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# United States Army in the World War, 1917–1919

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FOREWORD

Military historians and scholars of operational art have tended to neglect the role played by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. Although the Army organized a historical office in 1918 to prepare a multivolume history of the war, budget restraints and other considerations frustrated Chief of Staff Tasker H. Bliss’ intention to “record the things that were well done, for future imitation . . . and the errors as shown by experience, for future avoidance.” The momentous events of succeeding decades only strengthened this tendency to overlook our Army’s role in the fields of France in 1918. This neglect, although understandable, is unfortunate; World War I posed unique challenges to American strategists, tacticians, and logisticians—challenges they met in ways that could provide today’s military student with special insights into the profession of arms.

To encourage further research in the history of World War I and to fill a gap in the Army’s historical documentation of that conflict, the Center of Military History has created a World War I series of publications consisting of new monographs and reprints. Complementing our newly published facsimile reprint Order of Battle of the United States Land Forces in the World War, we are reprinting this seventeen-volume compilation of selected AEF records along with a new introduction by David F. Trask. Gathered by Army historians during the interwar years, this massive collection in no way represents an exhaustive record of the Army’s months in France, but it is certainly worthy of serious consideration and thoughtful review by students of military history and strategy and will serve as a useful jumping off point for any earnest scholarship on the war.

There is a certain poignancy connected with the publication of this collection in the seventieth anniversary year of “the war to end all wars.” Later this summer veterans of that war will gather together, perhaps for the last time, to discuss the history of the American Expeditionary Forces and to reminisce about their service. To them especially, but to all five million Americans who served in World War I, we dedicate this scholarly undertaking.

Washington, D.C.
1 June 1988

WILLIAM A. STOFFT
Brigadier General, USA
Chief of Military History
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Military Operations
of the
American Expeditionary Forces
The German offensive of July 15, 16 and 17, 1918, marked the turning point of the war. Immediately thereafter, the Allies launched an offensive which continued until the Armistice (Nov. 11, 1918).

The attack was made by the army group of the German Crown Prince, which included from their left to right, the German Third, First and Seventh Armies. The front of the attack extended from the west of the ARGONNE Forest to the vicinity of NEUILLY-la-POTERIE north of the Marne. The object of the attack was to seize the railroad center of REIMS and the high ground of the MONTAGNE de REIMS, and to push the Allied armies back to the MARNE in that locality (CHALONS to EPERNAY). A further purpose was to forestall an anticipated Allied attack against the flanks of the inherently weak MARNE salient. This attack was actually launched against both the flanks on July 18.

The German attack was opposed by three French armies, which were already in position on July 14, to wit: Left to right, the Sixth, Fifth and Fourth Armies. The Sixth Army comprised the French II Corps, the French VII Corps, the American I Corps, the French XXXVIII Corps, and the French III Corps. Its sector extended from ANCIENVILLE to BOUQUIGNY (incl.). The Fifth Army, in the middle of the group, included no American troops. The Fourth Army, comprised the French IV, XXI, VIII and XVI Corps. Its sector extended from PRUNAY (excl.) to the HOUYETTE Ravine, and later to BEAURAIN Woods.

Four American divisions (26th, 3d, 28th, 42d, in order from left to right), and the 369th Infantry, part of the 93d Division, took part in this operation. The 26th Division was in line on the right of the American I Corps. The 3d Division was in line on the right of the French XXXVIII Corps, on the south bank of the MARNE, immediately east of CHATEAU-THIERRY. The 28th Division, originally in reserve, fought in the front line of both the XXXVIII and III Corps. The 42d Division, in reserve of the XXI Corps, had five infantry battalions and all of its artillery in action. The 369th Infantry of the incomplete 93d Division, was in the reserve of the VIII Corps, and successively attached to the French 16th and 161st Divisions.

The German attack had been foreseen for at least a week, and on the night of July 14/15, it was learned from German prisoners that the preliminary bombardment would begin at ten minutes after midnight.

The French met the attack by opening a powerful counterpreparation fire about an hour before the German bombardment began. The French Fourth Army withdrew troops from its advanced positions and, on this front (CHAMPAGNE), the German bombardment fell on empty terrain. The attack on this front was almost a complete failure, and the Germans were unable to capture REIMS.

The heaviest German attack fell on the front of the American 3d Division and the French division on its right (the 125th) which were in line on the south bank of the river, in and adjacent to the valley of the SURMELIN Creek. The attack here was made by the German 10th and 36th Divisions of the Seventh Army. They crossed the river and drove back the French, and were able to make but little progress against the American 6th Brigade, which consisted of the 38th Infantry (MacAlexander) and the 30th Infantry (Butts). The 38th Infantry held its ground close to the river, although assailed on three sides at once. It has since been known as the Rock of the Marne.
Fighting on this front was fierce throughout most of the day of July 15. On the next day, offensive operations ceased all along the front. Having failed to capture REIMS or to hold their slight gains against the American 3d Division, the Germans on the next day, July 17, gave over the attack and began a withdrawal.

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Order of Battle

July 15, 1918

(from west to east)

French Sixth Army:
Commander - General Degoutte
Chief of Staff - Colonel Brion

French II Corps: Commander - General Philipot
Fr. 33d Div. - Fr. 2d Div. - Fr. 168th Div.

French VI Corps: Commander - General Massenet
Fr. 47th Div. - Fr. 164th Div. - Fr. 4th Div.

American I Corps: Commander - General Ligget
Fr. 167th Div. - Amer. 26th Div. - Amer. 2d Div.

French XXXVIII Corps: Commander - General Debeney
Fr. 39th Div. - Amer. 3d Div. - 1/2 Amer. 28th Div., French 73d Div.

French III Corps: Commander - General Lebrun
Fr. 125th Div. - Fr. 51st Div. - 1/2 Amer. 28th Div. - Fr. 20th Div.

French Fifth Army:
Commander - General Berthelot
Chief of Staff - Colonel Bellague

(Since no American units were assigned to the Fifth Army, its composition is omitted here.)

French Fourth Army:

Commander - General Gourand
Chief of Staff - Lieutenant Colonel Pettelot

French IV Corps: Commander - General Pont
Fr. 163d Div. - Fr. 124th Div. - Fr. 132d Div. - Fr. 71st Div. - Fr. 27th Div.

French XXI Corps: Commander - General Naulin
Fr. 170th Div. - Fr. 13th Div. - Fr. 43d Div. - Amer. 42d Div. - Fr. 46th Div.

French VIII Corps: Commander - General Hely d'Oissel
Fr. 161st Div. - Fr. 16th Div. - Fr. 1st D. C. P. - Fr. 4th Algerian Regt. - Fr. 2d Moroccan Regt. - Amer. 369th Regt.

ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE

German Ninth Army: Commander - F. von Below
German First Army: Commander - von Mudra
German Third Army: Commander - von Euiem

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

For the Generals commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the East

I. The object of the anticipated German attack in Champagne may be:
   To draw the mass of our reserves from the region of Paris and the zone of the Franco-British junction.
   To effect the fall of Reims and gain a foothold on the Montagne de Reims.
   To bring the Epernay---Chalons---Revigny Railroad within range of its artillery.
   To enlarge the salient formed by the front of the Second Army by means of an advance west of the Argonne.
   The enemy must be prevented from reaching these objectives.
   Consequently the Generals commanding the French Group of Armies of the North and the French Group of Armies of the East will conduct their operations in conformity with the following instructions:

II. Our combined forces, distributed on the Champagne front or concentrated in the rear of that front, now enable us to meet the enemy attack, at least, in the shape which this attack seems to be taking.
   Our best interest requires, therefore, the Group of Armies of the North and the Group of Armies of the East to prepare to conduct the battle in Champagne and in the Argonne with the means at present at their disposal so as to foil the diversionary maneuver which seems to be part of the enemy’s designs.
   This course of action involves great elasticity on the part of the two army groups in the handling of their reserves and immediate plans looking to the eventual constitution of new reserves (redistribution of means, transportation plans, and plans for rapid withdrawal, etc.).

III. The enemy effort must be broken on the position of resistance: This is the concern and the duty of the front line infantry divisions.
   The defense of this position will therefore be conducted as a continuous defense, without any break in its continuity, by the main bodies of the front line divisions reinforced, if need be, at certain important points, by elements detached from second line divisions [in fact our very first problem is one of organizing a powerful line of fire along the entire extent of the position of resistance].
   Effective at once, second line divisions will be disposed in such a manner as to be able to provide security detachments for the second position under any circumstances and also to be able to pass to the counteroffensive, either locally to reestablish the integrity of the position of resistance or in a general movement involving the whole army launched in an attack to regain lost ground after the main body of the enemy forces has been checked by the resistance of the front line divisions.
The general counteroffensive of the second line divisions, made possible by the stubborn resistance offered by the front line divisions will be, from the beginning of the battle, one of the preoccupations of the High Command.

IV. In the case of a large-scale battle, the Commander-in-Chief will bring up to the zone of the Group of Armies of the North a first echelon of 5 infantry divisions whose first destination zone will be the Dormans---Montmirail---Chalons region.

The transportation of these five divisions would be simultaneous, if need be, and would take place as follows.

One division by rail.
Four divisions by motor.*

The numerical designations of these divisions and their source will be indicated at the proper time.

The General commanding the Group of Armies of the North will request from the Direction of the Rear all necessary information concerning the arrival and the further movement, on the territory of the Group of Armies of the North, of the motor columns coming from the Reserve Group of Armies. He will make all the necessary advance arrangements for the stationing of the five above-mentioned divisions in the Dormans---Montmirail---Chalons region.

V. In case the battle should not extend to the Argonne, the General commanding the Group of Armies of the East will prepare for the rapid concentration in the region between Ste-Menehould and Nettancourt, of three infantry divisions (French 36th, 127th and 131st Inf. Divs.) or such elements of these divisions as may be available.

VI. The employment of the Commander-in-Chief's reserves brought up south of the Marne (Dormans---Montmirail---Chalons region) and of the reserves of the Group Armies of the East concentrated between Ste-Menehould and Nettancourt will be studied, either with a view to:

Supporting the flanks of the battle dispositions (Montagne de Reims on the west, Argonne on the east);
Reinforcing the resistance in a threatened zone or at any points which it is essential to hold for later developments in the battle; or
Passing to the counteroffensive against the flank of the enemy attack.

The mission of the French I Cavalry Corps has been previously defined by Instructions No. 2701 of July 3, from the Commander-in-Chief. This corps will be responsible for covering the later concentration of reserves brought up by the Commander-in-Chief to the Dormans---Montmirail---Chalons region.

PETAIN.

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* The Director of the Motor Transportation Service can transport the artillery of 2 of these 4 divs. together with the infantry.
Organization of Command

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 17736

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 14, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMAND IN THE ZONE
OF THE GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER

The General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center has the following forces at
his disposal for the operation:

French Fourth Army: VIII, XXI and IV Army Corps
French 63rd Inf. Div., 1st Dismounted Cavalry Division, 16th, 161st, 43rd, 13th, 170th,
French Fifth Army: I Colonial Army Corps, Italian II A. C., French V A. C.
French 45th, 134th, 8th, 40th, 7th, 120th Inf. Divs.; 2d, 3d, and 10th Colonial Inf.
Divs., Italian 3d and 8th Inf. Divs.
French Sixth Army: III, XXXVIII, VII, II A. C., American I A. C.
French 51st, 125th, 39th, 167th, 47th, 2d, 33rd, 4th, 20th, and 168th Inf. Divs.;
American 4th, 3d, 28th, and 26th Divs.

Means at the disposal of the General, Commander-in-Chief:

1) French Ninth Army (Hq. at Fere-Champenoise), eventual organ of command, will
study the plans which were defined by Personal and Secret Instructions No. 3915, July 3.
[Not Printed.]

2) The Corvisart Groupment (Hq. at Givry-en-Argonne), comprising the French
68th, 127th, 131st, and 52d Inf. Divs., will study its employment on the left of the French
Second Army or on the right of the Fourth Army, by reinforcement or counteroffensive.

3) The Marjoulet Groupment (Hq. at Avize), comprising the French 9th, 10th,
14th and 77th Inf. Divs., will study its employment with the Fifth Army, on the right with
the Sixth Army, or on the left with the Fourth Army, also by reinforcement or counter­
offensive.

4) The French I Cavalry Corps, the British XXII A. C., the French 18th Inf.
Div., forming a reserve at the disposal of the General, Commander-in-Chief.

The General, Commander-in-Chief will decide the time when he will place all or part of
the above-named elements at the disposal of the General commanding the Group of Armies of
the Center.

He will likewise decide whether the Ninth Army will be employed to command a counter­
offensive groupment in one of the armies now in line or whether the army itself will be
brought into the front line, taking command of forces and a zone of action to be determined
at the time.

Consequently, the provisions of telegram No. 344-345/M, dated July 5 [not printed],
which met the requirement that units be assigned as they arrive in the zone of the Group of
Armies of the Center, are annulled.

PETAIN.

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- 5 -
**Combat Instructions**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 5486  
FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,  
**July 16, 1918.**

**ORDER FOR THE FRENCH FIFTH AND SIXTH ARMIES**

The enemy is apparently preparing to make an attempt to enlarge the salient created in our positions by advancing east on both banks of the Marne, particularly along the left bank.

The Sixth Army will move the French 131st Division to the region of Bois de la BOULOYE---CHENE-la-REINE.

That division and the French 77th will pass to the orders of General Geraud, who will have the following mission:

1. To oppose the enemy advance along the left bank of the Marne.
2. To support the offensive action now being fought by the 77th Div. to throw the enemy back on the west.

They will establish close liaison on their left with the right of Lebrun's, French III Corps.

MAISTRE.

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**Use of Air Units**

[Editorial Translation]

Staff  
No. 5,457  
FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,  
AIR SERVICE,  
**July 15, 1918.**

**ORDER FOR JULY 16, 1918**

The general commanding the air division will place a combat group at the disposal of the French Fourth Army. He will operate with the remainder of his forces on the front of the French Fifth and Sixth Armies.

By order:

MOLLANDIN,  
Chief of Staff.

--------
Ninth Army Assigned

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section
No. 6079-6080/B

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,
July 16, 1918--8:15 p.m.

To: Hq. Trilport [French Sixth Army]; Montmort [French Fifth Army];
Esternay [French Ninth Army]; Provins [French General Headquarters]

I. The General commanding the Ninth Army will, effective at 8 a.m., July 17, assume
command of the two army corps on the right of the Sixth Army (French XXXVIII and III Army
Corps) and the divisions now stationed in their zones: that is, French 4th, 18th, 20th,
and 168th Inf. Divs., and also the artillery units in position in this area, and the
British aviation brigade.

II. He will take over the tactical command of this group which remains attached to
the Sixth Army for all other purposes. The zone of action of this group is bounded on the
right by the former boundary of the Fifth and Sixth Armies; on the left, by the present
boundary of the XXXVIII A. C. and the American I A. C.

III. His headquarters will open at Villenauxe, with a C. P. at Esternay.

IV. His mission will be to throw back to the Marne the enemy troops which have gained
a foothold on the south bank of the river, and in close liaison with the left of the Fifth
Army to oppose with all his means the enemy advance toward the Epernay area.

MAISTRE.

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French Sixth Army
July 15-17, 1918

Annex 2136: Telephone Message

Employment of French 73d Division Counterattack in the Jaulgonne Bend

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 15, 1918--7:35 a.m.

Telephoned French XXXVIII A. C.

Authorization given to XXXVIII Army Corps to employ the French 73d Inf. Div. to
counterattack in the direction of the JAULGONNE Bend as the Germans have crossed the Marne
at 5 points from FOSSOY to SAUVIGNY.

[No signature.]

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- 7 -
**Enemy Crosses the Marne between Dormans and Verneuil**

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 15, 1918---7:50 a. m.

Major Richter, at Trilport

Enemy has crossed the MARNE between DORMANS and VERNEUIL and has reached BORONDERIE Farm and penetrated into the Forest of BOUQUIGNY. [Telephoned to French Group of Armies of the Center.]

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HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Message

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2020/3

Confirmation of telephone message to Hq. SEZANNE [G. A. C.] at 9:20 a. m. and to French G. Q. at 10 a. m.

The French XXXVII Army Corps reports that the American 3d Division has held its position of resistance.

On the front of the French III Corps situation uncertain in the woods northeast of CONNIGIS and in Bois de CONDE.

The enemy is reported to have occupied La BORONDERIE (north of La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON)---CLOS-MILON---La GALINATERIE.

By order:

VERGNE,
Chief of 3d Section.

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HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Order

**Movement of French 4th Division**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2021/3

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 3492/3

(Confirmation of a telephone message)
The French 4th Infantry Division will proceed immediately to FONTENELLE, by marching. It will continue to be in army reserve. It will be disposed in the FONTENELLE region in such a way as to be prepared to counterattack either to the north or the northeast. Observation post: FONTENELLE.

By order:

C. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.1: Order

**Combat Instruction**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,023/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 15, 1918---12:20 a. m.

ORDERS No. 3,493

FOR THE FRENCH III ARMY CORPS

(Confirmation of a telephone message)

I am planning on a counteroffensive between VASSIEUX and COURTEMONT for tomorrow morning, July 16.

This counteroffensive will be directed by yourself and executed by the following elements placed at your disposal:

The French 77th, 20th, 18th and 73d Infantry Divisions (less one regiment left at the disposal of the French XXXVIII Army Corps) and the French 4th Infantry Division which will be in the region of FONTENELLE about 5 p. m. this evening.

Directions of attack for your counteroffensive will be the following:

(a) VASSIEUX (77th Division, which will at the same time maintain liaison with the French Fifth Army).
(b) IGNY-DORMANS (one division).
(c) La CHAPELLE---SOILLY---COURTHIEZY (one division).
(d) Bois de ROUGIS-REUILLY and contingently, COURTEMONT (one division).
(e) Bois de JUTE-COURTEMONT (73d Division, less the regiment left at the disposal of the XXXVIII Corps).

This counteroffensive will be executed as soon as possible during the early hours of the morning of July 16.

In case the 2d position is broken through, this counteroffensive will jump off from a base farther to the south which you will determine.

DEGOUTTE,
General.

---
FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
July 15, 1918.

TRUE COPY to the American 3d Div.

The counterattack of the French 73d Inf. Div. contemplated in this order for the morning of July 16, has been set for the afternoon of July 15 by the XXXVIII Corps under whose control it has been placed. It is in process of being carried out. The above order in no way modifies the orders issued for it and the movements in progress.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Assistant Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Message

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
Trilport, July 15, 1918--5 p. m.

Hq. TRILPORT, Sixth Army

To: Hq. VERSIGNY, Tenth Army; MONTMORT, Fifth Army; FERE-CHAMPENOISE, Ninth Army

A German attack was launched on the entire east portion of the army front beginning at CHARTEVES (10 to 12 divisions identified up to the present).

The preparation began at midnight all along the south bank of the river and was particularly violent from JAULGONNE eastward.

The infantry attack was launched about 6:30 a. m. and the enemy succeeded in crossing the MARNE.

At the latest reports the front held by us at 3 p. m. had not changed and was marked by FOSSOY---the railroad---MEZY---MOULIN-RUINE---JANVIER Farm---GRANGE-aux-Bois---south edges of St-AGNAN and La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON---COMBLIZY---NESLE-le-REPONS ---MAREUIL-le-PORT.

On the whole, no part of our front was broken.

In the course of counterattacks executed at MEZY and FOSSOY, the American 3d Division took 400 prisoners, including 1 battalion commander. The total number of prisoners amounts to about one thousand.

Leboq's division is executing a counterattack at this time in the general direction of St-EUGENE---COURTHIEZY. No information has yet been received.

On the right bank day calm, marked by several bursts of artillery fire on the SILLY-TROESNES area and by a concentration of 350 gas shells on the Le CHATEL Road. [Not identified.]

A long-range gun is firing on MEAUX, La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE, MONTMIRAIL.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Asst. Chief of Staff.

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**Movement of French 168th Division**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,027/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 3497

For the French 168th Inf. Div.

(Confirmation of telephone message)

Amended orders previously issued, the 168th Division (Hq. ETAVIGNY) will be brought to the south of the MARNE this evening (ORBAIS area).

Movement by truck, at least for the infantry. Detailed orders will be issued as soon as possible.

By order:

VERGNE,
Chief of 2d [sic] Section.

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**Movement of French 168th Division**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,035/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 3500

PART I

[Extract]

I. The French 168th Inf. Div. will move beginning the evening of July 15 to the zone of the French III Army Corps, at whose disposal it is placed.

II. ***

Initial destination, MONTMIRAIL ***

* * * * * *

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- 13 -
By phone. Received 8:45 p. m. - Lt. NORBY

The French 37th Field Artillery, at the disposal of the American I Corps, will be withdrawn from its firing positions during the night of July 15/16 and brought back to its echelons. It will prepare to move to the French Fifth Army, at whose disposal it will be placed at MARCHAIS-en-BRIE (initial destination). Route by way of La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE ---MONTMIRAIL Road.

maintenance of French 146th Field Artillery Unit

Degoutte, General of Division, commanding the Sixth Army to the General commanding American I Corps.

In response to your letter of July 15 concerning the 2d Bn. of the French 146th Field Artillery, G. P. F., I have the honor to inform you that I share your view completely. However, as a consequence of the attack of this morning, the situation places the temporary maintenance of this battalion with the Charlier Grouping.

Moreover, the General commanding the artillery of the American I Corps recognized the necessity of this after a conversation with the general commanding the army artillery.

The 2d Bn. of the 146th will be placed at your disposal as soon as circumstances permit.

BRION.

Situation at 3:50 a. m.: The enemy fire opened on the entire corps front about 12:10 a. m.
It extended to the rear areas and batteries which are being gassed. The French XXXVIII A. C. only slightly affected, lends its support. The bombardment does not seem to extend to the corps on the left. Boulanger [C. G., 51st Div.] announces at 3:40 a. m. that all his batteries are continuing to fire. Desnoyers has been ordered to move his 2d and 3d Bns. to within 1 km. of the 1st line of the 2d position.

---

5 a. m.: Shelling continues, particularly on the Jaulgonne Bend, Moulin-Ruine and St-Eugene. Gas in the Surmelin Valley.

---

6:10 a. m.: An airplane reconnaissance fails to yield a report of anything interesting because of the difficulty of observation. Fierce fires in Crezancy and St-Eugene. The pilot thought that he saw a bridge that had collapsed into the river.

---

6:15 a. m.: From the Courthiezy side a small enemy force was reported to have succeeded in crossing the Marne and to have seized one of our posts in the French 113th Inf. Order was given the colonel to throw his force back across the river, taking a company from the divisional infantry reserve, if necessary. In front of the French 76th Inf. nothing new on the principal position but still no news from the outposts.

Very thick smoke on the Marne in front of the 131st Inf. Montmirail was shelled last night by 380's.

---

6:25 a. m. by radio - regiment on the left: The fighting is up in front of the main line of resistance south of the Moriton (indecipherable, name unknown).

---

6:35 a. m. from the 51st Inf. Div.: A noncommissioned officer, liaison agent with the battalion commander in the outpost at Dormans, returned to his detachment with a message saying that at 4 a. m. the Boche had crossed the Marne between Verneuil and Try and had outflanked Dormans on the east.

---

7:15 a.m. Sent to the army: The enemy has crossed in force between Dormans and Verneuil. He is probably at La Bourdonnerie; they are in Forêt de Bouquigny as far as the command posts of the regimental commanders. Order has been given to Desnoyer's division to occupy a [sic] between the 2d position.

General Lebrun considers it desirable to alert the French 77th Inf. Div.

---

French 125th Inf. Div. - 7:35 a. m.: Principal position broken on the right. The enemy is advancing up the Surmelin Valley toward Crezancy. Report by a captain of the 125th Div. who passed through here.

Inf. of the 125th Div. at 5:25 a. m. reports that the French 273d Inf.
[51st Div.], has given way on the principal position of resistance and is fighting on the position of the reserves on a general line through La BOURDONNERIE.

The 1st position of resistance in front of the French 113th Inf. is being vigorously attacked and is yielding ground at some points.

General Diebold [125th Div.] has no information of the situation on his right.

5:45 a.m.: The enemy is reported to have reached the front REUILLY-SAUVIGNY at 5:30 a.m.

The Colonel commanding the French 131st Inf. announces at 5:45 a.m. that the enemy crossed the MARNE at SOMMELANS [sic] and is advancing on the slopes west of the MOULIN-RUINE plateau. He seems to have reached a point near CA. . . . . . . . [sic].

At 6:55 a.m. the line appears broken on the front of the French 173d [sic]; the enemy is nearing the colonel's C. P. (La GRANGE-aux-BOIS).

---

8:30 a.m. (Transmitted): The regiment on the left of Boulanger's div. has given ground. As a result a pocket has been created on the front approximately between the meridians of Les MARECHAUX and La CRESSONNIERE in depth about as far as CHEZY.

The two regiments on the right seem to be holding their ground on the principal position; their left near CHAMPAILLET.

Order from General Desnoyers to select the necessary forces from his troops to extend the center regiment to the 2d position.

(The General has issued the order to use 1 battalion for this purpose.)

---

8:40 a.m.: The preceding order relative to the French 20th Inf. Div. is annulled because of a new situation. The 2d regiment on the right has also given ground and the 2d position is reported under attack east of La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON.

La GALINATERIE is still being held, but weakly.

---

8:45 a.m.: The 77th Div. has held Bois des CHATAIGNIERS with 2 bns.

The Chief of Staff asks that it establish contact with the right of the 20th at Le VIVIER.

An officer is sent to establish liaison with the French 18th Inf. Div. which is unloading in the vicinity of MONTMIRAIL.

---

8:50 a.m. - 20th Inf. Div.: The enemy is preparing to attack on the front of the French 2d Inf. and 25th Inf. The front of the French 47th Inf. appears more quiet.

Request for plane to reconnoiter CLOS-MILON.

---

From Diebold - 9 a.m.: The front is marked by the line of resistance from MOULIN-RUINE to MAISON-ROUGE thence via 5177---north edge of the clearing---line of abatis at 5567. Liaison no longer exists on the right between French 76th Inf. and 113th Inf. The 76th has bent back its line, forming defensive flank. Machine-gun fire northeast of CELLES-les-CONDÉ. It is believed that other troops will have to be committed at once if outflanking is to be avoided.

---

- 16 -
9:20 a. m. from the 125th Div.: We no longer have La GALINATERIE. COMBLIZY is still holding out. The enemy is advancing east from CLOS MILON.

---

9:45 a. m.: A dropped message, 8:30 a. m.
French at Le MONCET---COMBLIZY [Ancien] Chateau---trench west of Le MONT CET. The front line seems formed by the COMBLIZY---La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON Road.
Some French are advancing north to Crossroads 2036-2546 [sic]
Boche are advancing south to Hill 243 (south of CLOS-MILON) skirting the woods.
8:55 a. m.: French in south edges of CHAPELLE-MONTHODON (trench).
Panels, 51st Inf. Div. have just left TROU-d'ENFER Fme.
Dropped message (no hour) received at 9:50 a. m.: CREZANCY occupied by our troops where the line is marked at the request of the observer. MOULIN de PAROY in flames.
Americans on the ECHAMPS Road going toward CREZANCY.
Sector rather quiet except in the CREZANCY-CONNIGIS Valley.

---

SEZANNE [French Group of Armies of the Center] 10 a. m. to French III A. C.:
507/3 [3d Section, General Staff]
The 18th Inf. Div. will be pushed north, its leading elements to the region of VERDON-MARGNY; stationing to be regulated by III Corps with the previous approval of director of motor transport service.
Elements already unloaded will be sent at once to the new stationing area.

---

18th Inf. Div. until further orders will be in reserve of the Group of Armies of the Center. It will maintain a liaison detachment at the headquarters at MONTMIRAIL. Will make a report of execution of above instructions.

---

10:10 a. m. - 20th Inf. Div.: The 20th Div. is defending the 2d position, which is intact, with 6 bns.; the 3 others are in rear.
Liaison is established with the 77th Div, which holds the Bois des CHATAIGNIERS.

---

LORRAINE 10:10 a. m.: The French 4th Inf. Div. will be put in march immediately for FONTENELLE. It continues to be in army reserve. It will be disposed in the FONTENELLE region in such manner as to be able to counterattack north or northeast. C. P.: FONTENELLE.

---

10:10 a. m.: The 77th Div. is placed at the disposal of the III A. C. for counter-attack. The French 1st Cavalry Division will take the place of that division.
The counterattack (from the Chief of Staff) cannot take place until the 1st Cavalry Division has arrived.

---
Front of the French Fifth Army at 9:45 a.m. from right to left: PRUNAY (Boche). The Boche are attacking SILDERY. No change as far as REIMS.

Starting from CHAUMUZY: CHAUNY (Boche)---NAPPES (Boche)---ESPILLY (French)---La NEUVILLE-aux-LARRIS (French)---CUCHERY (Boche)---BASLIEUX. The line crosses Bois de RARREY, VANDIERES (Boche), TROISSY (Boche).

---

10:40 a.m. from the army: Between DORMANS and TRELOUP the Germans have thrown across eight bridges on which our artillery is not firing.

---

AVIATION - 11 a.m.: There are 6 bridges west of DORMANS, 2 very large ones between DORMANS and TRELOUP, one to the south of TRELOUP unfinished, one at TRELOUP finished, one at COURTHIEZY, one unfinished between REUILLY and COURTHIEZY. Heavy traffic on the first two. A large column of vehicles is waiting to cross; another, between COURTHIEZY and ST-AGNAN, is arriving at the edge of the forest near Les LESNARDS Farm.

---

11:05 - Message at 10:30 a.m.: No French on the front between FOSSOY and CHEZY. No one at CREZANCY. A column of vehicles on the CONDE-COURTHIEZY Road going south, head on a line with Les LESNARDS.

1 battery near Les LESNARDS; no traffic on the right bank of the MARNE.

---

11:15 a.m. - Army order (Col. Pellegrin): I am planning a counteroffensive for tomorrow, to be carried out by you.

You will have the 20th, 77th, 18th, 73d and 4th Divs. The last--named will be in the FONTENELLE area this evening about 5 p.m.

---

12:15 p.m. - French 51st Inf. Div.: 11:30 a.m.: The Boche are probably surrounding the 2d position from La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON to COMBLIZY (incl.).

Left regiment: Leading battalion disappeared. The others have some elements north of Bois du BREUIL. Colonel killed. 2 bn. commanders wounded.

Center regiment: Colonel and some elements are resisting with ours east of COMBLIZY. No news of the battalion in line.

Right regiment: Remainder of 2 bns. in Bois des PLANS (north of NESLE-le-REPONS) in liaison with colonials.

At 10:05 a.m. the Boche were on the PATIS [de-TROISSY]---NESLES-le-REPONS Road, on the general line of La GRANGE-aux-BOIS.

Artillery situation will be the subject of a written report.

10 75-mm. guns and 2 batteries of 155's of the 5th Bn., 101st Heavy Artillery, south of the 2d position.

Diebold 1:05 p.m.: Two principal drives of the Boche on 231-223.

Diebold has asked that Leboeuf hurry. He has expended the two American companies that were on the switch.

The counterattack of the 77th should coincide with that of the 73d.
1:30 p.m. Situation 125th Div.: At 11 a.m. the 125th Div. was holding MOULIN RUINE---Le MAISON ROUGE---JANVIER Farm---the spring south of La GRANGE-aux-Bois. Liaison established with the American 3d Div. on the left.

After a slight calm, the enemy has again begun to push in the direction of ST-AGNAN---Bois de ROUGIS. General Diebold sent an officer to ask that the 73d Div. make its counterattack this evening or that he be sent reinforcements.

2:45 a.m. Telephoned to the army: We are holding MOULIN ROUGE---La MAISON ROUGE---the JANVIER clearing---the spring south of La GRANGE-aux-Bois. The Boche hold ST-AGNAN---La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON. We therefore are holding, in general, the 2d position or the ground in front of it (we certainly must have elements in the Bois des PLANS and to the east of COMBLIZY).

3:15 p.m.: A battalion of the French 33d Col. Inf. is supporting the MARNE to its front which extends along the east edges of MARUEIL-le-PORT; it is holding the crest of its Hill 122, then joins the line which passes to the north of Bois des CHATAIGNIERS. Some elements of the 73d are fighting near MONT-MERGEY.

3:25 p.m. from the Chief of Staff, 20th Div.: Observed by an artillery officer from La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON. Boche seem falling back in rear and reorganizing near MONTLECON, La BOURDONNERIE, La VITARDERIE (small group on plateau and slopes north of La CHAPELLE which appear occupied only by some machine guns and a few individuals). They are no longer even collecting their wounded. They have blown up an infantry ammunition dump. Their troops seem to be massed on the slopes south of the MARNE.

Request that an airplane go to see.

4 p.m. Chief of Staff 20th Div.: Violent shelling, by calibres of approximately 105-mm. and 150-mm., south of COMBLIZY, which seems to be a preparation.

The commander insists that every means be used to reduce the volume of traffic on the footbridges.

5:15 p.m. from the 125th: The order has been sent to the 73d for its operation.

Artillery situation: None of the elements west of the SURMELIN has stirred. Those to the east have been brought to the southeast of CONDE, forming 2 groupments, the 1st of 11 batteries of 75's; the 2d of 7 batteries of 75's (Hill 208).

In case of the heavy howitzers: 2 entire battalions remain.

The exact losses in personnel and materiel are not yet known. Situation in front
of the 125th Div. unchanged; front relatively calm. Hill 223 reported Boche (awaiting confirmation); Hill 216 undoubtedly ours. Clearing southeast of La GRANGE-aux-BOIS reported ours. Point 5567 certainly ours. West edge of JANVIER Farm clearing ours. Liaison established on the left; on the right, uncertain.

---

11:25 p. m. 125th Div.: On the right the battalion of the 356th which was attacking St-AGNAN continued to hold it almost intact in spite of a vigorous enemy counterattack.

Farther north the 2 bns. of the 356th which were attacking toward La GRANGE-aux-BOIS and the elements at JANVIER Farm ran into an enemy counterattack. They continued, nevertheless, to advance toward their objective.

The 3 bns. of the 366th were momentarily separated from the 356th by an enemy counterattack. They are not continuing their advance and should effect a junction with the left of the 356th on the general line of the north edge of the JANVIER Farm clearing.

Please report any additional telephonic communication that is established.

---

11:50 p. m.: General Lebrun is sending an officer to the General commanding the 4th Div., whose division is being moved by motor to the BAULNE-Le BREUIL area, to tell him that the General commanding the army wishes one of his regiments to participate in the attack, which has been set for 10 a. m. Consequently, one regiment of the 4th Div. will follow the attack of the Franco-American detachment to reinforce its attack if necessary. The General commanding the 4th Div. will reach an agreement on this subject with the General commanding the 20th Div., 1 regiment of which, with 1 American bn., forms the detachment and has regulated the attack with the artillery of the 4th Div.

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HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Letter

**Movements of 2d Division Units**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,049/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

Trilport, Seine-et-Marne, July 15, 1918.

General of division DEGOUTTE, commanding the French Sixth Army

To: The General commanding the French Group of Armies of the Center

I have the honor to report to you that, on the front held by the American I Army Corps, transfer has been made today of:

(1) The artillery of the American 2d Division
(2) The French 75-mm. artillery regiment (truck-carried)

and that the infantry of the 2d Division also will leave tomorrow, to be placed at the disposal of the army on the left.

I am reporting this situation to you for the reason that in the event an attack between the OURCQ and the MARNE is still possible, I shall be placed in a very unfavorable position to meet it.

- 20 -
I think that the French 168th Infantry Division, the only sector reserve, will be replaced also. The 168th and the porte regiment, whose departure you ordered today, were indispensable in the engagement provided for by Memorandum No. 1,500, July 15 [14] of the General commanding the French Reserve Group of Armies.

DEGOUTTE.


[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

July 16, 1918.

[Extract]

1:40 p.m.: Information brought by the Chief of Staff, 73d Div.

The attack of the 73d Div. was made by 2 regiments abreast, the French 346th and 356th; the 367th in reserve. The Boche are counterattacking everywhere.

The division takes St-AGNAN at 10 p.m. (356th) but loses it to an enemy counter-attack. The 356th retains only the last house of the village and the public laundry.

1 bn. of the 356th was marching to La GRANGE-aux-Bois; seems to have disappeared.

A gap has developed between this regiment and the 346th on its left. In order to guard against any enemy infiltration in that quarter, the General commanding the division has committed 1 bn. of the 367th on the CELLES-JANVIER Farm road.

The division is halted in this formation with 2 bns. of the 367th in reserve.

HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Message

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 2,065/3

To: Hq. VERSIGNY [French Tenth Army]; ESTERNAY [French Ninth Army]; MONTMORT [French Fifth Army].

The army front has remained calm on the right bank of the Marne. On the left bank, the Germans did not attempt any offensive action of any consequence. We launched a counterattack at noon. The operation, vigorously conducted, made good progress and enabled us to reduce the salient south of the river. Although violently counterattacked, our troops nevertheless continued their advance, and at 5 p.m. the front was marked by the following points held by us:

FOSSOY---Railroad---south part of MEZY---CREZANCY-Les-ETANGS---northeast edge of JANVIER Farm clearing---south approaches of La GRANGE-aux-Bois---Les MARECHAUX---La VITARDERIE---old Chateau at COMBLIZY---south portion of COMBLIZY and NESLE-le-REPONS.

Consequently the ground we have gained by this counterattack up to the present is as follows: Villages of St-AGNAN, La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON, CHEZY, MONTLEVON; the farms of
Les ETANGS, JANVIER, Les BOISETS, Les MARECHAUX, La BOURDONNERIE, La VITARDERIE, Ste-CROIX, CLOS-MILON, La CRESSONIERE, Les POZARDS, representing an advance of 1,500 to 3,000 meters on a front of more than 6 kilometers.

By order:

B. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

---

HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Order

**Troop Movement**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,067/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 16, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS
No. 3508

1st Part

[Extract]

I. The French 63d Inf. Div., placed at the disposal of the Sixth Army, will move as follows, effective July 16:

A. Foot elements and artillery by motor trucks. They will load July 16 at 7 p. m. (infantry) and at 9 p. m. (artillery). Initial destination: CHALONS-sur-MARNE.

B. The other elements will entrain and move by rail from the area GIZUCOURT—GIVRY-en-ARGONNE (density 24/24), effective at 11 p. m., July 16.

Detrainments: ORMoy, NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOuin, Le PLESSIS-BELLEVille, DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE.

II. The 63d Div., after detraining, will billet in rear of the French II Army Corps in the zone: THURY-en-VALOIS—AUTHEUIL-en-VALOIS—MAROLLES—Bois de BOURNEVILLE—NEUFCHELLES. C. P. at NEUFCHELLES.

Assignment of billets will be regulated by the General commanding the II Army Corps to whom an officer of the Motor Transport Regulating Commission of MEAUX will report without delay to prepare the plan for unloading the motor trucks.

The General commanding the II A. C., will also regulate the movement of the elements moved by rail from the detraining stations to the billets.

* * * * *

G. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

---
**Mission of Groupment Attached to French Ninth Army**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,070/3  
FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
July 16, 1918—11:45 p.m.

SPECIAL ORDERS

No. 3511

I. At 8 a.m., July 17, the French XXXVIII and III Army Corps will be placed under the orders of the General commanding the French Ninth Army (Hq. VILLENAUXE, C. P. ESTERNAY). This groupment will comprise all the infantry divisions under the orders of these two corps, as well as the French 168th Inf. Div. in army reserve (Hq. ARTONGES), and the artillery units in position in this region, and the British Air Brigade (Hq. at the Chateau de La FORTELLE, near ROZOY).

II. This groupment placed under the tactical orders of the Ninth Army, will remain attached to the Sixth Army for all other purposes.

III. The zone of action of this groupment is limited: On the right by the old boundary of the French Fifth and Sixth Armies, on the left by the present boundary of the French XXXVIII Army Corps and the American I Corps.

IV. The mission of this groupment is to throw back to the MARNE the enemy troops which have seized a foothold on the south bank of the river, and, in close liaison with the Fifth Army, to oppose with all means the enemy advance in the EPERNAY region.

V. Charlier Groupment of army artillery, retaining temporarily the heavy artillery of the American I Corps (4 bns. of 155 G. P. F.’s) (C. P. at FROMENTIERES), will continue its mission and will therefore comply with requests for fire which may be made on it by the American I Corps.

DEGOUTTE,  
General.

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HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Message

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
Trilport, July 16, 1918—7 a.m.

To: Hq. VERSIGNY, Tenth Army; MONTMORT, Fifth Army; FERE-CHAMPENOISE, Ninth Army

The attack executed at the end of the day by Lebocq’s division ran into a violent enemy attack launched almost at the same time. After a hard fight during which the village of St-AGNAN was taken by us, then lost again, our troops occupy the following line south of the MARNE:

- Last house in St-AGNAN---Public Laundry---Les DEBRETS Ridge---Triangulation Point 223---north edge of JANVIER Farm clearing---Les ETANGS.
The Americans are reported holding Le MOULIN-RUINE and being in the immediate vicinity of MEZY with elements in MEZY and FOSSOY. No change to the west of FOSSOY.

Gaucher's division has taken steps to straighten its front and has made a little progress, finding a few dead of the [French?] 260th and 74th.

The enemy attacked the American right about 10:30 p.m.; he was repulsed immediately.

Rather considerable enemy artillery activity with gas shells (some mustard) on the areas: BUSSIARES, CHAMIGNY, Bois de la BRIGADE-de-MARINE.

Harassing fire by enemy artillery on TROESNES, La FERTE-MILON, VAUX, and SILLY-la-POTERIE.

Shelling adjusted by planes yesterday about 11 p.m. on the FERTE-sous-JOUARRE railway station which is badly damaged.

By order:

G. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

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[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,080/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 17, 1918.

6 p.m., July 15 - 6 p.m. July 16

[Extract]

I. GENERAL APPEARANCE OF THE DAY: patrols very active. One of our detachments reoccupies the Bois CARRE.

Artillery very active. Numerous gas bombardments, especially in sector of American I Army Corps.

Moderate activity of the two air forces. A few bombs dropped on the PLESSIS-sur-AUTHEUIL region.

II. REPORT OF EVENTS
(a) Infantry Activity:

On the front of:

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<th>French</th>
<th>German</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Reconnaissance and observation patrols. In</td>
<td>Infantry very alert.</td>
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<tr>
<td>French II Corps</td>
<td>the afternoon of the 16th one of our patrols reoccupied Bois Carre.</td>
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<tr>
<td>French VII Corps</td>
<td>The advance of the French 164th Inf. Div. is executed without encountering any enemy. Numerous Franco-American patrols enable us to ascertain that the terrain in front of the DAMMARD distillery is free of enemy troops.</td>
<td>No Infantry action.</td>
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American I Corps

Our patrols active. One of them meets with strong resistance at the railroad near BOURESCHES.

French

About 11 p.m. a shelling of the front held by the American 101st Inf. points to an attack. A barrage immediately laid down prevents the enemy from leaving his lines.

French XXXVIII Corps

Report not received.

French III Corps

The counterattack by the French 73d Inf. Div., begun at 6 p.m., July 15, carried the front of this division during the night of July 15/16 to a line passing south of Hill 231 (REUILLY Hill)---500 meters northeast and north of MONTHEREL---Hill 223---south of [northwest?] of St-AGNAN.

At noon the expected counterattack is launched. The 73d Div. engaged in violent fighting around JANVIER Farm. It passes GRANGE-aux-BOIS captures St-AGNAN and goes beyond Les MARECHAUX Farm. In consequence of enemy counterattacks it is forced to fall back toward the south; St-AGNAN is lost again. ***

The French 20th Inf. Div. reinforced by a bn. of the American 55th Brigade captures MONTLECON Farm, CHEZY, La BOURDONNERIE Farm, La Vitarderie. It takes 172 prisoners but is forced to fall back.

The American bn. subjected to violent machine-gun fire, suffered considerable losses.

The left of the French 18th Inf. Div. advances in the direction of CLOS-MILON. Its right, counterattacked by the enemy, is unable to advance beyond COMBLIZY. In consequence of enemy counterattacks the left falls back to within 500 meters south of CLOS-MILON.

At night our front line is marked by: Les ETANGS Farm---St-AGNAN (exclusive; not retaken until 12:30 a.m. July 17) wood north of MONTLECON---CHEZY (inclusive) line of the ponds south of CLOS-MILON---old Chateau at COMBLIZY (inclusive)---COMBLIZY (exclusive)---MONT-MERGEY (exclusive) north edge of Bois Le VIVIER.

(b) Artillery Activity:

On the front of:

French

Harassing and interdiction fire on the BUISSON de CRESNES, the shelters southwest of CHOUY, Moulin-de-l'ILLE, PASSY, MARIZY-Ste-GENEVIEVE

Neutralization fire on the NOROY and NEUILLY-St-FRONT batteries.

Usual harassing fire.

Concentrations and harassing fire by the army heavy artillery on SOMMELANS, the south exit of NEUILLY-St-FRONT and LATILLY.

Counterpreparation fire on Bois des ROCHES and BOURESCHES.

Usual harassing fire.

German

Harrassing fire on Bois BUCHET, the OURCQ Valley, the Bois BOCHE, St-WAAS, Le SEPULCRE.

About 20 rounds in the direction of balloon 59 and on the THURY-AUTHIEUIL Road.

Normal activity.

Gas bombardment on Bois de VEUILLY, Le GRAND-CORMONT and surrounding woods. Our front lines shelled (VAUX---Bois de la MARNE [MORETTE?]---LUCY-le-BOCAGE and PARIS-METZ Road.

- 25 -
French Report not received.

French XXXVIII Army Corps

French III Corps

Preparation of French Infantry attacks. Counterpreparation against local enemy attacks. Continuous interdiction fire on footbridges and crossing points by

(c) Air Service activity:

Great activity.

German

Night and morning rather quiet. In the afternoon very strong reaction at the time of our counterattacks. Particularly heavy firing in the MONTH-UREL region, in the region of St-AGNAN, La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON and especially in the direction of the right boundary of the corps sector.

Lull about 3 p. m.

Activity resumed around 4 p. m. especially against PIOTS Farm, COMBLIZY and the northern part of Bois de ROUGIS.

No battery has been seen south of the Marne.

Rather considerable activity.

Several bombs dropped in the PLESSIS-sur-AUTHEUIL region.

Planes over our lines several times during the night.

(d) Miscellaneous: In front of the 1st line trench in VENDREST where the German raid had taken place during the night of 14/15, three German bodies have been found wearing the shoulder strap of the 250th Inf.

* * * * * *

By order:

E. LALANDE,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. File: Sixth Army: 416-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 16, 1918—2:30 a. m.

[Extract]

Capt. Martin in liaison with French III Corps: The Chief of Staff of the French 73d
Inf. Div. has just made a report of the attack of his division. The attack was made with
two regiments in front line, French 356th on St-AGNAN---GRANGE-aux-BOIS, French 346th on
the left, French 367th in reserve.

St-AGNAN was taken, then lost. The enemy has counterattacked everywhere. A
battalion of the 356th (the one which was attacking GRANGE-aux-BOIS) seems to have
disappeared. The gap between the 346th and 356th has been filled by 1 bn. of the 367th.

The line runs through the last house in St-AGNAN, the public laundry---Les
DEBRETS Ridge---north edge of JANVIER Farm clearing. GRANGE-aux-BOIS is very probably in
the enemy's hands.

Two bns. of the 73d Div. remain available.
The attack of the French III Corps is set for 10 a.m.
Nothing to report on the other portions of the III Corps front.

* * * * * *

The 346th is advancing to the north of JANVIER Farm clearing.
The 356th on the right holds Hill 223.

In Desvoyer's sector [20th Div.] nothing to report.

7:40 a.m. Gen. LeBrun to Gen. Lebocq: You have command of all the troops which are
in the front line between the MARNE and St-AGNAN; that is to say, on the 1st position and
the switch.

Move your C. P. to HAUCHE Farm immediately, beside General Diebold's C. P.

9 a.m.: It is learned that the French 77th Inf. Div. has lost Bois des CHATAIGNIERS.
Likewise the American 3d Division, during the evening and night, had to abandon
CREZANCY which is burning.

General de Mondesir has asked the 73d Division [sic] to endeavor to establish
liaison near PAROY with the 73d Division [sic] which, at the present moment is very uncertain.

11:15 a.m. from the 77th Div.: Attacks tonight on Bois des CHATAIGNIERS have been
violent.

They have cost the regiment of Foot Chasseurs severe losses.
It is reported that large enemy groups are assembling now on the wooded slopes
of LEUVIGNY, and the Bois du CROCHET and the Bois des CHATAIGNIERS. The enemy is attack­
ing at this moment in the direction of CHENE-la-REINE. Our artillery is taking these
groups under fire.

Assuming that all available troops are going to be employed in the attack, I ask
that a regiment at least be placed in reserve behind me on the north edge of Foret d'ENGHIEI.

11:20 a.m.: General Lebrun gives the order to the French 131st Div. to have its
leading regiment move to BEL-AIR area to protect the right flank of General Serigny, but
it is not to be employed in the attack.

11:30 a.m.: The preceding order revoked. The entire 131st will move toward the
north, its leading elements on the front: La GRANGE GAUCHER---ETANG du GRAND-PATIS, its
artillery prepared to enter the action of the 18th Div. or to defend the edge of the Bois
Communaux d'IGNY in case the 2d position has failed to hold.

12:40 p.m.: General Degoutte: To: General commanding the French 168th Inf. Div.:
Have the commanders of your two leading regiments reconnoiter the 2d position immediately.
One of them will reconnoiter that part lying to the west of the SURMELIN (COUFREMAUX
Ridge), the other, the part southeast of CONDE-en-BRIE (Hill 208). Study the dispositions
you would make of your command if you have to hold the 2d position between Bois de ROUGIS
(excl.) and the COURBOIN region.

For your information, the C. P. of the 73d Division is at La HAUCHE Farm.

By order:

F. PELEGRIN,
Asst. Chief of Staff.
Telephoned to French XXXVIII A. C.

5:15 p.m.: Headquarters Degoutte: To: Headquarters 168th Div. (CARTONGES): After having learned about your situation I have decided that your division (elements that have already unloaded or otherwise arrived) will pass the night in its present positions but you will take all measures necessary in order to be ready to move forward with all your forces beginning tomorrow the 17th, at daybreak.

C. P. MONTMIRAIL, III A. C.
July 16, 1918-5:15 p.m.

By order:

PELEGRIN,
Asst. Chief of Staff.

12 noon, from the 73d Div.: Situation in the 73d Div.: Public laundry at ST-AGNAN (incl.)---GRANGE-aux-BOIS (excl.)---north edge of JANVIER Farm clearing---MAISON-ROUGE (incl.). The offensive will be resumed at the hour set.

12:45 p.m. from the French 77th Div.: The Germans have attacked the plateau on the east and northeast of CHENE-la-REINE. Request at least two infantry regiments and a regiment of heavy artillery.

1:20 p.m. French 18th Inf. Div.: Regiment on the left is making normal progress. Nine prisoners of the 2d Jaeger and of the Hussars of the Guards. No information concerning the right regiment.

1:25 p.m. French 20th Inf. Div.: The Boche are evacuating the small woods north of MONTLECON; we are entering in pursuit.

1:40 p.m. XXXVIII A. C. Radio: Enemy infantry stopped at 0011 west of DORMANS before passing through MARNE-aux-PONTS [sic] 1120-1322.

1:40 p.m. French 18th Inf. Div.: Our left regiment is advancing. It is north of CLOS-MILON Farm. More prisoners.

Left bn. of right regiment is advancing. Right bn. has halted. Prisoners.

1st Foot Guards.

2 p.m. French III Army Corps: ST-AGNAN reported retaken.

6 p.m. French 125th Inf. Div.: Front of the American 3d Division: Rue de CHAILLY---MOULIN Road---thickets south of the road, PAROY (ours), liaison with Leboceq at Les ETANGS. Small number of Boche in front of the American 3d Division. Ready to advance as soon as the 73d Div. moves to MOULIN-RUINE.

(Information confirmed by the American brigade by means of Balloon 47)

7 p.m. 20th Inf. Div.: Line driven back by Boche counterattack north of CHEZY and MONTLECON Farm, losses heavy, especially in the American battalion; on the left line stopped at Les MARECHAUX; on the right, south of CLOS-MILON.

Apparent outline at end of day (8 p.m.) Les ETANGS (French)---GRANGE-aux-BOIS (French)---Les MARECHAUX (Boche)---Chateau at COMBLIZY (French)---MONT-MERGEY---Bois du VIVIEN.

ST-AGNAN [sic]
Tactical Command of Groupment Assigned to French Ninth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2078/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 17, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS

No. 3515

(Supplement to Special Orders No. 3511 of July 16, 1918)

By order of the General commanding the French Group of Armies of the Center, paragraph II, Special Orders No. 3511, is amended as follows:

II. This groupment is placed under the tactical control of the French Ninth Army.

For all other purposes (except questions of personnel, officers and men) it will remain attached to the Sixth Army as far as concerns those elements stationed between its west boundary (boundary between American I Corps and French XXXVIII Corps) and the old boundary between French Fifth and Sixth Armies: To wit: St-AGNAN—ARTONGES—MARCAIS-en-BRIE—MONTENILS—MEILLERAY—MOUTILS—VIEUX-MAISONS—COURTACON (these localities inclusive).

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BRION.

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[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
July 17, 1918—8 a. m.

[Extract]

Recapture of St-AGNAN by the 17th Co. of the French 356th [Inf.] the 17th at 12:50 a. m. At 7:15 a. m., the Boche shelled St-AGNAN and ROUGIS Woods violently. Situation unchanged during the night of 16/17; period marked by continual harassing fire from our artillery. No Boche reaction.

* * * * * 

The attack of the I Cavalry Corps and III Army Corps previously set (the 16th at 11:30 p. m.) by the Tenth [Ninth?] Army, for some time between 8 and 9 a. m., the 17th, is postponed until 11 a. m., the I Cavalry Corps not being ready (lack of ammunition).
From: Commanding General, I Army Corps, Am. E. F.
To: The Chief of Staff, Am. E. F.

1. Until yesterday, July 14, 1918, the I Army Corps command controlled tactically the 26th Division, Am. E. F. and French 167th Division in the front line and the 2d Division, Am. E. F. in the second line.

2. By orders deemed competent---viz: French G. H. Q., through the French Sixth Army---the artillery brigade of the 2d Division was moved on the night of July 14/15 to the French Tenth Army area in the vicinity of BETZ. Infantry and other elements of the 2d Division, Am. E. F. still remain in the vicinity of the 2d position of the I Corps, Am. E. F. sector and are still controlled tactically.

3. The 3d Division, A. E. F., is under the tactical command of the French XXXVIII Corps of the Sixth Army.

4. The 28th Division, A. E. F., is situated for training: One brigade on the 2d position of the French XXXVIII Corps, and one brigade on the 2d position of the French III Corps.

5. The 4th Division, A. E. F., is situated for training: One brigade on the 2d position of the French VII Corps and one brigade on the 2d position of the French II Corps.

6. The 1st Division, A. E. F., is in the vicinity of DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE in the area of the French Tenth Army: It is supposed by the Commanding General, Sixth Army, in a few days all of the 2d Division, A. E. F., will be moved to the French Tenth Army area, where, with the 1st Division, A. E. F., the III Corps, A. E. F., will be situated with corps headquarters at Meaux.

7. I am informed that there are no troops in sight to take the place of the 2d Division, A. E. F., in the I Army Corps, A. E. F., sector.

8. To sum up, these headquarters are responsible at present for the tactical command of the 26th Division, A. E. F., the French 167th Division, and the 2d Division, A. E. F. (less artillery brigade), until the moving of what remains of the 2d Division to its new area.

9. Administratively, these headquarters are at present responsible for the 3d, 4th, 26th and 28th Divisions, A. E. F.

MALIN CRAIG,

For: H. LIGGETT,
Major General, U. S. A.

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- 30 -
From 6 p.m., July 14 to 6 p.m., July 15, 1918

1. Germans inactive. Line held by 4th Ersatz, 87th Division and one regiment of the 201st Division.

2. Some information was received from prisoners captured after a German raid on VAUX. They state that the defenses against our right are poorly organized, consisting mainly of shell holes with a little wire. The prisoners are from the 403d Regt., 201st Division. A dead German left by a raiding party near BUSSIARES was from the 362d Regt. The order of battle is confirmed.

3. The enemy artillery was active during the day, still more so at night when gas and H. E. shells were used on our front lines, communications, and intermediate areas. There was long-range shelling of aviation fields at Ferme MORAS and FRANCHEVILLE. About 15,000 shells altogether were fired into the corps sector. Numerous air patrols over our right sector. 6 balloons up during the day.

There were two German raids. Fifty of the enemy encountered in ambush patrol of the French 174th Regt. The Germans were driven back after a grenade fight, leaving one man dead.

About 80 of the Germans opposite VAUX attacked that town. They were defeated with severe losses. We have 20 or 30 prisoners captured by the 101st Infantry.

5. Situation was quiet with the French 167th and 26th Divisions in the line, the 2d Division holding the army position.

6. The 2d Division artillery was ordered to leave at 9 p.m., July 14, for BETZ, where it will be under the Tenth Army and later under the American III Corps. Other changes were interior reliefs of slight importance.

7. The XXXVIII Corps on our right sustained a heavy attack. After violent artillery preparation the Germans started their offensive on all the eastern front of the army from CHARTEVES. They succeeded in crossing the MARNE though undergoing heavy losses. A vigorous counterattack by the 3d Division threw them out of some of their advance positions. About 1,000 prisoners were captured by units of the XXXVIII Corps.

8. Orders received from the Sixth Army refer to the move of the 2d Div. artillery noted above.

9. The artillery of the corps and divisions replied vigorously to the heavy German shelling. The successful resistance at VAUX and BUSSIARES kept our line intact.

10. The shelling of MORAS Farm near La FERTE by a heavy long-range gun was without effect.

11. No maps required.

12. The withdrawal of the 2d Division artillery lessens the present strength of the army position. It is probable that the Germans will make no serious attack at this point.

13. Plans are as previously described.

14. Morale is high. Supplies normal.

MALIN CRAIG,  
Chief of Staff.
Composition of I Army Corps

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
June 16, 1918

From: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.
To: The Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

1. There is a movement now on foot to bring the French Ninth Army to this region taking over a part of the front on the MARNE now held by the French XXXVIII Corps and the French III Corps of the French Sixth Army. A proposition has been made to turn over the command of the French 39th Division (now on our right and a part of the French corps) to the I Army Corps, A. E. F., this with one American division, the 3d, now in the French XXXVIII Corps and very close to us and with the 28th and 4th Division, A. E. F., approaching a stage when they will enter the line.

2. That the I Army Corps, A. E. F., should, under these conditions, be composed for tactical purpose of the 26th Division, A. E. F., and 2 French divisions, seems a military anomaly and I ask that American divisions should compose the I Army Corps for tactical purposes as they have composed it and do now compose it for administrative purposes.

3. The 2d Division, A. E. F., moves today to the French Tenth Army to complete the III Army Corps, A. E. F., for tactical purposes.

H. LIGGETT,
Major General, U. S. A.

Request for Special Troops

LAREDO I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
July 16, 1918—7:46 p. m.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF:
G. H. Q., A. E. F.

G-3 No. 827. The situation in regard to corps troops is becoming more and more pressing, owing to the removal of practically all French corps troops from this area for service elsewhere. Corps cavalry understood to have been ordered has not yet arrived. Request this be expedited. The withdrawal of French Territorials has also left this sector without any labor troops, whereas formerly there were as many as five battalions of territorials on that work in this corps area. The pioneer regiment of infantry or its equivalent is indispensable to the service of this corps. Request that it be furnished as soon as possible and if not immediately available, request three battalions of labor troops temporarily to take its place.

HUNTER LIGGETT,
Maj. Gen., Commanding I Corps.
From 6 p. m. July 15 to 6 p. m. July 16, 1918

[Extract]

1. Situation had quieted down after two ineffectual raids by the Germans. Line held by the 4th Ersatz Division, 87th Division, and 1 regiment of the 201st Division [all German].

2. Photographs of July 15 show no important changes in the German defenses. It seems that no complete and connected system of trenches is being constructed either as a first or second position.

3. The enemy artillery was very active during the night, bombarding the front lines and the batteries with H. E. and gas shells.
   There was considerable circulation in the enemy back areas during the day.
   It is considered proven that the Germans are flying over our sector with French planes and French insignia.
   At 9 p. m. after heavy artillery preparation an infantry attack was apparently made on the sector of the 101st Infantry near VAUX. Our combined artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire completely stopped the attack before it reached our lines.

5. The situation was quiet. The 26th Division and the French 167th Division were holding the resistance position, the 2d Division (less the 2d Artillery Brigade), the army position.

6. The remainder of the 2d Division and the French 37th Artillery (75's) received orders to move during the following night. The 26th Division Headquarters was moved from Genevriés Farm to MERY-sur-Marne.

7. The French VII Corps on our left reports patrol activity and heavy fire by German artillery for July 14 to 15.
   The French XXXVIII Corps on our right carried out counterattacks at noon July 16 to restore their original lines. These were partially successful. The Germans made no further advances in the XXXVIII Corps sector.

8. Orders received concerned the move of units as noted above. No orders were received affecting corps operations.

9. The day was marked by active artillery fire, harassing, C. P. O. (contre-preparation offensive), and barrage. The infantry activity was confined to patrols of the immediate front.
   Aerial activity was normal.

10. There were considerable losses from the enemy's gas bombardment, 1 in the 167th Division, 258 in the 26th Division.
   Enemy planes bombed La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE at 11 p. m. July 15. The rather small railroad station was destroyed.
   The long-range fire on MORAS Farm continues very intermittently.

12. The situation on the corps front is without change.

13. Plans are as previously described.
14. Morale high. Supplies needed are covered by requisitions and requests by telegraph.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 290: Memorandum

Designation of Railheads

MEMORANDUM
I CORPS, A. E. F.,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918.

No. 78/3

[Extract]

The plan of System of Supply contained in Order No. 6, Part II, Pages 3 and 4, is amended, effective from receipt of this memorandum, to read as follows:

SYSTEM OF SUPPLY

1. RATIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS SUPPLIES:
   (a) Railheads

   (French 167th Division
   (Corps Troops, I Corps
   La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE (French 161st Territorial Brigade
   (Elements of French Sixth Army
   (E. N. E., III Corps*
   NANTEUIL-sur-MARNE (American 26th Division
   (146th Field Artillery [American 41st Div.]

   * * * * *

   (c) All French units will draw daily from the Sous-Intendant [Assistant Quartermaster] at La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE.

   (d) Corps troops of the American I Corps will draw directly from the railheads from which supplied. Units will notify railhead officer daily in advance of their needs for the following day.

   * * * * *

   (f) Division commanders will designate distributing points and rations dumps within their respective sectors.

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By command of Major General Hunter Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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* E. N. E., Elements nonedivisionnnes, III Corps - nondivisional units of the III Corps.
Plan of Attack

79/G-3
FIELD ORDERS

No. 9

MEAUX } 1:80,000
MAPS: Ste-AULDE )
CHATEAU-THIERRY ) 1:20,000

PART I

[Extract]

1. (a) MISSION OF THE ARMY: With a view of taking in reverse the enemy attack between CHATEAU-THIERRY and REIMS, the Tenth Army, north of the OURCQ, will attack in direction of the plateau north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS. The attack of the Tenth Army will be supported on its right by an attack of the Sixth Army.

(b) ACTION OF THE SIXTH ARMY: The attack of the Sixth Army will have its principal effort between the OURCQ and the Ru d’ALLAND, with eventual exploitation in the direction of COINCY. This principal effort being supported on its right by an attack extending as far as BOURESCHES, with an eventual exploitation extending as far as the MARNE.

1st objective of the Sixth Army: NEUILLY-St-FRONT---Hill N. of BREUIL---COINTICOURT---Hill 172---HAUTEVESNES---woods S. E. of HAUTEVESNES and TORCY-BELLEAU.

The exploitation will be guided by the progress of the left and will pushed far as that progress will allow.

(c) ACTION OF NEIGHBORING CORPS: The French II A. C. with the 33d, 2d, 47th and 63d Divisions will conduct the attack between the OURCQ and the Ru d’ALLAND.

The French VII A. C., reduced to the 164th Division and the 8th Brigade of the American 4th Division will attack on the right of the French II A. C.

The 1st bound will include CHEVILLON---ST-GENGOULPH---Bois-en-CROISSANT (west edge). The 2d bound will include the 1st objective: Line COINTICOURT---Hill 172---HAUTEVESNES.

The 1st and 2d bounds will, if practicable, be executed by the VII A. C., without intervening delay.

2. (a) ACTION OF I ARMY CORPS: The I Army Corps will attack on the line Bois CROISSANT (west edge) to BOURESCHES (exclusive), in direction MARIGNY-MONTHIERS. The exploitation will be conducted by a general advance on the entire corps front in direction BOURESCHES---EPIEDS.

(b) ZONE OF ACTION OF I ARMY CORPS: * * *

Left (northern) limit: Bois-en-CROISSANT (west edge)---Bois TOUFFU [sic] (inclusive)---LICY Farm (exclusive)---MONTHIERS (inclusive)---EPAUX-BEZU (inclusive)---BEZU-St-GERMAIN.

Right (southern) limit: VAUX (R. R. bridge)---VINCELLE (exclusive)---Les CHESNEAUX (exclusive).

(c) OBJECTIVES OF I ARMY CORPS: * * *

Intermediate objective: The enemy outposts (brown line)

1st objective: Woods S. E. of HAUTEVESNES, TORCY-BELLEAU (green line)

Ultimate objective: To be ordered later.
(d) INITIAL DISPOSITION FOR THE ATTACK: The attack will be made by the French 167th Division and the left brigade of the 26th Division. All troops will be in position before daylight on J day. Parallel of departure will be the present outpost line.

(e) EXECUTION OF ATTACK: * * *

The attack will begin

On J day
at H hour.

At H Hour the outposts positions of the enemy will be rushed by surprise to the intermediate objective (brown line).

On the left (from BUSSIARES westward), the advance of the 167th Division will be made in liaison with the VII A. C., without necessarily stopping on the brown line.

At H hour the artillery action will begin.
At H hour plus 1 hour 30 minutes, the attack will move forward from the brown line to the 1st objective (green line).

The attack for exploitation (from the green line) will be ordered later by the Commanding General, I Army Corps.

As the attack of the outpost positions is to be made by surprise, NO SPECIAL FIRE WILL BE PERMITTED BEFORE H HOUR; THE NORMAL APPEARANCE OF THE SECTORS WILL BE CAREFULLY PRESERVED AND AT ALL COSTS THE ENEMY WILL BE PREVENTED FROM TAKING PRISONERS.

3. (a) LIMIT BETWEEN 167th DIVISION and 26th DIVISIONS: TORCY (to 26th Div.)--­GIVRY (to 26th Div.)--­les BRUSSES FARM (to 26th Div.)--­St-ROBERT Farm (to 26th div.).
(b) The 3d Battery, 181st Regt. of Artillery (French) (220-mm.), now in sector of 26th Division is assigned to the 26th division for this operation.
(c) The following units will be under the orders of the Chief of Artillery, I A. C.

Artillery: The corps artillery as at present, viz.
1 battalion 115’s short (3 batteries)
2 battalions 155’s long (3 batteries each)
2 battalions 155’s long S. P. F. (2 batteries each).

The corps artillery plan will be submitted promptly to the Chief of Artillery.

(d) Corps Reserve: One battalion, 26th Division, will be held as corps reserve under cover of woods north of ISSONGE Farm, where it will be placed before daylight on J day.

4. AIR SERVICE:

88th Squadron to 167th Div.
12th Squadron to 26th Div.
1st Squadron to corps command and corps artillery.

The air service plan will be submitted by the Chief Air Service after consultation with Chief, Air Service, Sixth Army.

5. LIASON:

(a) Axes of liaison:
I Army Corps: La FERTE---GENEVOIS Farm---PARIS Farm---MONTGIVRAULT---BELLEAU---ETREPILLY---La PENONERIE Farm.
167th Division: DHUISY---MARIGNY---BUSSIARES---MONTHIERS---La LOGE Farm---BEZU-St-GERMAIN.

26th Division: Same as the I Army Corps.

(b) The 167th Division will ensure liaison with the right division, VII A. C. and mutually with the 26th Division, by means of special liaison detachments.
(c) Command posts will be located as follows:
   (1) I A. C.  La FERTE
   (2) 167th Division  DHUISY
   (3) 26th Division  GENEVROIS Farm

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By command of Major General Liggett:

MARIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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No. 18A/3.0  I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
89/G-3  La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918.

From 6 p. m. July 16 to 6 p. m. July 17, 1918

[Extract]

1. German artillery had been active, otherwise the sector was quiet. Line held by
   the 4th Ersatz Division, 87th Division, and 1 regiment of the 201st Division [all German].

* * * * *

3. Little action of any consequence. There was rather violent harassing fire on our
   left sector from 2 to 4:30 a. m. The long-range gun continued fire on our back areas.

* * * * *

5. The situation was quiet, the 26th Division and the French 167th Division were
   holding the resistance position. The remainder of the 2d Division was preparing to move in
   accordance with orders received from the I Corps.

6. The 2d Division, less the artillery brigade which had already gone, left the
   sector during the night under orders of the French Sixth Army to report to the French
   Tenth Army.

* * * * *

8. Sixth Army orders. An order for execution of the attack, which had been previous-
   ly planned, was received the morning of July 17. There were certain modifications in the
   direction and objectives to correspond with changes in the situation on the front south of
   the Marne, and the mission of the army.

9. There were a few patrols without event, otherwise no infantry action.
   Usual harassing fire was carried on, reprisal fire on the woods near BELLEAU at
   the request of the infantry.

10. There is no change in the resistance position of the corps front. The army
    position is occupied only by a few French machine gun companies.

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- 37 -
12. The German defenses in this sector are probably weak, the divisions opposing the corps are third class troops. The chances for an initial success in the coming attack are very good.

13. The corps will take the offensive in the near future.

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MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 290: Letter

_Tactical Recognition of I Corps_

I CORPS, A. E. F.,

_La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918._

From: Commanding General, I Corps, A. E. F.

To: Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

1. The attack upon the line of the MARNE and upon the front DORMANS-REIMS, as well as on the CHAMPAGNE to the east of REIMS, has not as yet yielded results expected by the German High Command, nor commensurate with the effort.

2. A study of the great concentration of artillery material on the front CHATEAU-THIERRY---SOISSONS, combined with a consideration of the tenacity of the defense by the Germans in the Bois de BELLEAU, and at Hill 204 (just west of CHATEAU-THIERRY), leads to the conclusion, that failing in the push across the MARNE and upon CHALONS, the next immediate effort in great force may well be westward and against the lines from CHATEAU-THIERRY to the AISNE River.

3. The Germans possess interior lines for this effort and whether they make it or not depends entirely upon how badly they are hurt in the present attempt.

4. We are quite weak on the main line of advance, CHATEAU-THIERRY---MEAUX. The withdrawal of the 2d Division, A. E. F., leaves a gap not easily filled since French reserves from this front have been sent eastward.

5. While I feel highly honored indeed to have a French division in the I Corps and will be glad to have two, it must be remembered that the strength of two French divisions in rifles and field artillery does not equal that of one American division, and it is for these reasons - and these alone - that my request of yesterday for another American division in the I Corps was made.

H. LIGGETT,
Major General, U. S. A.

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Situation Report

I CORPS A. E. F.,
July 17, 1918—2 p. m.

Memo for Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3 [G. H. Q., A. E. F., Col. Fox Conner]

1. No change in the situation in front of the 3d Division which holds its front on the MARNE. The counterattack of the French to the east yesterday afternoon succeeded in establishing the line through St-AGNAN with very little resistance on the part of the Boche. For some reason, the counterattack was not carried through to the heights overlooking the MARNE and the French fell back from St-AGNAN during the night. The town was at once occupied by a patrol of the Boche who were again driven out by the French this morning without difficulty. A minor attack by the enemy about 9 a. m. failed according to a message from the C. O., 110th Inf. No one here or at the 3d Div. understands why the Boche has not been completely pushed out of the river bend south of JAULGONNE as he is certainly not in any great force there and his supply problem must be a very difficult one.

2. Everyone speaks very highly of the operations of the 3d Division and especially of the way Col. U. G. McAlexander [C. O. 38th Inf.] handled the very difficult situation that faced the 38th Infantry on the right flank of the division from 1 a. m. on the 15th to 4 a. m. on the 16th. This regiment had its flank entirely in the air owing to the precipitate withdrawal of the French infantry and artillery early on the morning of the 15th without any attempt to notify anyone of the movement. Four companies of the 55th Brig., 28th Div. [Cos. B and C, 110th Inf., and 1 and M, 109th Inf.], stayed in position entirely unsupported for several hours after the French had left and were rather badly damaged. They withdrew on the 38th Inf. to the south. They are not yet fully accounted for and probably lost a good many prisoners.

3. I believe it is time to make another effort to get some sort of an organization that will utilize the really fine spirit of hold on that our troops are showing. I think the French in this immediate vicinity would not only stand for it but would welcome it.

4. I was told that a group of the 10th Field Art. (3d Div.) which was in position north of CONDE and outside the 3d Div. sector had two guns destroyed by fire and had to destroy and abandon four others when their supports left but they partially made up for it by bringing away three French guns that had been left undamaged by their crews. I hope to get a more or less complete report of casualties and materiel losses tonight.

PARKER HITT,
Lieut. Col., Signal Corps,
G. H. Q. Liaison Officer.
From 6 p.m. July 17 to 6 p.m. July 18

[Extract]

1. Situation very quiet. Germans holding the line with the 4th Ersatz, the 87th Division and one regiment of the 201st Division, holding the line.
2. Prisoners captured during the day confirm the order of battle • • • Abnormal circulation is reported in the enemy back areas.
3. The resistance of the enemy infantry to our attack was determined but there were no important counterattacks. Normal harassing fire during the night on our front line, the valley of the CLIGNON and the Bois de VAURICHART. There was feeble artillery reaction to the Allied attack, principally on our former front line. German aeroplanes remained inside their own lines. Very few were encountered by our patrols. A few balloons up.

* * * * * *

5. No activity was in progress. The army position was lightly held by French territorial units. The resistance position was held by the French 167th Division and the American 26th Division. Corps artillery in the sector included:
   1 battalion, 155's short (3 batteries)
   2 battalions, 155's long (3 batteries each).

I Corps Field Orders No. 8 had been issued at 5:30 p.m. The army order stating day J and hour H as 4:35 a.m., July 18, was received in the early evening of July 17.
6. Excepting action preparatory to and during the attack covered in Section 9, there were no changes or movements of corps units during the day.
7. The VII Corps mission was to attack, guided by moves of troops of its left, and in liaison with them, and the 167th Division on its right. Their troops for the attack were the French 164th Division and the 8th Brigade of the American 4th Division.
   The French XXXVIII Corps on our right now under command of the French Ninth Army did not take part in the attack.
8. The mission of the corps and necessary directions for the attack had been covered in army orders previously received.
   An army order received at 1 p.m., July 18, stated that the attack on COURCHAMPS was to be resumed and that the I Corps should renew the advance in the neighborhood of LICY-CLIGNON and the line to the south and east.
9. The corps attacked at 4:35 a.m., July 18, on the front Bois-TOUFFU to BOURESCHES, and captured assigned objectives. At the end of the day the line ran LICY Farm, east limit of LICY-CLIGNON---TORCY---GIVRY---BOURESCHES and thence along the former front. The attack was made by the 167th Division with three regiments and by the 52d Brigade of the 26th Division with two regiments in the line. The first advance resulted in the capture of Bois-TOUFFU, in liaison with the 133d Regiment (which had captured HAUTESVESNES), and Moulin de BUSSIARES, BUSSIARES, TORCY and BELLEAU.
   The attack was resumed at 1 p.m. and at night the line was as stated above.
   A general bombardment by the corps and divisional artillery on the 1st lines and occupied zones accompanied the infantry attack. There was also destruction and concentration fire in accordance with information from ground observations and aeroplanes.
MONTHERIA was bombarded in preparation for the next attack.
Infantry liaison planes were flying all day. Artillery planes were in constant observation for fire control. Numerous protection flights and combat patrols by the pursuit groups. There was little opposition from the Germans.

* * * * * *

The army order for resumption of the attack in the afternoon was issued to the divisions.

10. The attack was a success. Casualties reported are as follows: 167th Division, 21 killed, 88 wounded. 26th Division, 262 wounded, 40 gassed (killed not determined). 103 prisoners were captured.

* * * * * *

12. The situation is favorable to a renewal of the attack. Further movements however, depend upon progress of troops to the north of this corps as the attack is a turning movement pivoting upon the right of the I Corps.

13. It is planned to resume the advance the morning of July 19.

14. Morale high. There has been serious embarrassment due to lack of corps transportation for the supply of ammunition to the troops. Because of a train wreck near PARIS, food supply was interrupted. This was a temporary delay.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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I Corps Arty.: 181-60.11: Letter

Operations of Corps Artillery, I Corps

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Rengsdorf, April 15, 1919.

From: Major General Wm. Lassiter, U. S. Army

To: Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Forces

[Extract]

1. Formal report on the operations of the Corps Artillery, I Corps, while under my command, has never been submitted for the reason that I passed so rapidly from one duty and command to another that I did not have time to prepare the report.

ORGANIZATION

2. The 66th Field Artillery Brigade, comprising the 146th and 148th Regiments of Field Artillery, was designated as the organic artillery of the I Corps by G. O. No. 9, G. H. Q., Jan. 15, 1918. ** *

* * * * *
VERDILLY-CHIERRY AREA
Looking north from Etampes towards Brasles
3. Just before the I Corps formally took over the sector, certain minor offensives had been carried out by the Allies, namely: By the 2d Div. to clear BELLEAU Wood, and by the 2d Div. and French 39th Division on our right, to take VAUX and Hill 204 dominating CHATEAU-THIERRY. But after the I Corps took charge the time was taken up in preparing to resist a German offensive which was imminent. Almost the exact limits of the subsequent attack were defined by the Army Commander, General Degoutte. The attack was expected on July 7, 8 and 9. Hence the telegraphic order, filed with operations orders and dated July 8, directing that counterpreparation fire be carried on each night until further orders, and that alert positions be taken each night.

* * * * * *

At midnight of July 14/15 the German attack started. It soon developed that the attack was not directed at the I Corps sector, but C. O. P. of corps artillery guns was kept up from 2:30 to 4:30, July 15. On the night of the 15th, lines of fire of C. A. guns were shifted to meet an expected attempt of the Germans to cross the Marne just east of CHATEAU-THIERRY **; but no such crossing was attempted. The Germans had been stopped farther east. The 16th and 17th were taken up principally in preparing for the Allied counterstroke.

* * * * * *

Wm. LASSITER,
Major General, F. A.

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Hist. of 1st Pursuit Group, First Army: Gorrell, Series N, Vol. 4: Order

OPERATIONS ORDER
No. 36

1. The following schedule of operations is announced as effective for tomorrow, July 15, 1918.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MISSION</th>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>ALTITUDE</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>SQUADRON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Patrol</td>
<td>Chateau-Thierry---Verneuil</td>
<td>Low Patrol</td>
<td>4:45 h. to 6:30 h.</td>
<td>27th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The entire 95th and 147th Squadrons will stand by for a protection patrol at 6 h. to accomplish the mission sought for the last few days.
3. The entire 27th Squadron will be on alert from 6 h. to 21 h. in addition to the early morning patrol.
4. The operations officer of the 27th Squadron will be on duty in the Group Operations Office from 4:45 h. until relieved by the Group Operations Officer and from 12:30 h. until relieved and from 6:30 until relieved.
5. A new enemy airdrome is reported to the south of Oulchy-le-Chateau comprising fifteen individual tents.

By order of Major Atkinson:

ROMER SHAWHAN,
1st Lt., A. S. Sig. R. C.,
Group Operations Officer.


1st PURSUIT GROUP, A. E. F.,
OPERATIONS OFFICE,
July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

Atmospheric Conditions: Low clouds early in the morning, low ceiling all the morning. Fairly clear in the afternoon.

1. 1 Patrol: 4:49 h. to 5:10 h., 17 planes altitude 300 meters. Chateau-Thierry---Verneuil. 27th Squadron. This formation took off at the time indicated but returned shortly afterwards to the airdrome. The ceiling was under 500 meters so the mission was impossible to perform. • • •

2. 1 Patrol: 18 h. to 19:30 h., 16 planes. Altitude 3,500 meters. Chateau-Thierry---Troissy. 147th Squadron. Lt. Robertson reports four E. A., about 5 kms. south of DORMANS at 18:50 h., altitude 3,500 meters. • • •

3. 1 Patrol: 19:36 h. to 19:48 h., 12 planes, altitude 3,500 meters. Chateau-Thierry---Troissy. 27th Squadron. This was a low patrol over the route indicated, clouds were very low. Nothing to report.

4. 1 Protection Patrol: 15:10 h. to 16:45 h., 7 planes, altitude 2,500 meters. Etampes---Neullly. • • •

5. 1 Protection Patrol: 16:20 h. to 16:45 h., 6 planes, altitude 2,500 meters. For the 1st Observation Group, 95th Squadron. • • •

6. 1 Protection Patrol: 17:03 h. to 18:26 h., 9 planes, altitude 4,800 meters. Around Bezu, for the 1st Observation Group. 27th Squadron. • • •

7. 1 Alert: 8 h. to 9:17 h., 3 planes, altitude? Vaux-sous-Coulombs. 27th Squadron. This alert was phoned in from corps headquarters and covered the region mentioned. • • •

Planes Available

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Nieuports</th>
<th>Spads</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th Squadron</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Squadron</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>95th Squadron</td>
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<td>147th Squadron</td>
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<tr>
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- 44 -
### Ground Summary

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<td>Sorties</td>
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<td>Protection</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patrols</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alerts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trial Flights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combats</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Pursuit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrols</td>
<td>83</td>
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<tr>
<td>Available planes</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Planes</td>
<td>70</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

ROMER SHAWHAN,  
1st Lt., A. S., Sig. R. C.,  
Group Operations Officer.

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1st PURSUIT GROUP, A. E. F.,  
OPERATIONS OFFICE,  
July 16, 1918.

Atmospheric conditions: Sky clear all day.

1. 1 Patrol: 12:45 h. to 15 h., 13 planes, altitude very low. North of Conde-en-Brie. 95th Squadron. One formation of 7 E. A. encountered at 13:30 h., region of Foret de Ris, north of Dormans, 3,000 meters, one-places and of Fokker type. Lt. Heinricho reports chasing them into their lines. Lt. Mitchell saw three (3) E. A. in the vicinity of Soilly at 1,000 meters below him crossing the Marne and dove to attack them, putting tracers through the wings of one of the machines. He was then attacked by a Fokker who managed to get bullets into the Nieuport’s motor. The Fokker continued firing, piercing the engine rod and wheels. Lt. Curtis forced plane near Rebais. Lt. Vann saw one machine go down in flames. 2 combats.

2. 1 patrol: 13:18 h. to 15 h., 11 planes, altitude 3,200 meters. North of Conde-en-Brie. 147th Squadron, nine (9) E. A. Fokker biplanes encountered at 14 h.-14:15 h. region of Dormans at 3,200 meters. Of this formation Lt. A. H. Jones encountered nine (9) E. A. flying south over this vicinity. He climbed for height and dove on a machine running away from him at 100 yards. He opened fire and saw his tracers entering the E. A. fuselage. Machine was seen to topple and fall out of control. He then discovered two (2) more E. A. on his tail. He outmaneuvered them by zooming and again dove on them firing several bursts, but without effect. Confirmation requested; Lt. F. M. Simmonds also dove on E. A. but found one E. A. on his tail and by maneuvering was able to fire about 100 rounds at about 150 yards, and closed upon E. A. until his wing tip almost touched E. A. E. A. turned over and dropped. He fired 150 rounds at an E. A. which he zoomed up to meet and believed him out of control as the E. A. spiralled faster and faster as it fell. Two confirmations requested.

Lt. Charles P. Porter lost this formation and in the region of Foret de Ris about 14 h. to 14:15 h., altitude 4,500 meters, encountered two Fokker biplanes. In a running fight his machine was badly shot up, finally one dove and Lt. Porter peaked on him...
firing both machine guns at a range of from 50 to 75 yards and saw tracer bullets enter the E. A. fuselage. He followed his man in a straight dive to 1,000 meters firing all the time. He reports that he saw the machine crash to the ground in a cloud of dust and smoke, and states that the E. A. motor was never out. He also reports that at 13:45 h. he saw a Hun balloon go down in flames at about the vicinity of Roncheres. Confirmation requested. (Evidently the balloon Lt. Zenes R. Miller of the 27th Squadron reports destroyed.) 6 combats. Lt. G. J. Brew had forced landing at Franchville [sic], crashing machine in wheat field. Lt. B. Wells had forced landing at Bassevelle crashing machine in wheat field. Lt. D. W. Cassard still missing.

3. 1 patrol: 13:30 h. to 15:15 h., 12 planes, altitude 1,500 meters. North of Conde-en-Brie, 27th Squadron. Lt. Z. R. Miller encountered three (3) Fokker biplanes 5 kms. north of Dormans. He attacked them, but broke off at the Marne. At Gland he reports about a company of infantry on road Trugny to Gland and fired 100 rounds at them. He then flew just south of Courpoil [sic], opened fire on a balloon, saw smoke above and round it. Balloon went down. Confirmation requested. 4 combats. Lt. Schmidt had forced landing, also Lt. Hoover at Rebais. Lt. Gunn is missing.

4. 1 patrol: 17:03 h. to 18:45 h., 8 planes, altitude low. Vicinity of Cercy [sic]. 147th Squadron. Lt. O'Neill leader encountered two seater E. A. 3,000 meters south of Neuilly, opening fire and seeing his tracer bullets enter the E. A. fuselage. Hun last seen in vertical nose dive at 1,500 meters. Confirmation requested. 1 combat.

5. 1 Patrol: 17:30 h. to 19:10 h., 12 planes altitude 2,500 meters. Courtemont-Vassieux. 95th Squadron. On this patrol Lt. Edward Buford reports seeing a machine fall in flames at 18:05 h. about 7 kms. southwest of Chateau-Thierry. Lt. Mitchell saw three biplanes Albatross, region of Champaillet at 18:10 h. altitude 800 meters and attacked from above, but was obliged to pull out on account of jams. At 18:31 h. in the vicinity of La Chapelle he saw one plane fall in flames and crash in the open field beside a wood. Lt. Vann claims to have shot this plane down. Lt. Hambleton also confirms this plane.

The low patrol encountered three biplanes Albatross at 18:05 h. region Rouilly-Crezancy at 1,000 meters. Lt. Curtis peaked on one and fired two bursts at close range, going down to the assistance of Lt. Cravatt and Lt. Sewall who were attacking. Lt. Curtis opened fire from the side and saw his man fall in flames in the region of Courtemont or Reuilly. Confirmation requested. Lt. Vann verifies the above. Lt. Hambleton saw two machines go down in flames, one at 18:10 h. evidently that of Lt. Vann, and another at 18:30 h. which he saw crash. Lt. Sewall made forced landing at Les Petits-Bordeaux. Lt. Knowles has not yet returned. 8 combats.

6. 1 Patrol: 17:25 h. to 19:32 h., 12 planes, altitude low. Courtemont-Vassieux. 27th Squadron. Lt. MacArthur reports three E. A. reglage Truzley [sic] vicinity about 18:40 h. He maneuvered for height and dove on machine firing about 60 rounds before gun jammed. He broke off and then later fired 500 shots at a balloon which was hauled down and kept down. Lt. Clapp took on one of a formation of three Rumplers in the region of Maza at 18:25 h., altitude 1,000 meters shooting about ten rounds from each gun. The machine caught fire instantly and was a mass of flames from pilot's seat to end of tail. He saw the observer wave his arms in panic. Confirmation requested.

Lt. Miller fired 100 rounds at a balloon in the region of Le Charmel and saw it descend in a very rapid and peculiar way. 3 combats. Lt. Vasconcells and Lt. Raymond missing.

Trial Flights:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Squadron</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th Squadron</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94th Squadron</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95th Squadron</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147th Squadron</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Planes Available: 27th Squadron, Nieuports 12 Camels 2. Total 20
94th Squadron, Spad 1 " 18
95th Squadron Nieuports 7 " 7
147th Squadron Nieuports 8 " 16
Total Nieuports out of commission 14
Total Squads out of commission 17
Total Nieuports Available 27

Spads 1
Camels 2

Group Summary:
Sorties 95
Patrols 6
Trial Flights 27
Combats 24
Pursuit Pilots Available 81
Planes Available 30
Planes Total 61

Supplementary to Yesterday's Report of Operations: Lt. Thomas J. Abernethy of the 147th Squadron reported missing yesterday regained out lines. He reports losing formation at an altitude of 3,000 meters in the vicinity of Dormans, and being attacked by one E. A. Fokker from above which dove past him, he gave chase following enemy line of balloons in the neighborhood of Courtemont firing 100 rounds at 50 yards. Tracers went straight into fuselage. E. A. last seen 50 feet from ground going straight for it.

At this time 5 E. A. dove on him shooting magneto and cylinder of his motor. A running fight ensued in which he dispatched about 50 rounds. Forced landing at Courboin. In taking off he hit shell hole and crashed. He says that his success in getting out of a tight corner was due to the wonderful qualifications of his Nieuport 28. Confirmation requested. 1 combat.

ROMER SHAWHAN,
1st Lt., A. S., Sig. R. C.,
Group Operations Officer.


AIR SERVICE, I CORPS, A. E. F.,
July 16, 1918.

18 h., July 15 to 18 h., July 16, 1918

Atmospheric Conditions: Visibility good throughout the day.

I. SQUADRONS 1st Aero Squadron---9 sorties
3 attempted reconnaissances
2 photographic missions
1 attempted photographic mission
3 flights for protection.
12th Aero Squadron---6 sorties
1 reconnaissance
1 attempted reconnaissance
1 infantry liaison exercise
1 ferry flight
2 flights for testing purposes.
88th Aero Squadron---17 sorties
6 reconnaissances
3 flights for alert duty
1 flight for dispatch service
2 attempted adjustments
1 photography mission
1 attempted reconnaissance
3 flights for testing purposes

II. BALLOONS
2d Balloon Company---2 ascensions
1st ascension, 17 to 19:03, July 15
Observers, Lt. Patterson and Lt. Phelps
800 meters, adjustment artillery fire
2d ascension, 15:29 to 17

III. PHOTOGRAPHIC
1st Aero Squadron: Region northwest Chateau-Thierry--15:40 to 18:20, altitude 3,800 meters, visibility good.
1st Aero Squadron, region, battery positions 167th Inf.
15:45 to 17:45, alt. 4,500 meters, visibility good; Pilot
Lt. Daly, Observer, Lt. Sykes. 36 exposures taken.

IV. ARTILLERY ADJUSTMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOUR</th>
<th>BATTERY</th>
<th>CALIBRE</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16:51 to 17:35</td>
<td>Walk E K-36, 3d Bn., 103d F. A.</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>77.16 - 62.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:12 to 19:02</td>
<td>Walk K-35, 3d Bn., 103d F. A.</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>77.90 - 60.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19:02 to 19:02</td>
<td>Walk L, 2d Bn., 103d F. A.</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>76.8 - 62.0 Adjustment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16:14 to 17</td>
<td>Walk K 35, 3d Bn., 103d F. A.</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>K79.04 incomplete</td>
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<td>(Adj. going on at 17)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16:27 to 17</td>
<td>Walk A 32, 1st Bn., 103d F. A.</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>75.66 - 63.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Adj. going on at 17)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

V. MISCELLANEOUS: At 19:03, balloon of 2d Balloon Co. was attacked, and burned, by five Spad planes with French insignia. These planes flew from the south and were allowed to get within 200 meters of balloon before being subjected to fire. Observers, Lt. Patterson and Lt. Phelps, jumped and landed safely.

1 infantry liaison exercise between 12th Aero Squadron and 26th Division; Pilot, Lieut. Paradise, Observer, Lt. Henderson.
Pilot, Lt. Huges, Observer, Lieut. Goodale, 12th Aero Squadron returning from reconnaissance, made forced landing at Moras Farm, due to motor trouble.

Status of Materiel and Personnel:

1st Aero Squadron:
15 Salmsons on hand---1 A.R.; 5 Salmsons - 1 A. R. available;
18 pilots, 16 observers, available for duty.

12th Aero Squadron:
15 Salmsons on hand---6 Salmsons available for duty.
88th Aero Squadron:
12th Sopwiths on hand---7 available for duty:
17 pilots, 14 observers, available for duty.

E. R. HASLETT.
1st Lieut., A. S., Sig. R. C.,
Operations Officer.

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26th Division
July 15 - 18, 1918

226-33.6: Report

Gas Attacks

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
OFFICE DIVISION GAS OFFICER,
Genevois Ferme, Aisne, July 20, * 1918.

From: Division Gas Officer, 26th Division, A. E. F.
To: Commanding General, 26th Division, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. In conjunction with the start of his fifth grand offensive the enemy protected
his right flank by means of a heavy gas attack on positions of our troops as follows:

101st Infantry VAUX, MONNEAUX and Bois la CROISETTE Hill
102d Infantry 201, Woods N. E. and S. E. of COUPRU
103d Infantry Woods N. E. of La VOIE-du-CHATEL Batteries
101st Field Artillery C, D, and F, in woods north of La MAISON-BLANCHE
and along Road La Ferme PARIS-MARIGNY [en-ORXOIS]
102 Field Artillery Roving piece in woods between COUPRU
and La CROISETTE
101st Engineers In La CROISETTE Wood
102d Machine Gun Battalion La CROISETTE
101st Ammunition Train

2. The attack started at midnight to 0.30 a. m. July 14/15 with a heavy concentra-
tion of artillery (diphosgene-chloropicrin) Green Cross shells lasting about ten minutes,
with some phosgene minenwerfer-shells on villages of VAUX and MONNEAUX, and was followed
by a continuous though not as concentrated attack with (mustard gas) Yellow Cross
artillery shells lasting until 4:30 a. m. in some places.

* Editorial note: Covers actions beginning July 15.
3. The following is an approximate number of shells used:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Shells</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VAUX and MONNEAUX</td>
<td>80 77's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bois de la CHATEL</td>
<td>40 77's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bois la CROISETTE</td>
<td>1,500 77's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill 201</td>
<td>200 77's and 105's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods E. and S. E. of COUPRU</td>
<td>6,000 77's and 105's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods N. E. of La VOIE du CHATEL</td>
<td>1,500 77's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woods N. of La MAISON BLANCHE</td>
<td>200 150-mm. mustard (Green Cross)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. The general wind direction was south with a velocity of 4 miles per hour and the atmosphere muggy.

   The terrain shelled was almost entirely woods occupied by support and reserve troops.

   Respirators were worn from 1-1/2 hours to 6-1/2 hours varying as to the locality and amount of gas thrown over.

   * * * * * *

6. Most of the casualties were caused by troops remaining in gassed areas. These, being woods, and the only cover for the troops, could hardly be avoided, though in a number of cases a diligent search would have shown sections of these woods in which no mustard gas had fallen. The Green Cross (diphosgene and chloropicrin) gas being more volatile and spreading out more, hid these spots for some hours particularly in La CROISETTE and vicinity which received the most gas and in which most of the casualties developed.

   The handling of the situation by the regimental gas officer of the 103d Infantry, Lieutenant Wilson, and the prompt cooperation of Captain Shumway prevented many casualties in that regiment, by discovering safe places and removing the men to them without delay.

   The disinfection of shell holes with chloride of lime was usually well and promptly done by all the units affected, immediately after the shelling stopped. A few men were burned in the 102d Infantry by handling salvaged clothes, etc., which were contaminated with gas without protective gloves and suits.

   There were some cases of men being burned by direct splashes of liquid gas.

   Two men, who were lung cases, claimed they did not hear the alarm.

7. A good many of the burn cases could have been prevented. These were caused by not properly guarding gassed areas which had been evacuated and men were permitted to go back into these areas in a few hours, no guards being posted to prevent this. There will undoubtedly be more cases developing from this omission.

   We should learn from this experience the necessity of promptly detecting the presence of mustard gas, and of removing men from the gassed area as soon as possible, which necessitates a prompt reconnaissance to determine positions not affected by the gas; also the posting of guards and signs to warn, and not allowing men to reenter these gassed areas until they are declared safe by battalion, regimental or division gas officers.

THOS. H. CUTLER,
Captain, Engineers, U. S. A.

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**Movement of Headquarters 26th Division**

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
Genevois Ferme, Aisne, July 15, 1918—2:30 p. m.

MESSAGE No. 1:

Division headquarters will close at GENEVROIS Fme at 16 o'clock today and opens at chateau northern edge of MERY-sur-MARNE on same date and hour.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,  
Chief of Staff.

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26th Div.: Fldr. 153: Journal of Oper.

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

Operations Report from 18 o'clock, July 14, to 18 o'clock, July 15

1. VISIBILITY: Fair.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: Great activity of artillery. German attack on right in early morning.
3. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Under cover of a barrage German infantry in strength, which is not yet known but which, according to the statements thus far obtained from prisoners, was approximately 100 men, attacked VAUX from the north. The assault was made by the infiltration method and thus swept by one of our advanced posts. Just before reaching the draw through which the railroad passes, northeast of VAUX, the enemy was met with a withering fire from our machine guns and probably suffered thereby. The Germans entered this draw and stayed there. Prisoners state that this was the objective of the attack and that it was intended to hold this draw through which the railroad passes because it is a very advantageous position. They also state that two companies were in reserve and were to come up later to hold the position.

American infantry weapons opened fire against the hostile left and the enemy was in a very precarious position in the draw. This was quickly followed by a counterattack upon the German right, and a barrage which cut off the means of retreat of the enemy. When the counterattack swept against the Germans, many attempted to run back to their lines and suffered heavy casualties from our machine-gun and artillery fire. The others were taken prisoner and are now passing through divisional headquarters.

Thirty German captives are so far accounted for.

Our patrols were active over our whole front but were, for the most part, uneventful, the enemy not being encountered. Our men did, however, cut two bands of wire east of TORCY, locate a battery at about 75.8-63.8 and find that there is no enemy post at about 75.8-63.2 nor listening post at tree at 76.5-62.4 as supposed.
In addition to his attack the enemy delivered sniping and machine-gun fire along our front, especially against BOURESCHES.

4. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: Up until 1:26 o'clock there was the usual harassing fire. At that time severe C. P. O.'s were fired by our batteries. Then, upon report from the infantry that hostile shelling was becoming localized at VAUX, the light artillery grouping fired 575 gas shells opposite the 101st Infantry. At 1:45 o'clock the liaison officer with 101st Infantry requested barrage in front of VAUX and same was given. At 2 o'clock barrage ended and C. P. O. started on woods north of VAUX with gas. At time of VAUX fight a barrage was put down in front of that place which lasted in great intensity until about 7:05 o'clock; after which time the rate of fire was reduced until 9 o'clock when the unusually active firing ceased. During the remainder of the day the normal harassing and interdiction work was kept up.
   (b) German: During the early evening there was the normal harassing. Soon the fire increased in intensity and, starting about midnight, our front lines and intermediate areas were heavily shelled with high explosive and gas. The Marne bridges and back areas were shelled intermittently during the night. As time went on the firing became more intense and it became evident that the 101st Infantry was receiving special attention. Bois de la BRIGADE-de-MARINE got severe punishment but, as a whole, the fire was concentrating toward VAUX. This concentration continued until about 3:45 o'clock when it reached the intensity of a barrage in front of VAUX with the subsequent infantry development as described above.

5. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) American: Allied aeroplanes were active over our own and the hostile lines and our observation balloon was up.
   Note: A late report establishes the fact that at 17:05 o'clock following its having been shelled, our observation balloon at VILLIERS-sur-MARNE was attacked by enemy avions and brought down in flames. Its occupants descended in parachutes, being fired on by the aviators.
   (b) German: There was quite a good deal of aeroplane activity and several observation balloons were up.

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8. TROOP MOVEMENT:
   American: Division headquarters, Hq., 51st F. A. Brigade, from GENEVROIS Farm to MERY-sur-MARNE. Headquarters troops from woods south of MONTREUIL to MERY-sur-MARNE.

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W. S. BOWEN,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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18 o'clock, July 15 to 18 o'clock, July 16, 1918

[Extract]

1. VISIBILITY: Good.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: General activity, especially of artillery.
3. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: 101st Infantry---By heavy firing which added to our artillery barrage, hostile groups were repulsed from left and right in the early evening. An uneventful patrol reconnoitered "No Man's Land" during the night.
   102d Infantry: An officer and 27 men went to crossroads at 76.95-61.3. A hostile outpost of four riflemen was encountered. The enemy retreated under railroad bridge, our men firing upon them and accounting for at least two, if not all. At the same time machine guns at two points along railroad, and one near railroad station opened fire, and the enemy also delivered a hot rifle fire. A corporal was almost cut in half by machine-gun fire and two other men were wounded, one in four places. Seeing that it was impossible to advance our men returned to their lines under cover of road cut. The dead American had to be left behind, due to the nature of his wounds, severity of the fire, and the fact that the men near him one was severely wounded.
   103d Infantry: An ambush at 74.1-63.4 was uneventful.
   104th Infantry: There was no particular action by the 104th Infantry.
   (b) German: There was the usual intermittent machine-gun firing all along the line, and especially from opposite in the early evening. At about 21 o'clock large groups appeared on the right and left of the 101st Infantry. They opened up a strenuous fire. Our barrage dropped quickly and thickly upon them and they were forced to beat a hasty retreat to their lines, being submitted to severe treatment from our infantry also.
4. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: There was the usual heavy harassing against such sensitive points in the hostile lines as billets, crossroads and trench positions. During the early evening, severe C. P. O.'s were fired against Bois des ROCHETS, BOURESCHES and other positions in the hostile lines. During the period of active C. P. O. fire a barrage was laid, first at about 21:17 o'clock. This barrage grew in intensity and spread farther to the flanks. It absolutely swept the enemy back and advanced by leaps over the hostile outposts on to his infantry positions. This continued until about midnight, ending with an extraordinarily heavy burst against the hostile lines, all calibers involved. At 2:30 o'clock the 101st F. A. fired a concentration on the dugouts in and around the towns of BELLEAU and GIVRY. During the remainder of the day the firing was normal.
   Total rounds expended: 10,772.
   (b) German: There has been an enormous amount of firing over our whole sector all the time, but especially in the first part of the night. We have been drenched with gas. Between 18:30 o'clock and midnight the front lines received intense bombardments. This ended in a box barrage around VAUX about 21:17 o'clock, at the time when the infantry groups were seen advancing against us. The gas we have been receiving is mustard. The fire was general and widespread, even over the back areas, but VAUX, Bois de la BRIGADE-DE-MARINE, LUCY-le-BOCAGE, the PARIS-METZ Road, and the entire front lines of the 51st Infantry Brigade may be mentioned as receiving special attention. Intermittent bombardment of the Marne bridges continued.
5. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) American: There was active scouting, patrolling and practice in liaison by aviators.
   (b) German: A great many aeroplanes were up; the 52d Infantry Brigade having many over it.

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8. TROOP MOVEMENTS: Headquarters 101st M. G. Bn., now at BEZU-le-GUERY. Organizations of the division moved to the alert position in the night. 2d Bn., 101st Engineers is at La CROISSETTE and 1st Bn. in Bois GROS-JEAN. 101st Fld. Signal Bn. now at GENEVROIS Fme. One 75-mm. gun and two 155-mm. guns shifted to more advantageous positions close by. Several roving pieces moved to new positions.

9. CIRCULATION: Normal behind the enemy lines.

10. MISCELLANEOUS: Nothing to report.

   W. S. BOWEN,
   Lieut. Col., G. S.,
   A. C. of S., G-3.

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226-23.1: Operations Report

26th DIVISION A. E. F.,
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918.

18 o'clock, July 16 to 18 o'clock, July 17

[Extract]

1. VISIBILITY: Variable.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: Quieter.
3. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: 101st Inf.: A patrol north of VAUX heard enemy shovelling in front of Bois des ROCHETS.
   102d Inf.: A reconnaissance patrol heard enemy group but did not gain contact with them. An ambush at 77.9-59.9 was uneventful.
   103d Inf.: There was an uneventful ambushade and a group near 75.6-63.0 was fired upon by the enemy.
   104th Inf.: 1 uneventful ambush was established.
4. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: In addition to a harassing schedule, a reprisal was fired on woods near BELLEAU during midnight at request of infantry.
   (b) German: Below normal. Long-range gun continued activity in rear areas.
5. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) American: Aeroplanes active.
   (b) German: Much flying. Balloons up.

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SITUATION
AMERICAN 26th DIVISION
17 JULY 1918

MAP REF: FRENCH 1:20,000; S/M: GILODE
CHATEAU-THIERRY
7. **WORK:**
   American: 3,029 engineer-man hours and 3,925 infantry-man hours (101st and 102d Inf. and 103d M. G. Bn.) on zone of resistance, trenches and dugouts, camouflage, policing, loading and unloading trucks and wagons, wiring and brigade P. C. Work impeded by intermittent shelling.

8. **TROOP MOVEMENTS:**
   (a) American: 102d Inf. relief of A and B Companies on Hill 201 completed by G and H Companies of 2d Battalion.

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   In yesterday's operations report 101st Engrs., 2d Bn. was reported at La CROISETTE and 1st Bn. at Bois GROS-JEAN. The reverse is the case. 1st Bn. is at La CROISETTE and 2d Bn. in Bois GROS-JEAN.

9. **CIRCULATION:** Normal behind hostile lines.

10. **MISCELLANEOUS:** Nothing to report.

W. S. BOWEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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226-33.1: Operations Report

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918.

From 18 o'clock, July 17 to 18 o'clock, July 18

[Extract]

1. **VISIBILITY:** Poor in early morning, later fair.
2. **GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS:** 52d Inf. Brig. attack complete success.
3. **INFANTRY ACTIVITY:**
   (a) American: 51st Inf. Brig. quiet.
   52d Inf. Brig.: Night quiet, troops concentrating in zone of advanced posts.
   At 4:35 o'clock brigade attacked. A heavy mist concealed our troops who advanced rapidly. The enemy's advanced posts were taken by surprise and overrun. Continuing the advance, TORCY and later BELLEAU were taken. A stiff resistance was met with at GIVRY where fighting took place for a short time. Our troops drove out the Germans and pursued them, some in their enthusiasm advancing beyond the limits of the sector up Hill 193, and had to be recalled. At about 10 o'clock we held the line TORCY---north of BELLEAU---BOURESCHES. Railroad station was taken by the troops on the left of the 51st Inf. Brigade. The whole of the first objective was thus rapidly gained. The German casualties are undetermined, but were severe. 32 prisoners passed through the divisional cage.
   Our lines at the close of this report are as follows:
   51st Infantry Brig.: No change except extreme left which occupied Bouresches Station.
   52d Inf. Brig.: Bouresches Station---Railroad---GIVRY-TORCY.
   (b) German: Except for unsuccessful resistance to our attack there was very little activity.
4. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: Beginning 4:35 o'clock bombardments were delivered on the areas around TORCY and BELLEAU. About 5 o'clock, at request of C. G., 52d Inf. Brig. C. P. O. was delivered opposite right of that brigade. All during remainder of day an interdictory fire has been kept up against hostile troop concentrations. There was the normal harassing.
   (b) German: Usual harassing. There was very little reaction to the attack; the only thing being bombardments of moderate intensity against TORCY, BELLEAU and old zone of advanced posts of the 52d Inf. Brig. and the old zone of advanced posts of the 51st Inf. Brig.

5. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) American: Aeroplanes were active, liaison with the infantry and with headquarters being maintained.
   (b) German: Diminished flying. A few observation balloons were up.

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7. WORK:
   American: 422 engineer-man hours occurring before period covered by this report and not previously reported - nature as described before.

8. TROOP MOVEMENTS: Mobile ordnance repair shop to CITRY.
   Gas station to CITRY.
   1st Bn., 104th Inf., from BEZU Wood to woods in vicinity of 1/2 km. N. W. of La LOGE Fme with hq. at ISSONGE Fme.
   Div. hq. established an advance P. C. and message center at Genevrois Fme.

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9. CIRCULATION: Active behind hostile lines.
10. MISCELLANEOUS: Nothing to report.

W. S. BOWEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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French XXXVIII Corps
July 15 - 18, 1918

HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.3: Situation Reports

[Editorial Translation]

Major Coissac

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918---11:45 a. m.

I. Generally speaking the XXXVIII Corps is holding its ground on its line of resistance.

The front has not undergone any change west of FOSSOY (ours). From that point it goes to MEZY (where the American 38th Inf. still holds the railroad and MOULIN-RUINE),
A counterattack of 2 American battalions in the Surmelin Valley has brought in 200 prisoners.

II. SITUATION OF UNITS: American 3d Div., completely engaged.
French 39th Inf. Div., initial situation.
2d position: American 56th Brigade and 1 groupment of 2 territorial bns. and 1 regular bn.
Units in reserve: French 73d Inf. Div. (Bois de la JUTE and Bois de CHARMOY region) is preparing to counterattack in cooperation with the French 77th Inf. Div.
The French 4th Inf. Div. is moving from the BASSEVELLE region to the FONTENELLE region. The first elements will be there at 4 p.m.
The 6 bridges built by the Germans west of DORMANS have been attacked by the artillery of the French Fifth and Sixth Armies and several bombardment squadrons.
Information taken from a Boche carrier pigeon reports the crossing of the river as very difficult.
According to a map found on an officer prisoner, the enemy was scheduled to reach MONTBAZIN at 12:30 p.m.
Handed to Gillot at 1 p.m.
The situation has not changed since 1 p.m.
The Americans hold the railroad between FOSSOY and MEZY. They have thus far taken 400 prisoners including a major.
The 73d Div. has received orders to hurry its counterattack which is to be delivered in the direction of MONTREUIL and JANVIER Farm with 2 regiments, the 3d remaining disengaged to oppose the enemy on the left if the situation requires.
The American 28th Div. receives the order to relieve 2 bns. of the American 3d Div. (30th Inf.) by 2 bns. of the 111th Inf.: One in the night of 15/16, the other in the night of 16/17.

Use of French 73d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1758/3
XXXVIII ARMY CORPS, 
July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDER TO THE FRENCH 73d DIVISION

I. The General commanding the Sixth Army places the 73d Inf. Div. at my disposal.
II. The enemy has crossed the MARNE in FOSSOY, MEZY, Jaulgonne and REUILLY. He has reached La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON on our right.
III. Your mission is to prevent the enemy from advancing up the SURMELIN Valley or from crossing it.
IV. The American battalion which was to be in the Les BIEZ center of resistance has been relieved and not replaced, in spite of my orders. Put in this center of resistance a battalion which will be under the orders of Colonel Lemaitre.

**de MONDESIR,**
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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Situation Report

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1762/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918---11:50 a. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS TO THE FRENCH 73d INFANTRY DIVISION

The situation appears as follows:

1. The American 3d Div. has recaptured the line of resistance of its outposts (MOULIN-RUINE---MEZY---railroad, etc.)

2. The French 125th Inf. Div. holds the crest running parallel to and on the right bank of the SURMELIN through the knoll south of VARENNES, the large clearing (not in its entirety), the country around La GRANGE-aux-Bois.

3. Between this line and the MARNE the situation is confused; fighting is going on.

4. The 2d position running through CONDE---CELLES-les-CONDE---north edge of the Bois de ROUGIS---south of the villages La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON and COMBLIZ¥ is held by the American 55th Brigade and the French 20th Inf. Div.

5. If the situation clears up in the woods in front of the 125th Div. and the line it occupies holds, the French 73d Div. will be able to counterattack by crossing the SURMELIN.

6. On the extreme right, toward COMBLIZ¥, the French 77th Inf. Div. is prepared to counterattack, but I do not know the orders it has received. I shall keep you informed.

L. de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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Combat Dispositions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1769/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918---11:30 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER

I. The French 73d Inf. Div. (less the 367th Inf. Regt. which remains at the disposal of the General commanding the XXXVIII Corps) will be placed at the disposal of the General commanding the French III Corps.

II. The bn. of the 367th Inf. stationed at GRANDS-BORDEAUX will move on receipt of this order to the Les BIEZ [Farm] center of resistance to relieve the bn. of the French 346th Inf. which is there.

The General commanding the 73d Div. will give to the bn. of the 346th Inf. occupying the Les BIEZ [Farm] center, the necessary orders for moving to a point assigned to it after relief.
III. The bn. of the 367th Inf. of center Les BIEZ [Farm] will be under the control of Colonel Lemaitre who, under the direct orders of the General commanding the XXXVIII Corps will have the command of the 2d position from Les PETITES-NOUES (excl.) to Les BIEZ [Farm] (incl.).

IV. The colonel commanding the 367th Inf. will keep his C. P. at GRANDS-BORDEAUX and will have the command of the two other bns. of his regiment (Les PETITS-BORDEAUX and BOCHAGE) which will be in corps reserve.

V. The French 45th Territorial Inf. is being held in the 2d position.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII A. C.

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HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.1: Order

Confirmation of Attack Orders

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1764/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918---12:45 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS

Confirmation of a message to the French 73d Division

Get in touch with General Diebold personally and immediately to launch your counter-attack.

My first impression is that because of your tanks the axis of attack JANVIER Farm, large clearing between SAUVIGNY, and REUILLY would free the Jaulgonne Bend completely. But I leave you free to choose the direction of your counter-attack.

The General commanding the American 3d Div. is sending you a liaison officer to give you the support of heavy howitzers in the region west of St-EUGENE. (2d Bn., 334th Arty.)

(Order issued after a staff officer of the French 125th Inf. Div. had been sent to the 3d Div. to request a counterattack as soon as possible.)

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.1: Letter

Situation Report

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 1763/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY, XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918.

Telephoned at 11:40 a. m., July 15.
General of division de Mondesir, commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps, to the General commanding the American 3d Division.
Situation: The French 125th Inf. Div. holds the crest parallel to and on the right bank of the SURMELIN along the line: Knoll south of VARENNES—the large clearing (not entirely)—outskirts of GRANGE-aux-BOIS.

You have asked me for reinforcement of one battalion. I cannot give it to you because Leboqc's division has a definite mission which requires all its means.

Moreover, there is not one footbridge on the MARNE on your entire front. By your counterattacks, you have regained your outpost line of resistance and for the present have removed all danger on the Marne front.

The danger is on the right; the SURMELIN and the wood of the left bank form your natural line of defense toward the right, the line now covered by the 125th Div. This line becomes the new switch.

Therefore, you can make use of the battalion you have on Le ROCQ-BOCAGE switch and employ it wherever you wish.

Reconstitute a security detachment on the said switch with the engineer companies and machine guns, for example.

Situated as I now am, I cannot give you any reserves, but it should be noted that the action of the French 73d Div. will free your right completely.

Lieutenant Dumas has just arrived. I am trying to find a solution for the relief of the American 30th Inf.

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HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.1: Order

Disposition of American 28th Division Units

[Editorial-Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1765/3
XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDER

The two bns. of the American 112th Inf. now occupying the 2d position centers of resistance: ARROUARD, Les PETITES-NOUES, are placed at the disposal of the General commanding the American 3d Div. for the relief of the two most tired battalions of the American 30th Inf. [which are now replacing those of the 112th Inf.].

The battalion occupying the ARROUARD center will carry out the relief in the night of 15/16.

The battalion occupying the Les PETITES-NOUES center will carry out the relief in the night of 16/17.

The General commanding the 3d Div. will regulate the details of the movements of the battalions placed at his disposal.

The General commanding the American 28th Div. will take the necessary steps to ensure the permanent occupation of the two centers ARROUARD and Les PETITES-NOUES by drawing upon his reserve and by the battalions of the 30th Inf. after relief.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII
Army Corps.

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FROM: French XXXVIII Army Corps
AT: C. P.
DATE: July 15, 1918 HOUR: 12:45 p.m.
TO: American 3d Division

By order of the army, two bns. of the French 367th Inf. are placed at the disposal of General Lebocq (C. P. La HAUCHE) who will issue the necessary orders for their further movement.

The Colonel commanding the American 38th Inf. will take under his control the bn. of the French 346th Inf. now in the Bois de la JUTTE.

The mission of this bn. is to assure close liaison with the left of Lebocq's division (probably near Les ETANGS).

Memorandum from the army corps:

If the bn. of the 346th Inf. is already in Les BIEZ Farm, the colonel of the American 38th Inf. will have only two companies cross to the right bank.

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The 73d Div. is scheduled to counterattack toward JANVIER Farm some time during the day.

L. de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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I. German attack on the right of the American 3d Div. and the army corps on our right.

II. At 12:10 a.m. the enemy begins a very violent artillery preparation using high explosive and gas shells, especially on the front lines and the battery positions of the American 3d Div. During the entire preparation for the attack, our artillery maintained an energetic and steady counterpreparation which it had begun at 11:30 p.m.

Toward 3 a.m. the enemy fires near the JAULGONNE Bend become more intense.

About 4 a.m. the bombardment increases in the GLAND-BRASLES region; at the same time the enemy lays a smoke screen on the MARNE from GLAND to MONT-St-PERE under cover of
which his elements cross the MARNE at MEZY and near FOSSOY. Outpost units in position in this sector stubbornly resist the enemy whose advance is speedily checked. He succeeds however in gaining a foothold in FOSSOY, but is driven out shortly by a brilliant counter-attack by American troops. At the end of the day the German line runs through the region north of FOSSOY---north of CREZANCY---north of PAROY. Liaison with the French 125th Inf. Div. toward Les ETANGS Farm.

During the day the American 3d Div. took about 350 prisoners, including 4 officers of the 10th and 36th Inf. Divs.

At 8 a. m. the French 73d Div. is placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII Corps.

At 12 noon it receives the order to counterattack by crossing the Surrnelin to stop the advance of the enemy who has succeeded in driving back the elements of the French 125th Inf. Div. to the lower part of CONDE. This attack, launched at 7:30 p. m., immediately encounters a violent enemy attack launched about the same time. In consequence the progress of the 73d Div. is very much retarded and even stopped after some time. The village of St-AGNAN taken by us at 9:30 p. m. is later retaken about 10 p. m. by the enemy who cannot debouch from it. At the end of the fighting the line is as follows: St-AGNAN (enemy)---Signal 223---line from Les BOISETS Farm to the east tip of the clearing of JANVIER Farm---Les ETANGS Farm.

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V. Two battalions of the American 112th Inf. of the centers of resistance ARROUARD and Les PETITES-NOUES relieve two tired battalions of the American 30th Inf.

HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.1: Memorandum

**Disposition of French Units**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1770/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 16, 1918---1:55 a. m.

SERVICE MEMORANDUM

Special Orders No. 1769/3 of July 15, 11:30 p. m., is modified as follows:

The French 73d Inf. Div. will leave 3 bns. at the disposal of the General commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps: 2 bns. of the 367th and 1 bn. of the 346th Inf.

The bns. of the 367th Inf. will remain at Les GRANDS-BORDEAUX and at Le Bochage Farm (corps reserve).

The bn. of the 346th Inf. now in Bois de la JUTE will move to center of resistance Les BIEZ Farm on receipt of the present order, where it will be under the control of Colonel Lemaitre.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.
Reassignment of French Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1778/3

SPECIAL ORDERS

Confirmation of the noon message.

I. By order of the general commanding the army, the French 367th Inf. (hq. and 2 bns.) held in reserve at the disposal of the General commanding the XXXVIII Corps is returned to the control of the French 73d Inf. Div.

The General commanding the 73d Div. (C. P. La HAUCHE Farm) will send to the Colonel commanding the 367th Inf. (C. P. Les GRANDS-BORDEAUX Farm) orders for his mission.

II. The bn. of the 346th Inf. charged with the defense of the center of resistance Les BIEZ Farm, will place 2 companies at the disposal of the Colonel commanding the American 38th Inf. (C. P. Courtelin Farm). The mission of this detachment is to maintain, on the right bank of the SURMELIN, close liaison between the right of the American 3d Div. and the left of the group consisting of the French 73d and 125th Inf. Divs.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII
Army Corps.

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HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.3: Reports of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 16, 1918---8:30 p. m.

XXXVIII A. C. Major Poirmeur

No change since 8 o'clock this morning, except that we have taken PERTHES.

(1) The artillery counterpreparation preceded the German preparation; heavy losses for the enemy.

(a) The 1st position was practically evacuated. The enemy suffered very heavy losses on this position.

Our losses seem inconsequential.

Most of the elements which remain on the 1st position escaped capture.

Situation looks excellent.

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[The document in the files of the Historical Section, A. W. C., bears this notation presumably made in the Paris office of that section after World War I]:

[NOTE: The following is copied from notes written with pencil. The first sheet of these notes is missing.)

- 65 -
At 10 a.m. the French 77th Inf. Div. was placed at the disposal of the French III Corps for counterattack when the French 1st Cavalry Div., which was to replace it, arrived. At 8:45 a.m. it had been requested by the III Corps to make contact with the French 20th Inf. Div. at Le VIVIER.

The French 18th Inf. Div. in the process of unloading is pushed to the north, its head in the VERDON-MARGNY region (Group of Armies of the Center reserve).

The French 4th Inf. Div., Sixth Army reserve, is sent to FONTENELLE where it will take up position, disposed so as to be able to counterattack either in a north or northeast direction. C. P. FONTENELLE. (Arrival of the division around 5 p.m.)

For the 16th, the army plans a general counterattack to be carried out by the Commander of the III Corps who has at his disposal the 20th, 77th, 18th and 4th Inf. Divs. [all French]. The counterattack will be launched either from the 2d position, if it holds, or from a line of departure farther in the rear.

II. 12:30 p.m.: The French 51st Inf. Div. reports from the left regiment: A few elements belonging to 2 bns. remain in the Bois de BREUIL. Colonel killed.

Center regiment: Colonel and a few elements east of COMBLIZY.

Right regiment: The remnants of 2 bns. are holding out in Bois des PLANS in liaison with the colonials who are holding the east edge of MAREUIL-le-PORT.

At 10:05 a.m. the enemy was on the NESLE-le-REPONS-PATIS-de-TROISSY Road on the general line of La GRANGE-aux-BOIS.

III. A captured aviator reports that an army corps is attacking with 4 infantry divisions, 2 south of the MARNE in the direction of St-MARTIN-d'ABLOIS. 2 north of the MARNE in the direction of AVENAY.

