as stated in paragraph 4.

X. SUCCESS OF OUR TROOPS IN OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE ACTION: After sharp fighting with strong raiding parties on east and west flanks on FISMETTE, our troops are still holding the town.

XII. REPULSE OR MISFORTUNE OF OUR TROOPS IN OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE ACTION: It is reported that our troops have suffered heavy casualties and some of our men have been taken prisoners by the enemy during activity in FISMETTE, but detailed information not available at this time.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.
Situation of the 28th Division

August 28, 1918.

No. 85

From: Capt. Withers, 28th Division

To: G-3, III Corps

Time Received: 10:45 h.

Telephone message from 112th Inf. to 28th Division.
Received at 28th Div. at 10:15 h.

Absolutely unable to get patrols into FISMETTE. Got down as far as 100 yards from bridge. Streets of FISMES running north and south covered by machine-gun fire and one-pounders. Two casualties in one patrol of six men. REIMS Road covered with machine-gun fire from left. Noticeable absence of flares. FISMETTE very quiet. No firing on FISMETTE since 10 h., August 27. If there any of our men in FISMETTE they are very few and scattered and in hiding. No evidence to confirm any of our men holding out. Will make further reconnaissances. We still control FISMES down to the river and we are constantly patrolling river front along entire front of sector. Relief of machine gun companies complete. Stokes mortars and one-pounders are in position.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Orders

Troop Dispositions

FIELD ORDERS
No. 26 [Sic]

MAP: FISMES. 1:20,000

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Bois de Rognac, September 1, 1918.

The following disposition will be made night of September 2/3, 1918.

1. 1st Battalion, 112th Infantry, to Area A.
   3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, to Area B.
   1st Battalion, 110th Infantry, to Area C.
   3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, to Area D.

2. Battalion commanders will select their P. C.'s within the area assigned to their battalions and when selected will report their location by sketch to division headquarters, through brigade headquarters.

   It is contemplated to have one battalion on barrier line and two battalions five kilometers back of barrier line in each subsector.

3. All work on trenches and wire within the divisional area will stop, after night September 1/2, 1918, except on the switch trench which connects up the line of resistance between the American 28th Division and the French 9th Division.

4. All troops movements will be made between 22 h., and 4 h.

   Routes: Any.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.
**Organization for Fake Attack**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 26

MAPS: FISMES, 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. A fake attack will be carried out on the front of the 55th Inf. Brigade the morning of September 1, 1918, H hour 2 o'clock; consisting of a box smoke barrage without infantry or artillery participation.

2. OBJECTIVE: The area whose westerly limit is 207.45---286.7, extending along the railroad to 208.25---286.65 with a depth resting on 287.0.

3. MISSION: To draw out the enemy’s intentions. Also to demonstrate what action the enemy will resort to in the face of an impending raid.

4. INFANTRY: The Commanding General, 55th Inf. Brigade will issue the necessary instructions to troops in the outguard zone of the right subsector

 By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
CHIEF OF STAFF.

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**Orders for Advance**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 27

MAPS: (FISMES) (BERRY-au-BAC) (MONTBERAULT) (CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud)

1. The Tenth Army, on the left of the Sixth Army, is advancing east on the plateau immediately north of SOISSONS. As a result of this advance and if this army continues its advance, it is believed that the enemy in front of the Sixth Army will retreat to the north. The Sixth Army will advance D day at H hour destroying or driving back the enemy’s rearguards and by vigorous pursuit prevent the enemy from establishing himself on the CHEMIN-des-DAMES.

2. (a) In conformity with the mission of the Sixth Army, the III Corps will advance with two divisions (less one brigade) in line:
   - RIGHT DIVISION: Major General Muir, Commanding---28th Div. (less 56th Brigade)---1 aero squadron---1 balloon company.
LEFT DIVISION: Major General Alexander, Commanding---77th Division---1 aero squadron---1 balloon co.
RESERVE: French 62d Division---American 56th Brigade---1st Pioneer Infantry---14th Engineers---Corps Cavalry---308th Engineers.
(b) Boundaries of the right division sector [28th Div.]:
   On the east: COULANDON, incl.---crossroads 300 meters west of HUIT-VOISINS, incl.---Le GRAND-HAMEAU, incl.---MEURIVAL, incl.---CONCEVREUX, incl.---CRAONNELLE, excl.---BOUCONVILLE, incl.
3. (a) In conformity to the orders of the Sixth Army and the III Corps, 55th Brigade will advance with its two regiments side by side, echeloned in depth. The advance guards of each regiment will push across the VESLE and establish bridgeheads along the general line La GRANDE-GREVE---Les GAILLARDS---Les ANGLAIS, in order to assure the crossing of the main bodies of this division. These advance guards will establish themselves and remain in those positions. The main bodies of each column will cross the VESLE successively and will pass, by bounds, the troops guarding the bridgeheads, and will establish themselves on the general line BLANZY-les-FISMES---woods to the north of Le GRAND-HAMEAU---Fme BEAUGILET. These main bodies will push out new advance guards to the first slopes north of the plateau, taking every precaution during the advance against the fire of enemy artillery. During these operations the field artillery and the heavy artillery of the division will be emplaced south of VESLE. As soon as the new advance guards have reached the plateau sufficient artillery will cross the VESLE in order to support the movements of these advance guards.
   (b) ROUTE FOR THE ADVANCE OF THE ARTILLERY:
      Left Route: LONGEVILLE---St-GILLES---VILLETTE---ROLAND-Ustne BASLIEUX---BEAUREGARD Fme---MUSCY---CUIRY-les-CHAUDARDES.
      Right Route: ARCIS-le-PONSART---COURVILLE---La BONNE-MAISON Fme---MAGNEUX---COURLANDON---Le GRAND-HAMEAU---MEURIVAL---CONCEVREUX.
(c) OBJECTIVES OF THE 28th DIVISION:
   Immediate Objective: The crossing of the VESLE River.
   First Objective: Heights along the general line BLANZY-les-FISMES---woods to the north of Le GRAND-HAMEAU---Fme BEAUGILET.
   Ultimate Objective: The crossing of the AISNE River and establishing of our position along the CHEMIN-des-DAMES.
(d) This division will hold its present sector until the advance begins. On D day at H hour the 55th Brigade will advance as outlined above in such a manner that taken in conjunction with the advance of the 77th Division, the entire 56th Brigade can be assembled and placed in reserve.
(e) As soon as the infantry of the main bodies of the two columns of the 55th Brigade have cleared the road south of the VESLE, the 56th Brigade will assemble in the following areas: One regiment between FISMES and VILLETTE; one regiment in the covered region between St-GILLES and La CENSE Ferme.
(f) ARTILLERY: The 53d Artillery Brigade Commander will support the advance of the two columns of the 55th Brigade by laying down a creeping barrage along the general line of the railroad running east and west through FISMES at H hour. In addition, covering barrage will be laid down on critical points, known machine-gun nests and known battery emplacements, as directed by the artillery brigade commander. During the time the advance guards are consolidating along the general line La GRANDE-GREVE---Les GAILLARDS---Les ANGLAIS a standing barrage will be put down 200 meters in advance of this line for 30 minutes after the arrival of our advance guards upon this line. Intermediate objectives, rate of advance, employment of the heavy artillery and any other minor details to be worked out at a consultation to be held as soon as possible between the Brigade Commanders of the 53d Artillery Brigade and the 55th Infantry Brigade.
One battalion of 75's will be in immediate support of the advance of the 55th Brigade when its main body has reached the first objective. The artillery brigade commander will so regulate the advance of his artillery that the advance of the infantry will be protected at all times. While certain guns are covering the advance of the infantry with their fire other guns will be moved forward to further support the advance of our infantry.

(g) ENGINEERS: As soon as the advance guards have crossed the VESLE the 103d Engineers will immediately construct 7-ton bridges at ROLAND-Usine and COURLANDON and as many footbridges as possible. Dumps will be immediately established for the construction of these bridges.

(h) MACHINE GUNS: The 107th Machine Gun Battalion will hold itself in readiness to move at a moment's notice, subject to order from the division commander.

(i) SERVICE OF SUPPLY: G-1 will prepare the necessary orders for the service of supply and evacuation to accompany this order.

(j) G-1, after consultation with the division A. P. M. will establish traffic-control posts along the two main routes of traffic, and stragglers posts at the bridges which cross the VESLE immediately after the advance guard has crossed. These stragglers posts will remain in position until the advance guard regiments have crossed the VESLE, then they will follow up the progress of the advance guard regiments. No men will be permitted to pass the stragglers post unless they are wounded men and have diagnosis tag pinned on them, or unless they are couriers, in which case they will show the message or the receipted envelope showing their authority for going to the rear. A concentration post will be established where all stragglers will be sent and returned to their organization as soon as possible.

4. LIAISON:

AXIS OF LIAISON, COURVILLE---VILLETTE---BASLIEUX---MUSCOURT.

Liaison to the flank and to the rear must be maintained at all costs; all available means will be utilized to this end. In addition to the standing plan of liaison in existence in this division, careful attention must be paid to the following points.

(a) Combat liaison must be maintained between the units of the French 9th Division and American 77th Division. Special liaison detachments consisting of one platoon of infantry and one automatic rifle team will be detailed for this purpose. At the beginning of the advance these liaison detachments of the 9th and 77th Divisions will progress with them.

(b) A system of signals by means of fireworks and to be used in communicating between advance guards and the main bodies will be established by the brigade commander.

(c) Advantage must be taken of the liaison dogs which are attached to each brigade.

(d) Advance guards battalions will procure pigeons for the purpose of using this means of communication with division headquarters.

(e) One aero squadron is assigned to the 28th Division. Two planes are placed at the disposal of the 53d Field Artillery Brigade Commander, one plane at the disposal of the 55th Brigade Commander, one plane - one command plane - to the division commander. The planes of this squadron will be used for the purpose of staking out our lines, giving the artillery information as to fleeting targets, and keeping the brigade and division commanders informed as to the progress of the attack. Careful instructions must be given all the manipulators of the panels so that when the planes call for the panels they will be immediately displayed. Only first line troops will display their panels.

(f) The balloon attached to this division will immediately ascend for observation of this sector, and will progress as progression of the 55th Brigade permits.

(g) The division signal officer will establish lines of communication between the regiments, brigade and division headquarters. Not less than two circuits of twisted field wire will be laid and maintained on the axis of liaison. Radio communication will not be cut at old P. C.'s until telephonic communication is established at new P. C.'s.
BASLIEUX-COURLANDON AREA
Looking east from Fismette
The division signal officer will establish a projector system of signals from front to rear.

5. The first transfer of P. C.'s will be as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Corps</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Brigade</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>St-GILLES</td>
<td>28th</td>
<td>VILLETTE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>55th</td>
<td>BASLIEUX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>56th</td>
<td>ARCIS-le-ponsart</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON.
Chief of Staff.

228-33.1: Operations Report

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mont-sur-Courville, September 5, 1918.

From noon September 4 to noon September 5

I. WEATHER: Hazy.

II. VISIBILITY: Fair; later poor.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLIED</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some harassing fire on points: north of VESLE River during early part of period. Balance of period, artillery inactive following advancing infantry.</td>
<td>Some harassing fire on advancing troops north of the VESLE, bridgeheads on VESLE with short concentrations on FISMES and vicinity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

Our troops are across the VESLE River in force and are pursuing the retreating enemy to the north.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enemy activity confined to rearguard action with machine guns and one-pounders in an effort to retard the advance of our troops north of VESLE River.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. AEROPLANE AND BALLOON ACTIVITY:

Numerous flights by reconnaissance planes during the afternoon of September 4. Decrease in activity over back areas noted. * * *

Decrease in activity on morning of September 5 due to atmospheric conditions.

* * * * *
VII. TROOP MOVEMENT:

In pursuance of Field Order No. 27, 28th Division, dated September 2, entire 55th Infantry Brigade and 108th Machine Gun Battalion have crossed the VESLE River in pursuit of the retiring enemy to the north. 56th Infantry Brigade acting as reserve. All movements of enemy troops observed are to the north of the VESLE River.

VIII. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Active along entire front.

* * * * * *

X. SUCCESS OF OUR TROOPS IN OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE ACTION: Our troops in spite of harassing fire from artillery and machine guns with some fire from one-pounders have crossed the VESLE River keeping in close contact with the enemy on our front who are retiring in direction of the AISNE River.

* * * * * *

XII. REPULSE OR MISFORTUNE OF OUR TROOPS IN OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE ACTION: More rapid progress by the troops on our front has been prevented owing to heavy enfilade fire on our right flank.

XIII. CHANGE IN LOCATION OF LINES HELD BY OUR TROOPS OR THE ENEMY: Up to close of period our front line troops had reached plateau at the head of the ravine sloping towards the AISNE.

* * * * * *

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 2: Orders

Relief of American 28th Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 29
G-3

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mont-sur-Courville, September 7, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to orders from the Sixth Army and G-3 orders, III Army Corps, dated September 6, 1918, the French 62d Div. will relieve the American 28th Division the night of September 7/8, 1918.

* * * * *
(b) The relief will be completed by 8 o'clock September 8, 1918, at which hour the command will pass to the Commanding General, French 62d Division.

* * * * *

(f) All movements of troops north of the VESLE River will be effective between the hours of 22 h. and 4 h.

* * * * *

4. Division and brigade headquarters, 28th Division will close at present location at 4 o'clock, September 9, 1918, and open at same hour:

(a) Division headquarters at Jaulgonne.

(b) Headquarters 55th Infantry Brigade, VINCLES.

(c) Headquarters 56th Infantry Brigade, BARZY-sur-MARNE.

(d) Headquarters 53d F. A. Brigade, TRELOUP.

By command of Major General Muir:

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28th-33.1: Operations Report

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mont-sur-Courville, September 8, 1918.

From noon September 7 to eight hour September 8

[Extract]

I. WEATHER: Clear during afternoon, thunderstorms during night.

II. VISIBILITY: Fair.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ALLIED</th>
<th>ENEMY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some harassing fire on enemy positions during afternoon. Relieved during night September 7/8, as per order III Corps, dated September 6.</td>
<td>Decrease noted with intermittent shelling of our front line.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

Pursuant to orders from the Sixth Army and G-3, III Army Corps, dated Sept. 6, 1918, this division relieved by the French 62d D. I. during night Sept. 7/8. Relief was completed and command passed at 8 hour. Our troops held line as stated in previous report until time of relief.

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V. AEROPLANE AND BALLOON ACTIVITY:

Active. Several reconnaissance patrols observed during afternoon. Two balloons up.

Very active along the front line throughout the day.

VI. CASUALTIES: No report available.

VII. TROOP MOVEMENTS:

Pursuant to orders as stated in Paragraph 4, our troops moving to the rear to the area as per Field Order No. 29, Headquarters 28th Division dated September 7, 1918.

Nothing to report.

* * * * * *

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.

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228-32.1: Order

March to Epernay Area

G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 31

MAPS: CHALONS-REIMS ) 1:80,000
      SOISSONS-MEAUX )

[Extract]

1. This division will move by marching to the EPERNAY area * * *

* * * * * *

8. Division headquarters will close at JAULGONNE at 12 o’clock, September 12, 1918, and open same hour and date at EPERNAY.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.

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- 134 -
At 12:30 h. [Aug. 5] the corps commander called on division commander and stated that the 28th Division would relieve the 32d Division in the line during the night of August 6/7, details of the relief to be arranged by the two division commanders concerned.

August 7:
The relief of the 32d Division was completed at 3:30 h., August 7. The 56th Brigade taking over the sector, with the 112th Infantry and the 109th Machine Gun Battalion on the line. The 111th Infantry in support. The 55th Brigade was held in reserve in the ravines north of DRAVEGNY.

The Boche had for three days stubbornly resisted all attempts of the 32d Division to cross the VESLE River and reconnaissances made by the 112th Infantry during the early hours of August 7, showed the VESLE to be about 15 meters wide and from 2 to 3 meters deep and consequently, unfordable. The characteristics of the ground north of the VESLE afforded excellent opportunity for the enemy to put up a strong resistance to the crossing of the river. A study of the FISMES, and CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud, 1:20,000 maps, will show that the ground north of the river rises quite abruptly from the north bank of the stream, to a plateau, which is indented by ravines, extending for a distance of from 1 1/2 to 2 kilometers northward, and offering excellent opportunity for concealing machine-gun nests and battery positions. The ravines are so located that it was possible for the enemy to bring enfilade fire on the sector held by this division, and great difficulty was to be expected in trying to advance our line, unless it was carried forward simultaneously by the units on our right and left flanks.

Reconnaissances established the fact that the CHATEAU du DIABLE, La GRAVETTE and the village of FISMETTE, were filled with Boche, armed principally with machine guns.

During the day the troops were under intense machine-gun fire, not only over their front, but from both flanks, and while the patrols succeeded in cleaning out many of these nests, the fire from machine guns and snipers in the village of FISMETTE became so intense that the division commander directed the Commanding Officer, 112th Infantry to attack and clean out this village. Field Order No. 14, 28th Division, August 6, 22:30 h., covered this attack.
The attack started at 19 h. preceded by a 15 minute artillery preparation. The attacking forces consisted of the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry and one company of the 109th Machine Gun Battalion, supported on the left by the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry.
The 2d Battalion succeeded in completing the occupation of FISMES, and gaining a foothold in the village of FISMETrE. The 3d Battalion crossed to the north side of the river in the Le GRAND-SAVART, on bridges which had been constructed by the pioneer platoon of the regiment, where they met strong opposition from machine guns and snipers in the CHATEAU du DIABLE, but were able to gain some ground and hold it. Due to the fact that the troops on the right and left did not succeed in coming up abreast of them, the 2d Battalion was obliged to withdraw from FISMETrE.

August 8:

Artillery fire was opened again on FISMETrE at 4 h. and continued for one hour, when the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry again crossed to the north side of the river, but were compelled to return. At 11 h. destructive fire by the artillery was placed on FISMETrE, continuing until 13:30 h. when a rolling barrage started and the 2d Battalion, 112th Infantry again crossed the stream into FISMETrE. After heavy street fighting, and the capture of about 40 prisoners, this battalion was able to establish themselves in the southern section of the village. During the afternoon and night, the hills and ravines, north, east and west of FISMETrE were subjected to heavy shelling by our artillery in an effort to dislodge the machine-gun nest, but this was only partially successful.

At 9:30 h., August 8, 1918, Field Order No. 15, 28th Division was issued, based on instructions received from Sixth Army, that the III Army Corps would hold its present position, without further attack until orders to that effect were received.

August 9:

During the night of August 8/9, troops held the position which they had established during the preceding day. Throughout the night, enemy artillery activity on FISMES and FISMETrE was very intense. In addition to a large quantity of high explosive shells, these towns were kept continually flooded with gas. Considerable gas was also thrown on our troops in the back areas. During the day, a number of minor counterattacks were made by the enemy, but were successfully repulsed. At 16:20 h., the Boche launched a heavy counterattack against the left of the 3d Battalion, 112th Infantry, which was successfully repulsed, with heavy losses to the enemy.

Field Order No. 16, 28th Division, August 9, 1918, 18:30 h. directing an attack by the 56th Brigade, was issued. This was later modified by F. O. No. 17, 28th Division, August 9, 1918, 23 h. on verbal instructions from the division commander, the 111th Infantry relieved the 112th Infantry on the line during the night of August 9/10, in order that a fresh regiment might be in position to make the attack as contemplated in Field Orders No. 16.

August 11:

Our troops were directed by the army to make local attacks wherever necessary to enlarge and strengthen our bridgeheads and with this object in view, Field Order No. 18, 28th Division, August 11, 1918, was issued. This attack was carried out at 17 h. by the 3d Battalion, 111th Infantry, but did not succeed, due to the intense machine-gun fire from the enemy. Based on orders from the III Army Corps, Field Order No. 19, was issued at 16:15 h. directing the 55th Brigade to relieve the French 164th Division, during the night of August 12/13. The command of the sector to pass to the 28th Division at 8 h., August 13.

August 12:

During the day, a great increase in the enemy artillery fire was noted, consisting, principally of harassing fire on our positions and especially on battery positions. This fire was directed by the enemy's planes which were constantly over our sector and in one case necessitated the movement of a battery. Harassing machine-gun and one-pounder fire continued from the nests north of the VESLE.

August 13:

The relief of the French 164th Division and the 56th Brigade by the 55th Brigade was completed during the night with the exception of the 2d Battalion, 111th Infantry. The side slip and shift in the division sector was accomplished and liaison established with
the 77th Division on our left and with the French 20th Division on our right.

August 14:
On verbal orders from the Commanding General, III Army Corps, the P. C. of the divi­sion moved at 16 h. from DRAVEGNY to the Chateau at ARCIS-le-PONSART. Move covered by Field Order No. 20, Headquarters 28th Division, August 14 at 14 h.

The plan adopted by the army for the organization of the line for defense was embodied in a plan of defense; the first chapter of which outlining the general scheme of organization of the sector and the mission of this division was issued this date.

August 15:
Constant patrolling along our entire division sector resulted in establishing the fact that the enemy’s machine guns were located along the railroad south of the VESLE and that our entire front was covered by enfilade fire.

August 16:
Throughout the sector the troops were improving their positions for defense. Con­stant harassing fire from enemy artillery and machine guns.

August 17:
*** Enemy machine guns and snipers located in houses in northwest edge of FISMETTE continued to harass our troops in FISMETTE and FISMES.

August 18:
*** During the night of August 17/18, the enemy patrols showed increased activity and during the day a noticeable increase in the enemy’s artillery activity on our rear areas.

August 19:
Work on the wire and trenches for the defense of the sector was carried on at night by all available troops. ***

August 20:
Division P. C. closed at ARCIS-le-PONSART at 10 h. and opened at Bois de ROGNAC (3 1/2 kilometers east of COULONGES), in accordance with Field Order No. 24, 28th Divi­sion, August 19.

Harassing artillery fire by the enemy increased during the day throughout the sector.

August 21:
The troops located in FISMETTE were under intense machine-gun fire and our men were continually active in endeavoring to clean out the Boche machine-gun nests and snipers in the houses of the northwestern edge of the town. Some success along this line was attained during the night of August 20/21 although the Boche still remained in some houses.

August 22:
*** During the night of August 21/22 and the early hours of the 22d, the 112th Infantry succeeded in cleaning the Boche out of the houses on the western edge of FISMETTE and in occupying the entire town. During the day the enemy’s artillery was very active on our rear areas.

August 23:
During the night of August 22/23, the 53d Field Artillery Brigade assisted the artillery of the 77th Division in protecting a raid made by their troops on the enemy’s positions.

Artillery preparation from 24 h. to 0:30 h. in front of our right sector was followed by three raiding parties from the 110th Infantry who were sent out for the purpose of obtaining identifications. These parties were subjected to heavy machine-gun fire, but succeeded in capturing one machine gun and four prisoners.

August 24:
During the night of August 23/24, and throughout the 24th, harassing artillery fire from 77’s and 150’s increased throughout our advanced area, particularly on FISMES and FISMETTE. ***
August 25:
With the object of cleaning out the enemy whose patrols had reported south of the VESLE River in our right sector, the 3d Battalion, 110th Infantry, attacked the enemy's position at 3:30 under protection of an artillery barrage. After severe fighting, our lines were advanced to the railroad embankment, running east and west across the sector. The enemy laid down a barrage along this railroad before our troops had had time to dig in, necessitating a withdrawal of the left and center companies to their former line. M Company, on the extreme right, was able to hold the ground and dig in under the protection of the railroad embankment. • • •

August 26:
The general situation in this division sector remains unchanged. • • •
August 27:

At 4 h., enemy placed destructive fire on FISMETTE and FISMES, using 77's, 150's and 210's. During the course of this fire, the bridge across the VESLE River, between FISMETTE and FISMES was destroyed. This fire was followed by a rolling barrage across the town of FISMETTE. Following closely behind the barrage, the enemy attacked our two companies who were holding town of FISMETTE with a force estimated as one regiment. This force attacked our troops from the north and from both flanks. The troops in the first wave were equipped with flame-throwers which were used in the cellars and houses along the main street of the town in which our combat groups were located. Due to the destruction of the bridge across the VESLE, very few of our men were able to get across the river into FISMES. Nearly all of the two companies were either killed or taken prisoners. The enemy's casualties were very heavy.

During the night of August 26/27 and throughout the 27th, the enemy's bombing squadrons were very active. The towns of DRAVEGNY, ARCIS-le-PONSART, COHAN and COULONGES were bombed between 23 and 24 hour. The enemy's planes were continually over our front line positions throughout the day, bombing and firing with machine guns wherever troops were visible.

August 28:
At 0:30 h., Company B, 1st Gas Regiment, released a concentration of projectors on COURLANDON and also a concentration of thermite on the Le ROLAND-Usine, by Stokes mortars. • • •

Patrols which were sent out to ascertain the exact conditions in FISMETTE were unable to approach nearer than 150 yards of the river on account of heavy fire by machine guns and snipers. Throughout the day one-pounder and machine-gun fire on the streets of FISMES was heavier than at any previous time.

In the right sector patrols from Company E, 110th Infantry encountered Boche patrols along the railroad and were forced to retire.

At 22 h. an artillery and gas bombardment against enemy machine-gun nests and known strong points, in the area west of BASLIEUX, as outlined in Field Order No. 9, Headquarters 53d Artillery Brigade, August 28, 1918, was carried out.

August 29:
A marked decrease in enemy's artillery fire throughout the day. The enemy continued to cover FISMETTE and roads leading thereto, with machine guns and one-pounders preventing our patrols from reaching the river.

• • • • •
August 30:
During the night of August 29/30, patrols from right subsector succeeded in reaching the railroad and reported that the enemy was digging in on the north side of the railroad embankment and locating machine guns between the railroad ties at intervals of from ten to fifty yards, also constructing wire entanglements between the railroad and the river.
Patrols from the left subsector, sent out to reconnoiter the entire sector front of the river, advanced to within 25 yards of the destroyed bridge where they were forced to retire because of heavy machine-gun fire. This crossing of the river was protected by the enemy by use of strong searchlights.

Information from corps and army, relative to the success of the Allied forces in the region of SOISSONS, lead to the belief of the possibility of the withdrawal of the enemy on our front, and in anticipation of such a withdrawal F. O. No. 25, 28th Division, August 30, 1918, was issued.

The troops in our left sector were subjected to a heavy bombardment with gas shells and high explosive between 21:30 and 23:30 h.
Patrols in left sector were hindered by continual use of large flares by the enemy, and in the right sector were unable to advance owing to the strong position that the enemy had established along the railroad embankment.
Troops located in FISMES had completed the construction of barricades on all streets leading to the river.

September 1:
Units of the 53d Field Artillery Brigade assisted the artillery of the French 9th Division on our right in the execution of a raid in their sector as outlined in Field Orders No. 10, 53d Brigade, August 30, 1918. At the same time a fake attack, as outlined in F. O. No. 26, 28th Division, August 30, 1918, was carried out on our right sector. The attack of the French 9th Division supported by our artillery resulted in the capture of Les CHENEVIERES. The enemy, however, still remained south of the river in some places and in BREUIL-sur-VESLE.
The fake attack carried out on our right sector drew retaliatory fire from the enemy's artillery, trench mortars, and machine guns, but inasmuch as this had been anticipated previously and the safety of our men provided for, the casualties were very slight. However, a good estimate of the nervousness of the enemy's forces and his action in the face of a concerted attack was obtained.

Work on trenches and wire for the defense of the divisional sector had been, to a large extent, completed.

September 2:

* * * F. O. No. 26, 28th Division, September 1, 1918, directed a new disposition of our troops on the barrier line during the night of September 2/3, 1918, and that all work on defenses of the division sector would be stopped at that time. F. O. No. 27, 28th Division, September 2, 1918, which was a tentative draft of orders for the purposed advance across the VESLE River, was published.

September 3:
In the right sector the 1st and 3d Battalion of the 110th Infantry were relieved during the night of September 2/3 by the 1st and 3d Battalions of the 109th Infantry. The battalions of the 110th who were relieved took up position as directed in F. O. No. 26. In the right sector eight patrols sent out during the night were able to advance to the railroad on the left and center and to the National Highway [No. 31] on the right. Several small enemy patrols were encountered, but they retired hurriedly without giving action. In the left sector, a patrol of five men went out at 23 h. to investigate a bridge of trees and planks that the enemy was working on across the river. Before they could take any prisoners, our machine guns had opened up and forced the enemy to withdraw.
At 15:50 h. orders were received from the III Corps to have our artillery open fire upon the enemy’s positions and known sensitive points opposite our front, to determine whether or not we would draw retaliatory fire. At 16:40 h. every battery of the brigade was reported firing. It kept up for some time, but drew no return fire from the enemy.

September 4:

The first intimation of the enemy’s withdrawal aside from the many fires observed in their rear areas, was made known on the morning of the 4th. During the night of September 3/4, 1918, our artillery had drawn no retaliatory fire from the enemy, but our patrols were met with the usual machine-gun and one-pounder fire, throughout the sector. Similar patrols during the early hours of the morning met with less resistance and succeeded in pushing forward. These patrols later were followed by larger bodies of troops, one battalion of the 109th Infantry on the right and one battalion of the 110th Infantry on the left. It developed that the main body of the enemy was attempting a general withdrawal in a northeasterly direction, toward the AISNE, leaving infantry, machine guns and one-pounders as a rearguard. During the afternoon our advanced elements, meeting with only slight opposition, pushed on and reaches the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE, with the enemy’s front line established on the general line: VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES---1 kilometer north to BASLIEUX---southwest to COURLANDON.

September 5:

After retiring to the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE, the enemy’s resistance strengthened and a rapid advance was impossible, due to heavy machine-gun fire from the right flank. The French 9th Division, on our right, were meeting with strong opposition in the vicinity of ROMAIN and were unable to keep abreast of the right of our line. On account of the failure of the French division to advance, the corps commander telephoned to the division commander at 11:45 h. to use one regiment of the 56th Brigade and secure the line Le GRAND-HAMEAU---BEAUREGARD Fme---MAIZY, facing in a northeast direction and from this line send out patrols to keep contact with the enemy, pushing the advanced guard in the direction of CONCEVREUX. These instructions were transmitted to the Commanding Officer, 56th Brigade, who immediately ordered the 111th Infantry with 2 companies of the 109th Machine Gun Battalion in support to occupy this line. On verbal orders of the corps commander, the division P. C. closed at Bois de ROGNAC and opened at Mont-sur-COURVILLE.

September 6:

The enemy’s resistance was still strong on the right flank and in front of the French division, on our right, and our infantry were unable to advance their line over that held on the 5th. During the morning the 103d Engineers completed several bridges across the VESLE; notably the one at Le ROLAND-Usine which had been destroyed by the enemy upon withdrawal. The completion of this bridge enabled the 107th Artillery to cross the river in support of the infantry.

On the afternoon of September 6, two strong enemy counterattacks directed against our right flanks were successfully repulsed with the cooperation of the French on our right, and by the assistance of a well-directed barrage from the artillery. During this encounter the enemy kept up an intermittent harassing fire on FISMES, VILLETTE, and MAGNEUX, with noted increase in the amount of mustard gas used.

September 7:

Throughout the 7th, severe fighting took place along the whole of our line, but owing to the failure of the division on our right to advance, we were unable to push our line over the plateau of the AISNE. Our units suffered heavy casualties from the enfilading machine-gun fire from in front of the French 9th Division.

Field Orders No. 29, 28th Division, September 7, 1918, directed the relief of this division by the French 62d Division during the night of September 7/8. At this time the units of the 28th Division were across the VESLE River and relief was accomplished only
with the greatest of difficulty, it being necessary to transport the artillery over hastily constructed bridges, and under continual shell fire. The relief was completed and the command of the sector passed to the Commanding General, French 62d Division at 8 h., September 8, 1918.

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32d Division
August 7 - September 9, 1918

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232-32.1: Order

Warning Order

G-3
FIELD ORDER
No. 36

PLAN DIRECTEUR 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. There is no new information concerning the enemy. Late this afternoon 3 companies of the 28th Division were reported across the River VESLE which would indicate that our corps is able to advance.

2. Pursuant to Field Orders No. 10, III Corps, this division (less artillery and engineers) constitutes the corps reserve, accordingly all troops will hold themselves ready for a forward movement.

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4. P. C.'s as at present: 63d Brigade Le MONTCEL
64th Brigade REDDY Farm
32d Division CIERGES

Future P. C.'s will be announced in orders for move.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Disposition of Units in the Vesle Sector

G-3, General Staff
FIELD ORDERS
No. 38

Map: PLAN DIRECTEUR 1:20,000

1. (a) The 28th Division on the left sector of the III Corps has maintained its foothold north of the VESLE and is improving its position.
   No progress on the right sector. Our Allies have achieved a great success north of MONTDIDIER, breaking the enemy line on a front of 35 kilometers or more. Without engaging in a general attack, the III Corps is to establish more bridgeheads on the north side of the VESLE and from these bridgeheads will send strong reconnoitering parties towards selected points covered by box barrage.
   (b) The composition of the forces in our front is:

   Left Column:
   Major Gen. Muir
   28th Division
   (less 1st Bn., 138th F. A.)
   107th Engineers (less 1 Bn.)
   1 air sq. (observation)
   1 balloon company

   Right Column:
   Brig. Gen. Gaucher
   164th Div. (French)
   6th Brigade
   1 bn., 107th Engineers
   Dets. of Divl. Art. 4th and
   164th Div. (French), now in
   sector
   1 air sq. (observation)
   1 balloon company

   Corps Artillery:
   Brig. Gen. Gatchell
   1st Gr., 138th Regt.
   1st Gr., 103d Regt.
   1 air sq. (observation)
   1 balloon company

   Boundary between left and right columns as follows: RONCHERES (to left column)--COULONGES (to left column)--valley of the ORILYN River (to left column)--main crossroads of ST-GILLES--FISME (to left column)--BASLIEUX (to right column)--GLENNES (to left column)--MAIZY (to left column).

2. The duties of the 32d Division as part of the III Corps Reserve remain the same as prescribed in Field Orders No. 36, 32d Division, dated August 7, 1918.
3. P. C. III Corps on road between COULONGES and VIEUX-VEZILLY.

Left column - DRAVEGNY
Right column - ABBAYE-d-'IGNY.
32d Division - CIERGES.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

- 142 -
FISMES-BASLIEUX AREA

Looking north-northeast from Fismes, across Vesle Valley
From noon, August 9 to noon, August 10, 1918.

[Extract]

VIII. CHANGES IN DISPOSITION OF TROOPS: 107th Engineers from attached to American 28th Division, night of August 9/10, en route to join American 32d Division.

J. G. PILLOW,
Lieut. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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From noon, August 10, to noon August 11, 1918

[Extract]

VIII. CHANGES IN DISPOSITION OF TROOPS: The 64th Brigade was moved from its area southeast of CHAMERY at 7 a. m., August 11, 1918, and encamped in the Bois de REIMS and Bois de VEZILLY, in the sector of French 164th Division (American III Army Corps), to be placed at the disposition of the C. G., French 164th Division, and used only in the event of a serious attack on that division.

P. C. 64th Brigade, VEZILLY.

J. G. PILLOW,
Lieut. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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MEMORANDUM:

**Combat Instructions**

G-3, General Staff

MEMORANDUM: 32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,

August 18, 1918.

1. The following is an extract from G-3 Orders No. 40, III Army Corps, August 18, 1918:

5. Pending the completion of the corps order, which will supersede Field Order 13, the reserve division will act promptly as follows in case of alarm:

   (a) One brigade will march at once and occupy the Bois de la BRUCE (between COHAN and ARCIS-le-PONSART) and the woods on both sides of the road between ABBAYE-d'IGNY and the southern exit of ARCIS-le-PONSART. The brigade will be prepared for counterattack to the north, or to block the valley between LONGEVILLE and COHAN, or to face to the east to protect the right flank of the corps in case the troops on our right are driven back.

   (b) One brigade will march at once and occupy PARCY Fine, Bois de la PISOTTE and that part of the FORET de NESLES lying immediately west of the Les BONSHOMMES Fme. This brigade will be prepared to counter-attack to the north, or block the LONGEVILLE-COHAN Valley, or protect the left flank of the corps along the west edge of the FORET de NESLES in case the troops on our left are driven back.

   (c) Each brigade will take into consideration the possibility of a counter-attack by us to the northeast or east or the northwest or west from the flank positions assigned above, in case adjacent troops are driven back.

   (d) Routes for the reserve brigades will be reconnoitered and selected with a view to escaping hostile artillery fire, and with a view to the prompt and orderly arrival of the troops in the positions assigned to them.

2. The 64th Infantry Brigade is designated to occupy, in case of alarm, the position described in Paragraph 5 (a) of extract above, the 63d Infantry Brigade that described in Par. 5 (b).

   Complete orders as to occupation of the positions will be issued later.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-32.1: Order

**Movement to Another Army Area**

FIELD ORDERS 32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 42

Cierges, August 23, 1918—7:30 p.m.

MAP: PLAN DIRECTEUR 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. In compliance with warning order from French Sixth Army through American III Army Corps, August 23, 1918, this division will move from its present location and will join the French Tenth Army.

2. (a) The movement will be by bus and marching...

3. ...

5. The divisional P. C. will close at its present location at 10 h., August 24, 1918, and will open at CHATEAU la CHENOYE same date and hour.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Inf., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

[Although the American 32d Division was transferred to the French Tenth Army as shown above, the documents of the division have been arbitrarily kept intact within this present set-up in order to make it easier for the reader to follow the progress of the division.]

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232-33.1: Operation Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,

Pierrefonds, Oise, August 25, 1918.

From noon August 24 to noon August 25, 1918.

[Extract]

V. Artillery Activity: En route to join division.

...
VII. Troop Movements: The division (less 57th F. A. Brigade, and horse transport) arrived in present billeting area and is attached to French Tenth Army.

The 57th F. A. Brigade and the horse transport are en route from III Corps area, the latter having billeted night of August 24/25 in area about Neuilly-St-Front.

J. G. Pillow,
Lt. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3.

232-32.1: Order

Divisional Movements

General Staff, G-3

32d Division, A. E. F.,
Chateau la Chenoye, Pierrefonds, August 26, 1918—5:30 p.m.

FIELD ORDERS

No. 43

Map: PLAN DIRECTEUR 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. In conjunction with the Moroccan 2d Division and the French 66th Division, this division is to move north of the AISNE tonight, as part of the French XXX Corps.

   * * * * *

5. Division headquarters will open at VIC-sur-AISNE at 10 h., August 27, 1918, and close at its present location same date and hour.

   The division advance P. C. will open at TARTIERS at an hour to be designated later

   * * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. Beck, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Inf., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Artillery Preparation for Attack

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 27, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, 32d Division
To: Commanding General, 57th F. A. Brigade

The following copy of Special Order No. 106, XXX Corps, August 27, 1918 is furnished for your information and guidance:

P. C. XXX CORPS,
August 27, 1918--14:50 h.

SPECIAL ORDER No. 106

I. Destructive artillery fire on the wire entanglements, trenches and important points of the enemy lines, up to the limits of the range of the heavy artillery, shorts, will be commenced as soon as the present order is received and be continued the days of August 27/28 in order to disorganize as much as possible the enemy's defense as a whole.

II. Harassing fire, both continued and irregular, will be carried on day and night:
   (a) By the division artillery, each in its respective divisional sector up to the SOISSONS-COUCY Road, inclusive.
   (b) By the heavy artillery of the XXX Corps and the heavy artillery of the army beyond this road and up to the limits of their range.

It is important in the present situation to allow the enemy no respite, to harass him energetically along all his communications, both upon his front line as well as upon his rear lines and as far beyond these latter as possible.

III. Regulate with directing gun with the greatest care all the batteries so that the barrage may be judiciously established and so that the heavy artillery shorts may be able quickly to lay down concentration of fire which may be demanded of them.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

Illegible.

By command of the Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Infantry, N. A.,
Chief of Staff.
Orders

General Staff, G-1
FIELD ORDERS
No. 44

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Operation Order No. 104, French XXX Army Corps August 27, 1918, this division will relieve, during the night August 27/28, 1918, the French 127th Infantry Division in its present zone of action.

LIMITS:
Northern Limit: BAGNEUX (excluded)---Point 89.45---Cote 1512, on the JUVIGNY-LEUILLY Road---Point 27.49 (these points belonging to the American 32d Division).
Southern Limit: NOUVRON-VINGRE---TARTIERS---the crossroad of the road from TARTIERS to JUVIGNY and the road leading to the Ferme VALPRIEZ---Cote 131 (2 km. north of CHAVIGNY) (this point belonging to the French I Army Corps)---Fenne BEAUMONT---TERNY-SORNY (these points belong to the 32d DIVISION)---SORNY (belonging to the French I Army Corps.)

5. P. C. of the 63d Brigade: TARTIERS
P. C. of the 32d Division: TARTIERS

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 63d INFANTRY BRIGADE:

[Extract]

1. The following from the corps commander is quoted for your information:
   The general commanding the army corps has issued the following order to the Commanding General of the 127th Inf. Div.:
   In conformance with the verbal order given to the General commanding the XXX
A. C., the 355th Regiment, before being relieved will proceed with the mopping up of the knoll to the east of CHAUSSEE-BRUNEHAUT (BRUNEHAUT Road) and should follow eastward as far as possible, the enemy which might evacuate this knoll, in order to reduce as much as possible the abnormal indentation in our line.

In the event of this operation not having given complete results at the moment of the relief of the 355th Regiment, the General commanding the American 32d Division will take all measures necessary so that the pocket which might still exist be reduced at the same time when the Div. on the right of the 32d Division (59th Inf. Div.) makes the planned operation tomorrow, August 28.

The Commanding General of the 32d Division will get in liaison with the General commanding the 59th Div., in order to find out the time when this operation is to take place.

2. Information has been received from the Commanding General, 59th Division, on our right that the hour at which the 59th Division will attack is 7 o'clock, August 28.

* * * * * * * * *

W. G. HAAN,
Major General, Commanding.

232-32.1: Orders

Directive for Attacks

General Staff, G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 46

Map: PLAN DIRECTEUR 1/20,000

[Extract]

[c] Mission of neighboring divisions: The 59th Div. on our right has as its 1st objective Le MOULIN de LAFFAUX, progressing eventually to the heights of MONTBAVIN.

The 64th Division on our left has as its mission to attain as its 1st objective ANIZY.

II. In compliance with Operations Order No. 103, French XXX Corps dated August 27, 1918, this division will attack the enemy’s lines on J day at H hour. Its mission is to conquer that part of the plateau north of TERNY-SORNY within its sector * * * then progressing to ARBRE-de-MONTBAVIN.

III. (a) ARTILLERY: At the disposal of the division:

3 groups of A. D. /127 3 Bat. 155 shorts Sch. (A. D./127)
4 groups of A. D./Am. D. 4 Bat. 155 shorts Sch. (A. D. /Am. D. I.)
3 groups of A. D. /1st D. M.
3 Bat. 155 shorts Sch. (A. D. /1st D. M.)

2 Batteries 220 T. R.
2 Batteries 220 - 1901.

The attack will be prepared beginning August 27 * * *

* * * * *
(b) INFANTRY: The attack will be made with the 63d Infantry Brigade in advance, regiments side by side, each with two battalions in the front line and one in reserve.

* * *

(c) ENGINEERS: The divisional engineer will have in readiness means of crossing the AISNE Canal.

(d) CAVALRY: The corps is to be given special instructions for the use of cavalry in our front.

(e) TANKS: There will be at the disposition of this division 30 tanks as follows:
   10 tanks (2 sections) with the 125th Infantry.
   15 tanks (3 sections) with the 126th Infantry.
   5 tanks in reserve, following behind the support companies.

* * *

(f) AERONAUTICS: Squadron No. 278 is to be put at the disposal of this division and the 64th Division.

(g) BALLOONS: Balloon No. 29 is to observe for this division, the 64th Division, and the heavy artillery.

* * *

IV. (a) SUCCESSIVE P. C.'s:
   French XXX Army Corps: Ferme FORETS, MONTECOUVE, MONT de LEUILLY.
   American 32d Division: TARTIERS, JUVIGNY, FONTAINE-St-REMY.

(b) Advance Centers of Information of the Corps: MONTECOUVE, MONT-de-LEUILLY, MONT des SINGES.
   32d Division: JUVIGNY, FONTAINE-St-REMY, CREUTES [not identified] (at Coordinates 185.7-305.5).
   Divisional axis of liaison: JUVIGNY---FONTAINE-St-REMY---CREUTES [not identified] (185.7-305.5).

* * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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- 151 -
From 0 h to 24 h.

[Extract]

I. Weather: Partly cloudy.
II. Visibility: Poor.
III. General Impressions of the day: Active.
IV. Infantry Activity: At 7 h, the 63d Brigade with the 126th Infantry on the right and the 125th Infantry on the left, advanced in division sector to point along railroad at 179.6-304.6 farthest point to 178.7-302.5. This objective was taken at 10:30 h., capturing 92 prisoners. The advance elements later retired about 300 meters in rear of railroad on account of lack of cover at the railroad.

At 15:30 h., the enemy made a counterattack from JUVIGNY southwest down the ravine. This counterattack was repulsed and was holding their position to the west of the railroad at the close of the day.

VI. Artillery Activity: Artillery moving into position.

Remarks: P. C., 32d Division, 63d and 64th Brigades in cave near TARTIERS, also 57th F. A. Brigade, P. C. 125th and 126th in cave near VALPRIEZ Farm.

J. G. PILLOW,
Lt. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.
line to the right so as to protect our right flank and also facilitate further movements on his part. This is furnished you for your information.

W. G. HAAN,
Major General, Commanding.

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232-32.15: Memorandum Order

Disposition of the 64th Infantry Brigade

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 29, 1918—23:30 h.

MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 64th INFANTRY BRIGADE:

Orders from the Tenth Army, through the liaison officer of the XXX Army Corps, states that there will be no infantry attack tomorrow, the 30th inst. The commanding general directs that you organize your position in such a manner as to give the maximum protection from shell and machine-gun fire and at the same time have a well organized position in depth. To secure this end you will organize the forward area of your position as well as the time will permit with small resistance groups with observation as a primary mission. The remainder of your area will be organized with a view to resisting counterattack and local frontal attack. Consideration must be given for the proper supply of food to your troops. This distribution should be completed before daybreak the 30th inst.

This will not prevent keeping in touch with the enemy by special patrols or scout platoons nor any instructions issued by these headquarters coming from the XXX Army Corps.

The commanding general directs that the 63d Brigade dispose themselves with the same object in view, that is, to avoid as many casualties as possible and to facilitate the supply of food to the troops and to organize in depth.

Please transmit the above instructions to the Commanding General of the 63d Infantry Brigade.

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-34.1: Order

Combat Instructions

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 30, 1918—13:24 h.

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, 64th BRIGADE:

1. Following instructions dated 1 p. m., received from corps commander:
   Considering the confirmation of the withdrawal of the Germans, the 32d Division must advance shoulder to shoulder with their neighbors on the right and follow up
the movement of withdrawal of the enemy, not only by means of patrols but as well
with the troops.

2. In consequence of these instructions, you will give orders at once for the
forward movement of your right flank, so as to keep abreast of the French troops on your
right. * * *

3. You are authorized to call for artillery preparation or barrage at any point that
you desire, provided it is not out of your sector, directly to the artillery liaison
officer with you, who has instructions to call for any assistance from the artillery
commander which he himself cannot immediately order. The artillery commander has instruc-
tions to comply with your request as to artillery fire.

4. Artillery counterpreparation on points to east of north and south line through
JUVIGNY has been ordered at once.

W. G. HAAN,
Major General, Commanding.

232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 30, 1918.

From 0 h to 24 h, August 30, 1918.

[Extract]

WEATHER: Fair.
VISIBILITY: Good.
GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Very active.
MACHINE-GUN ACTIVITY: Active.
ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Very active.

* * * * *

INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Patrols sent out towards JUVIGNY by 64th Brig., shortly after
12 h. to determine whether enemy holds front line in force.

At 15:30 h. the 64th Brig. advanced, from its position on R. R. 1 1/2 km. west of
JUVIGNY, to take JUVIGNY. Severe machine-gun fire and fire from artillery were encountered. 127th Infantry on right was reported at 16:18 h., as having entered the Bois de
COURONNE. The 128th Infantry on the left, after advancing some distance, was met by such
heavy machine-gun fire that only the right battalion succeeded in reaching a position
north of JUVIGNY, joining up with the 127th Infantry, now located on N. and S. road just
east of the town. The other two battalions of the 128th are located on railroad in
northern part of sector, but are to close in on the leading battalion during the night,
the gap which will then be left being filled in by a battalion of the 125th Infantry,
ordered up for that purpose. JUVIGNY reported at 19:15 captured by the 127th Infantry.

TROOP MOVEMENTS: The 64th Infantry Brigade relieved the 63d Infantry Brigade during
night of August 29/30, the 63d taking position in rear of the 64th. Movement completed
at 4:30 h.

* * * * *

J. G. PILLOW,
Lt. Col., F. A., U. S. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.
Renewal of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 47
Tartiers, August 31, 1918—2:30 P. M.

MAP: SOISSONS 1/20,000

II. In compliance with Special Order No. 124, P. C. XXX Army Corps, August 31, 1918, this division will attack at H hour in liaison with the 59th Division of the I Army Corps on our right and the 66th Infantry Division of the XXX Army Corps on our left.

FIRST OBJECTIVE: • • • Point 300 meters southeast of FONTAINE-St-REMY—eastern edge and southern edge of TERNY-SORNY. Later orders will prescribe the successive objectives of this division.

LIMITS OF SECTOR:
Northern limit: As previously fixed as far as Point 180.2-305.5—crossroads at Hill 151.2 (to the 66th I. D.)—crossroads at 184.0-304.7.
Southern limit: As previously given, up to BEAUMONT Farm due east to road leading south from TERNY-SORNY—to eastern outskirts of TERNY-SORNY (inclusive).

LIAISON: At 800 meters southeast of TERNY-SORNY (as well as during the course of the attack) the right of our line should be in liaison with the left of the 59th I. D.

III. (1) ARTILLERY:
(a) Distribution of the artillery same as given in Field Order No. 46, P. C. 32d Division, August 28, 1918.
(b) PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK: Counterbattery fires intended to demolish the located enemy batteries or batteries which might be discovered during the action, will be executed with regulation by aeronautics during the entire morning of the 31st and continued during the preparation.

The attack will be preceded by a very powerful artillery preparation which will last, in principle, four hours • • •

(2) INFANTRY:
(a) The following is quoted from Special Order No. 124, P. C., XXX Army Corps, August 31, 1918:

By reason of the advance realized during the night of August 30/31, by the American 32d Division, all the troops, in order that the movements may be concordant, cannot leave at the same hour. Consequently, the hours of the opening of the barrage and the departure of the elements which are to advance behind the barrage, will be regulated in such manner that the 1st line indicated above be reached by the infantry at H plus forty minutes. The ensemble of the attack will resume the advance from that line at H plus fifty minutes.

The advance will be continued under protection of the barrage from the north and south road at eastern outskirts of JUVIGNY at H plus 50 minutes. The advance from the 2d line will be resumed at H plus 1 hour and 40 minutes and continued to the first objective.
(b) AXIS OF ADVANCE: JUVIGNY---TERNY-SORNY---road to point 600 meters north of TERNY-SORNY---thence to crossroads 800 meters northeast of TERNY-SORNY.


(d) TANKS: 2 companies of tanks will be placed, by the XXX Army Corps, at the disposal of the division for the attack. * * *

(e) AEROPLANES: Squadron No. 278 is put at the disposal of this division.


V. P. C.'s no change.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

FIELD ORDERS No. 47, ANNEX A

Map: SOISSONS 1/20,000

Company No. 312, CHARS d'ASSAUT LEGERS [tanks] will debouch with the infantry at H hour and will proceed in the general direction east and then northeast and attack the high ground around BALISE [beacon]. Company No. 311, will, at H hour, proceed according to prearranged route to the front line troops of this division now located along the JUVIGNY-LEUILLLY Road, to be in positions there in time to proceed with the infantry at H hour plus 50 minutes.

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232-33.1: Operation Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Tartiers, Aisne, August 31, 1918.

0 to 24 h., August 31, 1918.

[Extract]

Weather: Fair.
Visibility: Good.
General Impressions of the Day: Very active.

* * * * *

Machine-gun Activity: Very active.
Infantry Activity: In compliance with Special Order No. 124, XXX Corps, August 31, 1918, the division attacked at 16 h. with first objective, the line running approximately from FONTAINE-St-REMY to eastern edge of TERNY-SORNY. Prior to the attack our line was as of the preceding night; from northern limit of sector, south along railroad west of JUVIGNY for a distance of 1/2 km., thence east, to north of JUVIGNY, thence south to
JUVIGNY-BOIS d'ALSACE AREA
Looking east-northeast from outskirts of Juigny
southern limit of sector. Troops were subjected all day, up to time of launching the attack, to fire from snipers, machine guns, artillery and avions. Preceded by preparatory fire by artillery all day, the rolling barrage was put down at 15:55 and at 16 o'clock the 64th Brigade, supported by the 63d Brigade, began its advance.

With good support from the tanks and in liaison with the 59th Div. on the right and the 66th I. D. on the left, the division at 17:15 had progressed steadily to a distance 600 meters east of JUVIGNY. Stiff opposition was encountered by our right from BEAUMONT Farm and our left was shelled by mortars located at about 17.42. From the Bois d'ALSACE progression was rapid, and the 59th I. D. reported at 18:45 that our troops were in TERNY-SORNY. A number of prisoners were taken during the course of the advance, and German infantry and artillery were reported in flight to the east and southeast of TERNY-SORNY. At 21:30 our objective was reported taken.

* * * * *

J. G. PILLOW,
Lt. Col., F. A., U. S. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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232-32.1: Orders

Relief of Division

General Staff, G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 48

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Tartiers, September 1, 1918--3:30 p. m.

MAP: SOISSONS 1/20,000

1. In compliance with General Operations Order No. 130, XXX A. C., dated September 1, 1918, the division (less artillery) will be relieved during the night of September 1/2, 1918, by the Moroccan 1st Division.

2. The relief will begin during the early evening and will be completed by 4 h., September 2, 1918. * * *

* * * * *

4. Division P. C. will remain at TARTIERS.

63d and 64th Brigade P. C.'s will open at TARTIERS at 5 h., September 2, 1918.

The command of the sector will pass to the Commanding General of the Moroccan 1st Division at 4 o'clock, September 2, 1918.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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WEATHER: Fair.
VISIBILITY: Good.
GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Active.
MACHINE GUNS: Active.
ARTILLERY: Active.

INFANTRY OPERATIONS: The end of the operations of August 31, 1918, found the 64th Brigade holding, with the 128th Infantry, supported by one battalion of the 125th Infantry, the CHATEAU-THIERRY Road from the northern limit of our sector down to the railroad crossing just south of RAPERIE. From this point the line held by the 127th Infantry extended in a general southwestern direction to BEAUMONT Farm and there connected up with the French 59th Division on the right of our sector. During the day of September 1, the 128th Infantry, supported by an additional battalion of the 125th Infantry, has hung to the line of the road mentioned, under cover of an embankment, making frequent attempts to move forward to its objective 1 kilometer farther on, but was constantly opposed by heavy machine-gun fire on the high points of ground to the front and enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the direction of TERNY-SORNY.

The artillery directly attached to the regiment was used intelligently but was unable to silence the machine guns. Just before dark this line was exposed to additional machine-gun fire from aircraft. As the dusk drew on they made a final and successful attack, reaching the TRENCH de CASTILLE and holding it from where it crosses the road to the southeast through a point which is not yet definitely reported.

The 127th Infantry has been making frequent attempts during the day to progress to its objective and has met with the same opposition from machine guns from the BEAUMONT Woods and the high ground east of there. They have been using trench mortars and 37-mm. guns and have been supported by the divisional artillery. In several forward movements they have gained ground, but they have not been able to retain the positions. The ground in their front, as far as the CHATEAU-THIERRY Road, has been cleared of the enemy, but they have been unable to occupy this road during the daylight.

The troops have been somewhat disorganized and suffered considerable losses during the operations of the last few days so that today it has been necessary to reorganize the units, consolidate the ground, and contact has been kept with the enemy by patrols pushed out to the front.
AMER 370th INF (93d DIV) NEAR VAUXAILLON
24 SEPT - 12 OCT 1918

Anizy-le-Château

MAP NO 84

Compiled by American Battle Monument Commission
Orders

Combat Instructions

G-3, General Staff
FIELD ORDERS
32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 50
September 2, 1918---14:35 h.

[Extract]

1. The XXX Army Corps is to continue its attack at an hour H which will be fixed later.

2. This division is to support the 66th Div. and the Moroccan 1st Div. in the attack.

OBJECTIVES: VAUXAILLON---VAUXAILLON-MARGIVAL Railroad.
The 64th Div. is on our left, and the 59th Div. of the I Corps on our right.

ZONE OF ACTION OF THE DIVISION:
Northern limit: Point 1957---Point 2866---Point 3872---PONT de COURSON (to 64th D. I).
Southern limit: Point 3030, then the Parallel 305.

3. (a) The division will be assembled with brigades side by side.
The 63d Brigade on the right, the 64th Brigade on the left, west of the line
MONTECOUVE-JUVIGNY, in the zone MONTECOUVE---JUVIGNY---VALPRIEZ [Fm].
Zone of assembly for the 64th Brigade: JUVIGNY---Bois du PROMONTOIRE (incl.)
Point 177.1---302.8 VALPRIEZ Farm.
Zone of assembly for the 63d Brigade: MONTECOUVE---northwestern corner of
JUVIGNY---VALPRIEZ Farm, exclusive---BAGNEUX.
The brigades will be held in readiness to follow the 1st line divisions; the 63d Brigade to follow the Moroccan 1st Div., and the 64th Brigade to follow the 66th Div. The 119th M. G. Bn. is attached to the 63d Brigade for this movement.
They will not enter into movement until further orders.

AXES OF DIRECTION:
32d Division: JUVIGNY---RAPERIE (182.8-303.9)---crossroads 185.4-304.3---MONT de LAFFAUX.
63d Brigade: Same as 32d Division.
64th Brigade: MONTECOUVE---Crossroads 182.3-305.5---VAUXALLION.
(c) ARTILLERY: It is expected that the artillery as at present assigned to the
Moroccan 1st Div. and the 66th Div. will be taken over respectively by the 63d Brigade and the 64th Brigade should they relieve the latter divisions on the line.
(d) TANKS: Present assignment of tanks:
Moroccan 1st Div. - 8 sections of light tanks.
66th Div. - 5 sections of light tanks.
They probably will be taken over in the event of our relieving the other divisions.
(e) AERONAUTICS: Assignment of aeroplanes:
Moroccan 1st Div. - Squadron 104
66th Div. - Squadron 289
Balloon No. 87 to the Moroccan 1st Div. - 66th Div. - 64th Div.
(f) TRAINS: Later orders will be issued governing the movement of trains.

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5. P. C.'s.

32d Division
- TARTIERS
- TERNY-SORNY
- Cave at NEUVILLE [-sur-MARGIVAL]

63d Brigade
- Cave at TERNY-SORNY
- Cave at NEUVILLE [-sur-MARGIVAL]

64th Brigade
- Cave at Point 183.6-305.5.
- VAUXAILLON

Moroccan 1st Div.
- VALPRIEZ Farm.

66th Div.
- Cave at MONTECOUVE.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-33.1: Operation Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Tartiers, Aisne, September 2, 1918.

From 0 to 24 h., September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

WEATHER: Fair.
VISIBILITY: Good.
GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Quiet.
ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Artillery temporarily detached from the division.
INFANTRY ACTIVITY: This division (less artillery) was relieved on the line, and went
into bivouac in rear part of sector as second line division during the night of September
1/2, 1918, by the 66th D. I. and the 1st D. M. under General Operations Order No. 130,
XXX A. C., dated September 1, 1918. The relief was made without incident.
There has been some shelling on troops in camp causing a few casualties.
Under telephonic instructions from the Commanding General, XXX A. C., at 17:30 h.,
the 63d Brigade moved forward in the wake of the Moroccan 1st Div. for support of the
latter division. However, under instructions from the same authority, the head of the
63d Brigade is stopped at VALPRIEZ Farm and has to wait there for further orders.
The brigade is under orders of the Commanding General, 32d Division, and will move
forward according to instructions to be given later by the Commanding General of the
Moroccan 1st Division.

* * * * * *

J. G. PILLOW,
Lt. Col., F. A., U. S. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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Corps to Renew Attack

General Staff, G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 52

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Tartiers, September 4, 1918--3:30 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The XXX Army Corps is to continue its attack today at an hour which will be fixed later.

2. The provisions of Field Orders No. 50, these headquarters, September 2, 1918, will govern the operations of the division in this attack with the following modifications:
   (a) Paragraph 1: Change Moroccan 2d Div. to read, 31st Div., and the objectives of the attack to read as follows: Crest of Hill 105 east of QUINCY-BASSE--Point 6005 (Brook) Ru [Ruisseau] de BASSE as far as 6192--La RAQUE--CHAMP-VAILLY--7167--crests west and south of MOISY Farm--crest of Les VAUCELLES--Le BESSY--7945--7538--7030.
   (b) Paragraph 2: Change objectives to read: Point 7030--Point 7538--Point 7945--Le BESSY--crest of Les VAUCELLES--crests west and south of MOISY Farm--Point 7167--La RAQUE.

Change 59th Div. to read 29th Div.
Change zone of action of the division. Northern limits to read as follows: without change up to include Point 2866; from that point continue as follows: Point 4174 (to the 66th Div. MONT-des-TOMBES)---then toward the east on parallel of that point (4174).

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Infantry, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Renewal of Corps Attack

General Staff, G-3.
FIELD ORDERS
No. 53

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Tartiers, September 5, 1918--5 a. m.

[Extract]

II. Should this division enter the first line the 63d Brigade will relieve the Moroccan 1st Div. and the 64th Brigade will relieve the 66th Div. The instructions
given in Field Orders No. 50, P. C., 32d Division, September 2, 1918, will govern, unless otherwise stated.

Objectives: That part of the objective fixed above included in the division's zone of action.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Col., Inf., U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau La Chenoye, Pierrefonds, Otse, September 6, 1918.

From 0 to 24 h., September 6, 1918.

[Extract]

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VII. TROOP MOVEMENTS: In compliance with telephonic instructions from P. C. French XXX Corps, September 6, 1918, and Field Orders No. 54, these headquarters September 6, 1918, the division moved from area in the neighborhood of TARTIERS and BIEUXY to area in vicinity of HAUTE-FONTAINE, with division headquarters at Chateau La CHENOYE. The command passed from the French XXX A. C. to the French Tenth Army. This division in reserve.

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J. G. PILLOW,
Lt. Col., F. A., U. S. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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232-33.6: Letter

Tanks at Juvigny

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Pierrefonds, Otse, September 7, 1918.

From: W. J. Goodwin, Liaison Officer
To: G-3, Rochambeau [32d Division]
Subject: Report on Operation and Effectiveness of Tanks in Recent Operation.

1. The source of this information was obtained from notes on opinions as given by officers of the 125th and 126th Infantry Regiments.
2. Value as a fighting arm of the Service: All things considered the general opinion is that tanks are of value as a fighting arm of the service.

Reasons:

1. They are effective in destroying strong points and in clearing a path through obstacles.
2. They lower the morale of the enemy.

This must depend upon certain things:

First: That they be under direct command of regimental commanders of regiments to which they are assigned.

Second: That they be used according to the American way of fighting; that is, not to go steadily forward in a straight line from which they must not deviate, but to be mobile in the attacking and the destruction of strong points, such as machine-gun emplacements, trench mortars, and the like. The quick darting here and there of these machines, would not only throw off the concentrated fire of the enemy's artillery on them, but would also surprise the enemy strong points to a greater degree than in this last attack.

Third: That the terrain over which the tanks are to operate be thoroughly considered beforehand. Locations of enemy strong points and plan of attack by tanks against these should be thoroughly understood by both the tank operators and the infantry going forward in support of tanks.

3. Work of tanks during recent operations:

The tanks suffered heavily during the recent operations. The main reasons for this being the method of their attack; not changing direction quick enough; the use of the new antitank gun against them; and the loss of contact by them with their supporting units of infantry.

The antitank guns had perfect aim on the operator's position in the tank and put many operators out of action by the spreading of hot, molten lead, and brass by the steel jacket armor piercing bullets used. Artillery fire, heavily concentrated, also put many tanks out of action. The tanks, on some occasions, turned about and left the supporting infantry in the hands of the enemy.

The effectiveness of the tanks was particularly noticed by the fact that they left many trenches filled with German dead by moving along them and pouring fire into them. This also brought many prisoners back to our lines which shows the effect it had on the enemy morale.

Many tanks were undoubtedly needlessly lost because of their first use by us and because they were not under direct control and orders of the regimental commanders.

4. Further reports from regiments to follow this information.

W. J. GOODWIN.
From 0 to 24 o'clock, September 7, 1918

[Extract]

VII. TROOP MOVEMENTS: The 57th Field Artillery Brigade completed movement from vicinity of TARTIERS to CHELLES in area in which 32d Division is billeted as reserve of the French Tenth Army.

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J. G. PILLOW,
Lt. Col., F. A., U. S. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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Movement to Another Army Area

General Staff, G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 56

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Special Order No. 517, Hq. French Tenth Army, September 7, 1918, this division will move to join another army.

2. (a) The movement will be made by rail and motor * * *

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3. The entrainment will commence September 9, 1918, at 10 o'clock.

* * * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel Infantry, U. S. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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277-32.1: Order

Taking Over of Sector

FIELD ORDER
No. 21

FERE-en-TARDENOIS 1:20,000
FISMES

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau des Bruyeres, August 11, 1918.

Maps:

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Field Order No. 31, American 4th Division and Special Order No. 325, French 62d Division, the 77th Division (less artillery), will relieve the 4th Division and part of the 62d Division on the night August 11/12. The artillery of the 4th Division and of the 62d Division will not be relieved until further orders.

* * * * *

** Adjacent units on the right: The American 28th Division of the American III Corps; on the left: The French 164th Division of the French XI Corps.

* * * * *

12. The command of the sector now occupied by the 4th Division will pass to the Commanding General, 77th Division, at 8 a. m., August 12. The command of that portion of the sector of the 62d Division taken over will pass from the Commanding General of the 62d Division to the Commanding General, 77th Division, at 12 noon, August 12.
Division headquarters will open at MAREUIL-en-DOLE at 8 a. m., August 12. 153d Brigade Hq. will open at CHARTREUVE Farm at 8 a. m., August 12. 154th Brigade Hq. will remain at FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

By command of Major General Duncan:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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Reorganization of Sector

FIELD ORDER 77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 22
Fere-Ancien Chateau, August 14, 1918.

Maps: FISMES 1/20,000
FERE-en-TARDENOIS

[Extract]

1. The reorganization of the sector occupied by the 77th Division prescribed in Message No. 13, these headquarters, August 13, 1918, will be carried out as follows:

2. Western boundary: PONT-ARCY---VIEIL-ARCY---DHUIZEL---HILL 175 (1,200 m. south of DHUIZEL)---HILL 159.4 of the P. D. (1,000 m. east of VAUXTIN)---Les WATTES---le Bois de la BRUYERE (all above points to the XI Corps)---northwest edge of ETANG de la GRAVIERE (to 77th Division)---MONT-NOTRE-DAME---Fme MONTBANI (to XI Corps)---MAREUIL-en-DOLE---SERINGES-et-NESTLES (to 77th Division)---FERE-en-TARDENOIS---Ferme PREAUX---BEAUVARDES---COURPOIL---TRUGNY---VERDILLY---BRASLES (to XI Corps).

Eastern boundary: JAULGONNE (to 77th Division)---RONCHERES (to 28th Division)---CIERGES (to 28th Division)---CHAMERY (to 28th Division)---HILL 213---BERGERIE (28th Division)---MONT-St MARTIN (77th Division)---ROAD FORK (2047 - 2864)---FISMETTE (to 28th Division)---HILL 175.8---MAIZY (28th Division).

3. (a) The sector occupied by the division will be organized into two brigade zones **

(b) The front of each brigade zone will be organized as a regimental subsector, and each brigade will occupy its zone with its two regiments echeloned in depth ***

4. The 154th Brigade will occupy the right zone and the 153d Brigade the left zone. The relief of the 153d Brigade in the right zone and the change of dispositions of troops in the left zone will take place on the night of August 14/15, in accordance with detailed order to be issued by the Commanding General of the 153d Brigade.

* * * * *

The P. C. of the 77th Division - FERE (Ancien Chateau) about 2 1/2 kilometers northeast of FERE-en-TARDENOIS on the main road to MAREUIL [en-DOLE].

By command of Major General Duncan:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

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Artillery Relief

FIELD ORDER
No. 23

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Fere-Ancien Chateau, August 14, 1918.

Maps: FERE-en-TARDENOIS ) 1:20,000
       FISMES

[Extract]

1. The 4th Field Artillery Brigade will be relieved by the 152d Field Artillery Brigade on the nights of August 15/16 and 16/17, 1918, in compliance with G-3 Order No. 31, III Army Corps, August 14, 1918.

• • • • •

7. Command will pass to battery, battalion and regimental commanders of 152d Brigade, as the relief of each unit is reported complete.

8. Command of the artillery of the sector will pass to Commanding Officer, 152d Brigade, at 8 a.m., August 17, 1918; P. C. 152d Field Artillery Brigade will open at FERE-Ancien Chateau at the same time, same date.

By command of Major General Duncan:

J. R. R. HANNAIG
Chief of Staff.

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Plan of Defense of 77th Division in the Vesle Sector

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 17, 1918.

MAPS: FERE-en-TARDENOIS ) 1:20,000
       FISMES

[Extract]

1. The enemy is holding the plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE with machine guns, light artillery, some heavy artillery and at least sufficient infantry to make frequent local counterattacks. He has machine-gun nests in the low country between the river and the south slopes of the plateau. Most of his heavy artillery and his main defensive position is probably north of the AISNE. West of BAZOCHES, which is in enemy territory, our front line runs along the railroad, thence south of the river in front of St-THIBAUT, then north of the river along the railroad to the wood of the CHATEAU du DIABLE, and through those woods. The front line of the division on our left connects with ours on the railroad, and the division on our right holds FISMETTE. Pending an ultimate advance to
the AlSNE, the III Corps is holding and organizing its present position, including the bridgeheads over the VESLE.

2. The 77th Division will:
   (a) Hold and organize the position described hereafter.
   (b) Its mission meantime is to maintain contact with the enemy not only to prevent surprise but to obtain prompt evidence of his withdrawal, and to enlarge and consolidate the bridgeheads with a view to a further advance.

   8. ARTILLERY: The principal missions of the artillery are the main barrage and counterpreparation forward of the zone of resistance to stop a large scale attack, protective barrages in front of outpost zone to break up raid, and box barrages to protect our own minor operations. **

   10. Hq. 77th Division - FERE-Ancien Chateau
       Hq. 153d Brigade - CHARTREUVE Fme
       Hq. 154th Brigade - La TUILERIE (198.9-280.8)

       By command of Major General Duncan:

       J. R. R. HANNAY,
       Chief of Staff.

277-32.15: Memorandum

*Temporary Policy*

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 19, 1918.

Memorandum to Infantry, Brigade and Regimental Commanders:

1. The Commanding General, III Corps, has directed that the following policy be maintained temporarily in this sector with regard to tactical use of troops for the present.
   (a) Give up present attack on BAZOCHES, holding our front as at present.
   (b) Drive the enemy from the southern bank of the VESLE.
   (c) Make a clean, distinct, connected front line.
   (d) Disinfect paths and communications through gas areas to our front lines with chloride of lime.

2. Omit aggressive patrolling and reconnaissance until the conditions enumerated in Par. 1, have been accomplished.

   By command of Brigadier General Johnson:

   J. R. R. HANNAY,
   Chief of Staff.
20 h., Aug. 21, to 20 h., Aug. 22

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Airplane activity continued slight in back areas with considerable increase of activity over the front line. Artillery activity very heavy along front line with considerable infantry activity.

II. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

Ours: At 20:30 h., one company from the 308th Infantry, after artillery preparation, attacked and captured TANNERIE. No opposition was encountered by the infantry in this operation. At 5 h., I and K Companies of the 308th Infantry, who were occupying the position along the railroad track in the subsector held by the 154th Brigade, were attacked by 2 battalions of the enemy after an hour’s heavy artillery barrage. The enemy attacked with liquid fire and machine guns, light machine guns in the line of heavy machine guns placed along the cliffs to the northwest of TANNERIE. The attack was very violent and at 7 h., I Co., was still holding the line and had lost a number of Chauchats and reported shortage of ammunition. Reinforcements were requested to support I Co. on the south bank of the VESLE. At 7:30 h., the left flank north of woods north of railroad track were still holding but had lost contact with the platoon on the right. At 8:30 h., Company K, on the right, reported that contact with Co. I had been lost and that the enemy was breaking through and called for reinforcements. Co. I requested an artillery barrage and reported that the enemy had forced the entire company to retire to the south of the railroad track and I Co. was falling back to the south bank of the VESLE. I Co. reported that the ground to the south of the VESLE, in case the enemy put down another barrage, would be untenable and reinforcements and orders were requested. At 14 h., word was received that all red flares were exhausted and request for artillery barrage was made by runner. Barrage opened and Capt. Harrington of Co. I counterattacked with his company and Co. L which was sent forward as reinforcements. Succeeded in retaking lost ground and at 19:30 h., a map was received from the airplane of the division showing our front line running along the railroad from 202.3 to 203.8.

By command of Brigadier General Johnson:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Disposition of Units

G-3
MEMORANDUM ORDER No. 90
(Operations)

[Extract]

1. In compliance with orders from the III Corps, the two battalions at rest in each brigade zone will be bivouacked not less than 5 kilometers in rear of the 2d position in well sheltered places, on orders to be issued later.

2. The boundary between brigades will be extended from NESLES (left brigade) through SERGY - (east of the main street to the 154th Brigade, and west of the main street to the 153d Brigade) - to the crossroads at 195.95 - 272.8, thence south along the SERGY-FRESNES Road.

By command of Brigadier General Johnson:
J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3
No. 13

20 h., Aug. 22, to 20 h., Aug. 23

[Extract]


II. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

* * * * * *

A counterattack by the 1st Bn., 308th Infantry, was initiated by an artillery barrage at 4:15 h., with a view to retaking the positions from which the advance companies of the outpost line in the right sector had retired the night before. The positions were retaken except a small part of wood to north of R. R. where strong opposition was encountered. Enemy estimated to be one battalion in attack with one in support.

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By command of Brigadier General Johnson:
J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Looking north from St-Thibaut, across Vesle Valley
77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 25, 1918.

20 h., Aug. 23, to 20 h., Aug. 24

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Aeroplane activity slight. During the night, 3 planes flew over the back area dropping bombs. Artillery activity heavy along the front line.

II. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:
Ours: Patrols along the river south of BAZOCHES driven back by machine-gun fire from woods east between river and R. R. track (201.95-286.5 to 202.0-286.35) and from stone building east of road and south of R. R. crossing 200.75-286.6. Old positions in Bois du CHATEAU du DIABLE reoccupied and extended to the east. We now control the ROUEN-REIMS north of woods to the R. R. crossing and from that point we hold it to the right boundary of our sector.

Enemy: Considerable machine-gun fire and sniping throughout the day and night. No patrols reported.

By command of Brigadier General Johnson:
J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

277-32.13: Order

Disposition of the 154th Brigade

1. The two rear battalions of the rear regiment of the 154th Brigade will proceed without delay to the woods to the east of SERGY, where they will bivouac in well-sheltered places. Regimental headquarters will be established in the village of SERGY.

2. The two rear battalions of the rear regiment of the 153d Brigade will proceed the day the command of the forward zone passes to the C. O. of the 305th Infantry to the woods west of SERGY and will establish the regimental headquarters in SERGY.

3. Hereafter, only one battalion in each brigade zone will work on the barrier position. The battalion will be the one stationed on that position.

By command of Brigadier General Johnson:
J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
277-32.15: Order

Necessity for Holding North of Vesle

To: Commanding Generals, 153d and 154th Brigades

1. In view of events preparing north of SOISSONS it is indispensable that such footing as we have north of the VESLE must be maintained at all hazards as we may need the bridgeheads within 24 hours. Take necessary measures to hold such gains as you may now have as a result of the operations of last night and this morning. This is imperative.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General.

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G-3 No. 16

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Less activity in back area, both artillery and aeroplane. Increased activity along the front line.

II. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:

Ours: At 4:15 h., one company of the 306th Inf. with one company in support attacked the town of BAZOCHES. The artillery assisted the operation with zone fire and a creeping barrage. The town was entered from the left flank with little opposition and 2 platoons worked their way through the town mopping up. Before they had time to dig in and consolidate they were driven out by a heavy counterattack and forced to retire to the position held before the attack. At the same hour assisted by artillery and machine-gun fire three companies and bn. hq. scouts of the 307th Inf. attacked the crossroads at 203.8-286.9 and CHATEAU du DIABLE. They met with a stubborn resistance. Fighting lasted for several hours, after which our troops withdrew, occupying the same positions they occupied before the attack.

By command of Major General Alexander:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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- 177 -
Combat Instructions

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 29, 1918.

1. Following is furnished for your information:
   At 3 a. m., on the 30th instant, our artillery will fire 50 rounds from 6-inch
   howitzers on TREMENEAU.
   At 4 a. m., on the 30th instant, 50 rounds of same caliber on eastern and south­
   eastern parts of BAZOCHES.
   At the same hour, a rolling barrage will creep over the woods at CHATEAU du DIABLE.
2. The division commander directs that the projects for action in the vicinity of
   CHATEAU du DIABLE and BAZOCHES be held in abeyance temporarily.

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

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Reorganization of 77th Division Sector

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 1, 1918.

G-3
MEMORANDUM ORDER No. 102
(Operations)

1. This sector will be reorganized and each brigade zone divided into two sub­
   sectors, with regiments employed in depth side by side.
2. The brigade commanders will locate the boundaries between regiments in their
   respective brigade zones.
3. The side slip will take place from left to right, the incoming regiment occupying
   the left subsector in each brigade zone.
4. The reorganization will take place on the night September 23, 1918. Density of
   occupation of the various positions will not be modified.
5. Details of reorganization to be arranged by brigade commanders.

By command of Major General Alexander:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Division Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDER
No. 24

Maps: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud ) 1/20,000
FISMES )

[Extract]

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Fere Ancien Chateau, September 2, 1918.

1. Under pressure of the Tenth Army on our left, advancing to the east on the plateau immediately north of SOISSONS, it is probable that the enemy on our front will shortly retire to the north. The III Corps will advance on D day at H hour, destroying or driving back the enemy rearguards and by vigorous pursuit preventing the enemy from establishing himself on the CHEMIN-des-DAMES.

2. (a) This division will advance with two brigades in line in conformity with the mission of III Corps.

(b) Boundaries of Division Sector:
Right boundary: FISMES (inclusive)---RUISSEAU Ste-MARIE---La CORBEAUCHE---GLENNES (exclusive)---MAIZY (exclusive).
Left boundary: Le POTEAU Fme (exclusive)---Hill 152 (N. E. of PAARS)---Crossroads (201.8-292.3) (S. E. of DHUIZEL)---Point 201.9-293.2 (E. of DHUIZEL)---VIEIL-ARCY (exclusive)---BOURG-et-COMIN (inclusive).

Boundaries between Brigades (north of the VESLE): Bend in ROUEN-REIMS Road at 202.8-287.2---PERLES (153d Brigade)---Crossroads CROIX-NOIRE---Crossroads 174, ARBRE (about 1 km. south of BARBONVAL)---BARBONVAL (154th Brigade)---VILLERS-en-PRAYEURES (153d Brigade)---OEULLY (154th Brigade).

3. (a) The 154th Brigade will advance on the right, the 153d Brigade will advance on the left, each brigade with its two regiments abreast, each regiment with its three battalions disposed in depth. Immediately upon notification of D day and H hour the element of the battalions in the outpost zone supported by their companies from the line of resistance, acting as regimental advance guards, will at the fixed time, seize the plateau north of the VESLE, establish bridgeheads and protect the crossing of the troops necessary for the pursuit. They will establish themselves along the line: GROTIE (206.2-288.7), thence across the ridge to Point 205.8-288.7---Point 204.9-288.4, thence across ridge to Point 204.6-288.4---railroad from Bois de PERLES to Point 203.10-288.45---Road-fork 171.7---Le BUCHERET (Hill 176.0)---Les TERRES-NOIRES. (The French 164th Division will cover all of the MONT de PAARS and the 153d Brigade will only have to furnish a combat liaison group on the west side of the BAZOCHES-VAUXCERE Ravine). The main bodies of regimental columns echeloned in depth will cross the VESLE successively and will pass through the troops on the above line, which will then become reserves. They will establish themselves on the line VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES---high ground 177.8 at La CORBEAUCHE. From this line each brigade will push out new advance guards to the northern slopes of the plateau, taking every precaution during the march against fire of enemy artillery.

(b) The 152d Field Artillery Brigade will cover the advance of the infantry, following by echelons.

(c) The division engineer will prepare at once as many footbridges for crossing the VESLE as practicable, at least six in each brigade zone.

(d) An aeroplane squadron will be assigned to the division with the mission of keeping the division commander informed of the location of his own troops.
(e) As soon as the main body has crossed the GROTTE---Le BUCHERET---Les TERRES-NOIRES line, on the southern edge of the plateau north of the VESLE, the two battalions then in third line on the flanks of the division will pass under the control of the division commander as division reserves, and the two interior battalions then in third line will be held by their respective brigade commanders as brigade reserves.

(f) In the advance, foot troops will keep off the main roads. The plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE will be crossed in extended formation. Until the positions of the enemy have been developed, only small bodies will be pushed to the front and care will be taken not to engage in force until real resistance is encountered.

5. First transfer of P. C.'s will be as follows: Division - BAZOCHES (but prior to this transfer, the advance message center will be established in the cave north of Fme des FILLES); 152d F. A. Brigade - same as division; 153d Brigade - cave north of Fme des FILLES; 154th Brigade - MONT-St-MARTIN.

In no case will any P. C. be closed until after communication has been established at the new P. C.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

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277-33.1: Summary of Operations

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 3, 1918.

[Extract]

ACTIVITIES:

Usual combat patrols
Increased enemy artillery fire with H. E. and sneezing gas.
308th Infantry relieved 307th of left subsector of 154th Infantry Brigade zone.
305th Infantry right subsector and 306th left subsector of 153d Infantry Brigade zone.
Our artillery gassed BAZOCHES.
At 17:30 h. division commander issued order for strong patrols from both right and left brigades directed on hills above CHATEAU du DIABLE and BAZOCHES respectively with orders for entire division to be prepared to follow these patrols in case indicated crests were reached.

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Timing of Advance

FIELD ORDER
No. 25

Maps: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud 1/20,000
      FISMES

Fere Ancien Chateau, September 4, 1918.

1. Field Order No. 24, these headquarters, is adopted and goes into effect. D day is September 4, H hour: 3 p.m.
2. Minor operations prior to H hour will not be interrupted, but will be developed as soon as possible into the general plan of Field Order No. 24.
3. The battalion in each brigade held as division reserve under the plan of defense will remain under the control of the division commander until the battalion formerly in the outpost zone on the exterior flank of each brigade is assembled and turned over to the division commander for division reserve, as provided for in Field Order No. 24.
4. Particular attention is invited to the vital necessity of prompt information of the front line reaching these headquarters without delay.
5. Brigade P. C.'s will make their first change of location at once and report to these headquarters as soon as established.
6. Division P. C. will open at cave north of Fme des FILLES at 5 p.m., September 4, and the old P. C. close at 5:30 p.m.
7. An advance message center is now in operation at cave north of Fme des FILLES.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

Directions for Advance

FIELD ORDER
No. 26

Fere Ancien Chateau, September 4, 1918.

1. The division commander directs that after you have occupied the line VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES---La CORBEAUCHE, you push advance guards as heretofore ordered, establishing a line of outposts on the general line PIERRE-LAROCHE---La PETITE-MONTAGNE. Combat patrols will be pushed aggressively across the AISNE and establish themselves on the heights north of the AISNE on the general line 204.0---297.2---BUTTE-de-TERRE---208.0---296, to cover the crossing of the AISNE.
4. Two battalions of the 306th F. A. will be pushed across the VESLE as soon as possible to support the advance of the division with fire north of the AISNE. The 3d Battalion of this regiment will be pushed across the VESLE as soon as the Brigade Commander of the 152d F. A. has established his first two battalions covering the infantry advance. This regiment will remain under the immediate command of Brigade Commander, 152d F. A.

7. P. C. 153d Brigade will be established at VAUXCERE. P. C. 154th Brigade at BLANZY-les-FISMES. Division P. C. will remain until further orders at cave near Fme des FILLES.

By command of Major General Alexander:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

277-33.1: Summary of Operations

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 4, 1918.

[Extract]

ACTIVITIES:

Many patrols met machine-gun fire. Two strong patrols from each brigade around VESLE overcame resistance and occupied La MONTAGNE des PERLES. Advanced patrols pushed forward and one battalion from each brigade crossed in support. Entire division was put in march to follow the leading elements referred to above.

277-32.13: Order

Axis of Liaison

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918.

1. Pursuant to instructions from the III Corps, the axis of liaison of the 77th Division will be changed and will be as follows: BAZOCHES---BLANZY-les-FISMES---BARBONVAL---ŒUILLY---PARGNAN---ARBRE de PAISSY---AILLES---CHERMIZY.
2. The axis of liaison of the 153d Brigade will remain: BAZOCHES---VAUXCERE---LONGUEVAL---BOURG-et-COMIN---VENDRESSE-et-TROYON.
That of the 154th Brigade will be: FISMES---BLANZY-les-FISMES---thence same as division axis.

3. Boundaries of the division beyond the AISNE.
Right Boundary: LA CULEE (Point 209.0-296.2)---CUISY Fme (incl.)---JUMIGNY (excl.)
---ARBRE de PAISSY---AILLES (excl.)---CHERMIZY (excl.)
Left Boundary: BOURG-et-COMIN (incl.)---COURTONE (incl.)---VERNEUIL-COURTONE (excl.)---CARRIERE [Quarry] (500 m. S. E. of CHIVY)---CERNY [en-LAONNOIS]---BIEVRES (excl.)
Boundary between brigades: From river at Point 206.0-294.9---north along 206.0 to road fork at La TUILERIE Fme---MOULINS (154th Brig.) Quarry [Carriere Souterraine] 700 meters north of MOULINS (153d Brigade)---CHEMIN-des-DAMES at Point 207.9-301.4.

By command of Major General Alexander:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

277-32.15: Memorandum Order

Reconnaissance in Force by 77th Division

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918.

MEMORANDUM TO Commanding Generals, 153d and 154th Inf. Brig.:

1. The division commander directs that during the night of September 5/6 advance elements of the 153d and 154th Brigades push forward strong patrols to and across the canal and River AISNE. The Commanding General, 152d Field Artillery Brigade, has been directed to harass the enemy on the heights north of the AISNE. There will be no fire from our artillery south of the AISNE, unless specially called for by you.

2. Division commander desires to impress upon the brigade commanders of infantry that a most strenuously aggressive action will be employed. It is probable that the only means of crossing the canal will be by swimming, as nothing is known at this P. C. of any fords, and it is assumed that the bridges have been destroyed. Information has just been received that the French 164th Division on the left and the 28th Division on the right have reached the canal. This division cannot afford to be left behind. The division commander further desires that arrangements for the use of projectors be made and stations be established, giving liaison with the P. C.'s of the infantry brigades. He sees no reason why these should not have been established long before this, and believes that no effort has been made to utilize this means of communications. Similarly, no use has been made of the wireless, and apparently no strenuous effort appears to have been made to get the wireless forward and in operation. The division commander directs me to inform you that he has been harping upon the question of liaison ever since he took command of this division, apparently without any effect upon the brigade commanders, and unless some result is obtained in the immediate future, he will take other measures.

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

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Support of 28th Division

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918---10:40 a. m.

Message Commanding General, 154th Brigade:

28th Division reports that they have 2 companies holding the GROTTE spur (ridge running N. and S. along X Coord. 206.0). This is in your subsector. You will relieve these 2 companies and push up to extend your general line E. from BLANZY-les-FISMES to La CORBEAUCHE.

28th Division report their front line as follows: Left La BOSSETTE 208.8-292.9, thence S. E. to CROIX-ROUGE. French on their right meeting strong resistance.

28th Division desires your assistance in taking La PETITE-MONTAGNE. You will cooperate to fullest extent. Push forward vigorously with troops you report near MERVAL.

Acknowledge.

By command Major General Alexander:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
C. of S.

Consolidation of Position of 153d Brigade

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 7, 1918.

MEMORANDUM TO C. G., 153d Infantry Brigade:

1. The division commander directs that you consolidate the present positions in your brigade sector and hold on. You will cause your artillery regiment to register for fire in front of your positions.

J. R. R. HANNAY
Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM TO Commanding General, 154th Inf. Brigade:

1. The French 62d Division relieves the American 28th Division the night of September 7/8. The division commander directs:
   (a) That the 154th Infantry Brigade send a liaison group to get in contact with the French 62d Division at the crossroads at the head of the ravine known as La FOSSE-au-LOUP, x Coordinate 207.0, y Coordinate 289.75. This liaison group to consist of one platoon, with a section of machine guns.
   (b) The line established by the French 62d Division will join your line at La CORBEAUCHE. It is directed that your line advance in unison with the French to the point designated on the map as FOND de VAS, establishing yourself with your right on the line fixed by the French. This line will be well dug in and prepared to hold the ground as occupied.
   (c) It is not intended that you should preserve an absolutely rigid alignment with the French. This will depend entirely upon the character of the terrain.

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

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Weather fair.
Infantry and machine-gun activity: Fighting continued along the entire front; strong resistance from the enemy from the neighborhood of GLENNES.
Artillery activity: Harassing and concentration fire, enemy using large percentage of gas.
Airplane and balloon activity: Our airplanes observing; enemy airplanes harassing advancing troops with machine-gun fire and bombing sensitive points at night. Visibility good to fair.
Our troops moving up to consolidate line; enemy concentrating to the northeast of GLENNES.
General impression of the day: Increased and continued activity.

Our troops driving the enemy out of La CENDRIERE [Farm and Woods] and patrolling the AISNE Canal.
Change in location of line: Along the road VIEIL-ARCY---VILLERS-en-PRAYERES to a point west of REVILLON south to the east of MERV.

77th Division.

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277-32.1: Order

**Plan for Attacking La Petite-Montagne**

FIELD ORDER

No. 27

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

*Cave near Fme des FILLES, September 8, 1918.*

Map: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy, in strength of about one battalion is occupying GLENNES and La PETITE-MONTAGNE. The French 62d Division is on our right and will advance in conjunction with us. Boundaries between divisions are changed to the following: Le CHATEAU---La BOSSETTE---MAIZY (to 77th Division).

2. This division will occupy La PETITE-MONTAGNE, destroying or driving out any enemy parties found in that vicinity.

3. (a) The 154th Brigade will carry out the attack.

   First objective: REVILLON---Southern edge of plateau from La ROCHE to CUCHERY, La BOSSETTE.

   Second objective: Bois de SERFONTAINE, MAIZY.

   On receipt of this order, the line will be advanced to the general line road forks Le VERDILLON, through Le MARAIS-MINARD to Point 206.9-292.0: then to crossroads 123.2 west of GLENNES. **

   (b) At 18:45 h., September 8, rolling barrage will be laid two hundred meters in advance of this line and the infantry will advance as close behind it as possible, at the rate of one hundred meters in three minutes. The 1st objective must be reached by 19:30 h. The advance will continue from this point at the same rate to the 2d objective. The left of the brigade will conform to this movement and occupy the woods south of the canal with small elements to maintain contact with the 153d Brigade. PatROLS will be pushed out to the bank of the canal and MAIZY will be held with small combat groups. The line of resistance will be consolidated along the north and northeast edge of the plateau of La PETITE-MONTAGNE.

   (c) The C. G., 152d F. A. Brigade, will arrange to support this attack by a rolling barrage of 75's and a concentration of 155's on La PETITE-MONTAGNE. **

4. Trains will remain at their present location.

5. Liaison: The signals prescribed in the plan of liaison will be used. Regimental commanders will see that their units are supplied with the proper pyrotechnics.

P. C. Div.: Cave north of Fme des FILLES.

Adv. Center of Information: Vicinity of MERV.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,

Major General Commanding.

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MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

Direct C. G., 153d Infantry Brigade, to leave his brigade under command of his senior colonel and to proceed to the 154th Brigade assuming command thereof temporarily. During the remaining hours of this night, he will reorganize the brigade and will prepare for an attack at dawn tomorrow morning, the 9th instant, on La PETITE-MONTAGNE. Advise him fully as to the situation and tell him to report here for consultation with me on his way to the 154th Brigade.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

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MEMORANDUM C. O., 154th Brigade, through Chief of Staff:

The attack of La PETITE-MONTAGNE made this evening by the 154th Infantry Brigade has failed, apparently through lack of close cooperation with the French on their right. It seems that they have failed to take GLENNES from which very heavy machine-gun fire was directed on our right flank, causing the withdrawal of our advancing line.

Upon assuming command of the 154th Infantry Brigade you will advise yourself specially of the situation; will reorganize the command, utilizing in your front line units which were not involved in the action of this evening, and be prepared to move forward in liaison with the French as soon as they have taken GLENNES. The battalion of the 308th Infantry under Major MacNeill, which is reported to have advanced about 600 yards from its initial position, will be withdrawn therefrom as it is an open ground with its flanks exposed to fire from GLENNES and La PETITE-MONTAGNE. This order has already been started to Major MacNeill through the former Commanding Officer of the 154th Brigade. You are authorized to place at the disposal of the French a regiment of 75's attached to your brigade for the specific purpose of assisting in the reduction of GLENNES, which will be preparatory to your own advance. The assistance of the divisional artillery regiment (306) can also be obtained for this specific purpose if desired. This latter will be taken up by me directly with the French 62d Division. It is desired that you be prepared to resume the attack at daylight, September 9.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.
MEMORANDUM TO Commanding General, 153d Brigade
Commanding General, 154th Brigade
Commanding General, 152d F. A. Brigade:

1. It is understood by me to be the intention of the VI Army Corps and the Seventh Army to straighten out the line of the French 62d Division and the American 77th Division so as to make the line run approximately from northwest to southeast generally along the line of highway VIEIL-ARCY---VILLERS-en-PRAYERES, thence along the road running southeast from VILLERS-en-PRAYERES to the dominating hills La BUTTE-de-BOURMONT---La VALLON---La CARRIERE (north of MERVAL), thence to the high ground over GLENNES. This line will be organized and held. The ground between the hills will be cleared of all lurking parties of the enemy and entrance thereto will be barred to the enemy by suitable posts.

2. The divisional artillery will continue its bombardment of La PETITE-MONTAGNE and the valley running northeast from COCHERY. It is also desired that searching fire be directed on Bois de SERFONTAINE. The regiments of 75's will remain at the disposal of the infantry brigade commanders for the purpose of repelling hostile counterattacks or for firing on such targets as desired.

3. Intimate liaison will be maintained between the right of the 154th Infantry Brigade and the left of the French 62d Division. It is believed that the line of the French 62d Division now follows approximately the highway leading southeast from GLENNES.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

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Division and Brigade Boundaries

FIELD ORDERS
No. 28
77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Cave near Fme des Filles, September 10, 1918.

Maps: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud )
 ) 1:20,000
MONTBERAULT )

[Extract]

1. The enemy has withdrawn across the canal as far east as the point opposite VILLERS-en-PRAYERES; thence he holds a line running S. E. along the VILLERS-en-PRAYERES ---REVILLON---GLENNES Road in some strength, principally with machine guns, but with apparently about two battalions along the above mentioned road and a battalion in the
vicinity of GLENNES and the ravine to its east. He is holding La PETITE-MONTAGNE in considerable force, with probably two battalions in that locality. This hill constitutes one of the important points of the line of defense of the enemy.

2. (a) The 77th Division while consolidating the line VILLERS-en-PRAYERS—La BUTTE-de-BOURMONT---le Bois du MARAIS-MINARD and the ridge to the east of MERVIAL, will hold itself in readiness to advance with the left of the French 62d Division. Close contact with the enemy will be maintained and his movements will be observed by detachments and patrols pushing up to the enemy line on the whole length of our front.

It is essential that in case of further withdrawal of the enemy no time be lost in pursuing his rearguard and inflicting on him all the loss possible.

(b) The artillery, in addition to its normal mission of protecting the infantry and harassing the enemy, will have for special mission the prevention, by frequent and carefully adjusted fire, of hostile defensive organization of La PETITE-MONTAGNE, keeping, however, on hand the necessary ammunition to be able to neutralize the garrison of that point by intensive bombardment in case the right of the French 62d Division should advance on the plateau of the Hangar of de BEAUREGARD.

(c) Boundaries of the division beyond the AISNE, as prescribed by the American III Corps (until further orders):

Right Boundary: La CULEE (Point 209.0-295.2)---CUISSY Fme (incl.)---JUMIGNY (excl.)---ARBRE de PAISSY---AILLES (excl.)---CHERMIZY (excl.)

Left Boundary: BOURG-et-COMIN (incl.)---COURTONNE (incl.)---VERNEUIL-COURTONNE (excl.)---CARRIERE [Quarry] [500 m. S. E. of CHIVY]---CERNY [-en LAONNOIS]---NEUVILLE (all incl.)---BIEVRES (excl.).

Boundary between Brigades: From river at Point 206.0-294.9---La BUTTE-de-TERRE (entire ridge to 154th Brig.)---point on R. R. at 206.0-297.3---north along 206.0 to road fork at La TUJERIE Fme---MOULINS (154th Brig.)--- Quarry [Carriere Souterraine] 700 meters north of MOULINS (153d Brig.)---CHEMIN-des-DAMES at Point 207.0-301.4.

3. (a) Pending receipt of orders from the French XVI Corps, the following will govern in case of withdrawal of the enemy. The pursuit will be carried out with brigades maintaining their present dispositions. Each regiment will push out an advance guard consisting of one battalion. These advance guards will occupy the crest to the north of PARGNAN and a line from Bois de la FOSSE-aux-FRESNES---RUINES---Sunken Road 205.1-297.5---the northern edge of the woods (approximately along the Y Coordinate 298.0) on the ridge north of BOURG-et-COMIN---COURTONNE. The ridge to the N. of PARGNAN will be attacked by the advance guard of the right regiment of the 154th Brigade advancing up the spur to the east of the town, while the advance guard of the left regiment advances up the spur to the west of the town. The ridge north of BOURG-et-COMIN indicated by the Crest 175 will be occupied by the advance guards of the 153d Infantry Brigade. The valley east of the indicated ridge will be cleared of the enemy by such elements of the advance guards of the 153d Brigade as may be deemed necessary by the brigade commander.

(d) Two companies of engineers, one in each brigade zone, will be utilized to place footbridges across the canal and the AISNE and will then advance with the infantry advance guard to repair roads, remove obstructions and neutralize traps left by the enemy.

(e) The division reserve will consist of two battalions of infantry (the rear battalions of the regiments on the exterior flanks of the division), the 306th Regiment of F. A., the 302d Trench Mortar Battery, the 304th M. G. Battalion and 4 companies of the 302d Engineers.

4. (a) Axis of Liaison:

Division: BAZOCHES---BLANZY-les-FISMES---BARBONVAL---OEUILLY---PARGNAN; 153d
Brig.: VAUXCERE---LONGUEVAL---BOURG-et-COMIN---VENDRESSE-et-TROYON; 154th Brig.: BLANZY-les-FISMES, thence same as division axis.

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5. (a) First transfers of P. C. will be as follows:
153d Brig.: Vicinity of BOURG-et-COMIN
154th Brig.: Vicinity of OEUILLY
Division: BLANZY-les-FISMES.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

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277-32.1: Order

Change in Divisional Boundaries

FIELD ORDERS
No. 29
77th DIVISION, A. E. F., Cave near Fme des Filles, September 11, 1918--10:30 a. m.

Maps: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud )
FISMES ) 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to orders from the French XVI Corps, western boundary of the sector of the division is moved as follows:
   No change up to BAZOCHES.
   BAZOCHES (77th Div.)---MONT-de-PAARS---CHAMP-du-ROI---Elevation 160.9---Head of the ravine (BELLE-AUMMONE)---road from Elevation 160.9 to the CROIX-CHANTELOUP---east edge of the Bois des GENETTES---Crossroads 1,500 meters E. of VIEIL-ARCY (to 164th Div.)---W, bank of the BASSIN de BOURG---crossroads 300 meters E. of BOURG-et-COMIN (to 164th Div.)---MOULINS (to 77th Div.).

2. This change in boundary gives to the 164th Div. most of the front occupied by the 306th Infantry and as a consequence the dispositions of the 77th Division will be changed so as to have three regiments in line instead of four, the relieved regiment going into reserve.

* * * * *

(e) The C. G., 152d F. A. Brigade, will arrange direct with the colonel commanding the divisional artillery of the French 164th Division for the taking over by the latter of the missions of the artillery on the front affected.

(x) All movements must be completed by 6 o'clock, Sept. 12, '18.

4. The Supply Company, 306th Infantry, will remain at its present location.
5. The regimental headquarters will be established in the vicinity of one of the battalions south of the VESLE as directed by the C. G. 153d Brigade.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commander.

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277-32.1: Order

Support of French Attack

FIELD ORDER

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Cave near Fme des Filles, September 11, 1918--11 p. m.

No. 30

Maps: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud 1:20.000

[Extract]

1. An offensive operation having for its object the increasing of our gains on the heights between the VESLE and the AISNE and taking possession of the plateau of the ARBRE de ROMAIN will be carried out by the 62d, 45th, 9th, and 10th Infantry Divisions under the direction of the Commanding General of the French V Army Corps on a date which will be announced later.

2. (a) The 77th Division will take part in this operation, covering the left flank of the French 62d Division on its right, by advancing its present line from the heights of MERVAL to the line La CARRIERE--western exit of GLENNES and by artillery support, which will cover the attack of the V Army Corps by fire delivered in the region of REVILLON, La PETITE-MONTAGNE, HAUT-de-CUCHERY, MAIZY.

* * * * *

3. (a) INFANTRY: The 154th Brigade will carry out the attack with one battalion. The left of this battalion will be covered by a detachment which will have as its objective La CARRIERE, connecting with the left of the attacking battalion on the RUISSEAU de la CHAMET. * * *

(b) ARTILLERY: * * * Artillery support will continue until the French 62d Division has gained the objective of the second phase: * * *

The Commanding General of the French 62d Division will inform the Commanding General of the 77th Division direct of the time when the artillery of the 77th Division may discontinue its support and will furnish him with the necessary data for lengthening its fire in the event of a further advance.

(c) MACHINE GUNS: Before and during the attack machine guns on the slopes of north of the spurs of MERVAL, SERVAL, and BARBONVAL will fire on REVILLON, La ROCHE, Le MOULIN de GLENNES. * * *

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ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General.

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- 191 -
MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. The disposition of the infantry is desired as follows:
   (a) The entire 154th Brigade is at the disposal of the Commanding General of that brigade; the battalion formerly designated as part of the divisional reserve, located in the vicinity of FISMETTE being returned to the disposal of the Commanding General, 154th Brigade, with the idea of being his brigade reserve.
   (b) In the 153d Infantry Brigade, the two battalions of the 306th Infantry relieved on our former front by the French 164th Division and now located near St-THIBAUT and VILLESAVOYE becomes the divisional reserve. The remaining battalion of this regiment, which was located in the vicinity of BAZOCHES, north of the VESLE, becomes the brigade reserve of the 153d Infantry Brigade. This does not change the location of any unit except the two battalions of the 306th Infantry which were withdrawn from the line upon relief by the French 164th Division. It merely changes the designations and disposability of the units.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

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277-32.1: Order

RELIEF OF DIVISION

FIELD ORDER
77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 31

Maps: SOISSONS )
       ) 1/80,000
       )

REIMS

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to General Order No. 1288, French XVI Corps, the 77th Division will be relieved from the CHERRY-CHARTREUVE sector during the nights of September 14/15 and 15/16 by the Italian 8th Division. • • •

• • • • • •

8. (a) The command will pass as follows -
From battalion and Regimental Commander of the 77th Division to the corresponding Commanding Officers of the Italian 8th Division when the relief is reported complete in their respective units.
From the C. G. of the 153d Brigade to the C. O. of the ALPI Brigade at 8 h. September 15.
From the C. G. of the 154th Brigade to the C. O. of the BRESCIA Brigade at 8 h. September 16.
From the C. G. of the 152d F. A. Brigade to the C. O. of the Divisional Artillery of the Italian 8th Division at 8 h. September 16.

* * * * *

14. Division headquarters (1st echelon) will open at COULONGES at 8 h. September 16 and close at its present location same date, same hour.

* * * * *

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General.

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277-32.1: Order

**Plan for Attacks**

FIELD ORDER
No. 32

* Cave near Fme des Filles, September 13, 1918--6:30 p. m.*

Maps: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Special Order No. 1052, XVI Army Corps, the following is prescribed for the 77th Division during the 3d phase of the attack contemplated in Field Order No. 30, these headquarters.

2. The 77th Division having reached at the end of the first phase the objective La CARRIERE, western exit of GLENNES, will be ready at the hour P (beginning of the attack of the 3d phase) to advance to the following objective: BUTTE-de-BOURMONT---crossroads 800 meters northwest of the Fme PIERRE---CHEMINEE Barracks at 84.7---crossroads of the dirt roads northwest of GLENNES.

3. (a) The attack will be carried out by the 154th Brigade with at least 3 battalions participating.

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REVillon - BUTTE DE BOURMONT AREA
Looking east from Villers-en-Prayères
MEMORANDUM TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. The operation contemplated for J at H, is subdivided into three phases for convenience of reference.

1st PHASE: Infantry: The elements of the 77th Division, acting in conjunction with the French 62d Division on the right, will advance their line, pivoting on the left so as to occupy the western exit of the town of GLENNES. The western exit of the town of GLENNES is construed to mean such portion of the town as is west of the crossroads at 207.97-291.95. Arrived upon this line, the elements involved will halt and dig themselves in. While this operation is in progress, a covering group will occupy the St-PIERRE Fme.

Artillery: For the protection of this operation, the artillery will lay down a rolling barrage in front of the infantry line, on the line shown on sketch heretofore furnished by the artillery commander, rate of fire to be as directed in my memorandum of this date (4 rounds per gun per minute). The rate of advance of this barrage will be 100 meters in five minutes.

The infantry forces designated for the operation will be as follows: Advance of line to western exit of GLENNES, one battalion of infantry, with one battalion of infantry in immediate support.

Covering detachment, St-PIERRE Fme, one company, with the remainder of the battalion to which that company belongs, in immediate support.

The disposition of machine-guns, 37-mm. guns and trench mortars, to accompany this infantry, left to the direction of the Commanding General, 154th Infantry Brigade.

Each man engaged in the operation will carry with him two days' rations, two sandbags and four hand or rifle grenades.

Attention is invited to the urgent necessity for a thorough cleanup of the houses, cellars, enclosures, etc., including caves or dugouts in the territory over which our advance passes.

2d PHASE: Artillery: The barrage laid down in front of the infantry rolls up the slopes of La PETITE-MONTAGNE and is fixed upon the lines indicated in the sketch heretofore referred to. The battalion of 75's which has been directed on REVILLON during the first phase, continues to fire upon that point and in the depressions in the vicinity of that town. The activity of the 155's continues on the areas of La PETITE-MONTAGNE indicated in the sketch, for the time prescribed, and at the rate of fire directed.

Infantry: The infantry maintains its position and consolidates the ground gained, maintains liaison with the French 62d Division on the right which is to advance simultaneously with our line. Other operations farther to the right will be undertaken by other French units during this second phase of the operation.

3d PHASE: As an ultimate objective, dependent upon the developments, this division is assigned La PETITE-MONTAGNE and the slopes east of REVILLON. This eventual objective is dependent upon the success of the French on our right. Should, during the 2d phase, the advance continue over the plateau of the HANGAR de BEAUREGARD, our line will advance and will storm the slopes of La PETITE-MONTAGNE. This operation will be directed by the Commanding General, 154th Infantry Brigade. It is obviously essential that the closest liaison be established and maintained between the Commanding General of the 154th
Infantry Brigade, the Commanding General of the French 62d Division, and the Commanding General of the 152d Field Artillery Brigade. The occasion, if it presents itself, must be seized at once. The division commander cannot be in a position where he can himself direct the movement. It is desired, however, that the utmost aggressiveness be displayed and that any sign of weakening on the part of the opposition be immediately and fully exploited.

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

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277-32.13: Memorandum

**Time of Attack**

P. C. 77th DIVISION,
September 14, 1918--9 h.

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF:

[Extract]

1. The first objective having been attained, the whole line will advance to second objective - REVILLON--RUISSEAU du MOULIN--MOULIN de GLENNES.
   This attack will take place at 9:45. It will be preceded by ten minutes intensive fire on the objective indicated, which will begin at 9:35.

* * * * *

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.

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277-32.13: Memorandum

**P Hour Fixed**

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 14, 1918--9:05 h.

MEMORANDUM:

Division Girard requests that his left flank should be covered in the direction of the MOULIN de GLENNES. General commanding army corps after taking the advice of General Pelle decides that the objective of the third phase will be reached as soon as possible and the 77th Division will endeavor to occupy La PETTIE-MONTAGNE. Consequently, hour P is fixed at 9:45 h.

Captain KLOTZ.

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Order to Attack

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 14, 1918—10:30 h.

MEMORANDUM TO C. G., 154th Infantry Brigade:

1. The division commander directs that you prepare and launch your attack on the line REVILLON---RUISSEAU du MOULIN---MOULIN de GLENNES at once, calling for such artillery support as you want on such points as you deem necessary. He further directs that as soon as possible after you have obtained your objective, and are able to exploit this success by attacking and taking the crest of La PETITE-MONTAGNE, that you proceed with this attack. The division on your right promises to follow your movement to cover your right flank.

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

Order to Hold Line

P. C. 77th DIVISION,
September 14, 1918—18:25 h.

MEMORANDUM TO COMMANDING General, 154th Inf. Brig:

1. The division commander directs that you have your troops dig in and hold the line as occupied after your attack at 5 o'clock this 14th day of September, as he understands, approximately on the following line: 206.7-292.95---206.95-292.75---207.2-292.5---207.55-292.15 and intersection 208.0-292.0.

As soon as you ascertain the correct line that you hold, report it to these headquarters. Patrols should be pushed out during the night to prevent a surprise attack on this line.

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.
Telephone message received from Gun through Cairo 1 [C. G., 154th Brig.] confirmed the fact that the French have given way in the town of GLENNES. Our line is holding and he has sent three companies on the right flank next the French. That will entirely protect our right and the heads of these three companies are within 200 to 300 yards of the town of GLENNES.

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Movement of Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 33

Cave near Fme des Filles, September 15, 1918—6:30 p. m.

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Special Order No. 3101/3, Fifth Army, this division, less wheeled transportation and mounted elements, will be moved by busses. * * *

* * * * * *

By command of Major General ALEXANDER

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

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MERVAL-SERVAL AREA
Looking east from southern outskirts of Serval
Movement of Mounted Elements

FIELD ORDER
No. 34

MAPS: 1/80,000

SOISSONS MEAUX
REIMS ARCIS
CHALONS

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Special Order No. 3101/3, Fifth Army, the 152d Field Artillery Brigade, the headquarters troop, mounted military police, and the horse-drawn transportation of the division will proceed to a different army area by marching beginning on the night of the September 16/17.

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7. Headquarters of the division will close at COULONGES at 18 h. September 17.

By command of Major General ALEXANDER:

J. R. R. HANNAY,
Chief of Staff.

Divisional OISE-AISNE Operations

77th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Raucourt, Ardennes, November 11, 1918.

FROM: The Commanding General, 77th Division
TO: The Adjutant General, A. E. F. (Thru military channels)

[Extract]

1. THE VESLE-AISNE SECTOR:
The undersigned assumed command of the 77th Division on August 27, 1918. At that time the division was occupying the line of the VESLE River between CHATEAU du DIABLE and BAZOCHES. Both brigades had elements in the line; the 154th Brigade occupying a bridgehead north of the VESLE in the vicinity of CHATEAU du DIABLE; the 153d Brigade occupying a
bridgehead north of the VESLE in the vicinity of BAZOCHES.

2. The features of the terrain were such as to make these bridgeheads extremely difficult to hold, they being subjected to enemy artillery, rifle and machine-gun fire at all times, notwithstanding which fact the positions were held in the face of the most strenuous opposition and as time went on were improved.

3. The improvement of the positions was brought about by undertaking small gains which, from the time I took command of the division, were successful, until finally on the night of September 3 indications in my front being that the enemy was in process of withdrawal, I ordered strong patrols to be sent forward early on the following morning: one directed on the heights above CHATEAU du DIABLE and the other on the heights above BAZOCHES. Both efforts were successful notwithstanding serious opposition from machine-gun, rifle, and artillery fire, and as soon as a footing was gained upon the heights in question, the patrols were followed up by the remainder of the brigades from which they had been sent out.

4. The advance thus begun was continued, passing through the towns of BLANZY-les-FISMES, DHUIZEL, LONGUEVAL, SERVAL, AND MERVAL.

5. On September 5, the line was advanced to the general line from east to west: Le BOIS de la VICOMETE, Bois des GENETES to Bois de MAUCHAMP---PIERRE-LAROCHE---La BUTTE-de-BOURMONT---along REVILLON-GLENNES Road. In order to maintain liaison with the 28th Division on the right, the right flank of the division was refused. The former division, having encountered strong resistance in the vicinity of GLENNES, was unable to advance and consequently the advance of the 77th Division was necessarily retarded in order to maintain liaison with the 28th.

6. On September 6, the right flank remained practically in position, on account of the resistance given. On our left, however, we advanced to position on road VIEIL-ARCY, VILLERS-en-PRAYERES, occupying VILLERS-en-PRAYERES with one company. A strong combat patrol, sent forward after artillery preparation, succeeded in driving the enemy out of La CENDRIERE (Farm and Woods). Two counterattacks made against our troops at La CENDRIERE were repulsed. On September 7, the 28th Division, formerly on the right, was withdrawn, its place being taken by the French 62d Division. At this time the division formed part of the American III Corps.

7. On September 8, the 77th Division in conjunction with the French 62d Division on its right, was to advance, making its first objective north of CUCHERY and final objective along the AISNE Canal. The attack started according to schedule and, after advancing five hundred meters, contact with the French was lost, they having been held up by strong resistance from GLENNES, leaving our right flank exposed to enfilade machine-gun fire. Our troops, though still advancing, were ordered by me to refuse their right in order to retain contact with the French 62d Division, as an advance with my flanks in the air did not commend itself to me. The French, however, were unable to make more than very small gains and at the end of the day this division had only advanced its line in the subsector held by the 154th Brigade, and extended from VILLERS-en-PRAYERES to La BUTTE-de-BOURMONT, thence along the side of the hill past La MARAIS-MINARD to MERVAL, thence to a Point 207.8-291.4. This position was held substantially as given above from September 9 to 12 inclusive.

8. On September 13, a new attack was planned, the purpose being to advance our right so as to occupy La PETITE-MONTAGNE: the French 62d Division on our right having for its task the reduction of the enemy positions in GLENNES. The advance of the 77th Division was successful and its elements reached positions at La PETITE-MONTAGNE, but the French again failed to make the advance expected of them, did not reduce the town of GLENNES, and the enemy positions in its vicinity; and as the right flank of the division was again exposed to rifle fire on this account, the line was, by my order, withdrawn, as a retention of the advanced position with no supporting forces on the right and the enemy being unhampered in his fire against us in that direction, would have simply involved useless losses for which I could offer no corresponding advantage.
9. During the night of September 13/14, the French, in the southern outskirts of GLENNES, were counterattacked so as to force them to fall back. In order to reestablish the line, three companies of my right brigade were sent forward and reestablished the line through the southern outskirts of GLENNES and on the right of that town.

10. On September 15, the 154th Brigade on the right were counterattacked in strong force after an intense machine-gun and artillery preparation. This attack was unsuccessful, and after being repulsed, the brigade held its ground.

11. On September 15/16, the division was relieved by the corresponding arms of the Italian 8th Division. In turning over our sector, our front line was as follows: Along the road VIEIL-ARCY----VILLERS-en-PRAYERES to La BUTTE-de-BOURMONT, thence along the side of the hill past to Le MARAIS-MINARD taking a point 207.7-291.3 to 207.2-291.5 establishing a mixed group with the French 62d Division on our right at 207.75-291.3.

12. During the service of this division on the VESLE and its advance from the VESLE to the AISNE, the records of this division show losses, killed and wounded, as follows:

Killed - 418  Wounded - 1,806

ROBERT ALEXANDER,
Major General,
Commanding.
OISE - AISNE OFFENSIVE
18 AUGUST TO 11 NOVEMBER 1918

MAP No. 85

Italicized zones indicate sectors garrisoned by American divisions.
Annex to Oise-Aisne Operation

Translated German Documents


Combat Conditions in Ourcq Area

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,

August 7, 1918.

To: Wichura's [VIII Reserve) Corps

[Extract]

Reference: Corps Order No. 196, Operations Section

1. Report of the situation of the division (July 27 to August 6, 1918).

Placed under the command of Wichura's Corps for station on July 27, the division took over the sector of the 10th Landwehr Division during the night of July 27/28.

Powerful enemy attacks opened 8:30 a.m., July 28, led to violent fighting throughout the day in the outpost zone reaching as far as the OURCQ Creek.

At 1 p.m. the division took over command of the sector.

New attacks were made by the enemy in the noon hours as well as at 6:30 p.m., July 29. In some places the enemy gained a foothold on the north bank of the OURCQ.

Following partial attacks in the forenoon, strong enemy infantry masses pushed forward on the entire front at 12:30 p.m., July 30, against the outpost detachments, who were offering resistance as they withdrew to the main line of resistance, as ordered. In front of the latter, the enemy attack collapsed, with very heavy losses.

During the day, especially vigorous artillery fire cost the division considerable losses.

On July 31 and August 1, the enemy renewed his attack on only two of the adjacent divisions; this may be attributed to our shelling of the areas with mustard gas, particularly on draw and villages during the night of the 30th.

During the night of August 1/2, the prescribed withdrawal to the Bluecher Position was effected. After the withdrawal was completed according to plan, without interference from the enemy, the division was stationed in the Bluecher Position, ready for defensive action by 12 noon, August 8; the 5th Guard Grenadier Regiment was in line on the south bank and the 93d Infantry on the north bank of the VESLE. After its mission as counterattack regiment of the 1st Guard Division was completed, the 5th Guard Foot Regiment rejoined the division at 10 p.m. and in the evening of August 2, relieved the elements of the 93d Reserve Infantry in line in the left regimental sector.

During August 3, after evacuation of the Ziethen Position, the enemy pursued vigorously and reached the line VILLESAVOYE---Hill 100 meters directly north of St-GILLES. His approaching columns and concentrations in the draws presented good targets for our artillery.

- 204 -
The following night, the enemy brought the main body of his artillery into position; through the day it fired on FISMES and its advance positions, our trenches on the north bank, and villages, and approaches.

After the enemy had concentrated his artillery on FISMES for a short time in the afternoon, he attacked the town in force via CHEZELLES Farm at 4:30 p.m. He succeeded in pushing through the line of outposts, forcing back the forces detailed to defend the town, and capturing it.

The 5th Guard Grenadier Regiment was withdrawn during the night of August 4/5 and was assembled near BLANZY.

On August 5, the enemy did not execute any attacks against the division sector. Only patrol fights developed in the evening hours, in front of the right flank of the division.

While the combat activity remained slight in the forenoon of August 6, the enemy placed very heavy fire on the division sector in the afternoon and attacked the 17th Infantry Division powerfully in the evening hours. This attack overlapped to the right flank of the division. Wherever in the sector the enemy penetrated the main line of resistance, he was driven back by a counterattack at daybreak, August 7.

The division is in possession of its entire main line of resistance; the VESLE posts are standing at the creek, with the exception of the extreme right flank.

2. Estimate of the Situation.

The division is opposite the fresh American 4th and 32d Divisions, with apparently a narrow zone of action.

The enemy artillery is not very strong yet. So far the enemy engaged only infantry positions and shelled villages and rear areas. There has been no systematic engagement of our artillery so far.

No extensive placing or use of aviation units has been observed as yet.

The positions of the division are under construction but suffer from the small combat strengths of the division.

The defense of the assigned VESLE sector with the forces at the disposal of the division seems to be assured.


American Penetration of German Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 12897

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION
August 7, 1918--10:30 a.m.

DIVISION ORDER No. 1

[Extract]

1. The heavy attack made in the afternoon of August 6 by the French with the American 32d Infantry Division has led to the establishment of the enemy on the north bank of
the VESLE on the interior flanks of the 17th and 4th Guard Infantry Divisions. The counter-attacks executed at 5:20 a.m., August 7, without artillery preparation, did not succeed completely. On our right flank the 1st Bn., 5th Gren. Guard Regt., gained back the old main line of resistance of the 93d Res. Inf. by a thrust along the railroad. To what extent our posts have occupied the support line on the VESLE, is not yet clear. The line runs from the railroad south of the H in BAZOCHES to the highway in map square 2753/25 e, thence east along the north side of the highway to the corner of the woods in map square 2854/4 c, along the west edge of this wood as far as the railroad and along the latter toward the northeast.

According to reports just received, the 90th Fus. Regt. gained some additional ground from the west along the railroad, so that the enemy is lying in a rather pointed wedge, with the point on the highway.

2. The north back of the VESLE must be mopped up of the enemy without fail.

8. The town of FISMES will not be recaptured.

The corps has ordered that the division create an outpost zone between the highway bridge 1 km. west of FISMES and the FISMES railroad station, the forward limit to be located approximately on the railroad. • • • The outpost zone will be created by an attack, if necessary, in which prisoners will be taken and the manner in which the town is occupied will be ascertained.

9. Wherever necessary, the water level of the VESLE will be raised by simple dams, so that it will reach to the edges of the bank. Thus the enemy can be prevented from working under cover of the edges of the river bank when attempting to cross. • • •

Count FINCKENSTEIN.

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HS Ger. File: 647-33.5: Fldr. I: Order

Regimental Units in Line

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,
5th GUARD BRIGADE,
August 7, 1918--8 p.m.

No. 73

[Extract]

1. During the nights of August 7/8 and August 8/9, the 5th Gren. Guard Regt. will be put in line between the 5th Foot Guard Regt. and the 93d Res. Inf. • • •

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von OVEN.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,
C. P. 5th GUARD INF. REGIMENT,
August 7, 1918.

[Extract]

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At 8 p. m., after a short, sharp preparatory fire the enemy launched an attack against the right battalion sector after a violent fire preparation. By an accurately laid artillery and machine-gun fire the attack is broken up.

During the night, the battalions worked at constructing the positions.

An order was received relative to breaking the division sector into 3 regimental sectors. Thereafter, 1st Bn. sector was taken over by the 5th Gren. Guard Regt.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,
C. P. 2nd Bn., 5th GRENADE GUARD REGIMENT,
August 7, 1918.

[Extract]

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Ravine north of PERLES.

At 2 a. m. the battalion, as brigade reserve, moved up still farther, stationing in the ravine north of PERLES. The battalion remained there throughout the day and received orders to relieve elements of the 5th Guard Foot Regt. and 93rd Res. Inf. during the coming night.

At 10:30 p. m. the 5th and 8th Cos. relieved two companies of the 5th Guard Foot Regt. in the ravine east of the FISMETTE Road junction west of BLANZY (152.5); road near Hill 146.6.*

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* Shown on German maps - 1 km. south of BLANZY-les-FISMES, road passing 200 meters west of BLANZY.
At 5:20 a. m., a counterattack was made without artillery preparation. The 2d and 4th Cos., 5th Gren. Guards, followed by the 3d Co., 5th Gren. Guards, advanced on both sides of the railroad in a southwesterly direction and attempted, by envelopment, to drive the Americans from the north bank. At the same time, the 8th Co., 93d Res. Inf., pushed from the bank of the road forward in the south direction, while the 90th Regt., attacking from the north and west, attempted to clean the enemy out of the breach. Though the 90th Regt. did not advance across the highway, thereby making impossible the advance of the 8th Co., 93d Res. Inf., the Gren. Guards succeeded nevertheless in clearing almost the entire sector. The following units are now in the front lines, from left to right: 4th Co., 93d Res. Inf., (in close contact with the 11th Co.) along the railroad embankment adjacent to the 2d Co., 93d Inf., adjacent to the 2d Co., 5th Gren. Guard Regt., which holds the railroad embankment as far as the east edge of small wood in Map Square 2854. There the front turns northward and reaches the highway about 100 meters east of the bend in the road. The stretch is occupied by the 4th Co., 5th Gren. Guards, and the 8th Co., 93d Res. Inf., while the 3d Co., 5th Gren. Guards, and 3d Co., 93d, mixed with the remainder of the 1st, 5th and 7th Cos., 93d Res. Inf., are in reserve in the small wood north of the road.

The attack set for the afternoon did not develop at all, so that a rather large scale attack was ordered by the regiment for the evening. In the meantime, the enemy shelled the front line small wood with violent artillery fire.

At 1:45 p. m. the enemy succeeds in laying a direct hit on a protruding rock edge of the front line C. P. cave causing devastation and destruction by splintering the 15 cm. grenades used. After the thick smoke cleared away and the first shock had passed, there were found in the front line C. P. 6 dead and a whole row of wounded. ** These explosions set fire to light ammunition equipment at the entrance to the front line C. P. and revealed to the enemy the whereabouts of our battle headquarters. As a result the enemy directed his fire on this single point - the front line C. P. - and fired at regular intervals of 3 min. one 15 cm. grenade after another, before, beside and in rear of the cave. Conditions in the cave, where the staffs of 3 battalions are located are unbearable; messenger traffic is possible only under great losses.

At 6:30 p. m., pursuant to orders, the attack is launched simultaneously from the east, north, and west against the enemy who had broken through. The attack succeeds, although the troops have had no warm food for 2 days: they have been suffering from dysentery because of bad weather and are completely crushed from constant fighting operations.

Even so, during the night, it was established that the regimental sector in the left flank as far as the VESLE is entirely clear of the enemy, though, there have been identified, a machine-gun nest in the right flank at the bend of the railroad, and outguards in the small wood north of the railroad.

For the night relief is ordered of the 1st Bn. by the 2d Bn., and this in the following manner: the 2d Bn., 5th Gren. Guards, takes over the left regimental sector, relieving thereby the 3d Bn., 93d Res. Inf., the 2d Bn., 93d Res. Inf., moves in the right
sector to the front lines, while the 11th Co., 93d Inf., retains the left flank. The re-
mainder of the 3d Bn., 93d Inf., is alerted as reserve in the rear of the right flank.
The 1st Bn., 93d Inf., moves as reserve battalion to the slope southeast of PERLES. The first Bn., 5th Gren. Guards, which was to be alerted as reserve in rear of the front line, is by mistake not relieved owing to the great confusion of units, and must continue to hold in the front line.

By 6 a.m. the fighting comes to an end. The staffs of 4 battalions are still in the front line C.P., despite the continuous shelling, at 3-min. intervals, that the latter suffered for 16 hours.

At 7 a.m. the staff of the 1st Bn., 93d Inf., abandons the front line C.P., and at 8 a.m., after the regimental commander had personally convinced himself that a further stay at the command post is impossible, the cave is evacuated. The C.P. of the 2d Bn., 93d Inf., moves to the south portion of wood of PERLES, the support C.P. (3d Bn., 93d Inf.), to the PERLES-FISMES Road approximately 500 meters southeast of PERLES, the staff of the 1st Bn., 5th Gren. Guards, abandons the sector, the reserve troops command of the 1st Bn., 93d Inf., is located in a cellar of PERLES.

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**German Divisional Front Broken by Americans**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 911

GERMAN 17TH INFANTRY DIVISION,

August 7, 1918--2:15 p.m.

To: 4th Guard Division

[Extract]

1. The enemy has succeeded in breaking into both flank positions of the division. The 89th Grenadier Regt. is holding its sector which is seriously threatened at present.

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**Inquiry concerning Defense**

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Received for transmission; August 6, 1918: 6:30 p.m.

Sent by: Teletype No. 6276

To: Seventh Army

Report is requested as to how the army plans to conduct the defense if operations against its front are recognized as being a systematically prepared attack on a large scale.

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**Defense in Bluecher Position, etc.**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 50/August

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY, August 7, 1918.

To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

Reference: No. 6276, Group of Armies German Crown Prince

In Etzel's [XVII Army] Corps, Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps, and Wichura's [VIII Res.] Corps the Bluecher Position lacks the depth necessary to conduct full-scale battles. The rear boundary formed by the AISNE not only restricts the required distribution in depth but also seriously impedes supply and evacuation. Consequently the west portion of the Bluecher Position in the Seventh Army is incapable of being held against a systematic large-scale attack prepared by a comparatively lone artillery action. If such an attack is recognized in the preparatory stages, it is recommended that the defense be shifted to the north bank of the AISNE from the right wing of the army as far as REVILLON, and that contact be established with the Bluecher Position from REVILLON on via ROMAIN (ROMAIN switch position).

On the other hand it is considered possible and expedient to hold the Bluecher Position against surprise attacks also in its west portion, since the terrain features south of the VESLE hardly permit the sudden commitment of vastly superior enemy forces. However, the enemy must be prevented from establishing a bridgehead north of the VESLE on a comparatively wide front and in depth, which would facilitate the crossing of the VESLE with attack troops in some force and the use of tanks.

Therefore, until the combat situation becomes less tense than at present and we have succeeded in barricading the lowlands of the VESLE by obstacles, the front of Etzel's,
Schoeler's, and Wichura's Corps must remain completely fit for action, and the army must have fit reserves available. It will then be able to hold the VESLE line by an active defense that will drive off the enemy.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. II: Field Message

**Method of Defense**

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Received for transmission: August 7, 1918: 11 a. m.

Sent by: Teletype No. 6284

To: Seventh Army

I concur in the view held by the Army that the enemy must be prevented from gaining positions of departure north of the VESLE for an attack. Consequently the troops must be instructed to free the north bank of the river completely of the enemy. I request that this order be issued orally to the division commanders.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince.

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HS Ger. File: 805-33.5: Fldr. III: Message

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. German Seventh Army

DATE: Received for transmission: August 7, 1918: 5:25 p. m.

Sent by: Telephone No. 61/August 1918

ARMY ORDER

Supreme Headquarters has decided that the army will fight in the Bluecher Position, so that until further orders the defense will not be shifted back to the rear of the AISNE and into the ROMAIN switch position.

For the fight in the Bluecher Position it is indispensable that the enemy be prevented from gaining a foothold on the north bank of the VESLE. Wherever he has succeeded in gaining such a foothold, he will be attacked and driven back. I request the corps commanders to inform the division commanders orally of this mission, stressing the high importance of it. I am under the impression that there is not a complete understanding on this point or
at least that it has not reached all the troops including those in the most advanced positions.

It is essential that the artillery be distributed in depth. Even this necessity has not yet been recognized everywhere and effected.

Wichura's [VIII Res.] Corps will employ 1/3 of the 19th Inf. Div. for work on the ROMAIN switch position at all times. Employing the maximum energy of the troops, all corps will push the wiring of the VESLE lowlands and the organization of the Bluecher Position.

von BOEHN.

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FROM: Supreme Headquarters, Office of Chief of Staff, Operations Section

DATE: August 8, 1918. No. 9704

To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Text in Clear

The Bluecher Position together with the VESLE must be held. We are not concerned at the moment with the position recommended by the Seventh Army in rear of the AISNE and the ROMAIN switch position. However, these positions must be improved with all means available. The bringing up of fresh forces necessary for this purpose will primarily be the responsibility of the group of armies.

With reference to my Telegram No. 9705, Operations Section, Secret, of August 7, concerning defensive operations in case of any other local or large-scale attacks, the action must be conducted in the sense of the active defense, to which the extensive plateau-like terrain is especially adapted.

If, for instance, despite all our efforts, the enemy should succeed in gaining ground on the west wing, an offensive thrust from the east with massed forces from the line LONGUEVAL--BLANZY-les-FISMES would be apropos.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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Recommendations for Strategic Position Between Oise and Vesle

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 97/August 1918

To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

Reference: Order No. 2759

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 8, 1918.

First recommendation: Blue line.
Advantages: The dominating hills around LOIRE Farm, the possession of which is of decisive influence on the terrain around COUCY-le-CHATEAU, remain in our hands.

The key to the CHEMIN-des-DAMES Position in the LAFFAUX---La MALMAISON region will be protected by a wide zone.

SOISSONS will be eliminated as a rail point and assembly point of enemy forces of any considerable size.

The AisNE Position up from VAILLY and with it the east VESLE Position will have greater strength. We will retain greater freedom of operation to the front and rear.

These advantages offset the disadvantage of a somewhat greater length of front and the absence of a tank obstacle in some places.

Second recommendation: Red line.

The disadvantages of this trace of line are apparent from the above description.

Special attention is invited to the fact that the canal between the OISE and CRECY-au-MONT is not an important obstacle.

In both cases it would be of advantage to keep a portion of the hilly terrain north-east of NOYON in our possession to secure the OISE gap.

By order:

REINHARDT:
Colonel, Chief of Staff.

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PROPOSED STRATEGIC POSITION BETWEEN OISE AND VESLE
GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY
8 AUGUST 1918

MAP REF: FRENCH I 80000 LAON NO 22 AND SOISSONS NO 33
Preparation for Counterattack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 12917

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,
August 8, 1918—2:15 p.m.

DIVISION ORDER No. 1

[Extract]

1. Intercepts of enemy radio traffic disclose that the enemy has apparently withdrawn forces in the region of FISMES and has moved them more toward the west.

   The 5th Foot Guard Regt. has captured a prisoner from the French 10th Div.
   Further heavy attacks of the enemy against the VESLE line must be expected with certainty.

   Supreme Headquarters has again issued the order that a decisive battle be fought for the VESLE line.
   Every commander and every man in the division must put forth his best effort to ensure that the assigned sector is held at all costs.

   I emphasize again that any attacking enemy force that succeeds in pushing forward across the VESLE must be driven back across the river. In such a case, the quicker and the stronger the counterattack takes place, which is to be launched immediately by every commander, the easier it will be to drive the enemy back.

   • • • • • •

2. The penetration in the sector on our right will be neutralized within the next few days by a systematic counterattack with artillery and trench mortar preparation.

   Which forces of the division will participate in the counterattack will be ordered later. The 5th Guard Brig. will make provision for the security of our right flank by boundary detachments and by holding reserves in readiness.

3. After their new sectors have been taken over, the regiments will push outposts across the VESLE. • • • The 5th Guard Brig. will prepare an attack for the purpose of capturing prisoners. • • •

4. Our reconnaissance patrols observed tank-like vehicles in COURVILLE. There is a possibility that the enemy plans to cross the VESLE and to cover these attempts by tanks brought up close to the river. In our sector FISMES is the most appropriate location to assemble tanks for the purpose mentioned. The 5th Guard Brig. will check the dispositions for antitank defense. The advanced posts will be instructed to listen for tank noises particularly at night.

5. As soon as the water level of the VESLE recedes, the river bed will be searched for stranded bridge parts, etc. In places where bridge material accumulates in the river bed, the enemy will always find it easily possible to cross individually and with patrols. Consequently all these pieces of woods must be removed. Only the dams which are to be constantly well guarded will be allowed to remain. • • •

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   Count FINCKENSTEIN.

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- 215 -
Advance detachments are sent by the 5th Gren. Guard Regt. to 1st Bn. sector. At 8 p. m., after a quiet day, enemy opens rather heavy artillery fire; it is followed by his attempts to move patrols across the bridge.

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Early reply with map requested concerning most suitable trace of line of strategic position HAM---COUCY-le-CHATEAU---VAILLY---REVILLON---JONCHERY, for the territory between OISE and VESLE. Strictest secrecy enjoined.

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Instructions for Vesle Attack

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,
August 9, 1918---10:30 a. m.

To: 5th Guard Brigade.

The 5th Guard Regt. will mop up the north bank of the Vesle at all costs. Transfer of command will not take place until this is done. If necessary, troops will be placed at the disposal of the regiment from the reserve.

Count FINCKENSTEIN.

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Orders for Recapture of Fismette

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 12937

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,
August 9, 1918--6:50 p. m.

DIVISION ORDER No. 1

[Extract]

1. Enemy has spread out in the south portion of Fismette west beyond the bridge site along the main road, where he was able to gain a foothold during the night.
   Reinforcements were observed being brought up to Fismes.

2. Fismette will be recaptured this evening. The north bank of the Vesle will be reached and held.
   Time of infantry attack: 9:30 p. m.

3. The 5th Guard Brig. will conduct the infantry attack, the preparations for which will be started immediately.
   For this purpose the available elements of the 5th Foot Guard Regt. and the 5th Gren. Guard Regt. are at the disposal of the brigade. Reserves will be held out.
   Assault detachments will discontinue their efforts to advance the line. The front line of our infantry will be determined and reported.

4. The 4th Guard Artillery Commander will prepare the infantry attack by a concentration from 9 to 9:30 p. m. During the preparation the fire will be placed on the section of Fismette which is occupied by the enemy; at 9:30 p. m. it will jump to the south bank of the Vesle as a box barrage. Until the artillery preparation, very heavy high-angle fire will remain on the bridge site and the closest portions of the village, particularly west of the road.
By agreement with the artillery commanders of the 17th, 216th, and 29th Inf. Divs., heavy fire will be placed on FISMES before, during, and after the attack. Its approaches from the southwest, south and southeast will continue to be under rigorous harassing fire. Ammunition will be brought up so that it can be placed in the firing positions immediately after dark.

5. The 106th Pioneer Bn. will detail assault squads of the pioneers with obstacle material. The north bank of the VESLE will again be wired during the night, particularly the crossing points. Two medium trench mortars will be emplaced just north of FISMETTE under the control of the regimental commander in whose sector they are located.

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Count FINCKENSTEIN.

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Orders Relative to Recapture of Fismette

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 12944

GERMAN 4th GUARD DIVISION,
August 9, 1918--8:40 p. m.

1. After is recapture, FISMETTE will immediately be organized as a powerful strong-point of the outpost with wire obstacles and abatis, and it will be prepared for defense by sector by wiring the village quarter and siting light and heavy machine guns.

The groups of houses at FISMES located south of the VESLE will be demolished by shelling with heavy high-angle fire and trench mortars. In FISMETTE approaches to the bank of the VESLE will be run through the houses still standing. Barricading by wire, logs, etc., will be carried out and provision be made for protection of the obstacles by machine guns.

Cellars with several exits will be provided for support troops.

In the main line of resistance and in rear thereof, machine guns will be set up to sweep the main roads and to flank the terrain outside the edges of the town of FISMETTE.

2. By use of incendiary ammunition the 4th Guard Artillery Commander will set FISMETTE afire if the wind is favorable.

Count FINCKENSTEIN.

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FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Received for transmission: August 10, 1918: 11:40 p.m.

TO: Seventh Army No. 6325

I request report as to what steps have been taken to drive the enemy force that crossed the VESLE at FISMES back across the river.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince.

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Estimate of the Situation

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 109/August

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 10, 1918.

[Extract]

No doubt by this time the enemy has gained a clear picture concerning our intentions to defend the VESLE obstinately, while his first violent attempts at crossing obviously were based on a different estimate of the situation. He has gone over to a systematic establishment of bridgeheads. The army fully expects an attempt on a large scale to drive us back behind the AISNE. Whether the enemy will launch a full-scale attack only after a heavy artillery preparation as was formerly his practice, or whether after the experiences and successes of his recent attacks he will attempt to cross the VESLE on a broad front by surprise following a sudden heavy barrage, cannot yet be determined.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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- 219 -
Reference: Seventh Army Order No. 61/August 1918

To: Schmettow's 65th Army Corps, Wichura's VIII Res. Corps
Schoeler's VIII Army Corps, and Etzel's XVII Army Corps

MESSAGE NO. 175

The impression has been gained that the order not to allow the enemy to cross the VESLE, has led to an insufficient distribution in depth. This situation must be corrected speedily and thoroughly.

The following distribution of forces will serve as general indication:

The regiments will conduct the defense with the front line battalions and about half of the support battalions.

1 to 2 companies of the support battalions will remain in the position halfway up the slope, as security detachment.

The rest battalions will take position in rear of this half-slope position as division reserve. It will depend on the extent of the enemy attack whether the rest battalions will be used for counterattack in order to drive the enemy back across the VESLE or to check the assault in a full-scale action on the half-slope position or in the artillery protective position on top of the plateaus. Security detachments of infantry and machine guns must be placed in the half-slope position as well as in the artillery protective position.

As a certain opposition against such a real distribution in depth seems to exist on the part of some divisions, the corps must accomplish the desired result by issuing explicit orders.

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von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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Shortening of Front May be Necessary

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2760
GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 11, 1918.

To: Seventh Army

The general situation may make it imperative that a rather extensive shortening of the front be ordered perhaps within the very near future. In such an event the REVILLON Switch Position will assume special significance. This headquarters is well aware of the necessity of establishing depots and constructing roads. Nevertheless, the army will have to release labor details (construction details, Landsturm troops and pioneers) without delay and employ them on the rapid construction of the Revillon Switch Position.

Report by wire requested as to the steps taken.

Preparations for Flusschiffahrt Withdrawal Movement

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 120/August 1918
GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 11, 1918.

To be transmitted to Divisions only as far as
They are concerned, and only in Extract Form

[Extract]

Army Order No. 61/August 1918, according to which the line of the VESLE is to be held, is still in force.

However, regardless of this order the corps must prepare a withdrawal into the second position (AISNE Position) and into the Romain Switch Position.

Code word for the movement: "Flusschiffahrt" [River Traffic].

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On the AISNE it is of prime importance that the enemy be absolutely prevented from crossing the canal and river.

Preparations for "Flusschiffahrt" comprise the following:

(a) Organization of Position: Of particular importance

The field of fire on the river, especially the bends that project to the south, must be cleared.

The bridges must be prepared for demolition.
The organization of the ROMAIN Switch Position must take into account from the very beginning a sufficient distribution in depth.

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(b) Evacuation of the valley of the AISNE and organization of the supply on the basis of the new rear lines of communications.

The movement will be prepared for execution in two nights.

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By order:

REINHARDT,
Colonel.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section
AT: Hq. German Seventh Army
DATE: Received for transmission: August 11, 1918: 8:15 p. m.
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince No. 136/August

FIELD MESSAGE No. 215

Reference: Order No. 6325, Operations Section

Plans for the recapture of FISMETTE and regaining of the VESLE west of FISMETTE on both sides of BAZOCHES by a coordinated counterattack are in preparation.

The time of the operation will be reported later.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section
AT: Hq. Seventh Army
DATE: Received for transmission: August 11, 1918: 10:15 a. m.
TO: The Corps

TELETYPE MESSAGE No. 197

13 passable footbridges across the VESLE can be seen, some of them at points where the enemy is not on the north bank.
The corps must keep completely informed concerning footbridges by continuous reports from the troops. Wherever the VESLE separates outpost troops on both sides, no enemy footbridges can be tolerated.

Wherever our position is on the south bank, light footbridges must be under our control.

I request that the location of footbridges and any increase and decrease in their number be kept under surveillance and that continuous reports on the subject reach me.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5:Fldr. II: Order

**General Principles for the Defense**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 6320

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE.

August 11, 1918.

Commanders and troops must be much better prepared for a sudden enemy attack than heretofore. The enemy has repeatedly succeeded skillfully in concealing his preparations for the attack. He has not uncovered his advanced batteries until the attack or shortly before. After a brief artillery preparation or together with the rolling barrage the enemy infantry has advanced to the attack with numerous tanks.

Until definitive regulations issue from Supreme Headquarters, the following general principles for the defense will govern.

For the organization and distribution of forces it is imperative that the main line of resistance be held in case of surprise attacks. Therefore, wherever possible, the main line of resistance must be located sufficiently back from the enemy that it will lie outside of the effective zone of the mass of enemy artillery fire. The main line of resistance must be clearly designated to the troops.

A deep outpost zone in front of the main line of resistance is the best protection against surprise. Only special circumstances, such as strong sectors at the front, can justify in exceptional cases dispensing with a deep outpost zone.

When things are quiet, the outpost detachment by skilful mobile fighting will prevent the enemy from approaching the main line of resistance and will keep him from determining the location of that line. If the enemy penetrates into the outpost zone and we do not succeed in throwing him out immediately, then the army will decide whether the lost ground is to be retaken by counterattack. In an enemy attack the outpost detachment is to gain the time necessary for the units in the rear and the artillery to take up the fight for the main line of resistance at the right moment. For this purpose it may be desirable to withdraw by sector according to a previously established plan (successive intermediate delaying positions).

Dependent upon the tactical situation and the depth of the outpost zone, elements of the front battalion of varying strengths - if necessary the entire battalion - will have to be put in the outpost. Points of particular importance in the outpost zone can remain occupied in some force. Contact with adjacent sectors is also necessary in the outpost zone.

Mobile batteries (including heavy batteries), continually changing their positions, are necessary in the outpost zone in order to neutralize troublesome enemy batteries and
such objectives as cannot be brought under fire effectively from the depth of the advanced artillery disposition. For this purpose numerous positions must be fortified even in the outpost zone. This will facilitate our own preparations for the attack. A few antitank platoons can be located in the outpost zone.

In addition, the troops will be disposed with a view to fighting for the main line of resistance. The front line battalions - so far as they are not employed in the outpost zone - and the support battalions will always be so located that they will be ready to fight for the main line of resistance at any time, even in a surprise attack. Wherever there is the slightest possibility of an enemy attack, the reserve battalions will be sheltered so close to the main line of resistance, that they will reach that line sooner than the enemy infantry and the rapidly driving tanks.

The machine-gun defense must be regulated with particular care. The entire combat area is to be occupied by groups of machine guns - not just single guns - distributed in depth and under the command of officers, if possible. To the extent to which the number of available guns permits, machine-gun final protective lines will be established in important sectors. If these machine guns are sited according to correct principles, well covered against aerial observation, and if the machine-gun crews do their duty, then it will be impossible for the enemy to overrun our positions in the brief fire preparation for his surprise attacks. To prevent the troops from losing their fighting edge and becoming overtired the machine gun platoons should be relieved frequently. However, it will be the responsibility of the machine gun company commanders by iron discipline to induce their people in an enemy attack to use their weapon at the right time and to the last.

Security detachments with numerous machine guns and artillery for rear-ward positions must constantly be designated and instructed in their mission; provision must be made for their rapid commitment (motor trucks).

Boundary detachments are indispensable.

The main body of the artillery will be distributed in depth behind the main line of resistance. The basic data for barrage and annihilation fire in front of the main line of resistance must be so well established that the quick automatic opening of the fire is assured. Often it will be impossible to avoid assigning the artillery defense of the outpost zone to special batteries.

The complaint is forever being heard that the artillery in the sector ceases to function as soon as the enemy has effected a penetration. The artillery observation must be so well distributed in depth that the entire combat area from the line of guards of the outpost zone back to the rear positions of that zone is under unbroken observation. The existence of observation posts massed at conspicuous points of the terrain is detected by the enemy and they are neutralized by smoke. Teamed batteries are necessary in the vicinity of the main line of resistance in order to engage the enemy by direct fire if he penetrates into the outpost zone, to furnish swift and direct support to infantry launched in a counterattack, and in order to facilitate the rapid concentration of a strong artillery against the breach. By frequent fire control exercises, assuming specific situations, the quick assembly of strong artillery forces against an enemy who has penetrated into the position and at threatened fronts must be assured. In principle the higher command must have at its disposal artillery reserves, held in readiness, limbered.

To assure protection against an enemy breakthrough, a second artillery wave, kept farther in the rear, is necessary. Insofar as elements of this wave are not constantly in position, the timely and automatic movement into line of the second artillery wave must be assured. At any rate, the battery positions must be fortified and, as much as possible, supplied with ammunition. Shortage of artillery will frequently make it necessary from the very outset to designate strong units of artillery reserves as artillery of the second wave and to instruct them as to their missions.

A mass employment of tanks can be expected. The antitank defense starting in the outpost zone must be reinforced. The tank attack must also collapse in front of the main line of resistance. Antitank mines, tank traps, strong road blocks must protect the main
line of resistance. Concentrated effect of all antitank weapons in front of the main line of resistance is of decisive importance. In addition to machine guns, trench mortars, antitank rifles, and antitank guns, batteries held in readiness, limbered, in the vicinity of the main line of resistance will operate with direct fire in conjunction with other agencies of the antitank defense with excellent effect. If the enemy attacks with tanks at night or under conditions of reduced visibility and aimed fire of the antitank weapons is out of the question, then the protective barrage and annihilation fire systematically placed in front of the main line of resistance must suffice for the antitank defense. As far as possible, detachments still located in the outpost zone will be assigned special roads for their withdrawal. These roads will be used only in case of tank attacks. Apart from this, no consideration can be given them. The antitank defense will also be organized in depth in rear of the main line of resistance.

Higher commanders from division down, must always be able quickly to gain a clear picture of the situation, independent of reports from the troops, by means of observation posts, well supplied with all the means of communications and constantly manned by officers. The equipment of important observation posts with radio stations has proved to be of value.

Special attention is directed to the importance of lateral communications between adjacent troop elements and artillery headquarters, particularly on the army and sector boundaries.

All armies will make detailed preparations for the shelter of reinforcements and their movement to the front and commitment, as well as for rapid transfers of troops to other parts of the front by marches, motor trucks, and rail.

As heretofore, the defense will be conducted from positions organized in depth; it will be elastic and in the spirit of the offensive. Organization of the position, which must be pushed more than before, will conform to this requirement. Construction of strong obstacles, a series of dugouts distributed in depth, and machine-gun nests, observation posts, and signal communication lines will be given priority over the rest of the work on the position. Switch positions are particularly valuable if the defense is conducted in the spirit of the offensive. The organization of the position must not betray the location of the main line of resistance to the enemy (checking of our position by airplanes).

Commanders and troops must again learn defensive tactics along with the attack. Troop training for this purpose will be the easier, as we are forced, more than before, to conduct the defense in the spirit of the offensive - on a large scale as well as locally. The measures taken for the defense must be frequently checked on the terrain. The alert signal must be able to reach from the most advanced posts to the rearmost quarters within the shortest possible time. The appropriateness of the arrangements made to this end must be checked by all arms in alert exercises. The artillery observation posts and battery positions will also be inspected frequently and unexpectedly. The enemy attacks at times when he counts on the inattention and carelessness of the sentries and observers. In the early morning, during the noon hours, in fog and perhaps also at night. It is precisely at such times that vigilance will have to be checked by superiors.

The thorough and uninterrupted observation of the enemy with all the means of reconnaissance must be insisted upon. The best picture of the situation can be obtained through prisoners. I request that orders be issued that in addition to the daily minor patrols and reconnaissances, at least one raid a week on a considerable scale, be executed in every corps sector, to clarify the enemy situation.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of the German Empire
and Prussia,
Commanding.
[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Supreme Headquarters, Office, Commanding General

DATE: August 12, 1918

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

His Majesty has ordered:

At 9 p.m., August 12, the Second, Eighteenth, and Ninth Armies will pass to the control of the newly-formed Group of Armies Boehn.

von HINDENBURG.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. German Seventh Army

DATE: Received for transmission: August 12, 1918: 11:50 p.m.

TO: The Corps

FIELD MESSAGE No. 253

As a result of the examination of aerial photographs, 45 new footbridges have been identified in the BRAISNE-FISMES sector. A total of 89 footbridges have been located in the CIRY-SALSOGNE---JONCHERY sector.

The corps are requested to report whether the divisions have any footbridges of their own and how many.

At the same time recommendations are to be submitted as to how the enemy footbridges are to be destroyed.

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The Group of Armies anticipates that simultaneously with the expected attack against the Ninth Army, an attack will be opened against the Seventh Army. The attack may be expected either as a surprise or in a manner similar to the attack at La MALMAISON, in October 1917. At any rate, a heavy and steady barrage with gas on the AISNE Valley can be expected. The defense will have to prepare for the following: quick opening of artillery fire against surprise attacks, even in dull weather, must be assured and also powerful and quick concentration of fire against any enemy force that breaks into the position. Machine-gun barrage lines and security detachments with mobile batteries are necessary in all rear sectors suited for defense, particularly in the artillery protective position. The AISNE Position and the REVILLON Switch Position also will have to be occupied by security detachments and a second echelon of artillery.

In addition to the division placed in readiness on the right boundary of the army for the active defense of the LAFFAUX Plateau, the Group of Armies believes that three other counterattack divisions will be necessary. It is proposed to receive the attack on the VESLE. However, the withdrawal in rear of the AISNE and the REVILLON Switch Position may become necessary. It must be prepared in such a manner that it can be quickly executed on receipt of orders, if possible in a single night.

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Identification of French and American Units

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, Aviation
No. 1683

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
AVIATION COMMANDER,
August 15, 1918.

REPORT NO. 121

Summary of the Tactical Situation and Aviation Activity
During the Week from 1 p.m., August 6, to 1 p.m., August 13, 1918

[Extract]

1. Summary of the Tactical Situation
   Combat activity decreased considerably on the entire army front. It remained vigorous on both sides of FISMES.
   In fluctuating fighting a small bridgehead on the north bank of the VESLE between BAZOCHES and FISMES remained in the hands of the enemy.
   In this fighting and as a result of patrol operations by both sides, prisoners remained in our hands, who confirmed the French 4th, 127th, 164th, and 170th Divisions at the front, as well as the American 4th and 28th Divisions.

   * * * * * *

   SPERRI.

   * * * * *

Footbridges

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 72/VIII

SCHOELER'S (VIII) ARMY CORPS,
August 15, 1918.

To: Seventh Army

In front of the 26th Inf. Div. there are 5 of our own footbridges across the VESLE and none of the enemy’s.

The 24th Res. Div. and 17th Inf. Div. have no footbridges of their own. Those identified at their front by photographs are all enemy. Since the enemy is holding the north bank here, a thorough destruction is only possible after an attack. Daily attempts are made to destroy some footbridges by artillery and trench mortars but with little success, as the target is small and observation is difficult. The enemy is in a position quickly
to repair the damage caused or to throw new footbridges across the creek in the place of those destroyed.

By order:

von MORSBACH,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Identification of American Units

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 16, 1918.

EVENTS FROM AUGUST 9 TO 15, 1918, AND ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

A. Enemy Situation:

... ...

*** The increase in the radio traffic of the American 32d and 42d Divs., which also have advanced their stations, in comparison with the decrease in the radio traffic of the American 28th Div, leads to the conclusion that the latter has been replaced by the American 32d Div, and that elements of the American 42d Div. have been inserted between the American 32d and 77th Divs. ***

... ...

In resume, the radio traffic in the sector of the American I Army Corps must be described as particularly active. However, since even the American rear divisions, in contrast to the French, make themselves very noticeable, this activity can probably be explained by the lack of caution still existing in general among American troops and their great number. Noteworthy is the frequent relief of the American divisions and the frequent commitment of only parts of the division subsequently. No doubt it is intended to give experience to as many divisions as possible.

... ...

B. Estimate of the Situation:

The considerable number of the divisions probably available to the enemy, the strengthening of the front effected by the numerous reliefs, particularly by the still fresh Americans, and finally the presence of a powerful artillery enable him at any time to pass to a full-scale attack quickly. Except moving his landing fields closer to the front, preparations on a considerable scale have not been observed. However, as the experiences of the last large-scale battles have shown, we must not wait for those. The slight value which the enemy places on improvement of his position is an indication of offensive
intentions, at least on the front of the American I Army Corps. The direction of the line of fire allows us to suspect the front BRAISNE-FISMES as main point of breakthrough. The army must be constantly on the alert against a number of local actions as well as a large-scale attack opening suddenly against its entire front.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. IV: Order

**Checking for Possibility of Tank Attacks**

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,  
August 16, 1918.

Operations Section  
No. 219/Aug. 18

To the Corps.

A tank officer is reporting to the army with orders to reconnoiter the terrain of our forward positions as to the possibility of tank attacks. He will particularly give his expert opinion as to where the terrain favors or hinders enemy tank attacks; furthermore, where the conditions are favorable for the employment of our own tanks during counterattacks.

The tank officer will visit the corps in the following order: Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps, Wichura's [VIII Res.] Corps; Etzel's [XVII Army] Corps, and Schmettow's [65th Army] Corps.

The corps will arrange the further details in direct agreement with the tank officer, as soon as he arrives. In each instance they will report the completion of the reconnaissance and the results thereof.

By order:

REINHARDT,  
Colonel, Chief of Staff.

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Activities on the VESLE

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 115/VIII
SCHOELER’S VIII ARMY CORPS,
August 18, 1918.

Subject: Forward Limit of the Outpost Zone of the 24th Res. Div. and 17th Inf. Div.

To: Seventh Army

[Extract]

Map 1 [not available] shows the present trace of the forward limit of the outpost zone. The corps has decided to leave this forward limit as it is and not to advance it in the sectors of the 24th Res. Div. and 17th Inf. Div. by an attack. However, the complete control over the terrain as far as the VESLE and across the VESLE is to be gained and maintained by active patrolling.

The reasons for giving up the attack are as follows:

(a) The present forward limit of the outpost has a good field of fire as far as the VESLE and is located so favorably west of BAZOCHES that the enemy has not found it so far. Apparently he presumes it to be farther to the rear. Comparatively few troops are required to hold it and it can be effectively supported by machine guns located in the main line of resistance.

(b) The distance between it and the main line of resistance is sufficient (1 km. and more) as is also that separating it from the ground rising to the plateaus.

(c) To push it forward as far as the VESLE, or in the sector of the 24th Res. Div., even only as far as the BRAISNE-BAZOCHES Railroad, would be possible only by a well planned attack in which we probably would incur considerable losses.

(d) The holding of the VESLE west and east of BAZOCHES would result in constant heavy losses. Entrenching is not possible owing to the marshy subsoil. Even the railroad embankment offers only scant protection. The enemy bank of the river is much higher and covered with woods, bushes, and clumps of trees, offering excellent concealment to numerous enemy snipers and machine guns. The enemy would be in a position to prevent any movement on the part of the forward elements of the outpost detachment during the day, and even at night circulation would be possible only with losses.

(e) BAZOCHES gives great strength to the outpost defense. It can be taken by the enemy only by employing rather considerable forces. An envelopment of the town has been blocked by appropriately siting machine guns and trench mortars on the higher slopes in the rear and by the defensive fires of artillery.

(f) We cannot entirely prevent the enemy from crossing the VESLE west and east of BAZOCHES. He will always be able to put weak forces across on footbridges. However, he will hardly succeed in throwing across the heavy bridges needed for tank attacks, without being observed.

A withdrawal of the forward limit of the outpost, possibly to the COURCELLES-FISMES Road, cannot be considered. The enemy would immediately pursue and seize a foothold at the foot of the plateaus. It would then be impossible any longer to prevent him from crossing
the VESLE with strong forces and tanks. The fight for the slopes of the plateaus would begin and would probably cause us greater losses than holding the present outpost.

I trust that you can concur in the above.

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von SCHOELER,
Lieutenant General.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. II: Messages

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2762

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE, August 1918.

To: Supreme Headquarters

For the VESLE Position, the AISNE Position, and the position of the Seventh Army on the CHEMIN-des-DAMES, the possession of the plateaus of TERNY-SORNY, LAFFAUX-VREGNY and VAURAINS Farm-CONDE is of decisive importance. The Group of Armies requests an order binding on both groups of armies for the defense of the plateaus.

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Operations Section
No. 9849

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE, August 1918.

To: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

Reference: Operations Section No. 2762

The Group of Armies Boehn has orders to fight with the Ninth Army in the present main line of resistance. If later a withdrawal of the Eighteenth Army should also require a withdrawal of the right flank of the Ninth Army, then the Ninth Army will occupy the blue line approximately outlined in the communication of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince, Operations Section No. 2759. Additional switch positions between the AISNE and AILETTE will be prepared in rear thereof. Details will be reported to the Group of Armies Boehn when they are available. In consideration of the troop requirements of the latter group of armies, the protection of the boundary between the Ninth and Seventh Armies will be provided by the Group of Armies German Crown Prince.

By order:

LUEDENDORFF.

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Operations Section
No. 2762

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 10, 1918.

To: Seventh Army

Preceding telegrams exchanged with Supreme Headquarters for your information. The blue line named corresponds to the proposed trace of line in blue indicated on map accompanying Seventh Army No. 97/August 1918. Protection of the boundary will be the responsibility of the Seventh Army. The town of CONDE will be defended by the Ninth Army as heretofore. The 7th Pes. Div. will be conducted into the sector, as ordered.

By order:

Count SCHULENBURG,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. IV: Warning Order

Flusschiffahrt Movement in Rear of Aisne

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 280/August 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 20, 1918.

Flusschiffahrt [River Traffic code word]

[Extract]

1. Until further orders the defense will be conducted with the utmost vigor on the VESLE. However, heavy hostile pressure against the Ninth Army brings the possibility closer that the Seventh Army will be withdrawn behind the AISNE and into the REVILLON Switch Position.

The movement will be prepared in such a manner that it can be executed in two nights.

2. • • •

The corps will report by map sketches as soon as possible the division into sectors planned and the manner of occupation of the new position and quartering the withdrawn divisions.

3. Progress of the Movement:
   (a) 1st Night. Displacement of all batteries not essential for defensive action on the VESLE or that are capable of intervening in such an action from positions on the north bank of the VESLE. Movement to the rear of appropriate ammunition and close combat weapons. Preparations for the demolition of roads, etc., and bombproof shelters.

   Shifting to the north bank of elements of the troops in rest billets, trench mortars, etc. Organization of the framework of the defense there, using these troops and the artillery.

   Portions of the 19th Inf. Div. will occupy their sectors in the Romain Switch.

   (b) 2d Night. Until 12:30 midnight the front line infantry will repulse all enemy attacks employing all its forces, even if the displacement of the artillery has al-
ready started. The latter and the withdrawal of all other vehicles will begin at night-fall. Elements of the support troops and the troops in rest will occupy the ROMAIN Switch Position and the artillery protective position in rear of the summit of the plateaus as a delaying position.

At 12:30 a.m. the front line infantry will move to the rear passing through the artillery protective position to in rear of the AISNE Canal, which it will occupy and hold.

At 4 a.m. the detachment occupying the artillery protective position will withdraw behind the AISNE.

4. Strong combat patrols, commanded by officers and well supplied with machine guns, will be left behind on the southern slopes of the plateaus, particularly on the roads, to delay the advance of the enemy.

If these patrols are obligated to fall back, they will be covered in their withdrawal by similar combat detachments on the north edge of the plateaus and with these latter will take up the fight at that point. Here they will be supported by our artillery from its rear positions.

5. The bridges for vehicular traffic will be blown up after the last complete infantry bodies have crossed. The combat patrols that were left behind are to be directed to ferries and footbridges; the troops occupying the canal to be sent to a few specially protected footbridges and light bridges.

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7. A decisive stand will be made in the new position in rear of the AISNE and in the REVILLON-ROMAIN Switch Position.

The considerable force occupying the ROMAIN Switch Position must be employed energetically to give disposition in depth to the front line troops toward the front and rear, and to push the work on the position in the rear. For this purpose rearguard troops will remain for the present in the line REVILLON---GLENNES---Hill 165 [165.2?] south of GLENNES ---Hill 180 northeast of COURLANDON---west edge of the wood 1 km. east of COURLANDON, in order to delay the approach of the enemy's advance elements to the ROMAIN Switch Position as long as possible and to gain time for the improvement of the switch position.

After the withdrawal the AISNE Canal must be held on the entire front at first, in order to check a possible enemy pursuit energetically, inflicting losses on the enemy. Later on it is intended to shift the line of resistance of the outpost by an army order to the general line of the AISNE River; our patrols must control the terrain between the river and the Canal.

The main line of resistance is so located on the rising north bank that it dominates the AISNE. * * *

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.
GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
Marchais, August 20, 1918.

[Extract]

During the night there was unusual radio activity in the BRAISNE-MAGNEUX sector, indicating preparations for an attack. However, no attacks were made.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
Marchais, August 22, 1918.

[Extract]

Hostile troops within the bridgehead established by the enemy between BAZOCHES and FISMES on August 10, were forced back farther toward the VESLE despite obstinate American resistance. The enemy artillery fire increased in connection with this fighting.

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Visit of Tank Officer

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 413

WICHURA'S [VIII RESERVE] CORPS,
August 23, 1918.

Reference: Seventh Army Order No. 219, August 16, 1918.

To: Seventh Army

1. Lt. Fuchsauer inspected the positions of the corps on August 22 and 23.
2. The VESLE is impassable for tanks except on bridges.

* * * * *

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The conformation of the terrain makes it improbable that the enemy tanks will advance on a broad front. The tanks can be expected to move in column in the draws; only southwest of PERLES can they climb the ridge on a broad front, together with other tanks which would be advancing in the sector of Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps.

4. Employment of our own tanks is attended with difficulties:
   (a) The AISNE bridges in their present condition cannot be used by tanks,
   (b) The plateaus cannot be climbed by tanks from the north except on the roads.

SCHNIEWINDT,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
Marchais, August 23, 1918.

[Extract]

Vigorous artillery action. Enemy assaults to recapture the ground which he had lost the day before, failed.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
Marchais, August 24, 1918.

[Extract]

The local actions between BAZOCHES and FISMES continued. • • •

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,  
Marchais, August 25, 1918.

[Extract]

Under protection of a heavy barrage, enemy detachments attempted to push forward northwest of BAZOCHEs and east of FISMES. They were repulsed. No other activity except of the hostile artillery which was feeble.

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ACTION ON AILETTE FRONT

GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,  
August 27, 1918.

Operations Section

AT NOON

[Extract]

* * * * *

Ninth Army: On the Ailette front no special events.

An attack opening at evening against the center of Hofmann’s [XXXVIII Res.] Corps was crushed by our infantry and machine-gun fire in front of our lines. On the right flank of Staab’s [XXXIX Res.] Corps the 7th Res. Div. held its line against several attacks launched after violent artillery preparation.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
Marchais, August 27, 1918.

[Extract]

An American battalion pushed forward astride the St-THIBAUT---BAZOCHES Road and one also west of FISMES after a sudden and violent burst of artillery fire. Both attacks collapsed with heavy losses to the attackers. However, an operation by the 29th Infantry Division for the recapture of FISMETTE, beginning at 5:50 a.m. was a complete success. The village was cleared of the enemy as far as the VESLE, and the VESLE bridges were blown up. In addition to very heavy casualties in killed and wounded, the Americans suffered the loss of 6 officers and 322 men taken prisoners. Otherwise the day passed quietly.

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**Enemy Artillery Attack on 7th Division**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
GROUP OF ARMIES BOEHN,
August 28, 1918.

AT NOON

[Extract]

[* * * * *]*

Ninth Army:
After a generally quiet afternoon a heavy artillery fire opening at 7:30 p.m. on the sector of the 7th Res. Div., in which gas and smoke were employed, pointed to an enemy attack, which failed to develop because of our concentrated artillery fire.

[* * * * *]*

After a very violent artillery preparation the enemy attacked at 8:30 a.m. the left flank of the 7th Res. Div., the entire fronts of the 7th Inf. Div. and the Guard Cav. Division (Dismounted). After several assaults the front of the 7th Res. Div. was pressed back to the narrow gauge railway west of JUVIGNY-CHAVIGNY. The 7th Inf. Div. and the Guard Cav. Div. (Dismtd.) repulsed all attacks.

[* * * * *]*

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EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

*** In the Corps of Hofmann and Staabs the enemy succeeded in advancing by repeated attacks against the 7th Res. Div. and the left flank of the 7th Inf. Div. as far as the railroad west of JUVIGNY-CHAVIGNY and in penetrating into the last-named place. CHAVIGNY proper was retaken in an immediate counterattack.

A counterattack launched in the afternoon made some progress at first but later was forced back to the railroad embankment by the fresh American 32d Inf. Div., which was again attacking.

The Guard Cavalry Div. (Dismounted) completely repulsed three tank attacks launched suddenly against the PASLY Head after a very powerful artillery preparation. ***

Near SOISSONS an enemy attempt to effect a crossing in the bend of the AISNE at St-MEDARD* was foiled by our concentrated artillery fire this morning. *** In the afternoon the enemy succeeded in throwing rather strong forces across to the north bank of the AISNE at FAUBOURGE de REIMS* and establishing himself here in our outpost. The crossing has been contained and a counterattack is in progress.