IV. 1:30 p.m.: Situation in the 125th Div.

At 11 a.m. the French 125th Inf. Div. held MOULIN-RUINE, MAISON-ROUGE Farm, JANVIER Farm, spring 1 kilometer south of La GRANGE-aux-BOIS. Liaison established on the left with the American 3d Div. near CREZANCY.

After a short lull the enemy resumed his pressure in the direction of St-AGNAN, Bois de ROUGIS.

General Diebold [125th Div.] has requested that the 73d Div. counter-attack tonight or that reinforcements be sent to him.

V. Location of 18th Div. (headquarters at ORBAIS-l'ABBAYE).

77th Inf.: VERDON: 66th Inf.: La VILLE-sous-ORBAIS; 32d Inf.: La PETALERIE Farm, La HAUTE-FOY Farm.

Artillery: MARAGNY

Engineers: ORBAIS

Medical Service: MONTLIBAUT Farm

VI. 2:15 p.m.: General Lebrun's orders:

General Desvoies [20th Div.] will command the double sector (of the 2 infantry divisions), new 1st line and 2d position.

General Boulanger will concentrate his infantry division on a point of his choosing, in agreement with General Desvoies.

C. P. French 73d Inf. Div.: Le FORT-de-la-VILLE (north of ROZOY).
C. P. 77th Div.: La LACE-au-PUITS Farm (2 kilometers west of St-MARTIN d'ABLOIS.
C. P. 4th Div.: FONTENELLE
C. P. 18th Div.: ORBAIS
C. P. 20th Div.: COUPIGNY
C. P. 126th Div.: HAUCHE Farm

VII. At 11 a.m. SERRIGNY [77th Div.] received orders to occupy the 2d position between MONTMERGEY (east of COMBLIZY) and LEUVRIGNY. He will be relieved by De Boissieu.
VIII. 3:25 p. m.: The 20th Div. reports duration of halt north of La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON; the Boche are regrouping near MONTLEVON and La BOURDONNERIE Farm; small groups on plateaus and slopes of La CHAPELLE rather thinly scattered.

IX. XXXVIII A. C. Balloon: 2 footbridges west of COURTHIEZY. Strong columns of artillery and infantry on these footbridges and on a bridge in TRELOUP. 1 footbridge facing COURCELLES.

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HS Fr. File: XXXVIII Army Corps: 454-30.1: Letter

Reoccupation of Moulin Ruine

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1784/3

General of Division de Mondesir, Commanding the XXXVIII Corps

To the General commanding the French III Army Corps

I have the honor to confirm the request I addressed yesterday by telephone to your Chief of Staff.

To prevent hostile observation over my sector and to secure surveillance of the JAULGONNE bend in yours, it is important that the MOULIN-RUINE be reoccupied, strongly, by a mixed Franco-American post.*

The American 3d Div. is ready to cooperate in the operation which I do not expect to be very difficult, if delayed no longer.

I have given your Chief of Staff additional reasons of a morale order which I consider very important; he has doubtless repeated them to you.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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* Impossible. French 73d Inf. Div. very weakened; deprived of a battalion which assures liaison with the XXXVIII Corps. Cannot spare any element for this reason. The result would be a lengthening of the front line which is already over-extended for the forces in the line. Therefore impossible.
Redistribution of 28th Division on the Second Position

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1789/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 17, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 151

1. In front of the right of the French XXXVIII Corps and the left of the French III Corps, the enemy is held up on the general line north of: PAROY---Les ETangs Farm---the east edge of the clearing of JANVIER Farm---inside the Bois de CONDE---St-AGNAN.

The American 3d Division is in liaison with the French 73d Division (left division of the III Corps) in the vicinity of the ravine near LAUNAY.

2. The corps commander plans to support his right flank strongly so as to be able to resist any enemy advance debouching from St-AGNAN---CELLES-les-CONDE. To this end the main body of the American 28th Division will be moved gradually to the rear of the American 3d Division on the 2d position and to the south.

3. To effect this arrangement the following steps will be taken:
   (a) Organization of the Command: the 2d position will comprise two sectors:
       East Sector: From Les BIEZ center of resistance (including the woods of CHARMOY Farm) to the Les PETITES NOUES center of resistance (incl.). Sector commander - Colonel Lemaitre, 10th Chasseurs.
       C. P. La PISSEROTTE Farm (east of VIFFORT).
       West Sector: From the Les PETITES-NOUES center of resistance (excl.) to the small bridgehead at CHARLY (incl.). Sector commander - C. O., American 30th Infantry (until further orders).
       C. P. La CHAPELLE-sur CHEZY.

   The east sector, with the greater part of the 28th Division moved in rear of the 2d position and with such troops as may later be attached to that division, will form a group under the orders of the General commanding the 28th Division.

   (b) Distribution of Troops
       (1) Center of resistance of the east sector:

       7th M. G. Bn. (motorized) 2 companies
       346th Infantry [French 73d Div.] 1 company
       45th Territorial Inf. [73d Div.] 1 battalion
       23d Territorial Inf. [Fr.] 2 companies
       Cavalry 1 1/2 Troops, 10th Chasseurs

       These elements are already in position.

       American 111th Infantry 1 battalion
       American 109th M. G. bn. 1 company

       These elements are intended to reinforce the Les BIEZ center of resistance (2 cos.) and to relieve the troops holding the Les PETITES-NOUES center of resistance (2 cos. and 1 M. G. Co.).
(2) Group reserve

American 56th Brigade:

Brigade Hq.
American 112th Infantry
American 109th M. G. Bn. (less one co.).

These elements will take station in the zone MAISON-ROUGE---REDON---MONTBAZIN---CHAMBLON (all inclusive).

The General commanding the American 28th Division will have under his orders:
(1) The troops in the centers of resistance of the east sector.
(2) The group reserve.
(3) The bn. of 75's (3d Bn., French 214th Arty.) in position in rear of the 2d position (Les ALLOIS Farm).

C. P.: 28th Div., Les ORGERIUEx.
(Hq., HONDEVILLIERS)

(3) Troops in the center of resistance of the west sector:

On the left bank of the MARNE: American 30th Infantry (2 bns. and 1 regtl. M. G. co.)


NOTE: The American 30th Infantry, after being reorganized, is to resume its place in the American 3d Division so that the American 28th Division may eventually be regrouped together.

The 107th M. G. Bn. (motorized) of the American 28th Division remains in corps reserve at La MEULIERE.

The Colonel [Col. Frederic A. Snyder] commanding the American 103d Engrs. and 1 battalion [Major Burt Sapp] will remain temporarily in the sector of the French 39th Division.

4. The movements to be carried out in effecting the dispositions indicated above will be so regulated by the General commanding the American 28th Division that the troops will be in position by 6 p. m., July 18.

He will insure by arrangement with the General commanding the French 39th division that the relief of American units in position in the sector of that division is completed at the proper time.

5. The General commanding the American 28th Division will assume command at noon, July 18, at which hour the division headquarters will open at Les Orgerieux.

The Colonel commanding the American 30th Infantry will assume command of the west sector at 8 a. m., July 20. The relief of that officer (and of the M. G. Co. of his regiment) by the Colonel commanding the American 111th Infantry [Colonel Edw. C. Shannon] and the M. G. Co. of that regiment will be arranged by agreement between the Generals commanding the American 3d and 28th Division.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.
GENERAL ORDERS

No. 152

I. At 8 a.m., July 17, the XXXVIII Army Corps is placed under the control of the General commanding the French Ninth Army (C. P. ESTERNAY, Hq. VILLENAUXE).

II. The corps mission remains the same: To act in liaison with the French III Corps to throw back to the MARNE any enemy forces that have gained a foothold on the south bank.

III. The corps is placed under the tactical control of the Ninth Army. It remains attached to the Sixth Army for all other matters.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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At 8 a.m., July 17, the XXXVIII Corps is reattached to the Ninth Army.

The operation of moving the main body of the American 28th Division back in rear of the American 3d Division is still in progress.

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Quiet day in the left sector. No change.

In the right sector the line passes through FOSSOY---the heights south of MEZY---CREZANCY---the SURMELIN as far as 1 kilometer north of CONNIGIS---Les ETANGS where liaison is established with the French 73d Inf. Div.

Patrols sent to the MARNE found no enemy between MEZY and FOSSOY.

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I. GENERAL APPEARANCE OF THE DAY: Quiet day.

II. REPORT OF EVENTS:

(a) Infantry activity:
French: North of the MARNE, patrols in the region of Hill 204 met by steady fire. Capture of two Germans from the 501st Field Artillery.
South of the MARNE, combat patrols in the MEZY-CREZANCY region to clear the area of the few enemy elements which might still be hiding there.

(b) Artillery activity:
French: Field artillery - barrage fired twice, at the request of the infantry. Heavy concentration of gas shells fired on the region of VINCELLES Ravine. Harassing fire on the villages of VINCELLES, St-MARTIN, the grove and the ravine north of BRASLES.
Counterpreparation fire on the BRASLES, CHARTEVES, MONT-St-PERE and COURTEMONT-VARENNES region.
155-mm. howitzer fire on the CHATEAU-THIERRY railroad bridge.
Heavy artillery: Registration and fire on the BARZY bridge.
Harassing fire in the SAVIGNY, COURTHIEZY zone and on the GLAND---MONT-St-PERE Road.

German: French 39th Inf. Div.: Violent shelling of the southern slopes of Hill 204 and of the surrounding villages during the night.
American 3d Div.: Counterbattery fire with high explosive and gas shells.
Interdiction fire on the COUFREMAUX-COURBOIN region and Le ROCQ Farm. Shelling of the villages of CELLES, CONDE and VIFFORT.

(c) Aviation activity:
French: Limited activity because of the bad weather, except at end of day.
Ten sorties for adjustment and reconnaissance. One enemy plane is brought down in individual combat in the REUILLY-COURTEMONT region.

By order:

[Signature illegible],
Chief of Staff.
**3d Division**  
**July 15-18, 1918**

GHQ, AEF Records: 3d Div., Fltr. 6: Report

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*Report on Gas Attack by Germans*

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
OF THE DIVISION GAS OFFICER.  
July 21,* 1918

From: Division Gas Officer, 3d Division  
To: G-3, 3d Division

[Extract]

1. Bombardment started at approximately midnight July 14/15, and lasted without interruption til approximately 6 o'clock, a. m., July 15.

2. The area bombarded during this time extended along the whole divisional sector, from the Marne back to a line running from the ravine to the rear of Nesles--through Farm aux Charmes--Le Houty Fme--Greves Fme--St-Eugene--Conniges and Les Etangs Fme. • • •

   No gas in appreciable quantities was used on the slope toward the River Marne, and the few gas shells reported north of the plateau may be considered as accidents.

3. A count of shell holes in the shelled area indicates that about 1,000 gas shells per sq. kilometer were used during the first three hours of the bombardment. The proportion of gas shells used during this time is estimated at between 75 and 80 per cent. During the last three hours, the proportion of gas shells dropped to approximately 50 per cent.

4. Gasses used were diphosgene, chlopicerin, yperite, diphenychlorarsine, and ethyldichlorarsine.

5. Mustard gas was used only on the area to the rear. No mustard gas was reported anywhere east of a line extending from 898.579 to 915.557 [western edge of Bois d'Aigremont-Bois de la Jute].

6. Gas discipline in the various units was excellent, and especially in those units which had been trained in the divisional training area at Chateauvillain Center. Respirators were quickly adjusted, men kept cool, and in spite of intense shelling with gas, shrapnel and H. E., lasting over six hours, the actual casualties were few. In some cases troops wore respirators through the night seven to eight hours continuously, and discipline in this respect as to removal of respirators was all that could be desired.

   The 7th Infantry in particular, showed the results of careful training and during the heavy shelling of their reserve and support lines, evacuated only one really serious gas case. • • •

   It must be borne in mind that the artillery gas preparation was quite as intense as that used by the Germans in all of their recent attacks, and the fact that the division was able to stand the shock of such an attack with small losses and still be in condition to throw the enemy back, is a tribute to the foresight of the divisional and unit commands. Without the loyal cooperation and support of those in authority which has

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* Applicable on July 15.
enabled the gas service to organize and train the division in gas defense, it is safe to assume that the casualties might have been so severe as to have had a marked effect on the present tactical position of the division.

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In this connection, it may be noted that this is the first instance in which the German offensive tactics, in which gas plays a leading part, has failed to secure for them a material gain in territory. In addition to this the enemy was thrown back by the same troops which had sustained the shock of the gas bombardment, and not by fresh reserves brought up from the rear.

8. Conclusions:
   (a) That no new tactical uses of gas were developed in the attack. Smoke or artificial fog screen was used to cover the crossing of the river in boats and on pontoon bridges.
   Mustard gas was not used on any target in the area over which the enemy proposed to advance. The valley of the Surmelin River was kept entirely free of mustard gas or other persistent gases, with the exception of a few shells put in on the path leading from the valley road at Le Chanet to a P. C., in the Bois d'Aigremont. Here the direction of air currents was such as to prevent danger to troops advancing up the valley. It prevented, however, any movement on our part of troops in the east of the Bois d'Aigremont and Bois de la Jute.
   (b) Another system must be arranged for taking care of gas casualties in the field to avoid waste in organization personnel. At present every man who reports as being gassed must be given the benefit of the doubt and is evacuated to the rear. From the field hospitals he is evacuated, as necessity demands, to the rear hospitals, and thence on recovery to a replacement division. In all of these stages, whether or not he has been really gassed, he is carried as a gas casualty.
   A field hospital where all gassed cases could report and be kept and rested and where the bona fide cases could be sorted out after three or four days should be provided for all divisions. The nongassed cases could then be returned to their divisions, and loss of time and confusion could be avoided. At the same time, a severe penalty should be imposed on all cases of willful malingering under the cloak of gas poisoning. The symptomology of gas poisoning is so complex and at the same time so indefinite, that a man suffering from a slight shell shock, from excitement and fatigue, or from shock from a slight inhalation of gas, may think that he is a gas casualty and report to a dressing station as such. These cases cannot be overlooked, and until a further defined symptomology of gas poisoning is developed must be treated as gas casualties.
   Some plan such as suggested above would do much to remedy a wasteful condition.
   (c) It is most important that education of all personnel in gas defense be pushed to the furthest extent. Gas discipline must be constantly enforced. Particular attention must be directed to the end that men realize the necessity of wearing respirators in all gas infected areas, and that masks must not be removed unless some one in authority so orders.
   (d) Dugouts properly constructed proved to be absolute protection against gas, and were invaluable to surgeons, etc. The trench and dugout system was only in an early stage of construction so only few dugouts were available.
   Attention is directed to the question of the size of dugouts, as it was shown that a majority of dugouts were too small for the purpose. Air became exhausted during the long bombardment, and no means were at hand for reoxygenating same. In figuring area of
dugouts, calculation should be based on their being used for 8 or 10 hours, as a minimum, and relation of personnel to volume should receive careful consideration.

(e) Gas sentries should receive sufficient special instruction to admit of their readily recognizing dangerous gases, and a sufficient number of gas sentries should be posted in all commands to warn all personnel in emergency.

(f) Tissot masks should be issued to all dressing stations, artillery, machine-gun, and signal corps personnel.

W. M. SOMERVELL,  
Major, Engr., R. C.,  
Division Gas Officer.

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3d Div.: War Diary

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
La Doultre-Chateau, near Viffort, Aisne, 15, 1918.

[Extract]

REMARKS: At midnight of July 14 the German offensive on the Chateau-Thierry--Reims front began. Sector occupied by this division is its western limit. Artillery preparation very heavy. Attack from Gland to right of sector. Repulsed.

L. W. BISSELL,  
1st Lt., Inf.

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203-33.1: 3d F. A. Brig.: Operations Report

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
Vifforteau, Aisne, July 15, 1918.

Noon to noon, July 14/15, 1918

From: The Operations Officer, 3d F. A. Brigade  
To: G-3, 3d Division

[Extract]

Weather: Afternoon and evening of 14th, cloudy and rainy, 15th clear with light breeze blowing from northwest.  
Visibility: Good.

1. Enemy Shelling: Concentrated fires of high explosive and gas were received on all battery positions and P. C.'s of battalions and regiments. The battalion P. C. of the 2/76 was partially destroyed and the personnel forced to remove to 2d line infantry trenches at a point 500 meters northeast of former location. At Battery D, 2/76 the two
detached pieces were temporarily abandoned because of casualties sustained in carrying ammunition to these pieces.

2. Our Activity: At 12:05 p.m. [a. m.] a general O. C. P. was ordered. All batteries of the 76th were firing by 12:10. II/214* started the O. C. P., ** a few minutes later, all of which ended at the end of one-half hour. At 4:15 O. C. P. again fired, 4:20 O. C. P. fired for 15 minutes and continued with interval of 15 minutes between O. C. P. 4:25 1/76 and II/214 fired a GLAND right and GLAND left barrage. 9:25 a.m. 1/76 fired general O. C. P.

D and E Batteries II/76 fired eventual barrage GLAND left, F Battery fired on the MARNE. A Battery ceased firing at 10:41, cause out of ammunition. 10:50 II/214 resumed fire, 11:20 I/76 was firing on two smoke-producing machines at rate of four rounds per minute. 12 noon I/76 fired a GLAND O. C. P. II/76 fired on Le Ru-CHAILLY Fme.

Number of rounds fired by: 76th F. A. 3,500 H. E. 214th F. A. (French) 3,100 H. E.

3. Observation: Forward O. P.'s reported the enemy crossing the MARNE at GLAND and MEZY, at 4:35 a.m.


5. Infantry and Machine-Gun Activity: Great activity on the whole sector, particularly on the right.

6. Movements: Headquarters II/76 moved from La TRINITIE Fme to point in infantry support trenches about 500 meters northeast of farm at about 5 a.m.

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9. Impressions of the Day: Great activity on whole sector, particularly on the right.

10. Remarks: Due to the severe fire of the enemy upon lines of communication, reports from 10th and 18th Regiments have not been received. Verbal information indicates that 4 batteries of the 18th Regiment are in position. Unverified reports indicate that Battery A of the 10th Regiment evacuated its position, after destruction of its guns.

R. S. MASON,
1st Lt., Field Artillery,
Operations Officer.

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* 1 bn (Fr.) 334th Arty. (105); 3 bns. (Fr.) 214th Arty. (75); and 1 btry. (Fr.) 120th Arty. (105); were attached to the 3d F. A. Brig. for this operation.
** Counteroffensive preparation.
MOULINS-FOSSOY AREA
Marne Valley, looking east from Gland

REPORT OF COLONEL CROMWELL STACEY, 30th INFANTRY

The attack commenced last night about 12 o'clock and continued without intermission until 10 o'clock this morning when the intensity of shell fire dropped off very materially. The loss of the front line companies is about 50 per cent and the losses of the entire regiment about 25 per cent killed and wounded. The 30th Infantry has captured about 200 Germans including one major, two captains and some other officers, and the 38th Infantry has also captured prisoners.

The entire line of the 38th Infantry is intact. The small posts of the 30th Infantry were driven back; our support line from CREZANCY to the ravine to the left is intact and we have 2 or 3 companies in these woods to the front; I do not know how many men we have here because the shell fire has been so severe. We have 6 companies along here in the woods and we have 4 more companies back in here; that is, engineers, machine guns, 38th and 30th Infantry, so we have a fighting force right now of approximately 10 companies, 10 companies in the woods south of the CREZANCY-CHATEAU-THIERRY Road, and also 2 or 3 companies in the left group of woods, north of that road.

The regiment on the left has FOSSOY. I believe there are some Germans there.

The men are absolutely worn out from being 10 solid hours under shell fire without having even a drink of water, and the regiment ought to be relieved. We have been exposed to mustard gas, chlorine and chocolate gas and if a good many of our men don't get their clothes off we are going to have casualties from mustard gas. It is absolutely impossible for the men to get food, for all except what was in cans is spoiled from the gas. They are still there in the line and they will hold the line but they ought to be relieved and given the chance to clean up and rest and get something to eat because we have been on the alert for 10 days in addition to this attack last night.
Lieutenant Marchand, French officer, states that he has never seen any artillery fire to equal this since the attack on VERDUN. There are shell holes every five feet in the front line.

General Crawford states that he thinks a counterattack should be made down along that way right now.

How the Boche crossed the river we don't know. Some came across in boats. It will be absolutely impossible for them to maintain any communication with the other bank as there are 8 airplanes ranging for the artillery. Our artillery on 3 or 4 occasions has fired beautifully; they have dropped a barrage down within 75 or 100 yards of the bank of the river. The Boche that are here, are here. I don't think any counterattack is necessary; when the artillery gets in action and ranges on this, there is only one thing for these men to do, that is to come in and surrender.

Did the 2d Battalion reach Butts? Yes, sir. We have the whole regiment up there.

Have you seen any sign of French troops moving up? I have seen some French heavy artillery and machine guns and infantry, but it seemed to me they were marching the wrong way. I may have been mistaken; they may have been going to circle around. The French cavalry down the line was the first support I saw.

We have been in the front line since May 31. We wore gas masks for seven solid hours.

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4th Inf., 3d Div.: War Diary

July 15, 1918.

(Less Cos. K, L and M)

[Extract]

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REMARKS: 1st Bn. holding support line in vicinity of NESLES Wood. 2d Bn. holding first line; ETAMPS---Les EVAUX---CHIERRY---BLESMES. Three cos. of 3d Bn. join 30th Inf. at Bois d'Aigremont. This subsector heavily shelled from midnight to 6 a. m. and intermittently during the day with H. E. and gas shells. Enemy planes prevented from coming into our sector by our airplanes.

Co. I takes position in support line and in position vacated by Co. M. • • • Telephone lines out many times during the shelling. Liaison by runners maintained with only slight delay.

• • • •

E. J. BOND,
1st Lt., 4th Inf., Asst. Adj.

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From 20 h. to 20 h., July 14 to July 15, 1918

I. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Violent activity to the east of our sector. Heavy bombardment over our entire sector beginning about 24:20 and lasting until 9:30, shelling mostly with gas shells of all kinds including mustard.

IV. ENEMY ACTIVITY:

Infantry:

(b) Enemy crossed Marne about 5:30 at MEZY under protection of smoke. Probably 500 men were seen by our O. P. marching S. W. on road at 89.83-59.55 in column of squads. Fired on by artillery and went into trenches on south side of road, and filtered from there into woods around Le Ru-CHAILLY Fme, 89.6-59.7.

(e) Machine-gun fire in sectors east, machine gun located at 86.37-38.62.

(f) Twenty-five trench mortar bombs thrown over from 6.30-8.30 on Les EVAUX and Hill 186. 75-mm. located at approximately, 87.2-58.47, two 37 mm. located in woods at 87.06-58.47.

Eight 88's seen at approximately 88.20-59.28 in the open.

Artillery: No attempt made to count shells falling in this area during the period. Sector subjected to heavy bombardment, different kinds of gas shells, from 24.20-9.30. Mustard gas thrown into NESLES Woods. Only 40 H. E. shells reported as falling in extreme front line.

FRANK A. OWENS,
1st Lt., Am. 4th Inf.,
Regimental Intelligence Officer.

7th Inf.: War Diary

July 15, 1918.

REMARKS: This P. C. and all lines of communication heavily shelled. Heavy casualties. All stock and a great portion of transportation destroyed. Enemy shelling continued
from 24:15 to 8 h. and then intermittent shelling during the day. Aerial activity
increased during the day after shelling. Enemy effected a crossing at MEZY and lodged a
small body of troops near FOSSOY. 1st Bn. counterattacked and advanced as far as Bois
d'AIGREMONT.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS:
24:15 h.: Heavy shelling of this position began. Rockets sent up calling for
barrage. 1st, 2d, and 3d Bn. ordered execution of Order A.
24:25 h.: All telephone communication broken.
1:50 h.: Received word from GASTON by runner that his position was being heavily
shelled. Notified OXFORD and tried to connect with T. P. S.; shelling continued until 8.
8 h.: Shelling decreased slightly.
9:25 h.: Enemy reported crossed Marne at MONT St-PERE and moving in direction
FOSSOY.
14 h.: 1st Bn. ordered to counterattack and straighten out the right of our line.
20:20 h.: 1st Bn. reported as having arrived with 2 companies at northern edge of
Bois d'AIGREMONT, and one company on the right of F Co.
20:30 h.: Some prisoners taken by F Co. passed here.
12 h.: F Co., 6th Engrs., took up position on the left of support line.

J. L. McKEE,

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38th INFANTRY, A. E. F.,
Crezancy, Aisne, July 31, 1918.

BATTLE OF JULY 15/16, 1918

(This report is to replace preliminary report submitted on July 17, 1918.)

[Extract]

1. Troops: The 38th Infantry (less Companies A and C) plus Companies A and C, 9th
   Machine Gun Battalion, occupied the subsector of CHARTEVES (SURMELIN Valley) with limits
   as designated in division orders. Companies A and C of the regiment had been detached for
   service with the 30th Infantry. * * *

2. Disposition: The units of the regiment were placed as indicated in the accompany­
ing sketch [not found]: 2d Bn. on the front line, Companies B and D of the 1st Battalion
   in support near the aqueduct line, 3d Battalion on the woods line, and machine gun
   companies to the north of the CREZANCY-PAROY Line.

   It will be seen that I had provided lines of defense as follows:
   (a) On south bank of Marne
   (b) On railroad line
   (c) On the aqueduct line
   (d) On the CREZANCY-PAROY Line
   (e) On the woods line.

   I had also made provision for the defense of my right flank in event of withdrawal of
   the French, which later occurred.

3. The German Plan of Attack: From prisoners and captured documents it has been
   learned that the German first objective was a general line running from GLAND---southeast
of and including Le ROCQ Ferme---Les BIEZ Ferme---LONGEURDS---COUFREMAUX---HAUCHE Ferme---and south of MONTIGNY-les-CONDE, which they expected to attain by 10:40 a.m., July 15, 1918.

The accompanying maps [not found] show the forming-up positions for crossing the Marne, the areas to be bombarded with mortars, the areas to be covered with fog, and the line of advance after crossing the MARNE. The junction line of advance of the German 10th and 36th Divisions was along the line: Mouth of SURMELIN---MOULINS-PAROY Road---CONNIGIS---east of St-EUGENE---thence southwest to BAS-FORET.

4. Enemy Troops Engaged:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Troop</th>
<th>Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>398th Infantry</td>
<td>GLAND---MONT-St-PERE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>6th Grenadiers</td>
<td>MONT-St-PERE---SURMELIN Valley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10th</td>
<td>47th Infantry</td>
<td>In support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Grenadiers</td>
<td></td>
<td>Valley of the SURMELIN-JAULGONNE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The support regiments were used in the battle. Identifications since obtained have indicated that there were twenty-one (21) separate and distinct organizations of the German army opposite the sector of the 38th Infantry; of these, prisoners were captured from each regiment of both divisions.

5. The Action: The action began at midnight July 14/15, 1918, with a bombardment of guns of various caliber, reported to consist of eighty-four (84) batteries. The firing was rapid until 1:55 a.m., when it became moderate and remained so all over the area occupied by this regiment, with one exception, up to the movement of starting the rolling barrage along the railroad line at about 3:45 a.m.

Immediately preceding the rolling barrage there was apparently a concentration of artillery fire on the railroad line. The Germans pushed forward their preparations for crossing the MARNE under cover of smoke, tear and sneezing gas near the river, and lethal gas farther south. The French batteries of artillery in the subsector east of me are reported to have withdrawn at about 1 a.m., July 15, 1918, and the French infantry withdrew at about 4 a.m., after probable severe loss. This withdrawal exposed my right flank to hostile attack on a front of over four (4) kilometers. Attempts to cross the MARNE at three (3) places in my subsector were made; one in front of Co. E and another in front of Co. H were repulsed by rifle and Chauchat fire and hand grenades. The third place was in front of Co. G, made by the 6th Grenadiers. This was successful after the complete extermination of the platoon of that company on the river bank. A second platoon of Co. G on the north side of the railroad embankment was likewise exterminated after desperate hand-to-hand fighting. The third platoon of this company advanced over the railroad and engaged the enemy in similar manner and drove them off, which permitted the fourth platoon to first counterattack, then to resist a flank attack coming from the southwest of MEZY. The do-or-die spirit of this battalion prevented any Germans from entering our lines except as prisoners, of whom there were over 400 from this one point. It was here that by aid of Co. H the 6th Grenadiers were destroyed.

On the right flank of the front line battalion, Company F occupied trenches specially constructed to meet any possible contingency of retirement by the troops of the sector adjoining me on the east. Here this company fought throughout the day of the 15th and repeatedly repulsed and counterattacked the 5th Grenadiers until they, too, were driven, defeated and all but destroyed back towards JAULGONNE. That regiment did not again appear in action.

The battalion was withdrawn by order of higher authority to the aqueduct line on the night of July 15, after having sustained an action on its front and both flanks for over 14 hours. As far as known, not an officer or man abandoned his duty during those trying hours. The annals of our army do not record a more heroic action.
Companies B and D, during the 15th/16th, protected the rear and right flank of the 2d Battalion in a series of attacks that made possible the holding of the valley behind them.

To the 3d Battalion fell as hard a lot as can be imposed upon soldiers, that of having to remain constantly exposed under fire with no opportunity to return it. My praise for these battalions must, in fairness, be equally divided.

It is of interest to note that at the time the shelling first started, practically every company, except those in the front line, had working details of from seventy-five to one hundred men under supervision of the engineers engaged in digging trenches. In a great many instances these details were over half a kilometer from their respective positions, especially in the support battalions. In spite of the heavy bombardment, the officers in charge kept perfect control of their men, held them under cover, separated and organized their own men, and reported them back to their companies and positions when the barrage lifted.

The action of July 16 consisted principally in repulsing repeated attacks by the enemy from the northeast and east along the ridge east of the SURMELIN and as far south as CONNIGIS. During the afternoon the pressure became so great that a change of front along the Surmelin was required under a severe fire. On the night of the 16th, superior authority ordered the occupation of the woods line.

6. Result: This regiment fought the German 10th and 36th Divisions to a standstill and captured prisoners from each of their six attack regiments.

7. Commendations: I wish to record my praise and appreciation of the heroic manner in which every officer and man of the regiment clung with unflinching tenacity to his position until he was ordered to leave it. Of the attached units, I wish to commend especially the machine gun companies of the 9th Battalion. I wish further to acknowledge with extreme gratitude the assistance given me by Major General J. T. Dickman and Brig. Gen. Charles Crawford during the heat of the battle that raged with my regiment as its center.

The work of the Allied artillery was beyond praise; but I am under a debt of especial gratitude to the American artillery of our division.

The personnel of the Y. M. C. A. aided in the care of the wounded in a splendidly unselfish manner and while under a severe fire.

Recommendations of officers and men for special awards are forwarded separately.

* * * * * *

U. G. McALEXANDER,
Colonel, 38th Infantry,
Commanding.
To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3, G. H. Q., A. E. F., Col. Fox Conner, G. S.

At: G. H. Q., A. E. F., CHAUMONT, HAUTE-MARNE

[Extract]

No Boche south of MARNE. Situation in 3d Division at 10 a. m. 4th Infantry and 7th Infantry sector intact. 30th Infantry hold line north of FOSSOY and north of wood north of CREZANCY---St-EUGENE. 38th Infantry right flank withdrawn to point 1 kilometer north of CONNIGIS - because of retirement French 125th Division French front. French counterattack with brigade noon today. ***

HITT.

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ORDERS

No. 135

The following is published for your information:

3d Bureau, Staff
No. 1771/3

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER

No. 149

1. The situation of the XXXVIII C. A. appears to be the following:
   (a) Front calm on the left (CHATEAU-THIERRY---BRASLES---GLAND).
   (b) Bend at MONT-St-PERE---CHARTEVES: Without change since yesterday evening. The Germans do not appear to have crossed the Marne in force.
   (c) Bend at JAULGONNE: At the right of the C. A., the 125th Div. Inf. appears to have withdrawn considerably as well from north to south as from east to west. A grave danger exists for the C. A., namely, the possession of the western edges of the woods by the Germans.

   Yesterday evening, the counterattack of the 73d Div. Inf. succeeded in clearing the right of the 125th Div. Inf., the remaining elements of which seem to be holding on the right bank of SURMELIN a line as yet undetermined to the east of PAROY-CONNIGIS and probably JANVIER Farm.

- 83 -
II. Missions of the American 3d Div.:
(a) To bar at any cost the bend at CHARTEVES in front of FOSSOY-CREZANCY, by pushing its outposts as far as possible, so as to resume their former positions and be able to keep a close surveillance over the MARNE.
(b) To bar the Valley of SURMELIN, facing to the north, in front of CREZANCY-PAROY (liaison with the 73d D. I.).
(c) Organize itself firmly on the left bank of SURMELIN, facing to the east, by pushing outposts to the right bank of the brook, as far forward as possible.
Liaison with the troops of the 2d position to the south of the ravine of St-EUGENE (troops under the orders of Col. Lemaitre whose P. C. is at La PISSEROTTE Farm - 1 km. S. E. of VIFFORT).

III. Supplementary Information:
(a) The 73d Div. Inf. holds the line St-AGNAN---GRANGE-aux-BOIS---Les ETANGS Farm.
(b) The 125th Division is no longer to be counted on.
(c) Liaison with the 73d Div. Inf. to be sought and established between LAUNAY and Les ETANGS Farm.
(d) Establish itself firmly, always in liaison with the 73d Div. Inf., at the head of the ravine of LAUNAY and at Hill 164, on the edge of wood N. E. of PAROY.
The 73d Div. Inf. has received orders to cooperate with the American 3d Division in the reoccupation of MOULIN-RUINE.
The American 3d Div. will place itself in close touch with the commander of the divisional infantry of the 73d Div. Inf., at his P. C. at CELLES-les-CONDE.

The General commanding the XXXVIII C. A. de MONDESIR.

ROBERT H. KELTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

203-33.6: 6th Brig.: Operation Report

ORDERS 3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 136 July 16, 1918.

1. The following has been received by telephone at P. C. 3d Division at 45 minutes past noon, July 16:

By order of the army, the two battalions of the French 367th Regiment of Infantry are placed at the disposition of General LeBocq (P. C. La HAUCHE), who will assign them a position.

On the other hand, the Colonel commanding the American 38th Regiment of Infantry, will take under his orders the battalion of the French 346th Regiment of Infantry [73d Div.] now actually in the Bois de la JUTE. The mission of this battalion is to assure direct liaison with the left of the units of the division of General LeBocq (probably near the position Les ETANGS Ferme).
The instructions with reference to the above from the French XXXVIII Army Corps are as follows:

If the battalion of the French 346th Regiment of Infantry is now at Les BIEZ, the Colonel commanding the American 38th Regiment of Infantry, will only send two of the companies to the right bank of the SURMELIN River.

The Commanding General, 6th Brigade, will take necessary steps to insure liaison between the American 38th Regiment of Infantry, and the units of the French 73d Division on his right, and instruct the Commanding Officer of the American 38th Regiment of Infantry to be ready to move forward on his right flank in liaison with the progress of the French attack and movements of the French 73d Division.

ROBERT H. C. KELTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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[Pencil Note Attached.]

Received from 6th Brigade runner papers of instruction, etc. Recd. 3:35 p.m.

YOUNG,
Capt.

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203-32.1: 3d F. A. Brig.: Fldr. 11: Order

Plan of Fire for Day or Night

FIELD ORDER
No. 31

3d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. P. O. 740, Vifforteau, Aisne, July 16, 1918.

(In force from July 16 and until further orders)

I. Fire in daytime: By day, fire will be opened by order of the grouping commanders, when they will deem it expedient, on any objective which can be fired by the 75-mm. gun and especially on fugitive targets.

Consumption of ammunition: 200 shots per battery H. A. howitzer and 105-mm gun will be directly fired by the D. A. commander. This fire must be well adjusted and followed by fire for effect, observed during its whole duration.

It is absolutely necessary that a permanent observation service be organized in each battalion, in order to observe the effects of fire on fugitive objectives, as well as to report any other observations noted.

Grouping and H. A. howitzer commanders will report by July 18, in regard to such an organization.

II. Fire in night time: O. C. P. fire will be opened on the northern bank of the MARNE from GLAND to CHARTEVES.

Same objectives as on the preceding days.

Consumption of ammunition:

For the 75-mm. gun—400 shots per battery
" " 155-mm. gun—100 " " "
" " 155-mm. gun—100 " " "

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Starting fire: 9 p.m. Stopping fire: 5 a. m.
A call for barrage fire will have precedence over all other firing.

By command of Brigadier General CRUIKSHANK:

H. C. ALLEN,
Maj., Brigade Adjutant.

[Notes in ink]
(The C. O., 18th F. A., is authorized to direct the fire of the 155-mm.)

(C. O., 1st Bn., 18th F. A.)

(Show to C. O. French group

By order Col. Farr
C. W. M.)

C. W. McNEIL.
Capt.

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3d ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E.F.,
July 16, 1918.

From: The Operations Officer, 3d F. A. Brigade
To: G-3, 3d Division, Maj. Charles W. Foster, G. S.

[Extract]

Weather: Clear at night; rain a. m. Visibility: Fair.


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* Obus, allonge, long H. E. shell for heavy howitzers and siege guns.
10th F. A.: Gas used - not effective. Damage by H. E. excessive. Liaison officer with 30th Inf. reported enemy crossing MARNE. Major and lieutenant captured, reported enemy crossing bridge below MONT-ST-PERE, bridge near Le Ru-CHAILLY Farm, boats and bridges near MEZY. Bridge near MEZY demolished by our artillery.

18th F. A.: None.

Aerial Activity:

76th F. A.: One German plane at 18 h. 30 planes, mostly Allied, sighted. 8 enemy balloons up. 70 planes - July 15.

10th F. A.: Constant activity from 5 h. until 21 h. over battery positions. 5 enemy balloons sighted. Also enemy plane with British markings flying low firing M. G.

18th F. A.: Enemy planes over positions. Hostile plane with French marking over Battery D at 4:30 a.m.

[Written in ink]: (Think these must have been same planes, and that an error was made in observation of one of these units.)

Infantry and M. G. Activity:

76th F. A.: None.

10th F. A.: Battery C reports enemy plane brought down by machine gun at 11 on 15th. Battery F's first piece in forward position fired on by machine gun.

18th F. A.: None.

Movements:

76th F. A.: None.

10th F. A.: Battery A evacuated position and blew up guns under heavy M. G. and rifle fire.

18th F. A.: Battery D into position at 12 midnight.

Battery C did not get into position on account of heavy shelling. 3 guns damaged.

Works:

76th F. A.: Batteries A and B digging dugouts. Telephone dugouts complete.

10th F. A.: Splinterproof at 2d Bn. P. C.

18th F. A.: One dugout at Battery D. One dugout started at Battery D. Three dugouts at 1st Bn. P. C.

* * * * *

General Impressions of the Day: Extraordinary activity in and about gun positions.

Remarks: On account of heavy shelling, Battery C, 18th F. A., had to leave position.

1st Bn. ammunition destroyed.

R. S. MASON,
Operations Officer,
3d F. A. Brigade.

[Written in ink]: The report of the 76th, 2d Bn., has not been turned in.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 135: Letter

Situation South of Marne River

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
July 16, 1918--4:10 p. m.

MEMO for Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

1. In amplification of my wire this date, the following in regard to conditions in the 3d Div. and 55th Brig. may be of interest.
2. The Boche is cleaned out in front of the 3d Div. He crossed in boats only at that point and all indications were that many got away to the north last night by the same route.

The 55th Brigade had two companies of the 110th (B and C) and two of the 109th (L and M) in line for training with the French 75th [sic] Div. [73d Div.]. These companies are badly scattered and General Darrah does not have much news of them. He thinks many have gone to the 3d Div. Only 15 men of one company are accounted for. Practically no prisoners were taken by the Boche from the 75th [73d] Div. as its retreat was too rapid. More about these companies when I can find out.

3. Col. Kelton has had a very strenuous time for the past two weeks and is feeling the strain as are all the officers of the staff. Supply of rations, ammunition and medical stores are satisfactory but G-4 here has attempted to tie the ration issue down to the reported strength of the division without considering attached troops or replacements and there has been a little controversy about it that looks very big to these tired men. However, I think the matter is understood here now.

4. The counterattack scheduled for this noon on the right of the 3d was started late but is at this hour reported to be proceeding successfully.

5. Courier about to depart. Will try to get a report in daily at this hour to you.

PARKER HITT,
Lt. Col., S. C.,
Liaison Officer.

203-33.5: Annex to War Diary

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
July 16, 1918.

[3d F. A. Brig. to 3d Div.]
Report to Daniel 6 [G-3, 3d Div.] on condition of line as known to Canton.

We do not know exactly the position of the infantry line. Liaison between our regimental commanders and the infantry is kept up, but with great difficulty. We believe that the line has not changed since the information of last evening when we were informed that it passed from the north of Fossoy, over Hill 145 and following the road Fossoy-Crezancy. Latest reports indicate that no counterattack has been launched in the region of Fossoy. No fire has been delivered on this side of the river this night. At present we are delivering an O. C. P. on the far bank. The infantry has just called for the barrage, Gland right.

HENRY M. REES,
1st Lt., F. A.
3. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Intense artillery activity continues. No detailed reports.

4. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Minor operations in front of our lines in GLAND and MONT St-PERE subsectors to clean up territory south of the MARNE. Except for small groups, this ground as far east as MEZY is cleared of enemy. On our extreme right it became necessary to withdraw troops to line CREZANCY-PAROY to connect with elements on the right.

5. AEROPLANE AND BALLOON ACTIVITY: Activity normal under the circumstances. One enemy plane reported brought down in Bois d’AIGREMONT.

6. TROOP MOVEMENTS: One battalion, 30th Infantry, in MONT St-PERE subsector relieved by battalion, 111th Infantry. Other minor movements within the division.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Situation cleared up satisfactorily west of Surmelin Valley. East of that, the enemy has a fast hold in the Jaulgonne bend and on the bluffs to the south of it. A counterattack by French and Americans of the 55th Brigade in a northeasterly direction is now under way and designed to deal with this situation. Latest reports are that it is progressing favorably, the line being advanced north of St-Agnan—La Chapelle [Monthodon].

8. CASUALTIES: No definite report as yet. But it may be assumed as correct that they have been heavy in the 6th Brigade and considerable in the 7th Infantry. Though gas was used extensively gas casualties are reported to be comparatively small in number.

10. The defense of the sector was entirely satisfactory.

KELTON,
C. of S.
The beginning of the German offensive of July 15 was marked in this sector (CHATEAUTEIERRY to eastern side of SURMELIN Valley) by an artillery preparation which covered the forward area from BLESMES eastward and continued with scarcely any noticeable abatement for ten hours. Besides the concentrated fire on the front, line of communication and villages to a depth of 10 kilometers from the MARNE were bombarded. Shells of all calibers up to 210-mm. were employed, the latter particularly on the towns in the SURMELIN Valley. Gas shells were used everywhere and in enormous quantities. The intensity of the bombardment is witnessed by the fact that in ten minutes after it had begun, all wire communications were completely destroyed.

By daybreak the shelling had left the river front and settled on the slopes and woods occupied by our troops to the south of the river. At the same time, smoke screens were used under the protection of which and of a barrage which gradually advanced, from the river bank south, the enemy effected a crossing. The means employed were boats and pontoon bridges. In this sector, crossings were made at many points between GLAND and CHARTEVES.

On our own part, artillery barrages were put down along the northern bank of the river and the machine guns stationed in the front kept up a fire on the S. O. S. lines during the entire German bombardment. The exact effect of this fire is not known, but judging by results observed after daybreak, when four guns of the 9th M. G. Bn. frustrated the attempts of three German battalions to cross, it was effective. In spite of this fire, however, the enemy was able to put large numbers of men across the MARNE. Having reached this bank, they were at once subjected to frontal and flanking fire by our machine guns and suffered heavy losses.

During the night of July 14/15 two reliefs were being undertaken in this sector. In both the 7th and 30th Infantry, battalions were being relieved and, in each case, the losses due to the shelling were proportionately increased by the additional number of men subjected to it. But it remains a question whether these are not offset by the advantage of having had the men on the spot when needed.

In the sector occupied by the 7th Infantry, the enemy crossed in large numbers and established himself in FOSSOY. During the morning of July 15 the situation seemed critical here and a counterattack was ordered, using the three companies that had occupied the bretelle running from Le ROCQ to BOCHAGE Fme. Unfortunately, these positions had been subjected to a demoralizing enfilade fire in addition to the bombardment from the guns in front. Nevertheless, the troops advanced to the attack, but the bombardment was so severe and the losses so heavy that in all scarcely one company succeeded in reaching their objective. The counterattack as usual was not carried out, but the ultimate object was attained, for by nightfall this part of the front had been cleared of the enemy.

In the sector held by the 30th Infantry the bombardment was terrific. From midnight it continued until ten in the morning with its initial violence, the whole of the ground north of CREZANCY-FOSSOY Road and the Bois d'AIGREMONT south of this being subjected to the fire. The enemy crossed the river from CHARTEVES and advanced on MEZY. On company of regiment garrisoned this town and held out to the last, inflicting tremendous losses on the Germans. At the same time the enemy had crossed and was making an advance from the west. As a result, the main line of resistance was withdrawn to the FOSSOY-CREZANCY Road,
isolated bodies of troops only remaining north of this, a company in MEZY and two companies in the woods immediately north of the FOSSY-CREZANCY Road. The Germans never succeeded in penetrating south of this limit. During the afternoon, the regiment reoccupied the territory N. E. of FOSSOY and in the night of July 15/16 strong patrols operated in the territory south of the river from FOSSOY to MEZY and reclaimed it for our own. The losses in this regiment were heavy. They are estimated as 50% for the front line battalion and 25% as a minimum for the rest of the regiment; in figures, the regimental commander puts them at 1,300.

The regiment showed wonderful endurance and initiative and took its quota of prisoners - something over two hundred in number. Another satisfying circumstance was the liaison between the regiment and the supporting artillery. In the words of Colonel Butts, the regimental commander, "The liaison between the infantry and artillery was perfect, being by far one of the best features of the battle."

Taking now the sector occupied by the 38th Infantry extending across the SURMELIN Valley, we find the situation about as follows: The front line occupied by this regiment followed the R. R. extending north to a point on the river west of VARENNES; the remainder of this regiment was distributed in depth up the valley to St-EUGENE, in the villages and slopes east and west. The forward companies of this regiment which had remained in their positions were so demoralized by the preparatory fire of the Germans that the latter after crossing advanced regardless of their presence. Soon after daybreak, however, the supporting battalions counterattacked down the valley and this was successful, netting the regiment a large number of prisoners. By this move the original lines held by the regiment were reestablished. Unfortunately, the position could not be maintained, for on the left the Germans still retained a foothold on MEZY and the right flank was unsupported by the French elements with which the 28th had to connect. In consequence the right flank of the regiment was drawn back during the night of July 15/16, establishing liaison with the French in MOULINS.

This, in general, was the situation at midnight July 15, and except for completing the work of clearing the CREZANCY--FOSSOY--MEZY bend in the river and establishing a post in MEZY, it has remained so since.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 134: Telegram

**Right Flank Situation Critical**

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,

*La Doultre-Chateau, near Viffort, Aisne, July 17, 1918.*

To: G-3, G. H. Q., Col. Fox Conner, G. S.

At: A. P. O. 706, CHAUMONT, HAUTE-MARNE

Three naught two. Have reoccupied all grounds to south bank of river except to east of MEZY. Situation rather critical on our right flank. Shelling heavy and continuous by both sides.

KELTON,

C. of S.

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3d Division Situation

Operations, July 17, 1918, 9:36 a.m.

Just seen General Dickman. 3d Division situation unchanged and completely in hand. Situation on the right of 3d Division improved but definite information not received. Investigating.

HITT.

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Noon July 16 to Noon July 17

[Extract]

5. AEROPLANE AND BALLOON ACTIVITY: Observation balloons on both sides up at frequent intervals along line whenever visibility is sufficient. German airplanes with Allied markings flying low and harassing our troops with machine-gun fire at several points and at frequent intervals. Our batteries have been bombed by planes similarly camouflaged and after reconnaissance they have also given ranges to their artillery on targets in our sector.

6. TROOP MOVEMENTS: 1st Battalion, 111th Infantry, moved to MONT-St-PERE sector, where it relieved a battalion of 30th Inf. Along our front from MEZY westward the enemy has withdrawn across the MARNE.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Situation entirely satisfactory in this sector west of SURMELIN Valley---our original lines reestablished along MARNE. Potentially grave situation for our regiment in SURMELIN Valley facing northeast because of threatened failure of support on right flank under pressure of German offensive attempting to outflank this portion of the line. Latest reports, however, indicate an abatement of German push in direction of MONTHERREL---CELLES-les-CONDE, and that the French line here is holding.

9. SUCCESS OF OUR TROOPS IN PATROLLING: Patrols from the 7th and 30th Inf. [Regt.] and the battalion 111th Inf. operating in the MONT-St-PERE sector cleaned up the FOS-SOY---MEZY---CREZANCY bend in the MARNE. Two light machine guns and several prisoners were brought in.

13. CHANGE IN LOCATION OF LINE HELD BY OUR TROOPS OR THE ENEMY: Line definitely established along the MARNE from CHATEAU-THIERRY to MEZY. Thence it runs south to and
including CREZANCY, thence east to northern limit to LAUNAY, thence to MAISON-ROUGE, where it connects with the division on our right.

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KELTON,
Chief of Staff.

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203-33.6: Fldr. 6K: Operations Report

From: Commanding General, 3d F. A. Brigade
To: Commanding General, 3d Division

[Extract]

1. Submit herewith report of operations of this brigade while serving with the French XXXVIII Corps during the second battle of the Marne.

2. The evening of July 14 found the 3d F. A. Brigade with its headquarters at VIFFORTEAU and the units constituting it in position south of the MARNE River. The 76th Regiment between Le NORVIN Fme and the woods to the west of Les CORBEAUX; the 10th Regiment F. A. between JANVIER Fme and the small woods northeast of Le HOUY Fme with their regimental headquarters at Courboin; the 18th F. A. Regiment had established its regimental headquarters at VIFFORT and the disposition of its various units was as follows:

1st Bn. in position on reverse slope approximately 500 meters northeast of La PERLE Fme.

2d Bn. D Battery, in position in woods about 350 meters southwest of Le Chamoy [La CHARMOYE?] Fme.

C Battery on the road to take up a position north of D Battery.

3d Bn. not yet in position, but on its way up from GRANDE-FORET to go into position in the western portion of the sector on both sides of the CHATEAU-THIERRY Road, about 500 meters north of Les PETITES-NOUES. All telephonic communications between the batteries in position, battalions, regiments and brigade headquarters had been installed and were in working order.

In addition to this the 3d Trench Mortar Battery had six mortars in position on the south bank of the River MARNE, opposite GLAND, and a working party was digging the pits for the balance of their mortars at a spot near MEZY.

There was also under the command of the 3d Brigade the following French units:

1 bn., 334th Regiment (155's)
2 bns., 214th Regiment (75's)

1 battery of 120th Regiment (105's)

At this time F Battery of the 10th F. A. had detached one piece which had gone forward north of GREVES Fme for the purpose of covering the MEZY Bridge.

An attack by the enemy had been expected for some time, and the night of July 14, found the various units of the 3d F. A. Brigade, which were in position, ready to fulfill
their various missions in accordance with the brigade’s plan for barrage, O. C. P., and concentration fire.

Throughout the afternoon of July 14, continuous reports were received of the movements on the part of the enemy from the north in direction of the River MARNE. Information to the effect that materiel and smoke engines were being placed at various points north of the river bank was also received, and fire was delivered throughout the day on these various locations, as well as on the roads which were believed to be frequented by the enemy.

Late in the afternoon an order was issued from brigade headquarters calling for a fire extending from approximately 63.9 to 59.0, to be delivered beginning at 8 p.m., and consisting of a total of 3,000 #20 special shells. At 11:25 p.m., July 14 orders were issued for a general O. C. P., which commenced at approximately 11:45 p.m. and continued for one-half hour.

Throughout the night of July 14/15, both our artillery and the enemy’s showed a decided increase of activity and the northern bank of the MARNE was kept almost continually under fire by our guns. At approximately 4:15 a.m., July 15, we commenced the execution of a general O. C. P. fire, lasting for 15 minutes and with intervals of 15 minutes, which was to have been kept until broad daylight. This fire was executed by the entire brigade with the exception of the 1st Bn., 76th F. A., which unit, in connection with the 2d Bn., French 214th Regiment were executing a GLAND right and GLAND left barrage.

The steady increase of artillery fire and the reports received from all sources gave certain indication that the long anticipated attack was imminent, and the final confirmation was received at approximately 5 a.m., July 15 from one of the forward O. P.’s whose message read, “Enemy crossing the MARNE at GLAND and MEZY.”

In the meantime (that is during the night July 14/15) C Battery, 18th F. A., had been moving up, expecting to go into position just north of that occupied by D Battery of the same regiment. The enemy’s artillery fire, which had been intensive on all roads of importance throughout the night caught this battery under heavy fire on the road COURBOIN ---St-EUGENE, where it suffered severe losses, both as to personnel and materiel. Three of their pieces were put out of action, but the exact number of casualties was not established at that moment.

Later in the morning of the 15th, the confirmation of the enemy’s having crossed the river was received and the 3d Trench Mortar Battery, after having expended all of their machine-gun ammunition was driven from their pits near MEZY. This same unit’s emplacements opposite Gland was bombed by aeroplanes causing several casualties and making it impossible to remain there. The personnel, therefore, joined the infantry, with whom they remained fighting until the next day, at which time, they returned to their echelon. Their final report showed 2 officers wounded, 2 men killed, 2 men died of wounds, 30 wounded and 6 missing. This unit remained in its echelon reorganizing and have not since taken part in our activities. They were also able later to recover all of the materiel, with the exception of one machine gun.

The disposition of our artillery early July 15 was as already given. C Battery of the 18th, with only one piece left were organizing and arranging to take this piece into position under cover of darkness where they had originally intended to place the entire battery. The 3d Bn. of the 18th had not yet gone into position as already designated but would do so the night of the 15th.

Throughout the morning a continuous fire was being kept up by our artillery which, in addition to the heavy firing executed the night before, was causing an abnormal consumption of ammunition and it became necessary to employ every means of available transportation for the purpose of hauling ammunition to the battery positions. By using the trucks of the Trench Mortar Battery, the train of the 3d Engineers and the trucks which the brigade was able to secure from the division and through the utmost effort of all the personnel connected with the ammunition service it was possible to keep the batteries supplied.
The artillery fire was being carried out in accordance with the information supplied from all sources and especially that received from the infantry then engaged with the enemy south of the River MARNE. In addition, O. C. P. and barrage fires were carried on such spots as were indicated as points of passage, and concentration fire was executed on all bridges, boats and means of crossing the river, which were visible.

The advance which the enemy had been able to accomplish due to the first shock of the attack brought the lines to a point where A Battery of the 10th F. A. found themselves in an extremely precarious position. In the meantime, the detached piece from F Battery, 10th F. A., had been firing continually until our line practically flanked them and the enemy machine-gun fire was covering their position. At this moment they dismounted the breech of their piece which was brought back by an officer and one enlisted man which was all of the uninjured personnel left from that which had originally taken this piece forward. A battery also now found itself under the enemy's machine-gun fire with their line approaching and was finally forced, after using all of their machine-gun ammunition to blow up their pieces and retire. (Note: The detached piece of F Battery as well as practically all of the materiel of A Battery was recovered later.)

Owing to the heavy shelling which was being delivered by the enemy, it became impossible to maintain the telephone lines between the various units despite the untiring efforts of all the communications personnel and practically all the information from the front was not being handled by couriers, either mounted or with motorcycles.

Word was received that the P. C. of the 2d Bn., 76th F. A., had been forced to evacuate La TRINITE Fme, which was being heavily shelled and was now functioning from the support trenches at a point about 500 meters northeast of the above mentioned farm.

The division advised that our infantry would counterattack along the Surmelin Valley toward Mezy and orders were issued to the artillery units to cover with their fire the sectors BRASLES---GLAND---MONT-St-PERE---CHARTEVES---ECLUSE [Barrage Ecluse]---BOUCLE [bend in river?]. This fire, as well as all missions given by the infantry, was carried on throughout the morning.

Early the afternoon of July 15, the following message was received from one of the artillery liaison officers with the 7th Infantry: “The worst is now over and our front line holds. We have taken about 100 prisoners.” Word was also received from the 3d Division that the French 73d Division on our right would counterattack in the direction of Bois de JUTE-JANVIERS Fme to strike the bend in the river and that our division held its original line everywhere except a small portion north of FOSSOY. Throughout the afternoon of July 15, continual fire was kept on the enemy's positions north of the MARNE and on points indicated by the infantry in the form of harassing and concentration fire and orders were issued covering the fire to be delivered the night of the 15th, which was to be in the form of an O. C. P. at a reduced cadence.

The night of July 15/16 passed with no definite change in the artillery situation. The above mentioned O. C. P. was carried on with priority given to the infantry’s call for barrage.

The morning of July 16 showed a decrease of the enemy's artillery activity, our own, however, being conducted as on the day previous. The remaining units of the 3d F. A. Brigade, including the one gun of C Battery, 18th F.A., had now gone into position. The advance of our infantry line had relieved the situation for our batteries, although those units which found themselves on the extreme right of the sector were not as yet entirely comfortable as the line held by the French was still within fairly close proximity. The same nature of fire was carried out throughout the day as had been executed the afternoon before and the aviation reports stated that all bridges and methods of crossing the river had disappeared.
MONT-St-PERE--Jaulgonne AREA
Looking northeast from Fossoy and across Marne Valley
On July 17, F. O. 35 (brigade) was issued, calling for harassing fire over the entire front of the division, especially on such points of the river which appeared to be a likely choice in event of passage. This fire was delivered and carried out.

H. G. BISHOP,
Brigadier General.

G-3, GHQ, AEF: 3d Div.: Special Operations Report

30th INFANTRY, A. E. F.,
Bois d'Aigremont, July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

At 12:15 a.m. on the night of July 14/15 the enemy started a most severe preparation fire. For a number of days preceding the attack, the enemy artillery had been exceedingly quiet, hardly any shells falling into our territory, but when the preparation fire began it came all at once and without warning of any kind. Inside of five minutes after the first shot was fired the artillery preparation was at its height. All calibers of munitions were used, from 77's up to and including 210's. High explosive, shrapnel, and gas shells were used. It is not possible to tell accurately all the gases the enemy threw over, but it is believed that we received mustard, chlorine, lachrymatory, and a sort of gas which causes nausea.

After five hours of the most severe preparation fire the enemy started to cross in force. He used boats near MEZY, each one holding 20 men. He also had a bridge near MONT-St-PERE over which one thousand men crossed before our artillery destroyed it. It is thought that there was another bridge to the right of MEZY, for large numbers of the enemy were seen to come out of the brush along the bank of the river.

When a sufficient number of the enemy, in their estimation, had crossed the river, a barrage was started from just in front of MEZY, and under its cover the enemy was to advance and take Hill 145. In the meantime, however, the preparation fire on Hill 145 around the P. C. and all through the Bois d'AIGREMONT was vigorously continued. When the barrage reached the foot of Hill 145, it stopped and held there for 20 minutes, after which it again advanced, the enemy evidently figuring that his infantry was not keeping with the artillery.

In the meantime our infantry, as soon as the barrage had passed over them, came out from cover and directed an intense small-arms fire at the advancing line of Germans. Our front line was divided into small groups of one or two platoons each, some of them separated some little distance so that it was possible for the enemy to get through the line in some places. However, as soon as he was through the first line he was met by another group which was echeloned back from the first, and he was fired upon not only from the front but from the rear as well. It was this combination which doubtless caused many of the groups of the enemy to believe they were surrounded and resulted in their surrender. Very few of the enemy reached the woods which held the front line P. C. Post [sic], and those few were taken prisoner. None of the enemy reached the FOSSOY-CREZANCY Road.

During the afternoon of the same day the enemy continued to shell heavily the woods of the regimental P. C. and lines of communication to the rear. The shelling continued in the night also, but diminished in force.
The following day, July 16, the 2d Battalion of the 111th Infantry was ordered into the front line under command of Major Lindsey McD. Silvester of the 30th Infantry. Instructions were given to send patrols along the river to determine the strength of the enemy, to occupy the original lines held by our forces, and to counterattack vigorously if necessary. It was not necessary to counterattack and our forces met with no opposition. The front line is held by strong visiting [sic] patrols during the night, and observation posts are maintained during the day. Our lines are all established as they were originally and are being firmly held. It is believed that we are in position now to sustain as vigorous an attack as we received the night of July 14/15.

Since the first day of the attack the enemy has been rather quiet, but he has shown activity periodically.

July 17 he subjected the woods in the vicinity of our P. C. to a shelling almost a vigorous as the original preparation fire. The morning of July 18 the shelling was repeated. During the preparation fire and all the subsequent shelling our troops sought their shelters and remained there quietly.***

It has been clearly demonstrated that the enemy infantry will not stand up to our foot troops. We were met with vastly superior numbers, but our men in small groups held their lines, all the time pouring a steady stream of fire into the German ranks. The result was disastrous for the enemy.

It is not possible at this time to arrive at any accurate conclusion as to the number of casualties. They are not, however, as large as was at first thought.

LEWIS C. BEEBE,
2d Lieut., Intelligence Officer,
30th Infantry.

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203-20.1: 38th Inf.: Intelligence Report

38th INFANTRY, A. E. F.,
Courtelin, Aisne, July 17, 1918.

July 16/17, 1918

[Extract]

Day's activity almost normal with the exception of artillery and aeroplanes. From patrol sent out and from report of medical officer as well as some of my own men, I have learned that there are no Germans in LAUNAY and a few in MOULINS. They do hold the hill, however, from MOULINS to MOULIN-RUINE and in some cases advance posts farther to the south. The main dependence of the Germans is the machine gun, as usual, of which they have nests at all desirable points. They also have snipers placed at intervals, which cause our men a great deal of annoyance.

The artillery has been giving us as much trouble as it could, fortunately they have done comparatively little damage. At intervals we have received a concentrated fire followed by harassing fire of scattered shots; just enough to keep our troops uneasy. The result has been that, although there have been few losses, the men have been unable to get rest. They are still fighting, and fighting well, but they are greatly in need of rest and an opportunity to clean up and get clean clothes to put on. During the period I estimate that about eight thousand shells fell in our area. All calibers from 77's to 150's are both shrapnel and H. E. - probably 5% shrapnel. There have also been a few
210's fired into the sector or aeroplane bombs dropped. The craters made are too large to have been made by smaller caliber shells.

We have had German aeroplanes over the sector in groups of from one to ten, reconnoitering our lines and firing at troops with machine guns. I was myself fired on while going from St-EUGENE to COURTELIN Fme at about 16 h. Other officers report the same thing and I, personally, have observed planes using their M. G.'s on troops moving from place to place and in trenches. The German planes seem to meet little opposition from any source. I would like to know why the Allied planes are not more aggressive. We have seen French planes but have observed few battles and have not noticed that the work of the Germans was very greatly interfered with, most of the time. About twenty flights during the day.

We have been unable, owing to the nature of the sector we now occupy, to note movement other than of individuals. No movement of vehicles of any sort noted.

The enemy is, judging by reports, using bits of trenches dug by our troops and the French as the basis of M. G. nests.

Our troops have been active at all times in sending out patrols to locate the enemy. Owing to the conditions under which we are working it is impossible to get formal reports on them. They have done excellent work in capturing machine guns and locating the enemy's position.

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R. F. BRADLEY, Jr.,
1st Lt., 38th Inf.,
Regtl. Intelligence Officer.

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3d Div. 38th Inf.: War Diary

[Extract]

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REMARKS: Activity of enemy decreasing except for heavy shelling during afternoon and evening on trenches on woods line. Enemy planes still continue to fly over trenches with heavy machine-gun fire. Many patrols sent out for information. Encountered enemy on our extreme right (Hill 231). Men pretty tired but spirit and morale fine. Several machine guns, maps, papers and equipment taken from enemy by our patrols.

U. G. McALEXANDER,
Col., 38th Infantry,
Comdg.
3d Div., 7th Inf.: War Diary

July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

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REMARKS: Intermittent enemy artillery shelling during the day. Our artillery more active. Reorganization of companies. Groups on adjoining sector withdrawn. M Co. withdrawn to line of support.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS:
2:30 h.: Message from brigade arrives regarding smoke.
2:40 h.: E. Paso reports little smoke screen.
2:45 h.: Spokane notified. Spokane reports O. K.
3 h.: Spokane reports that they believe friendly artillery firing on side of river, probable enemy enfilade battery.
8:30 h.: Spokane reports subsector of GLAND cleared by Germans and our patrols successful.
10 h.: Maj. Gaston receives orders to withdraw his groups in woods on adjoining sector.
16 h.: Lt. White gave his statement of patrols during night July 15/16.

J. L. McKEE,
Capt. and Acting Adj.

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203-33: Fldr. 134: Memorandum

Situation Report, 3d Division, as of July 18

LAREDO [I CORPS],
July 18, 1918--14 h.

MEMO for A. C. of S., G-3

[Extract]

1. There are a few changes in the order of battle of the 3d Division. The 30th Infantry has been withdrawn from the right center section and placed on the extreme left to be refitted and get its replacements. A regiment from the 56th Brigade has taken its place.

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6. The 3d Division is ready to cross the river if the drive from the west makes it practicable.

PARKER HITT,
Lieut. Col., Signal Corps.

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- 100 -
On July 14, 1918, the 3d Division held a sector extending along the south bank of the Marne River from the eastern edge of Chateau-Thierry to a point on the river one kilometer due west of Varennes, a distance of 9 kilometers on an east and west line, and of almost 12 kilometers measuring along the river bank.

The division sector was divided into 4 subsectors each held by one regiment with one battalion in the front line, one battalion in support, and the third battalion in reserve. Machine gun battalions were assigned to brigade sectors and the guns employed for the defense of the sectors were echeloned in depth to provide a deep checkerboard formation. The division reserve consisted of only three companies of the 4th Infantry, located in the rear of the left subsector. From west to east the subsectors were held by the 4th, 7th, 30th and 38th Infantry Regiments respectively. The 10th Field Artillery had taken position in the eastern half of the division sector and had been assigned to the support of the 6th Brigade, the 76th Field Artillery in the western half of the sector being assigned to the support of the 5th Brigade. The 18th Field Artillery was on this date just coming into position; the last battery being caught on the road by the bombardment of the night of July 14/15. The units of this regiment and the French units already in the sector were given the mission of general support in the zone of the division.

Four general lines of defense had been organized, but the defensive works constructed were in a rather elemental stage, due to several circumstances, the most important of which were the more or less open character of the recent fighting, the lack of engineer personnel, and the constant shifting of units in the early stages of organization, and the continual changes in sector limits, occasioned by the army corps organizations and reorganization. The first of these lines, consisting of isolated pits and machine gun emplacements along the river bank, was intended to serve principally as a line of observation. Close in rear of this line a more strongly garrisoned defensive position providing a more or less continuous line of rifle fire (in compliance with orders XXXVIII A. E. F.) had been established along the railroad track, the so-called main line of resistance extending along the slopes of the first hills south of the Marne. Although this line was intended to be continuous eventually, the main reliance was placed upon certain groups or strong points fairly well organized. The 4th or reserve line followed the slopes about the crest of the 2d ridge of the south of the Marne, extending into the Surmelin Valley on the east. In rear of the division, a fairly strong position on the reserve slope of the hills had been organized by the Sixth Army, and was garrisoned by the American 28th Division, and the French 73d Division.

As stated above, the organization of the position held was far from being completed. Dugouts for use as P. C.'s and dressing stations and a number of splinterproofs had been installed. Fire trenches existed along the front edges of the woods and at certain isolated points, but were not of sufficient depth to afford reasonable protection from shell fire. The small isolated pits in the forward area, were, however, much nearer completion and were all fairly well camouflaged. A bretelle position garrisoned by three companies of the 7th Infantry and Machine Gun Company was in process of construction from Le Rocq-Chateau to BOCHAGE Farm, and another bretelle garrisoned by one battalion of the 38th Infantry had been commenced with a view to extending it along the eastern edge of Bois de la JUTE and the northern edge of the woods south of St-Eugene.
Four battalions of the division had been retained by the corps of the army for the purpose of garrisoning army positions, but on July 13 all but one of these battalions were returned to the division and on the night of July 14 this one remaining battalion had been put at the disposal of the division commander to accomplish the relief of one battalion of the 30th Infantry. Each subsector was held in general by one battalion in the forward area, and on battalion in support. Three companies of the 4th Infantry were at the disposal of the division commander. Three companies of the 7th Infantry constituted the garrison of the Le Rocq bretelle position. Two companies of the 38th Infantry were in the Bois de la Jute on a short bretelle, and the remainder of the units were in position at the disposal of the regimental commanders.

Division orders outlining the plan of the defense prescribed that all units hold the ground entrusted to them and that lost ground be immediately regained by counterattack. Pursuant to corps orders it was directed that this stubborn defense begin at the most advanced line and be continued by each unit, however small, even though the enemy succeeded in gaining ground to both sides and in rear of the unit. The use of gas and smoke had been foreseen and subsector commanders had been directed to prepare their plans of defense accordingly, but this particular point was not yet sufficiently covered so that proper precaution could not be taken without loss in personnel and great confusion resulting there-from.

The enemy artillery was known to have been heavily reinforced during the first part of July, and every point in the 3d Divisional sector had been accurately registered upon. Just previous to July 14, there was considerable decrease in the enemy's artillery activity with a corresponding increase in his aerial activity. On a number of occasions, reports of observers indicated that metallic cylinders were being handled from wheeled transportation on the north bank of the river and that work, accompanied by pounding upon iron was progressing. Although absolutely no movement was noted during the day, every night, observers reported movement of individuals, groups, wagons and other forms of transportation. Prisoners taken by our patrols which had crossed the river on several occasions reported having heard remarks of an offensive, but were unable or unwilling to definitely locate the objective of this offensive. Information was, however, finally gained by the army from a captured pioneer officer, who located Dormans as one of the probable points of crossing. This information, when pieced together, served as a warning and enabled the artillery to prepare and open their counteroffensive preparation before the enemy's bombardment had commenced.

On July 14 a gas-shell attack on the enemy's positions north of the Marne had been ordered by the XXXVIII Army Corps, to begin at 8 p.m. Shortly after this shelling commenced, telephone orders were received directing that general counterpreparation fire be delivered, to commence at 11:30 p.m., as a German attack was expected before daybreak. At this time, all of the 3d Artillery Brigade, with the exception of one battery of the 18th Field Artillery (155's) was in position, and, thanks to the data secured by the French units, which had previously occupied these positions, and to the careful dispositions made by the Commanding General, 3d Artillery Brigade, all of the artillery supporting the division was able to open at once a very effective concentration of fire upon all of the avenues of approach on the north bank of the Marne and upon suspected points of enemy concentration. At midnight, the enemy commenced a violent bombardment with gas and high explosive shell. Bombardment was especially violent upon the rear line of defense and in the wooded areas and lasted for about two hours. Several forms of gas were used, it being noticeable that mustard gas was used only on the rear areas, but that other forms of gas were freely used in those areas in which the enemy had planned to advance. Report of division gas officer attached hereto shows the extent and the results of this bombardment, and his conclusions as to the lessons to be learned by these observations are endorsed by all commanders who have studied the plan of this German attack.

The enemy bombardment started about midnight, July 14/15 and extended from Chateau-Thierry to Dormans and well into the rear areas. This preliminary bombardment gave way to
a barrage shortly which continued upon the front lines until about 3:30 a.m., and upon the rear lines until 10 a.m. About 3:20 a.m., July 15, the enemy commenced his crossing by means of boats and pontoon bridges. One regiment of his troops was caught by our artillery fire at the exits of Bois de Barbillon and suffered very severe casualties, according to the statement of prisoners. Another regiment after three attempts had been made, gave up the plan of crossing opposite the 38th Infantry due to our heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and moved to the east where crossing was finally effected, resulting in a mass movement upon the 38th Infantry. Shortly after the first troops of the enemy crossed the river, the troops on the right of this division gave way with the result that at 5 a.m., July 15, the 38th Infantry was devoid of any support on its right flank and was forced to present a line of resistance facing the east to resist enemy pressure from that direction. In the meantime, the enemy had crossed the plain of Mezy, and his heavy masses of troops were hurled against the advanced elements of the 30th and 7th Infantries. Such of these elements as were not entirely destroyed were finally forced to retire to the woods on the slopes north of CREZANCY and in the vicinity of FOSSOY. This in turn exposed the left flank of the 38th Infantry which still held its ground. At this time the 7th Infantry started a movement to regain the lost terrain and was successful after 12 hours of effort during which a number of patrols and small bodies of troops penetrated into the woods east of FOSSOY, and on the Plain of Mezy. The units of the 30th Infantry in the woods north of CREZANCY maintained their position and delivered a deadly machine-gun and rifle fire upon the advancing German troops with the result that no Germans reached our positions in these woods and remained alive or uncaptured. The advanced elements of the 38th Infantry were withdrawn toward evening on the 15th and that regiment was directed to prepare for resistance along the western crest of the SURMELIN Valley, in the event of a heavy German attack delivered from the east.

Patrols on having penetrated into the woods east of the SURMELIN Valley and the statements of prisoners having been cross-examined, some estimates of the German forces which had crossed the river was made possible. The division commander wished to secure at least two fresh battalions from the army corps reserve, 28th Division, and some French units, with which to make counterattack in the direction of REUILLY and clean out the Jaulgonne salient. After repeated requests, permission was finally obtained to deplete the strength on the left of the division (4th Infantry) and, with the troops so obtained, coupled with a few divisional reserve units which still remained available, to make this attack. It was then too late, however, as the German troops had already commenced their crossing of the river. The division immediately moved forward to keep contact with the retreating enemy and crossed the river; the 4th Infantry by means of the CHATEAU-TIERRY Bridge on July 21, and late the same evening the 7th Infantry near Fossoy by boat.

From this date until the division was relieved in the line, the fighting was of a more or less open character and consisted almost entirely of machine-gun fire, and flanking movements directed by our small units upon the positions assumed by the rearguard of the enemy. The division was finally relieved by the American 32d Division, the last unit being relieved early in the morning of July 31.

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Throughout the battle south of the MARNE, and the advance toward the north, hostile aircraft flew over our troops with impunity, observing for the enemy artillery, bombing, and firing upon all concentrations with machine guns. Many of our casualties were due to the work of these planes. In spite of all the work made by the division staff and repeated requests of the division commander, our planes put in their appearance only very
tardily and never for any extensive period of time. It is absolutely necessary that from a tactical standpoint and from that of morale that our air forces attain and maintain supremacy over those of the enemy.

It is thought that the full importance of trenches as protection against shell fire was not fully realized by the members of the command and in future greater effort will be made to complete trenches and to provide for the occupation in case of bombardment. No new lessons were to be learned as to the use of gas. The smoke screens attempted by the enemy largely failed of their purpose, their use having been foreseen and provided against. It is thought that this method of attack can be adequately met by the immediate strengthening of the forward line at the first appearance of the smoke cloud. The importance of perfect liaison between artillery and infantry was fully demonstrated, and the infantry of this division learned valuable lessons concerning the accuracy with which the artillery may be expected to fire, and the assistance which it is possible for them to render to the infantry units.

It was found almost impossible to maneuver reserves over the open ground during the course of the bombardment and to insure their prompt arrival at the point or points where they were needed. The importance of machine-gun fire, and the power of the rifle in the hands of the American infantry were demonstrated beyond the shadow of a doubt. In the advance, trench mortars were practically useless, it being found impossible to transport the weapons or the necessary ammunition with the troops. The one-pounder cannon, however, rendered excellent service against machine emplacements and has gained many enthusiastic adherents in this command. Frontal attacks against machine-gun nests proved costly and in most cases futile. Very light lines should be employed in this class of fighting, the larger supports being kept screened from hostile fire, the only practical method of attacking being that of flanking by small groups.

Telephone liaisons were completely destroyed within ten minutes after the bombardment commenced after which the only communication was by runner, although in a few cases the radio sets rendered excellent service until themselves destroyed. The time consumed in encoding and decoding messages, however, is a serious objection to this means of communication. A large number of carrier pigeons should be provided for every organization, to be used only after telephone communication has been broken. Such a means of liaison would have been invaluable under conditions experienced by this division, during the period July 14 to August 1, 1918. Machine guns were supplied with between 1,500 and 2,500 rounds of ammunition (supply in forward dumps limited by corps order prior to June 14). This supply was inadequate and in several cases gun crews were forced for lack of ammunition to destroy their guns and make their escape. The importance of accuracy in the reporting of military information was made clearly evident with the result that an officers school was established in this division immediately upon its return to a rest area for the purpose of inculcating in all members of the command the habit of rendering absolutely accurate and therefore extremely valuable reports.

An examination of a map showing the line held by the enemy, before and after this battle of the Marne, makes clear the fact that this one American division not only effectively stopped the second German division opposed to it and therefore rendered possible the stopping of the Germans advance, but also that the advance made toward the Vesle River was, in no small measure, due to the manner in which certain elements of the division advanced up the CHARMEL Valley in plain view of the enemy's observation posts and under his concentrated artillery fire to positions on the high ground north of Le CHARMEL. This valley in fact constituted a sort of chute which was strongly organized by the retiring enemy, and which was taken only after having suffered heavy casualties, by the
excellent leadership displayed by the commanders of small units and the wonderful fighting qualities of the individual men.

For and in the absence of:

ROBERT H. C. KELTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

CHAS. W. FOSTER,
Major, Cavalry,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3.

28th Division
July 14 - 18, 1918

Resume of the happenings which took place on and in front of the 56th Infantry Brigade sector for the past 24 hours, ending 8 a.m., this date. * * *

Information received from Headquarters 55th Brigade disclosed the fact that, at a few minutes before noon, aeroplanes dropped bombs on the front line of the 109th Infantry, just south of SACCONAY. The artillery preparation for the attack was started on the right of the sector of the corps, at 1:15 a.m., and at 1:40 a.m., Colonel F. A. Snyder of the [103d] Engineers, telephoned that PAVANT was being bombarded; word also received from Brig. Gen. William Weigel, C. G. 56th Brig. as to the situation there—"second position quiet." The line at 9:30 this morning extended through FOSSOY---CREZANCY---JANVIER Fme---La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON. Shortly after noon, the French XXXVIII Corps informed these headquarters that the Germans were pushing with some violence in the direction of CONDE-en-BRIE, the French 73d Division arranging a counterattack from the front LONGEURDS-BOCHAGE Fme in the direction northeast. A liaison officer of XXXVIII Corps made inquiry at 2:15 p.m. as to whether the 28th Division could give one of the regiments of the 56th Brigade to the American 3d Division to relieve the American 30th Infantry, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Muir [C. G. 28th Division] decided that the 111th Infantry should be put at the disposal of the 3d Division; one battalion of this regiment to move tonight being replaced in the second position by two companies in reserve; one battalion to move tomorrow morning and to be replaced by the units of the 30th Infantry; detailed orders for the relief of the 30th Infantry to be given by the 3d Division.

At noon, the positions held by the 56th Brigade extended from the left bank of the MARNE near CHARLY through La TOUR---NOGENT-L'ARTAUD---Le PETIT-TRONCET---La GRANDE QUEUE Ferme---ARROUARD---Les PETITES-NOUES. This brigade was composed of two regiments of infantry, 3,600 men each, one machine gun battalion of 4 companies, plus two regimental machine gun companies. P. C. 56th Infantry Brigade---La CHAPELLE-sur-CHEZY; P. C. 28th Division---La HOUSSIERE Farm. In addition to the above there were two companies of French
Territorials and one company of French engineers extending from CHARLY to Le BARRE, inclusive, commanded by Colonel Snyder, of the 103d Engineers of this division. Pursuant to instructions contained in S. O. 1755/3, French XXXVIII Corps, dated July 14, the command of the detachment charged with the defense of the bridgehead at CHARLY was turned over to Commandant Lalot, of the French 23d Regiment d’Infanterie Territoriale, Colonel Snyder of the engineers being responsible for the direction and tactical supervision of the work of the battalion of engineers under his officers.

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The command at Le PETIT-TRONCET Farm was shelled during the day with high explosive mustard gas shells, in the 2d Battalion of the 111th Infantry, which is to go out to the 3d Division tonight.

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CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major General.

55th Brig.: 28th Div.: War Diary

July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

CHRONOLOGICAL NARRATIVE OF EVENTS:

Message received from our liaison officer with the Fr. 125th Division Infantry at 2:45 a. m. at brigade headquarters Chateau at ARTONGES to execute alert at once. Brigade headquarters arrived at battle P. C. at 3:30 and notified 109th and 110th Infantry. C. O., 108th M. G. Bn., has his P. C. with brigade headquarters. Liaison officers were already established at the headquarters Fr. III Corps and 125th D. I. Bombardment started at midnight by the Boche.

Information from 125th Division at 4:40 a. m. that there is a heavy bombardment on the front lines south of Jaulgonne and at the MOULIN-RUINE, also gas shelling in the valley of the SURMELIN.

The 110th front is very quiet. The 109th front has received some gas and considerable shrapnel. * * *

Liaison agents from the Fr. 10th Chasseurs arrive about 4:40 a. m., and report heavy shelling in the back areas south of VIFFORT shortly after bombardment started.

At 5:40 a. m. message received by phone asking for two ambulances to go to MONTUREL to evacuate 12 wounded from companies on the bretelle [switch] position. This uses up all of the ambulances we have at this time, one having been sent to 109th Infantry to evacuate a wounded French soldier and three now going to MONTUREL. The wire is down to division. Ambulance drivers instructed to request 10 additional ambulances to come to brigade P. C. These to be obtained either from VERDELOT upon their arrival or by telephone message to division from VERDELOT. In the meantime, effort is being made to obtain ambulances through Fr. III Corps at MONTMIRAIL.

Report received at 6:05 from the 125th D. I., 3d Bureau, as follows: A heavy artificial fog is over the MARNE, north of the left sector of the 125th D. I. There is no news from the outpost line. The line of resistance remains unchanged. Some Germans have succeeded in crossing the MARNE north of COURTHIEZY. The strength of this party is not ascertained at this time. From information received this is not a serious breach.
Information received by 125th Division from Amer. 3d Division on their left states that the sector of the 3d Division is now much calmer. Information also received at the 125th Division to the effort that a heavy attack is developing on the front of the French Fourth Army.

Information received at 6:55 a.m. that the enemy has crossed the MARNE at REUILLY and farther east. Telephone message to C. O., 109th, at 7:05 a.m. that Co. I, 109th, is being sent to him for disposition at GRANDE-FONTAINE at once. C. O., 109th, advised not to commit this company until further developments.

Verbal message by motorcycle to the C. O., Co. K, 109th Inf., at 7:10 to move at once to GRANDE-FONTAINE and report to C. O., 109th Inf. C. O., 109th Inf., advised by phone and similar instructions given as for Co. I.

Information received on the phone at 7:20 from 125th Division that the enemy has forced the principal line of resistance of the [Fr.] 113th Regiment and is now possibly at GRANGE-aux-Bois. Col. Brown advised immediately of this situation by telephone.

In addition, at this time these headquarters advised by telephone that the 3d Division, on the left of the 125th Division had been obliged to fall back in the valley of the SURMELIN on the line CREZANCY-PAROY.

Message received from the liaison officer of the 38th Inf. on the left of the 125th Div. on his way to VIFFORT at 7:45 a.m., to the effect that the Boche had been stopped on the line CREZANCY-PAROY.

C. O., 109th Inf., reported at 8:05 a.m. by phone that the French 113th are pouring back through his front line and he is making an effort, with the assistance of the French detachment attached to the 109th Inf. to stop the French and form them up in his rear. The Germans crossed the river at REUILLY and a point 5 kilometers east of there and apparently have cut off Co. M, which was guarding the bridge south of Passy. A few Co. M men have fallen back and reached the 109th line.

No further word from the front.

Col. Brown also states at this time that the BAULNE is being heavily shelled and he has moved his supply co. back to Le BREUIL.

At 8:30 a.m. Major Thompson, 110th Inf., who was on duty at the front as observer with the 113th Inf., reports that when he left the Boche was almost at GRANGE-aux-Bois, and that the Colonel of the 113th Regt. after making every effort to stop his men from retreating, mounting and rode to the rear with his staff.

At 8:45 a.m., telephone message from the Adjutant, 110th Inf., that 135 German prisoners, captured by Co. C, American 38th Inf., in the SURMELIN Valley were then at La FOSSE Fme on their way back. Verbal message sent by ambulance driver on his way to Les Glapieds, to C. O., detachment of M. P. at PARGNY to be prepared to pass these prisoners on to the rear upon arrival at PARGNY.

Ambulances are badly needed in four places at this time—8:50 a.m. One ambulance just returned from VERDELOT after having evacuated, reports no more ambulances on their way to this brigade, to his knowledge. Have instructed this driver to bring back with him field dressings from VERDELOT.

At 8:55 a.m. message from 110th Inf., by telephone, to the effect that the number of German prisoners has now increased to 186.

Col. Kemp reported to C. G., this brigade, on the phone at 8:50 a.m., that the Boche had been driven back of the MARNE at CHARTEVES, and it was at that point that the prisoners referred to above were taken.

Message from C. O., 109th Inf., at 9:15, over the phone, that the Boche line now extends from CONNIGIS through Bois de CONDE to CHEZY, runs northeast to CHAMPAILLET. The 109th Machine Gun (M. G. Co., 109th Inf.), is engaging the enemy northeast of St-AGNAN at about 1,500 yards.

At 9:20 information received by phone from the 125th Div. Inf. that the Boche are filtering through the Bois de CONDE.
At 9:35 a.m., C. O., 110th Inf., reports no hostile inf. on his front.
At 9:20 a.m., Lt. Clarke, Liaison Officer to the 125th D. I., reports that the present German line is roughly in a southeasterly direction from the 1st R in Carre [quarry] (south of VARENNES 500 meters) through the R in REUILLY, thence nearly south along wood paths to northeast corner of JANVIER Fme (east of Les ETANGS) thence through the S in Bois de CONDE and thence to east through CHEZY, from which point it runs in a northeasterly direction.

The line on which the French will now hold is roughly as follows:
From MOULIN-RUINE east to point on road 800 meters south of 1st N in VARENNES---thence south roughly through R in REUILLY---thence by wood paths to northeast corner of JANVIER Fme (800 meters east of Les ETANGS)---thence southeasterly through the I in Bois de CONDE---thence southeasterly through the last E in CELLE-les-CONDE---thence on a continuation of that line to the 2d position in the Bois de ROUGIS, center of resistance. At 9:35 a.m., Col. Brown was informed of this situation. Also told that the Boche were now filtering through Bois de CONDE and that he would have to protect, with enfilade machine-gun fire, the ravine running in a northwesterly direction from DANNEJEU Fme and for this purpose Major Vail, C. O., 108th Machine Gun Bn., will shortly arrive at Hq. 109th Inf., and take up with Col. Brown the question of moving some of the 8 machine guns of his command now held in local reserve, in order to strengthen the enfilade fire in this ravine.
Lt. Clarke reiterates the desire of the 125th Division to have this brigade hold at any cost its present position.
At 9:45, the Adjutant, 110th Inf., reports another bunch of German prisoners, about 100, on their way down from La FOSSE Fme on the road to ARTONGES.
At 9:45, information from Chief of Staff, 125th Div., to the effect that the German infiltration through our line through the Bois de CONDE continues.
Message No. 1 from C. O., 108th M. G. Bn., at SOLO 7-15-18, 10 a.m. message telephoned to UNION 7 and by him delivered to Adj., 108th M. G. Bn. Message to C. O., Co. B, 108th M. G. Bn., as follows:
Arrange to concentrate fire 1st and 2d Platoons, Company B on roads and trails through Bois de CONDE to DANNEJEU Fme-VAIL.

C. G., 125th Div., advises C. G., this brigade, to defend particularly the Bois de Rougis and also by enfilade fire the ravine northwest from DANNEJEU Fme.
This information was the basis of message to Colonel Brown to rake the ravine running northwest from DANNEJEU Fme at first sign of hostile inf.
Message received from Col. Kemp at 10:10 a.m. that Capt. Brigham of the Amer. 10th F. A., in falling back from his position, lost his way and wandered into 2d Bn., 110th Inf., in the COUFREMAUX sector. The brig. commander, through the C. O., 110th Inf., by telephone, directed this officer to report to the 1st officer of the 3d Division he meets while passing west along the rear of the 2d position into the lines of the 3d Division on the left of the 110th Inf.
Following is message received from C. O., 110th Inf., 10 a.m.:

Message from C. O., 3d Bn., 110th Inf., to C. O., 110th Inf.:
In touch with 30th Inf. on our left. They advised our patrols that they were leaving. Will maintain liaison with left. Anderson.

Col. Kemp is sending 75 stragglers of the 10th Artillery back by way of the rear of the COUFREMAUX sector, to the 3d Division, under the guidance of an N. C. O. graduate of the candidates school, with instructions to deliver them to the first officer of the 3d Division he meets. Col. Kemp has ordered these stragglers to go back and perform their duty.
At 10:36 a.m., message from brigade adjutant to C. O., 109th Inf., by phone.
About 15 minutes ago the adjutant of the 108th M. G. Bn. left to get some of his reserve guns and take them over on your left to shoot up the ravine at
DANNEJEU Fme. Will they answer the purpose or were your guns, which were knocked out, in another section. (The answer to this question was yes, in another position.)
Do you know where Major Vail is, and are you in phone connection with your Solo 2?
Answer - yes. Send a messenger to reach Major Vail at the place he was going; if you can't locate him, find Capt. Watres and say that the C. G., this brigade, directs that he assist you by sending the guns necessary to replace the ones destroyed. Major Vail had gone forward to see Capt. Schwalm to take care of the siting of the guns that will rake the ravine N. W. from DANNEJEU Fme.

Original message dated 9:50 a.m. from Major Anderson, commanding 3d Bn., 110th Inf., in COUFREMAUX sector, to C. O., 110th Inf., and sent to C. G., brig. for his information, by C. O., 110th Inf.

Heavy shell fire tracing on left of bn. sector next to woods. Have moved line 150 yards to right. Have patrol in woods to left. Are covering trench vacated with automatic rifle. Slight trace gas here. All quiet on right bn. sector. Patrol in front unable to locate engineers. Have trace of trench in front not occupied. Continuing patrol.

ANDERSON, Major.

The messages are being returned to Col. Kemp at 10:47 a. m. by the messenger that brought them. Also returning at same time Message No. 1 from Maj. Martin to C. O., 110th Inf., dated 7:45 a. m., and Message No. 1 from C. O., 110th Inf., to Major Martin, dated 8:20 a.m., and sketch of French front line position in this sector. All left here by Major Thompson.

C. O. 110th Inf., reports at 10:50 a.m. that he now has 1st Lt. Leof and 2d Lt. Hoverson, reserve corps. 10th Artillery, both officers of Capt. Brigham's battery. These officers were ordered by the brigade commander, through Col. Kemp, and in person over the phone, to return to their proper unit and perform their duty, without any delay whatsoever. Messages received over the phone at 11 a. m. from Solo [109th Inf.] Message No. 1 from No. 1 Solo to No. 1 Penn, [28th Div.] dated 7-15-18, 10 a. m.

Our scouts report two new bridges across River SURMELIN, branch running northeast St-AGNAN near CELLES-les-CONDE. Have ordered these bridges blown up. Brown.

From No. 7 Solo to No. 7 Penn dated 7-15-18 10 a. m., for Altemose.

Regiment in action against enemy. No morning or strength report available. From information secured, No. 1 estimates casualties about 700. O. R. F.

Message received from Picket No. 7, at 11 a. m., that 150 German prisoners captured by the 38th Inf. are now leaving La ROSSE Fme on their way to the corps cage.

At 11:20 a.m., the brigade commander directed Major Sapp, C. O., 1st Bn., 103d Engineers, to collect his bn. and march it under cover and in small groups to GRANDE-FONTAINE, reporting there to Col. Brown for further orders, with view of taking up probable location in reserve in the SURMELIN Valley, in the vicinity of MOULIN-MALAQUAL Fme, establishing runner posts back to 109th Inf. The intention of this position of the reserve of the engineers is to be in readiness to reinforce Col. Brown either to the front or to his right flank in case of a turning movement from the east.

This battalion of engineers was not under command of the brigade, but under the circumstances, authority was assumed to command its services as the battalion was in this sector and unable to carry on its work of constructing the third line. This action was later confirmed by the corps commander and the battalion is now holding a part of the line of the 109th Infantry, replacing a battalion which was detailed to take part in the counterattack of July 16.
Information obtained by C. O., 110th Inf., from a German prisoner who speaks French and reported to these headquarters at 11:29 a. m.

The soldiers were from the German 10th Division. They crossed the Marne to the right of our sector. There was no artillery fire on them and they were not opposed. They crossed the river in boats. They waited for their right to come up before moving forward and the Americans attacked their right. The Americans being two of the four companies forward from this brigade and principally the 3d Division. When the German right was driven back over the river, the prisoners that have been filtering through here were gathered. The German division was cut to pieces in this attack. The prisoners seemed surprised that there are so many Americans over here.

Memorandum from S. O., 109th Inf., started at 9 a. m.; reached these hq. at 11:30 a. m., requesting ammunition as follows:

Chauchat, machine gun, 27-mm., rifle and Stokes wanted delivered as rapidly as possible to ORBAIS. After conversation, later, with C. O., 109th Inf., message was sent back to advanced echelon ammunition supply train to send one truckload of ammunition to Le BREUIL.

At 11:35 a. m., the following message was phoned to Solo 1 [109th Inf.] by Union [55th Brig.].

Liaison officer from corps states that there is a French division on the flank of the bulge in the line made by the Boche, two in the rear and one on the right moving forward to counterattack. They will probably counterattack tonight if the situation remains unchanged. They are bringing them up in motor trucks. Let the men in the lines know that their job today is to hold the line, and when this help arrives they will push the enemy back over the river. Let the men know these divisions are coming up but do not dwell too strongly on it. I believe it will help the men to know this.

Questions asked Solo No. 1, at this time, by Union 1.
Are you suffering much? Ans. We have some losses but not many.
Are you sure that you have definite, position liaison with the troops on your right?
Yes, we can see them and they can see us.
How many stragglers did you pick up? About 60, French, but the French officers stopped a good many more.
Is there any way of discovering the enemy location in the woods? The line is thinly held by the enemy on our right flank, at about 700 yards distance.
Is there much firing on your front? Not much.
Can you send out patrols to find out what is going on? They are out.
Have your 37-mm. guns pot the machine-gun nests. Major Vail has machine guns so placed that without moving them he can sweep your front.
Do you need more ammunition? If so, what kind and where do you need it? Machine gun, Chauchat needed, and cal. 30 at Le BREUIL.

11:50 Col. Brown was informed by phone that the engineers were reporting to him and that he should not be too hasty about using them.

15 motortruck ambulances reported and 6 were sent at 12:07 to dressing station [109th Inf.] MONTBAILLON Fme and 6 to P. C., 110th Inf., for directions. All to evacuate to VERDELOT in the absence of ambulances, three trucks to remain here for future calls.

Lt. of Co. M, 109th Inf., reports at 12:10 p. m., over the phone to brigade commander, that Co. M held its line to the south of the bridge on the MARNE south of PASSY until flanked on both ends of his line, at which time he fell back slowly and took up another position to the south until he was again flanked, when he withdrew for the 2d time and is now about 500 meters south of GRANGE-aux-BOIS. The French occupy a thinly held line in his rear. He was directed by the brigade commander to continue his maneuver, eventually withdrawing to the position of the French in his rear. He was advised that the
execution of holding engagement by his command, at this time, might be of vast importance. This is the first information from Co. M since early this morning, when from the reports of two stragglers that reached this P. C., it was feared that this company had been wiped out or captured. The fact that he is fighting hard is very encouraging.

At 12:20 p. m., Cos. A and D, 110th Inf., at brigade reserve, reported arrival in new position in ravine northeast of MONTLEVON. They were directed to hold their present position and await orders, and prepare the necessary trenches to protect the men from shrapnel fire.

At 12:30 p. m., hypodermic needles and morphine (3 cases of 12 boxes each), arrived at brigade P. C. Two of these cases were immediately dispatched on a truck to the dressing station of the 109th Inf. at MONTBAILLON Fme, one being held here for the present, awaiting future call.

Lt. Rose of the brigade staff reports that German prisoners questioned by a German-speaking soldier of this headquarters detachment, on their way to the corps cage seemed very anxious to give information of their forces and disposition, several of them, correcting unanimously, mistakes made by one of the prisoners in response to questions asked him. The prisoners seemed to be quite contented with their lot. From their appearance they were poorly clothed and fed and were very hungry.

Four medical officers reported at brigade P. C. at 1:20 p. m. to assist the 109th and 110th Inf. Two men directed at 1:35 p. m. to report to 110th Inf. P. C. for duty and one to dressing station 109th Inf., at MONTBAILLON Fme and one to NOGENT.

At 1:35 p. m., C. O., 109th Inf., reports that Co. K arrived at GRANDE-FONTAINE at 10:30 a.m. and was sent to its present location at the mill southeast of MONTHERUEL. Co. I arrived at 12:30 p. m., and is now in the woods north of GRANDE FONTAINE. The engineers reported at 12:45 p. m. and are now at La FOURCHE Fme.

At 2:05 p. m., C. O., 109th Inf., reports by telephone, that there are Boche on Hill 223 north of St-AGNAN from 196 to 197, on the CONDE-en-BRIE Map, 1:20,000. He requests artillery fire on this location and his request was transmitted to battery commander southeast of Brigade P. C. There are no artillery liaison officers with the commanders of the inf. regiments.

At 2:15 p. m. the C. O., 110th Inf., reports by telephone that everything is O.K. He has liaison with both flanks; the Amer. 30th Inf. being on his left.

Capt. Fish, C. O., Co. B, 110th Inf., has just returned from duty at the front with the 113th Inf. Regt. He reports his company badly crippled by reason of his platoons, which were sandwiched in with French platoons, being constantly flanked during the day. Two platoons of this company are now retiring on the CONDE-en-BRIE center of resistance, and the company will return to the 2d position.

The C. O., 110th Inf., has sent combat patrols to the front on both COUFREMAUX and CONDE-en-BRIE centers of resistance. Prisoners are still coming in to our rear in small groups, and being passed along to corps cage. Nothing heard so far from Co. C, 110th Inf.

The 6th Engineers are in the trenches in edge of the woods north of CHARMONY Fme. Telephoned C. O., 110th Inf., at 2:20 p. m. and C. O., 109th Inf. at 2:25 p. m., to reserve their 37-mm. guns solely for machine-gun emplacements, or located machine guns; to send out strong combat patrols to the front and flanks; to reconnoiter possible machine-gun emplacements to the front and to maintain a continuous line of outpost patrols to prevent any surprise attacks by the Boche; to improve their front line trenches as soon as possible and to direct troops in the rear areas to construct as much cover as possible against shrapnel fire.

At 2:50 p. m., Lt. Taylor, Aide-de-Camp, was dispatched to the C. G., 6th Brigade, on our left with instructions to ascertain how the C. G. of the 6th Brigade intended to hold the trenches skirting the north and northeastern edge of the woods north of Charmoy Fme, Colonel Kemp having just reported that there were no troops of any kind in these trenches and that the two platoons of A Co. of the 108th M. G. Bn. were on his left but that neither
the 6th Engineers nor the 30th Inf. immediately joined the 3d Bn. of the 110th Inf. on the left.

Col. Brown having reported by telephone at 2:05 p.m. the presence of Boche on Hill 223, and no battery being located in this immediate vicinity, or available for fire on this position, a request is sent by Lt. Casparis, by automobile, to III C. A. to furnish artillery liaison officers to the commanders of the centers of resistance.

Col. Brown sends message dated 2:44 p.m.

Reliable information indicates there are no Allied troops between his front line on the 2d position of the Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance and the Boche. That the Boche lines now run in an easterly direction towards CHEZY, along Hill 223 north of St-AGNAN.

His P. C. is being shelled and he asks for artillery support.

A message dispatched at 3:15 p.m. advised liaison officer with the 125th Div., that we are unable to get artillery support, and that we have requested artillery liaison officers from the III C. A.

The testing of the wireless by the operators at brigade and regimental P. C.'s has interfered to some extent with the French wireless. Upon receipt of this information, all testing of the TPS and wireless was ordered stopped, as long as the telephone net works.

At 3:50 p.m. fifteen ambulances were brought to brigade P. C. by division surgeon.

At 4:20 p.m., C. O., 109th Inf., was directed by the brigade commander to send a part of his reserve to the right of line to plug up any gap between the right of his line and the 2 R. I. adjoining on his right. C. O., 109th, reported K Co. already on its way to right rear of his line, it being feared at this time that contact liaison was lost on the right.

Orders were received at 4 p.m. putting the 1st Bn., 103d Engineers, at the disposal of the brigade commander.

At 4 p.m. order was received from III Corps which puts this brigade again under the orders of C. G., 125th Division. It now develops that the 109th has the 2d Bn. on the right of the Bois de Rougis center of resistance and the 1st Bn. on the left, each bn. less one co.

At 5:35 p.m., Col. Brown reports that part of Co. K, 109th, was put in on the right of the 1st Bn. to fill a small gap. One platoon actually on the line and three platoons in the rear on the flank in order to permit refusal of the right flank or extension of the line as development of the fight might warrant.

The truck load of ammunition sent from the advanced echelon at 12:30 p.m. to the 109th Inf. at Le BREUIL has not reported; another truck started from the rifle range at 5:15 with a similar load, to wit: one-half capacity machine gun, one-quarter capacity Chauchat, and one-quarter rifle ammunition, cal. 30, and Col. Brown so advised.

Delayed messages from the 109th Inf. which arrived at 5:55 p.m., inform the brigade commander that the shell fire from the direction of the northeast is flanking the position of the 109th Inf. in the Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance, particularly at subsector held by the 1st Bn. Also the information that the French line is holding from DANNEJEU Fme in a generally northwesterly direction through CONNIGIS and MOULIN-RUINE.

At this time no French troops are in advance of the 2d position to the east of DANNEJEU Fme, so that if this information is correct, and there is no reason to doubt it, the right of the 109th on the 2d position now becomes the first line facing the enemy.

At 6 p.m., Col. Brown reports that his front has quieted down and that the enemy are on the hill north of SACCONAY.

For transmission of essential information to corps and division, see copies of messages hereeto attached. Generally, both III C. A. and 125th D. I. were kept informed by liaison officers throughout the day. At 8:30 p.m., message received from Col. Brown that the enemy was again flanking his position with artillery fire from the northeast. He reiterates his request for artillery support and the brigade commander immediately sent
Lt. Taylor in the brigade automobile to the 125th D. I. to reiterate the request previously made for liaison officers.

Aside from the move of K Co., of the 109th Inf., there is no change in the disposition of troops, either on the line or in reserve, with the exception however of the bretelle. Co. D, 109th Inf., was withdrawn from the bretelle at 2:45 p. m. to hill near CELLES-les-CONDE by order of Major Blanc, and Co. H, 109th, was withdrawn from the bretelle and sent to top of hill near JANVIER Fme at about noon. Co. D taking over the entire bretelle, the platoon of machine guns of C. A., 108th M. G. Bn., that were assigned to support the bretelle accompanying Co. D to its new position.

The telephones fortunately have worked without interruption in the brigade all day, although there has been no connection south of brigade P. C. or north of bn. P. C.'s in the brigade.

About 8 p. m. Lt. Schoch of L Co. of the 109th Inf. and about 50 men came straggling through brigade P. C. looking for something to eat. They report that Captain Cousart and the other two lts. of the company captured and the rest of the company hors-de-combat. This message has not been confirmed and it is now known that there are two groups approximately 150 strong of American soldiers in the woods north of CELLES-les-CONDE. These troops are probably D and H of the 109th, although information is meagre as to the position of the balance of Company M after the middle of the afternoon.

About 8:30 p. m., Col. Kemp reported the headquarters of the 113th R. I. which is east of the S in Bois de CONDE at the stream. The P. C. is on Hill 216 where the No. 216 appears on map CONDE-en-BRIE, 1:20,000.

The following information is given by Col. Kemp with reference to Co. C, the informants being 3 hospital corps men returning with wounded: This morning Lt. Brown and his platoon were down on the south bank of the river at the X-coordinate 196; Lt. Krouse reinforced him and Capt. Truxel took command. When the hospital corps men left with two wounded men, Co. C was engaged on all sides. At the top of the hill the 2d Platoon under command of Bugler Jones was pouring a fire into the Boche. Two French soldiers reported to Col. Kemp that about 1 kilometer east of figures 216 on top of the Hill 150 Americans are in line on the right of French, and down on the reverse slope of the hill on the way to CELLES-les-CONDE, about half way to 216 and CELLES les CONDE there was similar number of American troops intrenching in support. About one-third of Co. B, 110th Inf., had rejoined the 2d Bn. of the 110th on the 2d position at 7:30 p. m.

Message from liaison officer, Lt. Clarke, 109th Inf., with 125th D. I. received at 3:10 p. m., gave information that a counterattack would be made this afternoon by two French divisions, one from the left of the 125th Div. sector towards the northeast and one from the right of the same sector toward Dormans. The order for the counterattack of the 73d Inf. Div. was received at these hq. at 9:30 p. m., but no information has reached here of the counterattack taking place nor has any firing been heard which would indicate the launching of either of these attacks up to 10 p. m.

At 9 p. m. Col. Brown requested more ammunition and messenger was immediately dispatched from these hq. to the ammunition train echelon southwest of rifle range to send him another truck load of ammunition, loaded to capacity, one-half being machine-gun ammunition, one-quarter Chauchat and one-quarter rifle, cal. 30.

At 9:48 p. m. Col. Kemp forwards copies of messages received from his battalion commanders, holding the CONDE-en-BRIE and COUFREMAUX sectors, in substance as follows:

Patrols furnished the following information: The 76th French Regt. is located at Les ETANGS Fme. The French 125th Regt. is located at JANVIER Fme. Note: It is thought that this is intended for the 131st Inf. Regt. The 38th Inf. U. S. is located north of Bois de CONDE. A patrol of the 38th Inf. sent in the direction of the MARNE to Hill 164 was unable to gain contact with the enemy or make an estimate of the number of Germans south of the MARNE in this sector.
Major Martin, at 6:35 p.m. had good liaison with both flanks. Major Martin reported that two bombs were dropped by an enemy airplane at 8 p.m. about 200 meters south of his P.C. (which is northwest of Maurepas Fme), and that three similar bombs were dropped at 8:15 p.m. just west of the bridge, 200 meters northwest of his P.C. and that the machine dropping the latter bombs also used machine gun upon the men on the ground.

Major Anderson from the COUFREMAUX sector with P.C. at 196 reports that the 10th Artillery, 2d Bn., are west of St-EUGENE. A combat patrol sent by him to gain contact in front and to the right advanced to the crossroads east of MONTHUREL, being the French line. The German line was 800 to 1,000 yards in front and the patrol was not permitted to advance beyond that point. Coordinates given 195.2-255.6. Second patrol advanced 300 yards beyond CREZANCY. The 30th and 38th U.S. Inf. are on both sides of the SURMELIN Valley. The 7th and 9th Machine Gun Battalions are on the high ground commanding MEZY-MOULINS. E and F Co. at PAROY and G and H Co. of 38th Inf. were under heavy shell fire at 7 p.m.

With the exception of occasional shelling at 10:20 p.m., Col. Brown reports everything quiet, and an artillery liaison officer has reported to him and assures him that artillery support will be forthcoming when needed, after the counterattack has taken place.

Message from sergeant in command of ammunition echelon, received at these hq. at 10:12 p.m. advises that two truck loads of ammunition have been successfully delivered to the 109th Inf. at La FREUIL [sic], and that the 3d truck will be sent at once; also that an attempt was made by him to make a report to the brigade commander, but he was stopped by the M.P.'s at PARGNY from proceeding to this P.C.

No further developments up to midnight.

S. W. RHOADS,
Maj., Brig. Adj.

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228-33.3: Journal of Operations

28th Division, A. E. F.,
July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

JULY 15: Resume of the happenings which took place on and in front of the 56th Infantry Brigade sector for the past 24 hours, ending 8 a.m., this date

Information received from the 55th Infantry Brigade Headquarters disclosed the fact that, at a few minutes before noon, aeroplanes dropped bombs on the front line of the 109th Infantry, just south of SACONNAY. The artillery preparation for the attack was started on the right of the sector of the army corps, at 1:15 a.m., and at 1:40 a.m., Colonel Snyder of the engineers, telephoned that PAVANT was being bombarded; word also received from General Weigel as to the situation there - "2d position quiet." The line at 9:30 o'clock this morning extended through FOSSOY---CREZANCY---JANVIER Fme---La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON. Shortly after noon, the French XXXVIII Army Corps informed these headquarters that the Germans were pushing with some violence in the direction of CONDE-en-BRIE, the
French 73d Division arranging a counterattack from the front LONGEURDS-BOCHAGE Fme in the direction northeast. A liaison officer of the XXXVIII Corps made inquiry at 2:15 p. m. as to whether the 28th Division could give one of the regiments of the 56th Brigade to the American 3d Division to relieve the American 30th Infantry Regiment. General Muir decided that the 111th should be put at the disposal of the 3d Division; one battalion of this regiment to move tonight, being replaced in the second position by two companies in reserve; one battalion to move tomorrow morning and to be replaced by the units of the 30th Infantry Regiment; detailed orders for the relief of the 30th Regiment to be given by the 3d Division.

At noon, the position held by the 56th Infantry Brigade extended from the left bank of the MARNE, near CHARLY, through La TOUR---NOGENT-L'ARTAUD---Le PETIT-TRONCET---La GRANDE-QUEUE---ARROUARD---Les PETITES-Noues. This was composed of two regiments of infantry, 3,600 men each, one machine gun battalion of 4 companies, plus two regimental machine gun companies. P. C. 56th Infantry Brigade - La CHAPELLE-sur-CHEZY; P. C. 28th Division - La HOUSIERE Farm. In addition to the above there were two companies of French territorials and one company of French engineers extending from CHARLY to Le BARRE [Farm] inclusive: Commanded by Colonel Snyder, of the 103d Engineers, of this division. Pursuant to instructions contained in S. O. 1755/3, XXXVIII Corps, dated July 14, the command of the detachment charged with the defense of the bridgehead at CHARLY was turned over to Commandant Lalot, of the 23d Territorial Inf. Regt., Colonel Snyder, of the engineers, being responsible for the direction and tactical supervision of the work of the battalion of engineers under his offices.

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The command at Le PETIT-TRONCET was shelled during the day with high explosive mustard gas shells, in the 2d Battalion of the 111th Infantry, which is to go out to the 3d Division tonight.

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28th Div.: War Diary

July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS:

1:40 a. m.: Colonel Snyder telephones that PAVANT is being bombarded.
9:30 h.: Front line extends through FOSSOY---CREZANCY---JANVIER Farm---La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON.
13 h.: XXXVIII Army Corps telephones Germans are pushing strongly in the direction of CONDE-en-BRIE. French 73d Division counterattack from LONGEURDS-BOCHAGE Fme in direction northeast.
14:15 h.: XXXVIII C. A., asks that C. G., Brig. designate one regiment to the American 3d Division to leave [relieve?] 30th Infantry Regiment. 111th Inf. ordered for this duty.
12 h.: 56th Brig. holds 2d position extending from left bank of MARNE near CHARLY---La TOUR---NOGENT l'ARTAUD---Le PETIT-TRONCET---La GRANDE-QUEUE Farm---ARROUARD---Les PETITES-NOUES Farm.

228-33.3: Journal of Operations

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
La Houssiere, near Bassevelle, Seine-et-Marne, July 16, 1918.

[Extract]

The division commander directed the Commanding General of the 56th Brigade to cause all French detachments with the brigade as instructing units, with the exception of machine-gun detachments, to proceed to Les FANS, so as to arrive there by 10 a. m., July 17; also that the following detachments report as instructors in the use of Stokes mortars with the regiments at the places mentioned below:

With the French 146th Infantry, 39th Division at MOUCHERELLE: 1 platoon Stokes mortars, personnel and gun complete.

With the French 156th Infantry, 39th Division at the woods 300 meters south of La CHAILLOUET-Ies-BULOTS Farm; same as with 146th. This personnel to be placed at the disposal of the French 39th Division for four days. It was also directed that the two companies of the 112th Infantry Regiment, then on the east portion of the sector held by the 39th Division, be relieved by two companies that have not had front line experience, the two companies reporting fully equipped at 9 p. m., July 18, at the road junction 800 yards east of CHARMOIS Farm, where they will go into the trenches relieving the companies of the 112th Infantry.

Field Order of the 56th Infantry Brigade states that the sector occupied the 2d position for the defense of Le CROCHET will be relieved this day by Company G, 112th Infantry, the assumption of these positions to take place at once. 1st Battalion of the 111th Infantry will move at once by marching to VIFFORT. Company D of the 109th Machine Gun Battalion will remain at Le CROCHET.

CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major General.

228-33.3: Journal of Operations

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
La Houssiere, near Bassevelle, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918.

Commanding general of the division directed the Commanding General of the 56th Brigade that one of the companies of the east sector be relieved by a company which has not had front line experience, the company to report at the crossroads 200 meters north of the bridge of NOGENT-l'ARTAUD at 9 p. m., July 18, when it will be taken to its position by its officers and the company to be relieved will be brought back. Company D of the 103d Engineers was ordered to move into billets at Les ROCHES for a four days' rest; Company E
to move a platoon to ROMENY for a four days' rest, alternating the platoons until the entire company has had a four days' rest. Colonel Snyder advised that a number of men in Company B have been wounded, but was unable to give any definite details as to the exact figures.

At 7:15 p. m. orders were received to move the 56th Brigade and division headquarters. Field Order No. 4 on its way at 8:15 p. m. The 56th Brigade revoked orders previously given for relief of companies now in first position.

CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major General.

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28th Div.: 55th Brig.: War Diary

July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

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NARRATIVE OF EVENTS, July 17, 1918: No infantry attack developed on any portion of the lines held by this brigade during the day. Shortly after 4 a. m. this morning the Bois de Rougis was heavily bombarded with high explosive and shrapnel, and Colonel Brown again requested counterbattery. The artillery liaison officer with the 109th Infantry did not stay at the 109th Inf. Hq., and it therefore became necessary to repeat Col. Brown's request to the 73d Div. Inf. upon receipt of which request a request was made by the 73d D. I. to the army corps artillery for counterbattery fire. At 6:12 a. m., Col. Brown reported the bombardment decreasing. In this connection, inquiry made at these headquarters this afternoon as to the proper place to connect these headquarters with the artillery telephone net gives assurance that liaison with artillery supporting the 2d position in this sector will soon be a reality.

At 9:35 a. m. our liaison officer with 73d D. I. reported that the French had retaken St-AGNAN, and expected to launch another counterattack at 11 a. m. from the right of the III Army Corps line in the general direction west of north. He also reported a German attack on CONDE-en-BRIE then in progress. The attack on CONDE, if contemplated by the Boche, resulted in nothing more than artillery fire.

At 10 a. m. the Chief Signal Officer of the American I Army Corps brought verbal information that a little more than one platoon and one officer of Co. L, 109th Infantry, name not given, reported at 3d Division Hq. during the night July 15/16.

Verbal information also received from a French liaison officer to the effect that this sector is now in the zone of the French Ninth Army.

At 3 p. m., Lt. Doret, attached to the 108th Machine Gun Bn., reports that from a personal reconnaissance the news from the right of the brigade is encouraging: French military police say the Germans are giving way on our right front, but there is no definite information at this time as to the points from which they are retiring. The French 18th Division is on our right in liaison with the 109th, and large bodies of French troops are reported directly in our rear. The morale of the 109th Inf. is excellent, in fact they are mad clear through and in no way discouraged by the enemy shelling received during the day.

About 4 p. m. the third platoon of Company A, 110th Infantry, was ordered from its position in the brigade reserve, in the ravine, N. E. of MONTLEVON, to MONTIGNY, where is...
St-AGNAN--BOIS DE ROUGIS AREA
Looking east-northeast from Conde-en-Brie, across Surmelin Valley
reported to Captain Watres, Co. B, 108th M. G. Bn., as a local protection for machine guns posted in the CONDE-en-BRIE center of resistance. Co. D of the 110th Infantry, also in brigade reserve, was moved this afternoon to GRANDE-FONTAINE, arriving at 7:40 p.m., and reported to Colonel Brown for assignment to position. This company is still in brigade reserve at GRANDE-FONTAINE, its location being changed in view of a possible attack launched from the salient the enemy now holds, the point of which is directly north of St-AGNAN.

About 5 p.m. it was reported that the French troops on our right front were evacuating approximately 200 Boche prisoners to the south, in the SURMELIN Valley, which corroborates previous information given by Lt. Doret that the Boche line on our right was falling back.

At 4 p.m., the S. O. of the 109th Infantry, reported that he was unable to get hot food up to some of the companies in the first line trench in the 2d position, unless he was furnished with containers of some sort for transportation of the food from the kitchens. Both the division surgeon and the division quartermaster gave assurance that G. I. buckets would be furnished Lt. Lawson at FRANSAUGES before dark.

At 3:55 p.m. the division surgeon notified the C. G. that Boche, dressed in the uniform of American officers, or else real American officers, had been giving both written and verbal orders to our troops to fall back, and that he personally saw a number of the 109th Infantry going to the rear, supposedly under the orders of a superior officer. Organization commanders were promptly notified by the C. G. that every soldier must be made aware of this information and instructed that if anyone gave them such orders at any time, he was to be immediately seized. About 8:30 p.m. the C. O., 110th Infantry, reported the capture of a spy dressed in American uniform and German underwear. The details of this capture have not yet been reported to these headquarters.

The CONDE-en-BRIE and Bois de ROUGIS sectors have been subjected to heavy shelling at intervals during the entire day, and this afternoon the 2d Battalion of the 109th Infantry holding the 1st line of the 2d position from the SURMELIN River to the west edge of the Bois de ROUGIS received considerable gas. These headquarters are not advised of the kind of gas used. Some casualties due to the gas shelling were sustained in the 109th Infantry.

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The following is the present distribution of the troops of this brigade:

109th Infantry: Hq. GRANDE-FONTAINE.
Supply Co., FRANSAUGES.
Machine gun co. supporting the right of the Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance.
1st Bn. (less Co. D), but reinforced by Co. K, in support of right subsector of Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance.
2d Bn. (less Co. H) on line in left subsector of Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance.
Companies D and H on right of French line near DANNEJEU Fme.
Company I, in regimental reserve in woods north of GRANDE-FONTAINE.
Companies L and M (portions returned from the front) in brigade reserve in ravine northeast of MONTLEVON.

110th Infantry: Two platoons of Company A in left rear of COUFREMAUX center of resistance, prepared to support two platoons of Co. A, 108th M. G. Bn., in northern edge of woods north of La CHARMOY Fme. (on account of the shelling of artillery located in this wood, both the M. G. platoons and the infantry have been withdrawn to the rear and held in readiness to take up their battle position in case of attack.).
Third platoon Co. A is supporting B Co., 108th M. G. Bn., at MONTIGNY.
Balance of Co. A in ravine northeast of MONTLEVON, in brigade reserve.
Remainder of Companies B and C have not been reformed.
Company D in brigade reserve near GRANDE-FONTAINE.
2d Battalion on line CONDE-en-BRIE center of resistance.
3d Battalion on COUFREMAUX center of resistance.
Regimental P. C., La FOSSE Fme.
Supply Company, ARTONGES.
Machine Gun Company in support of left of COUFREMAUX center of resistance.
108th M. G. Bn.: P. C. in railroad culvert west of Fontaine Fme, at Brigade P. C.
Co. A, two Platoons in left rear COUFREMAUX sector as eventual garrison, with
two Platoons Co. A, 110th Infantry, of northern edge of woods north of La CHARMOY Fme.
3d Platoon Co. A, supporting B Co., 108th M. G. Bn., at MONTIGNY. Balance in
brig. reserve N. E. of MONTLEVON.
Cos. B, C and D supporting 2d position between machine gun companies of the
109th and 110th Infantry.
Supply detachments, ARTONGES.
103d Engineers: 1st Battalion in right subsector Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance.
P. C., Bois de ROUGIS, south of center of subsector.
Brigade P. C.: In railroad culvert west of FONTAINE Fme.

At 11:50 p. m. message received from Colonel Brown that his battalion in the Bois de ROUGIS is under heavy machine-gun fire directed from Hill 200 on the center of the Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance, and artillery fire from the northern section of the woods on
the whole line of the Bois de ROUGIS center of resistance. Signal lights and rockets are
being used freely along the southern edge of these woods. Colonel Brown is again without
an artillery liaison officer and asks for artillery support, which is now, 11:55 p. m.,
being requested from 73d D. I., Captain Bergis answering the telephone. Major Vail was
directed to order the machine guns supporting the northeast side of the CONDE-en-BRIE
center of resistance to be prepared to open flanking fire along the wire in front of the
2d Bn. position of the 109th Inf. According to the best information obtainable from the
73d D. I. at 12:20 a. m., July 18, the French now hold St-AGNAN. Colonel Brown informed
at 12:20 a. m., of this situation, and directed by brigade commander to immediately notify
him of any further developments or of any protective barrage furnished by the French in
front of his position.

The light outpost wire with which the machine gun bn. strung its telephone net to
Companies B and C has been put out by the rain. Major Martin, holding the CONDE-en-BRIE
center of resistance was instructed by the brigade commander at 12:15 a. m., to send a
runner to Lt. Boss, Co. B, 108th Machine Gun Battalion, to have his gun crews in position
to open a flanking fire towards St-AGNAN if an attack developed and to direct Lt. Boss
to send two runners to Major Martin’s P. C. at once in case it becomes necessary to send
further information to Lt. Boss.

The 73d Division Infantry, Captain Bergis speaking, reports at 12:30 a. m., that the
commander of the divisional infantry of the 73d D. I. believes this fire to be only
harassing fire and that in his opinion no Boche attack will develop on account of darkness
of the night, before daylight. The occupation of St-AGNAN by the French is again confirmed
by the commander of the 73d D. I. Col. Brown advised at once of this information and
directed by the brigade commander to caution his battalions against any random fire in the
dark in the direction of friendly lines in their front.