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AT NOON

[Extract]

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Ninth Army:

The combat activity on the right flank of the XXXIX Reserve Corps remained extremely vigorous throughout the entire day. A counterattack opened in the afternoon against the breakthrough at CHAVIGNY was at first successful, but was forced back to the position of departure, when fresh American forces resumed their attack.

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* Suburb east of Soissons.
In the AISNE Bend east of SOISSONS the enemy forced our outposts back to St-MEDARD. The counterattack was successful, but so far it has not been possible to free the north bank of the AISNE entirely of the enemy. Enemy attempts to effect a crossing at VENIZEL were foiled.

Under heavy artillery fire the enemy established himself during the night on the east bank of the AILETE and on both sides of GONY. In the forenoon heavy attacks supported by tanks opened on the center and left flank of the XIV Army Corps and the entire front of the XXXVIII Reserve Corps. Their first effort was shattered; further attacks are in progress.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fltr. II: Reports

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN NINTH ARMY,
August 29, 1918.

MORNING REPORT
[Extract]

In the sector of Gontard's [XIV Army] Corps the enemy, during the night and under the cover of a heavy artillery fire, established himself in position in the low ground of the AILETE Valley on the east bank of the canal west of CHAMPS and north and south of GONY. Reports are still lacking on the results of the counterattack that was immediately launched there.

In the sector of Hofmann's [XXXVIII Res.] Corps the enemy artillery fire continued to be heavy throughout the night, particularly on the 222d Inf. Div. and the 1st Guard Div. In the sector of Staab's [XXXIX Res.] Corps the enemy attacked PASLY Head four and five times in the afternoon and evening, supported by tanks. These assaults also collapsed completely, thanks to the courage of the Guard Cavalry Schuetzen [Rifle] Division.

In the bend of the AISNE at St-MEDARD our counterattack was successful against the superior forces of the enemy who is still holding out only at one point, in the houses on the north bank of the AISNE.

Attempts of the enemy to effect a crossing at VENIZEL were thwarted by the fire of the 76th Res. Div.

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NOON REPORT

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Also against Hofmann's [XXXVIII Res.] Corps extremely heavy attacks are in progress on the entire front south of the AILETE. Enemy infantry advancing with flame throwers attempted to take INSELBERG (Hill 124, southeast of PONT-St-MARD). They were repulsed. To the south, the enemy repeatedly attacked the 1st Guard Div. and 7th Inf. Div. in dense masses, with numerous tanks. On the entire front the divisions repulsed the enemy, causing him heavy losses. The 1st Guard Div. made local gains in a counterthrust. Many of
the tanks that had broken through are lying destroyed behind our lines. The center of the 165th Inf. Regt. alone destroyed 20 of them.

The prisoners captured belong to the French 17th and American 32d Inf. Divisions. In the sector of Staab's [XXXIX Res.] Corps, the right flank and center of the 7th Res. Div. repulsed the enemy attacking here in conjunction with the attack on Hofmann's Corps. Here too they are holding the old lines completely.

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Movement into Position IV

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 440/August 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 29, 1918.

Subject: Wiederkehr [code word Return]

[Extract]

1. After Position III has been occupied by completing the Bergwanderung movement [code word Mountain Climbing], a withdrawal of the Seventh Army behind the AILETTE into Position IV may be necessary if the enemy pressure against the Ninth Army is continued. Preparations will be made to carry out this movement. * * *

Its code word is Wiederkehr.

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However, until further orders we are fighting a decisive battle for the AILETTE itself, for the outpost in the old German position east of CORBENY, and for the SUIPPE south of the AISNE.

3. Position IV will be held by three corps with four divisions each.

Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps (the right flank corps) will prepare the movement in its present sector in close agreement with Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps and will be responsible for its execution. After the movement has been completed, the corps will be withdrawn.

4. Three nights are assigned for the execution of Wiederkehr.

The first and second nights will be used for disengagement of the front, the removal to the rear of all unessential vehicles, the displacement of the greater part of the artillery, and thorough preparations for the destruction of the protective works on both slopes of the CHEMIN-des-DAMES. The movement will be executed during the third night. It will progress similarly to Flusschifahrt [code word, river traffic] and Bergwanderung, the detailed instructions for which may serve as a general indication.

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von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.
FROM: Operations Section
AT: German Seventh Army
DATE: Received for transmission: August 29, 1918; 1:45 p. m.
No. 416, August 18.
TO: Schoeler’s [VIII Army] Corps Sent by Telephone

Order No. 6493 of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince requests that a check be made to determine in which sectors occupation by two regiments is practicable, in order to rotate one complete regiment back in rest billets. It is requested that a brief report be made to the army by teletype not later than morning of August 31, 1918.

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**Occupation of Front with Two Regiments**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

SCHOELE‘S VIII ARMY CORPS,

No. 209/VIII

August 29, 1918.

Reference: Seventh Army Order No. 416/Aug. 1918 of August 29, 1918

To: Seventh Army

At present it is not possible to get along with 2 regiments in front in any division sector. The reasons for this are as follows:

1. The situation makes it seem possible that the enemy will launch a large-scale attack against the VESLE Position within a short time. If this large-scale attack is recognized early enough in advance, then the regiment that has been held out of the line must immediately be put back in line again, as the low strength of all three divisions in infantry (including the 80th Res. Div.) and the widths of the division sectors would cause the fighting with only 2 regiments in front line to be extremely difficult. The two regiments in the front line would not be in a position to organize in sufficient depth, the only manner in which we could continue fighting for any length of time. However, the insertion of the third regiment immediately before the large-scale attack would bring undesired nervousness and uncertainty to the troops.

If the large-scale attack is launched suddenly, which is most likely, then the third regiment could not be inserted at the front at the right time. The division would be forced to fight with its force disposed unfavorably and would be exhausted very quickly.

2. If no large-scale battle develops, no doubt a continuation of the patrol skirmishes and local attacks on the VESLE must be expected. They impose heavy demands on their regiments and sometimes entail considerable losses. Without suffering a too rapid
decline in its powers of resistance, a regiment can stand these losses for any considerable
length of time only if it can maintain the fight with its own means disposed in depth.
This is the case at present. Everywhere the desired division of the regiments into 3 por-
tions, front line, support, and rest bns., is still maintained. If a regiment is with-
drawn from the front, then the two other regiments must take their support battalions
partly or wholly into the front line and also weaken the rest battalions correspondingly.

3. The corps would not consider the withdrawal of a regiment as a rest for that re-
giment. For tactical reasons it could not be taken farther back than the terrain between
the AISNE and the CHEMIN-des-DAMES. There are no billets there. It would have to go into
bivouac.

The present arrangement, under which every regiment has one battalion in rest - most
of them south of the AISNE - makes it possible to shelter most of the men in caves, billets,
etc. Thus the battalions get a fairly good rest. They do lie within range of enemy artil-
lery, but so far have received almost no fire in their quarters.

4. The withdrawal of a regiment signifies such a reduction in the labor forces which
even now are rather weak in comparison with the amount of work to be done, that work on
the position, which is making extremely slow progress in the present continuous fighting,
would practically come to a standstill.

By order:

von MORSBACH,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Supplement: Reference the conference between the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the
Corps on August 29, 1918

Points of view to be considered in above-mentioned matters:

In view of the general situation, third regiments must be withdrawn from the division
sectors as much as possible, in order to
(a) have reserves available which can also be used in other corps sectors,
(b) prepare a thinning out of the corps front, if the situation should improve.

Under this consideration the withdrawal of the third infantry regiment in the sector
of the Wuettemberger 26th Inf. Div. is possible, but not in the sectors of the 80th Res.
Div. and 17th Inf. Div., where rather large-scale operations from the enemy bridgehead
west of BAZOCHES and around BAZOCHES must be expected.

If a complete division should be released when the situation improves, then Wichura's
[VIII Reserve] Corps must take over the left regimental sector of the 17th Inf. Div. Then
the sector of the 80th Res. Div. can be divided between the 26th and 17th Inf. Divs.
Boundary line between these two divisions, approximately TAN Creek east of PAARS.

By order:

von MORSBACH,
Major, Chief of Staff.
FROM: Operations Section No. 1592
AT: Petersdorf's [XVII Army] Corps
DATE: August 30, 1918
TO: Seventh Army

FIELD MESSAGE NO. 619

Reference: Your No. 416/August 1918
Occupation by two regiments impracticable in view of the width of the division sectors of 4 and 6 1/2 km. respectively, and considering the probability that fighting on front of Ninth Army will extend to the Corps front.

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Operations Section
GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
No. 435
August 30, 1918.

EVENTS FROM AUGUST 23 TO 29 AND ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

On August 27 two thrusts which had been prepared by violent fire and were launched by the Americans in approximately battalion strength each against BAZOCHES and west of FISMES, were repulsed with heavy losses to the enemy. In an attack by us on the same day, we wrested from the Americans FISMETTE which had been defended obstinately. Besides a considerable quantity of material captured, the enemy left 6 officers and 322 men in our hands as prisoners. There are no other events of importance to be reported.

Enemy Situation

As far as the Americans are concerned, the enemy infantry displays considerable reconnaissance activity and also executes thrusts with rather strong detachments; the French remain unaggressive as before.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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- 244 -
In the evening and during the night the enemy did not continue his attacks against Hofmann's [XXXVIII Res.) Corps and on the west front of Staab's [XXXIX Res.) Corps. Several times bodies of enemy troops assembled in the draws lying to our front, and reinforcements being brought up were observed, and taken under our annihilation fire. On the AISNE front there was considerable artillery activity until the evening hours, particularly at SOISSONS. In the St-MEDARD Bend several enemy assaults were repulsed by the Guard Cavalry Division (Dismounted) • • • Between SOISSONS and CONCE the enemy pushed forward against our outpost in many places. Attempts to cross on a rather large scale northeast of VILLENEAUVES, at VENIZEL, and at ROCHES Mill [MOULIN des ROCHES] were thwarted by the fire of our artillery and machine guns.

According to the reports available, the occupation of the JUVIGNY-CROUY Postion was completed unnoticed by the enemy.

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Ninth Army:

At the focal point of the battle between the AILETTE and AISNE our lines have remained intact in the face of repeated attacks supported by a powerful artillery fire and assisted by numerous tanks.
Most of the ground lost on the AILETTE at CHAMPS and GUNY was again wrested from the enemy, and of the 10 bridges put across there, 6 were demolished by evening.

The artillery fire remained heavy during the night; numerous hostile attempts to cross east of SOISSONS were repulsed. The JUVIGNY-CROUY Position was occupied unobserved by the enemy.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Report

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

SITUATION AT NOON, AUGUST 31, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * *

Ninth Army:

There was bitter fighting at several places between the OISE and SOISSONS. BAC-d’ABLINCOURT was lost. The enemy was unable to widen his breach in our position near CHAMPS and GUNY. NOGENTEL Farm was wrested from him again.

An attack made in the evening between JUVIGNY and CHAVIGNY gained ground as far as BEAUMONT Farm; in a counterattack the enemy was driven back as far as east edge of JUVIGNY ---west edge of LEURY.

Numerous bridges were put across the AILETTE. Statements made by prisoners and deserters confirm the assumption that the enemy will pass to a coordinated large-scale attack between the OISE and AISNE.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Report

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

MORNING REPORT

In the sector of the 34th Inf. Div. of Gontard’s [XIV Army] Corps our counterattack against BAC-d’ABLINCOURT in the evening encountered a fresh enemy attack in force. Our
line remained unchanged. East and southeast of GUNY our infantry succeeded in wresting from the enemy some ground which had previously been lost. In this action NOGENTEL Farm again came into our hands.

In Hofmann’s [XXXVIII Res.] Corps the 7th Inf. Div. repulsed two heavy tank attacks by the enemy yesterday afternoon and evening. However, the enemy succeeded in advancing in the sector of the 223d Infantry Division as far as BEAUMONT Farm, whereupon the left flank of the 7th Inf. Div. and the right flank of the Guard Cavalry Rifle Div. (Dismounted) also had to be withdrawn. In the sector of the latter division the enemy worked his way forward as far as our outposts. He succeeded in gaining a foothold in GUNY.

According to the unanimous reports of prisoners and deserters, further large-scale attacks are imminent.

On the AISNE, several enemy attempts to effect a crossing were again foiled.

Between the AILETTE and CONDE the enemy fire continued very intense and fell on the rear area as far as the canal bridge east of CHAVIGNON.

Throughout the entire night our artillery on the entire front of the army maintained very heavy fire from all guns with H. E. and gas on the enemy positions, approaches and the rear area. In this it received support from the Eighteenth and Seventh Armies.

In the morning hours the enemy assembly areas were shelled with annihilation fire.

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NOON REPORT

The general enemy attack expected for this morning did not take place. No special events except for our vigorous artillery action in Gontard’s [XIV Army] Corps and Hofmann’s [XXXVIII Res.] Corps. The 1st Guard Div. repulsed a rather heavy enemy assault against the left flank regiment.

In Staab’s [XXXIX Res.] Corps the enemy attacked the Guard Cavalry Division (Dismounted) on its entire front and the right flank of the 76th Res. Div. The attack was preceded by a heavy barrage and was supported by tanks. It collapsed in our fire, partly in the outpost zone. In a counterthrust on CROUY the 76th Res. Div. captured 17 prisoners and 5 machine guns. Further attacks are expected here.

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EVENING REPORT

On the army front the battle is in full progress and on a larger scale. According to the reports available so far, the enemy penetrated our line on either side of CHAMPS and west of COUCY-le-CHATEAU. Counterattacks are in progress. In the vicinity of CRECY-au-MONT and south thereof, we succeeded in beating off the enemy assault. East of JUVIGNY the enemy broke through our defensive front and pushed forward as far as the COUCY-le-CHATEAU—TERNY Road. Nothing is known so far concerning the success of the reserves of the 238th and 237th Inf. Divs. which were put in a counterattack.

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Tank Obstacles

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 305

SCHMETTOW'S 65th ARMY CORPS (PROVISIONAL),
August 31, 1918.

Reference: Seventh Army Order No. 219/Aug. 1918

To Seventh Army

From August 28 to 30 the three division sectors were checked by a tank officer as to the possibility of a tank attack.

The exceedingly swampy banks of the VESLE in front of the left flank of the corps and the rather wide bed of the river in front of the right flank constitute a very good tank obstacle.

There are no longer any bridges of any kind on which tanks could cross the river. If, nevertheless, enemy tanks were to cross the river, then the steep slopes of the plateaus would form a second very good tank obstacle. Antitank weapons could be concentrated at the few places where these slopes can be climbed by tanks.

In the same manner counterattacks by our own tanks would be made very difficult by the river obstacle and the steep slopes of the plateaus.

By order:

MATTHIASS,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Withdrawal of Seventh Army

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 441/August 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
August 31, 1918.

To all Corps

[Extract]

Flusschiffahrt [code word, river traffic].

1. In consequence of developments in the situation in the Ninth Army, the Seventh Army will withdraw behind the AISNE and into the REVILLON-ROMAIN Switch Position during the nights August 31/September 1 and September 1/2.

The movement will be executed in conformity with Army Order No. 280/August.

* * * * *
5. Supplement to Flusschiffahrt Order, Par. 4: Patrols and Very-pistol posts will remain on the front line (Vesle) until 5:30 a.m., Sept. 2, to simulate normal occupation of the position and deceive the enemy. Demolitions and destructions by fire will in like manner not be executed before 5:30 a.m.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fl dr. II: Reports

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN NINTH ARMY,
September 1, 1918.

MORNING REPORT

[Extract]

As previously reported, yesterday evening toward 6 p.m. the enemy launched a general attack on the entire front between the OISE and VENIZEL. On the right flank of Gontard's [XIV Army] Corps the attack was broken up by our artillery and machine-gun fire out in front of our lines. At the center and on the left flank the enemy succeeded in effecting a penetration. After hard, fluctuating fighting, the enemy was driven back into his lines of departure. * * * The town of PRAAST was wrested from the enemy by a bold raid of Saxon assault troops. Only in the woods west of COUCY-le-CHATEAU is the situation still uncertain. * * *

In Hofmann's [XXXVIII Res.] Corps a counterattack by the 1st Guard Inf. Div. succeeded in regaining our position in INSELBERG [Hill 124] and PARADISE* Hill, from which the steadily repeated attacks of the enemy had pushed it back. The enemy, debouching from JUVIGNY with tanks and in heavy force, after a bitter fight was able to press back the 7th Inf. Div. and the left flank of the 1st Guard Div. adjacent to it, as far as the line CRECY-au-MONT---Les RIBAUDES---road to TERNY-SORNY. Consequently, during the night the right flank of the 1st Guard Inf. Div. was withdrawn to the north bank of the canal, while its center and left flank retired behind the BETHANCOURT---TERNY-SORNY Road.

In the sector of Staab's [XXXIX Res.] Corps the enemy had attempted in the course of the morning to work his way forward to CROUY by continued assaults. * * * Not until the enemy executed his main attack in the evening launched after a very heavy barrage, did he succeed in taking LEURY and forcing back our line to the TERNY-SORNY Sugar Factory.

Opposite the center and left flank of the corps all attacks have been completely repulsed. The left flank of the Guard Cavalry Division (Dismounted) has withdrawn during the night to the east edge of CROUY.

Despite the squally weather, pursuit and attack flights participated actively in the fighting. * * *

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* PARADIES BERG - German designation for elevation 800 meters W. S. W. of CRECY-au-MONT.
NOON REPORT

No new attacks have been made so far this morning on the entire army front. Opposite Hofmann's [XXXVIII Res.] Corps the enemy pursued at 8 a. m. across the CRECY-au-MONT---JUVIGNY Road.

Our artillery is placing harassing fire against assembly areas and rearward communications of the enemy.

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EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

In the sector of Staab's [XXXIX Res.] Corps the enemy succeeded in the morning - as subsequently reported - in crossing the main highway on a front of about 1 km. between TERNY-SORNY and CLAMECY. An enemy attack launched astride the TERNY-SORNY---SOISSONS Road at 2:10 p. m. was broken up. A tank attack at the point of penetration north of CLAMECY and another attack against the right flank of the 76th Res. Div. at 5 p. m. both met the same result. Bodies of enemy troops observed in the draws at BAGNEUX, BIEUXY and west of TERNY-SORNY were shelled with concentrated annihilation fire, and portions of SOISSONS were gassed with Yellow Cross [mustard] gas. Large body of troops, apparently Americans, is reported forming up at 7 p. m. in JUVIGNY.

* * * * *

Evacuation

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 19

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The situation may require that the withdrawal movements planned by the army ("Flusschiffahrt," "Bergwanderung," "Wiederkehr") be followed by a further withdrawal of the entire army front.

2. In this event the army will withdraw into a rear position, the Hunding Position. The Hunding Position is a portion of a great strategic position which extends along the rear of the entire front of the Group of Armies German Crown Prince. Its construction was begun in the spring of 1917. * * *

3. The proposed planned withdrawal into the Hunding Position and all problems connected with it, such as evacuation of the territory that is to be abandoned, demolitions, evacuation of the civilian population, etc., have been worked out under the code word "Gudrun," which is to be kept secret.

4. In view of the present combat situation it cannot yet be definitely determined in what manner the withdrawal movement to occupy the Hunding Position will be executed. It will be influenced by the position from which the withdrawal into the Hunding Position is
effected, the combat situation in the sectors of adjacent armies and the time available. The occupation projected as well as the lateral boundaries of the army sector in the Hunding Position will form the subject of a later order by the group of armies.

By order:

REINHARDT,
Colonel, Chief of Staff.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Sent: September 2, 1918; 11:30 o’clock No. 2778

[ORDER]

In case subsequent developments necessitate a withdrawal of the right wing of the Seventh Army to the CHEMIN-des-DAMES, connection must be established between the CHEMIN-des-DAMES and the ROMAIN switch position. If preparations are not made to ensure this connection, comparatively insignificant penetrations on the right wing of the army might result in the withdrawal of the entire Seventh Army and the right wing of the First Army. Some way must be found to prevent this. You are requested to submit your recommendations early.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fl dr. VII: Reports

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN NINTH ARMY,

September 2, 1918.

[Extracts]

MORNING REPORT

* * * * *

Staab’s [XXXIX Res.] Corps: The 223d Inf. Div. relieved by the 227th Inf. Div. Yesterday evening the enemy, after brief bursts of artillery fire and employing numerous tanks, directed local attacks against the entire front of the 227th Inf. Div. and the Guard Cav. Div. (Dismounted). All of them were repulsed. In the sector of the 227th Inf.
Div. our outpost was pushed forward at yesterday's point of penetration as far as the TERNY-SORNY---SOISSONS Road. According to reports from the troops, dead Americans were found at that point. * * *

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EVENING REPORT

The general attack was resumed this afternoon on the entire front between PIERREMANDE and the AISNE.

In Gontard's [XIV Army] Corps the enemy attacked the 24th Inf. Div. at 4:30 p. m. after a fire preparation lasting 3 1/2 hours. At some points he was repulsed before reaching our lines and at other points he was driven back into his positions of departure by local counterattacks. Forty-five Americans were captured here. At COUCY-le-CHATEAU the enemy succeeded in advancing to within about 1 km. west of the railroad station and the railroad line south of the village. Pressing forward in a southeast direction, the enemy forced the detachment occupying the canal back to the line AUFRRIQUE-et-NOGENT---JUMENCOIJUT ---canal bridge 1 km. northeast of BETHANCOURT. At 3:10 p. m., after a very powerful artillery preparation supported by numerous tanks, the enemy committed the fresh Moroccan 2d Div. and the 66th Inf. Div. in an attack south of the AILETTE. West of LEUILLY he was repulsed before reaching our lines; south of LEUILLY he succeeded in advancing on a 2 to 3 km. front and reaching our artillery protective position. Counterattacks are in progress. TERNY-SORNY was also lost. No report has been received so far concerning the result of the counterattack that was made there. South of TERNY-SORNY Staab's Corps held its position according to reports received so far; only east of CROUY was a small penetration made. Counterattacks are in progress here. * * *

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Hq. German Seventh Army

DATE: Received for transmission: September 2, 1918: 12 n. No. 9

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

MESSAGE NO. 158

Withdrawal of another division from the front would have to occur primarily at the expense of Wichura's [VIII Res.] Corps, as any additional thinning out of the other corps sectors that would be worthwhile does not seem practicable at present. However, Wichura's Corps would then be so weakened that the situation on the VESLE, with the focal point at FISMES could not be maintained with any degree of certainty, in the face of the Americans who are very strong in numbers and who are also eager to attack.
However, an additional weakening of the front is especially incompatible with the un-
certainty of the entire situation of the army in consideration of its neighbor on the
right.

The withdrawal movements which will probably have to be carried out require the con-
tinued presence of the divisions now with the army. Particularly Flusschifffahrt with the
active combat zone to be expected on the ROMAIN Switch Position make the retention of the
present forces quite essential.

Particularly in view of the incidents in the sector of the Ninth Army, the army
urgently asks that any plan further to weaken the front be renounced for the present.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section
AT: German Seventh Army
DATE: Accepted for transmission: Sept. 2, 1918: 6:20 p. m. No. 14/Sept. 18
TO: All corps

FIELD MESSAGE No. 166

[Extract]

Reference: Seventh Army Order No. 280/August 18 and 441/August 18.

Flusschifffahrt [code word, river traffic] will take place during the night of Septem-
ber 3/4.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section
AT: German Seventh Army
DATE: Sent: September 3, 1918: 11:46 a. m. No. 23/Sept. '18
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

MESSAGE No. 181

Reference: Your No. 2778

Extract from Army Order No. 441/Aug. 18, August 31, 1918, Paragraph 5.
Extract from Army Order No. 14/Sept. 18, September 2, 1918: The provisions of Para-
graph 5 of Army Order No. 441/August 18 will be applied to September 4, 5:30 a. m.
To comply with Order No. 2778 of the Group of Armies, careful planning would have been necessary in advance. It is too late for this now.

In view of the great distance from the Aisne Position and the important obstacle of the river behind the rearguards, the measure would have been rather a daring one, even if well prepared. Even the demolitions could have been made only after withdrawing the rearguards. For all these reasons, the army requests rescinding of the Group of Armies order.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,

September 4, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

* * * * *

An enemy detachment in battalion strength, advancing in the afternoon on the FISMES-MERVAL Road, was attacked with machine guns by one of our aviators, who identified them as Americans beyond any question of doubt. It was checked and dispersed by hits into the infantry and animals.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,

September 5, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

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In the sector of Schoeler's Corps the enemy was successfully checked by our combat patrols in his hesitating attempt to descend the north slopes of the table mountains. We succeeded in dispersing and driving back a cavalry detachment. The enemy fire is still within moderate bounds.

In the sector of Wichura's Corps the enemy was unable to cross the line LONGUEVAL---BARBONVAL---SERVAL---MERVAL because of our artillery fire. Repeated attempts to gain a
foothold in the villages were foiled by our fire. An enemy battery unlimbering at BARBON-VAL was shelled effectively. Cavalry patrols advancing against the left flank of the 29th Division were repulsed by machine guns. According to troop reports, a prisoner of the French 7th Mounted Chasseurs was brought in. In the sector of the 216th Infantry Division, Sergt. Kastran with 2 men of the 10th Co., 59th Inf. captured 31 Americans east of MERVAL (apparently of the American 77th Division) and 1 machine gun. Since 11 a.m. the enemy has repeatedly attacked the sector of the 4th Guard Division in rather heavy force. All attacks were repulsed partly by a counterattack, with heavy losses to the enemy. Grenadiers of the 93d Res. Inf. claim to have observed beyond any question of doubt that Americans shot men of their regiment after they were captured. Sworn statements are being taken.


HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. I: Reports

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 6, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

In the sector of Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps the enemy advanced as far as the canal opposite the division on the right. The combat patrols located there were withdrawn; those of the division on the left are still south of the canal. The enemy harassing fire against the corps sector has increased somewhat compared with that on the preceding days. In the course of this forenoon the combat patrols of the 29th Division in a surprise attack drove enemy forces that had descended into the valley of the AISNE back to the ridge of the north slope of the AISNE. Two prisoners remained in our hands. In several sharp actions following an unsuccessful assault of the enemy against the 216th Division, patrols of the 59th Inf. brought in a total of 7 prisoners, again confirming the American 77th and 28th Divisions according to troop reports.

After an intense barrage in the sector of Wichura's [VIII Res.] Corps the enemy advanced to the attack in rather heavy force against the 4th Guard Division. At the same time the attack was extended, reaching the extreme right flank of Schmettow's [65th Army] Corps. After repeated futile attempts which were repulsed in bloody close combat by our artillery and infantry, the enemy again attacked in the late afternoon. The fighting is still in progress. No reconnaissance results.


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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,  
September 7, 1918.

MORNING REPORT

[Extract]

* * * * *

In the sector of Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps the enemy attempted twice last evening to cross the canal at two different places, after artillery preparation. Each time he was repulsed by infantry, machine-gun and concentrated artillery fire. No other attempts to cross were made.

In the sector of Wichura's [VIII Reserve] Corps the enemy in heavy force pushed our patrols of the 29th Infantry Division back from the hills south of the AISNE and occupied VILLERS. In the sector of the 4th Guard Division and on the right flank of the Bavarian 2d Division stubborn outpost fighting continued, in which the enemy worked his way about 1 km. closer to our main line of resistance northwest of BREUIL, in the sectors of the two flank regiments.

The enemy pressure there is supported by very heavy artillery fire which continued throughout the night.

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NOON REPORT

[Extract]

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Schoeler's Corps: * * * Confronted by rather strong detachments advancing on VILLERS in the morning hours, our combat patrols located there had to withdraw fighting across the canal. VILLERS is occupied by the enemy. The enemy fire against the corps sector is moderate.

Wichura's Corps: The 29th Division is withdrawn; the 17th and 216 Divisions have taken over its sector. The 59th Inf. again brought in 4 prisoners of the American 77th Division last evening. Since completing the withdrawal movement, the regiment has captured a total of 45 prisoners. No reports are available so far concerning the outcome of our counterattack of this morning, against the enemy forces that advanced yesterday against the 4th Guard Division and the extreme right flank of the Bavarian 2d Div.

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- 256 -
EVENTS FROM AUGUST 30 to SEPTEMBER 6, 1918 and ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

[Extract]

1. Week from August 30 to September 6, 1918:

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   The Flusschifffahrt [River Traffic] movement was executed according to plan. Two strong enemy detachments pushing forward into our position in the broad light of midday on September 2 and the increase in the enemy balloons used on the same day to 12 (as compared to the former average of 4) indicate that the enemy counted on a withdrawal of the Seventh Army in conjunction with his successes against the Ninth Army, and was trying to obtain information concerning the time of the movement. Nevertheless he did not notice our disengagement until late. Not until noon, September 3, did his first elements cross the VESLE. In a cautious pursuit, successfully shelled and checked by our rear-guard patrols and our artillery, they reached the valley of the AISNE on September 5. The losses of the enemy, particularly of the Americans, whose pursuit at times was very unskilfully conducted, must be considerable. Beginning at noon September 6, the enemy began to push his pursuit with attacks against the ROMAIN Switch Position.

   By September 4, we had moved into our AISNE Position. * * *

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   von EBERHARDT,
   Commanding.

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Construction of Tank Obstacles

[Editorial Translation]

Great progress has been made in the First Army in laying antitank mine fields. The work is making good headway, so that rather extensive antitank mine fields will rapidly come into existence if the work is done systematically.

The corps are invited to obtain information about the experiences in Dieffenbach's [IX Reserve] Corps of the First Army. The Seventh Army will start to construct antitank mine fields on a more extensive basis. Their construction is urgently needed in front of the REVILLON-ROMAIN Switch and in front of the third position wherever tank attacks are likely.
Surrounding antitank mine fields in front of rear positions with inconspicuous wire fences is recommended.

Sketches of two antitank mines which have been tried out and found suitable, and which can be quickly constructed with simple means, will be sent to the corps within the next few days by the General of the Seventh Army Pioneers accompanied by instructions.

By order:

REINHARDT,
Colonel, Chief of Staff.

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NOON REPORT

[Extract]

*** The futile attempt of the enemy to cross in the sector of Schoeler's Corps as reported this morning, was followed by a second attempt at CYS, which was also repulsed. A thrust by the enemy in the sector of the 4th Guard Division met the same results. The bridge site at BRAYE and the area around GLENNES were sporadically shelled by the enemy with gas.

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MORNING REPORT

[Extract]

*** In the sectors of Wichura's [VIII Reserve] Corps and Schmettow's [65th Army] Corps the enemy fire at times increased to great intensity. An attack that opened at 8 p.m.
against the left division of Wichura's Corps was repulsed with heavy losses. Attempts of
the enemy to advance against the 216 Infantry Division were smothered by machine-gun and
artillery fire. • • •

Names of Positions Changed

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 129/Sept.

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 10, 1918.

ARMY ORDER NO. 61/Sept. 1918

[Extract]

3. Change of Names of Positions.

Positions will be named as follows:
The former II positions (VAILLY---BEAURIEUX---GUIGNICOURT): Gunter Position,
The position REVILLON---ROMAIN---CHALONS-sur-VESLE: Hagen Position.
The position MAIZY---VENTELY---HERMONVILLE: Volker Position.
The front line held at present will therefore be named Gunter-Hagen Position.
The former IV Position (CHEVREGY---CHAMOUILLE---CORBENY---GUIGNICOURT): Ekkehardt Position.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 11, 1918.

Army Order No. 62/Sept. 1918

[Extract]

1. Naming of the sector of the III Army Corps.

Misdirected runners make it necessary to call attention to the fact that a Luettwitz
Corps II is in line in the Ninth Army. [The corps referred to is not the II Corps but is a second additional corps under Luettwitz II].

Therefore all letters and telephone messages for the III Army Corps must be directed to Luettwitz Corps I.

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By order of the Army Commander:

REINHARDT,
Colonel.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. II: Order

Lines of Resistance

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 149

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 13, 1918.

[Extract]

Since Order No. 9635, Operations Section, Supreme Headquarters, August 8, 1918, page 7, states that the outpost troops are to withdraw in case of an enemy attack, and since the latest Order, No. 10162, of Supreme Headquarters, dated September 4, 1918, also states that a decision will not be sought on the outpost and that a fight to the last man will not be "demanded" in that zone, the term "outpost" must be excluded for all those portions of a defensive zone, the defenders of which receive the order to hold out.

The permission to leave their position without further orders in case of an enemy attack can, in ordinary position warfare, only be actually granted to the foremost security detachments and posts pushed out beyond the defensive lines, who must act like outguards. * * *

Localities which must be defended cannot be evacuated by the troops of their own accord by any means. Precise orders must therefore be issued to such troops to resist to the utmost. However, on the basis of the order of Supreme Headquarters, the troops recognize this requirement without question only when the locality placed in their charge is indicated as belonging to the main line of resistance. This must be the determining factor in designating the lines, and higher authorities therefore must abandon the term "main line of resistance" as applied to a line of resistance further to the rear, which they have considered as a "main line of resistance" for some later phase of the battle and which they are already preparing for that purpose.

Therefore it is directed that:

1. The "main line of resistance" of our present defensive position (Gudrun-Hagen Position) is the line: CHAVONNE---OEUILLY---GLENNES---BREUILLY [BREUIL?]---VESLE Valley.

2. The former main line of resistance north of the AISNE and in the ROMAIN Switch Position will together form a continuous reserve line in the zone of the army, which will bear the name "Dachsbau" [badger's burrow] line.

3. The "Dachsbau" line must be strongly organized, so that it can at any time become the new main line of resistance if the fight for the main line of resistance takes an unfavorable turn for us.
Security detachments must always be present in the "Dachsbau" line. The main defensive effort will not be shifted into this line except on specific orders from the army. If the front line troops are forced back into the "Dachsbau" line by an unfavorable turn in the fighting, then the resistance will be continued there and the attempts made from that line to regain the main line of resistance.

* * * * *

von EBERHARDT.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 14, 1918.

Toward 12 noon, after a very heavy heavy artillery preparation in which gas, smoke and H. E. were used, the enemy renewed his heretofore futile attacks against the ROMAIN Switch Position. In close combat and in local counterattacks, he was again repulsed by our fire in the forward portion of the outpost zone, and suffered very heavy losses. In a counterattack the 1st Bn. of the 5th Gren. Foot Guard Regt. * * * drove the enemy back through GLENNES. Renewed enemy attacks against the town forced our troops out of the village again. The enemy fire continues to lie heavily on the ROMAIN Switch Position. Further attacks are expected. The fighting was severe. Until now the enemy had not succeeded in penetrating the main line of resistance. With the exception of GLENNES, which was lost, our front line troops held their entire outpost. According to reports from the troops, the enemy's losses are very heavy. * * *

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,

September 15, 1918.

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NOON REPORT

[Extract]

After a brief artillery preparation, one bn. each of the 216th Infantry Division and the 4th Guard Division at 6:25 a.m. attacked the enemy force that had penetrated into GLENNES and drove it back beyond the old outpost line. The 5th Gren. Guard Regt. which joined in the advance of the 5th Guard Regt. took 1 officer and 46 men of the French 62d Division prisoners. The former forward outpost line is again in our hands with the exception of some small points west of GLENNES. * * *

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,

September 17, 1918.

NOON REPORT

[Extract]

* * * The American 1 Corps seems to be relieved. Its radio station is not sending any more. The last American troops on the front of the army appear to have been withdrawn.

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Transfer of the Ninth To the Seventh Army

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 226/September

ARMY ORDER

Concerning Transfer of the Ninth to the Seventh Army

[Extract]

1. For Hoffmann's [XXXVIII Res.], Schoeler's [VIII Army], and Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps the orders issued by the Ninth Army will remain in effect until expressly countermanded by the Seventh Army and replaced by corresponding orders.

   The corps will endeavor to shorten this interim as much as possible by submitting recommendations on their own initiative.

2. Each of the corps formerly belonging to the Ninth Army will receive five copies of Seventh Army Order No. 149/Sept. concerning the fight for the outpost zone.

   In conformity with this order the shifting forward of the main line of resistance of Hofmann's and Petersdorff's Corps must be considered. The corps will report the intended shifting of this line on a simple sketch by September 21.

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   A decisive action will be fought for the possession of Vailly, beginning immediately.

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Uniformity in designation of the position makes it necessary to redesignate some portions of the position in the former area of the Ninth Army. The following designations will be used:

For the former Siegfried Position
   "   "   " Intermediate position
   "   "   " Nicolas Position
Gunther Position
Hildebrand Position
Ekkehard Position

All other portions of the position will retain their former designations.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,  
September 18, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

*** In the sector of Luettwitz’s Corps II subsequent reconnaissance developed the information that yesterday’s breakthrough by the enemy came within about 200 meters south of the road bend 1 km. southwest of PINON, and that the enemy there has not yet been driven back, so that the left flank of the 24th Reserve Division is still in great danger. Countermeasures have been initiated.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,  
September 18, 1918.

Attack Planned

[Extract]

1. At 5:30 a.m. September 19, after a heavy preparation lasting five minutes, Luettwitz’ Corps II will attack with the 29th Inf. Div. At the same time the interior flanks of Schoeler’s and Petersdorff’s Corps will make a local attack to rectify their lines. All corps, including Luettwitz’ Corps I, will at the same time place concentrated annihilation fire on portions of enemy positions opposite their front as a feint.
Preparations for Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

LUETTWITZ II (XXXVIII RESERVE) CORPS,

Reference Ninth Army Order No. 215 of September 14, 1918, Par. 2

To: Seventh Army

1. The preparations will probably be completed in eight days.

2. The corps recommends that the main line of resistance of the AILETTE Switch Position not run along the canal, but in the unbroken line indicated in red and that the canal be occupied as forward limit of the outpost zone.

The following factors determined this recommendation:

(a) The line of the canal is in complete view from the hills to the south; dugouts cannot be built in the marshy terrain. The troops occupying this ground would be smashed to smithereens within a short time. There is no cover for reserves. They would have to be brought up over the bare slope north and west of ANIZY-le-CHATEAU.

(b) The broken line indicated in red offers good opportunities for the construction of machine-gun nests, which on account of their good field of fire, would require only few troops to be able to dominate the canal.

(c) The proposed main line of resistance has the advantage that portions of it are on a reverse slope and that it can be based on existing installations. From this line most of the terrain as far as the canal can be taken under flanking fire, so that the outpost, which would have to be given up in the canal line, can be dominated. Suitable shelter for reserves exists in rear thereof in installations already available.

(d) It is proposed to flatten the BRANCOURT Nose [Salient], as soon as the WESTPHALIAN Switch Position has been organized.

By order:

LUDWIG,

Lt. Col., Chief of Staff.
PREPARATIONS FOR WITHDRAWAL
GERMAN XXXVIII RESERVE CORPS
18 SEPTEMBER 1918

MAP REF GERMAN 1:25000 GRUPPE VAILLY AND ZUS BRANCOURT
NOTE: All lines on original German document are shown in red except as indicated hereon.

MAP NO 87
Defensive Measures

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 277

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The enemy has introduced fresh troops on the AILNETE-AISNE section of the front. This explains the lull in heavy fighting, which will probably be of short duration. North of the AILNETE we are now opposed by divisions which are still fit for action but have been in line for some time; between the AILNETE and AISNE we are opposed by the 59th, 36th, 127th, 41st and 162d Inf. Divs. which have only just been committed or were put in line a short time ago; in addition to this, elements and remnants of the 29th, 5th, 128th, and 25th Inf. Divs. which have been in line for some time - on the whole a reinforced body of troops, well able to launch another large-scale attack. ***
   * * * Therefore we must expect further large-scale and local attacks. As next principal objectives of the enemy, PINON, VAUDESSON, and JOUY must be considered, with the intention of pushing through on CHAVIGNON. At the same time the ROMAIN Switch Position will probably be attacked, and the AISNE and VESLE front will be struck by reconnaissances, as the enemy expects our withdrawal at that point.

2. The army will accept the expected new battle in its present positions and will defeat the attacker by defensive combat.

3. Luettwitz' Corps II will hold the front FRESNES---Bois de MORTIER in as little force as possible and will place the main effort of the defense on the positions forward of PINON, in which the forces will be echeloned in depth in such a manner that the line Bois de MORTIER---hills on both sides of PINON can be held even if the most advanced sections of the trench system are lost. Reserves will be held in readiness in the region east of PINON. They will be charged with the special mission of covering the right flank of Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps, as the army itself will continue the fight for the line of hills running along the front TURMBERG*---VAUDESSON---VAILLY, facing west, if the hills west of PINON are lost.
   The artillery force of the group will be concentrated mainly in front of the sector of the left division.
   The artillery located farther north of the AILNETE, where the front faces the west, must be prepared with all batteries to reach the south bank of the AILNETE, shift its fire to that point, and intervene in the battle in case the enemy effects a penetration and pushes forward in the direction of PINON. Provision must be made for observation and the means of transmitting orders against this contingency.
   The pioneer forces will provide the means for crossing the AILNETE and furnish tactical protection for same.
   If the enemy delays his attack, then a wired switch position ANIZY-TURMBERG will be organized to complete the defensive system.

4. Schoeler's and Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps, disposed in depth, will defend their present front, using all their forces available. The fight will be conducted just

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* TURMBERG - German designation of elevation, surmounted by tower, 700 meters due E. of PINON.
as vigorously in the valleys as on the hills, and an effort must be made everywhere in preliminary minor operations, as well as in local and coordinated counterattacks, to force the enemy more and more back to the west and gain observation into the draws in which the enemy is located.

Schoeler's Corps will maintain a strong boundary detachment on the right to ensure firm contact with Luettwitz' Corps II, even if there is a change in the trace of line. Accompanying artillery will be attached to the boundary detachment.

Petersdorf's [XVII Army] Corps will hold the left shoulder on the Aisne strongly and will prevent the enemy from penetrating into Jouy Valley.

The main force of the artillery of both corps will lay annihilation fire on the front. The pioneers will be governed by the instructions given in paragraph 3.

5. Luettwitz' Corps I will support the 18th Inf. Div. vigorously with its artillery and will hold reserves in readiness for infantry support as well as to protect its own flank.

An increase of the enemy artillery in the region Chassey-MBrenelle can be expected. It is particularly important to use artillery against it. The firmness of the Aisne front and the action of the artillery located there must enable the army to feel no concern about its center fighting with its back toward the east.

Wichura's [VIII Reserve] Corps and Schmettow's [65th Army] Corps will repulse the enemy's attacks against the Romain Switch Position with the means at their present disposal, just as they have done before in so efficient a manner. Active artillery and an aggressive infantry will continue to keep the enemy concerned about his right flank on the plateaus and will prevent him from directing any flanking operations sharply against Vailly-Jouy.

Schmettow's Corps, limited to its own forces, will cover the left flank of the army on the Vesle.

6. After withdrawal of the XVII Army Corps, Schoeler's Corps and Luettwitz' Corps I will divide its mission between them, in conformity with the provisions of the present order. Corps Luettwitz' I will again free Vailly from the enemy.

8. The employment of forces for a decisive defense of the forward positions does not release us from the obligation to cover the rear by security detachments. For artillery protection the following must be continuously protected in the army: the intermediate position north of the Ailette (Hildebrand Position), then the general line, south-east tip of Bois de Mortier---hill east of Pinon---south edge of Pinon---Turmberg---Vaudesson---Katzenbuckel*---Vailly Switch Position---Dachsau** line. Points of contact will be established by mutual agreement and will be reported. Furthermore, detachments covering the bridges will be organized, which will be in communication with each other, on the Ailette from Bois de Mortier to Chevregny, on the canal from Chevregny to Bourg, [Bourg-et-Comin] on the Aisne to Berry-au-Bac and again on the canal as far as the left boundary of the army.

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von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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* Katzenbuckel - German designation of ridge 600 meters S. of Vaudesson.
** Badger's burrow
**Instructions Concerning Shifting of Defense**

*Editorial Translation*

Operations Section  
No. 278/Sept.

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,  
September 20, 1918.

Reference: Luettwitz' Corps II [XXXVIII Res. Corps] No. 414, Par. 2

Subject: Main Line of Resistance of the AILETTE Switch Position

To: Luettwitz' Corps II

If the defense is shifted behind the AISNE Canal, in conformity with Ninth Army Order No. 215, the initial fight will be made for the Canal. Consequently, in conformity with Army Order No. 149/Sept. (transmitted under No. 226/Sept. of September 18, 1918), the main line of resistance for the troops must be located close up to the north bank of the Canal. If the main body withdraws behind the Canal, the outpost zone must be retained as small bridgeheads at points suitable for this purpose south of the Canal. The defense of the mainline of resistance will be conducted as an elastic defense. Consequently the greater portion of the troops charged with this mission can be quartered approximately in the region indicated by the broken line. The command will make provisions to avoid too dense an occupation. The high authorities are reserving Wissignicourt Switch Position (indicated by a red line) as a reserve line for a later shifting of the main resistance, as the combat situation may require. * * * On this line, in addition to security detachments which must be located there from the very outset, will be reserves, whose employment will be subject to the orders of the corps and divisions. Most of the activities involved in the organization of the position will be shifted to this line. If the canal line is abandoned, the main line of resistance will be continued in the BRANCOURT Position and the Dachsbau Line in the WESTPHALIA Switch Position.

EBERHARDT,  
Commanding.

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**ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION**

There are no indications that a large-scale attack is impending north of the AILETTE. Minor attacks can be expected to continue. The strength of the enemy artillery leads to the conclusion that a sudden coordinated attack by the enemy is possible.
Between the AILETTE and AISNE the enemy attacks are certain to be continued. On this front of 12 km, there are seven divisions in line, of which five have been committed recently. The enemy artillery is pushed forward and has been increased by 87 batteries over those of last week. We have succeeded in relieving our exhausted troops at the main points of pressure. Comparatively fresh divisions are being put in on narrower fronts.

In addition to a continuation of the main attack against PINON, CHAVIGNON, and FORT de MALMAISON, we must expect new heavy pressure by the enemy from VAILLY in a northerly direction. A success here would provide the enemy with a broader basis for the continuation of his attacks against the CHEMIN-des-DAMES. No preparations were observed for an attack on a larger scale on the south front. The distribution of enemy forces has remained equally strong. An increase in the enemy artillery was not observed.

The strength of the enemy artillery indicates the possibility of a powerful attack at any time even on the south front - particularly against the ROMAIN Switch Position.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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[Editorial Translation]
FROM: Operations Section
AT: German Seventh Army
DATE: Accepted for transmission September 21, 1918: 11:15 a.m.
No. 277/Sept. 1918 Addendum No. 1
TO: Luettwitz

MESSAGE NO. 646

Subject: Amendment to Army Order No. 277/Sept. 1918
Paragraph 8 of Army Order No. 277, September 20, should read as follows:
Southeast tip of the Bois de MORTIER---hill west of PINON---south edge PINON.

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XVII Army Corps to be Relieved

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 291/Sept. 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 21, 1918.

'Extract]

Petersdorff’s [XVII Army] Corps is being relieved September 24, 1918, and will go into quarters in MARLE, where it will be under the administrative control of the Inspector General of the Communications Zone of the Seventh Army.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

Preparations for the Defense

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 415/Sept. 18

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
September 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. According to unmistakable indications the enemy intends to attack the ROMAIN Switch Position.

2. The mission of Wichura’s [VIII Reserve] Corps and Schmettow’s [65th Army] Corps is to beat the enemy by fighting a defensive battle in their positions, if he should attack on September 29 and 30. All forces of the corps will be committed for this purpose. As a preparatory defense, vigorous annihilation fire will be fired repeatedly, beginning in the early morning of September 30, against probable enemy assembly areas. Fire objectives must shift. In this manner the work of moving ammunition to the rear will be facilitated.

4. Regardless of the defense alert on September 30, the “Bergwanderung” [“Mountain Climbing,” code word] will be executed in three nights, in conformity with Army Order No. 358/August 1918.

The first night will be the night September 29/30.
5. In view of the fact that the canal switch position must be held, Wichura's Corps will hold the line of the AISNE between OEUILLY and BOURG-et-COMIN as main line of resistance. • • • •

7. The combat patrols prescribed in Paragraph 6 of the "Bergwanderung" order, will wait for the enemy in the ROMAIN Switch Position---VESLE Position, and in the third night in the rear-guard position, in order to screen the withdrawal. They will not retire except before strong enemy pressure.

8. I do not misjudge the difficult problem confronting the corps when preparing a defensive battle and a withdrawal at the same time, but nevertheless I am constrained to expect that on September 30, if the enemy attacks, the action will be fought to a finish without a single rearward glance. A successful defense is the best cover for the withdrawal.

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von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. III: Field Message

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: Sent: September 30, 1918: 12:45 p. m. No. 2816

TO: Seventh Army

Supreme Headquarters wires as follows under No. 10552:

No further reserves can be counted upon from Supreme Headquarters. Nevertheless, an enemy breakthrough must be prevented at all costs. Therefore, the Groups of Armies will direct the operations in such a manner, that they will withdraw according to plan and by sector, wherever the situation renders such procedure absolutely unavoidable, while preserving contact with adjacent units.

In this connection it is of paramount importance to gain time, to inflict heavy losses upon the enemy, to constitute reserves, to transport our equipment to the rear, and to destroy thoroughly the railroad and telephone installations. This work will be started at once.

The organization of the LYS-Hermann and Gudrun Position as a position intended for permanent occupation, will be expedited with all means.

I am well aware of the fact that this mission imposes very heavy demands on the morale of the troops and on the leisure of commanders. The German army must carry out even this mission. All must be firmly resolved to repel the enemy onset and not to withdraw prematurely. Any intention to withdraw on a rather broad front must be previously reported to Supreme Headquarters.

von HINDENBURG.

Supplements by the Group of Armies will follow.
Mission of Seventh Army to Fight Delaying Action

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 14

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY.
October 1, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

Combat Instructions for the next few Weeks

[Extract]

1. Based on the general situation, in compliance with the instructions of Supreme Headquarters, the Seventh Army is assigned the mission of fighting a delaying action in the near future. It will avoid a decisive battle and withdraw by echelon back to the Hunding Position.

   The more our troops and our equipment are saved from losses and the longer the enemy is delayed in every position, the better the mission will be executed.

2. The mission assigned to the army is more difficult than a rigid defense or an attack. It requires a particularly firm leadership, imbued with the idea that fighting is not to be avoided but is to be conducted in a manner which will postpone the decision because at the moment relative strength is unfavorable to us. Wherever fighting breaks out, the action will always be fought with energy and in the spirit of the attack. No one is permitted without orders to break off a defensive mission assigned to him. Without waiting for orders, every commander will endeavor to recapture lost positions which he had been ordered to hold, unless his counterattack is explicitly prohibited. * * *

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   von EBERHARDT,
   Commanding,

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY.
October 6, 1918.

From September 29 to October 5

[Extract]

1. Infantry:

   The withdrawal of the fronts of Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps, Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps, and Luettwitz's [III Army] Corps at the end of past report week let loose an enemy pursuit that varied in its intensity. * * *

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Violent local attacks gradually forced the rearguards back to the north bank of the canal. Since then only minor actions, raids and patrolling on both sides, have taken place there.

Thrusts that were initially only local and directed against the outposts of the canal position, between the inundated area and the AISNE, gradually increased to the proportions of rather heavy coordinated attacks. Their main pressure in the beginning was directed against the 18th Inf. Div. on the CHEMIN-des-DAMES.

On the AISNE front the enemy infantry remained quiet.

Toward the end of the month the indications of a coordinated heavy attack by the enemy on the ROMAIN Switch Position increased.

On September 30, after a barrage lasting one hour, the expected attack was launched. Supported by tanks, its main effort was directed against the corps boundary. While the enemy initially gained ground in the direction of ROMAIN, crossed the VESLE at JONCHERY and pushed forward on PEVY, in the GLENNES sector the 216th Inf. Div. and the right flank of the 19th Inf. Div. repulsed several heavy attacks, so that in the afternoon the enemy penetration was checked by committing elements of the 4th Guard Div. The attack came to a standstill in the new front GLENNES--VENTELAY--PROUILLY. The fighting was exceedingly heavy and was powerfully supported by the enemy artillery and numerous tanks.

Owing to the attack indications that had been noted on the preceding day, that portion of the front running along the ROMAIN switch position to the VESLE had been ordered withdrawn behind the AISNE. Its execution was anticipated by the enemy attack on September 30. It was started during the night September 30/October 1 and was completed the following night without interference from the enemy.

A further withdrawal of the extreme left flank of the army had to be executed during the night October 4/5, owing to the withdrawal of the First Army behind the SUIPPE. It was also completed without interference from the enemy, but the enemy pursued vigorously and on the evening of the same day came up to our rearguards that had been left behind south of the SUIPPE.

Estimate of the Situation

Opposite the army front the situation has remained unchanged. No indications of a full-scale coordinated attack against the entire army front were observed. Heavy enemy attacks are expected to continue against the canal position. On all fronts the undiminished strength of the enemy artillery always makes local attacks on a larger scale possible.

Enemy movements repeatedly observed opposite the right flank of the army may indicate an attack against the FORET de St-GOBAIN and need further surveillance. Traffic and movements in the area north and northeast of SOISSONS continue heavy. The enemy attacks against the canal sector grew from initially local attacks to coordinated attacks that have been unsuccessful so far. At OSTEL, tanks have been observed by airplanes. Statements made by prisoners captured there speak of a great quantity of artillery south of the AISNE and point to a continuation of the attacks to gain the CHEMIN-des-DAMES.

Opposite the two left corps the enemy circulation continues to be considerable. Increased enemy pressure to clarify our new front must be expected there, the more so, as according to observations made so far, the divisions that had been heavily massed for the attack against the ROMAIN Switch Position have followed to the AISNE.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.
Procedures for Berg-und-Tal Movement

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY.

October 8, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In the Second and Eighteenth Armies, full-scale battles are again in progress, which have led to losses in ground. Reserves are being brought up to the point of penetration. The Seventh Army has been ordered to move the 5th Res. Div. to the Eighteenth Army.

2. This development of the situation brings the probable date of the "Wintersaat" [Winter Seed, code word] movement so close that it is necessary to push the most urgent of the prescribed preparations energetically and ruthlessly postpone those that are less important.

3. In view of the lack of reserves in rear of the army front and as an initial preparatory step for "Wintersaat," the beginning of the "Berg-und-Tal" [Mountain and Valley, code word for movement] is set for the night October 9/10.

4. Procedure for the Movement:

   Night October 9/10:
   The present main line of resistance will be held until 2:30 a. m. At 2 a. m. the rearward movement will start. The forces left behind in the rearguard position must be so strong that the position can be held with certainty for 24 hours.
   At the canal switch position and on the ALSNE strong combat patrols will be left behind as a screen.

   Night October 10/11:
   The rearguard position will be held until 1 a. m. At 1 a. m. the rearward movement will start. Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps and Luettwitz's [III Army] Corps will move behind the AILETTE, Wichura's [VIII Reserve] Corps, unless otherwise ordered, behind the AILETTE and into the OULCHER Switch Position.
   Every effort will be made to leave combat patrols in the canal switch position and on the ALSNE.

5. The continuation of the retrograde movement and the completion of the "Wiederkehr" [Return, code word] operation by Wichura's and Schmettow's [65th Army] Corps should be anticipated and prepared.

6. In the "Wiederkehr" Position the corps will constitute reserves from its own forces. The army has no reserves in rear of the front at its disposal.

   von EBERHARDT,
   Commanding.
GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
October 9, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The situation in the Second and Eighteenth Armies may require that the movement prescribed in Seventh Army Order No. 80/October (withdrawal of the front behind the AILETTE and into the OULCHER Switch Position) be followed by the "Wintersaat" movement. In that case, the first march night would perhaps be the night October 11/12; the second, the night October 12/13. If the general situation is less favorable, the march nights will be advanced 24 hours. ** The definite time will be ordered later by the army. To afford more time for the work of evacuating material to the rear, it is intended to postpone this time as long as the general situation permits.

2. Supplementing Order No. 46, "Wintersaat," the following is directed: During the first march night the red position (NICOLAS Position--LANISCOURT Switch Position--DIETRICH Position) will be occupied, during the second march night the Hunding Position from ACHERY as far as 1.5 km. northeast of Altes Lager [Old Camp] SISSONNE, from the SISSONNE Switch Position and DIETRICH Position, establishing contact with the First Army in the R 3 Position.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Colonel, Chief of Staff.

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Preparations for Withdrawal Movements Must be Made

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 40

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
October 15, 1918.

Reference: Berg-und-Tal [Mountain and Valley, code words]

Seventh Army Order No. 7, October 1918.

Wiederkehr [Return, code word] Seventh Army Order No. 440/Aug. 18

[Extract]

1. Developments in the situation in the army, particularly on both flanks of the army, may result in the Berg-und-Tal Position being held only temporarily, so that the completion of the Wiederkehr would follow after a brief halt. Preparations must also be made for this contingency.

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von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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Withdrawal Movement Marschbeginn Planned

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 165/October 1918

Written by an Officer

Marschbeginn [Beginning of March, code word]

[Extract]

1. If the enemy continues his attacks against the Eighteenth Army, it may cause the withdrawal of the left flank of the army into the Hermann I Position: ORIGNY---VILLERS-le-SEC---MESBRECOURT---CRECY [CRECY-sur-SERRE] (contact at the last-named place with the Seventh Army), then into the Hermann II Position: GUISE---COLONFAY---MARFONTAINE (contact at the last-named place with the Seventh Army, to whom the town will be assigned).
2. As the Eighteenth Army moves into the Herrmann II Position, the right flank of the Seventh Army will be refused into the line MARGENFANTEINE—ROUGERIES—LUGNY—ROGNY—MARLE—AUTREMENCOURT—VESLES (VESLES-et-CAUMONT). Contact on the VESLE with the Hunding Position. The code word for this movement is Marschbeginn.

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4. Marschbeginn will be executed in one night. It is possible that by that time the bridgehead on both sides of the road to LAON will already be abandoned. Details for the execution of Marschbeginn will form the subject of later orders.

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von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. III: Order

Withdrawal Order

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 198

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
October 18, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In the sectors of the Eighteenth and Second Armies heavy fighting is in progress with losses of territory between Le CHATEAU and MONT-d'ORIGNY. The Eighteenth Army will withdraw from further attacks and for this purpose will move during the night of October 18/19 into the general line: CATILLON—GUISE—Bois-les-PARGNY

2. At the same time the right wing of the Seventh Army will move into the line: Bois-les-PARGNY (excl.)—DERCY—PIERREPONT.

3. * * * The interior flanks of the 86th and 26th Inf. Divs. will accordingly be extended in rear of the SOUCHE [River], so that the right flank of Luettwitz [III Army] Corps will establish contact with Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps at the unimproved road AUTREMENCOURT-GRANDLUP.

   Luettwitz Corps will secure BRAZICOURT Farm and the bridges located there.

4. The rear boundaries ordered for the Marschbeginn Movement [beginning of the march] will go into effect October 19.

5. All corps will prepare for the contingency of being obliged to issue the orders required for the first day of the Wanderung Movement as early as October 19.

   However, this latter is only a warning order and is strictly secret.

6. If the Wanderung immediately succeeds Marschbeginn, then the loads on the trains will be reduced at once by ruthlessly destroying everything that can be spared or that is of no value.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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Counterattack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 219/Oct. 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
October 19, 1918.

To: Petersdorff's XVII Corps and Luettwitz III Army Corps

Petersdorff's and Luettwitz Corp will regain possession of the forward position by a counterattack.

Petersdorff's Corps will support the 86th Inf. Div. with the available elements of the 24th Res. Div. Its main effort will be made from the region of BARENTON in the direction of VERNEUIL. Luettwitz Corps will advance in the direction CHANTRUD Farm---[Ancien] MOULIN-de-la-TOUR Ferme.

The attack will be made before the end of the day after a strong artillery preparation. Petersdorff's Corps will suggest the time; the army will then designate the time for the joint attack.

von EBERHARDT.

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FROM: German Seventh Army, Operation Section No. 226/Oct. 1918

AT: Headquarters

DATE: Sent: October 19, 1918. 8:15 p. m. to Wichura's [VIII Res.] and Schmettow's [65th] Corps.

By: Frenzel/Blandt 8:30 p. m. to Petersdorff's [XVII Army] and Luettwitz Corps.

By: Frenzel/Blandt 9:20 p. m. to Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps

By: Frenzel/Blandt. 10:10 p. m. to Group of Armies German Crown Prince. By: Hecht/Lang.

FIELD MESSAGE NO. 195

Today the enemy vigorously attacked the bridgehead on either side of the LAON-MARLE Road on a front of 10 km. In Wichura's Corps, reconnaissance patrol and outpost fighting resulted. The right flank of the First Army was likewise heavily attacked.

According to the general situation corroborated by prisoner statements, the army must expect an attack against the entire army front on October 20.

The fight will be accepted. The army will fight for a decision on the Hunding Position.
The corps will absolutely have to depend upon their own resources. Commanders must accordingly insist with determination upon sufficient organization in depth to be able to check attacks with deep objectives and be able to help their neighbors.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM:  German Seventh Army, Opns. Sect. No. 231/Oct. 1918

AT:  Seventh Army Station

DATE:  Accepted for transmission: October 20, 1918: 10:50 a.m.

By: Hacourt, Teletype Det.

Sent: October 20, 1918: 11:01 a.m. to Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps. By: Himberger

FIELD MESSAGE NO. 227. URGENT

The 121st Inf. will reach TOULIS as army reserves; 1 bn. will be moved into the sugar refinery west of TOULIS. The regiment will place posts to secure the SOUCHE crossings between the LAON-MARLE Road and SNORY Farm. [not identified]

Issuance of orders from now on by Petersdorff's Corps. Petersdorff's and Luettwitz Corps must contain the enemy pressure north of CHANTRUD Farm with the forces at their present disposal.

For this purpose Petersdorff's Corps may thin out the occupation of the ridge south of BARENTON or give up this ridge. BARENTON must be held.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM:  von Eberhardt, Commanding German Seventh Army

AT:  Seventh Army Station

DATE:  Accepted for transmission: October 21, 1918: 11:30 a.m.


Sent: October 21, 1918: 11:53 a.m. By: Kley/Schultze

TO:  Petersdorff's [XVII Army] and Luettwitz Corps

Group of Armies German Crown Prince (Sent 12 noon)
1. The bridgehead will be evacuated during the night of October 21/22. The position at the base of the SERRE [SERRE-SOUCHE Salient] and SOUCHE Salient (CRECY-sur-SERRE---MORTIERS---DERCY---TOULIS---VESLES-et-CAUMONT) will be held.

2. Both corps will withdraw in their sectors and offer sharp resistance there to any pursuit of the enemy.

3. The army reserve at TOULIS, 121st Inf., will be at the disposal of Petersdorff’s Corps to support the 86th Inf. Div. and to act as a covering force in the withdrawal of that division.

4. It is planned that in the position referred to in Paragraph 1 Luettwitz Corps will extend its right flank as far as the LAON-MARLE (incl.) road as soon as possible. The boundary will connect up with the present corps boundary directly south of MARLE.

5. The front line infantry will evacuate the front line at 4 a.m., October 22, leaving reconnaissance patrols in contact with the enemy. Combat patrols, covered by our artillery, must hold the last undulations of the terrain lying in front of the SERRE and of the SOUCHE as long as possible.

6. Special importance is attached to the defense of CRECY, DERCY, the FROIDMONT-MARLE Road and PIERREPONT.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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Amending previous orders, the boundary between Petersdorff’s [XVII Army] and Luettwitz Corps run just east of the LAON-MARLE Road. The defense of the road and the vil-
lage of FROIDMONT, as long as it is held, is therefore the mission of Petersdorff's Corps. The sugar factory, small woods south of the sugar factory, and the mill south thereof belong to Luettwitz Corps.

* * * * *

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 266/October 1918

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,

October 22, 1918.

From October 13 to 20

[Extract]

A. General: The withdrawal into the Hunding Position was completed the morning of October 13 without interference from the enemy. * * *

* * * * *

B. Infantry: The enemy infantry followed up cautiously the Hunding Movement on the right half of the army; opposite the left half he followed quickly. * * *

The enemy pressure increased steadily in the days following. Opposite Petersdorff's [XVII Army] Corps and the right division of Luettwitz [III Army] Corps initial local thrusts gradually increased to powerful attacks, in which the outguards were forced back to the outpost zone. Toward the end of the report week, on October 19, the enemy executed repeatedly coordinated attacks, with artillery support, against the entire bridgehead position between CHERY-les-POUILLY and MISSY, after a brief but powerful artillery preparation. While the left flank of the 21st Res. Div. repulsed five heavy attacks and held its main line of resistance completely, in the sector of the 86th Inf. Div. the enemy penetrated into the main line of resistance and was not checked until he reached the line south of BARENTON-sur-SERRE---hills west GRANDLUP. * * *

* * * * *

While the fighting northeast of LAON bore all the marks of a full-scale battle the hot outpost fights opposite the left half of the army can be considered as the opening phase of impending large-scale attacks.

* * * * *

Estimate of the Situation

The enemy situation opposite the army front has not yet been quite clarified. In general the enemy can be assumed to be in heavy force opposite the right and left flanks of the army. On the right flank the enemy will probably try to take only the bridgehead at first, while on the left flank of the army the general situation indicates that we
must expect a powerful attack striking for a deep objective. By means of this latter attack the enemy will attempt to get us away from the SOUCHE obstacle. The attack on the bridgehead is in progress.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section
AT: Group of Armies German Crown Prince
DATE: Sent: October 26, 1918: 2:40 p. m. No. 2907
           Received: October 26, 1918: 3:40 p. m. By: Hecht
TO: German Seventh Army Urgent

[Extract]

During the night October 26/27 the left flank of the Eighteenth Army and the right flank of the Seventh Army will withdraw into the Hermann II Position (GUISE---FAUCOUZY---Bois-les-PARGNY---DERCY). Time and details will be regulated by direct agreement between the two armies.

* * * * *

The holding of the Hermann II Position is of decisive importance. I request that it be impressed on commanders and troops beyond any doubt that the Hermann II Position must be defended to the last. The shortening of the front must enable the Eighteenth Army to constitute reserves.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince.

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Operations Section
No. 356

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
October 28, 1918.

From October 21 to 27

[Extract]

A. General:
The enemy relaxed his activities somewhat, following his attacks against the bridgehead position. Indications at the front of preparations for a large-scale attack against the east half of the army gradually began to increase. In the light of our recent experiences, the large amount of artillery, in particular that being held in reserve by the enemy, pointed to impending attacks. At the close of the report week these attacks opened on the entire front of the army with the main pressure against the left flank, exactly as we had anticipated.

B. Infantry:
The evacuation of the bridgehead executed in view of the situation in the Eighteenth Army (against the left flank of which the enemy exerted steady pressure) and in order to prevent future losses by us, led to the termination of the coordinated enemy attacks there. Since the withdrawal movement during the night October 21/22, the enemy limited himself opposite the entire army front to local attacks, some of them very heavy, which were repulsed. Opposite the right half of the army he attempted to establish bridgehead positions on the near banks of the SERRE, the SOUCHE, and the canal. In front of the left half of the army, his thrusts aimed at diminishing our outpost zone. Both actions were patently preliminaries to a full-scale attack to follow. Movements at the front, increased density of the enemy troop dispositions gradually indicated more and more preparation for imminent large-scale attacks, in which the main effort was to be made against the wings of the army and particularly against the left flank. In the evening of October 24 the picture as to the enemy intentions was clear, and large-scale attacks were expected on the entire army front. They opened as was also predicted by prisoners, the morning of October 25, after a heavy fire preparation.

On most of the attacked fronts the attack was repulsed on the very first day. The enemy obtained only local success by gaining a small bridgehead west of CRECY-sur-SERRE on the north bank of the SERRE and by capturing VESLES-et-CAUMONT and PIERREPONT.

Estimate of the Situation

The army fully expects the enemy attack begun October 25 to be continued. The main pressure must further be expected on the two wings of the army. Rather weak disposition of forces, unaggressive activity, and unfavorable terrain at the center of the army point to only local attacks there to accompany the main action. The situation on the right flank of the army will be influenced to a great extent by the events on the left flank of the Eighteenth Army.

von EBERHARDT,
Commanding.
THE YPRES-LYS OPERATION
August 19 - November 11, 1918

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Preface

In the region from Ypres to the seacoast the closing operations are known under the title, "Ypres-Lys." Armies involved were the Belgian, the French Sixth, and the British Second; American divisions involved were the 27th and 30th from August 19 to September 4 and the 37th and 91st from October 28 to November 11.

The American 27th and 30th Divisions were stationed along the Lys Salient just south of Ypres. Since the Germans were then withdrawing from the Lys Salient, the 27th and 30th Divisions were ordered to reconnoiter forward positions with the idea of occupying a new line to include Voormezeele. These operations are shown herein as "Initial Phase."

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In the middle of October 1918, the American 37th and 91st Divisions were put under command of the French Army of Belgium which was then a part of the Group of Armies of Flanders, commanded by the King of the Belgians. The two American divisions began their operations in this sector on October 31 when a general assault was launched eastward toward the Escaut (Scheldt) River. These operations are shown herein as "Final Phase."

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INITIAL PHASE

Canal and Dickebusch Sectors
August 19 - September 5, 1918

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ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE: (Left to right)

British Second Army:
Commanding General: Plumer
Chief of Staff: Robertson

British II Corps
Commanding General: Wilson
Chief of Staff: Duke
British 14th Div.
American 30th Div.

British XIX Corps:
Commanding General: MacMullen
Chief of Staff: Duke
American 27th Div.
British 34th Div.
American II Corps:
Commanding General: Read
Chief of Staff: Simonds

*Relationship with American divisions was purely administrative. Tactical control of both divisions for period covered was exercised by British corps named.

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American 30th Division:
Major General Edward M. Lewis, Comdg.
Lt. Col. John K. Herr (Acting)

Attached: Br. 132d Field Amb. Cos.
Br. 134th Field Amb. Cos.
Br. 33d Div. Arty.
Br. 35th Div. Arty.

American 27th Division:
Major General John F. O'Ryan, Cmdg.
Lt. Col. Stanley H. Ford, Chief of Staff.

Attached: Br. 133d Field Ambs.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 431: Telegram

*American Units Assigned to British Second Army*

AMERICAN II CORPS,
Fruges, August 13, 1918.

G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

C. of S. 91. Following telegram received from Commanding General, British Second Army: "I have just seen the chief of general staff British forces and he has given instructions to put American 27th and 30th Divisions into the line as soon as they have finished phase B in their training. 30th Division has I believe completed this, so should go in at once under British II Corps." I am informed that they propose to put them in the line as divisions under command of their own division commanders, attaching British artillery. Is this authorized? Request immediate instructions.

READ.
Relief of British by American Divisions

BRITISH SECOND ARMY,  
August 14, 1918.

G.805  
II Corps  
XIX Corps

1. The following reliefs will take place on the dates stated:
   (a) The American 30th Division (less artillery) will relieve the British 33d Division (less artillery) on the nights August 16/17 and 17/18, under arrangements to be made by the British II Corps.
   (b) The American 27th Division (less artillery) will relieve the British 6th Division (less artillery) on the nights August 22/23, 23/24, under arrangements to be made by the British XIX Corps.

2. The British artillery at present covering the above sectors will not be relieved but will remain in action.

3. Acknowledge.

W. ROBERTSON,  
Colonel.

Assignment of American Units

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,  
August 14, 1918.

F. C. (G-3)  
Commanding General, American II Army Corps,

Number 485 G-3. Reference your C. O. S. 91 you are authorized to put 27th and 30th Divisions into the line but only as complete units, artillery to be furnished by British, under our own commanders. Say also to proper authority that it is desired that these units be under your immediate command at an early date. The above covers employment of units mentioned only.

By Order:

CONNER.
**American 30th Division Relieves British 33d Division**

ORDER
No. 263
II CORPS, B. E. F.,
August 14, 1918—11:55 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The American 30th Division (less artillery) will on the nights of August 16/17 and 17/18 relieve the British 33d Division (less artillery) in the right sector of the British II Corps front, i.e., the front between the railway from VIJVERHOEK to OATEN Wood (0.8.b) (inclusive) on the right to the YPRES-COMINES Railway (inclusive) on the left.

* * * * *

The command will pass to the G. O. C., American 30th Division, at 3 a. m. on August 18.

2. The British 33d Division artillery will continue after the relief to cover the front being taken over by the American 30th Division and will come under the orders of the G. O. C. of that division at 3 a. m. on August 18.

* * * * *

The headquarters of the American 30th Division will remain as at present at ESDAILE Camp (K.6.b.7.7.).

* * * * *

S. H. WILSON,
B. G., G. S.

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**Movement of American 27th Division**

APPENDIX No. 6
ORDER No. 185
XIX CORPS, B. E. F.,
August 15, 1918—4 p. m.

[Extract]

1. American 27th Division (less artillery) will relieve the British 6th Division (less artillery) on the nights August 22/23, 23/24. British 6th Divisional Artillery will not be relieved but will remain in action.

* * * Command will pass at 10 p. m. on August 23.
2. The British 6th Division sector will continue to be held by the American 27th Division as at present organized, American regiment being considered as the equivalent of a British brigade.

American 27th Division will locate one regiment in the RATTEKOT and St-ELOI areas for the purpose of garrisoning the 2d position in case of necessity. • • •

3. British 6th Division (less artillery) will move on relief to the WINNEZEELE, OUDEZEELE and ZERMEZEELE areas en route to the TILQUES area.

C. N. MacMULLEN,
Brigadier General,
General Staff, XIX Corps.

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G-3; GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 415: Letter

Entry into Line of American 30th Division

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 16, 1918.

FROM: Chief of Staff.

TO: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. As authorized in your telegram No. 485, G-3, the British Second Army has issued orders putting the American 30th Division into the line. The 119th Infantry goes into tonight (16th and 17th), the 120th Infantry goes in tomorrow night (17th and 18th). The other two will be held in support and reserve.

2. They have also issued a warning order for the American 27th Division to take effect on the completion of their phase B training, which will put that division in on the nights of August 22/23 and 23/24.

3. The conditions as to putting them in under their own division commanders and attaching British artillery to the divisions are complied with by the British.

5. The plans of the British army commander are at this writing unknown to me. I am strongly of the opinion, however, that this army contemplates an offensive in the near future in which some of these troops are extremely likely to become involved.

6. Since these divisions will relieve British divisions in the front line they must of necessity come under the tactical control of the British army commander and the commanders of the British corps to which attached, and it would appear to be impracticable to restrict their use in case of eventualities which I believe will take place. However, it has been considered advisable to make a report of the situation to G. H. Q. exactly as it exists. Effort will be made to ascertain definitely the plans of the British Second Army, and prompt information will be furnished with regard to developments.

GEO. S. SIMONDS,
Chief of Staff.

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**Information about the Enemy**

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 17, 1918.

[Extract]

A. The Enemy

1. Identity of opposing division in the sector: Though the identity of the German division holding the sector from ZILLEBEKE Lake to VOORMEZEELE has not yet been definitely established by the capture of a prisoner, it is practically certain that it is the German 236th Division.

2. Dispositions:

Front Line: The front line is held by a series of disconnected posts forming a line of outposts and sited either in shell holes, short lengths of trench or shelters as the ground and the existing features permit. No definite work has been done on establishing permanent forward posts, and at various points along the front, particularly in the area BLAUWE-POORT Farm to ZILLEBEKE Lake (I.27, I.21.d.) the enemy will be found difficult to locate owing to his habit of occupying alternative positions and moving his posts at irregular intervals.

North of the Canal no definite trench line exists and the enemy's defenses consist almost entirely of shell hole positions.

South of the Canal the VOORMEZEELE Switch is held down to light railway at I.32.a.0.2, whence it branches westward to the north (H-36.d.4.3) of VOORMEZEELE.

3. The Main Line of Resistance, where also positions of heavy machine guns of the battalion M. G. Co. are located, runs along the line of the MIDDLESEX Road, though N. of the Canal there is still no definite trench line. Old French Trench [not located] continues this line southward to below the railway in 0.1.d. The VOORMEZEELE Switch Trench is apparently to be held as an intermediate line in the event of the village being lost to an attack from the west.

5. Reliefs: The 236th Division is presumed to have come into line in this sector on the night of July 26/27. It has been in line 23 days up to today. In the absence of prisoners, no definite information of reliefs has been obtained, but indications of an interbattalion relief were noticed on the evening of August 10. It is probable that battalions are doing a tour of 5 to 6 days in the front line.

B. Operations:
4. Patrols: On the whole, hostile patrols have been inactive during our tour in this sector, and our reconnoitering parties have had complete command of "No Man's Land." The enemy has usually been found very alert as soon as his posts are approached. Latterly, i.e. since the 236th Division returned to the line, more patrols have been detected.**

5. Raids: No organized attempt has been made by the enemy to raid our line during the ten weeks of our tour in this sector, although evidence has been obtained that identifications were urgently required by the German command.

**

13. Summary: After the abandonment of the projected hostile attack about the middle of July, and particularly since our own minor operations on the right flank of this division, the enemy has shown many signs of nervousness. His attitude now appears to be purely defensive, as is shown by the frequent reports of wiring, and the apparent commencement of a definite defensive system in the fighting zone. At present, the discontinuance of morning counterpreparations, and morning air reconnaissances, indicates less anxiety than formerly.

There are now no indications of hostile attack, though his previous preparations still hold good, and a local attack on a narrow front could be delivered at short notice.

C. C. RUTLEDGE,
Capt., G. S., N. A.,
Acting G-2.

HS Brit. File: F. VI-VII: Message

II CORPS, B. E. F.,
August 18, 1918.

HOUTKERQUE Situation quiet---Command of CANAL sector passed from 33d Division to American 30th Division at 3 a. m.

30th Div. Gen.: File 370.4: Message

II CORPS, B. E. F.,
August 18, 1918 -- 10:25 p. m.

To: American 30th Division

[Extract]

By end of tomorrow all your units must be south of WATOU-POPERINGHE road and clear of St-JAN-ter-BIEZEN areas and PROVEN area. You will take over HIPSHOEK, ROOZENDAAL and ZWYNLAND areas with BRANDHOEK and HAGEBAERT areas, all formerly allotted to Saul [British 33d Division]. **

- 291 -
Relief of the British 33d Division by the American 30th Division was completed.

230-32.1: Order

**Movements of 30th Division Units**

FIELD ORDERS  
No. 10

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
August 19, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In conformity with instructions from British II Corps, the following movements are ordered for the 20th instant:
   (a) Headquarters American 30th Division from ESDAILE Camp to VOGELTJE [Convent]. Headquarters will close at former place at 12 noon, August 20, and open at VOGELTJE [Convent] at the same hour.

*****

EDWARD M. LEWIS,  
Major General, N. A.

*****

227-32.1: Order

**27th Division to Relieve British 6th Division**

FIELD ORDERS  
No. 33

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
August 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. This division (less artillery) will relieve the British 6th Division (less artillery) in the left (DICKEBUSCH) sector of the corps front.
2. The relief will commence on August 21 and will be completed on the night of August 23/24  

*****
6. The division commander, 27th Division, will assume command of the DICKEBUSH sector at 10 p.m., August 23, with headquarters at DOUGLAS Camp.

By command of Major General O’Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Brit. File: 929-32.9: War Diary

BRITISH XIX CORPS,
August 23 and 31, 1918.

[Extract]

WINNEZEELE

Aug. 23 Relief of British 6th Division by American 27th Division completed. British 6th Division to TILQUES area.
Aug. 31 Orders issued for British 41st Division to relieve American 27th Division on night Sept. 2/3.

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HS Brit. File: 30th Div.: Fldr. VI-VII: Order

Transfer of Divisional Artillery

ORDER No. 268
II CORPS, B. E. F.,
August 26, 1918 — 8 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The British 66th Divisional Artillery will be transferred from British XIX Corps to British II Corps and will relieve the British 33d Divisional Artillery covering the CANAL sector of the British II Corps front on the night of August 28/29 and 29/30.
2. Details of relief will be arranged direct between the C. R. A.’s concerned.
3. The command of the artillery covering the American 30th Division front will pass from C. R. A. British 33d Divisional Artillery to C. R. A. British 66th Divisional Artillery at 3 p.m. on the 29th instant at which hour the British 66th Divisional Artillery will come under the command of G. O. C. American 30th Div.

* * * * *
230-32.12: Order

**Defense of part of EAST-POPERINGHE System**

G-3/9

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 26, 1918.

MEMORANDUM ORDERS

[Extract]

1. Under orders of the British II Corps the brigade of the 30th Division not in the line is responsible for the defense of the southern half of the EAST-POPERINGHE System. • • • •

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

Assumption of Command of Canal and Dickebusch Sectors

ARMY ORDER NO. 34

BRITISH SECOND ARMY,
August 27, 1918.

Reference Army Area Map,
July 1918.

[Extract]

1. American II Corps will take over command of the CANAL and DICKEBUSCH sectors from the British II and XIX Corps respectively on August 30.

W. ROBERTSON.
Command of Canal and Dickebusch Sector to II Corps

SECOND ARMY, B. E. F.,
August 28, 1918.

Reference Par. 1 of A. O. No. 34 dated August 27, command of the CANAL and DICKEBUSCH sectors will pass to the G. O. C., American II Corps at 6 p. m. on August 30, 1918.

W. ROBERTSON.

II Corps: Gen. File 323.71: Location List

BRITISH XIX CORPS LOCATION REPORT No. 11

[Extract]

Location of Units August 29, 1918

Reference Maps Sheets 27 and 28

XIX Corps Headquarters

WINNEZEELE

27th AMERICAN DIVISION

Div. Hq. DOUGLAS Camp
53d Inf. Brig	G.23.c.9.3.
54th do L.20.c.2.6.

XIX Corps Hq.

August 28, 1918 E. LANSDOWNE,
Capt.

HS Brit. File: 902-32.9: Message

O. A. 222

BRITISH SECOND ARMY,
August 30, 1918.

Telephone message from Col. Robertson, Second Army, to Col. Dobbie at 7:45 p. m. 30/8/18. It has been decided that the American II Corps shall not now take over a sector of the Second Army front.
**Administration of 27th Division by II Corps Rescinded**

ORDERS
No. 75

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 30, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

XIX Corps, B. E. F., will continue to administer 27th Division, until further orders.

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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II Corps: Gen. File: 323.71: Order

**Movement of American Divisions in the British Zone**

G.251

BRITISH SECOND ARMY,
August 31, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

(b) XIX Corps will arrange to relieve American 27th Division (less artillery) in DICKEBUSCH sector before 8 a. m. on September 3.

(c) American 27th Division (less artillery) on relief will be prepared to entrain at PROVEN, WAAYENBURG, and HEIDEBEEK for Third Army about midnight September 3/4, on receipt of further orders.

* * * * *

(b) 35th Division (less artillery) will relieve American 30th Division (less artillery) in Canal sector before 8 a. m. on September 5.

(c) American 30th Division (less artillery) on relief will be prepared to entrain at PROVEN, WAAYENBURG and HEIDEBEEK, for Third Army about midnight September 5/6, on receipt of further orders.

* * * * *

W. ROBERTSON,
Colonel.

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- 296 -
Operation Orders

In continuation of II Corps G. 474 of today's date and in confirmation of verbal instructions already issued. Our troops are occupying MONT-KEMMEL and there are indications that enemy may be withdrawing on front of II Corps. In such an eventuality the American 30th and British 14th Divisions will follow the enemy up. Enemy will be pressed but not seriously attacked if encountered in strength. American 30th Div. will work forward in close cooperation with American 27th Div. (XIX Corps) and endeavor to establish a line on the general line 0.1.a.5.0., MOATED Grange inclusive and thence east of VOORMEZEELE to Lock 8 inclusive thence to BLAUCHE-POORT Farm inclusive and thence to MANOR Farm inclusive. At same time American 30th Div. will, if enemy is not encountered in strength, endeavor to establish line of posts on general line MOATED Grange (0.1.a.)--SPOIL Bank (I.33.a.)--La CHAPELLE (I.27.d.4.0) to railway crossing at I.28.b.40.80. British 14th Div. will endeavor to establish line of posts on general line Road Junction at I.23.c.2.6.--DORMY House (I.23.a)--HALFWAY House (I.17.c) BIRR Crossroads (I.17.b) and thence along CAMBRIDGE Road. Ref. divisional and corps boundaries given in II Corps G.474 of today's date, these will only be regarded as approximate and for purposes of communications. Every effort will be made to push forward artillery to more advanced positions and be in readiness for any further advance. Divisions will be prepared to make, if necessary, a further move forward covered by advanced guards. Acknowledge.