S. W. ROHADS,
Major, Brig. Adj.
REMARKS: French artillery shelling Hill 200 - 7:15 a. m. to 7:30 a. m. 100 shells dropped on hill.
   Capt. Williams with about 115 men of H Co. occupied position at DANNEJEU Fme. Boche still holding edge of St-AGNAN and woods around Hill 200.

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CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS:
11:30 a. m.: Capt. Mackey organized company from casuals and men lost from their commands and occupied position in woods back of BAULNE.
11:45 a. m.: O.P. reports heavy shelling of St-AGNAN also north of EVRY and Hill 200.
12 noon: Shelling of our trenches continues at intervals throughout the day. Occasional gas shells dropped.
1:35 p. m.: Capt. Williams reports from DANNEJEU Fme that with balance of B and H Cos. he is holding position under heavy machine-gun fire - needs ambulance and assistance.

228-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, G. S. No. 1

28th DIVISION, A. E. F., July 18, 1918.

July 17/18, 1918
20 h. to 20 h.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: Enemy still holds Hill 223 in Bois de CONDE territory north of Les BOISETS and the north slope of Hill 200.
III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: Nothing to report.
IV. ENEMY ACTIVITY:
   (a) Infantry: During the morning short bursts were fired at frequent intervals from machine guns on Hill 200
   (b) Artillery: Enemy artillery fire was very light except during periods of evacuation. Scattered firing continued throughout the day. 60 H. E. shells, 50 light shells, 30 exact type uncertain and 10 gas shells.
V. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) Airplanes: 1 Allied plane brought down - 195.80-253.80 at 9:45 a.m. 4:48 p. m., one reconnaissance plane few low over St-AGNAN and CELLES-les-CONDE for 12 minutes and returned to German lines. 7:20 p. m., enemy planes flying over 98.5-57.4---97.0-57.5 below sky line dropping bombs and firing machine guns at men in trenches.
7:42 p.m., 1 French and 2 Australian planes flew over our O.P. to 96.5 and 97.3 bringing two enemy observation balloons down within 1 minute and returned over our O.P.
(b) Balloons: 2 enemy observation balloons up all day.

VIII. MISCELLANEOUS: 1:05 p.m., man seen running through field from woods at 97.9 - 56.7 to road crossing field to Les MARECHAUX vanishing at 98.1 - 56.45?
7:30 p.m., enemy planes flying low over 97.8 - 57.5 dropping white signals in the woods giving location of our troops to artillery and later these troops were shelled by the enemy.

IX. ACTIVITY OF OUR OWN TROOPS: During the afternoon and evening of July 18, the 109th Infantry evacuated their position having been relieved by the 110th Infantry.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:
S. A. HOWARD,
Major, F. A., N. A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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HS Fr. File: Fr. Mily. Mission, Am. 28th Div.: 405-30.9: Report

Activities of American 28th Division

[Editorial Translation]

LIAISON REPORT
No. 6
LIAISON OFFICER

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION WITH THE AMERICAN ARMY,
AMERICAN 28th DIVISION,
July 18, 1918.

Captain Aulanier, Liaison Officer with the American 28th Division

To the General commanding the French Mission with the American army

The American 28th Division was engaged as follows during the course of the recent operations south of CHATEAU-THIERRY:

I. On July 14 the division was alerted, the 56th Brigade occupying the 2d position in rear of the French 39th Inf. Div. in the sector of the French XXXVIII Corps, the 55th Brigade occupying the 2d position in rear of the French 125th Inf. Div. in the sector of the French III Corps. The 2 brigades were separated by elements of the American 3d Division: On the left of the 56th Brigade was the American I Corps: On the right of the 55th Brigade was the French 51st Inf. Div. The French 73d and 4th Divisions were stationed in rear of the 2d position in the XXXVIII Corps sector. Five companies of the 56th Brigade were with the 39th Division, 4 companies of the 55th Brigade were lent to the 125th Division. These companies of the two brigades were distributed between the line of observation and the lines of resistance of the French divisions.

II. The enemy attack developed during the day of July 15 on the fronts of the American 3d Division and the 125th Division. The companies lent to the 125th Division fell back with the elements of the 125th Division and conducted themselves splendidly.
Unfortunately, liaison during the withdrawal between the French and American elements was not perfect. Some American detachments, not reached by the orders to fall back, interpreted unfavorably the withdrawal of the 125th Division (already tired when it entered the sector). The 4 companies in line in the sector of the 125th Division suffered extremely heavy losses.

III. The 2d position, in the sectors of the 56th and 55th Brigades, was not attacked by the enemy infantry. But this position was and is still being violently shelled. Losses are high.

IV. On July 16 at 4 p.m., the American 3d Inf. [sic] (56th Brigade) [111th Inf.] lends 2 bns. to the American 3d Division to relieve the American 30th Inf. which is extremely exhausted.

V. A counterattack between St-AGNAN and La CHAPELLE-MONTODON was carried out during the afternoon of the 16th by a regiment of the French 20th Division and 1 bn. of the American 109th Inf. (55th Brigade). This battalion behaved very well, attacking even with spirit. Unfortunately some undamaged machine guns checked its dash. It was obliged to return to the trench from which it had jumped off, after suffering heavy losses.

VI. At 4 p.m., July 17, the 56th Brigade receives the order to move to the south of the 2d position in the sector immediately to the left of the 55th Brigade. The American 28th Division, therefore, is going to be almost entirely regrouped. The men have shown, during the recent operations, that they can hold a shelled position. The offensive spirit of the command and the troops is unquestionable. Undoubtedly, their training is far from being complete, but this frequent parcelling out hampers all efforts to train either the staff or the troops. I consider that it is important to place the American 28th Division in sector. At the same time that they would be inflicting damage on the enemy, the troops would also perfect their knowledge of the use of combined arms. The command would be favorably situated to improve the functioning of liaison and would learn to maneuver artillery, all of which is impossible in a division as nomadic as the American 28th Division for some weeks past. It will then be necessary to have with the French Mission of the American 28th Division an officer in charge of the group of instructors replacing Captain Quintin, seriously wounded July 14 while visiting the American companies in the 39th Division sector.

VII. Colonel King, Chief of Staff, has just been promoted to a brigadier general. The American 28th Division, not always having a third section of the general staff, runs the risk of being deprived of the Chief of Staff and operations officer at the same time. In any case, neither the Chief of Staff nor the future 3d section will be acquainted with the division. The same difficulty confronted the American 3d Division. American G. H. Q. waited until the American 3d Division had gone into sector before detailing an operations officer to it. It would seem advisable to have officers responsible for the functioning of the 3d section from the very formation of a division.

VIII. General Pershing visited the C. P. of General Muir on Friday, July 12; he went over the positions occupied by the 56th Brigade.

IX. Location of the American division:

55th Brigade: No change.

56th Brigade: Zone: MAISON-ROUGE---REDON---MONTBAZIN---CHAMBON (these localities inclusive).

Advanced C. P.: Les ORGERIEUX.

HQ., 1st Echelon: Le FORT de la VILLE.

HQ., 2d Echelon: HONDEVILLIERS.

AULANIER,
Liaison Officer.
Orders No. 3493 for the French III Corps July 15, 1918, from the French Sixth Army after the German attack of the morning:

A counterattack will be launched by General Lebrun between VASSIEUX and COURTEMONT.
The following additional elements are placed at his disposal: 77th, 20th, 18th, 73d Inf. Divs. (less 1 regiment to the XXXVIII Corps to which this last-named division belongs) and the 4th Inf. Div. [all French]. Service Memorandum No. 28565 Op., July 15, 1918, from the Sixth Army Air Service:
The 58th Squadron (elements of the 73d Div.) is placed at the disposal of General Lebrun and, for the duration of the operation to be executed between VASSIEUX and COURTEMONT:

(a) Squadron 284.
(b) Five planes of Squadron 219 if necessary.

Instruction for combat aviation: No. 20570/Op. July 15, 1918, from the Sixth Army Air Service:
The 2d Brigade of the air division is placed at the disposal of General Lebrun for the counterattack.

Orders to the General commanding the French 51st Inf. Div. to assemble the remaining elements of his division in rear of the 20th Div.

Events of the period from 8 p. m., July 14 to 8 p. m., July 15:
At 9 p. m., July 14, general counterpreparation fire by the French artillery.
At 12:10 a. m., beginning of a violent enemy artillery preparation.
At 12:15 a. m., opening of a rapid counterpreparation and a fire of special No. 20 shells in the region west of JAULGONNE.
Under cover of thick artificial smoke, the enemy crosses the MARNE between REUILLY and COURTHIEZY west of DORMANS and between VERNEUIL and TRY.
He succeeds in advancing rapidly in the center of the corps sector in a sharp fight against the French 273d Inf.
At 11:30 a. m. the pocket thus formed brings the attacker into contact with our 2d position between COMBLIZY and La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON but without breaching this 2nd position which is held by the 20th Div.
In spite of the enemy's efforts, this situation remains unchanged.
In the left sector the advance is slower and less important. At 3 p. m. the front is marked by a line running south of St-AGNAN—Hill 223—500 meters northeast and north of MONTHUREL—Hill 231 (west of REUILLY)
A counterattack by the 73d Div. is launched at 6 p. m. St-AGNAN, retaken and finally lost again. However, we have a firm hold on Hill 223 south of GRANGE-aux-BOIS and are advancing slightly north of the clearing of JANVIER Farm. The 77th, 18th, 4th and 131st Inf. Divs. [all French] are moved by truck to the III Corps sector.
Assignment of Command

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1.191/3-Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918—3:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 558

PART I

The French 20th Inf. Div. now being in front line of the 2d position, the General commanding that division, on receipt of the present order, will assume command of the right sector of the corps; he will keep his C. P. at COUPIGNY.

The General commanding the French 51st Inf. Div. will assemble the remaining elements of his division in rear of the 20th Div. in a zone that he will determine in agreement with the General commanding the 20th Div.

A report will be made to the General commanding the III Corps of the zone selected. C. P. of the 51st Div. at JANVILLIERS.

The General commanding the French 125th Inf. Div. will continue to be in command of the left sector of the corps. He will have at his disposal the American 55th Brigade, reinforced by the American bn. of engineers.

L. LEBRUN.

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Counterattack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1196/3-Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918—9:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 559

PART I

I. The Germans have succeeded in crossing the MARNE, have carried the position of resistance and have reached the 2d position along the entire corps front except on the
left where our troops at 5 p.m., July 15, were still holding the following line in front of the 2d position:

MOULIN-RUINE---Hill 231---north edge of the clearing of JANVIER Farm---the firebreak starting from the east tip of the clearing and passing 500 meters south of GRANGE-aux-BOIS, the west slopes of the ridge of Triangulation Station 233.

This 2d position is defended:

In the left sector: By the General commanding the French 125th Division who has the American 55th Brigade and certain elements of the French 125th Division at his disposal.

C. P., HAUCHE Farm.

In the right sector: By the General commanding the French 20th Division, who has the 20th Division and certain elements of the French 51st Division at his disposal.

C. P., COUPIGNY (near ORBAIS).

To the right of the French III Corps: By the General commanding the 77th Division who has at his disposal on the position itself a chasseurs regiment of his division, the other regiments being in reserve south of IGNY-le-JARD.

C. P., La PLACE-au-PUITS Farm.

II. The General commanding the French III Corps has received orders to deliver a counterattack employing the following means.

The French 77th Division, whose elements, engaged on the 2d position on the right of the III Corps, will be relieved by the French 3d Cavalry (de Boissieu’s).

C. P., La PLACE-au-PUITS Farm.

The French 18th Division, whose leading elements are located in the region VERDON-MARGNY.

C. P., ORBAIS.

A detachment composed of one regiment of the French 20th Division and a battalion of the American 55th Brigade [28th Div.] under a commander to be designated by the General commanding the 20th Division.

French 73d Division (less one regiment at the disposal of the French XXXVIII Corps).

C.P. at [sic].

The French 4th and French 168th Divisions will unload during the night in the areas BAULNE-le-BREUIL (4th Division) and MONTLEVON-PARGNY (168th Division) where they will receive further orders.

C. P. 4th Division: Le BREUIL.

C. P. 168th Division: ARTONGES.

III. This counterattack will be executed at the earliest practicable hour the morning of the 16th. It will be launched generally speaking from the 2d position but if the position should give way in the mean time, the counterattack will be launched from the front on which contact has been regained with the enemy.

Large counterattacking units should therefore be formed up facing their objectives at a distance sufficiently removed from the 2d position to avoid surprise and any deployment movements within effective hostile range.

This counterattack is to be pushed with the utmost vigor to the MARNE, with the mission of driving the enemy back to it and to the far side.

Each large attacking unit or detachment must break through the hostile dispositions on a relatively narrow front with determination and, so far as possible by surprise, to the line of the north edge of the woods, moving over the most favorable terrain, it will then fan out immediately to the right and left in order to reestablish a continuous front without delay.

IV. OBJECTIVES:

1. Normal Objective: The position of resistance.

77th Div.: From TROISSY to VASSY (excl.)

Line of Departure: That portion of the 2d position comprised in the bend of the FLAGOT River (the round hill of Bois des CHATAIGNIERS and Bois des CHATAIGNIERS).

Direction of attack: VASSIEUX.
18th Div.: From VASSY (incl.) to CHAVENAY Creek. [Not identified.]
Line of Departure: That portion of the 2d position corresponding to the open
space between the Foret de BOUQUIGNY and the woods of CLOS-MILON Farm.
Direction of attack: IGNY-le-JARD---DORMANS.
Franco-American Detachment: From CHAVENAY Creek to Les LESNARDS Farm.
Line of departure: That portion of the second position corresponding to the gap
of La BOURDONNERIE Farm.
Direction of attack: La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON---Les COQS.
73d Div.: Will continue its advance in such manner as to maintain close contact
with the Franco-American detachment at Les LESNARDS Farm.
It will report its C. P. without delay.
The 20th Division and American 55th Brigade will be responsible for holding the
second position and covering the flanks of the attack at the start.
2. Contingent Objective: Once the normal objective is gained, strong detach­
ments, well provided with engineers and demolition equipment, will be pushed without stop­
ing to the Marne to destroy the bridges and cut off the enemy's retreat.
Considering the nature of the terrain over which the attack must move and the ex­
tent of the woods separating the zones of action of the divisions, liaison between them can
only be established at opportune intervals.
It is therefore essential under all contingencies that the attack be launched
vigorously along the entire front at the same time (H hour to be determined later) and that
the attacking troops advance directly to their objectives where they can establish effective
liaison again.
As the infantry moves forward, it will mop up only the near edges of woods that
immediately enclose the zone of attack, leaving to the artillery the task of combing the
interior of the woods, whose defenses will fall by being bypassed and outflanked.
Along these general lines and dependent on the obstacles their attacks may en­
counter, the division commanders will regulate the employment of their artillery for the
preparation, accompaniment, and all other phases of the attack.
An infantry plane will be assigned to each attack.
As soon as the normal objective is reached, the line will be marked by all the
means of signal communication.
V. The divisions will have at their disposal all their organic artillery, reinforced
by such field artillery and heavy field howitzers as may be in the areas where they are
operating as delimited below (the commanding officers of the artillery of the 20th and
125th Divisions should be consulted as soon as possible):

77th Division: Northeast limit: LEUVRIGNY-TROISSY,
West limit: Southwest exit of NESLE-le-REPONS---VASSY.

18th Division: East limit: Southwest exit of NESLE-le-REPONS---VASSY.
West limit: La CRESSONNIERE [Farm]-CHAVENAY.

The Franco-American detachment will have at its disposal the artillery of the French
4th Division which will be pushed forward tonight to Le BREUIL where the General commanding
the 20th Division will send it orders for its further movements. It will operate within
the zone of action delimited as follows:
East: La CRESSONNIERE Farm-CHAVENAY.
West: SACONNAY-Les LESNARDS Farm, this last line serving as east limit of the
artillery of the French 73d Division.
The villages of COURTHIEZY, SOUILLY, CHAVENAY, VASSY, VASSIEUX, BOUQUIGNY and
TROISSY will be taken as objectives by the heavy artillery (guns) and by the heavy high-powered
artillery.
All the crossings of the MARNE between PASSY [-sur-MARNE] (incl.) and VERNEUIL (incl.) will be taken under fire constantly night and day by the heavy high-powered artillery.

VI. UNIFORM: Light pack with reserve rations and at least one canteen of water.

L. LEBRUN.

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War Diary, 55th Brigade: Addition to G. O.

**Hour of Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,197/3-Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918—10 p. m.

ADDIITION TO GENERAL ORDER NO. 559
of JULY 15, 1918

H 6 (six) a.m.

By order:

[Signature illegible],
Chief of Staff.

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War Diary, 55th Brig.: Memorandum

**Orders**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1198/3-Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918.

The commander of the battalion of the American 55th Brigade, designated by the General commanding the American 55th Brigade to participate in the attack, will immediately obtain his orders from General Desvoyes, commanding the French 20th Inf. Div. at COUPIGNY near ORBAIS.

By order:

[Signature illegible],
Chief of Staff.

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Disposition of Engineers

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1190/3-Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDER

The bn. of the American engineers placed at the disposal of the General commanding the American 55th Brigade for work on the 2d position will remain at his disposal for the defense of this position, but with the condition that he use it to assure absolutely effective liaison on the right with the French 20th Inf. Div.

L. LEBRUN.

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[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1387/3-Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 16, 1918.

8 p. m. July 14, to 8 p. m., July 15

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Day marked by a violent attack by the enemy along the entire front of the army corps.

II. REPORT OF EVENTS:

A. Infantry Activity: Following a violent artillery preparation, begun at midnight and under cover of a heavy smoke screen, the enemy crosses the MARNE between REUILLY and COURTHIEZY west of DORMANS and between VERNEUIL and TRY.

In a vigorous action against the 273d Infantry, he succeeds in advancing rapidly in the center of the corps sector.

At 11:30 a. m. the salient thus created brings the enemy into contact with our 2d position between COMBLIZY and La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON, but without breaching this 2d position which is here held by the French 20th Infantry Division.

Despite the enemy’s efforts, this situation remained unchanged.

In the left sector, the advance is less rapid and less important. At 3 p. m. the front line runs: South of St-AGNAN---Hill 223---500 meters northeast and north of MONTHEUREL---Hill 231 (west of REUILLY).

At 6 p. m. a counterattack is launched by the French 73d Inf. Div. Retaken and lost again, St-AGNAN is no longer in our hands but we still hold in our firm possession Hill 223 south of GRANGE-aux-BOIS and are making a little progress north of the clearing around JANVIER Farm.
B. Artillery Activity:

Friendly: At 9 p. m. the 13th [sic], general counter offensive preparation. At 12:15 a. m., July 15, opening of counteroffensive preparation and fire of special No. 20 shell. Destruction fire on bridges reported. Army heavy artillery destroys at least one large bridge between TRELOUP and DORMANS in afternoon of 15th. Interdiction fire on crossing points. Neutralization fire on groups of batteries reported by planes.

340-mm. pieces in ARTONGES fire on the FERE-en-TARDENOIS railway station (50 rounds).

Hostile: The hostile artillery preparation begins very violently at 12:10 a. m. the 14th [sic] (H. E. and gas) (no mustard).

Especially violent interdiction fire on CONDE-en-BRIE, IGNY-le-JARD, ORBAIS, and MAREUIL.

A few 380-mm. rounds on MONTMIRAIL.

C. Air Service Activity:

Friendly: Airplanes active.

Enemy: Medium activity

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 16, 1918.

[Extract]

EVENTS OF JULY 15/JULY 16 (8 p. m.): At noon the counterattack planned on the entire front of the corps sector is launched.

The 73d Div. engages in violent fighting around JANVIER Farm. It overruns GRANGE-aux-BOIS, captures ST-AGNAN and advanced beyond Les MARECHAUX Farm. In consequence of enemy counterattacks it is forced to fall back to the south. ST-AGNAN is lost again. It will be retaken July 17 at 12:30 a. m.

The 20th Div., reinforced by a bn. of the American 55th Brigade, captures MONTLECON, CHEZY, LA BOURDONNERIE Farm, LA VITARDERIE Farm. It takes 172 prisoners but is obliged to fall back.

The left of the 18th Div. advances in the direction of CLOS-MILON Farm. Its right, subjected to enemy counterattacks, is unable to advance beyond COMBLIZY.

Following enemy counterattacks, the left is brought back to 500 meters south of CLOS-MILON Farm.

At nightfall our front is marked by LES ETANGS---ST-AGNAN (excl.) (which was not re-taken until 12:30 a. m.)---woods north of MONTLECON---CHEZY (incl.)---line from ponds.
Use of French 4th and 20th Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1207-3-Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 16, 1918--4:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 561

PART I

In order to consolidate the advance made by the attacks of the counteroffensive conducted by the French 18th Division, the Franco-American detachment, and the French 77th [73d] Infantry Division [the 77th Division was engaged east of the III Corps], it is necessary immediately to establish contact across wooded areas, at all events before nightfall, connecting up the different attacks with each other.

To this end, the attack divisions and the American detachment will be responsible for establishing this contact in their respective zones of action assigned to them by Par. 5 of Field Orders No. 559.

The General commanding the French 20th Infantry Division can employ organizations of the French 4th Infantry Division which may be placed at his disposal at the necessary time by the General commanding the III Army Corps.

The generals of division will come to a mutual agreement by direct consultation as to the position of the front on which this contact can be established at the end of the day.

As a matter of information, the farthest points reached at 3 p. m. were the following:

73d Division: Les BOISETS Farm--St. AGNAN.
Franco-American detachment: La BOURDONNERIE Farm-CHEZY.
18th Division: Ste-CROIX--CLOS-MILON Farm--old COMBLIZY Chateau.

L. LEBRUN,
General Commanding the III Corps.
GENERAL ORDERS

No. 562

PART I

I. The general counterattack launched during the day of the 16th will be renewed the 17th with the same objectives as those laid down in General Orders No. 559.

II. The General commanding the French 18th Infantry Division will have his own division at his disposal for this purpose and to hold the old 2d position, he will have attached to his division, the units of the French 20th Infantry Division which now occupy the sector included between the east limit of the army corps (liaison with the French 77th Infantry Division) and the line CHAVENAY-La CRESSONNIERE extended south, but the 2 battalions of the French 26th Territorials and the company of the 3d Battalion, French 3d Engineers, will be moved farther to the rear to the north edge of the Bois Communaux d'IGNY to be regrouped there.

III. The General commanding the 20th Division will have the following troops at his disposal:

1. The Franco-American detachment organized for the attack of the 16th.
2. The French 147th Infantry.
3. The French 18th Chasseurs Battalion.

He will, moreover, command all French and American troops on the 2d position between the line CHAVENAY-La CRESSONNIERE and the line Les LESNARDS-SACCONAY.

IV. The General commanding the French 73d Infantry Division will cause the line gained by the counterattack to be held and organized.

He will have at his disposal his entire division less the battalion which, under orders of the colonel commanding an American regiment, is charged with maintaining liaison between the French III and XXXVIII Army Corps.

The troops of the French 125th Infantry Division are kept provisionally under his orders, placed in reserve at points determined by him and regrouped by organization.

The General commanding the 73d Division will assume command at 5:15 p. m. the 17th of all French and American troops between the west limit of the army corps and the line Les LESNARDS-SACCONAY extended south.

The General commanding the 125th Division will move with his staff and await the withdrawal of his division from the front line.

V. The Generals commanding the 18th and 20th Divisions will immediately direct toward MAREUIL-en-BRIE the infantry elements of the French 52d Infantry Division which are still on the old 2d position.

VI. Each division commander will have at his disposal all the field artillery and heavy howitzers in position in his sector as defined above.

L. LEBRUN.
Organization of Position for Defense

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1216/3 Op.

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 17, 1918---7:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 563

PART I

[Extract]

I. After the two days of counteroffensive on July 16 and 17, 1918, the front of the French III Army Corps at 6 p.m. is as follows:

Les ETANGS Farm---Hill 223---northern outskirts of St-AGNAN---south and east edges of the woods on Hill 200---small woods north of MONTLECON---north and northeast outskirts of CHEZY---south bank of the pond south of CLOS-MILON Farm---Hill 243---then 2d position from the old Chateau COMBLIZY to JOBBERDERIE Farm.

II. MISSION OF THE ARMY CORPS:
1. Immediately to organize the position gained, the line defined above constituting the line of resistance on the 1st position.
2. To maintain this position intact until the projected offensive designed to throw the enemy beyond the MARNE is resumed.
3. To take dispositions that will enable the troops to meet a new German attack in great force under the most favorable conditions; to this end, to reorganize the units and reconstitute reserves, adopting a formation in depth.
4. To reply instantly by counterattack to any hostile action and thus to keep up the aggressive spirit of the troops, having in mind the resumption of the offensive.

III. The sector of the army corps will be divided into 3 divisional sectors held respectively from left to right by the French 73d, 4th and 18th Infantry Divisions with the following boundaries:

73d Division:
West: The present boundary of the corps (liaison with the French XXXVIII Army Corps by means of a mixed detachment).
East: The line Les LESNARDS Farm---St-AGNAN (incl.)---EVRY (excl.)---MONTCHEVRET (excl.)---La FOURCHE Farm (excl.)---COURJENSON (incl.).

4th Division:
West: East boundary of 73d Division.
East: Unimproved road from CHAMPAILLET to La CRESSONIERE---La CRESSONIERE---MONTLEVON Farm---St-GERMAIN (all incl.)---La VILLE-sous-ORBAIS (excl.)

18th Division:
West: East boundary of 4th Division.
East: Army corps boundary (liaison with the French I Cavalry Corps; a mixed detachment to be organized).

IV. The generals commanding the front line divisions will have at their disposal only their own units, replaced as rapidly as possible by regiments side by side with local sub-sector reserves.
V. Elements not organic to front line infantry divisions will be moved back to the following general line:

The old 2d position as far as CONDE-Le BREUIL Road---the heights of the west bank of the SURMELIN---Les GLAPIEDS---a line from Les GLAPIEDS to the crossroads 700 meters south of Etang des LANDOIS---La GRANGE-GAUCHER---north edge of the Bois Communaux d'IGNY (liaison with the French I Cavalry Corps to be effected in the vicinity of Etang de la COUDRE).

In case of attack, these units will be responsible for the defense of this line which will be organized at once and serve as 2d position.

A detailed study of this position will be begun at once by the Colonel commanding the engineers of the III Corps but the work will begin with the utmost speed without awaiting the final results of that study. They will be pushed with the greatest possible energy.

The distribution of forces for the organization of the position as well as for its defense will be the following:

Sector of the 73d Division: American 56th Brigade, reinforced by one American engineer battalion, and placed under the tactical control of the General commanding the 73d Division. *

* * * * *

At least one infantry battalion and one machine gun company per sector will be permanently maintained on the position as security detachment. Moreover so long as attacks are to be feared, the remainder of the troops will be kept on alert status immediately in rear of this position.

VI. The movements and local reliefs necessary for the execution of these new dispositions will be carried out in two nights:

1. The night of July 17/18: The 73d Division will relieve the elements of the French 125th Division still remaining in its sector - the movement to be regulated after agreement with the General commanding the 125th Division who will have at his disposal for the quartering of his infantry the zone: MONTLEVON---PARGNY-la-DHUYS---ARVONGES (hq.)

To facilitate this withdrawal the General commanding the 73d Division is authorized at his discretion to call upon the American 55th Brigade for one battalion to act provisionally as reserve.

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2. The night of July 18/19: All elements of the French 20th Infantry Division, the 26th Territorial Infantry Regiment, engineers and machine gun platoons still on the old position, will be moved back to the new line (provisionally taken as the 2d position) by agreement between the General commanding the 20th Division and the Generals commanding the 4th and 18th Divisions.

VII. The C. P.'s of the infantry divisions and the divisional infantry will be respectively:

73d Division: (Div., MONTLEVON (Divisional Infantry, HAUCHE Farm

* * * * *

125th Division (division and divisional infantry, ARVONGES

* * * * *

* All portions of this order not here printed refer to French units with which no American troops were serving at the time.
VIII. ARTILLERY: The distribution of the artillery means among the divisions will be the following:

73d Division
- 3 bns. of 75’s of the divisional artillery of the 73d Division (1st, 2d and 3d Bns., 239th F. A.)
- 3 bns. of the divisional artillery of the 125th Division (1st, 2d and 3d Bns., 245th F. A.)
- 1 bn. of 75’s of the French 11th F. A. (2d Bn., 11th F. A.)
- 1 bn. of 155-mm. howitzers (Schneider) of the French 307th Heavy Artillery (3d Bn., 307th Artillery)
- 5 155-mm. howitzers (Schneider) of the divisional artillery of the 125th Division (6th Bn., 10th Artillery)
- 4 155-mm. howitzers (St-Chamond) of the French 138th Artillery (heavy) (7th Bn., 138th Artillery)

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IX. The Generals commanding the French 51st and 125th Infantry Divisions will expedite to the utmost the reorganization of their divisions.

In the meantime they will constitute from remaining elements, provisional units at full strength, capable of being placed, in case of necessity, at the disposal of the General commanding the 20th Division for the defense of the provisional 2d position.

The General commanding the 125th Division will consult with the General commanding the American 55th Brigade to determine the conditions under which the training of the elements of that brigade will be resumed when circumstances permit.

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L. LEBRUN.

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[Editorial Translation]

General Staff

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,

July 17, 1918.

Orders No. 1690/3 July 17, 1918 from the French Ninth Army: Effective at 8 a. m., July 17, the French III Corps is placed under the tactical control of de Mitry’s Ninth Army. It remains under the administrative control of the French Sixth Army.

General Orders No. 561 and General Orders No. 562 July 16, 1918 from the III Corps: The counteroffensive executed on the 16th will be continued on the 17th.

Three divisions will carry out the attack, the General commanding the French 18th Inf. Div. will have at his disposal his own division and the units of the French 20th Inf.
Division which occupy the old 2d position. The General commanding the 20th Div. will have available his own division plus the American detachment organized for the attack of the 16th, the 147th Inf. and the 18th Bn. of Chasseurs (these last two units belonging to the French 4th Inf. Div.). The General commanding the French 73d Inf. Div. will have at his disposal the troops of his division and the elements of the French 125th Inf. Div. holding the old 2d position. Effective at noon the French 77th Inf. Div. is under the control of the French 1st Cavalry Corps. The General commanding the 125th Div. will move to Artonges with his headquarters.

General Orders No. 563, July 17, 1918 from the III Corps: Fixes the boundaries of the 3 sectors into which the zone of the corps is divided. Organization of the ground gained. The 125th Division is regrouped in the Artonges region but its artillery remains in its present positions.

Special Orders No. 1817/3, July 17, 1918 from the Ninth Army: The bn. which the 73d Division left at the disposal of the XXXVIII Corps for liaison between the American 3d Division and the 73d Division is returned to the control of the latter.

Events from July 16 (8 p. m.) - July 17 (midnight): A strong enemy attack is launched at 9 a.m. on the front of the 73d Division, forcing our line to yield and reaching the south edge of Bois de Conde. The situation is restored through the intervention of troops placed in position for our counterattack.

At 11 a.m. our counterattack launched as planned.

In the left sector the 73d Div. advancing slightly completely reestablished the lines it was holding before the German attack at 9 a.m.

In the center our attack advances to the edge of the woods south of Hill 200 but is thrown back by counterattacks supported by flame throwers and hangs on 200 meters south of the edges of the woods. With difficulty it advances north of Chezy but succeeds nevertheless in reaching the south edge of the small woods. We take 240 prisoners including a bn. commander.

On the right Andlauer’s division advances his left to 500 meters north of Les Pozards Farm and to the top of Hill 243 taking prisoners.

The right is unable to advance.

In the evening the front is marked as follows:

2d position from Joberdere to the old Chateau near Comblizy—Hill 243—south bank of the pond south to Clos-Milon Farm—south edge of the wood northeast of Chezy—groves north of Montlecon—east and south edges of Bois de la Cote 200—north approaches of St-Agnan—Hill 223—clearing of Janvier Farm—Les Etangs.

In the evening, the front* is marked as follows:

Les Etangs Farm—clearing of Janvier Farm—Hill 223—north approaches of St-Agnan—east and southwest edges of Bois de la Cote 200—groves north of Montlecon—south edge of the wood northeast of Chezy—south bank of the pond south of Clos-Milon Farm—Hill 243—old 2d position from the old Chateau near Comblizy (incl.) to Joberdere.

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* Indication of front line in inverse order from that of preceding paragraph without other change than of the edges of woods on Hill 200.
Assignment of French III Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1225/3

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
July 18, 1918--11 a. m.

GENERAL ORDERS

No. 564

PART I

[Extract]

I. Effective 8 a. m., July 17, the French III Army Corps is placed under the tactical control of the General commanding the French Ninth Army.
   C. P. at ESTERNAY, Hq. at SEZANNE.
   It remains attached, as before, to the French Fifth and Sixth Armies in other respects (supply, billets, etc.).

II. The army corps boundaries remain unchanged.
   The rear (south) limit of the Ninth Army is established as follows: SEZANNE (to the zone of communications)---MOEURS---ESTERNAY---COURGIVAUX---MONTCEAUX-les-PROVINS---CERNEUX---COURTOACON---BETON-BAZOCHES.

III. The units placed under the orders of the General commanding the French V [sic] [III] Army Corps comprise:
   (a) Large units - French 18th, 4th, 73d, 20th, 51st, 125th Infantry Divisions, American 55th Brigade reinforced by one battalion of engineers of the American 28th Division.

   * * * * *

   (d) Tanks - One battalion of tanks attached to the 73d Division.

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   (g) The nondivisional elements of the French III Army Corps (less the 16th Bridge Train Company of the 3d Battalion), left temporarily at the disposal of the American I Army Corps.

L. LEBRUN.

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Assignment of Rear Area to American 55th Brigade

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 565

PART I

[Extract]

I. General Orders No. 563 of the French III Army Corps prescribed the organization of a 2d position in the sector of the army corps. It is necessary that the troops charged with the organization and defense of that position have at their disposal a quartering area immediately in rear of that position.

To this end, the combat, field and service trains and parks of the French 73d, 4th, 18th, 20th, 51st, 125th Infantry Divisions and the American 55th Brigade will be moved back south of the following general line:

VILLENERON Farm—ARTONGES—MARGNY—CORROBERT (all incl.) and between this line and the south limit of the army corps.

* * * * * *

III. The forward limits of the three divisional sectors established by General Order No. 563 (Part III) will be extended as follows:

73d Division:
West boundary: Present boundary of the corps, then
MONTBAZIN—Les ORGERIEUX—GILLAUCHE—ROZOY-BELLEVALLE—La HAUTE-EPINE (all to French XXXVIII Army Corps).
East boundary: COURJENSON Farm (incl.)—Les GROISILLIERS (incl.)—Les COURBES Farm (incl.)—LANDAIS (incl.)—St-LAZARE Farm (incl.)—MONTMIRAIL (incl.)—Le CHENE (incl.)—FONTAINE-ARMEE (incl.)

* * * * * *

IV. The 125th Division and the American 55th Brigade will be quartered in the sector of the 73d Division.

* * * * * *

L. LEBRUN.
I. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: A French counterattack is launched at 11 a. m. and is continued during the afternoon on the front of the French III Corps sector. Night quiet, marked only by rifle firing, then a false preparation executed by our artillery at 5 a. m.

II. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:
(a) French: At 11 a. m. launching of the counterattack planned. In the left sector the French 73d Inf. Div., moving forward slightly, finally reestablishes the lines it held before the German attack at 9 a. m.
In the center, our attack advances to the edge of the woods south of Hill 200, but is thrown back from that point by counterattacks supported by flame throwers. It digs in 200 meters south of the edges of the woods. It moves forward north of CHEZY with difficulty but at last reaches the south edge of the small woods.
240 prisoners including 1 battalion commander fall into our hands.
On the right the Andlauer unit at the start advances its left to a point 500 meters north of Les POZARDS Farm and to Hill 243, taking some prisoners. Its right cannot advance.

In the evening the front line runs as follows: 2d position from JOBERDERIE to the old Chateau near COMBLIZY—Hill 243—south bank of pond south of CLOS-MILON Farm—south edge of woods northeast of CHEZY—small woods north of MONTLECON—east and south edges of woods on Hill 200—north outskirts of St-AGNAN—Hill 223—clearing of JANVIER Farm—Les ETANGS.
(b) German: A strong enemy attack was launched at 9 a. m., July 17, against the front of the 73d Division holding the left sector. Initially it caused our line to give way and reached the south edges of the Bois de CONDE. The situation is restored by troops in position for counterattack.
During the day the German infantry makes several counterattacks and employs flame throwers in the center sector against the 18th Foot Chasseurs Brigade and in the right sector.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
(a) French: Support of the attack and interdiction fire on the woods occupied by the German front line.
At 5 a. m., feint preparation fire, followed by a rolling interdiction fire on the foot bridges thrown across the MARNE.

* * * * *

VII. MISCELLANEOUS:
Relief movements: The 73d Div. will relieve the elements of the French 125th Inf. Div. still in its sector.
The 4th Div. will relieve the 20th Div. elements still in the center sector. The General commanding the 4th Div. will assume command of the center at 8 a.m. the 18th. The 18th Div. is taking up position for the occupation of its sector.

By order:

[Signature illegible],
Chief of Staff.

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_French Ninth Army_
_July 16 - 17, 1918_

**Headquarters FERE-CHAMPENOISE**

* * * * *

Effective at noon, July 16, the staff of the Ninth Army will operate as follows:

C. P.: ESTERNAY

Headquarters: VILLENAUXE

A detail will remain at FERE-CHAMPENOISE until noon.

By order of the Chief of Staff:

GILLOT,
Officer on duty.

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Assumption of Command by General de Mitry

_French Ninth Army, Fere-Champenoise, July 16, 1918--11:45 p. m._

At 8 a.m., July 17, General de Mitry, commanding the French Ninth Army, will take command of a tactical grouping comprising the French XXXVIII Corps (including the French
39th Division,* the French III Army Corps, and the French 168th Infantry Division, army reserve.

The services will continue to function under the French Sixth Army.

A later order will prescribe the detailed composition of the Ninth Army.

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de MITRY,
General Commanding the Ninth Army.

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[On July 17, 1918, the French Ninth Army took over a sector of the MARNE front extending from the right of the Sixth Army at VAUX, to the left of the Fifth Army at FESTIGNY-les-HAMEAUX.

This frontage included the French XXXVIII and III Corps, which had previously formed part of the French Sixth Army, and included the American 3d and 28th Division.]

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HS Fr. File: Ninth Army: 419-30.1: Order

Mission and Forces at Disposal of French Ninth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1690/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
Esternay, July 17, 1918.

I. Situation the evening of July 16: The front line runs: VAUX---the MARNE between CHATEAU-THIERRY and GLAND---FOSSOY---CREZANCY---edges of the woods north of JAN-VIER Farm---Les MARECHAUX---La BOURDONNERIE Farm---COMBLIZY---MONTMERGEY---CHENE-la-REINE.

II. At 8 a.m., July 17, General de Mitry, commanding the French Ninth Army, assumes command of a tactical groupment having as mission:

1. In conjunction with the French Fifth Army on its right, to oppose the advance of the Germans in the direction of EPERNAY.
2. To drive the enemy back across the MARNE.

The Ninth Army is under the orders of the Group of Armies of the Center.

III. The zone of action of the tactical groupment under the orders of the General commanding the Ninth Army is limited:

1. On the west, by the present boundary between the French XXXVIII Army Corps and the American I Corps.
2. On the east, by the present boundary between the French Fifth and Sixth Armies.
3. On the south, by the forward limit of the zone of communications: SEZANNE (to the zone of communications)---MOEURS---ESTERNAY---COUGIVAUX---MONTCEAUX-les-PROVINS---CERNEUX---COURTACON---BETON-BAZOCHES.

The Ninth Army has the Fifth Army on its right: C. P., MONTMORT; on its left the French Sixth Army: Hq., TRILPORT.

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* Also the American 3d Division. Later July 20 the XXXVIII Corps, including the 3d Division was returned to the control of the French Sixth Army [See Aisne-Marne documentation.]
IV. The Ninth Army has at its disposal:

1. Large Units:
   (a) The French III Army Corps (C. P. MONTMIRAIL) having in front line from right to left: The French 18th Infantry Division (C. P., ORBAIX-l'ABBAYE), the French 20th Infantry Division (C. P., Chateau de COUPIGNY), the French 73d Infantry Division (C. P., La HAUCHE Farm, 1,500 meters southwest of CONDE-en-BRIE), the French 125th Infantry Division in 2d line, the French 4th Infantry Division partly engaged (C. P., Le BREUIL), the American 55th Brigade (C. P. the hamlet of GRANDE-FONTAINE).* In the rear, the French 51st Infantry Division (Hq., VERDON).
   (b) The French XXXVIII Army Corps (Hq., VIELS-MAISONS) having in front line from right to left: The American 3d Division (C. P., VIFFORT), the French 39th Infantry Division (C. P., SAULCHERY); in the second line, the American 56th Brigade (C. P., La CHAPELLE-sous-CHEZY).
   (c) The French 168th Infantry Division (Hq., ARTONGES), in army reserve.

2. Artillery: (In addition to the organic artillery of the several corps and division):
   (a) Field artillery: 2 regiments of 75-mm. truck carried (the French 214th and French 11th).
   (b) Heavy artillery: 2 American regiments: The 146th F. A. (one battalion), the 148th F. A. (3 battalions) [American 41st Division].
      2 battalions of 145's (2d and 4th Bns., French 81st Artillery).
      2 battalions of 155-mm. GPF (3d and 5th Bns., 81st Artillery).
      1 piece of 340-mm. heavy railway artillery south of CONDE-en-BRIE.
   3. Aviation: In addition to the organic squadrons of the units under its orders, the Ninth Army has at its disposal an additional squadron (the 284th attached to the XXXVIII Army Corps), the 234th Squadron of the 81st Artillery, army squadrons of the 218th, the British 9th Brigade (Chateau de la FORTELLE near ORMEAUX), comprising one pursuit wing of 5 squadrons (ORMEAUX), one bombardment wing of 4 squadrons (CHAILLY-en-BRIE and ROZOY).

V. Limit between the III and XXXVIII Army Corps: 500 meters northeast of the confluence of the SURMELIN and MARNE---MOULIN-RUINE (III Army Corps)--MONTBAZIN (III Army Corps)--COUFREMAUX (I11 Army Corps)--MONTBAZIN (XXXVIII Army Corps)--MONTARMEUX (III Army Corps)--LES ORGERIEUX (XXXVIII Army Corps)--GILLAUCHES (XXXVIII Army Corps)--ROZOY-BELLEVALLE (XXXVIII Army Corps)--L'EPINS-aux-Bois (III Army Corps).

VI. Hq. Ninth Army: VILLENAUXE.
    C. P. Ninth Army: ESTERNAY.

VII. Units under the tactical control of the Ninth Army will remain under the administrative control of the Fifth Army.

    de MITRY,
    General of Division, Commanding
    the Ninth Army.

* The 20th and 18th Divisions, as well as the elements of the 4th Division and American 55th Brigade that are engaged, are intermingled. The General commanding the 18th Division has command of units engaged between the east boundary of the army and the line CHAVENAY-La CRESSONIERE, extended south. The General commanding the 20th Division has command of troops engaged between the line CHAVENAY-La CRESSONIERE, extended south, and the line Les LESNARDS-SACCONAY.

The 73d and 125th Divisions are intermingled. The General commanding the 73d Division has command of all the troops engaged between the line Les LESNARDS-SACCONAY and the west boundary of the 111 Army Corps.

The French 51st Infantry Division which has been withdrawn from the front is being regrouped in the VERDON region.

The 125th, with a view to withdrawal from the front, has received orders to move its headquarters to CORROBERT.
**Attack Mission**

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,699/3

[FRENCH NINTH ARMY, Esternay, July 17, 1918.]

[Extract]

The general mission of the French Ninth Army is to push into the MARNE the enemy troops that have gained a foothold on the south bank of the river, and in close conjunction with the French Fifth Army, to resist with all available resources the advance of the enemy in the region of EPERNAY.

While pursuing the offensive which will enable us to push the enemy into the MARNE, it is important, after each advance, to cling to ground on which we are fighting, to organize it in a manner which will prevent any enemy approach to it, and to make of it a base of departure for subsequent offensive action.

The army corps will devote their every effort to organizing the position on which we are now fighting, and must possess a firm resolution not to abandon one inch of ground to the enemy.*

This work of organization will be carried out in conformity with the provisions contained in the regulations on the organization of ground.

* * * * *

In the following out of these plans, the French III Corps will plan to hold its present front with three infantry divisions, the 18th, the 4th and the 73d [all French] and will reorganize the French 20th and 125th Inf. Divs. near the front, with a view to their later employment in the battle.

MISSION OF THE ARTILLERY: See special instructions attached.

MISSION OF THE AIR SERVICE: Following a precise program to be worked out by the commander of the army air service, the air forces will be responsible for:

(a) Protection for our own aviation by driving enemy planes back to the other side of our positions and by preventing them from crossing the MARNE.

(b) Destruction of the crossings of the MARNE and the harassing of the enemy troops located south of the river so as to make life miserable for them by constant bombing.

MISSION OF THE ENGINEERS: The general commanding the engineers will reconnoiter the general trace of the line of a 2d position tying in on the west with the 2d position of the XXXVIII Corps on the part of the front that has not changed, and resting on the east, on the line of the ponds of the Forêt d'ENGHIEN. This line will pass generally through the valley of the SURMELIN, Bois de BREUIL and the IGNY Communal Woods.

**de MITRY,**
General Commanding the Ninth Army.

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* This concerns only the zone of active operations (III Army Corps and the right of the French XXXVIII Army Corps). As for the zone of the XXXVIII Corps there will be no change in the plan of defense now in force.
Use of Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,701/3

C. P. FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
Esternay, July 17, 1918.

In addition to the preparations for the attack, for which special plans will be drawn up, the artillery will be employed:

(1) To render the enemy’s problem of supply south of the MARNE impossible; by destruction of bridges, harassing fire on essential crossing points, and by simultaneous and deep interdiction on the roads, taken as much as possible in enfilade.

(2) To prevent the enemy from consolidating his position on the terrain which he occupied at the moment, not by firing counterpreparations that always follow the same general pattern, but by observing his field fortifications very closely and covering suspected points with fire.

(3) To destroy the enemy batteries, or at least their personnel, not by laying fire for indefinitely prolonged periods according to a schedule drawn up the night before, but by shelling with very violent bursts, every battery reported in action.

This triple mission will be carried out by the field batteries or the heavy batteries without any distinction except that of range.

Liaison will be established so that concentrations of fire may be instantly obtained at the request of the observers. In the daily plan of aerial observation prepared in the artillery of each army corps, aviation will be employed to keep objectives under observation and to observe fire, thereby eliminating registrations requiring a long time that consume the entire flight of an airplane for a single destruction fire mission.

The orders prescribing the use of short and violent bursts on all objectives do not apply to the use of gas shells, the action of which must be prolonged and which must always be used in quantity.

Finally, the artillery must remain mobile, if only to assure its own security. It will change its position frequently either by complete batteries, by sections, or by single pieces. This will permit interdiction at greater ranges and make it possible to deliver enfilade fire as well. These orders apply just as much to the latest type heavy artillery as to field artillery.

de MITRY,
General Commanding the Ninth Army.

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Placement of French 168th Infantry Division

SPECIAL ORDERS

For the French III A. C. and the 168th Infantry Division

I. The 168th Infantry Division will move July 18 into the zone: Le BREUIL---La VILLE-sous-ORBAIS---MARGNY---VERDON---VIOLAINES (headquarters at Le BREUIL), where it will be located in army reserve and disposed as follows: 1 regiment at VILLE-sous-ORBAIS and vicinity; 1 regiment at Le BREUIL and vicinity; 1 regiment in the region of VIOLAINES. Artillery in the region of VERDON.

II. Departure at 2 a.m., July 18.

It will not be necessary to move the elements already located in the above designated zone, since the 168th Division will be required to continue its movement during the night of July 18/19.

III. In conjunction with other units, the 168th Division is under orders to take part in an offensive action the morning of July 19. In this operation it will jump off from the line of departure MONT-MERGEY---NEUVILLE and will have as objective, the ridge between the northeast edge of the Foret de BOUQUIGNY and the north edge of the Bois du CROCHET.

It will conduct its reconnaissance and preliminary studies during the day of July 18.

IV. The General commanding the 168th Division will report to the C. P. of the Ninth Army (La NOUE-Chateau, 4 kms. east of ESTERNAY) at 7:30 a.m., July 18 (sharp), in order to receive further instructions there.

He will be accompanied by the commander of the 168th Divisional Artillery.

de MITRY,
General of Division Commanding the Ninth Army.

CONFIRMATION OF A TELEPHONE MESSAGE

By order of the French Group of Armies of the Center, at 5 a.m., tomorrow morning, July 18, the artillery will fire a sudden concentration on the front of the army. This fire will take the form of a preparation for the attack, followed by a rolling barrage and will be as violent as possible from the very beginning.

Expenditure of ammunition will be limited to 1/3 of a day of fire for the artillery of the sectors of the French XXXVIII Army Corps and for the heavy artillery.
The XXXVIII Corps will set the heavy army artillery in movement at once.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. File: Ninth Army: 419-30.1: Order

Battalion of 346th Infantry Assigned Its Mission

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 1817/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY.
July 17, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS

For the French XXXVIII and French III Army Corps

I. The battalion of the 36th Inf. which the French 73d Division had left at the disposal of the XXXVIII Army Corps for liaison between the American 3d Division and the 73d Division will be returned to the control of the latter without delay.

II. The General commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps will take the proper measures, with the means at his disposal, to accomplish the missions with which this battalion was charged. He will come to an agreement directly with the General commanding the III Army Corps concerning the place, date, and hour when this battalion will be returned to the control of its commanding officer.

III. A report will be made to the General commanding the Ninth Army by the XXXVIII Army Corps of the dispositions taken for the execution of the present order.

de MITRY.

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French Fourth Army
July 10 - 16, 1918


Attachments of Heavy Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 6,702/3

FRENCH FOURTH ARMY,
Chalons-sur-Marne, Marne, July 10, 1918.

[Extract]

I. The headquarters of the American 53d Heavy Railway Artillery and the howitzer regiment of the French 30th Artillery Brigade, whose units are now on the Fourth Army front, will be billeted at AUVE, effective July 11.

* * * * *
SITUATION
FRENCH FOURTH ARMY
15 JULY 1918 (Morning)

MAP REF FRENCH 180000 REMS 34 VERDUN 35
CHALONS 50 BAR 16 DUC 51
II. The commanding officers of these regiments are attached to the commanders of the groupments to which the battalions organically under their orders are attached, so that they may be informed at all times when the situation permits as to the employment of these battalions and the operation of a heavy artillery groupment.

These groupments are as follows:

(a) Tessier's and Saramito's Groupments (French VIII Army Corps), each of which includes one battalion of the howitzer regiment.

(b) St-REMY and DONMARTIN Heavy Railway Artillery Groupments, each of which includes one battery of the 53rd Artillery.

GOURAUD,
General Commanding the Fourth Army.

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Role of the Aviation in the German Attack of July 15, 1918, on the Front of the Fourth Army

[Extract]

I. BEFORE THE ATTACK: The attack of July 15 between PRUNAY and La MAIN-de-MASSIGES was not a surprise. As early as June 9 it was foreseen that it would take place at a date yet undetermined, and from June 30 it was expected with certainty and considered as imminent.

The army photographic reconnaissance (57 missions from June 1 to July 15) had revealed numerous indications of an offensive in rear of the enemy front. Beginning with the month of March numerous railways had been constructed (line CHATEAU-PORCIEN---BERGNICOURT---THUGNY---BIGNICOURT---ATTIGNY---SEMIDE and several other secondary roads). In May and June a considerable increase in the number of aviation fields of the German First and Third Armies had been noticed (40 new hangars on the already existing fields, 17 new fields containing 120 hangars).

In the same period reliable information established the fact that there was a considerable increase in ammunition dumps. The old depots, and 12 new depots, were established from March to the end of June.

From July 1 on, distant photographic missions made it possible to determine that a decided increase in rolling stock in the stations of the valleys of the AISNE, the RETOURNE, and the SUIPPE had taken place. At VOUZIERS, JUNIVILLE, and MONTHOIS the number of cars was doubled; at AMAGNE-LUCQUY and at ATTACHY [sic] [ATTIGNY?] it was tripled.

Heavy traffic was seen along the roads; columns, motor supply trains, numerous individual vehicles, were visible on the photographs. In the stations one could see the detraining of troops; trains were visible in the ammunition dumps.

In the army corps, photographic missions revealed also, from June 15 on, numerous indications of an offensive. At first there were new railways, old roads repaired up to the 1st line of trenches, new roads constructed and camouflaged. New emplacements were built, the ammunition dumps increased in number, many were located in the open or in shell holes. The telephone system was considerably developed. The number of paths increased in the
vicinity of the batteries and even in the first positions. In the last days an increase in
the number of trench mortars installed in prepared emplacements was definitely deter-
mained. Finally, also, we were able to see footbridges over trenches, sortie steps, and
dumps of stores and munitions in the front line trenches.

Observation reconnaissance, maintained night and day, enabled us to confirm the in-
formation gotten from photographs. The heavier traffic reported along the roads and railways was actually seen. Night patrols gave us information of the increased activity in the
bivouacs and billets and made it possible to follow the movement towards the point of at-
tack, of troops which were formerly in reserve in the region of SEDAN---MEZIERES---HIRSON.

The balloons, aided by days of excellent visibility, and in the course of night asc-
censions contributed to the observation of traffic in the enemy area back of the front.

II. THE DAY OF THE ATTACK: The night of 14/15, the night reconnaissance aviation and
balloons made it possible from the beginning of the preparation for the attack to fix ac-
curately the limits of the zone concerned by the battle. During the course of the day infan-
try planes succeeded, under the protection of pursuit aviation, in obtaining the posi-
tion of the line occupied by the infantry every time the command asked for it. Artillery
observation planes reported to the batteries the enemy columns on the march, and the bat-
teries in action, and quickly adjusted fire on a great number of these fleeting targets.
Pursuit aviation, working in close liaison with the corps balloons, and informed by the
latter of the general aspect and the developments of the battle made it possible for the
balloons to accomplish all their missions with a minimum of losses. Besides, they re-
peatedly attacked columns on the march and assemblages of enemy troops. During the day of
the 15th they brought down 5 balloons, 12 planes, and seriously damaged 5 other enemy
machines. * * *

The balloon service gave uninterrupted observation of the battlefield, furnishing
precious indications concerning the position of the infantry line and informing the
artillery of numerous important targets upon which effective fire was directed.

BOUCHER,
Major, Commanding the Air Service
of the Army.


[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH FOURTH ARMY,
July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

I. SUCCINCT HISTORICAL ACCOUNT: The battle begun July 15 on the CHAMPAGNE front
formed part of the general offensive opened the same day by the German armies with the pur-
pose of pinching off the MONTAGNE-de-REIMS by capturing a position on the MARNE in the
CHALONS-CONDE region on one side of REIMS and in the region of EPERNAY on the other.

Swiftness of execution sought through surprise was the condition indispensable to suc-
cess. Moreover, on the Champagne front, the enemy had taken every precaution to preserve
secrecy and not to attract the attention of the French High Command: Almost no artillery
and aviation activity - quiet of the infantry which evacuated its front lines and showed
its presence neither by raids nor by extensive patrolling - very great care to avoid letting prisoners fall into our hands - instruction of men in case they should be made prisoners.

However, beginning with the end of June, certain indications pointed to a German offensive on the army front: The equipment of the front revealed by photographs, the construction of new railways, the increase in the size of aviation fields, and ammunition dumps, the statements of prisoners, activity back of the front, special information.

By July 1, the indications were such that an attack could not but be expected in a short time on the front east of the SUIPPE.

As early as July 2 the general commanding the army informed the corps and division commanders of the situation, reminded them once more of the position on which the army was to make its defensive stand, gave each one his mission and the troops at his disposal (Personal and Secret Instructions No. 6459/3 of July 2).

The army corps commanders received the order to make frequent and deep raids along the whole front. Everyone bearing in mind the imperative necessity of making prisoners, numerous and profitable raids were carried out with extraordinary vigor and zeal.

The interrogation of prisoners left no doubt about the preparations for attack.

The air service reported the increase in traffic behind the front, particularly in the stations (the number of cars has doubled and even tripled in some stations). Reconnaissance by night and day confirmed the information from photographs. Night patrols reported the increased activity in the bivouacs and billets and made it possible to follow the movement towards the point of attack of troops formerly in reserve in the region of SEDAN--MEZIERES--HIRSON, the establishing of numerous dumps of material and ammunition located well toward the front, the construction of numerous battery emplacements, and the repairing of roads up to the front line trenches.

July 6, the general commanding the army prescribed the dispositions to be made each evening in order to be ready to receive the attack and avoid any shifting of troops during the artillery preparation which we expected to see begin about midnight (Memorandum 6604/3). As soon as the alarm was given the night guard balloons were to ascend.

The 1st position, entirely under the fire of the trench mortars, was not to be held - the position of resistance was the intermediate position; its density of occupation was to be such that no enemy infiltration would be possible. This density was to be attained by taking troops beforehand from the 2d position. Units not employed were to occupy the 2d position. Observation detachments commanded by selected officers were designated to remain in our 1st parallel and signal the jump off of the enemy assault waves. Behind on the line of the reserves of the 1st position advanced detachments had the mission of delaying the assault waves and breaking up the attack by sacrificing themselves. Everyone understood the duty he would have to perform.

This disposition for combat was taken when the alert was ordered.

Meanwhile, as the information became more accurate, it appeared that the anticipated attack would extend more to the west than had been supposed at first and would include the front of the IV Army Corps and the right of the Fifth Army.

From July 13 the general commanding the army had reached a definite opinion as to the front on which the attack would be delivered, and was certain it would extend from the region of La POMPELLE to MAISONS-de-CHAMPAGNE Farm. He expected the attack might be made at any time after July 14.

Dispositions for a full alert were taken beginning with the night of July 13/14, and were to be put into effect each night at 11 p. m.

Instructions were given to yperite the dugouts of the 1st position the evening of July 14.

Finally, at 8 p. m., July 14, a raid by the IV Corps brought back 27 prisoners who made known that the attack would take place the 15th between 3 a. m. and 5 a. m. and that the preparation would begin about midnight.
At 11 p.m. the general commanding the army gave the order to fire the counterpreparation. This order was carried out beginning at 11:30 p.m., according to prearranged plan. Batteries that had been silent until that time, revealed themselves. German officers taken prisoner later declared their astonishment at the number of our batteries that had not been detected previously, and did not appear on their maps, which suddenly disclosed their existence at the moment of the attack, and the surprise they experienced in consequence.

This was the situation, our troops occupying their battle posts, the counterpreparation being fired along the whole front, when the German artillery preparation opened at 12:10 a.m., July 15.

During the period preceding the attack the French command sought by all the means at its disposal to discover the intentions of the enemy. The German command on the contrary showed a passiveness, certainly intentional, to maintain secrecy, made no attempt to discover the dispositions taken by its opponent for the defense of his positions nor to know what positions would be encountered.

II. BATTLE OF JULY 15: At 12:10 a.m. the enemy preparation broke loose, sudden and in terrific violence, by cannon of all calibers (77, 150, 105 and 210). The trench mortars came into action about 2 a.m. and reached their maximum intensity towards 4 a.m.

A large proportion of gas shells was reported, but little mustard.

The bombardment affected the front of the IV and XXI Army Corps and of the 161st Infantry Division, continuing, but in decreasing intensity, east as far as the AISNE. The 1st position was the most violently shelled. The intermediate and 2d positions were subjected to less violent fire. Only these batteries that had been in action before the attack were clearly engaged. The majority of our silent batteries were not shelled.

Interdiction fire extended along lines of communication and billets as far as 20 km. to the rear.

At 4:15 a.m. the enemy infantry came out of its trenches and leaped to the assault, preceded by a rolling barrage. The attack was reported by rockets set off by our observation groups.

On the front of the IV Corps the enemy made only painful progress, delayed by the fire of the advanced elements, and in particular by machine guns placed in the pill boxes south of [the heights of] Le CASQUE and Le TETON.

At 6:30 a.m. the enemy was still engaged with elements of the front line battalions which had fallen back to the general line: VOIE-ROMAINE [Roman Road]---ST-CYR Parallel---Ouvrage GOURAUD [fieldworks]---HAIE-CLAIRE---Bois-en-ESCALIER---Bois-du-CHIEN---Hill 181---former French 1st position in the eastern part of the corps zone.

At 7 a.m., the enemy who had just taken PRUNAY, was advancing toward the southeast. Dispositions were taken at once to check this advance.

Between 7 a.m. and 7:30 a.m. the enemy came up to the intermediate position. The most vigorous pressure was experienced, especially in the direction of PROSNES. To the north of this village, the enemy penetrated our intermediate position as far as the ROMAN ROAD, in spite of sharp hand-to-hand fighting. Everywhere local counterattacks threw back the few attackers who had penetrated within the position.

On the front of the XXI Army Corps after having crossed the line of observation, the attack infiltrated through the works of the reserve line of the 1st position occupied by the advanced elements which resisted with energy. Toward 8 a.m. they came up against the intermediate position. The attack of this position, supported by tanks, was particularly violent. At some points the enemy attempted as many as seven times to penetrate within our lines, without obtaining the least success. The village of PERTHES, taken and retaken, finally remained in our hands. It should be noted that at no point did the tanks reach our line, that many were destroyed either by our cannon or by the lines of land mines, placed according to the plan of defense, in the 1st position.

Opposite the VIII A. C. the action of the enemy was limited to the MAIN-de-MASSIGES. An advance took form south of La BUTTE-du-MESNIL in a southwesterly direction.
At 5 a. m. the enemy infantry came up to the reserve line of the 1st position and advanced slowly toward the MARSON. Twice he attacked Le MESNIL Redoubt; each time he was repulsed and his attempts toward the village of MESNIL had no more success.

This first part of the battle, from the jump off to the attack on the intermediate position, developed exactly as the command had foreseen.

* * * * * *

At midday the enemy appeared definitely blocked and from thence on his activities became limited to artillery concentrations and fire of interdiction.

The battle position fixed by the general commanding the army was intact.

The right of the army not being attacked, the general commanding the army withdrew artillery units from the VIII Corps to reinforce the IV and XXI Corps.

At 6 a. m. he decided to constitute reserves by drawing upon available elements of the VIII A. C.

The 63d Inf. Div. was to be regrouped around SOMME-BIONNE and SOMME-TOURBE; the available elements immediately, the elements in sector to be relieved during the night by the Second Army and to rejoin their division.

The 2d and 4th Tirailleurs were assembled before 9 a. m. in the HANS region.

Finally a part of the elements of the 2d position having been moved up to the line of resistance as reinforcements, the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center placed the 52d and 10th Inf. Divs. at the disposal of the army for the contingent occupation of this position.

One regiment of the 52d Div. was placed at the disposal of the commander of the XXI A. C. for the occupation of the 2d position.

A regiment of the 10th Div. was placed at the disposal of the General commanding the IV A. C. under the same conditions.

Aviation: During the night of July 15/16, night reconnaissance aviation made it possible from the beginning of the attack accurately to determine the limits of the zone involved in the battle.

Pursuit aviation, working in liaison with the balloons of the several corps, enabled them to accomplish all their missions with the minimum of losses. During the day of the 15th they brought down 5 balloons, 12 planes and seriously damaged 5 other enemy machines.

The balloon service provided continuous observation of the battlefield.

The enemy aviation displayed little activity during the morning, but from 10 a. m. on, the number of patrols increased. They crossed our lines and provided cover for their infantry planes.

Enemy aviation was particularly active from 3:30 p. m. to nightfall. Patrols of 7, 10, 15 and 20 planes penetrated our lines and attacked our planes.

At 6:50 p. m. 50 planes were flying at the same time over the region of the MONTS.

GOURAUDAHD,
General Commanding the Army.
Consolidation of Positions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 6938/3

ORDERS FOR THE ARMY CORPS AND ARTILLERY

On the entire front of the army the enemy attacks have been shattered in front of the position of resistance designated.

As soon as possible the army corps will:

1. Reorganize their units,
2. Redistribute their artillery if necessary so as to effect an organization in depth, thereby enabling all batteries to take part in the defense of the intermediate position and insuring that the largest possible number of batteries occupy positions permitting them to support the defense of the 2d position without change of position. It will also permit all batteries to use the full range of their guns so as not to endanger themselves needlessly.

Moreover, corps commanders will without delay see to the reestablishing of an advanced position in front of the position of resistance intended to cover the latter and get it out of trench mortar range.

They will lay such plans as may be necessary for the capture, by a series of operations, of important supporting points marking this outpost line, which apparently should be:


XXI Corps: AUBERIVE---line of the woods: Bois de la Cote 152---Grand Bois du CAMEROUN---Bois de la PIE---MAMELLES [the KNOLLS].

VIII Corps: Bois de la TRUIE, Le PROMONTOIRE [ridge].

GOURAUD,
General Commanding the Army.

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French XXI Corps  
July 15 - 18, 1918

Occupation of Intermediate Position

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2526/3

SPECIAL ORDERS

I. On receipt of the present order, one battalion of the American 83d Brigade will be placed at the disposal of the General commanding the French 170th Inf. Div. to reinforce the occupation of the intermediate position.

II. Two companies of the bn. of the American 84th Brigade now in reserve at the rear of the right of that brigade are placed at the disposal of the General commanding the French 13th Inf. Div. under the same conditions and for the same purpose.

III. The General commanding the American 42d Div. will be responsible for the occupation of that part of the 2d position which is assigned to him, employing the battalions that remain at his disposal and placing in line the engineer battalions if necessary.

The General commanding the American 42d Div. will hold in reserve in rear of his right brigade, the two companies of the battalion which supplied two companies to the General commanding the 13th Div.

NAULIN,  
General Commanding the  
XXI Army Corps.

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1st Ind.

Transmitted to Brigade Commanders, 83d and 84th Brigades, for compliance and report by return courier of dispositions taken.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,  
Brigadier General, General Staff,  
Chief of Staff.

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2d Ind.

Hq. 83d Inf. Brig., A. E. F., France, July 15, 1918 - To C. G., 42d Div.

1. Complied with, by placing the 3d Bn., 165th Inf., at the disposal of the C. O., S/Sector AUBERIVE.
St. HILAIRE--AUBERIVE-SUR-SUIPPE AREA
Looking west-northwest from vicinity of St-Hilaire-le-Grand
2. The C. R. TUNIS will be occupied by the 1st Bn., 117th Engrs., which has been placed under the command of the C. O., 165th Inf., for tactical employment.

MICHAEL J. LENIHAN,
Brigadier General.

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Extension of Limits of Sector of 43d Division

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXI ARMY CORPS,

July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS

The General commanding the American 42d Div., whose right extends at this time only to the Center of Resistance VERDUN (incl.) of the 2d position, will, on receipt of this present order, be responsible also for the occupation and defense of the Center of Resistance CRAONNE (sector of the French 43d Inf. Div.) so as to release immediately the 62d Bn. of Alpine Chasseurs, which is placed at the disposal of the General commanding the 43d Div. to reinforce the defense of the intermediate position.

The two American reserve companies mentioned in Special Orders No. 2526/3 of July 15 will remain in reserve in rear of the American right brigade.

NAULIN,
General Commanding the XXI Army Corps.

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Redisposition of Units of 42d Division

[Contemporary Translation]

XXI ARMY CORPS,

July 15, 1918—6:15 p. m.

GENERAL ORDER

1. The 10th Regiment Tirailleurs (52d Inf. Div.) will immediately occupy C. R.'s VERDUN, CRAONNE and VAUCLERC, on the 2d position.

It will be charged with the defense of these C. R.'s under the command of General Michel, commanding the 43d Infantry Division; the authority of this general officer will, from now on, extend on the west to C. R. VERDUN, inclusive.

II. The 53d Battalion Alpine Chasseurs, relieved at C. R. VAUCLERC by a battalion of the 10th Regiment, will be stationed as army corps reserve behind Division Michel. Stations will be determined by General Michel behind and near the 2d position.
III. The Commanding General of the American 42d Infantry Division will reinforce the occupation of the 2d position in the sector of the 170th Infantry Division so that four battalions, if possible, may hold and defend this position in case of necessity.

IV. The battalion of the American 168th Infantry Regiment, made available by the entry in line of a battalion of the 10th Regiment Tirailleurs in C. R. VERDUN, will remain as army corps reserve behind the 2d position, in the sector of the 13th Infantry Division, so that there will be at this moment in reserve in the sector of the 13th Infantry Division, one and one-half battalions of the American 168th Infantry Regiment.

V. No change will be made in the defense of C. R. VERDUN by the artillery of the American 42d Infantry Division.

VI. An artillery group of the 52d Infantry Division is placed at the disposition of the Commanding General of the 13th Infantry Division, until the disabled cannon of this division can be replaced. Hence this group must be stationed so as to be quickly and easily moved, if necessary.

VII. The carrier pigeons, now in the C. R.'s of the 2d position, will continue to be assigned to these C. R.'s and will be turned over to and receipted for by the relieving battalions.

NAULIN,
The General Commanding the XXI Army Corps.

Hq. 42d Division, A. E. F., July 15, 1918---To Commanding General, 83d Infantry Brigade; Commanding General, 84th Infantry Brigade; Commanding Officer, 117th Engineer Regiment.

1. Forwarded for compliance in accordance with verbal instructions of the Chief of Staff of this date.

2. 1st Battalion and 2d Battalion, 117th Engineer Regt., under command of Commanding Officer, 117th Engineer Regiment, will assume the defense of the Centers of Resistance TUNIS and ATHENES, respectively, on the 2d position, and will be reinforced for that purpose by one and one-half machine gun companies from 149th Machine Gun Battalion, in accordance with verbal instructions of the Chief of Staff to the division machine-gun-officer.

3. The 1st Battalion, 168th Infantry, upon the occupation of C. R. VERDUN by the 10th Regiment Tirailleurs will, together with the 2d Battalion, 168th Infantry (less Companies E and F), constitute the 84th Infantry Brigade reserve and will be stationed on the right flank of that sector under orders to be issued by the Commanding General, 84th Infantry Brigade.

4. All movements necessitated by the disposition indicated will be made as soon as the 10th Regiment Tirailleurs has occupied Centers of Resistance CRAONNE and VERDUN, respectively, and together with the machine-gun reinforcement of the 1st and 2d Battalions, 117th Engineers, will be completed at the earliest moment practicable.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.
Preparation for Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2533/3

FRENCH XXI ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918—6:15 p. m.

OPERATION MEMORANDUM

The present lull, the fact that almost everywhere the enemy has withdrawn a few hundred meters from the intermediate position and also the numerous troop movements which have been observed indicate that a new attack is in preparation. This attack will probably be launched at daybreak tomorrow at the latest.

It will be preceded by a preparation that is likely to be short and violent, and will be carried out by masses of infantry operating with tanks.

To meet this attack, it is necessary:

1. That the individual artilleries carefully study the assembly areas of the enemy and his approaches by communication trenches and sheltered areas, to take them under their harassing fire tonight and lay their counterpreparation fires on the probable base of departure of the enemy.

The subgroupments of divisional heavy artilleries (guns) will be closely linked up with these tasks of the divisional artilleries. Their mission will be assigned to them by the colonel commanding the divisional artillery.

2. That the supplying of enemy batteries be hampered by an appropriate harassing fire carried out tonight by the 4th subgroupment of the heavy artillery.

During the counterpreparation the heavy artillery will assure the neutralization of enemy batteries in action.

3. The ammunition expenditure for the divisional artilleries and for the heavy artillery will be determined by the generals commanding the infantry divisions and the colonel commanding the heavy artillery, taking into account the supplies received tonight at 8 o'clock. In any case the expenditure for harassing fire is not to exceed 1/2 day of fire.

Ammunition expenditure for counterpreparation cannot be regulated as rigidly. It is, however, absolutely necessary, to save guns and ammunition stocks, that the batteries adopt a slower rate of fire than that used this morning and cease firing occasionally.

The ammunition remaining at the close of the counterpreparation must be at least equal to 1 day of fire.

NAULIN,
General Commanding the XXI Army Corps.

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[The French Fourth Army occupied the right portion of the front which received the attack of July 15, 16 and 17, 1918.

The German attack made little progress on the front of the Fourth Army, which withdrew its advanced troops from their positions so that the German bombardment fell on empty terrain.

The sector of the French Fourth Army extended from Prunay to the Houyette Ravine and later to the Beaurain Woods.]
Included in the French Fourth Army were the French IV, XXI, VII and XVI Corps, and the French 9th and 46th Divisions, not attached to corps.

The American 42d Division participated in this operation as part of the French XXI Corps. The 369th Infantry of the incomplete American 93d Division also participated as part of the VIII Corps.)

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HS Fr. File: XXI Army Corps: 445-60.9: Memorandum

Disposition of Groupments

[Editorial Translation]

Artillery Command
General Staff
No. 5244/3

Colonel Broussaud, Commander ad interim of the artillery of the XXI Army Corps.

To the Lt. Colonel commanding the 21st Heavy Artillery, for compliance;

The General commanding the XXI Army Corps

" " " " French 43d Inf. Div. )
" " " " 13th Inf. Div. )
" " " " 170th Inf. Div. ) for information
" " " " American 42d Inf. Div. )
" " " " artillery of the army, as a report.

SERVICE MEMORANDUM

The center of gravity of the battle is clearly found today to be shifted toward the left; the deployment of the heavy long artillery should conform to this situation.

For the present, there will be no change in the composition and in the location of the divisional subgroupments.

The long range subgroupment will retain its present composition but its deployment will be modified as follows:

a. The bn. of 105's on the right (1st Bn., French 456th [Arty.]) will move to the valley to the Suippe, toward Ferme de JONCHERY-Moulin de CHANTERENNE, with the mission of covering the zone comprised between the road from NAVARIN Farm to SOMME-PY (incl.) and with the main direction of fire MONT-sans-NOM.

b. The bn. of 105's in the center (2d Bn., 456th Arty.) will rectify the direction of its pieces so as to extend its field of fire to the BUTTE du MESNIL; if necessary, one or two batteries would change to new positions;

c. The bn. of Filloux on the right (4th Bn., French 87th Arty.) will advance one battery to the region of Hill 204 (4 kilometers southwest of PERTHES) so as to be able to undertake, with prospects of success, the destruction of the enemy long-range guns in position at SOMME-PY and at MANRE.

The lieutenant colonel commanding the heavy artillery will have these changes of position studied immediately upon receipt of the present memorandum so that they may be effected not later than the evening of July 17.

He will report completion of these movements and will take all the necessary measures so that interruptions of fire resulting therefrom may be reduced to the minimum.

BROUSSAUD.

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- 160 -
Orders for Reoccupation of Forward Areas

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2539/3

FRENCH XXI ARMY CORPS.

July 16, 1918---12 n.

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

I. It is indispensable

(1) That we relieve pressure on our intermediate position by covering it as
soon as possible with outposts so as to get it out of trench mortar range;

(2) That we have a clear picture of the situation of the enemy facing us; to
that end prisoners must be taken and especially must we make sure that the enemy does not
proceed to install trench mortars in front of us.

II. For this double purpose each division will endeavor, first and as soon as pos­
sible, to retake its three areas in the foreground. The problem does not involve putting
on any full-scale attacks but only requires that small units be pushed forward gradually
by infiltration.

Later, when these areas in the foreground have been reoccupied, effort will be made
to connect them up with one another somewhat to the front by a line of surveillance simi­
lar to that existing before the battle.

The objective to reach, if possible, is to push the enemy back 1,200 or 1,500 meters
from our intermediate position. If, as it appears, the enemy has withdrawn slightly from
our front leaving before us only contact elements, the affair can be accomplished at lit­
tle cost. It will enable us at the same time to liberate several combat groups which our
airplanes report as still holding out at certain points in our forward areas.

III. It is generally understood that in each infantry division advantage should be
taken of the present comparative quiet to reorganize units and reequip them with materiel
and ammunition.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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[Handwritten memorandum]: Each subsector commander will submit to the general commanding
the inf. div. by 10 a. m., July 17 (through the commander of the divisional infantry) a
brief report of the measures taken by him to reoccupy the forward area; the report will
indicate plainly the situation existing at 8 a. m.
Preparations to Withstand Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2547/3
FRENCH XXI ARMY CORPS,
July 17, 1918--4 p. m.

SERVICE MEMORANDUM

It is not impossible that the enemy will attempt a new offensive on our front. Every possible measure must be taken immediately to nip it in the bud as was done with the preceding one.

Concerning artillery fire the plan of fires will provide:

1. An interdiction fire executed by divisional artillery on the enemy's old 1st position (incl.) and by the heavy artillery (guns) beyond that position to the limit of range. Fire to be executed from the shortest range to the farthest range as soon as the order is issued for delivery of interdiction fire.

2. A counterpreparation fire to begin at the start of the enemy preparation and work from the farthest range to the closest.

   This counterpreparation must have these basic characteristics:
   (a) Depth.
   (b) Lower boundary as close as possible to our wire.
   (c) Delivery by heavy concentrations, of at least 30 minutes' duration, by the entire divisional artillery and part of the heavy artillery (guns), subsector by subsector.

   With the intelligence at our present disposal, the enemy's line of departure cannot be definitely stated. Subsequent information to be expected from the activity of our reconnaissances will doubtless shed light on that point and enable us to indicate by an appropriate signal system, the successive lines of advance of the enemy.

3. A neutralization fire delivered at the start of the counterpreparation on the nests of enemy batteries, preferably by guns provided with special shell. All the heavy artillery (guns) not employed in neutralization fire will participate in counterpreparation.

4. Barrage fire in depth, delivered as rolling barrages, by bounds of 50 meters, 400 meters deep, preferably with time shell, to be used in the zone between the intermediate position and the 2d position, in case the enemy succeeds in capturing part of the intermediate position.

Divisional artilleries and heavy artillery (guns) will immediately begin the preparation for these fires, if that has not already been done. The liet. colonel commanding the heavy artillery of the XXI Corps will advise the colonels commanding the divisional artilleries as to the heavy artillery (guns) which can take part in the counterpreparation from the beginning, and as to those that can participate in it later, two hours after the beginning of the preparation.

After the launching of the infantry attack, the entire 4th groupment of heavy artillery will be used for harassing fire and on fleeting targets. The divisional subgroups will act similarly after having continued the counterpreparation fire for 30 minutes; they will however comply with all requests for support from the divisional artilleries, reporting the facts to the lieutenant colonel commanding the heavy artillery of the XXI Corps.

Aside from the question of the organization of fire, it is important to remember that the incontestable efficiency of our fire during the July 15 attack was due, in large
measure, to the fact that the batteries had been very little affected by the preparation
fire of the enemy.

This was the result of:
Keeping some batteries silent.
Daily delivery of fire with roving pieces.
Preparing alternate positions for the batteries it was impossible to keep
silent.

It is by the ingenious application of the same procedure that during a future
attack we will have the opportunity to retain freedom of action for our artillery. Begin-
ing now, the daily and nightly activity exacted from the artillery does not prevent keep-
ing certain batteries silent in each battalion. For the batteries that have to open fire,
they must do so most of the time only in a general action which will prevent discovery by
sound ranging. Nevertheless, adjustment operations by enemy planes must be closely
watched, and any battery which has, without possible doubt, been fired on for adjustment
will have to change position.

All batteries will prepare their close-range defensive fires with the greatest
care.

To that end field batteries will see that they are supplied with reduced-charge
ammunition or plaques* as the case may be.

Finally, as has already been ordered by Memorandum No. 2538/3, July 16, the per-
fecting of observation and liaison will be pushed with the greatest energy.

The generals commanding the infantry divisions and the colonel commanding the
corps artillery will ensure the execution of these orders.

NAULIN,
General Commanding the XXI Army Corps.

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*Plaquettes in the original. The plaque Malandrin, a circular flange-like device slipped over the nose of the shell and
secured by the fuze, for increasing curvature of trajectory and shortening range.
After the withdrawal of the 10th Tirailleurs, the occupation of the centers of resistance it held will be maintained by:

(a) VERDUN, CRAONNE centers of resistance: The American 42d Div. which will have at its disposal for that purpose the 1st Bn., French 168th Inf., now in reserve.

The relief of the 10th Tirailleurs by the American 42d Div. in the VERDUN and CRAONNE centers of resistance will be completed by 11 p.m. at the latest. Orders will be issued by the General commanding the American 42d Div.

(b) VAUCLERC center of resistance: 43d Div. which will use for that purpose and to the extent strictly necessary, the elements of the French 46th Inf. Div. still available in its sector. The relief of the 10th Tirailleurs by the 43d Div. in the VAUCLERC center of resistance will be completed by 11 p.m. at the latest. Orders to be issued by the General commanding the 43d Div.

Reports indicating completion of the above reliefs to be submitted on the morning of the 18th by the General commanding the American 42d Div. and the General commanding the 43d Div. to the General commanding the army corps.

NAULIN,
General Commanding the XXI Army Corps.

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Battle Instructions

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXI ARMY CORPS,
July 17, 1918—10 p.m.

OPERATION MEMORANDUM

Information received today seems to indicate that the enemy did not withdraw as far from our 1st lines as had been generally reported yesterday. On the contrary in a great many places he has probably dug in very close to our wire.

Memorandum 2539/3, July 16, prescribes local operations intended to push back the enemy little by little beyond our old front lines. These operations are to begin at once so as to afford the enemy no opportunity to organize strongly.

But independently of these actions, the enemy, on the entire front, will be prevented from digging in close to our trenches, where he would be protected from our artillery fire.

To obtain this result, rifle grenades will be employed extensively. Each infantry division will consequently plan for supplies of rifle grenades.

NAULIN,
General Commanding the XXI Army Corps.

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Allied Offensive Action

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2568/3

FRENCH XXI ARMY CORPS,
July 18, 1918.

In spite of the late hour at which the order of attack was issued the five infantry divisions of the corps gave proof of the best offensive spirit this morning. The general commanding the corps desires particularly to congratulate the French 43d Inf. Div. which advanced its line on its entire front to an average depth of 1 kilometer, capturing 70 prisoners and 7 machine guns from the enemy.

By this effort we have made our contribution to the possible decisive great battle which is being fought on our left:

Attacking between SOISSONS and CHATEAU-THIERRY, the French armies had already at 8 a. m. realized on their entire front an average advance of 5 kilometers; the latest news announced continued progress.

Closer to us, PRUNAY has been retaken and the French IV Army Corps has broken up a German attack in the vicinity of PROSNES and advanced about 1,000 to 1,200 meters.

It is of the greatest importance for the general interest that we should continue to participate in the fight by keeping up as vigorous an offensive as possible. Our present allowance in guns and ammunition makes this possible.

Consequently the general commanding the corps enjoins each infantry division energetically to continue the offensive operations, soundly coordinated. The object will be the one already indicated in Memorandum 2539/3, July 15: To reoccupy in front of our line a zone of about 1,200 to 1,500 meters necessary to give our intermediate position security from trench mortars; to take prisoners, collect materiel and documents, and to maintain the upper hand over the enemy.

NAULIN,
General Commanding the XXI Army Corps.

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42d Div.: War Diary

July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

REMARKS: At 1:30 a. m. the division P. C. was established at CRETE-NIEL in dugout.
(Dewey Abri) about 3 kilometers from Ferme de VADENAY in direction of MOURMELON-le-GRAND.

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WALTER E. POWERS,
Major, M. G., Adjutant General,
Division Adjutant.

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42d Division
July 15 - 18, 1918

G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 187: Summary of Events

2d Section, General Staff

Ferme de Vadenay, Marne, July 16, 1918.

Midnight July 15 to Midnight July 16

[Extract]

1. There is no additional information as to the order of battle. The position of the enemy divisions opposite the front of the 42d Division from east to west is the 7th Division, the 88th Division and the Bavarian 1st Division from TAURE to the SUIPPES-SOUAIN Road; the Bavarian 2nd Division, the Guard Cavalry Division and the 1st Division from the SUIPPES-SOUAIN Road to a point about a kilometer west of St-HILAIRE-le-GRAND. It is probable that there is an additional division not yet identified on the west of the 1st Division.

2. The enemy divisions attacked on a front of from 2,500 to 3,000 meters. Each division had two regiments in the first line and one in support. In general each regiment had two battalions in the first line with one in support and each battalion had two companies in the first line and two in support.

From information given by prisoners it is learned that each attack division was followed by a division in support. From these figures it is possible to estimate that the attack on the CHAMPAGNE front was made with 25 divisions, in the front line and in support, on a front of about thirty kilometers.

3. The number and first-class quality of the divisions in the attack make it clear that the enemy expected great results. Captured documents show that one of the enemy divisions which attacked west of the front of the XXI Corps was expected to reach the MARNE between AULNAY and CHERVILLE in the evening of July 15. CHALONS, as stated in yesterday’s report, was to be taken at 4 a.m. on the morning of the 16th. However, the battle has so far resulted in a complete check for the enemy at all points. The three divisions of the XXI Corps aided by elements of the 42d Division and a Polish regiment broke the attack of seven divisions of the best German troops.

4. According to captured documents the infantry attack was aided by 900 minenwerfer. The number of tanks taking part in the attack is still unknown. At one point on the front of the French 43d Division ten tanks were in action. It is reported by prisoners that the German losses were very heavy. It is said that one of the divisions waiting to attack suffered from our artillery counterpreparation to such an extent that it could not attack and its place was taken by its support division. An entire enemy battalion is said to have been annihilated by our artillery fire on the front of the French 13th Division. Prisoners state that our barrage fell at the very moment of the infantry assault and their losses were tremendous. The infantry fighting was very violent. At one point on the intermediate position the enemy renewed his attack seven times between 8 a.m. and noon. The village of PERTHES was taken by the enemy but retaken by the French counterattack. An isolated detachment of the French 43d Division was reported by our aviators to be still holding out and fighting in the Bois des PERDREAUX during the afternoon of the 16th.

5. Throughout the night of July 15/16 the enemy aviation was extremely active over our rear areas. Bombs were dropped on roads and towns and the enemy planes fired with machine guns on moving troops and convoys. During the day of the 16th the airplane activity over our forward areas continued. During the evening of the 16th the activity over our rear was renewed but no serious damage has resulted. A low-flying plane was brought
down by an automatic rifleman of the 165th Infantry about 8 p. m. The aviator was killed. Twenty enemy pursuit planes are reported to be in permanent patrol in the sector over our lines to prevent our planes from penetrating the enemy territory. Twenty enemy observation balloons have been in ascension on our front.

6. During the attack various points to a distance of twenty kilometers from the front were bombarded by the enemy. This fire was mainly on roads and cantonments and at midnight July 16/17 shells were still falling in the region of VADENAY. Throughout the day of the 16th the battalions of the 165th and 166th Infantry on the intermediate position received a heavy fire of gas shells.

7. Tanks were again seen by our observers in the evening of the 16th near the Bois Raquette and were fired on and destroyed by the French artillery.

8. During the night of the 15/16, a platoon of the 165th Infantry was attacked by a raiding party of 21 Germans. Our men went over the top to meet them and killed the entire party with the bayonet without loss to themselves.

9. The 165th Infantry reports that a party of Germans with French helmets and coats attempted to penetrate one of our boyaux. The leader succeeded in approaching our machine gunner, posted at this point, saying that he was French. When within a short distance of the gun the German threw a grenade which wounded our gunner. The gunner’s team mate seized the gun, turned it on the Germans and put them to flight. The 166th Infantry reports that an officer in French helmet and coat approached an outpost guard saying that he was bringing back a detachment of French from farther front and requested the guard not to fire. The detachment proved to be Germans in French helmets and coats. These incidents are reported so that everyone will be on his guard against German ruses.

10. On the Marne front south of DORMANS the French counterattack of July 16 drove the enemy back to within a kilometer of COURTHIEZY and retook COMBLIZY. South of CHATILLON-sur-MARNE the enemy has pushed east on the south side of the river to within three kilometers of BOURSAULT. No other information from that front at this time.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3 GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 187: Summary of Events

BULLETIN OF INFORMATION
No. 3

[Extract]

1. The day of the 17th was relatively quiet. The enemy artillery maintained a harassing fire along our whole front but it was much lighter than the day before. During the afternoon the fire became very heavy around Camp POGGI and the enemy renewed his shelling of St-HILAIRE-le-GRAND and the road from SUIPPES to JONCHERY. Our aviators report that the enemy combat planes were fewer and less active than the day before. Four enemy balloons were brought down in flames and an enemy plane was shot down by the French 109th Infantry.
2. Airplane photographs and the reports of our aviators and observers show that the movement of troops and convoys in the enemy lines is very active. There is no indication that the number of troops has diminished and there are indications that the artillery is being reinforced. Although there is no precise indication yet of a renewed drive on our front, the enemy still has sufficient troops in the forward area to strike a heavy blow.

3. During the attack of July 15, the enemy bombarded CHALONS with a long-range gun from midnight July 14/15 to 5 a.m. July 16. During the first two hours, a shell fell every five minutes; from 2 a.m. to 4 a.m., a shell fell every ten minutes; after 4 a.m., the fire was irregular and stopped at 5 a.m. the next morning. Fragments of the shells show that they were 380's, a meter and a half long, fitted with a false ogive and charged with 31 kilograms of explosive.

4. Much interesting information has been obtained by the army and army corps from prisoners and from captured documents. The objectives to be reached by the enemy were from 15 to 20 kilometers from the enemy lines. Several divisions were not limited but were to push as far forward as possible. Certain enemy divisions on the east of the front of attack after passing the Butte-du-MESNIL were to oblique to the southeast and continued their advance in that direction, taking the positions on the east of the CHAMPAGNE front from the rear.

5. Strict orders had been given to the troops not to pass through or occupy the towns. As soon as these were reached the exits were to be placed under guard. Officers of the quartermaster's department would then come to make an inventory and a distribution of what was found there. An order of the First Army provided that quartermaster officers would come to take possession of the stores in CHALONS.

6. Captured officers attribute the failure of the attack to various causes. One of them stated that they did not have enough artillery. “We can no longer prepare two offensives at the same time. A third of the artillery available was on the east of REIMS, a third on the west, and the other third up north.” He said that when he reached PERTHES the rolling barrage had almost disappeared. Another officer attributed it to disorganization of the units and lack of liaison due particularly to the violence of our artillery fire. As a result of our heavy fire on the evacuated first position the men scattered and took shelter in the dugouts. A third said the failure was due to their lack of numbers. His companies had only 60 effectives, reduced to 50 by the epidemic of grippe. The effectives in line had to be reduced to two waves 250 meters apart. Also he had only three light machine guns per company instead of five.

7. The enemy losses were said by prisoners not to have been very severe until the approaches to the intermediate position were reached. They were particularly heavy around PERTHES and east of AUBERVIE where entire companies are said to have been destroyed. The prisoners also complain of the short fire of the German artillery.

8. A captain of a tank detachment was captured while he was trying to establish a message center on Hill 200 (at the right of our sector). His detachment was composed of five tanks but after the beginning of the action he lost touch with all of them. A page from this Field Message Book contained the following: “La Butte de Tahure, 5 a.m. To the 88th Division: All the five tanks have passed the first enemy line and are continuing their advance toward Walburg [German name for terrain feature] where the enemy has many machine-gun nests. I am marching on SOMME-SUIPPES in pursuit of the enemy and will return afterwards.”

9. On the Marne front the struggle continues but the lines are substantially as reported yesterday with the exception that the enemy has taken MEZY. Between CHATEAU-
THIERRY and SOISSONS the French have taken the offensive and have advanced five kilometers into the enemy lines on a front of 40 kilometers. There are no further details available at this time.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff.
Chief of Staff.

* * * * * *

DOUGLAS MacARfHER,
Brigadier General. General Staff.
Chief of Staff.


[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH MILITARY MISSION,
AMERICAN 42d DIVISION,
July 17, 1918.

July 15 and 16, 1918

[Extract]

I. DISPOSITIONS BEFORE THE ATTACK: The American 42d Division occupied the 2d position in rear of the French 13th and 170th Inf. Divs. Three infantry battalions had been moved up to the intermediate position, where they were placed at the disposal of the Generals commanding the 13th and 170th Divisions.

The artillery was distributed between the two groupments of the artillery of the 13th and 170th Divisions.

The 1st position was held by observation elements only, two-thirds of which were to be withdrawn before the attack. The main battle was to be fought on the intermediate position. In the event that the intermediate position was breached, the General commanding the American 42d Division was to be responsible for the defense of the 2d position. He then was to assume command, not only of the infantry, but also of the French and American artillery charged with the defense of that position. The delicate operation of this assumption of command after the action had fully developed, had been very carefully prepared. Actually this eventuality did not come to pass, the intermediate position not being touched by the enemy.

II. JULY 15: The headquarters of the American 42d Div. leaves Vadenay Farm at 3 a. m. and opens at the advanced C. P. at Crete-Niel. This C. P. had been set up in advance. The telephone communications system, which was completely organized, has never been interrupted. The enemy preparation begins at midnight. During the night and morning the intermediate position and the 2d position was very violently shelled. About 7 a. m. the enemy reaches the intermediate position. All his attacks break before the resistance offered by the 3 American battalions there. One battalion of the American 166th Inf. repulses 7 successive attacks. Two companies of the American 167th Inf. and 2 French companies execute a brilliant counterattack on two centers of resistance of the intermediate position, into which the enemy had infiltrated, and retake them. The enemy is everywhere thrown back to the 1st position on which our artillery lays an intense fire.

At 11:30 a. m. the American 83d Brigade receives the order to move a battalion up to the intermediate position at the disposal of the 170th Div.; the American 84th Brigade
receives the order to move two companies of the American 168th Inf. up to the intermediate position at the disposal of the 13th Div. Two companies of the American 168th Inf. remain in reserve behind the 84th Brigade. One battalion of the American 117th Engrs. comes up to the 2d position to plug up the hole created by the departure of the battalion of the 83d Brigade. The American 42d Div. thus has 5 1/2 battalions committed.

At 2 p.m. the General commanding the American 42d Div. receives the order to extend his front toward the east and occupy center of resistance CRAONNE. This center of resistance is occupied by the 2d Bn. of the American engineers. At 6 p.m. an order of the French XXI Army Corps reduces the front occupied by the American 42d Div. by taking from it centers of resistance CRAONNE and VERDUN. The new dispositions to be assumed will result in the following distribution of forces on the 2d position:

- 83d Brigade: 3 bns. on this position
- 84th Brigade: 3 bns. on this position
- 1 1/2 bns. in reserve immediately in rear.

In order to effect this distribution, the 83d Brigade is given the entire regiment of engineers which from then on acts entirely as infantry and to which is attached the division M. G. bn. (less 1/2 co.).

III. JULY 16: The shelling continues very violent during the night and day of the 16th. The enemy unsuccessfully attempts two attacks on the 170th Inf. Div. He is repulsed with great losses.

V. CONDUCT OF AMERICAN TROOPS: The conduct of the American troops has been perfect and has been greatly admired by French officers and men. Calm and perfect bearing under artillery fire, endurance of fatigue and privations, tenacity in defense, eagerness in counterattack, willingness to engage in hand-to-hand fighting - such are the qualities that have been reported to me by all the French officers I have seen. The American artillery conducted itself admirably under fire. It suffered rather serious losses but in compensation has gained superb success. Some batteries attacked infantry and artillery columns for several hours with direct fire. The commanders of the divisional artillery and the French officers have highly praised the work of the artillery of the American 42d Div. and have observed that the fire was carefully prepared and vigorously executed.

General Gouraud and all the French generals have congratulated General Menoher on the splendid conduct of his division.

VI. FUNCTIONING OF THE SERVICES: Ration and ammunition supply was handled well. The evacuation work of the field hospital companies was remarkable. The morning of the 16th, the American field hospitals had evacuated 1,150 wounded Americans and a rather large number of French soldiers. The Germans having shelled the BUSSY hospital very violently, it was necessary to evacuate it during the fighting. The American hospitals are now at ECURY-sur-COOLE and VATRY, with a hospital for the very badly wounded at CHALONS (annex to the Mixed Hospital).

VII. IMPRESSION MADE ON THE AMERICAN 42d DIVISION BY THE BATTLE OF JULY 15: The staff of the American division did not believe an attack would be made in the Champagne. It had admitted with the best of grace that it was mistaken. The magnificent work of our two sections, the appropriateness of the measures taken by the French Fourth Army and the victory it has won, enhanced the impression of it on this staff and on all the American officers. The excellent temper of our troops has been highly admired as well.
The esteem and understanding which the American 42d Division had often shown for our staffs and our troops have become all the greater by this common victory.

J. CORBABON,
Major, Liaison Officer, American 42d Div.

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293-11.4: 369th Inf.: Report of Operations

AMERICAN 369TH INFANTRY, A. E. F.,
Le Mans, Sarthe, January 7, 1919.

[Extract]

* * * * *

On the day of July 14, the Chief of Staff of the VIII Corps made a thorough inspection of the disposition of the regiment and pronounced them the best in the corps. The history of the battle is already well known. Before midnight of July 14 the French artillery began its intensive counterpreparation. At the appointed hour all combat positions of the regiment were fully manned and the attack was awaited with the assurance of victory inspired by the thrilling order of the day issued by General Gourand. The 3d Battalion of the regiment, Major L. Spencer, commanding, occupied its position on the line of first resistance and did its full share in breaking up the enemy's attack on this line through which he was not able to penetrate. This battalion suffered some casualties at this time. The German artillery began its terrific bombardment, which included many kilometers of rear area, at midnight and within an hour after the opening of the German artillery, the commanding general of the division informed the regimental commander that all means of liaison with one of his regiments (the 27th Regt. Inf. occupying the line of resistance) had been severed and that it was necessary to establish runner liaison at once, if such a thing were possible, from our P. C. to the P. C. of the colonel of the French 27th Regt. Inf. This involved the establishment of a line of relay runners from the regimental P. C. to a distance in front of about three kilometers, the entire area being under extremely heavy shell fire. The runner group of regimental headquarters performed this hazardous duty in a courageous and efficient manner, which received the commendation of the general commanding the division. The German assault wave having been launched about 4:15 h. on the morning of the 15th, it became apparent by 7 h. that this assault had been definitely stopped in front of the 16th Division.

At this time the divisional general inquired of the regimental commander whether he could move the regiment from its present position to the left as reinforcement for the French 161st Division, where the enemy was still furiously attacking. He was answered in the affirmative and the order was accordingly executed. The regiment was withdrawn from the now 1st and 2d positions, and constantly under heavy shell fire, marched six kilometers to the westward and reported to General Lebouc, commanding the French 161st Division. Orders were immediately received to send one battalion to the front line, relieving a battalion of Moroccans and the other two battalions relieved the same Moroccan regiment on the 2d position of this new divisional sector. Officers and men were tired almost to the point of utter exhaustion; they had been hours without food or water; nevertheless they executed this order, moved into and occupied their assigned positions and took up the combat cheerfully and without complaint. The battle continued with but little diminished intensity all of the day and night of the 16th and with diminished intensity on the 17th and 18th. Casualties were suffered by all three battalions during these days, but
BOIS RAQUETTE-BOIS DE LA COTE 150 AREA
Looking north-northeast from St-Hilaire-le-Grand
more particularly by the third battalion which occupied the advanced lines. The advance of the enemy having been definitely checked, the division on the 18th, began pushing them back and reoccupying the abandoned terrain. One of the two battalions occupying the 2d position was detached to assist a French regiment in this process, and the remaining battalion was moved from its position to relieve a chasseur battalion on the 2d position some two or three kilometers to the westward. This situation obtained until July 21 when the regiment took over and reestablished the front line sector (subsector Calvaire).

* * * * *

WILLIAM HAYWARD,
Colonel.

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**Annex to Champagne-Marne Operation**

Translated German Documents

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[German records, both texts and maps, frequently give arbitrary names to geographical features or places located outside of Germany, making it difficult, if not impossible (where contemporary German maps are not available,) to identify same on French, American, or British maps. Wherever practicable, explanatory footnotes have been added to the translations herewith to assist students to locate such points.]

German Order of Battle

July 15, 1918

West to East

Group of Armies - German Crown Prince

in Line

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* No American units concerned
Tentative Date for Attack at the Marne

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 8685

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
June 14, 1918.

[Extract]

2. Army Group German Crown Prince: The Eighteenth and Seventh Armies will cease the attack in general. Mery is to be taken; concerning all other local operations, decision is reserved. Both armies will make preparations for an attack on the front from Mareuil to the Marne.

In this connection the Seventh Army will pay especial attention to the front between the Foret de Villers-Cotterets and the Marne. Hill 204 west of Chateau-Thierry must remain in our possession.

The Seventh Army will prepare the offensive measures ordered under "Marne Defense."

The First Army will prepare the attack east of Reims (in the Prosnes sector) ordered under "Reims."

Plans of attack for the "Marne Defense" and "Reims" operations, indicating definitely the organization of the command and distribution of forces, as well as requirements in infantry and artillery, etc., will be submitted as soon as possible. Beginning of the attack, about July 10.

3. The artillery and trench-mortar action will be maintained on the recent attack front from Montdidier to the Marne and against the Chambrecy-Reims front. It is worthwhile to have the Entente believe that the attack on Paris is being continued.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.
Sites for the Construction of Bridges

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE GERMAN FIELD ARMY,
June 20, 1918.

No. 8840

Reference: No. 2608, Secret, dated June 19 and
No. 2615, Secret, dated June 20, Operations Section

[Extract]

The Group of Armies can and must content itself with limited objectives in a southerly
direction, whereas a deep advance is possible to the southeast.

Concerning the different drafts of plans of attack, I desire to make the following com­
ment:

Seventh Army

1. I concur in the comments made by the Group of Armies.

2. Concerning the Marne bridges to be put across, I invite attention to the follow­
ing:

The hills southeast of Chateau-Thierry afford observation into the Marne valley as
far as the vicinity of Jaulgonne. Therefore it is necessary to locate the bridges desig­
nated for the crossing of divisions 1 [10th Inf. Div.] and 2 [36th Inf. Div.] in such a
manner that they cannot be subjected to the fire of any hostile battery that may come into
action on D Day or D plus 1 day. Such sites exist in the area east of Mezy and east of
Courtemont, as has been found by reconnaissance of officers of my staff. If the material
should not be sufficient for the construction of these bridges, in addition to those already
designated by the army, then provision must be made for the later removal of bridges to
these sites.

3. I assume that Division 3 has been assigned the road west through Courthiezy and
Division 4 the road west through Soilly.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.
Instructions for the Attack

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,

June 21, 1918.

GROUP OF ARMIES ORDER

[Extract]

1. The enemy opposite the south and southeast front of the Seventh Army, opposite the first Army and the right wing of the Third Army will be attacked on D Day.

6. The mission of the First Army will be to break through the enemy positions between Prunay and Auberive [Auberive-sur-Suippe] (incl.), protected against (a possible attack from) Reims and the Montagne de Reims; advance in force against Epernay on both sides of the Marne; and concentrate its troops on the Marne alongside the troops of the Seventh Army advancing via Epernay.

To secure the attack toward the south and southeast, the army will also cross the Marne above Conde. [Conde-sur-Marne?] Corps Borne [IV Res.] and Corps Ilse [XV] will join the attack as soon as the resistance of the enemy opposite their front slackens.

7. The Third Army will cover the left flank of the operation and will for this purpose initially gain the position of the general line: Hills east of St-Etienne [St-Etienne-a-Arnes]---southeast slopes of the Piemont-Berg [Heights 182; 4 kms. N. of La Cheppe]---Somme-Suippe---hills south of Perthes. [Perthes-les-Harms]. As the attack of the First Army progresses, the Third Army will gain the general line: Montplaisir [Ruin]---Courtisol---Tilloy-et-Bellay---Somme-Tourbe---Tourbe S'tor [sic], to secure toward the east the crossing of the Marne by the First Army.

8. The interior wings of the First and Third Armies will remain in close contact during the attack. The First Army will capture the Burgberg [hill n. w. of Ft. de St-Hilaire] and Fort de St-Hilaire in time. The right wing division of the Third Army will place the main effort on its west flank.

9. Rapid execution of the attack is of fundamental importance for the success. The first two days of the attack and the first night are decisive.

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WILHELM,
Crown Prince of Germany and Prussia, Commanding.

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TELEPHONE MESSAGE

The High Command has designated July 15 as D Day.

*: * * * *

Corps Boundaries Designated for the Marne Attack

[Extract]

The following corps headquarters are assigned during the time of preparation for Strassenbau:

- Corps A---Loupeigne; for the present, Chartreuve.
- Corps B---Mareuil
- Corps C---Chartreuve
- Corps D---Courville

*: * * * *

By order of the Commander:

REINHARDT,
Chief of Staff.
ARMY ORDERS NO. 32 July 18

[Extract]

1. After artillery fire that opened suddenly and lasted an hour and a half, the enemy attacked our position on Hill 204 in battalion strength. In violent hand-to-hand fighting the enemy was repulsed by our annihilation fire.

   Enemy fire remained moderate throughout the day. In the evening hours it generally increased in violence and continued throughout the night as vigorous harassing fire and powerful surprise fires. Toward morning it gradually slackened.

   As during the last few days and nights, the fire was directed against our positions, villages, and approach routes deep in the rear area. Crugny was in particular heavily shelled; the ammunition dump south of Clerges caught fire from heavy flat trajectory shelling.

   The tension before the front of the Ninth Army has relaxed. Minor actions continue in the sector of Corps Watter.

   *

   von BOEHN,
   Commander-in-Chief.

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Orders for Corps Kathen

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1019

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
July 15, 1918.

Reference: Corps Wichura [VIII Res.], Opns. Section No. 1123 Secret

To: Corps Wichura (for information).

Corps Kathen [XXIII Res.] will take up the defensive. After nightfall the elements of the 10th Inf. Div. south of Mont-St-Pere will be withdrawn across the Marne. Thereafter the 10th Div. will be strongly echeloned in depth north of the Marne. The withdrawn elements will so far as possible be taken out of the zone of fire. Likewise, all artillery batteries not needed in the defense will be taken out of the line and sent back, primarily those that have been prepared for departure. * * *
Corps Kathen will energetically carry on the artillery battle with the artillery remaining in position and will protect the front of the 36th Inf. Div., which in its turn will cover the disengagement of the 10th Inf. Div. with artillery and machine-gun fire from the heights east of Surmelin Creek. The retirement of the 10th Div. will be screened from the enemy.

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HS Ger. File 811-33.5: Seventh Army: Fldr. XII: Reports

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
AVIATION COMMANDER,
July 15, 1918.

Morning Report

[Extract]

*****

Evening Report

*****

Fighter planes were launched in several attacks on columns marching back and on troop concentrations in localities south of the Marne, and engaged them with machine guns and thrown mines with visible success.

The advanced infantry line at 9 p. m. runs from the right flank approximately as follows:


In the afternoon hours the enemy was unusually active in the air. At 7 p. m. an enemy squadron of 40 to 60 planes, which had broken through, was driven off by the united employment of the Richthofen Squadron and Squadron 3, after fierce air battles.

Opposed by an enemy consisting of French, American, and English [British] Aviation units many time superior in number, control of the air could not always be maintained in spite of constantly renewed and reckless use of fighter units (some squadrons took off 7 times).

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Organization for Defense

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 1025

GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
July 16, 1918—1:30 a.m.

To: Corps Wichura [VIII Res.], Operations Section, No. 1353.

[Extract]

1. The 16th of July brought about on the attack front of the army violent enemy counterattacks which were effectively repulsed. Corps Conta and Schmettow made progress in their advance. ***

2. The army will initially suspend the attack on the left bank of the Marne. ***

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Evening Report

[Extract]

********

Enemy aviation activity was intense in the afternoon. As on the previous day, bombing squadrons (20 units and more) attacked our Marne bridges west and east of Dormans at 6:30 p.m. The concentrated use of our fighter planes forced the enemy to turn back.

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GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY,
July 17, 1918--5:30 p. m.

COLONEL REINHARDT'S REPORT ON THE SITUATION SOUTH OF THE MARNE

[Extract]

The French attack is still in progress today as far as the artillery is concerned, but as far as infantry action is concerned, it seems practically to be finished. The artillery effect of the enemy was and still is very considerable, particularly against the rear communications. (Valley of the Marne). In Wichura's [VIII Res.] Corps the attack has been repulsed; at some points the enemy gained a foothold north of the creek. In Conta's [IV Res.] Corps the penetration was very considerable. At times almost the entire gain in ground of July 16 and 17 was lost. At present we are again in possession of the hills at Oeuilly. The territory located in front of it remained in the hands of the enemy.

The enemy artillery fire against the Marne bridges is so heavy that demolition is at present greater than construction; 70% of the bridge trains have been destroyed. An improvement - if the south bank is to be held - is only possible by continuing the attack. As far as the infantry is concerned, the attack does not promise any success if fresh enemy forces of equal strength oppose the infantry at present in our lines. The reports on the condition of the infantry deserve to be taken into account, since not only front line infantry but also the reserves suffered losses by artillery fire and airplanes attacks.

The Seventh Army is not interested in holding the south bank as far as its own situation is concerned. Therefore the decision will depend on the outcome of the general situation.

In the afternoon Supreme Headquarters decided that the territory south of the Marne will not be held for any length of time. Preparations must be made accordingly.

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GERMAN FIRST ARMY,
July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

Night: The intensive enemy fire upon our positions and rear areas failed to interfere to any considerable extent with the assembly of the infantry for the attack. The artillery preparation was started at 1:10 a. m. as planned. At 4:50 a. m. our infantry advanced to the attack in accordance with orders along the entire front of the Seventh, First, and Third Armies. Enemy counteraction was at first slight, enabling our infantry following the rolling barrage to overrun quickly the hostile front line trenches. Machine-gun nests offered stubborn resistance at isolated points only.
Day: According to information received up to 11 a.m. from the troops, Group Lindequist [VII Res. Corps] has reached the Vesle and was preparing to cross. The infantry of the Groups Gontard [XIV Army Corps] and Langer [XXIV Res. Corps] apparently had crossed the old Roman Road. [Ancienne Chaussee Romaine or on German maps "Alte Roemer Strasse"]. Within the zone of action of the Seventh Army the Marne had been crossed successfully. The right wing of the Third Army at 8 a.m. had reached the region west of St-Hilaire-le-Grand.

Consequently, the impression prevailed that the attack was progressing according to plan, although at several points our infantry, owing to more serious resistance of the enemy, had been unable to keep up with the rolling barrage. The divisions, therefore, ordered the forward displacement of the artillery, and army headquarters ordered the divisions of the second line (3d Guard Division and Bav. Repl. Div. in the region south of Nauroy and northwest of Vaudesincourt) to move forward.

At 12:20 p.m. Group Py [XII Army Corps], of the Third Army, reported that the enemy was putting up a stubborn defense in his second line. After the situation within the groups of the First Army had clarified, similar reports were received up to 2 p.m. Generally speaking, our attack had come to a standstill in front of the enemy position north of the Roam Road. [Chaussee Romaine] ** In consideration of the existing situation, a continuation of the attack, in accordance with the directions contained in Orders No. 2740, Operations Section First Army, seemed no longer feasible. First of all it was a question of getting the attack which had stopped for the time being, once more under way. Consequently, at 3:30 p.m. army headquarters issued the following orders to the groups:

1. The leading detachments of Groups Lindequist have crossed the Vesle and captured Courmelois. The center and left wings of that group are engaged in combat to take the Roman Road position.

2. Group Lindequist will continue the attack on the high ground, the Bav. 15th Div. making the main effort. The Bav. 8th Res. Div. of the Group will push forward between Courmelois and the right wing of the 3d Guard Division in the direction of Sept-Saulx, carrying forward with it the 3d Div. of the Guards and penetrating the Baconnes position. Simultaneously Group Gontard will attack the enemy opposing the 3d Guard Division enveloping his right. Group Langer attacks, making the main effort with the division constituting its left, after the delivery of artillery concentrations, and in extension of the attack of the Third Army scheduled to take place at 6 p.m.

The attack of the Bav. 8th Res. Div. was never executed. ** The attack launched by Groups Lindequist and Langer at 7 p.m., in conjunction with the right wing of the Third Army, did not bring about any material change in the situation. The enemy had occupied the position along the Roman Road with strong infantry forces and had organized both his infantry and artillery in depth. His barrage fires were uniformly organized along the entire front.

Under these circumstances success was to be expected only if the organized attack could be continued after a renewal of the artillery preparation. Two alternatives remained for continuing the attack; either immediate aggressive action or resumption of the attack after reorganization lasting several days. The former plan, according to the view entertained at army headquarters, seemed feasible but did not promise certain success. However, the high command decided to adopt this plan, notwithstanding. Consequently army headquarters ordered the attack to take place at 11 a.m., July 16, 1918.

** * * * *

The general impression prevailed in the evening of this day of battle that the enemy, in expectancy of our attack which had been communicated to him by prisoners as to the very
day and hour, had organized both his infantry and artillery in depth, had prepared a deep outpost area and shifted his main line of resistance to the positions along the Roman Road. Captured orders and statements of prisoners confirmed this impression.

Our batteries which after the first infantry penetration followed up promptly, came under strong enemy artillery fire when crossing the shell crater area situation on the open high ground of the Champagne hills. These batteries were compelled to unlimber under unfavorable conditions and suffered heavy losses. This deprived the infantry of adequate artillery support with the result that it stopped in front of the hostile position along the Roman Road the wire obstacles of which had suffered little damage. Our gas attack on the hostile batteries during the preparation had little influence owing to the strong wind prevailing. Consequently, our infantry was compelled to attack from numerous old and new battery positions, while being exposed to most intense hostile fire, and prematurely exhausted its strength.

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Army Headquarters: Rethel.

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His Majesty the Emperor and King at 1 a.m. arrived at the Menil [Menil-Lepinois] Observation Station of army headquarters and from that point observed the artillery preparation, assault and fighting of July 15 and 16.

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HS Ger. File: 811-33.5: Fldr. II: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN FIRST ARMY,

July, 16, 1918.

[Extract]

Night. Reconnaissance detachments of Group Ilse [XV Army Corps] ascertained that the enemy is still in possession of the positions west, north, and east of Reims and that no change has taken place.

Within the zones of action of Groups Lindequist [VII Res. Corps], Gontard [XIV Army Corps], and Langer [XXIV Res. Corps] local fighting continued throughout the night.

* * * * *

The attack of Groups Lindequist, Gontard, and Langer which was launched at 11 a.m. could gain ground only to a negligible extent owing to the enemy's effective countermeasures and well-placed barrage fire. * * * The Seventh Army was still advancing, in spite of the fact that, in places, it had to contend with very strong resistance.

* * * * *
GERMAN FIRST ARMY.
July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

The artillery on both sides was very active during the day as well as the night. The infantry lines, battery positions, and routes of approach, both our own and the enemy's were taken under fire.

Group Gontard [XIV Army Corps] repulsed three enemy local counterattacks north of Prosnes.

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GERMAN FIRST ARMY.
July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

Night. Hostile artillery, during the night, delivered harassing fire on infantry positions and rear areas of the entire army front and placed heavy bursts of fire [sudden concentrations] upon the Champagneberge [Champagne hills]. Our artillery continued to support the left wing of the Seventh Army as heretofore, executed counterbattery fire and fired upon enemy assembly positions.

Day. At daybreak shock troops of the 3d Guard Div. penetrated into the enemy positions along the old Roman Road capturing 2 officers and 80 men of the [French] 124th Div. The captured sector of trench could not be held, however, owing to the enemy's counterattack.

During the day the enemy attempted, with the aid of artillery protection, to invade our outpost area in several places. Wherever the enemy succeeded, he was at once ejected again leaving prisoners in our hands.

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Third Army Plans

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7565 Opn. Reims

GERMAN THIRD ARMY,
July 13, 1918.

ARMY ORDER

for the attack "Reims" on July 15, 1918

[Extract]

2. The Third Army will cover the advance of the First Army against the Marne and the Marne crossing. For this purpose the army will attack the enemy west of the Aisne and, while covering its own left flank toward the Argonne, will drive him back across the Chalons---La Croix-en-Champagne---Bionne sector line.

3. The XII Army Corps in close contact with the left flank of the First Army will gain the Suippes crossing, will seize Piemont in a resolute and energetic attack, and, while protecting its own flank toward Chalons, will drive the enemy back across the Noblette and the Vesle.

4. The Bav. I Corps will break through the enemy positions north of the Suippes, will cross this sector and, reinforced by the 30th Inf. Div. and at the same time turning its left flank toward the southeast, will push forward across the 4th position and the Noblette as far as the heights of La Croix-en-Champagne.

5. The XVI Corps will attack on July 15, 1918, only on the west of Butte de Mesnil. It will take the enemy positions in the Tahure bend, will then turn southeast and, pressing sharply, will drive the enemy back beyond Tourbe and Bionne. The left flank east of Butte du Mesnil will be prepared to pursue the enemy immediately as he falls back under pressure from the flank attack. If the enemy holds, the attack will be carried out at this point not until July 16, 1918, after a new concentration of artillery and trench mortars. Time of assault: 5 a. m.

10. Army headquarters will continue at Maison Rouge.
   Message Center of army headquarters: North of Somme-Py.

von EINEM,
Commander-in-Chief.
Continuation Orders for Corps Attacks

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7651
GERMAN THIRD ARMY.
July 15, 1918.

1:44 p.m. by Lieut. von Briesen.

1. The XII Army Corps, Bavarian I Corps, and XVI Army Corps have taken the 1st enemy positions; at present they are fighting a preliminary action in front of and partly in the 2d position.

2. According to statements made by prisoners, there are two American divisions in the vicinity of Suippes; the French 46th Inf. Div. is reported to have arrived west of Laval.

3. The attack will be continued in the afternoon as planned. The main effort for the breakthrough of the enemy 2d position in the sector of the XII Army Corps will be placed on the left flank of the Guard Cavalry (Dismounted) Division. The Bav. 1 Army Corps will carry the main effort on the left and the XVI Army Corps on the right.

4. The XII Army Corps Headquarters will determine the time of assault on its own initiative. The Bav. I and the XVI Army Corps will come to a mutual agreement on details. After a successful breakthrough, the attack will be continued in the former zone of action.

By order of Army Headquarters:

von CLEWITZ.

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Early Success of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7647 Operations Reims
GERMAN THIRD ARMY.
July 15, 1918--9:25 a.m.

[Extract]

1. The infantry attack along the entire front is making good progress according to plan. Givet Hoehe [Height 171, 3 1/2 km. S. S. E. of St-Souplet] is taken. Bav. 1st Inf. Div. has reached the middle of the Souain-Tahure Road. Klitzing-Hoehe [Height 190, 1 1/2 kms. S. S. W. of Tahure] is in our hands.

The presence of the French 13th Inf. Div. in the Guard Dismounted Cavalary Division sector has been confirmed so far.

2. Enemy counteraction generally weak.

2. Seventh Army has crossed the Marne near Dormans.
First Army has taken [Mont] Cornillet [Height (207.8) 1 1/2 km. S. S. E. of Nauroy] Hochberg, Keilberg, Poehlberg; the left flank is making good progress [last three places not identified].

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**Attack Orders for Action near Perthes**

Operations Section
No. 7651
GERMAN THIRD ARMY,
July 15, 1918---2:40 p. m.

1st Addendum to Army Order No. 7651. Operations Section. Operations Reims

[Extract]

Decision: Coordinated assault [will be] at 6 p. m. Brief artillery preparation against enemy infantry positions, at the time neutralizing enemy batteries that resume action.

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2d Addendum To Army Order No. 7651, Operations Section, Operation Reims

To: Corps

The XVI Corps has broken into the enemy 2d position near Perthes [les-Hurlus]; it is exploiting its success by prompt continuation of the attack. In the XII Corps and Bav. I Army Corps the time of assault remains fixed for 6 p. m.; however, before this time the Bav. I Army Corps will join the successful attack of the XVI Army Corps with its left flank.

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**Plan of Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7665
GERMAN THIRD ARMY,
July 16, 1918---2 a. m.

[Extract]

1. Enemy is holding the 2d position. 170th, 13th, and 43d Divisions, XXI Army Corps, confirmed to be at the front. Enemy artillery mainly in rear of the 3d position (strong groups near Suippes, northwest of Somme-Suippe, and in the Pfingst-Holz,* Zuaven-Holz,* and Roemer-Wald). * * *

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* Not Identified
PLAN OF ATTACK
GERMAN XXIII RES CORPS (KATHEN)
15 JULY 1918

MAP REF FRENCH 1:20,000 CONDE-AT-BRICE

LEGEND
- RIVER CROSSING
- ASSAULT POSITIONS
- AUXILIARY BRIDGES
- COMM ZONE BRIDGES
- LIGHT PONTOON BRIDGES
- HEAVY PONTOON BRIDGES
- DIRECTION OF ADVANCE OF ELEMENTS OF 175th INF REGT
- DIV AXES OF ATTACK
- MINIMUM OBJECTIVE

MAPS 1/100,000
2. The First Army will continue the attack. Third Army will join the attack with the right flank and will pass to the defensive on the remaining front for the time being.

* * * * *

By order of Army Headquarters:

von KLEWITZ.

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**Attack Discontinued**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 7695

GERMAN THIRD ARMY,

July 16, 1918---6 p. m.

Received: July 16, 1918---6:44 p. m.

To: XII Army Corps, Bav. I Army Corps, XVI, 58th Army Corps.

Attack in the XII Army Corps will be discontinued. The corps will hold its positions and will organize strongly in depth for defense against counterattacks.

Attack preparations that had been ordered for the XVI Corps and Bav. I Army Corps will not be carried out.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN VIII ARMY CORPS,

July 15, 1918.

Hq. at Fere-Ancien Chateau

On the 15th an offensive "Strassenbau" was begun by the troops in the adjoining left sector. In order to divert the attention of the enemy, bursts of annihilation fire were delivered and raids executed on the entire corps front. A raid by the 4th Ersatz Div. was unsuccessful; the 87th and 201st Divs. generally succeeded in extending their outpost zone forward by some 100 m. and in capturing in that connection prisoners from the American 26th Div.

The artillery of the 201st Div. supported the attack of the division on our left by counterbattery fire, to which the enemy replied with occasionally vigorous harassing fire on that divisional sector. The bombardment of the Fere railway station by heavy flat trajectory fire, which began in the evening of the 14th, continued until noon.

Weather: Mostly overcast.

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Location of Corps Headquarters

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Sections MARNE DEFENSE, GERMAN XXIII RESERVE CORPS, No. 287/VII July 13, 1918.

CORPS ORDER

[Extract]

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8. Effective at 11 p. m., July 14, corps headquarters will be at Chateau de Fresnes. * * *

* * * * * *

By order of the Corps Commander:

KEWISCH, Major, Chief of Staff.

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Attack Orders

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section GERMAN XXIII RESERVE [KATHEN] CORPS, No. 3125 July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The corps in heavy fluctuating fighting has occupied the following line:
   10th Inf. Div.: The railroad embankment north of Le Ru-Chailly Farm---Mezy (incl.).
   36th Inf. Div.: Small woods just east of the mouth of the Surmelin---Blue Point 669
   -674---Les Etangs [Farm].

2. The 36th Inf. Div. will today seize the western slope of the ridge south of Varennes and push forward its advance posts as far as the valley of the Surmelin (transmitted in advance by telephone).

3. During the night and on July 16 the corps will dispose itself for defense for the protection of the right attack flank. The 10th Landwehr Div. with the 377th Inf. in its present position is charged with the protection of the Marne between Chateau-Thierry and Gland (incl.). The 378th Inf. remains corps reserve in the wood southeast of Fary Farm. The 372d Inf. is attached to the 36th Inf. Div. The 10th Inf. Div. after dark will draw its elements now on the south bank of the Marne back to the north bank of the river and
take over the protection of the river in conjunction with the 10th Landwehr Division from Gland (excl.) to 1 kilometer southwest of Jaulgonne.

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von KATHEN.

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Disposition for Defense

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 3146

GERMAN XXIII RESERVE [KATHEN] CORPS,
July 17, 1918.

CORPS ORDER NO. 6

[Extract]

1. (Opns. Sect.) At 12:30 p. m. the enemy attacked the left flank of the 36th Inf. Div. and Corps Wichura. The attack was repulsed by the 36th Inf. Div. In the sector of the 17th Bav. Res. Inf. the enemy effected an insignificant penetration northeast of Janvier Farm.

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By order of the Corps Commander:

KEWISCH,
Major, Chief of Staff.

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Disposition of Units

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 3131

GERMAN XXIII RESERVE [KATHEN] CORPS,
July 18 [17?] 1918—6:45 p. m.

CORPS ORDER

[Extract]

1. The 10th Inf. Div. has withdrawn its forces during the night to the north bank of the river as ordered.
The 36th Inf. Div. has pushed advanced posts to Moulins and Paroy. Otherwise the situation in the sectors of Corps Kathon and Corps Wichura is unchanged.

2. The 10th Landwehr Division will relieve the 10th Inf. Div. during the night of July 16/17 in the Marne sector. Advance detachments will be sent out immediately. The divisions will arrange the details. Command will pass to the 10th Landwehr Division at 9 a.m., July 17.

The 372d Inf. will remain with the 36th Inf. Div. for the present.

3. The 10th Inf. Div. will assemble after relief in the area: l'Esperance Farm—Fresnes—Le Charmel—Fay Farm—La Logette [excl.]—La Croix-Rouge Farm (excl.)—Le Four-a-Verre (excl.).

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von KATHEN.

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GERMAN VIII RESERVE CORPS,

July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

C. P. Reddy Farm.

After the strongest kind of artillery preparation lasting several hours, the passage of the Marne was effected at 4:40 a.m. The enemy response was at first slight; stronger fire was placed on the bridges of the 1st Guard Inf. Div. Two pontoons of the 201st Inf. Div. were hit. The 23d Inf. Div. reached with its right flank the southern edge of the Bois de Conde after heavy fighting in the woods; from here eastward via Debrats [Les Debrets?] toward St-Agnan (incl.).

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Reorganization for Defense

[Extract]

VIII RESERVE [WICHURA] CORPS,

July 16, 1918--11:30 p.m.

1. In the course of the afternoon the enemy after very powerful artillery preparation passed from his defensive to a string coordinated attack against our entire corps
front. The attack was repulsed. Further strong attacks with the object of contesting the results achieved by us and driving us back over the Marne may be expected.

2. It is important that we retain the successes we have won. For this purpose the corps will organize immediately for defense. By increasing the front of the two division sectors on the right, the possibility of an attack by the left flank of the corps in conformity with the offensive ideas heretofore promulgated for narrower divisional sectors must, nevertheless, be calculated.

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8. Coincidental with the mission of preparing for the defense, in which especially mutual artillery support, concentrated fire in front of the several sectors, and counterbattery action against enemy artillery are to be emphasized, all divisions will continue energetically the preparations for carrying on the attack in their sectors. For this the most detailed reconnaissance of enemy positions, preparation of increased artillery concentration, careful surveys of artillery positions, and prompt installations of flash and sound ranging stations are of importance.

9. Special directions will follow concerning communications with the rear including bridge distribution as well as the establishment of depots of all sorts on the southern bank of the Marne in order to reduce the traffic over the Marne in the event of the renewal of the battle.

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WICHURA,
General of Infantry.

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[Editorial Translation]

GERMAN VIII RESERVE CORPS,
July 17, 1918.

EVENING REPORT


From dawn until afternoon the enemy in great strength attacked the front of our corps repeatedly. According to the statements of prisoners the Marne should have been reached today without doubt. In spite of a tremendous employment of artillery and fresh divisions (French 73d Inf. Div.) the enemy did not reach his objective. Where he succeeded in ever-renewed onslaughts in breaking through our lines he was thrown back in a counterattack. Only east of Janvier Farm north of La Chapelle [La Chapelle-Monthodon] beyond Cressoniere Farm have small penetrations been held which will probably be eliminated in the near future. According to previous troop reports the 1st Guard Inf. Div. captured 45 prisoners. From other divisions no reports as yet.

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- 196 -
GERMAN VIII RESERVE CORPS,  

July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

C. P. Reddy Farm

From 6 to 8 a.m. increased enemy artillery fire against the 23d Inf. Div. Beyond this the day was quiet with the exception of several enemy surprise fires, especially upon the Marne Valley. Our artillery destroyed two tanks in readiness at La Chapelle [-Monthodon] by direct hits.

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[Editorial Translation]

IV RESERVE CORPS,  

July 15, 1918.

[Extract]

Before our fire began, the enemy artillery laid only weak harassing fire on our line. In compliance with orders our artillery fire opened at 1:10 a.m. on the entire line and was at first returned only weakly by the enemy. Numerous red light signals went up in the enemy line. During the next few hours enemy counteraction remained moderate. The stormy and rainy weather which had prevailed in the last two days changed early in the morning and calm weather with cloudy skies set in. Foot troops crossed the Marne by pontons under cover of artillery fire; already at 3:15 a.m. the 1st Bn., 151st Inf. was on the other side and at 4:10 a.m. the railroad embankment beyond the river was already in the hands of the 37th Inf. Div. At 4:50 a.m. the barrage was launched according to plan and the infantry followed it to storm the enemy lines. However the enemy artillery fire had increased since 5 a.m. and lay especially heavily on the crossing points on both banks of the Marne. The ponton bridges near Bincelles were destroyed immediately after their completion and only with great sacrifices could the pioneers restore them by 6 a.m. Soon after that they were shot away a second time and until their restoration the troops and the artillery crossed on ferries. On the left flank the crossing was easier but there also the bridges sites lay under increased artillery fire. In spite of the delay in bridge construction the infantry followed the barrage according to the schedule and the 37th Inf. Div. had pressed forward in the forenoon to Patis-de-Troissy, the 113th Inf. Div. half-way to Troissy-Cerceuil the 10th Reserve Div. to west of Chatillon and the 2d Guard Div. to a point just east of Bois de Rarey. Enemy counteraction was especially powerful with machine guns from Chatillon. In spite of the increasing enemy resistance the 2d Guard Div. on the left flank pushed farther forward and in the first afternoon hours captured Montigny from the northeast. The leading regiment of the 10th Reserve Div., with Wuerttem-
berg Mountain Regiment pushed 1 company over the Marne into Port-a-Binson, the 113th Inf. Div. took Cerceuil and Mareuil. The bridge in Port-a-Binson was destroyed but a light bridge for all arms still remained in the vicinity. The plan to have the Wuerttemberg Mountain Regiment pushed ahead by trucks on the road to Epernay had to be abandoned on account of increased enemy resistance. The troops succeeded however in gaining ground and in the evening the corps stood on the line Moulin-de-Comblizy---Nesle-le-Repons (southeast edge)---Bois des Chataigniers (center)---Leuvrigny (southeast edge)---Bois de Misy---Oeuilly (east edge)---Reul (east edge)---Villers-sous-Chatillon (east edge)---Bois de Rodemat.

Weather: Clearing up; cloudy.

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Air activity: Because of the cloud blanket it did not become brisk until the afternoon when several enemy planes were shot down. Our planes attacked enemy infantry with bombs and machine guns.

Adjacent corps also succeeded in crossing the Marne but met with strong enemy resistance. Wichura's Corps stood in front of Comblizy in the evening, Schmettow's Corps at the southeast edge of Bois de Rodemat.

Corps headquarters: Arcis-le-Ponsart.

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[Editorial Translation]

Opns. Sect. GERMAN IV RESERVE [CONTA] CORPS, July 16, 1918---2:15 p. m.

To: Seventh Army Hq.

2d Guard Inf. Div. repelled strong counterattacks, emerging from Tincourt with great violence and tanks. Several tanks are lying before the front shot to pieces.

With its left flank, division is advancing further through the Savarts woods.

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Marne Crossing

[Editorial Translation]

Opns. Sect. GERMAN IV RESERVE [CONTA] CORPS, July 16, 1918---11 p. m.

[Extract]

1. In spite of the fact that the enemy was prepared for the attack and had disposed in depth for the counterattack, we succeeded in crossing the Marne after the most careful
preparation and in penetrating the enemy counterattack sector in its full depth. Rich war booty and over 4,000 prisoners were left in our hands.

II. On orders from higher authority, the troops will be held on the south of the Marne.

III. The 37th Inf. Div., 113th Inf. Div. and 10th Res. Div. will hold the line taken and will dispose in depth. Only the artillery that will be urgently needed will be left on the southern bank of the Marne. All the rest of the batteries will be placed in position on the northern bank, as 2d wave.

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The 37th and 113th Inf. Divs. will begin immediately with bridge construction near Troissy and Ecluse, the 10th Res. Div., near Port-a-Binson. Instructions in detail will follow.

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VII. North of the Marne the 2d Guard Inf. Div. in liaison with the 195th Inf. Div. will continue the attack of July 17 until Venteuil and the Harnotay Farm are taken. In order to cut off the strong flanking from the southern bank of the Marne, the attack will be conducted with the principal point of attack on the left flank, enveloping it to the north. The 10th Res. Div. will support the artillery after further agreement with the 2d Guard Inf. Div.

v. CONTA,
Commanding General.

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[Editorial Translation]

IV RESERVE CORPS,
July 16, 1918.

Shortly after midnight corps headquarters ordered continuation of the attack. To overcome the difficult wooded and hilly terrain the corps ordered a slight turn to the south of the 37th, 113th Inf. Div. and of the 10th Reserve Div. with the attached mountain regiment, so that the attack of the 113th and 10th Reserve Divs. continued at times in the sector of the right adjacent division. The 37th Inf. Div. attacked in the morning with strong left flank from Chaufignier Woods toward the south; the 113th Inf. Div. stood halfway between Levoirny and Chene-la-Reine in its attack on Chene-la-Reine; the 10th Reserve Div. wrested the ascent of Oeuilly on the ridge near La Cense-Carree. The mission of the 2d Guard Inf. Div. had remained the same; it attacked toward the east with the left flank halfway between Villers-sous-Chatillon and Tincourt. In spite of the cloudy weather a powerful enemy air attack was launched at 9 a. m. on the Marne bridges but did not cause any material destruction.

Enemy resistance continued growing, powerful artillery fire lay especially on the sector on the 1st Guard Inf. Div. and the 37th Inf. Div. However the 37th Inf. Div. in an attack crossed the Flagot sector, captured the former enemy position east of Nesle-le-Repons at 10:45 a. m. and penetrated into Festigny.
The 113th Inf. Div. completely repulsed enemy counterattacks from Le Mesnil-Huttier and Chene-la-Reine, and after capturing Hills 235 and 239 advanced on the Port-a-Binson--Chene-la-Reine Road as far as Clos-Davaux Hill. The enemy withdrew to the southeast.

The 10th Reserve Div. captured Montvoisin at 12:10 p.m. The 2d Guard Inf. Div. reached the line l'Echell-Savarts Farm toward noon and in the ensuing hours repulsed strong counterattacks executed from Tincourt with great force and with tank support. Several tanks were put out of action and remained lying before our front. The left flank of the division advanced farther through the Bois des Savarts.

At 1:30 p.m. the corps commander ordered the continuation of the attack with the main effort being directed on the Port-a-Binson---Chene-la-Reine---Ablois Road. The 113th Inf. Div. was to attack with strong left flank, the 10th Reserve Div. with strong right flank; the artillery preparation was to begin at 4 p.m. and the assault at 5 p.m. The 37th Inf. Div. continued the attack against the spur near Le Vivier and La Rue; the 2d Guard Div. retained its mission. In the early afternoon hours the enemy began again to overwhelm the Marne Bridges and villages in the Marne Valley with bombs and heavy artillery fire and to launch powerful counterattacks. The 37th Inf. Div. repulsed strong enemy attacks but units which had penetrated into Festigny were pushed back on Chataigniers Woods. Festigny remained under our annihilation fire.

The 113th Inf. Div. and the 10th Reserve Div. reached the line Clos-Davaux-La Cense-Carree in heavy fighting.

The 2d Guard Inf. Div. pushed forward to the east edge of Savarts Farm. Toward evening the 113th Inf. Div. penetrated into Chene-la-Reine; a few hours later a French counterattack drove it out but the town was retaken in a new attack.

The 2d Guard Inf. Div. pushed forward to the east edge of Savarts Farm so that the advance line of the corps late that evening ran as follows from right to left: Moulin de Comblizy---Flagot sector---Bois des Chataigniers---north around Le Mesnil-Huttier---Chene-la-Reine (south edge)---Bois-Brule Farm---La Cense Carree---Montvoisin (east edge)---crossroad between l'Echelle and Venteuil---southwest around Tincourt---Savarts Farm (east edge).

What the strong enemy resistance had caused us to surmise was confirmed by prisoners' statements and enemy orders found. Our attack had been betrayed to the enemy; by echeloning his infantry and artillery in depth and organizing a strong defense of the south bank of the Marne and of his line east and west of Reims, he had breached our advance.

As a continuation of the attack would have demanded too heavy sacrifices and the Third Army east of Reims had not progressed beyond the French first position, the Supreme Command ordered the offensive stopped south of the Marne, while on the line north of the Marne the position was to be further improved by attack.

The corps in its order issued appropriate instructions and reorganized the division boundaries.

Weather: Clearing, warm.
Captured: Over 4,000 prisoners since July 15 and numerous guns and machine guns.
Air activity: Very vigorous on both sides.
Adjacent corps: Wichura's corps remained before Comblizy-Monthodon; Schmettow's corps made progress in Bois du Roi.
Corps Headquarters: Arcis-le-Ponsart.

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IV RESERVE CORPS,
July 17, 1918.

Violent enemy fire concentrations lay on the sectors of the 37th, 113th Inf. Divs. and 10th Reserve Div. during the night, especially after 3 a.m. The 2d Guard Inf. Div. with the Alexander Regiment captured the whole of Tincourt and pushed forward to the southeast tip of Koenigswald* in contact with the 195th Inf. Div. In the forenoon it stormed Harnotay Farm, the enemy defending himself stubbornly. The center and right flanks of the corps were under heavy fire of all calibers from noon on. In the afternoon the enemy infantry following an artillery barrage burst forward against the 10th Reserve Div. from the east and against the 113th Inf. Div. from the southeast. Montvoisin, Oeuilly, Chene-la-Reine and Leuvrigny---Hill 239---Hill 235. The enemy artillery fire continued until evening in undiminished force; long-range fire lay on all the Marne bridges. The portable bridge near Vincelles was destroyed by a direct hit. In the meantime the 2d Guard Inf. Div. penetrated into Venteuil and occupied the village as far as the church but, faced by violent enemy attacks, had to withdraw its left flank again behind Harnotay Farm as the 195th Inf. Div. did not come forward. The enemy succeeded in penetrating into the southeast tip of Koenigswald. In the evening the enemy continued his attacks, supported by tanks, against the 10th Reserve Div. and the 113th Inf. Div. He was wholly repulsed.

* * * Trace of the front line: Comblisy Mill---Flagot sector---Chataigniers Woods---Nantay Mill---300 meters north of the north edge of Chene-le-Reine---300 meters south of Hill 239---Hill 235---Montvoisin---Venteuil church square---500 meters east of Savarts Farm.

Weather: Cloudy, very stormy.
Captured: To date, 4 staff officers, 97 officers, 17 doctors, 2 chaplains, 4,078 men.

Adjacent corps: No change.

Upon orders of higher authority the entire army front will change over to the defensive.

Corps headquarters: Arcis-le-Ponsart.

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IV RESERVE CORPS,
July 18, 1918.

During the night the enemy continued his harassing fire on the front line and especially on the Marne bridges. Nine pontons of the heavy portable bridge near Vincelles collapsed and 3 pontons of the light portable bridge just west thereof did the same. The adjacent bridge of the 1st Guard Inf. Div. was also unusable as the approach roads were

* [Bois-du-Roi]
too softened by the rain and cut up by driving. Traffic was at a standstill on both banks in the 37th Inf. Div. With 10 pontons still available a temporary light portable bridge was built and reinforced for heavy vehicles. New enemy attacks took place toward 6 a. m. and 7:30 a. m. against the 113th Inf. Div. and the 10th Reserve Div., accompanied by tanks in the latter case. In Clos-Davaux the 113th Inf. Div. was pushed back a few 100 meters, as well as the 10th Res. Div. in Montvoisin. North of the Marne the enemy broke into the position of the 195th Inf. Div. and toward noon forced also the 2d Guard Inf. Div. to give up Tincourt by enveloping it from the north. After one hour of drum fire at 12 noon a new attack was launched against the 113th Inf. Div.; it collapsed in our annihilation fire.

In the afternoon enemy artillery activity slackened and only a few focal points like Port-a-Binson, Leuvrigny, Bois du Crochet and Bois des Plans lay from time to time under fire. At 5 p. m. rather strong air attacks were launched on Chatillon, Port-a-Binson and Mareuil. At 10 p. m. the 10th Reserve Div. and 113th Inf. Div. repulsed new enemy attacks.

In the meantime on the west front of the Seventh Army a major attack had been launched by the French in great force and had pierced our main line of resistance. Heavy attacks were to be expected from the south and the east. Therefore Headquarters Seventh Army ordered the withdrawal of the troops located south of the Marne to the north bank of the river on the nights of July 18/19 and 19/20.

During the night the Chief of Staff had already sent over to the divisions “InSTRUCTIONS PREPARED FOR THE MOVE TO THE OTHER BANK.”

All available pioneer forces were placed at the disposal of the divisions. In its order the corps regulated the move to the other bank and ordered the withdrawal of the 113th Inf. Div. as corps reserve.

Captured: To date, 4 staff officers, 98 officers, 17 doctors, 2 chaplains, 4,265 men.

Adjacent Corps: On the fronts of adjacent corps heavy enemy attacks also took place and were repulsed.

Corps Hq.: Arcis-le-Ponsart.

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**Hard Fighting near Bois de Rodemat and Bois du Roi**

[Editorial Translation]


For Particular Purpose

Corps Order for July 16/17

[Extract]

I. Enemy is still offering stubborn resistance in Bois de Rodemat and Bois du Roi, as well as before the corps front up to Pourcy (incl.)

II. Attack will be continued.

III. 195th Inf. Div. will gain further possession of Bois de Rodemat and Bois du Roi.

IV. 12th Bav. Inf. Div. will attack as early as possible along both sides of road: La Neuville-Fleury, as indicated in order of July 15, Opns. Sect. No. 151. * * *

V. 22d Inf. Div. with about half of its artillery will participate in the preparation for attack of the 12th Bav. Div. * * *

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As to the rest, 22d Div. will attack simultaneously with the 12th Bav. Div. in the eastern direction. Center of division toward Nanteuil. Objective, as ordered for July 15.

VI. 123d Inf. Div. will participate in the attack with its right flank, objective Pourcy.

VII. During the night enemy approach routes and traffic centers will be taken under fire.

* * * * *

COUNT v. SCHMETTOW,
Commanding General.

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**Attack in Direction of Courmas**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 160

65th [SCHMETTOW] CORPS,
July 16, 1918.

To Information Hq., 123d Inf. Div. (Gen. Lt. v. Lucius)

I. The 86th Inf. Div. has reached with the assault troops the area near blue point 412 in map square 4171 and is about to execute the assault troops offensive in the direction of Courmas.

II. Left flank of troops of Gen. Lt. v. Lucius will maintain contact with right flank of the 86th Inf. Div. and will keep close to the boundary: South edge of Bligny---South edge of Courmas. Front-line troops will advance along same line with right flank of the 86th Div.

III. Just now the 86th Div. established that the north portion of Bois de Reims is unoccupied. Immediate feeling forward by patrols and the eventual occupation is ordered.

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**Assignment of Objectives**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 168

65th [SCHMETTOW] CORPS,
July 16, 1918.

Corps Order for July 17, 1918

[Extract]

I. The attack will be continued.
II. First of all, the attainment of the following objectives will be pursued with all energy:

- 195th Inf. Div. Ridge of Ferme d'Harnotay as far as Fleury (excl.)
- 12th Bav. Inf. Div. Fleury (incl.) and Fleury Woods as far as old boundary between 195th and 22d Inf. Divs.

* * * * *

The gap that developed between the 22d and 123d Divs. will be closed with forces of the 103d Div. They will advance from the Pourcy area approximately, as far as the line: Nanteuil (excl.)--Courtagnon-Chateau (incl.). Then the 103d Div. will again be detached between the 22d Div. and 123d Div.

COUNT SCHMETTOW,
General Lieutenant and
Commanding General.

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Measures to Resist Counterattacks

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 184

65th [SCHMETTOW] CORPS,
July 17, 1918--10 p. m.

Corps Order
[Extract]

I. 195th Inf. Div. will continue to take full possession of Bois du Roi.
II. Bav. 12th Inf. Div. will reach in the direction of Bois de Fleury ** *
III. 22d Inf. Div. will establish contact with the Bav. 12th Div. ** *
IV. 103d Inf. Div. will attack no more, withdrawing its troops into the sector assigned, and will insure contact with the 22d Div. and 123d Inf. Div.
V. At the point where no more attacks take place the front line that has been reached will be the front line of the outpost. The main line of resistance will be established about 800 - 1,000 meters behind it. Construction will begin immediately. Principal thing: Wiring.
VI. Strong enemy counterattacks will be expected in the next days already. All measures of divisions will take this into account. I expect that the divisions will begin the work with all energy.

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VIII. Exact orders concerning details of passing to defense will follow.

COUNT SCHMETTOW.
Commanding General.

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At 11:15 p.m. operations section of corps demanded that 109th Res. Inf. be immediately withdrawn to Baslieux. That it was not to take part in the attack of the 195th Inf. Div. Objectives by operations section and commander of the Corps 65, who are chiefly managing the unsatisfactory condition of the front line between the 195th and Bav. 12th Divs., are overruled. It is absolutely necessary that regiment be withdrawn. Order to the 195th Div. regarding it is immediately issued, with emphasis that it be carried out speedily and without fail, according to the wish of the corps' operations section. Later, commanding general remarks to army chief by telephone his doubts also in regard to this order and calls attention to the bad conditions of position (enemy ability to view valleys of Cuchery and La Charmoise, the drive back of our artillery concentration, our own unfavorable reconnaissance conditions), corresponding to cover for enemy's assembling of troops near Fleury and Bois de Fleury, invasion gaps along the roads Fleury, Grand-Pre and farther along the valleys, for a breakthrough of the east front. Difficult choice of main defense line.

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Enemy has established himself in the zone of action of the 1st Inf. Div. on the Suippes River, in the zone of action of the Guard Cavalry (dismounted) Division in the 2d position. The Suippe River has been crossed west of Zwerg-Wald. The left flank of the 1st Inf. Div. is immediately north of St-Hilaire [St-Hilaire-le-Grand?] and is fighting for the 2d position together with the Guard Cavalry (dismounted) Division.

At 8 a.m. the 239th Inf. Div. has crossed the old Roman Road. At 7:25 a.m. the Bav. 2d Inf. Div. has penetrated Souain and the 2d position. Attack is progressing.

The 7th Res. Div. has started to advance to the assembly position on the line Givet Reinser** woods. The Division C. P. is on Givet-Hoehe. The 20th Inf. Div. is moved forward to the vicinity south of St-Souplet. The Division C. P. is at present still in St-Etienne [-a-Arnes]. (The west half of the corps artillery---1st F. A. Regt., 1st Foot Arty. Bn.---in their present position at the disposal of corps headquarters. The east half if brought up by the Guard Cavalry (dismounted) Division in its rear. However, the division has not yet proposed its employment.)

* German name for woods [Bois Vallee]. 3 3/4 kms. S. S. E. of St-Souplet.
** German name for woods [Bois N. 4]. 3 3/4 kms. N. W. of Souain.
The French 13th and 170th Inf. Divisions have been identified. Aviation slight. An enemy airplane shot down our 51st and 147th Balloon Sections. Enemy is offering organized resistance in the 2d position. Attack is being continued as heretofore planned. Number of prisoners has increased.

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[Editorial Translation]

C. P., GERMAN XII ARMY CORPS,

July 16, 1918—12:05 p. m.

REPORT TO INTELLIGENCE SECTION, ARMY HEADQUARTERS

[Extract]

The attack in the forenoon encountered strong counteraction by enemy artillery and infantry. Nevertheless we succeeded in gaining ground on the right flank of the corps to an average depth of 800 meters. For the line reached by the corps and the adjacent divisions, see situation map of the corps of July 16. Contacts with the adjacent units are everywhere established. No change has been made in the distribution of our infantry forces. On order from the division, some of the division artillery has been drawn up in front of our former front line. A counterbattery artillery group of 13 batteries has been formed from the corps artillery. Employment predominantly in the left division sector of the corps. During the night of July 16/17, 1918, the 20th Div. will march to the First Army in St-Masmes. The enemy keeps the second position densely occupied. Counterattacks on a rather large scale are improbable. The enemy balloon barrage was somewhat more active than yesterday. It lay along the line St-Hilaire-le-Grand—Souain. Our balloons were again attacked but without success.

A continuation of the attack is feasible only after renewed exhaustive preparations. The corps organizes for defense.

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C. P., GERMAN XII ARMY CORPS,
July 16, 1918.

[Extract]

C. P. Dresdener-Hoehe.*

The night passed without any infantry activity on a larger scale. Vigorous enemy harassing fire lay on the terrain in rear of the captured position and on our batteries. By bursts of machine-gun fire and heavy surprise fires of his artillery, the watchful enemy, who seemed to expect a continuation of the attack, tried to prevent a new assembly at all costs.

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C. P., GERMAN XII ARMY CORPS,
July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

C. P. "Dresdener-Hoehe [Hill 187]"; beginning at 6 p. m., corps headquarters: Cauroy.

The night of July 16/17 passed without special events, with sporadically heavy harassing fire of enemy artillery which slackened at daybreak. The forenoon remained quiet. From noon on renewed harassing fire, heavy at times; otherwise situation unchanged.

In the course of the afternoon corps headquarters moved to Cauroy.

The Bav. 2d Inf. Div. and the 30th Inf. Div. passed to the control of the XII Army Corps, effective at 6 p. m. The Bav. 2d Inf. Div., Guard Cavalry [dismounted] Division, and the 1st Inf. Div. were to be relieved by the 7th Res. Div. and the 30th Inf. Div. by July 20 on orders from army headquarters.

The Bav. I Army Corps Hq. and the Bav. 1st Inf. Div. will be withdrawn from the front without replacement by July 22. The sector of the 1st Bav. Inf. Div. will be taken over jointly by the 30th Inf. Div. and the 88th Inf. Div. Transfer of command by Bav. I Army Corps Hq. at 8 p. m., July 22.

* Height 187
Operations Section

GERMAN XII ARMY CORPS,
July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

Guard Dismounted Cavalry Division: Enemy artillery fire on front line and rear area rather vigorous but somewhat weaker than yesterday. Our batteries delivered harassing fire on assigned targets. Enemy aviation activity moderate.

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Enemy artillery activity on the left flank of the corps sector decreased in the course of the day; in the sector of the 1st Inf. Div. it continued to be rather vigorous. Our artillery placed harassing fire on St-Hilaire, Jonchery, enemy batteries, traffic points and billets; it also delivered fire for destruction on enemy trenches belonging to the 2d enemy position. Aviation: Moderate In the enemy ground-telephone and radio traffic we intercepted only test calls on the battalion, regiment and brigade stations of the French 170th Inf. Div.

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ENDRES [BAVARIAN I ARMY] CORPS,
Bemont Farm, July 15, 1918.

Sector II

[Extract]

Beginning at 12 midnight (July 14/15), violent harassing fire of the hostile artillery opened on the infantry positions, on the battery area, and especially in the draws directly north of the high ground area Bremer-Hohe [Hill 186]---Kluck-Hohe [Hill] [height N. W. of Butte-de-Souain, 3 kms. S. of Somme-Pyl], as well as in the Py [Creek] valley. The enemy made full use of gas shells. At 1:10 a. m. our artillery opened it preparation fire in a sudden burst. 3 hours and 40 minutes were fixed for neutralizing the enemy batteries and for softening up the enemy position for the assault. Pursuant to express instructions from the Third Army Headquarters, the infantry defensive installations to be destroyed primarily were those of the enemy 1st position system, while the pinning down of the troops of the enemy 2d position was to be achieved by a corresponding retention of the barrage on this position. This gave rise to the assumption that the enemy, anxious not lose any ground, would accept decisive battle in the 1st position.
At 4:40 a. m. the batteries designated to participate in the barrage concentrated their fire on the enemy 1st line trench. The infantry pushed close up to the rolling barrage and went over to the assault at 4:50 a. m. according to plan. Its distribution, zones of action, and missions can be seen in the annexes.

The activity of the enemy artillery during the period of preparation was uniformly strong, altogether contrary to previous experience in our offensive operations.

From this fact it was to be concluded that all hostile batteries did not come under our fire, although the enemy artillery positions located by intersection up to the night before the attack could all be accounted for in our fire distribution. It was known that for several weeks the enemy had already undertaken a rather deep echelonment of his artillery.

At 6 a. m. the first reports began coming in to the corps, stating that the infantry had launched the assault according to plan and had made good progress.

Thereupon the 30th Inf. Div. received the order to begin the approach march over Butte-de-Souain.

Our infantry has passed the enemy 1st position without difficulties. In the intermediate area between the 1st and 2d positions it encountered scattered pockets of resistance which were overcome without important losses. At 10 a.m. the entire corps front was involved in the fighting against the enemy 2d position.

In front of this, the enemy had laid an interdiction fire prepared according to plan. Moreover, his artillery covered with violent harassing fire the exposed approach routes over the high area of the shell craters, across which the artillery was moving up. The batteries were able to reach their new positions only by slow degrees.

The infantry faced a well organized defense of the enemy 2d position. Only some elements of the 15th Inf. (Bav. 2d Inf. Div.) were successful in penetrating temporarily into the Souain Cemetery, though they were forced to give way to a French counterattack.

From the incoming reports it could be seen that the enemy 2d position formed a deeply echeloned trench system provided with numerous strong wire obstacles and held by strong enemy forces.

According to consistent prisoners' statements that were received in the meantime, the enemy had learned of our intentions from deserters and prisoners at an early date and had arranged his countermeasures accordingly. He had shifted his main line of resistance into the 2d position at the outset, but had systematically evacuated the 1st position and the intermediate area, except for weak outposts. For several weeks in advance the entire artillery had been strongly disposed in depth; liberal use was made of roving positions; for weeks together no shot was fired from the individual combat positions; they could not therefore be located by intersections. The daily missions of the artillery were carried out mostly by isolated guns from positions that were not occupied on the day of attack. Thus it happened that our artillery fire had no effect on the opposing hostile batteries, and the ammunition was used up on an area which was only sparsely occupied by pockets of resistance. It is, after all, a sign of steady nerves and strong will that the French, relying on their defensive measures, let us carry out our entire initial assembly almost undisturbed.

The ineffectiveness of our artillery fire against the hostile artillery explains the unbroken resistance of the enemy in his 2d position.

The weak fire that was laid on this position in conformity with artillery orders from army headquarters did not suffice to open the way for the infantry into and beyond the 2d position, despite the fact that it was concentrated by the corps to the utmost extent possible within the limited periods fixed for the barrage.

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There is no doubt, therefore, that liberal artillery preparation fire had to precede the carrying out of the attack.
This proposal was submitted to army headquarters at noon with a request for uniform regulation of the attack in consideration of the fact that the adjacent corps found themselves in the same situation.

The attack launched by the army at 7 p.m. failed along the entire army front. The time was too short to carry out fully the difficult details of reorganization for the attack; enemy batteries could not all be located and so could not be engaged.

For this reason both divisions were checked in front on the 2d position.

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[Editorial Translation]

BAVARIAN I ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918---10:30 p.m.

FINAL REPORT TO THIRD ARMY

According to reports up to the present, the attack of the Bav. 1st and 2d Inf. Divs. in front of the main line of resistance of the French 2d position has come to a standstill.

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Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

BAVARIAN I ARMY CORPS,
July 16, 1918---9:30 p.m.

CORPS ORDER

[Extract]

1. The attack of the First Army and of the right flank of the Prussian 1st Inf. Div. has gained some ground today. The 33d Res. Div. has taken the enemy strong points east of the Butte-du-Mesnil.

2. The Third Army goes over to the defense.

* * * * * *

7. The corps C. P. will remain for the present at Bemont Farm.

Von ENDRES.

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Operations Section
No. 817

To: Chief of the General Staff, Third Army

BAVARIAN I ARMY CORPS,
July 17, 1918.

1. Reasons why the enemy 2d position was not taken: The position consists of a deeply-echeloned trench system with strong obstacles ranged in several zones. For this reason the position could not be softened up for the assault by the artillery preparation fire.

The infantry came to a stop before the undestroyed obstacles while the barrage ran ahead. The troops of the enemy 2d position, who had escaped the barrage in good dugouts and could be shelled only here and there by the slowly approaching batteries of the divisional artillery, had time to recover and offered stubborn resistance, well supported by machine guns in the rear, by an exceedingly accurate artillery barrage, and a brilliant tank defense.

Therefore the artillery preparation for the attack of the 2d position had to be organized anew; this is difficult in the case of a barrage rolling on mechanically; valuable time was lost which naturally was to the enemy’s advantage in organizing his resistance, which was so strong that the attack launched in the evening (after 6 hours) could not penetrate the enemy trench system.

2. Proposals for changing the method of attack: The enemy undoubtedly knows precisely the method of our attack. We must count on it that he has intelligence of our attack preparations for the future—just as on the present occasion; complete security against betrayal is impossible. For this reason, the principle of surprise on which the method of attack was built ceases to exist. The enemy will adjust his defense to our method of attack, just as he did this time, i.e., he will dispose his defense in considerable depth, he will never use his actual artillery combat positions and in this way make impossible for us any opportunity for a systematic artillery neutralization.

Correctives: The enemy defense system must permanently be destroyed even before the beginning of the decisive attack. This can be achieved only by wresting permanently from him, by a number of raids, portions of the outpost zone. He will then be forced either to shift his defensive organization to the rear, which for political reasons he will no doubt be reluctant to do, or to regain the lost terrain; then he will disclose his dispositions and give us the chance for an effective neutralization of his artillery. In both instances he will be obliged to abandon temporarily his disposition in depth, at least partly, and a massing of his forces to the front will result. This is exactly what we want. If from that moment an overpowering far-reaching artillery fire is opened, the enemy will not be able to escape from us. This procedure will demand on our part a well directed artillery provided with numerous long-range guns. Nothing can be accomplished with only a more or less systematically planned rolling barrage which can hardly be managed.

The following is my opinion on the matter: Attack along a relatively narrow front, attacking forces echeloned in depth, in order to exploit immediately the penetration of the enemy position. The large-scale attack itself will develop in conjunction with a rather large action which will compel the enemy to launch counterattacks and move up his reserves. The large-scale attack can very well be a surprise attack. The mass of the artillery, the advance of which must be painstakingly screened, will go into action only when the large-scale attack takes place. A general heavy burst of fire on camps, headquarters, and lines of communication; powerful fire belt in the rear area to prevent a withdrawal to the rear and the moving up of more reserves; strong, densely concentrated artillery control
groups for neutralization of the enemy artillery; these groups must be in direct contact
with balloons, airplanes, and flash and sound ranging sections, so as to be able to hurl
an overpowering fire on batteries that reappear. Then, organization of the rolling bar-
rage, in which the control groups do not take part, in order not to draw them away from
their main mission. Rolling barrage strongly concentrated on the points of penetration; it
must remain on the main lines of resistance until it has been made certain that the in-
fantry has in the main surmounted the obstacles, or at least that it can surmount them
without much loss of time; further progress wherever possible will be started only on
signal from the infantry.

HAACK.

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[Editorial Translation]

Liaison Officer, Bav. I Army Corps
Inf. No. 19
Temporary Copy

[Extract]

BAVARIAN I ARMY CORPS.
July 17, 1918.

The following were brought in on July 15, 1918, into the Navarin-Hohe---Arbre-Hohe
(Hill 193) sector, 3 kms. north of Souain, extending to both sides of Souain:

* * * * * *

Total 10 officers 596 men

Enemy position before the German attack:

The German attack was expected for about 14 days. The enemy was prepared for a large-
scale attack, but the enemy leaders, according to statements of the prisoners, had not
made up their minds whether the main thrust would be directed against this front, or
whether it was a matter of a large-scale diversion only. The decisive blow was expected
against the English [British] front somewhere near Amiens. The German preparations were
observed by air reconnaissance. The conspicuously quiet conduct of the German artillery
aroused suspicion. The supposition was fully verified through statements of German pris-
soners who were brought in about B days before the attack during a French surprise thrust.
July 14 was allegedly the date they had fixed. Increased alert had been ordered for the
French 13th Inf. Div. since July 8. The outpost line and 1st position were almost com-
pletely abandoned, the materiel was moved back, the troops echeloned in depth to the rear.
Only a few pockets of resistance between the outpost line and 1st position were left oc-
cupied by combat squads, which were given explicit orders to sacrifice themselves in case
of a German attack and to withdraw only on written orders.

A French company commander had received on July 12 confidential instructions, accord-
ing to which the opening of the German attack would be signalized by a sudden opening at
midnight of massed artillery and trench mortar fire, mixed with gas, followed in the early
morning by the infantry assault.

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SOUAIN-NAVARIN FARM AREA
Looking northwest from the source of the Ain
The entire French artillery had been regrouped some time ago so that a few field batteries would fire from the old positions in order to mislead the German observers; whereas the main body of the artillery was held in readiness for the defensive battle in inconspicuous field positions farther to the rear.

The prisoners knew nothing about the expected counterattacks in smaller or larger units.

The statements were substantiated by captured orders containing extensive measures for defense, such as withdrawal of materiel from the 1st position, standing barrage in front of 4 different main lines of resistance, simulation of a strong force in the front line by frequent firing, request for barrage fire, etc.

By insertion of new troops the divisional sectors became smaller. On the corps sector front from west to east between Tannen-Eck, map square 2248, and west edge of Arbre-Hoeche (Hill 193), map square 2253, the following units were in line: In front: Right flank of the 170th Inf. Div., the 13th Inf. Div., as well as left flank of the 43d Inf. Div.; in reserve: The American 42d Division and elements of the French 46th Division [?] which were moved up as counterattack divisions.

The boundary between the 170th and 13th Inf. Div. lay approximately 1,500 meters west of the Souain-Sommepy Road, the boundary between the 13th and 43d Inf. Divs. about 2 km. east thereof, so that the 13th Inf. Div. extended along a front about 3 1/2 km. wide.

One battalion of the American 42d Division (2d Bn., 167th Inf.) was in the vicinity of Souain in rear of the combat troops of the 13th Inf. Div. with orders to hold at all costs the 2d-line trench of the 2d position. (For details on troops in sector, see below.)

The German Attack:

The French prisoners express themselves about the attack in general as follows:

The defense concentrated to the rear for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary losses in personnel proved completely successful. The German mortar fire which preceded the attack and lay on the trench positions in map squares 2248-2253 caused neither casualties nor any other results, as these positions were already beaten down by previous artillery fire. The artillery fire on the first series of nests of resistance lay accurately. but due to the rather wide spacing of these groups, which meshed closer together toward the rear, the casualties were slight here also. The German fire for effect that lasted several hours lay thus on a weakly held zone. The first German attack troops, who directly followed the forward rolling barrage and whose courage and fierce drive aroused general admiration, ran up against defensive troops who were relatively little used up and who surrendered only after hard fighting. In the opinion of the officers, the effect on the troops of a rolling barrage is less demoralizing and involves fewer casualties than a drum fire that lasts several hours.

Capture of Prisoners:

The French had been captured mostly in the area between the front line and 2d position. They were to a great extent taken out of dugouts or driven out of strong points after stubborn resistance. Individuals lay in the 2d position.

The Americans were brought in from the 2d position, about 1 km. west of Souain, by German attack troops that had advanced farthest.
BAVARIAN I ARMY CORPS,
July 18, 1918.

No attacks were made by the enemy infantry on the sector of the Bav. 1st Inf. Div. Enemy artillery activity moderate. Sporadic shelling and bursts of fire by enemy artillery on the whole division sector. Enemy aviation activity: Feeble.

C. P., GERMAN XVI ARMY CORPS,
July 15, 1918.

EVENING REPORT

[Extract]

I. Line reached: At the time of closing of the evening report, the 88th Inf. Div. did not get beyond the line reached in the forenoon. The 7th Inf. Div. broke through the French 2d position northeast of Perthes [Perthes-les-Hurlus] with the 393d Inf. Regt. and has been lying east of Perthes since 12:30 p.m., with front toward Muhlen-Hoehe [Height 190; E. S. E. of Perthes-les-Hurlus]--Pistolen-Hoehe. Contact with 33d Res. Div. established. The 33d Res. Div. is holding the line reached in the forenoon. Since 6 p.m. an attack of the 88th Inf. Div. against the 2d position has been in progress. Attack by the 7th Inf. Div. against Muhlen-Hoehe--Pistolen-Hoehe will take place at 6:30 p.m.

The 228th Div. with the 207th Inf. is on Wald-Hoehe. The 48th Inf. Regt. is on the march toward Laemmer-Wald. * 35th Inf. Regt. in the Bulgaren-Schlucht.

II. Enemy: Enemy artillery action strong against the 88th and 7th Inf. Divisions, but weak against the 33d Res. Div. According to prisoner statements, 2 American Divisions and elements of the French 66th Chasseurs Division [sic] are assumed to be reserves.

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V. Proposed Continuation of the Operations: Corps headquarters proposes, when the attacks now in progress are successful, to continue the attack in the prescribed zones of action.

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* [Bois des Perdreaux]
FINAL REPORT

The attack carried forward energetically by the 88th Inf. Div. came to a standstill on the line 1,700 meters south of Baraque---north of Perthes [Perthes-les-Hurlus]. Likewise the attack of the 7th Inf. Div. against Muehlen-Hoehe and Pistolen-Hoehe had no success. Both attacks died away in the fire of the strong infantry echeloned in depth and in the extremely violent counteraction of the very powerful, chiefly heavy, enemy artillery organized in depth. The center and the left flank of the 33d Res. Div. occupied sections of the advanced enemy trenches without fighting.

One regiment of the 288th Inf. Div. is on Wald-Hoehe, one regiment near Laemmer-Wald, and one regiment in the Bulgaren-Schlucht [Ravine]. Division headquarters will move to the headquarters of the 88th Inf. Div.

Contact established with all divisions.

From prisoner statements confirmed by personal impressions and the course of events, the following picture of the day results: The enemy was prepared for the attack and, by eliminating a deep outpost zone, had already evacuated the terrain by the evening of July 13 as far back as the 2d position, with the exception of unimportant intermediate detachments. The enemy artillery was distributed in depth in such a manner that it was in a position to cover the terrain from about 3 km. in rear of our old 1st position as far as calibers. The power of the enemy artillery disposed in this manner was not weakened by our preparation fire, the more so since the gas was driven to the north by the south wind, enabling the enemy artillery to recover from it very soon.

After bringing up and reorganizing a strong artillery force and after renewed systematic fire preparation, a continuation of the attack promises success.

The XVI Army Corps will be organized for defense for the time being: the 228th Inf. Div. will remain in readiness as counterattack division and will keep in contact with the 88th and 7th Inf. Divisions. All measures will be taken for the promptest continuation of the attack.

The number of prisoners has increased to over 750.

Our losses in the sector of the 88th Inf. Div. considerable in some units; in the sector of the 7th Inf. Div., moderate, and in the sector of the 33d Res. Div., slight.
Contemplated Enemy Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section C. P., GERMAN XVI [PERTHES] ARMY CORPS,
No. 890 July 17, 1918.

CORPS ORDER

[Extract]

1. It is of greatest importance at present to clarify the enemy's intentions. The forces available to the enemy and today's report of very heavy motor columns moving from St-Remy to Somme-Suippe make it seem not unlikely that the enemy is contemplating an attack. In the sector of the 33d Res. Div. he has already passed to the attack today. Tonight if possible, or tomorrow night at the latest, the 88th and 7th Inf. Divisions will capture prisoners by means of patrol raids and conduct them direct to corps headquarters (Int. Sect.).

* * * * *

By order of Corps Headquarters:

van den BERGH.

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THE AISNE-MARNE OPERATION
July 18 - August 6, 1918

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Preface

In spite of German advances in the CHAMPAGNE, Marshal Foch continued preparations for an attack against the western face of the MARNE Salient. The date for the attack was set by Marshal Petain as July 18; the place was the German lines between the MARNE on the south and the AISNE on the north.

If SOISSONS could be captured, the Germans would lose their principal railhead. Such loss would force them to withdraw from the MARNE Salient since supply could not then be maintained. A German retreat here would end the direct threat to PARIS and free the PARIS-NANCY Railroad for Allied use.

The attack, made without the usual artillery preparation, came as a complete surprise to the enemy whose front lines broke. However, by skillful and stubborn defense of secondary positions, the Germans gained time for a withdrawal from their now untenable positions.

By August 6, the Allied advance had reached the VESLE and tried out the enemy dispositions there. Here the Allies abandoned the offensive since the application of pressure at other points gave promise of greater results.

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**Allied Order of Battle**
*(Left to right)*

Allied Armies:
- Marshal Foch, Commanding
  General Weygand, Chief of Staff

Armies of the North and Northeast:
- General Petain, Commanding
  General Buat, Chief of Staff

American General Headquarters:
- General Pershing, Commanding
  Maj. Gen. McAndrew, Chief of Staff

American First Army:
- General Pershing, Commanding
  Col. Drum, Chief of Staff

Group of Armies of the Center:
- General Maistre, Commanding
  General Mollandin, Chief of Staff

Group of Armies of the Reserve:
- General Fayolle, Commanding
  General Paquette, Chief of Staff

French Tenth Army:
- General Mangin, Commanding
  Col. Hergault, Chief of Staff

French I Corps:
- General Lacapelle, Commanding
  French 153d Div.
  French 69th Div.

French XX Corps:
- General Berdoulat, Commanding
  American 1st Div.
  Moroccan 1st Div.
  American 2d Div.

American III Corps:* (In reserve)
- Maj. Gen. Bullard, Commanding
  Brig. Gen. Bjornstadt, Chief of Staff

*Administrative control only of American units in French Tenth Army.

* At outset of Operation
French XXX Corps:
   General Penet, Commanding
   French 38th Div.
   French 48th Div.

French XI Corps:
   General Prax, Commanding
   French 128th Div.
   French 41st Div.

French Sixth Army:
   General Degoutte, Commanding
   Col. Brion, Chief of Staff

French II Corps:
   General Philipot, Commanding
   French 33d Div.
   French 47th Div.
   French 2d Div. (plus 7th Inf. Brig. of Am. 4th Div.)

French VII Corps: (To July 25
   [Am. I extended to west.
   General Massanet, Commanding
   French 164th Div. (plus Am. 4th Div., less 7th Inf. Brig.)

American I Corps:
   Maj. Gen. Hunter Liggett, Commanding
   Brig. Gen. Malin Craig, Chief of Staff
   French 167th Div.
   American 26th Div.

French Ninth Army:
   General De Mitry, Commanding
   General Peschart d'Ambly, Chief of Staff

French XXXIV Corps:
   General Piarron de Mondesir, Commanding
   French 39th Div.
   American 3d Div.

French III Corps:
   General Lebrun, Commanding
   French 73d Div.
   French 4th Div.
   French 20th Div.
   French 18th Div.
   American 28th Div. (In reserve)

French Fifth Army:
   General Berthelot, Commanding
   Col. Belhague, Chief of Staff
French I Cav. Corps:
   General Feraud, Commanding

   French 77th Div.
   French 5th Div.
   French 131st Div.
   French 3d Div.

French V Corps:
   General Pelle, Commanding

   French 10th Div.
   French 7th Div.
   French 9th Div.
   French 40th Div.

Italian II Corps

Colonial I Corps

ORDER OF BATTLE OF AMERICAN DIVISIONS:

American 1st Division:
   Col. Campbell King, Chief of Staff
      1st Inf. Brig.
      2d Inf. Brig.
      1st F. A. Brig.

Attached: Fr. 42d Aero Sq.
          Fr. 83d Balloon Co
          Fr. 253d F. A., truck-carried (75)
          Fr. 11th and 12th Groups of Tanks

Detached: 1st Sn. Tn.

American 2d Division:
   Col. Preston Brown, Chief of Staff
      3d Inf. Brig.
      4th Marine Brig.
      2d F. A. Brig.

Attached: 10 Fr. Airplanes
          Arty. of Fr. 58th Div.
          Fr. 288th F. A. (75)
          Fr. 11th and 12th Groups Heavy Tanks

Detached: 4th F. A. Brig.

American 4th Division:
   Lt. Col. C. A. Bach, Chief of Staff
      7th Inf. Brig.
      8th Inf. Brig.
      4th F. A. Brig.

Attached: 51st F. A. Brig.
          101st Am. Tn.

Detached: 4th Am. Tn.
American 26th Division:
Col. Duncan K. Major, Chief of Staff
51st Inf. Brig.
52d Inf. Brig.
51st F. A. Brig.


American 42d Division:
Brig. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff
83d Inf. Brig.
84th Inf. Brig.
67th F. A. Brig.


American 3d Division:
Col. Fred. H. Turner, Chief of Staff
5th Inf. Brig.
6th Inf. Brig.
3d F. A. Brig.


American 32d Division:
Lt. Col. R. McC. Beck, Jr., Chief of Staff
63d Inf. Brig.
64th Inf. Brig.
57th F. A. Brig.

Attached: 147th F. A. Brig. 3d F. A. Brig.
Arty. of Fr. 39th Div.
107th M. G. Bn.
3d Bn., 18th F. A.

American 28th Division:
55th Inf. Brig.
56th Inf. Brig.
53d F. A. Brig.

Attached: Arty. of Fr. 39th Div.  Detached: 111th Inf.

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Inception of Soissons Counteroffensive

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 1439

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, Seine-et-Marne, June 14, 1918.

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

I have the honor to invite your attention to the importance of the communication net of SOISSONS, which is used for the supply of four German divisions on the front and which constitutes at the same time the sole junction point of all the railroads available to the enemy on the Aisne and south thereof.

It appears to me essential that instructions be given, if this has not already been done, to subject the bridges and the railroad net of SOISSONS to a methodical and intensive bombardment both by planes and by long-range guns.

In a like manner of thinking, it would be advantageous, as soon as circumstances permit, to launch an offensive action having as its purpose the capture by us of the plateaus dominating SOISSONS on the west, with a view to preventing the enemy from using this place, which is of considerable importance to him.

This plan for an offensive action should be prepared immediately, its execution being deferred until the time when the necessary forces may be assembled. I request that you advise me as to what may be done regarding these proposals.

FOCH.
Order to Prepare Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 18,932

For: The General commanding Group of Armies of the Reserve
The General commanding the General Artillery Reserve
The General commanding the Air Division

[Extract]

I. Free use of the communication net of SOISSONS insures to the enemy a primary advantage in the development of his operations between the Aisne and the Marne. Every means of destroying this advantage should be sought out and, if possible, put into action.

II. Therefore, the General commanding the French Group of Armies of the Reserve is requested:

(1) To prepare and to put into operation, with the assistance of the Generals commanding the General Artillery Reserve and the Air Division, a methodical and intensive plan of bombardment by planes and long-range guns of the bridges and of the railroad net of SOISSONS;

(2) To have the Tenth Army draw up the plan for an offensive, having as its objective the recapture of the plateaus which dominate SOISSONS on the southwest.

III. The offensive mentioned above will be carried out with a view to moving our front back to the line PERNANT---MISSY-aux-BOIS---LONGPONT at least. This action will be supported by tanks (from one to two regiments of light tanks). *

IV. The General commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve will report upon the orders issued in carrying out these instructions; in addition, he will send to the Commander-in-Chief as soon as possible an estimate of the various means which will required for the offensive operation planned for the Tenth Army.

PETAIN.

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[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 464/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY, June 20, 1918.

Major General Mangin, commanding the Tenth Army

To the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve

[Extract]

I have the honor of sending you herewith a summary plan of action for the offensive operation *** referred to and an estimate of the means necessary to accomplish the plan.
The number of additional divisions (8) which I request represents, in my opinion, the indispensable minimum for attainment of the minimum objective which you have assigned me: MERCIN, CHAUDUN, VAUXCASTILLE, VILLERS-HELON.

It is reasonable to assume that exploitation of any success realized beyond this objective, a probability which we should foresee and for which we should designate objectives immediately, will be directly proportional to the supplementary means which may be placed under my orders in addition to the eight divisions.

Furthermore I wish to stress the importance to us of possession of the ridge of VILLERS-HELON, from whence the enemy could enfilade, and even take in reverse, our entire line from VAUXCASTILLE to CHAUDUN.

Moreover, it is on the heights of VILLERS-HELON, and not in the low ground at LONGPONT, that the defense of the forest of VILLERS-COTTERETS should be conducted.

For this operation I am counting upon using the Moroccan Division, which already knows the terrain to be covered and which will be ready on June 30.

MANGIN.

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[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 405/OW

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
June 20, 1918.

PLAN OF ACTION

1st Phase: (To be accomplished within about eight days with means available to the army.)

Carry our front forward to the line: Ridge east of LAVERSINE---CUTRY and ravine to the northeast thereof---Les TROIS-PEUPLIERS and capture CORCY.

Possession of this bridgehead on the far side of COEUVRES Brook will provide and easy and rapid take-off point for the attack and will insure the best means for employment of tanks. It will greatly facilitate deployment of the artillery on the forward position.

2d Phase: Attack designed to attain the line: MERCIN-et-VAUX---head of ravine which descends toward VAUXBUIN---CHAUDUN---western edge of VAUXCASTILLE Ravine---height west of VILLERS-HELON---LOUATRE---CORCY.

It is necessary, in fact, to wrest from the enemy possession of the observatory at VILLERS-HELON (Hill 197), which dominates the entire region and to deny him the use of the defiladed valley of SAVIERES Brook, which now furnishes the enemy all facilities for infiltrating into the forest of VILLERS-COTTERETS.

The terrain for these attacks includes two zones within which, apparently, offensive action cannot develop favorably:

One consists of the wooded area DOMMIERS-Le JARDIN.

The other, of the area at the eastern edge of the forest between La GRILLE Farm and CORCY, including the marshy section northwest of LONGPONT.

Hence, the maneuver will involve the outflanking of these two "islands," above described, from the north and south. This may require command sectors and troops as indicated below:

1. SECTOR OF THE NORTHERN ARMY CORPS: Line of departure: Between AMBLENY and COEUVRES, inclusive:

   3 divisions in front line
   2 divisions in second line

   Objective: Plateau between SACONIN and BREUIL---VAUXBUIN---MISSY-aux-BOIS.
It is not necessary that, on the northern extremity of the plateau, the attack be
developed as far as the AISNE, since withdrawal of the troops occupying these spurs will
be determined by progress of our advance farther to the south, as well as by the flanking
actions.

II. SECTOR OF THE CENTRAL ARMY CORPS: (Responsible for reduction by envelopment of
the "island" DOMMIERS---Le JARDIN---Le TRANSLON.)
   2 divisions in front line
   2 divisions in second line
Line of departure: Plateau of Les TROIS PEUPLIERS, on the north----the front CARREFOUR
des FOURNEAUX [crossroads]---CHAVIGNY Farm, on the south.
   Objective: The line CRAVANCON---CHAUDUN---BEAUREPAIRE Farm.

III. SECTOR OF THE SOUTHERN ARMY CORPS: (Responsible for reduction by envelopment
of the zone LONGPONT---La GRILLE Farm----woods north of CORCY.)
   3 division in front line, of which one is on the north
   1 division in second line, behind division on the north
   Objective: SAVIERES Brook, north of LONGPONT---VILLERS-HELON---LOUATRE.

A total of 13 divisions, of which: 7 in first line; 5 in second line; the southern-
most division to be responsible for pushing the front forward to SAVIERES Brook, between
JAVAGE Farm and MAUCREUX.

ESTIMATE OF REQUIREMENTS:
A. Divisions: The army has at present four divisions between AMBLENY and CORCY.
   One of these divisions will not attack and will face the wooded area DOMMIERS-VERTESEUILLE.
   Leaving 3 divisions.
   There are at present in army reserve: 2 infantry divisions (the Moroccan division and
   the 48th Inf. Div.)
   Total: 5 divisions.
   Since the army should be able to furnish 5 divisions, it should receive eight, one of
   them immediately to relieve the 38th Division and enable the latter to reorganize before
   the attack.

B. Artillery: In addition to the artillery at present with the army and to the organic
   artillery of the eight reinforcing divisions, the means indicated below will be required:
   Field Artillery        6 regiments of 75's
   Howitzers             2 battalions of Schneider 155's
   Trench Artillery      1 battalion
   Heavy Artillery       52 batteries*
   Interdiction Artillery 5 battalions of 105's
   Interdiction Artillery 2 battalions of 145's

Ammunition supply: 4 days of fire for the heavy artillery of various calibers.
   5 days of fire for the field artillery.

* To include one battalion of 19-cm. heavy railway artillery, the other batteries not to be of a caliber over 220-mm.
and materiel of said caliber solely 220-mm. rapid fire.
Continuation of Plan of Action Against Soissons

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 10,452

GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE.
June 22, 1918.

Transmitted to the Commander-in-Chief in compliance with the provision of Instructions No. 18,932 of June 16.

In the main, the proposed objective is a logical one. The capture of the plateau of VILLERS-HELON would have the advantage of covering the right of the attack and of completely disengaging the forest of VILLERS-COTTERETS. However, from the strict point of view of the purpose assigned for the operation (i.e., to place the communication link of SOISSONS under fire) although it would be useful; it would not be indispensable.

The proposed preliminary operation which provides for an initial crossing of the ravine of LAVERSINE, presents the disadvantage that it will attract the attention of the enemy; nevertheless it appears necessary to insure the emergence of the tanks on the plateau since the latter will constitute one of the principal factors for our success.

The means requested by General Mangin are in keeping with the end in view. Limiting of the right objective to LONGPONT Brook should, in principle, effect a saving of two divisions. [In reality only one, because relief of the 1st Division in the very near future is absolutely necessary.]

Of the six to eight additional infantry divisions required, two could be drawn from Group of Armies of the Reserve under existing conditions: The 70th Division and one infantry division (the 5th or 14th) to come from the First Army.

Insofar as artillery is concerned, the estimates submitted by General Mangin correspond closely to average assignments of field artillery and to normal reduced assignments of counterbattery artillery; and these estimates are even more moderate insofar as artillery of destruction is concerned. These means, as requested, appear to be an irreducible minimum.

Bearing in mind the necessarily very restricted drafts which the Group of Armies of the Reserve might be able to make upon the French First and Third Armies (about two regiments of 77-mm., truck-carried, two regiments of horse-drawn artillery, two battalions of tractor-drawn guns, three battalions of 220-mm., rapid fire), the total deficit would amount to:

- 5 regiments of field artillery
- 50 batteries of counterbattery

It is understood that the action is to be supported by two regiments of light tanks.

FAYOLLE,
General,
Commanding Group of Armies of the Reserve.

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Employment of American 1st Pursuit Group

3d Section, General Staff

From: Chief of Staff, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.

1. With reference to the letter from these headquarters dated June 18, 1918, assigning certain aviation to your corps, it is directed that upon the arrival of the 1st Pursuit Group in the Chateau-Thierry region you place that group at the disposition of the Commanding General, French Sixth Army in all that concerns the tactical employment of the group. This action is taken because of the fact that until a considerable number of American divisions are in the line, pursuit aviation must be kept in its tactical employment a function of the army commander. The French authorities have been informed that it is desired that this group be used for such work as may be necessary in connection with American troops.

2. It is intended to place the group under American tactical control as soon as the size of our forces in the Chateau-Thierry region justifies such action.

J. W. MacANDREW,
Major General,
Chief of Staff.

Necessity for Preparing a Directive

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 1,648

General Foch, Commander-In-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

[Extract]

It is essential immediately to plan for the resumption of the offensive by the Allied Armies in 1918, as soon as the forces available permit.

In order that this offensive may be started at the desired time and under the best conditions, it is necessary immediately to prepare the command as well as the troops who will be charged with it.

In the case of the command, it is essential that they possess a clear understanding as to the method that should be adopted, taking recent lessons into account.

* * * * *
When the directive has been issued, the problem will be to prepare the troops for attack according to the method adopted.

For this purpose it is necessary to form immediately the large French and American units intended for the offensive and to draw up a plan of employment which will assure them a sufficient period for their training in camps.

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In order to effect the necessary preparations, it will be necessary to figure on an order of battle including at least twelve American divisions, some 10 French divisions, 7 or 8 British divisions, or a total of about thirty divisions, all of which should be ready within two months at the latest.

FOCH.

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Approval of Modified Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 33,873

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, June 27, 1918.

The Commander-in-Chief to the Commanding, Group of Armies of the Reserve

Reply to communication No. 10,452, Group of Armies of Reserve, June 22, 1918, transmitting letter No. 464/S, dated June 20, 1918, from the General commanding the French Tenth Army [printed herein].

I approve the summary of the plan of action prepared by the General commanding the Tenth Army, with the following reservations:

I. 1st Phase: The General commanding the Tenth Army is authorized to carry out the preliminary operation, which he calls the first phase, if this operation without requiring forces above those which he has at present, appears to offer real assurances of success.

If the contrary is true, the preliminary operation will be treated substantially as the first phase of the capture of the plateaus southwest of SOISSONS: it will precede by the shortest possible interval the main attack and will be aided by the employment of a portion of the reinforcements of all kinds which are necessary for that attack.

II. THE MAIN ATTACK (2d Phase)

(a) The occupation of the plateau included between the towns of SACONIN-et-BREUIL, MERCIN-et-VAUX, and VAUXBUIN, will create along the Aisne a flank very much exposed to fire from the north bank of that river, without in any way facilitating the task of placing in position the artillery designated to fire upon the communication net of SOISSONS.

Therefore, it is expedient to limit the objective north of CHAUDUN to a line running from Le PORT and taking in only the heads of the ravines which descend toward PERNANT and toward SACONIN-et-BREUIL, in such a way that these ravines, as soon as the situation has stabilized may be taken under our infantry fire.

(b) The plans regarding the initial supply of ammunition are excessive. The preliminary allotment of 4 days of fire for the heavy artillery and 5 days of fire for the
field artillery is out of proportion to the requirements of a short preparation, however violent it may be. Moreover, the accumulation of so great an amount of ammunition in close proximity to one of those parts of the front which continue to be the most exposed to a violent attack by the enemy should not be considered. There is no case on record of an army on the offensive having lacked ammunition. The General commanding the Tenth Army should figure his requirements more closely and should bear in mind the additional means of transport which he will have available for filling his dumps, once the action has begun.

Preparations for the operation should be pushed actively by putting all of your present resources into condition, without compromising the defensive organization of the Tenth Army.

I shall advise you later of the conditions under which the requested additional forces may be placed at your disposal.

PETAIN.

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HS Fr. Files: 403-30.1: Memorandum

Plans for Organization of an American Sector

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 36,208

For the Commanding General, French Military Mission with the American Army at CHAUMONT

1. The regrouping of the American I and II Army Corps requested by General Pershing will be accomplished as soon as circumstances permit, under the following conditions:

   The American 26th Division will relieve the American 2d Division.
   The American 1st Division will be relieved by a French division.
   The American 1st and 2d Division will be withdrawn to the rear for the purpose of constituting the American I Army Corps, which will return to the front after a period of rest.

   The Commanding General, I Army Corps, will assume command of the III Army Corps sector, now held by one American and one French division.

   The American 42d Division will be withdrawn from the Fifth Army, after having participated in the proposed operation. It will be transferred to the Sixth Army area to form, with the American 26th Division, the American II Army Corps.

2. It is not possible to visualize at present the organization of an American sector in the vicinity of CHATEAU-THIERRY, as suggested by General Pershing (American 2d, 3d, 42d, 26th Divisions).

   It is requested that these decisions be brought to the attention of the American Commander-in-Chief, and that this headquarters be informed concerning any observations which he might make in connection therewith.

By order:

ANTHOINE,
Chief of Staff.

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INITIAL PLAN OF ATTACK
IN THE AISNE-MARNE
MORNING 8 JULY 1918
Preparation for Offensive

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 589/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
July 5, 1918.

ANNEX NO. 9

From: Major General Mangin, commanding the French Tenth Army

To: The Commanding General, French Group of Armies of the Reserve

[Extract]

In letter No. 33873 [Armies N. N. E.] of June 27, 1918, the Commander-in-Chief ordered that preparations for the operation contemplated in Instructions No. 18932 [Armies of N. N. E.] of June 16 be pushed energetically.

I have the honor to submit the following report concerning the present status of this matter:

1. North of the Forêt de VILLERS-COTTERETS, as a result of the action carried out on June 28, by the XX Army Corps, we are in possession of an excellent base of departure east of COEUVRES Creek.

    South of the forest, the XI Army Corps has been ordered to carry out a local action on July 8, with the mission of advancing our front 600 meters northeast of CHAVIGNY Farm and thus insure a take-off point in case of an attack developing north of LONGPONT.

    When this advance has been realized the first phase, as contemplated in my letter of June 20, will be ended and the Tenth Army will be most favorably situated, under present circumstances, to pass to the general attack provided for by the instructions of June 16.

2. The necessary preliminary works required for this attack have been begun: Construction of new battery positions, observation posts, telephone centrals, command posts, etc.

    There is every reason to believe that their works will be sufficiently advanced by July 10.

    *

4. The minor operations in which the Tenth Army has engaged during the second fortnight in June were carried out very easily. Without giving them undue importance, they tend to prove that the enemy is experiencing the same difficulties as ourselves in defending himself against troops using the present methods of attack.

    Hence, it is reasonable to assume that an attack delivered on the plateaus southwest of SOISSONS, under the conditions set forth in instructions of June 16, would not only offer the best chances for success but might also bring about certain developments, resulting from immediate exploitation of the effect of surprise and aiming at reduction of the CHATEAU-THIERRY salient.

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In particular, I should know what divisions can participate therein.

MANGIN.

Preparations for Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 9,732

FRENCH ARMIES OF NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 8, 1918.

The General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To the General, Commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve.

[Extract]

In reply to indorsement No. 695, G. A. R., July 7, 1918 [not printed], to letter No. 589/S [Tenth Army] dated July 5 [preceding], from the General commanding the Tenth Army.

I approve in their entirety the conclusions in letter 589/S from the General commanding the Tenth Army relating to the operation under consideration against the plateaus southwest of SOISSONS.

There is no doubt that this operation not only offers the best chances of success but is also capable of fruitful exploitation. Furthermore, it will constitute the most effective parry to the impending German offensive.

Consequently, it should be prepared at once to the last detail so that when the time comes to carry it out, the concentration of the means and the launching of the attack can take place in a very short space of time (at the most, 4 days).

The preparations will be based on the following data:

A. (1) Initial Plan of Action: That drawn up by the General commanding the Tenth Army (letter from Tenth Army, No. 464/S of June 20) as amended by letter No. 33,873, June 27 [Armies N. N. E.]

(2) Subsequent exploitation to be developed in a southeasterly direction (OULCHY-le-CHATEAU). The General commanding the Tenth Army will complete his plan of action of June 20 by making provision for this. It must be understood that, for the exploitation under consideration, no infantry means should be counted on beyond those indicated in the aforementioned plan, viz: 13 divisions. However, plans may be laid for the employment of the II Calvary Corps.

B. Means:

(1) Large units: On the basis of a total of 13 infantry divisions to be employed
in the operation, 8 more infantry divisions will be placed at the disposal of the General commanding the Tenth Army, who has 5 at this disposal at the present moment; 3 in line, 2 (48th and Moroccan) in army reserve.

These additional means will be provided as follows:

(a) Three infantry divisions: To be designated by the Group of Armies of the Reserve after taking an inventory of its own resources. (Those 3 divisions could be the now reorganized 58th and 69th and the fresh 70th.)

(b) Five infantry divisions by transfer to the Group of Armies of the Reserve of 5 divisions now in G. H. Q. reserve viz:

The American I Army Corps (American 1st and 2d Divs. being reorganized)
French 9th and 10th Inf. Divs. (fresh)
French 72d Inf. Div. (being reorganized)
The American 2d Div., now in the Sixth Army, can be made available about July 12. The 9th and 10th would be replaced eventually if circumstances require, by British infantry divisions in rear of the left of the First Army.

(c) In addition, the nondivisional elements of an army corps and the infantry division that the Tenth Army is to withdraw from that part of its front north of the Aisne, in compliance with a previous memorandum (No. 5,528 of July 5), can be employed in the operation supplementing the foregoing.

(2) The II Cav. Corps will be placed at the disposal of the Tenth Army for exploitation.

(3) Tanks: To be furnished entirely by the Group of Armies of the Reserve from present resources: 501st Regt., 4 groups of St. Chammonds, 1 group of Schnider.

(4) Artillery: In order to be able to estimate the supplementary requirements to be furnished by G. H. Q., the means at the present disposal of the Tenth Army and those which the Group of Armies of the Reserve can transfer to it from its own resources, must be made the subject of fresh study and the results thereof be submitted to me without delay. In this connection, the Group of Armies of the Reserve must not hesitate to draw on other portions of its front as freely as the situation will permit.

C. Preparations To Be Made Immediately: As the situation exists at this moment, it is not feasible to shift now the supplementary means referred to in paragraph B above, but all possible steps may be taken to enable the concentration to be made in a very brief space of time once the order is issued. To this end:

(1) The large units mentioned in paragraph B, 1st subparagraph above, will conduct their reconnaissance without delay, according to instructions they will receive from the General commanding the Tenth Army.

(2) All plans for the concentration and movement will be drawn up.

(3) Battle orders for the larger units, likewise.

Special instructions with regard to the artillery will be forwarded at once. Effective at once, the supplementary supply of 3 days of fire requested by the General commanding the Tenth Army (which is approved) will be determined on the general basis of the total artillery means contemplated in the abbreviated plan of action of June 20.

D. Surprise constituting the basic elements of success, the most minute and rigorous precautions must be taken to maintain secrecy. • • •

PETAIN.
Regrouping American Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

From: General, Commander-in-Chief, 3d Section, General Staff
At: French Armies of the North and Northeast
Date: July 11, 1918 Hour: 11:30 p.m. No. 633/M, 634/M
To: Headquarters at NOAILLES Group of Armies of the Reserve and SEZANNE Group of Armies of the Center and French Military Mission at CHAUMONT

[Extract]

I. The American 1st Div. and army corps headquarters now at BEAUVAIS will move to new area in the region NANTÉUIL-le-HAUDOUIN---DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE.

II. Object of these movements is to regroup the American 1st and 2d Divs. in the Marne region under the orders of General Bullard, who will assume command of this American army corps upon arrival 1st Div. in Zone DAMMARTIN-NANTÉUIL.

This army corps, in reserve at my disposal, will be attached to the Sixth Army.

III. Movement and new location American 1st Div. and American corps headquarters will be regulated jointly by Group of Armies of the Reserve and Group of Armies of the Center.

By order:

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. Files: 403-30.1: Instructions

Reductions of Chateau-Thierry Salient

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 14546

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 12, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMMANDING GENERALS, GROUPS OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE AND GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER

[Extract]

The units now under the command of the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center for defensive operations permit a swift offensive to be launched
against the CHATEAU-THIERRY salient, using the Tenth and Sixth Armies on one flank, and the Fifth Army on the other.

The Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center will make immediate preparations for the attacks, in compliance with the following basic instructions.

I. The purpose of the operation is to reduce the CHATEAU-THIERRY pocket by executing two lateral drives at the plateaus north of FERE-en-TARDENois.

The minimum advantage gained from the operation should be to deprive the enemy of full use of the SOISSONS communications net, and to improve the course followed by our front line between REIMS and the MARNE (liberating REIMS).

These results will be obtained:

(1) By a rupture of the hostile front lines. On one flank, in the region south of the AISNE, the tenth Army will break through advancing in the general direction of OULCHY-le-CHATEAU, the Sixth Army in the general direction of the plateau south of BRENY-ARMENties. On the other flank, in the region south of the VESLE, the Fifth Army will drive in the general direction of ARCIS-le-PONSART.

(2) By exploiting with the utmost speed the break made on each flank of the pocket, so as to effect the junction of the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center in the region of FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

II. Organization of the command: Zones of action of the Groups of Armies:

(a) The attacks in the region south of the Aisne will be executed jointly by the Tenth and Sixth Armies under the common direction of the Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Reserve.

The Tenth Army will be charged with the main effort.

The Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Reserve, will have authority over the Commanding General, Sixth Army, only in tactical matters, and then only as concerns the employment of troops in the area north of the MARNE. For that purpose, he is authorized from now on to address his operations orders to the Commanding General, Sixth Army.

(b) The respective zones of action of the two groups of armies north of the MARNE will be separated by the line: BRASLES--VERDILLY--EPIEDS--BEUVARDES--FERE-en-TARDENOIS--LOUPEIGNE--JOUAIGNES (all to the Group of Armies of the Center).

III. Missions of the armies and the means at their disposal:

(a) The mission of the Tenth Army and the means placed at its disposal are defined in Instructions No. 9732, July 8, from the Commander-in-Chief to the Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Reserve.

The Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Center, will communicate directly with the Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Reserve, for information as to the particulars of the operation to be executed by the Tenth Army.

(b) The Sixth Army will attack between the valleys of the OURCQ and the CLIGNON, its left resting on the OURCQ.

Its 1st objective, from south to north, will be general line: LICY-CLIGNON---Hills 184 and 180 south and north of SOMMELANS--NEUILLY-ST-FRONT.

The main effort of the army will be directed at gaining the region of BRENY-ARMENTIES (south of OULCHY-le-CHATEAU), where it should endeavor to join the right flank of the attack front of the Tenth Army.

In addition to the divisions now occupying the sector between the OURCQ and the CLIGNON [four divisions], the Sixth Army will have at its disposal the following units:

2 infantry divisions: viz., the French 4th Division and the American 4th Division; French 502d Tank Regiment (regrouped in time by the Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Center).

The Commander-in-Chief hopes that it may be possible to assign one or two additional infantry divisions for exploitation.

As regards artillery, the Sixth Army will not count on any reinforcements; it will employ to the best advantage the means now at its disposal north of the MARNE.
(c) The Fifth Army will attack along both banks of the ARDRE, with the right flank of its attack resting on the heights south of the VESLE.

Its 1st objective from north to south will be the general line: GUEUX---COURCELLES---SAPICOURT---Hill 233---MONTAZIN Farm---BROUILLET---LAGERY---AOUGNY---ANTHENAY.

It will make its main effort in the region south of the ARDRE in the general direction of ARCIS-le-PONSART.

* * * * * *

Artillery support for the zone of attack should be furnished without weakening the defensive disposition of the Fourth Army.

IV. General progress to be made by the attacking armies: The Commanding Generals of the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center will make the necessary plans—depending upon the development of the action—for the eventual forward movement of large units that do not make the initial attack.

The crossing of the MARNE will be studied as a sequel to the gains made on the two flanks of the pocket.

The general advance of the Tenth, Sixth, and Fifth Armies will be organized so that our front initially will reach the general line: CHAUDUN---HARTENNES---plateaus north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS---ARCIS-le-PONSART---ROSNAY.

V. The characteristics of the operation will be as follows: The infantry will attack at daybreak after a brief and violent preparation: The divisions designated for the attack will move into position during the night, D minus 1 day—D day. [The Fifth Army will be prepared to change in one night from its present defensive dispositions to the offensive disposition.]

The Commander-in-Chief will issue advance instructions before midnight, D minus 4 days, though not before July 14.

H hour will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief.

Preparations will begin immediately and will be carried out with the greatest of secrecy, employing every means of camouflage necessary to assure surprise effect.

The Commander-in-Chief will determine the duration of the artillery preparation after studying the proposals on the subject which the commanders of the two groups of armies will submit to him.

PETAIN.

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HS Fr. Files: 409-30.1: Order

**Steps Toward Forming American Corps**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1282

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
July 12, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS FOR THE AMERICAN 1st DIVISION

[Extract]

1. The American 1st Division (Hq. at NIVILLERS) and the headquarters of the American corps will move to take up new stations in the region of NANTEUIL---DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE.
The purpose of this movement is to regroup the American 1st and 2d Divisions in the MARNE region under the command of General Bullard, who will assume command of the American corps upon arrival of the American 1st Division in his zone.

The American III Corps will be attached to the French Sixth Army and remain in reserve, at the disposal of G. H. Q.

II. Area of the American 1st Division, bounded by the following localities (inclusive):
MONTAGNY-Ste-FELICITE, le PLESSIS-BELLEVILLE, MARCHEMORET, MONTGE, VINANTES, ST-MESMES, GRESSY, VILLEPINTE, DUGNY, PIERREFITTE, ECOUEN, Le MESNIL-AUBRY, FONTENANY-en-PARISIS, LOUVRES, SURVILLIERS, ERMenONVILLE.

Headquarters, American III Corps: MEAUX;
Headquarters, American 1st Division: DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE.

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FAYOLLE,
General,
Commanding Group of Armies of the Reserve.

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Request for Four British Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

No. 709-710-711M

July 13, 1918.

General, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the Marshal, Commander-in-Chief of the British Armies from the French Mission at MONTREUIL.

[Extract]

I. In view of the turn that the impending battle in the CHAMPAGNE seems to be taking, I call on you for British reserves. I ask you to send 4 divisions to the French front to begin with.

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Detrainment in the region REVIGNY---VITRY-le-FRANCOIS.

III. These movements will be carried out in agreement with French G. H. Q.

IV. I ask you furthermore to prepare four other divisions to follow the first four, if the exigencies of the battle require.

V. I will be happy to meet you as soon as convenient to discuss the situation with you.

FOCH.

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Day of Attack Named

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 714/M

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 13, 1918--3 p. m.

Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters NOAILLES, French Group of Armies of the Reserve; VERSIGNY,

French Tenth Army; TRILPORT, French Sixth Army; SEZANNE, French Group Armies of the Center.

1. Attacks Sixth and Tenth Armies, outlined in my Instruction No. 14546 of July 12, must be ready to be launched the morning of July 18.
2. H hour will be indicated later.
3. I urgently invite your attention to the necessity of absolute secrecy.

PETAIN.

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Instructions for Attack

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1358

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
Noailles, Oise, July 13, 1918.

Memorandum for the General commanding the Tenth Army

[Extract]

1. If the main enemy attack takes place between CHATEAU-THIERRY and REIMS, as is expected, the purpose of the Tenth Army offensive will be to take it in reverse.
   Consequently the general direction of attack will be DOMMIERS---VIERZY---HARTENNES---CRAMAILLE---FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

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Objective of Sixth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1500

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
Noailles, Oise, July 14, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SIXTH ARMY

[Extract]

The main effort of the Sixth Army will be made in the direction of PASSY-en-VALOIS
---NEUILLY-St-FRONT---BRENY---between the OURCQ and ALLAND Creek.
It is necessary to cover it on the right by occupying the heights between ALLAND
Creek and the CLIGNON (HAUTEVESNES, ORME-Signal, Hill 184).
It follows that the forces will be distributed in two groupments: The main one intened to operate
between the OURCQ and ALLAND Creek; the secondary groupment, south of
ALLAND Creek.

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FAYOLLE.

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American Units Attached to French Tenth Army

[Editorial Translation]

No. 1506

July 14, 1918.

From: Headquarters NOAILLES [Group of Armies of the Reserve]
To: Headquarters VERSIGNY, TRILPORT, PROVINS, SEZANNE

1. Headquarters, American III Corps (Hq. at MEAUX), and the American 1st Division
are now entirely at the disposal of the French Tenth Army.
2. Headquarters, American 2d Division (Hq. at Le SAUSSOY, 2 kilometers northeast of
CHAMIGNY), is now at the disposal of the Tenth Army for all necessary reconnaissances. In-
structions will be issued later concerning the disposition of this division.

PAQUETTE.

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Movement of 2d Field Artillery Brigade

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
July 14, 1918.

No. 1530

Headquarters at NOAILLES

To Headquarters at TRILPORT; VERSIGNY; SEZANNE; PROVINS

Artillery of the American 2d Division will move during the night July 14/15 to BETZ area where it will be at the disposal of Tenth Army; movement regulated by Sixth Army. Location on arrival and subsequent movement will be regulated by Tenth Army after agreement with Sixth Army.

By order:

MEULLE-DESJARDINS,
Chief of Staff.

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Suspension of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 15, 1918---10 a. m.

3d Section, General Staff

SENT FROM: G. H. Q.
SENT BY: The General-in-Chief
RECD. BY: General Fayolle

The Boche have made a salient south of the Marne. Suspend the Mangin operation in order to enable me to send your reserves into the battle south of the Marne. The artillery of the American 2d Division will be returned to the American 2d Division.

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Suspension of Attack Countermanded

[Editorial Translation]

From: BACON, General Headquarters of the Allied Armies
At: Mouchy-le-Chatel
Date: July 15, 1918 Hour: 12:25 p.m. Sent By: Telephone
To: General Petain, French G. H. Q., 3d Section, General Staff

It must be understood that until there are new developments that you will communicate to me, there can be no question at all of slowing up and less so of stopping the Mangin preparations.

In case of absolute and imperative necessity you will employ such troops as are absolutely indispensable to meet the situation, informing me of it at once.

FOCH.

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French Tenth Army Ordered to Proceed with Plan

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
No. 834/M
July 15, 1918--14:30 h.

From: General, Commander-in-Chief, Petain, 3d Section, General Staff
To: Headquarters at NOAILLES, Group of Armies of the Reserve; SEZANNE,
Group of Armies of the Center; BACON, Allied General Headquarters

I. The enemy has driven a salient south of Marne, between the valley of the Surmelin and TROISSY, and has reached the outskirts of La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON, COMBLIZY, and NESLES-le-REPONS.
II. The elements that have crossed must be thrown back north of the Marne at once. All the force needed to accomplish this task must be employed.
III. I have therefore decided to call for the reserves on the left of the Sixth Army. The 168th Division is given to the Group of Armies of the Center for the counterattack south of the Marne.
IV. General Mangin [Tenth Army] will otherwise go ahead with his preparations for attack according to existing instructions. I will not call for any of his reserves except in case of imperative and absolute necessity.
V. The utmost secrecy concerning this attack is enjoined on headquarters, services and troops on the move or in billets.

By order:

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.

HS Fr. Files: 700-30.9: Telegram

**Modification of Mission**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 807/M
Commander-in-Chief

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
*Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 15, 1918—10:15 a.m.*

To Headquarters at NOAILLES

Reply to Telegram 1585-86 (2d part) of July 15, 1918.

I approve second solution proposed, which is to subordinate action of Sixth Army to the progress of Tenth Army.

PETAIN.

HS Fr. Files: 402-30.1: Letter

**Decision Reached to Take Soissons**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 1464

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE ALLIED ARMIES,
*Bombon, Seine-et-Marne, June 16, 1918.*

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

The day when we shall have under our guns the railroad net of Soissons, the supply of the enemy forces located to the south of the Aisne will be greatly hindered and also the entire German offensive toward CHATEAU-THIERRY will lose its vigor.

This outcome appears possible of attainment by advance along the plateau of DOMMIERS as far as the ravine of MISSY-aux-BOIS, an advance to be accomplished with the help of a heavy concentration of artillery and tanks, and consequently requiring only a relatively small outlay of infantry.
Such an action will be easier the sooner it is carried out, since it will be delivered against a less well-organized enemy.

On the other hand, the offensive of the French Fifth Army, prepared as a reply to the attacks of the enemy upon our Sixth and Tenth Armies, now is of much less immediate interest because the enemy has been stopped. It may be reduced in size or postponed.

Therefore, I request, if you are of the same opinion, that you prepare, without delay, and advise me of plans for the proposed operation.

FOCH.


Request for Plans

[Editorial Translations]

General Staff
No. 2109

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, Seine-et-Marne, July 16, 1918.

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the General, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

For the general conduct of operations on the entire front and from the viewpoint of my relations with the Commanders-in-Chief of the various Allied Armies, it is essential for me to know with accuracy not only the distribution of French, British, or American forces at your disposal, but also your plans for the employment of these forces.

Such information is not available to me.

For example, in the matter of the offensive operations to be carried out by the French Tenth and Sixth Armies, I know your plans only by the project dated July 12 submitted to me by General Duffieux. I do not know whether the project has been transmitted in the form in which it was presented to me or whether it has been modified.

And yet, in our present situation, a powerful offensive in the direction of FERE-en-TARDENOIS is of the greatest importance. The plan to devote the Tenth Army and the left of the Sixth Army to it is to be adhered to at all costs and to be carried out on the date contemplated.

General Duffieux has also handed me a proposal for secret and personal instructions to the General commanding the French Group of Armies of the Center in connection with the steps to take after the launching of the enemy offensive. This project contemplated that, in case of an enemy advance against the French Fifth Army, the General commanding the Group of Armies of the Center was to reestablish the front; then, by a combined action of the Fifth and Tenth Armies, reduce the Chateau-Thierry salient.

This project, which supplements that concerning the Tenth and Sixth Armies and will, at the very least, result in immobilizing the enemy reserves, must be followed up and maintained to the utmost and executed under the same time conditions as the first.

As for the Allied forces, British or American, placed at your disposal, it is my duty to inform the Commanders-in-Chief of those armies of the intended employment of these forces. I can do so only if I know in sufficient time your intentions and the arrangements made by you.

In the case of the British 51st and 62nd Inf. Divs. for example, now in the course of
detraining, I am unacquainted with the instructions you have doubtless given on the subject of their assignment and use, definitive or contingent.

Under these conditions I will ask you for the future to acquaint me without delay with all the instructions you give to the army group or army commanders under your orders, concerning operations (projected operations, assignment of available units, especially of Allied units, intentions or decisions relating to their employment) as well as any change you think necessary to make in such instructions.

FOCH.

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HS Fr. File: 409-30.1: Telegram

Recommendations for H Hour

[Editorial Translation]

No. 1803

To French G. H. Q.

GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,

July 16, 1918---11 a. m.

In reply to the last paragraph of instructions of July 12.

The French Tenth Army has no demolitions to be carried out on its front. This being the case, General Mangin recommends that there be no preparation and that the jump-off take place as a complete surprise at H hour, in rear of the rolling barrage.

I share that opinion. He asks that H hour be 4:35 a. m., an hour which to me seems very suitable.

The French Sixth Army requires an hour and a half of preparation. As its action is subordinate to that of the Tenth Army, it is expedient to leave to it choice of the hours, with the reservation that no firing take place before the Tenth Army jumps off.

FAYOLLE.

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HS Fr. File: 403-30.1: Telegram

Approval of H Hour

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

July 17, 1918---noon.

Commander-in-Chief

To: Headquarters LAMORLAYE, [Group of Armies of the Reserve]

Supplement to Telegram 714/M of July 13

Attacks of the Tenth and Sixth Armies will be launched July 18. Concerning determination of H hour, propositions contained in Telegram 1803 of July 16 from General Fayolle are approved.

PETAIN.

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Attacks to be Launched by the Group of Armies of the Center

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff                              FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
No. 940-941/M                                           July 17, 1918--5:20 p. m.

To:  Headquarters BACON, Allied Armies; SEZANNE, Group of Armies of the Center; SAINT MEMMIE, Fourth Army; MONTMORT, Fifth Army; ESTERNAY, Ninth Army; TRILPORT, Sixth Army; LAMORLAYE, Group of Armies of Reserve; VERSIGNY, Tenth Army.

1. As directed by my previous orders, the battle will resumed tomorrow morning on the entire front of the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Armies to reoccupy the lost ground, aiming first for points, the possession of which is essential to the security of the position of resistance.

2. The Fourth Army will begin its artillery preparation at 4 a. m. at the latest giving it its maximum intensity of fire from the start.

3. The Fifth and Ninth Armies will not begin their artillery preparation until 5 a. m., giving it similarly its maximum intensity from the start.

4. On those parts of the front where the armies deem artillery preparation unnecessary, the rolling barrage which will be launched suddenly at the hours indicated above, hours which are obligatory.

5. The Commander-in-Chief relies on the ardor and energy of all to make a memorable day of July 18.

BUAT,  
Chief of Staff.

Request for Additional British Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff                              FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,  
No. 20870                                               July 17, 1918.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

By letter No. 19641, July 16 [not printed], I called your attention to the small number of the reserves at my disposal.  
It is reasonable to expect that the offensive of the Tenth and Sixth Armies will take approximately 10 divisions, and its final outcome can moreover result in an extension of the front to be held.

As the enemy is still pushing southwest of REIMS and south of the Marne on the fronts of the Fifth and Sixth Armies, the attrition is considerable on that side also.
The memorandum inclosed with my letter No. 20318 of July 16 [not printed] set forth for you the state of my reserves. Their number is insufficient to feed a defensive battle of that extent and an offensive battle which will certainly be followed by heavy German counterattacks.

So as not to lose the benefit of the important effort which will be made between VIC-sur-AISNE and the Argonne beginning July 18, I have the honor urgently to request that the second group of 4 British inf. divs. which has been prepared by Marshal Haig in compliance with your telegram 709-710-711/M of July 13 (British 29th, 56th, 57th, 61st Inf. Divs. with the headquarters of the British XVII Army Corps) follow without interruption the course of the British 15th and 34th Inf. Divs. toward the battle that is now in progress.

PETAIN.

HS Fr. Files: Sixth Army: 416-30.1: Order

Mission of Air Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 5,595

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AIR DIVISION

Because of the necessity for observing closely the movements in the enemy’s rear, the army air service is not prepared, during the battle, to furnish distant day reconnaissance.

Consequently, the air divisions will carry out this mission.

Zone to be reconnoitered north of the VESLE Valley limited by the roads: PONT-ARCY---LAON---MARLE---MONTCORNET---ROZOY [ROZY-sur-SERRE]---FRAILLICOURT---SIGNY-l’ABBAYE---LAUNOIS---RETHEL (all incl.).

The purpose of these reconnaissances is to detect movements most likely indicative of the intentions of the enemy.

Attention should be paid to the following points in particular:

1. Activity on railroads converging near LAON (photographs of this station) and of railroads converging at AMAGNE---LUCQUY (photographs of this station). Especially the line LAON---La MAISON-BLEUE.

2. Movements on the LAON---PONT-ARCY, LAON---BERRY-au-BAC, MONTCORNET---REIMS Roads and the roads converging on RETHEL.

3. Large bivouac zone of Foret de SAMOUSSY and Camp de SISSONNE.

4. Landing fields between LAON and RETHEL and especially night fields observed near SISSONNE and at SERAINCOURT (photographs).

MAISTRE,
General of Division,
Commanding the Group of Armies of the Center.
**Zone of Action North of Marne**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 2,168

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Bombon, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918.

1. The region north of the MARNE from CHATEAU-THIERRY appears most favorable for a profitable offensive. On this account it is essential that the action in which our Sixth and Tenth Armies have been engaged there today be reinforced at once and then be exploited toward the north.

2. To the accomplishment of these two mission, we must, without delay, devote every fresh unit we have available south of the line CHATEAU-THIERRY---REIMS---MASSIGES, which is destined beyond any doubt to become our decisive field.

3. The units to be counted upon are the following:
   - (a) British XX Army Corps, which would rejoin the British 15th and 34th Inf. Divs.
   - (b) American 42d Division.
   - (c) French or American units coming from the east.

4. This new distribution of forces must in no way restrict the offensive action required of the French Ninth, Fifth, and Fourth Armies. It is by the reorganization of our forces that are engaged and not by the intervention of new forces that this action will be sustained.

FOCH.
Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

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**Fighting Around Soissons**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918---2:30 p. m.

To French Group of Armies of the Center

Sender: French G. H. Q.

Sending Officer: General Duffieux

Receiving Officer: Colonel Dessoffy

General Duffieux: We have to use the Fourth Army sparingly. You must give us the 52d Inf. Div. and prepare the American 42d Div. for movement.

Colonel Dessoffy: The American 42d Div. has lost 2,000 or 3,000 men.
General Duffieux: That makes no difference. We are having great success around Soissons and to the south. Everything must get into the battle as soon as possible. Therefore, I am giving you a warning order for the 52d Div. and the American 42d Div. The final order to carry out the movement will be given to you within an hour, if nothing interferes. The director of the motor transport service has been notified.

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HS Fr. Files: 700-30.9: Order

Instructions for Tenth and Sixth Armies

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 39/O.P.

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918—10 p. m.

1. Situation as known to exist at 10 p. m.

The Tenth Army has occupied the heights south of the Aisne as far as the Montagne-de-Paris. Its line facing east runs through Ploisy—Vierzy—Bois de Mauloy—Villers-le-Petit—outskirts of Chouy.

The Sixth Army has pushed forward to the general line of Neuilly-St-Front (excl.); farther south it occupies Cointicourt, Courchamps, Licy-Clignon, Torcy, Belleau.

The number of prisoners taken amounts to nearly 12,000, including some 10,000 taken by the Tenth Army. Numerous batteries have fallen into our hands. Their exact number is not yet known.

2. The battle which has started very well will be continued without a break tonight and tomorrow.

Tenth Army: There is no need for the left to go beyond the covering line originally planned: Aisne-Crise.

The center will continue its advance in the direction of Hartennes—Fere-en-Tardenois, while the right will wheel on Oulchy-le-Chateau and seek to envelop the plateau of Chouy from the east.

The first success to be exploited in our advance to the south of Soissons is to hold the railway lines south of Soissons and the road net near Missy [Missy-aux-Bois] under continuous artillery fire.

The II Cav. Corps has not succeeded in breaking out into open country. If any elements have been employed to stop gaps in the infantry line, they should be relieved at once. As a matter of fact, it is essential that this cavalry corps be reserved for a better use later on.

A counteroffensive on the part of the enemy is probable from tomorrow on. It must be anticipated and measures be taken to check it under any circumstances.

Accordingly, a line of resistance will be determined upon and occupied by reserves. Generally speaking, this line runs along the heights dominating the Aisne and the Crise as far as Berzy: it then follows the approaches of the Soissons—Oulchy-le-Chateau Road.

The 87th Infantry Division is placed at the immediate disposal of the Tenth Army.

Sixth Army: The Sixth Army will continue its offensive under the same conditions as governed today’s operations, in the direction: Neuilly-St-Front—La Croix. With its French VII Army Corps and American I Army Corps it will keep contact with the Marne front around Chateau-Thierry.

3. As soon as the Tenth Army, enveloping Chouy from the east, has reached the Ourcq with its right, that river will act as boundary between the two armies.
4. Because of the better means of communication afforded, the command post of the Tenth Army will be maintained at Bonneuil.

FAYOLLE,
General,
Commanding.

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HS Fr. File: 402-30.1: Instruction

**Plans for Continuation of Battle**

[Editorial Translation]

General Staff
No. 2206
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
July 19, 1918—12:50 p.m.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST

The battle now in progress must aim at the destruction of the enemy forces south of the Aisne and the Vesle. It will be conducted with the greatest force and the utmost energy, without loss of time, to exploit the surprise realized.

It will be continued by:

- The Tenth Army covered by the Aisne and subsequently the Vesle, aiming at the capture of the plateaus north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS, its right at FERE-en-TARDENOIS.
- The Sixth Army, supporting the advance of the Tenth Army and moving its left to FERE-en-TARDENOIS.
- The Ninth and Fifth Armies resuming a vigorous offensive as early as possible; the Ninth Army to drive the enemy back north of the MARNE; the Fifth Army to recapture first the front CHATILLON [CHATILLON-sur-MARNE]—BLIGNY and subsequently the VILLE-en-TARDENOIS—VERNEUIL Road.

FOCH.

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HS Fr. Files: 409-30.1: Instructions

**Continuation of Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 67/O.P.
FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
July 19, 1918—7 p.m.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SIXTH AND TENTH ARMIES

[Extract]

I. SITUATION AS KNOWN AT 7 p.m.: The Tenth Army has held on to the ground captured yesterday, despite a violent counterattack on CHAUDUN.
On the south it seized Plateau 188 and CHOUY. The Sixth Army has taken NEUILLY-St-FRONT, MAUBRY, RASSY and PRIEZ. Liaison between the two armies is solidly established at CROUTES mill.

II. Tomorrow the advance will continue according to the directions contained in yesterday's instructions.

• • • • •

FAYOLLE,
General Commanding,
The Reserve Group of Armies.

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Order to Force Crossings of the Marne

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 5849

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,
July 19, 1918.

[Extract]

The possibility must be anticipated that the enemy will evade our attack and fall back north of the MARNE, defending the river crossing.

Everything possible must be done to move the FERAUD GROUPMENT rapidly to the right bank, where it will take over a portion of the present zone of the V Army Corps. • • •

The necessary artillery will be held on the left bank to cover the flank of elements operating on the right bank.

The Ninth Army will attempt to force the crossings of the MARNE. It will be assisted in this operation by the left elements of the Fifth Army advancing on the right bank.

MAISTRE,
Commanding General.

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Mission of French Armies

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 1067-1068/M

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

July 20, 1918.

General, Commander-in-Chief

To Hq.: Sezanne, Lamorlaye, Montmort [Fifth Army], Esternay, Trilport, Bonneuil [Tenth Army], Bacon, May-en-Multien [Sixth Army]

1. The enemy is abandoning the south bank of the Marne. Instructions No. 14546 of July 12 goes into full effect. The problem is to clear out the CHATEAU-THIERRY pocket. Consequently, the objective of the armies will be to establish themselves on the line of Aisne and Vesle in order to cut off the withdrawal of all enemy forces south of that line.

2. The French Fifth Army will move on FISMES by way of both banks of the ARDRE, while covering itself toward the VESLE.

The French Ninth Army, leaving a minimum force south of the MARNE, between TROISSY and CHARTEVES, will push its elements on the right to GOUSSANCOURT and COULONGES, its elements on the left to VERDILLY, EPIEDS, BEUVARDES, in close liaison with the Fifth Army on the right and with the French Sixth Army on the left.

3. The Sixth Army will move on FERE-en-TARDENOIS, then MAREUIL-en-DOLE. The Tenth Army, establishing itself solidly toward the exits of SOISSONS, and toward MONT-de-PARIS [La MONTAGNE-de-PARIS], and Le MONT-de-BELLEAU Fme and establishing a strong line of artillery facing the AISNE, will make its main effort on the plateaus of AMBRIEF and LESGES, in the direction of BAZOCHES.

4. A methodical advance by means of proper interchange of units, including the progressive withdrawal of forces as the front narrows, must be assured. However, it must be understood that the enemy will be given no respite until the prescribed objectives have been reached.

PETAIN.

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Movement of American 32d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,058/M
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 20, 1918—10:50 a.m.

General, Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters Noailles.* Lamorlaye, Bacon [G. H. Q. of the Allied Armies],
French Military Mission at Chaumont

[Extract]

1. American 32d Division will begin to detrain ORMOY, NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOUIN, Le PLESSIS-BELLEVILLE, DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE, at noon, July 23. * * *
2. This division will be in reserve at my disposal. Regroupment area to be determined by Group of Armies of the Reserve, which will report action taken.

PETAIN.

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Movement of American 42d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,062/M
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
Provins, Seine-et-Marne, July 20, 1918—11:15 a.m.

General, Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters Noailles, Lamorlaye, Bacon, French Military Mission at Chaumont, Sezanne

[Extract]

1. American 42d Division will begin to detrain at LIZY-sur-OURCQ, La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE, TRILPORT, ESLY toward 3 a.m., July 22. * * *

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* Group of Armies of the Reserve actually moved its headquarters from NOAILLES to LAMORLAYE on July 16 while the Tenth Army moved from LAMORLAYE to VERSIGNY on July 10. However it would seem, on this date that NOAILLES was still retained as a code name for the Group of Armies of the Reserve and LAMORLAYE for the Tenth Army.
2. This division will be placed at disposal Sixth Army to operate in the zone of the American I Army Corps with American 26th Division. In exchange, the Group of Armies of the Reserve will return to my control the French 166th Inf. Div. as will be prescribed in later order.

By order:

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.


XXXVIII Corps Transferred to Sixth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1076-1077/M
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST, July 20, 1918 -- 4:45 p.m.

General Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters LAMORLAYE, SEZANNE, BONNEUIL, TRILPORT, ESTERNAY, MONTMORT, BACON

Supplementing Telegram 1067-68-69/M of July 20, 1918

(1) Effective at once, XXXVIII Army Corps passes under the tactical control of the General commanding the Sixth Army. Sixth and Ninth Armies by mutual agreement will determine conditions for carrying out this order. Sixth Army thus reinforced by XXXVIII Corps remains under the tactical control of the Group of Armies of the Reserve

(2) Amending Par. II C of my Instructions 14,546 of July 12, the respective zones of action of the Group of Armies of the Reserve (Tenth and Sixth Armies) and of the Group of Armies of the Center (Ninth and Fifth Armies) north of the Marne are, effective at once, separated by line: Jaulgonne---Roncheres---Cierges---Chamery (these localities to the Group of Armies of the Reserve)---Coulonces---Draegny---St.-Gilles---Fismes---Merval---Revillon (these localities to the Group of Armies of the Center).

(3) A subsequent order will determine division of territory between Group of Armies of the Reserve and Group of Armies of the Center, and assignment conditions of Sixth Army to the Group of Armies of the Reserve from the standpoint of communications and supply.

PETAIN.

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Plans for Crossing Marne

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,
July 20, 1918---9:10 a. m.

Headquarters CHAMPAGNE

To Headquarters ESTERNAY, MONTMORT, TRILPORT, G. Q. G. (for information)

As soon as the Ninth Army reaches the MARNE it will conform to the provisions of Instruction No. 5849 of July 19.

Moreover, the XXXVIII Army Corps, leaving only a screen on the MARNE east of CHATEAU-THIERRY, will operate from the right bank of the MARNE and attack with its forces in the direction of VERDILLY-EPIEDS in liaison with the Sixth Army (American I Army Corps).

The Ninth Army will reinforce it with all the artillery available.
As fast as the tanks cease to be used; they will be withdrawn to be placed at the disposal of the Fifth Army.

By order:

MOLLANDIN,
Chief of Staff.

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Distribution of Forces

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE CENTER,
July 20, 1918---7:20 p. m.

Headquarters CHAMPAGNE

To Headquarters TRILPORT, ESTERNAY, MONTMORT, G. Q. G. (for information)

Instructions, based on provisions of G. H. Q. telegram 1067/M, dated July 20, indicating the Mission of the Armies, will issue from these headquarters.

In the meantime the distribution of forces effective at 8 p. m. July 20 will be as follows:

XXXVIII A. C. attached to the Sixth Army.
III A. C. (73d, 18th, 4th Inf. Divs.) remains attached to the Ninth Army.
I Cavalry (20th, 77th, 168th, 131st Divs.) attached to the Fifth Army.
Boundaries of the zones of action: Sixth Army: East, boundary of the XXXVIII and
III Army Corps. Ninth Army: West, above boundary. East, the line TROISSY (Fifth Army)—IGNY-le-JARD—MAREUIL-en-BRIE (Ninth Army)—CHAMPAUBERT (Fifth Army). Fifth Army: East of the above boundary.

Approved:

MAISTRE.

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Instruction to Armies

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,

July 21, 1918—1 p. m.

(1) At the stage our affairs have reached, and to reap from the battle now in progress all the results it can yield, it is necessary to push the action of the Tenth Army on the plateaus north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS to the utmost.

To that end will be applied all available resources, not to mention the continuous support the left of the Sixth Army must give it, nor the offensive to be maintained on the fronts of the Ninth and Fifth Armies.

(2) At the same time as this offensive action takes place it will be necessary to organize a defense against a possible counterthrust north of the OISE or on the British front by which the enemy might try to disturb our action.

To that end, tired divisions withdrawn from the battle front will be regrouped without delay, first in rear of the left of the Group of Armies of the Reserve, then in rear of that group's center.

The units, which the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies has requested the British army to move to the south of the SOMME for possible support of the French front, will by these measures be returned to the complete disposal of the British army within a short time.

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Modification of Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

July 21, 1918.

ORDERS

I. Effective at 8 a. m., July 22, the boundary between the Group of Armies of the Center and the Group of Armies of the Reserve will be modified as follows:
MEZY---MOULINS---PAROY---LAUNAY---CONNIGIS (these localities to the Group of Armies of the Reserve)---COUFREMAUX---MONTTHARMEAUX---AUCLAINE---SOUDAN---FONTENELLE ---EPIINE-aux-BOIS---VENDIERES (these localities to the Group of Armies of the Center)---MONTDAUPHIN (to the Group of Armies of the Reserve)---MONTOLIVET (to the Group of Armies of the Center) then west boundary of the Department of the MARNE until its meeting with the boundary of the COULOMMERS arrondissement [largest subdivision of a French department].

South boundary of the COULOMMERS arrondissement.

East and south boundaries of the MELUN arrondissement.

II. The zones of action of the two groups of armies north of the MARNE will be divided by the line Le CHARMEL---RONCHERES---CIERGES---CHAMERY (these localities to the Group of Armies of the Reserve)---COULONGES---DRAVEGNY---St-GILLES---FISMES---MERYVAL---REVILLON (these localities to the Group of Armies of the Center)

III. The Sixth Army, the XXXVIII Army Corps (with the French 39th Div., the American 3d and 28th Divs.) passed to the Group of Armies of the Reserve.

IV. For the distribution of the artillery the two groups of armies are invited to submit their recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief.

V. The permanent installations situated in the territory that is passed to the Group of Armies of the Reserve, as well as the organizations of the service of the rear located in this territory will pass to this group of armies.

The Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center will come to an agreement on the regrouping of units which may find themselves divided between the groups of armies because of the adoption of this new boundary.

PETAIN.

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American Divisions Assigned to French

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1125/M
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 21, 1918---10:15 p. m.

General Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters LAMORLAYE [Group of Armies of the Reserve]

[Extract]

* * * * * *

(3) The American 1st and 2d Divisions are in reserve at my disposal. Let me know their losses.

By order:

de BARESCUT,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

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Dispositions of American Units

[Editorial Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, General Staff
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
Mouchy-le-Chatel, July 24, 1918.

At General Foch's headquarters on July 24, it was decided, by agreement between Generals Pershing and Petain, that the accomplishment of the following dispositions of the American larger units will begin July 25:

1 [one] Army Corps
32d Division
26th Division
4th Division

1 [one] Army Corps
42d Division
5th Division [See contemporary translation following]
28th Division

The American 77th Divisions will be reserved for use, either to fight in a French Army, or to become part of the American army.

F. FOCH.

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[Contemporary Translation]

1st Subsection, 3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,350
HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,
July 24, 1918.

NOTE*

July 24, it was decided at General Headquarters of General Foch, in agreement with General Pershing and General Petain, that the dispositions indicated below will be commenced beginning on July 25 for the larger American units

1 C. A. [one A. C.]
32d Div. 26th Div.
4th Div.

1 C. A. [one A. C.]
42d Div. 3d [sic] ** Div.
28th Div.

The employment of the American 77th Division is reserved either for the battle in the French army or to take its place in the American army.

By order:

WEYGAND,
Chief of Staff.

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* As a footnote on the original French of which this is a translation there appears in French, in pencil, the following note dated July 24, 1918, and signed by BUAT, Chief of Staff at Marshall Petain's headquarters: "Since drafting this memorandum, it has been learned that the 26th Div. had been withdrawn from the line. Gen. Pershing does not at all insist on the numerical designation of the divisions that is indicated above. He would be satisfied if the distribution of troops is effected employing a French infantry division if it should be necessary to await the reentry in line of one of the American divisions in rear." [Editorial translation.]

** Compare with copy signed "F. Foch."
Memo. to be appended to Note of July 24 signed by General Weygand.

This agreement was changed a few minutes after signature by the agreement of Gen. Pershing that the 42d Division should relieve the 26th on the evening of the 24th. This latter decision was taken with the understanding between Gen. Pershing and General Petain that it made no difference to Gen. Pershing the order in which divisions were placed, provided he could within the immediate future have four divisions grouped in the vicinity of the 42d and 3d, with 2 divisions in their rear.

CARL BOYD,
[Lt. Col., A. D. C. to C-in-C, A. E. F.]

Further Note: The above arrangements will be still further modified by a letter sent by the C-in-C to the French Mission on July 26.*

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Ninth Army in Reserve

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1220/M
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 24, 1918--5 p.m.

General, Commander-in-Chief

To Hq. Sezanne [French Group of Armies of the Center]

Noailles, Lamorlaye [French Group of Armies of the Reserve].
The French Ninth Army will cease to function effective at noon, July 25.
The French III Corps will pass to the French Fifty Army on that date.
Hq. of the Ninth Army will be established as soon as possible at Meru where it will
be in reserve at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.
Advise date on which it will be ready to function in new location.

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.

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* [The paper referred to, filed in G-3, GHQ, AEF records, Flr. 1022, provided that General Pershing would have for the formation of the American First Army in the Chateau-Thierry region the following divisions: 4th, 28th, 32d, 42d, 77th, and 82d. In the Toul-Nancy area there would be the 89th, 90th, and 92d Divisions in line with the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 26th in reserve.]
American Division to Enter Line

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 24, 1918--8:25 p.m.

General Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters LAMORLAYE, VERSIGNY-BONNEUIL, TRILPORT, BACON

[Extract]

I. The American 32d Div. is placed at the disposal of the Sixth Army to enter in line under the control of the General commanding the American I Army Corps. The movement of the 32d Div. will begin as soon as possible.

III. Above dispositions are nucleus for the constitution of the American battle sector. Report execution.

By order:

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.

Relief of the 26th Division

G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,
July 24, 1918.

Commanding General, American III Army Corps

Pierrefonds

No. 324, G-3, CARRIE [42d Div.] is being used to relieve JANE [26th Div] by authority these headquarters. Acknowledge.

McANDREW.
Creation of American Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 32,696

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 25, 1918.

Memorandum for the Commander of the Group of Armies of the Reserve

I. It has been decided that the American First Army will enter the line on the front now held by the French Sixth Army.

The arrangement of the American First Army will, in principle, be based on the occupation of two American corps sectors, each American corps to have two divisions in line and one in reserve. This occupation will start beginning July 25.

The American First Army will consist, initially, of the American 3d, 4th, 26th, 32d and 42d Divisions.

The headquarters of the American First Army will be established at La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE. The American First Army will be under the Group of Armies of the Reserve.

II. The Generals commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Sixth Army will take the necessary steps to facilitate the entry into sector of the American First Army and will arrange for the relief of French units, services, or establishments by the corresponding American elements.

The date of taking over of command by the American First Army will be fixed later.

PETAIN.

Assignment of Tank Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1271/M

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 25, 1918---5:15 p. m.

The Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters LAMORLAYE, SEZANNE, VERSIGNY, MARIGNY-en-OR XOIS [Sixth Army], MONTMORT [Fifth Army], MONTIGNY-sur-LOSING [ Tanks]

[Extract]

I. All the tank units now at the disposal of the Group of Armies of the Reserve and of the Group of Armies of the Center will be placed in reserve at the disposal of the Commanders-in-Chief beginning the morning of July 26.
II. These units will first be assembled in rear of the front of the armies to which they are now attached. They will be moved later by rail to regrouping areas for reorganization.

* * * * *

By order:

BUAT,
Chief of Staff.

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American 1st Division to Begin Entraining July 28

[Editorial Translation]

No. 178/O. P. GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
Headquarters LAMORLAYE July 26, 1918.

To Headquarters BONNEUIL, PROVINS

[Extract]

The American 1st Div. will begin entraining at 6 a. m., July 28 at ORMoy, NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOIN, Le PLESSIS-BELLEVILLE, DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE * * *

* * * * *

By order:

MEULLE-DESJARDINS,
Chief of the 3d Section.

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Transfer of the 32d Division from the III to I Corps

July 26, 1918.

Commanding General, III Army Corps, Mortefontaine


By order:

CONNER.

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Preparation for Operation

[Editorial Translation]

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED ARMIES,

July 27, 1918.

General Foch, Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies

To the Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the North and Northeast.

It is important to give the operation prescribed for the Tenth and Sixth Armies the maximum strength possible. Therefore:

(a) The Tenth Army must be brought up to proper offensive strength. Consequently the following measures must be taken.

- Check the use made by this army, on a given day and on a given part of its front of fresh units that have been or may be placed at its disposal.
- This measure is all the more necessary as the number of these units is relatively small.

- This army must be given tank units organized, if need be, by drawing on the other armies, taking into account all tank units that are still capable of being employed.
- At this phase of the battle, it is inadmissible to send all tank units to the rear for rest reorganization.

(b) Care must likewise be taken that the Sixth Army be made ready to make a serious effort with its left on the same day.

The assignment of the American 32d and 42d Divs. and of the French 62d Inf. Div. to this army will enable it to give the Tenth Army most effective support.

(c) The operation of the Tenth and Sixth Armies must be coordinated so as to bring about with these two armies a combined action in the general direction of FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

The Firth Army must be prepared to make a well organized attack on the same day in a direction that will prove most advantageous.

I shall be grateful to you for letting me know the measures you may have taken

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in this connection, as well as the nearest possible date when the contemplated operation
can be carried out.

FOCH.


Distribution of German Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

2d Section, General Staff
No. 9655/2

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
July 29, 1918.

Total number of divisions: 205*

155 at the front
50 in rear of the front

I. Units at the front

The 155 Divisions at the front are distributed as follows:

8 from the sea to YPRES
15 " YPRES to LA BASSEE
20 " LA BASSEE to VILLERS-BRETONNEUX
15 " VILLERS-BRETONNEUX to the OISE
52 " the OISE to REIMS
16 " REIMS to the ARGONNE
29 " the ARGONNE to SWITZERLAND

182 different divisions have been engaged since March 21**

* The total number of Germans divisions is 242; 37 are on the Russian front.

** Of the 182 divisions engaged, 30 have fought once 30
71 " twice 142
62 " 3 times 186
15 " 4 times 60
4 " 5 times 20

Total engagements 438
II. Units in rear of the front

The 50 divisions considered as being in rear of the front are distributed in the following manner:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION OF LOCALIZATION OR REGION OF ORIGIN OF THE DIVISIONS</th>
<th>LOCALIZED DIVISIONS</th>
<th>NOT LOCALIZED DIVISIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FRESH</td>
<td>TIRED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the sea to Ypres</td>
<td>Bavarian</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Ypres to La Bassee</td>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From La Bassee to Moreuil</td>
<td>Prince-28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From Moreuil to the Oise</td>
<td>Imperial</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From the Oise to the Ardre</td>
<td>Crown</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Champagne</td>
<td>Prince-22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdun</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorraine</td>
<td>=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsace</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                                                            | Fresh divisions | 20 |
|                                                            | Reorganized divisions | 18 | = 50 |
|                                                            | Tired divisions | 14 |

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HS Fr. File: 403-30.1: Order

*Operation to Prevent Enemy Withdrawal*

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section
No. 38,770

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

July 29, 1918.

[Extract]

I. The enemy, strongly established on the plateaus south of SOISSONS and on the heights between the VESLE and the ARDES, is effecting a systematic withdrawal between these two moats.

All the efforts of the armies engaged must be directed toward hastening this withdrawal, not only to prevent the enemy from executing his plans and carrying out demolitions, but also to hurry the time when it will be possible to put the MARNE railroad into operation.

II. Consequently: The Sixth Army, including the zone of action and the present forces of the French III Army Corps, will be in charge of the main operation. It will push vigorously and without interruption on its entire front in the general direction of FISMES and BAZOCHES, its left getting a foothold in the region of SAPONAY to facilitate the jump-off of the Tenth Army's right toward CRAMAILLE.
The Tenth Army, by a series of successive operations beginning on its right
(south), will seek to reach the line Bois d'ARCY - upper course of the CRISSE, and to ad-
vance via the plateau of ARCY-STE-RESTITUE, in the general direction of BRAINE.

During this entire maneuver, the main effort being made on the right, the center
will take part in the movement so as to occupy progressively the heights of the left bank
of the CRISSE.

The Fifth Army will support the right wing of the Sixth Army, by operating from
the heights on the south bank of the ARDRE on the axis ROMIGNY---LAGERY---CRUGNY; its ac-
tion north of the ARDRE will develop as a consequence of the progress realized on that axis.

• • • • •

IV. The Sixth Army, whose front will be progressively shortened, has at its disposal,
the necessary forces to accomplish its mission.

The Tenth Army can count on being assigned, before August 1, a fresh infantry
division coming from the reserves of the Commander-in-Chief.

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PETAIN.

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Instructions for Sixth and Tenth Armies

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE.

No. 3517

July 29, 1918--6 p. m.

[Extract]

I. The Sixth Army advancing beyond the upper OURCQ, has occupied SERGY.
The Tenth Army has captured GRAND-ROZOY. It took from 300 to 400 prisoners there.
Liaison between the two armies is established at CORBENY Farm.

II. The Sixth Army will continue to drive back the enemy on its entire front, making
contact on the right with the French Fifth Army and crossing the OURCQ on the left, so as
to outflank SAPONAY from the west. It will then advance through the terrain corridor
between the Bois d'ARCY and the wood at FERE-Ancien Chateau.

In the present situation it is improbable that the cavalry can be employed to
pursue the enemy; to clear the battlefield, the I Cavalry Corps can be moved back toward
the rear.

III. The Tenth Army will continue to exert pressure with its right in the direction of
ARCY-Ste-RESTITUE, in conjunction with the Sixth Army.

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FAYOLLE,
General Commanding the
Group of Armies of the Reserve.

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Units Assigned to III Corps

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 29, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, First Army
To: Commanding General, III Army Corps.

1. Orders will issue today from these headquarters assigning the 3d, 28th and 32d Divisions to the III Army Corps.
2. The Commander-in-Chief directs that your headquarters be moved tomorrow by motor transport from its present location to the vicinity of CHARTEVES, and that upon the establishment of your headquarters in its new location, you take over the command of the 3d, 28th, and 32d Divisions, now under command of the French XXXVIII Corps. All questions connected with the transfer of command will be arranged by you with the Commanding General, French XXXVIII Corps, transfer to be completed on or about August 3, 1918.
3. The 31st Brigade, C. A. C., will be assigned to the III Corps upon arrival in this area. Other corps troops will be assigned upon arrival in First Army.
4. In the move by motor transport above directed, route will be discretionary, except that it will be confined to roads west of the Ourcq as far as Neufchelles and south of the Clignon to Chateau-Thierry.
5. Additional transportation required to be requested from G-4, First Army.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Corps Troops

3d Section, General Staff

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, A. E. F.,

From: Assistant Chief of Staff G-3
To: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.

1. The following troops have been recently sent to the I Corps region. Copies of the telegraphic orders directing the movement of these troops have been sent you in each case.
   In explanation of the movement of these troops to the vicinity of your corps, as ordered in the various telegrams, you are informed that the present plans contemplate assigning the troops referred to in the manner below indicated:
TO BE ASSIGNED TO III CORPS

31st Artillery Brigade Headquarters  
55th Artillery (6-inch gun)  
56th Artillery (6-inch gun)  

II Corps Artillery Park, to be assigned to III Corps

157th Field Artillery Brigade, comprising 319th, 320th, 321st Field Artillery
Regiments and the 307th Trench Mortar Battery and the 307th Ammunition Train, all pertaining to 82d Division, will join the 82d Division upon its arrival in CHATEAU-THIERRY region.

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff.

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HS Fr. File: 409-30.1: Order

Boundaries between Tenth and Sixth Armies

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 3729  

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,  
July 31, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS

[Extract]

At 10 a. m. August 2, the boundaries of the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the boundaries between the armies within the Group of Armies of the Reserve will be modified as follows:

* * * * *

VII. Between the Tenth and Sixth Armies

SAPONAY---BRUYERES---ROCOURT-St-MARTIN---GRISOLLES---BONNES---BUSSIARES---  
MARIGNY---La SABLONNIERE---TORCHAMPS---AVERNES---MOLIEN---USSY---SIGNY-SIGNETS  
---PIERRE-LEVEE---GIREMOUTIERS (these localities to the Sixth Army).

N.B. (a) The nondivisional units of the XXXIV and XVIII Army Corps will pass entirely to the new army to which they are assigned.

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FAYOLLE.

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Instructions for Sixth and Tenth Armies

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 3874

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
August 1, 1918--7 p. m.

[Extract]

I. Known situation at 7 p. m.: The Sixth Army advancing with its right has reached Plateau 230 (REDDY Farm) beyond CIERGES. It holds the northern edge of Bois-MEUNIERE and it has entered GOUSSENCOURT.

The Tenth Army, passing beyond BEUGNEUX and CRAMOISELLE, has occupied the long ridge extending from Orme du GRAND-ROZOY [Signal] to SERVENAY Signal; it advanced beyond COURDOUX and the hamlet of SERVENAY, and captured CRAMAILLE and Hill 137 on its extreme right.

It took about 600 prisoners.

* * * * *

III. Sixth Army: The mission of the Sixth Army remains to gain ground to the north, for the purpose of completely freeing the CHALONS Railroad.

It will operate, especially, through the corridor SERGY---PARTY Farm---DRAVEGNY, between the Foret de NESLES on the west and the Bois de ROGNAC and Bois d'AIGUIZY on the east.