S. H. WILSON,
B. G., G. S.

Operations, 27th Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 38

[Extract]

1. The line of resistance for the front of this division for tonight will be the line VIERSTRAAT Switch as now held. Our southern divisional boundary will run road from N22a72 to N24a06 road inclusive.

2. The first objective for tomorrow, September 1, will be the general line from N 29 central to VIERSTRAAT. • • •

By command of Major General O'Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Chief of Staff.

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- 297 -
230-32.16: Field Message

From: American 30th Division

Date: Aug. 31, 1918       Hour: 3:57 p.m.

To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

* * * No troop movement seen on the part of the enemy. General impression of the day very quiet. * * * Indications received from neighboring units and our O. P.'s indicate general withdrawal on our divisional front. This morning strong patrols were sent out to get in contact with enemy and are known to have encountered machine-gun fire but few troops holding the enemy advanced posts. * * * Our line is advancing behind the patrols.

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HS Brit. File: Fldrs. VI-VII: Order

Relief of 30th Division

ORDER II CORPS, B. E. F.,
No. 270 September 1, 1918.

[Extract]

3. Command of the right sector will pass to the G. O. C., British 35th Division, at 6 p.m. on September 4.
4. The British 66th Divisional Artillery will continue after the relief, to cover the front being taken over by the British 35th Division and will come under the command of the G. O. C., British 35th Division at 6 p.m. on September 4.
5. Headquarters British 35th Division will be established at VOGELTJE Convent (27/F.22.d) on September 4. Headquarters American 30th Division will move to ESDAILE Camp (27/K.6.b) on the same date.

* * * * *

J. P. DUKE,
Major.

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Relief of Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 39

[Extract]

1. The British 41st Division, less artillery, will relieve the 27th Division, less artillery, in the line on the night September 2/3. The 27th Division will entrain in the neighborhood of PROVEN on the night September 3/4. • • •

• • • • • • •

Command of the divisional subsector will pass to the G. O. C. British 41st Division at 10 a.m. September 3, 1918, at which hour Headquarters 27th Division will open at OUDEZEELE.

By command of Major General O’Ryan:

STANLEY H. FORD,
Chief of Staff.

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Intelligence Reports 30th Division

6 a.m., Sept. 1, to 6 a.m. Sept. 2, 1918

[Extract]

1. OPERATIONS. Nil

Enemy Intentions. Owing to our heavy shelling, VOORMEZEELE was evacuated, except for the front line companies, several days ago. Stiff resistance was encountered by us on the western edge of the village and in 1.31.b—VENICE [sic]. Reports from the tunneling company indicate that the dugouts in VOORMEZEELE were prepared for demolition and that the charges had been in position several weeks. 260 pounds of dynamite were found in one dugout. • • • Strong resistance was encountered also at LANKHOF Farm.

• • • • • • •

(a) Hostile Activity: Artillery: During the day, quiet to normal, with increasing activity during the night. • • •

There was some gas shelling of our new lines in 1.31.b and d during the night and at 5:30 a.m. our GHQ-1 line, ANZAC Ridge and the front line were shelled rather heavily for twenty minutes. • • •

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C. C. RUTLEDGE,
Captain, G. S.,
Acting G-2.

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La LOVIE September 1, 1918, 6 a.m. General Situation quiet. Hostile M. G.'s active S. of ZILLEBEKE Lake. 6 p.m. No change in line. Right div. sent 3 platoons to clear up pocket of enemy holding out in dugouts I.32.a.95.95. Enemy shelling outpost line between YPRES-COMINES Canal and ZILLEBEKE Lake. YPRES sector quiet.

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La LOVIE Sept. 2, 6 a.m. Situation quiet with the exception of fairly heavy shelling in CANAL sector. Line now runs 0.1.a.5.0.---MOATED Grange (inclusive)---VOORMEZEELE Switch at 0.1.b.2.7 along VOORMEZEELE Switch to Lock 8-LANKHOF Farm.

6 p.m. Enemy artillery was active this morning on forward areas of CANAL sector. 6 E.A. were driven back from our line.

II Corps Order No. G.534 was issued: Second Army will continue to press enemy. XIX Corps will press forward in the direction of WYTSCHAETE with a view to ascertaining strength and disposition of the enemy and penetrating points weakly held. II Corps will hold present line and push out patrols.

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Sept. 3, 6 a.m. Situation quiet. Some shelling of YPRES with gas and H. E. shells.

Location report for September 3, 1918.

6 p.m. Situation quiet 6 E.A. driven back by A.A. II Corps Order No. 565 was issued to American 30th Div. ordering them to keep in close touch with the left flank of the XIX Corps in the event of XIX Corps advancing.

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182-33.3: Order

Transfer of American 30th Division

G.31

SECOND ARMY, B. E. F.,
September 3, 1918.

II Corps:

[Extract]

1. The American 30th Division (less artillery) will be transferred from Second Army (II Corps) to First Army, and will be held in G. H. Q. reserve.

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M. G., G. S.,
Second Army.
182-32.1: Order

Movement of Troops

FIELD ORDERS
No. 11
II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 2, 1918.

[Extract]

4. Corps Headquarters will close at HOUTKERQUE at 6 p. m., September 3, 1918, and open at BEAUVAL at the same hour and date.

GEO. W. READ,  
Major General,  
Commanding.

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HS Brit. File: 902-32.9: War Diary

BRITISH SECOND ARMY,  
September 2 and 4, 1918.

[Extract]

Sept. 2, 1918 American 27th Division, on relief, moves to WINNEZEELE area.

Sept. 4, 1918 American 27th Division left Second Army.

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HS Brit. File: 902-32.9: War Diary

BRITISH SECOND ARMY,  
September 4 and 6, 1918.

[Extract]

Sept. 4, 1918 35th Division relieved American 30th Division.  
Sept. 6, 1918 American 30th Division left Second Army.

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From: Commanding General.
To: G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

[Extract]

The following report is rendered supplemental to report rendered September 3.

1. HOSTILE SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The 27th Division reports that the enemy appeared to be holding isolated posts with machine guns on our front but there was no certain knowledge of where his line actually was. It was suspected that the line was on WYTSCHAETE Ridge.

* * * * *

3. HOSTILE MOVEMENTS, CHANGES AND CONDUCT DURING THE DAY: The 30th Division reports normal individual movement; enemy's quiet defensive conduct did not change during the day, noon September 2, to noon September 3. There was intermittent shelling during the day on forward areas. Also areas WOODCOTE House to BELGIAN Chateau. The 27th Division reports that enemy's resistance was strengthening during the day as patrols moved forward.

* * * * *

5. OWN SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF THE DAY: The 30th Division reports that left regiment had combat patrols operating on its front for the purpose of giving security to line held by it during this time. The 27th Division reports that line was along VIERSTRAAT Switch from our right through VIERSTRAAT thence in the direction of VOORMEZEELE boundary by four battalions in depth and two battalions in reserve.

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The 27th Division reports that patrols were sent out during the day noon September 2 to noon September 3, by the 53d Brigade where the line was slightly advanced. The 30th Division reports that the left regiment advanced after a 10-minute artillery preparation and captured LANKHOF Farm and Chateau after strong resistance on the part of the enemy. Several pill boxes were taken. During the night of September 1/2, Lock No. 8 was held by our troops.

* * * * *

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

for

G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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Location of Division Headquarters

FIELD ORDERS
No. 15
30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918.

1. Division headquarters will close at ESDAILE Camp at 12 noon, September 5, 1918, and open at ROELLECOURT at the same hour.

By command of Major General Lewis:

JOHN K. HERR,
Lieut. Col, G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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Location List

30th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
September 5, 1918.

[Extract]

Division Headquarters and Hq. Troop
ROELLECOURT

Hq. 59th Brigade
HERNICOURT

Hq. 60th Inf. Brigade
SAINS

J. SHAPTER CALDWELL,
Major, Acting Adjutant.

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From: Commanding General

To: G-3, GHQ, A. E. F.

[Extract]

6. OWN CHANGES, MOVEMENTS AND ACTION DURING THE DAY: The 30th Division entrained last night for transfer to the British First Army area, division headquarters at ROELLE-COURT. The 27th Division finished entraining yesterday for transfer to the British Third Army area, and division headquarters has been established at BEAUQUESNE.

F. E. BUCHAN,
Colonel, G. S., G-3.

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Summary of II Corps Operations

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
September 11, 1918.

From: Commanding General.

To: G-3, GHQ, A. E. F.

1. Following is a brief summary of the recent operations of II Corps.
2. The 30th Division went into the line as a division with British artillery in the CANAL sector on the British Second Army front on August 16.
3. The 27th Division went into the line as a division with British artillery in the DICKEBUSCH sector on the British Second Army front on August 22.
4. The II Corps Headquarters with British corps troops was prepared to take over the sector occupied by these two divisions on August 30, when on that date orders were received from British G. H. Q. withdrawing the corps from British Second Army front and sending them to G. H. Q. reserve, the corps headquarters and the 27th Division to Third Army area and the 30th Division to First Army area. Under present instructions, the corps is held in G. H. Q. reserve in readiness for use as the situation may demand, and is at present in training.
5. On September 1, the enemy on the Second Army front started a retirement in which he was closely pressed by our troops. The whole of the 27th and a part of the 30th Division became involved and took part in the attacks on his rear guard, in which they took
all the objectives allotted to them. Upon the completion of this operation they were withdrawn as above described. A more detailed report of their part in this operation will be submitted later.

6. For the present they are engaged in no operations, but as they are in reserve in readiness for immediate action, the daily situation and operation reports will be continued, stating the fact if there be no change.

G. W. READ,
Major General, Commanding.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF:Fldr. 5: Letter

_Report for the Battle Record_

II CORPS, A. E. F.,
January 4, 1919.

From: Commanding General, II Corps
To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. Under the provisions of A. R. 244, there is submitted herewith: first, a list setting forth the battles and engagements of the II Army Corps, A. E. F., and second, a tabulation of the organizations which took part therein. [Inclosures herein referred to were superseded by the inclosures attached hereto.]

2. It will be noted that the operations are grouped in four phases: first, the engagements in BELGIUM from July 9 to September 2, 1918, when the 27th and 30th Divisions operated as a part of the British Second Army. [Second, third and fourth phases don't apply to this compilation] • • •

3. In the second list the organizations of the II Army Corps are credited with such major operations as they may have taken part in, together with such of the engagements thereunder as fell to their lot in the order of battle.

GEO. W. READ,
Major General,
Commanding.

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REPORT

of

BATTLE ENGAGEMENTS OF THE II ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.

1. ENGAGEMENTS in BELGIUM
   1. East-Poperingehe Line July 9 - August 20
   2. Ypres July 17 - August 9
   3. Dickebusch Lake August 2 - August 8
   4. Dickebusch Lake August 21 - August 30
   5. Voormezeele August 9 - September 2
   6. Voormezeele August 31 - September 2
   7. Lankhof Farm August 31 - September 2
   8. Vierstraat Ridge August 31 - September 2

   • • • • •

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REPORT FOR THE BATTLE RECORD

of

II ARMY CORPS

I. ENGAGEMENTS IN BELGIUM: July 9 to September 2, 1918.

During this engagement the 27th and 30th Divisions operated as a part of the British Second Army. The 30th Division operated as part of the British II Corps, and the 27th Division as part of the British XIX Corps.

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4. DICEBUSCH LAKE

Troops Engaged

August 21 - August 30, 1918.

27th Div. Hq. and Hq. Troop
102d Military Police
102d Field Signal Bn.
102d Engineers
53d Inf. Brig. Hq.
105th Infantry
106th Infantry
105th M. G. Bn.
54th Inf. Brig. Hq.
107th Infantry
108th Infantry
106th M. G. Bn.
105th Field Hospital Co.
106th Field Hospital Co.
106th Field Ambulance Co.
107th Field Ambulance Co.

Note: Preliminary operation leading to advance toward Mont-KEMMEL.

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5. VOORMEZEELE

Troops Engaged

August 9 - September 2, 1918.

114th M. G. Bn.
105th Field Signal Bn.

Note: Minor operation carried out by British.

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6. VOORMEZEELE

Troops Engaged

August 31 - September 2, 1918.

30th Div. Hq.
60th Brig. Hq.
119th Infantry
120 Infantry
115th M. G. Bn.
105th Engineers
105th Military Police
105th Field Signal Bn.
118th Field Ambulance Co.
119th Field Ambulance Co.
118th Field Hospital Co.
Hq. 105th Sanitary Train
Hq. Troop, 30th Div.
Note: The 59th Brigade and the 114th M. G. Bn. were present but not engaged in the operation.

Part of operation of British II Corps in advance on Mont-KEMMEL.

7. LANKHOF Farm

**Troops Engaged**

August 31 - September 2, 1918.

- 30th Div. Hq.
- 60th Brigade Hq.
- 120th Infantry
- 115th M. G. Bn.
- 105th Engineers

Note: Advance on Mont-KEMMEL.

8. VIERSTRAAT Ridge

**Troops Engaged**

August 31 - September 2, 1918

- 27th Div. Hq. and Hq. Troop
- 102d Military Police
- 105th Infantry
- 106th Infantry
- 108th Infantry
- 105th M. G. Bn.
- 102d Engineers
- 102d Field Signal Bn.
- 105th Field Hospital Co.
- 106th Field Hospital Co.
- 106th Field Ambulance Co.
- 107th Field Ambulance Co.

Note: An operation consisting of attacks and counterattacks, under organized artillery and other fire support, finally resulting in the assault, capture and consolidation of VIERSTRAAT Ridge, a position of great tactical importance.

Note: (1) The artillery support for all the above operations was furnished by the British. No American artillery was present.

(2) During the above operations the following corps troops were present with the II Army Corps:

- Corps Headquarters
- Headquarters Troop
- Corps M. P. Co.
- 412 Telegraph Bn.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Opns. Rpts.: 27th Div.: Fldr. 7: Report

27th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

*December 19, 1918.*

From: Commanding General, 27th Division, U. S. A.

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., France

[Extract]

I. As directed in communication dated December 10, the following report of operations in which this division participated with French or British corps is submitted.

II. During the operations of this division in BELGIUM, it was part of the British XIX Corps. During the operations for the breaking of the HINDENBURG Line the division was part of the British Fourth Army and attached to the Australian corps with which our II
Look north-northeast from atop Mont-Kemmel
Corps was affiliated. Subsequent operations of this division were as part of the American II Corps and these latter operations therefore are not covered by this report.

III. Only July 9, the division, which was then in Phase B of training, took over the defense of the EAST-POPERINGHE Line, this being the 2d position under the British system of defenses near MONT-KEMMEL. The sector assigned to the division covered the DICKEBUSCH and SCERPENBERG Sectors of the front line. ** The EAST-POPERINGHE Line was under direct observation from MONT-KEMMEL and the enemy kept up intermittent shell fire by day and night, with occasional gas shelling. The British 66th Divisional Artillery was attached to the division for the defense of this line. During this same period, the division was sent into the front line by battalions or detachments for training with the British units. While still charged with the defense of the EAST-POPERINGHE Line the division, on August 23, relieved the British 6th Division in the DICKEBUSCH Sector of the front line. This line was about 3,500 yards in length, the 53d Infantry Brigade taking over the front and support positions with the infantry regiments side by side each with 2 battalions in the front line and one in support. The 108th Infantry was placed in reserve and the 105th Machine Gun Battalion took over the machine-gun positions. The British 6th Divisional artillery was attached to the division for the defense of the DICKEBUSCH Sector. The 54th Infantry Brigade (less 108th Infantry) took over the defense of the EAST-POPERINGHE Line. During the evening of August 30, an order was received from the XIX Corps to the effect that the enemy was believed to be retiring and that the British 34th Division on our right and the 27th Division were to send out reconnaissance patrols. Patrols sent out by our division during the night found the enemy not very active but met with resistance. At 10 a.m. August 31, an order was received from the XIX Corps stating that the enemy had retired from MONT-KEMMEL and directing the division to advance and occupy a line along VIERSTRAAT Switch in conjunction with a similar movement of troops on our right. The objective designated was about 1,000 yards from the present line occupied by us. Strong patrols were sent out all along the line, followed by one company of infantry in each battalion sector. The old enemy front line was occupied without resistance, but further advance was opposed by enemy machine-gun fire from numerous small machine-gun nests along the front. With the assistance of artillery, machine-gun, and 37-mm. gun fire, these nests were reduced. SIEGE Farm, near the right, gave considerable trouble and halted the advance in this sector for two or three hours. By 5:30 p.m. the objective was gained and was occupied and organized for the night, two support battalions moving up to the old front line trenches. A further advance of the right regiment was directed to commence at 7 a.m., September 1. The right regiment was to move forward its right flank, pivoting on VIERSTRAAT Village. The left regiment was to stand fast. This movement was successfully completed during the morning and the whole line then attempted to advance to the east crest of VIERSTRAAT Ridge. The enemy resistance stiffened. Our right flank was counterattacked and driven back to the first objective of the morning. Fighting continued during the afternoon. On the morning of September 2, the attack and advance was continued and a line along east crest of VIERSTRAAT Ridge was firmly held and organized. The enemy was found to have retired his main line to WYTSCHAETE Ridge, on the other side of a small valley and confronting VIERSTRAAT Ridge. As no serious attack was contemplated, no further advance was attempted by this division. On the night of September 2/3, the division was relieved by the British 41st Division and moved back to a rear area from whence it was sent by railway, on September 4, to the BEAUQUESNE area.

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JOHN F. O'RYAN,
Major General.

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VOORMEZEELE-ZILLEBEKE AREA
Looking west-southwest from vicinity of Zillebeke Pond
1. Situation and disposition preceding the operation:

**DISPOSITION**

After a period of training in the back area of the YPRES sector, the 30th Division took over the line from the British 33rd Division on the nights of August 16/17 and 17/18. The line was held by the 60th Brigade with the 119th and 120th Regiments in the line; 119th Infantry on the right and 120th Infantry on the left. The 59th Brigade was in reserve.

The division held what was known as the CANAL sector with a front line trench of about 2400 meters, extending from 1.20.a.00.10 on the north to H.36.c.9.5. on the south. A general outpost line was held extending as follows: 1.21.d.1.6---1.21.c.6.2---1.27.a.6.8---1.27.a.0.0---1.31.a.3.8---H.36.d.4.0. The 120th Regiment on the left held the front line from the northern divisional boundary to A.25.a.3.5: the 119th Inf. holding the right between the last point named and the southern divisional boundary. Each regiment had two battalions in the line and one in reserve; the outpost line being held by the front line battalion.

Headquarters of the 30th Division were at CONVENT Chapel* on August 20. The 60th Brigade Headquarters at the same place, and 59th Brigade Headquarters at ESDAILE Camp.

Regimental machine-gun companies, 119th and 120th, 115th Machine Gun Bn. were disposed, two companies forward, two in the intermediate position and two in reserve; reserve companies were under the 60th Brigade Commander. Each regiment had two machine-gun companies under its command.

**SITUATION**

From the time the division took over the sector up until August 31 the enemy had maintained a quiet, inoffensive attitude. No enemy movement was seen either by our observation posts or our aeroplanes, who carefully surveyed our immediate front and made a report port of their observation each morning and afternoon.

The area in front of our lines was kept carefully patrolled each night out to a distance of 1,000 yards. These patrols found the enemy on the outpost line held by machine-gun posts which seemed to be moved into a new position each night.

Enemy machine-gun fire was below normal except when our patrols appeared near their outpost line. Enemy artillery kept up the usual fire on the forward area but for most of the period this was below normal. The usual harassing fire was kept up day and night in our back area, especially on important crossroads and villages.

The enemy held KEMMEL Hill and from this could observe all of our movements in the area we occupied, necessitating troop and transport to move after dark.

2. **ORDER OF EVENTS**

At 10 p.m., August 30 our artillery and observation posts reported heavy clouds of smoke rolling toward our lines from a fire that appears to be behind KEMMEL Hill. It was at first thought to be a gas attack by our troops, but later proved to be the burning of enemy dumps of some sort.

On the night of August 30/31 a prisoner captured near KEMMEL stated that he was told that the enemy was retiring to the WYTSHAETE-MESSINES Ridge and that KEMMEL Hill itself was being held by one machine gun per company front.

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* [VOGELTJE Convent]
The division thus being placed on the alert to watch for a retirement on our immediate front and also in compliance with British II Corps orders, strong patrols were at once sent out by both regiments in the line to ascertain the enemy's strength and disposition. The order for this operation was sent to the 60th Brigade from the Chief of Staff in the form of message No. G-144:

In the event of your patrols reporting your front clear or held only by light covering detachments, you will occupy the line 0.1.a.50---VOORMEZEELE Switch to Lock No. 8 (inclusive)---LANKHOF Farm along trench to BLAUWE-POORT Farm, thence to MANOR Farm (exclusive). Establish communication with 27th Division at 0.1.a.50 and 14th Division at MANOR Farm; patrols to be pushed out well.

Your right boundary is the railroad from ELZENWALLE to OATEN Wood (0.8 central) your left boundary YPRES-COMINES railway of far as 1.28.b.35.95, thence along MORLAND Avenue (all inclusive).

Instructions for the sending out of patrols was issued at once verbally by the Brigade Commander and followed by *** Memorandum Order, Hq. 60th Brigade (dated August 31, 1918).

Prior to the issuing of these orders KEMMEL Hill was reported to have been taken. The day closed with the infantry patrols pushing forward.

3. ORDER OF EVENTS SEPTEMBER 1

At 1:50 a.m. a telephone message received from the 120th Regiment stated that two Platoons had been withdrawn to their original front after having advanced as far forward as the MIDDLESEX Road, a distance of about 1,000 yards. The retirement was made because they had lost touch with the troops on their right and left, and thought both flanks exposed to the enemy and in addition were subject to heavy trench mortar and machine-gun fire from RAVINE Wood.

The 119th Infantry on the right made steady progress and at 4:52 a.m. sent in the following report to division headquarters:

Situation on left uncertain. Right battalion has two Platoons, L Company, in VOORMEZEELE Switch Trench with left resting on VOORMEZEELE Road. I Company has taken MOATED-Grange and is connecting with L Company. Two Platoons of L Company in dugout at VOORMEZEELE. One squad of I Company in VOORMEZEELE, two Platoons of I Company in MOATED-Grange---Captures 1 N. C. O and 1 O. R.

On the afternoon of September 1, orders were received from the British corps, in compliance with which Field Order No. 12, these headquarters, was issued:

In accordance with orders, British II Corps, the American 30th Division will make good and hold the line 0.1.a.50---MOATED-Grange---VOORMEZEELE Switch in 1.31.d. and 1.32.a.---Lock No. 8 (inclusive). Covering detachments will be maintained in front of the line and patrols pushed forward beyond these detachments as opportunity offers. The 14th and 27th Divisions are sending patrols to front on our left and right respectively.

The line will be consolidated and wired.

Precautions should be taken to repel counterattacks and to avoid a too heavy concentration of men in VOORMEZEELE and G. H. Q.-1 line, which places will probably be shelled.

Immediately Field Orders No. 12, Hq. 60th Brigade, was issued.

* * * * *
The patrols of the British division on our left had failed to advance on August 31, but the American 27th Division on the right reported at 1:17 p.m. that it had reached and was consolidating its first objective.

At 7:30 a.m. after a short artillery preparation on LANKHOF Farm the 120th Infantry attacked the enemy and established its front line from Lock No. 8 (inclusive) LANKHOF Farm—thence along the former outpost line, and a new outpost line was established.

No counterattack was made by the enemy.

4. RESULTS OF THE OPERATIONS

(a) Enemy Losses.

As a result of these operations, this division took from the enemy a strip of ground comprising approximately one square mile. Sixteen prisoners (O.R.) were captured, one of whom was severely wounded and evacuated to hospital. Two machine guns and one granatengewerfer were captured, and a small amount of ammunition and stores.

It is estimated that enemy losses in killed were between ninety and one hundred; many dead bodies were actually seen. Enemy wounded is estimated at about two hundred.

(b) Our Losses: In the two days on which actual fighting took place, August 31, and September 1, our losses were: Officers killed 2, wounded 2. O.R. killed 35, wounded 126.

* * * * *

E. M. LEWIS,
Major General,
Commanding.

Annex to Ypres-Lys Operation

[Initial Phase]
Translated German Documents

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GERMAN 8th INFANTRY DIVISION, August 30, 1918.

[Extract]

1. A division reconnaissance patrol will be formed in the division sector beginning September 1.

Mission: Observation of the enemy by day and night and, if circumstances warrant, even employment of independent detachments in major engagements with missions determined by the division.

* * * * *
3. The forenoon the enemy has penetrated Bailleul, evacuated by us, and is cautiously feeling his way farther forward. The enemy may be expected to launch patrol thrusts tonight for the purpose of clarifying the situation on our front. The artillery commander will order surprise fires delivered on the foremost parts of the enemy position at irregular times.

* * * * * *

HAMANN.

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Preparations for Defense against Expected Attack

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 8th INFANTRY DIVISION,
August 31, 1918.

1. The rearguards repulsed with high casualties the enemy advance in front of the entire width of the division. In a counterattack south of Groote-Vierstraat the 7th Co., 93d Inf., captured 1 machine gun and several prisoners and inflicted heavy losses on the enemy.

2. The rearguard companies of the 153d and 93d Infantry Regts. will be withdrawn behind the Wytschaetebeek and the Haerlingenbeek after nightfall. The rearguard of the 72d Inf. will remain in the Nieuwerkerke [Neuve-Eglise?]-Basseye* Switch Line. Patrols will be left in contact with the enemy west of the Brook sector. Contacts will be insured at the regimental and divisional boundaries. The movements must take place unnoticed by the enemy.

3. The defense in the new rearguard position will be organized in such a manner that an enemy advance in the night or early morning will collapse in machine-gun and artillery fire. Closest contact between the rearguard companies and the combat companies in the Ploegsteert Position will be insured.

4. Until 3 a.m. artillery annihilation fire will be delivered in the sector of the 153d Inf. in front of the Franken Position (main line resistance), in the sector of the 93d Inf. on Groote-Vierstraat and the main line of resistance of the Franken Position, and in the sector of the 72d Inf. in front of the Nieuwekerke [Neuve-Eglise?]-Basseye Switch Line.

Also from 3 a.m. on in the sector of the 153d Inf. on the main line of resistance of the Franken Position.

5. I expect that an enemy advance early on September 1 will break up in machine-gun and artillery fire long before it reaches the Bach [Brook] sector and the Nieuwekerke [Neuve-Eglise?]–Basseye switch. All artillery and infantry observers must keep sharp watch on the maneuvers of the enemy night and day. Every enemy movement must be taken under fire immediately.

6. The artillery commander will see that the artillery positions are provided with ample ammunition up to 2 1/2 basic loads.

HAMANN.

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* "Basseye" on German 1/40,000 map; "Basseije" on British maps.
Occupation of Ploegsteert Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1801
GERMAN 236th INFANTRY DIVISION,
August 31, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Fighting their way forward and thereby inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, the most advanced security detachments of the 458th as well as the rearguard of the 457th and the 459th Inf. Regts. have reached the new line of security.

   The old line of security is unchanged on the right flank of the 458th Inf.

2. Further combat must be expected.

   In such event the outpost area of the Ploegsteert Position or the Franken Position, as the case may be, must be held without fail. At the conclusion of the fighting we must be firmly established on the present most advanced line of security.

   The forces which have been designated to carry out the counterattacks automatically, must be thoroughly familiar with their missions.

3. The Ploegsteert Position is to be occupied from 5 a. m. on. Definite contacts must be established by 6 a. m. These must be reported to the division by 7 a. m.

   *

   MUHRY.

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At 1 a. m. the information arrives that the KEMMEL [Mont-KEMMEL] has been surrendered. Relief ordered to take place on the night of August 31/September 1 is postponed because of the changed situation.

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Enemy Position and Reorganization for Defense

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2490

GERMAN 8TH INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 1, 1918—9:20 p.m.

[Extract]

1. Throughout the day numerous attacks have collapsed with high casualties in our effective artillery and machine-gun fire.

At present the enemy is situated opposite the 153d Inf. sector with sentries pushed forward west of the Wytschaetebeek. He has occupied the hill farther south on the west edge of the Haeringhebeek. Duhoot Farm [sic] and Lagache have also been occupied. It is not clear whether Sauvegardelinde [sic] and D’Hoine Farm have been occupied.

2. The rearguard will hold the line which they occupy at this time. Sauvegardelinde will be occupied again. In case the enemy should occupy this place, we will recapture it by a surprise attack, if necessary with forces from the Ploegsteert Position. Hill 77 will be held at all costs. Contact with the 22d Inf. of the left adjacent divisions will be established immediately at the square of the houses along the Wulverghem-Lindenhoek Road (middle of map square 7549.)

4. The annihilation fire will be brought up close along the Wytschaetebeek and Haeringhebeek and will continue via Duhoot Farm to red point w (map square 7449).

Artillery missions for the night:
Continuous searching fire on all approach routes, surprise fires on the enemy front lines, waves of annihilation fire along the entire front between 5 and 6 a.m. The artillery commander will arrange for details. Liberal use of gas!

5. Isolated tanks have been observed at Chateau de Hallebast toward 8 p.m. A possible tank attack is to be expected early on September 2, especially against the south flank of the division.

I am confident that all possible preparations have been carefully made for antitank defense and that the troops, relying on their excellent antitank weapons, will cool-headedly smash any tank attack.

HAMANN.

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GERMAN 8TH INFANTRY DIVISION,
Roncq. September 1, 1918.

Toward 9:30 a.m. enemy detachments of some size advanced south the Groote-Vierstraat-Wytschaete Road into the region of Parret and Berghe Farms for the purpose of attacking
Haeringhebeek. Effective artillery fire broke up this attack. The enemy withdrew after sustaining casualties to Groote-Vierstraat---Kemmel Road. Farther south detachments approximately 400 to 500 men strong advanced to the attack from the village of Kemmel astride the Kemmel-Sauvegardelinde Road. The company situated here fell back fighting to the east.

Toward noon Duhot [Duhoot?] and Plorain [sic] Farms and Vroilandhoek were occupied by the enemy. When the enemy pushed forward in the direction of Sauvegardelinde he was repulsed in a counterattack. On thrusting in the direction of Wulverghem, his most advanced elements pushed up to within 300 meters southeast of Caesleker [Farm].

At 5:30 p.m. heavy artillery fire lay on the outpost line of the center of the regiment. At the same time the enemy approximately 200 men strong advanced in an attack from the Groote-Vierstraat---Goethals Line. Our concentrated artillery fire had already brought him to a standstill at the Goethals [Farm]-Berghe Farm Road.

At 9 p.m. in the same sector he renewed his attempt to advance on Lompelstede [sic] from the Duhout [sic] Farm line. Annihilation fire was immediately requested by red Very light signals. Thus this attack also collapsed in our artillery fire. After nightfall the 93d Inf. dislodged the enemy from Sauvegardelinde and D’Hoine [Farm]. One prisoner was captured from the Irish 7th Fusilier Bn., British 30th Div. Several enemy batteries which had been moved up were silenced by our artillery.

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[Editorial Translation]

Division 1
Section Id

GERMAN 236th INFANTRY DIVISION,

September 1, 1918.

August 30 to September 1, 1918

[Extract]

I. Combat Activity
   1. In our own divisional sector:
      Enemy patrol attacks on VOORMEZEELE and the region north thereof since 1:30 p.m., August 31.
      Patrols 50 to 60 men strong repeatedly felt their way forward toward our line of security, which was withdrawn for a time at VOORMEZEELE and at the canal.
      The enemy was beaten back by our well-placed annihilation and machine-gun fire and in close contact with heavy losses. 3 prisoners were taken from the 119th Inf., American 30th Div. Enemy pressure increased from 5 p.m. on, especially just south of Etang de ZILLEBEKE as well as south of VOORMEZEELE. In the north regiment the enemy succeeded in temporarily penetrating some 300 meters into the outpost area of the FRANKEN Position on a more extensive front, but was repelled by counterattack. One prisoner was brought in from the 120th Inf., American 30th Div. Enemy losses are described as heavy.
      From 3:40 p.m. to 8 p.m. the enemy was engaged in bringing in the dead and wounded. The night passed quietly. At 6:30 a.m. the enemy attacked the left flank south of the regiment with approximately 200 men. He was driven back. An enemy detachment of approximately 30 men advancing along the canal in front of Mitt’s Regiment was driven off by machine-gun fire. It was observed at 9 a.m. that troops were being assembled at VOORMEZEELE, ELZENWALLE, and De SLYPER [sic]. Then toward 11 a.m. the enemy advanced on a broader front in

- 317 -
an easterly direction via De SYLPER [sic]. Our artillery, however, obstructed his progress across the east edge of VOORMEZEELE and the BOLLAARBEEK.

Enemy artillery activity remained feeble during the entire operation and in the night.

Our batteries delivered annihilation fire at various times as the enemy advanced. In addition, movements and traffic on the rear roads were taken under harassing fire.

2. In the adjacent divisional sectors:

(a) Right: In the early morning of August 30 one of our combat patrols attacked the enemy sentry posted at the canal lock in front of the right sector ** *

* * * * * *

British assault detachments advanced against the left sector on the evening of August 31. They were repulsed with severe casualties. **

A Belgian patrol likewise attacked the right sector in the evening. It was also repulsed. ** (6th Belgian Inf. Div. confirmed.)

Enemy artillery activity remained moderate.

Our artillery delivered harassing fire on enemy batteries and observed movements. Annihilation fire on TROIS-ROIS and Etang de ZILLEBEEK.

(b) Left: A weak enemy patrol was driven off by machine-gun fire on August 30. Toward 9 a.m., August 31, the enemy advanced in 5 to 6 waves in strength of about 300 men against the small and large KEMMELBERG (KEMMEL Heights) on both sides of the BRULOOZE-KEMMELBERG [Mont-KEMMEL] Road. Our patrols fell back fighting. The enemy occupied the large and small KEMMELBERG (KEMMEL Heights) toward 11 a.m. As the enemy was making further advanced on De LIN [De LINDE Cabaret] in an easterly direction and on the LINDEN-HOEK-SEVYNBAKBRAUEREI [sic - LAYNEBOK Brasserie?] road in a southeasterly direction, our concentrated artillery fire brought him to a standstill.

His attack was stopped on the right flank by our machine gun and artillery fire. On the left flank of the 93d Inf. the enemy attack was broken up in front of the position by our artillery and machine-gun fire, with heavy losses for the enemy.

One prisoner was taken from the 106th Inf., American 27th Division. ** Enemy artillery activity was slight. Only toward 5 a.m. were violent surprise fires delivered on the infantry zone and the artillery area. Our batteries took approaches and crossroads under increased harassing fire. Heavy surprise fires were laid on KEMMEL, KEMMELBEEK Bottom, and VYVERBEEK Valley. Waves of annihilation fire from 5 a.m. on.

III. Aviation Activity: At times lively air traffic was observed on both sides. One of our infantry fliers determined the trace of the most advanced line of security. Between St-ELOI and the canal the infantry did not disclose its positions when requested.

* * * * * *

KLUGE,
Captain, General Staff.

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At 6:30 p. m. an enemy assault north and south of the Groote-Vierstraat---Wytschaete Road was repulsed by artillery and machine-gun fire.

In the morning heavy forces of enemy infantry advanced against the center sector.

At 10:45 a. m. the right flank company of the center regiment was attacked by a force of approximately 200 men. The attack was repelled. An attack against Couwy Farm [sic], preceded by smoke screening and conducted by American colored troops, was also repulsed. The enemy succeeded in occupying Vadamme Farm toward noon.

After a short intense artillery preparation the enemy attacked the entire sector of the regiment on the left in 5 waves at 4 p. m.

Combined artillery and machine-gun fire smashed the attack. The enemy sustained heavy casualties. A second enemy attack on the left boundary of the division was repulsed by our rear guard company.

All enemy movements demonstrate a surprising lack of skill in the utilization of terrain, not only in the preparation but also in the attack.

Troops agreed in their reports of heavy enemy losses.

* * * * * *

The enemy infantry was quiet during the forenoon. Toward 11 a. m. the enemy attacked the left adjacent regiment. Our machine guns participated in the defense against this attack. The artillery delivered supporting fire.

At 8:45 p. m. the enemy advanced against the 93d Inf. but was repulsed in the combined fire of all arms. 1 prisoner was taken from the British 34th Div. After a brief but intense artillery preparation the 72d Inf. was attacked at 9:30 p. m. Our rearguards were compelled to fall back to the outpost of the Poegsteert Position. Only enemy patrol activity was observed in front of the 153d Inf. sector.

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Depreciation of American Tactics and German Defensive Organization

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2509

[Extract]

GERMAN 8th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 3, 1918.

1. The rearguard battles of the past 3 days have shown that the withdrawal of our line confronted the American troops with a task to which they were by no means equal. Presumably, the initial employment of the American 27th Div. at the front was to accustom it to quiet position warfare. Our Ploegsteert movement forced the division immediately into mobile warfare. This fighting demonstrated that the inexperienced troops do not yet know how to utilize the terrain in movement, work their way forward during an attack, or choose the correct formation in the event the enemy opens artillery fire. The infantry and artillery reports agree that the enemy has suffered heavy losses in his advance, in his assembly movements, and in his numerous attacks, which were executed over-hastily and on the spur of the moment without or with only slight artillery support. The enemy artillery is weak, cautious, and unsteady. • • • Cooperation between the infantry and artillery is not yet discernible at this time.

I express my full appreciation to the rearguards and the entire artillery for their achievements of the past 3 days. Good observation, quick firing on identified movements, proper conduct on the part of the rearguards, and steady machine-gun and rifle fire when the enemy attacked repelled the enemy with costly casualties at whatever point he pushed forward. The superiority of our infantry is clearly obvious.

I expect that every one will do his utmost in his place to inflict the heaviest possible damage on the Americans, whose state of mind is generally known, and to obliterate once and for all with withering fire their desire to renew the attack in case they should venture to advance against our Ploegsteert Position.

* * * * *

HAMANN.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 8th INFANTRY DIVISION,
Roncq, September 4, 1918.

[Extract]

After violent artillery fire which opened suddenly without warning the enemy attacked the entire division front at 6:30 a. m. The right flank of the 153d Inf. was temporarily pushed back, but immediately regained the old line in a counterattack.
Just east of the Groote-Vierstraat---Wytschaete Road the rearguards withdrew in face of superior forces into the outpost line after offering fierce and for the enemy, costly resistance.

Effective machine-gun, rifle, and artillery fire repulsed the enemy attack in front of the 93d Inf. sector with heavy casualties for the enemy. 8 prisoners from the British 41st Div. and 1 Lewis gun were captured in hand-to-hand fighting. The enemy attack carried out in 4 waves in front of the 72d Inf. also failed with heavy enemy losses.

At 9 a. m. the enemy smoke-screened the terrain before the entire front. Attacks against the 93d Inf. were repelled in part by counter-thrusts. * * *

The enemy infantry was quiet during the night. * * *

In general the physical condition of the troops is satisfactory. * * *

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Defense Instructions and Transfer of Units

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2519

GERMAN 8th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 4, 1918.

[Extract]

1. By employing heavy smoke screening after short violent artillery preparation, the enemy has succeeded in penetrating the sector of the 11th Res. Div. and in occupying the Nachtigallhoehe [Rossignol Hill]. Counterattack to recapture the hill has been ordered. Enemy success was due primarily to the heavy smoke screening, which blinded our artillery and machine guns as well as masked the enemy assembly preparation and attack.

The same procedure will be expected in the event the enemy continues his attack against our sector. If smoke screening of a sector is recognized, the artillery will deliver waves of annihilation fire. All front machine guns will fire into the smoke screen. The enemy himself will be blinded if he penetrates the screen. He will not know the location of our machine-gun nests. His attack is bound to fail, if all machine guns and rifles fire in definite directions previously determined by the rearguard and combat battalion companies. In case of smoke screening, sweeping fire will be laid particularly on the roads. The shell-crater area will greatly impede the advance of the attacker in the smoke. The roads enable him to advance rapidly without losing direction. Furthermore, tanks can be moved forward on the roads under the protection of smoke.

If the enemy screens his own position or approach routes with smoke, we will fire similarly into the smoke screen with a greater number of batteries, since screening indicates the assembly of reserves or even tanks under some circumstances.

* * * * *

7. Extract from X Res. Corps Order No. 1477, September 3, 1918, Par. 5: The 40th Inf. Div. will be transferred to the Guard Reserve Corps and billeted in the Roubaix---Tourcoing---Linselles area. Division headquarters and Headquarters 88th Inf. Brig. at Roubaix.

The division will establish itself in the sector of the 8th Inf. Div. as soon as possible.

HAMANN.

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RESUME OF OPERATIONS
IN THE YPRES-LYS OFFENSIVE
18 AUGUST - 4 SEPTEMBER 1918

MAP REF: FRENCH 1:50,000 YPRES ELVERDONHE
NOTE: GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE REMAINED UNCHANGED

LEGEND

BR II
BR XIX
AMER 30th DIV
GER 52d Res DIV
GER X Res
AMER 27th DIV
GER 11th Res DIV
GER 56th DIV
GER 12th DIV
GER Gd Res
BR 14th DIV
BR 34th DIV
KEMMEL
LOCHTITTE
MONT KEMMEL
DICKEBUSCH
LAKE DICKEBUSCH
VOORMEEZEELE
FRENCH 1:25,000 YPRES
KEY MAP

MAP NO 89
Instructions for the Defense of the Ploegsteert Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2527

GERMAN 8th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 4, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The rearguards of all 3 regiments will be withdrawn into the Ploegsteert Position after nightfall. Only sentries or patrols for the observation of the enemy will be left in front of the position. Thus the front sector of the division will be shortened, its defense facilitated, and above all contact insured with the left adjacent division, which has been pressed back. Artillery annihilation fire can be delivered in front of a line running as straight as possible. Contact on the flanks of the regiments and at the divisional boundaries will be secured and will be verified by officers.

Henceforth annihilation fire will be delivered as a unit in front of the Ploegsteert Position from 2 a. m., September 5, on. The signification of the high-rising yellow projector signal is canceled from 2 a. m. September 5, on. Up to that time it will continue to signify that the rearguards have moved into the Ploegsteert Position.

At this point it must be recalled that the following light signals will be in effect from 10 a. m., September 5, on: Green - annihilation fire, Red - lift fire, white with caterpillar - as a signal that the foreground has been evacuated.

The artillery commander will take the necessary steps to insure that on the morning of September 5, if the combat situation permits, annihilation fire observed with the utmost precision will be delivered by all batteries. The fire will be brought up to the Ploegsteert Position and must cover the areas which give the enemy the opportunity for assembling for the attack.

We must not permit the enemy to push up close to our battle position, which must be held at all costs. Infantry and artillery observation must determine the exact positions where the enemy has established himself. Then he will be destroyed in or dislodged from his positions by well-observed destruction fire. The enemy must realize that this time he is coming up against organized, strong resistance and that our forces will no longer retreat before his attack. He must be forced to remain at a proper distance from our battle position. This will also make it possible for the artillery to take the enemy's front lines under fire.

* * * * * *

The 8th Inf. Div. can be proud of its fine success in its first encounter with the Americans in so completely using up one American brigade in 2 days that it had to be withdrawn from combat because of exhaustion.

I ask that this commendation be communicated to all troops.

3. The successes of the enemy opposite the 11th Res. Div. and the distribution of enemy forces as well as prisoners' statements indicate that the attacks against the 8th Div. and the left flank of the 236th Inf. Div. will probably be continued.

They may begin this evening or early tomorrow morning. Objective: capture of the hills near [St-] Eloi, the Wytschaete hills, and the hills northeast of Wulverghem.

Prospective enemy assembly areas as well as approaches will be covered with the most vigorous harassing fire. In conformity with instruction of the artillery commander, waves of annihilation fire will be delivered on probable enemy assembly areas between 9 a. m. and
10 p.m. today and 5:30 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. tomorrow, especially on the area between the Groote-Vierstraat-Wytschaete Road and the Kemmel-Sauvegardelinde Road [sic], as well as on both sides of Wulverghem and the low ground on both sides of the Douve River.

HAMANN.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1829

To: Hq. X Res. Corps

[Extract]

2. Enemy Infantry Activity: Very limited at the beginning of the week. On August 31, in conjunction with his advance in the south corps sector, the enemy began to drive our outposts back.

In so doing he succeeded in temporarily effecting a deeper penetration into our outpost area in the sector of the north regiment and in taking prisoners.

Outside of this he was repulsed at all points in front of the new outpost line and suffered heavy casualties. Furthermore, local thrusts in the southern regimental sector during the next few days were unsuccessful.

The enemy infantry proved itself surprisingly unskillful in its utilization of the terrain.

3. Enemy Artillery Activity: The activity of the enemy artillery has fallen off markedly. It continued to be very weak on the days of the rearguard engagements. On September 4, it grew stronger for the first time.

The grouping of the enemy artillery shows no change. The number of identified battery positions has diminished greatly.

4. Enemy Aviation Activity: Continues to be very lively. Repeated bombing raids took place on the rear area and billets. The balloon of the division was shot down twice by enemy fliers.

5. Total Estimate: The division believes a large-scale enemy attack improbable at this time. Otherwise, the enemy would have pushed his pursuit more vigorously on August 31, particularly north of the canal.

Local attacks are to be expected at any time, chiefly south of the canal for the capture of ELOI [St-ELOI?] Hill.

6. Fighting Qualities: Of late the depletion of forces was fairly high in consequence of the strenuous work in field fortification and the comparatively high number of casualties.

In addition, the number of intestinal cases has increased, some proving to be dysentery.

For these reasons and on account of its weak combat strength the division can be considered fit for combat only in this sector.

MUHRY.

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Division Alert in the Ploegsteert Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1834

GERMAN 236th INFANTRY DIVISION,
September 4, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Today the enemy has continued his attacks opposite the 8th Inf. Div. and the 11th Res. Div. In the sector of the 8th Div. he succeeded in crossing the WYTSCHAETEBEEK in one place in spite of heavy losses. He pressed the 11th Res. Div. back as far as the midway point on ROSSIGNOL Hill.

The altered conduct of the enemy at VOORMEZEELE indicates that here also, just as opposite the 8th Inf. Div., the Americans have been relieved by the British.

Further attacks must be expected even on our own divisional front.

2. The 8th Inf. Div. will retire with its rearguards to the PLOEGSTEERT Position during the night of September 4/5, 1918, and will hold this position. At the same time the right flank of this division will be shifted to the southern edge of NASENWALD [Nose Wood - not identified]. Contact at this point must be assured.

3. The brigade will endeavor to obtain by all means at its disposal complete information concerning the enemy forces situated opposite the division.

* * * * *

MUHRY.

FINAL PHASE OF YPRES-LYS OPERATION

Flanders Offensive
October 14 - November 11, 1918

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ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE: (Left to right)

Group of Armies of Flanders:

Commanding General: Degoutte
Chief of Staff: Brion

French Army of Belgium:

Commanding General: de Boissoudy
Chief of Staff: Bernard

French XXXIV Corps:

Commanding General: Nudant
Chief of Staff: ?

French 70th Div.
French 77th Div.
French 11th Div.
French XXX Corps:

Commanding General: Penet
Chief of Staff: Seguin
    French 12th Div.
    American 37th Div.

French VII Corps:

Commanding General: Massenet
Chief of Staff: Hourruau
    French 128th Div.
    American 91st Div.
    French 41st Div.

Change in Order of Battle for period Nov. 7-11, 1918:

French XXXIV Corps:

    Fr. 5th Div.
    American 37th Div.
    Fr. 132d Div.

French XXX Corps:

    Fr. 12th Div.
    Amer. 91st Div.
    Fr. 41st Div.

French VII Corps:

    Fr. 164th Div.

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American 37th Division:

Major General Charles S. Farnsworth, Comdg.
Col. Dana T. Merrill, Chief of Staff.

Attached: Fr. 278th Aero Sq.
    Fr. 87th Bln. Co.
    Fr. 257th F. A. (75's)
    Fr. 43d F. A. (75's)
    1 bn. Fr. 130th Arty. (155's)
    1 bn. Fr. 103d Arty. (155's)
    Fr. 132d Cav.

Detached: 62d F. A. Brig.
American 91st Division:

Major General William H. Johnston, Comdg.
Col. Henry C. Jewett, Chief of Staff.

Attached: 53d F. A. Brig. and
103d Am. Tn. (28th Div.)
Fr. 59th Arty.
Fr. 264th Arty.
Fr. 72d Aero. Sq.
Fr. 73d Bln. Co.

Detached: 166th F. A. Brig.

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Preparations for Crossing the Escaut [Scheldt]
October 14/28, 1918

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91st Div., General Correspondence File: Telegram

Foch Orders Two American Divisions to be Sent to Belgium
[Contemporary Translation]

MESSAGE CENTER, FIRST ARMY,
October 14, 1918.

No. 4779. Very urgent. For General Pershing: The action that has been undertaken today by the Belgian, French and British troops in Belgium has made sufficient progress to enable us to expect important results if it is pushed through, and with that object, followed up with sufficient forces.

Under those conditions and to that effect, I order that two American divisions chosen among those that have taken part in offensive operations, be sent to that region. The first of those divisions will be ready to entrain by October 16 at noon, the second on October 17. One of those divisions could be sent without artillery.

Please let me know by telegram on October 15 before noon the numbers of those divisions, which, it seem, ought to be chosen among the 26th, 89th, 90th or 78th divisions.

It is always understood that this reduction of the American forces will to no extent change the mission assigned to the American Army especially between the Meuse and the Aisne.

FOCH.

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Movement of 91st and 37th Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 4784

HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED ARMIES,
October 15, 1918.

Received 12:20 p.m.

Headquarters BACON

To Headquarters at SOUILLY [American First Army]

For General Pershing. Pursuant to the recommendations which you transmitted to me, the American 91st and 37th Divisions will be moved to Belgium. The 91st Division will start entraining October 16 in the REVIGNY region; the 37th Division will start October 17 in the TOUL region.

French General Headquarters in agreement with your headquarters will regulate the conditions of entraining.

FOCH.

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Troop Movements

First Army, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

MEMORANDUM for Troop Movement Section, G-3.

[Extract]

1. The 91st Division with the 53d Field Artillery Brigade will be entrained on October 16. Please make arrangement for this movement and notify division.

2. The 37th Division (less artillery), now on the front of the American Second Army will be entrained on October 17 or 18.

G. C. MARSHALL, Jr.,
Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. G-3.

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- 328 -
Relief of 37th Division

G-3 ORDERS
No. 5

SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918.

1. The 28th Division is relieved as army reserve and assigned to the IV Corps.
2. The 28th Division, less artillery, now in the ROYAUMIEX area will relieve the 37th Division, less artillery, in the PANNES sector.
3. Relief must be completed without delay.
4. Details of relief will be ordered by the Commanding General, IV Corps.
5. Upon completion of relief, the 37th Division will be concentrated in the TOUL-FOUG area preliminary to entraining for another area.

By command of Major General Bullard:

STUART HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

Relief of 37th Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 31

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 15, 1918 — 16 h.

MAPS: COMMERCY 1/80,000.
THIAUCOURT 1/50,000.

[Extract]

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2. (a) In accordance with Field Orders No. 39, Hq. IV Army Corps, this division (less artillery) will be relieved in the PANNES sector by the American 28th Division.
   (b) Relief will be commenced this date and completed by 23 h., October 16, 1918 [later amended].

*****

(c) P. C. 37th Division will close at EUVEZIN 23 h., October 16 and open at FOUG same date and hour.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

237-32.1: Order
Transfer of 91st Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 16
October 15, 1918

MAP: France: 1/1,265,000.

[Extract]

1. In compliance with telegraphic instructions, Headquarters First Army, [October 15, 1918] this division is to be transferred to a new area.
2. The movement will be made by rail.
Duration of journey about 60 hours.

* * * * *

Division headquarters will close at CONTRISSON at 9 o'clock, October 17, 1918, and will open in the new area on date to be announced later.

* * * * *

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major, General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

ORDER
No. 19 (In connection with Field Orders 16.)

1. Railhead October 16 and 17, REVIGNY; after that date, to be announced later.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Johnston:

H. J. BREES,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.
Supply of American Divisions in Belgium

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

Commanding General,

Services of Supply.

Number 5626 G-4. The 37th and 91st Divisions transferred to serve on Belgian front. Major Kilpatrick leaves this afternoon for DUNKIRK [DUNKERQUE] where he will install Major Estey as regulating officer to supply divisions referred to. Arrangements for supply these divisions will be similar to those made for the 1st Division when it was supplied through MANTES. Upon completing arrangements Major Kilpatrick will return. Please honor Major Kilpatrick's calls and designate the most convenient depot to serve them. Kilpatrick will investigate conditions on the ground and install most practical arrangements.

GEORGE V. H. MOSELEY,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Asst. C. of S., G-4.

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French Forces under Command of King of Belgians

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 262/3

C. P. FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 16, 1918--9:45 p. m.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 3948

[Extract]

To provide the High command in Flanders with additional facilities, necessitated by the growth of the French forces in the north, General de Boissoudy is placed under the orders of His Majesty the King of the Belgians as Commander of the French army of Flanders. Consequently, the French forces now operating under the orders of the Chief of the General Staff of the Belgian army, in the direction of THIELT and GHENT, flanked by the South and North Groupments of the Belgian army, will pass under the orders of General de Boissoudy at a date to be determined later.

The Belgian forces of the South Groupment (BIEBUYK) will be reassembled in the north, between the French army and the coast.

The Belgian divisions of the NIEBUYK [BIEBUYK?] Groupment will be relieved as soon as possible by French troops, north of the ROULERS Canal, and by British troops south of said canal, as directed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Belgian army.

* * * * *

- 331 -
The mission of the Allied Armies remains the same: Push to the LYS at the earliest opportunity, especially on the axis: COOLSCAMP---THIELT---DEYNZE, covered by the French Cavalry Corps.

In the name of the King,

DEGOUTTE,
General.

Distribution of French Troops

[Editorial Translation]

SPECIAL ORDER

The following distribution of French troops will be made gradually:

South [VII] CORPS: (MASSENET), composed of the 164th Division on the north and, eventually, of the 41st Division on the south, within a zone limited on the north by ROULERS (excl.)---MEULEBEKE (excl.)---OESSELGHEM (incl.) and on the south by the British boundary.

CENTER [XXX] CORPS: (PENET), composed of the 5th Division on the north and of the 132d Division on the south; limited on the north by ARDOYE---PITTHEM---THIELT---GRAMMENE (all incl.).

North [XXXIV] CORPS: (NUDANT), composed of the 7th, 77th and 128th Divisions, between this last limit and the southern boundary of the Belgian army.

The dates of passage of command will, obviously, depend on circumstances and will be indicated in ample time.

The 12th and 11th Divisions are pushed forward but remain at the disposal of His Majesty the King, in general reserve, to be employed wherever they may be needed to strengthen the line.

Two American divisions (91st and 37th) will arrive within a few days to enlarge the successes already gained by the Allied Armies in Belgium. Their employment will be governed by subsequent developments.

In the name of the King,

The General.
Relief of 37th Division

G-3 ORDERS
No. 9
SECOND ARMY, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

[Extract]

1. 37th Division is relieved from duty with the IV Corps and will proceed to another area by rail beginning the 18th instant.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Bullard:

STUART HEINTZELMAN,
Chief of Staff.

---------

Change in Field Order

G-3 ORDER
No. 556
37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 16, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

5. That part of subparagraph C, Par. 7, F. O. 31, which relates to division headquarters opening at FOUG, is changed to read PAGNY-sur-MEUSE.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.
ANNEX No. 2 F. O. No. 31

* * * * *

Organizations will be in position at ESSEY not later than 12 midnight.
Organizations will be in position at XIVRAY not later than 3 h. October 17.
Organizations will be in position at BERNECOURT not later than 3 h. October 17.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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First Army, Gen. File 370: Fldr. 11: Memorandum

Strength of Organizations of 91st Division

A. P. O. 776, October 16, 1918.

Memorandum showing present strength of organizations in the 91st Division.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters and Detachment (*)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters Troop</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>346th Machine Gun Bn.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181st Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347th Machine Gun Bn.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>361st Infantry</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2701</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>362d Infantry</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182d Infantry Brigade Hq.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>348th Machine Gun Bn.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>363d Infantry</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>2901</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>364th Infantry</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>3086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th Engineers</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th Field Signal Bn.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th Tn. Hq. and Military Police</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th Supply Train</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>466</td>
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<tr>
<td>316th Sanitary Train</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th Ammunition Train (**)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>316th Engineer Train</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) Including attached personnel.
(**) Only two companies now with this division.
Of the above number 2309 men replacements assigned to the 181st Brigade are isolated on account of being influenza contacts. In addition approximately 500 men of this same brigade are unfit for duty on account of illness and fatigue due to recent campaign.

----------

Fr. File: 410-30.1

**Boundaries Allied Armies in Belgium**

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,

*October 17, 1918.*

[Extract]

The boundaries were fixed during the meeting held October 16, 1918, at the Hq. of the Group of Armies of Flanders.

* * * *

The boundaries of the three armies have been determined as follows:

I. Between the Belgian and French armies:

ZUYDCOOTE---LEFFRINCKHOUCKE---UXEM---HOYMILLE---BERGUES---REXPOEDE---
OOSTCAPPEL---ROUSBRUGGE---STAVELE---OOSTVLETEREN---RENINGHE---NORDSCHOOTE---
MERCKEM---HOUTHULST---LICHTERVELDE---WYNGHENE---LOOTENHULLE---NEVELE
(these localities to the French army).

* * * *

II. Between the British and the French armies:

LINCK (on the HAUTE-COLME Canal)---BOLLEZEELE---RUBROUCK---ARNEKE---ZERMEZEELE---
HARDIFORT---OUDEZELLE---WINNEZEELE---WATOY---St-JANS-ter-BIEZEN---ELVERDINGHE---
BRIELEN---St-JEAN---ZONNEBEKE---MOORSLEDE---ROLLEGHEMCAPELLE---WINKEL-St-ELOI---
HUSLTE---OYGHEM (these localities to the French army).

* * * *
Arrival of 91st Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 269/3

C. P. GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 17, 1918---6 p. m.

Special Orders No. 3,950

PART I

[Extract]

I. The American 91st Division will begin to arrive by rail in the zone of the Group of Armies of Flanders the evening of October 17. It will be placed in reserve of the group of armies.

* * * * * *

III. The American 91st Division will arrive without its motorized trains, that is, without ambulances or ammunition sections, and with field trains reduced.

* * * * * *

General DEGOUTTE.

---------

Entrainment 37th Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 32

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 17, 1918---19 h.

MAPS: Northern France

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to G-3 Orders, No. 9, American Second Army, this division, less motorized units, will entrain on October 18, 19, and 20. * * *

* * * * * *

11. Division headquarters will close at PAGNY-sur-MEUSE at 8 a. m., Oct. 19 and will open at a point to be announced later.

C. S. FARNSWORTH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Comdg.

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- 336 -
37th Div.: War Diary

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

Pagny-sur-Meuse, October 17, 1918.

[Extract]

Available for duty: 707 officers, 19,582 men.

SUMNER WAITE,
Major, General Staff.
A. C. of S., G-3.

---

First Army: 191-34.3: Telegram

Transfer of the 91st Division

REVIGNY, October 17, 1918.

C. G., First Army

91st Division Headquarters closed this station 9 a. m. today destination unknown. First regulation station NOISY-le-SEC. Representing G-1 and G-3 remain on duty at REVIGNY until completion of movement. Movement progressing satisfactorily and trains leaving according to schedule.

JOHNSTON,

8:48 a. m.

---

HS Fr. Files: 410-30.1: Order

Assignment of the 37th and 91st Division

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,

October 18, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 3954

I. At midnight, October 19, the French Army of Flanders is placed under the orders of General de Boissoudy, who will have at his disposal the staff and the services of the French Sixth Army, less the elements designated in Special Orders No. 3955.

- 337 -
II. The Commanding General of the French Army of Flanders will have at his disposal all troops now within the zone, said zone determined by Instructions No. 3948 of October 16, 1918, limits are: North: LICHTERVELDE---WYNGHENE---LOOTENHULLE---NEVELE (all to the French army). South: ZONNEBEKE (to the French army)-OYGHEM (to the British army).

III. The French II Cav. Corps and the French 11th and 12th Inf. Divs. remain under the direct orders of His Majesty the King of the Belgians.

The American 37th and 91st Divs., upon detraining, will also be under the orders of His Majesty the King of the Belgians.

IV. C. P. of the General commanding the French Army of Flanders: HOONDSCHOOTE, then ROULERS as soon as possible.

In the name of the King:

DEGOUTTE,
General.

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37th Div: War Diary

October 18, 1918.

[Extract]

Headquarters PAGNY-sur-MEUSE.
REMARKS: Advance party of division headquarters left PAGNY-sur-Meuse at 12 noon for new area at HOOGLEDE, BELGIUM.
Troops preparing for movement, which began at 6 p. m.
Three troop trains left for new area.

SUMNER WHITE,
Major, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-3.

----------

91st Div.: War Diary

October 18, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * * *

REMARKS:

Division completed schedule of entrainment in accordance with F. O. 16, Hq., 91st Division, October 15, 1918. Troops arriving in YPRES---St-JEAN area.

DEAN G. WITTER,
Captain, Infantry,
Asst. G-3.

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- 338 -
Arrival and Station of 37th Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2/3

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 19, 1918—6:10 p.m.

[Extract]

I. The American 37th Division will arrive by rail (serial 322) beginning the morning of October 20 in the zone of the Group of Armies of Flanders, where it will be in reserve of the army group.

* * * * *

Headquarters: STADEN.

IV. The American 37th Div. will arrive without its artillery.

* * * * *

DEGOUTTE,
General.

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Instructions for Resumption of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 8/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
October 19, 1918—9:15 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 2 O. P.

I. The line reached by the army at 10 a.m. runs as follows: West of Poesele---Vynckt---Driesch---Grammene---Gotthem---Vaarinckhoek---Wacken---Wielsbeke.

II. The operation will be resumed tomorrow, the 20th, as follows: The French XXXIV Army Corps will continue its movement so as to reach the Lys, and secure crossings. The French XXX and VII Corps will cross the Lys to seize the heights in the Lindenhoek region.

III. The zones of action of the corps will be bounded as follows: North boundary of the XXXIV A. C.: Lootenhulle---Nevele---Deurle---La Pinte (excl.)---Teirlinck---localities incl.

Boundary between the XXXIV and XXX Corps: Aerseele (XXXIV)---Driesch (XXX)---Leihoeck (XXX)---Goedleven (XXX)---Asper (XXXIV)---Laethem-Sté-Marie (XXXIV).

Boundary between the XXX and XVII Corps: Wacken (VII)---Zulte (VII)---Wannegem-Lede (XXX)---Audenaerde (VII).

South boundary of VII Corps: Oyghem (excl.)---Spitael---Ansegem---Elsegem-Chateau---Pladutse, localities incl.
IV. a. The French 11th Inf. Div. will move on the 20th and proceed to the zone: Ruysselede---Schuyfferscapselle---Hooithoek. Movement to be regulated by the XXXIV Corps. The battalion of 75 mm.'s of the divisional artillery of the French 11th Inf. Div., still at the disposal of the center corps, will be returned to its division the night of 19/20. Movement to be regulated by agreement between the XXXIV and XXX Corps.

b. The French 12th, 41st and 128th Inf. Divs. will not move. The artillery of the French 128th Inf. Div., now at the disposal of the XXXIV Corps, will revert to that division on the 20th. Movement to be regulated by agreement between the corps concerned.

c. For administrative control and discipline the above-mentioned divisions will be attached as follows:
- 11th and 41st to the XXXIV Corps
- 12th to the XXX Corps
- 128th to the VII Corps

V. Effective on the 20th, the rear boundary of the corps will be marked by the road (excl.): THOURLOUT---ROULERS---MENIN.
The corps will advise as to which of their elements might, for special reasons, have to be maintained west of said road beyond noon of the 20th.

Billeting for only one regiment of the 41st Inf. Div. will be provided in the town of ROULERS since army headquarters are to be established there in the near future.

De BOISSOUDY.

237-32.16: Message

**37th Division Headquarters Closed**

From: Farnsworth
At: Headquarters 37th Div., A. E. F.
Date: October 19, 1918

Headquarters 37th Division closed PAGNY-sur-MEUSE 8 a. m. October 19.

FARNSWORTH.

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Disposition of the 91st Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 17

[Extract]

1. This division has been designated as part of the army reserve.
2. The division will march to the area, the movement to be completed October 20, 1918.

5. Division P. C., OOSTNIEUWKERKE.

William H. Johnston,
Major General, Commanding.

Preparation for Crossing the Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 20/3

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 20, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 3

[Extract]

I. The progress achieved by the Group of Armies of Flanders is such that, from this moment, consideration should be given to the crossing of the ESCAUT and to an advance east of that river.

II. The Group of Armies of Flanders will advance in the general direction of BRUSSELS.

III. The boundary between the Group of Armies of Flanders (right of the British Second Army) and the British armies (left of the British Fifth Army) is designated as PECQ, on the ESCUAT---LESSINES, on the DENDRE---HAL, on the SENNE (these places to the British Second Army).

IV. The boundary between the British Second Army and the French Army of Belgium will pass through NEDERBRAKEL (to the British army)---POLLAERE, on the DENDRE (to the British army)---AUDERGHEM (7 km. southeast of BRUSSELS) (to the French army).
V. The boundary between the French army and the Belgian army will be: MELSEN (to the Belgian army)---ALOST (to the French army)---VILVORDE (to the French army).

VI. The crossing of the ESCAUT is to be attempted by forcible means • • • • •

• • • • • 

XI. The reserve [of] American divisions, at the disposal of His Majesty the King, will remain in the French zone in the vicinity of ROULERS.

• • • • •

In the name of the King.

DEGOUTTE,
The General.

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Instructions for Continuation of Operations.

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 20/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM.
October 20, 1918---7:45 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 4

[Extract]

I. Today, at all points, the army reached the canal and the Lys, and at certain points passed beyond the latter.

II. The general stresses the importance of rapidly expanding bridgeheads established on the south bank of the Lys. The Nudant [XXXIV] Corps, with its right, and the Penet [XXX] Corps, with its left, will enlarge the Grammene bridgehead which is of special importance due to the fact that its possession forces the entire line of the canal. Because of their respective repercussions, the operations of the French XXIV and XXX Corps must be closely integrated.

The Massenet [VII] Corps will continue its movement in the direction of Waereghem for the capture of the heights in the region of the Lindenhoek, the importance of which was pointed out in General Orders No. 2 of October 19.

Between these two operations, which are the most important ones, that on the Chateau of Zulte will be resumed by the Massenet Corps; it can be of assistance either to the right of that army corps or to the left of the Penet Corps.

The corps commanders will pool their means and, particularly, their artillery to insure the success of these operations.

• • • • •

V. C. P. XXXIV A. C.: Ondank (northeast of Thielt)
XXX A. C.: Thielt
VII A. C.: Iseghem

De BOISSOUDY.

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- 342 -
GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS, October 22, 1918 - 1:30 a.m.

Confirmation of Telephone Message to FRENCH ARMY of BELGIUM

With regard to the attack which the British Second Army will execute today, General Degoutte directs that the right of the French army support that attack to the greatest extent and that it [the right of the French army] debouch on the far side of the LYS.

By order:

Chief of 3d Section.

---

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 5

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS, October 22, 1918.

Although the American 37th and 91st Divisions remain at the disposal of His Majesty the King of Belgium, they will be attached to the French army of Belgium for supplies and administration.

By order:

G. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

---

37th and 91st Divisions Attached to French Army of Belgium

[Editorial Translation]
237-34.1: Memorandum Order

Movements to Billets 37th Division

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 22, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The 37th Division will move to its billeting area in the vicinity of STADEN-HOOGLEDE, movement commencing tomorrow, under orders to be issued later.
2. Division headquarters has been established in the eastern outskirts of HOOGLEDE.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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291-32.16: Message
FROM: G-3, 91st Division
DATE: October 23, 1918
TO: C. of S. 91st Division

Memorandum to the Chief of Staff:

[Extract]

Special Orders No. 439, Hq. First Army, October 15, 1918 states, "The 53d Field Artillery Brigade is detached as army artillery and attached to and will accompany the 91st Division." • • •

CLARK LYNN,
Lieut. Col., Infantry,
G-3.

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Les Armees Fr.: Tome VII, 2d Vol.: Annexes: Orders

Offensive Plan

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 63/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
October 24, 1918—6:30 p. m.


I. Tomorrow, October 25, the French Army of Belgium will proceed with the French VII and XXX Army Corps to the attack on the Lindenhoek heights, in liaison with the British Second Army, which is to attack on the Bergwijk---Heestert front, and it will endeavor to reach the Escaut.

The offensive of the French army of Belgium will be carried out as follows:

a. The XXX Corps will engage the French 12th Division which, starting from the line Machelen Station---Olsene, will have as objective the line of heights between Boekwetstraet and Lindenhoek exclusive.

This attack will be covered on the left by the artillery of the French XXXIV Corps. In connection therewith, the general commanding the army artillery will coordinate, the artilleries of the XXX and XXXIV Corps.

On both sides of the line of departure of the attack, the front of the XXX Corps will be held by a minimum of forces; nevertheless, a reserve should be ready to intervene towards the left of the corps, should need arise, to meet any enemy reaction on the front St-Hubert---Machelen Station.

b. The French VII Corps, attacking with the equivalent of one division, will have as first objective the wooded massif of Spitaals-Bosschen; for subsequent objective, the heights extending from Lindenhoek inclusive, to Mariom [sic].

Line of departure of attack: to be fixed between Waereghem and Heirweg.

It is important that the VII Corps maintain close liaison with the British; consequently, it will push a special detachment towards Ansegheem.

A second regiment of the French 128th Inf. Div. is placed at the disposal of the general commanding the VII Corps.

The two corps (VII and XXX) will have to provide for efficacious liaison between the offensive zones assigned to each of them.

II. The attacks of the VII and XXX Corps will be launched at 9 a. m., hour at which the British Second Army will also attack.

III. The XXXIV Corps will not attack during the day of October 25. The French 11th Inf. Div. will be brought up to the Vynckt, Aerseele, Caeneghem area.

IV. The army heavy artillery will support the attack on the Lindenhoek heights. The general commanding the army artillery will regulate its employment, in agreement with the generals commanding the XXX and VII Corps.

The general commanding the VII Corps will request the support of a part of the artillery of the British II Corps for his right.

de BOISSOUDY.
Plan for Operation

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 64/3

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS No. 1 Op.

I. The fighting of October 22 and 23 revealed resistance by the enemy rearguards who do not permit themselves to go to pieces easily.

II. Only operations in force on reduced fronts will enable us to break through these [hostile] detachments and [cause them to] withdraw across the Escaut.

III. Under these conditions, the maneuver to be achieved, based on the sequence of efforts, will be as follows:
   a. Gain a foothold on the Lindenhoek heights, with the right wing of the army,
   b. Subsequently, attain the Escaut, in the vicinity of Eecke, with our left wing from the area south of Deynze.

IV. The first of these offensive operations will be made by the French XXX and VII A. C., from bases at right angles:
   Machelen Station-Olsene, on the one side, Waereghem-Heirweg on the other.
   This operation is joined with an offensive in the direction of the Escaut conducted by the British Second Army.
   The second operation will be under the French XXXIV A. C., operating south of the Lys, in the direction of Nazareth-Eecke.

V. The army artillery will support each of these attacks.

de BOISSOUDY.

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291-32.1: Order

Extension of Area Assigned to Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 19

Roulers )
Maps: ) 1/40,000
Ypres )

[Extract]

1. The area assigned to the division has been extended to include the district south of ROULERS.

• • • • • •
5. Division P. C. will close at OOSTNIEUWKERKE at 9 o'clock, October 26, 1918, and open at RUMBEKE (Chateau) same date and hour.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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237-32.1: Order

**Enlargement of Divisional Zone**

FIELD ORDERS 37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 33

MAPS: ROULERS 1/40,000
THIELT 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. The divisional zone has been increased to include the zone of LICHTERVELDE--COOLSCAMP.
2. The following organizations will move to this area:
   Division Headquarters,
   Headquarters Troop,
   Hdqrs. Det., 112th Engineers,
   112th Military Police (less 1 company),
   73d Brigade.
3. All units will move to the LICHTERVELDE area at 8 h., October 26, 1918.
   * * * * *
4. Division headquarters will close at HOOGLEDE at 16 h., October 26, 1918, and will open at LICHTERVELDE same hour and date.
   By command of Major General Farnsworth:
   DANA T. MERRILL,
   Colonel, General Staff,
   Chief of Staff.

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INSTRUCTIONS No. 9

I. The resistance offered by the Germans on the front of the French Group of Armies of Flanders, the reinforcement of the enemy who has put new divisions in line, and the present political situation in Germany permit consideration of a combined operation assigned to throw the forces opposite us behind the ESCAUT and enables us to seize a footing beyond that river.

The offensive preparations on the front for this operation must be completed by October 29. The date of the attack will be designated later.

II. The Belgian army will cross the secondary canal north of the GHENT-BRUSSELS Canal, to establish bridgeheads and subsequently, be ready to exploit any weakening which might develop on the hostile front.

It will make its main effort south of the GHENT-BRUSSELS Canal in liaison with the left of the French army its mission being to drive the enemy beyond the LYS and to establish itself beyond that river, south of GHENT.

The French army will clean up the region between the secondary canal and the LYS, with its left, and will debouch beyond that river.

It will make its main effort with its right, [which will operate] in close liaison with the British army, while its center advances in the direction of the ESCAUT.

Concentrating the major portion of its means on its left wing, the British army will decisively break enemy resistance between the LYS and the ESCAUT by outflanking, [in conjunction with the French right [wing], the enemy forces along the LYS.

With its center and right, it will seek to cross the ESCAUT and establish bridgeheads on the right bank of the river.

III. From these directives, it develops that, the main effort of the Group of Armies of Flanders being directed between DEYNZE and the ESCAUT, it will become necessary to concentrate the greatest possible amount of artillery in that region.

Consequently, the Belgian army will have to provide a certain number of heavy batteries from its own means, for the purpose of the artilllery action on the French front.

Likewise, the British Second Army will, in so far as is compatible with its own mission, support the attack by the right of the French army.

The commanders of the Belgian, French and British armies will reach an agreement on this point.

IV. For the proposed operation, the French army will have at its disposal: the two American divisions, now in the reserve of the King (the American 37th and 91st Divisions), and all [but two] of the French infantry divisions. These two [divisions] are to be designated by the army commander and will be placed in reserve, at the disposal of the King: presumably, in the region east of ROULERS.

The French II Cavalry Corps, whose [future] employment cannot be foreseen at this time, will also be placed in the reserve of the King in the region west of ROULERS, actually occupied by the American divisions. All of its artillery is left at the disposal of the commander of the French army.

V. The attack units will not be moved into position until the last moment. Movements will be carried out by night.
VI. In so far as the French army is concerned, it should improve its base of departure, between now and the moment for the attack by minor operations designed to advance its front to DEYNZE-COURTRAI Railroad and to the WAEREGHEM-ANSEGHEM Road.

In the Name of the King,

DEGOUTTE,
General.

HS Fr. Files: 412-30.1: Instructions

Offensive Preparation

[Editorial Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 86/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM.

October 26, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 1 Op.

For the Generals Commanding the French VII, XXX and XXXIV Army Corps,

The General Commanding army artillery,
The Colonel Commanding the army engineers.

I. The high command contemplated a general attack to be executed by the Belgian army, the French army of Belgium, and the British Second Army. This offensive must be ready to be launched October 30.

II. Consequently, the employment of the French Army of Belgium is no longer to be considered in the manner defined in General Instructions No. I of October 24. Subsequent orders will determine its employment.

III. But the several army corps will immediately initiate local actions to secure a favorable line of departure.

This line of departure will be marked by the railroad between PETEGEM and WAEREGHEM-ANSEGHEM Road.

An extensive use of artillery will be planned for these local operations. The distribution of the artillery between the corps will remain as it now is. It will moreover be the concern of the general commanding the corps to request from the general commanding the army artillery, such assistance as they deem necessary from the army artillery.

IV. The French 128th Inf. Div. is placed at the disposal of the VII Corps.

V. A subsequent order will bring the American 91st Div. into the zone of the VII Corps on October 28 and the American 37th Div., into the zone of the XXX Corps.

de BOISSOUDY,
General,
Commanding the French Army of Belgium.

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- 349 -
Movement of 37th and 91st Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 85/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
October 26, 1918—7 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 8 Op.

[Extract]

I. The American 37th Division will move October 28 to the zone: THIELT, POELBERG, GINSTE, Les CINQ-CHENES, MEULEBEKE, MAANEGHEM, TURKEYENHOEK, PITTHEM, (localities inclusive).

Headquarters: MEULEBEKE

II. The American 91st Division will move October 28 to the zone: CACHTEM, LIESTER, PAANDERS, OOSTROOSBEKE, LENDELEDE, BOSCHMOLENS, (localities inclusive).

Headquarters: INGLEMUNSTER

III. Movements of both divisions to occupy their new zones will be extended according to detailed instructions issued by the generals commanding the respective divisions.

de BOISSOUDY,
General.

---

37th and 91st Divisions Placed at Disposal of French

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 84/3

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 27, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 10

The American 37th and 91st Divisions are placed at the disposal of the General commanding the French Army of Belgium, effective at midnight October 27/28.

By order:

G BRION,
Chief of Staff.

---
Equipment for American Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 65/3

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS.

October 27, 1918.

General Degoutte

To Marshal Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces

The American 37th and 91st Divisions have joined the French Group of Armies of Flanders lacking equipment; in particular, the 37th Division did not have its artillery. This artillery, the 62d F. A. Brigade, was recently resting at TOUL, according to information furnished by the division commander.

It is requested that, in view of forthcoming events, these divisions be completed as soon as possible: (1) The American 37th division, by sending its artillery, ammunition trucks, and the 100 ordinary trucks it lacks. (2) the American 91st Division by sending its motor ambulances, 80 ordinary trucks, and 120 ammunition trucks which it likewise lacks.

[signature illegible]

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237-32.1: Order

Movement 37th Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 34

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 27, 1918...17 h.

MAPS: ROULERS ) Scale 1/40,000
THIELT )

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Special Orders No. 8 Op. French Army of Belgium, October 26, 1918, this division will proceed by marching to a new area.

2. The 73d Brigade will be billeted in the THIELT Zone; the 74th Brigade in the PITTHEM Zone. * * *

* * * * *

10. Division headquarters at LICHTERVELDE will close at 14 h., October 28, 1918, and open at MEULEBEEK at same date and hour.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff, Chief of Staff.

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Movement Orders

FIELD ORDERS
No. 20

MAPS: ROULER 1:40,000
COURTRAI
THIELT
YPRES

[Extract]

1. This division has been attacked to the French VII Army Corps.
2. The division will proceed by marching on the 28th inst. to the areas designated in Message No. 32. Hq. 91st Div., October 27, 1918.

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5. Division P. C. will close at Chateau de RUMBEKE at 13:30 o'clock October 28, 1918, and open at ISEGHEM same date and hour.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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Designation of D-Day

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 28, 1918.

For the operation planned in Instructions No. 9 of October 26, D Day is October 31. H Hour will be determined later.

In the name of the King:

DEGOUTTE,
General.

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Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 94/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
October 28, 1918.


[Extract]

I. The mission of the French Army of Belgium is to throw the enemy back across the ESCAUT.

On its left, the Belgian army, making its main effort south of the GHENT---BRUGES Canal, will seize positions east of the LYS, south of GHENT.

On its right, the British army, massing the greater part of its forces on its left wing, will clear the ground up to the ESCAUT, cross that river, and establish bridgeheads on the right bank.

II. The scheme of maneuver of the French army is as follows: the army will attack between ANSEGHEM and PETEGEM, that part of the front between DEYNZE and NEVELE being merely the theater of local actions connecting the French and Belgian attacks.

The main effort will be made on the right, with the object of capturing the heights: WEEDRIESCH---BOSCHKANT---KLEIHOEK---LINDENHOEK---CRUYSHAUTEM.

On the left, the army will drive to the ESCAUT in the direction of EECKE.

... ... ...

IV. The attack will be made by the French VII, XXX, and XXXIV Army Corps.

(a) The VII A. C., with the French 41st and 128th Infantry Divisions and the American 91st Division at its disposal, will have as objective: [1] on one side, the WEEDRIESCH---BOSCHKANT massif [2] on the other side, SPITTAALS-BOSSCHEN and the heights of KLEIHOEK---WAALEM.

Each of these attacks will be made by one division in the general direction, west-southwest---east-northeast.

The attack against the WEEDRIESCH---BOSCHKANT massif will be carried out in close liaison with the left of the British army. An agreement to this effect is to be reached between the French VII Corps and the British II Corps.

The remainder of the front of the VII Corps will be occupied by a division, widely spread, which will pass to reserve when the right division of said corps and when the XXX Corps (discussed below) have reached their objectives.

(b) On the left of the VII Corps, the XXX Corps will have the American 37th Division and the French 12th Infantry Division at its disposal. Its objectives will be: (1) the heights of LINDENHOEK---CRUYSHAUTEM on one side; (2) Te BUSDONCK Woods, (east of the station of MACHELEN) and the heights of WATERHOEK on the other side.

The attack by the right division of this corps will be in liaison with that by the left elements of the VII Corps.

The attack by the left division will facilitate the attack by the right division, and will make possible that to be made by the XXXIV Corps, which is defined hereinafter.

(c) The XXXIV Corps, employing the French 11th, 77th and 70th Infantry Divisions will attack: (1) on one side, in the direction of NAZARETH---EECKE; (2) on the other side, [and in a direction] parallel to the LYS, south of that river.
In addition, separate actions will be attempted between the Canal and the LYS to join the French and Belgian attacks.

Lines of departure of army corps are separated as follows: (1) between the VII and XXX Corps, by the point where ZAUBEEK Brook cuts the COURTRAI---GHENT Railroad; (2) between the XXX and XXXIV Corps, by St-HUBERT Farm (to XXX Corps).

VI. [Par. V is missing (or order was not correctly numbered) in the original.] The following divisions will be held in rear of the attacking divisions: (a) the French 132d Infantry Division in the region: HAM, DENTERGHEM, MARCKEGHEM, at the disposal of the general commanding the army; (b) the French 5th Infantry Division in the region of THIELT and the French 164th Infantry Division in the region: VIVE-St-BAVON---OOSTROOSEBEKE, at the disposal of the King.

IX. As soon as the heights between the LYS and the ESCAUT have been taken and that the [ESCAUT] river shall have been reached, in the region of EECKE, by the XXXIV Corps, the two corps on the right (VII and XXX) will advance to the ESCAUT: (1) the VII Corps on either side of AUDENARDE between MELDEN and EYNE; (2) the XXX Corps between EYNE and GAVERE; the XXXIV Corps will maintain liaison on the left with the Belgian army.

de BOISSOUDY,
General,
Commanding the Sixth Army.

HS Fr. Files: VII Corps: 412-30.1: Orders

Certain French and American Divisions Placed at the Disposal of French VII Corps


No. 96/3 Special Orders No. 10 Op.

[Extract]

Pursuant to Instructions No. 2 Op. dated October 28 (sent only to generals commanding army corps):

I. The French 41st Infantry Division and the American 91st Division are placed at the disposal of the French VII Army Corps (Hq. at ISEGHIEM) effective October 29.

II. The American 37th Division is placed at the disposal of the French XXX Army Corps (Hq. at THIELT), effective October 29.

III. The French 11th Infantry Division is placed at the disposal of the French XXXIV Army Corps (Hq. at ONDANK), effective October 29.

IV. The generals commanding army corps will regulate the movements of the divisions placed at their disposal so that the distribution of troops prescribed in Paragraph IV of the order mentioned above can be completed during the night of October 30/31.
As soon as the advance of the army corps will permit: (a) the French 132d Infantry Division, regrouped in the prescribed zone, will go into reserve at the disposal of the general commanding the army, (b) the French 5th and 164th Infantry Divisions will go into reserve at the disposal of the King.


de BOISSOUDY,
General Commanding the French Army of Belgium.

HS Fr. Files: VII Corps: 432-30.1: Order

* * * * *

Attacks Orders for October 31

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
October 28, 1918---10 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 502

[Extract]

II. The VII Army Corps, having at its disposal the French 41st and 128th Divs. and the American 91st Div., will have as objective: 41st Div: the WEEDRIESCH---BOSCHKANT massif; 91st Div: SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN, then the heights of KLEIHOEK---WALLEM.

The 128th Inf. Div., deployed on a broad front, will attack in liaison with the 91st Div. and the right division of the French XXX Army Corps which has as objective the heights of LINDENHOEK---CRUYSHAUTEM. It will pass to reserve when these divisions have reached their objective.

The French 164th Inf. Div., after having been replaced on its present front by the 41st and 91st Divs., is placed in 2d line at the disposal of the King.

As soon as the heights between the LYS and the ESCAUT have been captured, the VII Corps will reach the ESCAUT on both sides of AUDENARDE, between MELDEN and EYNE.

* * * * *

By agreement with the British II Corps the present boundary will be bent toward the south to the point where front line contact exists at present. It will then pass through WINTERKEN---ANSEGHEM---ANSEGHEM Station (these points to the British corps).

IV. The artillery placed at the disposal of the divisions and the artillery of the VII Corps will include:
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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>128th Div.</td>
<td>3 organic bns.</td>
<td>1 organic bn.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 bn., Div. Art.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>164th Div.</td>
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<tr>
<td>91st Div.</td>
<td>4 organic bns.</td>
<td>3 organic bns.</td>
<td></td>
<td>So far as possible, 2 bns. of 75’s will be placed south of GAVERBEEK.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 bns., 59th Art.</td>
<td>(6 btry.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 bns., 264th</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>41st Div.</td>
<td>3 organic bns.</td>
<td>1 organic bn.</td>
<td></td>
<td>The 6 bns. of 75’s will, so far as possible, be placed south of GAVERBEEK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 bns., Div. Art.</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>164th Div.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 horse bn., 4th Cav. Div.</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII A.C. Art.</td>
<td>3 bns., 305 Art</td>
<td>3 organ. bns.</td>
<td></td>
<td>414th Hv. Arty. will work for the A. C. but remains at the disposal of the general commanding the army artillery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VIII. DISTRIBUTION OF AVIATION:

American 91st Div. ) 72d Squadron ) 73d Balloon Co.
128th Division ) 72d Squadron ) 73d Balloon Co.
   In addition )                       )                   
41st Division ) 259th Squadron ) 62d Balloon Co.
Command and heavy art. ) 34th Squadron ) 62d and 73d Balloon Cos.
   artillery (Spad) )                       )                   

INITIAL COMMAND POSTS:
Effective at (Army Corps: ISEGHEM
noon Oct. 30 (41st Div: SPRIET (1 km. southeast of DESSELGHEM)
   (91st Div: DESSELGHEM
   (128th Div: MOLENWYCK.

IX. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS:
A mixed detachment of 1 company, 1 machine gun platoon per division, under the command of the senior officer will provide liaison between two adjacent divisions.

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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Operation for Crossing the Escaut
First Phase, October 29 - November 4, 1918

Detailed Attack Plan

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 103/3

FRENCH ARMY IN BELGIUM,
October 29, 1918.

General Orders No. 12
for the attack

Map: 1:40,000

I. The attack prescribed by Instructions No. 2 Op of October 28, will take place
D-day at H-hour.
D and H will be fixed later.

II. An artillery preparation will be delivered H-51 to H: Its principal purpose will
be to neutralize machine guns whose emplacements have been determined.

III. The attack will advance under protection of a rolling barrage, [and] by close
follow-up. The rate of progression will be 100 meters every 3 minutes.

IV. There will be:
1. A halt of two hours on the line: Chateau and park at Anseghem---road junction
38, east of Haantjeshoek---Stuvenberghe Mill---Chateau at Heirleghem---Stukstorne Farm---
Te Parys Farm---Astene.
2. After seizing the crests, a halt of three hours on the line:
Boschkant---Bergstraat---Meeraagstraat-[Meerhaaghoek?]---De Keete Farm---Waterhoek---
Chateau and village of Nazareth---Klapstraet Station.

V. Two battalions of light tanks will participate in the attack: 12th Bn. of the
504th [Tank Regt.] with the VII Corps [which will place it at the disposal of the British
II A. C., operating on its right.] 7th Bn. of the 503d [Tank Regt.] with the XXX A. C.

VI. Boundaries:
1. Between the VII and XXX Corps: Lower course of the Zandbeck [Zaubeek?]---
De Biest---Lindenhoeck---Baltenshoeck---Eyne, on the Escaut; these localities to the XXX
Corps.
2. Between the XXX and XXXIV Corps: St-Hubert (XXXIV)---Netenshoeck---Overbeke
---Asper (XXX A. C.).

VII. The right of the VII Corps will operate in close cooperation with the left of the
British II Corps, which is to attack Winterken and Anseghem without going beyond the latter
locality, since the British Second Army is to pivot around its left and, at the end of the
attack, establish its front on the line: Anseghem---Elsegem-Chateau, facing northeast.

Starting at the Anseghem-Chateau, and as far as the Escaut, the right of the VII
Corps will therefore find itself progressing in advance of the British front, the latter
[British front] will readjust its position [to] face the Escault by a right turn, executed
[progressively] on the spot, by the British troops [concerned], to conform with the
advance of the French VII Corps.
On the other wing of the army, the left of the XXXIV Corps will operate in close cooperation with the right of the Belgian Army: it will occupy a bridgehead at Nevele, on the east bank of the canal, to permit it to debouch, and eventually, assure the movement of the Belgian troops belonging to the Michel Groupment.

VIII. The corps air services, to a distance of 8 kilometers from the front, will be responsible for air observation, photographic missions and machine-gunning of enemy troops.

The army air squadrons and the pursuit aviation will protect the corps air services and will assume responsibility for all missions to be effected at distances beyond 8 kilometers from the front. Their employment will form the subject of special orders.

de BOISSOUDY.

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D-day Announced

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 103/3

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 29, 1918.

For the commander of:

The Belgian army
The British Second Army
The French army in Belgium
D Day: October 31 (October thirty-first)
H Hour: 5:25 a. m. [for the Belgian army, H hour of infantry attack may be chosen between 5:25 and 6:30 a. m.]; no preparation fire will take place before H hour. The information about H hour will be given immediately to the superior authorities so that preparatory measures may be taken in sufficient time. It will not be given to the participants until the very last.

In the name of the King:

DEGOUTTE,
General.

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Reserve Troops Assigned to 37th and 91st Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 109/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
October 29, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 14 OP

For the operation prescribed by General Orders No. 12 Op., October 29, the infantry divisions in reserve of the King (French 132d and 164th) will place their divisional [cavalry] troops at the disposal of the French XXX and VII Army Corps which will assign them respectively to the American 37th and 91st Divisions.

By order:

BERNARD,
Chief of Staff.

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Plan for Air Service

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 112/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
October 29, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 16 OP

For the Air Service

[Extract]

For the attack directed by General Orders No. 12 Op., of October 29, the missions will be the following:

Pursuit Aviation:
(1) Attack the kite-balloons beginning at H plus 15 minutes.
(2) Prevent the enemy aviation from crossing our lines and protect the corp planes by seeking out and attacking enemy pursuit aviation; to that end, operate in force:
*** During intermediate periods and after H plus 8 hours, limit action to strong patrols.
(3) Machine gun enemy reserves and retreating columns.

Army Reconnaissance Aviation:
Photographic and visual reconnaissance of movements on the roads and railroads starting at a distance of 8 kilometers from the front.
37th Div.Fldr. 8: Order

**Relief of French by 37th Division**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S. No. 169/3

OPERATION ORDER No. 33

[Extract]

1. The American 37th Div. will relieve the French 132d Div. in the night of October 30/31, 1918. The details of this relief will be regulated by the commanding general of the French 132d Div. after agreement with the commanding general of the American 37th Div.

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H. PENET,
The General,
Commanding the XXX C. A.

---

Objective, American 91st Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 7839/3

C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
October 29, 1918---4:30 p. m.

Special Instructions for the American 91st Division

[Extract]

Plan of Maneuver:
The SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN is to be encircled from the north and south and the attack continued in the direction of KLEIHOEK, with first objective on the heights of

- 360 -
STUIVENBERGHE; during this time the SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN will be mopped up by specially assigned units. [F. O. 21, 91st Div., dated Oct. 30, 1918 printed in this series].

• • • • •

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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HS Fr. File: 432-30.1: VII Army Corps: Order

Plan

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 503

C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
October 29, 1918---7:10 p. m.

Map 1 to 40,000

I. The focal attacks executed by the 128th and 164th Divisions on October 28 and 29 have gained for us the major part of the line of departure foreseen as a necessary step in the continuation of offensive operations.

The front line is clearly marked out by the railroad tracks DEYNZE---COURTRAI (going beyond 200 meters), the GAVERBEEK, Milestone 5 on the road WAEREGHEM---ANSEGHEM (east of Hill 28), POTEGEM, the dirt road POTEGEM---STEENBRUGGE (the t'GOED-te-WALSKERKE Farm excluded) as far as the houses 87.88, the crossroads 88.84 and the railroad of AUDENARDE 300 meters northwest of K. 4.

II. October 30 and the night of October 30/31 will be used to place the troops in position and to organize the stocks of ammunition in accordance with the regulations of Field Orders No. 502 of October 28.

The artillery will establish and verify its range as cautiously as possible. The strictest economy in ammunition is necessary to ensure the continuation of operations.

III. After being relieved, the 164th Division will maintain its command post at INGELMUNSTER. The main body of its troops will be located in the region OOSTROOSEBEKE---VIVE-St-BAVON.

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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Instructions for Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 7840/3

C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
October 29, 1918---9 p. m.

SUPPLEMENT TO GENERAL ORDERS No. 502
of October 28, 1918

[Extract]

Map to the scale of 1 to 40,000

I. Boundary of the attacking division:
   (a) The advance boundary between the 128th Div., the American 91st Div., and the
   XXX A. C. will be marked by:
   The lower course of the ZAUBEEK---De BIEST---LINDENHOEK---BALTENSHOEK---
   EYNE, on the ESCAUT, these localities as far as the XXX A. C.

   * * * * *

   MASSENET,
   General,
   Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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Enemy Order of Battle

2d Section, G. S.
Intelligence Memorandum No. 5

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Enemy Order of Battle:
   * * * The probable enemy order of battle opposite this divisional sector on October
   29 is as follows:
   46th Reserve Infantry Regiment (119th Infantry Division) opposite left brigade sector.
   6th Infantry Regiment Guard Ersatz Division opposite right brigade sector.
   It is possible that left brigade may encounter the remaining units of the 119th
   Division or of the Guard Ersatz Division; the right brigade will probably encounter the
   remaining regiments of the Guard Ersatz Division.
   The Guard Ersatz Division is composed of the 6th Guard Infantry Regiment, 7th Guard
   Infantry Regiment and 399th Infantry Regiment. This division has already lost more than
   2,000 prisoners of which more than 1,000 were from the 399th Regiment in the engagement
   of October 14. The 7th Guard Regiment has been reduced to 200 rifles. Each battalion has
   been formed into a single combat company.
The 6th Guard Regiment was recruited up five weeks ago from the disbanded Infantry Regiment. Nevertheless, after the battle of Iseghem, it found itself reduced to an effective strength of from 20 to 30 men per company. This effective strength has lately increased to 50 men per company, thanks to the rejoining of the greater part of the men employed in the back area. The number of men of this regiment who have deserted to the interior of GERMANY or who have crossed BELGIUM in civilian clothes is considerable. It would seem at least equal to the present effective strength of the regiment. Two battalions of this regiment on October 28 were in line along the railroad tracks to the east of ZULTE.

The quality of this division is considered poor.

The 119th Division is composed of the 46th Infantry Regiment, the 58th Infantry Regiment and the 46th Reserve Regiment. It was organized in the V Corps District of PRUSSIA. Information tends to show that the 119th Infantry Division has been placed under the orders of the 3rd Infantry Division. Both the 46th Infantry Regiment and the 46th Reserve Infantry Regiment are known to be greatly reduced in strength. The 58th Infantry Regiment is still weaker in effectiveness than the two other regiments of the division. It is composed of a single battalion only, consisting of two infantry companies of 60 men each, and a M. G. Co. The entire strength of the regiment will not number more than 180 men. The 58th Infantry Regiment came into the line on the afternoon of the 27th as reinforcements for the 46th Infantry.

It is to be noted that all the units of the infantry divisions in line which are not represented on the front have already occupied, with the 32d Reserve Division and probably the 1st Bavarian Reserve Division, the line of resistance (Aufnahme Stellung) on the line NAZARETH---CRUYSHAUTEM, to which the enemy should retire in the near future.

2. Probable Intentions of the Enemy:

A prisoner of the 239th Reserve Infantry Regiment who was captured near the station of MACHELEN, lost contact with his regiment four days ago. Since then he has encountered ten men of whom three were high-ranking noncommissioned officers, all of whom were telling the civilian population "We are going to withdraw to the ESCAUT". In searching for his organization, the prisoner encountered the C. O. of the 46th Lanwehr Regiment and was taken by him to the regimental P. C. where he overheard the following conversation, concerning an approaching retreat: "The 119th Infantry Division is said to be going into the line to cover the retreat to the ESCAUT. Some machine guns will remain in position, also a telephone operator who, after the arrival of the French, will destroy his instrument and make his escape." The retreat ought to have taken place about the 26th. The order was changed about 21 h. on the 26th, doubtless because of the fact that all of the materiel had not yet been withdrawn. All of the prisoners state that the retreat which should have taken place on the 26th has only been postponed and that it will be executed later. A halt on the ridge near CRUYSHAUTEM will be for several days. This position has been prepared in view of a short resistance by organizing shell holes to be manned by automatic riflemen and by placing machine guns in the old training trenches northwest of CRUYSHAUTEM. *** These former training trenches are said to be the only entrenchments of any magnitude on our front. There is practically no wire with the exception of a single line, in reality, not much more than a fence running along the road southwest of CRUYSHAUTEM toward AUDENARDE.

3. Enemy Morale:

The morale of the hostile troops, even of the machine gunners is, on the whole, very low. Prisoners state that they are not interested in the conditions of peace or an armistice, provided that one or the other arrives quickly.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

ROBERT L. COLLINS,
Lt. Colonel, of Cavalry,
A. C. of S., G-2.
Plan of Artillery Action for Attack of American 37th Division

[Contemporary Translation]

FRENCH 132d ARTILLERY DIVISION,
October 29, 1918—3 p.m.

[Extract]

I. Attached:

** * ** The American 37th Division will have: on the right, the French 128th Inf. Div.; on the left, the French 12th Inf. Div. * * *

II. Disposition of Attack:

The division will be disposed by brigades abreast, the 73d Brigade to the right, the 74th Brigade to the left. Each brigade will attack with one regiment having two battalions in first line.

The limit between the two brigades will be fixed later. From now on the 73d Brigade will have a front of attack narrower than the front of the 74th Brigade in view of realizing the echeloning in depth adequate to the projected maneuver.

III. Organization of the Artillery Command:

Artillery Commander: Colonel Maison, Commanding the A. D./132, P. C. DENTERGHEM.

Field Artillery

Supporting S/Groupment 73d Brigade 257th Regiment Field Artillery, Lt. Col. Chaffery commanding. 9 batteries (34 pieces).

Supporting S/Groupment 74th Brigade 43d Regiment Field Artillery, Major Garnuchot, commanding. 8 batteries (31 pieces).

Short Heavy Artillery (A. L. C.)

Major Leuillier commanding A. L. C./132 VI Group of the 130th: 3 batteries (8 pieces)

The short heavy artillery will be directly commanded by the colonel commanding the A. D. / 132.
Short Heavy Artillery

P. C. of Major Leuillier 69/96

VI Group of the 130th  ) 1 Battery in 74.93
) 1 Battery in 75.98
) 1 Battery in 77.99
) 1 Battery in 81.04

V Group of the 103d  ) 1 Battery in 85.04
) 1 Battery in 87.08

X. Aeronautics:
The Escadrille 278 and the Balloon 87 will work for the American 37th Division.

L. MAISON, Colonel, Cdt. l'A. D./132.

---------

HS Fr. Files: 91st Div.: 580-30.1: Order

Relief of Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S. FRENCH 164th INFANTRY DIVISION, P. C. October 29, 1918--11:45 o'clock.

No. 875/S Op

GENERAL ORDER OF OPERATIONS No. 154

[Extract]

1. The 164th Division will be relieved during the night of October 29/30 and 30/31 by elements of the 41st and 128th Inf. Div. and of the American 91st Div.

* * * * *

5. The generals commanding the relieving divisions will take the command of their sectors Oct. 31 at noon.

GAUCHER, General, Commanding the 164th Inf. Div.

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- 365 -
Mission of Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. FRENCH 128th INFANTRY DIVISION,
No. 1,358/B October 29, 1918.

FIELD ORDERS No. 22

[Extract]

I. An attack along the line will be carried out October 31, at H hour which will be designated later, in order to push the enemy back beyond the ESCAUT.

II. Mission of the French 128th Division:
The mission of the 128th Infantry Division is to cover on the north the attack of the American 91st Division, French VII Army Corps, which is operating against SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN and finally against the heights of KLEIHOEK and WAALEM, and to join on the north the American 37th Division (French XXX Army Corps) which attacks the CRUYSHAUTEM--LINDENHOEK massif.

* * * * *

SEGONNE,
General,
Commanding the 128th Division.

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H hour Announced

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. FRENCH ARMY IN BELGIUM,
No. 123/3 October 30, 1918--7 a. m.

1. The H hour of the infantry attack for the right division of the French VII Corps (41st Inf. Div.) is 5:25 a. m.
The hour of attack of the infantry for the center division and the left division will be determined by the general commanding the corps between 5:25 and 5:30 a. m. It will be announced.

2. The artillery preparation will not begin before 5:25 a. m.

3. For the French XXX Corps the time is:
   5:30 a. m. for the infantry attack.
   5:25 a. m. for the artillery preparation.

4. The H hour will not be made known yet to the headquarters (F. C.) below the division; it will be communicated to the participants at the very last only.

  de BOISSOUDY.

---------
Written Confirmation of Battle Plans

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, G. S.
No. 183/3

FRENCH XXX CORPS,
October 30, 1918.

(Written confirmation of the verbal)
(instructions given at the meeting)
(which took place at Hooge at 15:30)

[Extract]

1. The time H is 5:30 o’clock on October 31. Consequently the resuming of the march after the stop on the first objective (Winkelken-Huttegem) will take place at H plus 3 hours, that is 8:30 o’clock, (eight hours thirty.), and the resuming of the movement after the stop on the second objective (Merhaaghoek---De Keete Farm---Appelhoek) will be made at H plus 8 hours, that is 13:30 o’clock (thirteen hours thirty). * * *

2. It is necessary to foresee, and in an accurate manner, the conditions in which the move towards the Escaut River, after the taking of the 2d objective (Merhaaghoek---De Keete Farm---Appelhoek) will be made. Therefore two regiments should be ready to push after 13:30 hours, the one towards Eyne, the other towards Heurne, and be designated beforehand.

3. To pay great attention on the difficulty coming from the change of direction, the American 37th Division shall make the march to the Escaut after having reached the 2d objective.

It is absolutely necessary that the battalion commanders and the colonels commanding the regiments who shall have to march towards the towns mentioned above (Eyne and Heurne) take the greatest care to set [follow] the map but specially with the compass, and to survey steadily by the specialists (topographical officers, artillery observers, etc.,) the direction they follow.

4. Contrary to the dispositions formerly indicated, the American 37th and 91st Inf. Divs. will not enter in contact by the march towards the Escaut. Indeed there will be always between them one regiment of the French 128th Division which, by modification to the orders previously given, will push also towards the river.

H. PENET,
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.
Division Boundary Lines

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
SPECIAL ORDERS

No. 499

Because of the extension to the north of the northern boundary of the French 128th
Inf. Div., the south boundary of this division, starting from NELLEKENSKEER, will be
changed as follows:

NELLEKENSKEER (128th Div.)---NOKERE-Chateau (American 91st Div.)---ravine of the
HOLLEBEEK---east of NOKERE-Chateau---TJOENSHOEK crossroads on the WORTEGEM Road.
Liaison with the American 37th Div.

Starting from its 1st objective, the 91st Div. consequently will have a new north
boundary passing through:

NELLEKENSKEER (128th Div.)---NOKERE-Chateau (91st Div.)---ravine of the
HOLLEBEEK, east of NOKERE-Chateau---TJOENSHOEK crossroads on the WORTEGEM Road---De KATE [De
KEETE?] Farm (37th Div.)---kilometer post B-6 on the AUDENARDE Road---BALTENSHOEK
(37th Div.)---MAROLLE (37th Div.)---EYNE on the ESCAUT (37th Div.).

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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237-32.1: Order

Attack Order for 37th Division

G-3
FIELD ORDERS
No. 36

MAPS: THIELT 1/40,000
1/20,000

[Extract]

1. (a) Information concerning the enemy will be compiled and published by G-2 to
all concerned, item by item, as soon as received.

(b) The French XXX Corps attacks on D day at H hour. Order of battle: XXX
Corps, from right to left: American 37th Division, Infantry---French 12th Division,
Infantry.

The French VII Corps attacks on our right and the French XXXIV Army Corps attacks on
our left.
Order of Battle: VII A. C., from right to left: American 91st Infantry Division, French 128th Infantry Division.

2. (a) Corps Mission:
   The mission of the army corps is to drive the enemy across the ESCAUT. * * * The 37th Division will be in close liaison on its left, north, with the French 12th Division, and on its right, south, with the French 128th Division, with which it will maintain constant liaison.

   (b) Successive objectives of the 37th Division: * * *
   1st Objective: Ruisseau de KATTEBEEK (KATTEBEEK Creek)---Boqueteau [small wood east of] est de KARREWEG---Lisere est de [east edge of] HUTTEGEM---Junction of TICHELBEEK [point where OLSENE-CRUYSHAUTEM Road passes over TICHELBEEK Creek] with the route OLSENE to CRUYSHAUTEM---Point 1450.
   2d Objective: MERHAAGHOEK---Ferme de RECtE [De KEETE Farm?]---WATERHOEK---WEDER-RECHEM [NEDER-RECHEM?].
   Final Objective: River ESCAUT.

(c) Maneuvers to be Executed:
   The principal attack will be made by the 37th Division by brigades abreast, and each brigade with 1 regiment in the 1st Line. The regiment in the 1st Line on the right strongly echeloned in depth, the regiment on the left being also well echeloned in depth but deployed on a more extended front.
   The 37th Division maneuvers to surround the village of CRUYSHAUTEM from the north and south, by using the regiment on the north vigorously in order that the regiment on the south may reach the heights of LINDENHOEK as soon as possible.
   Each brigade will place 1 regiment in the 1st line. The 73d Brigade will place 1 regiment in the divisional reserve. The 74th Brigade will place 1 regiment in the reserve of the French 30th A. C. * * *

4. Artillery:

Summary of Artillery:

Colonel Maison, French 132d Division Artillery Commanding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Artillery Group</th>
<th>Pieces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 groups 257th Artillery, 132d Div. (Fr.)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 groups 23d Artillery of 5th Div. (Fr.)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 batteries of 155's heavy</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 batteries of 155's heavy</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* * * * *

Until the 1st objective is taken, all batteries engaged in barrage and counterbattery will be under the direction of the division commander. Thereafter, 1 group, bn. of 75's is assigned as accompanying artillery for each front line battalion, and will be subject to the supervision of the regimental and brigade commanders. Two groups of 75's and the heavy artillery will remain under orders of the division commander. The commanding officer of light artillery regiments, will accompany brigade commander as follows:

132d Div. (Fr.), 257th Reg. 73d Brigade
5th Div. (Fr.), 43d Reg. 74th Brigade

* * * * *
7. Aeronautics:

Aviation:

The aeronautics of the army corps will be charged, up to 8 km. of the front, with aerial observation, photographic mission, and the machine gunning of hostile troops.

11. P. C. of Departure:

Division P. C. DENTERGHEM

73d Brigade P. C. at H hour OESSELGHEM

74th Brigade P. C. at H hour HUGTSBERG

C. S. FARNSWORTH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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291-32.1: Order

**Attack Orders**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 21

Maps: THIELT) COURTRAI) 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. (a) The French Army of Belgium will attack the enemy and drive him east of the ESCAUT River.
   (b) The French VII Corps will attack on the front between WARANDE and HEIRWEG, both inclusive.
   (c) The French 128th Division is on our left and the French 41st Division is on our right.

2. This division attacks at H hour on October 31, 1918, on the front between WAEREGHEM (inclusive) and STEENBRUGGE (exclusive).

Zone of action of the 91st Division:

Northern boundary: WAEREGHEM (inclusive)---NELLEKENSKEER (exclusive)---Chateau de NOKERE (inclusive)---Ravin de HOLLEBEEK (Ravine) [to the east of Chateau de NOKERE]---crossroads at TJOENSHOEK (exclusive)---De KEETE Farm (exclusive)---BALTENSHOEK (exclusive)---MAROLLE (exclusive)---EYNE (exclusive).

Southern boundary: STEENBRUGGE (exclusive)---t'JAMMELSHOEK (exclusive)---WORTEGEM (inclusive)---PETEGEMSTRAAT (exclusive)---PETEGEM (exclusive).
Zone of action of the 182d Brigade:
Northern boundary: Northern boundary of the division zone of action.
Southern boundary: Southern edge of SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN--STUIVENBERGHE
(exclusive)--WAALEM Farm [t'HOF-te-WAALEM] (exclusive)--HULSTHOEK Farm (exclusive)--
AUDENARDE (exclusive).
Zone of action of the 181st Brigade:
Northern boundary: Southern boundary of the 182d Brigade zone of action.
Southern boundary: Southern boundary of the 91st Division zone of action.

5. Axis of Liaison:
DESELGHEM---WAEREGHEM---WORTEGEM---BEVEREN.
P. C.'s 91st Division: After 12 o'clock noon October 30, 1918:

DESELGHEM
182d Brigade: GAVERKEN
181st Brigade: EVANGELIEBOOM.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 30, 1918.

Note to be appended to copy of Field Order No. 21, for the Commanding General,
VII Army Corps.

The brigade attacking on the south of the SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN is disposed with one
regiment in front and the other in rear, in accordance with the wishes of the general
commanding the French Army in Belgium and by authority of G-3 of the French VII Corps.
This instead of the two regiments attacking in line as shown on map and as prescribed in
Special Instructions for this division from the corps commander.

HENRY C. JEWETT,
Colonel, Engineers,
Chief of Staff.
ANNEX No. 2 to FIELD ORDER No. 21

MAP: COURTRAI, N. E. 1/20,000

PLAN OF EMPLOYMENT OF ARTILLERY

[Extract]

1. (a) Organization of Command: the 53d F. A. Brigade, the 59th and 264th French Artillery will constitute the artillery supporting the 91st Division. This command will be organized in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESIGNATION</th>
<th>COMMANDING OFFICER</th>
<th>COMPOSED OF</th>
<th>CALIBER</th>
<th>AT DISPOSITION OF</th>
<th>P. C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grouping A</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Dellauleau</td>
<td>1/109</td>
<td>75 mm.</td>
<td>182d Inf. Brig.</td>
<td>Gaverken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(north)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/109</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/264</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grouping B</td>
<td>Col. Burleson</td>
<td>1/107</td>
<td>75 mm.</td>
<td>181st Inf. Brig.</td>
<td>Nieuwenhove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(south)</td>
<td></td>
<td>2/107</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1/264</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grouping C</td>
<td>Lt. Col. Marty</td>
<td>1/59</td>
<td>75 mm.</td>
<td>53d F. A. Brig.</td>
<td>Desselghem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3/59</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grouping D</td>
<td>Colonel Grebel</td>
<td>1/108</td>
<td>155 mm. C-</td>
<td>53d F. A. Sch.-17</td>
<td>Desselghem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2/108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3/108</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) Zones of Action: A Grouping, sector of the 182d Inf. Brigade; B Grouping, sector of the 181st Inf. Brigade; C and D Groupings, sector of the 91st Division.

(c) Missions: The artillery will support the advance of the infantry, covering the woods during the advance, so as to allow the infantry to surround and mop them up, and protect the first line against enemy counterattacks by protective barrages and offensive counterpreparations. For this purpose, one platoon of 75 mm. will be attached to each infantry first line battalion as accompanying artillery. The commanders of these platoons will be officers, and will receive their missions from the infantry battalion commanders. For supplying these platoons, two caissons per gun at least will be used.

By command of Major General Johnston:

HENRY C. JEWETT,
Colonel, Engineers,
Chief of Staff.
Assumption of Command

SPECIAL FIELD ORDER

No. 4

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 30, 1918--12 o'clock.

1. The undersigned hereby assumes command of the sector assigned to the American
91st Division.
2. Division P. C., DESSELGHEM.
3. The administrative staff of the division will remain at the old division P. C. at
ISEGHEM.

JOHNSTON,
Commanding.

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MESSAGE No. 36

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 30, 1918--12 o'clock.

The commanding generals 181st Brigade and 182d Brigade will make provision for re­
lieving the remaining elements of the French 164th Infantry Division during the night
October 30/31, 1918. Organizations of the 91st Division will be in positions prescribed
in Field Orders No. 21 by 24 o'clock, night October 30/31, 1918.

The command of the 91st Division sector passes to the commanding general this divi­sion at 12 o'clock, noon, October 30, 1918.

JOHNSTON.

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MESSAGE No. 37

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 30, 1918--13:30 o'clock.

Reference to Field Order 21, Hq. 91st Division, October 30, 1918, H hour is 5:30 a. m.

JOHNSTON.

-----------------
91st Division; Roster

Weekly Roster of Officers

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 30, 1918.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT, STATISTICAL DIVISION

[Extract]


Chief of Staff: Henry C. Jewett, Col., Eng.

G-1: Harold L. Mack, Maj., Inf. (acting)
G-2: Thomas A Driscoll, Maj., Inf.
G-3: Clark Lynn, Lt. Col., Inf.

* * * * * *

Commanding 181st Infantry Brigade: John B. McDonald, Brig. Gen.

* * * * * *


* * * * * *


* * * * * *

M. L. BARRETT, Jr.,
Statistical Officer.

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HS Fr. File: XXXIV Corps: Report

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXIV ARMY CORPS
October 31, 1918.

[Extract]

The attack is launched at 5:30 a. m. Handicapped by darkness, the tanks are at first unable to support the infantry, which encounters hostile defensive works that are strongly held. Nevertheless, the initial resistance is overcome. The 11th Div. carries its front lines to the DEYNZE-AUDENARDE road beyond which it is unable to pass. The 77th Div. is
in the same situation, it comes up to the line of the 11th Div. on its right, while one of its battalions on its left fights a sharp action in PETEGHEM Village, which it occupies at the end of the day. The 77th Div. in liaison with the Michel Groupment attempts in vain to cross the canal.

To sum up, the operation had enabled us to advance our right as far as the DEYNZE-AUDEMARDE Road, our left remaining in its initial position. The German artillery, covering its infantry, delivers throughout the day very violent artillery fire, mixed with gas. The general commanding the French army of Belgium issues the order to renew the attack at 5:30 a.m. Nov. 1 • • •

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37th Div., Flgr. 8: Operation Order

**Attack Order**

[Contemporary Translation]

Erat-Major, 3d Sect., G. S.,
No. 185/3

FRENCH XXX CORPS,
October 31, 1918.

OPERATIONS ORDER No. 39

[Extract]

1. The army corps is located on the high crest of Hill 60 (west of CRUYSHAUTEM)---Het-Bunder.
2. During the night, keep close contact with the enemy, so that they may be following without awaiting orders from the rear, in case his withdrawal would be established.
3. Tomorrow the army corps will follow his mission, each infantry division progressing towards the ESCAUT River in the zone of action indicated by Operations Order No. 32 of October 29, 1918, [not available] in order to take first, the 2d objective defined by that order; second, to throw back the enemy beyond the ESCAUT.
4. The American 37th Inf. Div. will continue its principal effort on the right, attacking from the heights.
   The French 12th Inf. Div. will also make its principal effort on its right in liaison with the American 37th Division and will advance on the north slope of the crests of HOOG-RECHEM and of the HOOG-BOEREGEM, thus helping the movement of its left on the north of Bois de [woods at] WATERHOEK, in the direction of ASPER.
5. The attack will take place at 6:30 a.m. after an artillery preparation of 5 minutes.
   It will be executed under the protection of a rolling barrage progressing at the rate of 100 meters each 3 minutes, and which will be continued for a depth of 600 meters.
   The commanding officers of divisional artillery will have an understanding so as to insure the joining of the barrage of their division and that of the adjacent division.
   A stop will take place until 11:30 o'clock on the 2d objective defined by Order No. 32, above mentioned (line MERHAAGHOEK---Ferme de RECTE (De KEETE Farm?)---WATERHOEK---NEVER-RECHEM).
6. Artillery: Same distribution.

Heavy artillery of the army corps will fire for the benefit of the 37th Division but may also be used for the benefit of the 12th D. I. following special request of the commanding general of the division.
7. The regiment of the American 37th Division in army corps reserve will pass tonight to the east bank of the river LYS, executing this movement early enough to escape the counter preparation fire which the Germans usually execute after 4 a.m. on the LYS Valley.

It will advance in the course of progression, in staggered formation by successive moves behind the left of the American 37th Division, its head resting at least 3 km., 500 meters behind the combat line.

* * * * *

10. Tanks: Distribution of the 8th Bn. of the 503d A. S. (Tanks).
   2 companies at the disposition of the 12th Inf. Div.
   1 company in army corps reserve at DENTERGHEM.

11. Engineers: The pile bridge of OLSENE being open to traffic the colonel commanding the army corps will take up the pontoon bridge of [at] De PALING tomorrow evening November 1.

12. Aviation: Compulsory marking of the lines for aviation by 9:45 a.m.


By order:

H. PENET,
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.

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HS Fr. File: 432-30.1: VII Army Corps: Telephone Message

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 7851/3

General Massenet

To General Johnston

General Johnston is authorized to move his C. P. to the WAEREGHEM---LEEUWKEN region where his liaisons with the rear are securely established.

He will advise of the date and hour of his installations in his new command post.

By order:

HOURRUAU,
Chief of Staff.

---------
C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
Iseghem, October 31, 1918--9:25 p. m.

No. 38

Sent by Telephone

To General Commanding American 91st Division

Amending Telephone order of October 31, displacement of the C. P., American 91st Div., will take place November 1, as soon as the division has reached its 2d objective, that is to say the WORTEGHEM--WAALEM ridge line.

[signature illegible]
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corp.

---

237-32.16: Telegram

Action on Cruyshautem Front

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 31, 1918--12 h.

Telegram: G. H. Q., A. E. F.,

37th Division launched attack at 5:30 a. m. this morning on the CRUYSHAUTEM front in BELGIUM. French 12th and 128th Divisions operating on flanks. At noon an advance of 4 km. had been made and 267 prisoners counted, of whom 11 were officers. *** Weather cloudy with light rain and mist.

FARNSWORTH.

---

237-32.1: Order

Attack Order 37th Division

G-3 No. 622
FIELD ORDERS No. 37

MAPS: THIELT 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. The division occupies the crest of the CRUYSHAUTEM Heights. The 128th Division, on the right has its left at approximately 25-25, and the 12th Division, on the left, has its right at approximately 45.73-40.72.
2. The division will resume the attack.

3. (a) The attack will start at 6:30 a.m. (H hour) tomorrow, Nov. 1, 1918. The 73d Brigade attacks on the right, and the 74th Brigade on the left, with the same missions, objectives and limits as set forth in F. O. No. 36, 37th Division.

* * * * *

(e) Divisional Reserve: (Major Christy, commanding)
    134th Machine Gun Bn.,
    1 bn., 146th Infantry

(f) Corps Reserve: 147th Infantry (less 1 bn.)
    One battalion, 147th Infantry, in corps reserve, will cross the LYS and billet in the area formerly occupied by 1st Bn. 148th Infantry before 2 h. tomorrow. The remainder of the corps reserve will remain at present location. No change in P. C.

* * * * *

5. * * *

(e) Evacuation of Sick and Wounded:

Field Hospital No. 145 with Triage at DENTERGHEM.
Field Hospital No. 147 at MEULEBEKE for surgical cases.
Field Hospital No. 146 at THIELT for surgical and non-transportable cases.

Routes of evacuation from Triage as follows:

Surgical DENTERGHEM, GINSTE, THIELT Road.
Gas DENTERGHEM, GINSTE, MEULEBEKE Road.

6. P. C. Division at DENTERGHEM.
   P. C. 73d Brigade at 201.35-465.60
   P. C. 74th Brigade at 199.80-468.60

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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237-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, G. S. 37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

October 30 to October 31, 1918, 16 h. to 16 h.

[Extract]

1. General Impression of the Day: Our attack very successful with slight opposition except for machine guns.
2. Enemy Front Line: Along north and south crest one kilometer west of CRUYSHAUTEM.
3. Enemy Order of Battle: The enemy order of battle at 5:30 h. from north to south was as follows:

- 6th Ldw. Regt. (3d Ldw. Division)
- 207th Division, echeloned in depth.
- 6th Guard Regt. (D. E. G.)
- 399th Infantry Regt. (D. E. G.)

The 6th D. C. P. was at rest at WANNEGEM-LEDE and was called out at 6 h. to reinforce the line with dismounted action.

4. Enemy Infantry: Except for a counterattack which was attempted against our right brigade on the heights N. W. of CRUYSHAUTEM, and which was repulsed, little enemy infantry has been encountered. The enemy machine guns have been very active.

5. Enemy Artillery: There has been heavy artillery activity all day on OLSENE and nearby crossroad with considerable gas, principally Arsene. There was slight harassing fire on towns of our back area.

6. Enemy Movements: Visibility: poor to impossible, during the entire day.

7. Enemy Works: No organized enemy works, except the old practice trenches near CRUYSHAUTEM have been encountered.

8. Enemy Aeronautics: The day has been unfavorable for aeroplane activity and a total of only 6 planes have been observed over our lines. One enemy plane was very active against the 3d Bn. 148th Infantry near the hill one km. west of CRUYSHAUTEM this morning. One observation balloon was observed at 7:30 h. in direction of CRUYSHAUTEM.

9. Enemy Works: No organized enemy works, except the old practice trenches near CRUYSHAUTEM have been encountered.

10. Miscellaneous: At the end of the period the following number of prisoners had passed through the Divisional P. W. E.: 11 officers and 276 enlisted men.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

ROBERT L. COLLINS,
Lt. Col. of Cavalry,
A. C. of S., G-2.

--------

291-32.1: Order

Attack Orders

FIELD ORDERS No. 22

MAP: THIELT )
     ) 1:40,000
     COURTRAI )

[Extract]

1. In front of the VII Corps, the enemy has been driven back to the line De BIEST ---BEERKEN---eastern edge of SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN---STEENBRUGGE---ANSEGHEM. The VII Corps will continue its attack tomorrow.
On account of considerable opposition in front of the French 41st Division on our right, the French 128th Division will not be placed in reserve, but will continue its attack on our left in the direction of EYNE.

2. This division will resume the attack at 6:30 o'clock, November 1, 1918. The northern boundary of the zone of action of the division and of the 182d Brigade is changed as follows: Northern boundary: NELLEKENSKEER (excl.)--LOMBAARTSKAPEL (inclusive)--OYCKE (inclusive)--MELKHOEK (inclusive)--BROWANN (inclusive)--railroad fork one kilometer north of AUDENARDE.

No change in boundaries of zone of action of 181st Brigade.

* * * * *

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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ANNEX No. 1
to FIELD ORDERS No. 22

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 31, 1918--23:50 h.

Plan of Employment of Artillery

[Extract]

1. The 91st Division will resume its attack: the following artillery units of the 91st Division will protect this advance by a rolling barrage from H to H plus 100:

   The French 59th
   1st Battalion of French 264th
   2d Battalion of French 264th

* * * * *

By command of Major General Johnston:

HENRY C. JEWETT,
Colonel, Engineers,
Chief of Staff.

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- 380 -
91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
October 31, 1918.

From 18 h. Oct. 30 to 18 h. Oct. 31.

[Extract]

I. General Impressions of the Day: In resisting our attack, the enemy has pursued his usual method of holding the ground tenaciously by small nests of machine guns, ensconced in woods, buildings, hedges, etc. These guns are accurately served, and as far as can be learned, are kept in action by their crews with great tenacity. The generally flat nature of the country, and the cover afforded by the wood in the center of the division zone, have rendered observation and the spotting of these machine-gun nests, and their approach by means of dead ground, extremely difficult.

II. Enemy Front Line: At the close of the day, we held approximately the first objective indicated by the corps order, although the position of the extreme right of our line is still somewhat doubtful and may lie a little to the west of the first objective line. How closely our troops are in touch with the enemy front line, and therefore, exactly where his front line is, have not yet been reported.

III. Enemy Order of Battle: Twenty prisoners have passed through the division cage; a considerable number more are reported to have been taken, but have not yet arrived at the P. C. The prisoners examined belong to the following organizations: 96th, 209th Reserve regiments of 207th Inf. Div., located in the vicinity of WAEREGHEM. Also two of the 228th Regiment of the 49th Res. Div. in the SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN district; thus confirming the order of battle from north to south as given in the corps order of Oct. 29. One man each from the 49th and 75th Foot Artillery Regiments of the 49th Res. Div. were taken.

IV. Enemy Artillery: Harassing Fire, small and medium caliber, H. E. and mustard during the night. Feeble reaction to our preparatory and barrage fire. During the day, as far as can be learned, fire against our front line by artillery was not severe, the enemy concentrating his artillery fire on roads, crossroads and gathering points (harassing and interdictory); principally 77's, gas and H. E.

VI. Enemy Movements: Civilians report that enemy is moving east out of WORTEGEM. Poor visibility has prevented observation to confirm this.

VII. Enemy Aeronautics: Aeroplanes: considerable activity between 18 and 21 h. by enemy planes. Front and rear areas, particularly the crossings of the LYS, were bombed actively during this period. Balloons: one enemy balloon, in ascension at 6 h. near WARANDEKEN (?), forced down by Allied planes, after one-half hour ascension. Enemy has difficulty in keeping observation balloons up.

THOMAS A. DRISCOLE,
Major, Infantry,
A. C. of S., G-2.
Attacks to Continue
[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
October 31, 1918—8:15 p. m.

To Major GROSVILLE

The French army will continue its attacks in the direction of the ESCAUT at 6:30 a. m. tomorrow.

The left of the British Second Army will assist in the advance of that army, combining its attacks with those of the French army.

Agreement to be effected between the army commanders.

[no signature]

In Instructions for Crossing of Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
November 1, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 11

I. Should the enemy put up strong resistance on the right bank of the Escaut, it will immediately become necessary to plan, study, and prepare for a forced crossing of that river.

II. In conformity with Instructions No. 9, it is of greatest importance that bridgeheads be established at once on the other side of the Escaut, which will permit us to maintain contact with the enemy and to ascertain whether or not he intends to resist effectively and energetically on the right bank of that river.

In connection therewith, all efforts will be devoted to the widening, as rapidly as possible, of such bridgeheads as may be established; this operation will be supported by all necessary artillery, reinforced by sufficient infantry to enable the latter to act offensively against the enemy and to pursue him, should he offer but slight resistance.

In the event hostile resistance is too strong, these bridgeheads will serve as a base of departure for the projected attack in force.

III. It is not believed that a forced crossing of the Escaut along the entire front of the group of armies can be effected satisfactorily.

The most convenient zones for a forced crossing, according to latest information received are: for one point the spur marked by the heights at Renaix and, for another point, the bend of the Escaut from Gavere-Semmersaeke.

The first of the attacks is to be executed entirely by the British army; the second will be [executed] by the France-Belgian armies. The boundary between these two latter
armies, fixed by previous instructions, can be modified slightly whenever detailed reconnaissances of the approaches to the river make it possible to determine the best conditions for such attack.

Two secondary attacks will also have to be made within the French army zone: one, in the region of Welden, in conjunction with the Franco-Belgian attack in the north; the other, in the region of Melden, in conjunction with the British attack in the south.

IV. For the remainder of the Belgian front, there need be considered only minor operations to permit fullest exploitation of results achieved on the main front by the attacks described above.

V. It is on these bases that the forced crossing of the Escaut must be studied and prepared. In each army, from hence on, measures should be initiated for the bringing up and placement of the material which will be required for passage of the river. Steps should, likewise, be taken to ascertain the most suitable artillery emplacements for the contemplated operation, and necessary ammunition dumps should be established.

VI. It is advisable that the attack infantry and a comparatively large part of the artillery not be placed into position until the last possible moment.

The army commanders will advise by noon, November 3, the approximate length of time they consider necessary for preparation of the forced crossing of the Escaut, it being understood that it is of great general importance that it [said crossing] be effected as soon as possible and, more especially, to facilitate the British advance in the direction of Mons.

In the name of the King:

DEGOUTTE,
General.

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HS Fr. File: 412-30.1: Order

**Plans for Crossing Escaut**

*Editorial Translation*

3d Section, G. S. FRENCH ARMY IN BELGIUM, No. 153/3 November 1, 1918--5:15 p. m.

GENERAL ORDER No. 16 Op.

I. The army, completing its success of October 31, reached the ESCAUT today on almost its entire front from PETEGEM to EECKE; on its left, it mopped up the ground between the LYS and ESCAUT up to BEGUIHOF Farm [BEGUINHOF] (12 kms, southwest of GHENT).

II. The results must be exploited by a surprise crossing of the ESCAUT and occupation of the debouches on the right bank. This operation will be undertaken by the three army corps, beginning tonight. It will be assigned to the advance guards, reinforced, if expedient, by artillery.

III. The tail of regiments of front line divisions and army heavy artillery will not pass beyond the front: PETEGEMSTRAAT---MELKHOEK (French VII A. C.); BALTENSHOEK---HUYSSE---KLEIN-GAVERE (French XXX A. C.); EEDEMOLEN---NAZARETH---ASTENE---BACHTE (French XXXIV A. C.).
At least half of the strength of the American divisions will be held to the west of the aforementioned line.

IV. The C. P.'s of the army corps will be set up near the LYS; the generals commanding the corps will announce the positions which they have selected.

de BOISSOUDY.

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37th Div., Fldr. 8: Order

Continuation of Plans for Crossing the Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. No. 194/3

FIELD ORDERS No. 41

FRENCH XXX ARMY CORPS, November 1, 1918.

I. By order of the general commanding the army, the heavy artillery of the army corps, the reserve battalions of the regiments of the French 12th Inf. Div. and at least half the strength of the American 37th Div. will be held west of the line Baltenshoek---Huysse---Kleh---Gavere [Klein-Gavere?] until further orders.

II. The crossing of the Escaut which, pursuant to the telephone message of this evening, must be carried out tonight, will be forced during the day of November 2 if not successfully accomplished by surprise. (So as to conceal the operation of forcing the crossing, the employment of smoke shells is recommended. A supply of 1,000 rounds will be sent up to each division this evening.)

These operations will be entrusted to the advanced guard, reinforced by artillery if need be. The support of the heavy, long artillery of the corps will be requested if necessary for counterbattery action.

III. The colonel commanding the engineers of the army corps is in charge of directing the construction of bridges with the materiel in the trains. To this effect he will give the necessary technical orders to the commanders of the divisional engineers and will see that the work is expedited with the utmost energy. Next he will direct the conditions be studied, under which trestle bridges may be constructed as soon as the advance of troops on the right bank of the Escaut permits.

The assembling of the materiel necessary to the construction of these bridges will start at once.

H. PENET,
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.

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3d Section, G. S.
No. 7,861/3

C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS, November 1, 1918—12 noon.

Headquarters Massenet

To Headquarters Segonne, Bablon, Johnston

The general commanding the army orders the divisions to cross the ESCAUT as soon as they reach it, and to reconnoiter it:

Bablon's Division near MELDEN, to occupy the heights east of MELDEN;

Johnston's Division at AUDENARDE, preferably by the south suburb, to occupy the high ground to the south;

Segonne's Division between AUDENARDE and EYNE, to occupy the heights between RECKHEM and EENAME.

Expedite reports on the condition of the valley and its crossings.

By order:

HOURRUAU,
Chief of Staff.

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3d Section, G. S.
No. 7,865/3

FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS, November 1, 1918—3:50 p. m.

Headquarters Massenet

To Headquarters Segonne

1. From information furnished by aviators it appears that AUDENARDE decked with flags was abandoned by the enemy at 11 a. m.

2. Consequently, the general commanding the French 128th Inf. Div. will immediately push cavalry elements into AUDENARDE. These elements will pass through the town and establish themselves in position on the heights of Fort KEZEL. They will be followed very closely by infantry detachments of the 128th Division which will move up to the line of the ESCAUT facing southeast.

3. The first American Infantry elements to enter AUDENARDE will continue to advance to the southeast edge of the town, will cross the ESCAUT east of the railroad to BLATON and will establish a bridgehead on the heights of Fort KEZEL.

By order:

[signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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I. Following the attack of October 31 and the constant pressure of the infantry, the enemy has been obliged to abandon during the night all the ground between the LYS and the ESCAUT on the British front, on that of French VII Army Corps, and on the right of the French XXX Army Corps. He is still holding out on the left (west) bank of the ESCAUT on the general line of GAVERE (9 km. northeast of AUDENARDE) and, farther north, west of GHENT.

Franco-American troops of the VII Corps, following on the heels of the enemy, reached the EYNE---BEVERE---PETEGEM---KERKHOVE Highway, then occupied the banks of the ESCAUT at BUITEN-EYNDRIESCH, BEVERE, HUIWEEDE, chateau southwest of PETEGEM, ELSEGEM-Chateau as follows:

French 41st Inf. Div. at 10:30 a.m.
French 128th Inf. Div. at 11:30 a.m.
American 91st Div. at the end of the day

At 11 a.m. the armored cars motorized [machine guns] of the French II Cavalry Corps, placed at the disposal of the VII Corps, were at the east exit of BEVERE; checked in front of AUDENARDE by destruction of the roads.

II. The Germans occupy the heights south of the ESCAUT along the entire front of the A. C.; numerous machine guns, particularly on the height of EDELAERE (southeast of AUDENARDE). The AUDENARDE Station and the general vicinity are being vigorously shelled by heavy caliber. The railroad station is burning. All bridges leading to AUDENARDE are down.

III. In conformity with orders, transmitted by means of messages at 9:30 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., the infantry divisions will push their artillery forward so as to be able to act on the heights south of the LYS and to support the advance guards, whose mission is to establish bridgeheads south of the river. (Operation to be attempted during the coming night):

128th Div., east of AUDENARDE (heights of RECKHEM)
91st Div., southeast of AUDENARDE (heights of Fort Kezel)
41st Div., southeast of MELDEN (heights of ROTELENBERG)

IV. Present limits remain unchanged until further orders. The limit between the 41st Div. and the British army has been set forth in Field Orders No. 492 of October 20, i.e. OYGHEM, (exclusive)--- kilometer post No. 10 (COURTRAI-DEYNZE Road)--- kilometer post No. 3 (northeast exit of EVANGELIEBOOM)---HEIRWEG Station---ANSEGHEM---ELSEGHEM-Chateau---PLADUTSE (these localities to the 41st Div.). This limit will be resumed on the front from ELSEGHEM forward, the rear elements of the 41st Div. keeping to their present zone.

V. Command Posts November 2:

Army Corps: WAEREGHEM, effective November 3
128th Div.: HEIRLEGEM-Chateau
91st Div.: STUIVENBERGHE-Chateau
41st Div.: ANSEGHEM-Chateau
VI. West of the line ANSEGHEM---BOSCHKANT---PETEGEMSTRAAT---MELKHOEK, the infantry division will hold the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>41st Div.</th>
<th>91st Div.</th>
<th>128th Div.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Regt.</td>
<td>2 Regts.</td>
<td>2 Regts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Distribution to be effected as soon as possible

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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291-32.16: Field Message

From: Captain Hoover

At: Hdqrs. VII Corps

Date: 1/11/18 Hour: 19:00 No. 1

To: G-3, 91st Div.

Situation 6 p.m. as follows. French line now runs north to south 1 kilometer east of ASTENE, east of NAZARETH just west of EECKE thence along west bank of SCHELDT [ESCAUT] to just south of EYNE. VII Corps are along line of SCHELDT from this point to junction with British. All bridges over the river have been destroyed. No estimate of prisoners taken. Our losses slight today. No change in Hdqrs. except American division. Hdqrs. Massenet, probably move to WAEREGHEM moving on third inst.

HOOVER.

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291-32.7: Field Message

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
Iseghem, November 1, 1918—17:30 p.m.

No. 7867/3

General Massenet

To General Johnston

The crossing of the ESCAUT ordered by telegram No. 7861/3 of November 1 is to be attempted tonight.

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**Efforts to Cross Escaut**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 7742/3

C. P. FRENCH 12TH INFANTRY DIVISION,  
November 1, 1918.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

[Extract]

General Penet commanding the French XXX Army Corps sends the following message:

* * * * *

The river must now be crossed, using immediately any means at hand (rafts, barrels, bridge wreckage, etc.) and the prepared or regulation materiel to be ordered up from the rear. In spite of the night, in spite of incontestable difficulties, all necessary measures will be taken and the greatest activity must be displayed so that at dawn tomorrow each front line regiment has an advance guard on the right bank and the combat trains can follow the troops to the far side.

* * * * *

CHABORD,  
General,  
Commanding the 12th Infantry Division.

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37th Div., Fldr. 8: Telegram

**Headquarters Moved**

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
November 1, 1918---15:45 h.

G. H. Q., A. E. F.,

Operations Nov. 1, 15:50 h. Advance headquarters 37th Division closes DENTERGHEM and opens CRUYSHAUTEM 18 h., November 1.

FARNSWORTH.

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**Movement Divisional Headquarters**

FIELD ORDERS NO. 23

MAP: COURTRAI 1:40,000

1. Division P. C. will close at DESSELGHEM at 14 o'clock, November 1, 1918 and open at STUIVENBERGHE (Chateau) same date and hour. The first echelon, Hq. 91st Division will leave DESSELGHEM at 12:30 o'clock, November 1, 1918.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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Les Armees Francaises, Tome VII, 2d Vol.: Annexes: Memorandum

**Return of British Second Army to Marshal Haig's Command**

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, G. S.
No. 5522

ALLIED ARMIES,
November 2, 1918.

MEMORANDUM

The Group of Armies of Flanders, by a series of successful operations, has just reached the line of the Escaut up stream from Ghent.

Since the principal maneuver, [designed to cause] the fall of the defense of the Escaut, is to be executed by the main body of the British armies [operating] south of Valenciennes, it is necessary all [British] of its forces be returned to and [remain at] the disposal of the British command.

Marshal Foch therefore requests His Majesty, the King of the Belgians, to bear in mind that effective as of noon, November 4, the British Second Army will revert to the direct command of Marshal Haig.

The boundaries between the British Second Army and the French Sixth Army will be announced later by telegram.

FOCH.

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Reorganization Front Line Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 164/3  
FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,  
November 2, 1918—5:30 p.m.


I. To provide some rest for a portion of the troops of the French army of Belgium, it is important to hold the line of the ESCAUT with a minimum of troops. Therefore only the French 41st, 12th, 11th, and 70th Inf. Divs. will be retained in the front line.

The French 128th and 77th Inf. Divs. (army reserve) and the French 132d Inf. Div. (at the disposal of the King) will be stationed in the vicinity of the LYS.

The French 164th and 5th Inf. Divs. and the American 91st and 37th Inf. Divs. will be held or brought back, to the zone west of the VIVE-St-BAVON---VYNCKT line. * * *

All divisions will remain attached to the same army corps as previously for administrative purposes.

II. The 164th Inf. Div. will occupy its new zone during the day of November 2. The other divisions will begin movements during the night of 2/3, such movements to be completed no later than the morning of the 4th.

III. The following artillery elements will be withdrawn and placed at rest with their organic major unit:

All of the artillery of the French II Cavalry Corps.
Artillery of the French 5th, 164th, and American 91st Divs.
1 bn. of 75-mm.'s from the divisional artillery of the 77th and 128th Divs, respectively.

The following artillery will remain on the front:
a. Artillery of the 4 front line divisions: 2 bns. of 75-mm.'s. and 1 bn. of 155-mm. howitzers, each, of the 77th and 128th Divs. respectively: the French 59th Field Artillery, truck-carried.
b. Organic heavy artillery of the army corps.
c. The French 305th and 414th Heavy Artillery

IV. The tank units will revert to army reserve.

The 3 bns. of the 503d [Tank Regt.] will remain in the corps zone in their present locations.

The 12th Bn. of the 504th [Tank Regt.] will be brought back to INGLEMUNSTER.

de BOISSOUDY.

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Withdrawal of Division from Front Line.

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 166/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
November 2, 1918—5:35 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 19 Op.

[Extract]

1. The time limit for execution of the movements prescribed in Par. II of General Orders No. 17 Op. is extended from the 4th to the morning of the 5th.

   • • • • •

   de BOISSOUDY.

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37th Div.: Oper. Reports, Flr. 8: Operations Order

Movement 37th Division

3d Sect., G. S.
No. 199/3

FRENCH XXX CORPS,
November 2, 1918—23:59.

OPERATIONS ORDER No. 43

[Extract]

1. By order of the army No. 17, O. P. November 2, in order to assure some rest to a certain portion of the troops, it is necessary to hold the course of the ESCAUT with a minimum of forces.

   For this purpose, there will be maintained in the first line in the sector of the XXX C. A., the 12th D. I. of which the actual front north of SYNGEM (inclusive to 12th Div.) will be taken by the XXXIV C. A.

2. After withdrawal, the American 37th Div. will be stationed in the area THIELT (Hq.)—POELBERG—GINSTE—Les CINQ-CHENSE—MEULEBEKE—LIESTER—De WEEZE, Ferme—In-den-PAUW Cabaret—TURKEYENHOEK—PITTHEM.

   • • • • •

7. P. C. of XXX C. A. - DENTERGHEM at 13 h. on November 3.

   H. PENET,
   General,
   Commanding the XXX Army Corps.

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- 391 -
General Massenet

To General Johnston

Pursuant to my message No. 7,864/3 November 1, you will occupy AUDENARDE with an infantry detachment which will then establish a bridgehead on the heights east of AUDENARDE.

The crossing of the ESCAUT is to be attempted as soon as possible.

Report to me what was done to occupy AUDENARDE last night.

By order:

HOURRUAY,
Chief of Staff.

Order to Cross the ESCAUT River

1. Pursuant to Operations Order No. 41, Headquarters French XXX Army Corps this division will cross the ESCAUT today, with strong advance guards.
   (a) Limitations: In order to preserve depth not to exceed one regiment of each brigade will proceed beyond the line BALTENSHOEK-HUYSSE.
2. (a) Commanding Generals, 73d and 74th Brigades, will execute this mission as per verbal instructions issued this morning by the division commander.
   (b) The divisional artillery commander will arrange for the necessary artillery covering fire for the operation, as well as protective fire on lines established east of the ESCAUT.
237.32.16: Telegram

Consolidation of Position

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 2, 1918.

G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 Number 634. During night November 1/2 our troops consolidated their position on the west bank of the ESCAUT River. At 8:25 h. this morning small groups were beginning to cross the river and at 10:30 temporary bridges of felled trees had been thrown across and strong detachments were being established on the east bank. Crossing opposed by machine guns and snipers. Counted seven 77 mm. guns captured since commencement of operations.

FARNSWORTH.

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37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 2, 1918.

G. H. Q. G-3 Number 638

Crossing of ESCAUT River by small groups continued during the afternoon and road from river southeast to NEDER-ENAME now controlled by our battalions. Crossing effected by infantry in fact of machine-gun and artillery fire. Casualties not known. Weather cloudy with light rain.

FARNSWORTH.

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237-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, G-2. No. 3

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 1 to November 2, 1918, 16 h. to 16 h.

[Extract]

1. General Impression of the Day: Our advance retarded by difficulty encountered in crossing the ESCAUT. Visibility poor.
2. Enemy Front Line: The enemy front line generally parallel with the River ESCAUT and at a distance of from 500 to 1000 meters from its east bank.
3. Enemy Order of Battle: No change.
4. Enemy Infantry: No enemy infantry activity with exception of small amount of sniping on east bank of ESCAUT. Hostile machine guns very active throughout the day, against our troops on the west bank of the river.
5. Enemy Artillery: Harassing fire on towns of our back area intermittent throughout the period of this report. Enemy artillery active against our troops on west bank of the ESCAUT.

R. I. O., 145th Infantry, reports following battery location;
Battery of two guns at 212.35-458.75
Three batteries at approximately 213.20-459.06, 212.00-457.45 and 210.50-455.20.

6. Enemy Movements: Enemy has made a temporary stand east of the River ESCAUT.


8. Enemy Aeronautics: Enemy bombing planes active during the night dropping bombs on great number of towns in back area. Several enemy planes over our front lines during the day.

* * * * *

10. Miscellaneous: At the end of the period 12 officers and 317 enlisted men had passed through the divisional P. W. E. and 38 wounded Germans had been evacuated.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

ROBERT L. COLLINS,
Lt. Col. of Cavalry,
A. C. of S., G-2.

291-32.15: Letter

Request to Enter 37th Division Zone

91st DIVISION, A. E.F.,
A. P. O. 776, November 2, 1918.

From: The Commanding General
To: The Commanding General, 37th Division

1. All bridges crossing the ESCAUT within the zone of action of this division have been destroyed. On account of strong enemy positions on the east bank of the river, it is impracticable to construct any bridges across the river in my front.

2. I desire to send a regiment of infantry across the ESCAUT tonight within your zone of action. Request information as to whether this regiment can cross on bridges already constructed by you and, if not, if I may construct bridges near these now being used by you. If I am to construct bridges, I will send with the regiment of infantry engineer troops and material for the bridges. Request that guides meet the column at crossroads 7919 to conduct my troops to the point at which the crossing is to be made. Column will be placed in march immediately upon receipt of information from you that crossing may be made in your front.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.
From: Commanding General, 37th Division

To: Commanding General, 91st Division

SUBJECT: Passage of the ESCAUT

1. With reference to your request to cross regiment of infantry within the zone of action of 37th Division, I have to inform you that the construction of two small foot bridges across the ESCAUT, one at 300 and the other at 600 meters north of the EYNE--NEDER-EENNAME Road, was begun at six o'clock this evening. I believe that these bridges have been finished by this time and can be used by troops. The pontoon bridge being constructed at the crossing of the last named road will probably not be completed until very late tonight or tomorrow forenoon. It is possible, however, that this pontoon bridge will be finished earlier than I anticipate. I will be very glad to have you pass a regiment of infantry over anyone of these three bridges. I will also be glad to assist the passage in any way that I can with my troops or arms. Machine guns now in position might be able to assist and I would suggest that the commander of the regiment to cross might consult the commander of my battalion in EYNE with a view to use of his machine guns. My divisional artillery will also be placed in part at your disposal to fire on targets at times and with kind of ammunition as you may designate to me. If there is anything further that I can do to assist your passage, please advise me.

2. I now have seven companies across the river in the left of my sector and at least two and possibly five, have crossed the river and are in position from 300 to 600 meters northeast of EYNE--NEDER--EENNAME river crossing. Nearly all of the above crossed on bridges made of fallen trees and material secured in HEURNE and by wading.

C. S. FARNSWORTH,
Major General, U. S. A.

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291-32.1: Order

Attack Orders

FIELD ORDERS NO. 24

MAPS: COURTRAI 1:40,000
       GRAMMONT 1:40,000

[Extract]

1. The 37th Division has sent forward small groups totaling about 300 men, across the ESCAUT River to the east of HEURNE and to the north edge of EYNE.
2. This division will attack the enemy on the heights southeast of AUDENARDE (Fort KEZEL), tomorrow morning November 3, 1918.

* * * * *
The Commanding General, 181st Infantry Brigade, will occupy the town of AUDENARDE with a strong detachment and will cover with machine-gun fire all bridges giving entrance to that town from the east. He will post necessary guards to prevent civilians from leaving the town of AUDENARDE and will be in readiness to move his brigade across the ESCAUT River to support the attack from the northeast.

* * * * *

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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ANNEX NO. 1
To FIELD ORDERS NO. 24

Plan of Employment of Artillery

[Extract]

1. At O hour and again at 3 h. November 3, 1918, a barrage will be put down from a line northeast and southwest (91.63 to 01.71) proceeding from river southeast 400 meters. This barrage will have nothing to do with the mission of attacking regiment, and is an attack for destruction of machine-gun nests and to confuse the enemy as to our real intention. Concentrations will also be made on crossroads at same hours.

2. At signal from advancing infantry, a barrage will be laid down on line running northwest and southeast (at 03.75 to 10.69) proceeding southwest at rate of 100 meters per 4 minutes for 1,000 meters, lasting 44 minutes. This barrage is a protective barrage for attacking infantry from the north.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Johnston:

HENRY C. JEWETT,
Colonel, Engineers,
Chief of Staff.

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291-33.1: Report of Operations

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,

From 12 o'clock November 1 to 12 o'clock November 2, 1918

[Extract]

1. Hostile Situation at beginning of the day: Enemy retirement to the east bank of ESCAUT River effected. Artillery and machine-gun fire from heights east of the river directed on our advancing troops.
2. Information received of enemy during the day: Statements of refugees and inhabitants indicated that the enemy hurriedly withdrew to his defensive positions east of the ESCAUT.

3. Hostile movements, changes and conduct during the day, including maps illustrating same: Enemy bombing planes active during the night Nov. 1/2. His machine guns placed in position to cover approaches to ESCAUT River. Considerable artillery fire during afternoon of November 1, and intermittent artillery fire during the night November 1/2.

4. Own situation at beginning of the day: Defensive positions organized on high ground west of ESCAUT River.

5. Own changes, movements and action during the day: Patrols sent forward during the night of November 1/2 to reconnoiter bridges and town of AUDENARDE occupied. Report received that all bridges over ESCAUT River within 91st Division sector have been destroyed. Special reconnaissence of river bank and bridges made by patrol under engineer officer and also by Major Wm. A. Aird. • • • Division P. C. moved forward to STUIVENBERGHE.

6. Information neighboring units: Divisions on our right and left are reported to have progressed to the river. Detachments of 41st Division, on our right, crossed the river during the night November 1/2, but were forced to retire to the western bank of the river.

8. Action during the day and orders issued and received: Reconnoitered the front and organized defensive position.

9. Results of actions, both own and enemy, including maps illustrating same: Destruction of the bridges over the ESCAUT River by the enemy has been the means of delaying an immediate advance of this division.

10. Estimate of the situation: Availability of material necessary for construction of bridges is being ascertained. The enemy's withdrawal is well covered by artillery and machine guns, placed in selected positions east of the ESCAUT River. The ESCAUT River offers a considerable obstacle to advancing troops.

11. Plans for future: Construction of bridges and maintaining bridgeheads are plans for immediate future; also to effect a crossing over the ESCAUT River and resume the attack.

12. Remarks, morale, supplies, etc.
Morale very good. Health good. Supplies satisfactory.

CLARK LYNN,
Lieut. Col., Infantry.
G-3.
Action in Event of Enemy Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,

November 3, 1918.

3d Section, G. S.
No. 140/3

INSTRUCTIONS NO. 14

I. Instructions No. 11 provided for a forced crossing of the Escaut, in case very serious enemy resistance was encountered on that river. It is expedient to continue actively execution of the instructions contained therein.

II. This present document is designed to meet a situation wherein the enemy would be forced to retreat between the Escaut and the Dendre, whether as a result of our pressure, on account of his own military or political situation or, finally, because of important successes achieved by the adjoining army.

From intelligence of all kinds, it is now reasonable to assume a general retreat of the German army in the near future, toward the east.

Consequently, the bridgeheads, prescribed by Instructions No. 13 are to be increased in number and enlarged at the most favorable points, by employing therefor whatever is necessary in infantry and, particularly, in artillery; in addition, strong pressure to be exercised on the enemy beyond Escaut.

III. In case the enemy should yield to this pressure, unrelenting pursuit will begin. It will be carried out, by each army within the zones fixed by Instructions No. 3 of October 20, 1918.

a. Cavalry: The infantry advance will be protected by the greatest part of the Belgian cavalry, within the zone of that army and by the French cavalry corps, within the French and British zones.

In order to expedite the entry of the cavalry into action, the cavalry corps will ascertain the construction of crossings over the Escaut, on the French front as well as on the British front, and will study the most rapid means to reach same.

The mission of the cavalry is to protect the advance of the armies by moving its main forces as rapidly as possible into the triangle Grammont, Ath, Enghien, to cut enemy communications. Subsequent direction of March: Wavre.

b. Infantry: It appears that it will be advisable to carry on this pursuit with a limited number of divisions, say one for [every] four or five kilometers of front, for two reasons: first, because of the condition of the enemy's forces, which are scarcely capable of any serious reaction; second, because of the difficulty of supply operations which, as a result of the destruction of railroads and canals by the enemy will have to be effected for quite a period of time from west of the Lys.

A second line of divisions, of equal strength, will provide beyond the Escaut, but it will [however] remain in proximity to that river and within reach of supplies by rail, prepared to intervene in case of enemy resistance.

A third echelon of divisions can be held, until further orders, west of the Escaut.

In the name of the King:

DEGOUTTE,
General.
Plans for Crossing the Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. 
No. 181/3

INSTRUCTIONS No. 3 Op.

[Extract]

I. General Orders No. 17 of November 1, supplemented by Order No. 19 op. of the 2d, prescribed the conditions for holding the front along the Escaut attained by the French Army of Belgium during the days of November 1 and 2. It also specified the staging areas of large units (French and American) in rear of the front line troops.

II. In general, the enemy, after being driven from the heights between the Lys and the Escaut, put up only very feeble resistance to our pressure and he has recrossed the Escaut, after destroying all of the bridges.

Fresh and serious enemy resistance may be encountered on the right bank; hence, it is advisable to initiate plans, studies, and preparations for a forced crossing of the river without delay.

That operation will be the subject of instructions which will set forth the manner of execution. Corps commanders [concerned] will receive those orders shortly.

III. This being understood, the general commanding the French Army of Belgium deems it highly important to, successively and without delay—which is always profitable to the enemy—establish bridgeheads on the other side of the Escaut, which will permit maintaining contact with German rearguards and ascertaining whether the enemy intends to resist effectively and vigorously on the right bank of that river, or, whether he intends to give way to our pressure again and withdraw farther to the east.

In this connection, it becomes equally important that we concentrate all our efforts on the establishment of bridgeheads within the corps zones, where they do not yet exist, as well as upon the gradual widening of those which are already established.

All necessary artillery will be assigned thereto and provision will also be made for the minimum of infantry deemed necessary for offensive action against, and pursuit of, the enemy, should the latter only offer mean resistance.

In the event resistance is too strong, the bridgeheads thus created could serve, as on the Lys on October 31, as a line of departure for the projected planned attack.

........

deo BOISSOUDY.

- 399 -
Exploitation of Gains on Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 202/3

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 44

(Confirmation of Telephone Message)

The advance made on the right bank of the Escaut should be exploited by both the American division and the French 12th Inf. Div.

To widen the bridgehead, the first objective to reach is the following: Neerwelden-Kilometer post 29 on the Nederzwalm-Audenarde Road, then that road to its crossing of the railroad north of Ename.

The second objective is marked by the loop of the ZWALM west of Nederzwalm---the villages of Bossche---Hoogeberg---Oossche---and La Cantine height, north of CAster. Liaison to be effected at this point with the French 128th Inf. Div.

Zone of action of the infantry divisions on the right bank of the Escaut, limited by the north edge of Welden and the south edge of Bossche.

H. PENET,
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.

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Relief of 91st Division by French Troops

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
GENERAL ORDER OF OPERATIONS NO. 508

VII ARMY CORPS,
P. C. November 3, 1918.

Hour of signing: 9:35.

[Extract]

I. In execution of the General Order No. 17 Op. of the French army of Belgium, the front of the A. C. will be held only by the 41st Inf. Div.

II. The necessary movements to bring the 41st Inf. Div. on its new front will be regulated by the General commanding the 41st Inf. Div., after an understanding with the Generals commanding the American 91st and the French 128th Inf. Divs. on the following bases:

a. Day of Nov. 3 and night of Nov. 3/4:
   Extension of the 41st Inf. Div. on the front of the American 91st Div.
AUDENARDE-EYNE AREA
Looking north-northeast from Audenarde
Taking over of the command of the present front of the 41st Div. and of the 91st Div. by the General commanding the 41st Div., Nov. 4 at noon.

P. C. Chateau of STUIVENBERGHE.

IV. 1. The 91st Div. (artillery included) after relief will be regrouped in the zone indicated.

Hq: OOSTROOZEBEKE.

VI. Will remain at the disposal of the army corps:

Divisional Artillery Park 128, at the disposal of the General commanding the VII Army.

Engineers of the American 91st Div. at the disposal of the lieut. [?] commanding the army corps engineers, till morning November 6.

IX. Liaison axis of the A. C. and 41st I. D. VIVE-St-ELOI—WAEREGHEM—WORTEGEM—AUDENARDE.

X. Hq. of the A. C. will function November 4, 12 h. noon) in WACKEN.

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

237-32.1: Order

American Troops Crossed Escaut

G-3 No. 639
FIELD ORDERS No. 39

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 3, 1918—1 h.

[Extract]

1. Our troops have forced the crossing of the ESCAUT and have established strong forces on the general line PUITHOEK-RYDSTRAAT-WELDEN-Point (212.0-462.2) covering the bridgeheads in the divisional sector. The French 12th D. I. on the left and the French 128th D. I. on the right have advanced to the ESCAUT.

5. Division P. C. CRUYSHAUTEM.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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**Position Improved**

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 3, 1918.

TELEGRAM: G. H. Q.

G-3 Number 643. Nov. 3, 12 noon. In face of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire last night, our position on east bank of the ESCAUT was improved. Bridgehead now established and assured by 3 1/2 battalions of infantry plus 4 machine-gun companies. Wounded evacuated to date 904. Known dead 109. Weather cloudy with light rain.

FARNSWORTH.

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237-32.1: Order

**Relief of Remaining Units of 37th Division**

G-3 No. 644. 37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
FIELD ORDERS No. 41
November 3, 1918--21 h.

MAP: THIELT 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Operations Order No. 43, Hq. XXX A. C., the French 12th Division will relieve the remaining units of the 37th Division now in CRUYSHAUTEM sector on night of November 4/5.

* * * * *

8. P. C. 37th Division closes at CRUYSHAUTEM and opens THIELT at 24 h., November 4, 1918.

P. C. 73d Brigade, after relief MEULEBEKE.
P. C. 74th Brigade, after relief THIELT.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.
Relief Orders

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 3, 1918—13 o'clock.

FIELD ORDERS No. 25

MAP: THIELT )
) 1:40,000
COURTRAI )

[Extract]

1. The front of the VII Army Corps will be held by the French 41st Infantry Division.

• • • • •

5. Division P. C.: OOSTROOSEBEKE.
181st Brigade P. C.: OYGHEM.
182d Brigade P. C.: OOSTROOSEBEKE.
53d F. A. Brigade P. C.: DESSELGHEM.
Division headquarters will close at STUIVENBERGHE [Chateau] at 12 noon, November 4, 1918, and open at new location same date and hour.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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Report

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,

[Extract]

From 12 o'clock November 2 to 12 o'clock November 3, 1918

1. Hostile situation at beginning of the day: Enemy occupying eastern bank of ESCAUT River and heights to the southeast of AUDENARDE, covering bridge crossings with machine-gun fire. Enemy has destroyed all bridges over the ESCAUT River.

2. Information received of enemy during the day: Civilians reported arrival of another hostile division east of AUDENARDE. Refugees and civilians give location of enemy machine guns and artillery.

3. Hostile movements, changes and conduct during the day, including maps illustrating same: Light harassing artillery fire with occasional sniping and machine-gun fire from eastern side of ESCAUT River.

• • • • •

6. Information neighboring units: Reported that division on our right again attempted to cross the ESCAUT River, night November 2/3 but were not successful. 37th
Division, immediately north of the French 128th Division on our left reported that a detachment of about 300 men had been able to effect a crossing of the ESCAUT River in the vicinity of EYNÈ.

* * * * *

CLARK LYNN,
Lieut. Col., Infantry,
G-3.

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37th Div. War Diaries

November 4, 1918

[Extract]

Headquarters 37th Div. Cruyshautem, Belgium

REMARKS: Relief of troops of back area effected during night November 3/4 and early hours of November 4. At 16 h., the enemy laid down a heavy machine-gun and artillery barrage on troops in front line, and immediately followed the barrage with an attempted raid, but was successfully repulsed by the effective work of the machine guns, and our advanced line was held where established earlier in day. * * *

The actual relief of the front line troops was effected between 18 h. and 24 h.

The command of the Cruyshautem sector passed at 24 h. to the French 12th Division and division Hq. opened same hour at Thielt.

* * * * *

SUMNER WAITE,
Major, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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201-12.8: Letter

Command of Sector

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
A. P. O. 776, November 4, 1918—9:40 h.

FROM: Commanding General

TO: Commanding General, French VII A. C.

SUBJECT: Relief of Troops

1. In compliance with telephonic orders from your headquarters, the command of this sector was officially turned over the Commanding General, 41st Division, at midnight November 3/4, 1918. The relief of my first line units was completed at 2 o'clock.
November 4, 1918, at which hour my troops were withdrawn. I am now awaiting the arrival of the Commanding General, 41st Division, at these headquarters.

2. My P. C. will be at OOSTROOSEBEKE from 12 o’clock, November 4, 1918.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.

37th Div. Fldr. 8: 237-32.1: Report

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE 37th DIVISION IN FLANDERS OFFENSIVE, FORCING THE CROSSING OF THE LYS AND ESCAUT RIVERS, OCTOBER 31, NOVEMBER 4, 1918 INCLUSIVE

October 18: Pursuant to F. O. 32, hq. 37th Division, October 17, 1918 issued in compliance with G-3 Order No. 9 of Second Army, entrainment of division for new area was commenced at 18 h. Detraining point unknown. Before commencing this movement, 75% of truck transportation of ammunition and supply trains was taken from the division and ordered turned over to American Second Army.

October 20: Troop trains began to arrive and detrain at points WIELTJE---BOESINGHE---St-JEAN---VLAMERTINGHE in the neighborhood of YPRES. The P. C. of the division was established at HOOGLEDE, BELGIUM, and troop movements by march to billeting areas in STADEN-HOOGLEDE and GITS area started on the 21st.

October 21: Difficulties immediately began to arise in equipping and rationing of troops, due to extreme shortage of transportation and devastation of country, which was “No Man’s Land” from YPRES to HOOGLEDE, difficult and slow for transportation. Efforts to obtain from French, English and American sources, additional transportation, were unsuccessful.

October 22: Pursuant to S. O. 5 A. F. B. [French Army of Belgium] October 22, the 37th Division was put at the disposal of the King of [the Belgians] Belgium and attached to the French Army of Belgium for operations.

October 23/24: Detraining and march to billeting areas completed by all troops.

October 25: The billeting area of the division was enlarged to include the area of LICHTERVELDE.

October 26: Division headquarters and 73d Brigade moved to LICHTERVELDE.

October 27: Pursuant to S. O. 8, A. F. B., October 26, the division advanced one stage nearer the front lines and P. C. was established at MEULEBEKE October 28, at 14 h.

October 28: Pursuant to note from XXX Corps, the 37th Division, on order of A. F. B., was attached to that corps for pending operations. Another step forward was taken by the division and the P. C. (advanced) was opened at DENTERGHEM at 8 h. October 29.

October 29: Special Order No. 29, from the XXX C. A., dated October 29, was received this day, ordering relief of French 132d Division in the CRUYSHAUTEM sector and F. O. 35, hq. 37th Division, dated October 29, was issued from these headquarters. Relief to take place in night of October 29/30 and 30/31.

October 30: Operations Order No. 32, Hq. XXX French Corps, of October 29, 20:35 h., was received this date. The order directed the attack by the corps at a day and H hour to be fixed later. The French 132d Divisional Artillery Balloon Company 87, Aero Squadron 287, and the Cavalry Squadron of the 132d D. I. were attached to this division for the projected operation. Based upon Operations Order No. 32, XXX Corps, F. O. 36, Hq. 37th Division, October 30, was issued.
At 17:30 h. memo was received from French XXX C. A. fixing D day as October 31 and H hour as 5:30 a. m.

Order of Battle from Right to Left

VII A. C.  
American 91st Division
French 128th Division

XXX A. C.  
American 37th Division
French 12th Division

XXXIV A. C.  
French

Mission to drive the enemy across the ESCAUT.
Disposition of troops of this division for the attack was as follows:
The Infantry Brigades abreast, 73d on the right, 74th on the left, each with two battalions in 1st line and echeloned in depth as follows:

October 31: Formation of troops, 37th Division, at 5:30 a. m., October 31, 1918.

LINE OF DEPARTURE

148th Infantry
2d 3d Bn.

1/2 Co. 112th
Engrs.
Reg. Reserve
1st Bn.

Brigade Reserve
1st Bn. 147th Infantry

112th Engineers
(less 2 cos.)
Division Reserve
146th Infantry
(less 3d Bn.)
134th M. G. Bn.

Corps Reserve
147th Infantry
(less 1 bn.)

To each infantry battalion was attached a machine gun company.
One company, 112th Engineers, was employed in keeping in repair the bridges over the LYS River and the approaches thereto.

After an artillery preparation of 5 minutes the infantry went over the top at 5:30 a. m., following a rolling barrage of high explosives and shrapnel, moving at a speed of 10 meters in 3 minutes. Enemy counterbattery work commenced immediately and contained a great many arsenic gas shells. The wind being from the east, the effects were felt as far back as division headquarters then located at DENTERGHEM.
The advance was steady right from the start and all enemy resistance was methodically broken down.

Prisoners began to arrive at 7:35 and reported the first enemy line thinly held, and that the main resistance would be met on the ridge west of CRUYSHAUTEM.

At 8:15, the division had reached its first objective---Ruisseau de KATTEBEEK [Creek] ---Boqueteau est de [small woods east of] KARREWEG---lisiere est de [east edge of] HUTTEGEM---junction of TICHEBEEK with the route OLSENE to CRUYSHAUTEM [point where OLSENE-CRUYSHAUTEM Road passes over TICHEBEEK Creek]---Point 1450.

A pause until 8:30 was made at the first objective, when movement was begun toward the line MERHAAGHOEK---Ferme de RECTE [De KEETE Farm?]---WATERHOEK---NEDERRECHEM, on which line the attack was to be resumed at 13:30 h. The enemy artillery was very active, especially upon roads leading forward. Casualties, however, were not heavy and the advance continued steady. The resistance of the enemy was mostly by machine guns, the greater part of the hostile infantry having fallen back to the ridge southwest of CRUYSHAUTEM. The heavy enemy artillery fire continuously broke the telephone lines of communication of this division and difficulty was had in keeping accurately in touch with the advanced elements. The roads were good, being generally paved and thus permitting the use of motor ambulances and assuring prompt attention to and evacuation of all wounded.

During the enemy retirement the enemy heavily shelled the town of OLSENE, wounding many civilians and blowing down two houses which temporarily blocked forward movement. A detachment of engineers immediately cleared away the debris and permitted traffic to proceed with little delay. Between the hours of 10 and 11, our artillery held the ridge southwest of CRUYSHAUTEM under very heavy shell fire and at 10:15, the advance was ordered continued regardless of the progress of the adjoining units.

At 13:05, the division reserve was ordered to advance to a point within 2000 meters of the reserve of the 73d Brigade and to be prepared for action at a moment's notice. At this time, the 74th Brigade was held up on the crest of the ridge west of CRUYSHAUTEM and a pause was ordered until 15 h., when a strong attack was ordered by all units to take the ridge.

At 15 h. the Commanding General of the French XXX A. C. was requested to move that part of the 147th Infantry in the corps reserve to the area between the railway and HOUTSTRAAT. This request was made because of the delay of the 12th Division, on our left, and the consequent exposure of our left flank.

The advance was ordered to cease shortly after 17 h. and all units were directed to deeply intrench. The line rested for the night on the crest of the CRUYSHAUTEM Heights.

Total prisoners taken for the day, 11 officers, 306 enlisted men. November 1: Field Order No. 37, Hq. 37th Division, dated October 31, was issued at 22 h. and ordered the attack for November 1 to commence at 6:30 h., artillery preparation to commence at 6:25, the infantry to make the attack at 6:30, preceded by a rolling barrage at a distance of 600 meters and which was to move at the rate of 100 meters in 3 minutes. The first objective of the day was the 2d objective of the original plan, upon reaching which a pause was to be made until 10 o'clock.