* * * * *

Tenth Army: The Tenth Army will continue to operate with its right in the direction of ARCY-Ste-RESTITUE; on the remainder of its front, it will maintain a defensive attitude.

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FAYOLLE.

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Germans in Retreat

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 3987

FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
August 2, 1918--7 p. m.

INSTRUCTION FOR THE SIXTH AND TENTH ARMIES

[Extract]

I. The enemy is retreating on the entire front of the Tenth, Sixth, and Fifth Armies.

It is most probable that he is withdrawing to the line AISNE-VESLE.
At 6 p. m. our line passed through MERCIN-et-VAUX—approaches to SOISSONS—road from SOISSONS to CUiry-HOUSSE, as far as MONT-de-SOISSONS—in front of BRANGES, LOUPEIGNE and MAREUIL—through DRAVEGNY and IGNY-L'ABBAYE. Beyond that, it extends through LAGERY—LHERY—POILLY—JANVRY and GUEUX.

The pocket of CHATEAU-THIERRY is being emptied. This is the crowning result of the counteroffensive launched on the 18th by the Tenth and Sixth Armies.

II. The pursuit is to be continued without respite * * *

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III. Instead of following the railroad from the vicinity of MONT-NOTRE-DAME, the line of demarcation between the Tenth and Sixth Armies will follow the course of the Ruisseau de MURTON.

FAYOLLE.

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3d Div.: Gen. File: Fltr. 373: Memorandum

Employment of 3d Division in Pursuit of Enemy

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF STAFF,
August 2, 1918.

Colonel Pellegrin, Asst. Chief of Staff, French Sixth Army, called on me at 2:30 p. m. this date and said that he was presenting a request from General Degoutte, of the Sixth Army, which was as follows: Due to the depleted state of the French 18th Division and the French 4th Division, comprising the French III Corps, he requested that one brigade of American infantry be utilized to carry on the pursuit in the direction of FISMES and on the right of the 32d division for the next four or five days. This request was based on the fact that the French 18th Division has been withdrawn. The French 4th Division is now in line covering over four kilometers of front, with about 3,000 rifles.

It was distinctly understood that this reinforcement was for the purpose of carrying out the pursuit and for a period of four or five days and had no connection in any way with the question as to the front to be taken over by the First Army, A. E. F.

Based on the foregoing I agreed to the employment of a brigade of the 3d Division for the use as indicated above.

H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Assignment of General Bullard to III Corps

FIRST ARMY, A. E. F.,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
August 2, 1918.

Major General R. L. Bullard
Commanding General, III Army Corps

[Extract]

My dear General:

I have arranged for you to take command of our III Corps on the 4th instant. General Degoutte of the French Sixth Army will issue the necessary orders. * * *

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H. A. DRUM,
Chief of Staff.

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Extension of Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 4062
FRENCH GROUP OF ARMIES OF THE RESERVE,
August 3, 1918.

Headquarters LAMORLAYE.

To Headquarters BONNEUIL, MARIGNY, SEZANNE, PROVINS, BACON

Limit between zones of action of Tenth and Sixth Armies is extended as follows (map 1:80,000) north of the VESLE: Junction of the Ruisseau de MURTON and of the VESLE---Orme 165 [geodetic point] (1500 meters southwest of VAUXTIN)---Road VAUXTIN---St-MARD (road and places to the Sixth Army)---CHAVONNE---OSTEL---FILAIN (these places to the Tenth Army)

By order:

PAQUETTE,
Chief of Staff.

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Orders for Operations North of Aisne

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,

August 4, 1918—9 a.m.


[Extract]

I. Under the steady pressure of the French Tenth, Sixth and Fifth Armies, the enemy has retreated north of the VESLE.

II. The mission of the armies engaged in pursuit is to throw him back north of the AISNE.

The Generals commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center will conduct their operations methodically, without exposing themselves to needless losses or to a failure with a river at their back.

III. It is first necessary to maintain contact along the entire front by pushing light infantry and cavalry patrols immediately into the wake of the enemy and which will infiltrate into any gaps in his positions.

At the same time, all means of obtaining information will be employed to ascertain the intentions of the enemy (observation and analytical study of various intelligence, aerial reconnaissances, interrogating of prisoners, etc.).

(a) The enemy may seek to continue his retreat, merely covering himself by rear-guards, first on the VESLE, and thence on the AISNE.

Our advance guards will first establish a bridgehead north of the VESLE, protected by powerful artillery left on the south bank.

They [the advance guards], in turn, will be followed by the mass of the major units echeloned in depth, meanwhile, light elements will be pushed to the AISNE and the artillery will establish itself progressively between the VESLE and the AISNE. No heavy battery is to cross the VESLE until these light elements are established upon the AISNE.

Subsequently, the crossing of the AISNE by our advance guards and continuation of the advance toward the AILETTE will, if necessary, be carried out in accordance with these same principles.

(b) If the enemy defends the VESLE stubbornly, the larger elements of major units should establish themselves solidly on the plateaus south thereof. Resistance and barrage positions should be defined, prepared, and occupied under the general conditions prescribed by Memorandum No. 29473, June 24, 1918.

The position of resistance south of the VESLE is marked by the ORMES Ridge---VRIGNY---the plateau between the ARDRE and the VESLE [liaison between the two groups of armies between La CENSE (Farm) and La BONNE-Maison (Farm)], thence the northern part of the large plateau between the MURRON and the CRISE, from TANNIERES to BELLEU.

Between the VESLE and the AISNE the position of resistance would be marked, on the east, by the heights from St-THIERRY to CORMICY and, on the north, by the plateau which separates the two rivers [liaison between the two groups of armies in the vicinity of Arbe de ROMAIN].

In both cases, an advance line will be established to cover the entire terrain up to the river.
Intelligence secured from advance guard actions, and from any other means of obtaining information, will enable the command to determine and prepare plans for the maneuver to be executed for the crossing of the VESLE.

The Generals commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center will make known, submit recommendations concerning their maneuver conception to their General-in-Chief as soon as possible, the latter will coordinate them and will decide upon the main effort to be furnished.

IV. In any case, the armies will proceed without delay to the reorganization of their front, the thinning out of their formations, and the reconstitution of major units which have been withdrawn.

Subsequent instructions will set forth:
The conditions under which the American First Army is to enter the line and take place of the French Sixth Army.
The grouping of reserves which the Generals commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center are to return to the disposal of the General-in-Chief.

V. Boundary between the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center (telegram No. 1436/M, 1442/A and 1580/M):

Eastern boundary of the Department of SEINE-et-MARNE---BAULNE---La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON---CHAMPAILET---VASSIEUX (these places to the Group of Armies of the Reserve)---Road VERNEUIL---PASSEYGRIGNY---Ste-GEMME---Le TEMPLE (Farm)---VILLERS-AGRON---VEZILLY---ARCIS-le-PONSART---COURVILLE (this road and those places to the Group of Armies of the Reserve, with right of passage for the Group of Armies of the Center on the stretch DORMANS---Le TEMPLE Farm)---La BONNE-MAISON Farm---MAGNEUX---COURLANDON---cross-road 800 meters west of HUIT-VOISINS---Le GRAND-HAMEAU---MEURIVAL---CONCEVREUX---(these points to the Group of Armies of the Reserve)---CRAONNELLE (to the Group of Armies of the Center)---BOUCONVILLE (to the Group of Armies of the Reserve).

PETAIN.

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Relief of French Sixth Army by American First Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff             FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
                Provins, Seine-et-Marne, August 4, 1918.

[Extract]

FIRST ARMY: The American First Army will occupy the present front of the French Sixth Army.

{East: Limit between the French Group of Armies of the center and the French Group of Armies of the Reserve

Proposed boundaries

{West: A line passing through BRAINE---CYS-la-COMMUNE

The army will be composed initially of 2 American army corps side by side and of 4 American divisions in the front line.
The American First Army will be under the control of the Group of Armies of the Reserve.
The reliefs of French units, services and establishments by the corresponding American elements will be regulated by agreement between the French Sixth Army and the American First Army. The French Sixth Army will leave at the disposal of the American First Army the French troops, services and establishments necessary to the functioning of the American army until the Americans are able to relieve these troops, services or establishments.

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[No signature]

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HS Fr. Files: 403-30.1: Telegram

**Action Stopped at Vesle**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1741/M

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 6, 1918--8:10 p.m.

Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters at SEZANNE

Until further orders no final action will be undertaken north of the VESLE.

By order:

de BARESCUT,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. Files 403-30.1: Telegram

**Hold on Vesle Line**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1734/M

FRENCH ARMIES OF THE NORTH AND NORTHEAST,
August 6, 1918--8:35 p.m.

Commander-in-Chief

To Headquarters BACON

I. The enemy seems to be establishing himself strongly on the VESLE. A decisive action with powerful means is necessary to dislodge him.

II. The present condition of the troops at my disposal does not permit me to conduct two battles simultaneously.

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III. Consequently, I had directed the Group of Armies of the Reserve and the Group of Armies of the Center to establish themselves on the positions south of the VESLE as defined in my Instructions No. 5254 Aug. 4, while continuing to give the enemy the impression that preparations for a forced attack are continuing and, especially, for the critical date.

PETAIN.

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**French Tenth Army**

*July 13 - July 28, 1918*

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HS Fr. File: 420-30.1: Letter

*Conditions for Attack*

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 669/S

Major General Mangin, Comdg. Tenth Army

To: Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Reserve

During the days of July 12 and 13 we have progressed beyond the SAVIERES Stream and we are established between the Quarries of CATIFET and the Bois MADAME, assuring a bridgehead as favorable as possible for a future take-off point.

On the other hand, the enemy divisions which have been worn down by our attacks since June 28 have been relieved: the 34th Inf. Div. by the 241st, the 23d Inf. Div. by the 42d, the 211th Inf. Div. by the 15th, perhaps the 105th; and quite recently, the 14th Res. Div. by the 47th Res. Div.

These new divisions in general have come from active sectors recently and have not received replacements.

The enemy, following these defeats, remains very feeble; but the orders which have been given to sector commanders and which we have captured are explicit: “Hold at all costs without hope of reinforcement. The mass of the German army is reserved for the great offensive.” In front of the Tenth Army, I estimate therefore that the situation is eminently favorable for an attack and I believe it my duty to bring it to your attention.

MANGIN.
Attack Ordered

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 684/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
Versigny, Oise, July 14, 1918.

ORDER NO. 232

[Extract]

I. MISSION OF THE ARMY: The army takes the offensive. Its mission is to break the enemy front between the AISNE and the OURCQ, to push without stopping in the direction of FERE-en-TARDENOIS, in liaison with an offensive of the Sixth Army.

II. OBJECTIVES:
1st Objective: Crest to the west of PERNANT---SACONIN-et-BREUIL---CHAUDUN---VIERZY---VILLERS-HELON---La LOGE Farm.
2d Objective: The plateaus between CHACRISE and OULCHY-le-CHATEAU. The ultimate exploitation will be made during the course of the battle.

Axis of Attack: COEUVRES---DOMMIERS---VIERZY---HARfENNES---ORME du GRAND ROZOY (signal)---FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

III. ZONES OF THE ARMY CORPS: The forces which are to operate on the front of attack are divided into four army corps, each comprising three or four divisions.

I Army Corps: 3 inf. divs. in first line (72d, 11th, 153d); 1 inf. div. in second line (69th).

XX Army Corps: 3 inf. divs. in first line (American 1st Div., Moroccan 1st Div., American 2d Div.); 2 inf. divs. in second line (58th and 87th).

XXX Army Corps: 2 inf. divs. in first line (48th and 38th); 2 inf. divs. in second line (19th and 1st).

XI Army Corps: 2 inf. divs. in first line (128th and 41st); 1 inf. div. in second line (5th).

MISSION OF THE ARMY CORPS: The I Army Corps has for its mission to capture the heights dominating FONTENOY and recapture the old French front line, to seize and organize for defense in case of attack, the plateaus south of the AISNE, from PERNANT to BERZY-le-SEC (inclusive), without going to the foot of the slopes. It should hold the exits of SOISSONS under powerful fire.

The XX Army Corps, coordinating its movement with that of the XXX Army Corps, will outflank by the north and the south the northeastern edge of the FORET de RETZ, will capture CHAUDUN-VIERZY, and then will strive to reach the plateau northeast of HARTENNES and hold the south exits of CRISE Ravine in force.

The XXX Army Corps will cross the SAVIERES and move forward to the attack of the front VILLERS-HELON---MONTREMBOEUF Farm, then advance via St-GERVAIS Crest---ORME du GRAND ROZOY [signal]---Bois d'ARCY and move in the direction of FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

The XI Army Corps will take off with its left division north of the BUISSON de HAUT-WISON, which it will neutralize; it will capture LOUATRE with a view to turning toward the south in the direction of CHOUY. With its right division, it will be prepared to
take off between HAUTWISON and CRESNES as soon as the progress of the left division makes itself felt, in order to advance in the direction of CHOUY and the valley of the OURCQ. 

Final Objective: BILLY-sur-OURCQ---OULCHY-le-CHATEAU.

V. ARTILLERY AVAILABLE:
The army corps will have the following artillery regiments at their disposal:

Field Artillery:
- I Corps: Divisional Artillery of the 72d, 11th, 153d, 69th Inf. Divs., plus the 57th Regt. of F. A., truck-carried.
- XXX Army Corps: Divisional artillery of the 48th, 38th, 19th, and 1st Divs., plus the 41st and 226th Regts. of F. A., truck-carried.
- XI Army Corps: Divisional artillery of the 128th, 41st, and 5th Divs., plus the 3d Regt. of F. A., truck-carried.

Heavy Artillery: A separate memorandum will regulate its distribution.

In addition, tanks will be allotted to certain army corps. A later order will govern their employment.

VI. DAY AND HOUR OF THE ATTACK: The attack can probably be launched on July 18 at an H hour, which will be designated later. There will be no preparation: The attack will advance behind a rolling barrage as dense as possible and under the protection of a strong covering fire of the heavy howitzers.

VII. MOVEMENT OF THE SECOND-LINE DIVISIONS: The second-line divisions will follow the army corps to which they are attached; they will not be engaged without the authorization of the commander of the army, who may change their assignment to army corps. Care should be taken to reorganize engaged units and reconstitute the command progressively with a view to constituting new reserves as elements are passed by fresh units.

VIII. MOVEMENT OF COMMAND POSTS OF THE ARMY CORPS:
The C. P.'s of the army corps will move forward during the advance:
- I Army Corps: from HAUTE-FONTAINE to ST-BANDRY
- XX Army Corps: from RETHEUIL to MONTGOBERT
- XXX Army Corps: from EMIVILLE to FLEURY
- XI Army Corps: from IVORS to DAMPLEUX

The C. P. of the Tenth Army will be at BONNEUIL.

MANGIN.

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HS Fr. Files: 420-30.1: Order

Distribution of Tanks

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 706/S
FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
Versigny, Oise, July 5, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 243

I. Available tanks will be distributed in the following manner:

I Army Corps:
- III Groupment, Schneider (Major Refebvre): 3 bns. of batteries of 3 tanks each.
Employment: To operate with 153d Inf. Div. south of the crest commanding the height of the north bank of the AISNE.

XX Army Corps:
- XII Groupment, St-CHAMOND (Major Ajais): 2 bns. of 3 batteries of 3 tanks each; 1 bn. of 3 batteries of 4 tanks each.
- XI Groupment, St-CHAMOND (Major Herlaut): 5 bns. of 3 batteries of 3 to 4 tanks each.

Employment: To operate with American 2d Div.*
- IV Groupment, Schneider (Major Chanoine): 4 bns. of 3 batteries of 4 tanks each.

Employment: To operate with Moroccan division.
- I Groupment, Schneider (Capt. de Blee): 4 bns. of 3 batteries of 4 tanks each.

Employment: To operate with American 1st Div.

XXX Army Corps:
- X Groupment, St-CHAMOND (Major de Villet): 1 bn. of 3 batteries of 4 tanks each; 2 bns. of 3 batteries of 3 tanks each.

Employment: To operate with the 38th Inf. Div. with the limitation that it shall not be used to attack the present German front line.

In Army Reserve:
- The VILLERS-COTTERETS---FLEURY---PUISEUX zone, under the orders of the lieut. colonel commanding the army tanks:
  - 1st Bn. of Light Tanks (Major Goubernard): 3 companies of 15 tanks.
  - 2d Bn. of Light Tanks (Major Wattel): 3 companies of 10 to 15 tanks.
  - 3d Bn. of Light Tanks (Major Peraldi): 2 companies of about 10 tanks; 1 company of about 5 tanks.

Employment: Exploitation of the success.

II. From a tactical viewpoint, the tank units are under the generals at whose disposal they are placed, but army corps commanders will designate the organizations which will be responsible for their administration.

From a tank technical point of view, tank units placed at the disposal of the XX Army Corps are directly under Major Velpry, Commanding Officer of the 501st Tank Regt. and commanding the tanks of the XX Army Corps.

The latter and the two majors commanding the III and X Groupments, from a tank technical point of view, will be directly under Lt. Col. Chederville, commanding the 2d Tank Brig. and commanding the tanks of the Tenth Army.

Supply: The organizations at whose disposal tank units are placed will be responsible for their supply the same as for their organic components.

With reference to the special supply of tank units, gasoline, oils and greases, special ammunition, etc., these units are supplied by the different technical echelons pursuant to a special order of the lieutenant colonel commanding the tanks of the army.

MANGIN.

* The great density of tanks attached to this American division is justified by the condition of the materiel of the Ajais Groupment which is certain to lead to considerable losses from mechanical breakdowns.
Day and Hour of Attack Designated

3d Section, General Staff

D day is July 18.
H Hour is 4:35 a.m.
The order indicating the day and hour will be carried by an officer to the different echelons concerned. It will be communicated to the troops during the night.

By order:

HERGAULT,
Chief of Staff.

Provisions for Continued Tank Action

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 739/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
Bonneuil-en-Valois, Oise, July 17, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 253

Under the orders of the lieutenant colonel commanding the army tanks, the tank units in army reserve will be pushed forward as soon as the situation permits, so as to be ready to go into action as soon as the tank units placed at the disposal of the first line divisions are unable to continue operations.

MANGIN,
General Commanding the Tenth Army.
SECOND PART - FIRST PHASE

Situation the morning of July 18. * * *

At 4:35 a.m. the artillery opens fire on the entire front of the army. South of the AISNE, the infantry moves to the attack at the same time, following the rolling barrages. North of the AISNE, the artillery prepares the infantry action which will not start until 5:20 a.m.

Information received up to 7 a.m. by the army is as follows: The 162d Div. has reached its objectives on Plateau 140 north of FONTENOY. (Does not have FONTENOY)

The 11th Div. has reached the crest between PERNANT and MONTAIGU and is completing encirclement of the enemy who is holding the wooded spur north of Le MARAIS and of MONTAIGU.

The 72d Div. seems to have crossed the ravine south of PERNANT.

The 153d Div. is reaching the line ORME-St-AMAND---TILLEUL de la GLAUX.

The American 1st Div. is opposite MISSY-aux-BOIS.

The Moroccan 1st Div. reaches CRAVANCON Farm.

The American 2d Div. seems to be west of BEAUREPAIRE Farm.

The 43d Div. is held up in front of VILLERS-HELON.

Farther south no precise information: The 128th Div. is having difficulty in passing beyond the SAVIERES; the 5th Div., which is following it, is not yet engaged.

The 41st Div. is unable to advance between BUISSON de HAUTWISON and BUISSON de CRESNES.

To the right of the XI Corps, the II Corps (Sixth Army) arrives opposite MARIZY-St-GENEVIEVE and occupies the heights north of DAMMARD.

The general commanding the army orders the advance pressed and command posts moved forward. He orders the cavalry to lead the attack, however, the cavalry will not be able to pass through the infantry until 9:15 a.m.

Order 301 prescribing the continuation of attacks on the 19th is sent out about 8 p.m.:

I. Tomorrow, July 19, continuation of the attack for the purpose of gaining the objectives announced for July 18.

II. The attack will be launched at 4 a.m. with the assistance of tanks under the same condition as for July 18.

III. The I Corps will consolidate the ground taken and will hold the general line PERNANT---SACONIN-et-BREUIL---BERZY-le-SEC (zone of observation can be pushed up to the AISNE) so as to be able, as soon as possible, to repulse an enemy counterattack.

IV. The II Cavalry Corps will take position in the region Le TRANSLON---Le JARDIN---St-PIERRE-AIGLE; alerted, and at the disposal of the general com-
manding the army after 4 a. m., it will establish liaison with the first line
infantry divisions, ready to enter into action separately and, especially, by
small units.

V. Tanks not used in the attack will be reassembled west of the position
of departure of July 19.

VI. Infantry and artillery battalions placed at the disposal of the II
Cav. Corps July 18 will return to the control of their divisions.

Anyhow, one hour later, toward 9 p. m., a telephone call from the headquarters of
General Foch advises General Mangin that other divisions will be given him.

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HS Fr. Files: 420-30.4: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,

July 19, 1918.

SECOND PART - FIRST PHASE

The Battle and its Exploitation, July 18 - August 5, 1918.

[Extract]

At 4:30 a. m., July 19, the arrival of 4 divisions [British and French] is announced
for the 19th and 20th by telegram from the Group of Armies of the Reserve. * * *

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5:45 a. m. Order of the general commanding the army putting the 58th Div. at the disposal
of the XX Corps with the relief of the American 2d Div. in view.

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The American 1st Div. has its left in liaison with the 153d Div. toward PLOISY.
About 11 a. m. the Morrocan 1st Div. on its right is vigorously counterattacked in the
CHAZELLE-LECHELLE region. Farther south the American 2d Div., assisted by a few troops
of the 6th Cav. Div., fighting dismounted, advances east of VIERZY in the direction of
TIGNY which is reported occupied by us between noon and 1 p. m.

In the XXX Corps, the 38th Div. reaches PARCY-TIGNY at the same hour. The 48th and
1st Div. outflank BLANZY with the support of tanks of the Tenth Army, but the place re-
mains in enemy hands.

In the XI Corps between 7 and 8 a. m. the south part of Bois des BRUSSETTES (5th
Div.) is reached as well as VILLERS-le-PETIT and CHOUY, to the approaches of which the
41st Div. succeeds in advancing, thanks to the assistance of an American division of the
Sixth Army which has advanced south of this locality. At noon, CHOUY is still German;
the 3rd Div. is checked west of BLANZY.

Toward 11 a. m. the 19th Div. is placed under the orders of the XXX Corps to effect
passage of lines of the 48th Div. and attack in the general direction of GRAND ROZOY

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Corps) with the 1st and 38th Divs. This attack timed at first for 6 p. m. is not
sufficiently prepared at that hour; the General commanding the XXX Corps orders it
launched at 7:30 p. m.

In the afternoon relative lull on the whole front. Resuming of attacks between 7 and
8 p. m. The 153d Div. in liaison with the American 1st Div. succeeds in advancing toward
MONT-de-COURMELLES Farm and in the direction of BERZY-le-SEC. The Moroccan 1st Div.
cleans up CHAZELLE and LECHELLE Ravines. The American 2d Div. cannot make any progress.
In the XXX Corps the front reached toward 9 p. m. is the following: Wood 1,200 meters
east of PARCY-TIGNY---COUTREMAIN---FONTAINE-aux-CHENES---St-REMY-BLANZY

* * * * *

Toward 9 p. m. General Mangin receives the following order for July 20, Instructions
67/op, from the Reserve Group of Armies:

I. Known situation at 7 p. m.: The Tenth Army has held the ground gained
yesterday in spite of a violent counterattack directed on CHAUDUN.
The Sixth Army has seized NEUILLY-ST-FRONT, MAUBRY, RASSY and PRIEZ.
Liaison between the two armies is firmly established at MOULIN de CROUTES.
If. Tomorrow the attack will continue according to the directions issued
in yesterday’s instructions.

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During the night the following movements are executed: The 53d Div. relieves the
right division of the XX Corps (American 2d Div.).

The American 2d Div. passes to army reserve and moves 1 brigade to the Le JARDIN---
Le TRANSLOY [Farm] region, the remainder (including the artillery) to VIVIERES-PUISEUX,
with Headquarters at VIVIERES.

The 12th Div., which had arrived in the morning of the 19th and had been located
in the NANTEUIL Region, moves during the night to the zone BOURSONNES---CUVERGNON---
BETZ---LEVIGNEN---GONDREVILLE---CHAVRES (headquarters)---Le PLESSIS-aux-BOIS.

The British 15th Div. arrives (by truck and marching) in the zone MONTIGNY-LENGRAIN
---HAUTEFONTAINE---CHELLES---CUISE-la-MOTTE (headquarters)---TROSLY-BREUIL---
VIEUX-MOULIN.

The 48th Div. is regrouping in the VILLERS-COTTERETS region after having been re-
lieved by the 19th Div. (XXX Corps).

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HS Fr. File: 420-30.1: Order

Objectives to be Attained

[Editorial Translation]

ORDER NO. 262

I. Mission of the Army: The Army will continue the pursuit of the German forces
between the AISNE and the OURCQ.
II. Zones of Action:

I. Army Corps: South limit, the general line: BERZY-le-SEC---SEPTMONTS---MONT-de-SOISSONS Fme.

XX Army Corps: South limit, the general line: TIGNY---DROIZY---MAAST-et-VIOLAINE---LHUYS.

XXX Army Corps: South limit, the general line: Le PLESSIER-HULEU---GRAND-ROZOY---BEUGNEUX---CRAMOISELLE---CRAMAILLE---MAREUIL-en-DOLE.

XI Army Corps: South limit, the course of the OURCQ (same as the Sixth Army).

III. First Objectives of the Corps:

I Corps:

(a) Flank protection toward the AISNE and the south exits of SOISSONS by occupying the north and east slopes of MONT-de-PARIS [MONTAGNE-de-PARIS?].

(b) Capture of the plateau southeast of BELLEU (in conjunction with the left of the XX Corps) on which the I Corps will face SOISSONS and BILLY-sur-AISNE.

XXX Corps: Plateau of La FOLIE [Pt. de la FOLIE?], heights east of MAAST-et-VIOLAINE.

XI Corps: Heights north of ARCY-Ste-RESTITUE, Bois d’ARCY.

IV. Means Available to the Corps:

I Corps: 162d, 72d, 153d, 69th Inf. Divs. (The 69th Div. in reserve in COEUVES is placed at the disposal of the I Corps for the attack of the plateau southeast of BELLEU).

The I Corps will place the 11th Inf. Div. in reserve in the same region.

XX Corps: American 1st Div., 58th Div., Moroccan 1st Div., 87th Div. (The 87th Div. is placed at the disposal of the XX Corps for the relief of the Moroccan div. by passage of lines).

XXX Corps: 38th, 19th, 1st Inf. Divs. (The 48th will be placed in reserve in the VILLERS-COTTERETS region).

XI Corps: 5th and 41st Inf. Divs.

V. No H hour designated by the general commanding the army. Each corps commander will conduct his actions as rapidly as possible, while maintaining liaison with adjacents units.

VI. The artillery units of the divisions relieved will remain in position at the disposal of the corps in the absence of contrary orders.

Push the artillery forward so that it is constantly able to act in front of its infantry.

MANGIN.

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[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,

July 20, 1918.

SECOND PART - FIRST PHASE

The Battle and its Exploitation, July 18 - August 5, 1918.

[Extract]

The situation on the morning of the 20th: * * *

* * * * *
In the morning the 5th Div. carried BILLY-sur-OURCQ. The 41st Div. attacks and captures ROZET-St-ALBIN. The progress of the 5th Div. is checked west of GEROMENIL Farm, which is strongly occupied by the enemy. Farther north local attacks yield us toward 6 p.m. the front PLESSIS-HULEUX [Le PLESSIER-HULEU]—west of COUTREMAIN—PARCY-TIGNY—sugar mill [RAPERIE] south of VILLEMONTOIRE—ACONIN Farm—PLOISY—West of MONT-de-COURMELLES Farm—head of the ravine west of VAUXBUIN: VAUX, for a while captured by the 72d Div. cannot be held. North of the AISNE, no change.

The attack is to be continued energetically on the 21st and the army issues Order 262

At 11:30 a.m. another telegram is received from the Reserve Group of Armies, 70/OP:

According to information received during the night, the left and the center of the Tenth Army have reached the general line of the SOISSONS—CHATEAU-THIERRY Road.

The right has a foothold north and south of the long crest dominating OULCHY-le-CHATEAU. The Sixth Army has gone well beyond NEUILLY-St-FRONT.

The situation being as stated, drive hard and unsparingly on the entire front, always in compliance with directives and have reserves follow. Keep the cavalry corps at a suitable distance for quick use.

Order 266: The American 2d Div. will move to the PIERREFONDS—PALESNE zone; artillery remaining with the XX Corps.

General Fayolle having called to see General Mangin during the day personally writes the following order:

Effective tomorrow, the Tenth Army advancing between the AISNE and the OURCQ, will take as general axis of advance: BAZOCHES-FISMES.

Use the VESLE for flank protection initially to guard against counterattacks which will probably be launched on either side of SOISSONS; establish a strong left flank and move the heavy artillery forward.

Relief of Tank Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 767/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
Bonneuil-en-Valois, Oise, July 21, 1918.

ORDER NO. 270

The tank units placed at the disposal of the French I, XX, and XXX Army Corps will pass this evening to army reserve for reorganization.
Relief of American 1st Division

[Editorial Translation]

Code Section, General Staff

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
Lamorlaye, Oise, July 21, 1918.

From: Headquarters LAMORLAYE [French] [Reserve Group of Armies]

To: Headquarters BONNEUIL [Tenth Army]

PROVINS [General Headquarters, Armies of the North and Northeast.]

No. 100/OP. Authorize you to commit the British 15th and 34th Divs. morning July 22 on fronts now held by tired American 1st Div. and French 38th Div.

F. CHAMBAUD,
Coding Officer.

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SECOND PART - FIRST PHASE

[Extract]

July 21 the attack continues:

Toward 9 a. m. the 153d Div. in liaison with the American 1st Div. enters BERZY-le-SEC; farther to the south, the XX Corps began its attack in the morning (American 1st Div., 87th and 58th Divs. from left to right) so as to reach the line of heights marked by ROZIERES—BUZANCY—Bois de CONCROIS—Bois d'HARTENNES. Jumping off at 4:45 a. m., the attack reaches ROZIERES (American 1st Div.)—BUZANCY (87th Div.)—TIGNY—VAUX—west edge of Bois de CONCROIS (58th Div.); at 5:15 p. m., our line, violently counterattacked by the enemy debouching from the ravines north of Bois de CONCROIS, falls back on TIGNY—RAPERIE de VILLEMONTOIRE [sugar mill]—BUZANCY.

* * * * *

At 7:40 p. m. telegram 96/OP. from the Group of Armies of the Reserve is received:

From the mass of information it appears:

1) That the enemy has evacuated CHATEAU-THIERRY and is retreating toward the northeast.
(2) That he is seeking to organize a delaying position in front of the Tenth Army with his reserves.

* * * * *

Instructions No. 105 from the Reserve Group of Armies gives the directives of General Fayolle for the 22d:

I. Known situation at 7 p.m.

The Tenth Army is opposed by considerable forces; however it has been able to occupy BERZY in the north, TIGNY in the center and to penetrate into the Bois de LUD in the south.

The Sixth Army pursuing the retreating enemy has arrived in front of ARMENTIERES; it has occupied ROCOURT and has advanced northeast of CHATEAU-THIERRY to EPIEDS, TRUGNY and MONT-ST-PERE.

II. Directives for the night and tomorrow remain the same:

Sixth Army: FERE-en-TARDENOIS, its right clearing the heights north of the MARNE.

Tenth Army: on the north: BUZANCY---AMBRIEF,

on the south: ORM du GRAND-ROZOY---ARCY-Ste-RESTITUE.

General direction of advance: BAZOCHES.

III. The 6th Cav. Div. is at the disposal of the Sixth Army.

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HS Fr. File: 420-30.4: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,

July 22, 1918.

SECOND PART - FIRST PHASE

[Extract]

During the night of July 21/22 the XI Corps advanced toward OULCHY-la-VILLE but an attempt to capture the village failed.

Enemy resistance has increased and an operation has to be prepared to resume the advance on ORM du GRAND-ROZOY; however, the I Corps will continue its preparations for the attacks on the MONTAGNE de PARIS.

* * * * *

During the day violent local fighting occurs on the front of the XI, XXX, and XX Corps, causing a slight advance of our line which passes in the evening through Chateau at ARMENTIERES---400 meters west of Hill 130---Bois de LUD---west and northwest approaches of OULCHY-la-VILLE---PLESSIER-HULEU Station---southwest tip of Bois du PLESSIER---west approaches of HULEU---west outskirts of TIGNY---SOISSONS Road west of TAUX---sugar mill [RAPERIE]---ravine northwest of VILLEMONTOIRE---west edge of park of the Chateau at BUZANCY---the CRISE south of NOYAND-et-ACONIN (inclusive); the rest without change.
During the night of July 22/23, the British 15th Div. relieves the American 1st Div. and the British 34th Div. relieves the 38th Div. which reassembles in army reserves in the VEZ zone.

232-32.7, Fldr. 3: Order

32d Division attached to the French Tenth Army

3d Section, General Staff
No. 782/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
July 22, 1918.

[Editorial Translation]
OPERATION ORDERS No. 275

[Extract]

I. The American 32d Division held in reserve for the General Commander-in-Chief, is attached to the Tenth Army.

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Transfer of the III Corps to Dammartin Area

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau
No. 787/S

FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
July 22, 1918.

ORDER No. 278

[Extract]

I. The American III Corps (American 1st and 2d Divisions) is ordered to rest billets in the region of DAMMARTIN-NANTEUIL.

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MANGIN.

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Relief of American Artillery

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 800/S
FRENCH TENTH ARMY,
Bonneuil-en-Valois, Oise, July 24, 1918.

ORDER No. 283

[Extract]

1. Relief of Artilleries of 1st and 2d Division, A. E. F.: These two artilleries will proceed to their respective zones and will be billeted in these zones under the orders of the Generals commanding the American 1st and 2d Divisions.
   a. The artillery of the American 1st Division withdrawn during nights 23/24 and 24/25 will be assembled in the rear zone of XX Corps. * * *

   * * * * *

   b. The artillery of the American 2d Division will be relieved during the night 24/26 and assembled in the rear zone of XX Corps, under this corps. This artillery will proceed to LEVIGNEN, where it will receive the orders of its divisional headquarters.

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   MANGIN.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 355: Letter

Transfer of the 1st and 2d Divisions

3d Section, General Staff

July 28, 1918.

FROM: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

TO: Chief of Staff, IV Corps, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. The 1st and 2d Divisions will shortly be moved to the TOUL-NANCY region; each of these divisions will, upon arrival, become part of the IV Corps.

   * * * * *

By order:

FOX CONNER,
Colonel, General Staff.

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- 288 -
French XX Army Corps
July 15 - July 25, 1918.

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HS Fr. Files: 444-30.1: Order

Bivouac Area of Divisional Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1226/3

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 224

[Extract]

The divisional artillery of the American 2d Division, placed at the disposal of the General commanding the French XX Army Corps, arriving at EMEVILLE on the evening of July 15, will bivouac in the Forêt de RETZ during the night July 15/16.

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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

201-32.7: Order

Command Posts

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1227/3

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 15, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 225

[Extract]

1. The first echelon of the headquarters of the American III Army Corps will operate in TAILLEFONTAINE the evening of July 15; the rear echelon will remain at La CHESNOYE [sic].

Consequently, the C. P. of the General commanding the Moroccan 1st Division will be moved to VIVIERES, the evening of July 15.
2. The Generals commanding the American 1st and 2d Divisions will occupy the morning of July 16, the C. P.'s which have been assigned to them:
   MORTEFONTAINE---1st Division
   Carrefour de NEMOURS 3 km. north of VILLERS-COTTERETS---2d Division.

* * * * * *

BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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201-32.7: Order

Plan of Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, Staff
No. 1235/3 - S. C. No. 6991

XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 16, 1918.

OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 227

[Extract]

See Order No. 232, Tenth Army, July 14, 1918

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2. The XX A. C. will take part in this attack in connection on the right with the XXX Corps, on the left with the I Corps.
   Its strength will be constituted of:

   3 divisions in first line
     (American 1st Div. (north))
     (Moroccan 1st Div. (center))
     (American 2d D. I. (south))

   2 divisions in second line
     (69th Div. (north))
     (58th Div. (south))

* * * * * *

General axis of attack: TROIS-PEUPLIERS---DOMMIERS---CHAUDUN---VILLEMONTOIRE.

* * * * * *

3. The attack will be carried out on J day, at H hour, which will be settled later on. There will be no preparation; the attack will proceed behind a rolling barrage, as dense as possible and under the protection of a strong support of heavy field artillery.

4. Consequently:
   A. The zones of action of the 3 divisions in the first line are shown on the annexed sketch [not found].

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B. These divisions will act so as to reach, in a first rush, each in its zone, the transversal line marked out by the Road ORME-St-AMAND-TILLEUL de la GLAUX-La GLAUX Farm—eastern edge of Bois du QUESNOY—158 (on MAUBEUGE Road)—BEAUREPAIRE Farm—La GRANGE Farm.

This line must be organized at once and held by units provided with machine-guns, to be designated in advance.

A second rush will be effected, so as to move forward the front to the line MONTPLAISIR Farm—MISSY-aux-BOIS—CRAVANCON Farm—MAISON-NEUVE Farm—VAUXCASTILLE, the possession of which will be secured as the objective of the first rush.

Infantry divisions will progress afterwards with their available elements, so as to reach the front marked out by—the ridge 166 (between MISSY-aux-BOIS and PLOISY)—CHAUDUN—G. M. P. trench between CHAUDUN and 147—VIERZY—Elev. point 148.

C. Liaisons must be secured in an effective manner between the divisions of the XX Corps and with the adjacent army corps. To that effect, mixed detachments will be used; their composition will be agreed upon by the division commanders and they will proceed on horseback astride the boundaries of their respective divisions.

The liaison between the Moroccan 1st Division and the American 2d Div. must be particularly strong, because the outflanking movement of the 2d Division by the plateau east of VERTE-VEUILLE and of Le TRANSLON Farms will facilitate the cleaning up of the region of FOND-d'ARGENT Crossroads and will cause the capture of Bois de QUESNOY.

D. Artillery means will be the following:
1. Each of the 3 divisions (Moroccan, American 1st and 2d) will have its own divisional artillery.
2. The American 1st Div. will be reinforced by the 253d F. A. Regt.
   The Moroccan 1st Div. will be reinforced by the Div. Art., 87th Div.
3. The 2d Div. will be reinforced by the F. A. Regt. 69th Div.

The 248th F. A. regt. will be at the disposal of the C. O., XX Corps Artillery, for firings on fugitive objectives in the whole area of attack of the XX Corps.

F. P. C.'s will be shifted in the course of the advance and will occupy the following emplacements:

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<td>P. C. initial RETHEUIL</td>
<td>P. C. subsequent MONTGOBERT</td>
<td>P. C. initial MORTEFONTAINE</td>
<td>P. C. subsequent COEUVRES</td>
<td>P. C. initial NEMOURS Crossroads</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. C. subsequent MONTGOBERT</td>
<td>P. C. TAILLEFONTAINE</td>
<td>(advanced element subsequently at MONTGOBERT)</td>
<td>P. C. subsequent ST-PIERREAIGLE</td>
<td>subsequent MONTGOBERT Crossroads</td>
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The shifting of division P. C.'s will be ordered by division commanders and reported by same to the corps commander.

5. The divisions in second line have to follow the movement of the army corps, but they must be put into action only if authorized by the army commander.

These divisions, less their artillery, will be assembled during the night before the attack, as follows:

Northern division [Fr. 69th Div.], in the area MORTEFONTAINE—LONGAVESNES—MARIVAL
---P. C. at MORTEFONTAINE. This division will follow the 1st Div., his commander will proceed with the C. G., 1st Div.

As soon as the infantry of the 1st Div. will carry out the 2d rush, the northern division will move forward and station its first elements at LAVERSINE-CŒUVRES; its rear elements at VAUBERON and VAUBERON Wood.

Southern division [Fr. 58th Div.], in the area VIVIERES---ESSART Fme and south---P. C. at VIVIERES.

This division will follow the Moroccan division and move forward its head elements to Le JARDIN-CHARFOSSE, its rear elements to VALSEY---MONTGOBERT---La BEAUVIE, as soon as the infantry of the Moroccan division will carry out its 2d rush.

The C. G., southern division, will proceed together with the C. G., Moroccan division.

6. Surprise being the essential condition of success of the attack, no registering or "accrochage" [bracketing adjustment] fire will be carried out before H hour by the batteries which will occupy new emplacements.

The utmost secrecy will be observed in transmitting orders and telephone connections will be under special control.

All movements of troops will take place during the night.

At H hour, supporting, counterbattery and prohibition fires contemplated in the plans of engagement will start with the utmost violence and infantry will rush up in groups made for speed, so as to get rapidly in touch with the enemy, to outflank him and to drive him back relentlessly.

BERDOULAT,
Major General,
Comdg. XX A. C.

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201-32.7: Orders

Allocation of Divisions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1239/3

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 16, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 229

[Extract]

1. By order of the army commander:

(1) The French 69th Inf. Div. is attached to the French XX Army Corps (including the divisional artillery of the 69th Div., placed at the disposal of the XX Army Corps, as replacement for the 57th Regt. of Field Artillery [truck-carried]).

(2) The French 58th Inf. Div. is attached to the XX Army Corps, effective July 16.


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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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- 292 -
Emplacement of Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. [Sic] /3

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 16, 1918.

From MAROC French Tenth Army, received at 4:30 p. m.
All the artillery ordered to take part in the operation will be in position tomorrow morning July 17.
Regulate movements accordingly during the night 16/17.
Report.

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Attachment of American 2d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1238/3

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 16, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 230

[Extract]

I. The American 2d Division is placed under the orders of the General commanding the French XX Army Corps.

II. Special instructions have been issued regulating the movement and quartering of the divisional artillery of the 2d Division as well as the mission and employment of that artillery.

III. The infantry and engineers of the 2d Division, arriving the night July 16/17, will be quartered that night in the village of TAILLEFONTAINE (southern part of the village) as well as in the section of the Foret de RETZ located southwest of TAILLEFONTAINE, between the northern edge of the woods and the line of Route du FAITE.

C. P.'s of the colonels commanding the brigades: TAILLEFONTAINE. (Telephonic communication through the TAILLEFONTAINE central.)

IV. The General commanding the 2d Division will move his C. P. to the Carrefour de NEMOURS (2-1/2 km. southwest of VIVIERES).

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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX A. C.

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- 293 -
Relief of French Troops

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 1247/3

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 231

[Extract]

I. The American 1st and 2d Divisions during the night of July 17/18, will relieve respectively, the elements of the Moroccan 1st and French 38th Infantry Divisions which are now located in the sectors assigned to the 1st and 2d Divisions by Operations Orders No. 227, XX Army Corps.

* * * * *

III. The Generals commanding the 1st and 2d Divisions will take command at midnight, July 17/18, of the sectors assigned to them by Operations Orders No. 227, XX A. C.

The General commanding the Moroccan 1st Division will send to the French I. A. C. the 3 battalions temporarily placed at his disposal by the French 72d Infantry Division, as soon as they are relieved by the American 1st Division.

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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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Rolling Barrage

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 1245/3

SUPPLEMENT TO OPERATIONS ORDERS NO. 227

[Extract]

1. The attack prescribed by Operations Order No. 227 of the French XX Army Corps will take place July 18 at 4:35 a.m.
3. Corps Reserve: The second line regiment of the American 2d Div. (6th Marines) is designated as general reserve of the XX Army Corps.
   This regiment will follow the advance of its division during the course of the attack, but it will not be engaged in whole, or in part, without authorization of the General commanding the XX Army Corps.

BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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201-32.7: Memorandum

**Motorized Infantry to Accompany Cavalry**

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 17, 1918.

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1259/3

[Extract]

1. With a view to reinforcing the cavalry corps which may be called upon to exploit our success, the General commanding the army directs that the following units be held in readiness to load in auto trucks, on July 18, on receipt of orders:
   One battalion and one machine gun company of the American 1st Div. 2d of the French 69th Inf. Div.
   " of the French 69th Inf. Div.
   " platoon of engineers of the 69th Div. \\*

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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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201-32.7: Order

**Use of Tanks**

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne, July 17, 1918.

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1249/3

ANNEX TO OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 227

[Extract]

1. **SPECIAL DISPOSITIONS FOR TANKS**
   1. Itineraries in order to reach the line of departure:
      (a) AZAIS Group:
          Mortefontaine---Raperie near Pouy Farm---Riverseau Farm---crossroads at northern exit of Coeuvres---bridges north of Saulon Mill---Cutry.
(b) HERLAUT Group:
L'Epine Farm---Vauberon Farm---Le Murger Farm---bridges at Coeuvres---roads
climbing the plateau east of Coeuvres, north of grid parallel 292.

(c) CHANOINE Group:
Soucy---St-Agnan Farm---bridge 500 meters south of Coeuvres (contingently,
bridge in the southern part of the village of Coeuvres)---road climbing the plateau on
the 292 parallel and possible routes of approach south of the preceding, to the Villers-
Cotterets---Soissons Road.

(d) The de BLIC Group:
Itineraries reconnoitered by the group commander.

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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

201-32.7: Order

Continuation of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,260/3

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Retheuil, Aisne. July 18, 1918--11 a. m.

FIELD ORDERS NO. 233

I. The attack of the French XX A. C. on the objectives assigned by Order No. 227
having succeeded, it should be exploited energetically and as quickly as possible and the
cavalry corps which is going into action to pursue the enemy must be supported as closely
as possible.

II. Consequently:
1. The American 1st Div. will endeavor to reach the line BERZY-le-SEC (ex-
clusive)---BUZANCY (exclusive), where it will establish its lines facing the northeast,
to block the southern outlets of CRISE Ravine.

This division will establish close contact in BERZY-le-SEC with the French
153d Infantry Division, which will occupy that place with its extreme right.

The American 1st Division will have then as its mission to cover the left front
of the XX Corps.

2. The Moroccan 1st Division will endeavor to reach the line BUZANCY (inclusive)
---Bois de CONCROIS (exclusive), which it will organize strongly facing CRISE Ravine.

The Moroccan 1st Division will establish contact with the American 1st Div. at
the western edge of the park of BUZANCY Chateau.

3. The American 2d Div. will endeavor to reach the line Bois de CONCROIS (in-
clusive) HARTENNES-et-TAUX (inclusive), which it will organize strongly.

This division will establish contact with the Moroccan 1st Division on the west-
ern edge of the Bois de CONCROIS and with the French XXX Army Corps at the south edge of
HARTENNES-et-TAUX.

4. The Generals commanding the American 1st Div., Moroccan 1st Division, and
American 2d Div. will move their battle C. P.'s as far forward as possible, and will re-
port their location. They will dispose their artillery so as to support their infantry as close as possible.

5. The General commanding the artillery of the XX A. C. will order the necessary changes of position forward of the heavy artillery.

6. The C. P. of the XX A. C. will open at 3 p. m., today, at MONTGOBERT.

BERDOULAT,
General,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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201-32.7: Operations Report

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,263/3
FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Montgobert, Aisne, July 19, 1918.

[Extract]

I. At 4:35 a. m., July 18 the three first line divisions of the XX Army Corps (American 1st Div., Moroccan 1st Div., American 2d Div.) advanced to the attack of the objectives which had been assigned to them.

The enemy barrage was released at 4:30 a. m., probably because of the noise made by the movement of the tanks. The ensuing enemy artillery reaction was not strong and was scattered all over the front. Local resistance of enemy machine guns was outflanked or overwhelmed by our attacking infantry.

In a general manner, the enemy seems to have been surprised by our offensive.

• • • • • •

III. At this same hour, the General commanding the XX Army Corps issues the following orders:

(1) Order to the French 69th Inf. Div. (second line inf. div.) to assemble in a formation organized well in depth in the area VALSERY, COEUVRES, LAVERSINE. Order to the French 58th Inf. Div. (second line inf. div.) to proceed to the area Le JARDIN, VALSERY Crossroads.

(2) Order to the first line infantry divisions to continue the offensive beyond the objectives originally assigned to them:
   (a) The American 1st Div., to the front BERZY-le-SEC (exclusive)---BUZANCY (exclusive), and to establish itself on that position, faced to the northeast, in strong contact on its left with the right of the French 153d Inf. Div., in the vicinity of BERZY-le-SEC.
   (b) The Moroccan Div., to the front BUZANCY (inclusive)---Bois de CONCROIS (exclusive), and to organize itself there facing the ravine of the CRISE.
   (c) The American 2d Div., to the front Bois de CONCROIS (inclusive)---HARTENNES-et-TAUX (inclusive).
IV. At 2 p. m., the General commanding the XX Army Corps moves his C. P. to MONTGOBERT.
The General commanding the 2d Div. moves his C. P. to VERTE-FEUILLE Fme.
The General commanding the Moroccan 1st Div. moves his C. P. to CRAVANCON Farm.
The General commanding the American 1st Div. sets up his C. P., at COEUVERS.
The General commanding the French 69th Inf. Div. accompanies the General commanding
the American 1st Div. to his C. P. in COEUVERS.
The General commanding the 58th Inf. Div. moves his C. P. to St-PIERRE-AIGLE.

V. In spite of local counterattacks executed by the enemy, in spite of serious re­
sistance offered by certain machine-gun nests organized in unusually strong position,
particularly in the trench of the G. M. P., the front reached at the end of the day, runs
generally as follows: Point located 400 meters east of BREUIL (where the 153d Inf. Div.
has held its right fast)--northwestern tip of CHAZELLE Ravine---slopes west of LECHELLE
---VIERZY.
The necessary steps are taken in each first line division to reorganize its units,
reconstitute reserves, supply the troops and prepare to continue the prescribed offensive.

VI. The number of prisoners captured is approximately 3,300 of whom 38 are officers.
It has not yet been possible to determine accurately the number of guns and machine
guns taken. However, at least 30 or 40 guns have been reported.

VII. The losses reported up to now do not seem excessive. They seem to have been more
marked in the Moroccan Div. than in the two Allied Divisions.

VIII. As to the reserves, the two second line divisions have not been engaged but di­
visions have each pushed one regiment forward, one to the vicinity of Tilleul de La GLAUX;
the other towards the Bois du QUESNOY.
Moreover, in compliance with orders issued, the American 1st and 2d Divisions, also
the French 69th Inf. Div. have each placed a battalion at the disposal of the General com­
manding the cavalry corps.

IX. It should be noted that in spite of all the measures taken within the army corps
to improve traffic and to facilitate troop movements and the supplying of rations and
ammunition, movements have been considerably interfered with for various reasons: The
presence of tanks, motorized machine guns of the cavalry corps; number and size of ve­
hicles employed by the Allied troops; reduced strength of specially trained traffic person­
nel; the necessity for continuing during the night of 17/18 the supply of ammunition so
as to provide the batteries with about 2 1/2 days of fire.

X. Attention is invited to the fact that during the course of the attack the Ameri­
can infantry, which was brought up to its lines of departure under particularly hurried
conditions (especially the 2d Div.), displayed remarkable endurance and keenness.
The infantry of the Moroccan division fought bravely and suffered rather heavy losses.

XI. For the 19th, in compliance with orders received from the General commanding the
army, the American 1st and 2d Divs. and the Moroccan 1st Div. has received orders to con­
tinue the attack on the objectives which could not be reached on the 18th and to pursue
the enemy relentlessly.
In spite of the fatigue of the troops and the losses suffered, this operation seems
to have bright prospects.

BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding of XX Army Corps.
Relief of 2d Division

[Editorial Translation]

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 235

[Extract]

I. The French 58th Infantry Division, placed at the disposal of the French XX Army Corps, as designated to relieve the American 2d Division in its present zone of attack. ** This relief will be made progressively beginning on the evening of July 19, bearing in mind the degree of fatigue of the units of the American division.

The General commanding the 58th Division will take advantage of this relief to continue the advance as far as the SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY Road **

* * * * *

BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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Plans of Attack

C. P. FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,

July 18, 1918.

I. The attack will be resumed at 4 a. m., July 19, to the objectives fixed by Order No. 233, July 18, of the General commanding the French XX A. C.

When these objectives are reached, combat patrols will be pushed forward until they gain contact with the enemy.

II. The bns. of the American 1st and 2d Divs. and of the French 69th Div., which had been placed at the disposal of the cavalry corps will return to the control of their divisions (bn. of 69th Div. to be directed towards COEVURES by the cavalry corps).

The 248th F. A., also placed at the disposal of the cavalry corps July 18, will be returned to the control of General commanding the artillery of the XX Corps who, consequently, will issue necessary orders to that regiment and who will employ it to support the attack of the first line infantry divisions.

III. The attack of July 19 will be carried out at the hour indicated, without artillery preparation, as was that of July 18, supported by rolling barrages and heavy tanks, as directed by division commanders concerned.

BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.
Note: Infantry divisions will employ the tank units at their disposal, using the heavy tanks first, insofar as possible, and employing the light tank units only in case of necessity.

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HS Fr. Files: 420-30.2: Message

**Attack on Berzy-le-Sec**

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XX ARMY COWS,

July 19, 1918---10 p.m.

[Extract]

To French Tenth Army

The American 1st Division on the north has made an attack upon BERZY-le-SEC in conjunction with Goubaud.

According to information, this attack appears to have completely succeeded. The liaison officer has just reported that the American div. holds BERZY-le-SEC. He says that Goubaud is probably occupying COURMELLES.

Daugan’s Chief of Staff has also received news announcing the advance of the Americans. Under these conditions he is going to attempt tonight to establish himself on the plateaus to the west of the SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY Highway, the mopping up of CHAZELLE Ravine and of other points being assigned to the Senegalese. If this operation succeeds, tomorrow morning he will attempt to take the objectives to the east of the highway, which were assigned to him yesterday by the General commanding the XX Army Corps, and to push a reconnaissance up to the CRISE.

On its side, the American 1st Div. has just received orders to gain close contact on its right with Daugan and to attempt also to gain the objectives which were assigned it yesterday, that is to say, the front BERZY-le-SEC---BUZANCY, with patrols to the CRISE.

To the south, the Americans coming up to the front this evening have orders to effect a passage of lines and to reach the SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY Highway too, and to go beyond it if possible.

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- 300 -
Relief of Moroccan Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1270/3
s. c. 7030

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Montgobert, Aisne, July 20, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 236

[Extract]

The French 87th Inf. Div. is placed at the disposal of the French XX Army Corps to relieve the Moroccan 1st Div. in its present zone of attack.

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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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HS Fr. File: 444-30.1: Order

Relief of 2d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,273/3

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Montgobert. Aisne, July 20, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 238

[Extract]

I. By order of the general commanding the army and in order to enable the American 2d Division to reorganize, this division (less its artillery which will remain in the sector) will move to the area PIERREFONDS---ST-ETIENNE---RETHEUIL---TAILLEFONTAINE, where it will be quartered.

The headquarters of the 2d Division will be at PIERREFONDS.

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V. Upon its arrival in the new area, the 2d Division will be in reserve at the disposal of the general commanding the army: however, its artillery will remain until further orders at the disposal of the General commanding the XX Army Corps.

BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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- 301 -
Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1272/S
s. c. 7033

FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Montgobert, Aisne, July 20, 1918.

FIELD ORDER NO. 237

[Extract]

I. The army [Fr. Tenth] continues to drive before it the German forces between the AISNE and the OURCQ.

II. The first objectives of the army are the following:
   I Army corps:
   (a) Flank protection towards the AISNE and the terrain corridors south of SOISSONS, by the occupation of the north and east slopes of the MONT-de-PARIS [La MONTAGNE-de-PARIS]:
   (b) Conquest of the plateau southeast of BELLEU (in liaison with the left of the XX Corps), where the I Corps will face in the direction of SOISSONS and BILLY-sur-AISNE.
   XX Army Corps: Plateau of La FOLIE [Pt. de la Folie?] heights east of MAAST-et-VIOLAINE.
   XXX Army Corps: Heights north of ARCY-Ste-RESTITUE, Bois d'ARCY.
   XI Army corps:

III. In consequence, the XX Army Corps, between the I Corps on its left and the XXX Army Corps on its right, will deliver a full-scale attack at 4:45 a. m., tomorrow, July 21. in the general direction of CHACRISE and CUIRY-HOUSSE.

   There will be no artillery preparation: the attack will move forward behind a rolling barrage as dense as possible, reinforced by heavy howitzers.

IV. (A) The attack will be executed by:
   The American 1st Div. on the north.
   The French 87th Inf. Div. in the center.
   The French 58th Inf. Div. on the south.

   (C) These infantry divisions will act so as to reach in a first bound the line of the heights: ROZIERES---BUZANCY---Bois de CONCROIS---Bois d'HARTENNES.

   As soon as the line is reached, it will be immediately organized and held by units reinforced with machine guns which will be designated in advance.
(E) The artillery means will be as follows:

(a) The American 1st Div. will continue to have at its disposal all the artillery which it now has.

(b) The 87th Div. will have at its disposal the artillery of the Moroccan div. (including the battalion of 155 hows.), and the artillery of the 87th Div. (including the battalion of 155 hows.).

(c) The 58th Inf. Div. will have at its disposal the artillery of the American 2d Div. (which remains in the sector until further orders), and the 248th F. A., and the 7th Bn. of the 112th F. A.1

The divisional artillery of the 69th Inf. Div. will be returned to control of the 69th Div.

(d) The General commanding the artillery of the XX Corps will continue to have all units now at his disposal.

The Generals of the infantry divisions will have at their disposal, in addition to their batteries of 155 hows., a battalion of 105's from the groupment of the army corps, which will be placed at their disposal this evening.

The attention of the generals of the infantry divisions is invited to the necessity which devolves upon them of executing counterbattery fire with their 155 hows., and even 75's in the zone of action of their infantry divisions.

The General commanding the artillery of the XX Corps will prepare a plan of employment of the artillery and will make provision for interdiction fire on assembly areas or points across which the enemy is forced to pass: and for counterbattery fire against batteries which disclose themselves in the course of the action and against all other fleeting targets.

(F) The following tank elements are placed at the disposal of the General commanding the 58th Div.

1. The Chanoine Group (12 to 15 Schneider tanks).
2. The 1st Bn. of light tanks (45 tanks).
3. The 2d Bn. of light tanks (35 tanks).

(G) The forward displacements of C. P.'s will be provided for during the course of the advance by the generals of the infantry divisions, who will report their location to the general commanding the army corps.

The advanced C. P. of the army corps will be indicated later: for the present and until further orders, the C. P. of the XX Corps and of the artillery of the XX Corps remains at MONTGOBERT.

V. Surprise being the element essential to the success of the attack, the utmost discretion in the use of the telephone is enjoined: troop movements will take place at night: before H hour, the activity of our artillery will remain normal: but at H hour, barrage, interdiction, and counterbattery fire will open with the greatest violence, and the infantry will advance to the attack with the maximum of rapidity and energy.

BERDOULAT.
General of Division.
Commanding the XX Army Corps.
From 8 p.m., July 19 to 8 p.m., July 20

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS: During the evening and the night of the 19th, our troops continued their advance to the west edge of BERZY-le-SEC, captured ACONIN Farm, the hamlet of VISIGNEUX and Crest 146 (northwest of VILLE-MONTOIRE).

The enemy resists strongly and his machine-gun nests are difficult to reduce on [Hill 146] [not identified]. The situation remains practically the same during the day in spite of violent local enemy counterattacks and we hold the west edge of ACONIN Farm, the east edge of Bois GERARD and the west slopes of Hill 146. However, we are unable to capture TIGNY, the west edges of which are strongly held with machine guns, combining their action with those on Hill 160 (northeast of the village).

The reaction of the enemy artillery was also intensified.

It is definitely established that we are opposed by a strong reinforcement of artillery that has been hastily installed (area of VILLEBLAIN---Bois de CONCROIS---SEPTMONTS). An airplane observe reports at least 10 guns lined up in a field south of VILLEBLAIN.

III. IDENTIFICATIONS:

10th Inf. Div.: 6 prisoners of the 47th Inf. (1st Bn.) taken on the 19th on the front of the American 2d Div. (west of TIGNY). The 10th Inf. Div., which took part in the MARNE offensive was withdrawn from the region east of CHATEAU-THIERRY on the evening of the 15th. It was at rest at MONT-St-PERE. The 47th was put into the line already held by mixed elements of the 14th Reserve Division and the 3d Reserve Division. Its strength seems weak.

46th Reserve Div.: Two noncommissioned officers and five men of the 2d Bn., 214th Reserve Inf., taken the afternoon of the 20th on the SOISSONS----CHATEAU-THIERRY Road west of BUZANCY. The 46th Reserve Division was withdrawn from the RESSONS-sur-MATZ Front three weeks ago and placed at rest in the APPILLY area (west of NOYON). It arrived on the 18th in the area east of BUZANCY. The entire division is probably on that part of the front.

By order:

[Signature Illegible,]
Chief of Staff.
Relief of 1st Division

(Edited Translation)

C. P. FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Montgobert. Aisne, July 21, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 243

[Extract]

1. By order of the general commanding the army, the British 15th Infantry Div., which is arriving during the night 21/22, in the area of Le JARDIN with C. P. at COEUVRES, is placed at the disposal of the General commanding the XX Army Corps at noon, to relieve the American 1st Div. in its present zone of action.

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VI. Following its relief, the 1st Div. will be assembled in army reserve in the region of NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOIN and will occupy the zone limited by the localities: NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOIN—ROZIERES—FRESNOY-le-LUAT—AUGER-ST-VINCENT—VILLERS—ROUVILLE—BOISSY—FRESNOY—VILLERS-ST-GENEST—BOUILLANDY—BREGY—OISSERY—SILLY-le-LONG (all inclusive).

Headquarters of the 1st Div. will be at NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOIN.

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BERDOULAT,
General Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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Disposition of Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

C. P. FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Montgobert, Aisne, July 22, 1918.

FIELD ORDERS NO. 245

[Extract]

E. Confirming the action initiated by the General commanding the American 1st Div., the artillery of the 1st Div. will remain in position to support the Scottish 15th Infantry Division. * *

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BERDOULAT,
General of Division,
Commanding the XX Army Corps.

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20 l-32.7: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

C. P. FRENCH XX ARMY CORPS,
Montgobert, Aisne, July 21, 1918.

[Extract]

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4:45 a.m. On the left, the American 1st Division rapidly reached the course of the CRISE. In the center the 87th Infantry Division captured BUZANCY and Ru-GAILLOT Farm.

On the right, the French 58th Infantry Division, supported by tanks, reached the western edges of the Bois de CONCROIS, captured TAUX and TIGNY. At 7:15 a.m., severe counterattack debouching from the Bois de CONCROIS in the general direction of Hill 157. Our battalions fell back on the front: VILLEMontoire beet sugar mill[raperie]---western edge of TIGNY. The counterattack was checked.

The Left Brigade of the American 1st Division capture BERZY-le-SEC.

Summarizing, we advanced 1500 meters east in that part of the zone situated north of the BUZANCY parallel. And are on our line of departure in the zone south of this same parallel. We captured about 400 prisoners and took some machine guns. Our losses are considerable: 1,000 men in the 87th Infantry Division and 1,900 in the 58th Infantry Division.

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- 306 -
The artillery of the American 1st Division is relieved: One-half the night 22/23, the remainder, the night 23/24. After this relief, the General commanding the Scottish 15th Infantry Division will have at his disposal all the artillery of the Scottish 15th Infantry Division and the French 253d F. A. (truck-carried).

The American 1st Division captured the sugar works south of NOYANT-et-ACONIN and the French 58th Infantry Division is reinforcing its position at the TIGNY beet-sugar mill.

III. Artillery: Until further orders there will be no change in the artillery now in position in the sector of the French 58th Infantry Division. Consequently, the General commanding the French 12th Infantry Division will have at his disposal, after the relief has been affected:

(1) The divisional artillery of the American 2d Division.
(2) The field artillery of the 58th Division.
(3) The 7th Battalion of the French 112th Regt. (155 howitzers).
No. 48. July 22 to 23, 8 p.m.

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS: The attack executed by our troops at 5 a.m., after an artillery preparation which lasted from 4:15 to 5 a.m., encountered stubborn enemy resistance. This resistance was characterized by the use of light and heavy machine guns with which all of the strong points are abundantly provided. Particularly strong centers of resistance: BUZANCY, woods southwest of BUZANCY, VILLEMONTOIRE, TIGNY.

At the close of the day, we were at the west outskirts of TIGNY and had made some progress on the slopes west of GAILLOT Creek. Our troops held the NOYANT sugar mill.

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By order:

[Signature Illegible.1]
Chief of Staff.

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From July 23 to 24, 8 p.m.

[Extract]

I. OPERATIONS: On the entire front, the activity of the enemy Infantry is characterized by frequent machine-gun fire.

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The activity of the enemy artillery against our front lines presented the same characteristics as during the preceding day. Intermittent bombardments of slight intensity.
OPERATIONS OF THE AMERICAN 1st and 2d DIVISIONS IN THE AISNE-MARNE
18-23 JULY 1918

KEY MAP

AMERICAN 1st DIV

1st BRIG

2d BRIG

16th INF

26th INF

CCOUESNE - VIEUX-VALSERY

MAR

Fr I

3d BRIG

MOROCCAN 1st DIV

4th MAR 3d BRIG

AMERICAN 2d DIV

3d BRIG

238th INF

FR XX

FR XXX

MAP NO 72
Fire on our rear areas increases from day to day. In particular: (Counterbattery on the region around VIERZY coming from region of DROIZY—Bois d'ENCENS) and on the (region around MISSY coming from north of the AISNE).

Interdiction or harassing fire on: CHAUDUN, the northeast exit of CHAUDUN, the outskirts of VERTE-FEUILLE and of BEAUREPAIRE Farms.

Only slight activity and aggressiveness shown by the aviation. Its patrols, in general, do not pass beyond our front lines. One raid of four machines is reported as deep as BEAUREPAIRE Farm (handled roughly by our antiaircraft defense).

Four observation balloons up, one of which is on a line with VILLEBUIN-CHACRISE.

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III. IDENTIFICATIONS: Five prisoners of the 1st and 2d Bns. of the 79th (20th Inf. Div.) captured at 1 a.m., the 24th, in the southern part of VILLEMONTOIRE. * * *

Prisoners sent to the prisoner cage from 8 p.m., July 23, to 8 p.m., July 24:

(1) One officer and four men of the 2d Bn. of the 92d taken on the 23d near Hill 157 (north of TIGNY) during the fighting on the 23d.

The 2d Bn. of the 92d, which entered the line on the night 19/20, was engaged on the 20th and relieved during the night of the same day to be reorganized. It was again placed in line during the night 22/23 and went through our attack of the 23d. At that moment, according to the statement of an officer prisoner, the combat strength of the battalion was very weak—-in his company: 36 men in the line.

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By order:

[Signature Illegible],
Chief of Staff.

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American 1st Division
July 16 -July 27, 1918

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20 l-64.2: Orders

General Summer-all takes Command

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 37

1st DIVISION, A. E. F.

1. Pursuant to instructions form G. H. Q., A. E. F., the undersigned hereby assumes command of the 1st Division relieving Major General R L. Bullard who is assigned to command the III Army Corps, A. E. F.

C. P. SUMMERALL.
Major General, N. A.

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SACONIN--MISSY-AUX-BOIS AREA
Approaches to Missy-aux-Bois, looking south from Saconin-et-Breuil
Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 27
G-3, 694

1st DIVISION. A. E. F.,

Map: 1/80,000 - SOISSONS

1. The French Tenth Army attacks in direction FERE-en-TARDENOIS.
2. The French XX Corps participates in this attack.
3. The 1st Division participates in this attack under orders of XX Corps. It has on its right the Moroccan 1st Division, on its left another French division of the French I corps.
4. The zone of action of the division is limited as follows:
   Southern limits - Reservoir 1,500 meters southeast of MORTEFONTAINE—north edge of Bois-VAUBERON—Ru-de St-AGNAN-ou-de-RET2 (stream bed to road crossing south of COEUUVRES)—Elevation Point 162—old trenches and wire running west-east to crossing of road 400 meters north of La GLAUX Fme (trench included)—along same trench system to crossing of road 300 meters north of CRAVANCON Fme (trench included)—road crossing 500 meters northeast of CHAUDUN (trench system excluded).
   Northern limits - Fme de POW (included)—along trench to LAVERSINE (included)—wood at head of ravine 1,200 meters northeast of CUTRY (included)—RAPERIE (included)—MONTPLAISIR Fme (included)—PARIS to SOISSONS Road 2,000 meters northeast of CRAVANCON Fme.

Objectives:
1st: Road running east of north through La GLAUX Fme—TILLEUL de la GLAUX.
2d: Eastern side of ravine east of MONTPLAISIR Fme—eastern edge of MISSY-aux-BOIS—eastern edge of CRAVANCON Fme.
3d: PARIS-SOISSONS Road at northern sector limits—eastern edge of CHAUDUN.
5. The attack will be on J day at H hour, to be announced later. There will be no artillery preparation. The attack will be covered by a rolling barrage and dense artillery covering fire.

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By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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Relief of Moroccan Brigade

Operations Section 2d BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
No. 170
Retheuil, Aisne, July 16, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The 1st Division will relieve one brigade of the Moroccan division commencing tonight, July 16/17, as follows:
   2 battalions, 28th Infantry and hq. co., will take station in intermediate position at MORTEFONTAINE on night July 16/17.

   * * * * *

   2 battalions 26th Infantry and hq. co. will take station in intermediate position at ROY-St-NICOLAS.

   * * * * *

   Brigade combat P. C. will be on trail 500 meters north of RIVERSEAU Farm, and will open at 12 midnight, July 16/17.

   A rear echelon of brigade hq. will be maintained at RETHEUIL until further orders.

   By command of Brigadier General Buck:

   JOHN H. WILLS,
   Major, Engineers,
   Brigade Adjutant.

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Occupation of Forward Area

G-3, 692
1st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Dammartin-en-Goele, Seine-et-Maine, July 16, 1918.

Subject: Warning order preliminary to operation in vicinity of MORTEFONTAINE

[Extract]

1. This division, under the orders of the French XX Army Corps will be moved up to the vicinity of CUTRY---MORTEFONTAINE---PALESNE---CREPY-en-VALOIS.

2. Movements of motorized trains not yet in forward area: All motorized trains will move to the forward area the night of July 16/17.

   * * * * *
3. The forward area will be occupied as follows: Division P. C. - MORTEFONTAINE from 9 a. m. July 16. P. C., F. A Brigade - MORTEFONTAINE. Rear echelon division P. C. - CREPY. Rear echelon F. A. brigade vicinity of FRESNOY-la-RMERE. Temporary P. C. 1st Infantry Brigade - LONGAVESNE. 2d Infantry Brigade - ROY-St-NICHOLAS. Infantry and engineer units in the zone TAILLEFONTAINE---ROY-St-NICHOLAS---Les BOURBETTES---PALESNE and woods to west. 1st Brigade on south of zone: 2d Brigade on north of zone. Division engineers in rear.

5th, 6th and 7th Field Artillery. Zone FRESNOY-la-RIVIERE---VATTIER-VOISIN (in this zone 75 cannon and equipages will be reunited). All other elements in the zone CREPY---ROUVILLE---TRUMILLY.

5. PRELIMINARY DISPOSITIONS:

Infantry: The front line of the sector to be occupied by this division extends from Elevation Point 162 west of DOMMIERS north to point about 1 km. north of crossroads west of CUTRY. The division will enter the line night of July 17/18. All elements, including machine guns, enter same night. The brigades will be in line with their regiments in line. Each regiment will be disposed in depth, with first, second, and third line battalions. Infantry reconnaissances of the terrain will be made night of 16th or early morning of the 17th.

The infantry brigade P. C.'s will be installed the night the brigade enters the line at:

1st Brigade - Le MURGER Fme.
2d Brigade - Quarry north of RIVERSEAU Fme.

Artillery: Artillery will be emplaced in the region of SOUCY and COEUURES-et-VAISERY. The artillery will be put in battery the night of 17th/18th. Reconnaissances morning of 17th.

By command of Major General Bullard:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.
J Day, H Hour

Memorandum for Commanding General, Brigades

[Extract]

I. The attack orders in Field Order No. 27, G-3, 694. will take place July 18 at 4:35 a. m.

* * * * * *

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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Plan of Artillery Support

Operations
No. 180

1st FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Mortefontaine, Aisne, July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

The divisional artillery of the 1st Division, reinforced by the 253d R A. C. P. (3 groups) will protect the infantry in the offensive operations described in F. 0. 27.

* * * * * *

By order of Colonel Holbrook:

DE LANO ANDREWS,
2d Lieut., F. A., U. S. A.,
Acting Adjutant.

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Movement of Division Command Post

G-3, 709
1st DMSION. A. E. F.,
Mortefontaine, Aisne, July 18, 1918.

C. O., Co. C. 1st Engrs.  
Division Reserve

Division P. C. moves forward to P. C. of 1st Inf. Brigade in crook of road 300 meters west of COEUUVRES immediately.

Conforming to this movement, move your units into reserve position in COEUUVRES prepared to march in the direction of CUTRY. All liaison officers will accompany division P. C.

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

Disposition of Troops

G-3, 714
1st DIVISION. A. E. F.,
COEUUVRES-et-Valsey, Aisne, July 18, 1918.

Memorandum for Commanding General, 2d Brigade

1. The present situation according to information at these headquarters is as follows:
   18th Infantry in liaison with Moroccan division advancing across railroad south of BERZY-le-SEC.
   16th Infantry in liaison with 18th Infantry is also advancing. It has, however, contact with the 26th Infantry.
   26th Infantry organizing on plateau west of PLOISY. In contact with French troops moving up in the vicinity of crossing of north sector line and Route No. 2, from PARIS to SOISSONS.
   28th Infantry reported being relieved by elements of the French 153d Division and assembling in ravine north of MISSY-aux-BOIS for reorganization.

2. If this condition exists reorganize the 28th Infantry 2 front line battalions and place them in position to cover your front which appears to be extended from south of PLOISY to junction with French at SOISSONS-PARIS Road.

3. The brigade reserve battalion of the 26th Infantry will not be put in line but will be held to resist counterattack.

4. The ultimate front of this division according to latest orders is BERZY-le-SEC (exclusive)---BUZANCY (exclusive). Of this front the part BERZY (exclusive)---pond (etang) south of ACONIN Farm (inclusive), will ultimately be held by your brigade. Occupy this line as soon as the expected advance of the 153d Division occurs and organize
it strongly. Make your distribution of troops so as to face northeast and protect the left flank of the corps. The 153d Division is definitely charged with the taking and occupation of BERZY-le-SEC.

5. Liaison with 1st Brigade and with 153d Division must be maintained: the losing of contact constitutes the principal danger.

6. Exact information as to the position of your front lines must be secured and communicated to these headquarters tonight.

By command of Major General Summer-all:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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201:32.15: Order

Continuation of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 28
G-3, No. 717

1st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Coeuwres-et-Valsery, Aisne, July 19, 1918---1:35 a.m.

[Extract]

1. The Tenth Army attacks this morning at 4 a.m.
2. The Moroccan division on our right holds a position somewhere close to the railroad. The 153d Division on our left holds a position somewhere on the PARIS-SOISSONS Road.
3. In liaison with flanking divisions the 1st Division will take and hold line BUZANCY (exclusive) to BERZY-le-SEC (exclusive). This line will be consolidated to resist counterattack and cover the left flank of the corps.
4. Interior limits between brigades, south end of pond south of ACONIN Fme.
5. INFANTRY: The position of our infantry is: 2d Brigade has attained 2d objectives; 1st Brigade has attained final objectives prescribed for yesterday. Same distribution of troops as for yesterday. The battalions in division reserve will not move. ***
6. ARTILLERY: There will be no artillery preparation. Our artillery will start a rolling barrage at a safe distance before yesterday’s third objective. ***

* * * * *

7. Tanks will act with infantry. ***

* * * * *

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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Reorganization after Attack

G-3, 719 1st DIVISION, A. E. F.

Cave west of Coeuwres-et-Valsery, Aisne. July 19, 1918.

Memorandum for Commanding Generals Infantry Brigades

1. At the conclusion of the operation ordered for 5:30 this date, brigade commanders will reorganize their regiments in accordance with the prescriptions of Field Orders No. 27. G-3, 694.

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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Disposition of Division Reserve

G-3, 720 1st DIVISION, A. E. F.

Cave west of Coeuwres-et-Valsery, Aisne, July 19, 1918.

Memorandum for C. 0.. Battalion 18th Inf. in Division Reserve
C. 0.. Battalion Engineers in Division Reserve
C. 0.. 1st M. G. Battalion in Division Reserve

[Extract]

1. The division reserves will be established for the night on our first line trenches of this afternoon in the vicinity of trail crossing 1 km. south of west of PLOISY. *

* * * * *

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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- 318 -
Plan of Attack July 21

Coeuvres-et-Valsery, Aisne, July 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The Tenth Army attacks tomorrow morning at 4:45 a.m.
2. The Moroccan division, on our right, holds Bois-GERARD. It will be relieved tonight by a new division. The 153d Division, on our left, holds trenches in the vicinity of MONT-de-COURMELLES Farm. It will be relieved tonight by the 69th Division.
3. In liaison with flanking divisions, the 1st Division will attack in the zones indicated on map attached [not found].

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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201-32.15: Memo

201-32.15: Memo

Attack to Straighten Line

1st DIVISION. A. E. F.,
July 20, 1918.

Memorandum for Commanding Generals, Infantry Brigades

[Extract]

1. The corps has ordered this division to take and hold BERZY-le-SEC.
2. The attack will be delivered at 2 p.m. for the purpose of taking this town and the heights to the north. At the same time the positions of both brigades will be straightened so as to form the division on the general front BERZY-le-SEC--BUZANCY.

* * * * *
4. TROOPS:
Infantry: 2d Bn., 18th Inf. Div. Reserve, S. W. of PLOISY Ravine on MISSY-PLOISY Road is put under the order of the Commanding General, 2d Brigade, for use in the taking of BERZY-le-SEC.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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201-32.15: Order

Relief of Division Ordered

G-3, 724
FIELD ORDERS
No. 30

1st DIVISION. A. E. F.,
Cave west of Coeuvres-et-Valsery. Aisne, July 21, 1918.

PART I

[Extract]

1. This division will be relieved, commencing night of July 22/23, by the 15th Scottish Division. This division is in line two brigades abreast - each regiment in each brigade abreast. Division reserves: 1 battalion engineers (2 cos.), 1st M. G. Battalion (2 cos.) and composite battalion of 800 men. The 15th Scottish Division will, on relief, adopt this order as nearly as possible.

2. The following conditions of the relief are prescribed by the corps.
   (a) The Infantry will be relieved on the night of July 22/23. This relief must be completely terminated and the relieved units have passed the north and south line marked by the Ru de RETZ at daybreak on the 23d.
   (b) The artillery will be relieved by fractions on the nights of July 22/23 and 23/24. The artillery will be regrouped after relief at its echelons.
   (c) All other elements will be relieved on night of July 22/23.
   (d) Preliminary reconnaissance will be made in the morning of July 22.

* * * * *

13. Taking over command:
   Commanding General, 1st Division, will turn over command of the sector to the General commanding the 15th Scottish Division on July 23 at 8 a. m.
   Commanding general, F. A. brigade, will turn over command to the Commanding General, 15th Scottish Divisional Artillery, at same hour.
   Commanding generals, infantry brigades, will turn over command to Brigadiers, 15th Scottish Division, on relief of their brigades.
PART II

1. After relief, this division will be regrouped in the vicinity of NANTEUIL-le-HAUDOUPIN, with headquarters at that point. * * *  

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Map reference:

SOISSONS: 1 /80,000  
PARIS: 1/80,000

By command of Major General Summer-all:

CAMPBELL KING,  
Chief of Staff.

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201-32.1: Order

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDER  
No. 36  
2d INF. BRIGADE, A. E. F.,  
Missy-aux-Bois, Aisne, July 21, 1918.

[Extract]

1. This brigade will attack in accordance with F. 0. 29. Hq. 1st Division.

2. For objectives, division between regiments and brigades, see F. 0. 29. 1st Division [July 20, 1918].

* * * * *

6. The 69th Div. on our left advances at 8 a. m. The 1st Brig. at 4:45 a. m. * * *

* * * * *

9. The brigade P. C. will be at MISSY with advance center of Information at Crossroads 6.703. * * .

By command of Brigadier General Buck:

JOHN H. WILLIS,  
Major, Engineer Corps,  
Brigade Adjutant.

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-321 -
Correction of Field Order

G-3, 728
1st DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Cave west of Coevres-et-Valseroy, Aisne, July 22, 1918.

1. So much of Field Orders 30 as prescribes the northern limit of the sector as north of BERZY-le-SEC is amended to prescribe the northern limit of the sector as BERZY-le-SEC exclusive.
2. The 15th Scottish Division will relieve only the elements of the 28th Infantry south of BERZY-le-SEC.
3. The Commanding General, 2d Infantry Brigade, will arrange the details of the relief of BERZY-le-SEC by the 69th D. I.

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

Relief of 1st Field Artillery Brigade

1st FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Cave west of Coevres et Valseroy, Aisne, July 23, 1918.

1. The 15th Scottish Division will complete the placing in position of its artillery on the night of July 23/24. The command of the artillery of the sector will pass to the Chief of Artillery, 15th Scottish Division as soon as all these batteries are in position. The following batteries of the 1st Field Artillery Brigade will remain in position until the night of July 24/25 in order to participate in an operation to be executed on the morning of July 24:
   - 5th Field Artillery - all batteries
   - 6th Field Artillery - all batteries of 2d group
   - 7th Field Artillery - all batteries of 2d group
   - 253d Regiment - all batteries
   The 253d Regiment will remain in the sector under the direct orders of the Chief of Artillery, 15th Scottish Division.
2. All groups not mentioned above will withdraw from their positions on the night of July 23/24 and will assemble at the echelons preparatory to marching to rest billets. These groups and the regimental headquarters will be prepared to march at 6 p. m. July 24. The remaining elements of the command will prepare to march 24 hours later.
3. Operations Order No. 124. these headquarters, is hereby cancelled.

By order of Colonel Holbrook:

DE LANO ANDREWS,
2d Lieut., F. A., U. S. R.,
Acting Adjutant,
Artillery Support of 15th Scottish Division

1st FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

Cave west of Coeuvres-et-Valsery, Aisne, July 22, 1918.

[Extract]

It is noted that for the first time in history French, British and American artillery are working together under the same command. They will support an attack tomorrow morning to be made by the 15th Scottish Division. * * *

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By order of Colonel L. R. Holbrook:

DE LANO ANDREWS,
2d Lieut., F. A., U. S. R.,
Acting Adjutant.

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Report on Operations south of Soissons

G-3, 735

1st DIVISION, A. E. F.,


Map References: General 1/80,000 SOISSONS

[Extract]

1. ENTRY INTO ATTACK:

(a) On July 18, 1918, the commanding general of this division was relieved from command of the CANTIGNY sector. On July 10 the relief of all elements of the division was completed, and the division was placed in rest in the area north of BEAUVAIS, occupying stations from the suburbs of BEAUVAIS to BRETEUIL inclusive. The division was placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, Group of Armies of the Reserve, The 2d Brigade, however, and the 7th Field Artillery, were grouped in the northern part of the areas, between FROISSY and BRETEUIL, and were temporarily in reserve of the [French] X C. A. (Apparently intended as abbreviation of Corps d’Armée)

(b) July 11 orders were received directing the movement of the division to the area of DAMMARTIN-en-GOELE, and placing it at the disposition of the French Tenth Army. The movement began July 12. The field artillery brigade and all other mounted elements proceeded by marching, all dismounted elements being moved by trucks furnished by the French authorities and from the divisional trains. On July 14 all elements of the division were in the area with the exception of some elements of the field artillery brigades, which were just outside. No elements of the field artillery brigade had as yet reached their final cantonments in the area.

* * * * *
BERZY-PLOISY AREA

Berzy-le-Sec and vicinity, looking west-southwest from Brezy Station
On July 15 orders were received from the Tenth Army placing the division under the orders of the French XX Army Corps, and outlining the movement in the direction of the sector held by the XX Army Corps, southwest of SOISSONS. The same day more detailed orders were received from the XX Army Corps, directing the movement, to commence during the night of July 15/16. * * * On July 16 the division P. C. was established at MORTEFONTAINE. During the night of July 16/17 and the day of the 17th the movement of all elements into the area in rear of the XX Army Corps was completed. ** *

2. ATTACK:

(a) July 17 orders were received from the XX Army Corps that the Tenth Army would make an offensive to break the enemy's front between the AISNE and the OURCQ, and to push in the direction of FERE-en-TARDENOIS: that the XX Army Corps would participate with three divisions in the first line and two in the second. The 1st Division was designated as the left (north) front line division of the corps. The 1st Division had on its right the Moroccan 1st Division: on its left the 153d D. I. of the French I Army Corps, The attack was ordered for 4:45 a. m. July 18. It was not to be preceded by artillery fire but the advance was to be covered by a rolling barrage. Three objectives were assigned.

(b) In conformity with the above orders the 1st Division attacked as in F. 0. 27. * * * In addition to the French artillery units as enumerated in F. 0. 27, the division was supported by the following French units:

- Groupement XI - Heavy Tanks
- Escadrille Spad 42
- Balloon 83

All troops were in place in sufficient time to begin the attack at 4:35 a. m. At 5:30 a. m. the first objective had been attained by all troops, with comparatively few losses and there was little resistance encountered, mostly on the right. At 7:15 a. m. the right of the attack had reached the second objective. The left of the division was on the west side of the MISSY Ravine. Shortly, afterwards the second objective was reached by all troops. The 2d Brigade had heavy fighting in the MISSY Ravine.

After the halt at the second objective, the 2d Brigade was unable to continue the advance to the third objective on this day. The 1st Brigade advanced to the third objective and pushed patrols out in front of the objective. The failure of the 2d Brigade to advance was occasioned by very heavy enfilading machine-gun fire from machine-gun nests to the north and northeast. The 153d Inf. Div. on the left was unable to capture these nests, which lay in its zone, and the fire for the time being held up our attack.

At the end of the day the situation was: 2d Brigade on second objective, in liaison with 153d Div.; 1st Brigade on third objectives, in liaison with the Moroccan division with left flank refused, to establish liaison with 2d Brigade. The casualties suffered during the advance to the second objective were very light. Quite heavy casualties were suffered thereafter by the 2d Brigade in attempting to advance and by the 1st Brigade, which had its flank exposed. The advance was a complete surprise to the enemy and he suffered heavily in casualties and in prisoners. Approximately 2,000 prisoners were taken the first day, of which approximately 75 were officers. In the quarry 500 men, with battalion commander and several other officers, were taken by a very small group of men. It is impossible to estimate the small material captured. Many machine guns were taken and operated against the enemy. Approximately 30 field guns (77's and 150's) were taken in the MISSY Ravine and neighboring positions. At 7:30 on the morning of this day the division P. C. was moved from MORTEFONTAINE to quarry 500 meters west of COEUVRES. Both brigades also established advance P. C.'s. The division reserves, other than the infantry battalions, were moved into the vicinity of the division P. C. One battalion, 18th Infantry, in division reserve, was moved to DOMMIERS for entrucking. to support the II Cavalry Corps in case it was able to penetrate the enemy's lines.
On the night of July 18/19 orders were received from the XX Army Corps that the Tenth Army would continue the attack at 4 a.m. July 19 and that the division would attack as part of the XX Corps in liaison with flanking divisions. The battalion of the 18th Infantry sent to DOMMERS for entrucking was returned to the division as reserves. The objective given to the division was the front - BERZY-le-SEC (exclusive)---BUZANCY (exclusive)---to thus establish itself facing to the northeast to cover the left flank of the corps.

As soon as this objective was obtained the division was ordered to push out offensive reconnaissance parties until contact with the enemy was gained. The conditions for the execution of the attack were otherwise the same as for the first day.

In conformity with these orders the division attacked at 4 a.m. Due to the lateness of the hour at which orders were received, it was impossible to notify some battalions until almost the hour of assault, but all battalions went forward at approximately 4 a.m. In liaison with the Moroccan division the 1st Brigade was able to sensibly advance and to occupy the line extending from the head of the CHAZELLE Ravine and to its junction with the 2d Brigade on the SOISSONS-PARIS Road. The 2d Brigade continued to suffer heavily from machine-gun fire and was unable to advance beyond the PARIS-SOISSONS Road at this time. Supporting tanks were able to advance as far as the edge of the PLOISY Ravine. They suffered heavy casualties, however, and from this time were unable to participate further in the attack.

At 5:30 p.m., in liaison with the 153d Div. on the left, the division again attacked with the objective of advancing its left to the western edge of the PLOISY Ravine and strengthening its front. This operation was successful, although many casualties were suffered from machine-gun fire from strong points to the north. Right of the division was marked by Fme du MONT-de-COURMELLES--edge of PLOISY Ravine---CHAZELLE. The casualties suffered in this day's operation were very heavy - probably 3,000 for this day and 4,500 for the two days. An additional thousand prisoners were taken and about 35 officers. About 30 additional field guns were taken in the ravines between PLOISSY and CHAZELLE. Liaison was established for the night with both flanking divisions.

On July 20 orders were received from the XX Army Corps that on account of the difficulties the 153d D. I. had encountered in its progress the 1st Division would be charged with the taking of BERZY-le-SEC, formerly in the zone of the 153d Div. and that the zone of action of the 1st Division would extend to the north of the village. In compliance with the above orders the division attacked at 2 p.m. for the purpose of taking BERZY-le-SEC and the heights to the north and strengthening the front of the division on the general line BERZY-le-SEC---BUZANCY. For this purpose one battalion divisional reserves were put under orders of Commanding General, 2d Brigade. The divisional artillery, which had been moved into forward positions, delivered a powerful preparation of two hours, and a rolling barrage from H hour. The 2d Brigade suffered very heavily from machine-gun nest to north which had not yet been taken and was unable at this time to take BERZY-le-SEC. The 1st Brigade, in liaison with the Moroccan division, crossed the railroad and advanced to the vicinity of Bois-GERARD. VISIGNEUX and ANCONIN Farm, retreating its flank to connect with 2d Brigade. The situation at nightfall was: 28th Infantry on plateau in front of BERZY-le-SEC; 26th Infantry dug in along road between BERZY-le-SEC and CHAZELLE: the 1st Brigade in liaison with the 2d Brigade and with the Moroccan division at VISIGNEUX. Casualties continued heavy, approximately 1,000 for the day. Some prisoners and material were taken in PLOISY Ravine and in the zone of the 1st Brigade.

During night of July 20/21 orders were received from the XX Army Corps that the corps would attack on the morning of July 21 at 4 a.m.: that on this night the Moroccan division would be relieved by the 87th Inf. Div. and the 153 Inf. Div. reinforced by one regiment of the 69th Inf. Div. The first objective was given as BERZY-le-SEC (exclusive)---the heights north and east of BUZANCY---BUZANCY (exclusive).
In conformity with these orders the division attacked at 4 a. m. July 21. The situation was complicated by the necessity of maintaining liaison with the 87th Div. which attacked at 4 a. m. and with the 153d Div. which only attacked at 8 a. m. after three hours artillery preparation. To meet this situation the 1st Brigade was sent forward in liaison with the 87th Div., retiring its left to protect its flank, which was also covered by intense supporting artillery fire. This brigade, however, necessarily suffered severe casualties from flanking machine-gun fire in attaining its approximate objective on the heights north of BUZANCY. At 8:30 a. m. after the ground in front and flank had been subjected to a heavy artillery fire, and 2d Brigade advanced under partial barrage and at 9:15 a. m. took BERZY-le-SEC. The rest of the day was spent in exploiting the success by the seizure of commanding heights and by pushing out patrols. The line at nightfall was the heights north of BERZY-le-SEC----the CHATEAU-THIEF---SOISSONS Road south of the SUCREFUE---and the heights north of VISIGNEUX. Casualties continued heavy in the front line from machine-gun and increasing artillery fire and in the rear from machine-gun fire from the nest to the north and long range artillery fire from the north down the MISSY Ravine. Several hundred prisoners were captured, especially in region of BERZY-le-SEC which was held by one battalion. A battery of field guns and many machine guns were taken in BERZY-le-SEC and other guns captured. On this date the division was notified that the promised relief for the night of July 21/22 was impossible, as the relieving division could not be gotten into place.

On July 22 the 26th Infantry occupied the SUCRERIE so as to straighten out the line at the front of the division on its given objective, in liaison with the 153d Div. on its left and with the 87th Div. on its right, north and west of BUZANCY which that division had been unable to take. Casualties were lighter. Few prisoners were captured. On this day a preliminary reconnaissance was made by the relieving division. On the day of July 22 orders were received for the relief of the division by the 15th Scottish Division, beginning the night of July 22/23 with the relief of all infantry and one-third of the artillery, and ending July 23/24 with the relief of the remainder of the artillery. These orders also covered withdrawal of the division to reserve positions in the NANTEUIL area, afterward changed to the DAMMARTIN area. Due to the difficulties of ammunition supply for the relieving division and the fact that it was to attack on the morning of July 23, the Commanding General of the 1st Division considered it imprudent to withdraw any of his own artillery. On his own initiative, therefore, the artillery of the 1st Division was retained in the sector one extra day.

In accordance with the above orders all elements of the division except the field artillery brigade, the ammunition trains, and the sanitary units are relieved and withdrawn from the sector on the night of July 22/23. Casualties were light. The Commanding General, 1st Division relinquished command of the sector midnight of July 22/23, and opened P. C. at DAMMARTIN the next morning.

The elements left in the sector continued to function for the 15th Scottish Division, the field artillery brigade supporting its attack on the morning of July 23. The artillery was relieved and withdrawn nights of July 23/24 and 24/25. It assembled on July 25 at rear echelons in vicinity of MORTEFONTAINE. * * * * * * * * * *

By command of Major General Summerall:

CAMPBELL KING,
Chief of Staff.

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American 2d Division
July 17 - July 25, 1918

2d Div.: G-3, GHQ. AEF. Reports: Order

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDER
No. 15

Map: SOISSONS 1:20,000

I. Enemy holds line through eastern part of the Forêt de RETZ from near the Tranchée de BADE (1364) along the LAIE du GRAND-VENEUR to Carrefour d'AUMALE, thence to Carrefour du CONSERVATEUR.

The French Tenth Army will attack and break the enemy's front between the AISNE and the OURCQ Rivers, pushing forward without stop in the direction of FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

The French XX Army Corps attacks with the American 1st Division on the left, the Moroccan 1st Division in the center, the American 2d Division on the right. A division of the French XXX Army Corps is on the right of the 2d Division.

Normal objective of XX Army Corps: 6020---eastern exit CHAUDUN village---6379---eastern edge VIERZY---6555. Objective of XXX Army Corps: 6555---MONTREBOEUF Fme---eastern exit VILLERS-HELON. The first attack will be carried out in three phases.

First Intermediate: Crossroads 2789 excluded 3380---BEAUREPAIRE Farm---road from BEAUREPAIRE Fme to La GRANGE Farm down to 3267.

Second Intermediate: 4781 to 4964. Normal objective as above. The second attack will be carried out in the general direction of TIGNY and DROIZY.

II. The 2d Division attacks on D day at H hour.

Boundaries of the Division:

Northern: LAIE du FOND d'ARGENT to Carrefour de FOURNEAUX; thence Route CHRETIENNETTE to the Road VERTE-FEUILLE Farm---St-PIERRE-AIGLE---crossroad 2789 (exclusive)---4781---6379---8072.

Southern: 1363---2965---3067---4067---5063---6555---7949---HARTENNES-et-TAUX (incl.). The first attack will be made in three phases with sector and objectives as above.

III. (a) Infantry

1. Brigade Sector:

Northern boundary: 08.70---crossroads 17.87---29.85 on 1st Intermediate Objective---thence to 49.78 on 2d Intermediate Objective---thence to 65.74 on normal objective.

Southern boundary: Southern boundary of the division. This brigade will attack with two regiments side by side.

2. 5th Marines

Sector: Northern boundary: Northern boundary of the division.

Southern boundary: Northern boundary of the 3d Brigade. The rate of advance will be 100 meters in two minutes up to the normal objective. Halts at intermediate objectives will be short. At the normal objective the attack will halt until ordered to continue.

(b) Reserves: The 6th Marines, 2d Engineers, and 4th Machine Gun Battalion

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constitute the division reserve—stationed as follows: Hq. and 1st Bn., 6th Marines—Carrefour CHRISTINE, Hq. and 2d Bn., 6th Marines—Carrefour d’AMELIE,* Hq. and 3d Bn., 6th Marines—Crossroads 300 meters southeast of Carrefour de MONTGOBERT.

2d Engineers:
- Hq. and 1st Bn. at Carrefour des VENTES-CAGNIER
- 9th Bn. at Carrefour de la BAUVE
- 4th Machine Gun Bn. at Carrefour des VENTES-CAGNIER

(c) The 2d Field Artillery Brigade, reinforced by the French 268th F. A., will support the attack. The 12th F. A. supports the 5th Marines, the 15th the 3d Brigade. Remainder at disposition artillery commander.

(d) Tanks: The 11th Grouping of heavy tanks, consisting of three battalions of three batteries of three to four tanks each, is assigned to the 3d Brigade. The 12th Grouping of heavy tanks, consisting of three battalions of three batteries of three to four tanks each, is assigned to the 5th Marines. See plan for employment of tanks.

(e) Aviation Service: Ten French airplanes are assigned.

IV. Liaison: The 1st F. S. Bn. will establish lines of information to the brigades and stations of the reserves.

Supply: Two days’ reserve rations and 220 rounds of ammunition will be carried by each man.

Evacuation: The division surgeon will establish field hospitals at HARAMONT. Dressing station will be established near Carrefour d’AMELIE and crossroads 300 meters north of letter T in RETZ.

Military Police: The commanding officer, M. P., will establish a line of straggler posts on the line PUISEUX—Carrefour des 6-ROUTES—Carrefour des FONDS-DOUCHARDS.

V. Liaison: The C. G., 3d Brigade, will detail one company and one machine gun platoon for combat liaison with the French division on his right. The C. O., 5th Marines will detail one company and one machine gun platoon for combat liaison between the 5th Marines and the 3d Brigade. He will also designate one company and one machine gun platoon for combat liaison with the Moroccan division.

No communication will be sent by means of telephone. T. S. F. [Radio] or T. P. S. [Buzzer] by units less than a brigade between the time of entering the sector and H hour.

VI. P. C.’s as follows: XXA. C. and corps artillery—initial P. C. RETHEUIL, final P. C. MONTGOBERT.

(a) 2d Division—Hq. 400 yards north of Carrefour de NEMOURS. Will move to Carrefour de MONTGOBERT when final objective is attained. Moroccan 1st Division—initial P. C. VMERES, final P. C. St-PIERRE-AIGLE.

J. G. HARBORD,
Major General, N. A., Commanding.

* Not to be confused with Carrefour d’AUMALE, 1 km. west.
**J Day and H Hour**

2d DIVISION. A. E. F.

*July 17, 1918.*

The division commander directs me to inform you that J Day is July 18, 1918, and H hour is 4:35 a.m.

The attack will therefore come off tomorrow morning at 4:35 a.m.

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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**Corps Reserve**

2d DIVISION. A. E. F.

*July 17, 1918.*

Memo. for the C. O. 6th Marines

The division commander directs me to inform you that your regiment is detailed as corps reserve. While it will follow the course of the attack, it will not be engaged without the authority of the corps commander.

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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**Plan of Artillery Support**

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM

No. 1

2d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.

*July 17, 1918* -- 12 noon.

[Extract]

1. This brigade, with French 268th Regt., F. A., supports attack of 2d Division as follows:

2. The 12th F. A. supports the 5th marines.

The 15th F. A. supports the 3d Brigade.
TIGNY-VAUXCASTILLE AREA
Looking across fields, east-southeast from Beaurepaire Farm
3. First attack is divided into three stages as per 2d Division order.

* * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Bowley:

W. F. BURR,
Major, Field Artillery,
Adjutant.

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202-32.8: Memorandum

Employment of Tanks

[Contemporary Translation]

July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

The American 2d Division disposes of one group of tanks, Schneider type, consisting of 4 groups of 3 batteries of 12 tanks each.

Two groups cooperate in the 1st part of the operations (1st stage): One group (Captain Favot, 9th Group) will be attached to the brigade on the right, one group (the 4th Group, Captain Frechez) to the brigade on the left.

Mission of the group on the right: To support the action of the brigade as much on its front as on its right flank (trench of the G. M. P.) and to cooperate in the taking of the objective marking the limit of the 1st stage (Ferme BEAUREPAIRE).

Mission of the group on the left: To support the action of the brigade on the left.

1st) To neutralize the eastern edge of the forest (1 battery)
2nd) To support the attack against VERTEFEUILLES Fme (1 battery)
3rd) To cooperate in taking Le TRANSLON (1 battery) also in taking the objective marking the limit of the 1st stage (all tanks available).

Other groups cooperating in the second stage in the following manner:

One group (the 2d group, Captain Rollon) will support the brigade on the right in the attack on VAUXCASTILLE. His mission commencing on the departure for the 2d stage, and concluding at the ravine east of VAUXCASTILLE. this ravine excluded.

One group (the 5th group, Captain Nocoreau) will support the brigade on the left for the attack on VIERZY to this effect. After having followed the movement behind the brigade on the left, he will go northward around the ravine coming from CHAUDUN, and will get into liaison with the infantry on the plateau east of this ravine. He will try to circle east around the village and the ravine. His mission will terminate at the normal objective.

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Orders for Second Attack

2d DIVISION. A. E. F.,

Carrefour de Nemours. Aisne, July 18, 1918—1:30 p. m.

From: Division Commander

To: C. G., 3d Brigade

1. The objectives assigned by orders of the XX Army Corps have been attained. Our cavalry, with some infantry and trucks, have been pushed to the front in pursuit of the enemy.

2. The 1st Division is to be pushed to the front BERZY-le-SEC (exclusive) BUZANCY (exclusive), where it is to consolidate with Allied elements on either side.

3. The Moroccan 1st Division is to take the front BUZANCY (inclusive) Bois de CONCROIS (exclusive) and establish itself facing the ravine of the CRIZE.

4. Disposition and Limits of Objectives:
   (a) The 3d Brigade will make the attack supported by the 5th Marines and 6th Machine Gun Battalion. Objective: The village of HARTENNES-et-TAUX (inclusive) Bois d'HARTENNES (inclusive) to northwest corner of Bois de CONCROIS (inclusive).
   (b) The attack will be made on receipt of this order.
   (c) The 2d Engineers and 4th Machine Gun Battalion constitute the division reserve and will take station in the ravine just east of VAUXCASTILLE.
   (d) The attack will be supported by the 2d Field Artillery Brigade.
   (e) The position will be consolidated as soon as attained and held at all costs.
   (f) The 6th Marines will take station in the wood of the ravine just east of BEAUREPAIRE Farm.

5. Division Headquarters to VERTE-FEUILLE Farm.
   3d Brigade P. C. to VIERZY.
   4th Brigade P. C. to VIERZY.

JAMES G. HARBORD,
Major General, N. A.

Reserves Ordered Forward

2d DIVISION. A. E. F.,

Carrefour de Nemours, Aisne. July 18, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff

To: C. O., 6th Marines

1. The division commanders directs that you move your regiment to the vicinity of VERTE-FEUILLE Farm, and there await orders.
2. Bear in mind that you are corps reserve and will not become engaged unless attacked, except by order of the corps commander.

3. Your 2d Bn., which we have been unable to locate for some time, is now thought to be west of this point and it has been ordered to proceed to VERTE-FEUILLE Farm.

4. The receipt of this message will be acknowledged.

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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Reserves Ordered Forward

2d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Carrefour de Nemours, Aisne, July 18, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff
To: C. O., 2d Engineers

1. The division commander directs that you move your regiment to the immediate vicinity of VERTE-FEUILLE Farm, where you will remain as reserve. The 4th M. G. Bn., will accompany you, unless it has gone into action as previously ordered with the 5th Marines.

2. Report your change of location to division headquarters.

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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202-33.3: Journal of Operations

[Extract]

July 18, 1918:

Weather: Fair.

From midnight to dawn troops continued to march from the rear into their battle positions and by 4:30 a. m., the last echelon was in place. Zero hour was 4:35 a. m.

Infantry from right to left: 9th and 23d Infantry, 5th Marines. The 6th Marines was held in corps reserve. The attack progressed with extreme rapidity, no strong resistance being encountered and by 6:45 a. m.: the first wave had advanced about 4 kilometers well out of cover of the woods and were advancing across the open fields towards BEAUREPAIRE Farm. Tanks accompanied the first wave. As early as 7 a. m., our light artillery was moving forward. The 2d Battalion, 15th F. A., was in advance position east of VERTE-FEUILLE Farm by 10:10 a. m. *

At 2 p. m., the headquarters of the division advanced to VERTE-FEUILLE Farm. In the meanwhile the troops themselves advanced about 2 kilometers to the east of BEAUREPAIRE.
Farm and were still advancing. By dusk the skirmish line extended north and south through VIERZY. Division headquarters at 10 p. m. was moved up to BEAUREPAIRE Farm.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2d Div.: Reports: Order

Continuation of Attack

FIELD ORDERS 2d DMSION. A. E. F.,
Beaurepaire Farm, Aisne. July 19, 1918—3 a.m.

[Extract]

1. The enemy occupies the position in front of our lines. Our troops occupy a position about three kilometers west of the SOISSONS--CHATEAU-THIERRY Road and parallel to it from the old French trenches southwest of CHARANTIGNY to a point on the VIERZY-TIGNY Road, two kilometers west of TIGNY.

II. The division will attack and take the line HARTENNES-et-TAUX (inclusive): Bois d'HARTENNES to Bois de CONCROIS (inclusive).

* * * * *

IV. Headquarters 2d Division---BEAUREPAIRE Ferme
Headquarters 3d and 4th Brigades and initial headquarters of 6th Marines at VIERZY.

By command of Major General Harbord:

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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WWR, 2d Div.: Vol. V: Field Message

No. 4366

15th FIELD ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
July 19, 1918.

MEMORANDUM

[Extract]

1. 2d Division attacks at 7 a. m., July 19.
2. 6th Marines, Col. Lee commanding, makes the attack. Col. Lee’s P. C. is at 3d Brigade Headquarters, Vierzy.
3. One brigade, French 6th Cavalry Division, supports the right flank.

* * * * *

J. R. DAVIS,
Lt. Colonel, 15th F. A.,
Commanding.

202-33.6: Letter

Report on Attack

2d DIVISION. A. E. F..
July 19, 1918.

From: Commanding General
To: Commanding General, XX Army Corps

1. The order of the XX Army Corps to the 2d Division to attack at 4 a.m. this date was received at 2 a.m. It was impossible to comply with the order to attack at 4 a.m. due to the delay in receiving the order.

2. With the exception of the 6th Marines, kept out of the fight as corps reserve yesterday, and the 2d Regiment of Engineers, which are armed with rifles, every infantry unit of the division was exhausted in the fight yesterday. It was necessary therefore to make the attack this morning with one regiment, the 6th Marines, supported by a battalion of the engineer regiment, a force regarded by me as inadequate to the task, but no other was available. The attack has progressed favorably until the line has come to a north and south line approximately through TIGNY. It is held up on the right from the direction of PARCY-TIGNY, a place previously reported to us as being in French possession. On the left it is being held up and our left flank threatened, due to the fact that the Moroccan 1st Division has not apparently advanced as far as CHARANTIGNY.

3. I do not anticipate any great danger to my right flank, having a brigade of the 6th Dragoons constituting the liaison between my right and the left of the French 38th Division. The effect, however, of this cavalry is principally a moral one as I have been informed by their general and by the brigade commander himself that he preferred not to be used in actual fighting unless a gap occurred in the line. On the left I have sent a fraction of a battalion which was at VIERZY and which suffered the least of any battalions employed in the fight yesterday. This battalion has been sent to occupy the former French trenches along the front southwest and south of CHARANTIGNY.

4. The tank commander, who employed this morning 28 tanks, just now reported that 11 of this tanks have been put out by German artillery fire.

5. I do not anticipate that my division will not be able to hold what it has already gained but I desire to insist most strongly that they should not be called upon for further offensive effort. Due to the congestion of the roads through the Foret de RETZ, the regulation of which was not under our control, and the circumstances of our arrival from the Sixth Army without information as to destination or manner of employment after arrival, the troops in the fighting line of the division have many of them been without water or food for over twenty-four hours. This statement applies to practically the whole division, including the animals of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade.
VIERZY-CHATEAU--VAUXCASTILLE AREA
Looking east-southeast from Vauxcastille towards grounds of Chateau at Vierzy
6. It is earnestly recommended that this condition which exists as a result of no fault of anyone connected with this division, be recognized and the further prosecution of the offensive in our front be done by divisions in the second line, passing them through our present position.

J. G. HARBORD,
Major General, N. A.

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WWR, 2d Div., Vol. I: Order

Relief

2d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beaurepaire Farm, Aisne, July 19, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff
To: Division Surgeon

[Extract]

1. The division will be relieved as follows:
   3d Brigade (2d Engineers attached)
   4th Brigade
   Field Signal Bn.
   2d F. A. Brigade

2. You will provide proper medical attention to each of these units consistent with the paramount duty of the evacuation of the wounded men in this area.

* * * * *

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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202-33.3: Journal of Operations

2d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beaurepaire Farm, Aisne, July 19, 1918.

[Extract]

July 19, 1918

Weather: Fair

At 4 a. m. in the morning of the 19th, the skirmish line extended north and south through a point 1 kilometer east of VIERZY. The 3d and 4th Brigades both had their head-
quarters at VIERZY at 10 a.m. By noon, the line advanced to a point running from 1/2 kilometer west of TIGNY due north. Progress had been very slow. Casualties were heavy, Ammunition was scarce: food and water were lacking. The enemy artillery very active. Also the enemy had entire air supremacy and repeatedly flew to the rear as far as BEAUREPAIRE Farm at a very low altitude.

At 5 p.m., word arrived that the 2d Division was to be relieved by the 58th Colonial Division. The troops were notified at once and by midnight the relief of the elements had begun.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: 2d Div., Reports: Order

2d Division goes into Army Reserve

FIELD ORDERS 2d DIVISION. A. E. F.,
No. 17
Beaurepaire Farm Aisne, July 20, 1918---10 p.m

MAP: SOISSONS 1/80,000

[Extract]

1. The 2d Division, less the 4th Brigade, and the 2d F. A. Brigade, with attached medical units, marches to the vicinity of PIERREFONDS.

IV. 2d Division Headquarters---PIERREFONDS.
3d Brigade Headquarters---RETHEUIL.

By command of Major General Harbord:

PRESTON BROWN,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff,

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202-32.1: Memo

Artillery Support

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM 2d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
No. 1
Beaurepaire Farm Aisne, July 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The French 58th Division attacks.
2. The American 2d F. A. Brigade plus artillery of the 58th Division will support the attack.

* * * * *
9. *** Headquarters 2d F. A. Brigade and divisional artillery will be at BEAURE-PAIRE Farm until further orders.

By command of Brigadier General Bowley:

W. E. BURR,
Major, Field Artillery,
Adjutant.

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202-33.3: Journal of Operations

2d DISION. A. E. F.,
Pierrefonds, Aisne, July 20, 1918.

July 20, 1918

Weather: Fair.

From midnight, July 19/20, to well after dawn, the infantry continued in a steady stream to march by division headquarters towards the rear and by 5 p. m. practically the entire division, less the artillery, was concentrated in the woods just east of VERTE-FEUILLE Farm.

Division headquarters at 5 a. m. moved to VMERES.
Troops bivouacked in the woods west of VERTE-FEUILLE Farm.

Late in the afternoon information was received which detached the division from the French XX Army Corps and placed it in the army reserve of the French Tenth Army. Division headquarters immediately moved to PIERREFONDS and the 3d Brigade, the 4th M. G. Bn., and the 2d Engineers were ordered to proceed to the woods south of TAILLEFONTAINE and to the vicinity of PIERREFONDS, St-ETIENNE and RETHEUIL.

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202-32.1: Memorandum

Relief of 2d Field Artillery Brigade

2d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, 2d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
July 25. 1918.

MEMORANDUM:

[Extract]

1. The 2d F. A. Brigade will be relieved tonight, July 25/26. **

* * * * *
2d Field Artillery Brigade at Soissons

2d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

December 19, 1918.

From: Adjutant, 2d Field Artillery Brigade

To: G-3, 2d Division

[Extract]

1. On July 14 the 2d Division was occupying a secondary line of defense in rear of the 26th Division with the expectation that the enemy might attack in force at any moment. On the afternoon of July 14 the alert was given and all troops were held in readiness for an immediate attack by the enemy. At 6 p.m. that date orders were received for the 2d F. A. Brigade to march to the vicinity of BETZ, reporting to the French Tenth Army. The Brigade marched that night and by noon, July 15 was in the area of BETZ. At 1 p.m., July 15 orders were received from the French Tenth Army, as a result of the attack by the Germans east of CHATEAU-THIERRY that morning, for the return of the brigade to the 2d Division. At 2 p.m. the orders were received cancelling the return of the brigade to the 2d Division and providing for its march to the Foret de RETZ, north of VILLERS-COTTERETS, the night of July 15/16, reporting to the French XX Army Corps. On the morning of July 16, information was furnished that the French Tenth Army would counterattack the enemy on the western side of the CHATEAU-THIERRY salient July 18. and the remaining units of the 2d Division would be brought up and that the 2d Division would attack on the right of a Moroccan division, with the 1st Division on the left of this Moroccan division. By noon, July 16, after considerable traffic difficulties due to heavy concentration of French troops, all units of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade were in the Foret de RETZ, approximately 6 kilometers north of VILLERS-COTTERETS. Elements of the 3d Brigade arrived in the Foret de RETZ by truck during the night of July 17/18, and were pushed to the front, taking up positions to the right of the road passing by VERTE-FEUILLE Fme. The 5th Marines arrived in position on the left of the 3d Brigade at 4 a.m. July 18. The 2d Field Artillery Brigade was supported by the French 288th Artillery, 75's. The attack was delivered at 4:35 a.m. without preparation. By 11 o'clock the attack reached a line approximately north and south through VAUXCASTILLE, approximately 2,000 prisoners and all the artillery in the front of the division were taken. At 5 p.m. the attack was pushed on from VAUXCASTILLE and by darkness reached a north and south line through VIERZY. The front of the division being about two kilometers. The losses during the attack of the morning were below normal, while those of the afternoon's attack were 56% heavier.
2. From reports sent in the night of July 18, the front of the division was from 2 to 3 kilometers in advance of the French division on our right and from 1 to 2 kilometers in advance of the French division on our left. About 1 a.m., July 19, orders were received for the continuation of the attack, with unlimited objective. The 6th Marines, the division reserve, were ordered forward and attacked at approximately 7 o'clock. Advancing three kilometers into the enemy’s lines, they suffered heavy losses from the enemy’s fire and were forced to fall back on a line running generally north and south through TIGNY. During the day of July 19, an excessively heavy artillery fire was carried on by both sides. On the afternoon of July 19, orders were received for the relief of the 2d Division by the French 58th Division, during the night of July 19/20. By the morning of July 20 all units of the division, with the exception of several elements of the 2d Field Artillery Brigade had been relieved and marched to an area in the Forêt de RETZ. At noon, July 20, orders were issued by the French XX Corps directing that the 2d F. A. Brigade would support the 58th Division in the same sector in which the 2d Division had just been relieved. By midnight, July 20, all units of the brigade were again in position in the sector in which they had been relieved that morning. During the night of July 20/21, orders were issued for an attack on the whole army front with practically unlimited objectives. The French 58th Division, supported by the 2d F. A. Brigade, attacked at 4:30 a.m., July 21, and penetrated the enemy’s positions to a depth of 3 kilometers. Unsupported on both flanks by the neighboring divisions, it was heavily counterattacked by the enemy and was forced to retreat to a line about 1 kilometer west of the road running south to CHATEAU-THIERRY from SOISSONS. Two battalions from the 2d F. A. Brigade (1 from the 12th F. A., and one from the 15th F. A.) suffered heavy casualties while following up the early advance of the 58th Division. July 22 was spent in reorganizing the infantry positions under heavy hostile artillery fire. The 2d F. A. Brigade executed severe fires of concentration on the enemy and broke up several local attacks. The 58th Division attacked July 23 at 5 a.m. and after progressing about two kilometers on a front of about 2 1/2 kilometers unsupported on either flank, was heavily counterattacked by the enemy and driven back to a line west of VILLEMONTIORE, thence southeast to the CHATEAU-THIERRY Road, thence south to a point on the road east of TIGNY. The night of July 23/24 after losing over 56% of its effectives, the 58th Division was relieved by the French 12th Division, the 2d F. A. Brigade remaining in place for its support. On July 24 many captured German guns were brought up and heavy artillery fire was maintained on the enemy. On July 25, the 12th Division, supported by the 2d F. A. Brigade, attacked and captured VILLEMONTIORE, after a severe artillery preparation. During the night of July 25/26, the 2d Field Artillery Brigade was relieved from duty with the French 12th Division and reverted to the command of the American 2d Division, whose other units had been moved to an area in the vicinity south of CREPY.

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W. E. BURR,
Major, Field Artillery.
Adjutant.

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VIERZY-CHAUDUN AREA
Southern approaches to Chaudun, looking north from Vierzy
American III Corps Attached to Sixth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,969/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Trilport, Seine-et-Mame. July 13, 1918—6:45 p.m.

SPECIAL ORDER NO. 3,478

[Extract]

PART I

1. The headquarters and staff of the American III Army Corps (General Bullard) will arrive on July 14 at MEAUX where it will be billeted.

IV. Effective at 8 a.m., July 15, the Commanding General of the III Army Corps will take command of the American 1st and 2d Divisions and will obtain from the Commanding General of the I Army Corps (headquarters La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE) all information concerning this last division.

The III Army Corps will be attached to the Sixth Army, and remain in reserve at the disposal of G. H. Q. However, until further orders, the mission of the 2d Division, in case of alert, will not be modified: this division will remain provisionally attached to the I Army Corps, with regard to its tactical employment.

DEGOUTIE,
General,
Commanding.

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Departure of III Corps From French Sixth Army

[French Sixth Army, Trilport, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918—3 p. m.]

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 3.512

[Extract]

1. The American III Army Corps left the Sixth Army the morning of July 16.

By order:

[signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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Air Support

[French Sixth Army, Trilport, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMBAT AVIATION

[Extract]

1. The Sixth Army will carry out a general offensive July 18 in liaison with the Tenth Army to the line: SACONIN-et-BREUIL---CHAUDUN---VILLERS-HELON. Exploitation in the general direction of the plateaus north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS.

Objectives of the Sixth Army, the line: NEUILLY-St-FRONT---slope north of BREUIL. Exploitation in the direction of BRENY.

II. The combat aviation of the Sixth Army is composed of the British 9th Brigade and the American 1st Pursuit Group.

III. Attack missions against German airplanes and balloons will be executed by the 2d Brigade of the air division with the object of keeping the main portion of the German units inside its lines.

[signature illegible]
Major,
Commanding the Air Service of the Sixth Army.

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Attack Order

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2068/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

Triport, Seine-et-Mame, July 16, 1918—1 p. m.

INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3509*

[Extract]

1. *** The French Tenth Army will attack on D day ***

   II. The attack of the Tenth Army will be assisted on the right by an attack of the Sixth Army, making its main effort between the OURCQ and ALLAND Creek, in order to gain first of all the line NEUILLY St-FRONT—hill north of BREUIL, with contingent exploitation in the direction of COINCY, in liaison with the Tenth Army near BRENY. ARMENTIERES.

   III. This attack between the OURCQ and ALLAND Creek will be directed by the General commanding the II Army Corps, who will have the 33d, 2d, 47th. and 63d Infantry Divisions at his disposal.

   The 63d Division, which will arrive the 17th. will be placed at the disposal of the II Corps in the zone THURY-en-VALOIS—AUTHEUIL-en-VALOIS—MAROLLES—Bois de BOURNEVILLE—NEUFCHELLES (C. P. NEUFCHELLES)

   It will be disposed so as to be prepared to be engaged behind the right of the II Corps. A sufficient number of footbridges will be built over the OURCQ.

   Its artillery will arrive by motor on July 17; on its arrival it will be placed in position during the night to reinforce the artillery of the II Army Corps.

   IV. The attack of the II Corps will be extended to the right by attacks of the VII Corps and the American I Corps which will gain as minimum objectives:

        (a) VII Army Corps (reduced to the 164th Infantry Division and one American brigade): CHEVILLON and St-GENGOULPH. with the contingent objective, COINTICOURT—Hill 172 and HAUTEVESNES.

        (b) American I Corps: the small woods southeast of HAUTEVESNES—TORCY—BELLEAU.

   Moreover, it must be understood that, as the II Corps will take advantage of any advance of the Tenth Army, in order to push deeper into the hostile positions, so the VII Corps and the American I Corps will take advantage of any advance of the II Corps in order to speed up their movement forward.

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   The execution of the II and VI Corps attacks will be regulated as follows:

At H hour, a surprise attack on the enemy outpost zone, in order to gain contact with the enemy line of resistance, and beginning of the artillery preparation.

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* Editorial Note: The system of numbering of the following French documents, particularly of the Sixth Army, has apparently been jumbled.

For example, Ordre General d'Operations, No. 3525, bears an hour date of 18h 25, while No. 3524 is dated at 19h 45.

Similarly Etat-Major 3e Bureau. No. 2,100/3 is dated at 1945h, while 2,109/3 is dated 1530h.

The hour stated on a document usually indicates the time of signature while, normally, the numbering would show the sequence in which published or issued. However, it cannot now be determined what system was actually followed.
At H:30 hour, an attack on the enemy position of resistance.
The successive bounds will be designated by the General commanding the II Corps.
The American I Corps will have the same hours of attack and preparation.

ARTILLERY MEANS PLACED AT THE DISPOSAL OF THE ATTACKING ARMY CORPS:

(a) Besides the elements at present at its disposal, the II Corps will receive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps Arty.</th>
<th>46th Regiment</th>
<th>1 bn. of 220's (4th Bn., 285th Arty.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

(b) The VII Army Corps receives under the same conditions:

| 2 bns. of 220's (3d and 4th Bns., 281st Artillery) |
| 1 bn. of 280's (5th Bn., 285th Artillery) |

In addition, the Tribout artillery groupment will be placed entirely, on D day, under the orders of the II Corps, to support the main attack.

VII. DISTRIBUTION OF TANKS: One bn. of St-CHAMOND heavy tanks and 2 bns. of the
503 Tank Regiment to the II Corps.

One company of the 503 Tank Regiment to the VII Corps.

VIII. The chief of the army air service will immediately contact the II and VII Corps and the American I Corps in order to settle the questions of employment of the aviation.

IX. PREPARATORY MEASURES FOR THE ATTACK:

(a) The 47th Infantry Division passes to the control of the II Corps at 9 a.m.

July 17.

(b) Effective at once, the Generals commanding the II and VII Corps will have at their disposal the American brigade of the American 4th Division attached to their respective sectors.

(c) New boundary between the II and VII Army Corps: 

ALLAND Creek (to the II Army Corps)---the OURCQ---VARINFROY (to the II Army Corps)---Le PLESSIS-PLACY (to the VII Army Corps)---TORCY (to the VII Army Corps) will be put into effect immediately by agreement between the generals commanding the army corps.

* * * *

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. File: 416-30.1: Order

Extension of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,


The enemy has just received a severe check on an 80-kilometer front, from CHATEAU-
THIERRY to the ARGONNE.

The right of the Sixth Army captured 1,100 prisoners from him the day before yesterday and stopped him in his tracks.

The left of the army will now attack.

On our left, to the north, Mangin's army with powerful reserves will attack in great force, in an easterly direction so as to take the enemy in the rear.

We must extend this attack and keep up with it. In morale and materiel we are superior to our opponent, with whom we are already well acquainted since we have already jolted him.
The battle which is about to begin will be decisive.
Let everyone go forward.

DEGOUTTE,
General,
Commanding the Sixth Army.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

D Day and H Hour

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2082/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Trilport, Seine-et-Mame, July 17, 1918.

FIELD ORDER No. 3,516

[Extract]

D day: July 18
H hour: 4:35 a. m.
The preparation will last 1 hour and 30 minutes.
There will be no artillery fire before 4:35 a. m., after which hour it is understood that the advance to seize the enemy outpost zone will begin.

* * * * * *

The command post of the army will open at the church in MAY-en-MULTIEN at 4 a. m., July 18.

DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. File: 416-30.1: Order

H Hour

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,136/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Trilport, Seine-et-Mwne, July 18, 1918.

FIELD ORDER No. 3,518

Tomorrow, July 19. continuation of today's operation.
Same objectives, same missions.
H hour: 4 a. m. (hour for beginning the attack).

DEGOU-ITE.

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Preparation for Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2091/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Trilport, Seine-et-Mame, July 18, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,521

1. The France-American units engaged in the battle today gained very important results owing to the splendid dash of the troops and fine leadership.

The line reached by 6 p.m. runs in a general way: Eastern edge BUISSON de CRESNES ---NAUROY [NOROY-sur-OURCQ]---MARIZY-St-NARD---east of MACOGNY---Cote 167 west of MONTMENJON---ORME-Signal---east of COURCHAMPS---Station of LICY-CLIGNON---north of TORCY and of GIVRY.

II. During the night, units will be reformed, reserves reconstituted, the terrain taken organized. Steps will be taken to repulse any counter attacks and to resume the offensive as soon as the order is given, which will be not later than 4 a.m. on the 19th.

Close liaison must be maintained by the II Army Corps with the right of the Tenth Army.

III. The 63d Infantry Division will proceed this evening to the region: DAMMARD---CHEZY-en-ORXOIS---St-QUENTIN [P. C. St-QUENTIN]. The division will be distributed in such a manner that it can enter into action either between the OURCQ and ALLAND Creek or on the plateaus south of ALLAND Creek. Its artillery will be placed in position astride of ALLAND Creek, so that it can open fire at the request of the front line divisions.

Until further order, the 63d Infantry Division is constituted as reserve of the army. It will receive its orders through the II Army Corps, which will maintain its liaison with this division.

IV. The distribution of tanks remains the same as today, with the exception, that the II Army Corps will not have the St-CHAMOND Group, which was in action today, but instead will dispose of the two other groups of the MARET Groupment.

The 63d Infantry Division retains its two companies of light tanks.

DEGOUTTE,
General.

N. B. According to reports, the enemy may, under cover of night, retire to a rear position, and it is therefore necessary to have numerous patrols along the whole front and to maintain contact.

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- 350 -
Attack Order

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,109/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
May-en-Multien, Seine-et-Mame, July 19, 1918--3:30 p.m

Confirmation of TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Headquarters DEGOUTTE to Headquarters at ROZOY-en-MULTIEN

The American I Army Corps has just taken MONTHIERS, Hill 193, Les BRUSSES Fme. woods east of BOURESCHES, thus gaining its first objective. It is advancing on ETREPILLY.

The General commanding the French Sixth Army orders the French II Army Corps to attack along the entire line in full force.

G. BRION.
Chief of Staff.

Position of Resistance

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,095/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
May-en-Multien, Seine-et-Mame, July 19, 1918--6:35 p.m

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,525

[Extract]

I. The attack of the Sixth Army has continued to make good progress today. This evening we are holding the front east of CHOW---south of the OURCQ---Hills 153 and 154 (1,500 meters east of NEUILLY-St-FRONT)---east of MAUBRY and RASSY---La GRENOUILLE---MOULIN de BRISE---GIVRY (all ours).

II. In order to be in readiness to continue our attacks tomorrow morning and also in anticipation of possible hostile counterattacks:

(1) Troops will be still further echeloned in depth and reserves will be reconstituted as strongly as possible.

(2) Preparations will be completed to attack tomorrow very early (at an H hour, which will be announced later). To anticipate the enemy is the best way to thwart his counterattack plans.

(3) Work will begin immediately on a position of resistance protecting our artillery. It will run as follows:

Hill 148 (southeast of MARIZY-St-MARD)---hill 500 meters east of MACOGNY---Hill 167---BREUIL---MONTMENJON---ORME Signal---Hill 153 (west of LICY Farm).
III. The 63d Infantry Division will remain in army reserve.
IV. Tank units which have been fighting for 48 hours will be placed in army reserve.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**H Hour**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,100/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
May-en-Mullien, Seine-et-Mame. July 19, 1918—7:45 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,524

(Attack of July 20)

[Extract]

* * * * * * *

(2) * * * In case Mangin’s Army advances north of OURCQ, the II Army Corps will conform to its movement, the 330th Infantry Division advancing at the same time as the right of the Tenth Army.

Hour for the beginning of the attack 3:40 a.m.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**Plan for Combined Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,103/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Trilport, Seine-et-Mame, July 20, 1918.

ORDERS No. 3,527

The objective designated for the attack this morning has been gained or passed between the OURCQ and Ru-d’ALLAND.

The French VII Army Corps and the American I Army Corps will immediately carry out a combined attack in order to advance our lines in an easterly direction according to the following plan:

First objective: Marked by the line SOMMELANS---Hill 143 [145?]---Hill 190---La GONETRIE---VAUX, followed as soon as possible by a forward movement which will place us
in possession of the Bois de BONNES. the VALLEES Plateau, and the ETREPILLY Plateau.

The objective to be gained: The BRENY---CHATEAU-THIERRY Road and if possible, the railroad, especially in the region of NANTEUIL-NOTRE DAME---COINCY.

On the north, the French 63d Infantry Division is placed at the disposal of the French II Army Corps in order to hasten the advance in the direction of COINCY.

The French XXXVIII Army Corps, sending the maximum of its available elements north of the MARNE, will move in the general direction of VERDILLY. The east limit of the American I Army Corps will therefore be: VAUX-VERDILLY (exclusive).

Effective at once, the artillery of the French 52d Infantry Division is placed at the disposal of General Massenet, who will take the necessary steps to remedy the lack of teams.

The hour of attack of the VII Army Corps and the American I Army Corps is set at 3 p.m.

General DEGOUTTE,
Commanding the Sixth Army.

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Reassignment of Heavy Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,106/3
May-en-Mutien, Seine-et-Maine, July 20, 1918--2:10 p.m.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 3,529

I. At midnight, July 20/21, the Tribout Groupment of long artillery (left groupment of the Sixth Army) ceases to be at the disposal of the French II Army Corps and is placed under the direct orders of the general commanding the army artillery. Its mission is to answer immediately and as much as possible, requests for fire from the French II and VII Army corps.

Consequently, the general situation will be made known to Colonel Tribout by the general commanding the army artillery.

II. The 4 bns. of American G. P. F.'s [Grand Puissance Filloux] (lbn. of the 146th Heavy Artillery, 3 bns. of the 148th Heavy Artillery), detached temporarily from the Ninth Army, are placed the afternoon of July 20, at the disposal of the American I Army Corps, which will get them into position as soon as possible.

Their movement will be regulated by agreement between the artillery of the American I Army Corps and the Blanchet Groupment of long artillery (left groupment of the Ninth Army).

General DEGOUTTE.
Situation Report

[Editorial Translation]

2d and 3d Sections, General Staff

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
May-en-Multien, Seine-et-Marne. July 20, 1918—9 a.m.

I. FRONT LINE REACHED: The army on our left has reached the line FONTENOY---PERNANT---COURMELLES---VILLEMONTOIRE---TAUX---HARTENNES-et-VAUX---PLESSIER-HULEU---Bois de LUD (places and wood inclusive).

   Farther south, we are attacking TREVILLE-les-ABATIS---Bois de LATILLY---SOMMELANS---MOULIN de BRISÉ---BELLEAU.

   South of the MARNE, our advance is continuing without the enemy seeming to offer serious resistance. The majority of the footbridges are destroyed and the enemy seems to be withdrawing north of the MARNE.

II. ENEMY FORCES: Thus far the enemy has only reinforced his divisions in the sector opposite the Sixth Army on the 18th with 3 fresh divisions: the 45th Reserve Division, the 33d Division and the 5th Guard Division.

   All prisoners so far captured state that German units are extremely tired and worn.

   G. BRION,
   Chief of Staff.

Corps Mission

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 2,108/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 3.530

for the XXXVIII A.C.

I. The XXXVIII Army Corps is returned to the control of the Sixth Army.

II. The mission of the XXXVIII Army Corps will be:

   (1) To attack with Pougin's Division in the directions of VERDILLY. EPIEDS. in liaison with the right of the American I Army Corps.

   (2) In conformity with orders already received from the Ninth Army, to put across to the north bank of the MARNE whatever forces are available to support and reinforce the attack of the Pougin Division.

   (3) To cross the MARNE during the night by forcing the passages in the regions of GLAND and MONT-ST-PERE, in order to outflank the Bois de BARBILLON from the east, while covering itself on the right.

III. The right limit of the zone of action of the Sixth Army will be communicated later.
IV. Two battalions of G. P. F.’s from the Blanchet Groupment will be pushed forward to the FOSSOY region in order to operate on the Sixth Army front.

General DEGOUTTE.

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Mission of Sixth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,181/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
May-en-Multien, Seine-et-Maine. July 20--8:20 p.m

FIELD ORDERS NO. 3,561

[Extract]

I. The Sixth Army, continuing its attacks today, this evening passed the front NANTEUIL-sur-OURCQ---TREVILLE---Bois de LATILLY---SOMMELANS---MONTHIERS---Les BRUSSES Farm---Bois de BOURESCHES.
The enemy has abandoned the south bank of the MARNE.
II. The mission of the Sixth Army is to continue its offensive in the direction of FERE-en-TARDENOIS and MAREUIL-en-DOLE.

*

III. The advance will continue energetically and without halts. Each division, without waiting for the adjacent division which may be held up, will push its main body as far as the NANTEUIL--CHATEAU-THIERRY Railroad, regardless of cost, and if this railroad is reached during the night, it will cover itself with advance guards (1 regiment without artillery) as far as each of the following points:

French XXXVIII Army Corps : BRASLES, VERDILLY
American I Army Corps : TRUGNY, EPIEDS
French VII Army Corps : COURPOIL
French II Army Corps : La GRANGE-aux-BOIS Farm, La MISERE (east of COINCY) BRUJERES

IV. The mission of the XXXVIII Army Corps remains that prescribed by Field Orders No. 3,530, July 20 *

V. Command Posts: (effective at 5 a.m., July 21).

Sixth Army : MAY-en-MULTIEN
IIA. c. : BOURNEVILLE
VIIA. c. : CROW-sur-OURCQ
American I A. C. : MONTREUIL-aux-LIONS
XXXVIII A. c. : CHARLY

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General DEGOUTTE.

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COMBINED ORDER OF BATTLE
OF THE FRENCH SIXTH AND NINTH ARMIES AND GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY
IN THE AISNE-MARNE
20 JULY 1918
Reserve Assignment for American 42d Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section. General Staff

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Trilport, Seine-et-Mame. July 21, 1918—11:15 a.m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,543

1st PART

[Extract]

I. The American 42d Div. will begin to arrive in the zone of the Sixth Army July 21, 1918. It will be attached to the American I Army Corps, will be stationed in the latter’s zone, and will remain in the army reserve until new orders employing it elsewhere.

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General DEGOUTTE.

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Order to Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 2,183/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Trilport, Seine-et-Mame, July 21, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,547

[Extract]

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Air reconnaissance undertaken during the evening indicates that the enemy is systematically burning all of the region south of the FERE-en-TARDENOIS—GOUSSANCOURT Road and is destroying the FERE Railroad Station.

From all indications the enemy intends to evacuate this region tonight.

Consequently, the army commander directs that each corps attack in its zone this very night.

DEGOUTTE.

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Continuation of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,184/3

Trilport, Seine-et-Mame, July 21, 1918—6:30 p.m.

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,563 for July 22

[Extract]

I. The enemy is retreating along the entire front of the army, which, at 6 p.m. this evening, has crossed the CHATEAU-THIERRY—SOISSONS Road between the OURCQ and CLIGNON and reached the BEZU—EPIEDS—CHARTEVES Road.

II. The mission given in yesterday’s operations orders continues: * * *

The generals of division will conduct the battle from forward observation posts, so as to hasten the advance.

III. C. P.’s effective at noon, July 22:

Sixth Army: MARIGNY-en-ORXOIS

XXXVIII Army Corps: CHATEAU-THIERRY

American I Army Corps: vicinity of ETREPILLY

VII Army Corps: BONNES

II Army corps: LATILLY

Telephone communications for tomorrow not being completely installed, communication will be assured primarily by a well-organized courier service (motorcycles and light cars) and by wireless.

Communication between the several army corps and the divisions will be established from right to left.

IV. All units will push straight ahead.

Only the XXXVIII and II Army Corps will have to cover their flanks: the XXXVIII Corps on the right, and, especially, the II Corps on the left, against a counterattack coming from the north and debouching from the region between OULCHY and FERE-en-TARDENOIS. The density of the troops of the II Army Corps enables it to handle this situation by echeloning its left division in depth and by placing another division in second line. Two divisions seem to be enough to continue a strong advance on FERE-en-TARDENOIS. which must be reached at any cost and with a minimum of delay.

V. A cavalry division (General Mesple) is placed at the disposal of the army. It will march by bounds, following the axis of advance of the VII Army Corps. This division will move in the general direction of FISMES, with the mission of throwing the rear installations of the enemy into disorder, notably by cutting the highways that come from the south and lead to CIERGES, COULONGES, COURVILLE. (S. O. No. 3,562, July 21)

VI. As a consequence of the contraction of the front, corps commander will take immediate steps to place certain divisions in the second line. These will follow the front line divisions at sufficient distance, so as not to interfere with them.

Only a relatively small, but well-equipped, force of artillery will be placed in the front line.

VII. Tanks: All tank units are withdrawn to army reserve.

VIII. Because of the few roads available, over which all supplies for men, rifles, and artillery must move and by which we must advance. careful traffic control is essential.
IX. A special order will be issued covering the organization of the battlefield.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Message

**Brigade Assignment**

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

*Trilport, Seine-et-Marne, July 22, 1918.*

To: American I *Army Corps*

French XXXVIII Army Corps

[Extract]

The 56th Brigade of the American 28th Division [one kilometer north of BRASLES] which is north of the MARNE, in the region of CHATEAU-THIERRY, is placed at the disposal of the American I Army Corps.

* * * * *

The 55th Brigade of the American 28th Division, upon its arrival, will be placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII Corps.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Instructions

**Reorganization of Sixth Army Front**

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

*Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 22, 1918 10:45 p.m.*

INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3.580

for the Army Corps Commanders

[Extract]

I. When the army reaches the FERE-en-TARDENOIS---JAULGONNE Road, the number of army corps in line will be reduced to three, which will be, from right to left: French XXXVIII Army Corps: American I Army Corps: and French II Army Corps.

A special order will give the day and hour when this distribution of troops will be effected. The army corps will initiate an immediate study of this matter.

II. The XXXVIII Army Corps will have at its disposal the French 39th Division and the
American 3d Division (normally one division in first line, one in reserve).

The American I Army Corps will have at its disposal the American 26th Division and the French 167th Infantry Division (also, if possible, one division in first line and one in reserve).

The French II Army Corps will have at its disposal the French 63d, 33d, 2d, and 52d Infantry Divisions (two fresh divisions in line and two in reserve). This disposition of troops will be effected only when the 33d Division is no longer required to furnish a left flank guard.

III. Headquarters French VII Army Corps (at BRECY) and the French 47th and 164th Divisions, which will be attached to the corps, will be placed in army reserve in the region of ROCOURT-ST-MARTIN—GRISOLLES—SOMMELANS—MONTHIERS—BELLEAU—BOURESCHES—ETREPILLY.

IV. The American 4th and 28th Divisions will reorganize in the rear, and in proximity to the position of resistance defined in General Orders No. 3,523 [3,525], July 19, 1918, in accordance with special orders to be sent them to this effect.

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General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**Plan of Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 2,204/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY, Tréport, Seine-et-Maine, July 22, 1918—8 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3.581

I. The front line reached by the army at 6 p. m., July 22, passes through BRENEY—SOISSONS Highway—the southern edge of the Bois du Chatelet—L'HERMITAGE—EPIEDS—La CENSE-a-DIEU—MOLIN DOLY—JAULGONNE.

II. The army will attack on its entire front on July 23. This attack will be localized within each large unit to relatively narrow and particularly favorable zones, in order to make certain of breaking through the hostile front.

The artillery preparation, consisting of heavy concentrations on points selected for the breakthrough, will commence at 3:45 a. m. The attack will be launched at 3:55 a. m. Attacking troops will be given objectives sufficiently distant so that they may exploit the breakthrough and the enemy's surprise.

III. Three tank companies now east of NEUILLY-St-FRONT have been placed at the disposal of the II Army Corps, which will issue orders directly to the Commander of the French 502d Tank Regiment.

General DEGOUTTE.

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- 360 -
Front Line Conditions and Orders

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 22, 1918.

[Extract]

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The C. P. of the American I Army Corps is beginning to open at BUIRE (1 km. west of EPAUX-BEZU).

The I Corps was unable to give me any definite information this morning at 8 a. m.
I went to the Chateau at EPAUX-BEZU where I have just had a conference with General Schmidt, the result of which is as follows:

1. The present front line passes through the following points: southwestern corner of Bois Du CHATELET (to the French 164th Infantry) – l’HERMITAGE (to the French 167th Infantry) – La GOUTTIERE Farm (doubtful).

2. The Americans are at present only in front of the southwestern outskirts of EPIEDS but hold TRUGNY entirely, and say that they have passed it (?) .

3. The functioning of the transmission of orders as well as of intelligence by our Allies appears to me to leave much to be desired.

This morning the American 26th Division was to have advanced at the head of the army corps, the SCHMIDT Division behind it (by Order No. 19 of the American I Army Corps, July 21). But this morning the 26th Division did not start and was at the same place as last night. According to the French officer of the American 51st Brigade of the 26th Division, the non-execution of the operation order was chargeable to the staff of the 26th Division, which at 8 a. m., July 22, had as yet neither prepared nor issued its order.

Under these conditions, the 26th Division not having started, General SCHMIDT gave orders to continue the advance.

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12:50 p. m: Arrival of a staff officer of the American 26th Division at BUIRE. He gives the following information: The C. P. 26th Division is at GRAND-RU Farm, 2 km. southeast of ETREPILLY. Confirmation of the capture of EPIEDS and TRUGNY.

C. P. 51st Brigade: BEZUET
C. P. 52d Brigade: CHAMPLUISANT Farm (1,200 m. north-northeast of VERDILLY).

The 4 regiments of the 26th Division are reported as being side-by-side and on a generally north-south line extending from the eastern outskirts of EPIEDS to the word "de" in "Bois de BARBILLON". This officer does not know the order in which the regiments are placed, neither does he know what elements they have had in action or what they have in reserve. He replied to me, "They are thought to be intermingled."

This officer added that Boche taken prisoner had stated the following:

(a) "We have eaten nothing for 4 days."
(b) "There are only machine guns here: all the infantry has left." (He could not tell me where.)
“Our officers with revolvers in their hands have compelled us to stay here. We have had enough of it.”

COURTIN.

Resumption of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 23, 1918—7:15 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,587 for July 24

[Extract]

I. The advance of the Sixth Army was marked today by the capture of the heights southeast of ARMENTIERES, the outskirts of COINCY, BRECY, and the greater part of the Bois du CHATELET.

On the south, our front follows the general line EPIEDS-TRUGNY and has been carried forward by the Americans to GRANGE-MARIE Farm—La TIEULERIE—Les FRANQUETS.

II. The attack will be resumed tomorrow morning, July 24. Artillery preparation beginning at 3:55 a.m. and the attack taking place at 4:05 a.m.

III. The mission will remain the same as today: to break the enemy front by localizing the attacks to the zones most favorable for the advance and enlarging the breaches by swinging units in echelon by the flank— the leading units continuing to push straight ahead.

The least tired units will be used in local breakthrough attacks, while all available artillery of the army corps and even of the two adjacent corps and that of the army (especially that of the French II Corps) will be concentrated for such attacks.

IV. DISTRIBUTION OF TANKS: The two companies of the IV Army Corps which fought today will be placed in army reserve and will again occupy their rallying position at VAUX Farm (500 m. south of NEUILLY-St-FRONT).

Tomorrow, the II Army Corps will have at its disposal: the 319th Company and two companies of the 8th Battalion. At the disposal of the American I Army Corps will be: one company of the 8th Battalion, whose mission will be to operate in the direction of COURPOIL-BEAUVARDES.

General DEGOUTTE.
Conservation of Troops

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2, 229/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
C. P., Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 23. 1918--11 p. m.

INSTRUCTIONS NO. 3,589 FOR THE
COMMANDING GENERALS, AMERICAN I ARMY CORPS
FRENCH II, VII, AND XXXVIII ARMY CORPS

The offensive of the Sixth Army continues: the first objective to be gained remains unchanged: FERE-en-TARDENOIS and the OURCQ.

However, the Sixth Army will have to carry this offensive through to the end with the troops it now has. It is important, therefore, to hold out as well as to fight. Economy of force is possible. As a matter of fact, there is an accumulation of force on the front at present, because of the narrowing of the zones occupied by army corps, compared with the number of divisions engaged.

In order that the divisions may gain new strength and be able to hold out, a change in the disposition of troops is necessary. Therefore, the general commanding the army directs that:

1) Each army corps holds a division, less artillery, in corps reserve, and at such distance from the front as to be able to rest, yet close enough to go into action in time in case of a hostile attack.

2) Each division in line has in division reserve (in a state of semirest), either an entire regiment or three battalions if the three regiments are in the front line side by side.

This will enable the second line units (divisions and regiments or battalions) to hold out and draw reinforcements from their division training centers.

These dispositions will be effected during the night July 25/26, and will be completed by the morning of July 26, except as regards the American I Army Corps which will receive special instructions.

General DEGOUTTE.
Brigade Attachment

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2.217/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
Trilport, Seine-et-Marne, July 23, 1918.

For the GENERAL COMMANDING THE AMERICAN I ARMY CORPS

The General commanding the Sixth Army recommends that the American 56th Brigade [28th Div.], placed at the disposal of the General commanding the American I Army Corps, be employed by as large units as possible, at least by regiments or battalions.

By order:

G. BRION,  
Chief of Staff.

242-32.7: Memorandum

42d Division to I Corps

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2.220/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
Trilport, Seine-et-Marne, July 23, 1918.

MEMORANDUM for the AMERICAN I ARMY CORPS

[Extract]

I. The American 42d Division, is placed from now on at the disposal of the Commanding General of the American I Army Corps, whose attention is invited to the urgent advisability that this division go into line by entire brigades at least, rather than bit by bit as its elements arrive.

* * * * * *

DEGOUTTE.

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Employment of 42d Division

[Editorial Translation]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AMERICAN I ARMY CORPS

The American 42d Division is placed at the disposal of General commanding the American I Army Corps.

This Division will relieve in the front line:

1. The French 167th Infantry Division, which will be regrouped on the morning of July 27 in the following area: DHUISY---Ste-AULDE---CHAMIGNY---MARY-sur-MARNE (headquarters at DHUISY), where it will be in army reserve.

2. The American 26th Division, which will be placed in reserve as prescribed by Instructions No. 2.229/3 of July 23, and will remain under the orders of the American I Army Corps.

3. The American 56th Brigade, which will be moved, in army reserve, into the area: MARIGNY-en-ORXOIS---LUCY-le-BOCAGE---COUPRU---DOMPTIN, where the American 28th Division will be regrouped, as soon as the 55th Brigade has returned.

BRION.

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Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3.592

[Extract]

I. The enemy is giving way on our center and right. It is necessary to drive aggressively ahead and seize the OURCQ crossings, thus permitting our cavalry to take off north of the river at dawn.

II. Consequently, tomorrow, July 25: The VII Army Corps will attack at VILLERS-sur-FERE---MOULIN VERT---and PETIT-MOULIN.

The American I Army Corps will attack SERGY. A foothold along the OURCQ must be gained before daylight.

These main attacks will be covered by the XXXVIII Army Corps on the right and the French II Army Corps on the left.

Moreover, it must be understood that such a covering mission means an echelonment in
depth on the flanks, accompanied by a general offensive movement, with the purpose of assisting the progress of the main attacks.

III. Tanks: These will be distributed as follows:
1 company (323d) to II Army Corps.
2 companies (319th and 326th) to the American I Army Corps to participate in the attack on SERGY.
1 company (327th) at the disposal of the VII Army Corps.
The other tank units will remain in army reserve.

IV. Cavalry: The 6th Cavalry Division and I Cavalry Corps will follow the progress of the infantry attacks by advancing in successive bounds until the moment when the way has been paved for their debouchment.

* * * * * *

General DEGOUTTE.

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COMBINED ORDER OF BATTLE
OF THE
FRENCH FIFTH AND SIXTH ARMIES
AND
GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY
IN THE AISNE-MARNE
29 JULY 1918
9am

KEY MAP

MAP No 75

MAP NET: FRENCH, BRITISH, AMERICAN, MEXICAN, "BIG 4"
Preparation for Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff,
No. 2,256/3

SIXTH ARMY,

Marigny-en-Orxois, Seine-et-Marne, July 25, 1918—5:30 p.m.

ORDER No. 3,597

I. The General commanding the Group of Armies of the Reserve has decided that, to facilitate the combined actions on both banks of the OURCQ, the XI Army Corps (5th and 41st Infantry Divisions) and the corresponding artilleries are on July 25 at 3 p.m., and until further order, under orders of General commanding the Fr. Sixth Army for everything concerning tactical use.

The temporary limit of action between the Sixth and Fr. Tenth Armies follows the road: Le PLESSIER-HULEU---GRAND ROZOY---CRAMAILLE. this road in the Tenth Army.

The XI Army Corps will still be attached to the Tenth Army for all matters not referring to its tactical use.

II. One regiment of the American 4th Division (taken from the brigade remaining in the neighborhood of CHEZY-BRUMETZ) will be from now on at the disposal of the XI Army Corps to hold in second line the crest BEROMENIL and crest south, down to the OURCQ.

It is understood that the mission of this regiment, which stays in army reserve, will be to support the rear of the XI Army Corps and that it will not be placed in action except with the authorization of the general commanding the army.

III. From now on the attack of the wood of La BAILLETTE will be prepared so as to come in line on the road SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY.

General DEGOUTTE.

Advance Towards Fresnes

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff,
No. 2,264/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 25, 1918—7 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,599

I. Situation: During the day of the 25th, we occupied BEUVARDES, gained a foothold on the ridge southwest of BRUYERES, and took by storm CLIGNY---OULCHY-le-CHATEAU and OULCHY-la-VILLE.

II. Tomorrow, July 26:
(A) The XI and II Army Corps will remain in the positions they occupied at the close of the day and will reorganize their units. They will establish reserves and stand ready to repulse any counterattack.
The units of the American 4th Division which have been placed in the second line behind these army corps will not be moved forward unless authorized by the army commander. The II Army Corps will not place the 62d Infantry Division in line. This unit will be held in readiness to repulse any counterattack and will not be used for the time being except for this purpose.

(B) The VII Army Corps will make every effort to reach the northeast edge of Bois de la TOURNELLE and Ridge 228.

(C) The XXXVIII Army Corps will advance to the line: eastern outskirts of VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME [Woods]---ridge of ARBRE-de-la-FOSSE.

(D) If the relief of the American 26th Division by the American 42d Division now under way permits, the American I Army Corps will join the movement of the XXXVIII Army Corps by advancing to the edge of the woods southwest of FRESNES and to FOUR-a-VERRE.

III. Of course, under no circumstances should contact be lost. If the enemy withdraws, all units will push forward.

IV. Distribution of Tanks: The 319th and 326th Tank Companies will move to BRECY, where they will be at the disposal of the II Army Corps. However, this army corps will keep them in reserve and will commit them to action only for repulsing an enemy attack. All other tank units will be in army reserve.

V. The XXXVIII Army Corps will permanently guard the MARNE bridges between Jaulgonne and CHATEAU-THIERRY and will utilize the American 55th Brigade for this purpose.

General DEGOUTTE.

Air Support

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY, Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 26, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 385

On July 27 (12 noon), the allotment of air service units with the various army corps will be as follows:

II Army Corps: MAY-en-MULTIEN---BOURSONNE

(a) Airplanes:

Squadrons: 11th and 260th - organic
287th - French 52d Inf. Division
285th - French 62d Inf. Division

(b) Balloons:

Balloon Cos.: 59th - organic
73d and 62d - organic to the French VII Army Corps;
left temporarily at the disposal of
the II Army Corps
American I Army Corps: FRANCHEVILLE-MORAS Farm [?]
(a) Airplanes:
   Squadrons: 1st, 12th, and 237th (Lorraine Motors)
(b) Balloons:
   Balloon Cos.: 1st and 2d

XXXVIII Army Corps: La CHAPELLE---VERONGE---des GREVES Farm [?]
(a) Airplanes:
   Squadrons: 39th and 273d - organic
            284th - reinforcement
            88th - American
(b) Balloons:
   Balloon Cos.: 90th and 54th

VII Army Corps (in reserve): CHAUCONIN
(a) Airplanes:
   Squadrons: 34th and 72d - organic
            259th - Infantry Division
(b) Balloons:
   Organic Balloon Cos. 62 and 73, left temporarily at the disposal
   of the II Army Corps

I Cavalry Corps (in reserve): EGLIGNY-CHAUCONIN
(a) Airplanes:
   Squadron: 30th and 63d - organic
(b) Balloons:
   Balloon Cos.: 92d - organic

The commander, army air service, will regulate the movements required by the above
distribution.

DEGOUTTE,
Commanding General.

HS Fr. Files: 416-32.1: Order

Assignment American 32d Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,275/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 26, 1918—2:45 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,602

PART I

[Extract]

1. The American 32d Division is sent to the Sixth Army to enter the line between
the American 3d Division and the American I Army Corps.
2. On arrival, it will be placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII Army Corps, which will relieve the 39th Infantry Division as soon as possible.

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DEGOUTTE,
Commanding General.

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Return of Regiment to 4th Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
No. 2,277/3 July 26, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,604

[Extract]

The regiment of the American 4th Division which was placed at the disposal of the XI Army Corps the morning of July 26 is returned to the control of the 4th Division.

It will return to its former area July 27. * * *

DEGOUTTE.

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Reallocation of Corps Sectors

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
No. 2,278/3 Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 26, 1918--3 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,605

[Extract]

I. Headquarters VII Army Corps will be withdrawn from the front at 8 a. m., July 28, and will move to CROUY-sur-OURCQ in army reserve.

II. As a result of this withdrawal, the front of the Army will be held by the French XXXVIII Army Corps, American I Army Corps, and French II Army Corps. * * *
III. The corps will have at their disposal the following units:

**XXXVIII Army Corps**
- American 3d Division
- American 32d Division (which will arrive July 27)
- American 28th Division (less units now in the sector of American I Corps)

**American I Army Corps**
- American 26th Division
- American 42d Division
- American 4th Division (units to arrive progressively; movement to be completed in three or four days)

**II Army Corps**
- 33d Division
- 62d Division
- 52d Division
- 63d Division

IV. The French 39th, 167th, and 164th, and 2d Infantry Divisions will be withdrawn from the front • • •

V. The 167th, 164th, and 2d Divisions are under the orders of the General commanding the VII Army Corps, in army reserve.

The 39th Division will remain under the orders of the XXXVIII Corps.

VI. The artillery units now with the VII Army Corps, but not as organic part of that corps, pass to the control of the II Army Corps.

The organic artillery of the relieved divisions will be withdrawn from their sectors not later than 48 hours after the infantry. The organic artillery battalions of the VII Army Corps pass to the control of the II Army Corps and will be withdrawn from the front as soon as circumstances permit and when orders are issued to that effect.

VII. All movements incident to the redistribution of troops outlined above will be effected as soon as possible and not later than the morning of the 28th.

The Generals commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps, American I Army Corps, and II Army Corps will assume command of their new fronts at noon of the 27th.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**Preparation for Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,279/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 26, 1918—3:40 p. m.

WARNING ORDERS No. 3,606

Everything will be prepared for a general attack which will be made under the following conditions:

**XXXVIII Army Corps:** On its entire front, in the direction of:
1. Le CHARME-RONCHERES
2. FRESNES-COURMONT-CIERGES

- 372 -
American I Army Corps: On its entire front, in the direction of:
1. La CROIS BLANCHE [Farm]—SERGY
2. Vicinity of PREAUX Farm—La FOLIE—VILLES-sur-FERE—MEURCY Farm.
(Two attacking columns will be formed, passing east and west of the CHATEAU de la FORET.)

II Army Corps: Behind the left flank of the American I Army Corps:
VILLENUEVE-sur-FERE—VILLEMOYENNE—and the woods between these two villages.

The purpose of this attack is to have our infantry gain a foothold on the north bank of the OURCQ to enable the cavalry to cross. Since the slopes running down to the west bank of the OURCQ can be seen from enemy observation posts on the north bank, this attack will be made tomorrow night at 8:10 p.m., at nightfall. The moon will provide sufficient light for the advance of the infantry.

Moreover, the corps commanders will arrange, during the day and night, departure positions facilitating the launching of the attack.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**Plan of Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,287/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
*Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 26, 1918—8:35 p.m.*

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 3,609

[Extract]

I. Situations: The advance of the Sixth Army has reached Hill 123 (west of BRUYERES)—the south bank of the Ru de LUAY—the east edge of the Bois de la TOURNELLE—Hill 228—and the southwest part of the Foret de FERE, from Le FOUR-a-VERRE to La CROIX-ROUGE [Farm]

II. The night of July 26-27 and the day of July 27 will be employed in shifting and placing in position the large units as provided in General Orders No. 3,605 of July 26 (the XI Army Corps being entirely returned to the control of the Tenth Army).

In carrying out these movements, every precaution will be taken to keep them concealed, so as not to attract the attention of enemy observers.

III. Preparations for the attack outlined in Orders No. 3,606 of July 26 will be completed at the same time.

Objective: North bank of the OURCQ, from MEURCY Farm, inclusive (east of FERE-en-TARDENOIS) to CIERGES and RONCHERES, inclusive.

The attack will be led by the XXXVIII and the American I Army Corps, supported on the left by the II Army Corps; it will be a forward drive of infantry, organized in great depth so that nothing will be able to stop it.

Zones of Action: ***

The XXXVIII Army Corps will cover its right as it advances along the northwest edge of the Foret de RIS.

The II Army Corps will attack behind and to the left of the American I Army corps in the direction of VILLENUEVE and VILLEMOYENNE, and will seize these two strong points and
the woods between the two, thus covering the left flank of the attack of the American I Corps.

The artillery preparation will begin at 9:30 p.m. The attack will be launched at 9:40 p.m. In order to profit from surprise, there will be no increase in the density of fire before 9:30 p.m. Details of the rolling barrage will be arranged between the two army corps concerned (American I and French XXXVIII Army Corps). For this purpose the artillery commanders of each of these corps, provided with instructions from their corps commanders, will meet this evening, July 26, with the army artillery commander, who will definitely determine the schedule for this barrage.

IV. The French 6th Cavalry Division will be assembled in time to debouch onto the north bank of the OURCQ at daybreak, and execute the mission given in Instructions No. 3,562 of July 21.

The Commander of the 6th Cavalry Division will remain with the General commanding the American 42d Division, and follow the course of the battle so that he may go into action at the desired moment.

Conforming to instructions contained in Orders No. 3,591, July 24, [not found] the French I Cavalry Corps will likewise be assembled to exploit any advance that may be made by the 6th Cavalry Division.

The General commanding the I Cavalry Corps will report the position of his C. P. and will choose the moment at which he will commit his corps to action.

V. The French 62d Infantry Division will be moved during the night to the neighborhood of MOUCHETON-Chateau, prepared for action in such detachments as may be necessary to support the attack of the French 52d Infantry Division. In principle, however, this division is intended to operate as a whole, in direct support of the I Cavalry Corps, to whose command it will pass, if the cavalry corps crosses the OURCQ.

Division C. P. at MOUCHETON-Chateau.

VI. The infantry divisions in army reserve will remain in their present positions; they will be alerted in their billets, but not assembled.

VII. The heavy artillery (guns) will go into action in the course of the night operation and during the advance of the cavalry, under conditions to be determined by the general commanding the army artillery.

VIII. During the advance and until daybreak, the troops engaged in the attack are strictly forbidden to fire their rifles or revolvers. All fighting will be with the bayonet.

DEGOUTTE,
Commanding General.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Telegram

Postponement of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,295/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

MARGNY, Sixth Army; to PROVINS, Armies of the North and Northeast; and LAMORLAYE, Tenth Army.

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No. 2,295 bis/3 - As adequate bases were not captured on July 26, the operation contemplated in Orders 3,609 of July 26 is postponed to a later date.

By order:

R. LALANDE.
Chief of 3d Section.

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204-32.7: Order

**Provisions for Attack**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,308/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
No. 3,613

July 27, 1918—3 p.m.

ORDER OF OPERATIONS No. 3,613

I. The enemy has evacuated FRESNES, COURMONT; it is possible that he is retiring north of the OURCQ to a line of resistance running through FERE-en-TARDENOIS---Plateau 184 (west of SERINGES-et-NESES)---NESES---Hill 230 (2 km. S. W. of COULONGES).

II. Information obtained is not yet sufficiently definite to enable the commanding general of the army to decide to launch this evening the operation specified in his Order No. 3,609 of July 26, 1918. Nevertheless, everything must be in readiness for its execution this evening, in the event that sufficient progress will have been made in the northern part of the FORET de FERE to permit it.

III. In this case, the objective to be attained tonight would not be the one indicated yesterday, namely MEURCY Farm-CIERGES, but the following line of heights which would apparently constitute the enemy's line of resistance: FERE-en-TARDENOIS---SERINGES-et-NESES---Hill 230. These latter objectives are the ones to be attained by the main body, the advance guard pushing on in direction of FERE-Ancien Chateau---Les BONS-HOMMES [Farm]---PARTI Farms---COULONGES.

IV. The advance guards of the infantry and cavalry will at once follow the enemy, in order to maintain close contact with him and to occupy all the ground abandoned by him.

The main body will follow the movement of the advance guards but will not pass beyond the edge of the woods. The artillery will take position as close as possible to the edges of these woods, in order to be able to bombard the enemy's line of resistance.

V. The taking of the plateau north of the OURCQ will be followed by the entrance into action of the cavalry (6th Cavalry Division, and I Cavalry Corps) in accordance with orders already issued.

VI. During the execution of the movement close contact must be maintained at the right with the III Army Corps, deploying forces in echelon if necessary to cover our right flank.

VII. As soon as the American troops will have completely occupied the zone indicated in Order No. 3,605, of July 26, 1918, dividing the army into only three corps, General Massenet [VII Corps] will pass his command to General Philipot. An understanding will be arrived at between these two Generals without hindering in any way the present operations.
VIII. The American 4th Division receives the mission to advance in order to occupy the line VILLEMOYENNE—northern edge of Bois du CHATEAU de la FORET—northern edge of the FORET de FERE as far as BALANCHERES inclusive. The movement will be executed upon order from the commanding general of the army as soon as the American I Army Corps has advanced far enough.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 413-30.1: Order

**Time of Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,313/3  

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  

ORDERS No. 3,617

The operation set forth in Orders No. 3,609 of July 26, 1918, preparations for which were prescribed in Paragraph II of Orders No. 3,613 of July 27, will be carried out this evening, July 27, at 11 p. m.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**Army Boundaries**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,315/3  

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,618

I. Effective July 28, the boundary between the Sixth and Tenth Armies will be as follows:
   Course of the OURCQ as far as TROESNES (Sixth Army),
   Railway in the OURCQ Valley (MAROLLES to the Sixth Army),
   The line NEUFCHELLES—ROUVERS—ROSAY-en-MULTIEN (Sixth Army), FOSSE-MARTIN ---BREGY—OISSERY—ST-PATHUS (Tenth Army).

II. All elements of the Sixth Army located in the territory transferred to the Tenth must evacuate it before July 30.
Corps units will be moved by their respective corps. Chiefs of services concerned will expedite recommendations for the movement of army units.

The rear boundary of army corps will be defined in a later order.

General DEGOUTTE.

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Advance

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,316/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY.
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 27, 1918--11:45 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,619

[Extract]

I. In case the enemy does not hold on the north bank of the OURCQ, but starts a general retreat to the north, the army corps will continue without delay their advance in the respective zones assigned them.

Each army corps will be preceded by an advance guard. During the evening of the 28th their advance guards are expected to reach the VESLE; and their main bodies the heights south of BRUYES---CHERRY---CHARTREUVE.

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II. In order to avoid traffic congestion, the army corps should take with them only a minimum of artillery. ****

The corps artillery of the VII Army Corps will be attached to the American I Army Corps.

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IV. C. P.'s effective noon, July 28:

XXXVIII Army Corps: CHARTEVES
American I Army Corps: EPIEDS
II Army Corps: BRECY

V. Effective at midnight, July 27/28, the entire American 28th Division will be attached to the XXXVIII Army Corps, which, therefore, will send it orders.

The American 4th Division will be attached to the American I Army Corps in manner; * * * will move out on the 28th at 4 a. m. and will proceed to the vicinity of the Bois du CHATELET. C. P.: MOUCHETON-Chateau, where the American I Army Corps will send it further orders.

General DEGOUTTE.

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Change in Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2.320/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 28, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,621

I. Because the Tenth Army has taken over a portion of the Sixth Army zone (Special Orders No. 3,618 of July 27), the boundary between the American I Army Corps and the French VII Army Corps, effective at noon, July 29, will be as follows: Forward boundary, no change up to GRISOLLES—BONNES—PETRET [Farm?]—LICY Farm (to the American I Army Corps)—HAUTEVESNES—VINLY—Les GRANGES [Farm]—MOULIN du RHONE [Farm] (to the II Army Corps)—GRANGE-COULOMBS—CROTIGNY—RARAY-Ruines—MARNOUE-les-MOINES (to the American I Army Corps)—railroad from OCQUERRE to the MARNE—thence along the MARNE downstream from the railroad as far as the rear boundary of the army corps.

II. The withdrawn divisions, as well as the non-divisional elements of the VII Corps and the army elements, will not be moved.

General DEGOUTTE.

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Relief of Non-divisional Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2.323/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 28, 1918—10:50 p.m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,623

[Extract]

II. The non-divisional units of the French VII Corps will be relieved by elements of the American I Army Corps by agreement between the two army corps, so as to be freed on the morning of July 31, at the latest, with the exception of the two least fatigued territorial battalions, which will be held until further orders at the disposal of the American I Army Corps for work on the roads.

By order:

G. BRION,
Chief of Staff.
**Enemy Retreats**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,329/3  
FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 28, 1918---7 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,627

I. The enemy, giving way under our pressure, has gone back north of the OURCQ, the crossings of which we have forced.

The front line reached this evening is: GIVRAY---course of the OURCQ---FERE-en-TARDENOIS Railroad Station---FERE-en-TARDENOIS---MEURCY Farm---course of the OURCQ---RONCHERES.

II. Tomorrow we must continue to push the enemy back by energetically concentrating our artillery fire on the points of resistance and by operating against these points with mixed infantry and cavalry advance guards.

Close contact must be maintained both day and night, to prevent the enemy from slipping away. This is the duty of all.

III. Tomorrow at daybreak, 3:40 a. m., there will be a general resumption of our forward movement, the minimum objective to be gained by nightfall being the line: CHERRY-CHARTREUVE---BRUYS, with advance guards on the line: MONT-NOTRE-DAME---MONT-St-MARTIN.

IV. Cavalry: Missions defined in previous orders.

General DEGOUTTE.

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204-32.7: Instruction

**Center of Resistance**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,345/3  
SIXTH ARMY,  
Marigny-en-Orxois, Seine-et-Marne, July 29, 1918---4:30 p. m.

INSTRUCTION No. 3,632

ORGANIZATION AND OCCUPATION OF A LINE OF SECURITY

I. A line of security running through Saddle 174 (wood east of BRUJERES) saddle of VILLENEUVE---VILLEMOYENNE---east edges of the wood at CHATEAU de la FORET---forest of FERE---FRESNES and the north edge of the forest of RIS, will be organized immediately under the direction of corps commanders, each in his own zone. For the present this organization will be limited to the creation of a few centers of resistance.

II. These centers of resistance will be held at all times by safety garrisons.

General DEGOUTTE.

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Withdrawal of French Artillery Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,346/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 29, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,633

[Extract]

I. The 8th Battalion, 109th Heavy Artillery (155-mm. Schneider howitzer) will be withdrawn from the front of the American I Army Corps during the night of July 30/31 and will assemble at its echelons and await orders to join another army.

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III. The 1st Battalion, 333d Heavy Artillery (155-mm. gun, Model 1877) will be withdrawn very shortly from the front of the American I Army Corps.

G. BRION,
Chief of Staff.

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Hs Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

Continuation of Advance

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,351/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 29, 1918---8:20 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,635

[Extract]

I. North of the OURCQ, the army has encountered serious resistance which has made our advance very difficult. This advance has been marked only by the capture of CAYENNE Farm (north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS) and Hill 183 (west of SERINGES).

On our left, the Tenth Army has advanced between BEUGNEUX and CORBENY Farm.

On our right, the French III Army Corps has reached the line: ruined telegraph station---La GRANGE-aux-Bols [Farm]---Ste-GEMMES---NEUVILLE-Chateau.

* * * * * *

III. Tomorrow, July 30, the army will continue its advance with the same objective as those given in Orders No. 3,627 of July 28.

* * * * * 

- 380 -
COMBINED ORDER OF BATTLE
OF THE
FRENCH FIFTH AND SIXTH ARMIES
AND
GERMAN SEVENTH ARMY
IN THE AISNE-MARNE
30 JULY-9 AUG 1918

KEY MAP
VII. As soon as possible, the American I Army Corps will return to the control of the XXXVIII Army Corps.

General DEGOUTTE.

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Army Boundaries

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,639

I. The new boundary between the Sixth and Fifth Armies as of midnight, July 29/30 is the following:

1. North of the MARNE: The road connecting VERNEUIL---PASSY-GRIGNY---Ste-GEEMME---Le TEMPLE Farm---VILLERS-AGRON---VEZILLY---ARCIS-le-PONSART---COURVILLE (roads and villages to the Sixth Army, but available for use of the Fifth Army between the MARNE and Le TEMPLE Farm).

2. South of the MARNE: VERNEUIL---VASSIEUX---CHAMPAILLET---La CHAPELLE-MONTHODON---BAULINE (these localities to the Sixth Army). thence, along the east boundary line of the Department of SEINE-et-MARNE as far as its intersection, west of RIEUX, with the former boundary of the Sixth Army.

II. Units which are split up by this new boundary will be regrouped by agreement between the two armies, based upon recommendations of the interested services.


[Unsigned]

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Organization of Security Positions

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 3,640

The enemy still appears to have more reserves at his command which will permit a counteroffensive in which he will attempt to regain lost ground. Therefore, in our advance we must be prepared to meet it and stop any enemy thrust that may develop.
It was to this end that Instructions No. 3,632, July 29, prescribed the establishment of a security position determined by the line extending through Ridge 174—VILLENEUVE Ridge—VILLEMOYENNE—eastern edge of the FORET de FERE—FRESNES and the northern edge of the FORET de RIS. This security position must be occupied at all times. Its purpose is to ward off any counteroffensive debouching from the OURCQ.

If the enemy withdraws behind the VESLE, it may be that he is awaiting that moment when our troops will be more exhausted and our reserves diminished, for launching a counterattack.

Therefore, the army commander orders that a new security position be established during the course of our further advance north of the OURCQ. The trace of this position is as follows: ridge east of LOUPEIGNE—northern edges of the woods east of MAREUIL-en-DOLE, of the woods southeast of DOLE, and of the woods northwest of DRAVEGNY—LONGEVILLE Farm—the small woods 1 km. east thereof—Hummock 200 (ruined tower [Tour RUINES Signal])—ARCIS-le-PONSART.

The main body temporarily will be held on this security position. Only strong advance guards will be pushed beyond it in the direction of the VESLE, having as their mission the pursuit of the enemy; if necessary, they will cross the VESLE in order to maintain contact.

DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

Instructions for Advance

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,369/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 30, 1918—4:15 p. m.

WARNING ORDERS No. 3,644

JULY 31

In execution of the orders contained in Memorandum No. 2,371/3 [not printed] of July 30, 1918, tomorrow's operations will require:

For the III Army Corps: In particular, an advance between Bois MEUNIERE and Ste-GEMME, along the plateau of Ste-GEMME, with the object of capturing this village and gaining a foothold in the southeast corner of Bois MEUNIERE.

For the XXXVIII Army Corps: An advance in the direction of Hill 213 (Map, 1:20,000) and to the east, the purpose being to take the village of CIERGES by using, if necessary, a departure base in the American I Army Corps zone.

For the American I Army Corps: An advance and the seizure of 207 with secondary action against 177 (Map, 1:20,000).

For the II Army Corps: Advance along Plateaus 184 and 183.

NOTE: The action of the XXXVIII Corps and the American I Corps will be combined.

General DEGOUTTE.

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- 383 -
Arrival of Heavy Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,372/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 30, 1918—6:50 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,645

[Extract]

I. The American 56th Artillery Regiment (three battalions of 155 G. P. F.), assigned to the American III Army Corps, will detrain at La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE Railroad Station on July 31 and August 1 and 2, at the rate of three trains per day.

* * * * * *

III. The American 319th Field Signal Battalion, assigned to the American First Army, will detrain at Le FERTE-sous-JOUARRE Railroad Station on July 31 at 6 a. m.

* * * * * *

General DEGOUTTE.

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Continuation of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,376/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 30, 1918—7:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,647

[Extract]

I. Today the Army again encountered serious resistance along the OURCQ. The front reached this evening runs as follows: south of SAPOY---SERINGES-et-NEZLES---MEURCY Farm---SERGY---Hill 212---rectangular woods north of RONCHERES---ruined telegraph station---south edge of Bois MEUNIER---La BRILLERIE---NEUVILLE-Chateau.

II. Tomorrow, July 31, at daybreak, the attacks will be resumed in accordance with the provisions of Warning Order No. 3,644 of July 31 [30] * * *

III. The objectives indicated above are only a minimum, and it must be understood that the seizure of these objectives should be accomplished by an advance carried as far
forward as possible. The necessity of maintaining close contact with the enemy remains in force.

IV. The mission of the 6th Cavalry Division remains unchanged.

General DEGOUTTE.

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204-32.7: Order

Extension of Safety Positions

[Contemporary Translation]


SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,648

The line of security to be organized south of the OURCQ as defined in Instruction No. 3,632, July 29, 1918, will be prolonged in the zone of the III Corps and established on the general lines:

North edge of the FORET de RIS---HURLAY Chapel---[La CHAPELLE-HURLAY]---north edge of wood east of the BONRU Farm---MOULIN-QUARRE.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Message

Situation

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY, Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 31, 1918--morning.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Staff MARIGNY-en-ORXOIS [Sixth Army] to [Staff MONTMORT [Fifth Army]
[Staff BONNEUIL-en-VALOIS [Tenth Army]

During the night the enemy launched numerous artillery actions along the front, using gas shell.
A violent counterattack was launched against SERINGES at 9:30 p. m.; there was a hot
struggle, and SERINGES, which had been taken by the Germans, was immediately recaptured by the Americans, who encircled the enemy elements.

Situation unchanged on the front.

By order:

Ch. HANOTE,
Chief of 3d Section.

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Pursuit

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,411/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, July 31, 1918--8:20 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,663

I. The front gained by the Sixth Army on the evening of July 31 runs as follows:
Small woods south of VILLERS-AGRON---the stream west of that village---the north edge of Bois-MEUNIERE---CIERGES---SERGY---SERINGES---Hill 184---height south of the FERE-en-TARDENOIS Railroad Station---CORBEAU.

Certain indications (statements of prisoners, artillery movements to the rear, [intercepted radio messages?]) suggests that the enemy is preparing for a new withdrawal.

II. Consequently, previous orders will be complied with: the enemy will be pursued along the entire front and close contact maintained with him.

If enemy resistance continues to be maintained on the positions which he holds at present north of the OURCQ, means must be sought to break this resistance by outflanking it by way of the ridges north of CIERGES towards CHERY-CHARTREUVE.

The American I Army Corps and the XXXVIII Army Corps, which are to execute this attack, will be covered on the right by the III Army Corps operating in the direction of COULONGES. The left elements of the American I Army Corps will operate in the direction of Hill 190 (east of Les BONS-HOMMES Farm), avoiding NESLES.

The XI Army Corps attacks at 4:45 a. m. tomorrow to the west of the Bois d'ARCY, making its main effort against SAVENAY [SERVENAY?]. The II Army Corps will support this attack by attempting to outflank SAPONAY on the east and to advance along the western edge of the woods north of FERE.

III. The 6th Cavalry Division, withdrawn from the front, will move to the neighborhood of La FERTE-MILON this evening.

General DEGOUTTE.
Army and Corps Limits

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,424/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, August 1, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,665

[Extract]

I. From the second of August 10 a. m., the limits of the Sixth Army will be modified as follows:

(1) Limit between the Fifth and Sixth Armies: no change.
(2) Limit between the Tenth and Sixth Armies: SAPONAY---BRUYERES---ROCOURT-St-MARTIN---GRISOLLES---BONNES---BUSSIARES---MARIGNY---La SABLONNIERE---TORCHAMPS---AVERNES---MOLIEN---USAY (USSY-sur-MARNE)---SIGNY-SIGNETS---PIERRE-LEVEE---GIREMOUTIERS---(All these localities to the Sixth Army).
(3) South limits of the Army. (Advance limit of the Zone of the Etapes.) No change except COULOMMIERS which is given to the D. E.

II. Temporarily, the large units in second line stationed in the area which is given to the Tenth Army will not be moved and will remain attached to the Sixth Army.

Until further orders, the headquarters of the Sixth Army (2d Echelon) and the army services established at TRILPORT, MONTCEAUX, FUBLAINES, POINCY, ETREPILLY, and NANTEUIL-les-MEAUX, will not be moved.

III. Owing to the preceding modifications and to the advance of the front line, the army corps limits will be modified as follows:

(1) Rear limits of the army corps areas: Valley of the MARNE, from USSY to AZY; valley of the DOLLOIR from AZY to ESSISES; valley of the stream of VIFFOR to its source, then Bois-MILON and ARTONGES (to the III Army Corps).
(3) Limits between the American I Army Corps and XXXVIII Army Corps, Bois at 1,500 m. east of ST-THIBAUT---VILLESVOYE (to the I Army Corps)---MONT-St-MARTIN---LES BOULEAUX---EVRY [Ferme] (to the XXXVIII Army Corps)---Ferme de CAMP---SERGY (to the I Army Corps)---FRESNES---La CROIX-ROUGE Ferme---[MON] MAISON-BOUTACHE---BRASLES---CHATEAU-THIERRY (north bank to the I Army Corps)---valley of the MARNE from CHATEAU-THIERRY to AZY.
(4) Limits between the XXXVIII and III Army Corps: ST-GILLES (to the III Army Corps)---COURS de l'ORILLON [valley of the ORILLON]---COULONDE---RONCHERES (to the XXXVIII Army Corps)---BARZY-sur-MARNE---VARENNES---MONTHEREL---COUREMENAX (to the III Army Corps)---MONTBAZIN---Les ORGERIEUX---La VILLENEUVE [VILLENEUVE-sous-BELLOT?] (to the XXXVIII Army Corps).

* * * * *
V. A subsequent order will fix the rear limits of the army zones.

DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

Army Boundary

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,442/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

CORRECTION TO GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,665 of AUGUST 1

In the next to the last line of the first page [Par III (3)], read . . . FRESNES---
La CROIX-ROUGE [Farm]---[MIN] MAISON-BOUTACHE---BRASLES (to the XXXVIII A. C.)---
CHATEAU-THIERRY (north bank - to the American I A. C.)--- . . .

DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

American Brigade for French Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,445/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orgois, Aisne, August 2, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,674

[Extract]

I. One brigade of the American 3d Div. is placed at the disposal of the General commanding the French III Army Corps to relieve the French 18th Division which will be used in the zone of the corps while awaiting further orders.

* * * * *

III. This brigade will be placed at the left of the corps and will receive its orders from the General commanding the III Corps.

General DEGOUTTE.

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**Americans to Take Over Sector**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,449/3

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,675

[Extract]

I. General commanding the American III Corps will take command of the sector actually occupied by the XXXVIII A. C. on August 4 at 8 a. m.

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General DEGOUTTE.

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**Continuation of Pursuit**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 2,449/3

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,676

I. The enemy is giving way along the entire front. This evening we reached the line: LOUPEIGNE---MAREUIL-en-DOLE---DRAVEGNY---IGNY-l'ABBAYE, with our advance elements.

II. Tomorrow, August 3, continuation of the pursuit, under the conditions already prescribed.

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General DEGOUTTE.

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Army and Corps Boundaries Extended

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 2,461/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY, Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, August 3, 1918--2:40 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,680

[Extract]

I. North of the MARNE, the limits of the Sixth Army are extended as follows:

Between the Sixth and Tenth Armies: Junction of the MURTON and the VESLE---ORME 165 ---road VAUXTIN---[to] St-MARD (road and towns in [to] the Sixth Army)---CHAVONNE---OSTEL ---FILAIN (these towns in [to] the Tenth Army).

Between the Fifth and Sixth Armies: COURVILLE---La BONNE-MAISON Ferme---MAGNEUX---COURLANDON---crossroads 300 meters west of HUIT-VOISINS---Le GRAND-HAMEAU ---MEURIVAL---CONCEVREUX (all these places to the Sixth Army)---CRAONNELLE (to the Fifth Army)---BOUCONVILLE (to the Sixth Army).

II. The limits between the several army corps are extended as follows:

Between the II Corps and American I Corps: BAZOCHES and VAUXCERE (in [to] the I Corps)---VIEIL-ARCY and PONT-ARCY (the II Corps).

Between the American I Corps and French XXXVIII Corps: PERLES---BARBONVAL and VILLERS-en-PRAYERES (the I Corps).

Between the XXXVIII and III Army Corps: FISMES and GLENNES (XXXVIII Corps)---MAIZY (to the III Corps).

* * * * *

General DEGOUTTE.

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Forcing of the Vesle

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 2, 469/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY, Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, August 3, 1918--2:50 p. m.

ORDER No. 3,682

Orders have been given for some or all of the advance guards, with the exception of the artillery, to cross the VESLE tonight.

This operation will be attempted by each of the advance guards on its own account, during the first part of the night.

If they are unable to accomplish it, a general attempt to force the passage of the VESLE will be made tomorrow morning at 3:30 a. m. following an artillery preparation which
will be carried out during a portion of the night, and which will be effected by suffi-
cient artillery placed in position south of the VESLE.

The advance guards will establish bridgeheads north of the VESLE. Combat patrols
will be pushed forward to maintain contact with the enemy.

All measures will be taken so that the pursuit by the advance guards, with the main
body echeloned to the rear, may continue with energy tomorrow morning on the plateaus
between the VESLE and the AISNE.

General DEGOUTTE.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

Sixth Army Advance

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,473/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
August 3, 1918---5 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,685

[Extract]

I. The Headquarters of the Sixth Army (1st Echelon) will open in CHATEAU-THIERRY at
10 a. m., August 4.

A detail will remain in MARIGNY-en-ORXOIS until 4 p. m., August 4.

II. The 2d Echelon will remain in TRILPORT.

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General DEGOUTTE.

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232-32.7: Order

Axis of Liaison

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,452/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, August 3, 1918---10:30 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 3,678

The Axis of Liaison and Roads of march of the army corps:

XXXVIII A. C.: CHARTEVES---Le CHARMEL---COUMONT---CIEGES---CHAMERY---
COULANGES---COHAN---DRAVEGNY---St-GILLES.
III A. C.; VEZILLY---ARCIS-Le-PONSART---COURVILLE.

BRION,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**Crossing the Vesle**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau
No. 2.478/3

SIXTH ARMY,

Marigny-en-Orxois, Aisne, August 3, 1918---20 h.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,687

[Extract]

I. The enemy yields on the whole front.
At the end of the day our advance guards are on the edge of the VESLE, reached also by the Fifth and Tenth Armies.

II. The pursuit will continue without interruption in the conditions prescribed by Order No. 3,682: the advance guards crossing the River VESLE during the night, and forming bridgeheads across, so they may be able to resume their progression, in the morning of August 4, on the plateaus between VESLE and AISNE; the large echelons on the rear advancing in a rush.

III. During their march forward, the Fr. II and III A. C. will stay in close liaison with the flanks of the neighboring corps.

IV. On August 5 at 8 o'clock, the American I Corps will assume the command of all the front presently held by the American I Corps and the Fr. II Corps.

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V. On August 5 at 8’clock American III Corps will assume the command of the whole front held by the American III Corps and Fr. III A. C.
He will dispose temporarily, in addition to his own units, of the following units: 4th D. I.
Corps troops of the Fr. III A. C. (heavy artillery of the Fr. III A. C. included).
Army artillery groups presently at the disposal of the Fr. III A. C.
At the same date, the P. C. of the American III Corps will operate around COULONGES.
After being relieved, Headquarters of Fr. III A. C. will operate at MONTMIRAIL.

VI. The P. C. of the army will operate at CHATEAU-THIERRY (northwest), August 4, beginning at 10 o’clock.
Temporary staff at MARIGNY until 16 o’clock.

General DEGOUTTE.

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Bridgehead

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,485/3

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3690

[Extract]

I. Today we succeeded in crossing the VESLE at certain points.
   It does not seem that the enemy intends to offer serious resistance between the VESLE
   and AISNE, but rather wishes to reorganize north of the AISNE.
   II. Tomorrow, August 5, continuation of the pursuit.

   * * * * * *

   VI. The C. P. of the army is at CHATEAU-THIERRY.
   Headquarters, French II Army Corps, will move to REBAIS.
   Headquarters, French III Army Corps, will be established at DORMANS (forward echelon)
   and at CONDE-en-BRIE.

General DEGOUTTE.

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French Units With American Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
and Air Service

SPECIAL ORDERS No. 338

Supplementing General Orders Nos. 3,673, August 2, [not found] and 3,687, August 3,
the following French formations are temporarily at the disposal of the American I and III
Army Corps in addition to their organic units:

   American I Corps:
   Spad Squadron 285 (62d Inf. Div.) Le PLESSIS-[sur-]AUTHEUIL
   Breguet Squadron 237 (heavy artillery) MAY-en-MULTIEN
   Balloon 59 (organic to the II Army Corps)

   American III Corps:
   Salmson Squadron 39 (XXXVIII Army Corps) La CHAPELLE-VERONGE
   Salmson Squadron 280 (III Army Corps) La FERTE-GAUCHER
   48th Photographic Section (III Corps) Les GREVES Farm
Balloon 54 (XXXVIII Corps)  
Balloon 44 (III Corps)  
Balloon 47 (III Corps)  

To assure continuity of work, the air service staffs of the French II and III Corps (commanding officer, commander of the lighter than air, the intelligence officer, the photographic officer) will remain with the air service staffs of the American I and III Corps until further orders.

The commander of the army air service will regulate the execution of the movements to carry out the above measures. In addition, he will prescribe the necessary measures for taking over command and for the transfer of the sector records in the most satisfactory manner.

DEGOUTTE,  
General Commanding.

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.1: Order

**Passage of the Vesle**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 3,509/3  
FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,  
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, August 5, 1918---8:20 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 3,700

Same dispositions for the day of August 6 as those contained in General Orders No. 3,690, with the following exceptions:

Paragraph II of Order No. 3,690 is revoked and is replaced by the following, which is to be pasted on the aforesaid order.

The advance guards will seize a foothold on the plateaus north of the VESLE initially to create a bridgehead and to assure the passage of the troops necessary to continue the pursuit.

They will organize and occupy that position.

The main body, echeloned in depth, will cross the VESLE successively and by bounds, and will effect passage of lines of the troops guarding the bridgehead. They will establish themselves on the general line: VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES---wood north of Le GRAND-HAMEAU---BEAUGILET Farm.

The main body will immediately push forward new advance guards to the northern slopes of the plateau, taking, while crossing them, every precaution against the fire of enemy artillery. During these operations, the field artillery and heavy howitzers will be placed in position south of the VESLE.

As soon as these advance guards have crossed the plateau, the VESLE will be crossed by such artillery as is necessary to support their advance.

* Since this present Order, No. 3,700, is sufficiently definite in itself, the amended portion of No. 3,690 need not appear in its printing on August 4.
The heavy long artillery will at once be pushed forward as far as it can be supplied so as to fire upon the principal crossing of the AISNE.

General DEGOUTTE.

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183:32.7: Message

**Warning Order**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,525/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

*Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, August 6, 1918.*

Confirmation of Telephone Message


On the front of the army, our outposts are on the VESLE between BAZOCHES and a point east of FISMES. Some elements have crossed the river between La CENDRIERE and St-THIBAUT. This situation on the VESLE is not to last any longer. Orders will be issued by the generals commanding the army corps that tomorrow morning, following the operations prescribed for the day of the 6th and for the night 6/7, our advance guards will be in a bridgehead position on the line: PAARS---PERLES---BASLIEUX---COURLANDON.

DEGOUTTE.

[Pencil notes in English:]

1. Fixing of time (morning) altered by later instructions to insure preparation.
2. Subsequent orders prescribed contingencies which may delay attack until afternoon.

A. W. B. [Brigadier General A. W. Bjornstad, Chief of Staff, III Corps]

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HS Fr. Files: 416-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,

*Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, August 6, 1918.*

[Extract]

American III Army Corps:

General Crawford (American 38th Infantry) has relieved the French 147th Infantry. The outposts are on the VESLE in the sector of the American 6th Brigade and are getting
ready to cross the VESLE. Reconnaissance was made last night by the engineers but their reports have not yet been received.

Our front line has contact with units on the right and left.

American 32d Division: 8:30 a.m.

An American company is north of the VESLE in the VILLESAVOYE Woods. At that point the troops have not yet been able to cross the river for it has been impossible to build a bridge.

Violent barrage of gas and H. E. on the VILLESAVOYE-FISMES Road.

Enemy machine guns are firing from the north bank of the river, making any advance impossible.

Two cavalry platoons are held north of FISMES, so as to cover the building of bridges and to be pushed forward in a contingency.

American I Army Corps: 12:30 p.m.

The American 4th Div. had sent 8 patrols north of the VESLE August 5, and 1 company during the evening. These units have engaged in combat with enemy elements between the river and the FISMES-SOISSONS Highroad, but, fearing an enemy counterattack, all American units were withdrawn to the south bank of the VESLE. At present the American 4th Div. is south of the VESLE and along the river.

American III Army Corps: 1:50 p.m.

No change in the situation.

We are still in position along the VESLE.

American I Army Corps: 9:30 p.m.

A first attack launched at 4:30 p.m. enabled 2 bns. of the American 8th Brigade and 2 bns. of the French 62d Inf. Div. to cross north of the VESLE.

A second attack launched about 7:30 p.m. enabled 2 bns. of the American 7th Brigade to cross. (At present 6 bns. are north of the river.)

American III Army Corps: 10 p.m.

General characteristics: Great activity on both sides. Barrages of 77's and 105's have made the crossing of the VESLE difficult; nevertheless a few patrols have succeeded in crossing the river several times. Report of the General commanding the American 32d Division to the General commanding the American I Army Corps.

In answer to the question of the chief of staff about my decision concerning the operation he had suggested to me, I have not yet been able to get complete information. But information available at the moment shows that we have suffered exceptionally heavy losses, that the troops are exhausted and that the enemy is occupying good positions north of the VESLE in considerable force. In my opinion the operation can not be carried out with the troops of my division. Moreover, the condition of these troops is such that I consider it inopportune to attempt any kind of offensive action during the day. It will be difficult for the troops to keep the positions they have been ordered to hold.

Report of the American III Army Corps:

Situation stable. The American 127th Infantry "is making ready to resist counter-attacks." Reports that the men are very tired and lack supplies.

The American 128th Inf. has established its support line 500 m. south of FISMES, west of the St-GILLES---FISMES Road.

The Germans are said to have constructed a bridge north of the factory in FISMES. Enemy machine guns are probably in position south of the VESLE west of FISMES.
A prisoner says that the slopes north of FISMES are strongly occupied. FISMES is being violently shelled and has probably been evacuated by American troops who may have taken position on the outskirts.

The American 32d Division will be relieved tonight by the American 28th Div. which will take up position with brigades side by side: 55th Brigade on the right (109th and 110th Inf.); 56th Brigade on the left (111th and 112th Inf.), the regiments behind each other in each brigade, one battalion probably in line in each regiment.

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183-32.17: Orders

Suspension of Offensive

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,561/3

FRENCH SIXTH ARMY,
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, August 7, 1918.

INSTRUCTIONS No. 3,723

[Extract]

The enemy is offering rather strong resistance north of the VESLE. However, the condition of the troops does not permit uninterrupted continuance of large scale attacks in full force to seize the plateaus between the VESLE and the AISNE.

Therefore, the High Command orders for the present only the establishment of the bridgeheads north of the VESLE to permit the construction of foot-bridges across the river for the later continuation of the offensive which it intends ordering for the combined armies.

* * * * *

DEGOUTTE.

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Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDERS No. 200

First Part

[Extract]

I. The French II Army Corps reinforced by the French 47th Infantry Division and the American 7th Brigade [4th Division] will attack on D day in an easterly direction. One division, the French 63d, which will detrain the night of the 17/18, will be attached to this corps.

II. Zone of Action of the II Army Corps. On the left (north) of the II Army Corps, the French XI Army Corps will outflank the [thickets of] Buisson de CRESNES on the north. On the right (south) flank of the II Army Corps, the French VII Army Corps should reach as a minimum objective: CHEVILLON and St-GENGOULPH, the subsequent objective being: COINTICOURT, Hill 172 and HAUTEVESNES.

Corps reserve: American 7th Brigade, less American 39th Infantry; French 63d Division; 3d and 4th Companies, French 2d Engineer Battalion, 7th Company, French 5th Territorial Engineer Battalion.

IV. The attack will be launched at H hour along the entire army corps front. The attack will not be preceded by an artillery preparation. Firing will not commence until H hour. The infantry will advance behind the rolling barrage which will progress at the rate of 100 meters in three minutes.

Tanks will not be used to capture the hostile covering [outpost] position. They will advance so as to cross the first objective at the same time as the infantry, namely H plus one hour and thirty minutes.

The second objective will be reached at H plus two hours and 15 minutes. There will be a three-hour halt until H plus five hours and 15 minutes on this objective to allow the artillery time to displace forward, and if feasible, to allow the infantry of each division to affect a passage of lines.
The attention of the Commanding General, 33d Division is called to the importance of the nest of batteries and the Center of Resistance of NOROY. These must be reduced to permit the advance to continue on the plateaus between the OURCQ and the Ru d'ALLAND.

The American 39th Infantry is placed under the orders of the Commanding General, 33d Division, who may use it for the occupation of the BUISSON de CRESNES when he considers that the most favorable moment has arrived.

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PHILIPOT,
General Commanding.

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204-32.7: Orders

Amendment to Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,574

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 17, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS

(SUPPLEMENTING GENERAL ORDERS No. 200 OF JULY 17)

[Extract]

* * * * *

The front of attack will extend from the present north boundary of the army corps south to the Ru d'ALLAND.

On the day of the attack, the American 7th Brigade (less the American 39th Infantry), the French 117th Territorial Infantry (less 2 1/2 companies), and the 7th Company, French 5th Battalion of Territorial Engineers, will occupy the second line as prescribed by the Commanding General, American 7th Brigade, in his Orders No. 8 of July 16.

Necessary measures will be taken so that the troops which will occupy the second line may move forward when the order is given.

PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.
Designation of D Day and H Hour

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,576

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 17, 1918.

SUPPLEMENTING OPERATIONS ORDERS No. 200

I. D day is July 18, 1918

II. H hour is 4:35 a.m.

PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.

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4th Div: 204-32.12: Orders

Attack Orders

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2594

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 18, 1918.
[Received: 10:50 p.m.]

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDERS No. 203

The army commander directs that the attack be resumed at 4 a.m., July 19.

PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.

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- 402 -
Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 2,596

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 18, 1918.

[Received - 1 a. m., July 19]

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDERS No. 204

Part I

[Extract]

I. Tomorrow, July 19, at 4 a. m., launching of the infantry attack in continuation of today’s operation.

The first objective to be gained is the objective indicated to the east of NEUILLY-St-FRONT on the map attached to General Order No. 200 of July 17, 1918, except that, since the French VII Army Corps is going to push towards PRIEZ-SOMMELANS with its left, the front to be gained first by the French 47th Infantry Division will be altered so as to extend from the east of RASSY to REMONT-VOISIN.

Final minimum objective: VICHEL-NANTEUIL---TREVILLE---Bois de LATILLY---HILL 180---SOMMELANS (VII Army Corps).

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PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.

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Orders for Continuation of Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff 2,605

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 19, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 206

First Part

[Extract]

I. The French and American troops of the II Army Corps, have reached the first objective indicated by Order No. 2596, July 18.

Prisoners, materiel and guns were captured.
It is important that the success be completed, and to reach the latter minimum objective indicated by the same order, from where attack will start again on July 20.

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PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding

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HS Fr. Files: 427-39.1: Supplement to Order

Designation of H Hour

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,605
FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 19, 1918.

SUPPLEMENT TO GENERAL ORDERS No. 206, July 19, 1918

The general commanding the army announces the hour for the attack as 3:40 a.m., July 20.

PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.

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204-32.7: Order

Occupation of 2d Position by 7th Brigade

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, G. S.
No. 2608
FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 19, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDER

The American 7th Brigade (less 39th Infantry) will occupy the old 1st position from MOSLOY to La LOGE-aux-BOUEIFS, and will continue the work of organization.

The brigade will be in position the morning of July 20.

The General commanding the 7th Brigade will obtain all the information necessary from the General commanding the French 2d Inf. Div. (C. P.: PASSY-en-VALOIS).

The C. P. of the General commanding the 7th Brigade will be established in MAREUIL-sur-OURCQ, by noon.

PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.

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Movement of American 7th Brigade

[Contemporary Translation]

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 21, 1918—2:45 p. m.

The General commanding the French II A. C. confirms the order to put your brigade in the region of the BUISSON de BORNY.

The General commanding the American 7th Brigade and his staff will be placed tomorrow at La FERTE-MILON, where the headquarters of the Fr. II A. C. itself is to placed.

A next order will indicate at what o'clock the headquarters of the American 7th Brigade will have to be placed.

PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.

Disposition of 39th Infantry

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Rosoy-en-Multien, Oise, July 21, 1918—10:50 a. m.

The American 7th Brigade will move its 39th Infantry into the BUISSON de BORNY, where it will bivouac.

[Signature illegible]
7th Brigade Returned to 4th Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2/PC

FRENCH II ARMY CORPS,
Bourneville, Oise, July 22, 1918—4:20 p. m.

NOTE

[Extract]

By order of the general commanding the army, the American 7th Brigade is returned to the control of the General commanding the American 4th Division.

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PHILIPOT,
General, Commanding.

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French VII Army Corps
July 17 - July 27, 1918
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HS Fr. Files: 432-30.1: Order

Movement Orders for Battalion in Corps Reserve

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 6252/3

FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
July 17, 1918.

[Extract]

I. The battalion of the American 8th Brigade in corps reserve will move the night of July 17/18 from MARNOUÉ-les-MOINES to the north part of Chateau de BRUMIER Park.

* * * * *

II. Mission of the Battalion: The battalion in corps reserve is designated to operate behind the left of the French 164th Inf. Div.; direction of advance: CHEZY-en-ORXOIS—172—slopes to the north of ORME SIGNAL Crest—La GRENOUILLERE. Reconnaissance

- 406 -
to be conducted during the afternoon of the 17th by the battalion commander and the company commanders accompanied by Captain DUCHANGE.

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MASSENET,
General, Commanding the VII Corps.

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204-32.7: Order

**Continuation of Attack**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
Chateau de Belleville, near Crouy-sur-Ourcq, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918.

GENERAL ORDER OF OPERATIONS NO. 403

I. SITUATION ON THE FRONT OF THE ARMY CORPS: The 164th Div., supported by the American 8th Brigade, attacked at daybreak, July 18.

With one dash it penetrated the enemy advanced posts, took HAUTEVESNES and COURCHAMPS and captured 22 cannon and 350 prisoners of which 5 were officers.

At the end of the day its front runs to the east of COURCHAMPS, western edge of the Bois SIGNAL-de-l’ORME [Bois de l’ORME 150 meters N. of ORME-Signal], region of the 7 woods [Les Sept-Bois], Ru-d’ALLAND, 800 meters west of MONTMENJON.

II. SITUATIONS OF NEIGHBORING ORGANIZATIONS: To the right, the American I Army Corps is at LICY-CLIGNON---TORCY---BELLEAU.

To the left, the French II Army Corps reached the front: BREUIL---Hill 167---Hill 148---MARIZY-St-MARD.

III. MISSION OF THE ARMY CORPS: Tomorrow, July 19:

(a) The 164th Div. disposing of all the units determined by plan #6251/3 of July 17, and of the American battalion in army corps reserve, will maintain close contact with the enemy in close liaison with the 167th Div. at LICY-CLIGNON and the 47th Div. on the Ru-d’ALLAND.

It will follow up its success so as to occupy at least the whole of the height 184, from MONTHERYS exclusive to SOMMELANS inclusive.

(b) General Zeude, with the units determined by S. O. 6282/3 of July 18, will organize a position of resistance running through the old German organizations east and northeast of HAUTEVESNES Height 172, and the slopes east of CHEVILLON.

(c) The army corps artillery will ensure the counterbarrery work on the entire front of the army corps and of the 47th Div. and to the greatest possible depth, in liaison with the artillery of the American I Army Corps.

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Corps.

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COURCHAMPS-BOIS DE LA FOLIE AREA
Looking east from vicinity of Hautevesnes
Attack Instructions

[Editorial Translation]

C. P. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS, Crouy-sur-Ourcq, Seine-et-Marne, July 19, 1918--9 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 404

[Extract]

I. SITUATION ON THE ARMY CORPS FRONT: Following the operations of the 19th, the French 164th Infantry Division's front passes to the east of PRIEZ through the height of La GRENOUILLERE and Hill 169.

II. ARMY CORPS MISSION: In order to be in a position to continue our attacks and also in view of possible enemy counterattacks:

1. Consideration will be given to the echeloning of troops in depth and the formation of as many reserves as possible.

2. At an early hour on July 20 (H hour which will be determined subsequently), the 164th Infantry Division will prepare to attack in liaison with the 47th Infantry Division, and the 167th Infantry Division, in order to bring its front to the SOMMELANS---La GRENOUILLERE Fme---Bois PETRET line. It will confine itself to the capture of the PETRET Farm and Bois PETRET.

***

General Zeude will continue the organization of the COINTICOURT---Hill 172---HAUTEVESNES position.

MASSENET,
General,
Commanding the VII Army Corps.
Regrouping of American 4th Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, General Staff
No. 212

VII ARMY CORPS,
Crouy-sur-Ourcq, Seine-et-Marne, July 22, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 446

[Extract]

The American 4th Division will continue its training and will at the same time be responsible for the organization and defense of the army's line of resistance between MARIZY-St-MARD and ORME-Signal (inclusive).

II. General Zeude and the elements of his brigade attached to VII Army Corps (Hq. of 73d Territorial Infantry and Hq. and one bn. of 74th Territorial Inf.) are again placed at the disposal of the army.

Per order Chief of Staff.

Attachment of American 4th Division Regiment

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
SPECIAL ORDER
No. 447

VII ARMY CORPS,
July 24, 1918.

By order of the General commanding the army [French Sixth Army]

I. One regiment (47th) from the American 4th Division will be placed immediately at the disposal of the General commanding the French VII Corps.

Point of first destination: BONNES.

II. Mission: Hold against every hostile counterattack the east edges of the Bois du CHATELET (east of the SOISSONS--CHATEAU-THIERRY Road), especially the peak northeast, facing Hill 200 (one kilometer east of COINCY). Mop up the wood which may still be occupied by a few enemy units.

III. The regiment is directly under orders from the General commanding the VII Corps.

P. C. of the colonel: GENEVROY Farm.

IV. The Lt. colonel commanding the corps engineers will put himself at the disposal
of the colonel commanding the American regiment in order to furnish him, if necessary, the material and technical instructions relative to the execution of his mission.

V. The American regiment will be at BONNES at nightfall, and will reach Bois du CHATELET during the night.

Reconnaissances by the colonel and battalion commanders on the afternoon of July 24. On arriving at BONNES, the colonel commanding the American regiment will obtain instruction from the general commanding the army corps.

MASSENET,
General Commanding.

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HS Fr. Files: 432-30.1: Order

Withdrawal of VII Army Corps

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, G. S.
GENERAL ORDER
No. 414

FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
July 26, 1918.

[Extract]

Headquarters of the VII Army Corps will be withdrawn from the front at noon, July 27, and will be stationed in reserve for army at CROUY-sur-OURCQ (chateau of BELLEVUE - 500 meters southeast of CROUY and on the CROUY-COULOMBS Road).

A. 52d Inf. Div.: After it has been passed by the 42d Division on the night of July 26/27, the 52d Division passes to the command of the II A. C. (P. C. LATILLY).

The General commanding the VII A. C. will arrange with the II A. C. and the American I A. C. for the later transfer of this artillery to the II A. C.

B. VII Corps Troops: The VII Corps troops (less the signal company which will follow the headquarters) will be continued in their present duty (territorial infantry regiments, cavalry, engineers, air service, Q. M. C., medical corps, trains). Later orders will fix their withdrawal.

MASSENET,
General Commanding.

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Withdrawal of VII Army Corps

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, G. S.                          FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
No. 6361/3                                July 26, 1918.

CORRECTION TO GENERAL ORDERS NO. 414 OF JULY 26, 1918

Since the movement of the American 42d Division cannot be carried out on the night of
July 26/27, the troops of the 52d and 164th Divisions will remain in their present sector
until relieved or passed by the 42d Division.

The General commanding the 164th Division will retain his command until completely
relieved by the Americans.

MASSENET,
General Commanding.

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American Brigade in Line

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, Staff                          FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
No. 6365/3                                July 27, 1918.

MEMORANDUM

A brigade* of the American 42d Infantry Division will relieve the troops now in line
of the 164th and 52d Inf. Divs. from the FOUR-a-VERRE (exclusive) to the boundary to be
created between the American II Army Corps and the American I Army Corps.

After this relief, the American brigade will have two battalions in the first line.
The details of the relief will be regulated by the Commanding General of the VII Army
Corps (P. C. at BONNES), to whom the American 42d Division will immediately send officers
to get instructions. The relief will take place during the day of July 27, except for a
few elements which will be relieved during the night of the 27/28.

MASSENET,
General Commanding.

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* 83d Inf. Brig.
Withdrawal of VII Army Corps

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Bureau, G. S. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
No. 6367/3 July 27, 1918.

SECOND CORRECTION TO GENERAL ORDER NO. 414 of July 26, 1918

General Order No. 414 of July 26, is modified as follows:

[Extract]

1. The General commanding the VII A. C. will retain his present command until 8 a. m.,
July 28.

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MASSENET,
General Commanding.

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 Withdrawal of VII Army Corps

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, G. S. FRENCH VII ARMY CORPS,
No. 6372/3 July 27, 1918--9:40 p. m.

CONTINUATION TO G. O. 414, of July 26, 1918

As a result of our advance in the direction of the OURCQ on July 27, the transfer of
command provided by order from army in the second correction No. 6367/3, this date, took
place at 9 p. m., July 27.

MASSENET,
General Commanding.

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VINLY--St-GENGOULPH AREA
Looking north-northeast from Vinly
American I Army Corps
July 17 - August 6, 1918

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181-32.1: Orders

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 9

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000
       Ste-AULDE  )  1:20,000
       CHATEAU-THIERRY )

[Extract]

• • • • •

2. (a) ACTION OF I ARMY CORPS: The I Army Corps will attack on the line Bois-en-
CROISSANT (west edge) to BOURESCHES (exclusive) in direction MARIGNY-MONTHIERS. The
exploitation will be conducted by a general advance on the entire corps front in direction
BOURESCHES-EPIEDS.

(b) ZONE OF ACTION OF I ARMY CORPS: • • • Left (northern) limit: Bois-en-
CROISSANT (west edge)---Bois-TOUFFU (inclusive)---LICY Farm (exclusive)---MONTHIERS
(inclusive)---EPAUX-BEZU (inclusive)---BEZU-St-GERMAIN.

Right (southern) limit: VAUX (R. R. bridge)---VINCELLES (exclusive)---Les
CHESNEAUX (exclusive).

(c) OBJECTIVES OF I ARMY CORPS:
    Intermediate objective: The enemy outposts (brown line).
    1st Objective: Woods S. E. of HAUTEVESNES, TORCY, BELLEAU (Green line).
    Ultimate objective: To be ordered later.

(d) INITIAL DISPOSITION FOR THE ATTACK: The attack will be made by the French
167th Division and the left brigade of the American 26th Division. All troops will be in
position before daylight on J day. Parallel of departure will be the present outpost line.

(e) EXECUTION OF ATTACK:
    The attack will begin on J day at H hour.
    At H hour the outpost positions of the enemy will be rushed by surprise to the
intermediate objective (brown line).

On the left (from BUSSIARES westward) the advance of the 167th Division will be
made in liaison with the French VII A. C., without necessarily stopping on the brown line.

At H hour the artillery action will begin.

At H hour plus 1 hour 30 minutes the attack will move forward from the brown line
to the 1st objective (green line).

The attack for exploitation (from the green line) will be ordered later by the
Commanding General, I Army Corps.

As the attack of the outpost positions is to be made by surprise, no special fire
will be permitted before H hour; the normal appearance of the sectors will be carefully
preserved and at all costs the enemy will be prevented from taking prisoners.
3. (a) LIMIT BETWEEN 167th DIVISION and 26th DIVISION: TORCY (to 26th Div.)---GIVRY (to 26th Div.)---Les BRUSSES Farm (to 26th Div.)---St-ROBERT Farm (to 26th Div.).
(b) The 3d Battery, French 181st Regt. of Artillery (220-mm.), now in sector of 26th Division is assigned to the 26th Division for this operation.
(c) The following units will be under the orders of the Chief of Artillery, I Army Corps.
   Artillery: The corps artillery as at present, viz.
   
   1 battalion 155's short (3 batteries).
   2 battalions 155's long (3 batteries each).
   2 battalions 155's long G. P. F. (2 batteries each).

   The corps artillery plan will be submitted promptly by the chief of artillery.
(d) CORPS RESERVE: One battalion, 26th Division will be held as corps reserve under cover of woods north of ISSONGE Farm, where it will be placed before daylight on J day.

4. AIR SERVICE: * * *
   The air service plan will be submitted by the chief air service after consultation with Chief Air Service, French Sixth Army.

5. LIAISON:
(a) Axes of Liaison:
   I Army Corps: La FERTE---GENEVROIS Farm---PARIS Farm---MONTGIVRAULT---BELLEAU---ETREPILLY---La PENONERIE Farm.
   167th Division: DHUISY---MARIGNY---BUSSIARES---MONTIERS---La LOGE Farm---BEZU-ST-GERMAIN.
   26th Division: Same as the I Army Corps.
(b) The 167th Division will ensure liaison with the right division, VII A. C. and mutually with the 26th Division, by means of special liaison detachments.
(c) Command posts will be located as follows:
   (1) I A. C. La FERTE
   (2) 167th Division DHUISY
   (3) 26th Division GENEVROIS Farm

* * * * *

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.
Air Support

AIR SERVICE, I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918---10:30 p. m.

From: Chief of Air Service, I Army Corps
To: Commanding General, I Army Corps (G-3)
Subject: Air Service Plans with Reference to Field Orders No. 9

1. Distribution Air Service:
   (a) 88th Aero Squadron---167th Division
   (b) 12th Aero Squadron---26th Division
   (c) 1st Aero Squadron---Corps Artillery and Corps Command
   (d) 2d Balloon Company---Corps artillery and divisional artillery, 26th Division.

2. Employment:
   (a) The 88th Aero Squadron will furnish an infantry liaison plane for the 167th Division, continuously, from zero hour, plus thirty minutes.
   (b) The 12th Aero Squadron will furnish an infantry liaison plane for the 26th Division, infantry continuously, from zero hour, plus thirty minutes. The 12th Aero Squadron will also furnish an artillery surveillance plane, for the division artillery from zero hour.
   (c) The 1st Aero Squadron will furnish two artillery surveillance planes for the corps artillery from zero hour.
   (d) The 2d Balloon Company will furnish artillery surveillance for the corps artillery and the divisional artillery of the 26th Division, from zero hour.

3. The I Corps Observation Group will be on the alert from 4 a. m. of the J day until further orders.

4. Communication: Communication is established between the C. A. S. [Chief of Air Service], the observation group and 2d Balloon Co. by the following means:
   (a) Radio
   (b) Telephone
   (c) Motorcycle
   (d) Aeroplane

   Liaison will be established between the C. A. S., I Corps and the Chef d'Aeronautique of the army corps to its right and left, by motorcycle messenger and aeroplane. Liaison will be established between the C. A. S., I Corps and the Chef d'Aeronautique of the Sixth Army by telephone and motorcycle messenger.

L. H. BRERETON,
Major, Air Service.

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- 417 -
J Day and H Hour

80/G-3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 17, 1918.

From: Commanding General, I Army Corps

To: Commanding General, 26th Division

[Extract]

1. J Day is July 18.
2. H hour is 4:35 o'clock.

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By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Flr. 63: Message

All Objectives Taken

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

July 18, 1918.


We have all our objectives and are advancing. COURCHAMPS has fallen and we have TORCY, GIVRY, and BELLEAU. These have fallen and we are advancing, guiding on our left units. Everything lovely.

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181-60.11: Order

Artillery Command

OPERATIONS ORDER

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,

No. 12

July 18, 1918.

Confirmation of telephone messages
sent at 9:30 a. m.

1. The Group Chavannes is placed under command of Colonel Sery, 167th D. A. C. [Divisional Artillery Commander]; also the ammunition train (18 trucks) of the Groups
Chavannes (III/333) and Maillard (VIII/121). The Groupment Bourboulon will assist the 167th Division and cover with its guns the left flank of the division.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A. N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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181-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 19, 1918.

No. 15

8 p. m., July 17 to 8 p. m., July 18, 1918

PART I

[Extract]

* * * * * *

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: The line now from E. to W. follows the original line to BOURESCHES—thence to the station of BOURESCHES and northward along the edge of the wood to GIVRY—400 meters N. of TORCY—through LICY-CLIGNON—N. of COURCHAMPS to the ORME-Signal.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: The order of battle is confirmed by the capture of 103 prisoners belonging to the 4th Ersatz Division and 87th Division. The eastern boundary of the 345th Regimental sector is approximately at BASCON-le-BAS Farm, and the western boundary from the crossroads W. of the BOURESCHES station northeasterly along the road. The western boundary of the 3d Res. Erz. Regt. is E. of BELLEAU and S. E. of GIVRY, and that of the 347th Regt. in the vicinity of TORCY.

* * * * * *

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 63: Telegram

**I Corps Reports its Success**

**LAREDO [I CORPS, A. E. F.],
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918—9:55 p. m.**

Attention G-3, No. 830. Attack by Tenth and Sixth Armies started 4:35 a. m., July 18. First objective Sixth Army NEUILLY-St-FRONT, hill north of BREUIL, COINTICOURT, Hill 172, HAUTEVESNES, woods southeast of HAUTEVESNES and TORCY, BELLEAU. I Corps attack made by French 167th Div. and 52d Brigade, American 26th Div. First objective woods southeast HAUTEVESNES, TORCY, BELLEAU. Reports received follow: 5:32 a. m., attack begun; artillery reaction feeble, 5:37, TORCY taken with little trouble. 6:47 French have taken BUSSIARES and HAUTEVESNES. German artillery active. 8:40 a. m., BELLEAU taken; 8:50 a. m., COURCHAMPS taken. Report from Sixth Army 10:55 a. m. line runs BELLEAU---TORCY---LICY-CLIGNON---COURCHAMPS---MONTMENJON. North boundary 26th Div. zone: TORCY---GIVRY---Les BRUSSES Farm, inclusive. Advance progressing. Axis of advance BELLEAU---ETREPILLY---BEZUET.

LIGGETT.

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G-3, GHQ, AEF: Fldr. 295: Telegram

**Request for Supply Train**

**LAREDO 18 [I CORPS],
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918---10:35 p. m.**

Adjutant General, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

One G No. 2711. Request a supply train for the I Corps be sent at once from any available source. Due to the delay in the arrival of the corps artillery park trucks, all transportation of corps troops together with help from Army Park B and A, draft of Jane [26th Div.] is being used night and day in maintaining ammunition supply. Trucks are needed by corps troops and I must have transportation to transport engineer road and bridge details in order to follow up our successes and to insure supply routes. Request immediate action as the date of arrival of the supply train assigned the corps is indefinite. Please advise by return wire.

LIGGETT.

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Resumption of Attack

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918—10:40 p. m.

Map: MEAUX 1:80,000

1. The Sixth Army has driven the enemy to the line NOROY—ORME-Signal—east of COURCHAMPS—east of LICY-CLIGNON—TORCY and BELLEAU—BOURESCHES.
2. The exploitation will continue as ordered, particular attention being paid to regulating the advance of each unit by the progress of the unit on its left.
3. The attack will begin tomorrow, July 19, 1918, at an hour H which will be communicated later.
4. As the enemy may retire to position in rear under cover of the night, if contact is lost at any time it must be immediately regained by vigorous pushing forward of patrols.
5. The night will be utilized to put the units in order, reconstitute the reserves, organize the captured ground, prepare to repulse any counterattack and be ready to take the offensive vigorously when ordered.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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Plan of Employment of Artillery

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

MISSIONS:
1. The front of attack is divided into two sectors as shown on accompanying calque [overlay] [not printed]; the south sector is assigned to American 26th Division, the north sector to French 167th Div. The corps artillery is divided into two groupings, north and south, which will support the corresponding divisional artillery. The northern sector extends from LICY-CLIGNON to BELLEAU; southern, from BELLEAU to VAUX: The advance is from west to east.

* * * * *

ADVANCE OF CORPS ARTILLERY TO NEW POSITIONS
4. When the attack has sufficiently progressed, the corps artillery commander may order the advance to the vicinity of line LICY-CLIGNON—BELLEAU—BOURESCHES—VAUX.
This advance will be carried out by echelon in each group, the methods of advance to be prescribed by the heavy artillery commander. The axis of fire is practically to the east.

* * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A. N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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181-32.1: Order

Organization of Front

FIELD ORDERS
No. 13
103/G3

La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 19, 1918—10 p. m.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. In order to prepare for continuation of our attacks tomorrow morning, and also to provide against possible counterattacks by the enemy.

(a) Distribution of troops in depth will be emphasized and reserves, as strong as possible, will be established.

(b) All preparation will be made to attack tomorrow at a very early hour (the hour H, which will be ordered later). * * *

(c) Work will be commenced immediately on a line of resistance covering our artillery. This position on our left will be on line MONTMENJON—ORME-Signal and Hill 153 (west of LICY Farm).

3. This position will be connected to our previous 1st position on the line Hill 153 (west of LICY Farm)—BUSSIARES—thence along old outpost position to a point 1 km. south-west of TORCY—thence leaving the old outpost line to connect with the old line of resistance 1 km. north northwest of LUCY-Ie-BOCAGE.

4. Limits between divisional sectors: GIVRY (to 26th Div.)—TORCY (to 26th Div.)—Hill 126—and thence following the old sector boundary.

5. Company B, 30th Engineers, is assigned to the 26th Division and Company D, 30th Engineers, is assigned to the 167th Division to assist in preparing these defenses. Orders of the divisional commanders will be sent to these troops at La LOGE Farm. The corps engineer will supply entrenching equipment.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-32.1: Order

**H Hour**

FIELD ORDER  
No. 14  
104/G3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,  
*La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 19, 1918.*

1. Tomorrow, July 20, 1918, H hour will be at 3:40 o'clock.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,  
Chief of Staff.

181-60.32: Order

**Preparation for Forward Displacement**

OPERATIONS ORDER  
No. 14  
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,  
*La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 19, 1918--12 noon.*

[Extract]

1. The H. A. C. will cause reconnaissance to be made immediately preparatory to movement of the guns of corps artillery farther to the front so as to face them, to meet the requirements of the new delimitations of the corps sector.

   The new delimitations of the sector from our front line toward the enemy are marked approximately by the east and west lines 260 and 266 of the *Kilometrique Quadrillage*. The axis of fire is thus due east.

2. Two hypotheses will be considered:

   First: That our front line is marked by VAUX---BOURESCHES---GIVRY---MONTHERS.

   Second: That our front line is marked by VAUX---ETREPILLY---EPAUX.

   * * * * * *

5. The areas suggested for study are: For the north grouping, roughly indicated by Bois-en-HACHE---Bois SENDRAL---VILLERS-le-VASLE---Les GRANGES Fme; those for the south grouping, by MARIGNY---COUPRU---Bois de BEZU.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,  
Lt. Col. F. A. N. A.,  
Chief of Staff.
I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: The offensive against MONTIERS and Hill 193 continued during the day. Enemy machine guns in woods S. of PETRET Farm, in the outskirts of MONTIERS and the Bois de GIVRY on Hill 193, hindered the advance of our infantry. Hostile artillery activity was feeble. Circulation very active in the rear areas.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: On right sector no change. From the northern outskirts of GIVRY to the southern and western edge of the Bois de GIVRY, to the southwestern outskirts of MONTIERS, to the BRISE Mill.

III. ENEMY ORDER OF BATTLE: Confirmation of order of battle by capture of 6 prisoners, as follows:

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>3 Erz.</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Erz.</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is significant that these 4 battalions were all in the first line on July 18.

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY: Activity from heavy and light machine guns from the lines N. W. of BOURESCHES from the edges of the Bois de GIVRY, the Bois PETRET and especially from the BRISE Mill. No hostile counterattacks.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY: Hostile artillery reaction feeble and less heavy than on preceding days. This may be normally accounted for by the apparent disorganization of the enemy and consequent battery movements. During the night there was intermittent shelling of our front line positions. Concentration of gas on BOURESCHES, S. of BOURESCHES, S. of BELLEAU, BELLEAU, TORCY, and the mill at BUSSIARES. During the day, harassing fire on the rear areas. At 15:30 h., enemy barrage between MONTIERS and the Moulin de BRISE. Owing to conditions it is impossible to approximate the number of shells. Following batteries seen in action: 6586, 9218, 2814, 0578, 0675, 0774, 0982, 3607, 3707, 2558.

VI. ENEMY MOVEMENTS: At 10 h., a steady stream of infantry and artillery was seen moving E. out of BONNES. Circulation was continually active on the BONNES-BUIRES Road. Numerous convoys and bodies of about 50 men from S. of BONNES followed the dirt road leading to the Bois des VALLEES, thence along the N. edge of the woods toward Le TARTRE. At 1:12 p. m., 500 or 600 men spread out over the fields between HALLOUDRAY Farm and SOMMELEANS were moving in a S. W. direction. At 1:40 p. m., 500 men in skirmish line were leaving Les BRUSSES Farm in a S. W. direction. At 1:47 p. m., 400 men from Bois BONNES, closely followed by 200 more, toward HALLOUDRAY Farm. Circulation remains active in the ravines S. of the Bois de BONNES.

VII. ENEMY WORKS: Prisoner of 360th Regt., 4th Erz. Div. states that a trench running east-west was being built recently 50 meters S. W. of the bridge at the western outskirts of MONTIERS on the road from MONTIERS to the BRISE Mill.
VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS: Hostile aerial activity decreased. Owing to the activity of our own aeroplanes, that of the enemy was restricted to patrolling his own lines.

Balloons: Enemy balloons have apparently been frequently shifted. 7 balloons were up during the day. Balloons were located at BEUVARDES, COURPOIL, Les VALLEES, CHANTE-MERLE, LATILLY, GRAND-MENIL, and WADON. At 4:45 a.m., a German balloon was burning either at LATILLY or WADON; at 5:45 a.m., Le CHARME balloon burning.

X. ACTIVITY OF OUR OWN TROOPS: The division on our left was engaged by the attack on MONTHIERS; otherwise our troops continued consolidating our positions. Our artillery was active.

Aggressive patrolling by our pursuit planes; liaison work with infantry and regulation of our artillery fire, reconnaissance and photographic missions by our corps planes.

* * * * *

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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181-32.1: Order

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS 1 ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
No. 15
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 20, 1918—11:20 a.m.
106/G3

Map: MEAUX 1:80,000

1. (a) General Situation: The Sixth Army is pushing its advance. Has taken line MONT-CHEVILLON—RESSONS—Bois de LATILLY—SOMMELANS—Hill 184 and has reached the western edge Bois PETRET. The Ninth Army on the right has attacked this morning and is driving the enemy back to and across the MARNE.

2. (a) In conjunction with the French VII Corps, the American I Corps will attack today at 3 p.m.

(b) Objectives: 1st Objective: MONTHIERS (inclusive)—Hill 193—Les BRUSSES Farm—Hill 190—La GONETRIE Farm—Hill 201—Point 192.

2d Objective: EPAUX-BEZU (inclusive)—St-ROBERT Farm—SOUILLARD Farm—Hill 226—VINCLES (exclusive).

(c) The attack will be pushed on from the 1st objective without further orders in conjunction with the French VII Corps and with the French XXXVIII Corps which will attack this afternoon.

(d) Zone of Action I Corps: Northern limit: Unchanged.

Southern limit: VAUX—BLANCHARD Farm—Point 190 at FARSOY Farm—Chateau north of VERDILLY.
(e) Limit between divisions: GIVRY (to 26th Div.)—woods 1/2 km. north of Les BRUSSES Farm (all to 26th Div.)—Point 128 (1 km. east of Les BRUSSES Farm)—St-ROBERT Farm—La PENONERIE Farm.

3. (a) The 167th Div. will take MONTHIERS and Hill 193.
   The 26th Div. will take woods 1/2 km. north of Les BRUSSES, Les BRUSSES Farm and woods, Hill 190, La GONETRIE Farm and Hill 201.
   (b) The attack will be made simultaneously at 3 p.m. on the entire front of attack.
   (c) Artillery preparation will begin at 1:30 p.m.


By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-32.1: Order

Corps Reserve

FIELD ORDERS
No. 16
110/G3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, July 20, 1918—1:15 p.m.

Map: MEAUX 1:80,000

[Extract]

1. Companies B and C, 27th Engineers, now at SAACY-sur-MARNE are assigned to the corps reserve.
   2. The entire corps reserve will be held in readiness to march at 3 p.m. today.
   The assembly must be under cover of woods so as to escape hostile observation. No movements of units before 3 p.m.
   3. At 3 p.m. all units of the corps reserve will march to vicinity of MAISON-BLANCHE [not identified] and be placed under cover. P. C. La Ferne de PARIS.

   * * * * *

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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- 426 -
Cos. B and D, 30th Engineers are relieved from duty with the 26th and Fr. 167th Divisions and are placed at the disposal of the corps engineer.

The portion of the corps artillery heretofore with Groupment Charlier (4 bns. 146th and 148th F. A.), are placed at the disposal of the chief of corps artillery who will issue orders for their employment.

181-32.1: Order

**Continuation of Advance**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 17
116/G-3

MAPS: SOISSONS MEAUX 1:80,000

I. The enemy is being pushed back all along the front.
The advance of the Sixth Army will continue this evening and tonight, being maintained energetically.

II. Each division, without waiting for its neighbors if they should be delayed, will push forward at all cost to place the main body of the army along the line of the railroad NANTEUIL--CHATEAU-THIERRY.

III. Each division commanders will throw out one regiment of infantry (without artillery) as advance guard and, on reaching the line of the railroad, will form march outposts as follows:
(a) The French 39th Division on the right of the I Corps, A. E. F. at VERDILLY.
(b) The 26th Division at TRUGNY.
(c) The French 167th Division at EPIEDS.
(d) The French 164th Division on the left of the I Corps, A. E. F. at COURPOIL.

IV. The advance will be resumed tomorrow morning, July 21, at daylight in a direction and under conditions which will be announced in subsequent orders.
V. Separate orders will issue to cover movement of corps artillery.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

- 427 -
Artillery Support

OPERATIONS ORDER
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 20, 1918—1 p. m.

[Extract]

1. In pursuance with Field Orders No. 15, Hq. I Army Corps, the corps artillery will support an attack this afternoon. The attack begins at 3 p. m.

2. The mission of the corps artillery is: (1) To counterbattery any hostile guns signalled in action by aeroplanes, or discovered by other means. (2) To put fire with interdiction on area bounded by EPAUX-BEZU—La SACERIE Fme—BETHUNE—CHATEAU-THIERRY Road [Route Nationale 37] from BEZUET to X line 66 and thence back to EPAUX-BEZU. H. A. C. will arrange the interdiction so that while the greatest possible number of guns are bearing on this area, there will still be reserved guns available for counterbattery work. Immediate liaison will be established with the corps observation squadron.

   The advanced G. P. F. guns will be prepared to fire on BEZU-St-GERMAIN, BEZUET, VERDILLY, and the northern outskirts of CHATEAU-THIERRY.

3. The artillery preparation will begin at 1:30 p. m. and will continue at slow rate until 3 p. m. when rapid rate of fire will be taken.

* * * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A. N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

Forward Displacement of Corps Artillery

OPERATIONS ORDER
HEAVY ARTILLERY, I CORPS, A. E. F.
Chateau l'Ange-Gardien, July 20, 1918.

1. The corps artillery will move forward to conform to the movements of the remainder of the corps to advanced positions.

2. The line of positions tentatively designated is marked by BUSSIARES, BEUJEAU [BELLEAU?], BOURESCHES and VAUX.

3. The groups of corps artillery will be removed immediately from their positions, and put on the road.

4. Rendezvous positions as objectives for the first march are indicated as follows:
   I/146, vicinity of MARIGNY, moving by the PARIS Road, and by the road leaving the PARIS Road one kilometer east of MONTREUIL to MARIGNY.

5. III/146 to the vicinity of COUPRU.

6. The 1st and 2d Battalions of the 148th by the road already designated to the vicinity of BEZU-le-GUERY.
7. I/333 and the I/334 will retain their present positions until further orders.
8. It is quite probable that the rendezvous positions will be the positions to be occupied, and these positions will be reconnoitered so that the batteries, if necessary, can occupy them on arrival. The axis of fire will be on EPIEDS.
9. The forward guns of I/146 and III/146 will remain in their present positions.
10. Trucks will be loaded with ammunition and telephone wire carried.

By order of Colonel Scott:

JOHN S. WINSLOW,
Captain, Field Artillery,
Acting Adjutant.

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181-60.32: Order

Forward Displacement

OPERATIONS ORDER
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The I Corps will continue its advance tonight and tomorrow morning, and occupy the line EPIEDS-TRUGNY east of the railroad between NANTEUIL-CHATEAU-THIERRY.

3. All arrangements will be completed tonight for an advance at dawn if so ordered, to the general line BUSSIARES-BELLEAU-BOURESCHES-VAUX. In this event, movement will proceed as follows: I/146, MARIGNY to BUSSIARES. III/146, COUPRU-LUCY-le-BOCAGE to BOURESCHES. I/148 and II/148, DOMPTIN via [Les AULNOIS] BONTEMPS-La NOUETTE Fme-BOURBELIN to VAUX.

4. The French I/334 and I/333, no change at present.

5. Corps dump on being moved forward will be located at crossroads eight hundred meters southwest of MARIGNY at point 03.04.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A. N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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- 429 -
Activities 3d Division

LAREDO [AMERICAN I CORPS],
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 20, 1918---14 o'clock.

Memo for A. C. of S. G-3

[Extract]

1. Following is line at 14 o'clock today: (north to south) VAUXBUIN---VIGNOLLES---east of SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY Road to HARTENNES-et-TAUX---PLESSIER-HULEU (incl.)---OULCHY-le-VILLE---WADON---LATILLY---east of SOMMELANS---La REMISE---just west of MONTHIERS---Les BRUSSES Fme---BOURESCHES---VAUX. East of the 3d Division, an attack has been in progress since this morning. The 55th Brigade is holding second line and not in the attack which is proceeding without serious resistance but without much enthusiasm so far as I can see. The 3d Division Artillery was asked at 10:55 o'clock to cease firing on Mon MAISON-ROUGE (north of CONDE) and to get ready to fire on REUILLY when directed.

2. The Headquarters 28th Div. has moved to FORT de-la-VILLE in the south part of the 3d Div. area. The situation of the 3d Div. is, from west to east, 4th Inf., 7th Inf., 2 bns. 111th Inf., 38th Inf. with 30th in division reserve and the 112th Inf. (28th Div.) in Fr. XXXVIII Corps Reserve.

3. An attack is projected for this afternoon to be undertaken from the west and southeast on Hill 204 and CHATEAU-THIERRY. The 52d Brig. (26th Div.) will attack from near VAUX and one or more divisions of the XXXVIII Corps will cross the MARNE in front of CHATEAU-THIERRY and push northwest. The 3d Division (4th Inf.) may get across also but this is not certain. Grant* is coordinating the action of the 52d Brig. with the XXXVIII Corps and should have a fine line on the attack.

* * * * *

PARKER HITT,
Lt. Col., S. C.

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226-32.11: Memorandum

Allied Advance

1 ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 20, 1918---3:20 p. m.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied armies orders that the following information be conveyed immediately to our attacking troops:

The Allied forces attacking on the front between REIMS and CHATEAU-THIERRY have driven the enemy back to the MARNE between OEUILLY and TROISSY and farther to the north toward

* Probably Lieut. Colonel Walter S. Grant, General Staff. On July 22, I Corps detailed Colonel Grant as a liaison agent with the 26th Div. (Memorandum 124/G-3, I Corps).
REIMS they have driven him back to the front: COURMAS—La NEUVILLE-aux-LARRIS. Many enemy convoys are seen retreating to the north.

H. LIGGETT,
Major General,
Comdg.

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181-32.1: Order

**Continuation of Advance**

FIELD ORDERS

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, July 20, 1918—11:30 p. m.

No. 18

110/G-3

MAPS: SOISSONS ) 1:80,000
     MEAUX )

1. The advance will continue at dawn and the pursuit of the enemy will be pressed with the utmost vigor.

2. **ZONE OF ACTION OF I ARMY CORPS**
   Northern Limit: VEUILLY-la-POTERIE—BUSSIARES—LICY-CLIGNON—MONTHIERS (all the above places to the French VII A. C.)—Le TARTRE (to I A. C.)—L’HERMITAGE (800 meters north of AUTRECOURT)---Point 217---BEUVARDELLE, north edge of Forêt de l’ERRE 1500 meters north of Point 206.
   Southern Limit: VAUX---BLANCHARD Farm---chateau north of VERDILLY---Point 700 meters north of La CENSE-a-DIEU---Point 1,000 meters S. E. of La CROIX-ROUGE Farm.
   Limit between divisions: GIVRY (to 26th Div.)---St-ROBERT Farm (to 26th Div.)---BEZU-les-FEVES Farm---COURPOIL (to 167th Div.)---Hill 211.

3. **AXES OF LIAISON:**
   26th Division: Same as I Corps.

167th Division: MARIGNY---TORCY---MONTHIERS (south edge)---EPAUX-BEZU---BEZU-St-GERMAIN---thence following corps axis of liaison.

4. Command posts will be located at 5 a. m. as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I Corps</td>
<td>MONTREUIL-aux-LIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French 167th Division</td>
<td>MARIGNY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Division</td>
<td>LUCY-le-BOCAGE</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5. Part 2 will follow.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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- 431 -
**Pursuit to Continue**

**FIELD ORDERS**

No. 19

119/G-3

MAPS  SOISSONS  ) 1:80,000

MEAUX  )

[Extract]

* * * * *

(c) ACTION OF NEIGHBORING CORPS: The French VII and XXXVIII Corps will continue to advance alongside of us. They will protect our flanks. Every one will push straight ahead.

(d) ACTION OF CAVALRY: A cavalry division, following in rear of the VII Corps, will, at the proper time, pass through to the front in the direction CIERGES, COULONGES, COURVILLE, to intercept and disorganize the enemy’s communications.

2. (a) ACTION OF I ARMY CORPS: The action will continue tonight without cessation, by the 26th and 167th Divisions abreast, in their respective sectors.

On account of the narrowness of the corps’ zone of action, the advance at daylight will be made by the 26th Division, covering the entire corps front. The 167th Division at daylight will stand fast until the portion of the 26th Division assigned to take up the advance in the 167th Division sector, has, with its reserves and divisional artillery, passed through the 167th Division.

When this has been accomplished, the 167th Division will follow the 26th Division in the second line at 3 km. distance, taking great care to avoid interference with the movement of the rear elements of the 26th Division, and the replenishment of ammunition supply.

(b) ZONE OF ACTION OF I A. C.: Unchanged within the limits heretofore prescribed. Beyond those limits, the axis of advance will be in the direction of FRESNES.

3. (a) The 26th Division will attack at daylight.

(b) The guns assigned to accompany the attacking infantry will consist of 75’s only, amply supplied with ammunition.

(c) The 167th Division will place one regiment of infantry at the disposition of the corps commander as corps reserve. The corps reserve will follow the remainder of the 167th Division at 2 km.

4. (a) * * * By daylight, all trains, other than combat trains, must be west of the Road EPIEDS-TRUGNY.

* * * * *

(d) POSTS OF COMMAND: Beginning at 12 noon.

I A. C.  EPAUX-BEUZU
MEMORANDUM FOR: 26th Division
           167th Division
Chief of Artillery, I Army Corps

1. The Sixth Army is marching on FISMES. The march of the I Army Corps will be
continued and pushed to the limit in the direction indicated on map herewith, and in zone
indicated. The great road from Jaulgonne by way of Le Charmel to Fere-en-Tardenois to be
reached at the earliest possible moment by the front of the corps and advance guards
pushed to the line Fresnes, northeast end of Forêt de Fere.

2. When the front of the advance is sufficiently narrowed, the advance being a
converging one, the 167th Division will march in rear of the 26th Division. Next on the
left of the 26th Division will come the right of the II Army Corps---the VII Army Corps
consisting of one division and one brigade to follow the II Army Corps. On the right of
the 26th Division the 39th Division will march, liaison to be maintained on both flanks,
if practicable but not at expense of speed. Upon the advance guards reaching the general
line Fresnes---La Folie---Villeneuve---Bruyeres, a cavalry division will be launched to
the front with the object of cutting roads leading northwest from the Chatillon-sur-Marne
region.

3. So much depends upon pressing this movement that every human effort must be made
to accomplish it as quickly as possible.

H. LIGGETT,
Major General, U. S. A.
Contact with a Retreating Enemy Lost

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Montreuil-aux-Lions, Aisne, July 21, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CORPS COMMANDER:

[Extract]

1. It is my duty to invite your attention to the fact that the headquarters of the 26th Division was changed from GENEVROIS Farm to MERY in violation at least of the spirit of your expressed wishes to the division commander.

2. The orders issued by you to establish an advanced post of command at GENEVROIS Farm on July 20 were in no way complied with by the 26th Division.

5. The advance of this corps has been stopped and contact lost with the retreating enemy due to a positive failure to comply with deliberate orders to push the advance by units regardless of neighboring units and at all costs.

7. It is not unreasonable to state that the failure of the 26th Division Headquarters to drive forward to the limit of endurance of every man and animal in that division has enabled the enemy to get away with guns and supplies intact, and to that extent has had a strong bearing on the nullification of the favorable opportunity presented to deliver a blow which would certainly have had a far reaching effect in connection with the settlement of the present strife.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Organization of Corps Artillery

OPERATIONS ORDER
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Montreuil-aux-Lions, Aisne, July 21, 1918.

1. The corps artillery is organized in three groupings, to take effect at once:
   1st Grouping (Bourboulon)---1/334, 1/333, 1/148
   2d Grouping (Patch)---II/146, III/146
   3d Grouping (Cavender)---I/148, II/148, III/148

2. The groupings will remain in localities for the present as follows: The 1st Grouping in the general vicinity of MARIGNY. The 2d Grouping in the general vicinity of
COUPRU. The 3d Grouping in the general vicinity of BEZU. Guns already emplaced will remain emplaced in position. Positions in the immediate neighborhood of the rendezvous will be selected for those not emplaced.

3. Reconnaissances will be undertaken at once with a view to selecting positions for the 1st Grouping to cover the advance of the 167th Division (positions to be in the general neighborhood of MONTIERS); the 2d Grouping, to cover the advance of the 26th Division, general neighborhood, BOURESCHES); the 3d Grouping, held at the disposal of the heavy artillery commander (in the general neighborhood of Bois de la COTE 192—one kilometer northwest of VAUX). All preparations will be made to occupy these positions immediately in case the front becomes established. If our troops continue to advance, the heavy artillery commander will cause reconnaissances to be conducted along the axis of advance for each division, so as to be ready to move guns forward and take positions quickly.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

H. WORTHINGTON,
2d Lt. F. A. U. S. R.,
Operations Officer.

181-32.1: Order

Attacks of Penetration

FIELD ORDERS

No. 20
122/G3

CORRECTED COPY

[Extract]

1. The enemy is continuing to withdraw his forces to the north and, to avoid having this withdrawal changed into a rout, is offering a strong resistance on the entire army front. This resistance consists of many machine guns, some artillery and little infantry. The breaking of this shell of resistance which covers his retreating forces will offer an opportunity for exploitation of the most decisive character.

2. Tomorrow morning, July 23, 1918, at 3:55 a. m., there will be executed on the entire front of the Sixth Army, a number of powerful attacks of penetration, one for each division, each on about one regimental front. These attacks will be preceded by ten minutes of violent artillery fire of destruction (beginning at 3:45 a. m.) - concentrated on the selected fronts, and followed by a general attack of exploitation by the whole army all along the line.

3. Each of the attacks of penetration must be driven home through the enemy's line of resistance, after which the attacking regiment will spread out to the right and left, taking the remaining portions of the enemy line in flank and reverse. However, in case the most favorable point for this regimental attack of penetration in any divisional sector lies adjacent to the limits of that sector, the spreading out of the attack after penetration will be only to the side away from the sector limit, so that the action of each division will be exclusively in its own sector (for sector limits see Field Orders 18, I A. C.) • • •

- 435 -
The attack, following immediately after the fire of destruction, will be covered by a normal barrage. The portions of each division not taking part in the regimental attacks of penetration will operate in such manner as to assist, from the front, the flank and reverse attacks to be conducted by the troops that have penetrated. When the initial attack has been carried through, the further advance must be pressed with the utmost vigor in accordance with Field Orders 18.

Divisional commanders, each within his own sector limits, are charged with making the necessary provisions to insure the efficiency of action and coordination of the elements of their divisions.

4. The commanders of the American 26th and French 167th Divisions will promptly select and report to the corps commander the fronts selected for penetration. They will notify the commanders of the adjacent divisions of the points selected and will, without further orders, take the action necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes indicated above.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

181-60.32: Order

Fire for Destruction

OPERATIONS ORDER
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
No. 19
Buire, Aisne, July 22, 1918—10:30 p. m.

[Extract]

1. In accordance with Field Orders 20, the corps artillery will execute fire for destruction to cover an attack to be executed tomorrow morning, the 23d instant, by the entire army. This fire will begin at 3:35 a. m., and will last ten (10) minutes at the rate of one round per gun per minute. * * *

* * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

H. WORTHINGTON,
2d Lt. F. A. U. S. R.,
Operations Officer.

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Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 21
129/G3

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000
      SOISSONS

[Extract]

2. ACTION OF I ARMY CORPS: When the FERE-en-TARDENOIS---Jaulgonne Road is reached, Field Order No. 19, I A. C., July 21, 1918, will be carried into effect.

3. 26th DIVISION: The C. G., 26th Division will make the necessary preliminary dispositions to carry out promptly, Par. 2 (a) F. O. 19, I A. C. To enable him to reassemble one infantry brigade and prepare it for the mission of relieving the 167th Division, there has been placed at his disposal, for July 23, 1918 only, as division reserve, one regiment of the 56th Brigade (111th Inf.).

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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Relief of 52d Brigade by 56th Brigade

130/G3

From: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, 26th Division, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. The 56th Brigade of the American 28th Division is placed at your disposal.
2. You are directed to utilize this brigade and place it in line without delay in order to comply with current orders of the Sixth Army Commander to drive your line forward.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-32.1: Order

**Plan of Attack**

FIELD ORDERS I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
No. 22
131/G3

Buire, Aisne, July 23, 1918—7 p. m.