The advance on the morning of the 1st proceeded as per schedule and at 7:20 o'clock the 3d Battalion, 148th Infantry had passed through the town of CRUYSHAUTEM. All indications were that the enemy had withdrawn. At 7:40 the second objective had been reached and the town of WANNEGEM-LEDE was occupied.

Attempts to make out the front line by aeroplanes were unsuccessful due to civilians everywhere waving handkerchiefs.

The pause at the second objective was ordered cancelled and at 10:40 the attack was ordered pushed to the final objective with all possible speed.
Liaison with the advanced units was very slow in reaching headquarters due to the rapid advance. However, reports of refugees indicated that at 11 o'clock our troops were within one kilometer of the ESCAUT River.

Advance dumps were established by the division and all available transportation used in hauling up ammunition and supplies from the division dumps at HOOG.

Reports at 18 h. established our line on the west bank of the ESCAUT River and in compliance with Memo Orders received from the Commanding General of the XXX Corps, all units were ordered to attempt to prepare for crossing the ESCAUT during the night and establish outposts on the east bank.

Advanced P. C. of Hq. 37th Division, closed at DENTERGHEM and opened at CRUYSHAUTEM at 18 h. this date.

During this night the artillery of the 132d A. D. supporting this division, was ordered to move forward and to have 75-mm. guns in position at 3,000 meters west of the ESCAUT and heavy artillery in position 6 kilometers west of the river.

Prisoners taken, one officer, five enlisted men.

November 2: Small detachments of our troops began to cross the river by 8:25 in the morning. The 148th Infantry made temporary bridges of fallen trees and material from destroyed houses in the town of HEURNE. The enemy had taken position on the east bank and disputed the crossing with both artillery and machine guns. Artillery fire was particularly heavy along the roads and on the town of HEURNE, making the bringing forward of bridge material extremely slow.

At 10:30 o'clock the 2d and 3d Battalions of the 148th Infantry, began a definite movement across the river under the protection of artillery and machine-gun barrage and by noon, approximately 300 men had succeeded in crossing the river and establishing a position on the east bank. Request was made of the French 128th D. I. and the American 91st Div. to cover the right flank of this small party with artillery. The enemy artillery reaction increased during the afternoon, both high explosives and gas shells being used.

The town of HEURNE was practically demolished and movement on the banks of the river was almost impossible.

Due to the impossibility of getting material through the town of HEURNE, the pontoon bridge to be erected at that place was shifted to EYNE where a bridge was to be constructed at 6 p. m. under cover of darkness.

Late in the afternoon the 145th Infantry had succeeded in getting 52 men across on the temporary bridge constructed by the 148th Infantry. One pontoon bridge was completed by 19 h. and at 20:50 h. the entire 2d and 3d Battalions of the 148th Infantry, less one company, were across the river and a second pontoon bridge completed. Ammunition, pyrotechnics and rations were carried across the river by carrying parties during the night.

All troop movements through the town of HEURNE were stopped at 23 h., due to the terrific enemy bombardment of high explosives and gas shells.

At 23 h. the engineer bridge in the sector of the 73d Brigade was completed and one battalion of the 145th Infantry crossed the river, and established liaison with the battalions of the 148th Infantry already across.

One regiment of the American 91st Division on our right, was authorized to cross the river during the night of the footbridge constructed by the 37th Division near EYNE.

Prisoners taken 5 enlisted men.

November 3: The crossing of the river was resumed early on the morning of this day in the face of continued heavy enemy artillery and machine-gun fire.

The French 12th Division began to cross the river on the footbridge of the 148th Infantry early during the morning and at 6:30, two companies of infantry and one machine gun company were securely established on the east bank. The regiment of the 91st Division, on our right, did not succeed in crossing and organized a position near the village of MARCLLE [MAROLLE?].

All during this entire day, small parties filtered across the river. The enemy concentrated all means at his disposal to prevent this crossing. Aeroplanes numbering as
high as ten at one time harassed the position with machine-gun fire and aerial bombs.

As fast as enemy battery positions were located our artillery would concentrate their efforts upon the known target and at times during the day the heavy concentration of enemy artillery would be greatly decreased.

At 18 h., three and one-half companies of the 148th Infantry, four machine gun companies, and six companies of the 145th Infantry, as well as four companies of infantry and two machine gun companies of the French 12th Division were established on the east bank of the river, securely holding the line.

One deserter from the 5th Prison Company surrendered.

Operations Order No. 43, XXX C. A. directed the relief of the 37th Division by the French 12th Division for the day of November 3 and night of November 4/5.

Pursuant to F. O. N. 40, Hq. 37th Division, dated November 3, 1918, 2 battalions of the 147th Infantry (corps reserve), 134th Machine Gun Battalion and one battalion, 146th Infantry (division reserve) proceeded by march toward THIELT area. One battalion, 148th Infantry and 146th Infantry, leses one battalion, occupied on morning of November 4, the area vacated by units of corps and division reserve.

Pursuant to F. O. 41, Hq. 37th Division, 21 h., November 3, relief of remaining units of this division in front line was completed during night of November 4/5 and units relieved proceeded by march to billeting zones in THIELT area.

Relief was completed without incident. P. C. 37th Division closed at CRUYSHAUTEM and opened at THIELT---24 h., November 4, 1918.

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<th>CASUALTIES</th>
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<td>KILLED</td>
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<td>Enlisted Men</td>
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<td>Enlisted Men</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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Prisoners: The following prisoners were captured in the sector of the 37th Division, October 31 to November 3, 1918, inclusive:

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<th>GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION</th>
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<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
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<td>----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>6th Guard Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>399th Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Guard Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>207th INFANTRY DIVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OFFICERS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>213th Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Reserve Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3d LANDWEHR DIVISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6th Landwehr Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Landwehr Infantry Regiment</td>
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### 6th DISMOUNTED CAVALRY DIVISION

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13th Jaeger (mounted)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Reserve Dragoon</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Field Artillery Regiment - attached.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 21st DIVISION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OFFICERS</th>
<th>ENLISTED MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>81st Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 deserter from 5th Prison Co.
About 38 wounded prisoners evacuated.

Partial list of materiel captured by 37th Division October 31-November 4, 1918, inclusive:

- 3 cannon, caliber 105-mm. (without sights - one without firing pin).
- 3 cannon, caliber 77-mm. (without sights - one without breech block).
- 7 caissons
- 5 limbers (three poles for same)
- 2 three-inch trench mortars
- 3 machine-gun stands
- 11 machine guns
- 20 machine-gun ammunition boxes
- 170 six-inch shells
- 2 ten-inch shells
- 1000 rounds, machine-gun ammunition in belts
- 7 horses

The above, except horses, are stored at salvage dump, THIELT.

C. S. FARNSWORTH,
Major General, U.S. A.

Nov. 11, 1918
[Extract]

1. In compliance with telegraphic instructions, Hq. American First Army October 15, 1918, the 91st Division (less artillery and ammunition train except personnel Cos. A. and C.) and the 53d Field Artillery Brigade entrained in the NETTANCOURT and CLERMONT areas respectively. The division detrained and was bivouacked October 18 and 19 in the devastated district in the vicinity of YPRES.

2. On arrival, the division was placed at the disposition of H. M. the King of [the Belgians] Belgium commanding the Group of Armies of Flanders. On October 28, it passed to the command of the Commanding General of the French Army in Belgium and on the same date was placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, French VII Army Corps.

3. After detraining, the division marched forward by successive stages and was placed in the line by midnight October 30, having relieved the French 164th Division, in readiness to participate in the contemplated offensive.

4. Belgian forces held the sector to the north of the French Army of Belgium and British to the south thereof. The order of battle of the French Army of Belgium Oct. 30, 1918, from left to right was as follows:

   XXXIV Corps,
   XXX Corps,
   VII Corps.

The VII Corps front was held by the French 128th Division, American 91st Division and Escadrille 72 and Balloon 73 attached, and French 41st Division in the order named from left to right, the 91st Division holding a front of about 4 kilometers, extending from WAEREGHEM (inclusive) to STEENBRUGGE (exclusive). The French 164th Division after relief by the 91st Division was placed in second line at the disposition of the King.

5. The mission of the 91st Division was to carry the successive heights within its zone of action extending in the general direction of AUDENARDE and to drive the enemy east of the ESCAUT River.

6. SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN, a wood of thin and scanty growth of approximately 1,500 meters in diameter, extends across the central part of the division zone of action, the western edge of which within 500 meters of the jumping-off line of the division. The terrain to the west of the second objective is rolling and sparsely wooded. To the east of this point the terrain is comparatively open, in general, slopes toward the ESCAUT River and is in most part visible from the heights southeast of AUDENARDE. Intensively cultivated fields, numerous farm houses and small hamlets, together with several villages of considerable size, all offered favorable positions for the enemy to place machine guns in concealment. A few civilians remained in the sectors during the action and took refuge in cellars and dugouts. As these included men, it was difficult to distinguish them from Germans.

7. The first objective passed north and south through the heights of STUIVENBERGHE, immediately west of SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN. The heights of WALEM and KLEIHOEK about 5 kilometers east of the jumping-off line formed the second objective while the final objective was the ESCAUT River. The dividing line between the brigade zones of action
followed the southern edge of SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN and thence in a generally southeastern direction to the northern outskirts of AUDENARDE.

First Day

8. The attack was launched at 5:30 o'clock on the morning of October 31. The two brigades were placed in line, the 182d Brigade on the left and the 181st Brigade on the right. A holding detachment of one battalion of the 364th Infantry and two machine gun companies of the 348th Machine Gun Battalion from the 182d Brigade was placed in position until the woods was encircled and the first objective was reached by the leading elements of the organization on its flanks. This was estimated by corps orders to be at E plus one hour forty minutes. One regiment of the 182d Brigade (363d) was disposed in column of battalions with one battalion in the front line. The remaining organizations of the brigade, together with the 346th Machine Gun Battalion and 316th Engineers (less two companies) constituted the division reserve and took position in the vicinity of SPITAALS-NIEUWENHOVE. One company of engineers was placed at the disposal of each brigade commander. Each brigade maintained combat liaison with the division on its flank by means of one company of infantry and one machine gun platoon. The 181st Brigade attacked having two battalions in the front line. All organizations were well echeloned in depth.

9. A creeping barrage covered the whole front of the division, exclusive of that part in which SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN is situated. The outskirts of SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN were screened with smoke shells to protect the flanks of the attacking units. One platoon of 75's was placed at the disposal of each front line battalion commander. After taking the first objective, one regiment of field artillery (75's) was assigned to each brigade commander. During the progress of the advance to the first objective, the brigade met with severe machine-gun fire, both from their front and from concealed positions in SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN. The brigade on the right suffered casualties from machine-gun fire from the heights west of HAANTJESHOEK, that is, from the zone of action of the French 41st Division. High explosives and scattering shells were used effectively by the enemy as the attack continued. The left (182d) Brigade advanced to within a few hundred meters of the first objective by 12:30 o'clock and gained that objective during the afternoon. The French 41st Division on the right failed to make headway, its left flank being held practically in place during the entire day. The right flank of the 181st was unable to push its attack forward without exposing itself to the enemy's enfilading fire. The left flank of the brigade, however, reached a point within a few hundred yards of the first objective during the course of the day's attack. The holding detachment, west of SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN, moved forward at the appointed time, that is, one hour and forty minutes after the attack on its flanks was launched. It met with stubborn resistance from the western edge of the woods. Machine guns were encountered in concealed and unexpected positions. The detachment was reinforced by one battalion of 364th Infantry from the division reserve and by 37-mm. guns of the 364th Infantry. By skillful handling of his troops the detachment commander progressed during the day to the eastern edge of the woods and mopped the areas. The line held by the division on the afternoon of October 31 extended from the line of the first objective on the left, through the eastern edge of SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN to a point a few hundred yards east of STEENBRUGGE. The outer flanks of the brigades were in liaison with the divisions on the right and left.

Second Day

11. On the morning of November 1, 6:30 o'clock, the attack was resumed. The disposition of the troops of the 182d Brigade remained unchanged except the detachment specially detailed to mop up SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN, which remained in position on the eastern edge of the wood until after the hour of attack. The detachment then constituted part of the division reserve. The 2d line regiment of the 181st Brigade (361st Infantry) was directed to move forward through SPITAALS-BOSSCHEN by the left flank of the leading regiment of the brigade. Thus the leading regiment formed a covering detachment to protect the right
flank of the rear regiment as it passed through the woods and debouched in the open with two battalions in the front line. The 362d Infantry then moved forward in the brigade subsector following the 361st Infantry.

12. Some artillery and machine-gun fire was encountered during the second day of the advance. However, the movement of troops in the direction of the ESCAUT River was rapid. Leading elements of the division reached the vicinity of the ESCAUT River early in the afternoon. Artillery and machine-gun fire from the eastern bank of the ESCAUT River was directed on the troops as they moved down the slopes in the direction of AUDENARDE.

13. Although the outskirts of the town of AUDENARDE were in possession of American troops the evening of November 1 and a considerable force held the western bank of the river within the 91st Division zone of action, it was decided to withdraw a greater part of the troops to a line of resistance extending along the ridge northeast of WORTEGEM and to establish a line of observation along the slopes near the ESCAUT River. Orders were therefore issued to carry this decision into effect and the movement was accomplished immediately after nightfall November 1.

14. During the night November 1/2, the front of the division was covered by patrols and reconnaissance parties sent out to ascertain the feasibility of effecting a crossing over the river. It was learned that a river formed a considerable obstacle to advancing troops, inasmuch as all the main bridges across it had been destroyed. It was impracticable immediately to push troops across the eastern bank. The 41st Division on the right and 128th Division on the left attempted to cross but failed.

Third Day

15. On the following day, November 2, careful search was made for available material for the construction of bridges and tentative sites selected for throwing them across the stream.

16. The heights southeast of AUDENARDE were strongly held by the enemy. His machine guns were placed to cover all approaches to the river from the west. Artillery fire by direct observation could be brought to bear by the enemy on the town of AUDENARDE and the sloping ground to the west thereof for a distance of approximately three kilometers. His position was a strong one. A battalion of the 361st Inf. and machine gun co. occupied AUDENARDE and searched houses for Germans. Approach at each bridge was placed under machine-gun fire.

17. Information having been received that the 37th Division had succeeded in sending a small detachment across the ESCAUT River in the vicinity of HEURNE and EYNE, permission was asked and authority was granted to send a force of one regiment of infantry and one engineer company from the 91st Division to the 37th Division sector. The detachment was instructed to cross over the river at or near the points referred to. The hour at which permission was received from the 37th Division to cross in that division sector, they arrived at the ESCAUT River when daylight was approaching. To construct bridges and cross by daylight would have deprived the enterprise of the element of surprise. The regiment withdrew a kilometer west of the river and was there held in readiness to effect a crossing the following night and the commanding officer sent to division headquarters asking for instructions. However, before this request reached division headquarters about 10:50 o'clock, orders were received to withdraw the division. The detachment returned after nightfall to the 91st Division zone of action.

18. It was contemplated that the detachment, directed to effect the crossing of the river in the vicinity of HEURNE and EYNE, should attack the heights southeast of AUDENARDE on the morning of November 3. With this idea in view the troops in AUDENARDE occupied in strength by infantry machine guns, had instructions to make a demonstration at the hour of attack by using all available means of fire. Two companies of the 348th Machine Gun Battalion were aligned along the railroad embankment north of AUDENARDE to aid in the operation. Inasmuch as the maneuver was not carried out, troops occupying AUDENARDE were
withdrawn the night November 3/4 in accordance with the plans for the relief of the division.

19. During the offensive operation, Escadrille 72 and Observation Balloon 73 were attached for duty with the division. Reports received during the progress of the attack gave definite information in reference to the position of front line units.

20. During the night November 3/4 and the morning November 4 the division was relieved by elements of the French 41st Division. The American troops withdrew to the area east of VIVE-St-ELOI.

21. The casualties sustained included the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KILLED</th>
<th>WOUNDED</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlisted Men</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggregate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

22. Forty-one prisoners were captured, including one commissioned officer.

23. Although it has been impracticable carefully to search and list the materiel captured, reports to date include the following:

- Guns, caliber 150: 1
- Guns, caliber 77: 1
- Guns, Machine: 26
- Rifles: 23
- Ammunition (small arms): 7000 rounds
- Trucks, motor: 1

24. The enemy's fighting spirit has decreased since the time this division encountered his forces in the ARGONNE, hardly a month since. No cases of extreme brutality or of atrocities committed have been officially reported to these headquarters. In general the Belgian population had been stripped of personal possessions but did not appear to be lacking in necessary food supplies. Gardens show abundant food products growing.

25. The division as a whole received uniformly courteous treatment at the hands of the French. Our troops succeeded in the mission of penetrating the enemy's line to a depth of about 12,000 meters, thereby regaining some thirty square kilometers of territory for the Allies.

* * * * *

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.
Operation for Crossing the Escaut,  
Second Phase, November 6-11, 1918

37th and 91st Divisions assigned to French XXXIV and XXX Corps, respectively.

HS Fr. File: Group of Armies of Flanders: 410-30.1: Order

**Day Fixed for Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 158/3  

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,  
November 6, 1918.

ORDER No. 18

The day of the attack on the ESCAUT is fixed for Monday, November 11.  
H hour will be announced later.  
Announcement of D day was made immediately to the army commanders so that the movements of the large units could be carried out at the proper time. It will not be communicated to the lower echelons until the latest possible moment.

In the name of the King:

General.

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Les Armees Fr.: Tome VII, 2d Vol.: Annexes: Instructions

**Exploitation toward the East**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 201/3  

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,  
November 6, 1918--1 p. m.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 5 Op.

[Extract]

1. In conformity with the directives of the General commanding the French Group of Armies of Flanders, the success of the French Army of Belgium will be exploited toward the east.
The army must gain a foothold on the right bank of the Escaut by a forced crossing and push vigorously towards the plateaus between the Escaut and the Dendre.

North of the French Army of Belgium: The Belgian army, acting in liaison with it, will force the crossing between Eecke and Gavere (excl.)

South of the French Army of Belgium: The British Second Army will attack on the front: Meersche-Herinnes, general direction of Amougies-Renaix-Grammont.

Each of the armies will operate within the zones fixed in par. IV • • •

II. The plan of operations of the French Army of Belgium is as follows: To launch an attack on the bend of the Escaut between Gavere (incl.) and Heuvel (excl.) enabling it to establish a wide bridgehead and reach the plateaus between Beirlegem and Dickele.

Also to attack in a west-east direction, between Heurne and Audenarde (incl.) so as to gain a foothold on the heights west of Sottegem by a strong effort on the right bank, consolidated with the bridgehead indicated above.

Seize the heights east of MELDEN, then push up to the Varent-Boignenberg Ridge, to assure liaison on the south between general offensive of the French Army of Belgium and that of the British Second Army.

III. The attack will be made by the French XXXIV, XXX, and VII Army Corps.

a. The XXXIV Corps will employ:
   French 5th Inf. Div.
   American 37th Inf. Div.
   Its objective will be the heights between Asselcauter (excl.) and Linden (incl.)
   Intermediate objectives:
   2. Heights between Munte (excl.)---Keerken---Gremberg. This offensive is to be made in close liaison with the right of the Belgian army (mutual agreement to be reached.)

b. The French XXX Corps will employ:
   French 132d Inf. Div.
   American 91st Inf. Div.
   Its objective will be the general line: Hundelgem---heights west of Rooborst---Bovestraat spur (south of Boucle-St-Blaise)---Hoorebeke-St-Corneille.
   Intermediate objectives:
   2. General Line: Laethem-St-Marie---Boucle-St-Denis---Rekegem---Hauwaert.

c. The French VII Army Corps will employ:
   French 164th Inf. Div.
   Its objectives will be the heights of Varent---Boignenberg---Hasselhoek.
   Intermediate objectives:
   1. Ommeloogen-Boom and the Kloppenberg [Coppenberg?]?
   2. Eikenberg Plateau and Etichove Ridge.
   It is important that the VII Corps assure, by a strong special detachment, its liaison with the British army.

IV. The boundaries of action between the Allied Armies on one hand and the army corps of the French Army of Belgium on the other are fixed as follows:

Between the French Army of Belgium and the Belgian army: Bachte---Astene---Nazareth---Vier-Eekens---Vurske-ten-Eede---Makeghem---Munte (these localities to the Belgian army), then former boundary.

Between the French Army of Belgium and the British army: Junction of the Casterbeek with the Escaut---Rotelemburg---Etichove (to the French Army of Belgium)---Schoorsis---Nederbrakel---Hemelverdegem (to the British).

Between the XXXIV Corps and the XXX Corps:
Former boundary, then St-Hubert---De Marolle---Hoog-Rechem---Huysse---Mullem---Heurne Station---Neerwelden---Nederzwalm-Hermelgem---Zwartenbroek---Linden---Elene Station---
Uilenhoek—Eesvelde these localities to the XXXIV Corps.

Between the XXX Corps and the VII Corps:

Former boundary, then Duffelstraat—Nokere—Waalem—Den Doorn—Mooregem—
Huttegem [Huddegem]—Leupegem—Cerisier Chapel—Hauwaert—Hoorebeke-St-Corneille—
Heuvelgem—Roosebeke—Erwetegem—Kruisweg—Driesch, these localities to the XXX Corps.

V. The following divisions will be held in the rear of the attack divisions.

1. At the disposal of the general commanding the army:
   French 70th Inf. Div. in the Vynckt—Deynze—Petegem area.
2. At the disposal of the King:
   French 77th Inf. Div. in their present billeting zones
   French 128th Inf. Div.

VI. The divisions now in line French 11th, 12th, 41st will be moved after relief by
the troops designated for the attack as follows:

11th Div. to the present zone of the American 37th Div.
12th Div. to the present zone of the 132d Div.
41st Div. to the present zone of the American 91st Div.

X. As prescribed in Instructions No. 3 Op. of November 3, it is advisable to prepare
all details of this operation and, particularly, to proceed with reconnaissances which will
make it possible to determine exactly the crossing points on which the effort will be
applied.

The attack will take place within a short time, at a date which cannot be specified
but which apparently, will be fixed for the beginning of the coming week (11/10-11/17).

It is therefore important that no time be lost, either in bringing up crossing
[bridging] material and munitions or in organizing the liaisons and the command.

XI. Finally, the general commanding the army emphasizes again the great importance he
attaches to the creation within each corps zone of bridgeheads destined to eliminate, at
the start, to a large extent, the difficulties [incident] to the crossing the Escaut, and
which will subsequently provide an advantageous line of departure for the army's offensive.

All efforts will be directed to this end [during the period] while preparations for an
under-way attack on the plateaus east of the Escaut are being made.

de BOISSOUDY,
General Commanding the Army.

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HS Fr. Files: VII Corps 432-30.1: Orders

Use of 91st Division in Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 512

MAP 1:40,000

[Extract]

The mission of the VII Corps is to storm the heights east of MELDEN, then to push up
to the VARENT spur and to BOIGNENBERG, so as to establish liaison between the general of­
fensive of the French Army of Belgium and that of the British Second Army.
## DISTRIBUTION OF ARTILLERY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>FIELD ARTILLERY</th>
<th>HEAVY FIELD ARTILLERY</th>
<th>HEAVY LONG ARTILLERY</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arty., French 70th Div. 3 bns.</td>
<td>Arty., French 70th Div. 1 bn.</td>
<td>Belgian Heavy Long Arty. 2 bns.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arty., French 77th Div. 3 bns.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arty., French 6th Cav. Div. 1 bn.</td>
<td>French 305th Heavy Arty. 3 bns.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French 264th F. A. 2 bns.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>French</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Heavy Arty.</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>French 414th Heavy Arty. 3 bns.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. Zone of action and objectives of this corps:
   a. Boundaries of the zone of action:
      North: (between the XXX Corps and the VII Corps): Old boundary, then
      DUFFELSTRAAT---NOKERE---WALEM---Den DOORN---MOOREGEM---HUDDEGEM---
      LEUPEGEM---Chapelle du Cerisier---HAUWAERT---HOOREBEKE-St-CORNEILLE---HEUVELGEM---
      ROOSEBEKE---ERWETEGEM---KRUISWEG---DRIESECH (these localities to the XXX Corps).
      A subsequent order will determine the conditions under which this new limit in rear
      of the present front will become effective.
      South: (between the VII Corps and the British XIX Corps): Junction of the
      CASTERBEEK and the ESCAUT---ROTELENBERG---ETICHOVE (these localities to the VII Corps):
      SCHOORISSE---NEDERBRAKEL---HEMELVERDEGEM (these localities to the British).
   b. Objectives:
      The heights of VARENT, BOIGNENBERG and HASSELHOEK.
      Intermediate Objectives:
      1. OMMEOOZEN-BOOM and [the] COPPENBERG
      2. EIKENBERG Plateau and ETICHOVE Ridge.

IX. Employment of the units now attached to this corps and not mentioned above: (for
   a date which will be set later).
   a. The 41st Div. now in line, will be moved after the crossing of the ESCAUT
      by the 164th Div. to the present zone of the American 91st Div.
   b. The 128th Div. (less its divisional artillery which is placed at the disposal
      of the 164th Div.) will be at the disposal of the King, in its present quartering zone.
      It will furnish one battalion for the use of smoke-generating equipment (at the disposal
      of the army).
   c. The American 91st Div. will be placed at the disposal of the General com-
      manding the XXX Corps.
   d. The battalion of the 305th Heavy Artillery, now attached to the artillery of
      the VII Army Corps, will go to the XXXIV Corps.

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

GHQ, AEF: 91st Div.: Roster

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT
STATISTICAL DIVISION

[Extract]
Division: 91st  Station: A. E. F., A. P. O. 776  Date: November 6, 1918.
A. D. C.: Herbert A. Robertson, 1st Lt., F. A.
A. D. C.: Joseph W. Rubush, 1st Lt. Inf.
Chief of Staff: Henry C. Jewett, Col., Eng.

- 420 -
GENERAL ORDERS No. 116

[Extract]

1. The French Army of Belgium will execute very soon an ensemble operation in view of getting a foothold on the right bank of the ESCAUT, by forcing a passage and pushing energetically on the plateaus between ESCAUT and DENDRE.

The XXXIV C. A. composed of French 5th D. I. and the American 37th Division has for a mission, to attack in the bend of the ESCAUT between GAVERE (inclusive) and HEUVEL (exclusive), in a manner to create a large bridgehead and to attain the plateaus between BAEGYM and DICKELE.

On its right, the XXX C. A. prolongs the line of attack in the general direction of SOTTEGEM. On its left, the right of the Belgian army, acting in close liaison with the XXXIV C. A. should force the passage between EECKE and GAVERE (exclusive) and march on MOORTIZEELE.
The day and hour of the attack will be fixed later.

3. The successive objectives to be attained by the 5th D. I., and the American 37th Div. are defined as follows: 1st Objective: ROYGEM BLEEKER---DICKELVENNE---MEYLEGEM---NEDERZWALM-HERMELGEM. 2d Objective: Plateau south of MOTTE---EEDTWYK---KEERKEN ---heights north of GEMBROG. 3d Objective: RATTEPAS (exclusive),---LET-HET-HEET---LANGEMUNTEN---LETENDRIES---HOOGWORMEN.

After the capture of the 3d Objective, the advantage will be followed up in the direction of ZONNENEG (5th D. I.) and BURST (37th Div.) in a way to take foothold on the plateaus which dominate the west bank of the DENDRE.

4. The attack will consist of two phases:
   a. Crossing the ESCAUT and placing of the troops opposite their objective. * * *
   b. The attack proper: The launching of it at H hour plus 1:30 h.

5. The first phase of the attack will be preceded by an artillery preparation in order to destroy or neutralize the enemy artillery and to silence enemy machine guns capable of acting on the ESCAUT. The duration of this part of the preparation will be fixed later.

   This preliminary operation is meant for the 5th D. I., the taking of GAVERE and the woods to the south; for the 37th Div., the taking of the western part of HERMELGEM and NEERWELDEN, and the placing of the troops so as to face their first objective. They will start from there at H plus 1:30 h.

6. The attack proper should aim at the conquest of the heights north of BOUCHAUTE, of which the possession will permit the taking from the rear DICKELVENNE and the covered region south of the BAEGEM, on the one hand; BEIRLEGEM and DICKLE on the other hand.

   The principal direction of the action of the XXXIV C. A. is this marked by LANGENLOCHUNG, the crossroads of the route BEIRLEGEM to MUNTE and to SCHELDEWINDEKE, LANGEMUNTEN, BAELEGEM.

   The principal mission of taking the plateau LANGENLOCHUNG-LANGEMUNTEN is entrusted to the American 37th Div. which will thus have the duty of making its principal effort on the left, straight on LANGEMUNTEN, at the same time pushing its right in close liaison with the left of the XXX C. A., by LAETHEM-Ste-MARIE and ZWARTENBROEK towards LINDEN, to produce the outflanking from the north and from the south of the region BEIRLEGEM-DICKLE.

   The 5th D. I. will maneuver by its left, until the conquest of the first objective, in a way to outflank DICKELVENNE by the north; from the first objective it will push its center forward in a way to cooperate with the 37th Div. for the encircling of the region ELLEVE---KASTEEL---BLAUW-KASTEEL, and will march straight on TURKENHOEK.

7. Liaison between the Units:
   a. Between the 5th D. I. and the 37th Div.: assured by a mixed detachment of one-half (1/2) company and one (1) section of machine guns under the orders of an officer of the 5th D. I. [corrected by No. 3998/3, Nov. 8]
   b. Between the 5th D. I. and the right of the Belgian army: assured by a mixed detachment of the same composition under the orders of an officer of the right Belgian D. I.
   c. Between the 37th Div. and the left of the XXX C. A.: assured by a mixed detachment of the same composition under the orders of an officer of the 132d D. I.

8. Execution of the attack to begin at the time H plus 1:30 h.

   The attack will be protected by a moving barrage starting at H plus 1:25 h., of intensity and as strong as possible, but variable according to the importance of the
objectives to be attained successively. This barrage will start moving at the time H plus 1:30 h.
Infantry will start at H plus 1:27 h. in order to follow as close as possible the moving barrage. • • •

• • • • •

9. A. L. XXXIV will continue during the whole operation its mission of destruction and neutralization of the enemy batteries.

• • • • •

10. Means at the disposal of the D. I. and the C. A.
   a. Artillery:
      5th D. I. (under command of Colonel commanding A. D. 5)
      A. D./5---A. D./77---A. D. C./6 (1 group of 75's)---A. L. C./70---1 group of
      the 305 R. A. L. (A. L. C.). In all, 7 groups of 75's, 4 groups of short guns.
      37th Div. (under command of Colonel commanding A. D. 11)
      A. D./11---A. C. D./70---2 groups of the 264th R. A. C.---2 groups of the 305
      R. A. L. (A. L. C.). In all, 8 groups of 75's, 3 groups of short guns.
      A. L./34---its 2 organic groups---1 group of A. L. of the 2d C. C.---2 groups of
      Belgian A. L.
   b. Tanks:
      2 battalions of Renault tanks are at the disposal of the C. A.; will be assigned
      in useful time.
   c. Aeronautics:
      1 plane will work for the 5th D. I. and the 37th Div. (with call letters from
      the 5th D. I.)
      1 plane will work for A. L./XXXIV
      1 plane will perform the mission of the command.
      1 balloon will work for the 5th D. I. and the 37th Div.
      1 balloon will work for A. L./XXXIV

11. Disposition of the infantry, its placing in position of the infantry and
    artillery, assignment of the roads to the D. I., rules for the road traffic, will be the
    subject of a later order.

12. P. C. will be selected by the commanding generals, in the region of PAPELENKASTEEL
    Farm for the 5th D. I., and in the region of the Chateau of HUYSE for the 37th D. I. U. S.
    P. C. of the C. A. is maintained at WONTERGEM.

13. A special order will specify details of the operation.

NUDANT,
Commanding the
XXXIV C. A.

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Preparations for Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 3990/3

FRENCH XXXIV ARMY CORPS,
November 7, 1918—7 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER OF OPERATION No. 470

[Extract]

1. The French 5th D.I., and the American 37th Div. and artilleries put at their disposal as well as to the disposal of the colonel commanding the artillery/XXXIV by General Order of Operation No. 116, will enter their sector beginning at 0 hours on November 8.
   a. The infantry will be in place on the night of the 9th to the 10th. Reconnaissance to begin the 9th in the morning.
   b. The artillery will be in place on the nights of the 8th to the 9th and of the 9th to the 10th. Reconnaissance to be made on the 8th and 9th in the morning.
   [Corrected by No. 3994/3, Nov. 8]
   2. The 5th D.I., on November 8 will go in the zone AERSEELE (inclusive, and which will have to be evacuated by the 77th D.I., November 8 before noon)---VYNCKT (exclusive)---NEVELE (south part)---VOSSELARE---BACHTE-MARIA-LEERNE (all points being inclusive)---DEYNZE (exclusive)---KLEPKAUTER---to t'HOUGE Road (inclusive). Hq. at ZEVEREN.

   3. Two regiments of the 37th Div. will go on November 8 in the zone DEYNZE-ASTENE. Hq. and other elements of this D.I. remaining in the zone THIELT will move on the 10th to reach their new emplacements in the sector taken by the 37th Div.

   4. The reinforcing artilleries on November 8 will be established in cantonment bivouac ** south of the Road COURTRAI---PETEGEM---GHENT.

   5. The coming into sector of the 5th D.I. will be regulated by Commanding General of the 11th D.I. (P. C. Moulin des FLANDERS, eastern outlet of PETEGEM, on the road of ASTENE.

   The coming into sector of the 37th Div. which is to establish itself astraddle on the limit of the 11th and 12th Divs. will be regulated by the Generals in command of the 11th D.I. and of the 12th D.I., each one for what concerns the zone given up by its div. to the 37th Div. (P. C. of the General commanding the 12th D.I.: CRUYSHAUTEM).

   The putting in place of the divisional and C.A. artillery will be respectively regulated by the Colonels commanding the A.D./5, the A.D./11 and the XXXIV C.A. artillery.

   6. The 11th D.I. will regroup itself, from November 9, in the zone vacated by the 37th Div.
The retiring of its left will be regulated by understanding between the general in command of the southern Belgian D. I (P. C. northeast of DEURLE at point 13.64) and the General in command of the 11th D. I.

The 11th D. I. will be mustered on November 11 in the zone: PITTHEM---THIILT---MEULEBEKE---Headquarters at THIILT.

7. The P. C.'s of the 5th D. I. and 37th Div. will function on morning of the 10th at the points fixed by the General Operation Order No. 116.

NUDANT,
General,
Commanding the XXXIV C. A.

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HS Fr. Files: XXX A. C.: 446-30.1: Order

Disposition of Units.

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXX ARMY CORPS,
November 7, 1918.

FIELD ORDERS No. 53

[Extract]

I. The mission of the French Army of Belgium is to seize a foothold on the right bank of the ESCAUT by forcing a crossing and to drive vigorously on the plateaus between the ESCAUT and the DENDRE.

This operation will take place on a D day and at an H hour to be announced later.

II. The French XXX Army Corps will have at its disposal the American 91st Div. and the French 132d Inf. Div., with the French XXXIV Army Corps on its left and the French VII Army Corps on its right.

Objectives:
1. The line RAASBOSCH---VOGELZANG---BROEKE---VOLKEGEM.
2. The general line LAETHEM---Ste-MARIE---BOUCLE---St-DENIS---ROKEGEM---HAUWAERT.
3. HUNDELGEM---Heights west of ROOBORST---BOVESTRAAT Spur (south of BOUCLE-St-BLAISE) and HOORBEKE-St-CORNEILLE. ** *

IV. Scheme of Maneuver: The main effort of the corps will be made by the 91st Div. and by the right of the 132d Div. The 132d Div. will attack with 2 regiments placed side by side in first line, and 1 regiment in 2d line.

The 91st Div. will attack with brigades placed side by side (north brigade, 2 regiments; south brigade, 1 regiment).

Line of departure: AUDENARDE (exclusive)-EYNE (exclusive).

V. Movement of Divisions into Position: The 91st Div. and the 132d Inf. Div. will take position in their zones of attack (now occupied by the French 12th and 41st Inf. 

- 425 -
Divs.) at a date which will be determined later but which may be considered as very near.

The generals commanding the divisions will immediately get in touch on that subject with the Generals commanding the 12th Inf. Div. (C. P.: CRUYSHAUTEM-Chateau) and the 41st Inf. Div. (C. P.: STUIVENBERGHE Chateau).

The 12th Div. will occupy the present quartering zone of the 132 Div. after relief by the 2 attack divisions.

The General commanding the 12th Div. will keep in close liaison with the General commanding the 91st Div. during the attack, so as to be ready to enter the action, at the first order, to exploit the success of that unit.

VI. Artillery

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**DISTRIBUTION**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>UNITS</th>
<th>FIELD ARTILLERY</th>
<th>HEAVY HOWITZERS</th>
<th>HEAVY GUNS</th>
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<tr>
<td>91st Div.</td>
<td>Artillery, [French], 2d Cav. Div.: 1 bn.</td>
<td>Belgian heavy shorts 1 bn. (220 mm. mortars)</td>
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<td>Army Corps</td>
<td>Artillery, [French], 4th Cav. Div.: 1 bn.</td>
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H. PENET,
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.
Relief by Divisions and Preparatory Movements

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 234/3  
FRENCH XXX ARMY CORPS,  
November 7, 1918--5 p. m.

FIELD ORDERS No. 54

[Extract]

I. The infantry divisions and the regiments or battalion of artillery which are to take part in the operations contemplated in Field Order No. 53, November 7, 1918, are placed at the disposal of the corps as of midnight November 7/8.

* * * * *

[Signature illegible]
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.

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Allocation of Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,  
November 7, 1918--11 a. m.

(Supplementing General Orders No. 512)

The American 91st Div. is placed at the disposal of the French XXX Army Corps, effective at midnight, November 7/8.

The battalion of the French 305th Heavy Artillery Regiment, now attached to the artillery of the VII Army Corps, is placed at the disposal of the French XXXIV Army Corps the same date and hour.

The French 164th Inf. Div. is placed at the disposal of the VII A. C. the same date and hour. A subsequent order will regulate the relief of the French 41st [Infantry] Division by the 164th Division and the XXX Corps. The relief will take place the nights of November 9/10 and 10/11.

MASSENET,  
General,  
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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- 427 -
[Extract]

1. This command will be in readiness to move tomorrow afternoon November 8, 1918.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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291-32.1: Order

Movement of Division

FIELD ORDERS No. 26

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 7, 1918---23:45 o'clock

MAPS:  COURTRAI  )
       THIELT  )

[Extract]

1. The 91st Division will be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, French
   XXX Army Corps, November 8, 1918.

2. Preparatory movement of organizations of the division to relieve French units will be
effected November 8 and 9, 1918.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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Order

No. 226/3

GENERAL
ORDERS No. 26 Op.

[Extract]

I. The forced crossing of the Escaut and the attack directed by Instructions No. 3 Op. of November 3, 1918, will take place on D day and at F. G. H hours, which will be fixed later.

II. The crossing will be accomplished as follows:
   a. At F hour: in each attack division, crossing of the river under cover of night by advance guards, with the mission, first, of assisting in crossing operations of the larger units; second, of assuring on the right bank, at a suitable distance [therefrom] protection for the regrouping of forces for the assumption of their attack dispositions.

   Those advance guards will utilize principally footbridges prepared in advance along the bank of departure and concealed from enemy observation.

   b. At G hour (G=F plus 2 hours): crossing by the larger units which as soon as they reach the right bank, are to be regrouped and placed in readiness to attack.

   *   *   *   *

   The objectives of this attack as well as the attack boundaries between the French Army of Belgium and the Allied Armies, and between the corps of the French Army of Belgium remain as defined by the precited instructions (pars. 3 and 4).

   A halt of two hours will be made on the line of the first objective, [this halt] will be used to bring up the artillery which is now too distant to accompany the attack to, at the very least, the second objective.

   The attack will be resumed at H plus 3 1/2 hours.

   The artillery fire will be concentrated initially:
   1. On the zone of enemy batteries;
   2. On the portions of terrain deemed most favorable for organization [by the enemy] of a defense of the right bank of the Escaut, by means of machine guns.

   The rolling barrage will cover the infantry attack until capture of the first objective.

   For the attack on the second objective, this will be preceded by fire concentration on the principal centers of resistance which have been uncovered without [however,] seeking to attain uniform protection on the entire front.

   V. The French XXXIV Army Corps will coordinate its action with that of the right of the Belgian Army (Jacques Groupment), which will attack in the bend of the Escaut, toward Semmersaeke and Vurste.

   The French VII Army Corps will, by means of a detachment, assure its liaison with the left of the British army (British XIX A. C.), which will attack in the direction of Sulsique and then continue to advance in a general west-east direction.

   VI. Two battalions of tanks (7th and 8th of the French 503d [Tank] Regt[?].) will take part in the attack, with the XXXIV Corps, as soon as bridges strong enough to permit them to cross [that river] have been constructed over the Escaut.
VII. The air services of the corps [concerned] will be responsible up to 8 kilometers of the front ***.

As soon as the enemy begins to retreat, machine-gunning of [hostile] troops will, in so far as the air forces are concerned, have priority over all other missions.

VIII. Army C.P.: Roulers
VII A. C.: Wacken
XXX A. C.: Cruyshautem
XXXIV A. C.: Wontergem

de BOISSOUDY,
General,
Commanding the Army.

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HS Fr. Files: XXXIV A. C.: 450-30.6: Journal of Operations

*Announcement of D day*

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXIV ARMY CORPS,

November 8, 1918.

[Extract]

The attack of Vuillemot's Division [11th Div.] is launched at 5:30 a.m. To the south, the 2d and 4th Bns. of Foot Chasseurs fail in their attempt; the first, on account of the overflow of the ESCAUT, that renders the approach to the river impossible; the second is stopped by barbed wire and machine-gun fire.

To the north, the 69th Div. succeeds in putting two companies across at GROOTENBROEK. The enemy vigorously resists our advance. In spite of his defense, a third company crosses during the day.

D day for the attack of the Group of Armies of Belgium is set for November 11.

Preliminary movements are carried out; 2 American regiments move into the DEYNZEASTENE region.

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HS Fr. Files: 446-30.1: Order

*Occupation of Command Posts*

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 250/3

FRENCH XXX ARMY CORPS,

November 8, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 56

The Generals commanding the French 132d Inf. Div. and the American 91st Div. will occupy the command posts designated by Field Orders No. 53, dated November 7, by 6 p.m.
November 10, at the latest:

132d Inf. Div. Lede
91st Div. Nokere-Chateau (instead of Oycque)

They will take command of their respective zones of attack at 8 p.m. the same day.

Until that time, command of the front of the French XXX A. C., including the one to be occupied during the night of 9/10 by the French 41st Inf. Div., will be exercised by the Commanding General of the French 12th Inf. Div.

The Commanding General of the 91st Div. is authorized at his own request, to occupy the above mentioned command post on November 9, provided telephone communication with the corps has been thoroughly established and checked.

PENET,
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.

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HS Fr. File: XXX A. C.: 446-30.1: Order

Infantry Action in Crossing Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. No. 248/3
FRENCH XXX ARMY CORPS, November 8, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 58

[Extract]

(Concerning the infantry action in the proposed operation)

I. Because of terrain difficulties, the ESCAUT will be crossed at a rather limited number of points. To avoid concentration of enemy fire on these points, the generals commanding the divisions will, at the hour set for the crossing, order numerous diversions (fire action, throwing bulky objects into the river, etc.) along the entire length of the river.

II. The halt to be made by the advance guards after crossing of the ESCAUT (paragraph IV of Field Orders No. 55, November 7, 1918) no longer permits setting H plus 1 hour as the time when, after envelopment from the north an attack is to be made from the Fort KEZEL Height.

It is therefore to be understood that said attack is to take place half-an-hour after the time set for the beginning of the combined operation, starting from the line on which the advance guards shall have made the halt prescribed above.

This line will be, approximately, that marked by the highway from AUDENARDE to RYDSTRAAT and, thence, by the RYDGRACHT [a stream].

III. To avoid any massing on the right bank of the ESCAUT, the river will not be crossed previous to the time set for the beginning of the general attack by other than the front line battalions, that is, a maximum of 3 battalions for the French 132d Inf. Div. and 5 battalions for the American 91st Div. (not including units intended to temporarily mask the height of Fort KEZEL on the north).
The generals commanding the division will mount their attacks in such manner as to always retain one or two battalions at their disposal, which will advance in flexible formation about 1 km. in rear of the line of the brigade or divisional infantry reserves. (For the 91st Div. this reserve will be taken initially from the 3 regiments charged with the attack on the left).

All reserves must be well echeloned in depth; moreover, they must not allow themselves to be drawn prematurely toward the front, nor to join units engaged, without an order from responsible authority.

* * * * *

H. PENET,
General,
Commanding the XXX Army Corps.

237-32.1: Order

Movement of Units of 37th Division

Doc. No. 663
FIELD ORDERS No. 44

MAP: THIELT 1/40,000

[Extract]

1. a. In compliance with Special Operations Order No. 470, November 7, 1918, XXXIV Corps, the 146th Infantry with 2 cos. of the 135th Machine Gun Bn., and the 147th Infantry with 2 cos. of the 136th M. G. Bn., will move on the night of November 8, 1918 * * *

* * * * *

d. The 145th Infantry and the 148th Infantry, including the remaining companies of the 135th Machine Gun Bn., and the 136th Machine Gun Bn., respectively, together with the 134th Machine Gun Bn., will move to the new area, November 9, 1918.

* * * * *

8. P. C. 37th Division - Chateau de HUYSE, at 9 a. m. November 9, 1918.
   P. C. 73d Brigade - HOOG-BOEREGEM, at 9 a. m., November 9, 1918.
   P. C. 74th Brigade - BEERTEGEM, at 9 a. m., November 9, 1918.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff.
Chief of Staff.

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NOKERE-WAEREGHEM AREA
Looking west from Nokere-Château
Amendment to Field Order 26

FIELD ORDERS No. 27

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 8, 1918—21 o'clock.

1. Paragraph 5, Field Orders No. 26, Hq., 91st Division, November 7, 1918, is amended to read as follows:

5. Division P. C. will close at OOSTROOSEBEKE at 12 o'clock, November 10, 1918 and will open at Chateau (de) NOKERE (south) same date and hour.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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Occupation of Towns beyond the Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,
November 9, 1918.

The Belgian troops are along the canal from GHENT to TERNEUZEN, from the Dutch frontier up to the GHENT Station.

The troops of the French Army of Belgium, advancing to the far side of the ESCAUT, were able, in spite of sharp resistance, to occupy the localities of WELDEN, EDELAERE, MELDEN, and the north portion of MEERSCH, the south part of which was taken by the British troops.

East of MELDEN, the heights of the COPPENBERG were captured.

[no signature]

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Dispositions Preparatory to Pursuit of Enemy

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,
November 9, 1918—10 p. m.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 6

[Extract]

1. Because of increasing indications of enemy withdrawal, it is advisable to assume the following dispositions for pursuit. • • •
II. The French XXXIV A. C. will have available the French 5th Inf. Div. and the American 37th Division.
   The French XXX A. C. will have available the French 132d Inf. Div. and the American 91st Division.
   The French VII A. C. will have available the French 164th Inf. Div.

III. The boundaries for the pursuit zones of action will be:
   a. No change for the Allied armies.
   b. Between the XXXIV and XXX Corps: Nederzwalm-Hermelgem---Hundelgem---Elene---St-Roch---Langemunte---Haelttert---Welle (all these localities to the XXXIV A. C.).
   c. Between the XXX and VII Corps: Ommeloozen-Boom---Varent---Elst---Audenhove-Ste-Marie---Asschestraet---Heghe---Ninove (all these localities to the VII A. C.).
   The crossroads south of Leupegem will be at the disposal of the VII A. C.

IV. Artillery
   For the divisional artillery, the corps will normally have only the artillery of the divisions placed at their disposal for the pursuit.
   However, the XXXIV A. C. will employ the divisional artillery of the French 11th Division for the American 37th Division.
   Of the heavy long guns of the corps artillery, only the battalion of 105mm.'s will be available.
   Special measures will be taken by the generals commanding the corps to assure, during the entire duration of the pursuit, by every means in their power and with all equipment at their disposal, for the supply of [ammunition to] guns on the far side of the Escaut.

V. Tanks
   The 7th and 8th Battalions of the French 503d Tank Regiment will remain at the disposal of the XXXIV A. C.

VI. Because of the advance already begun on the right bank, the generals commanding the corps will regulate the entry into the line of large French or American units which have been placed at their disposal for the pursuit, without being compelled to send back immediately to the second line those divisions which are now engaged (French 41st, 12th, 11th).
   They will not, however, lose sight of the fact that the divisions are to be regrouped and placed at the disposal of the general commanding the army in the near future.

VII. Air Service
   The primary mission of the air forces will be to cooperate in the pursuit by machine gunning and bombing enemy columns in retreat. The bridges of the Dendre, and the roads leading thereto, will be kept under constant observation in order to attack enemy formations which might appear thereon.

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de BOISSOUDY,
General,
Commanding the Army.
Relief of French Units

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 4005/3

SPECIAL ORDER No. 472

1. In order to let the 11th D. I. free November 10, the units of this D. I. which must be relieved in the night from November 10/11 by the 37th Div. will be relieved by the 5th D. I. in the night from the 9th to the 10th. The 5th D. I. will keep all the sector of the 11th D. I. till the 10th at night.

2. The units established on the south of the limit fixed between the 5th D. I. and the 37th Div. by the Operations Order No. 116, will be relieved by the 37th Div. in the night from November 10/11.

NUDANT,
The General of the Division,
Commanding the XXXIV A. C.

Continuation of Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 280/3

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 63

[Extract]

I. The enemy, disorganized through our repeated attacks is giving way on the whole front. Marshal Foch prescribes to precipitate actions in making a call upon the energy and initiative of all to render decisive the results obtained.

II. In consequence, the pursuit will be proceeded with without respite and with the utmost vigor on all the front of the XXX C. A. tonight and tomorrow, following the axis: EENAME, SCHOOTLAND, SOTTEGEM.

It will be led by the 12th D. I. and the value of one brigade of the American 91st Div.

III. The 12th Div. will continue to act under present conditions until the 91st Div. is in line.

The 91st Div. will, from tonight, push one brigade, its head at the ESCAUT, so as to act, from 7 a. m. November 10, in the area described below. This brigade will cross the
river at 7 o'clock. It will relieve, by passing through and beyond, units of the 12th D. I. and the 41st D. I. which will be at that time in its zone.

The General commanding the 91st Div. will have an agreement with the General commanding the 12th D. I. and the General commanding the 41st D. I. concerning the passing beyond of their troops to be executed and on which line.

The other brigade will be stationed on the spot until further orders, taking care to leave the roads and ways entirely cleared.

The 132d D. I. will stop until further orders in its zone: point (head) at WANNEGEM-LEDE, at its elements east of the LYS.

*****

IX. Starting P.C.
P. C. C. A.: DENTERGHEM, then Chateau of CRUYSHAUTEM
P. C. 12th D. I. Chateau of CRUYSHAUTEM, then EYNE.
P. C. 91st D. I. Chateau of NOKERE (from 10 a. m. November 10, then AUDENARDE).
P. C. 132d D. I. Chateau of LEDE.

No change of div. P. C. will be made without authorization of the general commanding the C. A.

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H. PENET,
General,
Commanding.

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237-32.1: Order

Order of Battle

G-3 No. 662
FIELD ORDERS No. 43

MAPS: THIELT ) 1/40,000
       GAND )

[Extract]

1. a. Information concerning the enemy will be compiled and published, as annexes to this order, by G-2 to all concerned, item by item, as soon as received.
   b. The XXXIV Corps (French) to which this division is assigned, attack on J day at H hour, which will be announced later.

   Order of Battle: From right to left: American 37th Infantry Division French 5th Infantry Division.
   The Belgian Army attacks on the left of the French XXXIV Corps and the XXX A. C. on the right. The 37th Division will be in liaison on its right with the French 132d Division, and on its left with the French 5th Division.

2. The XXXIV Corps will attack across the bend of the ESCAUT between GAVERE, (inclusive) and HEUVEL (inclusive). The direction of the attack of the XXXIV Corps is marked by the line LANGENLOCHUNG, the crossroads of the route BEIRLEGEM to MUNTE and to SCHELDEWINDEKE, LANGEMUNTEN, BAELEGEM.
3. a. Zone of Action of Division

Northern Boundary: From the ESCAUT River; VREKHEM (exclusive)---crossroads BEIRLEGEM-MUNTE (inclusive)---LANGEMUNDEN (inclusive)---BAELEGEM (inclusive).

Southern Boundary: HEUVEL (exclusive)---NEDERZWALM---HERMELGEM (inclusive)---BROEK (inclusive)---STEENBEKE (exclusive)---UILENHOEK (inclusive).

b. Zone of Action of Brigades

74th Brigade: Northern Boundary: Northern boundary of the division.

Southern Boundary: HERMELGEM (inclusive)---BEEKMEERSCH (exclusive)---KLEINENBERG (inclusive)---Lake southwest of BURLEHEN (BEIRLEGEM?) (inclusive)---MUNKBOSCHBEEK Rivulet (inclusive)---HAUTE (inclusive)---ROYGEMDRIES (inclusive)---HEIDE (inclusive)---HAUTEM-ST-LIEVIN (inclusive)---MOORLEGEM (inclusive).

73d Brigade:

Between the Zone of Action of the 74th Brigade on the north and the southern boundary of the division on the south.

The division reserve will take station in region WATERHOEK on J day at H minus one hour.

The corps reserve will take station on J day at H hour minus two hours in region POPLEN-KASTEEL [PAPELENKASTEEL] Farm.

The aeronautical units assigned to the division will work in conjunction with the artillery, under orders to be given directly by the division commander.

5. P. C. 37th Division at Chateau [at] HUYSE at 9 h. November 9, 1918.

P. C. 74th Brigade at BEERTEGEM at the same hour.

P. C. 73d Brigade at HOOG-BOEREGEM, at the same hour.

C. S. FARNSWORTH,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 8[9?], 1918.

ANNEX to F. O. 43 Headquarters 37th Division (par. 1-a)

INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY

[Extract]

The enemy defensive position opposite this division sector is not divided into zones as is the usual German custom, but follows the general plan of placing machine guns in the

- 438 -
advance zone with the greater portion of the infantry well behind, being used only when
the enemy counterattacks, although some infantry will undoubtedly be encountered in
organized shell holes.

These machine guns are not in regularly built emplacements, but are placed in houses,
behind hedges and haystacks and behind the reverse slopes of small hills ready to be
brought into action. **

The ESCAUT is from 24 to 26 meters wide in front of division sector.
The organized positions consist mostly of shell holes. ** Very little barbed wire
has been discovered, and where the enemy has made use of wire it is usually in single
strands.

The 21st Infantry Division is opposite the front of this division, although our left
brigade may encounter elements of the 2d Guard Division and our right brigade elements of
the 207th Division.
The 21st Division is composed of the 87th Regiment, 81st Regiment, and 80th Regiment.

**

The 119th D. I. composed of the 46th Infantry Regiment, 46th Reserve Infantry Regi-
ment and 58th Regiment, Infantry, is probably in reserve opposite this corps sector. This
division which came from battle front St-QUENTIN---CAMBRAI on Oct. 21, where it lost
3,000 prisoners, is greatly reduced in strength and at present contains only three
battalions.

On November 8, 1918, enemy batteries were signalled in action opposite the front of
the corps. ** These guns are not placed in regular emplacements but are roving guns,
taking up position for a day or two and then moving. They are mostly 77's though some
105's and 150's have been signalled in action.

The enemy has no prepared zone of withdrawal. The closest natural defensive position
is on the DENDRE River which is 26 kilometers east of that part of River ESCAUT which runs
across our division front.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

B. E. ROBINSON,
Captain, Infantry, U. S. A.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

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37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 8[9?], 1918.

ANNEX to F. O. No. 43 (par. 1 C)

INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY

[Extract]

From information gained from questioning a prisoner of the 100th Grenadier Regiment
(23d Division) it appears that at least one regiment of the 2d Guard Division has been
relieved and our left brigade may encounter elements of this new division.
The prisoner was captured on the eastern bank of the ESCAUT River, southwest of the
EECKE-SEMMERSAEKE Road. The prisoner last saw the other two regiments of his division
(1st Saxon and 2d Saxon) at LICHTERVELDE on Oct. 18, when the division was relieved at
that point. He does not know whether these two regiments are actually in line with the
100th Grenadier Regiment or not.

The 100th Grenadier Regiment went into line near SEMMERSAEKE on the night of
November 5 relieving the Regiment August (4th Grenadier Guard Regiment, 2d Guard Division).

* * * * *

Composition of the battalions: Each battalion of the 100th Grenadier Regiment is
composed of 3 companies and a machine gun company, the number of rifles per infantry
company being approximately 80.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

B. E. ROBINSON,
Captain, Infantry, U. S. A.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

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37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 9, 1918.

ANNEX to F. O. No. 43 (par. 1c)

INFORMATION OF THE ENEMY

[Extract]

From information gained from prisoners captured in the region of EECKE it appears
that the whole of the 2d Guard Division was relieved by the 23d Division on the night of
November 5/6.

* * * * *

The fighting strength of the 23d Division was very much reduced when it last retired
from the line, a single infantry company of 100 rifles per battalion with one section of
machine guns in the 100th and 108th Regiments, and 3 companies of 40 rifles each per
battalion in the 101st Regiment.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

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Modification of Field Order 43

G-3 668
FIELD ORDERS No. 45

[Extract]

1. a. F. O. 43, c. s., 37th Division, is modified as set forth below:
   b. The enemy has commenced to fall back before the French VII A. C. and to the
      south. The entire army attacks at 7 h. tomorrow (Nov. 10, 1918). The attack in this
      sector will be made by elements of the French 11th D. I. and the French 12th D. I., now
      in position, and will be preceded by an artillery preparation of 2 hours.
      The French 5th D. I. attacks on our left and the French 12th D. I. attacks on our
      right of sector.

2. a. The 37th Division disposed as set forth in F. O. No. 43, c. s., will be in
      position at 7 h. tomorrow ready to cross the ESCAUT. It will cross and relieve the
      elements of the French 11th and 12th D. I. on the general line MEYLEGEM---BEEKMEERSCH---
      NEDERZWALM---HERMELGEM, east of the ESCAUT and immediately take up the pursuit, in the
      general direction HAUTEM-St-LIEVEN.
   b. The 37th Division disposed as set forth in * * * F. O. No. 43, c. s. No
      pauses will be made on the objectives. The pursuit will be pushed vigorously.
   c. All cavalry (if any) at disposal of the 37th Division will act under orders
      of the division commander. No cavalry will be assigned to brigade or regimental head-
      quarters as messengers.
   d. Reserves: The corps reserve will march in time to arrive at WATERHOEK
      (206.6-466.6) at 7 a. m. November 10, 1918, via DRIESCH---De MAROLLE.
      The division reserve will march in time to arrive at Crossroad (207.9-466.8) at
      7 a. m. November 10, 1918.

   * * * * *
   f. Axis of liaison of XXXIV Corps and 37th Division, DICKELE---KALLE [Farm]---
      HAUTEM-St-LIEVIN.

   * * * * *

5. P. C.'s No change.
   A. I. C. Division near SYNGEM at 8 h. November 10, 1918.

   C. S. FARNSWORTH,
   Major General, U. S. A.,
   Commanding.

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DICKELE-BEILEGEM AREA
Looking north-northwest from vicinity of Dickele
Order

FIELD ORDERS No. 28

MAPS: THIELT
      COURTRAI  1:40,000
      GAND
      GRAMMONT

[Extract]

1. a. The French army of Belgium will effect a crossing over the ESCAUT River and thereafter push energetically forward and gain possession of the plateau between the ESCAUT and the DENDRE.
   b. The XXX Corps will attack on the front between HEURNE and AUDENARDE, both inclusive. The French 132d Division is on our left and the French 41st Division is on our right.

2. The division will attack on D day at H hour, to be announced later.
   Zone of action of the 91st Division:
   Northern boundary: EYNE (inclusive)---PUITHOEK (inclusive)---OOSCHE (inclusive)---DUISBEKE (inclusive)---MOLDERGEM (inclusive)---HONDENDRIES (inclusive)---HERZELE (inclusive).
   Southern boundary: AUDENARDE (inclusive)---LEUPEGEM (inclusive)---Fort KEZEL (inclusive)---HOOREBEKE-St-CORNEILLE (inclusive)---ROOSEBEKE (inclusive)---GODVERDEGEM (inclusive).

   

3. A. Initial disposition for the attack: The division will be formed with both brigades in line, the 182d Brigade on the left and the 181st Brigade on the right. ***
   B. The operation will be carried out in three phases as follows:
      1st Phase: Crossing of the ESCAUT by the advance guard. ***
      2d Phase: Crossing of the ESCAUT by the remainder of the troops of the first line battalions. ***
      3d Phase: Launching of the attack as hereinafter provided.
   C. Execution:
      b. Objectives:
         1st Objective: the line RAASBOSCH---VOGELZANG---BROEKE---VOLKEGEM.
         2d Objective: the general line LAETHEM-Ste-MARIE---BOUCLE-St-DENIS---ROKEGEM---HAUWAERT.
         3d Objective: HUNDELGEM---Heights west of ROOBORST---Spur of BOVESTRAAT (north [south] of BOUCLE-St-BLAISE)---HOOREBEKE-St-CORNEILLE.

   K. The division reserve, *** will be held in readiness, about one kilometer west of OYCKE.
Division P. C.: Chateau [at] NOKERE (south) after 12 o'clock, November 10, 1918.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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291-32.1: Order

ANNEX No. 2
To FIELD ORDERS No. 28

MAPS: COURTRAI 1:40,000
       GRAMMONT

Plan of Employment of Artillery

[Extract]

1. a. The 53d F. A. Brigade, augmented by A. D. 12 (French), 2 horse battalions
   A. C. C., and 1 battalion A. L. C. (Belge) [Belgian] will support the attack of the
   American 91st Division.

   By command of Major General Johnston:

   HENRY C. JEWETT,
   Colonel, Engineers,
   Chief of Staff.

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291-32.1: Order

FIELD ORDERS No. 29

MAPS: THIELT
      COURTRAI 1:40,000
      GAND
      GRAMMONT

[Extract]

1. a. Information has been received that the enemy is in retreat east of the
   ESCAUT River.
   b. French 12th Division is on our left and the French 41st Division is on our
   right.

2. 182d Brigade, supported by one regiment of light artillery (75's) will take up
   the pursuit at 6:30 o'clock, November 10, 1918, and maintain contact with the enemy.
3. a. Approximate zone of action of the 91st Division:
   Northern boundary: East and west line through railroad station at EENAME.
   Southern boundary: East and west line through the southern edge of Fort KEZEL.


   WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
   Major General, U. S. A.,
   Commanding.

Les Armees Fr.: Tome VII, 2d Vol.: Annexes: Instructions

Mission of the Army
[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,  
November 10, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 20

I. On the entire Western Front, from the Woëvre to the Escaut, the enemy is in full retreat.
   On our right, the British armies were able to cross the Escaut on their entire front and this morning reached the Renaix-Leuze area; farther to the south they reached the Mons-Maubeuge Line.

II. The French Army of Belgium, taking advantage of the bridgeheads which have already been captured, forced a crossing over the Escaut on almost its entire front and began the pursuit towards the east.

III. The mission of the Group of Armies of Flanders is to make an effort, with its right, in the direction of Brussels, maintaining liaison with the British Second Army.
   However, it is important that this effort be combined with a frontal effort by the French left and by the Belgian army, particularly on the right of the latter army, in order to free the Ghent area more quickly and lend assistance to the main body of the French army.

IV. In conformity with directions contained in Instructions No. 141, the infantry along the entire front, should endeavor to break up the enemy’s defense by violent and rapid action designed to prevent the enemy from continuing his orderly retreat, carrying out methodical destructions which can only delay us and paralyze our supply operations, and which, finally, will permit the cavalry to take up the pursuit and change the retreat into a rout.

V. The mission of the cavalry remains as defined by previous instructions, with the following change: the British Fifth Army having two British cavalry divisions at its disposal, the zone of the cavalry corps will be bounded on the south by Grammont (incl.)
the axis of advance of the main body of cavalry remaining Wavre, south of Brussels, and the Soignies Forest.

In the name of the King,

DEGOUTTE,
General.

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HS Fr. File: Group of Armies of Flanders: 410-30.1: Communiqué

Continuation of Advance

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS, No. 191/3 Evening, November 10, 1918.

The French Army of Belgium, continuing to drive back the enemy during the day of the 10th, had by afternoon reached the front: east edge of SEGELSEM.

On its left, American units crossed the ESCAUT east of HEUVEL.

The advance effected is: to the south, 15 kms.; in the center, on a line with AUDENARDE, 7 kms.

The Belgian army crossed the ESCAUT with some elements, in the bend at SEMMERSAEKE.

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Les Armées Fr.: Tome VII, 3d Vol.: Annexes: Instructions

Provisions for Continuation of Pursuit

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM, No. 252/3 November 10, 1918—6:15 p. m.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 7 Op.

I. The French VII Army Corps today reached the heights between Segelsem and Elst.
   The French XXX Army Corps passes beyond the general line: Hoorebeke-St-Corneille---Schooltland---Boucle-St-Denis---Dries-te-Laethem.
   In the French XXXIV Army Corps only a few battalions are reported on the right bank of the Escaut in the vicinity of Nederzwalm-Hermelgem.

II. Tomorrow, November 11, it is important to continue the pursuit, already successfully begun on a large portion of the front of the French Army of Belgium.

III. In case strong resistance is met: By the VII Corps, on the Elst heights, or farther to the east on those of Audenhove-Ste-Marie;

By the XXX Corps on the Roosebeke-Rooborst Heights, or on the other side of the Zwalm, on the heights of Audenhove-St-Gery, and Strypen.
Each of these resistances must be broken by a combined action to be mounted in each corps with the maximum means and, particularly, in artillery.

* * * * * *

IV. Insofar as the XXXIV Corps is concerned the operation will consist of taking advantage of the crossings established east of Heude and employment of troops already established on the right bank, in the Nederzwalm-Hermelgem area, to push northeast towards BEIRLEGEM and thereby facilitate the crossing of the Escaut farther north by the troops of the French 5th Inf. Div.

V. These results obtained, the pursuit will continue in the directions fixed by Instructions No. 6 of November 9.

de BOISSOUDY,
General Commanding the Army.

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Corps Orders for Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

FRENCH XXXIV ARMY CORPS,
November 10, 1918.

No. 4015/3

From: General Nudant

To: Captain Royer, French Division.

SPECIAL ORDER

1. Tomorrow, November 11, in case the enemy will continue to oppose resistance on the line NEDERZWALM--BOUCLE-St-BLAISE, the XXX Corps will attack at 10 a. m. under protection of a moving barrage.

   The VII C. A. will extend this notice in the south of the XXX C. A.

2. The American 37th Div., joining its action on the left of the XXX C. A., will attack at the same hour with its right brigade in the conditions indicated by the General commanding the 37th Div. and will take possession of the hills at the east of LAETHEM-St-MARIE and of MEYLEGEM to support the left of the XXX C. A. and break down the resistance opposed by the enemy opposite SYNGEM for the benefit of the north brigade of the 37th Div. The division will continue to attack the objectives assigned by Operation Order No. 116.

3. If in front of the 5th D. I. the enemy's resistance keeps going on tomorrow morning, the general commanding the division will make all arrangements to send all or part of his division across the river on the slope of the left brigade of the 37th Div.

   He should have then to extend the attack of this brigade in attacking in direction of DICKELVENNE.

4. The attack of the 37th Div. will be supported by all the heavy artillery of the C. A.

   NUDANT,
   General.
Attempts to Cross Escaut

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXIV ARMY CORPS,
November 10, 1918.

[Extract]

The attack ordered could not be carried out under the conditions prescribed, the artillery not being in place. In consequence, the divisions receive the order to attempt the crossing of the ESCAUT and to support the advance of corps on the right. The American 37th Division, which has moved its assault units up to the front line during the night, succeeds in getting 4 battalions to the right bank of the ESCAUT by using the footbridges that are already in position in the sector of the XXX Army Corps north of HEURNE. The attempts at crossing made by the 5th Division prove fruitless.

The reaction of the enemy artillery and machine guns during the day is rather violent.

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Efforts to Break Enemy Resistance

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXX ARMY CORPS,
November 10, 1918.

I. In order to break by a combined effort the resistance our advance has encountered at the end of the day, operations will be resumed on the entire front of the A. C. at 10 a. m. tomorrow.

II. In each division this operation will be preceded by concentrations on those points judged the strongest. The length of this concentration will be fifteen minutes.

III. In order to make the artillery action as intense as possible the French 12th Inf. Div. will put its 3 mounted battalions of field artillery east of the Escaut tonight. The American 91st Div. will also move a 3d battalion of field artillery to the far bank tonight.

Finally, the colonel commanding the corps artillery will take steps to have the battalion of 105's cross to the east bank as well. This battalion will be used to support the divisions according to requests to be submitted before midnight this evening to the general commanding the corps.

IV. This combined action will take place, of course, only if the resistance encountered this evening still continues.

The order given does not modify in any way the general mission of the divisions, which continues to be to maintain the closest contact with the enemy and to pursue him
immediately and with the utmost vigor, if he tries to break contact under cover of
darkness.

H. PENET,
General,
Commanding.

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HS Fr. File: 446-30.1: XXX Army Corps: Message

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S. No. 286/3

FRENCH XXX ARMY CORPS,
November 10, 1918.

CONFIRMATION OF TELEPHONE MESSAGE

The general commanding the army corps authorizes General Johnston unless it be
physically impossible to do so, to send a third field artillery battalion of field
artillery to the right bank tonight.

H. PENET.

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HS Fr. Files: VII Corps: 432-30.1: Order

Orders for a General Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.

FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
November 10, 1918—7 p. m.

[Extract]

I. The advance of the French 41st Division was delayed by an enemy rearguard holding
with machine guns the hill 1500 meters east of SEGELSEM (marked from south to north by the
elevation points: 102, 103 and 95, and continued by the GRAMMONT-GHENT Highway) and
supported by several pieces of field artillery around ROOSEBEKE.

To the north, the American 91st Division reached the small valley of the FONTEINLOOP
[Creek] (1 kilometer east of HOOREBEKE [HOOREBEKE-St-CORNEILLE]).

To the south, the line of the British 41st Division passes along the SCHOORISSE
meridian.

II. The general commanding the army directs that this resistance be crushed by a
general attack for an H hour that he will fix later. [For the operation of November 11,
H hour = 10 a. m.]

III. This operation will be carried out by the General commanding the 164th Division
who will push forward the artillery judged necessary. This artillery will be taken from
the 164th Divisional Artillery and, if convenient, from the 128th Divisional Artillery,
but not from the 41st Divisional Artillery, the caissons of which can be utilized for supplying ammunition, if necessary.

IV. Beside its reconnaissance missions, the aviation of the army corps will attack with machine guns at every opportunity.

After carrying the RENAIX-GHENT Railway, the advance will continue without halt, so as to reach the GRAMMONT-GHENT Highway and to throw out advance guards to OPHASSELT and STEENHUYZE-WYNHUYZE.

V. Liaison with adjacent divisions will be maintained on the right (British 41st Div.) and on the left (American 91st Div.) by detachments of one company and one machine gun platoon, which will act as flank guards, if the division is ahead of the general line at any time.

VI. C. P. for November 11: no change.

The necessary steps will be taken (telephone communication, prolongation of the axis of signal communications) so that the forward displacement of the C. P. can be made rapidly.

C. P. Army Corps: LEUPEGEM (immediately after the repair of the AUDEMARDE bridges).
C. P. 164th Division: MAERCKE-KERKHEM.

* * * * *

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.

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237-32.1: Order

Information of the Enemy

ANNEX to F. O. No. 43 (par. 1-d)

37th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 10, 1918.

[Extract]

Prisoner of 2d Company, 80th Regiment, 21st Division, captured south of WELDEN at 11:30 a. m., states that his regiment was put into line five days ago. The trench effective are 30 to 35 men per company. The battalions have 3 companies each, 2 battalions to the regiment. As far as prisoner knows the regiment has but one machine gun company of 4 guns. His company has no light machine guns.

Previous to coming to this sector, the 80th Regiment was in line near GHENT, losing heavily in the Allied attack of October 31, which brought the combative strength of his company down to 12 men. Having since received replacements from depots, the combative strength of his company has been increased to 30 to 35 men.

Order of Battle from North to South:
North of 80th Infantry Regiment is the 6th Guard Regiment (D. E. G.).* south of 80th

* [D. E. G. - Guard Ersatz Division.]
Regiment is 87th and 81st Inf. Regiments. From this it is probable that at least some elements of the D. E. G. have been put back into line.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

B. E. ROBINSON,
Captain, Infantry, U. S. A.,
Acting A. C. of S., G-2.

291-32.16: Field Message

From: L. O. French 12th Division

Date: Nov. 10, 1918        Hour: 13:30        Sent by: Phone

To: Racoon 3 [C. of S., 91st Div.]

This division (Fr. 12th) has advanced its forward elements at 11 o'clock to the line BOUCLE-St-DENIS---NEDERZWALM---HERMELGEM. No resistance reported as yet. The American 37th Div. is meeting resistance on the line NEDERZWALM-HERMELGEM north. The French 12th Div. has one pontoon bridge on the ESCAUT at EYNE.

SCHOELLER.

291-32.1: Order

FIELD ORDERS No. 30

MAPS: GRAMMONT 1:40,000

The zone of action given below is prescribed for this division in Corps Order dated November 9, 1918, 23:55 o'clock. Paragraph 3 (a), Field Orders No. 29, these headquarters, is amended accordingly:

Zone of Action 91st Division:
Northern boundary: EENAME---SCHOOTLAND---SOTTEGEM---WOUBRECHTEGEM---DENDERHAUTEM (all exclusive).
Southern boundary: OMMEOOZEN-BOOM---VARENT---ELST---AUDENHOVE-Ste-MARIE---ASSCHESTRAET---HEGHE---NINOVE (all exclusive).

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.
Order

FIELD ORDERS No. 31

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 10, 1918--13:45 h.

Division P. C. will close at Chateau (at) NOKERE (south) at 15 o'clock November 10, 1918 and open at AUDENARDE same date and hour.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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Order

FIELD ORDERS No. 32

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 10, 1918--13:30 h.

MAPS: COURTRAI N. E. 1:20,000
GRAMMONT N. O.

[Extract]

1. The enemy is continuing his retreat east of the ESCAUT River.
2. a. Contact with the enemy will be maintained. The division will resume the attack at 10 o'clock, November 11, 1918.
   b. No change in division zone of action.
3. a. The 182d Brigade, supported by one regiment of field artillery (75's) will continue the attack at the hour prescribed above. The 181st Brigade will remain in support west of the ESCAUT River.

* * * * *

5. No change in Axis of Liaison, Plan of Liaison, or Division P. C.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

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Report

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 10, 1918.

From 12 h., November 9, 1918 to 12 h., November 10, 1918

[Extract]

1. Hostile situation at beginning of the day: Enemy holding heights west of SCHELDT [ESCAUT] River. Zone of action of the 91st Div. extending from EYNE (inclusive) to Fort KEZEL southeast of AUDENARDE (inclusive).
2. Information received of enemy during the day: Enemy reported to be making preparations to retire from the eastern bank of the SCHELDT [ESCAUT] River.

3. Hostile movements, changes and conduct during the day, including maps illustrating same: No enemy activity on our front except occasional shells evening November 9, directed against AUDENARDE from the northeast.

4. Own situation at beginning of the day: Troops in bivouac in vicinity of CRUYSHAUTEM in readiness to move forward at nightfall.

5. Own changes, movements and action during the day: The 182d Brig. commenced crossing SCHELDT River at 6:30 o'clock and advanced in line of regiments about five kilometers to the east. The 181st Brig. moved forward in position of readiness west of SCHELDT River. Material for constructing bridges across river assembled during night Nov. 9/10 and bridges thrown across tributaries to river in AUDENARDE. Footbridges across SCHELDT River constructed and construction of traffic bridge over river partially completed.

6. Information neighboring units: French 12th Division on our left and French 41st Division on our right reported to have crossed the SCHELDT [ESCAUT] River and to have made progress in their attacks.

9. Results of actions, both own and enemy, including maps illustrating same: Our movements have resulted in placing a brigade of infantry east of the SCHELDT River and established a line of resistance to cover the advance of other elements across the SCHELDT.

10. Estimate of the situation: Reports indicate that the enemy contemplated further retirement and that our own troops will push forward.

11. Plans for future: To continue the offensive.

12. Remarks, morale, supplies, etc.: Morale very good. Supplies sufficient.

CLARK LYNN,
Lieut. Col., Infantry,
G-3.

Location of Brigade, Order for Transfer

53d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
FIELD ORDERS No. 34
November 10, 1918—6 h.

[Extract]

1. Information has been received that the enemy is in retreat east of the ESCAUT River.

2. In compliance with F. O. 29, Hq. 91st Div., November 9, 1918, 21 o'clock, 109th F. A. will support 182d Infantry Brigade in pursuit of the enemy.

3. a. C. O. 109th F. A., will arrange the details for accompanying artillery with the infantry brigade commander, and will prepare to cross river immediately.

b. The remainder of the regiment will be placed in readiness to cross the river at 10 a.m.

By command of Brigadier General Price:

W. W. HESS, Jr.,
Major F. A.,
Acting Brig. Adjt.

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HS Fr. File: Group of Armies of Flanders: 410-30.1: Communiqué

**Situation at Time of Armistice**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 197/3

GROUP OF ARMIES OF FLANDERS,  
*Evening, November 11, 1918.*

Today, the Group of Armies of Flanders, reaping the rewards of efforts of the preceding day, has achieved significant advances which only the execution of the Armistice has checked.

The Belgian army has entered GHENT.
The French II Cavalry Corps, completely outdoing the infantry, reached the DENDRE at GRAMMONT where it established a bridgehead.

[no signature]

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HS Fr. File: French Army of Belgium: 412-30.1: Order

**American Divisions Attached to French Corps**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.  
No. 263/3

FRENCH ARMY OF BELGIUM,  
*November 11, 1918.*

GENERAL ORDERS No. 27 Op.

[Extract]

1. The infantry divisions will be attached to the corps, with distribution as follows:

* * * * * *

Advance Limited

[Editorial Translation]

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 42 Op.

Confirmation of telephone message

In conformity with messages sent at midnight and at 7 a. m., the troops may advance today, November 11, until 11 a. m.

Actually push forward your leading elements, but only if they do not meet any resistance.

There will be no engagement this morning.

It is advisable, on the other hand, to avoid a massing of troops on the right bank of the Escaut.

By order:

BERNARD,
Chief of Staff.

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JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS

[Extract]

At 5:45 a. m. the General commanding the French Army of Belgium transmits by telephone the announcement of the signing of the armistice.

The troops are to continue their advance until 11 a. m., at which hour they will stop where they are until later orders direct resumption of the advance.
At 11 a.m., the army corps halts on the front PAULAETHEM---2 kilometers east of GAVENRE [GAVERE?].

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HS Fr. File: VII Corps: 432-30.1: Order

**Hostilities Suspended**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 521

[FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS, November 11, 1918--8:15 a.m.]

[Extract]

I. The French Army of Belgium telephones the following:
   Marshal Foch to the Commander in Chief [Petain]
   1. Hostilities are suspended on the entire front at 11 a.m. (French time),
      November 11.
   2. Allied troops will not go beyond the line reached on that date and at that
      hour until further orders. An exact report of this line will be made.
   3. All communication with the enemy is forbidden until instructions being
      sent to army commanders are received.

II. From the above message it appears that the troops can advance today until 11 a.m.

       * * * * *

MASSENET.

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237-32.16: Message

**Cessation of Hostilities**

G-3
OPERATIONS MESSAGE No. 30

[37th Division, A. E. F., November 11, 1918--8:45 a.m.]

1. By direction of Marshal Foch, hostilities will cease at 11 h., November 11, 1918.
2. This division will not move beyond the line reached at 7 h.
3. No additional troops will be moved beyond the Escaut.
4. Until receipt of further instructions all communication with the enemy is
   forbidden.

By command of Major General Farnsworth:

DANA T. MERRILL,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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- 456 -
In compliance with orders from Marshal Foch, hostilities along the entire front will cease at 11 o'clock, French time, November 11, 1918. The line held at that hour will be reported and will be held by a strong line of outposts. The remaining troops will be billeted as near their present locations as possible. Communication with the enemy is absolutely forbidden. All officers and noncommissioned officers will take the necessary steps to see that every man is informed of this fact.

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.

Date of Relief of French Troops

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
November 12, 1918.

Memorandum to Captain Requoir, French Mission:

The 182d Brigade did not relieve any part of the French 12th Division on the night November 10/11, but gained contact with them on the left of the 91st Division sector. The American troops relieved elements of the French 41st Division in the 91st Division zone of action between 18:30 and 20 o'clock, night November 10/11.

CLARK LYNN,
Lieut. Col., Infantry,
G-3.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF THE 37th DIVISION IN THE FLANDERS OFFENSIVE IN FORCING THE CROSSING OF THE ESCAUT RIVER AT SYNGEM, NOVEMBER 9/11, 1918

On November 7, this division received information that it was attached to the French XXXIV Corps for operations. On the evening of the same day, General Order No. 116, XXXIV Corps, dated November 7, 1918, 7 a. m., was received. This order gave the plans of
the French Army of Belgium for an ensemble operation to be executed at an early date for the purpose of forcing other crossings of the ESCAUT and establishing the Allied line on the plateaus between the ESCAUT and DENDRE. The XXXIV Corps thus consisted of the Fr. 5th D. I. and the Amer. 37th Div. The attack was to consist of two phases: the first phase, the crossing of the ESCAUT and placing of troops in position opposite their objectives; the second phase to consist of the attack proper with final objective the plateaus which dominate the west bank of the DENDRE. The attack was to begin on J day at H hour, both of which were to be definitely fixed at a later date. The A. D./11, A. C. D./70, 2 groups of the 264th R. A. C., 2 groups of the 305th R. A. L. (A. L. C.), all artillery under the command of the Colonel (Cammile Gelin) commanding the A. D./11, was attached to the division for the operation. Special Operations Order No. 470, of the XXXIV Corps, dated November 7, 1918, 19 h., directed two regiments of the 37th Division to be placed in the zone DEYNZE-ASTENE on the afternoon of the November 8, the remaining units to move on the 10th to the forward area. The details of the relief of elements of the French 11th and 12th D. I. parts of whose sectors were to be taken over by this division, were to be regulated by the commanding generals of the two French divisions concerned. Relief was to take place on the night of November 9/10, 1918.

November 8, 1918:
Field Order No. 42, Headquarters 37th Division, dated November 8, 1 h., directed the movement of the 146th Infantry with 2 companies of the 135th Machine Gun Battalion and the 147th Infantry with 2 companies of the 136th Machine Gun Battalion to the DEYNZE-ASTENE area. Correction to Special Operations Order No. 470 of the XXXIV Corps, received 14 h., November 8, changed the date of relief of the elements of the French 11th and 12th D. I. from the night of November 9/10 to the night of November 10/11 and reconnaissance of the sector to be made on the morning of the 10th. At 22 h., Field Order No. 44, Headquarters 37th Division, November 8, was issued, and in compliance with Special Operations Order No. 470, XXXIV Corps, directed the movement of the 146th and 147th Infantry, with attached machine gun companies, to the forward area, touching on the east the towns of SYNGEM and ASPER, and the movement of the remaining units of this division to the DEYNZE-ASTENE area.

November 9, 1918:
Advance echelon division headquarters moved from THIELT to Chateau de HUYSES at 9 h. Field Order No. 43, Headquarters 37th Division, November 9, 1918, issued at 9 h. and based on details issued in corps orders, covered the plan of action of this division in the pending operations. Preceded by an artillery preparation, the ESCAUT was to be crossed at H minus 5 minutes on bridges to be launched by the 112th Engineers, and at H plus 1:27 h., the infantry was to have been reorganized on the east bank of the ESCAUT and move forward following a rolling barrage which was to start at H plus 1:25 h. and proceed at the rate of 100 meters in four minutes. A reorganization on the first objective was to have been made at H plus 4 hours and advance again continued, following a rolling barrage moving at the rate of 100 meters in 3 minutes. At the second objective, a pause was to be made until H plus 10 hours, when the advance was again to be continued following a rolling barrage moving at the rate of 100 meters in three minutes. From the third objective the advance was to be continued upon orders from the division commander. 