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000

SOISSONS

[Extract]

I. The enemy has been driven back to the line ARMENTIERES—Hill 141—RO COURT-St-MARTIN—l'HERMITAGE—west of TRUGNY—La CENSE-a-DIEU—CHARTEVES.

The Sixth Army will attack the enemy on this line tomorrow morning, July 24, 1918.

II. The I Army Corps will attack July 24, 1918 at 4:05 a. m., on the Front l’HERMITAGE, inclusive, southern I Corps boundaries (100 meters south of TRUGNY). Direction of attack EPIEDS—COURPOIL—BEUVARDES. The attack will be preceded by ten minutes’ violent artillery fire commencing at 3:55 a. m. The zone of action of the I Army Corps and of the 26th and French 167th Divisions will be as was announced in Field Orders No. 18, I Corps • • •.

III. (a) The C. G., 26th Division and 167th Division will use their freshest troops in making the attack and will concentrate and use all of their available artillery. The advance of the infantry will be covered by a normal barrage. Some artillery (75's) will be pushed well forward to destroy machine-gun nests.

The 111th Infantry remains at the disposal of the C. G., 26th Division for this attack.

(b) The corps artillery will assist the attack and will use every available piece of artillery for this purpose.

* * * * *

(c) Posts of command will be located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I A. C.</th>
<th>BREUIL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>26th Division</td>
<td>GRAND-RU Farm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167th Division</td>
<td>EPAUX-BEZU</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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- 438 -
Cover for Attack

OPERATIONS ORDER
No. 21

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,

Buire, Aisne, July 23, 1918—9 p. m.

[Extract]

1. In accordance with Field Orders No. 22, the corps artillery will deliver fire for destruction and interdiction to cover the attack which will be executed tomorrow morning, July 24, 1918 at 4:05 a. m. * * *

* * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

H. WORTHINGTON,
2d Lt. F. A., U. S. R.,
Operations Officer.

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Artillery Instructions

OPERATIONS ORDER
No. 21-A

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,

Buire, Aisne, July 23, 1918—11 p. m.

The following orders to be complied with at once:

1. Direct communication will be established between the heavy artillery commander and the headquarters of the chief of artillery.

2. All guns of the de Bremond Group will be ready to fire by the night of July 23.

3. Missions and points of C. P. O. will be given and a copy of the same forwarded to these headquarters.

4. All guns will be able to fire on VILLEMOYENNE to the north and TRUGNY to the south.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

H. WORTHINGTON,
2d Lt. F. A., U. S. R.,
Operations Officer.

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- 439 -
Relief of 26th Division by 42d Division

FIELD ORDER
No. 23

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000
      SOISSONS

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Buttre, Aisne, July 24, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The following dispositions will be made night July 24/25.
2. 1 brigade, 42d Division will be moved in trucks of 42d Division between 4 p. m. and midnight via PARIS-METZ Road to debussing points on Roads La SACERIE-TRUGNY, and if necessary, La SACERIE-BEZUET. • • •
3. The brigade on arrival at CHATEAU-THIERRY is placed at the disposition of the C. G., 26th Division, who will issue instructions for its movement beyond CHATEAU-THIERRY, and for the relief, by it, of the infantry of the 26th Division and of the 56th Brigade on the front of the 26th Division sector. This relief to be accomplished at such time as will enable this brigade to take up the pursuit of the enemy, at dawn July 25, 1918, at H hour to be announced later.
4. As soon as the designated brigade of the 42d Division shall have taken up the advance on passing through the front line of the 26th Division command passes to Headquarters 42d Division. Further orders, covering subsequent movements of Headquarters 26th Division and of the 51st and 52d Brigades after passing of command, will follow. The remaining elements of the 26th Division, and the 56th Brigade, will be at the disposition of the C. G., 42d Division, after passing of command, until further orders.
5. Advanced P. C. 42d Division will be established in vicinity of TRUGNY. The exact location to be communicated prior to passing of command, by special messenger to these headquarters.
6. The 51st Brigade to remain in place under cover until further orders. The 52d Brigade to be placed in ETREPILLY area, • • • must be west of the CHATEAU-THIERRY---SOISSONS Road before 6 p. m., July 24.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.
Movement of 84th Brigade

1st Indorsement to FIELD ORDER No. 23

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000
       SOISSONS

[Extract]

1. To accomplish the above directions the 84th Infantry Brigade will be moved by trucks tonight (July 24). * * *

* * * * *

7. The 84th Infantry Brigade will receive orders from the Commanding General, 26th Division, at BUIRE instead of CHATEAU-THIERRY, as stated above.

8. The forward echelon of division headquarters will be established in the immediate locality of TRUGNY as soon as possible. Main headquarters will remain as at present.

9. The Commanding General, 84th Infantry Brigade, will keep close liaison with his elements and with division headquarters, by courier.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brig. Gen., General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

Continuation of Attack

134/G3

From: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.
To: Commanding General, 26th Division, A. E. F.

1. The Commanding General, French Sixth Army, desires that his orders for the action tomorrow be anticipated as follows:

2. The I Corps is to be pushed forward without cessation. The men are to be called upon to make a supreme effort to attack and take SERGY not later than 2 o'clock on the morning of July 25 and push on without delay to the plateau beyond.

3. This effort on the part of the 167th Division and the 26th Division will be
aided by the division of General Gaucher acting on the left and to the north of the 167th Division.

4. The foregoing accomplishment which must take place just prior to the break of day will permit the cavalry corps to pass through and effectively break up the retreating and hard pressed enemy and complete the victory which is at hand.

5. The corps commander impresses on you the necessity for complying with the wish of the army commander to require of every soldier in the ranks and their officers a constant steady driving forward which must push aside all obstacles and accomplish the desired end to the limit of endurance of every man and animal of the corps.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-32.1: Order

Pursuit

FIELD ORDERS
No. 24
135/G3

MAPS: SOISSONS and MEAUX: 1:80,000

[Extract]

3. In conjunction with attacks of the VII A. C. on VILLERS-sur-FERE, MOULIN-VERT and PETIT-MOULIN, the I A. C. will attack SERGY. Our right will be covered by the advance of the XXXVIII Corps.

4. The 167th and 26th Divisions will push forward without cessation to take SERGY not later than 2 o'clock on morning of July 25 and will push on to the plateau beyond. * * *

5. The 326th Company of CHARS d'ASSAUT [tanks] is placed at the disposition of the 167th Division in addition to the 319th Company heretofore assigned. Special mission to assist in the attack on SERGY.

* * * * *

I A. C. P. C. BUIRE
Advanced Message Center after 12 m., July 25. EPIEDS
167th Division P. C. MOUCHETON Chateau
26th Division GRAND-RU Farm

* * * * *

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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Movement of 42d Division Elements

137/G3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, 42d Division, A. E. F.

[Extract]

1. You will take the necessary steps to move the remaining elements of your division to the vicinity EPINÉS-TRUGNY or forward of that area should circumstances render it desirable. The 117th Engineers and the engineer train will be given priority in this movement. * * *

* * * * *

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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101st Engineers Attached to I Corps

138/G3

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding General, 26th Division

1. You will order the 101st Engineers, after relief by the 117th Engineers, assembled and held in place under cover.

2. After relief, the 101st Engineers come under the orders of the Chief Engineer, I Corps for forward road work.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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- 443 -
Reorganization of Corps Artillery

OPERATIONS ORDERS

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,

Buire, Aisne, July 24, 1918—10:30 a. m.

1. The corps artillery will be reorganized as follows to take effect at once:
      (167th Divisional sector).
   2d Grouping, 148th Regiment, Colonel Joseph J. Cavender commanding.
      (26th Divisional sector).
   3d Grouping, 1st Battalion 334th, 1st Battalion 333d,
      Commandant Bourboulon commanding.

2. Commandant Bourboulon will take command of the 3d Grouping. He will hold
   this grouping on wheels in reserve in the general area of MARIGNY until further instructions
   are issued from this office.

3. The H. A. C. will have the groupings formed at once, and the grouping commanders
   will take over their sectors, establish their P. C.'s, complete their liaisons, and enter
   into their functions at once.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

H. WORTHINGTON,
2d Lt. F. A., U. S. R.,
Operations Officer.

181-60.10: Memorandum

New Positions

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,

Epaux-Bezu, Aisne, July 24, 1918.

1. The following orders were issued by me from 8:30 to 9 a. m. this date.

   Group de Bremond will order up his three rear platoons to rendezvous position between
   EPAUX-BEZU and BEZU-St-GERMAIN to reconnoiter firing positions in that vicinity. The
   remaining platoon in observation east of EPAUX-BEZU.

   The II/146 will move two batteries now in readiness, to position in readiness
   near BEZU-St-GERMAIN, reconnoiter firing position in that region. Other battery to remain
   in position. The battery now in readiness at BOURESCHESS, to position in readiness near
   BEZU-St-GERMAIN. The battery in observation near ETREPILLY to remain so. The 3d
   Battalion to remain in position. Reconnaissance party from the 2d Battalion and regi­
   mental headquarters, reports here for instruction on reconnaissance.

   The 148th, Lt. Col. Burke H. St-Clair's battalion to remain in position. Capt.
   William A. Sawtell's 3d Battalion to advance from BEZU-le-GUERY by the PARIS Road to La
   SACERIE Farm and await orders. Major Henry C. Nickerson's 1st Battalion to remain in
   position. Reconnaissance parties from regimental and battalion headquarters to report
   here for instruction. Groupment BOURBOULON I/333 and I/334, two batteries each, to be
sent to the vicinity of EPAUX. Positions of the others to be held in readiness in their present position. Reconnaissance to and beyond BEZU-ST-GERMAIN.

A little later this was modified as follows:

The platoon of the 1/146 at BIURE to remain in position. 11/146, position in readiness, changed to BEZUET. Arrangements confirmed verbally by the chief of artillery.

Verbal order by telephone to the ammunition train commander 146th to arrange to have two trucks of ammunition per gun accompany any guns ordered to move.

By order of Colonel Scott:

M. S. BATTLE,
Lieut. Col., F. A. N. A.,
Counterbattery Officer.

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181-32.1: Order

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
No. 25
Buire, Aisne, July 25, 1918.
142/G3

[Extract]

2. FRONT OF ADVANCE:
   (a) The entire front of the I Corps will be held by the 42d Division.
   (b) The 26th Division will reform in the vicinity of ETREPILLY, where it will await further orders.
   (c) The 56th Brigade will be assembled under cover of the woods in the vicinity of EPIEDS where it will constitute a corps reserve.
   (d) The 167th Division (less the divisional artillery) upon being relieved by the passage through its lines of the designated units of the 42d Division, will pass to the army reserve.
   (e) The divisional artillery of the 167th Division will be placed in reserve under cover as directed by the C. G., 42d Division until 21 o'clock, July 26, when it will be relieved from duty in this sector and will follow its division.
   (f) The 319th and 326th Cos. of tanks (Chars d'Assaut) are placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 42d Division until 8 p. m., July 26, at which hour they will be taken to BRECY to report to the C. G., French II Army Corps.
   (g) The artillery brigade of the 26th Division remains at the disposition of the 42d Division.
   (h) The 101st Engineers will be assembled and held in place under cover of the woods at the disposition of the Chief Engineer, I Corps, for forward road work.

3. CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK OF THE I A. C.
   (a) The attack will be conducted with a view to piercing the front of the enemy by the method indicated in F. O. 20, I Corps.
   (b) Commanders of adjacent divisions will be kept informed of the points at which attacks are to be launched, with a view to their cooperation.
On account of the narrow front, these attacks will often be made on a battalion or company front, well supported in depth.

c) Contact with the enemy will be maintained in such a manner as to economize the infantry, utilizing in full turning movements, accompanying guns or artillery together with concentration of rifle, machine-gun and 37-mm. fire in overcoming machine-gun nests.

d) To attain the maximum driving power in the front lines, a minimum of one-third of the infantry will be kept as reserve in repose, arranged in depth and ready to intervene in case of strong counterattack by the enemy.

4. AIR SERVICE: The following assignment of air service units is ordered:
   1st Squadron (observation) to I Corps for command and corps artillery.
   12th Squadron to 42d Division.

5. LIAISON:
   (b) I A. C. P. C. BUIRE
       I A. C. Adv. Message Center EPIEDS
       42d Division P. C. TRUGNY
       26th Division P. C. GRAND-RU Farm
       167th Division (until relieved) P. C. MOUCHETON Chateau

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-60.10: Order

Dispositions

OPERATIONS ORDER
I CORPS HEAVY ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Epaux-Bezu, Aisne, July 25, 1918--3:50 p. m.

No. 11

1. (a) The following dispositions of command, Groupment Patch P. C. BEZU-St-GERMAIN, will be effected at once. Groupment Patch I/146, less one platoon, position in observation, one to two kilometers northeast of BEZU-St-GERMAIN. One platoon remains in observation east of EPAUX. II/146 position in observation northwest of EPIEDS. III/146 position near 185.000---261.700.

   Echelons: Headquarters 146th Le THIOLET. I/146 BEZU-St-GERMAIN. II/146 BEZU-St-GERMAIN. III/146 at present P. C.

   (b) Groupment Cavender, P. C. TRUGNY. I/148 near Le GOUTTIERE Farm and south of it. II/148 position in readiness near BEZUET. III/148 near TRUGNY. Echelons to be selected by regimental commander.

   (c) Groupment Bourbolon in readiness near EPAUX.

2. Line of fire of batteries not yet established DOE (196.600-280.000).

3. An observing station will be established by each group.
4. Liaison: Besides the usual communications, each group will run a wire direct to Balloon number two near EPIEDS.
5. Missions: Missions will be assigned later supplementary to those already given verbally.
6. This post of command will move later to BEZUET. Present liaison with this post will continue until later; in the meantime the new P. C. Cavender and P. C. Patch will be connected with the proposed P. C. of this command at BEZUET.

By order of Colonel Scott:

M. S. BATTLE,
Lieut. Colonel, F. A. N. A.,
Counterbattery Officer.

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181-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff
No. 22

July 24 to July 25, 1918
(20 h. to 20 h.)

PART I

[Extract]

* * * * *

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: Approximately from Le FOUR-a-VERRE, S. W. through woods to a point on the road N. of La CROIX-ROUGE (machine-gun nest here)--to edge of VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods--S. along edge of woods to la CROIX-ROUGE--Le CHARMEl Road--along W. side of this road to opposite S. part of VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods--to E. along S. edge of these woods.

* * * * *

IV. ENEMY INFANTRY: Our progress was very slow due to the large number of light machine guns which the enemy has placed through the woods and along the road opposite our front. We did not come into actual combat with the enemy infantry.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY: The fire has been mostly harassing fire on the front lines and on the roads near the front lines, these places having been violently bombarded, mostly by 105's. Between 2 h. and 5 h., there was desultory shelling in the rear divisional areas.

* * * * *

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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Geographical Description of the Ourcq

2d Section, General Staff

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Butre, Aisne, July 26, 1918.

INFORMATION ABOUT THE OURCQ IN OUR SECTOR

The River OURCQ cuts across our present sector at almost right angles to our line of march. The part that we are interested in (S. and W. of SERGY) has the following characteristics:

The stream is about 6 meters wide and about 50 cm. deep, and flows in a narrow valley between well-defined banks, with only a few spots of marshy ground. It is crossed by the following bridges:

At SERGY, a stone bridge 5 m. wide, 3 m. between sidewalks. There is also a small stone bridge on the runway of the mill of SERGY, 1 1/2 m. wide. At the MOULIN-VERT a stone bridge on the runway of the mill, 4 1/2 m. between parapets, and another smaller one at the PETIT-MOULIN, just N. of VILLERS-sur-FERE.

The Ru du POMPERULE [PONT-BRULE] which flows into the OURCQ N. of VILLERS-sur-FERE seems to be very small and unimportant. No details as to its depth or size can be found:

Towns: VILLERS-sur-FERE, population 497; 139 houses; 39 wells; umbrella factory; brickyard.
SERGY, population 256; 78 houses; 20 wells.
SERINGES-et-NESLES, population 293; 90 houses; 12 wells.
NESLES; from W. to E., in almost a straight line, there is an old chateau, a small cluster of buildings, and 2 farms.

Miscellaneous: Farms at the following points are likely to contain machine-gun nests;
La CROIX-BLANCHE Farm, 93.5-69.6; a farm at 93.3-71.8; FAVIERE Farm, 95.2-71.3; La GRANGE [au-PONT-MOULIN], 96.3-72.8; brickkiln, [Ancienne Tuilerie] 93.5-73.1; MEURCY Farm, 95.2-74.9.

Relief of Heavy Artillery

OPERATIONS ORDERS
No. 28

1. The Groupment CHAVANNES (III/333) having been detached from the D. A. 167th, is returned to the Groupment BOURBOULON. The commanding officer of the groupment will report to Cdt. Bourboulon for instructions.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A. N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

181-20.7: Memorandum

181-60.32: Order

- 448 -
**Forward Reconnaissance**

**OPERATIONS ORDERS**

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,

**Buire, Aisne, July 26, 1918—6:15 p.m.**

1. Batteries of corps artillery already in position will execute slow interdiction fire all of tonight on the bridges over the OURCQ that lie in their normal sector, also on roads running north from the OURCQ as far as LOUPEIGNÉ and MAREUIL-en-DOLE, this fire to continue until it is clear enough for aerial observers to adjust batteries on other targets.

2. No movement of the batteries will be undertaken until further orders, except the platoon of de Bremond’s battalion, which will move forward and join the rest of the battalion. However, reconnaissances will be made so that one battery of Sinclair’s battalion may be promptly placed in position in the vicinity of the Bois de FARY and one battery of Weyrauch’s battalion in the vicinity of the Ferme Le PLESSIER on receipt of orders. Further careful reconnaissance extending approximately one and one-half kilometers to each side of BEUVARDES will be made with a view to occupying positions south of the crest leading up to the plateau whose center is near PREAUX Ferme. Observation posts will be selected on this plateau from which fire may be adjusted on targets to the north and northeast.

3. No fire will be delivered south of the OURCQ unless on direct request of the infantry.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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**Communications with Balloon**

I CORPS HEAVY ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,

**Bezuet, Aisne, July 26, 1918.**

MEMORANDUM: To Groupments Patch and Cavender:

1. Coordinates of Balloon Number 2 are 7937.

2. Each groupment will run a direct wire to the balloon, and maintain it for the adjustment for fire. Work on this must begin at daylight tomorrow.

3. Points on which the balloon can best adjust are, forks of roads north of SERGY, close to coordinate 7242. Road fork east of FERE-en-TARDENOIS near coordinate 3555. These will be known as registration points A and B respectively.

4. All batteries will have firing data prepared for both these points. Map data will be checked by mathematical calculation of range and deflection from the coordinates of the road forks given.
5. This work must be done early in the morning so that these adjustments may be made as rapidly as possible.
6. Groupment commanders will give this work their personal attention, and omit no effort necessary to push it to completion.

By order of Colonel Scott:

M. S. BATTLE,
Lieut. Col. F. A. N. A.,
Counterbattery Officer.

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181-32.1: Order

**Attack on the Ourcq**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 26
144/G3

MAPS: SOISSONS 1:80,000
MEAUX

[Extract]

(c) The slopes leading down to the west bank of the OURCQ are in view of enemy observatories on the north bank. The attack will, in principle, commence after dark during the night July 27/28 (at H hour to be ordered later), the moon furnishing sufficient light for the infantry to march.

(d) The French VII Army Corps will be withdrawn from the front and revised zones for the French II, American I and French XXXVIII Army Corps will be as indicated on map herewith [not found]. These revised limits are effective at 12 m., July 27, 1918. The relief of troops on the front now pertaining to the VII Corps will be carried out by troops of the I Corps during the attack.

(e) The French XXXVIII Corps will attack in the direction of: 1st, Le CHARME, RONCHERES. 2d, FRENS---COURMONT---CIERGES.

The I Corps will attack in the direction of: La CROIX-BLANCHE [Farm], SERGY, 2d, Region of the PREAUX Farm---La FOLIE---VILLERS-sur-FERE---MEURCY Farm.

Behind the left of the I Corps, the French II Corps will attack VILLENNEUVE-sur-FERE---VILLEMAYENNE and the woods between these two villages.

(f) The 6th Division of Cavalry and the I Cavalry Corps, supported by the 62d Infantry Division, placed in the region of MOUCHETON-Chateau, will be in readiness to exploit the breach in the enemy's line north of the OURCQ.

The 62d Division will also, if necessary, assist the 52d Division in its mission of protecting the left flank of the 42d Division.

The commander of the 6th Cavalry Division will have his P. C. with the C. G., 42d Division during the attack.

2. (a) The attack of the I Corps will be made in columns of attack, passing to the east and to the west of the Chateau de la FORET, and the Foret de FERE.
(b) The base of departure for the attack will be established during the night July 26/27 or during the day July 27, in accordance with instructions already given, great care being taken to avoid hostile observation.

(c) Objective of the I A. C. will be the slopes of the north bank of the OURCQ from MEURCY Farm to SERGY and PEUPLIER-disp [disparu [signal]].

(d) The attack will be executed by the 42d Division on its present front and that now occupied by the 164th Division, the troops of the 42d Division passing through those of the 164th Division, the left of the 42d Division in the vicinity of PREAUX Farm. Liaison will be maintained with the 52d Division which will attack at the same time.

* * * * *

4. ARTILLERY: The relief of the artillery of the 167th Division will be arranged mutually between the division commanders concerned. The heavy artillery will conduct its fire during the course of the night and during the progress of the cavalry under conditions which will be determined by the general commanding the army artillery. An intense artillery preparation of a duration of ten minutes will precede H hour. The rolling barrage will be arranged for by agreement between the Commanding General, 42d Division and representatives of adjacent divisions.

5. The division of infantry in army reserve will remain in place in its billet on the alert but not assembled. The 56th Brigade of the 28th Division constituting the corps reserve will remain in place assembled and on the alert. The 26th Division will remain in place.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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Relief of Artillery

181-32.15: Letter

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Buire, Aisne, July 27, 1918.

From: Chief of Staff, I Army Corps, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, 42d Division, A. E. F.

1. The corps commander directs that the relief of the artillery of the French 167th Division be commenced at once, and that it be completed not later than noon, tomorrow, the 28th instant.

2. Upon completion of this relief, the artillery of the 167th Division will be directed by you to join its division by marching, utilizing the roads heretofore assigned.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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- 451 -
Artillery Support

OPERATIONS ORDERS

No. 31

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Buire, Aisne, July 27, 1918—3:15 p.m.

[Extract]

1. The latest information is that the enemy is withdrawing from our front. The 42d Division is advancing, one regiment of light artillery and one battalion of light howitzers to cover each wing.
   They are ordered to occupy a line extending approximately VILLE-MOYENNE---along the edge of the forest, through FRESNES---to Chalet de VILLARDELLE, and to be ready to move forward tonight from that line.


By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.


Artillery Support

OPERATIONS ORDER

No. 32

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Buire, Aisne, July 27, 1918—8 p.m.

[Extract]

3. The heavy artillery will support this attack by fire of interdiction on the roads and crossroads north of the line just indicated and at least two kilometers beyond this line. The right flank of our line of advance is commanded by hills just east of SERGY, and it is very important to bring fire to bear on the west of roads near CHAMERY and COULONGES.
   The commencement of this fire for interdiction will be at H hour. It will continue until daybreak. H hour will be probably 2:30 o'clock. Confirmation will be given later by telephone. Daybreak will be taken as 4 a.m. unless further instructions on this point are received.


4. If the heights beyond the river are taken, the cavalry is to break through at daybreak. At this time (4 a.m. as above) the fire will be shifted away from the front of
the I Army Corps to areas on the right and left. These areas are defined as follows:

On the left: SAPONAY, ARCY-Ste-RESTITUE, l'ERMITAGE, BEUGNEUX, and CRAMOISELLE.

On the right: CHAMPLOISY, GOUSSANCOURT, VEZILLY, VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY, St-

GEMINE [Ste-GEMME?].

It will be noted that the zones thus defined are different from the one prescribed in the order for a corresponding fire in Operations Order 30, and has the effect of shifting our fire much farther to the right and left and to put it mostly beyond the range of our guns. But such guns as can be turned on objectives in these zones should bring fire to bear. This latter fire of interdiction will continue at the rate of twelve rounds per hour for one hour, when the H. A. C. will ask for orders.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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132-12.8: Orders

Heavy Artillery to I Corps

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 28
31st HEAVY ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Clermont-Ferrand, Puy-de-Dome, July 27, 1918.

[Extract]

1. This brigade will leave this station for duty with the I Army Corps.

By command of Brigadier General Gatchell:

W. S. DOWD,
Major, C. A. C.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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181-60.32: Message

Artillery Positions

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Butre, Aisne.

Confirmation of Telephone Instructions 9:30 p. m., July 27, 1918 to Col. Scott:

Take all fire off except on your most distant objectives that you can reach. Tell me that they will be: “Crossroads to the left of CHAMERY, the roads south of Les BONS-HOMMES [Farm], crossroads south of BAYON, and crossroads south of railroad crossing 500 meters south of VAUX.” Continue the fire on those four targets until 10:15 and then cease all
firing until further orders. Have a platoon from each grouping, making four guns in all, ready to move forward at daybreak to positions near BEUVARDES, and all necessary reconnaissances made. It is quite possible, however, that the march will be continued to the neighborhood of the OURCQ or beyond. Reconnaissance officers will be ready to move forward in advance to select positions as soon as the position of the infantry has been determined. The movement will not be begun until further orders are sent from these headquarters.

LASSITER.

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181-32.1: Order

Plan of Advance

FIELD ORDERS
No. 28
154/G3

MAPS: SOISSONS 1:80,000
       MEAUX

[Extract]

   * * * * *

3. Objective of the I Corps: 500 meters east of CHERY-CHARTREUVE (inclusive)---Road CHERY-CHARTREUVE---BRUYS to the western edge of Bois de DOLE (exclusive), which will be occupied and held by the main body.

4. Artillery: To avoid blocking the roads, only the divisional artillery (including the 155 short regiments) will advance with the troops. The corps artillery of the French VII Corps will be under the orders of the Chief of Artillery, I Corps.

5. Trains: Trains will not be taken across the OURCQ until further orders. They will be parked under cover, clear of the roads.

6. Reserves: The 56th Brigade of the 28th Division stands relieved as corps reserve and will proceed under orders which emanate from the French XXXVIII Corps.

   The American 4th Division constitutes the reserve of the I Corps and will hold itself ready to march, under cover, in the southwestern portion of the Bois du CHATELET.

7. Liaison: No change. Great care will be taken to maintain contact, in addition to other means by combat groups of liaison with division to our right and left.

8. P. C.'s at noon, July 28:

   French XXXVIII C. A.  CHARTEVES
       I A. C.           EPIEDS
   French II C. A.       BRECY
   4th Div.             MOUCHETON-Chateau
   42d Division          COURPOIL

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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- 454 -
Corps Mission

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 28, 1918—10:55 p. m.

FIELD ORDERS
No. 29
159/G3

MAPS: SOISSONS 1:80,000
       MEAUX

[Extract]

1. The enemy has given way before our pressure and is in position on the north bank of the OURCQ, whose passage has been forced by the army. Our actual front this evening is marked by: GIVRY—the River OURCQ—the station of FERE-en-TARDENOIS—FERE-en-TARDENOIS—MEURCY Farm—the OURCQ—RONCHERES.

   • • •

4. Mission of the corps to push forward at 3:40 h. on the morning of July 29, with a view to reaching with the main body, the line CHERRY-CHARTREUVE—Road CHERRY-CHARTREUVE—BRUYS—to the western edges of Bois de DOLE. The advance guards must reach the general line MONT-NOTRE-DAME—MONT-St-MARTIN.

5. Cavalry: The definite mission of the cavalry has been given separately.

6. Artillery: The divisional artillery (including the 155's) will push forward to support the infantry with a view to reduction of obstructing points and supporting the general advance.

The artillery of the corps will conduct its fire according to the general provisions of Field Order No. 28.

7. Reserves: Two battalions to be designated by the Commanding General of the 4th Division have been placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 42d Division. The remainder of the 4th Division, constituting the corps reserve, will continue its assembly in the Bois de CHATELET as heretofore ordered.

8. Liaison: No change. Combat liaison will be maintained with the divisions on the right and left in addition to the other means provided.

9. Post of Command:
   1st A. C. MOUCHETON-Chateau
   4th Division ARTOIS Farm
   42d Division BEUVAERDES

Otherwise unchanged.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.
Report on 42d Division

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 28, 1918.

From: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.

To: Commanding General, Sixth Army

1. I desire to inform you that according to report received from the Chief of Staff, 42d Division, at 18 h. this date, the following is the state of affairs on the front of this corps:

2. (a) The 42d Division attained the objectives designated by the army commander.
    (b) During the course of the day this division has been subjected to four different strong counterattacks delivered by the 4th Guard Reserve Division, and on each occasion the Americans succeeded in holding the line.
    (c) During the entire day they have been subjected to intense artillery fire which was delivered with great accuracy, due to the enemy having the mastery of the air.
    (d) To maintain the bridgehead on the north side of the OURCQ, it was necessary as casualties occurred to send forward reserves to take their places.
    (e) The total number of casualties reported by the Chief of Staff, who had investigated in person was at the hour mentioned, about 4200.

3. It was understood this morning that the 42d Division would hold what it had gained, the divisions on its right and left moving up and rectifying the alignment.

4. This they did not do until late in the afternoon on the part of the unit on the left, and not at all on the part of the unit on the right.

5. I have already turned over to the 42d Division two battalions from the 4th Division to be utilized in case of emergency.

6. It is not practicable to assemble the 4th Division in time to have the entire unit in hand within 24 hours.

7. The foregoing is brought to our attention for the simple reason that in my judgment an advance such as is contemplated, even if it meets with little resistance, is hardly practicable for the 42d Division at the hour and on the date named. In the meantime, pursuant to operation orders No. 3,627 the advance will be ordered as you direct, and every attempt will be made to carry it out with the certainty that if the enemy is retiring contact will be maintained, and with the equal certainty that if resistance is serious and the units on the right and left do not perform their full part in keeping abreast, the move will be stopped almost on its inception.

H. LIGGETT,
Major General, U. S. A.
181-60.10: Memo

C. P. to Beuvardes

I CORPS HEAVY ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Bezuet, Aisne, July 28, 1918.

MEMORANDUM: Colonels Patch and Cavender

1. Groups Pettit and Nickerson will move tonight to the areas designated for the
regiments. Missions will be assigned later.
2. Regimental commanders will make necessary arrangements looking to the establish­
ment of their P. C.'s tomorrow at BEUVARDES.
3. This P. C. will move to BEUVARDES tomorrow
Line of fire, DOLE.

By order of Colonel Scott:

M. S. BATTLE,
Lieut. Colonel, F. A., N. A.

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181-60.11: Order

General Instructions

OPERATIONS ORDERS
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
No. 33
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 28, 1918—6 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The Corps Artillery, I Corps, consists of two groupings: One American and one
French.
   (a) The American grouping (Colonel Scott) consists of the 146th Regiment Field
Artillery and the 148th Regiment Field Artillery. The 146th Regiment will cover the west
(left) half of the sector. The 148th Regiment will cover the east (right) half of the
sector. Missions remain as announced heretofore.
   (b) The French grouping (Lt. Col. Fournier) will include the subgrouping Rolin,
and will cover the corps sector. Its mission will be: First, counterbattery on
batteries located by its own means of observation or whose location is given from this
office. Second, interdiction fire and harassing fire in the sector. Third, special
missions as announced from time to time by the C. A. C. Daily programs of fire will be
drawn up by the lieutenant colonel commanding.
2. The P. C. Scott will be advanced today to BEUVARDES. Each regiment of this
grouping will send forward an additional battalion to positions already selected. This
will give each regiment two forward battalions and one rear battalion; the forward
battalions to execute counterbattery, interdiction fire, and harassing fire. The rear battalions to execute a counteroffensive preparation if called for in front of our lines.

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By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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181-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff
No. 25
I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 29, 1918.

July 27 to July 28, 1918
(20 h. to 20 h.)

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: The day was one of very fierce infantry fighting on our corps front, on the slopes to the N. of the OURCQ from the neighborhood of MEURCY Farm to E. of SERGY. The enemy attempted to hold the line of the OURCQ and counter-attacked us in force, but we succeeded in crossing. The enemy is making a strong defense on this line with good troops, but from statements of prisoners the main line of defense will be N. of FISMES. Enemy aeroplanes and artillery were very active throughout the day. Visibility good.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: The enemy line appears to be the S. edge of the Foret de NESLES and then S. E., passing just to the N. of SERGY. At 20 h. SERGY was held by us.


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VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS: Enemy aeroplanes were very active over our lines throughout the day and had complete supremacy in the air. * * *

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By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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Situation I Corps

G-3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Alsne, July 29, 1918--10:15 a. m.

The following sent to LORRAINE [French Sixth Army]

During late afternoon and early evening of yesterday, July 28, troops on front of I Corps maintained position on general line south of MEURCY Farm-SERGY in spite of numerous counterattacks by the enemy, reported to include 4th Guard Reserve Division and Bavarian 6th Division. Town of SERGY reported to have changed hands 7 times. Information this morning indicated line practically unchanged and attack to start at 8 a. m. First reports of attack just received as follows: 165th Infantry was held up at Bois-COLAS and MEURCY Farm by machine-gun fire. After artillery preparation, infantry at 9:20 a. m. was advancing with rolling barrage on east and west line through SERINGES-et-NELES. On the right the 168th Infantry is reported just south of crest of Hill 212 held up by machine-gun fire from the Bois Les JOMBLETS against which artillery preparation was requested. Information as to situation on right has been transmitted to XXXVIII Corps.

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181-60.32: Order

Zones of Action

OPERATIONS ORDER
No. 35

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Alsne, July 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Zones of action for the Scott Grouping and the Fournier Grouping, are defined as follows:
   For the Fournier Grouping, the entire sector front from our front lines to a distance of four kilometers in advance of that line toward the enemy.
   For the Scott Grouping, the entire sector front from a line four kilometers in advance of our front line to the extreme range of the guns.

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By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Supporting Fire

OPERATIONS ORDER
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F., Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 29, 1918—8:55 a. m.

[Extract]

1. Our infantry advances this morning. The infantry starts from the line SERINGES—MEURCY Farm—SERGY. The corps artillery will deliver harassing and interdiction fire in advance of this line, each grouping operating in its normal sector. Fire will be commenced as soon as practicable, but lifted as the infantry advances. * * *

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

Organization

OPERATIONS ORDER
I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F., Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The organization of the corps artillery into two groupings is hereby cancelled.
2. The corps artillery is hereby organized into four groupings: The Patch Grouping, the Cavender Grouping, the Poussenot Grouping, and the Rolin Grouping. * * * Colonel E. D. Scott, as heavy artillery commander, will direct all four groupings.
3. The H. A. C. will cause this office to be notified at once of the location of all batteries of the corps artillery. Those batteries not actually emplaced will be shown as on wheels, but their position will be indicated by coordinates.
4. The further limit of the normal zone of action of the division artillery is now marked by a line traced through Hill 184—northern edges of NESLES—200 meters north of Farm de CAMP—the Bois-PELGER. Zones of action for each of the groupings pertaining to his command will be assigned by the H. A. C. * * *

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col. F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.
Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 29, 1918—11 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The army has met a serious resistance north of the OURCQ, which has made progress very difficult, marked only by the capture of the CAYENNE Farm, north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS, and Hill 184 (west of SERINGES).

2. The army will continue its advance tomorrow with the same objectives as were given in Field Order No. 29, these headquarters, July 28, 1918.

3. The 6th Cavalry Division, conforming itself to the movements of the infantry, and taking advantage of every favorable occasion for intervention in the general direction of FISMES or in the general direction of BRAINE, will furnish to the I Army Corps, the cavalry units necessary to reconnoiter in front of its advance.

4. Missions, objectives, posts of command, location of reserves and arrangements for liaison of the I Army Corps remain unchanged.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

181-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff
No. 26
ADVANCE P. C.,
I CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

July 28 to July 29, 1918
(20 h. to 20 h.)

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: The day was marked by severe infantry fighting along the whole corps front. The enemy kept up an unceasing machine-gun fire. The artillery fire was very heavy in the morning, but much lighter in the afternoon, except during the period of an attack we made on SERINGES. The enemy aviation was less active than on the preceding two days. During our attack on SERINGES the enemy infantry resisted desperately but did not counterattack. Visibility good.
II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: The crossroads N. of SERINGES-et-NESLES---the Bois-BRULE---S. E., passing N. of SERGY---to Les JOMBLETS---and then S., passing to the W. of CIERGES.

By command of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.
A. C. of S., G-2.

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204-32: Letter

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Preparation Against Counteroffensive

174/G3

I ARMY CORPS,

Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

From: C. G., I Army Corps

To: C. G., 4th Division

1. The enemy still appears to possess reserves which may allow him to carry out a counteroffensive with a view to recapturing the ground which he has lost. It is necessary, therefore, in our advance, that we be always ready to oppose and stop the enemy’s attack if it should occur.

2. For this purpose, instructions have already been given in letter of this date, No. 168/G3 [not printed] (and instructions 3,632 of the Sixth Army) for the organization by the 4th Engineers, under the supervision of the corps engineer, of a position [line of security] along the northern edges of the Foret de Fere.

3. This position has for its purpose, stopping of a counteroffensive which might be launched from the line of the OURCQ.

4. The above position must always be occupied and the commanding general directs that you place thereon at least two battalions, in addition to the engineers already directed to work on the line, to assist in construction as well as defense.

5. Report promptly to these headquarters, dispositions made by you for the occupation of these defenses with location of units concerned.

6. It is the intention to maintain a garrison continually on this position until further orders. In case your division should be ordered to move from the vicinity of this line, you will turn over all orders and instructions, maps, plans and other data relating to this line, to the commanding officer of troops assigned thereto.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
C. of S., I A. C.

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Preparation Against Counteroffensive South of the Vesle

175/G3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

From: C. G., I A. C.
To: C. G., 42d Division

1. Your attention is invited to letter of this date to C. G., 4th Division (preceding).
2. If the enemy retires beyond the VESLE, it is possible that he may take advantage of the moment when our troops are the most fatigued, and when our reserves are diminished, to launch a counterattack.
3. For this reason the army commander has ordered that in our advance north of the OURCQ, there shall be established a new safety position along the line: Hill east of LOUPEIGNE—northern edges of the wood east of MAREUIL-en-DOLE—edges of wood southeast of DOLE—edges of wood northwest of DRAVEGNY—LONGEVILLE Farm and the woods 1 km. east thereof—Hill 200 (ruined tower) [Tour Ruine-Signal]—and ARCIS-le-ponsart.
4. After this safety position has been reached, the main body of the troops in line will be held provisionally on the position and strong advance guards only will be pushed on beyond in the direction of the VESLE, with the mission of pursuing the enemy, crossing the VESLE when necessary to preserve contact.
5. In making your advance northward, these instructions will be kept in mind and the necessary preparations made to establish promptly a defensive line as contemplated herein.
6. In case your division should be relieved of any portion of the corps sector, these instructions will be turned over to the commander of the relieving troops.

By command of Major General Liggett:
MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Disposition of the Division

180/G3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

From: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.
To: Commanding General, 4th Division, A. E. F.

1. The corps commander directs following dispositions:
2. The 7th Brigade entire will, for emergency use, be placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 42d Division.
3. The battalion of infantry and machine gun battalion (less two companies) now in
vicinity of ARTOIS Farm will be alerted at once. The Commanding General, 7th Brigade, will get in touch with Commanding General, 42d Division, and notify him as to the location of all units of his brigade. The regiment on the line at the northern edge of Foret de FERE, if required by the Commanding General, 42d Division, will be given its orders by the Commanding General, 42d Division, through the brigade commander.

4. The 4th Division (less the infantry, machine-gun units, artillery and engineers already placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 42d Division, or assigned to work on the line Foret de FERE) will be assembled in the neighborhood of ARTOIS Farm tomorrow, July 31, 1918, at an early hour.

5. G-3, these headquarters, will be kept advised as to location of all units of the 4th Division.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-60.32: Order

Relief of French Artillery Units

OPERATIONS ORDER
No. 38

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, July 30, 1918—9:45 a. m.

[Extract]

1. In accordance with memorandum, Headquarters I Army Corps, July 29, 1918, the artillery of the French VII Army Corps is relieved from duty with the artillery of the American I Army Corps, and will proceed to the zone CROUY—MAY-en-MULTIEN—Le PLESSIS-PLACY—MARNOUE-les-MOIINES—FUSSY.

* * * * *

This movement will be completed by the morning of July 31, 1918 at the latest.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 31
178/G3

MAPS: FISMES 1:20,000
FERE-en-TARDENOIS

[Extract]

1. Heavy pressure has been exerted on the enemy during July 30, 1918, and he has been driven back. The French III Army Corps has been assigned to the Sixth Army, and is operating on the extreme right.

* * * * * *

(c) The I Corps will attack and capture as minimum objectives, Hill 207 (400 meters south of Hill 200) and Hill 177 (1000 meters east of MEURCY Farm) on July 31, 1918, at an hour H to be arranged between the C. G., 42d Division and the C. G. of left division, XXXVIII A. C. The C. G., I A. C. will be immediately notified of the hour selected. This attack must be made simultaneously by the two divisions concerned. After the minimum objectives have been reached, close contact with the enemy will be maintained.

(d) For this attack, the sector limit between the I and XXXVIII A. C. is modified so as to pass from a point 200 meters northwest of Point 212, through the middle of the Bois-PELGER to the creek running in a northerly direction therefrom, thence along the east bank of the creek to the existing limit of the corps sector.

3. (a) The C. G., 42d Division will arrange the details of the attack with the C. G. of the left division of the XXXVIII A. C.

(b) The 42d Division will deliver the attack on the front of the I A. C. supported by the artillery under the command of the C. G., 42d Division.

(c) The 7th Brigade [4th Division] is at the disposition of the C. G., 42d Division as division reserve.

(d) The corps artillery will assist the attack in accordance with plans arranged between the artillery commanders concerned.

(e) The 4th Division (less the 7th Brigade) constitutes the corps reserve, and will be held on the alert during the attack.

4. AXES OF LIAISON: Unchanged.
P. C.'s Unchanged.
Combat liaison must be maintained by the 42d Division with divisions of the XXXVIII Corps on the right, and of the II Corps on the left.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.
MEMORANDUM:

The Commanding General, 42d Division, advises that the hour H, arranged between the C. G., 42d Division and the C. G. of the left division of the XXXVIII Army Corps, for the operations contemplated in Paragraph 2 (c) Field Orders No. 31, these headquarters, is 4:30 p. m., July 31, 1918.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-60.10: Operations Order

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2. MISSION: The mission of the I Corps Artillery is the neutralization from H minus 15 minutes to H plus 15 minutes of known enemy batteries, the neutralization of batteries subsequently reported in action, and interdiction fire on the back areas.

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By order of Colonel Scott:

M. S. BATTLE,
Lieut. Col. F. A. N. A.,
Counterbattery Officer.

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181-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff

ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, August 1, 1918.

July 30 to July 31, 1918
(20 h. to 20 h.)

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Hard infantry fighting during the day. Enemy was on the defensive, but there is no indication that he intends to withdraw without being forced to do so. Artillery fire was less than the day before, even during the time of our preparation for the attack which we made on our right in the late afternoon. A number of 150-mm. shells fell in our sector, especially on the front lines. Enemy aviation was less than during the preceding 5 days. Visibility poor.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: The enemy holds along the line N. side of Hill 184---SERINGES from N. of the crossroad---Bois-BRULE---point 197.10-274.60---Bois-PELGER---and part of Bois de la PLANCHETTE. (MEURCY Farm is in "No Man's Land.") We hold Bois-COLAS.

* * * * *

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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181-32.1: Order

Relief of 42d Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 33
I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, August 1, 1918--2:30 p. m.
198/G3

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000
      SOISSONS

[Extract]

1. The 4th Division (less artillery brigade) will relieve the 42d Division (less 67th and 51st Artillery Brigades) during the night August 2/3, 1918.
(a) Upon relief, the 42d Division will be assembled in the area now occupied by the 4th Division (Hq. ARTOIS Farm) and will constitute the corps reserve.

* * * * *

5. Command will pass to the C. G., 4th Division, on August 3, 1918, the time to be designated by the C. G., 42d Division. The C. G., I Army Corps will be notified of the time this command is to pass. * * *

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

181-32.1: Order

I Corps to Conform to Advance of XXXVIII Corps

FIELD ORDERS
No. 34
202-G3

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000
SOISSONS

1. The enemy is still retiring under our pressure. The army will continue on its present objective, keeping close contact by patrols well out to the front.

2. The XXXVIII Corps on our right will move forward at 4:15 a. m. tomorrow, left in front, to the heights north of the Road COULONGES-NESLES, after a short artillery preparation of 10 minutes duration and preceded by a rolling barrage.

The I Corps will conform to this advance, maintaining close liaison with the American 32d Division on the right, and masking the town of NESLES.

3. ARTILLERY: Preparation will be of 10 minutes duration, and the right of the 42d Division will be covered by a rolling barrage confined to sector limits.

4. RESERVES: No change.

5. AVIATION: Observation planes will report location of our front lines as they advance.

6. LIAISON: No change.

7. P. C.'s: No change.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.
Employment of Artillery

I CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, August 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The 4th Div. Arty. will be assigned echelons in proximity to those of the 42d Div. Arty. and the firing batteries of the 4th D. A. will occupy positions along side of those of the 42d D. A.; • • •

2. On the withdrawal of the 26th Div. Arty., the 42d D. A. will extend its front so as to cover the entire corps sector, the elements of the 4th D. A. extending with those of the 42d D. A. with whom they are associated.

3. At a later date, when the 4th D. A. has had sufficient experience to warrant it, the two artillery brigades will be segregated, and each will cover one-half of the entire corps front.

D. C. CUBBISON,
C. S.

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Fire Missions

FIELD ORDER
No. 10

HEAVY ARTILLERY, I CORPS, A. E. F.,
Beuvardes, Aisne, August 1, 1918.

[Extract]

2. Normal zone of action of this command, the area defined by the lines joining the points 8020-6286-9066 and 0108. Eventual zones to include the valley of the ORILLON on the right and the railroad on the left.

3. Groupment Cavender will continue interdiction fire assigned by interdiction order of this date, and will at 4:05 a. m., August 2, open fire of neutralization on hostile batteries • • • and will be prepared for counterbattery work on call in the east half of the normal zone and in the right eventual zone.

4. (a) Groupment Patch will continue interdiction fire assigned by interdiction order of this date, and will at 4:05 a. m., August 2, open fire of neutralization on hostile batteries • • •, and will be prepared for counterbattery work on call in the left half of the normal zone and the left eventual zone.

5. Regimental commanders provide for ammunition supply

6. No change in P. C.’s.

By order of Colonel Scott:

A. L. LOUSTALOT,
Major, C. A. C.

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181-331: Operations Report

Sector Activities of I Corps

221/G-3
33A/3-0

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 1, 1918.

6 p. m., July 31, to 6 p. m., August 1, 1918

[Extract]

5. We held the line along the north bank of the Ourcq with the 42d Division. The 4th Division was in reserve.

6. 4th Division Headquarters and both infantry brigades are in the region of Bois de BEUVARDELLE. The 13th and 16th Artillery are stationed in the Bois de MOUCHETON.

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-32.1: Order

Pursuit

FIELD ORDERS
No. 35
211/G3

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, August 2, 1918--6 p. m.

MAP: MEAUX 1:80,000
SOISSONS

1. The enemy is retiring on the entire front from HARTENNES to VILLE-en-TARDENOIS. Our advanced infantry line has reached the general line BRANGES-DRAVEGNY, with the cavalry well in front.

2. The 42d Division will follow closely in pursuit and give the necessary orders for the 4th Division to follow in support.

   The line ChÉRy-CHARTREUVE---BRUYS will be organized as a line of resistance with the outposts on the general line MONT-St-MARTIN---MONT-NOTRE-DAME.

3. When the pursuit is halted, the 4th Division will relieve the 42d Division by passing through its lines. Orders already issued will thereafter govern the movements of the 42d Division.

4. P. C. 4th Division: Chateau de la FORET after 9 p. m., August 2, 1918.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: The enemy retreated throughout the day. There was practically no resistance to our advance. It is possible the enemy will continue his retreat, as he is blowing up ammunition dumps to the N. of our present line, and at 20 h. was shelling MAREUIL-en-DOLE and the S. part of the Bois de DOLE.

Visibility bad.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: Latest reports show our line to be from crossroad 196.1-278.9 to crossroad 196.5-278.3, to the N. edge of the Bois de la PISOTTE. The exact location of the enemy line is not known, as at 20 h. we were not in contact with him on our front.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY: During the early part of the night there was harassing fire and during the day some long-range fire on FERE-en-TARDENOIS but there was otherwise practically no enemy artillery activity.

VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS:

A balloon was up during the morning in the Foret de NESLES and another far to the rear in the afternoon.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.
Advance Guard to Cross the Vesle

FIELD ORDER
No. 36
218/G3

1. The enemy is retiring across the VESLE. Troops on the left are already at the VESLE. Those on our right are also in close pursuit.
2. The Commanding General, 4th Division, will immediately organize a strong advance guard consisting of all arms and pursue boldly. The artillery of the advance guard to consist of at least one battalion well supplied with ammunition. This advance guard will cross the VESLE and form a bridgehead in advance of the line VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES. The right boundary of our sector will pass through PERLES.
3. The main body will be handled more cautiously so as to avoid hostile artillery fire and will advance from position to position. The main bulk of the artillery to remain on general line BRUYS---CHERY-CHARTREUVE, which will be organized into a position of surety as already ordered.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Artillery Support

OPERATIONS ORDER
No. 43

1. In case our infantry is stopped on the line of the VESLE, the principles covering the posting of the heavy artillery of the corps will be the following.
   a. All of the heavy artillery of the corps must be able to search the rear slopes of the ridge separating the VESLE from the AISNE. All of the guns must thus be able to reach as far as DHUIZEL, LONGUEVAL and BARBONVAL.
   In addition to the foregoing, the advanced guns must be able to reach the villages beyond the AISNE: BOURG-et-COMIN, and OEUILLY.

By command of Brigadier General Lassiter:

D. C. CUBBISON,
Lt. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Chief of Staff.
Relief 51st Field Artillery Brigade

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

Moucheton-Chateau, Aisne, August 4, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The 51st Field Artillery Brigade is hereby relieved from duty with the 4th Division and will proceed by marching to rejoin its division in the La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE area.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 37
229/G3

MAPS: MEAUX 1:80,000
SOISSONS

1. Our troops have crossed the VESLE at certain points. The sector of the French II Corps will be placed under the command of the C. G., I Corps on August 5 at 8 a. m. The French 62d Division will advance in this sector.

2. The I Corps will continue the pursuit August 5, 1918.

3. (a) The advance guards will move forward and seize the plateau to the north of the VESLE as a bridgehead for the passage of the main body.

   (b) The main body will follow the advance guard as soon as the bridgehead is assured, and organize the line VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES (exclusive). Existing trench organizations will be used where practicable.

   (c) Artillery: The corps and divisional artillery will be placed south of the VESLE and will cover the advance effectively from fire both from north of the VESLE and of the AISNE. The main body and the artillery will not cross the VESLE until the bridgehead is established.

   (d) The French 58th and 73d Divisions, in army reserve, will organize the line

CHERY-CHARTREUVE---BRUYS.

4. Axis of Liaison: Unchanged to the VESLE. North of the VESLE: 62d Division - PAARS---VAUXTIN---DHUIZEL.
4th Division: St-THIBAUT---PERLES---BLANZY-les-FISMES---LONGUE [Longueval ?]
P. C.'s I A. C. FERE-en-TARDENOIS
4th Division MAREUIL
62d Division MONTBANI Farm

Combat liaison will be maintained with neighboring units.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff
No. 32

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Fere-en-Tardenois, Aisne, August 5, 1918.

August 3 to August 4, 1918
(20 h. to 20 h.)

PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: The enemy continued to retreat throughout the day, making no opposition to our advance until we approached the VESLE River, when we were subjected to artillery and machine-gun fire, this fire being heavier against our left than it was against the right. Both visibility and weather were bad.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: The enemy's front line is evidently along the N. side of the River VESLE.

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IV. ENEMY INFANTRY: With the exception of fire from a few machine guns to the S. of St-THIBAUT, the enemy infantry made no resistance throughout the day. In the afternoon enemy infantry was seen digging hurriedly on a hill to the N. of BAZOCHE.

V. ENEMY ARTILLERY: As our troops approached the VESLE they were subjected to a very heavy artillery fire, especially in the left of our sector. This continued throughout the afternoon. Gas shells were fired in the right of our sector. St-THIBAUT was heavily shelled and our back areas received a few shells during the day. The principal artillery fire was from 77's and 105's; no 150's were positively identified.

Battery located in action at 201.5-288.5.

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VIII. ENEMY AERONAUTICS: Considerable activity, especially over the left sector. There was one flight of 17 planes at 1 p. m.
An enemy balloon just N. of the VESLE, opposite our sector, was directing artillery fire on our infantry in the late afternoon.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.
A. C. of S., G-2.

Orders to Establish a Bridgehead Beyond the Vesle

FIELD ORDERS
No. 38
Fere-en-Tardenois, Aisne, August 5, 1918—10:45 p. m.

1. There is no new information about the enemy. He is still holding the north bank of the VESLE.
   Our troops are still pressing and small detachments have crossed the VESLE at different points.

2. The provisions of F. O. 37 still apply and this command will continue to push its advance guards to the heights north of the VESLE and establish a bridgehead on the line VAUXTIN—VAUXCERE—BLANZY-les-FISMES. As soon as the advance guards have established themselves in this position, the first echelon of the main body will march through and form new advance guards for further pursuit.

3. The heavy artillery will take such positions as to be able to bombard the principal crossings of the AISNE. No artillery will cross the VESLE until after bridgehead has been established; it will then cross and support the new advance guards.

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

Deepening of Bridgeheads

FIELD ORDERS
No. 39
232/G-3
Fere-en-Tardenois, Aisne, August 6, 1918—11 p. m.

1. The enemy is still holding the north bank of the VESLE with the exception of our sector. This corps has established bridgeheads across its entire front, along the Route Nationale. The troops to our right and left hold the south bank of the VESLE.

2. The bridgeheads established by our corps will be deepened tomorrow, the 7th, by
pushing new advance guards, whose objective will be the line BASLIEUX---PERLES---PAARS, through the bridgeheads.

3. The artillery will support the new advance from the south side of the VESLE.
4. Combat liaison will be established between the leading divisions of this corps, and also with the adjoining divisions of the corps to the right and left.
5. The division engineers will enlarge the bridges already laid and construct two additional bridges on each division front for the crossing of artillery.
6. Attention is called to the necessity for the arrangement of the infantry in depth and the prompt consolidation of the objectives when reached, always keeping patrols well forward.

7. P. C.'s  No change
8. Aviation  No change

By command of Major General Liggett:

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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181-33.1: Operations Report

Sector Activities of the I Corps

247/G-3  I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
37A/3-0  August 6, 1918.

6 p. m., August 5 to 6 p. m., August 6, 1918

[Extract]

...5...

5. The corps held a sector south of the VESLE from La CENDRIERE to VILLESAVOYE with the American 4th Division and the French 62d Division, the former with two brigades side by side each with one regiment in advance positions along the VESLE, the latter with the 338th Regiment in advance, the other two regiments in the reserve positions. No action in progress.

...5...

MALIN CRAIG,
Chief of Staff.

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PART I

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: With the exception of artillery bombardments on our front lines during the night and considerable harassing fire on the roads throughout the whole sector, there was very little activity until the afternoon, at which time, after an artillery preparation, we succeeded in advancing the left of our line to the R.R., and the right of our line to the ROUEN-REIMS Road. During this action the enemy artillery and machine guns were active. Visibility poor; heavy rain in the afternoon.

II. ENEMY FRONT LINE: From W. to E.: N. of the R. R. to BAZOCHEs---along N. bank of the river opposite the center of our sector---then N. E. to the ROUEN-REIMS Road---to a point to the N. of the 202 X coordinate---and to the E. along this road opposite the right of our sector.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

R. H. WILLIAMS,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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Recent Operations of 26th Division

From: Commanding General, I Army Corps, A. E. F.

To: Adjutant General, G. H. Q., A. E. F.

1. Herewith are transmitting reports [not printed], submitted at my direction, by officers of the 26th Division covering the activities of their respective commands during the recent advance from the Marne. I have heretofore refrained from making any report or comment on the operations of this unit other than the daily operations reports of these headquarters. The following comments and suggestions which I deem pertinent are made.
after due consideration of these reports, and are based on my own experience and observation as corps commander.

2. The division sustained its part during a period of the last important operation of the corps which was difficult and exhausting for all concerned, and I give great credit to the men of the division for their achievement. On the whole, their performance was admirable in its result and particularly so in view of the attending tactical difficulties to which I shall allude.

3. Subject always to the requirements of regulating its movement by the progress of the units on its left, primarily as a pivot in the initial stage of the advance, and subject to the necessity for maintaining close liaison with the divisions of both flanks, the 26th Division was under constantly repeated orders to push forward in pursuit of an enemy who was known to be retreating. After the initial stage, the advance was made with a constant change of direction to the left so that finally the operation which began with the 26th Division faced toward the east came to a standstill with the leading unit facing north. Under these circumstances, it is unfortunate that a tendency to question orders should manifest itself and that there was not a spirit of implicit and prompt obedience, in that attacks were seldom or never launched at the prescribed hour. Any confusion or delay incident to the movement involved in the extension of the division front by the 52d Brigade or the 56th Brigade which replaced it (alluded to in the reports), was due to no order for delay either oral or written emanating from the corps commander, who particularly and specifically directed that the forward movement should continue under the governing order which was never annulled but which was suspended until such time as the elements involved should, during the course of the forward progress, reach the point designated for the execution of the order.

4. The necessity for liaison and control of infantry elements in the execution of difficult maneuvers such as were involved during this advance is obvious. While liaison with adjacent divisions was maintained with some reasonable interruptions, a satisfactory liaison between the infantry elements of the division, laterally, or from front to rear, was never established. At no time during the operation was it possible to procure from the division or from the infantry, brigade or regimental commanders a complete or accurate statement as to correct, or even approximately correct, positions of the elements of their respective commands. The confusion and lack of knowledge in the 52d Infantry Brigade commanded by General Cole was particularly noticeable from the evening before the operation commenced until after the division was replaced.

5. I observed a hesitation and lack of keenness in the execution of orders for the pursuit, and my attention was constantly called to the necessity for relief and the state of exhaustion and fatigue of the troops. On the evening of July 22, the division commander sent me an urgent request for immediate reinforcement, in view of the exhausted condition of his troops and the casualties sustained. In the absence of adequate corps reserves, reinforcements (the 56th Brigade) were supplied by the army commander to whom the request of the division commander was referred. Fatigue and exhaustion were natural incidents of the continuous advance, but I am constrained to believe that a spirit of endurance and determination in the officers, particularly the senior officers, would have been instantly reflected by the men in ranks and that this spirit had such been shown by the officers would have sustained them through the hardships of their undertaking. The spirit to which I refer is that which was shown by Major Greenway of the engineer reserve corps, and Colonel D. K. Major, the Chief of Staff of the division, both of whom took charge of advance guards and advanced elements in the vicinity of Epieds and by their determination led forward men at a critical time when the spirit of the men was very low. In my opinion, the action of the division commander in sending his Chief of Staff and a battalion commander of his engineer regiment to lead an advance of this sort was a very proper one and it saved a very difficult situation, but it also shows a distinct reflection on the state of mind of the Commanding General, 52d Brigade and his regimental and battalion commanders.
6. I have advised the division commander that a change in his regimental commanders and the commander of the 52d Brigade should be considered by him in spite of activity and faithfulness which are alleged. The latter did not, in my judgment, exercise proper control over his brigade from the beginning to the end of the operation. It is my belief that the usefulness of the 26th Division as a dependable fighting unit can be restored only after a period of thorough basic training and reconstruction, together with such readjustment or substitution among the officers of higher command as will insure a correction and eradication of the faults above mentioned, together with the instilling of a spirit of obedience and obliteration of personal complaints. It is fair to state, such basic training has never been given this division.

7. The foregoing comments do not obtain in connection with the artillery brigade and no attempt has been made to single out many of the smaller elements to which nothing is due but commendation. The purpose of this communication has to do solely with the consideration of the larger aspect as affecting the usefulness and efficiency of this division of fine individual soldiers.

8. I desire to invite attention particularly to the conduct of Major Greenway, Engineer Reserve Corps. This officer is a natural leader and, in my opinion, he should be in command of an infantry regiment of a combat division. The conduct of Colonel Major was most creditable, as almost without rest this officer bore the burden of staff duty at headquarters and then proceeded to take command of advanced units to further the repeated insistence that orders be carried out.

H. LIGGETT,
Major General, U. S. A.

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181-33.6: Report
3d Section, General Staff

I ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,

Report of Operations of the I Army corps, while serving under the French Sixth Army,
July 4 to Aug. 14, 1918

[Extract]

II. The beginning of the counteroffensive and the advance to EPIEDS. The morning of July 16, orders were received from the French Sixth Army for the execution of the attack which had been previously planned. There were some modifications to correspond with changes in the situation on the front south of the MARNE and the mission of the army. A corps order was prepared, submitted to the army for approval and issued at 5:30 p. m. The Sixth Army supports the attack of the French Tenth Army. Its principal effort, on the left, is sustained by an attack as far south as BOURESCHES with eventual exploitation extending to the MARNE.

The French II Corps with four divisions made the main attack between the OURCQ and the Ru d’ALLAND, the French VII Corps reduced to the 164th Division and the 8th Brigade, American 4th Division, attacked on its right.

The zone of action of the I Corps extended from the corps boundary to BOURESCHES. The axis of attack was northeast, and the objectives the towns of TORCY and BELLEAU. Attacking troops were the 167th Div., with all three regiments in line, and the left brigade of the 26th Division. The exploitation ordered was an eventual advance on the entire corps front in the direction of EPIEDS. (I Corps F. O. 9.)

The withdrawal of the 2d Division to the Tenth Army had left the corps without any considerable reserves. The 1st Battalion Trench Artillery, Cos. B and C, 27th Engineers
(mining) and Cos. B and D, 1st Gas Regt. (30th Engineers), were available. One battalion of the 26th Div. was held out for the first day but remained under orders of the division commander.

The French Ninth Army was formed and took command of the XXXVIII Corps on July 17 relieving the Sixth Army commander of responsibility for anything but the main attack, which was a turning movement pivoting on the right of the I Corps.

The attack began at 4:35 a.m., July 18, without any artillery preparation. Any unusual activity previous to H hour was prohibited. The first advance resulted in the capture of Bois TOUFFU in liaison with the Fr. 133d Regt., which had captured HAUTEVESNES. Other places captured were the Moulin de BUSSIARES, BUSSIARES, TORCY, and BELLEAU.

An army order received at 1 p.m., July 18, stated that the attack on COURCHAMPS was to be resumed and that the I Corps should renew the advance in the neighborhood of LICY-CLIGNON—TORCY—GIVRY—BOURESCHES, and thence along the former front.

The infantry attack was assisted by a general bombardment by corps and divisional artillery of the first lines and occupied zones. Corps artillery at this time included the following: 3 batteries, 155 shorts, 6 batteries 155 longs, 4 batteries 155 G. P. F.

Locally the strongest enemy resistance was at MONTHERS and Hill 193, the former being in the VII Corps sector. The Tenth Army was making a deep advance farther north, and this resistance at best could be only temporary. There was still no certainty however, that a passive resistance on our front would continue.

Accordingly, the Sixth Army order, the evening of July 19, while directing preparations for an attack the next day, stated that troops would be distributed in depth and a line of resistance established to provide for counterattacks and the protection of artillery necessary in such event. F. O. 13, 10 p.m., July 19, directs this arrangement. One company of the 1st Gas Regiment (30th Engineers) was assigned to each division, to assist in defensive work.

As in the stabilized sector, from which the attack started, energetic measures were necessary to obtain this distribution of troops in depth. Throughout the operation, divisions crowded the forward areas unnecessarily. This resulted in tiring troops which might have been in reserve and resting.

The army attack order for July 20 was received at 10 a.m. The corps order (F. O. 15) was issued at 11:20 a.m. The Ninth Army on the right has attacked this morning, and is driving the enemy back to, and across the MARNE. On the left the advance has reached SOMMELANS and Bois PETRET. In conjunction with the VII Corps, the I Corps will attack at 3 p.m.

This marked a distinct change in the situation. The corps was no longer held down to the advance on its left, and was aided by the pressure brought to bear on its right. An attack made so late in the day could not result in any great advance, but the enemy was dislodged on the entire front of the corps. The only important resistance encountered was at Hill 193, on the extreme left of the sector. On the right, the XXXVIII Corps made an unsuccessful attack on Hill 204.

The line at the end of the day extended from MONTHERS to ETREPILLY and thence south to VAUX.

F. O. 16, 1:15 p.m., July 20, directs the advance of corps reserve to the woods north of Ferme PARIS. The two companies of mining engineers (Cos. B and C, 27th Engrs.) at SAACY, were assigned to the corps reserve and ordered to march to the concentration point.

The enemy was commencing to withdraw from the MARNE salient, for his communications were threatened by the advance to SOISSONS and the SOISSONS—CHATEAU-THIERRY Road. The Sixth Army was anxious not to lose contact and ordered that the advance be continued at all costs during the evening and night of July 20/21, to reach the NANTEUIL—CHATEAU-THIERRY Railroad line.

The corps order, F. O. 17, 8 p.m., July 20, directs that each division without reference to units on its flank, push forward to place the main body of the army on the
railroad. One regiment of infantry, without artillery, will form the advance guard of each division. March outposts to be formed: 26th Division at TRUGNY, 167th Division, at EPIEDS.

A second order was issued at 11:30 p. m., July 20, directing that the attack continue the 21st, with mission and plan as previously laid down. Corps headquarters was moved to MONTREUIL-aux-LIONS the morning of the 21st.

The enemy retreated during the night and the next day, north and consequently at an angle to the advance of the corps. The 87th and 201st Divisions were left on the corps front. Once MONTHERYS and Hill 193 were taken, their principal resistance was with machine-gun fire on the CHATEAU-THIERRY--SOISSONS Road.

The 167th Division attacked with two regiments, the 26th Division with both brigades. Corps artillery supported the attack and executed harassing fire on roads and towns. Divisional artillery, which had been on a general line BELLEAU-BOURESCHES the previous day, was mostly on the road moving forward.

The VII Corps on the left and the XXXVIII Corps on the right, both made successful attacks, pushing forward several kilometers in a north easterly direction. CHATEAU-THIERRY was evacuated by the enemy.

At the end of the day the line I'HERMITAGE---BEZU-St-GERMAIN---EPIEDS (exclusive) ---TRUGNY---MONT-St-PERE. This marked the first of the series of positions on which the enemy fought determined delaying action. As there were many divisions which had been moved into the salient for the disastrous attack of July 15, the sector divisions on the west had to hold as long as possible to permit an orderly withdrawal of the shock troops. They were not able to do this alone, despite the fact that the offensive was being made by the French and American troops, which had been in the sector, none of them fresh or rested. Units of the Prussian Guard Divisions were used at EPIEDS and at other positions later on in the retreat.

III. The attack on EPIEDS and the advance to the Foret de FERE.

Field Order 19 was issued at 10:40 p. m., July 21. It covered the successive dispositions for the attack and missions of the divisions for July 22. It was intended that the 26th Division, with brigades in line, should pass through the 167th Division and occupy the entire front of the corps. This front was narrowing with each advance, as the arc of the salient became less and less. The 167th Division was to follow the 26th Division as corps reserve. It was not possible to make this relief and as resistance was encountered which checked further advance, the plan was abandoned.

Corps headquarters was moved to BUIRE less than 10 km. from the line the morning of July 22. Changes in the line during the day were slight. On the left the VII Corps continued its progress east of the SOISSONS Road. On the right the XXXVIII Corps advanced north and captured La CENSE-a-DIEU. The I Corps line was pushed out to join with them near there. Heavy fire of enemy artillery and machine guns were encountered throughout the day. Harassing fire of 77's on the roads greatly hindered movement of troops.

From this time upon the end of the offensive in August, transportation was a very serious problem. As the map clearly shows, there were few good roads and most of these ran crosswise of the sector. It was thought at times that it would be necessary to cut roads through some of the woods in the region through which the corps advanced. Arrangements were made to borrow roads from the French corps on either flank and all possible effort was put forth to change one way or to two way roads.

In anticipation of a breakthrough, several French cavalry divisions were brought up into the back areas. These further complicated the supply problems and use of roads. There was a shortage of transportation for ammunition which was finally relieved in part, by the arrival of a corps artillery park.

The 42d Division began detraining in the region of La FERFE-sous-JOUARRE the night of July 21. It was moved to the forward areas as rapidly as possible to relieve the two divisions in line.

The successful enemy resistance continued July 23. F. O. 20, issued 7:45 p. m.,
July 22, directs an attack at some selected point on the front of each division with the idea of penetrating the enemy lines on a regimental front and exploiting this success vigorously. A ten-minute artillery preparation will precede the attack.

These attacks were made as ordered, but without success. The enemy's system of machine-gun nests delivered a heavy and effective fire.

Sixth Army Order 3580 of July 22, was received. It states that when the FERE-en-TARDENOIS—JAULGONNE Road is reached, the corps in line will be reduced by one and the VII Corps, with 47th and 164th French Divisions, made an army reserve. The I Corps sector will be shifted toward the north, with one division in line. I Corps F. O. 21, July 23, directs the action laid down in the army order. To enable the 26th Division to effect the relief of the 167th Division, the 111th Inf. is put at its disposal as division reserve, for July 23 only.

The 56th Brigade, 28th Division was attached to the corps as corps reserve, permitting the use of the 111th Infantry as laid down in F. O. 21.

These plans were again postponed by the continued heavy resistance and an attack was planned for July 24, with both divisions in line. The 26th Division retained the 111th Infantry and was assigned the remainder of the 56th Brigade for use in the attack. F. O. 22, 7 p. m., July 23, directs the attack in the direction of COURPOIL and BEUVARDES for 4:05 a. m., July 24.

Troops were greatly fatigued. In this connection the endurance of the 167th Division as a small unit continuously in action, is worthy of note. In the stabilized sector at VAUX, and throughout the advance, it held a little less than half the corps line. The remainder was held by the 2d Division from the early part of June until July 9, and by the 26th Division reinforced by the 111th and 112th Regiments (28th Division) until relieved by the 42d Division on July 25. The 167th Division remained in sector from before June 20 until relieved by the 42d Division the night of July 26. It made an attack and captured Le FOUR-a-VERRE the last day it was in line. The strength of the division was approximately 9,000 men - of these not more than 5,000 rifles. There were generally three regiments in line; occasionally one was withdrawn as reserve. At all times one battalion of each regiment was in reserve and resting as well as possible under the circumstances.

The enemy withdrew again July 24, after unsuccessfully counterattacking with the 5th Guard Division at EPIEDS. The fighting around this town had been desperate. It was taken by the 26th Division, retaken by the enemy, subjected to heavy artillery preparation and regained by the American troops the 24th.

The advance was halted the night of the 24th on the line BEAUVARDELL-E-BLEUVARDES (exclusive)--through the Forêt de FERE to Le CHARMEI

The 84th Brigade, 42d Division was assembled at La FERRE the afternoon of July 24, preparatory to a truck move to the region of TRUGNY.

IV. The capture of BEUVARDES and the crossing of the OURCQ.

Important instructions were received from the Sixth Army relative to the strength of reserves and the imperative need for economy in the use of troops. By the night of July 25/26 each corps will have one division, less artillery, in corps reserve; each division in line will have at least three battalions in reserve. The object is to continue the offensive with economy of forces, as no other troops will be available. The mission of the army is to advance to FERE-en-TARDENOIS, with the line of the OURCQ as the first objective.

The next two days hard fighting continued, resulting in the capture of BEUVARDES and an advance into and partly through the Forêt de FERE. F. O. 23 directs dispositions for the night, July 24/25. The brigade of the 42d Division arriving by trucks will pass through the line of the 26th Division to take up pursuit of the enemy the morning of July 25, thus relieving the 56th Brigade (28th Division) and 51st Brigade. The relief was not possible as the 84th Brigade did not arrive at TRUGNY until 6 a. m., July 25.

The 26th and 167th Divisions continued the attack in accordance with F. O. 24. A very distant objective was assigned as directed in the army order. * * *
July 25, the corps on the right and left pushed forward a little. The XI Corps, the left flank corps of the Sixth Army, made an important advance taking OULCHY-la-VILLE, OULCHY-le-CHATEAU and NANTEUIL-NOTRE-DAME. The I Corps advance continued slowly. On the left the town of BEUVARDES was taken and the 167th Division went on into the Foret de FERE. The 26th Division advanced two kilometers to the Jaulgonne---Fere-en-Tardenois Road. Enemy machine-gun and minenwerfer fire was heaviest on this road. Light harassing fire of artillery, especially on the BEUVARDES-COURPOIL Road hindered transport.

The 42d Division relieved the 26th Division during the day. The 56th Brigade (28th Division) remained as reserve for the 42d Division in the Bois de Trugny. The relief was completed at 7 p.m. The following day the 83d Brigade commenced the relief of the 167th Division.

F. O. 25 gives the mission of the I Corps for the attack of July 26. The army is to pivot on the left and continue pressure on the right, inflicting on the enemy the maximum of damage, at the same time conserving our own strength. The I Corps will push steadily to the front and support the advance of the division on its right. Army directions for the retention of one-third of the infantry in repose were incorporated in this order.

The 174th Regiment of the 167th Division made an attack in the direction of Le Four-a-VERRE, taking that place but without further advance. The 84th Brigade attacked at 5 p.m. La CROIX-ROUGE Farm and machine guns along the Jaulgonne Road were taken. The infantry dug in under heavy fire of gas and H. E. shells as they were unable to go into Vente-Jean-Guillaume Woods.

The situation was complicated at this time, insofar as the relation of orders to events is concerned, by the fact that contingent orders were issued. It should be noted that the VII Corps with the 164th Division continued in line until 8 a.m., July 28.

The intentions of the Sixth Army are covered in orders received July 26. The XI Corps will be under the tactical command of the Sixth Army after July 25 in order that operations along both banks of the OURCQ may be coordinated. On and after July 27, the VII Corps will be relieved and go to CROUY-sur-OURCQ. The front will be held by three corps as follows:

- French XXXVIII---American 3d, 32d and 28th Divisions.
- American I Corps---American 26th, 42d and 4th Divisions.
- French II Corps---French 33d, 62d, 52d and 63d Divisions.

Directions for attack for the corps in an advance to be made across the OURCQ are stated in Preparatory Order 3606 [Fr. Sixth Army]. The axis is shifted from northeast to north-northeast.

The last readiness of the enemy west of the OURCQ was made July 27. Artillery carried out considerable harassing fire with gas and H. E. on the Foret de FERE and the roads leading into it from the time of the attack on La CROIX-ROUGE Farm, the evening of July 26, until midnight. Fire then ceased and the batteries were moved back across the OURCQ. Machine-gun fire continued until the early morning of July 27.

Field Order 26, 1:10 a.m., July 27, was issued before it was known that the enemy had evacuated the left bank of the OURCQ. It provides for an attack to seize crossings over the OURCQ commencing the night of July 27/28, from a base of departure established during the day July 27. Troops are to move from both sides of the Foret de FERE avoiding the Chateau de la FORET; no firing to be permitted during the progress of the attack prior to dawn.

The important advance of the XI Corps had had its effect and no resistance was encountered by the 42d Division during its advance July 27. The VII Corps occupied VILLENEUVE and on the right the XXXVIII Corps occupied FRESNES and COURMONT with the French 39th and American 3d Divisions in line from right to left.

This day there were rearrangements of reserves. The 4th Div., less the 7th Brigade, was ordered to go to the Bois de BONNES the morning of the 28th. The 7th Brigade was at GRISOLLES. The 55th Brigade (28th Division) came into line as the left unit of the
XXXVIII Corps. The 56th Brigade remained as I Corps reserve. The 26th Division, worn out by ten days' hard fighting was concentrated at ETREPILLY for rest and refitting. Its experience while in the line demonstrated clearly the necessity for a supervision by the higher command of the use of infantry battalions and a well organized system of maneuver to prevent smaller units escaping from divisional control.

The attack to seize the heights north of the OURCQ was covered in F. O. 27, 10 p. m., July 27. Objectives were the supposed enemy line of resistance from FERE-en-TARDENOIS to SERINGES-et-NErLES to Hill 230 (north of CIERGES). Advance guards were to follow the enemy but the main body of the infantry was not to advance beyond the northern fringes of the Forét de FERE before H hour. Artillery was directed to take positions close to the edges of the woods prepared to bombard the enemy positions described above. No firing was permitted until dawn.

The 42d Division attacked the morning of July 28 with both brigades in line. The elements on the left passed through the 164th Division. The 55th Brigade under the XXXVIII Corps had relieved those units of the 42d Division in the former I Corps sector. All four regiments were in line; from right to left the 168th, 167th, 165th and 166th. The infantry forced the OURCQ and by 10:30 a. m., all regiments had units on the north bank. After a heavy counterattack by the enemy the American position was on the slope of the hill northeast of SERGy. Possession of the town was disputed after it had been taken and lost three times. The MEURCY Farm on the left marked the farthest penetration of the enemy position on the 28th.

The II Corps advanced in its new sector about five kilometers taking FERE-en-TARDENOIS station and the south edge of the town itself. The enemy position on their front was very strong. Hill 184 and the woods north of FERE-en-TARDENOIS were entrenched positions with many machine-gun nests.

The 55th Brigade made the attack in the XXXVIII Corps sector advancing 2 1/2 kilometers and taking La MOTIE Farm and RONCHERES.

The position along the right bank of the OURCQ represents the third effort of the enemy to seriously delay or if possible check permanently the threatening advance of the Allied forces. The continuation of this position to the left above FERE-en-TARDENOIS as described and the right of the corps sector at CIERGES and through the Bois MEUNIERE to the south made it very strong.

V. The attack north of the OURCQ and the advance to the VESLE River.

Corps headquarters was moved to MOUCHETON-Chateau at noon the 28th. Roads were a very serious problem. The Sixth Army took account of this fact in the Operations Order No. 3619 received July 28. No corps artillery is to be moved forward and all trains will be left behind until further orders. The 28th Division is attached to the French XXXVIII Corps and the 4th Division is attached to the I Corps.

It was still thought that a breakthrough was possible and the French I Cavalry Corps and the French 6th Cavalry Division were held in close reserve ready to form the advance guard of the army as soon as an opening was made for them.

The corps action in this event was covered by F. O. 28, 2 a. m., July 28. Contingent upon an enemy retreat from the OURCQ, corps in line will press forward the advance guards to reach the VESLE the night of the 28th. This action was to be independent of though, of course, facilitated by the cavalry advance.

The American 4th Division was moved to the Bois du CHATELET.

The attack of July 29 in accordance with F. O. 29 was made at 3:40 a. m., with objectives CHERY-CHARTREUVE---BRUYS. The exposed position of 42d Division on the slopes north of the OURCQ made it imperative to advance as artillery fire with direct observation was causing heavy casualties.

After hard fighting the 83d Brigade, in coordination with the French took SERINGES-et-NErLES. MEURCY Farm was disputed and on the right SERGy was held by American troops. Enemy counterattacks were frequent during the day. The 4th Guard Division, which had
been reported on the corps front the previous day, was used for these assaults.

Fighting of much the same nature continued the next day. It was particularly heavy in the region of CIERGES. The line was advanced about one kilometer.

At this time the French high command apparently abandoned the idea of breaking the enemy’s line. The I Cavalry Corps was ordered to move south of the MARNE. The army was already considering the possibility of an enemy offensive. Special instructions 3640, July 30. Corps commanders are warned against a possible counteroffensive. To prevent a success of such an action a defensive position is laid down on the general line LOUPEIGNÉ ---MAREUIL-en-DOLE---DRAVEGNY, which, when attained, will be occupied by the main body of attacking troops. Advance guards only will be pushed beyond this point.

This position was not actually attained until August 2, but the construction of a defensive position was immediately begun when it was reached. In the meantime a position was started in the Foret de FERE, construction work being carried on by units of the 4th Division.

Orders were received for a general attack at daylight, July 31. It became apparent at this time that to break the enemy’s resistance the weight of the attack must be in the region of CIERGES and farther south and east. The French III Corps was put under the Sixth Army on July 31. It had been in line on the right of the XXXVII Corps.

F. O. 31, 12:30 a.m., July 31, directs the attack. It is to be a combined operation by the 42d Division and the left division of the XXXVIII Corps. The 7th Brigade, 4th Division, is assigned as reserve 42d Division. The remainder of the 4th Division constitutes corps reserve.

The problem of machine-gun nests became so serious in the attacks along the OURCQ that the Sixth Army issued • • • “Tactical Instructions - Means for overcoming the Enemy’s Machine-Gun Defense.” • • •

The corps line was practically unchanged at the end of the day, but the situation was greatly improved by the taking of CIERGES by the XXXVIII Corps in cooperation with the French III Corps, which moved forward through the Bois de MEUNIERE.

August 1, the same conditions obtained - determined resistance by the enemy - an effort to break his line by an attack of the XXXVIII Corps and the right brigade 42d Division meeting with small success. The artillery brigade of the 26th Division was still in sector, supporting one brigade of the 42d Division. The organic artillery of the 42d Division supported the other infantry brigade.

Field Order 33, 2:30 p.m., August 1, directs the relief of the 42d Division by the 4th Division, relief to take place the night of August 2/3 under control of the C. G., 42d Division.

The resistance on August 1, marked the last effort of the enemy to hold the OURCQ position. His efforts to drive the 42d Division to the left bank of the river and to prevent the advance of the French XXXVIII and III Corps had been unsuccessful. A general retirement to the line of the VESLE began directly.

August 2, the 42d Division advanced steadily all day, meeting some resistance but never checked for any length of time. The infantry brigades of the 4th Division moved out from the Foret de FERE at 5 p.m. and across the OURCQ in two columns, the 7th Brigade on the left, the 8th Brigade on the right, advancing on the east and west of the Foret de NESLES. The front line at night was southeast from MAREUIL-en-DOLE (inclusive) to PARIY Farm.

The 4th Division passed through the 42d Division and continued its advance toward the VESLE August 3. The 42d Division was withdrawn to the region of ARTOIS Farm as corps reserve.

Field Order 36, 11:45 a.m., August 3, directs that the 4th Division continue the pursuit to the VESLE and send across an advance guard to form a bridgehead.

St-THIBAUT was captured at 8:30 a.m., August 4, and the line that night ran along the VESLE River. The enemy resistance was sufficient to prevent patrols from crossing to the north bank.
VI. The organization of the position on the VESLE and the relief of the I Corps.

When the VESLE was reached and the enemy dislodged from the south bank of the river, the main offensive was ended.

The MARNE salient no longer existed. It was hoped that the enemy could be driven from the high plateau between the VESLE and the AISNE. Determined efforts were made to accomplish this result. The I Corps established bridgeheads and finally held the entire north bank of the VESLE on its front, despite counterattacks and heavy fire of enemy artillery. The effort to gain the VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES plateau was finally abandoned. However, outposts were maintained north of the VESLE and a defensive position on the south bank organized.

The corps moved its P. C. from MOUCHETON-Chateau to FERE-en-TARDENOIS at 8 a. m., August 5. At the same time it took over the French 62d Division and corps troops of the French II Army Corps and with them occupied the II Corps sector in the line. The 52d Division which had been reserve of the II Corps was put under the general direction of the C. G., I Corps for its forward movement.

The day was not marked by important activity on either side. There was infiltration by small groups of both American 4th and French 62d Divisions across the VESLE. The enemy checked the advance of larger units by a heavy machine gun and artillery fire along the river.

The corps sector extended from VILLESAVOYE to La CENDRIERE. The 4th Division on the right had one regiment of each brigade in line, the 62d Division on the left had one regiment in line and two in reserve. The 4th Division was supported by the artillery brigades of the 4th and 42d Divisions.

On the right of the corps two changes had been made. On August 4 the American III Corps relieved the French XXXVIII Corps staff. Divisions and corps troops remained in place. The next day the American III Corps took over the sector held by the French III Corps, and with it assumed command of the French 4th Div. and corps troops of the French III Corps.

The mission of the corps for August 6 is covered in F. O. 37, 10:45 p. m., August 5. The army plan had been changed slightly. Advance guards were originally to form bridgeheads on the line VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES to permit passage of the main body across the VESLE and then advance to the north slopes of the plateau. By this order advance guards were directed to remain on the bridgehead positions and the main body should form the more distant advance guards.

Both divisions attacked at 4 p. m., August 6, supported by an artillery barrage. At night, advance elements held the line of the railroad east and west from BAZOCHES.

The next two days were uneventful. Troops in the forward areas were subjected to heavy harassing fire and the corps and divisional artillery were replying with continuous counterbattery and reprisal fire. A slight advance was made by the 62d Division.

At 1 p. m., August 8, the plan for organization of the ground, F. O. 41, was issued.

On August 10, the enemy plan for the relief of the I Corps was received. By it the army zone was to be held by the French XI and American III Corps after August 13. The 4th and 62d Divisions were to be relieved by the American 77th Division.

The 77th Division started to move by truck from COULOMMIERS, where it had detrained August 7, to the I Corps area, and the 42d Division commenced its march to CHATEAU-THIERRY. The 26th Division was in the region of La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE where it had been carrying out a training program after its move from Etrepilly. It began entraining August 11 for a rest area preparatory to entering the line for the St-MIHIEL offensive.

On August 11 the 77th Division commenced the relief of the French 62d and American 4th Divisions, in accordance with I Corps F. O. 42. The relief was completed August 12.

I Corps Headquarters was closed at FERE-en-TARDENOIS at 8 a. m., August 13, at which time command of the 77th Division passed to the American III Corps. Headquarters
were reestablished at La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE the same day and remained there until August 18. They were then moved to DOULEVANT-le-CHATEAU in the 18th Training Area and the corps came under control of the American First Army.

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American 4th Division
July 23 - August 6, 1918

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204-32.1: Order

Regrouping

FIELD ORDERS
No. 12
Bourneville-Chateau, Aisne, July 23, 1918 --- 12:30 a. m.

[Extract]

1. The 4th Division will be regrouped as a reserve for the Sixth Army and will be stationed within the zone MARIZY-St-MARD---BONNES---HAUTE-VESNES---BRUMETZ---St-QUENTIN
   ---MARIZY-Ste-GENEVIEVE.
2. The movements of divisional units *** will be completed by 6 p. m., July 23, 1918.

7. The P. C. of the commanding general will be at BOURNEVILLE-Chateau after 10 a. m., July 23, 1918.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

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7th Brigade to Vicinity of La Croix

FIELD ORDERS
No. 13 1/2
Bourneville-Chateau, Aisne, July 14, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In accordance with instructions contained in S. O. 3593, Fr. Sixth Army dated July 24, 1918, the 7th Brigade (less the 47th Inf. and hq. and 2 companies, 11th Machine
Gun Battalion) will proceed, by marching, to the vicinity of La CROIX and occupy, in the sector of the II Corps, the crest south of MONTIGNY-Chateau (between La CROIX and ROCOURT).

2. The movement will be terminated by 8 a.m. July 25, 1918. * * *

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GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

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204-32.1: Field Order

58th Infantry to XI Corps

FIELD ORDERS
No. 14

4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Bourneville-Chateau, Aisne, July 25, 1918.

[Extract]

1. In accordance with instructions contained in Order 3597, Sixth Army dated July 25, 1918, the 58th Infantry is placed at the disposal of the XI Army Corps for the purpose of holding, as a second line, the crest GEROMENIL Fme and the crest south down to the OURCQ.

2. The change of station will be accomplished by marching. The head of the column will be at the CHATEAU [de] PRINGY (2 kilometers N. E. of NEUILLY-St-FRONT) at 6 a.m., July 25, 1918. * * *

3. Route: NEUILLY-St-FRONT, Station of NEUILLY-St-FRONT.

4. Administrative details will be arranged with G-1.

5. P. C. XI Army Corps: Chateau of MAUCREUX.
   P. C. 58th Infantry: BILLY-sur-OURCQ.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

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204-32.1: Order

58th Infantry Returned to 4th Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 15

4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Bourneville-Chateau, Aisne, July 26, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Under authority contained in Order No. 3.604, Sixth Army, dated July 26, 1918, the 58th Infantry is returned to the control of the Commanding General, 4th Division.

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GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

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Concentration of Division

FIELD ORDER 4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 17 Artois Farm, 3 km. N. E. of Epieds, Aisne, July 29, 1918—1 a.m.

[Extract]

1. The 7th Brigade reverts to the control of the Commanding General, 4th Division.
2. The 4th Division will be concentrated in the southeastern portion of the Bois du CHATELET.

* * * * *

5. The movement will be completed by 12 noon, July 29, 1918.

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7. P. C. - 7th Brigade - GRISOLLES.
   P. C. - 8th Brigade - Le CHARME.
   P. C. - 4th Division - ARTOIS Farm (3 kilometers N. E. of EPIEDS.)

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.
Construction of Centers of Resistance

FIELD ORDERS

No. 21

[Extract]

4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Artois Farm, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

1. The enemy still appears to possess reserves which may enable him to carry out a counteroffensive.

2. The 4th Division will immediately prepare a defensive position along the northern and eastern edges of Foret de FERE, by organizing a series of centers of resistance.

8. P. C. 4th Division - No change.
   P. C. 39th Infantry - vicinity of Le FOUR-a-VERRE.
   P. C. 11th M. G. Bn. - Vicinity of Le FOUR-a-VERRE.
   P. C. battalion to be designated by C. O., 39th Infantry and their location notified to these headquarters.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

7th Brigade to 42d Division

FIELD ORDERS

No. 22

4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Artois Farm, Aisne, July 31, 1918.

1. Pursuant to instructions, Headquarters I Army Corps, the 7th Brigade is placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, 42d Division. The brigade commander will report to the Commanding General, 42d Division, for instructions.

P. C. 8th Brigade: Le PLESSIER Farm
P. C. 58th Brigade: Le FOUR-a-VERRE.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.
Relief of 42d Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 23

[Extract]

1. The 4th Division will relieve the 42d Division, in accordance with the provisions of General Orders No. 53, Hq. 42d Division, dated August 1, 1918.

2. The 7th and 8th Brigades will divide the corps sector; the 8th Brigade on the right, the 7th Brigade on the left.

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   P. C. 4th Division: At ARTOIS Farm, closes at 9 p.m. and opens at Chateau de la FORET at the same hour.
   P. C. 7th Infantry Brigade: SERINGES-et-NESLES.
   P. C. 8th Infantry Brigade: SERGY.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

Plans for Pursuit

FIELD ORDERS
No. 24

Maps: FERE-en-TARDENOIS, FISMES, CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud: 1:20,000

1. The enemy is retiring across the VESLE. Troops on the left are already at the VESLE. Those on our right are also in close pursuit.

2. This division will immediately organize a strong advance guard, (each brigade in its own sector) consisting of all arms and pursue boldly. The artillery of each brigade to consist of at least two batteries well supplied with ammunition. This advance guard will cross the VESLE and form a bridgehead in advance of the line VAUXCERE-—BLANZY-les-FISMES. The right boundary of our sector will pass through PERLES. For these operations, one troop of French cavalry is assigned to each brigade. The Commanding Officer, 4th Engineers, will send at once, one company of engineers to report to the Commanding General, 7th Brigade, at SERINGES and one company to the Commanding General, 8th Brigade at NESLES.

3. The main body will be handled more cautiously, so as to avoid hostile artillery fire and will not, until further orders, advance beyond the general line, marked by the line passing through Hills 204.8 [?] and 210.

4. The 51st Artillery Brigade will be placed in position by the brigade commander to defend the line, Hills 204.8 and 210. Locations of regiments and P. C.'s to be reported to these headquarters.
DOLE--CHERY-CHARTREUVE AREA
Looking northeast from vicinity of Mareuil-en-Dole
The 67th Artillery Brigade will take over the duties heretofore assigned to both the 51st and 67th Artillery Brigades. The Commanding General, 67th Artillery Brigade will assign one regiment of 75's to each of the infantry brigades. The regiment of 155's will be controlled by the artillery brigade commander, under orders from these headquarters.


P. C. 7th Brigade: MAREUIL-en-DOLE.
P. C. 8th Brigade: DOLE.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

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204-35.75: Field Message

Advance Guard

4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

Chateau de la Foret, Aisne, August 3, 1918.

Message from C. G., 4th Division to C. G., 7th Brigade

Under instructions from Chief of Staff, I Army Corps, you will send forward the advance guard prescribed in Field Order No. 24 without artillery.

If artillery is available, it should be brought up to a position where it can protect the column after it has crossed the river. The corps order has not yet been received, but by telephone I understand it directs that the movement be made early tonight. The bridge in front of St.-THIBAUT is reported to be intact.

In case of a failure, the repetition of the effort will be made under artillery preparation at 3:30 a.m. tomorrow. I will send you a copy of the corps order as soon as received, but the column should not delay after 9 p. m., whether this order is received or not.

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

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204-32.1: Order

51st Field Artillery Brigade Relieved

FIELD ORDERS

No. 26

Map: FERE-en-TARDENOIS  ) 1:20,000
      FISMES  )

[Extract]

1. The 51st F. A. Brigade, now in positions of surety along the line Hill 204.8
   [?]---Hill 210, will leave their positions at midnight of August 4/5, and will proceed by
marching to the vicinity of PREAUX Fme for regroupment. All movements north of the River OURCQ will be completed before dawn. Upon the arrival at PREAUX Fme the command of this brigade will pass to the C. G., 26th Division.

2. On the night of Aug. 5/6, the *** elements of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade will take up filial positions with *** elements of the 67th Field Artillery Brigade. ***

* * * * *

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

204-32.1: Order

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 27

4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mareuil-en-Dole, Aisne, August 6, 1918—12:40 a. m.

Maps: FISMES, CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud: 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. Our efforts to cross the VESLE have developed strongly organized hostile machine-gun nests and minenwerfer fire from concealed positions along our entire front. The hostile artillery has been active.

Patrols from our forces have been across the VESLE, but could not advance beyond the railroad north of the river.

2. All troops north of the VESLE have been ordered to withdraw to the south side of the river during the night August 5/6, 1918.

3. ARTILLERY: From H-4 hours (H hour to be notified later) the artillery will carry out fire of destruction on the town of BAZOCHES and HAUTE-MAISON and all probable machine gun and minenwerfer positions in the sector north of the VESLE as far as Line 288.

At H hour a barrage with 75's will be put down on railroad north of the VESLE and remain there until H minus 30 minutes when it will be advanced to a line 300 meters north of the railroad where it will rest until H plus 1 hour and be advanced to the ROUEN-REIMS Route Nationale No. 31, where it will rest until H plus 1 hour and 15 minutes when it will be advanced to a line 200 meters north of the ROUEN-REIMS Route Nationale No. 31 where it will rest until H plus 1 hour and 40 minutes and then cease until the infantry signals for a barrage.

During the entire advance certain battalions will be designated to carry on a combing fire on the wooded areas north of the ROUEN-REIMS Route Nationale No. 31. When the heavy artillery fire on BAZOCHES and HAUTE-MAISON ceases, fire from these guns will be put down on PERLES and VAUXCERE and any other targets that may present themselves.

4. INFANTRY: At H minus 30 minutes troops which are to advance across the VESLE will be in position as near as possible to points selected by brigade commanders for crossing the river.

At H plus 30 minutes the crossing of the VESLE will begin and troops placed in position on the south side of the railroad embankment.
At H plus 1 hour the line will advance from the railroad to the south side of ROUEN-REIMS Route Nationale No. 31 where they will dig in.

* * * * *

GEO. H. CAMERON,
Major General, N. A.

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204-33.6: Special Operations Report

4th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
December 28, 1918.

SECOND BATTLE OF THE MARNE

July 18 to August 12, 1918

[Extract]

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FIRST PHASE

The division did not operate as a tactical unit during the first period. The elements of the division were attached to various French units and operated directly under the command of the French. In this manner three of the four infantry regiments were in the front line when the Allied counteroffensive was started July 18 and one regiment was in immediate reserve. Although this was the first time these organization had been under fire, their boldness in attack contributed in no small degree to the unqualified successes of these French divisions during the first part of this engagement.

Throughout this period the division, less the 7th Brigade, was attached to and operated under orders of the French VII Army Corps. The 7th Brigade similarly was attached to and operated under orders of the French VII Army Corps. During this time no organization larger than a regiment functioned as a tactical unit and in most cases battalions were sent into action with French regiments.

The French Sixth Army was composed of three army corps. From left to right these corps consisted of the French II and VII, and the American I Corps. The front line of the army extended on July 17 from a point on the SAVIERES River approximately half-way between FAVEROLLES and ANCIENVILLE in a general southerly and southeasterly direction to VAUX, west of CHATEAU-THIERRY. The front line of the II Corps extended to a point south of DOMMARD, and that of the VII Corps from this point to a point southeast of HAUTEVESNES.

The only infantry regiment of the 4th Division that was not in the front lines was the 47th Infantry. The 47th Infantry, two companies of the 4th Engineers, and two companies of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion were held in reserve to defend a position extending from VARINFROY to RIVIERE. The balance of the 4th Engineers also worked on defensive positions.

The French II Corps Sector: In the sector of the II Corps the 39th Infantry was placed under orders of the French 33d Division and on the afternoon of July 16, 1918, received orders to relieve French troops then in the line. This relief was nearing completion on the night of July 17/18 when orders were received to attack at 8 a. m., July 18. The attack was made in accordance with plans and all objectives were taken by 3 p. m.,
after which the regiment took NOROY, which according to plans was to have been taken by
the French.

At 4 a.m., July 19, the regiment again advanced, taking its three successive objec-
tives as ordered. At about 5 a.m., July 19, the regiment received orders to withdraw
from the line upon its relief by French troops, which was done during the night of July
19/20. The 39th Infantry took up a position in support.

Two companies of the 11th Machine Gun Battalion were attached to battalions of the
39th Infantry throughout these operations.

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The French VII Corps Sector: In the sector of the VII Corps the 58th Infantry, 59th
Infantry, and 12th Machine Gun Battalion were attached to various units of the French
164th Infantry Division. The infantry battalions were used as tactical units, and the
12th Machine Gun Battalion and regimental machine gun companies were so distributed that
each battalion had one machine gun company attached to it. The four engineer companies
were distributed with the attacking troops for the organization of the conquered terrain.
The 10th Machine Gun Battalion was placed in reserve for the 164th Division.

The units of the 4th Division arrived in the sector on the night of July 16/17. The
58th Infantry was placed with the attacking troops. Two battalions of the 59th were
placed as safety garrison of the position of resistance and one battalion in reserve for
the army corps at MARNOU-la-POTERIE. These reserve battalions were sent forward on
July 19.

On July 18, at 4:35 a.m., without artillery preparation, the French and American
troops advanced to the attack after a fire of smoke shells. HAUTEVESNES was taken at
5 a.m., COURCHAMPS about 11 a.m.

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INTERMEDIATE OPERATIONS

After the units of the division were relieved from duty with the two French corps,
the division, from July 22 to 24, was regrouped as reserve for the French Sixth Army in
the zone MARIZY-St-MARD---BONNES---HAUTEVESNES---BRUMETZ---St-QUENTIN---MARIZY-
Ste-GENEVIEVE.

On July 24, the 7th Brigade was placed under orders of the French VII Army Corps.
During the night of July 24/25, the 47th Infantry marched to the Bois du CHATELET and was
assigned the task of mopping up this forest. This was done. The 39th Infantry, having
been attached to the French II Army Corps, marched to the vicinity of La CROIX and took
up a position between La CROIX and ROCOURT.

On July 25 the 58th Infantry was placed at the disposal of the French XI Army Corps,
and on the night of the 25th/26th marched to just west of OULCHY-la-VILLE and went into
position. Here they remained until the night of July 26/27, when they marched to BRUMETZ,
again coming under control of the 4th Division Commander.

The division passed under the control of the American I Army Corps on July 28.
On July 29 the division was again assembled in the Bois du CHATELET.

Two battalions of the 47th Infantry were placed July 29 at the disposal of the
Commanding General, 42d Division, which was then in the front line. These two bat-
talions participated in the offensive of the 42d Division on July 30, crossing the OURCQ
and attacking SERGY. The losses were extremely heavy - about 50% of the strength. On
July 31 they were relieved by the 39th Infantry which in turn operated with the 84th
Brigade, 42d Division, until August 2.
MONT-ST-MARTIN--ST-THIBAUT AREA
Looking south-southwest from Bazoches
On July 31 and August 1 the different units of the 7th Brigade and 4th Engineers worked on a line of security running through the Foret de FERE.

The division, on the night of August 1/2, moved up to the Foret de FERE and prepared to enter actively into the engagement.

SECOND PHASE - THE VESLE OPERATION

In the second phase of this battle the 4th Division operated as a tactical unit. The division had been assigned to the American I Army Corps, which in turn was a part of the French Sixth Army. While the 42d Division was in the line the 4th Division was following in immediate reserve.

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Epitome of Events: During the night of August 2/3 the 4th Division relieved the 42d Division in the front line running east and west through Foret de NESLES and during the day of August 3 advanced to the heights south of the VESLE. * * *

During the night of August 3/4 and the day of August 4, the division advanced to the south bank of the VESLE, where it was held by intense artillery and machine-gun fire. No enemy infantry was observed. Despite strong opposition one regiment of each brigade was pushed forward to the river. During the night these regiments were subjected to heavy gas attacks.

The artillery moved forward to new positions and carried on interdiction and harassing fire on towns and crossroads north of the VESLE. Considerable activity was displayed by enemy artillery, firing on our troops, towns, woods, and roads with gas and high explosive shells from 77’s, 105’s, and minenwerfers.

During the night of August 4/5 and the day of August 5 small groups crossed to the northern bank of the VESLE. Progress was slow and difficult, and strong opposition by machine guns and artillery prevented deep penetration. Determined resistance by artillery was opposed to all attempts to cross the river. The enemy did not expose himself to view. Only one opportunity was given to fire on German troops, when a platoon passed along a path visible for a short distance.

The 51st F. A. Brigade was relieved during the night of August 4/5.

During the nights of August 5/6 and 6/7 the 4th Field Artillery Brigade entered the line by taking up filial positions with the units of the 67th Field Artillery Brigade.

All infantry north of the VESLE was withdrawn during the night of Aug. 5/6 to await artillery preparation. After such preparation and preceded by a barrage, the infantry started to advance at 4:30 p. m., August 6. The 58th Infantry (on the right of the division sector) gained its objective along the SOISSONS-REIMS Road, but the 39th Infantry on the left came under intense artillery and machine-gun fire and was unable to cross the VESLE.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Hersey:

C. A. BACH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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OPERATIONS
OF THE
AMERICAN 4TH DIVISION
IN THE AISNE-MARNE
18-22 JULY 1918

MAP No 78
American 26th Division
July 18 - August 7, 1918

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226-32.1: Order

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 51
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918—12:30 a. m.

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

G-3, 121

MAPS: Extract from CHATEAU-THIERRY,
SAINTE-AULDE, CONDE-en-BRIE,
OULCHY-le-CHATEAU.

SCALE: 1/20,000.

[Extract]

1. The Sixth Army attacks between the OURCQ and the Ru-d'ALLAND, in conjunction with the Tenth Army to its left, with the object of taking the enemy in reverse between CHATEAU-THIERRY and REIMS.
2. The I Corps, on the right of the Sixth Army, attacks between Bois-en-CROISSANT and BOURESCHES (exclusive).
   Order of Battle from right to left: 26th Division, French 167th Division.
3. Action of the 167th Division:
   Intermediate Objective: The enemy outpost.
   First Objective: Woods S. E. of HAUTEVESNES.
4. Action of the 26th Division: The 52d Infantry Brigade will attack on the line, BOURESCHES (exclusive), to the left of the division sector (inclusive).
   The 51st Infantry Brigade will stand fast and await orders. It will be prepared to take part in the attack.
5. Zone of action of the 26th Division:
   Left Limit: TORCY---GIVRY---Les BRUSSES Farm---St-ROBERT Farm (all to 26th Division.)
   Right Limit: VAUX (R. R. bridge)---VINCELLES (exclusive)---Les CHESNEAUX (exclusive.)
6. Objective of the 26th Division:
   First Objective: TORCY---BELLEAU---GIVRY Railroad from GIVRY to BOURESCHES (exclusive).
7. All troops will be in position before daylight on J day.
   Parallel of departure: Present outpost line.
   Attack will take place on J day, at H hour, when the infantry will move forward.

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By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

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26th Division to Guide Left

No. 1

TO: C. G., 52d Infantry Brigade

1. The 167th Division have occupied LICY-CLIGNON. The division to its left has occupied COURCHAMPS.
   It is understood that your brigade has reached the first objective -TORCY---GIVRY---railroad from GIVRY to BOURESCHES.
2. As part of the general plan of operation you are reminded that the guide for the 26th Division is left. You will therefore keep in close liaison with the 167th Division and advance abreast of it.
3. The left limit of the zone of action of your brigade is TORCY---GIVRY---Les BRUSSES Farm---St-ROBERT Farm (all to your brigade).

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel,
Chief of Staff.

226-33.1: Operations Report

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, July 18, 1918.

From 6 p. m. July 17, to 6 p. m. July 18

1. VISIBILITY: Poor in early morning, later fair.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: 52d Inf. Brig. attack complete success.
3. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: 51st Inf. Brig. quiet.
       52d Inf. Brig. - Night quiet, troops concentrating in zone of advanced posts.
At 4:35 o'clock brigade attacked. A heavy mist concealed our troops who advance rapidly. The enemy's advanced posts were taken by surprise and overrun. Continuing the advance TORCY and later BELLEAU were taken. A stiff resistance was met with at GIVRY where fighting took place for a short time. Our troops drove out the Germans and pursued them, some in their enthusiasm advancing beyond the limits of the sector up Hill 193, and had to be recalled. At about 10 o'clock we held the line TORCY north of BELLEAU-BOURESCHES. Railroad station was taken by the troops on the left of the 51st Inf. Brigade. The whole of the first objective was thus rapidly gained. The German casualties are underdetermined, but were severe. 32 prisoners passed through the divisional cage.

Our lines at the close of this report are as follows: 51st Inf. Brig. - no change except extreme left which occupied BOURESCHES Station. 52d Inf. Brig. BOURESCHES Station---Railroad---GIVRY---TORCY.
(b) Germans: Except for unsuccessful resistance to our attack there was very little activity.

4. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: Beginning 4:35 o'clock bombardments were delivered on the areas around TORCY and BELLEAU. About 5 o'clock, at request of C. G. 52d Inf. Brig., C. P. O. [Counter Offensive Preparation] was delivered opposite right of the brigade. All during remainder of day an interdictory fire has been kept up against hostile troop concentrations. There was the normal harassing.
   (b) German: Usual harassing. There was very little reaction to the attack, the only thing being bombardments of moderate intensity against TORCY, BELLEAU and old zone of advanced posts of the 52d Inf. Brig and the old zone of advanced posts of the 51st Inf. Brig.

5. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) American: Aeroplanes were active, liaison with the infantry and with headquarters being maintained.
   (b) German: Diminished flying. A few observation balloons were up.

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W. S. BOWEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

226-20.1: Intelligence Summary

2d Section, General Staff
No. 96

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne

July 18 to July 19, 1918.
20 h. to 20 h.

[Extract]

I. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Very quiet. During the night there was some intensive machine-gun fire from the hostile lines northwest of BOURESCHES. Considerable movement of troops in back areas during the day. Balloons and airplanes active.

* * * * *

IV. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY:
   (a) Infantry: The only infantry activity against our lines consisted of machine-gun fire from the German lines northwest of BOURESCHES and some patrolling along the new line to which the enemy was forced to retire yesterday. Early this morning a sergeant and a private of the 2d Company, 347th Regiment, 87th Division, were captured from one of these patrols on the north edge of BELLEAU, while they were trying to establish whether our troops were occupying the village.

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S. T. MACKALL,
Major, General Staff,
A. C. of S., G-2.

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- 502 -
Continuation of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 54
G-3, 125

MAP: Extract from CHATEAU-THIERRY)
Ste-AULDE, CONDE-en-BRIE ) Scale: 1/20,000
OULCHY-le-CHATEAU )

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Field Orders 13, I Army Corps, July 19, 1918, 22 o'clock, the Corps will resume the attack this date at H hour, which will be communicated later. This division attacks when the 167th Division has come abreast of it. In carrying out the attack you are again informed that the progress of each unit must be regulated by the progress of the units on its left.

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By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 55
G-3, 126

MAP: MEAUX: 1/80,000

[Extract]

2. Our corps attacks at 15 o'clock today.

3. The 26th Division attacks simultaneously, on the entire division front, in conjunction with the French 167th Division on our left and the French XXXVIII Corps on our right.

4. First Objective: Woods one-half kilometer north of Les BRUSSES Farm---Les BRUSSES Farm---Hill 190---La GONETRIE Farm---Hill 201---Point 192.
   Second Objective: St-ROBERT Farm---SOUILLARD Farm---Hill 226---VINCHELLES (exclusive).
5. **ZONE OF ACTION OF 26th DIVISION:**

Northern limit: GIVRY---woods one-half kilometer north of Les BRUSSES Farm---Point 128, 1 kilometer east of Les BRUSSES Farm---St-ROBERT Farm---La PENONERIE Farm (all to 26th Division).

Southern limit: VAUX---BLANCHARD Farm---Point 190 at FARSOY Farm---Chateau north of VERDILLY.

6. Limit between brigades: La GONETRIE Farm---Bois du GRAND-Ru---Bois de la SACERIE (all to 51st Brigade).

7. In moving from first objective to second objective, the division will be guided by the movements of the French 167th Division on our left and the French 39th Division on our right.

8. Artillery preparation will begin at 13:30 o'clock, in accordance with plans already prepared by the Commanding General, 51st Artillery Brigade.

9. The divisional machine gun battalion will await orders in its present position. The divisional reserve will await further orders. The engineers will await further orders. Detachments will be detailed to repair roads and remove obstacles in the zone of action as the division progresses.

10. Axes of liaison and P. C.'s unchanged.

By Command of Major General EDWARDS:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

226-32.11: Orders

**Artillery Support**

51st FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Genevriots Farm. Aisne, July 20, 1918.

OPERATIONS ORDER

No. 241

(Supplemental)

1. Field Order No. 15, I Army Corps, has slightly changed the limits of the divisional zone of attack.

2. The north boundary is as follows: GIVRY (to 26th Div.)---woods 1/2 km. north of Les BRUSSES Farm (all to 26th Div.)---Point 128 (1 km. east of Les BRUSSES Farm---St-ROBERT Farm---La PENONERIE Farm).

   The south boundary is as follows: VAUX---BLANCHARD Farm---Point 190 at FARSOY Farm---Chateau north of VERDILLY.
5. The 26th Division will take the following points: Woods 1/2 km. north of Les BRUSSES Farm, Les BRUSSES Fme and Woods, Hill 190, La GONETRIE Fme and Hill 201.

By command of Brigadier General Aultman:

W. B. LUTHER,
Captain, Field Artillery,
Operations.

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226-33.1: Operations Report

G-3

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, July 20, 1918.

From 6 p. m. July 19 to 6 p. m. July 20

1. VISIBILITY: Good.
2. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS: Division attack success.
3. INFANTRY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: At 3 p. m. the whole division attacked. Severe fighting took place all afternoon, our men gaining ground continuously. At time of closing of this report we held approximately the following line; west part of ETREPILLY---Bois d'ETREPILLY---La GONETRIE Farm---La HAZMARDIERE.
   (b) German: There was a great deal of machine-gun firing. During the attack this was especially severe. [Les] PETITS Bois, Bois des ROCHETS and Hill 204 were places from which came terrific machine-gun fire during our attack. This was especially severe against our right and held our troops considerably on the first objective. 41 prisoners of whom 2 were officers.
4. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY:
   (a) American: Up until noon heavy harassing fire against such targets as Bois d'ETREPILLY, Les BRUSSES Farm and Bois des ROCHETS. A great deal of interdiction, counter-battery and fleeting target work was done. Beginning 2 p. m. a very heavy barrage was laid down opposite our front under cover of which our infantry advanced as described above.
   (b) German: Up to the time of our attack the firing was characterized by light harassing with small calibers on the PARIS Road, by high bursts against our observation balloon and by bombardments of considerable intensity against BOURESCHES, Bois de la BRIGADE-de-MARINE and our front lines generally. A good deal of gas was used. The same sort of work continued up to and during the start of our attack. When our first objective was reached we got pretty severe shelling on our front lines. The enemy artillery was not a great menace in its intensity however.
5. AERONAUTICS:
   (a) American: Aeroplanes very active, * * *
   (b) German: Occasional flights, * * *

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W. S. BOWEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S.,
A. C. of S., G-3.

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Plan of Attack

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, July 21, 1918--3:15 a. m.

MAP: SOISSONS ) 1/80,000
     MEAUX   )

[Extract]

1. The Division will attack the enemy at 4 a. m. and press the pursuit with the utmost vigor.

       * * * * * *

9. Division headquarters will close at 5 a. m. at MERY-sur-MARNE and open same hour and date at LUCY-le-BOCAGE.

10. 51st Artillery Brigade Headquarters same as 26th Division.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

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Attack to be Pushed

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Lucy-le-Bocage, Aisne, July 21, 1918--5:25 p. m.

MAP: SOISSONS ) 1/80,000
     MEAUX   )

[Extract]

1. The division reached the line of the CHATEAU-THIERRY---SOISSONS Road at noon today.

2. The attack will be pushed without delay and cessation. The division must arrive by daylight, July 22, 1918 on the line FERE-en-TARDENOIS---JAULGONNE Road.

       * * * * * *

9. Division Headquarters will close at LUCY-le-BOCAGE at 8 p. m. this date and open same hour and date at GRANDE-PICARDIE Farm.

P. C. 51st Infantry Brigade will close at 10 p. m. today at VAUX and open same hour and date at La SACERIE Farm.
P. C. 52d Infantry Brigade will close at ETREPILLY today at 10 p. m. and open at same hour and date at BEZUET.
P. C. 51st Field Artillery Brigade will close at LUCY-le-BOCAGE at 8 p. m. and open same hour and date at GRANDE-PICARDIE Farm.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

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22632.1: Order

**Divisions Ordered to Attack**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 59
G-3

MAP: SOISSONS  )  1/80,000
      MEAUX        

1. The enemy has offered a stubborn resistance during the day along the entire front of the Sixth Army in order to cover the withdrawal of his forces who are retreating to the north.

   Each division of the army will launch a powerful attack of penetration on a regimental front at 3:55 a. m., July 23, 1918.

2. The 101st Infantry will attack at 3:55 a. m., July 23, 1918, through the Bois de TRUGNY, with the object of piercing the enemy's line of resistance in the zone of action.

3. Axis of direction of attack: Coordinate 87.5-63.5, Point 225, east of La FOURBETTERIE-Rnes.

4. After penetrating the enemy's line of resistance the attack will spread out to the right and left in order to exploit the success.

5. The C. G., 51st Artillery Brigade will immediately form a plan of action for the artillery in which he will devote special attention to the Bois de TRUGNY and EPIEDS. At 3:45 a. m. he will lay a violent fire of destruction on the zone of action of the attack.

6. All troops east of a line through EPIEDS-TRUGNY will be immediately withdrawn to permit of the artillery preparation.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

NOTE: This order was communicated verbally to the Commanding Generals, 51st Infantry Brigade, 51st Field Artillery Brigade and C. O., 101st Infantry.

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- 507 -
**Change in Orders**

G-3
No. 5

TO: C. G., 51st Infantry Brigade  
C. G., 52d Infantry Brigade  
C. G., 51st F. A. Brigade

**26th DIVISION, A. E. F., Grand-Ru Farm, near Etreplly, Aisne, July 22, 1918---10 p. m.**

[Extract]

1. Referring to the orders issued you from these headquarters early this morning to carry out the orders of the corps commander assigning to this division its own sector and also the sector of the division on the left, you are informed that execution of this order of the I Army Corps has been postponed.

2. The commanding general directs that the original assignment of troops to sub-sectors be resumed ***

3. He further directs that the necessary changes in your present dispositions be effected tonight.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,  
Chief of Staff.

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**51st Brigade to take over 26th Division Zone**

FIELD ORDERS  
No. 60  
G-3

**26th DIVISION, A. E. F., Grand-Ru Farm, near Etreplly, Aisne, July 23, 1918---4 p. m.**

[Extract]

1. The enemy continued its retreat. The Sixth Army continues in pursuit.

2. Upon arrival at the FERE-en-TARDENOIS---JAULGONNE Road, the 26th Division will take over the present zone of action of the 167th Division.

3. In order to carry out the provisions of Paragraph 2, the following dispositions will take place during the night of July 23/24, 1918.
   (a) The 51st Infantry Brigade will take over the entire zone of action of the 26th Division.
(b) The 52d Infantry Brigade will be assembled in the vicinity of CHANTE-MERLE by daylight July 24, 1918, ready to follow the 51st Infantry Brigade, when ordered. • • •
(c) The 51st F. A. Brigade will support the advance of the 51st Infantry Brigade under orders issued by the C. G., 51st F. A. Brigade.

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By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

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226-32.1: Order

Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS

No. 61

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

G-3

Grand-Ru Farm, near Etrepilly, Aisne, July 23, 1918--8 p. m.

MAP:

MEAUX

SOISSONS 1/80,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy has been driven back to the line l'HERMITAGE---west of TRUGNY---La CENSE-a-DIEU---CHARTEVES. The 101st Infantry occupies the eastern part of the Bois de TRUGNY.
2. The 1 Corps attacks at 4:05 a. m. July 24, 1918, on the corps front.
3. In accordance with Paragraph 2, the 26th Division will attack at 4:05 o'clock. The attack will be preceded by a violent artillery bombardment on EPIEDS and the northern part of Bois de TRUGNY, in accordance with artillery plan of C. G., 51st Artillery Brigade. The attack will be carried out by the 101st Infantry in continuance of the plan which it pursued today.
4. Field Orders No. 60, 26th Division, this date, revoked.
5. (a) During the night of July 23/24, 1918 the 56th Infantry Brigade will relieve the 52d Infantry Brigade in the left zone of action of the 26th Division.
   (b) The 111th Infantry will place in the line two battalions with one battalion in support, the latter in Bois de la STATION.
   (c) The 56th Infantry Brigade (less 111th Infantry) will take station during the night of July 23/24, 1918 in the Bois SOUILLARD.
   (d) When relieved the 52d Infantry Brigade will be concentrated in the vicinity of CHANTE-MERLE where its reorganization will be expedited.
   (e) The Commanding General, 52d Infantry Brigade will assure himself personally that officers of the 111th Infantry in line are thoroughly acquainted with the situation.
   (f) Command of the left zone of action of the 26th Division will pass to the C. G., 56th Infantry Brigade at 10 o'clock, July 24, 1918.
6. The C. G., 56th Infantry Brigade will hold his command in readiness to attack when ordered and exploit the success of the 101st Infantry in Bois de TRUGNY and EPIEDS.
BEZU-ST-GERMAIN--EPIEDS AREA

Looking west-southwest from outskirts of Bezu-St-Germain
7. The Commanding Generals, 51st and 52d Infantry Brigades will take precautions to assure an intimate liaison with their neighboring division and between their brigades.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

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226-32.1: Order

**Change in Plan of Attack**

FIELD ORDERS 26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 62  Grand-Ru Farm, near Etrepilly, Aisne, July 23, 1918---11:30 p. m.

MAP: MEAUX ) 1/80,000
SOISSONS )

1. So much of Paragraph 3, Field Orders No. 61, c. s., as refers to the 101st Infantry is revoked.

2. At 4:05 a. m. July 24, 1918, the C. G., 56th Infantry Brigade will attack EPIEDS and the Bois de TRUGNY on the front of the left brigade with two battalions of the 111th Infantry which went into position in the front line tonight.

3. One battalion of the 112th Infantry will move into position near the south boundary of the division sector and will advance to the north to attack the Bois de TRUGNY between Coordinates 87.7-63.0 and 88.6-63.0.

4. In accordance with plan submitted by the C. G., 51st Field Artillery Brigade the artillery will lay down a fire of destruction on EPIEDS and the Bois de TRUGNY. From 3:55 to 4:05 o'clock there will be a violent bombardment of the area to be attacked. The advance of the infantry will be covered by a rolling barrage.

5. The command of the left subsector of the divisional sector will pass at zero o'clock July 24, 1918.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.
Relief of 26th Division

FIELD ORDERS

No. 63

G-3

MAP: MEAUX)1/80,000

SOISSONS)

[Extract]

The following dispositions will be made night July 24/25, 1918.

1. One brigade, 42d Division*, will arrive by trucks to relieve the infantry of the 26th Division and the 56th Brigade, and will debus in the area: BEZU-St-GERMAIN---EPIEDS---VERDILLY, being placed on arrival at the disposition of the C. G., 26th Division. This brigade will take up the pursuit of the enemy at dawn, July 25, 1918, at an Hour H to be announced later.

* * * * * *

3. The 51st Infantry and 56th Infantry Brigades will continue the pursuit until relieved, thereafter these brigades will remain in place under cover until further orders.

4. The 52d Inf. Brigade will be placed in the area:
   On the west: ETREPILLY---Bois des ROCETS (both inclusive)
   On the south: Bois des ROCETS---Point 190 and CHATEAU-THIERRY---SOISSONS Road.
   On the east: CHATEAU-THIERRY---SOISSONS Road exclusive
   On the north: La PENONERIE Fme---St-ROBERT Fme---ETREPILLY (all inclusive). The 52d Inf. Brig. must be west of the CHATEAU-THIERRY---SOISSONS Road before 18 o'clock this date.

5. As soon as the brigade of the 42d Division shall have taken up the advance on passing through the front line of the 26th Division, command passes to headquarters, 42d Division.

6. MESSAGE CENTER - 26th Division, GRANDE-Ru Farm
   MESSAGE CENTER - 42d Division, Vicinity of TRUGNY
   MESSAGE CENTER - 51st Inf. Brig., GRANGE-MARIE Farm
   MESSAGE CENTER - 52d Inf. Brig., La PENONERIE Farm
   MESSAGE CENTER - 56th Inf. Brig., COURPOIL

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

* 84th Brigade.
Plan to Take Sergy

FIELD ORDERS

No. 64

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

Grand-Ru Farm, Aisne, July 24, 1918—8:30 p.m.