Correction to General Order of Operations No. 116 of the XXXIV Corps, received this date, changed the time of the attack proper from H plus 1:30 hour to H plus 3:30 h. and fixed a general destructive fire from guns of all calibers from H to H plus 30. At 23 h., November 9, Special Order No. 472 of the XXXIV Corps, was received, and contained the information that the enemy was retiring in disorder on the entire front, and in consequence, the proposed attack was to take place as soon as possible. In consequence of the above order, the 145th Infantry (less one battalion and headquarters company) was designated as corps reserve and ordered at 23 h. to move to WATERHOEK, and the division reserve (134th Machine Gun Battalion and 148th Infantry (less one battalion) was ordered to crossroads at
point 207.9-466.8, and to be in position at those places at 7 a.m., November 10, 1918. At 24 h., due to the above information, Field Order No. 45 was issued, ordering the attack to commence at 7 h., November 10, 1918. The first phase of the attack was to be made by elements of the French 11th and 12th D. I., then in line, which elements were to be overtaken by the 146th and 147th Regiments of this division along the first objective. These two regiments of the 37th Division were then to push forward as vigorously as possible without pause and regardless of objectives reached. The movement forward was commenced by this division as scheduled at 7 h.

November 10, 1918:

At 8 h. message was received from 74th Brigade stating that the 1st and 3d battalions of the 147th Infantry were at that time at SYNGEM, but that there were no bridges in position to cross the river. No attack had been made by the elements of the French 11th and 12th D. I. which were to advance to the starting point of the second phase, the attack proper. The front of this division was along the west bank of the ESCAUT River from KLEIN-MEERSCH to HEUVEL, between which points it makes a U-shaped bend with the bottom of the U to the east. The terrain between the points of the bend is low and marshy, a large part, due to recent continuous rain, being under water. The entire approach to the river in the sector of this division was under direct observation and fire from three sides, and made the construction of bridges and the advance to the river by troops very difficult and slow.

At 9:40, 150-caliber shells were being dropped in the vicinity of SYNGEM at the rate of one per minute. Under the continued heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, progress in bringing forward bridge material was almost stopped at times, and permission was obtained from the XXX Corps for the 146th Infantry to cross the river in the sector of the French 132d D. I. at HEUVEL. At 10:42 the 1st Bn. of that regiment had crossed the river and were moving along east bank in the direction of NEERWELDEN.

At 11:25 all artillery under control of the division commander was directed to fire on houses and ridge east of the river opposite 74th Brigade sector, until 12, and from 12 to 12:15 a box barrage was put down on area east of DICKELENVE to lake south of the Convent. At 12:15, the box barrage rolled forward at the rate of 100 meters in 3 minutes until it reached a point 300 meters beyond the 2d objective. A great decrease in enemy artillery and machine-gun fire resulted immediately. Troops of the 74th Brigade were able to filter up to the river and at 13:55 a foot passenger bridge at the Axis of Liaison was completed.

At 15 h. enemy artillery and machine-gun fire again increased abnormally and an attempt by the 3d Battalion, 147th Infantry, to reach the river was unsuccessful. The entire 146th Infantry, and two companies of the 135th Machine Gun Battalion, however, had succeeded in crossing the river at HEUVEL and had advanced through the towns of NEDERZWALM-HERMELGEM and had extended their line to the north along the east bank of the river to point 215.6-463.1. At 18:40 h., two companies of the 2d Battalion, 147th Infantry, had succeeded in crossing the bridge at the axis of liaison and were pushing north on the east bank to assist in establishing a bridge in the 74th Brigade subsector, from that side. At 10:45 the other two companies of the 2d Battalion had succeeded in crossing.

Under cover of darkness, the 1st Battalion, 147th Infantry, was able to move from its position in the lowlands along the border of the river to the bridge at the axis of liaison and at 24 h. the entire battalion was across the river and established on a line 200 meters east of the river.

At 23 h., notice was received from the XXXIV Corps of a change in the zone of action of this division, which was extended on the south to include NEDERZWALM-HERMELGEM---HUNDELGEM---ELENE---St-ROCH---LANGEMUNT---HAELTER---WELLE. A special order (unnumbered) from the same corps directed the attack to be made in force the morning of November 11, at 10 h., in case the enemy continued to offer resistance. The 37th Division was to take the
position on the hills of LAETHEM-Ste-MARIE and MEYLEGEM and an effort, on the part of this division, was to be made to break down the resistance of the enemy in the sector of the 5th D. I., on the north, to assist that division in effecting a crossing in their sector and to protect the crossing of part of its units, in the sector of the 37th Division. The attack for the day, as specified in the above order from the corps, was covered by Field Order No. 46, issued from these headquarters at 23:25 h., November 10.

November 11, 1918:

During the evening of the 10th, rumors came to this division of the signing of an Armistice and the cessation of hostilities, and at 1 h., November 11 information was received over telephone from the XXXIV Corps that hostilities along the entire front would cease at 11 o'clock French time, November 11. Pursuant to telephonic instructions from the XXXIV Corps, Operations Message No. 30 was issued from these headquarters at 8:45 h., directing that no movement be made beyond the line reached at 7 h. and that no additional troops be pushed across the ESCAUT. At 9:45, however, instructions (telephonic) received from the A. F. B. directed strong patrols be pushed forward as rapidly as possible and to advance until 11 o'clock, when all movement was to cease and the line reached at that time held. As early as 9:45 h. on this day, all was reported quiet on the front, and at 11 o'clock, cossack posts had been established in the sector held by this division at DICKELE ---ZWARTENBROEK---Fme BOUCHAUTE and crossroads 800 meters southwest of KEERKEN.

Casualties:

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<th>WOUNDED</th>
<th>MISSING</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>56</td>
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C. S. FARNSWORTH,
Major General, U. S. A.

November 13, 1918

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 7: Letter

91st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
A. P. O. No. 776, November 15, 1918.

From: Commanding General, 91st Div.

To: Adjutant General, A. E. F. (Attention G-3).

Subject: Special Report of Operations

[Extract]

1. On November 8, 1918, the 91st Division was relieved from duty with the French VII Army Corps and placed at the disposal of the Commanding General French XXX Army Corps. The division was transferred from the OOSTROOSEBEKE area to the OLSENE---CRUYSHAUTEM ---OYCKE area November 8 and 9, preparatory to relieving elements of the French 12th and 41st Divisions on the front extending along the western bank of the ESCAUT River from EYNE.
BOVESTRAAT—BOUCLE-St-BLAISE AREA
Looking north from outskirts of Bovestraat
exclusive, to AUDENARDE, inclusive. On completion of the relief, the French 132d and 164th Divisions were placed in line on the left and right, respectively, of the 91st Division.

2. The order of battle of the French Army of Belgium from left to right November 9, 1918, was as follows:

XXXIV Army Corps

XXX Army Corps

VII Army Corps

3. In compliance with Operations Order No. 53, XXX Army Corps, orders were issued November 9 directing the 91st Division to effect a crossing over the ESCAUT River and to push energetically forward and gain possession of the plateau within its zone of action between the ESCAUT and the DENDRE. The division was authorized to utilize the three foot bridges already constructed north of EYNE for the crossing of troops over the river. All elements of the division were ordered to be in position of readiness west of the ESCAUT River by 24 o'clock November 10, 1918. However, late in the afternoon November 9, information was received that the enemy was in retreat east of the ESCAUT River and that detachments of the French 12th and 41st Divisions had already gained possession of the eastern bank of the river in the 91st Division's zone of action.

4. Operations Order No. 63, XXX Army Corps, directed the 12th and the 41st Divisions to continue the pursuit of the enemy. The same order provided that one brigade of the 91st Division would pass through and beyond the French elements east of the river and thereafter pursue and maintain contact with the enemy. The remainder of the division was directed to remain in position west of the river. To carry this order into effect, the 182d Brigade was ordered to cross the river at 6:30 o'clock November 10, 1918, and to move forward in line of regiments. To support the infantry in its advance, one regiment of field artillery (75's) was also ordered to cross the river. The foot troops of infantry brigade crossed the ESCAUT at AUDENARDE over improvised bridges. The animals of the machine-gun organizations crossed over by swimming. The 109th Field Artillery crossed the river, beginning at 12:30 o'clock November 10, 1918, over a bridge near EYNE, and immediately thereafter took up a position to support the advance of the 182d Brigade. The French elements east of the river continued their advance until they met artillery and machine-gun opposition from the ROOSEBEKE Ridge. Elements of the 182d Brigade completed the relief of the French units in their front by 22 o'clock November 10, 1918. During the day's operation but one casualty was reported as a result of enemy machine-gun fire.

5. Orders were issued and the division prepared to attack the enemy at 10 o'clock November 11, 1918. One additional battalion of field artillery (75's) crossed the ESCAUT at AUDENARDE at 7 o'clock over a bridge hastily constructed the previous day and night by the 316th Engineers. A message received from corps headquarters at 1:15 o'clock directed that the attack be postponed until further notice and that no action would take place on the morning of November 11. Another message received from corps headquarters at 6 o'clock directed that hostilities would entirely cease at 11 o'clock and that the line reached at that hour would be held by a strong line of outposts. Operations Order No. 288/3 XXX Army Corps, received at 9:10 o'clock directed the leading elements of the 91st Division to continue to advance until 11 o'clock, provided no opposition was encountered. The line held at that hour extended from the heights north of BOUCLE-ST-BLAISE to the heights east of BONTEVELD. The outpost line was established as directed, and the remaining elements of the division were placed in billets.

* * * * *

WILLIAM H. JOHNSTON,
Major General, U. S. A.
Annex to Ypres-Lys Operation

[Final Phase]

Translated German Documents

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Order

The Hermann Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT.

September 12, 1918.

To: Fourth, Sixth, and Seventeenth Armies

(Copy to Group of Armies Boehn)

[Extract]

1. In rear of the front of the Group of Armies a strategic position, the Hermann Position, will be organized. It will branch off from the Flanders-II Position in the vicinity of Iseghem. (Connected with the forward combat zones by the Dixmude-Roulers Switch Position.) Continued east of Courtrai—Bossuyt—in rear of the Scheldt as far as Valenciennes.

The continuation of the Hermann Position from Valenciennes to the south is being reconnuitered at present by the Group of Armies Boehn and will be organized by that group.

2. The armies will immediately begin the organization of the Hermann Position. At present we are only concerned with setting up the organization for the work in hand along purely general lines: formation of the various staffs; the assembly of supplies (by rail and particularly by water); reconnaissance of position and plan of occupation; division into work sectors corresponding to the tactical boundaries; construction of railroads and parks; rough estimates of requirements in labor, transportation, and materials; initial requirement in materials (including construction of railroads); beginning of the survey for the preparation of suitable maps (important for the work of organizing the position); preliminary studies of water (inundations), and soil conditions.

The experiences gained in organizing the Siegfried Position will be published again. Although doctrine concerning the organization of a position for defense has undergone some change in the meantime, particularly in the field of tactics, the Siegfried [Position] experiences nevertheless contain ideas that are still valuable, especially in questions of organization.

* * * * *

8. * * * The Hermann Position may prove as fully important [to us] as was, in the recent past, the Siegfried Position. Therefore, I request that the difficult initial preparations be carried out with the greatest care, and that from the very start qualified personnel be selected for the direction of the work. Temporary employment of troop
officers of all arms, particularly the artillery, is very important, especially for the
detailed reconnaissance.

RUPPRECHT,
Crown Prince of Bavaria,
Field-Marshal, Commanding.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5:Fldr. II: Memorandum

*Necessity for Organizing Switch Position*

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 9553, 2d Part

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,

September 14, 1918.

To: Supreme Headquarters

(Copy to Group of Armies Boehn)

[Extract]

In the annex the first orders for the organization of the Hermann Position are trans­
mitted. (See Order No. 9553 of the Group of Armies, dated September 12, 1918.)

A more accurate trace and a tactical evaluation of the Hermann Position will be sub­
mitted as soon as the results of reconnaissance are available.

In order to be able to occupy the Hermann Position without abandoning the U-boat
base, special stress is laid on the organization of the Dixmude---Roulers---Iseghem
Switch Position (junction at last-named point with the Hermann Position). In order to
make it possible for the Group of Armies Boehn to withdraw, in case of necessity, without
involving the Group of Armies Crown Prince Rupprecht too much, it will be necessary to lay
out an extensive switch position, from the general vicinity of Seclin via Marchiennes in
the general direction of Valenciennes. Within the near future there will be no labor or
other means available for this work; however, a position will be selected and reconnoitered
as soon as possible.

Even at this time it can be foreseen that the labor and means of transportation for
the construction of the Hermann Position will be insufficient. The total requirements
cannot yet be determined. Information is requested whether help may be expected within
the near future. If not, it will be unavoidable to employ labor which so far has been
used for the construction of the forward system. The latter will then be retarded. Mil­
itary forces, in addition to prisoners and civilian laborers, are indispensable for the
construction of the Hermann Position.

• • • • •

The measures for evacuation and demolition (code word Harald) in case of a movement
into the Hermann Position, will be put into effect as soon as the first preliminary work on
the Hermann Position has been started. The armies have already been instructed to move all
unessential administrative installations, etc. in rear of the Hermann Position.

In order to put the construction work and the Harald measures on a time basis, a date
will be set for the most important defensive installations to be ready. However, since it cannot yet be determined whether and when the Hermann Position will have to be occupied, all arrangements will be made in such a manner that a withdrawal can take place at any time, even though the preparatory work is not yet completed.

By order of the Commander:

Von KUHL.

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HS Ger. File: Group of Armies Boehn: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Order

Use of Hermann Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,

No. 9572

September 14, 1918.

Subject: Hermann Position

To: Fourth, Sixth, and Seventeenth Armies

(Copy to Group of Armies Boehn).

For reconnaissance and selection of the Hermann Position, attention is directed to the following points:

The position will run largely in rear of watercourses. These natural obstacles are to be strengthened to the greatest possible extent by damming, in order to economize on the number of troops to occupy it and to make an attack on a broad front impossible. Furthermore, the organization of the position will be simplified by this measure. The latter consideration gains in importance, because it is anticipated that only comparatively little labor and a small amount of transportation will be available.

Our present combat principles (outpost action, etc.) cannot be applied mechanically to the defense of the Hermann Position. The special local conditions prevailing will determine the type of defense to be employed. It is of particular importance that the reconnaissance personnel in the execution of their missions examine these conditions with complete impartiality and draw the right conclusions from them for the organization of the position. Thus, for instance, fronts with a powerful natural obstacle will absolutely have to do without an outpost, and the decisive resistance will have to be offered close to the edge of the obstacle. (Marginal note: Outposts in front of the sector.)

The organization of the Hermann Position cannot be kept secret, but the importance which this position may attain in connection with the general situation must be concealed from the troops. As far as they are concerned, the Hermann Position will be designated as merely another rearward position, similar to Flanders-II, Wotan-III, etc., which will serve to strengthen our present defensive system.

Separate action will be taken on the first reconnaissance reports submitted by the armies.

RUPPRECHT,
Crown Prince of Bavaria,
Field-Marshal, Commander-in-Chief.

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Protection of Hermann Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 8653

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,

September 19, 1918.

Subject: Hermann Position

To: Supreme Headquarters

[Extract]

1. Trace of the Line in the Sector of the Seventeenth Army.

So long as the Hermann Position in rear of the Schelde* as far as the vicinity of Maing, and thence via Moncheaux where it makes junction with Selle River in the vicinity of Haspres or Saulzoir, runs in rear of the dammed Schelde, it possesses great strength and can be occupied by weak forces. Valenciennes is a weak point. On the other hand, the front south of the Schelde lacks a tank obstacle and is enveloped by artillery from the hills southwest of Valenciennes and east of Douchy; movements in rear of this front can be observed by the enemy. A large-scale attack by the enemy with the left flank along the Schelde would find favorable conditions.

In order to avoid these disadvantages (cf. also Order No. 1121, Group of Armies Boehn, September 16, 1918), the final trace of the Hermann Position will be fixed as shown on the attached map [not available]. The bridgehead of Valenciennes deprives the enemy of observation to the south from the hills southwest of Valenciennes. Resting its right and left on the impassable obstacle of the Schelde, the bridgehead is well-guarded by artillery (mass of the artillery east of the Schelde) and commands observation into the enemy territory, while the movements of our infantry can be made under cover. The northernmost portion of the bridgehead at Beuvrages requires considerable clearing. South of the Schelde the hills between Thiant and Douchy are included in the position; outposts will be pushed forward as far as the very swampy valley of the Schelde and to Selle River.

[(Marginal) note: The enemy is not deprived of observation afforded him from the coal fields, nor of that obtainable from the Valenciennes-Rouvignies Road. The outposts will be pushed back soon then, the bridgehead too. This is something that must be avoided.)

A position with shorter lines from Flines in rear of the Scarpe, branching off from the Scarpe either via Helesmes on the Schelde west of Denain or via Haveluy to the vicinity of Wavrechain is not recommended because of the very difficult conditions affecting circulation. Many of the woods in the Forêt de Vicoigne and Forêt de Raismes are swamps. There are no solid east and west roads. Movements of artillery into position and particularly the work of supplying ammunition to the batteries would encounter considerable difficulty. South of the woods in the open terrain all circulation from the valley of the Schelde toward the front can be observed by the enemy. The rearward communications of the position with the shorter lines would have to be laid across the big obstacle of the Schelde lying comparatively close in rear of the front.

[(Marginal) note: Roads can be constructed. As to observation by the enemy: On the contrary, traffic could not be observed, or, if at all, only from the southwest.)


It is not recommended that the boundary be on the Schelde at Douchy, because the

* [Spelled also Schelde, Schelte, Escaut.]
bridgehead position and the position between Thiant and Douchy give mutual support. Unit command over both sectors is desirable.

*[ * * * * *

([Marginal] note: The line is not favorable for defense, as it is an utter compromise.)

By the order of the Commander:

von KUHL.

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Orders for Withdrawal Action Fighting

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES CROWN PRINCE RUPPRECHT,
October 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The situation may require that the Group of Armies front fight a withdrawal action, delaying in successive positions back to the Lys-Hermann Position. This will impose very heavy demands on the morale of the troops and the rest of the commanders. We must carry out this task too. We must be determined to repel the assault of the enemy and not to withdraw prematurely.

2. If we do withdraw, then it is of primary importance that we inflict losses on the enemy, constitute reserves, bring our material back with us, and cause the enemy lengthy delay by effecting demolitions, particularly of all roads. * * *

The Sixth and Seventeenth Armies will reconnoiter an intermediate position between Wotan-III and the Hermann Position, on the general line: West of Tournai—La Glanerie—Hasnon—Waller—Denain—Selle River. Report concerning the result of this reconnaissance will be made as soon as possible.

*[ * * * * *

4. The Lys-Hermann Position will be organized, employing all troops that can be spared for the work. Recruit depots will not be used.

*[ * * * * *

RUPPRECHT,
Crown Prince of Bavaria,
Field-Marshal, Commanding.

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Americans in Readiness in Region of Kortriyk [Courtrai]

[Editorial Translation]

Foreign Armies Section

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

October 28, 1918.

BRITISH-BELGIAN FRONT

[Extract]

1. Dutch Boundary as far as the Scheldt Canal.
   a. Americans in the Region of Kortriyk [Courtrai].
      A prisoner of the [Brit.] 41st Division captured October 26, reports having seen
      a great many Americans on October 20 in the region of Kortriyk. He states that he heard
      his captain say that 6 American divisions are in readiness at Kortriyk to continue the
      attacks. The statement of this prisoner agrees with the report from an agent according
      to which 150,000 Americans are said to be in Flanders.

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Expectation of Enemy Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN 49th RESERVE DIVISION,

October 30, 1918.

[Extract]

1. An enemy attack is to be expected on October 31. The main line of resistance
   will be held.
2. At 6 a.m. October 31, the front line battalions will be ready for immediate
   action; all supports and reserves will be alerted.
3. As soon as the enemy barrage opens the artillery will immediately deliver annihila-
   tion fire on the probable assembly areas west of Leeuwken---Hondeskonte [not identified]---
   Meerlaan---Predikheer Cabaret and west of the Heirweg railway station.
   In case of fog or artificial smoke the machine guns will also fire on final protective
   lines at the opening of enemy drum fire.

       * * * * *

UECHTRITZ.

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Concerning traffic regulations for the crossing of the Escaut.

Division Order

In modification of Par. 1 and 2 of Order No. 5438, Intelligence Section, secret, October 10, 1918, the following is ordered:

Par. 1. For the crossing of the Escaut, bridges 5, 6 and 7 and foot bridges a, b and c are at the disposal of the division.

Matthiass

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Division Order

I. Yesterday afternoon, after a vigorous artillery preparation the enemy attacked the left flank of Sector C and the division on the left, whereby the outpost was pushed back somewhat from the west part of Leeuwen.

Attempts to recapture the position were broken up by violent enemy counteraction.

During the night and the day weak combat activity. French troops were identified in front of Sector B.

II. Artillery missions for the night of October 30/31 and for October 31 remain as before. Preparations for recapture of houses near Leeuwen. Gas shell fire on Vive-St-Eloi and the bridge there will be prepared.

MATTHIASS.

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GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION,
ARTILLERY COMMANDER,
October 30, 1918.

Weather: good; visibility: variable.

Changes of position: antitank gun 3d Btry., 75th F. A. Regt. from map square 6001/2d to 6001/4th; 4th Btry., 38th Foot A. Bn. to 6101/6ac.
Slight enemy artillery activity; harassing fire on infantry and artillery areas.
From time to time during the night vigorous harassing fire on front line and intermediate terrain.
From 4 p.m. to 8 p.m. the 4th Btry., 38th Foot A. Bn. received 200 rounds of medium and heavy calibers.
In the morning hours and in the course of the day our artillery kept up harassing fire on traffic points, farms, roads and the Lys bridges.
During the night we laid concentrations, annihilation waves and harassing fire on fireproof shelters, traffic points and roads of approach.
Brisk aviation activity during the day.
Losses: 4th Btry., 38th Foot A. Bn.

Preparations for Scheldt Crossing

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,
October 30, 1918.

No. 2574

1. The distribution of the sectors of the Ghent Position has not yet been decided. As far as practicable the front line divisions will occupy corresponding sectors in the Ghent Position. The 21st Inf. Div. will be inserted possibly in one of the 3d Div. sectors.

4. As far as possible advance preparations for the execution of the movement will start at once.

Von POSECK.
BRITISH-BELGIAN FRONT

[Extract]

1. Dutch Boundary as far as the Scheldt Canal.
   a. American 91st Div. in Flanders.

   On October 30 an officer of the 107th F. A. Regt. of the American 28th Div. was captured 2 km. south of Waereghem. According to the statement of the officer, the 107th F. A. Regt. is at present attached to the Amer. 91st Div., which is located in the region of Iseghem as reserve for the French divisions. In October the American 91st Div. was employed twice in the large-scale battles north of Verdun and was withdrawn from the front about October 14. The American 28th Div. has been in the front line in Lorraine since October 18 and was last confirmed at the front by prisoners on October 29.

   Furthermore, prisoners of the Belgian 11th Div., who were captured this morning, state that they were quartered in Sysseele (about 6 km. east of Bruges) with Americans from 6 different regiments, and that they had seen in this region American field artillery on the march in an easterly direction. An attack by Americans at Somergem and south thereof is said to be impending. The previously suspected presence of several American divisions in Flanders thus seems to be confirmed.

West: Since our withdrawal to the Lys the enemy has been seeking to reduce the Lys Position by continuous attacks southwest of Deynze and between the Lys and the Scheldt. Furthermore he seems not to have abandoned this intention. The attacks are being made by the French and British; the Belgian army has recently been inactive.

The relentless shelling of the villages in the Scheldt lowlands and east thereof by British artillery, caused considerable losses among the civilian population and forced them to migrate.

The English attacks between the Scheldt and the Oise, began on October 23, were
designed to reduce the Scheldt and Oise front by a thrust on Maubeuge and Avesnes. After the local success on the first day of attack the main effort was made in a northerly direction. It must be expected that these attacks will be continued.

The minor attacks of the French since the middle of October have developed into full-scale attacks between the Oise and Aisne, which aim at the opening of the Oise and Aisne front. So far even local successes have been denied them. The employment of very strong forces indicates a continuation of the attacks. After the failure of their full-scale attacks, the French limited themselves east of the Aisne to minor operations, which did not bring about a change in the situation. After the heavy losses which the Americans suffered last month they have not yet been able to organize full-scale, coordinated attacks on either side of the Meuse; but such attacks are being prepared now.

By order:

HEYE.

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HS Ger. File: 49th Res. Div.: 695-33.5: Fltr. 1: Division Order

Withdawal Orders

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8476

GERMAN 49th RESERVE DIVISION,
October 31, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The corps will withdraw to the Scheldt Position the night of October 31/November 1, 1918. The Bav. 6th Res. Div. is in position in Sector I.

2. The 49th Res. Div. will withdraw across the Scheldt, effecting a passage of lines through the Bav. 6th Res. Div. located on the Scheldt and will assemble in the area Hoorebeke-St-Corneille---Boucle-St-Blaise---Roosebeke---Audenhove-Ste-Marie---Elst.

......

10. At 6 p. m. division headquarters will open its C. P. near Edelaere, on the Audenarde---Hoorebeke-Ste-Marie Road; at 1 a. m. it will move to its new location in Audenhove-Ste-Marie.

UECHTRITZ.

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GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION,
ARTILLERY COMMANDER,
October 31, 1918.

[Extract]

Weather: Rainy; visibility: Poor.

At 6:30 a.m. sudden bursts of heavy drum fire were delivered on our sector and on the adjacent one. Shortly thereafter the enemy attacked with tanks under cover of a rolling barrage. He soon succeeded in penetrating into the center of the sector. In the unit on the right the first position was soon lost. The enemy penetrated into the artillery position, and pressed hard from the north against the division sector. As a result of the penetration the situation had become unendurable and in the center and north of the sector the infantry was withdrawing through the artillery; the batteries received the order to move into the Cruyshautem Position.

The 6th Cavalry Division dismounted also occupied this line with the artillery. Not all the batteries had been able to make a change of position.

* * * * * *

At 6:30 p.m. the order was received for occupation of the Scheldt-Ghent Position in the night of October 31/November 1, 1918. In compliance with the order the artillery was to regroup in case the Cruyshautem Position had to be occupied.

At 9 p.m. October 31 the artillery commander moved to the Leeuwergem billets, arriving there at 1 a.m.

* * * * * *

Occupation of Positions in Rear of Scheldt

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,
GUARD ERSATZ INFANTRY BRIGADE,
October 31, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Tonight (October 31/November 1) the position in rear of the Scheldt will be
occupied. In the new sector, the following organizations will put in line as indicated below:

7th Guard Inf. on the right, 399th Inf. in the center, 81st Inf. on the left; the 6th Guard Inf. will assemble in Dickele at the disposal of the brigade.

4. Enemy pursuit across the Scheldt must absolutely be prevented; consequently adequate security detachments will immediately be established for the outpost zone and especially for the bridge sites.

6. Completion of the Scheldt crossing and distribution in the new sector will be reported to the brigade at the assigned C. P.; elements of the 6th Guard Inf. now with the separate regiments will march to Dickele.

Baron von LEDEBUR.

HS Ger. File: Guard Ersatz Div.: 673-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diaries

[Editorial Translation]

GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION UNITS, OCTOBER 31, 1918

6TH GUARD ARTILLERY COMMAND,

Gaver.

[Extract]

Day of large-scale fighting.

At 6:30 a. m. very powerful drum fire opens on the entire division sector and right and left adjacent sectors, followed a little later by powerful enemy attacks.

Toward 7 a. m. the enemy barrage was reported to be already from 2 to 3 kilometers in rear of our former front line and single accompanying guns were observed moving back. One hour later the enemy had reached the Karreweg-Huttegem Road. The close-range group reports that the accompanying battery of the 6th Guard Inf. (1st Btry., 268th) has fallen into the hands of the enemy after offering heroic resistance and disabling its guns.

Toward 9 a. m. it becomes clear that the 399th Inf. has fallen back in the face of extremely strong pressure and linked up with the right flank of the 6th Guard Inf. Elements of the 399th Inf. and the 81st Inf. are assembled on the heights west of Cruyshautem with the energetic assistance of artillery officers and occupy the "Blue Line."

English patrols are observed pillaging in map square 6002/8. The left flank of the 6th Guard Inf. is apparently holding its ground against all attacks for the present, while the enemy has broken through on its left and right. The advanced batteries of the long-range group are withdrawn to the Blue Line; the field batteries also withdraw gradually to the positions reconnoitered for them in the Blue Line.

Toward noon the division confirms the report that the enemy is located near Winkelken and De Lieve-Dochter. A flier is said to have dropped over the left flank of
the 6th Guard Inf. the order to occupy the Blue Line. The division reports further that
the Blue Line is to be held at all costs and that a withdrawal of the front will take
place later in the evening hours. Following this move mortars and heavy field howitzers
will effect the assigned change of position to the reconnoitered positions in the Ghent
Position. By order of the corps the entire artillery will begin the occupation of the
Ghent Position by echelon at 6 p.m.

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Morning: overcast; afternoon: rain.

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7th GUARD FIELD ARTILLERY,
Cruysshautem.

A strong enemy attack begins at dawn. On the right flank of the 2d Guard Inf. Div.
the enemy crosses the Deynze-Cruysshautem Road and pushes forward in the sector of the
Guard Ersatz Div. past Winkelken along the Cruysshautem Road, in the sector of the 207th
Inf. Div. via Heirtlegem-Chateau.
The Guard Corps withdraws to the Blue Line. • • •
Further withdrawal of the front into the Ghent Position takes place during the night
of October 31/November 1. Regimental headquarters move to Dickelvenne at 10 a.m.
Weather clear and sunny.

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Withdrawal from Front Line

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8477

GERMAN 49th RESERVE DIVISION,
November 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. After all, the disengagement from the enemy has been accomplished systematically
and unobserved. This morning, for a whole hour, the enemy laid drum fire on the
abandoned position.
2. The division will become counterattack division of the Flanders Group.

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UECHTRITZ.

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GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION.
November 1, 1918.

Division Order

[Extract]

I. Today in the forenoon, after a heavy fire preparation, the enemy attacked the position south of Cruyshautem that we had evacuated at 3:45 a. m. At 10 a. m. the enemy had reached the line Huysse-Oycke. At 4 p. m. a detachment one battalion strong advancing toward Huysse was destroyed by artillery and machine-gun fire.

II. The present position will be held against any attack. With adequate vigilance on the part of both infantry and artillery, a successful crossing of the Escaut by the enemy will be out of the question.

The enemy who advanced across the river will be thrown back by an immediate counter-attack.

Special vigilance is enjoined in the morning hours which, because of the fog, will be used by the enemy at the earliest possible moment to attempt a crossing. Fog alert will therefore be organized in detail by infantry and artillery.

* * * * *

V. Artillery missions:

a. Adjustment fire on the fire shelters as well as on the roads, unimproved roads, crossroads and village entrances leading from the line Niederzwalm---Mullem---Melkhoek to the Escaut.

b. Harassing fire on the targets named in par. a and on the localities Heuvel, Heurne and Eyne.

c. Concentrations of annihilation fire will be prepared and registered on the prospective crossing places near Heuvel and Eyne.

d. Ascertained enemy movements will be at once taken under fire.

MATTHIASS.

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GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION.
ARTILLERY COMMANDER,
November 1, 1918.

Weather: fair; visibility: hazy
Changes of position: entire artillery in the prescribed position back of the Escaut.
The 1st and 2d Btries, 138th Foot Arty. Bn. remain in their position and are attached to the 207th Inf. Div.

The enemy felt forward but slowly toward the Escaut; in the afternoon fliers sighted 5 tanks on the road leading to Zonnegem; our artillery took them under fire.

Enemy artillery remained quiet; only scattered searching shots east of the Escaut.

In the afternoon and during the night we laid harassing fire on roads of approach.

In the morning hours of November 2, 1918, the batteries in Sector B delivered annihilation fire on rocket signal.

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HS Ger. File: Guard Ersatz Div.: 673-33.5: Fldr. I: Division Order

Report on Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2602

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,
November 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The withdrawal behind the Scheldt during the past night has been carried out as planned.

The patrols left in contact with the enemy caused him to shell the evacuated position this morning with very heavy drum fire and to follow up only with hesitation.

In the afternoon the enemy pursued with tanks as far as Zingem and felt forward with patrols from Asper to the Scheldt.

2. The Scheldt Position will be held by the Guard Corps.

3. The division will prepare for a stubborn resistance in its sector behind the Scheldt and will prevent all enemy attempts to cross the Scheldt.

4. The Guard Ersatz Inf. Brig. will prepare detailed instructions for the infantry occupation and for the organization of the defense on the Scheldt.

Favorable terrain conditions permit weak force in the front line, but the extensive frontage of the sector requires constant observation during the night (patrols and reinforcing of sentry posts).

Reserves will be kept close up in order to prevent by counterattack a surprise crossing by enemy. Provision will be made to insure speedy support.

5. The artillery commander will direct the defensive fire, and the mutual supporting fire by agreement with the artillery commanders of the adjacent divisions.

At the outset the enemy will be prevented by powerful annihilation fire from gaining a foothold in the villages and farms close to the Scheldt. When weather conditions permit, extensive use will be made of gas ammunition (mustard).

Enemy roads of approach will be held under constant harassing fire during the night. Independent guns will be pushed forward as far as possible to the ridge to engage close-range targets in the Scheldt flats by direct fire.
6. As soon as feasible the commander of the pioneers will order the destruction of buildings at the Gaver bridgehead and will communicate directly with the 7th Guard Inf. to that effect. Pioneer patrols will again thoroughly search the Scheldt in the division sector for enemy crossing possibilities, especially at the old bridge sites.

8. Division headquarters: Baelegem.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION.
November 1, 1918.

[Extract]

Weather: fog in early morning; sunny during the day.

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At 9:30 division headquarters arrives in Velsique.
In the morning the division commander and the 1st general staff officer proceed to reconnoiter in Sector H of the Ghent position. The sector will probably be occupied within the next few days.

In compliance with corps orders received at 6:45 the 2d Guard Ersatz Division withdraws its right flank from the Eecke Switch Position to the Scheldt Position during the night of November 1/2. The 80th Fusiliers is withdrawn to Baelegem and with attached accompanying artillery and also the 87th Inf. (Vurste-ten-Eede south of Vurste) is group reserve. Issuance of orders through the 2d Guard Inf. Div.

The pioneer companies rejoin the division (from the 119th Inf. Div).

The division field train remains in Hofstade and Keiberg for the present.

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HS Ger. File: Guard Ersatz Div.: 673-33.5: Fldr. I: Army Order

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN FOURTH ARMY.
November 2, 1918.

Operations Section No. 41

The enemy will leave no stone unturned to force a crossing of the Ghent-Terneuzen Canal and of the Scheldt. Until his preparations for a major attack are completed he will attempt to establish bridgeheads, as he has already done today near Eename. Once the enemy establishes a foothold on the east bank by means of bridgeheads (the river loops projecting west are especially suitable for his purpose), the otherwise tactically favorable Ghent Position has lost much of its value.
Therefore every enemy attempt to cross will be opposed with all means at our command. Extreme vigilance, especially now during the frequent early morning fogs, and special defensive measures at the vulnerable points are necessary. Measures will be taken to insure prompt counterattack against any enemy force which has crossed. It must be a matter of honor for every unit entrusted with the defense of the Ghent Position to allow no enemy to remain on the east bank.

SIXT von ARNIM,
Commander in Chief, General of Infantry.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,
Wichelen, November 2, 1918.

The division stands in readiness as reserve division in rear of the 13th Reserve Div.; the 100th Household Grenadier Regt. with the 2d Bn., 12th F. A., near Westrem and Vantegem; the 2d Co., 101st Grenadier Regt., with the 1st Bn., 12th F. A., near Massemens and Witterstraat; the 108th Rifle Regt. with the 3d Bn., 12th F. A., near Gysenzeele, Langemunte and Kwaedbeke [or Quadbeke]; the 1st Btry., 19th Foot Arty., near Wetteren.

The division receives the order for the relief of the 2d Guard Inf. Div. on the right flank of the Guard Corps (Sector F of the Ghent Position) to begin on November 3.

Division headquarters removes to Wichelen in the forenoon.

Weather: Overcast, rain.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION.

Operations Section
No. 5071

FIELD MESSAGE: Telephone order

FROM: 207th Inf. Div.

DATE: November 2, 1918         HOUR: 3:30 p. m.

TO: 89th Reserve Inf. Brigade

The enemy who advanced over the Escaut will this day, before darkness, be thrown back to the other side in a counterattack.
If the forces of the 98th Reserve Inf. are not sufficient, elements of the 209th Reserve Inf. will be put in line along with them for the counterattack. Report will be made of action taken.

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 5076

GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 2, 1918—8:15 p. m.

Division Order

[Extract]

I. The nest of French troops still remaining on the east bank of the Escaut, will be mopped up at all costs by the 98th Reserve Inf. during the night or shortly before daybreak. The east bank of the Escaut at daybreak must be free of the enemy. Outguards and pickets on the Escaut will be taken over by the infantry along with the cavalry.

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MATTHIASS.

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HS Ger. File: 727-33.5: 207th Inf. Div.: Folder I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 5079

GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION.

Telephone Message

FROM: 207th Inf. Div.

DATE: November 2, 1918    HOUR: 11:30 p. m.

TO: 1. 89th Res. Inf. Brigade
    2. Artillery Commander

On November 3, increased combat readiness from 6 a. m. on. Prescribed as, because, as a result of strong and continuous movements of all kinds near Heurne, the 98th Res. Inf. expects renewed attempts at crossing.

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Operations Section
No. 5073

GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 2, 1918.

Division Order

for artillery activity on the night of Nov. 2/3 and Nov. 3, 1918.

I. Vigorous harassing fire on the crossing places the enemy used today over the Escaut as well as on Eyne and its east exits.

II. Harassing fire on roads and roads of approach as yesterday.

III. Completion of registration fire on fire shelters.

IV. Firing on targets (ascertain firing battery, etc.) according to the selection of the artillery commander, with aerial observation.

V. Aerials will be set up for reception at all time so that fleeting targets, reported by fliers can immediately be taken under fire.

By order:

Baron von SCHUMANN.

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Weather: cloudy, visibility: poor

Changes: In the night of November 1/2, 1918 relief by platoons has been effected as follows:

- The 7th Btry, 27th F. A. relieved the 12th Btry., 3d F. A.
- 8th " " " " " 14th " 11th F. A.
- 9th " " " " " 13th " " "
- 4th " " " " " 12th " " "

The enemy artillery activity was rather brisk. In the forenoon and in the late afternoon hours Eename and Welden lay under heavy fire.

At 1:30 p. m. the enemy was observed crossing the Escaut on footbridges in Sector B on rocket signal [?].

In the night the enemy kept up only weak harassing fire on roads of approach, artillery and infantry area.

As retaliation fire for the shelling of Welden and Eename, Heurne, and Heuvel were taken under fire. Firing batteries located near Herlegem, Huysse and Marolle received harassing fire.
The point of penetration and the Heuvel-Eyne Railroad embankment received vigorous harassing fire; upon request by rocket signals at 2:10 p.m. annihilation fire waves on the same area.

Toward evening the counterattack on the penetration point was supported by vigorous fire.

During the night concentrations on the railroad embankment near Heurne, Eyne and Heuvel.
At 4:30 a.m. until daybreak annihilation fire waves on Heurne, and Eyne, and harassing fire on the railroad embankment and roads of approach. Weak aviation activity.

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Counterattack on American Advance

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2521

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,
November 2, 1918---6 p.m.

[Extract]

1. During the past night the right flank of the Guard Corps has withdrawn from the Eecke Switch Position on the Ghent Position according to plan. The enemy has felt his way forward to the Scheldt on the entire front; he succeeded in crossing with 2 companies in the left adjacent sector near Heurne. A counterattack is in progress.

7. The division C. P. will be transferred to Houthem tonight (November 2).

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GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 2, 1918.

[Extract]

Weather: overcast; intermittent rain and sunshine.

By order of corps headquarters, the 207th Inf. Div. will withdraw from the position the elements in line of the 6th Cavalry Division (Dismounted) by November 4 (sector H) and replace them with the 80th Fusiliers and the 87th Inf. with accompanying artillery. The 80th Fusiliers will reach Moldergem on November 2 and the 87th Inf. on November 3; both regiments will send preliminary reconnaissance detachments to the 207th Inf. Div. on
November 2. The 2d Bn., 27th F. A., will be transferred from the [2d?] Guard Inf. Div. to the 207th Inf. Div. by November 4.

The occupation of sector H by the 21st Inf. Div. has been decided by corps headquarters for 10 a. m., November 5.***

In amendment of the above corps order, the transfer of the 80th Fusiliers by truck to Nederzwalm from the [2d?] Guard Inf. Div. to the 207th Inf. Div. by November 4.

The occupation of sector H by the 21st Inf. Div. has been decided by corps headquarters for 10 a. m., November 5.***

In amendment of the above corps order, the transfer of the 80th Fusiliers by truck to Nederzwalm from the [2d?] Guard Inf. Div. to the 207th Inf. Div. will not be carried out until the morning of November 3. Billeting in the Boucle-St-Denis area.

Opening of Flanders Attack

CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY, GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,

Operations Section  
No. 11181 Fr. H. 452

SITUATION ON THE WEST FRONT ON NOVEMBER 2, 1918.

[Extract]

In Flanders the expected large-scale attack was opened October 31. Americans were identified in this action. It must be expected that the attacks will be continued against the general line: Ghent---east of Roubaix.

In the adjacent sector of the front as far as north of Valenciennes, the situation is essentially unchanged. Partial attacks are possible here.

By order:

GROENER.
Division Order

[To order of Guard Corps Hq., Operations Section 1525, Secret 18 II, of November 2, 1918]

[Extract]

I. After entry in line of the infantry of the 21st Inf. Div., the 207th Inf. Div., with all units, less the artillery, will withdraw from front and become support division in rear of Sector H.

II. The 89th Res. Inf. Brig. will direct the relief of the infantry.

III. The following units will be put in line:

- 80th Fusilier in Sector A ) on the night of November 3/4, 1918
- 87th Infantry in Sector B )
- 81st Infantry in Sector C ) on the night of November 5/6, 1918

On the night of November 3/4, 1918, the regiment will be withdrawn from the front of the Guard Ersatz Division brought up to the division in Moldergem and rest there until the evening of November 5.

* * * * * *

V. The relief of the artillery will take place according to detailed instructions of the 207th Arty. Commander so that the batteries of the 6th Cavalry Division (Dismounted) will be withdrawn during the morning of November 4 and the batteries of the 21st Inf. Div. will be put in line during the morning of November 5. With the exception of 3 accompanying batteries all other batteries of the 207th Inf. Div. will remain in line together with 1 bn. hq.

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MATTHIASS.

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Weather: cloudy at times; visibility: obscured.

* * * * *
During the night the enemy had succeeded in building 4 foot-bridges over the Escaut and he had already established himself with strong forces between Eyne and Heuvel. The time for the 5 p.m. counterattack was advanced. The hostile artillery was not very vigorous; only the area from Neder-Ename to Welden was covered with rather heavy fire. Enemy artillery activity did not increase until the afternoon; single heavy shells on the rear area.

Our artillery, supported by both adjacent units, kept up vigorous harassing fire on the point of penetration, on both banks of the Escaut, Eyne, Heurne, Heuvel and on depots of building material at the railroad embankment east of Eyne. In the evening and morning hours harassing fire on the same area.

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HS Ger. File: 772-33.5: 207th Inf. Div.: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

Telephone Message

FROM: 207th Inf. Div.

DATE: November 3, 1918 HOUR: 10:05 a.m.


The enemy who is still in the wood east of the Escaut in Sector B will be thrown back across the Escaut this day in a counterattack. Artillery support by direct fire of the guns placed under the control of the regimental sector. Box barrage by the remaining artillery after agreement between the 98th Res. and the artillery commander. The same order applies to Sector A.

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HS Ger. File 727-33.5: 207th Inf. Div.: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 5082

GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION.

Telephone Message

FROM: 207th Inf. Div.

DATE: November 3, 1918 HOUR: 12:08 p.m.

TO: 1. 89th Res. Inf. Brig. 2. 207th Artillery Commander

I. The bridgehead near Heurne will this day be recaptured in a counterattack under the leadership of the commander of the 98th Reserve.

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For that purpose 1 bn. will be placed at the disposal of the 82d Regt. Two field guns of the artillery remaining in the rear are placed at the disposal of the 82d.

The moment of the attack will be reported as soon as possible to the division.

II. The 80th Fusiliers will assemble 1 echelon in Kaasbosch [Raasbosch?] and the rest in the vicinity of the 213th C. P. and will become brigade reserve. It will cause the front line C. P. in Sector A to be relieved in the night of November 3/4.

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HS Ger. File 727-33.5: 207th Inf. Div.: Fldr. I: Diary

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 5087

Telephone Message

FROM: MATTHIASS, 207th Inf. Div.

DATE: November 3, 1918 HOUR: 3:10 p. m.

TO: 1. 89th Res. Inf. Brig.

The counterattack ordered for this afternoon against the bridgehead near Heurne is cancelled. The hostile points of penetration will be blocked and kept under steady artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire.

If the enemy should yield under the effect of our fire, the front line troops will pursue at once (on verbal orders).

Moreover, I direct attention to the repeated orders by which a crossing of the Escaut is to be prevented by all possible means.

Immediate counterattack against any hostile forces which have succeeded in crossing.

MATTHIASS.

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HS Ger. File 727-33.5: 207th Inf. Div.: Fldr. I: Diary

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 5083/II

Supplement to Operations Section Order No. 5038, Nov. 3, 1918.

FROM: 207th Inf. Div.

DATE: November 3, 1918 HOUR: 5:45 p. m.

TO: 1. 89th Res. Inf. Brigade
    2. 207th Arty. Commander

- 487 -
Telephone Order

I. Brigade Headquarters will be relieved on the 4th inst.; transfer of command at 8 a. m. Regimental Hq. [text incomplete] after completion of relief.

II. In reporting completion of relief mention will be made whether liaison has been established.

III. A sketch of the trace of line will be handed over at the time of transfer of position. Receipt and certification will appear.

IV. Rearguards, including those with hq., will remain 24 hours longer in compliance with orders of brigade and artillery commander.

V. At 10 a. m., 4th inst. division hq. will move to the village of Leeuwergem.

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HS Ger. File 727-33.5: 207th Inf. Div.: Fldr. I: Diary

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 3, 1918—11:30 p. m.

Division Order

[Extract]

I. In compliance with army orders a counterattack will be launched in the afternoon of November 4 for the recapture of the lost outpost on both sides of Heuvel. The attack will be pushed forward at all points as far as the east bank of the Escaut.

* * * * *

IX. After completion of the attack the east bank of the Escaut will be so strongly occupied that a crossing of the enemy will be made impossible. The troops not needed forward will be move back into the main line of resistance; then the remainder of the 98th and 213th Inf. Regts. will be withdrawn.

* * * * *

X. In compliance with detailed orders of the 89th Reserve Inf. Brig. officers of the 98th and 213th Inf. Regts. will be attached to the staffs of the 80th and 87th Inf. Regts., the same for the officers and NCO's of the storm troops.

XI. Further deployment of the enemy on November 4 on the east bank of the Escaut will be prevented with all means possible. Crossings and assembly areas will be held under continuous harassing fire.

Short, sudden bursts of fire in the early morning hours on enemy crossing places.

XII. At 8 a. m. November 4 the commander of the 21st Inf. Div. will take over the command of the sector.

At 9 a. m. the 21st artillery commander with the 207th artillery commander will submit to him the contemplated artillery cooperation and ammunition expenditure.

At 11 a. m. the commander of the 21st Inf. Div. will arrive at the C. P. of the 42d Inf. Brig. There the commander of the 42d Inf. Brig. will submit to him the manner in which the attack will be conducted, the changes that may be necessary in the plan of
attack, the detailed reconnaissance which lie ahead until that time and which hour is
desirable as H hour.

MATTHIASS.

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HS Ger. File: Guard Ersatz Div.: 673-33.5: Fldr. I: Division Order

**Fighting near Heurne**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2622

GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,
November 3, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The enemy who had crossed the Scheldt in the 207th Inf. Div. was pushed back, but he succeeded this morning in crossing near Heurne and also east of Heuvel and in getting a foothold. A counterattack will be prepared for the morning of November 4.

2. In the right adjacent sector the 2d Guard Inf. Div. will be relieved by the 23d Inf. Div. Transfer of command on the morning of Nov. 4.

The 2d Guard Inf. Div. will take shelter in the area around Scheldewindeke-Baelegem as counterattack division.

• • • • •

6. The C. P. of the Guard Ersatz Inf. Brig. is transferred to Turkenhoek, 1 kilometer west of Baelegem.

[Signature illegible]

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 3, 1918.

[Extract]

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Upon orders of corps headquarters transfer of command in sector H takes place at 8 a. m., November 4. The division commander and the 1st general staff officer go to the forward area to reconnoiter a division C. P. The field train is moved to the Ronseval---Boukhout---Aflingham---Alost area.

• • • • •
Attack plans are worked out by the 207th Inf. Div. (upon orders of corps headquarters) for throwing back the enemy who has pressed across the Scheldt at certain points in the H Sector and will be carried out under direction of the 21st Inf. Div. on the afternoon of November 4.

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Relief of 207th Infantry Division

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 9225/18

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 3, 1918—8 p. m.

Division Order

[Extract]

1. The 21st Inf. Div. will relieve the 207th Inf. Div. including the elements of the 6th Cavalry Division (Dismounted) it had put in line in Sector H.

The relief will be directed by the 207th Inf. Div. until the transfer of command at 10 a. m., November 4; from then on by the 21st Inf. Div.

* * * * *

12. After 9:45 a. m., November 4, division headquarters in Leeuwergem-Chateau. There at 9:45 a. m. the 42d Inf. Brig., the artillery commander, pioneer commander, 21st Division signal officer will report the completion of the transfer of command.

The 42d Inf. Brig. will submit the infantry distribution including C. P.'s for the front line troops and the trace of the front line.

The artillery commander will submit artillery distribution, disposition, and fire preparations.

The 21st Division signal officer will submit the communication net.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,

Oosterzeele, November 4, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

At 10 a. m. the division takes command over the sector.

In the morning hours enemy infantry attempts to cross the Scheldt, west of Grotenhoek [Grootenbroek] on the wreckage of the bridges there, but is repulsed by the 100th Household Grenadiers.
Otherwise the day passes very quietly. Our artillery delivers vigorous harassing fire.
Division headquarters moves to Oosterzeele.

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Adjacent unit on the right: 13th Reserve Div.
" " " " left: Guard Ersatz Div.

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HS Ger. File 727-33.5: 207th Inf. Div.: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 207th INFANTRY DIVISION,
ARTILLERY COMMANDER,
November 4, 1918.

[Extract]

Weather: Rainy; visibility: poor

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The 207th Inf. Div. remained counterattack division in the same sector; the 1st, 3d and 5th Btries., 75th F. A. as accompanying batteries of infantry regiment.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 4, 1918.

[Extract]

Weather: cloudy; intermittent sunshine.
At 8 a.m. transfer of command by the 21st Inf. Div. in division headquarters at Leeuwergem-Chateau.

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Generally quiet in the sector in the morning. For this afternoon's operation the enemy was identified on the Rydgracht Creek northwest of Rydstraat on a front about 500 meters wide. Strong forces in the scattered farms and woods northwest of Rydstraat and individuals walking on the Scheldt footbridges south of Meerschkant.
Throughout the day artillery shelling was in general rather moderate on the infantry advanced zone, but there was considerable infantry and machine-gun harassing fire from the slopes of the river bank near Heuvel.

Toward noon rather vigorous artillery fire on individual farms and localities in the rear area, especially toward Boucle-St-Denis.

Besides harassing fire on remunerative targets our artillery executed fire for registration for the afternoon attack.

This took place according to plan between 5:40 and 6:05 p.m. After a short fire preparation the assault troops of the 80th Fusiliers and 87th Inf., supported by accompanying guns and trench mortars, advanced against the enemy bridgehead. The assault troops of the 80th Fusiliers approaching the wood east of Heuvel (6291/24, etc.) received surprisingly strong machine-gun fire from the north bank of the Scheldt and could not reach the enemy in spite of several attempts. Farther south the outpost zone was recaptured in liaison with the 87th Inf.

The two right companies of the battalion of the 87th Inf. which was executing the attack reached the Scheldt south and southwest of Heuvel in a spirited assault. Because of heavy machine-gun fire the center and left companies were forced to remain in front of the wood 1 kilometer southwest of Heuvel. Attempts to capture the two sections of woods which had remained in the hands of the enemy were unsuccessful.

Enemy artillery fire and violent machine-gun fire opened simultaneously with our preparation fire.

The enemy remained comparatively quiet after the attack. His harassing fire on our infantry and approaches was weak.

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**Plans for Sector Defense**

[Editorial Translation]

**Operations Section**

**No. 7161**

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,

*November 5, 1918.*

[Extract]

For conduct of the defense in sector F of the 23d Inf. Div.

A. Estimate of the situation:

The hostile forces in front of the division are at the present time as follows:

- on the right the French 77th Inf. Div.
- in the center the French 11th Inf. Div.
- in liaison on the south the French 12th Inf. Div.

The enemy will leave no stone unturned to continue his attacks as soon as possible and force a crossing of the Scheldt. Until preparations for a larger attack are completed he will attempt to establish bridgeheads on the east bank, as he has already done near Welden (sector of the 21st Inf. Div.). Surprise operations screened by natural or artificial fog are probable.

If the enemy succeeds in establishing bridgeheads on the east bank, the loops of the river being especially suited for the enemy's purpose, then the otherwise tactically favorable Ghent Position will have lost much of its value.
B. Estimate of the terrain:

The position derives its strength from the fact that the Scheldt constitutes an obstacle on the front. Moreover, the heights rising from the east bank of the Scheldt offer good facilities for observation into the broad, extensive flat terrain through which the Scheldt flows and the gently rising ground west of the Scheldt. The critical points of the position are Hill 25, near Melsen, and the village of Semmersaek.

Observation of the river bed in the loop of the Scheldt near Sluis is made difficult by the broad bottom land this side of the river.

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BARENSPRUNG.

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[Editorial Translation]

Intelligence Section

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 5, 1918.

EVENTS OF THE DAY FROM NOVEMBER 4 to NOVEMBER 5, 1918, 8 a. m.

Enemy activity:

Infantry: On November 4 the enemy attempted to cross the Scheldt on the remnants of the bridges 800 meters south of Eecke. He was driven off by machine-gun and rifle fire of the 11th Co., 100th Household Guard Regt.

Artillery: Enemy harassing fire on approach roads and villages was weak. The O. P. of the 6th Btry., 12th F. A., at the windmill near Melsen was shelled by the enemy with fire for destruction.

Our activity:

Our artillery several times disrupted observed movements with special effect, according to infantry reports, on traffic on the Landuit-Eecke Road (several direct hits), and shelled an enemy plane brought down near Asper.

Vigorous harassing fire principally at night was laid on enemy approach roads and villages. The west bank of the Scheldt between Eecke and Klein-Gavere, where reconnaissance planes had reported the setting up of crossing material, was taken under concentrated burst from 7:15 to 9:15 p. m. and from 5 to 6:20 a. m.

Aviation activity:

Enemy aviation was extremely active throughout the day.

At 9:45 a. m. aerial combat over Oosterzeele-Scheldewinkel [Scheldewindeke?] in which about 10 planes participated. 2 planes shot down, 1 identified as hostile. In addition 1 enemy plane was brought down near Asper and 1 by flak near Baelgem.

Activity of 204th Squadron (Observation): 1 artillery plane, 3 infantry planes, 1 photographic mission, 1 observation mission.

Observations and reconnaissances:

On aerial photographs rifle pits are identified 200 meters west of the Ecluse-Teirhoek [Teirlincken?] Road in map square 5489/10/15.
According to infantry reports the enemy has not yet gained a foothold on the Scheldt opposite the right regimental sector. In this area the occupation of only the south edge of Landuit and traffic on the Landuit-Eecke Road have been confirmed. On the other hand, enemy posts have been observed along the Moerbeck between Eecke and Klein-Gavere, in front of the center and left of the regimental sector.

Observations of the 204th Squadron (Observation):

The enemy is cutting down small trees everywhere.

Enemy bridge materiel was identified in the Scheldt loop, 1 kilometer northwest of Melsen, at the north exit of Eecke, 100 meters north of Klein-Gavere, and at the north exit of Syngem. The footbridges across the creek west of the Scheldt have generally been restored by the enemy. Otherwise very little individual traffic has been observed.

Adjacent divisions:

Only weak harassing fire in the right adjacent division (13th Reserve Div.) and in the left adjacent division (Guard Ersatz Div.).

On the left flank of the corps (21st Inf. Div.) the bridgehead established on the east bank of the Scheldt by the enemy in repeated attacks during the last few days was retaken by counterattacks. Prisoners from the French 21st Div., hitherto presumed to be farther north, and of the American 34th [sic] [37th?] Inf. Div. were brought in.

BARENSPRUNG.

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GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 5, 1918.

Concerning Hq. Guard Corps Order No. 115789, Operations Section, April 27, 1918. Regarding the combat efficiency of the artillery units.

To Guard Corps Headquarters.

[Extract]

1. Combat Efficiency:

   General:

   After the taxing efforts of the last employment with the Second Army, the men and horses of the 27th F. A. and of the 2d Bn., 14th Foot Arty., while detailed as attack troops to the headquarters of the Guard Reserve Corps and Guard Corps have had little rest because of numerous shifts, night marches, and alerts. A need for recuperation therefore exists, also for the 3d Bn., 268th F. A., after the strenuous fighting of the last few days.

   27th F. A.:

   Only of limited combat value. Because of the many shortages only 2 guns in each battery can be manned at present.

   2d Bn., 14th Foot Arty.:

   Combat effectiveness, under present conditions, within divisional sector. Because of shortages only 3 guns per battery can be manned at the present time. As a result of a lack of time for training, the degree of training of the gun crews, made up mostly of replacements, is poor. New men expected soon.
3d Bn., 268th F. A.:
Not up to full fighting efficiency. Gun crews and vehicles are in an exhausted condition following the heavy fighting and strain of recent days and the resulting shortages.

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7. Required Rest Period
After replacements are put in line 4 weeks will be needed by the troops to reach their complete strength.

von WAHLEN.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 5, 1918.

[Extract]

Weather: Cloudy.
The enemy brought bridge materiel from Heuvel to the Scheldt during the night.
At 6:25 [a. m.?] after an effective advance artillery preparation, elements of the 80th Fusiliers and 87th Inf. attacked the woods still in possession of the enemy on the east bank of the Scheldt. In the 87th Inf. the attack met with complete success. The companies, which had already captured 11 Americans of the American 37th Div. on the previous evening, advanced again with excellent spirit despite strong enemy counter-action and took 1 officer and 39 men of the French 54th Inf., French 12th Div., prisoner. In the sector of the regiment on the right the assault detachments of the 80th Fusiliers were unable to reach their objective because of violent fire coming from the north bank from machine guns which the artillery had failed to neutralize.

During the forenoon until past noon enemy fire action was weak.
Rather strong enemy patrols which attempted to approach the front of the southern regimental sector south of the railroad line along the Scheldt were driven off.

Between 3 and 4 p. m. under cover of powerful artillery fire the enemy pushed forward suddenly to the east bank of the Scheldt across the still existing footbridges at Ryd-Meersch. Although he was pushed back, he was nevertheless able to keep a foothold in the small woods north of Ryd-Meersch.

At 5:15 p. m. under cover of heavy artillery fire the enemy attempted to gain ground on the fronts of the right and center regiments in the direction of the Rydgracht. He was driven back.

In the evening and at night rather vigorous harassing fire was maintained by the infantry and artillery of both sides. The enemy harassing fire was concentrated especially on the battery areas.

During the enemy's attacks our artillery laid annihilation fire in front of the sectors attacked. There was no other activity by our artillery except harassing fire and continuation of registration.

* * * * *
The remainder of the 213th and 78th [98?] Regts. were withdrawn from the right or center regimental sector during the night of November 4/5 and put in march to the 207th Inf. Div. In the left sector the 1st Bn., 209th Inf. is relieved by the 3d Bn., 8th [80th Fusiliers].

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[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 7195

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 6, 1918.

A. Information of the enemy:

1. Activity of enemy infantry:
The infantry remains quiet. Only small detachments have been observed so far in front of the right regimental sector between Landuit and Eecke; south of Eecke the enemy stands on the west bank of the Scheldt.
The enemy attempt to feel his way forward across the Scheldt at that point during the night of November 3/4 was repulsed by rifle and machine-gun fire.

2. Activity of enemy artillery:
Enemy artillery confined itself to weak searching fire, more on the intermediate area in rear of the front line than on the front line itself. In the first few days enemy fire into the rear area hardly reached beyond the battery area.
Munte, Scheldewindeke, and the region around Oosterzele were shelled only during the night of November 5/6.
No observations have been made of the strength of enemy artillery. The only units located were 2 antiaircraft batteries. There are also no definite indications of grouping.

3. Enemy aviation was very active in good visibility.

B. General impression:
There are no indications of an immediately impending large-scale attack. Nevertheless, it must always be taken into account that the enemy may continue his attacks without special preparations, as he has done heretofore.
Weak enemy artillery activity and surprisingly little traffic by day must not deceive us.

C. Combat value:
The division is suitable for employment on a quiet front. It will require a training period of at least 14 days to be fit for full offensive action.
State of health is generally satisfactory. There is, however, an increase of colds and grippe due to the bad weather.
Horses are in fairly good condition.
Average battalion field strength of the division:
575 men, including 69 men who have completed recruit training (including [sic] 792 replacements which arrived today).

In field recruiting depot:
Fit for assignment:
Unfit for assignment: 1379 men.

BARENSPRUNG.

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Operations Section
No. 2696

[GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,
November 6, 1918.]

[Extract]

1. The Antwerp-Meuse Position will be consolidated as a rear position. The Bav. 14th Inf. Div. has commenced reconnaissance and construction.

2. The following positions will be reconnoitered as intermediate position:
   (a) The Lokeren Line
   (b) The Heldergem Line in connection with the Antwerp-Meuse Position.
   (c) The Elst Line (H-Line) in connection with the Ghent Position.

* * * * *

4. Withdrawal to the Antwerp-Meuse Position (A-M Movement) will probably be executed in 2 bounds:
   (a) Lokeren Line
   (b) Antwerp-Meuse Position

* * * * *

6. The manner in which the divisions in line and counterattack divisions will be employed in the Antwerp-Meuse Position is not yet decided. Possibly the counterattack divisions will be put in line in the new position during the Antwerp-Meuse Movement and the present sector divisions will pass through their line.

The division will prepare for the contingency of withdrawing from position to position in its zone of action.

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[Extract]

The enemy infantry which debouched from the small wood 500 meters southeast of Heurne with orders to capture the groups of houses east of the Eyne bridge pushed against
our main line of resistance at 8 a. m. in the vicinity of Eyne. A determined counterattack by 1 company each from the 81st and 87th Inf. Regts. threw the enemy back, causing him heavy losses.

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Only moderate enemy artillery activity in the forenoon and just after midday after the termination of the fighting east of the Scheldt bridge near Eyne.

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Statement of Effectives Available

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 9276/18

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 6, 1918.

[Extract]

Reference: Hq. Guard Corps, Intelligence and Operations Section, No. 133781 B. I., August 27, 1918.

Subject: Combat value of the troops and estimate of the situation.

To: Guard Corps Headquarters

Estimate of the situation:
The enemy's continued attempts to establish bridgeheads on the east bank of the Scheldt indicate that he intends to resume his attacks shortly.

We have to reckon constantly with more extensive operations to enlarge these bridgeheads.

The combat conditions favorable to the enemy i. e., the wide, high bank, the narrow strip of meadow on the left bank of the Scheldt, cover reaching to the river itself especially near Heuvel-Eyne and several woods, the existence of footbridges which it has not yet been possible to remove will continue to be assets for him in such operations.

We will need to put stronger forces in line to offset them. This is not possible on a division sector 7 kilometers wide at the Scheldt and 6,500 meters at the main line of resistance. Deep echelonment of the infantry is almost totally lacking. The only reserves immediately at the disposal of the division in case of emergency are the pioneer companies and the 18th Machine Gun Sharpshooter Bn. after its arrival.

Combat value of the infantry:
The effective part the regiment took in the repulse of the large-scale enemy attack of October 31 and the very successful operation of the 87th Inf. on November 4 and the morning of November 5 have raised the morale of the troops.

The 80th Fusillers and the 81st Inf. received Ukraine replacements of 54 men each on Oct. 29. This assignment almost makes good the losses of the 2 regiments on October 31.

The reduced number of light and heavy machine-gun crews is now as before a particularly serious disadvantage. Sufficient replacements cannot be trained by the regiments while the men are employed with the already depleted trench forces.
Health conditions have deteriorated because of the spread of influenza.
To reach full fighting effectiveness a training period of two weeks outside the zone of fire is required.

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[Unsigned],
Major-General and Division Commander.

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[Editorial Translation]

Intelligence Section

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 7, 1918.

Activities of the Day, November 6/7, 8 a.m

[Extract]

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Our own activity:
Our artillery delivered systematic harassing fire on the enemy rear area.
From 10:40 p. m. to 11 p. m. 5 batteries by arrangement with the infantry delivered a sudden concentration of fire on the west bank of the Schelde where it bends at Eecke.
Aviation activity:
As a result of the bad weather there was no aerial activity.
Observation and reconnaissance:
The artillery liaison officer of the north subgroup reports: the enemy has established himself north of the swampy land at the confluence of the Schelde and the Moerbeek, has machine-gunned our forces from that point, and has fired Very light signals.
A constant stream of timber has poured down the Schelde since the morning of November 6. This is piling up in front of the blasted bridges, especially against the remains of the bridge at barrage east of Eecke. It is suspected that the wood has been thrown in deliberately.

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BARENSPRUNG.

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Antwerp-Meuse Movement

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,

No. 2718 Operations Section, November 7, 1918.

1. The Antwerp-Meuse Movement began this evening, November 7. Movement only by the front line battalions.
2. Further movements will be regulated from day to day in compliance with the army order expected at Corps Hq. by 1 p.m.

The 1st bound planned for the division for the night of November 8/9 will therefore be ordered not before the afternoon of November 8 and will be transmitted to all units by telephone.
3. Conduct of the defense during the 1st bound:
   (a) The artillery will begin its gun displacement at nightfall. The infantry will withdraw its main body from the front line at 10 p.m. (at the same time as the 21st Inf. Div.).
   (b) The artillery will continue its former fire action for deception, especially in front of the rearguard area of the 21st Inf. Div. near Heuvel and Heurne. No increase in rate of fire.

   The rearguard will fall back only upon orders or under pressure from the enemy.
4. The Guard Ersatz Inf. Brig. and the artillery commander will issue the detailed instructions by direct agreement.
   The pioneer commander will give precise instructions that the prepared demolitions will be carried out only after the withdrawal of the rearguard.
5. Under the circumstances it will be understood that during the execution of the Antwerp-Meuse Movement the rearguard will remain at the Scheldt.
6. The Antwerp-Meuse Movement will be concealed from the enemy by all means and even kept secret from the inhabitants facing us.
   All burning is strictly forbidden.
7. The artillery commander will make direct provision for the execution of the artillery order of corps headquarters for the Antwerp-Meuse Movement, Artillery Order No. 1555 Operations Section, November 7.

von POSECK.

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- 500 -
GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 7, 1918.

[Extract]

After a short, violent artillery and trench mortar preparation the assault detachment of the 80th Fusiliers pushed forward into the small wood in front of the regimental sector at 6:05 a.m. and cleared the area of enemy as far as the Scheldt. The 3 footbridges over the Scheldt east of Heuvel and the footbridge at Heuvel were destroyed; our own guard remains at the latter. 23 prisoners of the 67th Inf. Regt. (French 12th Div.) were brought in. Otherwise the sector was quiet; the enemy artillery also was inactive except during the period of our operation.

Withdrawal Order

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 7, 1918.

Division Order

[Extract]

I. In conformity with the general situation the Guard Corps will execute a withdrawal into the Antwerp-Meuse Position.

The movement will probably start in the evening of November 8. The X Reserve Corps will move its left flank back to the Ronse Line [sic] during the night of November 7/8.
ACTIVITIES OF THE DAY, NOVEMBER 7/8, 6 a.m.

[Extract]

Our own activity:
Harassing fire on an enemy battery observed in action. Yellow Cross shells on the Eecke-Nazareth Roadfork.
At night vigorous harassing fire on the enemy's rear area, particularly on Nazareth and its suburbs. Advanced field guns delivered harassing fire into the enemy rear area as far back as the La Pinte—Den Biesen and Eede-Molen region.
Aviation activity:
Slight aviation activity because of poor visibility.
Observation and reconnaissance:
The Schelde has risen almost 1 1/2 meters in the last 24 hours. Parts of the outpost zone have been flooded.
At 6:30 p.m. 2 boats filled with water floated up in front of the regimental sector.

BARENSPRUNG.

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Oosterzeele.
Sudden strong concentrations of light and medium calibers on the infantry combat zone and the advanced battery positions from 2 a.m. to 2:20 a.m. and 3:15 a.m. to 3:35 a.m.
Heavy fire is renewed on all 3 sectors at 4:15 a.m., gradually concentrating between Semmersaekte and Gavere.
The reserve battalions are alerted at 6 a.m. and in march readiness at 6:20 a.m. since enemy attacks are thought imminent following the increase of enemy fire to great violence since 5:15 a.m.
The Reserve Battalion, 2d Grenadiers, 101st Inf., formerly division reserve, is moved up to Wassen as brigade reserve at 11:50 a.m.; at 12:20 p.m. the Res. Bn., 100th Body Gren. Regt., formerly division reserve, to Wassenkerkhof as brigade reserve.
Our fire frustrates the comparatively weak attempts of the enemy to cross the river opposite the right regimental sector. The 108th Rifle Regt. foils the enemy's attempts to cross in the left regimental sector. The enemy streams to the rear after sustaining severe losses from our artillery and machine-gun fire.

The enemy succeeds in gaining a foothold on the east bank of Schelde south of Sluys (east of Eecke) in the sector of the 100th Body Gren. Regt. and on the extreme right flank of the 108th Rifles. The level, swampy bottom land prevents the execution of a counterattack in the daytime, since the terrain is completely dominated by enemy machine guns.

Enemy fire continues throughout the day in various degrees of intensity.

At 6:30 p.m., after dark, a counterattack launched after brief fire preparation by the 100th Body Gren. Regt. and the 108th Rifle Regt. again dislodges the enemy from the east bank of the Scheldt, on the right flank of the 100th Body Gren. Regt. and in the sector of the 108th Rifle Regt. Here 5 prisoners are taken from the French 11th Div. Enemy forces, about one company in strength, succeed in establishing themselves on the east bank, on the left flank of the 100th Body Grenadiers.

Following cancellation of march readiness orders, the reserve battalions are withdrawn to their billets after dark at 8 p.m., since no further enemy attacks have taken place.

The withdrawal into the Lokeren or, as the case may be, the Antwerp-Meuse Position is ordered for the night of November 9/10 or November 10/11 and is prearranged.

* * * * *

Weather: Cloudy, rain.

 Order for Antwerp-Meuse Movement

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 8, 1918.

Operations Section
No. 7250

[Extract]

I. Beginning on November 8 the guard corps will move its front back to the Lokeren Line in the Antwerp-Meuse Position (Dender front) * * *

II. The division will carry out this movement in 2 phases and will form 2 combat echelons for that purpose.

* * * * *

VIII. The 1st echelon of divisional headquarters will transfer its C. P. either on November 9 or 10 to Lede and on the following evening to Molhem.

The 2d echelon of divisional headquarters will march to Aalst on November 9 and to Molhem on November 10.

BARENSPRUNG.

* * * * *
Weather: cloudy, drizzle in the forenoon
Renewed French crossing attempts at all bridge sites. In spite of the defensive fire launched at once upon request of the infantry, the enemy succeeded in crossing the Scheldt at several points and in capturing all the woods located on the east bank. He went across the low ground. The defensive fire was shifted back to the east bank. The operations were preceded by very heavy enemy artillery fire.

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Concerning the Antwerp-Meuse Movement.

1. Daily at approximately 1 p.m. the division will announce whether the movements are positively to be undertaken.

   Whenever a movement is to be carried out, the time for its execution will be definitely fixed.

   Moreover, all preparations will be made so that, after receipt of the Antwerp-Meuse
   [Movement] orders, the movements can be begun on short notice.

2. The movement into the H-Switch position will be started in time to insure that the artillery has crossed the Zwalm by midnight.

   The main body of the infantry will cross the Zwalm between midnight and 2 a.m.

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6. The Zwalm Position has steep, vaulted slopes and is cut through by draws. The Zwalm is from 2 to 3 meters wide and so deep that on the whole it is an obstacle even for infantry.

   ******
8. The artillery will be so distributed that part of it lies far forward in order to
reach the approaching enemy; the mass of the artillery will remain echeloned in depth;
limbers will be kept close by.

* * * * *

11. During the Antwerp-Meuse Movement, the lighting of fires is absolutely prohibited.
The withdrawal must be concealed from the enemy at all costs.

* * * * *

von WAHLEN.

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Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 9320/18

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 8, 1918.

Division Order

[Extract]

The withdrawal into the H-Switch Position will take place during the night of
November 8/9 in compliance with Division Order No. 9314/18 Operations Section, Secret,
November 8.

* * * * *

von WAHLEN.

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HS Ger. File: Guard Ersatz Div.: 673-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diaries

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION, NOVEMBER 8, 1918

7th GUARD FIELD ARTILLERY,

Bouchaute.

From 2 to 3:30 a.m. vigorous enemy surprise fires; from 4:25 to 6:45 powerful enemy
sustained fire on front lines, artillery zone, and rear areas.

At 5 a.m. the batteries of the close-range group fired an annihilation fire wave on
Gavere and at 5:45 one on Langenlochting. The area west of Klein-Gavere is kept under
constant harassing fire; similarly, Overbeke. The south group lays several sudden
concentrations on the annihilation fire areas whole front; the center group, a similar concentration at 6:50. The accurate and powerful German artillery fire prevents the enemy infantry from going over to the attack in our sector. On the other hand in the left adjacent sector the small wood south of Lescaut [Escaut] is lost again. In the right adjacent division the enemy succeeded by 11 a. m. in crossing the Scheldt with 2 companies.

Vigorous reciprocal harassing fire during the whole day.

The Guard Ersatz Div. begins the Antwerp-Meuse Movement during the night of November 8/9. The first bound planned for the division consists in a withdrawal of the left flank into the H-Switch Position. ** The batteries of the south group and 6th Btry., 268th Arty., move 1 gun each into their new positions in the early morning and register on the Hermelgem bridge position and the farm buildings northwest of the bridge, using the same observation as before. Firing data are computed on Hermelgem, Nederzwalm-Hermelgem, Laethem-Ste-Marie and on the roads between these localities.

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The 4th and 2d Btries., 7th Arty., and 1 platoon of the 2d Bn., 268th Arty., are designated as rearguard batteries for the impending movements.

Weather cloudy; visibility good at times.

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Provisions for Meeting Impending Enemy Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 9, 1918.

1. Present signs indicate that the enemy will probably launch a large-scale attack on the morning of November 10.

2. The reserve battalions will be in readiness in their billets from 6 a. m., November 10, on.

3. In conformity with detailed instructions from the artillery commander, vigorous harassing fire will be laid tonight on the nearer foreground as well as on footbridges and the west bank of the Schelde south of Sluis. Bursts of concentrated annihilation fire in proportion to the ammunition available will be delivered on the west bank opposite the point of penetration south of Sluis on November 10 from 4 a.m. on.

4. From 6 a. m. on, November 10, 2d Troop, 20th Hussars, will detail 2 reconnaissance patrols for each regimental sector to the division observation post Franz.

5. All headquarters will carefully check their communication channels for orders immediately.

6. One infantry plane will be ready to take off any time after daybreak, November 10.

BARENSPRUNG.

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EVENTS OF THE DAY FROM NOVEMBER 8/9

Enemy activity:
Beginning at 4:15 a.m. heavy enemy artillery fire reopened on the front line and the rear area.
At 5:30 a.m. it increased to great violence. It lay especially on the center and left regimental sectors; most of the battery positions also received heavy fire.

Enemy attempts at crossing were frustrated by our artillery fire in the right regimental sector. In the left regimental sector all enemy crossing attempts failed in our machine-gun and artillery fire. The enemy surged back with bloody losses. Only in the center regimental sector did the enemy succeed, after several fruitless attempts, in gaining a foothold on the east bank of the Scheldt and in forcing his way into our outpost.

Enemy artillery activity continued with varied intensity throughout the whole day. Vurste, Semmersaeke, Groothulle, and Gavere lay especially under rather heavy fire in the afternoon.
The fire did not slacken until nearly 7 p.m.
During the night moderate harassing fire only, mixed with gas, on the terrain and near Semmersaeke.

Our activity:
At 6:15 p.m., after a short artillery preparation, assault detachments from the Household Grenadier Regt. 100 advanced against the enemy elements still holding out on the east bank of the Scheldt. The enemy was pushed back over the Scheldt in stubborn fighting, except for weak elements which still remained on the east bank south of Sluis. 5 prisoners of the 69th Inf., French 11th Division were brought in.

While the enemy was attempting to cross the Scheldt, our artillery delivered annihilation fire and held the Scheldt island and the west Scheldt bank under vigorous harassing fire throughout the day.
From 6 p.m. on the batteries fired preparation for the counter-attack of the Household Grenadier Regt. 100 and supported it with a standing barrage.
At night enemy assembly areas and roads of approach were taken under harassing fire.
Aviation activity:
Very weak aviation activity on account of poor visibility.
Adjacent division:
Right: From 2:15 to 6 a.m vigorous enemy artillery activity. An enemy patrol trying to cross the Scheldt was thrown back.
Left: No infantry activity. During the night the left flank regiment withdrew behind the Zwalm to the Hermelgem-Hundelgem Line unobserved by the enemy. Rearguards remained on the Scheldt. Rearguards, no change.

BARENSPRUNG.

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Plans for Move to Lokeren Position

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7305

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 9, 1918.

DIVISION ORDER No. 3 FOR THE ANTWERP-MEUSE MOVEMENT

[Extract]

I. As a supplement to or modification of the orders issued to date for the Antwerp-Meuse Movement, the following is directed on the basis of a corps order just received:
   a. At 6 p. m., November 10, departure of Combat Echelon-II for the Antwerp-Meuse Position as security detachment in compliance with instructions of the II-Combat Echelon commander. In case of bad weather corps headquarters reserves the right to order the departure for an earlier hour.
      Runners of Combat Echelon-II will report to division hq. at 2 p. m., November 10.
      Information as to the quarters of the commander of Combat Echelon-II must be obtained from the town major of Aalst.
   b. At 10 p. m., November 10, departure of Combat Echelon-I (less its rearguards) for the Lokeren Position and occupation of this position.
   c. At 6 a. m., November 11, departure of the rearguard of combat Echelon-I from the Ghent Position. Rather strong patrols will remain on the Scheldt. The rearguard will hold the Oosterzeele-Rooborst Line. The right adjacent rearguard (commander Major von Bescherer, 57th Reserve Inf., 13th Reserve Div.) will seek liaison on the Gontrode-Oosterzeele improved road; the left adjacent rearguard (commander Lt. Dehn, 399th Inf., Guard Ersatz Div.) on the Scheldewindeke-Baelegem Road. The commander of the rearguard will keep contact with adjacent units.
      The pioneer companies will march with the rearguard. Provided no other order follows, prepared demolitions will not be carried out.
   d. The retrograde movement by echelons of the artillery will begin at 7 p. m., November 10.

II. An order follows concerning the further movement of Combat Echelon-I and of the artillery into the Antwerp-Meuse Position.

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V. Main dressing station for the Lokeren Position: Lede.

VI. Troops occupying the division Observation Post Franz will be withdrawn at 7 p. m., November 10, by the 1st Troop, 20th Hussars, and will join the retrograde movement of the 1st Troop, 20th Hussars.

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BARENSPRUNG.

- 509 -
Progression of Antwerp-Meuse Movement

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2732

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION,
November 9, 1918—7:30 a.m.

[Extract]

1. As on November 8, the time at which the Antwerp-Meuse Movement will be resumed will not be announced by the army until noon of the day of execution. Consequently, the decision whether the withdrawal will be into the Lokeren Line will come probably at noon, November 9 or 10. At the same time the army will fix the time for the withdrawal of the rearguards, and the corps headquarters will order a simultaneous withdrawal of the main body of the infantry from the front line.

2. The Guard Ersatz Inf. Brig. will issue detailed instructions for the movements of the infantry with attached artillery.

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3. The artillery commander will prearrange the withdrawal of the artillery so that it will start as darkness sets in. To deceive the enemy, the batteries to be withdrawn last will simulate the previous artillery activity by augmenting their fire. The artillery commander will also give detailed instructions to that effect to the batteries remaining with the rearguard.

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von POSECK.

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From: Guard Ersatz Inf. Brig.
At: C. P.
Date: November 9, 1918: 2:45 p. m. No. 5082
To: The 3 regiments

By order of the army the Antwerp-Meuse Movement will not continue on November 9. The Guard Ersatz Div. will remain in its present position; the rearguard of the 6th Guard Inf. will remain on the Scheldt.

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- 510 -
**Withdrawal into Lokeren Position**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 9, 1918.

Division Order No. 3

[Extract]

Concerning the Antwerp-Meuse Movement.

1. An order will be issued for the execution of the movement into the Lokeren Position.
2. The position will be divided in 3 regimental sectors * * *

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von WAHLEN.

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**Orders to Hold Switch Position**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 9, 1918.

Division Order

1. The H-Switch Position will be held during November 10. The troops occupying the position will be fully alerted at 6 a.m. The 226th Inf. will be ready to march at the same hour.
2. The rearguard is further directed to give way step by step only under strong hostile pressure and to retire fighting to the H-Switch Position. It is of particular importance to hold Nederzwalm as long as possible in conjunction with the Guard Ersatz Division. Communication with commanders of the left and right rearguard units will be maintained.

Artillery fire will be placed on crossing points during the night.

The 42d Inf. Brigade will report as soon as possible the disposition of the rearguard for November 10 and will state whether contacts are established.

3. The troops maintaining the H-Switch Position will establish liaison to the front and will be prepared to cover the withdrawal of the rearguard. The artillery will send out officer patrols so as to be able to open fire as soon as possible in case the rearguard is driven back farther.
The artillery commander will state in his morning report whether artillery liaison officers are present with the infantry regiments.

von WAHLEN.

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GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 9, 1918.

[Extract]

At 3 p.m., after a short, violent burst of fire, the enemy attacked the center rearguard battalion (87th Inf.); the latter was severely handled by strong enemy forces and its remnants were pushed back to the north and south. In view of this situation the rearguard commander decided to withdraw the rearguards behind the H-Switch Position. After his instructions became known, the counterorders immediately issued by the division and brigade were too late to prevent the execution of the reaward movement already in progress. Of the rearguard patrols only the 1st Bn., 80th Fusiliers, was reached; it received orders to occupy and hold the east edge of Nederzwalm-Heufenstraat-Station Line. The 81st and 87th Inf. Regts. each sent out a strong officer patrol to Boucle-St-Blaise on receipt of this order. The rearguards of the 3d Bn., 81st Inf., and of the 2d Bn., 87th Inf., arrived in the H-Switch Position during the night. One company of the 87th Inf. is set up as outpost company in Rooborst, and the 1st Co., 21st Pioneers, near Munkzwalm.

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GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION UNITS, NOVEMBER 9, 1918

7th GUARD FIELD ARTILLERY,
Bouchaute.

[Extract]

All the guns of the 3d, 6th and 7th Btries., 7th Arty., and of the 6th Btry., 268th Arty., have occupied the new positions during the night. C. P. of the south subgroup in Dickele. Because of heavy shelling the 1st Btry., 7th Arty., occupies its alternate position. Otherwise, unimportant fire activity.
At 11:30 p.m. the 21st Inf. Div. withdraws to the main line of resistance of the H-Switch Position. In connection with this move, the withdrawal of the rearguards of the 6th Guard Res. Inf. into the outpost line of the H-Switch Position takes place.

Weather: Clear with good visibility.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,

November 10, 1918.

[C. P. Oosterzeele, Lede, in the afternoon.]

At night more vigorous enemy harassing fire than heretofore. In the early morning hours our artillery fires 6 annihilation bursts.

At 6 a.m. heavy enemy artillery fire opened on the entire sector. It become heavier at 7 a.m., especially on the infantry positions there.

The reserve battalion of the 108th Fusiliers is brought up to the farm just east of Eedwijk [Eedtwy], the reserve battalion of the 100th Household Grenadiers and the 2d Grenadier Regt. 101 are placed at the disposal of their regiments for occupation of the artillery protective position.

After considerably increasing his fire the enemy attacks at 7:40 a.m. to expand his bridgehead. The 2d Guard Regt. 101 holds its position.

In the course of the day the enemy is pushed back over the Scheldt in front of the 100th Fusilier Regt. after he had first succeeded in gaining possession of the village of Aelbroek. The contact temporarily lost with the Guard Ersatz Div. was reestablished by these counterthrusts. The 100th Household Grenadier Regt. holds the west edge of Semmersaeke and the high ridge of the Scheldt Valley.

Toward 10 a.m. enemy fire slackens noticeably and remains moderate throughout the day. After dark the enemy attempts once more to gain ground under the protection of a heavy barrage but is everywhere repulsed.

Execution of the prepared withdrawal into the Lokeren or Antwerp-Meuse Position is ordered for the night of November 9/10.

At 6 p.m. the reserve battalions of the 3 inf. regts. and 3 batteries of the 12th F. A. march as security detachment into the Antwerp-Meuse Position under command of Major von Watzdorf, forming the 2d combat echelon.

The artillery begins its withdrawal to the Lokeren Position after dark and the main body of the infantry at 10 p.m., forming the 1st combat echelon.

Disengagement is carried out without interference from the enemy. A rearguard under command of Major von Hodenberg (in each regimental sector 1 battalion with accompanying battery and the 1st and 3d Cos., 12th Pioneers) remains in the old position until the next morning.

Division headquarters changes to Lede in the afternoon.

Weather: Fair.

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Weather: Sunny

Toward noon the 1st echelon of division headquarters moves to Meire, arriving there at 5 p.m. The commander and the 1st and 2d staff officers remain until 9 p.m in Leeuwegem-Chateau and arrive in Meire at 10:30 p.m.

In the morning, while continuing violent fire on the right corps sector, the enemy also increased his harassing fire in the division zone.

Toward 10 a.m., as the enemy pushed across the Nederzwalm and simultaneously attacked from a southwesterly direction against Heufkenstraat Station, the rearguard battalion, 1st Bn., 80th Fusiliers, was obliged to withdraw to the line: west edge of Laethem-Ste-Marie---south exit of Dries te Laethem---southwest edge of Wafelstraat; it received the order to hold this line at all costs. Enemy pressure on our rearguards kept increasing in the course of the day.

Toward 4 p.m., according to a brigade report, the rearguard on the right flank had withdrawn behind the Zwalm. In front of the center the enemy had pushed forward from Munkzwalm along the road to Rekegem; on the left the rearguard holds the hill between Hondendries and Rooborst.

This line was held until the evening. ** Our artillery delivered observed harassing fire on the area in front of our rear-guard positions, especially on enemy roads of approach and on Nederzwalm.

Enemy artillery has not yet followed across the Scheldt; on this side of the Scheldt several vehicles have crossed the Scheldt apparently near Eyne on a new bridge identified by aerial observation.

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Operation Section
No. 9338/18

Withdrawal

GERMAN 21st INFANTRY DIVISION,
November 10, 1918.

Division Order

1. The rearguard has withdrawn to the H-Switch Position under heavy pressure of the enemy. The 1st Bn., 80th Inf., and officer patrols of the 87th and 81st Inf. Regts. occupy the line Nederzwalm---station northwest of Heufkenstraat---Boucle-St-Denis---Kauter-Molen---Boucle-St-Blaise.
The outpost will make a gradual withdrawal from this line to the H Line only under pressure.
The H Line will be held on November 10 without fail.
Elements of the rearguard will be brought under firm control as they arrive.

2. The division will fall back to the Lokeren Line during the night of November 10/11.
The rearguard will remain in contact with the enemy in conjunction with rearguards of the adjacent division and will hold the line Linden---Ruddershove---west of Knutsegem until further orders.

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The rearguard position on the line Linden west of Knutsegem will be reconnoitered during the course of November 10 and marked by advanced parties.

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9. The 207th Inf. Div. will move to the rear of the Antwerp-Meuse Position by marching on November 10 and will leave behind in that position the 98th Inf. with 1 battalion of the 209th Inf. as security detachment under Major Zander. * * *

von WAHLEN

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HS Ger. File: Guard Ersatz Div.: 673-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diaries
[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION UNITS, NOVEMBER 10, 1918

6th GUARD ARTILLERY COMMAND,
Houtem.

[Extract]

In the afternoon division and artillery commanders shift their C. P.'s to Erpe.

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7th GUARD FIELD ARTILLERY,
Te Munkbosch Farm, near Bouchaute.

From 7 a. m. until noon very powerful fire chiefly of heavy caliber falls on the front lines, gun positions, C. P.'s, and approaches. The C. P. of the close-range group receives several direct hits and is evacuated. New C. P. Munkbosch Farm. The enemy infantry debouches to the attack from Syngem, crosses the Scheldt near Hermelgem and occupies the villages of Hermelgem and Nederzwalm evacuated by us the evening before.
The positions occupied, including the bridgehead of Klein-Gavere, is held throughout. The batteries of the close-range group open up vigorous fire action. Enemy column advancing from Asper to Klein-Gavere and Syngem and from Syngem to Langenlochting and
Hermelgem are caught in observed fire for annihilation and suffer heavy losses. Troop concentrations in Stuivenberg Cabt. [Cabaret], Meerschkant, and Boterhoek meet the same fate. The Hermelgem bridge site is gassed. The following batteries especially distinguished themselves: The 2d Btry., which destroyed the bridge over the Leibek on the Syngem-Nederzwalm Road and repeatedly threw the enemy back; the 9th Btry., which immediately silenced an enemy battery brought up to the west edge of Asper; and the 4th Btry., which annihilated with several direct hits an advancing column loaded with bridge materiel. Combat activity decreased gradually after 12 noon.

At dusk the batteries withdraw by echelon and occupy the new positions of the Lokeren Line.

At 9 p.m. regimental hq. moves to the new C. P. at Erondegem.

Weather: Clear, visibility good; somewhat foggy in the morning.

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GERMAN 23d INFANTRY DIVISION,
Lede, November 11, 1918.

At 6 a.m. the rearguards, leaving officer patrols behind in contact with the enemy, fall back to the Oosterzeele-Baelegem Line which they hold until noon without pursuit by the enemy.

Hostilities will be suspended at 12 noon after the Armistice between the German Government and the Entente has been signed.

Rearguards and officer patrols will fall back to the Lokeren Line. This line will be occupied by a reinforced outpost disposition.

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GERMAN 21ST INFANTRY DIVISION,
42d INFANTRY BRIGADE.
November 11, 1918.

[Extract]

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At 6 a.m. von Nickisch's rearguard is withdrawn on orders to the Linden-Knutsegem Line. The 1st Bn., 87th Inf., moves back by marching to the sector of the regiment in the Lokeren Position.

At 12 noon Armistice.

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- 516 -
GERMAN GUARD ERSATZ DIVISION UNITS, NOVEMBER 11, 1918

6th GUARD ARTILLERY COMMAND,
Erpe.

No special combat actions.

Armistice at 12 noon.

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7th GUARD FIELD ARTILLERY,
Erondegem.

The enemy, following only slowly after dawn, is successfully engaged by platoons of the 2d and 4th Btries., 7th Arty., and of the 6th Btry., 268th Arty., which had remained with the infantry rearguard, and is no longer in contact with the outpost line of the Lokeren Position.

On account of the Armistice ordered at noon, November 11, the long-range firing which had partly opened at this time is suspended.

With the declaration of the Armistice, the abdication of His Majesty Kaiser Wilhelm II and the outbreak of the revolution in Germany are announced. A telephone message from General Headquarters states that Field Marshal von Hindenburg remains as before Commander-in-Chief and requests all commanders and officers to continue to do their duty under the new regime.

Major von Busch goes at once to the C. P.'s of the subgroups and gives corresponding instructions to the officers assembled there.

Weather: Cloudy, without rain.

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Preface

Early in 1918 the Secretary of War recognized the need of establishing an American Mission in Italy. This establishment would be able to study at first hand the attitude of the Italians toward the Allies; the effect of German propaganda on the Italian people; the general military situation of the Italian Army as to armament, equipment, organization, supply and morale. On February 18, 1918, General Pershing named Major General Eben Swift; on July 24, 1918, he was relieved by Brigadier General Charles G. Treat, to head such a mission. In May, General Swift was designated to assume command of all troops and organizations of the A. E. F. serving in Italy, except such officers as might visit the Italian front under authority of General Headquarters, A. E. F.

Secretary of War on June 20, 1918 directed General Pershing to send one regiment of infantry to Italy and the 332d Infantry of the American 83d Division was selected for this duty. On July 25, 1918, a force consisting of the 332d Infantry, the 331st Field Hospital, and a Provisional Motor Truck Train entrained for Villafranca di Verona, Italy.

The 332d Infantry assisted in building bridges of the Piave River during October. As a part of the 31st Division (British XIV Corps, Italian Tenth Army) the 332d participated in the pursuit of the Austrians from the Piave to the Tagliamento Rivers and, after crossing the river, reached Villaorba on November 4 when the Austrian Armistice became effective. American participation in these operations is commemorated by the inscription, "Vittorio-Veneto."
Military Mission to be Sent to Italy

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., January 31, 1918.

Pershing, Amexforce, H. A. E. F.

[Extract]

3. The President directs that a military mission be formed by you which will be sent to Italy. This mission will first report to Rome and then proceed to the Italian enemy's front. Should consist of a general officer and four or five others, as you may think best. The Secretary of War suggests that General Kuhn [Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Kuhn] now abroad be head of that mission. Notify this office when the mission is formed so that the Embassy at Rome may be notified.

McCAIN.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 15, 1918.

Letter of the Chief of Staff, A. E. F., to Major General Eben Swift, American army, on the subject: Duties of Special Mission.

1. In conformity with the instructions from the War Department, you are designated as chief of American Mission to be established with the Italian army. Additional officers comprising the mission are:

   Colonel John McA. Palmer, General Staff
   Lt. Colonel R. U. Patterson, Medical Corps.

   It is expected that your personal aide will be made your disbursing officer and will perform such duties as might be expected of a quartermaster.

2. You are directed to proceed to Rome and report to the American Ambassador for any special instructions he may have to communicate to you, after which it is desired that you visit the several portions of the Italian front, including the French and British forces in Italy. It is understood that your headquarters station will be near the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief of the Italian army.

3. Studies should be made on the following subjects:
   a. Morale of the Italian army
   b. Attitude of the Italians toward the Allies
   c. Effect of the German propaganda in the army and among the people
d. General military situation, including armament, condition of the army, supplies, equipment, organization, morale, etc.
e. Preparation for defense
f. Losses in men and guns, and needs
g. Food supply and fuel
h. Relations with Allied forces in Italy.

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SWC: 315-1: Cablegram

Participation on Italian Front

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Versailles, February 15, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For John Biddle (Maj. Gen.)

Reference your letter January nineteen conclusions have previously been reached in War College Division number 10050-111 dated September 28, 1917, that our best course is to concentrate our efforts on western front. Present conditions confirm the wisdom of this conclusion. However in view of action which I understand has already been taken with reference sending a mission to Italy, I recommend it proceed there for study of the situation as presented by Italian Government but feel that our government should not commit itself in advance to policy of further participation by us on Italian front.

BLISS.

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Cable: P-612-S

Military Mission to Italy

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, February 16, 1918.

AGWAR, WASHINGTON.

[Extract]

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Subparagraph 5A. General Swift and mission to Italy will proceed on 19th. This mission as well as the one to French, British, and Belgian Headquarters will be subjected to some necessary expenses for entrainment and other contingencies. These matters are purely official and the burden should not fall on personal funds of officers. Request a contingency fund be placed at my disposal to cover such expenses of these missions not to exceed for the present $1,500 per month.

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PERSHING.

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- 520 -
Troops to Italy

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., February 20, 1918.

Bliss, American Embassy, Paris

With reference to your 27, plans of War Department do not contemplate sending troops to Italy except perhaps some medical units promised by Department of State.

McCAIN.

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GHQ, AEF: War Diary

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
February 23, 1918.

Par. 1C-635-S. For the Chief of Staff

With reference to Par. 7, your Cablegram 815. It was presumed mission to Italy would be on same footing as mission maintained by me at French, British and Belgian Headquarters. Mission was planned for indefinite period, it being intention leave General Swift in charge and from time to time relieve other members in order that our general staff have benefit their observations and to give other officers opportunity to witness war on the Italian front. Will send engineer, ordnance and artillery officers suggested but request that this mission be regarded as on same footing as other missions mentioned. Its presence there will undoubtedly produce good relations very desirable at this time and will give us direct channel of information not otherwise available.

PERSHING.

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GHQ, AEF: War Diary

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
March 21, 1918.

Par. 1D-749-S. With reference to Par. 7, your Cablegram 815, presence of Swift Mission in Italy desirable for some time. Its presence has produced most excellent results both in furthering relations with Italian authorities and in keeping these headquarters thoroughly informed as to operations on Italian front which have indirect bearing on operations here. Desired to retain General Swift as head of this mission for necessary period and renew my recommendations to his staff, et cetera, in Par. 3, my 613. Advise if any special report from this mission desired by department. Retention of mission in Italy has the approval of Secretary of War.

PERSHING.
American Forces to Italy

AMERICAN SECTION, SUPREME WAR COUNCIL,
Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, April 29, 1918.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL, WASHINGTON

FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

[Extract]

Paragraph 1. With reference to paragraph one signed by you in telegram Number 49 I report as follows: In my weekly letter to you date April 20, which left Brest on transport America I stated that General Giardino had represented to me on April 18 view of Italian Government about sending American military unit to Italy. He said they did not expect a large unit but only a brigade or even only a regiment. They propose to put them in training behind the line near the Swiss frontier. I told Giardino I did not favor dispersion of our military efforts but that I would write to you sympathetically about suggestion of sending small unit solely for morale effect if it should prove possible. Danger is that demand would follow for more troops. This morning had interview with Italian Civil Representative with War Council and learn that his view is that we would send at first small unit and then establish a base in Italy with view to having eventually large force there. I told him emphatically that I did not believe my government would send any troops except with distinct understanding that it would be a small unit for morale effect and not to be followed by others; I think your proposition is only practicable solution. Let British or French or both send some of the infantry that we are loaning them to be brigaded with their divisions now in Italy relieving equivalent number British and French troops that can be sent north. I think this plan would be gladly accepted by British and French and do for the Italians all we can do. Number of troops sent to Italy should be small, not more than one or two regiments. Personally I do not favor sending troops to Italy because of the certain demand that will be made for more. The trouble in Italy is not so much the morale of the army as it is the morale of the country at large. The common people will soon complain that more Americans are not coming in order to relieve them from the burden of the war and the final morale effect may be bad instead of good.

* * * * *

BLISS.

* * * * *
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCES,

Special Order No. 126

May 6, 1918.

[Extract]

17. Major General Eben Swift, National Army, in addition to his other duties, will assume command of all troops and organizations of the A. E. F. serving in Italy, except such officers as may visit the Italian front by authority of these headquarters.

By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

A Conf. Cables: 1101-1500

Supply of American Troops in Italy

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., May 10, 1918.

No. 1284-R

Pershing, Amexforce, France

[Extract]

2. Reference to the statement of Prime Minister Strassburg sent us by Bliss he states he has communicated to you, the Secretary of War desires that any arrangements made with Italy with reference to the supply of American troops should be first submitted to the War Department for approval. The proposition to send American troops direct to Italy has not at any time been considered by the War Department with the exception of the sanitary units which were scheduled to be sent in Steamship Verona. March.

McCAIN.

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Arrangements for Troops to Italy

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 14, 1918.

For the Chief of Staff and Secretary of War

With reference to Paragraph 2 your Cablegram 1284, not understood, as no arrangements have been made regarding sending troops to Italy and there has been no intention of making such arrangements without approval of War Department. No communication received from Italy or elsewhere except one from M. Orlando with whom question was discussed at Abbeville resulting in his proposition already cabled you.

Further reference recommendation approving his second plan, purpose of transporting troops direct to Italy is in order that they may be sent by rail through Italy to show people visually that American troops are actually there. It is believed result will be a tremendous reception similar to that given our troops in London which was authorized after consultation with British authorities and at their request.

Troops sent to Italy should be practically all Americans and not naturalized Italians, as M. Orlando thinks his people might otherwise be in doubt regarding their nationality. Am strongly of opinion that if we send troops we should plan to send eventually one division in order to maintain Italian morale by successive arrivals, and demonstrate to Italian Government our desire to be of material aid. Unless there should be some reason of which I am unaware bearing on general situation, believe plan outlined is best and that any smaller number of troops would in the end be likely to react against us. Sending one division by detachments as proposed would not materially reduce the number to be sent to France within the next three or four months and hence would meet with no opposition from other Allies, especially if partially trained troops could be selected for the purpose.

PERSHING.

Policy Regarding Individuals for Service with Italian Forces

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, May 16, 1918.

1st Ind.*


1. The Commander-In-Chief directs that the policy of not turning over individuals for service with the Allies be adhered to in the case of air service personnel in Italy.

* Basic letter, not printed, was from Bliss to G. H. Q., A. E. F., March 18, 1918
2. Trained pilots now in Italy should be brought to France unless there is some other alternative not known at these headquarters.

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Library, Army War College: Order

Detail of General Treat

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., May 27, 1918.

[Extract]

Par. 9 By direction of the President the following changes in the stations and duties of general officers are ordered:

Brigadier General Treat upon being thus relieved will proceed to Italy for duty with the American Mission with the Italian Army, relieving Major General Eben Swift, National Army.

By order of the Secretary of War:

PEYTON C. MARCH,
General,
Acting Chief of Staff.
Movement of American Troops to Italy

No. 1560-R

Pershing, Amexforces

[Extract]

Paragraph 1. Reference the shipment of 1 regiment of American infantry to Italy, the Secretary of War directs that you ship one regiment from your command for that purpose, arranging with Italian authorities that the regiment, which was to have been sent from United States to them, be carried as heretofore in Italian transportation replace regiment so selected. March.

* * * * *

McCAIN.

Cable: L. S.-1027

Forces to go to Italy

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, June 24, 1918.

General Bliss, American Representative Supreme War Council, Versailles

Please inform the Italian military representative that American government desires to send a regiment to Italy directly from the forces here with the understanding that the regiment which was to be sent from the United States for service in Italy will replace the regiment sent from here. The Italian authorities to arrange that such regiment will be carried as heretofore agreed upon on Italian transportation embarking at New York and debarking at Bordeaux if vessel is routed in American convoy which will depend upon speed of vessel selected by Italian Government. I request that you ask the Italian military representative to give us assurances in regard to this. Meanwhile arrangements will be made by me to send the selected regiment to Italy without delay and I shall keep you advised in order that you may inform Italian military representative.

PERSHING.
Designation of the 332d Infantry for Service in Italy

3d Section, G. S.  

From: The Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F.(G-3)

To: Chief of the French Mission

1. I have the honor to inform you as to the following decisions which have been taken with reference to the 83d Division:
   a. In order to comply with the instructions of the American government for the early dispatch of a regiment to Italy, I have designated the 332d Infantry for this duty.
   b. To meet the urgent question of supplying replacements to American divisions now on the battle front I have designated the 83d Division (less the 332d Infantry) as a replacement division.

2. The 332d Infantry is now being prepared for its departure for Italy.

By direction:

J. W. McANDREW.
Chief of Staff.

Designation of 332d Infantry for Service in Italy

No. 1374-S

AGWAR, WASHINGTON

For the Chief of Staff.

Paragraph 1. Reference your 1560. I have selected the 332d Infantry for service in Italy. That regiment is now being organized and equipped for such service and actual movement will be made as soon as Italian authorities arrange for transportation of replacement regiment from New York to France. It was necessary to select a regiment from the newly arrived 83d Division which I have designated as a replacement division, as all the other divisions are either actually in the battle line or completing preparations therefor.

Subparagraph A. If any announcement of plans for sending troops to Italy is to be made, it should be given out in Washington and therefore I shall make no announcement here.

PERSHING.
G-3. GHQ. AEF: Fldr. 696: Cablegram

**Composition of American Force Designated for Service in Italy**

G-3.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

*June 28, 1918.*

American Representative, Supreme War Council, Versailles.

No. 89, G-3. Reference your telegram of June 27. Please inform Italian representative that regiment assigned to Italy will have to complete its training after arrival there. Please give him also detailed composition of infantry regiment from Tables of Organization but say that it is probable number of soldiers will not exceed 2800. Also intended to send one field hospital with regiment.

PERSHING.

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Base Section No. 8, SOS: General File: Fldr. S: Letter

**American Troops in Italy to Serve with British**

*July 1, 1918.*

From: Chief of American Military Mission to Italy.

To: Commanding General, A. E. F.

1. Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of Staff of the British army has returned to England after a brief visit to Italy. Lord Cavan commands the British forces in Italy. He has recently been promoted to the full rank of general.

Prior to March, the English and French forces, each constituting an army by itself was keeping the line west of the Piave at Montello and Mount Tomba. During March they changed their positions to the Asiago front and became a part of the Sixth Army commanded by an Italian general. Thus the Sixth Army is mixed command consisting of 3 British divisions, 2 French divisions and 2 Italian divisions. They are stationed in the above order from left to right on the southern side of the Asiago Plateau. To the right front is the valley of the Upper Piave, to the left front is the Trentino. Each line of advance is of high strategic value. In front of the Allies and in rear of the Austrians is the Val Sugana which is hidden by an almost impassable range of mountains. The communications of the enemy are therefore confined to the wagon roads at the flanks. If these roads come within the interdicting fire of the Allied artillery, considerable results will follow, just as has happened at Amiens, but greater results.

The change in the positions of the British and French forces was made with the expectation that they were to play an active part on the Asiago Plateau. The detailed plans for an offensive were made and ready. Then came the transfer of 4 British and 2 French divisions to France, thus reducing each army to an army corps. The offensive plans were not abandoned but the commanders expected results of a less decisive character than before. All was ready and timed to take place on June 18, but the Austrian attack 3 days earlier, on the 15th, stopped them again.
2. I was somewhat surprised to get an invitation to lunch with Lord Cavan yesterday as I had lunched with him only a short time ago. It soon appeared that he had important propositions to make to me. After lunch we had a long private conversation. He lost no time coming to the point. He stated that he would like an American division attached to his command. He would then be able to form 2 army corps, one consisting of 2 British divisions and he would like to have me personally command the other army corps consisting of one British and one American division. In what follows I am giving my recollection of the conversation from the point of view of the English commander. It was my impression that it was to some extent the result of his conference with Sir Henry Wilson, although I remember his quoting the chief of staff distinctly only once, as being in thorough agreement with the idea that not much could be accomplished by a mixed command, that an English speaking command could get great results, and that it was advisable to get the cooperation of the American troops.

There are many difficulties about a mixed command. The Italians so far have not qualified as satisfactory even if the difference of language is not counted. The French are first class but American troops as a portion of an English army would probably work toward a better result because they would all speak the same language.

The result of the recent offensive by the Austrians has greatly increased the confidence of the English and French. It has shown so much weakness in the Austrian army as to make it evident that the offensive would have been successful as originally planned. In any case it would be safer not to attack them with the reduced force but to make sure by the addition of American troops.

The English commander seemed to agree exactly with General Graziani, the French commander, in his estimate of the Austrian artillery. Instead of trying to remember just what he said, I will quote the French Summary as follows:

- The enemy only knew about 15% of our battery positions.
- Special shells were badly used by the enemy, were scattered instead of being concentrated.
- They gave the impression of disorderly firing. The result was that our batteries were not neutralized and that our trenches remained intact.
- Both machine guns and artillery remained almost silent before our fire of destruction, interdiction and harassment.

3. The strategic situation and the results possible in the direction of the Upper Piave and the Trentino can only be discussed with considerable detail and would take much time. I presume that it is not necessary as a part of this paper. The Trentino is one of the great prizes with which the Italians hope to be rewarded for their effort in this war. A success in the Upper Piave would be exceedingly embarrassing for the Austrian system of defense.

4. Reports have come to me from many sources about American troops being ordered to Italy. I have not credited them because I have had no official information that they were coming and felt sure that I would get ample notice beforehand. I have, however, been making studies of the problems which are apt to arise on the arrival of American troops, so far as the selection of billeting areas, bases and hospital accommodations are concerned. I think I have gone as far as possible in these matters until I get definite information. The Italian newspapers today contain the following article: Washington-June 29.

A regiment of troops, belonging to the Expeditionary Forces under the command of General Pershing, has received orders to proceed to Italy to complete the union of British, French and American forces with those of Italy on that front.

Yesterday, Secretary of War Baker announced that General Pershing has been charged with the task of choosing the regiment, which is now in training in France. It is to be sent immediately to Italy.
This sending of American troops to Italy again shows the unity of purpose of the Allied nations and the United States on all the fronts.

5. I have not supposed up to the present that it was proper for me to make recommendations as to the policy of our country with reference to Italy. I did not think that a policy would be adopted of using American troops for propaganda purposes only. It appears to me, however, after seeing the character of newspaper articles which are written in the United States on this subject, that it is time to make a recommendation. It is my opinion that American troops should be sent to Italy in some force or not at all. Such a headline as appears on the enclosed may be offensive to the Italians as well as mortifying to the American soldier. Captain La Guardia expresses the idea more forcibly still: He says, "The Italians themselves, will be the first to despise us if we use our troops to such a purpose." It would be interesting to read the Austrian leaflets which they will drop into our lines when they hear of the character of help which America proposes to give Italy. I believe that our ambassador will not agree with me in this.

6. If we ask why the English commander made his proposal to me, we may get an explanation as follows:
   (1) He believes that General Foch will be opposed to the diversion of any American troops from France to Italy.
   (2) He desires a command appropriate to his rank composed of English speaking troops in whom he feels a full confidence.
   (3) It may be the suggestion of the British Chief of Staff who has just left here.

7. If a regiment of American troops comes to Italy I should like to brigade them with troops at the front, if they seem to be suitable.

8. So many names of high personages are mentioned in this letter and so much frankness of statement appears, so many plans in prospective, that I have thought it best not to trust this letter to the mail but to send it by my Aide-de-Camp, Captain McKinney.

EBEN SWIFT,
Major General, Chief of
American Military Mission to Italy.

GHQ, AEF: War Diary

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
July 11, 1918.

Letter of the Commander-in-Chief to the Chief of the Italian Military Mission, dated July 11, 1918, regarding the movement of American troops to Italy.

In compliance with your verbal request, I have the honor to inform you of the following:
   (a) This force will consist of one regiment of infantry, one field hospital and one American ambulance section, totaling about 125 officers and 4,000 men.
   (b) The daily ration of our men, the components of which have already been given you, amount to about four pounds, of which you will note one and one quarter pounds is meat, beef or mutton.
   (c) The bakery unit will not be sent at present.
   (d) Troops will be paid in Italian money by an American paymaster.
It is requested that the Italian Government furnish 178 draft animals, 70 riding animals and in addition sufficient field transportation, either motor or horse-drawn, to provide for the movement of one hundred tons, and also two motor cars, passenger. The rations are to be furnished by the Italian military authorities, according to the components, and will be replaced by us in kind, probably in monthly installments.

GHQ, AEF: Order

**Detail of General Treat**

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 196

Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Brigadier General Charles G. Treat, U. S. Army, now at these headquarters will proceed to Paris to carry out the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief. The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

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By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

Cable: L. S. 1064

**Troops to be Sent to Italy**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, France, July 18, 1918.

GENERAL SWIFT, WAR ZONE, HEADQUARTERS AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION, ITALY.

There is constant pressure from various sources for American troops to be sent to Italy. The latest has come through General Radcliffe, head of the British Military Mission in Italy. It is deemed advisable that you inform all concerned that no such requests will be considered. That the allied troops in the west are under a supreme commander who supervises military movements on this front and on the Italian front as well. The American army is not available for use as reserves or to build up any other allied army. It is the purpose of the American government to build up an army on the western front in France and there is no idea of sending forces to Italy or elsewhere unless directed to do so by the High Command to meet an extreme emergency. I desire to state our position in this matter in order that all may understand that further importunities along this line will be quite useless. This telegram is intended for you only and to indicate to you the policy to be adhered to.

PERSHING.

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Cable: L. S. 1065: Telegram

**Troops for Italy**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, July 18, 1918.

General Bliss, Supreme War Council, Versailles

Reference your telegram July 17, am in entire agreement with your views as to sending divisions to Italy. Am positively opposed to dissipating our forces in any such manner. Have today wired General Swift to express my views on this subject to the Italian high command. In any event I do not understand why the chief of the British Military Mission should interest himself in the matter.

PERSHING.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 696: Telegram

**332d Infantry Ordered to Italy**

4th Section, G. S.
Telegram

July 20, 1918.

C. O., 332d Infantry, Mandres.

No. 154 G-3. The 332d Infantry, the 331st Field Hospital and a provisional motor truck train under your command will proceed by train to Villafranca di Verona, Italy. The troop movement bureau these headquarters will furnish the necessary transportation.

CONNER.

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G-3 GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 696: Memorandum

**Transfer of the 332d Infantry to Italy**

Advance section

TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
A. P. O. 706, July 23, 1918.

MEMORANDUM for G-3, G. H. Q.:

1. Movement of 332d Infantry, 331st Field Hospital, and Provisional Motor Truck Train will take place July 25, from Fouain to Villafranca di Verona, Italy. Seven trains will be provided, each train due Italian border approximately 25 hours after departure.

TROOP MOVEMENT BUREAU

H. H. ADAMS,
Lt. Col., R. T. C. N. A.

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- 532 -
July 25, 1918.

Hon. Thomas Nelson Page,

United States Ambassador,

American Embassy, Rome, Italy.

Dear Mr. Page:

I arrived here last night under orders for duty with American Military Mission with the Italian army, relieving General Swift who is leaving here tomorrow. I hope very soon to be able to go to Rome to see you and pay my respects. In the meantime, please let me know if in any way I can serve you.

Sincerely,

CHAS. G. TREAT,
Brig. General, U. S. A.

 Proposal to Train American Troops in Italy

Versailles, Seine-et-Oise, July 29, 1918.

General PERSHING, H. A. E. F.

The Italian Military Representative this morning presented a joint note providing for a possible reinforcement of the Italian Army on the ground that it may be necessary either to resist an enemy offensive or to renew the offensive against him. Among the proposed provisions was one for the establishment of training camps in Italy for several American divisions. I objected to the consideration of the proposition on the ground that my instructions from Washington are to the effect that the United States will permit no diversion of American troops from France unless on the declaration of General Foch it is necessary in order to carry out his strategic plans. The Italian representative then said that the proposition would be submitted to General Foch. Since under the provisions of the Convention of Beauvais this diversion of American troops could not be made unless you agree with General Foch I recommend that you immediately communicate with him and ask him to form no opinion on the subject until after conference with you.

BLISS.

Increase of Forces in Italy

A. G. O., WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, D. C., July 30, 1918.
Received July 31, 1918—12:45 p. m.

American Section, Supreme War Council, Versailles

With reference to your 162, the State Department has been directed to communicate to the Italian Ambassador here the following statement of policy.
It is the firm hope and set purpose of the United States to have its Expeditionary Force assembled as an American army just as the Italian army is now assembled and as are the armies of Great Britain and France on the western front. The President is not adverse to having a gradual and relatively small increase made in the American combatant force now associated with the Italian army on the Italian front but he believes that this should be done with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief, General Foch, to whom the President feels obliged to defer in the matter of detaching American forces from the French front where they are now engaged. The President's idea therefore would be that the main body of the American army will ultimately be assembled as one army occupying its own position on the French or western front with such relatively small bodies of American troops associated with the Italian army on the Italian front as may from time to time seem advisable and not inconsistent with the general purpose above expressed. The President, however, particularly anxious to have the Italian government know that this view is dictated by the President's feeling that the course suggested will lend the greatest assistance to the Allies generally and that it is entertained in harmony with the most sincere and earnest wish to render every possible aid to the Italian government and its great army on the Italian front. March.

McCAIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 696: Telegram

Arrival of the 332d Infantry in Italy

July 30, 1918.

L. R. No. 2290
Italia
July 29, 1918.

C. G.

G. H. Q., A. E. F.

The last section of the 332d Infantry arrived this date. Came through in good shape and are billeted in their training area.

CHARLES G. TREAT,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.,
Chief, American Military Mission to Italy.

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Activities of the 332d Infantry in Italy

July, 1918.

[Extract]

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Record of Events: The regiment performed the usual garrison and training duties in France to July 25, 1918. 1st section left station in France en route to Italy July 25, 1918. Last section left station in France en route to Italy 26, 1918. 1st section arrived at present station July 27, 1918. Last section arrived at present station July 29, 1918. Regiment is performing usual garrison and training duties at present station.

WILLIAM WALLACE,
Colonel, 332d Infantry,
Commanding Regiment.

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GHQ, AEF: Order

Relief of General Eben Swift

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 215

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
Chaumont, Haute-Marne, August 3, 1918.

[Extract]

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58. Major General Eben Swift, N. A., and Captain E. O. Hunter, F. A. N. A., A. D. C., accompanied by two authorized orderlies, will proceed to the United States by first available government or commercial transportation, reporting upon arrival to the adjutant general of the army for instructions.

The quartermaster corps will furnish the necessary transportation and pay these soldiers commutation of rations at the prescribed rate for the necessary number of days travel, it being impracticable for them to carry rations of any kind.

The travel directed is necessary in the military service.

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By command of General Pershing:

JAMES W. McANDREW,
Chief of Staff.

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- 535 -
Activities of the 332d Infantry in Italy

August, 1918.

[Extract]

Record of Events: This regiment was billeted to August 13, 1918, performing the usual garrison and training duties. Since August 13, 1918, the regiment has been encamped and at its present station is performing the usual garrison and training duties.

WILLIAM WALLACE,
Colonel, 332d Infantry,
Commanding Regiment.

Report on Military Situations in Italy

AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO ITALY,
WITH THE SUPREME COMMAND IN THE WAR ZONE,
September 4, 1918.

FROM: Chief of American Military Mission to Italy
TO: Commander-in-Chief, G. H. Q., A. E. F., France.

1. The general military conditions have undergone little or no change since my arrival about one month ago. The main points of the line have been visited and general conditions observed. If the Italian army had erred in the fall of 1917 in not preparing positions in their rear to guarantee a safe withdrawal in case of necessity, they are now apparently making up for this deficiency in their present plans. In some places, as many as five parallel lines have been organized, wired, and connected up. The front on the Piave appears to be especially well-organized, the front trench being replaced by a parapet eight to ten feet in thickness, perfectly revetted, and containing about every 100 yards, a very complete machine-gun emplacement of solid concrete. The approach trenches are wired on both sides and constructed so that they can be used against flank movements of the enemy should they be successful enough to enter one of the sectors. In the mountain portions of the line, the most elaborate system of road building and gallery and trench work has been carried out. This extends likewise along the whole of the Swiss frontier. The rear sides of the mountains selected as strong points for a defense line, are all provided with a military road built with a strong foundation and drainage ditches, so that it becomes a permanent highway, and at such a grade, that it can be taken in most cases by trucks the entire distance. On one of these roads on one mountain, 75,000 men were employed for a period of six months. Artillery emplacements for heavy caliber guns have been undertaken as high up and as near to the front as possible, and the whole aspect appears to be that all preparation is for defense instead of being planned for an active offensive.
2. The lines at the front do not appear to be heavily occupied by troops in any localities, but the cities and towns, even as far back as Milan, seem filled with troops of various character and description. I have been unable to estimate accurately the number of troops constituting the reserves of the Italian army, and whether it amounts to 200,000 as claimed by some military observers or does not exceed 80,000 composed almost entirely of the 19-year old class, as it claimed by some of the Italian military officials.

3. The spirit and morale of the army is apparently much improved from what it was last fall, and in all the schools, and at large military functions, there is every evidence of good tone and spirit among the men.

4. Military activities during the period of the last thirty days have been confined to raids at different points of the line, all of a minor character. A great number of Czech-Slovaks, who have been in the Austrian army, are deserting to the Italian lines from time to time, and over 90% of these men have accepted service in the Italian army, and have been brigaded separately. A portion of the front line has been recently turned over to a part of this organization composed exclusively of Czech-Slovak troops. These deserters bring over a vast amount of intelligence and reports on the internal conditions and plans, which do not, however, always turn out to be accurate. The loyalty of these troops to the Italian interests appears to be accepted without question. The Czech-Slovak organizations are conspicuous for their excellent appearance and military bearing and attention to duty. The general military situation has the appearance more of a settling down for the winter on the defensive than any active preparation for any considerable forward movement. There are rumors of an Italian offensive.

5. Food supplies seem to be sufficient and I have observed in several instances, a considerable amount of bread unconsumed after a meal. Fuel supply is short, and every effort is being made, I understand, to accumulate a sufficient supply for the winter.

6. Relations with Allied forces in Italy appears to be everything that could be desired, although there exists now and probably always will exist, a trace of jealousy between the French and the Italians, and perhaps a slight trace of dislike for the assertive methods of the English.

7. The general health seems to be excellent, the only abnormal illnesses being that of a large number of cases of malaria among the troops serving on the lower Piave River, the number of cases running as high as 500 to 700 a day. In the opinion of our medical officers, this infection is caused by the mosquitoes breeding in the marshes and shell holes which are almost continuously filled with water. Instead of attempting to dispose of the mosquito by oiling, and protecting their men by the use of screens, the Italian authorities have resorted to the continued use of quinine as a preventive measure, serving it with meals in the form of pills, with apparently little effect other than using up all the available supply of quinine in the country and causing a shortage of it where its use is necessary in cases where malaria has already been contracted. I think our experience in the Canal Zone proved beyond question that quinine given as a preventative for malaria was ineffective even if the system was kept saturated with it, which could be done only by continuous doses, as one dose is eliminated from the system of the patient inside of 12 hours. The effect of taking enough quinine to cause the patient to be immune from malaria is an extravagant and expensive use of the drug, and disqualifies the patient for active duty of any kind, causing deafness, indigestion, and other internal disorders. Before putting troops into this lower section, they are given 20 days preparation with the idea of making them immune to malaria, presumably by saturating their systems with quinine.

8. The welcome and reception accorded the American troops has apparently been sincere and seems to have had marked influence on the spirit and morale of the Italian people at large, as it is an ocular statement to them that the United States had entered the war as an ally of Italy. The Italian people have been told so many things that have turned out to be exaggerated and untrue, they undoubtedly and possibly unconsciously have come to be influenced mainly by what they see and what they know personally.
9. The time since the American troops have arrived in Italy has been taken up largely in perfecting their proficiency in target practice, training in trench work and raids, use of bombs and hand grenades, work with machine guns on an extended area where firing of all character can be actually practised; also the assigning of officers of various grades to different points of the line to observe in detail the Italian methods of administration and care of troops in the line. It is the intention, within a week or ten days, to take over a sector of the line, probably the one previously outlined by my predecessor, but in the north end of the line where malarial conditions do not exist.

For reasons of sentiment, at whatever portion of the line the United States troops are assigned, they will be assigned to duty with an Italian command. Both the King and the commanding general of the Italian Army have been consulted whether they have any preference as to place of assignment, and they prefer to leave it entirely to our judgment.

10. The general health of the infantry regiment has been excellent. They are at present under canvas in camp at Valeggio for the purpose of facilitating their training. There have been two deaths since arrival in Italy, one from dysentery and one from pneumonia.

CHARLES G. TREAT,
Brig. General, U. S. A.

332d Infantry Assigned to Sectors

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
September 7, 1918.

No. 2499-L. R.
Italia
Commander-in-Chief,
General Headquarters, A. E. F.

No. 83. As per arrangement with the Italian authorities, one battalion, 332d Infantry, will be put in the line Tuesday, September 10, with the Third Army on Piave. Other battalions will be assigned in this section or to a neighboring section in more mountainous country to afford more varied experience and training.

TREAT.

Situation of Allied Forces on the Italian Front

AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO ITALY,
American Military Post Office 901, September 21, 1918.

FROM: Chief, American Military Mission to Italy
TO: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., A. P. O. 706, France

[Extract]

1. * * * There has been no important change since the MONTELLA and PLAVE affairs in June, 1918. Numerous minor raids both by Allied and enemy troops have taken place at
various points along the whole front; the locality and approximate results are indicated
in the list herewith.

2. There has been a considerable amount of rumor and talk about an offensive and
large quantities of ammunition have been gotten up for the artillery, but the atmosphere
is not pervaded with an unmistakable spirit of decision, and determination to all get
together and start an aggressive campaign. The Italian officers talk about shortage of
troops and lack of a proper reserve, but the Italian Army is presumably about two million
strong, and there appears to be not over five hundred thousand Italian soldiers at the
front. The cities, towns, and villages are full of men in uniform.

3. The English, three divisions, approximate 50,000 men, and the French, two divi­sions, approximate 24,000 men, are occupying the ASIAGO sector, hoping to push forward
sooner or later to Val SUGANA [sic] and the BRENTA and thus cut the lateral communications
between the eastern and western parts of the Austrian Army. Complete arrangements to make
this a concerted move, have not been satisfactorily settled, though preliminary moves have
been ordered and orders later countermanded.

4. The British and French are maintaining a series of schools, lectures, and
demonstrations for the training of officers, and the other nationalities are invited to
take advantage of them. The lectures at the last course at the British school were
written in the Italian language. Although a limited number of foreign officers attend
these courses, the greatest possible advantage is not made of them. In the military
profession you never accomplish very much or get very far through voluntary work of
officers or enlisted men. To have the maximum benefit here, all schools should be
prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief in Italy and details to schools and training should
be by roster and for those most needing instruction, and attendance be compulsory.

5. The Italian soldier is a good type, strong, rugged, and uncomplaining and with
training and good leadership they have demonstrated that they make good soldiers.
Without doubt their efficiency and effectiveness could be quickly and wonderfully im­
proved by a short period of intensive training in close order drill, target practice, and
gymnastics.

The value of the rifle is not fully appreciated. The rifle is not kept clean, and
apparently is not greatly depended upon, or steps taken to train the soldier in its
efficient use.

The Italian officers, as a whole, have not had the opportunity to see and learn
by experience and observation, or been required to acquire by attendance at schools, the
latest methods of using artillery and machine-gun fire in attack and defense. They
know the theory, but the necessity for the absolutely accurate refinement of detail in
its use cannot come without trained instruction. It would be unreasonable to expect that
they would appreciate any deficiency to the extent of acknowledging it, and to voluntarily
seek information from brother officers between whom there is a bit of national jealousy.

What is needed in Italy is not so much more troops, as more teamwork.

6. The sending here of even several divisions of American troops to serve, as at
present, as a part of an army not absolutely under the control of a single commander,
would not in my opinion, accomplish any immediate advantage, or result, unless the size
of the force was sufficient to warrant asking for, and being accorded full control of all
Allied forces operating in Italy, subject of course, to the control of the present Allied
Commander-in-Chief. It is easy to realize the difficulties of an Italian commander under
present conditions of lack of absolute authority and control. It would be the same under
any commander not designated by an authority absolutely recognized by all the Allied
governments.

7. The present method of limiting operations to raiding, taking, and losing an
occasional mountain peak, can go on indefinitely without decisive result. Austria can
be invaded by the CAMONICA, GIUDICARIA, and LAGARINA Valleys through TRENT or on the
east up the routes taken by Austria in her move against Italy, but there must be a fight and
provision made to follow up advantages promptly and effectively.
The question of how far Italy is willing to go after she is in possession of the territory she claims should belong to her, should be positively ascertained.

CHARLES G. TREAT,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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Rolls and Rosters: Return

Activities of the 332d Infantry in Italy

September, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

Record of Events: This regiment performed the usual garrison and training duties in camp to September 11, 1918. On September 11, 1918, the 2d battalion accompanied by auxiliary detachments from headquarters company, supply company, and machine gun company, and the sanitary detachment, proceeded to take over a designated sector of the Italian front. The remainder of the regiment performed the usual garrison and training duties in camp from Sept. 11 to Sept. 30, 1918.

WILLIAM WALLACE,
Colonel, 332d Infantry,
Commanding Regiment.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fl dr. 696: Telegram

Disposition of American Troops in Italy

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
October 2, 1918.

L. R. No. 2638
Italia

C-in-C.,

G. H. Q., A. E. F.

Number 118. One battalion American troops now occupying sector on Piave just north of Maserada. Plan remaining two battalions to follow later in same sector. The whole regiment will then be made a part of a division not yet designated that will take part in whatever movement is ordered. Health excellent, spirits high. Field training and target practice worked on since arrival here.

TREAT.

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Situation of the 332d Infantry

[Contemporary Translation]

ITALIAN MILITARY MISSION,
AT AMERICAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS IN FRANCE,

October 8, 1918.

No. 1211

Subject: 332d American Regiment

A-1 From: General Perelli - Chief of Italian Mission

To: Commander-in-Chief

I have the honor to communicate you that the last map of situation of the Italian front shows that all the American 332d Regiment is in line in the zone of Treviso.

PERELLI,
Brigadier General, Chief of Mission.

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Base Section No. 8

Brigadier General Treat, American Military Mission,

Supreme Headquarters in the Zone of Action

Following telegram received for you from H. A. E. F.: “Number 3438 G-1. You are hereby appointed Commanding General, Base Section No. 8, which will comprise Italy. You will receive instructions from Commanding General, Services of Supply.” Signed McAndrew.

October 21, 1918.

BUCKEY,
Military Attaché.

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Disposition of American Troops in Italy

L. R. No. 2773
October 21, 1918

Commander-in-Chief,

General Headquarters, A. E. F.

Number 158. 1 division British and one division French remain opposite Asiago in Sixth Army Italian Command. Two new armies organized on Piave, Tenth and Twelfth. Twelfth, Graziani, French commanding occupying sector west present Eighth Army. 1 French division remainder Italian troops. Tenth, Lord Cavan, British commanding occupying sector east present Eighth Army and that Third Army on Piave composed of two British divisions and remainder Italian troops. Full details will be sent later. The American regiment remains with Third Army and is now in billets in Treviso.

TREAT.

Location List of American Units in Italy

Major General James G. Harbord,

Commanding General, Headquarters Service of Supply, A. E. F., France.

[Extract]

My dear General Harbord:

Replying to recent telegram announcing my selection as Commanding General of Base Section No. 8, I wired for instructions as directed.

In order to better acquaint you with the conditions in Italy, I am enclosing you a list of all the separate elements belonging to the United States that are on duty in Italy or loaned to the Italian Government. You will notice that they are considerably scattered and a number of loose ends to be picked up.

* * * * *

Very truly yours,

CHARLES G. TREAT,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.
HQ. BASE SECTION No. 8, S. O. S.  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-E
Telegraphic: Hq. Base Section No. 8, S. O. S., via Cesarotti 10, Padova, Italy

U. S. A. A. S. DETACHMENT  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-A
Telegraphic: Genoa, Italy

SUPT. POSTAL EXPRESS SERVICE  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901
Telegraphic: Milan, Italy

C. O. U. S. AIR SERVICE IN ITALY  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-B
Telegraphic: Coasit, Rome, Italy

C. O., 332d INFANTRY  
C. O., 331st FIELD HOSPITAL  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-C
Telegraphic: Treviso, Italy

C. O., BASE HOSPITAL 102  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-D
Telegraphic: Vicenza, Italy

C. O., U. S. A., AMBULANCE SERVICE  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-F
Telegraphic: Mantua, Italy

C. O., U. S. SUPPLY DEPOT  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-G
Telegraphic: Comando Deposito Americano Alessandria

C. O., AIR SERVICE  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-H
Telegraphic: Turin, Italy

C. O., 8th AVIATION INSTRUCTION CENTER  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-J
Telegraphic: Foggia, Italy

American R. T. O.  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-M
Telegraphic: Modane, France

C. O., U. S. COMBAT UNIT AIR SERVICE WITH ITALIAN ARMY  

Mail address: A. P. O. 901-E
Telegraphic: Padova, Italy.
Organization of Base Section Number 8

SERVICES OF SUPPLY,
OFFICE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF,
October 26, 1918.

Commanding General, S. O. S.

General Treat, Headquarters, A. E. F., Padova, Italy.

Letter of Instructions

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to instructions of the C-in-C, contained in Telegram No. 3439, G-1, G. H. Q., dated October 21, 1918, the organization of Base Section No. 8, comprising all A. E. F. personnel in Italy, will shortly be announced in orders. It is assumed that you will proceed with the organization of your command in accordance with our Telegram F-897, this date.

By order of the C. G.:

J. P. McADAMS,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

Movement of the 332d Infantry

FIELD ORDER No. 1

332d INFANTRY, A. E. F.,
A. P. O. 901, October 28, 1918--21 h.

Map Reference: Map between the Tagliamento and the Piave, 1/100,000

1. The enemy is resisting our troops north of the Piave. This regiment is a part of the 31st Division, British XIV Army Corps, Italian Tenth Army.
2. This regiment will march on VARAGO [via TREVISIO] LORGIO d: LANCENIGO--VASCON- VARAGO Road. The head of the column will clear initial point (the southwest corner, 1st Battalion parade grounds) at 23 h. An officer from regimental headquarters will be present to act as guide from the initial point.
3. The regiment will march in column of squads, keeping close to the right side of the road. The head of each battalion will reach the initial point in time to take its place in line. The order of march will be:
(a) Headquarters Co.
   Captain Wm. H. Robbins
   (a) Headquarters Company with M. G.

- 544 -
(b) 2d Battalion, Maj. F. M. Scanland  
(c) 1st Bn., Major R. B. Burch  
(d) 3d Bn., Major Henry Vaughn.  

X. A. E. F. march discipline and regulations will be maintained. Passing initial point, a distance of eighty (80) yards will be kept between companies and two hundred and fifty (250) yards between battalions.

4. Rolling kitchens, water carts, ration carts will follow their respective companies. Ambulances, medical carts, machine guns, and machine-gun carts will follow their respective battalions. The supply and ammunition train will follow the column as close as road congestion permits.

5. Commanding officer and regimental staff will be at the head of the column.

By order of Colonel Wallace:

SAUL MAGNUS,  
Captain, 332d Infantry,  
Adjutant.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Troops in Italy: Fldr. 3: Report

Situation of the 332d Infantry

Varago, October 28, 1918---4 h.

Map Reference: PIANURA---VENETO---FRULANA---1/100,000.

[Extract]


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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Troops in Italy: Fldr. 5: Letter

Plan of Italian Offensive

AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO ITALY,  
A. P. O. 901-E, October 29, 1918.

From: Chief, American Military Mission to Italy.

To: Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., France.

1. In accordance with your directions in your telegram Number 138, October 26, 1918, "Plan for present offensive desired. Request that all data be submitted in English,
by order Conner,” the following outline of the general plan of the present Italian offensive is submitted.

2. In the section from the Swiss border down to the Adige River no definite movement was to be undertaken. In the sector between the Adige and the Brenta sufficient activity was to be undertaken to occupy the enemy’s troops of this sector and prevent their being shifted to other more seriously threatened points. Between the Brenta and the Piave the advance was to be sufficiently far to occupy the commanding heights in this sector and to cut off communications from Feltre to the Asiago Plateau. The main movement was to center about the Italian Eighth Army in the region of the Montello.

3. Across the Piave and to the north of the Montello there is a prominent ridge of hills rising from the Piave near Sernaglia to an altitude of twelve to fourteen hundred feet, and running northeast toward Vittorio. Much of the Austrian artillery was located on the south face of this ridge and on some lower hills just west of Conegliano. The only other means of retreat for the Austrian troops located south of this ridge was round the south point of the hill or through Vittorio. The Twelfth Army was to cross and close the line of retreat south of the ridge. The Eighth Army, supported by the Tenth Army, was to advance on Vittorio and close the egress in this direction, when it was hoped that a large part of the artillery and the troops in this sector would be cut off and captured. The Tenth Army was to hold the line from Conegliano southeast of the river and when securely in position, the Third Army was to cross and move to the northeast toward Pordenone.

4. Crossing was to be made over a series of sixteen foot and eight wagon bridges between Vidor and Vernasca, with additional bridges in the vicinity of Papadopoli [sic] Island for the Tenth Army, and some to the north of Vidor for the crossing of the Twelfth Army. All the bridges between Vidor and Vernasca were broken the first day by the current or the Austrian artillery fire, and they were unable to replace them. Many of the bridges to the north and south of this sector were also destroyed during the day and replaced during the night, which accounts for the modification in the plan of advance from that contemplated in the original plan.

5. A division or more of cavalry was to be crossed over the fords in the vicinity of Papadopoli Island for use in the plain country to the north of Pordenone.

6. The sending of the plan was delayed until today to be sure that any information contained herein would not be detrimental to the success of the movement if it were disclosed through accident.

7. Full report of the advance as it was actually conducted will be submitted later.

CHARLES G. TRENT,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Troops in Italy: Flr. 3: Report

Situation of the 332d Infantry

Varago, October 29, 1918...17 h.

Map Reference: PIANURA--VENETO--FRIULANA - 1:100,000

[Extract]

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- 546 -
Troop movements, own and enemy: Regiment bivouacked at VARAGO awaiting orders to move.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Troops in Italy: Fldr. 3: Order

Orders for Pursuit

332d INFANTRY, A. E. F.,
A. P. O. 901, October 30, 1918—22 h.

Map Reference: PIANURA—VENETO—FRIULANA - 1/100,000

Troops

1. The Italian 31st Division, to which this regiment belongs is pursuing the enemy north of the Piave.
2. This regiment will move on VAZZOLA via ZANDONADI-TEZZE Road, and will cross the Piave tomorrow October 31, 1918, via the bridge at SALETTUOL. The head of the column will pass VARAGO at 7:15 h.
3. The regiment will march in column of squads keeping close to the right side of the road. The head of each battalion will be on the road at 7 h. The order of march will be:
   (a) Headquarters Company, Captain Robbins
   (b) 2d Battalion, Major Scanland
   (c) 1st Battalion, Major Burch
   (d) 3d Battalion, Major Vaughan
   X. Reveille will be at 5:30 h., breakfast at 6 h. A police of battalion areas will be made.
   A. E. F. march discipline will be maintained. The strictest economy in rations and water will be enforced.
   Passing the starting point a distance of 80 yards will be kept between companies and 250 yards between battalions. To avoid checks on the bridge and on the island these intervals need not be kept. The crossing will be carried out as rapidly as possible, the bridge being available for only 2 hours.
4. Rolling kitchens, water carts and ration carts will follow their respective companies. Ambulances and medical carts will follow their respective battalions. The supply and ammunition train consisting of thirty country carts will follow. This train will cross the Piave on the morning of November 1, 1918.
5. The commanding officer and regimental staff will be at the head of the column.

By order of Colonel Wallace:

SAUL MAGNUS,
Captain, 332d Infantry,
Adjutant.

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Situation of the 332d Infantry

Varago, October 30, 1918---17 h.

Map Reference: PIANURA---VENETO---FRIULANA - 1/100,000

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(f) Troop movement, own and enemy: Regiment bivouacked at VARAGO awaiting orders. Enemy continued retreat.

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Situation of the 332d Infantry

Vazzola, October 31, 1918---20 h.

Map Reference: PIANURA---VENETO---FRIULANA - 1/100,000

[Extract]

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(f) Troop movements, own and enemy: Marched from VARAGO at 7:15, arrive at the left bank of the Piave at 14:49, a distance of 6 kilometers. Crossed the Piave and arrived at the right bank at 16:26; Piave at this point being 3 kilometers from bank to bank. Italian and British troops movement and traffic extraordinarily heavy. Marched on to VAZZOLA, a distance of 8 kilometers, arriving at the hour 19:05.

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Rolls and Rosters: Monthly Return

Activities of the 332d Infantry in Italy

[Extract]

* * * *

Record of Events

The 1st and 3d Battalions of this regiment, together with headquarters, supply, and machine-gun companies, performed the usual garrison and training duties in camp from Oct. 1 until October 4, 1918, and on that date struck camp and went into billets back of
TYPICAL ITALIAN TERRAIN WHERE AMERICAN UNITS FOUGHT
Italian front, where the usual garrison and training duties were resumed. The 2d Battalion of this regiment, accompanied by auxiliary detachments from headquarters, supply, and machine-gun companies, and the sanitary detachment, occupied a designated sector on the Italian front from October 1 until October 13, 1918, and on October 14, 1918, rejoined the regiment in billets, resuming the usual garrison and training duties.

On October 28, 1918, this regiment moved forward and took part in advance on the enemy, regiment being on the march at the close of the month of October, 1918.

WILLIAM WALLACE,
Colonel, 332d Infantry,
Commanding Regiment.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF:Fldr. 696: Telegram

332d Infantry Crosses the Piave River

TELEGRAM 13 FCOBT OB November 1, 1918.

Commanding General, A. E. F., France, H. A. E. F.

No. A-95: November 1, on Astago line, advanced to Mt. Mosciagh, Mt. Longara, Mt. Lisser. Between Brenta and Piave, Colle. del Gallo, Fonzasco Pedavena, along the right bank Piave to Belluno, east of the Piave Infantry has reached Lago di Santa Croce, Polcenigo along the river Livenza to the sea. Cavalry has crossed the Livenza at several points and is reported as far east as San Quirino, Roveredo, Meduna. Over 700 guns and between 50 and 100,000 prisoners to date. Roads leading north reported choked with retiring troops behind Astago and Grappa sector. Weather cloudy. Additional bridges being put across Piave and bridges across Livenza under construction. American troops crossed Piave noon, October 31, are in positions west of Livenza River.

TREAT.

4:39 a. m., [November] 2.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Troops in Italy: Fldr. 3: Report

Situation of the 332d Infantry

Gajarine, November 1, 1918---17 h.

Map Reference: PLANURA---VENETO---FRIULANA - 1/100,000

[Extract]

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(f) Troop movements, own and enemy: Marched out of VAZZOLA at 9 h. to GAJARINE, a distance of 16 kilometers, arriving at GAJARINE at 16 h. Regiment bivouacked 2 kilometers north of town.

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Situation of the 332d Infantry

Cimpello, November 2, 1918—17h.

Map Reference: PIANURA---VENETO---FRIULANA - 1/100,000

[Extract]

(f) Troop movements, own and enemy: Marched out of GAJARINE at 2 h., arriving at MARON, a distance of 10 kilometers, at 5:05 h. At this point the regiment halted until 9 h., when it marched on to CIMPELIO, a distance of 17 kilometers, arriving at 16:30 h. Combat patrols preceded the regiment at a distance of 2 kilometers, covering a front of 5 kilometers.

Disposition of the 332d Infantry

FIELD ORDER NO. 4*

Chisitoll, November 3, 1918—1:45 a. m.

Map Reference: Map between the Tagliamento and the Piave.

[Extract]

TROOPS

1. The enemy is reported in position and retreating east of the Tagliamento. The 31st Division, to which this regiment is attached, continues its advance and will take up position on the west bank of the Tagliamento tonight. The British 7th Division is on our left. The Italian 10th Division is on our right.

2. This regiment marches as division advance guard at 9 h. and will take up position on the line established by Valvasone and Communale. The head of the column will clear Cimpello at 9 h.

ADVANCE GUARD

3. (a) 3d Bn., Maj. Vaughn: The 3d Bn. will be the advance guard. Its point will clear Cimpello at 9 h. Leaving Cimpello its route will be Road Fiume Veneto [sic]---Pescincanna---R. R. Pordenone-Casarsa to Orcenigo di Sotto then to Orcenigo di Sopra at which point it will follow the itinerary Orcenigo di Sotto---Castions---Moline Brusatrivio [sic]---Quota 39 [sic]---S. Lorenzo---Arzene---Valvasone.

* [Editorial Note: F. O. No. 3 is missing. Possibility exists that it was never issued.]
The advance guard will secure its flanks by numerous patrols.

**MAIN BODY**

(b) 1st Bn., Maj. Burch; 2d Bn. Maj. Scanland; Hq. Co., Capt. Robbins: The main body composed of 1st Bn., 2d Bn., and Hq. Co. will follow the advance guard at 300 yards.

The 1st Bn. will follow the itinerary of the 3d Bn. as far as S. Lorenzo where it will halt and await orders. Upon arriving at Orcenigo di Sopra, the 2d Bn. with headquarters company will leave the column and follow the Road Orcenigo di Sotto---Casarsa della Delizia---Communale.

X. Lt. Trik, R. S. O., will secure the whole front of the division with a reconnaissance detachment which will assemble at Cimpello 6h. He will keep liaison with the British 7th Division on our left and with the Italian 10th Division on our right.

4. The trains will be brought up as soon as they cross the river.

5. The commanding officer with regimental headquarters will be with the main body.

By order of Colonel Wallace:

SAUL MAGNUS,
Capt. 332d Infantry,
Adjutant.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 696: Telegram

**Situation of the 332d Infantry**

II FC A. O. B. November 3, 1918.

C. G., H. A. E. F.

Morning. Between Lake Garda and Swiss Border an advance has been started. Between Lake Garda and the Brenta River, the line has been advanced to Mori Rovere [Rovereto?] to Col Santo, Passo Della Borcila [sic] Mt. Majo [Mt. Maggio?] and Lastebasse. Between the Brenta River and the Piave the line has been advanced to Mt. Porreche [sic] Mt. Colombara, Mt. Flara [sic], Costa Alta capturing one thousand prisoners, and 200 guns. East of the Piave line is Longarone [sic] Aviano, San Quirino; east of Fordenone, Praturlone, Villotta, Cinto Caomaggiore, Settimo and advancing toward Tagliamento. The cavalry has reached the Tagliamento where the enemy is defending the passage. On November 1, seventeen American aviators in Italian planes in cloudy weather bombed bridges and enemy troops vicinity Tagliamento River, all returned. Weather Nov. 3 drizzling rain. American troops with line in vicinity of Tagliamento.

TREAT.

11 p. m.

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S. Lorenzo, November 3, 1918—17 h.

Map Reference: PIANURA---VENETO---FRIULANA - 1/100,000

[Extract]

Troop movements, own and enemy: Marched out of CIMPELLO at 9 h. arrived at S. LORENZO at 16 h., covering a distance of 18 kilometers. The 2d Battalion proceeded to the bridgehead at Ponte Della Delizia, at the Tagliamento River, arriving there at 17 h. Combat patrols preceded the regiment by 2 kilometers, covering a front of 5 km.

General impressions of the day: Due to successful marching, drawing close to the enemy rear, morale of our troops good.

Valvasone, Cse. della Ponte Road, November 4, 1918—17 h.

Map Reference: PIANURA---VENETO---FRIULANA - 1/100,000

[Extract]

Weather: Cloudy.


Our infantry activity: one battalion (2d) crossed the Tagliamento capturing or killing the crews of ten machine-gun nests on opposite bank of the Tagliamento. Our machine-gun activity: none.

Artillery activity: None.

Airplane and balloon operation: None.

Visibility: Good.

Troop movements, own and enemy: 1st and 3d Battalions moved from S. LORENZO at 8 h. to the VALVASONE---CSE della Ponte Road, a distance of 7 km. arriving at 13 h. The 2d Battalion, after crossing the Tagliamento at 5:30 h. moved forward along the CODROIPO-UDINE Road, through the town of CODROIPO which it captured with vast stores of munitions and wagons and hospital supplies; to the town of VILLAORBA on its left and the TREVISO-UDINE Railroad on its right.

General impressions of the day: Enemy demoralized. Morale of our troops good.

Success of our troops: All objectives gained; 52 prisoners taken; one town of enemy stores captured. Extremely light casualties.

Repulse or misfortune of our troops: None.
The location of the lines held by our troops or enemy and all changes: 1400 meters from VILLAORBA on the left and the TREVISO-UDINE Railroad on the right. Hostilities ceased at 15 h.

Available for all duty: Officers; 112. Men; 3,364.

Operations of the 332d Infantry

Received at G. H.Q., A. E. F.
186F CF 199 OB
Commanding General, H. A. E. F.

[Extract]

No. 210, November 6, 332d Infantry, American, Colonel William Wallace, left Treviso 22:30 h., October 29, as part of the Italian 31st Division attached to Tenth Army. After four days forced marches reached Tagliamento River near Valvasone, 15 h., November 3. The 2d Battalion with attached fractions, 1st and 3d Battalions, with machine-gun detachment 16 guns, Major F. M. Scanland, crossed Tagliamento by single plank over wreckage of destroyed bridge at Ponte della Delizia between 3:45 and 5:20 o'clock morning November 4, in face of machine-gun fire from front and flank deployed under left bank river and pushed forward 10 miles to final object Villaorba, where they were at 15 h., when Armistice went into effect. • • • The American regiment was the first infantry across the Tagliamento. Large stores of munitions transport and field piece captured Codroipo. In conjunction with British on left and Italians on right, large numbers of prisoners were taken. Weather cloudy, no air activity.

10:34 p. m.

Operations of 332d Infantry in Italy

2d BATTALION, 332D INFANTRY,
Codroipo. November 6, 1918.

From: C. O., 2d Bn., 332d Inf.
To: C. O., 332d Inf.
Subject: Report on action Nov. 4/5

[Extract]

1. At 4 p. m., November 4, 1918, I was ordered by Gen. De Angelis, Comdg. Italian
31st Div. to proceed to the west side of the Tagliamento River and take up an outpost position at the bridgehead (this message was delivered to me by the general's aide.) I arrived at the bridgehead at 5 p.m. and was informed that there was a force of approximately one battalion of enemy infantry occupying a defensive position on the east of the Tagliamento River at the bridgehead and that I was to hold my battalion in readiness to force a crossing of the river at this point. I sent reconnaissance patrols to determine the approximate strength and position of the enemy and from reports of these patrols I estimated strength of the enemy to be five hundred.

2. At 3:15 a.m., November 5-18, I was ordered to proceed to cross the river with my battalion, taking up a front of 1600 meters before reaching the east bank of the river. This position was taken up at 5:15 a.m. and the advance began at 5:20 a.m. and immediately upon starting the enemy opened up with intermittent rifle fire and in about two minutes opened up with a heavy machine-gun fire. From about twenty guns. I continued to advance supported by twelve of my own machine guns, assailing and taking the enemy positions at 5:40 a.m. It was necessary to use hand grenades to dislodge enemy machine guns.

3. Upon advancing the entire line 500 yards on the east bank of the Tagliamento River, I reassembled my battalion and continued the advance on Codroipo, using one company in the advance guard and one company with two platoons on the right and two platoons on left of road, consisting of strong combat patrols supported by automatic rifles, and reconnoitering the country for about 2,000 yards on either side of the road. When the column had advanced about one and one-half miles we were subjected to enemy shrapnel fire which necessitated forming the column on either side of the road to continue the advance. During the entire advance on Codroipo we met with repeated machine-gun action. These guns were dislodged by our own machine-guns, five of which were with the advance party.

4. We arrived at Codroipo about 9 a.m. taking the town, capturing about two and one-half million dollars worth of ammunition (all calibers) arms and wheel transportation. En route we captured a 77-mm. field gun with full complement of equipment.

5. At 3 p.m., two companies of the battalion had advanced and had taken up a 1400 meter front with the left flank resting on Villaorba and the right on the Treviso-Udine Railroad, two companies remaining in Codroipo guarding town and captured materiel.

6. The morale of the troops throughout the entire action was excellent and perfect control and liaison was maintained at all times.

8. The assistance rendered by the medical detachment was excellent.

9. My losses occurred in the early stages of the action in my attempt to take machine-gun positions which were hindering my approach.

F. M. SCANLAND,
Major, 332d Infantry.
Activities of the 332d Infantry in Italy

November, 1918.

Record of events: October 29, 1918, this regiment left Treviso, Italy, arriving at Varago at 23:39 h., a distance of 13 km. October 30, 1918 bivouacked at Varago. Oct. 31, 1918 marched from Varago at 7:15 h.; arrived at left bank of Piave at 14:49 h., distance of 6 km.; crossed Piave, reaching right bank at 16:26 h. (Piave at this point 3 km. from bank to bank); marched on to Vazzola, arriving at 19:05 h., distance of 8 km. Nov. 1, 1918, marched out of Vazzola at 9 h., reaching Gajarine at 16 h., distance of 16 km.; regiment bivouacked 2 km. north of town. Nov. 2, 1918, marched out of Gajarine at 2 h., arriving at Maron at 5:05 h., distance of 10 km.; halted until 9 h., then marched on to Cimpello arriving at 16:30 h., distance 17 km. Combat patrols preceded regiment 2 km., covering front of 5 km. Nov. 3, 1918, marched out of Cimpello at 9 h., arrived at S. Lorenzo at 16 h., distance 18 km. The 2d Bn. proceeded to bridgehead at Ponte della Delizia at the Tagliamento River, arriving there at 17 h. Combat patrols preceded the regiment by 2 km., covering a front of 5 km. Nov. 4, 1918, enemy bn. on opposite side of Tagliamento maintained a steady machine-gun fire at bridgehead Ponte della Delizia. 2d Bn. crossed Tagliamento at 5:30 h., capturing or killing the crews of ten machine-gun nests on opposite bank of Tagliamento. *** 1st and 3d Bns. moved from S. Lorenzo at 8 h. to Valvasone-Cse della Ponte Road, distance of 7 km., arriving at 13 h. 2d Bn., after crossing Tagliamento at 5:30 h. moved forward along Codroipo-Udine Road, through town of Codroipo, which it captured, with vast stores of munitions, wagons and hospital supplies, to the town of Villaorba on its left and Treviso-Udine R. R. on its right. Nov. 5, 1918, 1st and 3d Bns. marched from Valvasone-Ponte della Delizia Rd. at 12 h. to S. Lorenzo, distance 7 km., arriving at 19 h.; November 6, 1918, 1st and 3d Bns. left S. Lorenzo at 9 h., met at Codroipo by 2d Bn. at 17:30 h. and marched to Pozzuoli, distance of 43 km., arriving at 4 h.; Nov. 7, 1918, regiment marched from Pozzuoli at 9 h. to Lovario, distance of 12 km. arriving at 14 h.; Nov. 8, 1918, regiment marched from Lovario at 11:30 to Ippilis, distance of 11 km., arriving at 15:30 h. Regiment bivouacked 2 km. south of Ippilis, until Nov. 12, 1918. Nov. 12, 1918, the 2d Bn. received orders to move to Cattaro [Montenegro] Dalmatia, via Venice, which order was executed at 8 h. 1st and 3d Battalions marched from Ippilis at 13 h. to Cormons, Austria, a distance of 13 km., arriving at 16:30 h. 1st and 3d Battalions bivouacked at Cormons until Nov. 18. Nov. 18, 1918, 3d Bn. ordered to Fiume by train, via Trieste. Departure 11 h.; 1st Bn. remained at Cormons until Nov. 23. Nov. 23, 1918, 1st Bn. ordered to return to Treviso, Italy. 1st Bn. marched to Treviso arriving evening of Nov. 28, 1918. Nov. 29, 1918, 1st Bn. went into billets south of Treviso-regimental headquarters established at Treviso. (Note: Figures of 2d and 3d Bns. shown on their return represent status at time battalions were detached from regiment, except the subsequent changes in status covered by hospital reports; no direct communication with 2d and 3d Bns. available.) This regiment took part in the Allied offensive on the Italian front, October 26, to November 4, 1918.

WILLIAM WALLACE,
Colonel, 332d Infantry,
Commanding Regiment.
ACTIVITIES
AMER 332d INF REGT
OCTOBER - NOVEMBER 1918

ITALY

AUSTRIA

GULF OF TRIESTE

ADRIATIC SEA
Report on Italian Offensive Operations, October 24-November 4, 1918

From: Chief, American Military Mission to Italy, A. P. O. 901-E, Italy.

To: Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

[Extract]

1. Enclosed herewith is a duplicate of a report furnished the Commander-in-Chief, A. E. F., at the close of the Italian offensive.

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CHARLES G. TREAT,
Brigadier General, U. S. A.

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The Battle Of Vittorio

FOREWORD

Because of the large number of prisoners taken by our army and the amount of documents of every kind left by the enemy in our hands, all of which require time for examination, it has been impossible as yet to reconstruct the battle in detail. Beginning on the Piave between Moriago and Sernaglia and ending at Vittorio four days later, this battle resulted in the break-through and destruction of the Austro-Hungarian army. It will be more difficult to reconstruct its retreat, because, with the exception of individual cases, it represents a flight not of a defeated army, but of human herds withdrawing aimlessly and without a guiding hand.

The present report contains a summary of what we have so far been able to deduce concerning our offensive from the questioning of prisoners and from a first examination of enemy documents possessed by this office. In this summary, even if minute details are lacking because of insufficient clearness, the important happenings are given in such a way that no change will become necessary at the conclusion of further investigations, the result of which will be contained in a larger work, which this office is now engaged upon.

INTRODUCTION

If, in the study of a military operation, the taking into account of the soldier's morale is of capital importance, the morale of the troops composing the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army, opposing us in the battle of Vittorio, will require particular investigation. This was never truer than in the present case. Not that the disaster which befell the enemy army is due to causes other than those which were the results of the development of our maneuver (besides, all the information hitherto received leaves one with the absolute certainty that the enemy was defeated in a bitter struggle), but because the development of the whole battle appears clear enough when the materiel and morale of the enemy are taken into account.

SITUATION OF THE ENEMY UPON THE EVE OF THE BATTLE

The political disturbances in the Austro-Hungarian army at the beginning of the present autumn assumed towards the middle of October a revolutionary character, not be-
cause they were accompanied by vast and violent popular outbreaks, but for the fact that they aimed infallibly at a complete change of the existing order of things in the old Hapsburg Monarchy.

The manifesto of October 16, with which Emperor Carl I of his own free will granted the different nations subject to Austria the right to dispose of themselves, represents the culminating point of this revolution. On October 21, the Germans of Austria formed their own National Council. While acting as provisional government for the German provinces in the monarchy, this really represents the end of the dominion over the other races subject to the Hapsburgs, a dominion which had hitherto been exercised by the German-Austrians. On October 23, Hungary proclaimed her separation from Austria. By doing this, she became unable to exercise her supremacy over the Roumanians, Slovaks and Jugo-Slavs, something which was possible before due to the complicity of Austria-German element. These two events had a rapid effect on troops of German and Hungarian nationalities, and especially on the latter, which constituted the majority of the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army. This, however, happened only in the rear, for but vague and uncertain news reached the front lines. It must be added that such news began to reach the line only after the commencement of the attack against the enemy between the Piave and the Brenta.

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On October 24, from the report of our two officer-informers then present in the zone of the 6th Arag (Buja-Majano,) an open revolt broke out among the Hungarian troops of reserve battalion of the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army. The revolt first began with the refusal to go to the front and later with the development of real combats between Hungarians and Jugo-Slavs; and especially between Croats and Mahometans, still obedient to the orders of the Austro-Hungarian command.

On the eve of our attack, the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army was, for all the reasons given above, in a very difficult situation. At the front it had, intact and still loyal, faithful units, but it was faced by the unavoidable threat of seeing them disperse the moment they came to learn of the events which had already developed in the interior of their country. It had, moreover, in the reserve zone, march formations in open revolt (as the above-referred to officers stated, the rebels amounted to more than 5,000) troops upon whom not only was it impossible to rely to fill up the eventual gaps of the units at the front, but whom it was absolutely essential to get rid of, to prevent their seditious spirit from spreading to the units which were still loyal.

Finding itself in such conditions, the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army command decided to evacuate a vast zone of the invaded territory, with the intention of placing in safety the greatest possible number of men and quantities of material, and of eventually successfully opposing our probable pursuit on the Tagliamento, and on the Cadore and Carnian Alps, as well as preventing an invasion of Austrian territory.

But at the beginning of the movement of evacuation, the Austro-Hungarian Sixth Army was caught by our offensive. It became, therefore, necessary for the Austro-Hungarian army to resist determinedly on their lines in order to save the materiel already on the way to the interior, and to countermand the order for the evacuation of the artillery and all materiel indispensable for the soldiers in the trenches; in a word, its plan of withdrawal was frustrated. It had, therefore, to remain on the spot and accept the fate which the Italian thrust had reserved for it.

DISLOCATION OF THE TROOPS OPPOSING OUR ARMY ON THE EVE OF THE OFFENSIVE

On the enemy front, from the Bersaglio della Priula to San Vito di Valdobbiadene (this front, according to documents captured from the enemy, was organized exactly as reported by this office in its publication La Fronte della 6a Armata a. u.) the following major units were lined up on the eve of the battle:

- The 51st Division H. from the Bersaglio della Priula to Marcatelli
- The 41st Division H. from Marcatelli to Falze' di Piave
- The 12th Dismounted Cavalry from Falze' di Piave to Sernaglia
- The 11th Dismounted Cavalry from Sernaglia to Vidor
- The 31st Division from Vidor to west of Valdobbiadene

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Two divisions were in reserve. The 25th, with its headquarters at Campea, especially
destined for the Vidor Sector, where it had previously been in line; and the 34th in the
Pordenone zone, especially destined for the Falze’ sector.

Besides these units, should the need arise, the command of von Boroevic’s Group of
Armes could dispose of several other divisions: The 10th at Francenigo; the 26th at
Sclovons (26th Schz.); the 43d and 44th Schz. between the Tagliamento and the Livenza.
These units were not particularly to be relied upon, as signs of great war-weariness, not
to mention of rebellion had already appeared among them.

ENEMY’S PREPARATIONS FOR RESISTANCE

The enemy had foreseen our attack. Being engaged in bitter combats in the zone be­
tween the Piave and the Brenta, he began to get the impression that an offensive on a
vast scale was imminent. The exact date of our attack on the front of the middle Piave
was probably indicated to him by Italian prisoners taken on the 25th and 26th. The fore­
telling of our offensive was received by the enemy troops with apathetic resignation.
On the 26th, the headquarters of the Sixth Army gave orders to resist to the last on the
front lines, hastening at the same time their preparations for a temporary transfer to
Pordenone, the first stop on the way to the Carinthia.

The 34th Division, with its headquarters at Pordenone, received orders to move
towards the Piave, and to line up temporarily in the Colle Umberto zone. The Austro­
Hungarian command relied greatly on this division, composed of fresh troops, hardly three
months back from the Ukraine, where they had had time to gain efficiency. This unit
represented an excellent element of resistance to our offensive.

The 25th Division had been collected for a long time at Campea. It had no need of
further movement, as it was in a good position for reinforcing the line anywhere in the
plain of Sernaglia.

THE BATTLE

On the night of the 27th, all the units depending on the Eighth Army had the order
to attempt the crossing of the Piave. The first reaction on the part of the hostile
infantry was practically nil. Our pontoniers began to build bridges without being har­
assed by a single Austrian machine-gun or rifle shot. The artillery, however, soon be­
came very active. In the sector of the attack Bersaglio della Pruida [sic] - Nervesa the
fire was so intense that it hindered the crossing of the river. In the sector Grave di
Ciano-Vidor the bridges thrown over were destroyed by very violent fire of concentration,
executed by medium and heavy calibers.

Only in the middle sector was the fire less intense, because the disposition of the
enemy artillery (which we knew) was such as to be unable to develop a strong reaction,
especially on the part of the front facing the salient north of the Montello.

For these reasons, only a small number of our troops could be taken to the left bank of the
Piave, troops which were exclusively dependent on the army corps in the center. The army corps
on the left was able to send across the Piave only a few hundred men, using for that purpose the
bridge which had been built by an Allied division a little below Valdobbiadene.

The infantry regiments, as soon as the river was crossed, vigorously attacked the
enemy line. The enemy had left only small outposts along the observation line partly
on the sandy ground of the river, partly on its left bank. The main forces were drawn
up on the line of the Villages of Vidor---Mosnigo---Moriago---Sernaglia---Falze’ di Piave.

On this line, which was reached at daybreak, October 27, our troops met with an in­
tense resistance. Especially between Sernaglia and Vidor the enemy doggedly opposed our
advance. Between Sernaglia and Falze’ di Piave his reaction was less violent.

Some units of the 41st H. Division, after but a few hours of fighting, began to fall
back toward Piave del Trevisan, but not without attempting to hinder our advancing troops.
Thus, by night, the enemy line between Mosnigo and Sernaglia had suffered only slight
withdrawals; between Sernaglia and Falze’ however, it could be considered as broken. But
our troops were unable to take immediate advantage of this. They were deprived of all
communications with the right bank of the river, all the bridges on the front of the army having been destroyed. They could not receive reinforcements and could rely upon few provisions, brought to them almost exclusively by air.

On the contrary, the enemy had been able to reinforce the wavering units with fresh and numerous troops. To support the 11th H. and the 12th Dismounted Cavalry, which were in the Vidor sector, the enemy had sent the 25th Division; the 34th Division moving from Colle Umberto to Pedeguarda. It then came into line behind the 41st Division. On the night of the 27th, the latter was able to counterattack, compelling our farthest advanced elements to fall back on the Sernaglia-Falze' line.

On that night of October 28, the construction of the bridges was again undertaken, only to be disturbed by the enemy artillery fire in the western and center sectors and prevented in the eastern sector. Having augmented our forces on the left bank of the river, we were able to overcome the resistance of the enemy on the Moriago-Sernaglia line. After the 11th and 12th Dismounted Cavalry Divisions had been reduced to a few men, the front was taken over by the 25th Division. The latter deemed it necessary to engage all its units in order to put up a determined resistance. And these, under the ever increasing pressure of our men, took up their positions on the line Colbertaldo---Posmone---Farra di Soligo towards evening. The 41st H. Division also found it necessary to withdraw onto the hills of Col della Tombola, along the valley of the Soligo.

On the night of the 29th, all the bridges on which the work of reconstruction had been started previously, were finished for the third time. Two new ones were thrown across the river between Nervesa and the Ponte della Priula, and then all the troops of the Eighth Army were able to pass to the left side of the river. Decisive operations date from that time. The 25th Division offered some resistance at [Monte] Moncader and then withdrew on Refrontolo, leaving a considerable number of prisoners in our hands. The few survivors of the 11th and of the 12th Dismounted Cavalry received orders to take up positions at Vittorio-Veneto. The 41st H. Division was left without orders, with its scattered remnants between Refrontolo (20th H. Regt.), Santa Maria di Feletto (31st H. Regt.), and the 12th H. Regt. cut off in the zone of the Colle della Tombola, where the rest of the regiment, 999 men in all, was surrounded and taken prisoner. The 32d Honved Regiment, already thrown in disorder during the day of the 28th, withdrew disorganized and with difficulty reached the plain, where it followed the wide wagon road Conegliano-Udine and was captured in small groups.

On the night of October 30, all the Austro-Hungarian troops who had fought in the Sernaglia Plain withdrew completely routed to Vittorio-Veneto. For, from then on it was no longer possible to speak of organized units. The commands of major units no longer carried out their functions. The commands of minor units could rely solely upon units of troops picked up here and there, with which they could only harass, but not stop our advance.

The day of October 29 had a terrible effect on the enemy. Besides the complete and definite breaking of his line, the capture of large numbers of prisoners, and a great quantity of arms and material, our offensive caused the greatest discouragement in the hearts of the enemy troops, which soon degenerated into an open revolt.

Thus, on the 30th, while the struggle was going on at the Serravalle Pass, the 28th Fj. and 32d Fj., the only units not yet engaged in the battle, refused to enter the line, and their individual units, without their officers but with their weapons, turned right about and started homewards. A large unit of the 29th Regiment of the same division, a regiment which had hitherto proved to be loyal and well-disciplined, first opposed some resistance to our advance beyond Ceneda and then surrendered in mass (707 prisoners). The 29th Schz. and the 30th Schz. of the 43d Schz. Division, having received orders to march on Vittorio, stated their desire to return to their homes. With its band in the lead, the 29th Schz. with all its officers, set out for Udine via the Sacile-Pordenone Road.

The battle was over. The enemy’s withdrawal was changed into a disorderly flight. Our pursuing troops had only to overcome the resistance of stubborn units here and there.

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