G-3

MAPS: CHATEAU-THIERRY SOISSONS 1/80,000

1. The I Corps is to be pushed forward tonight without cessation. A supreme effort is to be made to attack and take SERGY not later than 2 o'clock on the morning of July 25, and to push on without delay to the plateau beyond.

2. This effort on the part of the 26th Division with the 56th Brigade and a brigade of the 42d Division will be aided by the 167th Division and other divisions to the north.

3. The SERGY Plateau must be reached just prior to the break of day. Accomplishment of this will permit the cavalry corps to pass through and effectively break up a retreating and hard-pressed enemy. A complete victory is at hand.

4. The 26th Division (less 52d Brigade) and the 56th Brigade will push forward on SERGY and the plateau to the east of SERGY.

5. Axis of the advance: FRESNES---La MOTTE Farm---SERGY.

6. The infantry will not cross to the north bank of the OURCQ before 24 o'clock.

Frontage of attack: SERGY (inclusive)—Point 212 (1 1/2 km.) to southeast (inclusive).

7. The artillery will prepare and execute a plan for the artillery attack on SERGY.

8. Infantry commanders will keep in close liaison with artillery.

By command of Major General Edwards:

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

26th Division: War Diaries

July 25, 1918.

[Extract]

REMARKS:

Div. in line: During the night July 24/25 the advance of the 56th Brig. on the left and the 51st Brig. on the right through the FORET de FERE continued. The enemy was in position near the FERE-en-TARDENOIS Highway and when our troops reached the edge of the woods a stiff resistance was met with so that our line was established along the eastern edge of FORET de FERE except for the extreme southern part which was pushed forward into the Bois-VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME.

Slight harassing fire of artillery of both sides.

Reconnaissance, bombing and scout aeroplanes all active. The finding out of infantry lines and liaison work being done.
During afternoon the 84th Brig. of the 42d Div. began relieving the infantry of the 26th Div. and the 56th Brig. At 19 o’clock this was completed and the command of the sector passed to the C. G., 42d Division. The following locations were taken up the night July 25/26:

Hq., 51st F. A. Brig. to EPIEDS
51st Inf. Brig. marching toward Bois de la SACERIE
56th Inf. Brig. in the reserve of the 42d Div. with location Bois de TRUGNY.

DUNCAN K. MAJOR, Jr.,
Chief of Staff.

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226-32.14: Memo

Command

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM
No. 16

51st ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Courpoil, Aisne, July 27, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The 51st F. A. Brigade is now acting as an independent artillery brigade under the command of the 42d Division. To it has been assigned the mission of supporting the 84th Infantry Brigade of that division.

* * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Aultman:

W. B. LUTHER,
Captain, Field Artillery,
Operations.

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226-10.3: Orders

Relief of 51st Field Artillery Brigade

G-1
No. 144

26th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mery-sur-Marne, Seine-et-Marne, August 5, 1918.

MAP: MEAUX 1/80,000

[Extract]

1. (a) The 51st Field Artillery Brigade and the 101st Ammunition Train having been relieved from duty with the 4th Division will proceed to and take station in the area...
 included as follows: CITRY (included)---NANTEUIL-sur-MARNE (excluded)---SAACY (included)---GRAND-MONT-MENARD (included)---ROUGEVILLE (included)---FONTAINE-d'AIN (included)---north-east to the MARNE.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Edwards:

W. S. BOWEN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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GHQ, AEF Opns Rept: 26th Div: Special Operations Report

51st FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

August 7, 1918.

FROM: C. G., 51st F. A. Brigade

TO: C. G., 26th Division

From July 18 to August 4, 1918

[Extract]

1. SITUATION AT COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS: At the commencement of operations, this brigade was located in defensive positions covering the front TORCY-VAUX. * * *

2. SUCCINCT ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS:
   A. July 18/25, inclusive: TORCY, BELLEAU, and GIVRY.
      On July 16, 1918, in accordance with memorandum from headquarters, I Army Corps, * * * preparations were made for the displacement of the batteries into positions from which their fire could be delivered deeper into the enemy's territory. This movement was completed on the night of July 17/18 * * *. An artillery plan was also prepared for the attack on TORCY, BELLEAU and GIVRY.
      At H hour (4:35 o'clock, July 18) the brigade supported the advance on TORCY, BELLEAU and GIVRY, covering the infantry attack until the objectives were attained, and thereafter keeping up harassing and interdiction fire upon sensitive points within the enemy lines. Machine-gun nests and routes of approach were especially fired upon. * * *
      The 3d Bn., 181st Artillery (French) 220-mm. mortars, under command of Major Taillandier, assisted in the bombardment on the northern portion of TORCY and the Chateau at BELLEAU. * * *
      Due to the delay in the capture of PETRET Wood and Hill 190, by the 167th Division, the division remained in place until July 20. Reconnaissances were made for forward positions and in some cases, where displacement was possible, batteries were moved well to the front. * * *
      BOURESCHES Wood and VAUX: In accordance with F. O. 52, 26th Division, July 18, 1918, Operations Order No. 238, 51st F. A. Brigade, was issued for the further attack. As no change in the plan was made, these orders were found to be applicable with minor alternations for the attack on July 20 at 15 o'clock, at which hour the brigade supported the infantry attack on BOURESCHES Wood and VAUX.
EPIEDS and TRUGNY: On the capture of these objectives and the pursuit of the enemy to the vicinity of EPIEDS and TRUGNY, the entire brigade was immediately moved forward to positions in the vicinity of St-ROBERT Fme, Bois de la SACERIE, Bois de BRETEUIL, and LUCY-le-BOCAGE and GRAND-RU Fme.

When resistance was met before EPIEDS-TRUGNY, the forward P. C. was established at La SACERIE Fme on the SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY Road in direct liaison with the Commanding General, 51st Infantry Brigade. Direct liaison with the other brigade was maintained through Brig. General G. H. Sherburne, N. A., who continued in command of the 101st F. A., during the operation and who was in close touch with the brigade commander during the entire period.

At this stage of the operations, great difficulty was experienced in giving immediate support to the infantry, due to lack of information as to the exact location of our own lines. • • •

On the night of July 23, in accordance with F. O. 61, 26th Division, a formal artillery plan was made for the attack of the line EPIEDS-TRUGNY. Before this attack was made, however, infantry reconnaissance disclosed the withdrawal of the enemy.

On the night of July 24, 1918, Field Orders 64, 26th Division, were received, for the capture of the SERGY Plateau by daybreak on July 25, 1918. An artillery plan of attack was prepared but was never put into effect, due to the impossibility of execution.

FORET de FERE: The brigade immediately took position in the vicinity of COURPOIL, the eastern portion of the Bois de TRUGNY and GRANGE-MARIE Fme, firing upon objectives in the edges of the FORET de FERE and upon La CROIS-ROUGE Fme. The Brigade P. C. was established at EPIEDS with the forward P. C. at GRANGE-MARIE Fme. During this period, the brigade supported the infantry of the 26th Division and the 56th Brigade of the 28th Division, (Brig. Gen. Weigel) with whom direct liaison was maintained by the 101st F. A.

PASSING OF COMMAND: On the night of July 25/26, 1918, the infantry of the 26th Division and the 56th Infantry Brigade were relieved by the 84th Brigade of the 42d Division (Brig. Gen. R. A. Brown, N. A.). At the same time, the 83d Brigade, 42d Division (Brig. Gen. M. J. Lenihan, N. A.), relieved the French 167th Division thus placing the 42d Division on the entire I Corps front.

As a part of this plan, the divisional artillery of the 42d Division was to reinforce the 51st F. A. Brigade on the night of July 25/26. The extension of the divisional front of the 42d Division, however, resulted in diverting the 42d Divisional Artillery to the support of the 83d Brigade, leaving the 51st F. A. Brigade in support of the 84th Infantry Brigade alone.

The command passed from the 26th Division to the 42d Division upon the passage of the first units of the latter through the front line of the 26th Division, this actually taking place on the morning of July 26. Under Par. 4, F. O. 23, I Army Corps, July 24, 1918, this brigade was placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 42d Division. Post of command of the brigade remained at EPIEDS. The forward P. C. was established at headquarters of the 84th brigade at COURPOIL.

In the foregoing operations, while the command post of the brigade was frequently at a considerable distance from division headquarters, liaison was maintained therewith through conference at divisional headquarters and through the visits of the division commander and the chief of staff to the forward brigade P. C.

Operations Subsequent to July 25, 1918: On the afternoon of July 26, plans were made to support the attack on our right of the French 39th Division and the 3d Division. The artillery preparation was made and the infantry advance found that the enemy had withdrawn across the OURCQ.

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HEIGHTS OF THE OURCQ: Following the withdrawal of the enemy across the OURCQ, after reconnaissance on the morning of July 27, batteries were moved on the night of July 27/28
to positions in the vicinity of l'ESPERANCE Fme, Le FOUR-a-VERRE, La CROIX-BLANCHE Fme and La CROIX-ROUGE Fme, covering with their fire the plateau to the north and east of SERGY. The brigade P. C. was moved to BEUVARDES and the advance P. C. was established at La CROIX-BLANCHE Fme.

During the period from the morning of July 28, to the morning of August 1, with the exception of a slight forward move by two heavy artillery battalions, the brigade remained in position and engaged in repeated artillery demonstrations in connection with infantry attacks on the heights to the north and east of SERGY. Its special mission during this time was neutralization of machine guns and especially those in Bois-PELGER, Bois de la PLANCHETTE and Les JOMBRETS Woods, which enfiladed any infantry attack to the north and east. ** *

At 9 o'clock, July 30, the 84th Brigade attacked the heights north of SERGY. Artillery preparation commenced at 8 o'clock and continued throughout the operations ** *. Bois de PELGER and Bois de la PLANCHETTE were to be held under heavy fire prior to, during, and after the operation, in order to protect the right flank of the infantry attack. This program was not adhered to and the fire on these points was lifted in accordance with verbal request of the infantry commander. The attack failed.

On July 31, another attack was planned in conjunction with the troops on our right. The artillery plan was similar to that of the previous day. The preparation was to start at 16:30 o'clock. At 16:20, the infantry commander gave orders to stop all artillery fire. Five minutes later the infantry commander requested fire to be placed on all points except Bois de PELGER and Bois de la PLANCHETTE. With this exception, the program was fired. At 18:10 o'clock, a repetition of part of the program was requested and given, and at 18:18 o'clock, a request was made to concentrate on Bois de PELGER and Bois de la PLANCHETTE all possible fire and to continue the same until further order. It is understood that the infantry attack did not progress and the fire was ordered later to cease.

On August 1, the brigade prepared an attack of the 84th Infantry Brigade, which was to advance on the heights north of SERGY in conjunction with the 32d Division on its right. The artillery preparation was fired throughout and the advance was successful.

THE VESLE: As a result, the enemy withdrew on the night of August 1/2 and on the night of August 2/3, all batteries were moved forward to positions in the valley of the OURCQ, the light artillery north of the stream, and the heavy artillery south of it. The brigade P. C. was moved to SERGY early on the morning of August 3, and it developed that the enemy's withdrawal had been more extensive than at first indicated. The brigade P. C. was at once moved to NESLES and the entire brigade started forward in support of the infantry.

During this movement, the 8th Brigade of the 4th Division, ** * passed through and relieved the 84th Brigade of the 42d Division.

At 14:15 o'clock, August 3, telephonic orders were received (later confirmed by F. O. No. 26, 4th Division) for this brigade to occupy a position for the defense of a line marked by Hills 204.8 and 210. Positions were immediately reconnoitered and the batteries placed in position by nightfall, the light artillery east and west of CHERY-CHARTREUVE, and the heavy artillery in the vicinity of CHARTREUVE Farm. Brigade P. C. was established at DOLE. This order placed the brigade in a defensive position, and relieved it from any further mobile mission with the 4th Division.

It later transpired that it was not intended to move the brigade into these positions, but to make the reconnaissance and prepare for occupation. The order was, however, explicit, and was obeyed without delay or question. The positions taken commanded towns and heights north of the VESLE.

At 14 o'clock on August 4, forward observers of this brigade noticed heavy movements of enemy troops in these areas. This was reported to the heavy artillery of the 67th Brigade, but as this regiment was not prepared to fire thereon, the 51st F. A. Brigade took the targets under fire. The final fire of the 51st F. A. Brigade was by the 3d Bn., of the 103d F. A., upon German organizations north of the VESLE.
At 17 o'clock, August 4, verbal orders from the Commanding General, 4th Division, confirmed by F. O. No. 26, relieved the brigade from duty with the 4th Division and directed it to proceed to rest billets. This movement commenced at midnight, August 4.

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DWIGHT E. AULTMAN,
Brigadier General, N. A.

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American 42d Division
July 20 - August 4, 1918

242-32.1: Order

Transfer of the 42d Division

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 48

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Ferme de Vadenay, Marne, July 20, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to orders from the French Fourth Army, the 42d Division (which has been put at the disposition of the Commander-in-Chief of the French Army) will, beginning on the morning of July 21, 1918, proceed westward, by rail. * * *

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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242-201: Bulletin

Front Line Situation

2d Section
No. 4

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, Seine-et-Marne, July 24, 1918--9 a. m.

[Extract]

1. The 42d Division is not attached to the French Sixth Army. * * *

2. The front at midnight July 23/24 from southeast to northwest was: Le CHARMEL---La CENSE-a-DIEU---EPIEDS---HERMITAGE---the east edge of the Bois-du-CHATELET---COINCY---

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ARMENTIERES-BRENY. Le CHARMEL-COINCY and BRENY are held by us, while EPIEDS and ARMENTIERES are in the hands of the enemy. Le CHARMEL was taken by the Americans the morning of July 23. EPIEDS, taken by the Americans the evening of the 22d, was retaken by a strong counterattack on the afternoon of the 23d. On the afternoon of the 23d the French captured COINCY.

*****

4. The enemy has withdrawn across the MARNE at all points. CHATILLON-sur-MARNE is again in the hands of the French and from that point to REIMS heavy fighting is going on. SOISSONS is still held by the enemy but the heights west and south of the city have been taken and the French are still pushing the attack. The French have also taken the offensive between MONTDIDIER and MOREUIL. On a front of five kilometers they have advanced three kilometers and have retaken the village of MAILLY-RANEVAL.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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Change in Command

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 50

ADVANCED P. C., 42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
July 25, 1918--8:50 p. m.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to telegraphic orders from the I Army Corps, the command of the right sector of that corps (being the sector of the 51st Infantry Brigade and the 56th Infantry Brigade, respectively) passed to the Commanding General, 42d Division on July 25, at 7 p.m.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brig. Gen., G. S.,
C. of S.
8 a.m. to 8 p.m., July 25, 1918.

[Extract]

1. General Impression of the Day: It appears that the enemy is still holding his line with a strong concentration of machine guns. Contact with the enemy has not yet been laid by elements of this division, so that it is not possible to form an opinion as to his intentions. From his failure to reply to our continuous harassing fire, it would appear that all his heavy artillery has been withdrawn to the rear.

2. Enemy front line: In the sector taken over at 7 p.m., July 25, by one brigade of this division, the enemy line is along the FERE-en-TARDENOIS--Jaulgonne Road.

10. Activity of our own Troops: The elements of the 84th Infantry Brigade arrived in the neighborhood of the division command post at Trugny at 6 a.m., July 25. They cleared Trugny at 7 p.m. and took position in the Bois de Fary where they remained until late in the afternoon when the relief of the 56th Brigade of the 26th Division commenced. The relief was finished and the command passed about 7 p.m. The headquarters of the 84th Infantry Brigade are in Courpoy.

The remaining elements of the division commenced the movement to the TRUGNY-EPIEDS area from the La Ferte-sous-Jouarre area the morning of July 25. The 83d Brigade and the 117th Engineers moved by camion and arrived in the new area in the afternoon. The headquarters of the 83d Infantry Brigade are also in Courpoy.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brig. Gen.,
Chief of Staff.

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GENERAL ORDERS
No. 51

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Trugny, Aisne, July 27, 1918--9:30 a. m.

Reference Maps
(FERE-en-TARDENOIS )
( CONDE-en-BRIE )

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to orders from the Sixth Army, the 42d Division (with the 166th Infantry, having passed through and taken over the front of the French 164th Infantry Division) will be prepared to attack, under cover of darkness on the night of July 27/28, at the hour H, to be communicated later. The objective of the attack will be the following line:

The north bank of the River OURCQ between the points MEURCY Ferme (inclusive) on the west and Triangulation Point 212 (inclusive) on the east.

2. The French VII Corps on the right of the 42d Division, with the French 52d Division at its right, and the French XXXVIII Corps on the left of the 42d Division, with the French 39th Division on its left, will be prepared to attack simultaneously and will have, each as their respective objective, a continuation of the line of the objective of the 42d Division to either flank.

3. (a) The axis of advance of the 42d Division will be along the line: EPIEDS-- COURPOIL--BEUVARDES--northeast tip of town of BEUVARDES--Le FOUR-a-VERRE--Point 16.96--east to La CROIS-ROUGE Ferme to VILLERS-sur-FERE Road--La FOLIE--VILLERS-sur-FERE--Cote 124--MOULIN-VERf--MEURCY Ferme, which line will also be the dividing line between the 83d and the 84th Infantry Brigades.

(b) The 84th Infantry Brigade, reinforced by the 149th Machine Gun Battalion and supported by the 51st Field Artillery Brigade (Brigadier General D. C. Aultman, commanding), will attack on the left* of this line. It will have the 168th Infantry on its right and the 167th Infantry on its left, abreast of each other. The 149th Machine Gun Battalion, in brigade reserve, will follow as directed by the Commanding General, 84th Infantry Brigade.**

(c) The 83d Infantry Brigade, supported by the 67th Field Artillery Brigade, will attack on the left of the boundary line fixed in Subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. It will be disposed with the 165th Infantry on its right and the 166th Infantry on its left, abreast of each other.***

* "Left" crossed out and "Right" written over it in pencil but without authentication.

5. The American 12th Aviation Squadron will be attached to the 42d Division. ****
FORET DE FERE-SERGY AREA
Looking west from Sergy across Ourcq Valley
11. Division headquarters will remain at TRUGNY.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff.
Chief of Staff.

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242-32.15: Memorandum

Relief of French Divisions

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Trugny, Aisne, July 27, 1918---10:45 a. m.

1. Orders have just been received from the I Army Corps that the operation projected for tonight will not take place until a later date.
2. The 83d Infantry Brigade will, as soon as possible, complete the relief of both the French 167th Division and French 164th Division. This relief will comprise both the infantry and artillery of these two French divisions.
3. The statement of captured prisoners would seem to indicate that the enemy is withdrawing. Those elements of the division now on the line are directed to follow up his retirement with the greatest possible energy and to establish contact. As fast as the elements of the division take over the positions of the French 167th and 164th Divisions, respectively, those elements of the 42d Division will do likewise.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff.
Chief of Staff.

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226-32.15: Memorandum

Principles to be Observed

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beuvardes, Aisne, July 28, 1919---11:30 a. m.

[Extract]

1. Unless orders are received from higher authority, the following general plan will govern the further advance of the 42d Division.
2. The general line SERINGES-et-NESLES---NESLES will be consolidated and held during the day of July 28 and the following night, the main body being prepared to move forward from this line at daybreak on the morning of July 29. The consolidation of the above line will involve the pushing forward of contact and reconnaissance patrols in an endeavor to maintain contact with the enemy.
3. Every effort will be made, as soon as the line SERINGES-et-NESLES—NESLES is consolidated, to advance supply trains and to secure organizations the maximum amount of rest and refreshment.

* * * * * *

7. Posts of Command will be as follows:

- P. C. 83d Brigade: VILLERS-sur-FERE
- P. C. 84th Brigade: SERGY
- P. C. 67th Brigade: BEUVARDES
- P. C. 51st Brigade: BEUVARDES
- P. C. 42d Division: BEUVARDES

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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242-33.1: Operations Report

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beuvardes, Aisne, July 29, 1918.

from 6 p. m., July 28, to 6 p. m., July 29.

[Extract]


* * * * * *

2. SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

Infantry activity:

Our own: Both the 83d and the 84th Brigades were operating in the front line, except the 166th Infantry, which was marching behind the left flank of the division front. * * *

A counterattack by the enemy was launched along the entire 84th Brigade front, over a period of about one hour, and was completely repulsed and the enemy driven back at 10 p.m., July 28. Early on the morning of the 29th, our infantry advanced from its position on the north bank of the OURCQ, and before noon took the town of SERGY and MEURCY Ferme. During the afternoon of the 29th, a powerful attack was launched by the 83d Infantry Brigade against the town of SERINGES-et-NESLES which met with desperate resistance. However, the town was taken before 6 p. m. and the backbone of the enemy's resistance on the heights north of the OURCQ broken.

Enemy: The principal attack made by the enemy was by the 4th Guard Division which has been brought up for this counterattack, and which has launched a number of counterattacks during the afternoon of the 28th against both brigade fronts.

Artillery activity:

Our own: The 51st Field Artillery Brigade, supporting the 84th Infantry Brigade, and the 67th Field Artillery Brigade, supporting the 83d Infantry Brigade, were pushed up to the north edge of the Foret de FERE.
Enemy: On the afternoon of the 28th and the morning of the 29th, there was rather heavy harassing fire on our front line troops which in the afternoon of the 29th increased in intensity to sector proportions.

Aerial activity:

Our town: The 12th Aerial Squadron is employed in reporting our advanced infantry elements, which was done successfully three times during the period, and in artillery surveillance and ranging fire for the divisional artillery.

Enemy: The enemy harassing our troops in the front line by machine-gun fire directed from aeroplanes, also by bombing, and in some portions of the line was reported as regulating fire on the front line so that enemy artillery was securing direct hits. The enemy had complete possession of the air.

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CHARLES T. MENOHER,
Major General, U. S. A.

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242-64.2: Order

Employment 4th Field Artillery Brigade

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 52

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beuvardes, Aisne, July 30, 1918--7 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The 4th Field Artillery Brigade, which has been ordered to bivouac in the woods west of ARTOIS Farm and north of MOUCHETON-Chateau beginning on the night of July 30/31, has by orders received from the 1 Army Corps dated July 30, been placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 42d Division.

2. On the arrival of the 4th Field Artillery Brigade in the place stated above, it is placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 67th Field Artillery Brigade. ***

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DOUGLAS MacARThUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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242-32.16: Field Message

FIELD ARTILLERY
67th BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
July 30, 1918.

Message received from Lieutenant Potter, dated 10 a. m. at La FONTAINE-sous-PIERRE [sic]. (Intelligence Officer, 1st Bn., 149th F. A. with 1st and 2d Bn., 146th Infantry).

The French are going to make an attack about 12 o'clock on the front from CAYENNE Farm to SERINGES, supported by their own artillery. Direction of advance very nearly
northeast. Two hundred meters of this line will be held by Americans on extreme right of line. On our right, about Chateau de NESLES large numbers of the enemy have been seen making barbed wire entanglements and other works. Alabama and New York could not advance yesterday on account of heavy machine-gun fire in woods and fields in Square 274-195. The enemy is very well situated in the Foret de NESLES, and the artillery fire of the enemy this morning appears to come from this direction, where yesterday it was more to the left. ***

POTTER.

242-33.1: Operations Report

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beuvardes, Aisne, July 31, 1918.

from 6 p. m., July 30, to 6 p. m., July 31, 1918.

[Extract]


   The characteristic of the day was an offensive by the 84th Infantry Brigade on the right, which failed to make any appreciable progress, due still to the division on our right not coming up.

   At 6 p. m. our line was marked approximately by the southern edge of the Foret de NESLES--MEURCY Ferme--99.5-74.5 and 95.8-74.3 and 96.7-73.8, extending on the right to Hill 220 south of PELGER Woods, which it is understood was at that hour held by the 32d Division on our right.

   * * * * *

   By command of Major General Menoher:

   DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
   Brigadier General, General Staff,
   Chief of Staff.

42d Div: Gen. Order File: Order

Relief

GENERAL ORDERS
No. 53

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beuvardes, Aisne, August 1, 1918--3:30 p. m.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to orders from the I Army Corps, the 42d Division (Advanced P. C. BEUVARDES), less the 67th Field Artillery Brigade, will, on the night of August 2/3, 1918, be relieved by the 4th Division (P. C. ARTOIS Farm).
2. The 84th Infantry Brigade (P. C. La CROIS-BLANCHE Farm) will stand relieved by the 8th Infantry Brigade when the designated relieving elements of the latter have passed through the front line battalions of the 84th Infantry Brigade. The 83d Infantry Brigade (P. C. 400 meters south of CHATEAU-de-la-FORET) will stand relieved by the 7th Infantry Brigade when the designated relieving elements of the latter have passed through the front line battalions of the 83d Infantry Brigade.

11. The Commanding General, 42d Division, will retain command of his present sector until August 3, at 8 a. m., at which time the command will pass to the Commanding General, 4th Division (P. C. BEUVARDES).

12. Upon arrival in the regroupment area, the 42d Division will pass into the Reserve of the I Army Corps.

13. The divisional post officer will be at TRUGNY after August 3, at 8 a. m.

14. The railhead for the division will remain at CHATEAU-THIERRY.

15. Division Headquarters, 42d Division, will be at CHATEAU-THIERRY until August 3, at 8 a. m. and at TRUGNY thereafter.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

242-32.15: Memorandum

117th Engineers to Combat Service

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Beuvardes, Aisne, August 1, 1918—6:30 p. m.

MEMORANDUM

1. It is understood that tomorrow morning at 4:15 a. m., the 32d Division on our right will attempt to advance several kilometers. If their attack is successful, it will be necessary to advance the right of our line so as to be in contact with their left.

2. The 117th Engineer Regiment will be used for this purpose, passing through the troops of the 84th Infantry Brigade now in place, who will remain as at present. The engineer regiment will have as its mission the pushing forward of our line so as to establish fighting liaison with the infantry of the 32d Division, provided the latter is successful in its attack. Under no circumstances will the engineer regiment make an independent attack. If the 32d Division is unable to clear the field for the advance of the 117th Engineer Regiment, the latter will not attempt to advance.

3. The details of the movement will be in charge of the Colonel of the 117th Engineer Regiment. The artillery of the 67th Field Artillery Brigade will support the
movement of the 117th Engineer Regiment in such way as may be mutually agreed upon. Under no conditions will the artillery fire extend over or beyond the limits of our own sector.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

242-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff.
No. 118

August 1 to August 2, 1918
8 p. m. to 8 p. m.

[Extract]

1. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: The enemy has continued his retreat. His artillery fire during the night ceased almost entirely and was not renewed again until the afternoon. Owing perhaps to the bad weather the activity of the enemy aviation was very slight. It is not possible at this hour to say whether the enemy intends to make another stand before reaching the line of the VESLE, but the blowing up of enemy ammunition dumps far to the north of the Foret de NESLES would indicate that he is withdrawing a considerable distance.

9. ACTIVITY OF OUR OWN TROOPS: Shortly after daybreak our troops commenced their advance on the right of our line. Our only fresh troops, the 117th Engineers, acting as infantry, pushed over Hill 212, which had been the scene of bloody combat during the last few days. As this regiment neared Bois de la PISOTTE it was halted by machine-gun fire from the southern edge of the woods. The 167th and 168th Infantry were also halted by machine-gun fire from the same woods and from Les BONS-HOMMES Farm and the woods to the north of it. On our left the 165th Infantry and the 166th Infantry, the latter in liaison with the French division to the west of us, pressed on through the Foret de NESLES and up the open fields to the west of the Foret. The 165th Infantry on reaching MAREUIL-en-DOLE--Les BONS-HOMMES Farm was halted by the enemy artillery fire in the woods. Meanwhile, the Bois de la PISOTTE and Les BONS-HOMMES Farm had been flanked and the enemy machine gunners put to flight so that the troops on our right were able to advance abreast of those on our left. Our artillery followed the infantry advance and tonight all our regiments of 75's and one regiment of 155's have crossed the OURCQ and are firing. Our most advanced element, the 117th Engineers, occupied CHERY-CHARTREUVE at dawn on August 3.

In eight days of battle the 42d Division has forced the passage of the OURCQ, taken prisoners from six enemy divisions, met, routed, decimated, a crack division of the
Prussian Guard, a Bavarian division and one other division, and driven back the enemy's line for 16 kilometers.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

242-20.1: Bulletin of Information

2d Section

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Trugny, Aisne, August 4, 1918—9 a. m.

[Extract]

1. The troops on our front are reported to have progressed to the VESLE River without encountering the enemy infantry. SOISSONS has been evacuated by the Germans and the French are advancing east of the city.

By command of Major General Menoher:

DOUGLAS MacARTHUR,
Brigadier General, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

242-33.1: Operations Report

42d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 27, 1918.

[Extract]

July 25 - August 3, 1918.

The division commenced to move forward from La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE on July 24. On July 25, the 84th Infantry Brigade relieved the 56th Infantry Brigade of the American 28th Division. The remaining elements of the division were moved into the EPIEDS area during the day.

On the afternoon of July 26, the 84th Infantry Brigade attacked in the direction of La CROIS-ROUGE Ferme and captured the farm buildings, sustaining heavy losses from machine-gun fire. During the night, the enemy withdrew.

On July 27, the entire division took up the pursuit and gained contact along the line of the OURCQ.

In spite of strong resistance, on the morning of July 28, both the 83d and 84th Infantry Brigades, supported by the 51st and 67th Field Artillery Brigades, crossed the
SERINGES--FERE-EN-TARDENOIS AREA
Looking northwest from vicinity of Seringes-et-Nesles
OURCQ, captured SERGY and established themselves on the northern slope of the stream. The enemy launched a heavy counterattack, employing a fresh division, the 4th Guards, and retook SERGY, but we attacked again and recaptured the village. Severe fighting ensued, SERGY changing hands four times, but the enemy was unable to break our hold on the north bank of the stream.

On the morning of July 29, we definitely occupied SERGY and captured MEURCY Ferme. In the afternoon, after stubborn resistance by the enemy, the 83d Infantry Brigade assaulted and took SERINGES. At 8 p.m., the division held the line SERINGES--MEURCY Ferme--SERGY--Hill 212.

On July 30, the division attacked in the face of heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, the 83d Infantry Brigade advancing to the southwestern edge of FORET-de-NESES-38.55, the 84th Infantry Brigade advancing its left across the heights northwest of SERGY and its right about 1 kilometer north of SERGY.

On July 31, the 84th Infantry Brigade attacked on the right but failed to make any appreciable advance due to the inability of the troops on our right to progress. At 6 p.m., the line held by the division was approximately the southern edge of Forest de NESLES--MEURCY Ferme, 95.5-74.5, 95.8-74.3, and 96.7-73.8, extending on the right to Hill 220, south of PELGER Woods.

On August 1, the 84th Infantry Brigade again attacked but was again unable to advance due to exposing its right flank.

On August 2, the division advanced in liaison with the division on the right. The enemy withdrew and the division took active pursuit meeting opposition in the form of artillery and machine-gun fire.

In order to permit the pursuit by fresh troops, while still advancing the infantry of the division was relieved by the passing through of the American 4th Division. The 67th Field Artillery Brigade was attached to the 4th Division and proceeded with them to the VESLE. It supported this division in the crossing of the VESLE and remained with them until the night of August 10/11, when it was relieved and withdrawn to the vicinity of MOUCHETON-Chateau.

* * * * * *

CHARLES T. MENOHER,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Commanding.
French Ninth Army  
July 18 - July 24, 1918

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Cooperation Between French and American Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 1747/3  

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,  
Villenauxe, Aube, July 18, 1918—0:10 H.

ORDER

For the General commanding the XXXVIII A. C.

[Extract]

* * * * * * *

The XXXVIII Army Corps will cooperate in the operation of the American I Army Corps:

1. By firing, at the same time as that corps, an artillery preparation in that portion of the front of the 39th Inf. Div., on the right bank of the MARNE that shall be as intense as possible.

2. By holding the 39th Division ready to occupy the ridge numbered 204 west of CHATEAU-THIERRY, in conjunction with the American I Army Corps if the attack by that corps should force the enemy to withdraw.

d'AMBLY,  
Chief of Staff.

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Plans to Capture Marne Heights

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 1,757/3  

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,  
Esternay, Marne, July 18, 1918.

GENERAL ORDERS

[Extract]

1. The French III Army Corps and the Feraud Groupment will execute a combined offensive operation the morning of July 19, to capture the heights on the left bank of the MARNE and throw the enemy back to the MARNE.
For this operation, the Feraud Groupment is placed under the orders of the General commanding the Ninth Army.

* * * * * *

III. Combined objectives: North edge of Bois de MISY (1,500 m. west of OEUILLY)---CERSEUIL---northern edge Bois du CROCHET---Hill 204 (1 km. southeast of BOUQUIGNY)---VASSY---Hill 198 (500 m. southwest of VASSY)---La VITARDERIE---Hill 200 (1 km. northeast of St-AGNAN).

* * * * * *

de MITRY,
General Commanding the Ninth Army.

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HS Fr. File: 419-30.1: Order

Correction to Order

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1784/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
Esternay, Marne, July 18, 1918.

CORRECTION
to Order No. 1690/3 of July 17

[Extract]

By order of the General commanding the French Group of Armies of the Center, Paragraph VII of Order No. 1690/3 of July 17 is amended as follows:

VII. The units with the Ninth Army are under the tactical control of the general commanding the army.

* * * * * *

d'AMBLY,
Chief of Staff.

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- 533 -
**Postponement of Attack**

[Français]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,798/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,

*Esternay, Marne, July 18, 1918—8:15 p.m.*

FIELD ORDERS

[Extract]

I. Because of the delay in the arrival of the tanks, the operation provided for in Field Orders No. 1,757 of July 18, is postponed 24 hours. • • •

• • • •

de MITRY,
General Commanding the Ninth Army.

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**Plans for Future Attack**

[Français]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1857/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,

*Villenauxe, Aube, July 19, 1918—12:30 p.m.*

[Extract]

I. The joint offensive action of the III A. C. and the FERAUD Groupment will take place July 20, under the conditions set by Orders No. 1,757 and 1,758 of July 18.

The attack will begin in the early hours of the morning. H hour will be communicated to the commanders of the groupments during the evening of July 19.

II. The mission of the Ninth Army continued unchanged, to clear the left bank of the MARNE. Order No. 1,757 of July 18, has set the combined objectives to be gained. It is still understood that once these objectives are gained, the results achieved must be exploited boldly and without delay in order to push the enemy back beyond the MARNE and occupy the river crossings. Preparations will be made to move the artillery forward.

• • • •

de MITRY,
General Commanding the Ninth Army.

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- 534 -
MEMORANDUM relating to the artillery action upon the crossings of the MARNE

[Extract]

The crossings of the MARNE and their approaches are distributed among the different elements of the army from west to east as follows:

XXXVIII A. C. (corps and divisional artillery): From the left as far as the wrecked footbridge between COURTEMONT and VARENNES (51-52) (exclusive).

III. A. C. (corps and divisional artillery): As far as the COURTHIEZY sluice dam (78-96) (inclusive).

Army Heavy Artillery (Blanchet Groupment): As far as the VERNEUIL bridge (31-25) (inclusive).

Army Heavy Artillery (Petit Groupment): From the bridge east of VINCELLES (16-27) (inclusive) to the right.

(The two zones of the army heavy artillery overlap between VINCELLES and VERNEUIL.)

* * * * *

M. de MITRY.

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ATTACK ORDERS

[Editorial Translation]

To Headquarters: VIELS-MAISONS [French XXXVIII Corps] (to be passed only to TRILPORT [Tenth Army] and SEZANNE [Group of Armies of the Center] (TRILPORT, the others have been informed).

1. Upon receipt of this order, the XXXVIII Army Corps will move all reserve units of the 39th Infantry Division to the right bank of the MARNE, leaving only a screen on the left bank of the MARNE.

2. The 39th Division will prepare without delay to attack in the direction of VERDILLY-EPFIEDS in conjunction with the right of the American I Army Corps.

3. This action will be supported by the entire artillery of the XXXVIII Corps so as to assist the 39th Division.
4. Report when the 39th Division will be ready to pass to the attack.

By order:

[signature illegible]
Chief of 3d Section.

HS Fr. Files: 419-30.1: Order

**Attack Orders**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations
No. 513/CH

Dispatched at 12:20 p. m.

To Headquarters

ESTERNAY [Ninth Army]
VIELS-MAISONS [French XXXVIII Corps]
MAY-en-MULTIEN [Tenth Army]

1. Sixth Army attacks July 20 at 3 p. m. The 39th Infantry Division will attack at the same hour in conjunction with the American army corps. It will jump off in the formation in which it may be at that time.

2. By order of the Group of Armies of the Center, liaison with the Sixth Army will take place on the line VAUX-EPIEDS (inclusive, to the 39th Division).

HS Fr. Files: 419-30.1: Order

**Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,007/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
Esternay, Marne, July 20, 1918--1:20 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The enemy has fallen back north of the MARNE before our attack. Our troops, driving back the enemy rearguards, have recaptured the crests on the left bank and have pushed their advance guard across the MARNE.

2. The mission of the Ninth Army is:
   (a) To maintain contact with the enemy's rearguards by effecting crossings over the MARNE without delay, and by driving advance guards beyond the river.
   (b) To maintain on the present front south of the MARNE, not more than a weak infantry and artillery screen (the artillery is to be brought up to the MARNE) and to
return to reserve the greatest strength possible.

(c) To attack on the right bank of the MARNE in the direction of VERDILLY-EPIEDS, in conjunction with the right of the Sixth Army, with all the available forces of the XXXVIII Army Corps.

3. Consequently.

(a) The XXXVIII Corps will mop up the left bank of the MARNE and occupy it as far as REUILLY (inclusive) and with its left will attack north of the MARNE in conjunction with the Sixth Army in accordance with Special Orders Nos. 1,997/3 and 513/Ch. of July 20.

(b) The III Corps will mop up and occupy the left bank of the MARNE between REUILLY (exclusive) and TROISSY (exclusive) with two divisions, the 73d and the 18th Inf. Divisions and will push advance guards beyond the river.

5. Artillery: The heavy artillery battalions, 2d Bn. of the 334th Artillery (155-mm howitzers) and 3d Bn. of the 453d Artillery (95-mm.) and the 246th Artillery (porte) will be withdrawn upon receipt of the present order and held in readiness to move toward the Fifth Army (right bank of the MARNE).

de MITRY,
General of Division Commanding
the Ninth Army.

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HS Fr. Files: 419-30.1: Telegram

**Force Marne Crossing**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,140/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
Esternay, Marne, July 20, 1918--10:30 p. m.

Headquarters ESTERNAY [Ninth Army]

To Headquarters MONTMIRAIL [French III Corps]

The III Army Corps will attempt the crossing of the MARNE on July 21, between JAULGONNE (exclusive) and VERNEUIL (inclusive) by advance guards supported by the artillery.

These advance guards will occupy initially the ridge east of JAULGONNE near Le GROS-CHENE Crossroads, La BOULANGERE, Les CARRIERES, Hill 234, HAUT-VERNEUIL; they will then move to the line: VILLARDELLE Farm—PASSY, with their right flank covered in the direction of VERNEUIL and PASSY, while their left will seek liaison with the XXXVIII Corps towards JAULGONNE and Le CHARME.

By order:

d'AMBLY,
Chief of Staff.

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Corps Attachment
[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2,172/3
FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
Esternay, Marne, July 20, 1918—11 p. m.

[Extract]

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMAND:
Effective at 8 p. m., July 20:
The Ninth Army retains the III Army Corps • • •
The XXXVIII Army Corps is attached to the Sixth Army.
The I Cavalry Corps • • • is attached to the Seventh Army.

II. LIMITS OF THE ZONE OF ACTION OF THE NINTH ARMY:
On the west, the present boundary between the III and XXXVIII Corps south of the MARNE.
North of the MARNE the line: Jaulgonne---Roncheres---Cierges, (these localities to the Sixth Army).
East and south of the MARNE: the line Troissy (Fifth Army)---Igny-le-Jard (Ninth Army)---Mareuil-en-Brie (Ninth Army)---Champaubert (Fifth Army).
North of the MARNE: Verneuil-Roncheres (these localities exclusive)*

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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Situation on Corps Front
[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2261/3
FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
July 21, 1918—10 p. m.

[Extract]

I. The detachments of the French III Corps which attempted to cross the MARNE ran into resistance of enemy detachments supported by the artillery holding the heights of the right bank.
To the left of the III Corps, the French Sixth Army threw back the enemy toward the

* These zone-of-action limits will not change the order issued to the III Corps for its mission of July 21 (2,140 of July 20).
northeast and occupied the front: BRENY---ROCUrT---ST-MARTIN---EPIEDS---CHARTEVES.

To the right of the III Corps the French Fifth Army advanced to the north of the
MARNE.

II. The mission of the II Corps remains as defined by Orders No. 2007/3, 1:20 p. m.,
July 20, and 2140/3, 10:30 p. m., July 20. The III Corps will take advantage of the
advance effected on the right bank, by the right of the Sixth Army, to move the outposts
to the north of the river and occupy the objectives which were fixed for the corps, main­
taining direct liaison with the elements of the Sixth Army.

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IV. The III Corps will have available for its operations the American 55th Brigade
by attaching it to the French 18th Division and employing it according to conditions
prescribed by orders from the General, Commander-in-Chief. If the brigade goes into
action, the III Corps will assign an attack sector to it and the brigade will retain its
basic organization.

de MITRY,
General Commanding the Ninth Army.

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HS Fr. Files: 419-30.1: Order

Marne Crossed

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2388/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
July 22, 1918.

[Extract]

I. In spite of the very active resistance by the enemy on the right bank, the left
of the French III Corps crossed the MARNE at ROZAY---PAssY-sur-MARNE and COURCElLES, and
captured the SIGNAL de COURCElLES Hill.

On the right, elements thrown over to the right bank established themselves near
CHASSINS and VINCtELLES which are still occupied by the enemy.

On the left of the III Corps, the right of the French Sixth Army occupied JAULGONNE
and La CENSE-a-dIEU.

On the right of the III Corps, the elements of the French Fifth Army crossed the
MARNE at PORT BINSON and l'ECtLUSE de VENDlERES.

II. The mission of the III Corps remains the same ***

III. The enemy appears to have nothing on the right bank but rearguards strongly
equipped with machine guns and supported by a very watchful artillery element. In order
to reduce the points of resistance of those rearguards, it is necessary to neutralize
them and deliver artillery concentrations to blind them, during which the infantry will
outflank them by boldly infiltrating through the terrain corridors.

The bridgehead created by the occupation of the SIGNAL de COURCElLES Hill may make
it possible to create passages in the PASSY-sur-MARNE region through which reserves can
pass, liberating the CINtCELLES-CHASSINS region by outflanking it on the east edges of
FORET de RIS.
IV. The American 55th Brigade will pass to the Sixth Army not later than the morning of the 24th.


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Communications Established

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2552/3

[Extract]

I. The enemy resisted very strongly the efforts made by the French III Corps to widen its bridgehead north of PASSY-sur-MARNE.

The towns of MARCILLY and BARZY-sur-MARNE were occupied by our troops and communication established on the right bank of the MARNE toward BRAZY with the American 3d Division.

A ponton bridge was launched during the night of July 22/23 near PASSY-sur-MARNE. The right of the French Sixth Army occupied Cote 224 (2 km. north of JAULGONNE).


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IV. The American 55th Brigade (including the engineer battalion of the American 28th Division) will rejoin the 28th Division, with the Sixth Army, on July 24. It will move into the CHARLY-sur-MARNE---SAULCHEREY region and woods to the north.

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de MITRY,
General Commanding the Ninth Army.
Relief of Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 2676/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
July 24, 1918--9:45 p. m.

1. Headquarters of the Ninth Army will cease to function at ESTERNAY effective noon, July 25.
2. On the same date and at the same hour, the French III Corps and all the elements which are attached to it will pass to the French Fifth Army.
3. Hq. of the Ninth Army (hq. and services) will be prepared to begin moving the morning of July 26.
4. The army elements will remain in place until a later order and will continue to be supplied as under the present conditions.

de MITRY.

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French XXXVIII Army Corps
July 18 - August 3, 1918

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Preparations for Crossing Marne

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1809/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Villenauxe, Aube, July 18, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS

I. The Sixth Army has captured NEUILLY-St-FRONT and has turned MONTHIERS. The American 51st Brigade is moving from BOURESCHES to BEZUET.
   The American 52d Brigade will move forward as soon as the 51st Brigade comes on a line with it.
II. The French 39th Inf. Div. will hold itself in readiness to move as soon as the American 26th Div. debouches from VAUX.
III. Liaison with the right of the American 26th Div. will be established on the line VAUX---the VAUX Road---VINCELLES---Hill 187 (north of Hill 204)---Hill 190 (CHATEAU-THIERRY---BEZUET Road).
IV. The 156th Inf. will prepare to cross the MARNE as soon as the enemy begins to evacuate the north part of CHATEAU-THIERRY; the divisional engineers will improvise means of crossing, making use of material from the destroyed bridge.

V. In view of a possible crossing of the entire XXXVIII Corps or part of it to the right bank of the MARNE, the following measures will be immediately taken:

(a) The 6th Company, 2d Bn. of the Corps Engineers will be moved to CHATEAU-THIERRY with the materiel it has prepared for the construction of light bridges; they should be thrown across the river east of CHATEAU-THIERRY. This materiel will be put under cover in the false MARNE, under bridges, among sunken barges, etc.

(b) The American 3d Div. will collect all boats that are on the front of the left brigade and will have them assembled at dusk in the town of CHIERRY and BLESMES, and in the creek between these two village, so as to be able to use them rapidly to pounce on BRASLES at the same time the 156th Brigade crosses the MARNE.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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Advance to Mezy

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Viels-Maisons, Aisne, July 19, 1918—9:30 a. m.

Supplement to this morning's report

The American 3d Div., reenforced by elements taken from the American 56th Brigade has reoccupied the spur south of MEZY-sur-MARNE and pushed its line to MEZY and on a line with MOULIN-RUINE [Signal].

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Placing of Reserves

[Editorial Translation]

July 19, 1918—9:30 a. m.

General de Mondesir [Commanding General, French XXXVIII Army Corps] announces that he had anticipated the orders issued directing him to have reserves ready to enter into action to assist the French 73d Inf. Div., if necessary.

At the present time the following are available: 1 American regiment of the American 56th Brigade with the General commanding the American 28th Div. in COUFREMAUX.
2. American battalions in the region of NOGENT-l’ARTAUD and Bois du CROCHET, which would be moved toward the right by motors if needed.

[No signature]

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HS Fr. Files: 454-30.1: Order

**Line Reliefs**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1822/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Viels-Maisons, Aisne, July 19, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS

I. By order of the general commanding the army, the bn. of the 346th Inf. which the French 73d Inf. Div. had left at the disposal of the Army Corps will be returned to the control of its division.

II. During the night of July 19/20, the General commanding the American 3d Div. will effect the relief of the detachment of the 346th Inf. which had been placed under the orders of the Colonel commanding the American 38th Inf., by an American detachment which will be responsible for the same mission of liaison.

* * * * *

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII
Army Corps.

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203-32.7: Order

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1826/3

FRENCH NINTH ARMY,
Villenauxe, Aube, July 19, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDER

I. The General commanding the Army Group of the Center has ordered that all measures be taken to combat the possible situation where the enemy would attempt to enlarge toward the west, the pocket which he has created to the south of the MARNE.

Army Corps Order No. 1789/3, of July 17, already permitted echeloning behind the right of the Corps, the main body of the American 56th Bgd. [28th Div.]

II. To complete these dispositions, the following measures will be taken:

(a) One of the two bns. of the American 30th Inf. Regt. [3d Div.], which had been brought back into the western sector of the 2d position, will be withdrawn, and
will proceed to establish itself between COURBOIN and Les BIEZ Fme constituting a reserve at the disposal of Colonel LEMAITRE, commander of the eastern sector of the 2d position.

Movement to be completed by July 20, 18 h.

(b) The other bn. of the 30th Inf. Regt., with the regimental M. G. co., will remain in the western sector of the 2d position, under the orders of the lt. colonel commanding the regt. (P. C. transferred to Ferme le MESNIL), with the special mission of assuring the defense of the southern issues of the bridge of NOGENT-TARTAUD.

Movement to be completed by July 20, 18 h.

(c) The garrisons of the resistance centers (ARROUARD, GRANDE-QUEUE, TRONCET, Le CROCHET, La TOUR) will be eliminated. The fractions of the bn. of the 73d Regt. Terr. Inf. forming security garrisons, will alone be maintained there.

d) The detachment, on the right bank of Major LALOT (normally comprising two cos. of the 23d Regt. Terr. Inf. at RUDENOISE), will remain under the orders of the Lt. Colonel commanding the American 30th Inf. Regt.

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203-32.7: Letter

**Projected Operation**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1829/3

From: Lieut. General De Mondesir
Commanding XXXVIII Army Corps

To: Commanding General, American 3d Div.

I have the honor to request that you submit to me propositions for the following operation, which should be carried out with the last practicable delay:

It is a question for the 3d Division of reestablishing itself at MOULIN-RUINE [Signal) and all along the edge of the wood, so that the enemy may no longer have observation posts hanging directly over, and at arms length, from the troops in the valley and in the bend of CHARTEVES.

The corps artillery will afford its support for the operation, and the army heavy artillery will execute the necessary counterbattery fire.

In case the wood were weakly occupied, it is essential that the attacking troops, in their advance, be able to signal.

---

de MONDESIR,
Further Orders for Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
No. 1837/3 Villenauve, Aube, July 20--10 a. m.

SPECIAL ORDER

Supplementing the 9 a. m. telephone order.

I. The attack launched at 6 o'clock this morning by the French III Army corps has made possible a rapid advance. At 9 a. m., the front reached is reported to be the line: OEUILLLY---Bois des CHATAIGNIERS---north edges of Bois des PLANS---Hill 254 (north of La GALINATERIE)---head of CHAVENAY Ravine---head of VITARDERIE Ravine.

The Germans apparently have already destroyed or withdrawn several footbridges.

II. The general commanding the army orders the II Army Corps to push the 73d and 4th Inf. Divs. up to the MARNE.

III. The American 3d Div., in its sector, acting in liaison with the 73d Div., will move forward so as to mop up the left bank of the river.

It will throw out patrols to the northwest edge of the Bois du MOULIN-RUINE and if possible to the MARNE.

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de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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Plan of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
No. 1,839/3 Villenauve, Aube, July 20, 1918--noon.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 153

[Extract]

* * * * *

II. In the XXXVIII Corps the 39th Inf. Div. with its main body will be ready to attack without delay on the right bank of the MARNE in liaison with the American I Corps.

Successive objectives of the division: Hill 204, Les CHESNEAUX, les ROCHES and VERDILLY.

Zone of action limited on the left by: VAUX---VINCELLES---Hill 190---north of Les CHESNEAUX---VERDILLY (liaison with the American 26th Div., right division of the American I Corps).
III. To that end, the General commanding the 39th Div. will move without delay his entire infantry to the right bank, with the exception of the bn. in CHATEAU-THIERRY which is held in position and which will prepare to cross the MARNE by improvised means.

IV. To support the 39th Div. and maintain liaison with it, the American 3d Div. will move the heads of its second line battalion of the left regiment (bn. in the NESLES region) up to the line: LUXEMBOURG-ETAMPES. This battalion will be prepared to cross the MARNE in rear of the bn. of the 39th Div. in CHATEAU-THIERRY and will have as first objective: BRASLES.

V. The heavy artillery of the corps capable of action will establish liaison with the 39th Div. so as to act according to the request of that division.

VI. The Colonel commanding the engineers of the corps will have the 6th Company, 2d Battalion, ready to construct an infantry footbridge in CHATEAU-THIERRY (site reconnoitered).

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

HS Fr. Files: 454-30.1: Order

Corps Returned to Sixth Army

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,845/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Villenauxe, Aube, July 20, 1918—noon.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 154

[Extract]

I. The enemy has withdrawn north of the MARNE. Our troops have recaptured the heights of the left bank and are moving their advance guards north of that river.

On the left, the American I Army Corps is attacking in general direction of EPIEDS.

II. The XXXVIII Corps is returned to the control of the General commanding the Sixth Army. Its mission is to attack from the right bank of the MARNE with its main body in liaison with the American I Corps.

IX. Effective at 6 a. m., July 21, the General commanding the Corps will have his command post in CHARLY.

Command posts of the 39th Div. and American 3d Div., no change.

Command post of the American 28th Div. in RUVET, west of SAULCHERY.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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Shifting Corps Units

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,840/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Villenauxe, Aube, July 20, 1918--2:30 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER

[Extract]

I. So as to be ready to support the attack planned for the 39th Inf. Div. on the right bank of the MARNE, the available elements of the American 28th Div. will be brought back in rear of the 39th Div.

II. Consequently, the following measures will be taken:
   (a) The available elements of the American 28th Div. (division headquarters, brigade headquarters, brigade machine gun battalions, 112th Inf. and bn. of the 111th Inf. divided between Les BIEZ Fme and Les PETITES-NOUES) will be brought back to the right bank of the MARNE in the CHARLY-SAULCHERY region and to the north. • • •
   (b) Tonight (July 20/21), the American 3d Div. will effect the relief of the elements of the 111th Inf., which had been made available to it, using reserves that are at its immediate disposal.

   The elements of the American 30th Inf. (bn. in NOGENT-l'ARTAUD, the bn. in COURBOIN, regimental M. G. co.) are returned at once to the control of the American 3d Div. which will send them direct orders to rejoin their brigade.

   After relief, the American 111th Inf. (less the battalion moved on the right bank) will be assembled in the GRAND-HÉRITEN Farm region at the disposal of the General commanding the Army Corps.

   de MONDESIIR,
   General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

[Extract]

At 5:45 p. m. the division [39th] moves to the attack of Hill 204; the enemy reacts with machine guns and gas shells.

   Toward 7 p. m. the Americans are fighting in the Bois des ROCHELS, in the Bois de BORNE-AGRON and in the Bois d'ETREPILLY.

   The left battalion of the 39th Div. advances between the wood on Hill 204 and the PARIS Road.

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During the morning two prisoners of the German 307th Inf. (10th Inf. Div.) were taken by the 3d Div. in the HERBENNERIE region.

VI. The available elements of the American 28th Div. have been moved back in rear of the 39th Div.

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203-32.7: Order

Preparations for Marne Crossing

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 1,847/3

GENERAL ORDERS No. 155

I. It is learned from a very accurate source that the Germans are in complete disorder. At 8:30 h. we reached the N. crest of Les CHESNEAUX.

II. The XXXVIII A. C. is to pursue vigorously, in the direction of Le CHARMEIL in liaison on the left with the American I Corps.

III. The 39th Inf. Div. has as its mission to pursue in the direction of VERDILLY, to flank the Bois de BARBILLON on the N.

General direction of the attack: Ferme La CENSE-a-DIEU---Ferme FARY---Hill 228 (W. of Le CHARMEIL).

Zone of action bordered on the W. by Les COUPETTES---VERDILLY---La CENSE-a-DIEU---crossroad 500 meters W. of Ferme FARY---road going through Le Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME (all these points inclusive)---liaison on the left with the American I Corps.

IV. The American 3d Division will cross the MARNE as quickly as possible and by every available means (boat-bridges, rafts, pontoons left by the enemy), and will invest the Bois de BARBILLON on the E.

General direction of the attack: Les FRANQUETS Ferme---Le CHARMEIL.

Zone of action bounded on the W. by: BRASLES (inclusive)---main crossroad of the Bois de BARBILLON at 1,500 m., N. E. of BRASLES (excl.)---crossing of the road MONT-St-PERE---VERDILLY and of the road EPIEDS---GLAND---(as far as MONT-St-PERE) excl.---line passing through La THEODERIE---La TIEULERIE (incl.)---crossroad 800 m. W. of the church of Le CHARMEIL.

Boundary on the east: BRAZY (excl.)---western edge of the FORET de RIS (inclusive)---RONCHERES (incl.)---liaison with the III A. C.

V. The cavalry crossing the MARNE as quickly as possible with push reconnaissances ahead rapidly to Le CHARMEIL and beyond.

(Keep in close liaison with the American 3d Div. and take with them mounted American officers to avoid misunderstandings.)

Give orders to have a new information center operate near BRASLES or GLAND as soon as the order is given.

VI. The artillery will advance as far as possible. Rapid change of position of the 214th Regt., F. A. to support the action of the 39th Inf. Div. is ordered. This regiment is assigned to the 39th Inf. Div.
VII. The 7th M. G. Bn., motorized, is placed at the disposal of the General commanding the 39th Inf. Div.
The 107th M. G. Bn. motorized will come to NOGENT-l'ARTAUD.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

HS Fr. Files: 454-60.9: Order

Enemy Retreat

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,860/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charly, Aisne, July 21, 1918---11:30 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER

Air reconnaissance has determined that the enemy is systematically burning the entire area along the FERE-en-TARDENOIS---COULONGES---GOUSSANCOURT Road and that he is destroying the FERE Railway Station.
The inference is that the enemy intends to abandon this area tonight.
Therefore, the attack will be resumed tonight.
The American 3d Division will at all costs get its field artillery north of the MARNE tonight (at least 2 battalions, the remainder tomorrow morning at daybreak) to support its infantry.
The General commanding the 3d Division will move his C. P. tonight to GLAND.
NOTE: The footbridge at BLESMES will be completed about 11 p. m. A reinforced bridge will be constructed beside this one tonight and will probably be completed the morning of the 22d. (Inquiries as to the probable hour when crossings can begin should be made of the engineer captain who is putting up the bridge.)

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

HS Fr. Files: 454-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 21, 1918.

[Extract]

I. The day is marked by an advance of more than 10 kilometers on the part of the French 39th Inf. Div. which, starting from Hill 204, has elements beyond La CENSE-a-DIEU [Farm] in the evening.
The command post operates in CHARLY at 6 a. m.

II. At 7:45 a. m. French troops surround VERDILLY. At 10:15 a. m. French troops enter the Bois de BARBILLON by the BRASLES Ravine.

At 10:45 a. m. it is announced that the right battalion of the 39th Div. which crossed the MARNE before 8 a. m. occupies CHATEAU-THIERRY.

At 11:40 a. m. the French 5th Brigade moves its command post to Le ROCQ Farm, the American 6th Brigade to St-EUGENE.

At 12:50 p. m. the American 4th Inf. begins to cross the MARNE at CHATEAU-THIERRY. Artillery reaction weak.

At 2:10 p. m. our troops occupy CHATEAU-THIERRY---VERDILLY---Bois de BARBILLON and are advancing toward EPIEDS which seems to be strongly held by the enemy.

At 3:15 p. m. large group of enemy batteries in the BEUVARDES region which appears strongly occupied.

At 7 p. m. the 146th Inf. is at BRETEUIL Farm, the 153d Inf. at La CENSE-a-DIEU.

At 7:30 p. m. the American 4th Inf. is in Bois de BARBILLON, the American 7th Inf. is crossing the MARNE, the American 38th Inf. has not yet begun to cross.

The American engineers are building footbridges in FOSSOY and in MEZY.

At 10:25 p. m., upon an air service report that the enemy is systematically burning the entire region south of the FERE-en-TARDENOIS---COULONGES---GOUSSANCOURF Road and is destroying the FERE-en-TARDENOIS Railroad Station, the General commanding the army orders each army corps to attack in its zone this very night.

At 10:30 p. m. the American 4th Inf. is in the MONT-St-PERE region; command post in GLAND; 3 companies of the American 7th Inf. have crossed the MARNE.

At the end of the day we are holding TRUGNY firmly and are advancing toward the ETANG [Pond Wedge of Bois de TRUGNY, 750 meters E. of TRUGNY]. We are at the south edges of the clearing of La CENSE-a-DIEU (which the enemy has retaken in a counterattack) and of La THEODERIE, but we occupy MONT-St-PERE.

III. Observers report numerous explosions and fires in the FERE-en-TARDENOIS region and in the Foret de RIS.

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V. Footbridges on the MARNE. The first elements which crossed the MARNE, battalion of the 39th Div. south of CHATEAU-THIERRY, made use of the destroyed railroad bridge east of CHATEAU-THIERRY and crossed rather easily with water up to the waist; then a footbridge was thrown across at the east end of the Isle of CHATEAU-THIERRY by the engineers of the 39th Div.

From 9 to 10 a. m. the 6th Company of the 2d Battalion of engineers threw across two new footbridges on either side of the railroad bridge east of CHATEAU-THIERRY.

Beginning at 4:30 a. m. the elements of a pontoon bridge were transported to the north of BLESMES and the bridge was opened to traffic about 11 p. m.

The engineers of the American 3d Div. also put across two footbridges at FOSSOY and MEZY.

VI. At 6 a. m. the command post of the corps moves to CHARLY.

The American 28th Div., army corps reserve, arrives in Bois de LOUP whence it moves toward noon to the BRASLES region.

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**Attempt to Make Frontal Breakthrough**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,862/3
XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 22, 1918—10 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 157

[Extract]

2. Tomorrow, the 23d the army will attack on the entire front.
3. In each division the attack will be made in the general direction already assigned on July 21.

The attack will be launched at 3:55 a. m.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, July 22, 1918.

[Extract]

I. Our troops continue to advance, applying strong pressure on the enemy. During the days of July 21 and 22 we have taken about 200 prisoners. The command post of the Corps opens in BRASLES at noon, that of the American III Corps at the same hour in GLAND.

II. During the night the enemy drove us out of La CENSE-a-DIEU. The American 38th Inf. crosses the MARNE at MEZY. The American 76th Art. crosses the MARNE during the forenoon. Toward 7 a. m. the first American elements enter JAULGONNE and advance slightly to the north.

Toward 12 noon the advance of the 39th Div. is stopped by the machine guns set up in La CENSE-a-DIEU, La THEODERIE and surrounding thickets.

At 12:30 p. m. a reenforced ponton bridge, capable of supporting 8-ton vehicles, is put across in place of the ponton bridge north of BLESMES. The first bridge is moved to the east exit of CHATEAU-THIERRY.
At 3 p.m. the entire 5th brigade is north of the MARNE; command post, MONT-St-PERE. A battalion of the American 38th Inf. is north of the MARNE. The remainder of the regiment continues crossing on the MEZY footbridge despite the enemy machine guns. The entire American 30th Inf. is south of the MARNE.

III. During the forenoon fairly strong reaction of enemy artillery on MEZY, MONT-St-Pere and CHARTEVES.

Two battalions of the American 76th Field Artillery crossed the MARNE during the forenoon and went into position in the afternoon toward the east edge of Bois de BARBILLON southwest of MONT-St-PERE.

Numerous explosions toward the south edge of the Foret de RIS, FERE-en-TARDENOIS and the woods to the north. Fires in FRESNES and VINCHELLES.

IV. Air force very active on both sides. Toward 5:15 p.m. enemy planes bombed the MEZY Bridge.

V. The American 56th Brigade is placed at the disposal of the American I Corps.

The American 55th Brigade is placed at the disposal of the French XXXVIII Corps in the CHARLY-SAULCHERY region.

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203-32.7: Memorandum

Instructions for Pursuit

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,864/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, July 23, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The pursuit of the enemy must be vigorous and incessant.

2. The American 3d Div. will pursue the enemy on the axis Le CHARMEL--RONCHERES--CIERGES--COULONGES--VILLESAVOYE.

3. The French 39th Inf. Div. is to pursue the enemy on the axis VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME--COURMONT--PELGER Wood (W. of CHAMERY)--PARTY Farm--BAZOCHES.

L. de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII
Army Corps.

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Constitution of Liaison Detachment

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 1,867/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS. July 23, 1918.

SPECIAL ORDERS

[Extract]

The French 73d Inf. Div. has received orders to send a platoon to BARZY to establish liaison there with the XXXVIII Army Corps.

The American 3d Div. will also send a platoon to BARZY.

These two platoons will remain together at all times and will constitute the liaison detachment between the 3d Div. and XXXVIII Army Corps.

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de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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Advance upon Le Charmel

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 1,868/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS, July 23, 1918—6:30 a. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 158

[Extract]

1. Tomorrow morning, July 24, the XXXVIII Army Corps will resume the attack under the same conditions as this morning.
2. Artillery preparation: 3:55 a. m.
   Time of attack: 4:05 a. m.
   Line of departure: The front that is reached by that time.
3. Objective:
   American 3d Div.: Le CHARMEL---Le CHARMEL-CHATEAU.
French 39th Inf. Div.: Hill 228 (1 km. west of the church in Le CHARMEL)---grove east of this hill and east edges of the FORET de FERE, west of Hill 228.

   * * * * *

   de MONDESIR,
   General Commanding the XXXVIII
   Army Corps.

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HS Fr. File: 454-30.1: Report

**Enemy in Retreat**

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 24, 1918---9:25 p. m.

The enemy is falling back along the entire front of the Sixth Army. At the end of the day our leading elements have advanced beyond ARGENTOL, have reached the wood south of Le CHARMEL and are attempting to debouch from the Foret de FERE to attack the VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Wood.

On the right, the French 73d Inf. Div. has advanced in the FORET de RIS and reached the line ARGENTOL--Le GROS-CHENE [Carre followers of GROS-CHENE]--La BOULANGER.

On the left, the American 26th Div. appears to have reached the line MOULIN de la LOGETTE [La LOGETTE-MAISON]--BEUVARDELLES.

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203-32.7: Letter

**Reduction of Front Line Strength**

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

No. 1,886/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, July 25, 1918---12 a. m.

General of Division de Mondesir, Comdg. the XXXVIII Army Corps, to the General Commanding the American 3d Division.

Examination of the map showing the position of the troops permits it to be stated that there is on the front of your division a density of troops greater than the mission to be fulfilled requires.

I request you to take into consideration the following indications dictated by experience: In the present situation, it is not yet a question of breaking a strong enemy resistance; it is only necessary to bring about my maneuver and by infiltration the fall of the line of machine guns by which the enemy covers his retreat. For this
purpose there is required a small force in order to diminish the losses but light and active to be able to outflank rapidly the machine guns which are uncovered.

I am of the opinion that in the present circumstances it would be sufficient to put in line one brigade, the other brigade being in reserve and resting.

The first line brigade does not need more than two battalions in first line, the remainder being in the hands of the general of the brigade in case there should be a serious resistance to be overcome.

In this manner, the losses would be diminished and it would be possible to allow the troops a little rest, having them relieve each other for the 1st line service. Thus the 6 battalions of the brigade in first line would be able to support the combat for 4, 5 or 6 days, while the reserve brigade would be resting.

Moreover, it would be possible to lighten the first line troops by having them carry only what is indispensable (cartridges, rations, portable tools, and shelter tents), the rest distributed in individual packets could be stored in a shelter under the guard of several men and could be picked up again at the time when the brigade would pass into reserve.

This is the method which the experience of four years of war has caused the French divisions to adopt; this permits them to last for a long time in the fight although they have effectives infinitely smaller than those of the American divisions and although they are composed of older men.

de MONDESIR.

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HS Fr. File: 454-30.1 Order

Orders to Capture Arbre de la Fosse

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,889/3

GENERAL ORDERS No. 160*

1. The French 4th Inf. Div. (which has relieved the 73d Div.) has reached the line: RUISSEAU de la BELLE-AULNE---l'HEROLLE.

2. The enemy is now offering stiff resistance in VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods and in Le CHARME defile. A sketch of the enemy defensive organization has been already sent out. It shows that the enemy has decided to oppose our debouchment from the defile between VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods and the FORET de RIS.

The enemy is determined to hold his command of observation at ARBRE de la FOSSE [Signal]. This enables him to observe into our positions beyond the MARNE and prevents us from observing his terrain.

3. Consequently, the resistance of the enemy will be broken by a concerted action and command of observation on ARBRE de la FOSSE [Signal] will be captured.

* On the face of the French document the following handwritten notation in English appears: "This attack countermanded. RCHK G 3" [This referred to date only].

- 555 -
This operation will be carried out by a regiment of the 39th Div. and 2 battalions of the American 3d Div. supported by the artillery of two divisions.

5. Objective of attack: Southeast corner of VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods---ARBRE de la FOSSE [Signal]---ridge line north of La FOSSE Farm.

6. In order to assure unity of command, the General commanding the 39th Div. will be given the direction of the operation and the command of troops that will participate therein. The General commanding the American 3d Div. will designate the troops of his division to participate in it and the officer who will command them. The officer will receive his orders from the General commanding the 3d Division.

The general commanding the artillery of the American 3d Div. will command the artillery of the two divisions.

7. The support of the Corps artillery will be requested by the General commanding the 39th Division.

8. The attack will be launched at 10 a.m., July 26.

9. Once the objective is reached, each infantry division will resume the pursuit in the zone which has already been assigned to it.

10. The support of the 4th Div. is requested for this operation. The General commanding the 39th Div. will communicate with the General commanding the 4th Div. and will issue the necessary instructions to him.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII
Army Corps.

Continuation of Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,893/3

GENERAL ORDERS No. 161

1. The army has seized BEUVARDES, CUGNY, OULCHY-le-CHATEAU and OULCHY-la-VILLE.

2. The mission of the XXXVIII Army Corps for tomorrow, July 26, is to carry by storm the eastern edge of VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods and the ridge of ARBRE de la FOSSE [Signal].

The order for carrying out this operation has already been given. The General commanding the French 39th Div., who is charged with the conduct of this operation, will change H hour if this is necessary.

3. If the relief of the American 26th Div. by the American 42d Div. now in progress permits, the American 1 Army Corps will conform to the movement of the XXXVIII Army Corps and advance to the edge of the woods southwest of FRESNES and to Le FOUR-a-VERRE.

4. Contact will under no consideration be lost; if the enemy should withdraw, all units will push forward.

5. The American 55th Brigade will be in continuous charge of the guard of the MARNE
bridges, from CHATEAU-THIERRY to JAULGONNE. It will be ready to move at 6 a. m. tomorrow. Detailed orders will be sent to it later.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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HS Fr. Files: 454-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Chateau-Thierry, Aisne, July 25, 1918.

[Extract]

I. The pursuit continues. Enemy resistance is very strong.

II. The attack on Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME which could not take place at daybreak is resumed at 7 a. m.

The left battalion succeeds in entering the wood, but the right battalion is checked at the jump-off by machine guns along the south edges of the wood.

On the right, the Americans capture the little square shaped wood [Bois 9] east of Hill 228 and advances in the village of Le CHARMEL which is completely mopped up about noon.

The advance in the Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME is soon checked by the enemy located in a line of trenches.

At the end of the day the front we have reached is marked by: the JAULGONNE Road between FORET-de-FERE and VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME---small woods east of Hill 228---Le CHARMEL---south of ARGENTOL.

On our right, the French 4th Inf. Div., meeting serious resistance, was able to reach BELLE-AULNE Creek with its advanced elements.

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V. The American 55th Brigade arrives south of the MARNE in the region CREZANCY---FOSSOY---BLESMES---NESLES, with the mission of guarding the bridges.

The American 6th Brigade is placed in Corps reserve.

The American 7th Machine Gun Battalion (Motorized) is returned to Corps reserve.

One company of the American 6th Engineers is placed at the disposal of the Corps engineers for road maintenance.

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Attack on the Ourcq

[Contemporary Translation]

FIELD ORDERS No. 162

[Extract]

I. For the purpose of opening to the cavalry the crossings of the Ourcq, the Sixth Army will attack tomorrow ***

II. The attack in the zone of the XXXVIII A. C. will be commanded by the General commanding the American 28th Div. Troops at his disposal:

American 55th Brigade, 103d Rgt. Engrs., 107th M. G. Bn.

III. The artillery, having a special mission, will be entirely - including that of the Inf. Divs.-under the orders of the General commanding the artillery of the Corps until the 28th at 6 h.; beginning with that hour the General commanding the American 28th Div. will have the disposition of the Divl. Art. of the American 3d Div.

IV. As the slopes descending toward the Ourcq are within sight of the enemy observation posts, the attack will take place at nightfall.

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VIII. The attack and the advance on the final objectives will be carried out without firing as long as it is night, to avoid mistakes, and by marching as rapidly as possible. The artillery preparation will be short and brutal.

Immediately upon arrival at its final positions, the American 55th Brigade will entrench itself there, one battalion of the American engineers following each column.

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de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.
Assignment of American 32d Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff, No. 1,900/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS, Brasles, Aisne, July 26, 1918 -- 11:50 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 163

[Extract]

1st Part

I. The American 32d Div. is placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII A. C. to relieve the 39th Inf. Div., and go into line between the American 3d Div. and the American I Corps.

II. This Inf. Div. will detrain in the zone of the XXXVIII A. C. beginning the July 27.


de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

Instructions for Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff No. 1,902/3

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS, Brasles, Aisne, July 26, 1918 -- 11:50.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 164

[Extract]

I. The Sixth Army will attack tomorrow under the conditions provided for by Preparatory Order No. 162.

   The attack will start at 9:40 p.m. after an artillery preparation of ten minutes.

II. The artillery and the cavalry will receive special orders.

III. The infantry (American 55th Brigade) will attack in two columns of one regiment each (with each regiment advancing obligatorily by successive battalions).

   

IV. Once the final objectives have been reached, the troops, helped by the engineer battalions following them, will install themselves on the conquered position and organize it.

- 559 -
The right column will take its position on the line Hill 231 (1,200 m. east of RONCHERES)--Hill 192 (1,500 m. north southeast of RONCHERES) where it will connect with the left column.

The left column will establish itself north of CIERGES and will connect at Hill 192 with the right column and at Hill 212 (500 m. west [east?] of SERGY) with the American I A. C.

* * * * * *

VI. The general commanding the American 28th Div., will have his P. C.:
During the attack, on the edge of the wood south of Les FRANQUETS Farm.
At FRESNES, once the objectives have been attained.

VII. During the advance and until daylight, the attacking troops will be absolutely forbidden to fire any rifle or revolver shots; all fighting should be done with cold steel only.

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de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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HS Fr. Files: 454-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Brasles, Aisne, July 26, 1918.

[Extract]

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II. During the night the enemy was very restless and very vigilant and succeeded in maintaining his positions on the corps front. The American 3d Div. has been unable to take Le CHARMEL-Chateau and contact with the French 4th Div. is still being made south of ARGENTOL.

At 4:50 p. m. the French 39th Div. receives the order to attack the Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME and the Signal at ARBRE-de-la-FOSSE. In addition to its own troops it has at its disposal for this operation 2 battalions of the American 3d Div.

As soon as the attack is launched, numerous enemy machine guns go into action. The reaction of the enemy artillery is weak on the left but stronger against the Americans.

On our left, the attack is supported by the American 84th Brigade advancing in the wood north of Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME.

At the end of the day, before the enemy resistance which is even stronger than the previous day, our troops withdraw to their position of departure.

The front we have reached is the same as yesterday.

III. Enemy artillery reaction in poison gas shells and H. E. was strong on the sector of the American 3d Div., particularly south of Le CHARMEL.
V.  The American 32d Div. is placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII Corps, with hq. in CHATEAU-THIERRY.

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203-32.7: Order

Relief of French Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 1,904/3  
FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,  
Brasles, Aisne, July 27, 1918—9:30 a. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 165  
[Extract]

I.  By order of the general commanding the army, the following changes are recorded in the situation of the XXXVIII A. C.:
(a) The operation, provided by the orders of the XXXVIII A. C., Nos. 162 and 164, of July 26, is postponed to a later date.
(b) The 39th Infantry Division is to be relieved.
(c) The zone of action of the XXXVIII A. C. is extended and the left boundary of this zone is pushed farther to the north.

II. Therefore, the following measures will be taken:
(a) From this evening, the 27th, the American 28th Division will relieve with the 55th Brigade the units in line of the 39th Infantry Division and those of the American 42d Division which are in the portion of the zone assigned to the XXXVIII A. C.

V. The General commanding the American 28th Division will have his P. C. at the CHANOIS Farm [Le CHANOIS (?), N. of MONT-St-PERE] beginning with July 28, at noon, at which time he will assume the command of his new sector.

de MONDESIR,  
General Commanding the XXXVIII  
Army Corps.

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Continuation of Advance

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,912/3

FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Brasles, Aisne, July 27, 1918--17:45 h.

GENERAL OPERATIONS ORDER No. 166

[Extract]

I. The enemy has evacuated FRESNES, COURMONT; our patrols were greeted by rifle shots coming from the right bank of the OURCQ and the woods to the north of RONCHERES.

IV. For the continuation of the attacks, the American 28th Div. and 3d Div. will have their zone of action at various points of the line: COURMONT---COURMONT-CIERGES Road---CHAMERY (incl.) to the infantry division of the left.

* * * * *

V. In order to maintain a close contact with the division on the left of the III A. C. (4th Inf. Div.), the American 3d Div. will have held by its rear regt., until the 4th Inf. Div. reaches its line the following points: The north corner of La FORET de RIS, Hill 231 (east of RONCHERES).

VI. Until the American 32d Div. has arrived in the zone of the XXXVIII A. C., the relieved elements of the 39th Inf. Div. will be maintained to the north of the MARNE and will stop temporarily in the zone: Ferme FARY---[La] TIEULERIE---La THEODERIE---Ferme le CHANOIS---Ferme GRANGE-MARIE.

They will push on later and on a new order, into the zone fixed by General Order No. 165 of the XXXVIII A. C.

VII. The generals commanding the infantry division will push their P. C. as far as Le CHARME, on the 28th before noon, at which hour a telephone central will be opened in this locality under the direction of the telegraph service of the A. C.

The American 3d and 28th Divs. must absolutely be connected with this central by the same hour.

P. C. of the 3d Div.: CHATEAU du CHARME and in the part of the village to the east of the road Le CHARME---RONCHERES.

P. C. of the 38th Div.: At the position chosen by the General commanding the 39th Inf. Div. one kilometer west of Hill 228 towards the F of the word FERE.

* * * * *

P. C. of the General commanding the XXXVIII A. C.: CHARTEVES (beginning at an hour which will be fixed later).

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.
CONTINUATION OF OPERATIONS ORDER NO. 166

[Extract]

The attack will begin tonight, the 27th, at 23 h. The artillery preparation will begin at 22:50 h.

* * * * *

The General commanding the American 28th Div. will have his C. P. at La Ferme Le CHANOIS beginning with 22 h. and will be in command of the attack beginning with 23 h.

By order Chief of Staff.

(s) Illegible.

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Plans for Resistance on Ourcq

[Contemporary Translation]

GENERAL ORDERS No. 168

I. The enemy appears to be decided to offer a certain resistance upon the OURCQ.

II. The intention of the General commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps is to maneuver the enemy from the east by taking, first of all, the hill or chain of heights encircled to the north and east by the stream of CIERGES [Ru du Bois de CIERGES] and to the west by the OURCQ.

Consequently:

(a) The American 3d Division will have as an objective: RONCHERES, the southwest tip of the MEUNIERE Woods and the small woods north of RONCHERES. It will ask the 4th Div. to support its attack or at least to cover it.

(b) The American 28th Div. will take advantage of the attack of the 3d Division to force a passage of the OURCQ and to take that part of the heights between CIERGES, MOULIN-CARANDA and the CIERGES-COURMONT Road.

III. Once the above-mentioned heights are solidly held, the American 3d Div.
force the passage of the CIERGES Stream in order to occupy the Crest 220-230 to the north of CIERGES.

The 3d Division will cover itself upon its right.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

203-32.7: Order

Forward Movement of American 32d Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,916/3

C. P. XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Brasles, Aisne, July 28, 1918—9:30 a. m.

[Extract]

I. Upon receipt of the present order, the American 32 Div., will move towards the N. E. to be ready to support the divisions engaged in first line.

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(d) The headquarters of the 32d Div., with the M. G. bn., motorized, will establish itself at Jaulgonne where it will operate beginning at 14 h.

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de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

228-32.7: Order

Crossing the Ourcq and Relief of American 3d Division

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,922/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, July 28, 1918—10 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 169

I. In front of the Sixth Army the enemy, yielding to our pressure, is reported to the north of the OURCQ, the passage of which we have forced.

At the end of the day, the front of the Corps was pushed toward Hill 212 (S. E. of SERGY)—Hill 138—MOULIN-CARANDA—Hill 188—wood N. W. of RONCHERES—RONCHERES.

At the right of the XXXVIII A. C. our front passes through the destroyed signal [Telege dett]—La GRANGE-aux-Bois [Ferme].
At the left of the XXXVIII A. C., we reached Ferme MEURCY—the station of FERE-en-TARDENOIS—the OURCQ River—GIVRAY.

II. Tomorrow, 29th, the army will continue to push the enemy vigorously so as to keep close contact and cause the points of resistance to fall by maneuvering around them after concentrated artillery fire on these points.

III. The movement forward will be generally resumed at the point of day: 3:40 h.

The objective to be reached at the end of the day, should be at least the general line: CHERY-CHARTREUFE---BRUYS, with outposts as far as MONT-NOTRE-DAME---MONT-ST-MARTIN.

IV. Missions of the Divisions:
(a) The American 3d Div. with one brigade, will continue to attack in its zone of action, having for its successive objectives: CIERGES—Hill 230 (1,500 m N. E. of CIERGES)—COULONGES.

It will keep in liaison with the French 4th Inf. Div. at its right, on the western edges of the Bois-MEUNIERE.

(b) The American 28th Div. will also attack with one brigade and at the same time as the 3d Div., having for its successive objectives Hill 220 (east of SERGE—hill N. W. of VILLOME.

V. The 56th Brigade (of the 28th Div.) and the American 32d Div. will be temporarily kept in their zones of assembling, at the disposal of the General commanding the A. C.

VI. In the night of the 29th the elements of the 3d Div. which are engaged will be relieved by a brigade of the American 32d Div. with one battalion of engineers and the machine gun battalion, motorized, of this division (later order will be given).

VII. The cavalry (10th Chasseurs) will act in liaison with the advance guards of the two divisions. Information center at COURMONT.

VIII. For what concerns the artillery, the Generals commanding the 3d and 28th Divs. should begin to provide for an echelonnement in depth so as to relieve their divl. art. namely:

That of the 3d Div. by two groups of 75's of the 32d Div.
That of the 28th Div. (Divl. Art. of the 39th) by two groups of the 32d Div.
The 214th Regiment of Field Artillery will be kept in the second line.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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[Editorial Translation]

P. C. FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charleves, Aisne, July 28, 1918.

[Extract]

I. Attack and capture of RONCHERES.

Effective at noon the Hq. of the Army Corps operates in CHARTEVES.

II. During the night, the elements of the American 28th Div. reached the line of the OURCQ which they have been unable to cross. The bridges blew up. The enemy is laying a brisk artillery and machine-gun barrage in front of the river. The division engineers are preparing footbridges. RONCHERES is still occupied by the enemy and a minor operation with artillery support is being prepared to capture it during the day.
On the left, the American 1 Army Corps succeeded in putting more than 2 battalions north of the OURCQ before 9 a.m.

On the right, the French 4th Inf. Div. has advanced at the same hour to the region located between La DEFENSE and RONCHERES and is moving forward on the right of the American 4th Inf. which is to attack RONCHERES to assist it in its attack.

The attack takes place toward 2:20 p.m. The French 4th Div. outflanks RONCHERES on the east; the American 55th Brigade, on the northwest. The American 4th Inf. enters the village which we soon occupy but the exit of which is interdicted by the enemy machine guns placed in the woods to the north and in the south edge of Bois-MEUNIERE. At the same time the 4th Div. seized the destroyed telegraph station (Hill 231).

On the left, 2 battalions of the American 28th Div. have succeeded in crossing the OURCQ.

At the end of the day our troops have reached the following line: 200 meters southwest of Hill 212 to the south of SERGY—Hill 138—Hill 188—north edge of RONCHERES—road to the destroyed telegraph station.

III. During the night enemy artillery activity marked by high explosive and gas shells in front of the line of the OURCQ and on the village of COURMONT.

French artillery preparation on the village of RONCHERES.

IV. During the day, enemy planes dropped bombs on the JAULGONNE—Le CHARMEL Road on which very heavy traffic was moving. A few American artillerymen were wounded.

V. Effective at midnight the American 56th Brigade is returned to the control of the 28th Div. and sent to the Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILAUME.

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203-32.7: Order

American 32d Division Assumes Command

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,929/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS, Chartesves, Aisne, July 29, 1918—2:50 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 170

[Extract]

* * * * *

V. The Commanding General, American 32d Division, will leave his rear echelon at JAULGONNE and will have his command post at Le CHARMEL with the Commanding General, American 3d Division, effective at 7 a.m. July 30.

Effective 11 a.m. July 30, the Commanding General, 32d Division, will assume command of his new sector.

At the same hour, the Commanding General, American 3d Division, will return to CHIERRY.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

* * * * *
Relief of American 28th Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,933/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 29, 1918--8 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 171

[Extract]

1. Tomorrow night, July 30, the American 32d Div. will relieve the American 28th Div. with elements which are not yet engaged.

Upon completion of the relief, the divisions of the Army Corps will be distributed as follows:

The American 32d Div., in the front line, with brigades side by side.
The American 28th Div., in support, north of the MARNE.
The American 3d Div., in rest, south of the MARNE.
(The last two divisions will be held in corps reserve.).
The French 39th Div., in rest billets.

* * * * *

4. The General commanding the American 32d Div. (P. C. Le CHARMEL) will assume command over the entire zone occupied by his division, beginning at 9 a. m., July 31, at which hour the C. P. of the General commanding the American 28th Div. will open at Jaulgonne.

The relief of the artillery will form the subject of a special order.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

* * * * *

232-32.7: Order

Attack by American Divisions

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,934/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, July 29, 1918--10:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 172

[Extract]

II. Tomorrow, July 30, the army will continue its advance.

III. The American 28th and 32d Divisions will recommence their attacks upon the objectives already indicated in Order No. 169, of July 28.
The General commanding the Army Corps draws attention to the fact that these attacks must be carefully prepared. Notably, the artillery should execute a short and violent preparation upon the points of resistance to be taken; it should continue to play a part in order to support the infantry in its movement forward.

IV. The entrance into the line of the remainder of the 32d Division during the night of the 30th is the subject of special instructions (General Order No. 171).

V. Beginning midnight July 30, the III Army Corps is attached to the Sixth Army and the P. C. of the Commander of this Army Corps will be brought up to the MARNE (REUILLY-DORMANS region).

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HS Fr. File: 454-30.1: Order

Disposition of Artillery

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1935/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 29, 1918---11:05 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER

[Extract]

1. The artillery of the American 32d Div., which arrived on the 29th west of CHATEAU-THIERRY, will be placed at the disposal of the general commanding that division, for the relief of the artillery of the 39th Div. and a part of the artillery of the American 3d Div.

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FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, July 29, 1918.

[Extract]

II. The front has not changed during the night. The Americans occupy the north edge of RONCHERES and cannot debouch from it because of enemy machine guns in position in the small wood on the north.
At 9:15 a.m. the American 110th Inf. (28th Div.) has succeeded in advancing to the edges of the wood north of RONCHERES, but taken under the fire of enemy machine guns and forced back by grenades, it had to withdraw to the line of departure: dirt road running from Hill 188 to the R of RONCHERES.

During the night, the American 42d Division on our left, counterattacked five different times by the German 4th Guard Div., has been compelled to abandon the village of SERGY. The line passes at present 1 kilometer south of SERGY and joins our line at the dirt road 1 kilometer south of the PEUPLIER-DISPARU [geodetic point on Hill 212].

Toward 1 p.m. the 110th Inf. moves a second line to the attack of the wood north of RONCHERES. It is compelled to fall back again to the OURCQ, but still holds the village of RONCHERES.

At the end of the day the 42d Div. on our left reached the houses west of SERGY but does not occupy the entire village.

The line reached by our troops is as follows: east of SERGY—La GRANGE-au-PONT [MOULIN]—east of MOULIN-CARANDA—north edge of RONCHERES—road up to 200 meters south of the destroyed semaphore.

III. During the night and at daybreak, artillery very active on both sides. During the forenoon brisk shelling of the OURCQ line and the villages of RONCHERES and COURMONT. During the day shelling of the CHARTEVES, MEZY region.

IV. Moderate activity of both air forces. Intense fog obstructing observation.

V. Relief of the American 3d Div. by the American 32d Div. After relief, the 3d Div. moves into rest billets on the zone limited on the north by the MARNE; on the east by MEZY (exclusive)—CREZANCY—St. EUGENE—COUFREMAUX—COURBOIN [these localities inclusive]; on the south by AUCLAINE and VIFFORT (inclusive); on the west by the CHATEAU-THIERRY Road as far as Le LUXEMBOURG—ETAMPS and CHIERRY (inclusive). Hq. in CHIERRY.

Regroupment of the French 39th Inf. Div. (less artillery) south of the MARNE in the zone bounded by NOGENTEL—ESSIES—La CHAPHELLE-sur-CHEZY—NOGENT-l'ARTAUD (localities inclusive). Hq. in SAULCHERY.

The Trench Mortar Co. of the Army Corps is sent to NEMOURS to be dissolved.

The artillery of the American 32d Div. arrives in CHATEAU-THIERRY (west exit).

Lt. Dupont of the French 10th Mounted Chasseurs, temporarily detached with the Hq. of the Army Corps, will rejoin his regiment.

Order

Organization of Safety Position

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,937/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
July 30, 1918—10:20 o'clock.

SPECIAL ORDER

[Extract]

I. The general commanding the army has ordered that a position of safety be organized, which, in the zone of the XXXVIII A. C. will be marked out by: BALANCHERES, FRESNES ---the crest N. W. of the VILLAR-DELLE Farm.
This position should be extended: to the left in the zone of the American I Army Corps by the eastern edges of the FERE Forest, and to the right in the zone of the American III Army Corps by the northern edges of the RIS Forest.

II. The colonel in command of the Army Corps engineers will establish at once, and after reconnaissances, a brief project of organization.

This organization, for the time being, will consist only of the creation of a few centres of resistance.

Further, this position should have some depth, by preparing the edges of the woods to the S. W. of FRESNES and the slopes to the north and northeast of the FOSSE Farm.

III. For this work, the colonel commanding the Army Corps engineers will dispose of the 103d Regt. of Engineers of the American 28th Div.

* * * * *

de MONDESR,  
General Commanding the XXXVIII  
Army Corps.

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203-32.7: Order

Plan of Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  
No. 1,946/3  

GENERAL ORDERS No. 173  

[Extract]

* * * * *

III. Mission of the Army Corps: To advance in the direction of the Hill 220---Map Scale 1/80,000 or 1/50,000---(1,500 m. E. of SERGY), to cause the fall of CIERGES.

IV. The attack will be conducted by the General commanding the American 32d Division whose inf. div. will be engaged in 1st line after the relief which is to take place to-night.

The 63d Brigade will execute the attack, taking as objective Hill 220. Zone of action of the brigade bounded on the east by a line passing through: crossroad of the dirt road SERGY---RONCHERES and of the road Le CHARME----CIERGES; [on the west, by the boundary of the A. C., then as far as Hill 220 by a line cutting Bois du PELGER in the middle]---the head of the ravine N. S. which skirts CIERGES on the west.

The 63d Brigade will take its base of departure on the line which it has been able to reach; it will keep in close liaison with the right of the American I Army Corps which is attacking in the direction of the crossing 600 m. N. W. of Bois du PELGER.

The 64th Brigade will advance in the direction of CIERGES so as to support the attack of the 63d Brigade and keep in close liaison with the left of the III A. C.

The hour H for the opening of the infantry attack is fixed at 4:30 p. m.

V. Artillery: Each division's artillery operates in the zone indicated.

The commanders of the divl. arts. will come to an agreement in advance for mutual support in case of necessity and for cooperation [coordination] in the progress of the creeping barrage.

- 570 -
The art. of the Corps will operate beyond the line: Ferme du CAMP---crossroad to the S.W. of CHAMERY---Hill 230, the separation of their zones of action being a line parallel to the road CHAMERY, COULONGES, 300 m. to the S.

VI. The air office of the Corps will receive the orders of the General commanding the 32d Div. for the cooperation to be rendered by the air service of the Corps.

VII. It remains understood that the capture of the objectives indicated will be accompanied by an advance pushed as far as possible. Close contact with the enemy will be maintained.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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HS Fr. Files: 454-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

C. P. FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

I. Attack and capture of the Bois des GRIMPETTES north of RONCHERES.
II. During the night the relief of the American 3d Div. is completed without incident. At daybreak the situation is the same as at the end of the day of July 29. On the left, the American 42d Div. has taken SERGY.

A minor attack made about 8 a.m. to advance north of RONCHERES was checked, after an advance of about 300 meters, by machine guns in position in the Bois des GRIMPETTES.

On the right, the French 4th Inf. Div. attacks about 11 a.m. and gains a foothold in the southwest part of Bois-MEUNIERE.

An attack is prepared between the American 32d and 28th Divs. to capture the Bois des GRIMPETTES and subsequently advance towards Cierges. This attack is launched at 2:40 p.m. after an artillery preparation of 20 minutes. At 3:30 p.m. the American 127th Inf. has reached the north edge of Bois des GRIMPETTES.

On the right, some American elements seize the west edges of Bois-MEUNIERE. The advance is made very difficult because of enemy machine guns.

At the end of the attack the front is limited by the south edges of CIERGES---the ravine of Hill 173---Bois des GRIMPETTES---west tip of Bois-MEUNIERE.

During the operation we took 78 prisoners from the 216th, 200th and 37th Inf. Divs.

About 8 p.m. an enemy counterattack partly succeeds in throwing us back, but a new attack of American troops, launched after a 20-minute artillery preparation, restores the situation.

In addition to prisoners, a great number of machine guns have been captured in the Bois des GRIMPETTES.

At the end of the day, the front line is as above. CIERGES does not seem to be occupied by the enemy, who has been shelling it with gas, a fact which caused the American command to forbid the troops to enter it.

III. During the night and at daybreak, violent shelling, mostly poison gas, by enemy artillery on the line of the OURCQ and the villages of RONCHERES and Le CHARMEL.

In the course of the day, the reaction of the enemy artillery during the attack was especially violent on the village of RONCHERES, a little less strong on COURMONT and Le CHARMEL.

At the end of the day the enemy shelled the village of CIERGES violently with poison gas.
IV. Both air forces have been fairly active in spite of the fog impeding observation.

V. Effective at 9 a. m. the Hq. of the Army Corps operates at MONT-ST-PERE. The Hq. of the American III Corps operates beside that of the XXXVIII Corps. Squadron 284 is placed in rest billets.

The American 7th Machine Gun Battalion (Motorized) rejoins the American 3d Div. in its rest area.

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HS Fr. Files: 454-30.1: Order

Combat Instructions

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,950/3

C. P. XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, July 31, 1918—10:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 174

[Extract]

III. The American 32 Division will continue to push the enemy back on the ridges which separate the ORILLON Creek on the east from PONT-BRULE Creek on the west.

It will advance by taking as successive objectives: Hill 230—REDDY Farm—Bois-PELGER—Le MONTCEL—VILLOME—Hill 200—PARTY Farm.

IV. The guns of the heavy artillery will support the action of the 32d Division as prescribed for the day of the 31st.

The same conditions will apply to the air service.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

1st Ind.

Combat P. C., 32 Division, A. E. F., August 1, 1918 - Copies to Commanding General 64th Brigade, Commanding General, 63d Brigade, and General commanding the Artillery.

1. The operations now going on for the capture of Hill 230 will be continued, at the same time contact will be maintained with the enemy in our left sector in liaison with the troops to the left.

2. When the results of the issue of the attack on Hill 230 are known, orders will issue for further attack on the objectives mentioned in Paragraph III.

W. G. HAAN,
Major General, Commanding.
FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, July 31, 1918.

[Editorial Translation]

I. Advance of our troops north of CIERGES on the south slopes of Hill 230, in liaison on the right with the French 4th Inf. Div. which completely mops up the Bois-MEUNIERE at the end of the day.

II. The American 32d Div. plans an attack with artillery preparation to capture Hill 230. This attack is to take place around 2 p.m.

The American troops succeed in capturing the Bois les JOMBLETS, Hill 220, the Bois de la PLANCHETTE and are taking a few prisoners. But the enemy still holds BELLEVUE Farm strongly. His machine guns deny any further advance there.

On the right, the advance in the Bois-MEUNIERE continued without encountering strong resistance on the part of the enemy, and at the beginning of the afternoon, our cavalry patrols have reached the north edge of the wood from which they cannot emerge because of the machine guns in position in the PENTAGONAL Woods [believed to refer to PATIS de CHAMERY], 1 kilometer southeast of Hill 230.

At the end of the day our line runs through the east edge of the woods south of Hill 220---south edge of these woods---crosses the CIERGES-COULONGES Road at the C of CIERGES north edge of the village---then approximately CIERGES---Ste-GEMME Road to the general vicinity of La MEUNIERE Farm.

On the right, the 4th Div. is at the north edges of Bois-MEUNIERE.

On the left, the American 42d Div. has moved its line to about 500 meters from SERGY.

III. Normal activity of enemy artillery (77's and 105's).

IV. Great activity of enemy bombardment aviation during the night, particularly on the villages and the crossings of the MARNE.

V. During the night the 63d Brigade of the American 32d Div. relieved the 56th Brigade of the American 28th Div.

At 9 a.m. the General commanding the 32d Div. assumes command of the forward area of the army corps.

C. P.: Le CHARME-CHATEAU.
The 28th Div. is in 2d line.
C. P. of the General commanding the 28th Div.: JAULGONNE.
American 55th Brigade: ARGENTOL Ravine.
American 56th Brigade: Bois de la VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME.
The 2d Bn., French 120th Heavy Artillery (105's), was withdrawn during the night.
The 3d Bn., French 285th Heavy Artillery (rapid-fire howitzers), moves from CHATEAU-THIERRY to COURCHAMPS.

The 1st Bn., American 56th Heavy Artillery (155-mm gun, Filloux), detrains at La FERTE-sous-JOUARRE and goes into billets at CHARLY and RUVET.
Alert for Possible Attack

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,960/3

SPECIAL ORDERS

C. P. XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
August 1, 1918—4:30 p. m.

I. Concentrations of enemy troops and possibly of tanks in the south and east parts of FORET de NESLES warrant the anticipation of an attack on our front.

II. Consequently:
   (a) The motorized machine gun battalion of the American 28th Div. will be placed at the disposal of the General commanding the American 32d Div. on receipt of this order.
   (b) The General commanding the American 28th Div. will alert in position one of the regiments of his division. This regiment will hold itself in readiness to support the American 32 Div., but it will be moved and placed at the disposal of the General commanding the American 32d Div. only upon the order of the General commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps who will be asked for it by telephone.

This regiment will arrange to be provided with a warm meal tonight.

III. The General commanding the American 28th Div. will proceed to the headquarters of the General commanding the American 32 Div. to examine with him the support he can give him in case of counterattack.

dé MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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Preparation for Attack

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,963/3
Map 1/50,000

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
August 1, 1918—8:30 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 175

I. By order of the general commanding the army, the American I Army corps, the French XXXVIII Army Corps and the American III Army Corps will attack tomorrow morning, August 2. All three will open their attacks at the same time at 4:15 o’clock.

II. With the end in view of encircling the area ("agglomeration") CHAMERY-Le MONCEL, the objectives to be reached by the XXXVIII Army Corps will be:
   (a) For the left: the road NESLES-CHAMERY from the west limit of the Army Corps (brook to the east of the Ferme de CAMP) as far as the earth road coming from BELLEVUE Farm.
(b) For the right: Hill 177 (600 meters S. E. of Le MONCEL) and hill crests to the east and to the west of this hill.

III. The attacks of the XXXVIII Army Corps will be covered: On the right, by the attack of the 4th Infantry Division which will have for objective the Ferme COURTEAUX; on the left, by the attack of the American I Army Corps, which will have for its mission to pivot around a point of its front (to be chosen by the Commander of the American I Army Corps), in such a way as to move on the line joining this point with the left of the XXXVIII Army Corps on the road NESLES-CHAMERY.

IV. The infantry of the XXXVIII Army Corps will lead the attack with two fresh battalions (one for each objective), each battalion having at the maximum, two companies in first line, the remainder of the battalion in support.

The operation will be executed by a crossing of the line, that is to say that the first lines of attacking troops will pass beyond at 4:15 o'clock, the troops holding the front reached.

V. The artillery will execute a fire of preparation lasting ten minutes (4:05 to 4:15 o'clock) at 300 meters in front of the front reached. At 4:15 o'clock, it will carry forward its barrage to 300 meters beyond the objectives to be reached encircling CHAMERY by the south. * * *

* * * * * *

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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1st Ind.

P. C., 32 Division, American E. F., August 1, 1918 - To Brigade, Artillery and Regimental Commanders.

1. Brigade commanders will take immediate steps to make the disposition required to carry out the foregoing instructions. * * *

2. The artillery commanders will prepare instructions for necessary artillery preparation and barrage as called for.

By command of Major General HAAN:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lieut. Col., Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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HS Fr. File: 454-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

C. P. FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, August 1, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Attack on Hill 230 north of CIERGES.
II. At daybreak the situation is the same as at the end of the day July 31. Hill 220, Bois-PELGER and the groves around BELLEVUE Farm are still occupied by the enemy.

At daybreak the American 32d Div. moves to the attack of Hill 230 but the advance is considerably slowed up by enemy machine-gun fire. At 9 a.m. BELLEVUE Farm is occupied but it is impossible to debouch from it.

On the left, the American troops gained a foothold in Bois-PELGER but were driven out of it shortly afterwards by an enemy counterattack.

At the start of the afternoon the American troops return to the assault of Hill 230 and REDDY Farm; the advance is made very difficult by enemy machine guns placed in the wood southeast of Hill 230. On the right, the French 4th Inf. Div. which has received the order to organize the north edges of Bois-MEUNIERE for defense, cannot support the movement.

At the end of the day the American line runs through the R of REDDY, follows the west edge of the small wood between REDDY and BELLEVUE Farms, runs through the two 1's of BELLEVUE, thence, the north head of the ravine 1 kilometer east of CIERGES---west tip of Bois-MEUNIERE on the general line of CIERGES.

* * * * * *

IV. Great activity of the two air forces. The enemy aviation was particularly active between 5 and 6 p.m. Low-flying patrols machine-gunning the infantry.

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HS Fr. File: 454-30.1: Order

American 32d Division to Drive Forward

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,964/3

XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
August 2, 1918---8:45 a.m.

SPECIAL ORDERS

[Confirmation of telephoned order]

I. The enemy is offering little resistance and is even falling back on certain parts of the front.

On the right, the French 4th Inf. Div. has reached COURTEAUX Farm.

On the left, in front of the American 42d Div., the enemy is in retreat. Patrols of the 42 Div. have reached NESLES and the NESLES-CHAMERY Road.

II. The American 32d Div. will drive the enemy back, axis of advance: VILLOME---Hill 200---wood northwest of DRAVEGNY. It will advance without halts, so as to prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold on the ground.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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GENERAL ORDERS No. 177

I. The enemy is retreating on the entire front from HARTENNES on the west to VILLE-EN-TARDENOIS on the east.

II. The cavalry of the French XXXVIII Corps has pushed out patrols as far as DRAVEGNY. The infantry also will advance to DRAVEGNY.

III. Consequently:
   (a) The American 32d Division will move its leading elements to DRAVEGNY and the woods northwest of the village.
   (b) The 32d Division will move its artillery as far forward as possible, so as to be able to assist the subsequent advance of the infantry north of DRAVEGNY.
   (c) The 32d Division will have the rear of its columns north of the CIERGES Brook. Movement to be completed by 8 p.m., this evening.

IV. The American 28th Division will move its leading element to the line COURMONT-RONCHERES, and will be distributed in depth between that line and the Le CHARME---FERE-EN-TARDENOIS Road.

   It will be prepared to relieve 32d Division and continue driving the enemy back, as soon as it receives the order.

V. The heavy artillery of the XXXVIII A. C. will be pushed forward tonight, according to the front line gained by the infantry at the end of the day, so as to be able to fire on the VESLE if possible.

VI. The cavalry will continue to cover the infantry and reconnoiter in advance of it.

VII. C. P.'s will open tomorrow, August 3, 9 a.m.
   C. P., 32 Div.: CIERGES.
   C. P., 28th Div.: FRESNES-CHATEAU.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.
Advance of American 32 Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,974/3
Map: 1/50,000 or 1/80,000

GENERAL ORDERS No. 178

[Extract]

III. * * *

1) Tomorrow, August 3, at 4 a.m., the American 32d Division will advance rapidly on FISMES, covered by the cavalry and its advance guards, which will march without halts and without being held up by the few machine guns left behind by the enemy. The main body of the division will advance by bounds to:

(a) The line: PARTY Farm---COHAN
(b) North of CHARTREUVE Creek
(c) The crests south of the VESLE.

Brigade commanders will march with the main body to regulate and expedite the movement.

2) If the VESLE is crossed, the advance guards, viz. 1 infantry regiment, 1 artillery battery, 1 engineer battalion per brigade, will advance to the crest north of BLANZY-les-FISMES and will dig in there to protect the debouchment of the rest of the column.

IV. The American 28th Division, constituting the main body of the Army Corps, will be held ready to move on orders to the line: North edge of the woods northwest of DRAVEGNY-LONGEVILLE, where it will establish the heads of its columns entrenched.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

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HS Fr. Files: 454-30.6: Journal of Operations

[Editorial Translation]

C. P. FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, August 2, 1918.

[Extract]

* * *

At 6:30 a.m. the CHAMERY---Le MONCEL massif is reached. At the same time the French 4th Inf. Div. on our right also reached its normal objectives: COURTEAUX Farm---north edge of PATIS de CHAMERY, and continues to advance.
On the left, the American 42d Div. reached NESLES and the CHATEAU de NESLES and continues to advance without meeting much resistance. Around 9 a.m. our cavalry patrols are reported in VILLOME and shortly after in PARTY Farm which the enemy set on fire before his departure. Our patrols are machine-gunned from the south edge of the wood on Hill 206. Toward noon our cavalry patrols reached DRAVEGNY and the wood located to the north but the infantry is still only on the general line of VILLOME. On the right the 4th Div. has captured COULONGES and is advancing in ORillon Creek toward COHAN. About 2:30 p.m. the infantry arrives at PARTY Farm; our patrols are on the general line of LONGEVILLE Farm.

At the end of the day the left brigade has gained a foothold in Bois CHENAY (Le Bois CHENET) (northwest of DRAVEGNY) and the right brigade has captured DRAVEGNY early in the night. A few wounded of the 354th Inf. (German 216th Inf. Div.).

III. Slight artillery activity on both sides. Toward 10 a.m. a few enemy shells of small caliber on Le MONCEL and VILLOME. At the beginning of the afternoon, barrage a little denser on VILLOME Crest.

V. Effective at 3 p.m. the advanced intelligence center operates in COURMONT. The boats of the two pontoon units are placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII Army Corps in SAMMERON in anticipation of the crossing of the VESLE.

HS Fr. Files 454-30.1: Order

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Change in Zone Assignments

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
No. 1,977/3 August 3, 1918--3:40 p.m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 179

I. By order of the general commanding the army, the General commanding the American III Army Corps will take command of the present zone of the XXXVIII Corps at 8 a.m., August 4.

On the same date the General commanding the XXXVIII Corps will move his hq. to VIELS-MAISONS, where it will be in army reserve.

II. The elements belonging to the non-divisional units of the XXXVIII Corps and the temporary retention of which is desired by the General commanding the American III Corps, will be left in position. The withdrawal of these elements will only take place by degree at a later date. The same holds for the army elements which had been placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII Corps.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII
Army Corps.

- 579 -
Movement American 28th Division

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  C. P., XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
No. 1,986/3  August 3, 1918--2 p. m.

TELEPHONE MESSAGE

Headquarters MARCEL to Headquarters PEN

On receipt of the present order the American 28th Div. will move to the line LONGEVILLE---north edge of the wood northwest of DRAVEGNY.

By order:

[Signature illegible]
Chief of Staff.

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Provisions for Crossing the Vesle

[Contemporary Translation]

3d Section, General Staff  XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
No. 1,988/3  August 3, 1918--8:40 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 180

[Extract]

I. The General commanding the Sixth Army orders: that all or part of the advance guards, except the artillery, crosses the VESLE tonight;

* * * * *

II. The American 32d Division will be charged with the construction of the means of passage; * * *

* * * * *

As soon as the light bridges have been thrown across, the advance guards of the American 28th Division will cross the VESLE, and will move to the crest of Hill 182 (road FISMES-MERVAL) * * *

* * * * *
III. As soon as the American 28th Division will have crossed the VESLE, the American
32d Div. will take stations in the region included between Le MONCEL---CHEZELLES Farm---
on the north and the line RENOY Farm---Les PETITES-CHEZELLES, on the south.
It will leave a guard at the bridges across the VESLE and will have the heights to
the south of FISMES organized defensively.

IV. The cavalry will cross the VESLE as soon as possible and will do scout duty on
the axis of pursuit.

V. The Army Corps Artillery should be in such positions as to be able to shell the
heads of the ravines coming down toward the AISNE.

IV. The P. C.'s of the divs., will function on August 4 beginning at 9 o'clock:
American 28th Div.: at DRAVEGNY.
American 32d Div.: at COULONGES.

VII. The advanced intelligence center will push to St-GILLES as rapidly as possible.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII
Army Corps.

C. P., FRENCH XXXVIII ARMY CORPS,
Charteves, Aisne, August 3, 1918.

At 6:30 a. m. the infantry advance guards are up to the line of CHERRY-CHARTREUVE
Creek, while cavalry patrols are in front of St-GILLES which is defended by a few machine
guns. The crest northwest of village is also held by the army.

At 9:30 a. m. MONT-St-MARTIN is occupied by our troops which cannot debouch from it
because of enemy machine guns.

At the same hour our cavalry patrols entered St-GILLES which the enemy evacuated
after blowing up the bridge on the ARDRE.

Toward 3 p. m. our elements which have advanced on the crest running from MONT-St-
MARTIN toward FISMES are checked by strong resistance of the enemy who occupies the woods
between Le MONCEL and CHEZELLES Farm.

On the right the French 4th Inf. Div. is also checked by machine guns placed in the
Bois de VILLETTE west (?) of FISMES.

In the course of the day, the 147th Inf. of the 4th Div. which is preparing to attack
FISMES asks the support of the right regiment of the American 32d Div. The attack executed
in liaison by these two regiments is checked by violent enemy shelling and very violent
machine-gun fire, as well as by enemy aviation bombing our infantry at low altitude. Our
troops fall back to the south slopes of Hill 143 [?]. They intend to return to the attack
from that point after an artillery preparation.

III. Great activity of German artillery, much more than on preceding days, especially
on FISMES and its surroundings. Numerous fires and explosions of ammunition dumps in
FISMES, BAZOCHES and in the entire valley of the VESLE.

IV. Aviation very active on both sides. During the attack of FISMES the enemy air
force machine-gunned the assault waves several times.

During the entire day numerous balloons aloft north of the VESLE.

- 581 -
V. Beginning at 12 noon the advanced intelligence center operates in COULONGES. The American 28th Div. moves to reach the LONGEVILLE line northwest of DRAVEGNY. Lieutenant Prenat will rejoin the 10th Chasseurs.

Note: By French Sixth Army Order No. 3675, dated Aug. 2, 1918, the American III Corps is ordered to take over the French XXXVIII sector at 8 a.m., Aug. 4, 1918.

American III Army Corps
July 12 - August 6, 1918

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3d Section, G. S.
No. 1282

SPECIAL ORDER

[Extract]

The American III Corps will be attached to the French Sixth Army and will remain in reserve at the disposal of French G. H. Q.

FAYOLLE,
General,
Commanding.
American Units Attached to French Tenth Army

[Editorial Translation]

No. 1506

July 14, 1918.

From: Headquarters NOAILLES, Group of Armies of the Reserve

To: Headquarters VERSIGNY, TRILPORT, PROVINS, SEZZANNE

(1) Headquarters, American III Corps (hq. at MEAUX), and the American 1st Division are now entirely at the disposal of the French Tenth Army.

(2) Headquarters, American 2d Division (hq. at Le SAUSSOY, 2 kilometers northwest of CHAMIGNY), is now at the disposal of the Tenth Army for all necessary reconnaissances. Instructions will be issued later concerning the disposition of this division.

PAQUETTE.

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Functions of Corps

HISTORY OF THE III CORPS, A. E. F., 1918-1919

[Extract]

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*** On July 14 Major General R. L. Bullard was assigned to the command of the corps and the administrative control of the 1st and 2d Divisions operating under the French Tenth Army *** On July 15 the corps headquarters moved to CHATEAU CHENOYE, and on the following day, namely, July 16, advanced echelon moved to TAILLEFONTAINE.

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Communications

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Taillefontaine, Aisne, July 18, 1918.

From: Commanding General, III Army Corps

To: G-4, PARIS Group

1. This letter is being sent by courier as telephone connection during this offensive has been impossible through French centrals and telegraph communications has also been
impossible due to the mass of operation orders by the French over these wires.

2. It is of paramount necessity that steps be taken by your office to put Headquarters III Corps of La CHENOYE-Chateau on a direct wire to G-4, PARIS Group.

3. Due to forward movement of men and animals, practically all available transportation is used up, and the railhead at CREPY [CREPY-en-VALOIS?] is too far away to haul rations. It is impossible to obtain wires from French and the matter should be taken up with the highest authority.

4. We are obliged to supply the American troops of this corps with certain ammunition, material and food, and the present method of supply through CREPY has fallen down, due to lack of telephone communication.

For the Corps Commander:

S. C. Reynolds,

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1st Ind.

4th Sec., G. S., PARIS Group, July 19, 1918. To G-4, GHQ, American E. F.

1. This is a matter of urgent necessity, and in view of the fact that it concerns the front of both the French Sixth and Tenth Armies, it is forwarded to G. H. Q., with the request that it be taken up with the French Mission at that place.

J. L. DeWITT,
A. C. of S., G-4.

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AG, GHQ, AEF: 15918-A-75: Letter

III Corps Organization for Operations

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Taillefontaine, Aisne, July 21, 1918.

From: Commanding General, III Army Corps, A. P. O. 754

To: Chief of Staff, A. E. F., A. P. O. 706

[Extract]

1. The Commander-in-Chief today personally directed me to call on G. H. Q. to furnish without delay the officers, troops and equipment required for the III Corps to assume full responsibility for operations. The strong desire of the Commander-in-Chief to put large units in actual operation is found to be impracticable at this time of activity unless each such unit is fairly independent of its Allies and need not call on them for troops and equipment that they really cannot spare. If the officers, troops and equipment hereinafter mentioned are actually in France with the schools or with the S. O. S. or in quiet sectors, the situation now demands their use as contemplated by this letter. If not impossible, it is at least very unwise to ask the French for assignment of corps sector for
attack or defense and then immediately demand from them all the artillery, pioneers, ambulance service, air service, etc., that are absolutely necessary to the maintenance of the corps front.

* * * * *

3. All officers, troops and equipment should be sent to CONFLANS, from which point everything will be forwarded to the corps after I have assured myself that it is equipped and ready to function.

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Chief of Staff,
For Corps Commander.

American III Corps Begins Functioning

G-3

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,

July 24, 1918.

MEMORANDUM FOR Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

[Extract]

1. Headquarters III Army Corps located at MORTEFONTAINE-CHATEAU. This corps, composed of 1st and 2d Divisions, commences to function as a corps this date.

2. 2d Division, less artillery brigade, relieved from line on the night July 19/20 ***

3. Artillery brigade of 2d Division to be relieved on the night of July 23/24. This division now assembling in the area of NANTEUIL with headquarters at NANTEUIL.

4. 1st Division, less artillery brigade, relieved on night July 22/23. Artillery brigade remained in position at the suggestion of the division commander to support the attack of the British 15th Division (the division which relieved the 1st Division) and I do not know when it is expected that the artillery brigade will be relieved - probably the night of July 24/25 ***

* * * * *

R. H. LEWIS,
Lt. Col., General Staff.

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FIELD ORDERS No. 1

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Mortefontaine, Oise, July 29, 1918.

[Extract]

1. This corps will move to new location at CHARTEVES, MONT-ST-PERE, and MEZY, commencing July 30, where the staff will function alongside the staff of the French XXXVIII Corps.

* * * * * *

5. Advanced P. C. will be opened at CHARTEVES at 6 p. m. July 30. P. C. at Morte­fontaine will close at same hour and date.

R. L. BULLARD,
Major General, N. A.,
Commanding.

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GENERAL ORDERS No. 12

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Mont-St-Pere, Aisne, July 31, 1918.

1. The 3d, 28th, and 32d Divisions, having been assigned to this corps, the under­signed hereby assumes administrative control. Until further orders, tactical command remains under the French XXXVIII Army Corps.

R. L. BULLARD,
Major General, N. A.,
Commanding.

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FIELD ORDERS No. 2

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 3, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to General Order No. 3675, French Sixth Army, 2 August 1918 [printed herein], the Commanding General and Staff, American III Corps will relieve the Commanding
General and Staff French XXXVIII Corps in the present XXXVIII Corps sector. The command will pass at 8 a.m. August 4, 1918.

2. Orders heretofore issued by the XXXVIII Corps remain in force.

* * * * *

8. P.C. III Army Corps will remain at MONT-ST-PERE.

R. L. BULLARD,
Major General, N. A.

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183-33.1: Operations Report

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Mont-St-Pere, Aisne, August 3, 1918.

6 p.m., August 2 to 6 p.m., August 3

[Extract]

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DAY:

   Weather: Rainy
   Visibility: Poor
   Day very active

II. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Our forces continue their advances during the period of this report. St-GILLES and MONT-ST-MARTIN have been taken and our advance elements are pressing on toward FISMES. The Germans are retiring across the VESLE, blowing up the bridges, and fires have broken out in FISMES and other towns in the VESLE Valley. Enemy activity was limited to rearguard action by machine guns. According to latest reports our line is well north of the St-GILLES---MONT-ST-MARTIN Road.

III. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Active, but less than on previous days.

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183-32.1: Order

**Sector Limits after Relief French III Corps**

FIELD ORDER
No. 3

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Mont-St-Pere, Aisne, August 4, 1918.

MAP: SOISSONS and REIMS 1:80,000

1. Pursuant to General Order No. 3687, French Sixth Army, August 3, 1918, the Commanding General and Staff, American III Corps will relieve the Commanding General and Staff, French III Corps in the present French III Corps sector, the sectors of the two
corps thus being combined into one sector. The command will pass at 8 o'clock August 5, 1918.

2. The sector of the American III Corps will then be as follows:
   
   Western limit: VILLERS-en-PRAYERES (excl.)---BARBONVAL (excl.)---BLANZY-les-FISMES (incl.)---PERLES (excl.)---MONT-St-MARTIN (incl.)---CHERRY-CHARTREUVE (excl.)---Fme de CAMP (excl.)---SERGY (excl.)---FRESNES (incl.)---La CROIX-ROUGE Fme---MAISON-BOUTACHE ---BRASLES---CHATEAU-THIERRY (north bank excl.)---MARNE River from CHATEAU-THIERRY to AZY.
   
   Eastern limit: CONCEVREUX (incl.)---ROMAIN (excl.)---HUIT-VOISINS (excl.)---ORMONT Fme (excl.)---COURVILLE (incl.)---ARCIS-le-PONSART (incl.)---eastern edge of Bois DORMONT---Bois de LANAUX---VILLERS-AGRON-AIGUIZY (incl.)---Le TEMPLE Fme (incl.)---PASSY (incl.)---VERNEUIL (incl.).

   Dividing line between sectors of American 32d Division and French 4th Division:
   MAIZY (to 4th Div.)---GLENNES (to 32d Div.)---BASLIEUX-les-FISMES (to 4th Div.)---St-GILLES (to 4th Div.)---LONGEVILLE Fme (to 32d Div.)---COHAN (to 32d Div.)---COULONGES (to 32d Div.)---RONCHERES (to 32 Div.)---BARZY-sur-MARNE (to 4th Div.).

3. Principal units of American III Corps (and their approximate location during night August 4/5) as newly constituted are as follows:
   American 32d Div. in left sector between Le CHAMP-GAILLARD and FOND de MEZIERES. P. C. at CIERGES. P. C. will advance the morning of August 5 to vicinity of DRAVEGNY.
   American 28th Div. in left sector between FOND de MEZIERES and an east and west line through DRAVEGNY.
   French 4th Div. in right sector, 2 regiments between ridge 2 km. southeast of FISMES and east and west line through COURVILLE; one regiment between COURVILLE and ARCIS-le-PONSART. P. C. at farmhouse 500 meters east of ABBAYE-d'IGNY.
   American 6th Brigade (Infantry) in left sector between Les PETITES-CHEZELLES Fme and ravine east of LONGEVILLE. P. C. at LONGEVILLE.
   American 3d Div. less 6th Brigade, south of river MARNE. P. C. at CHIERRY.

4. The American III Corps Chief of Artillery, and commanders of special corps troops of French III Corps and attached army troops, and assume direction of same at 8 o'clock August 5.

5. Orders issued by French III Corps up to time of passing of command will continue in force.

6. Liaison: No change

7. P. C. of American III Corps, with commanding general, will open at COULONGES at 8 o'clock August 5, and close at MONT-ST-PERE at 16 o'clock August 5.

R. L. BULLARD,
Major General.
III Corps Ordered to Cross the VESLE

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 4, 1918—22:45 p. m.

MAPS: SOISSONS 1:80,000
        PLANS DIRECTEURS 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. It is not believed that the enemy intends to make a serious resistance between the VESLE and the AISNE Rivers, but probably proposes to reestablish himself north of the AISNE.

   Allied troops have today crossed the VESLE at certain points, one battalion 8 kilometers east of FISMES and one 12 kilometers east of FISMES. Farther east Allied troops also occupy GARENNE de GUEUX (woods 2 kilometers north of GUEUX), CHAMPIGNY, Chateau de la MALIE and bridge of St-THIERRY.

   Fighting continues two kilometers northwest of RHEIMS.

   Allied troops on our right and left will continue the pursuit on August 5.

2. The American III Corps will cross the VESLE River and continue the pursuit in conjunction with neighboring units. Sector remains as announced in Field Order No. 3.

       * * * * * *

P. C. III Corps at MONT-St-PERE until 8 o'clock, August 5; thereafter at COULONGES.

By command of Major General Ballard:

   A. W. BJORNSTAD,
   Brigadier General, G. S.,
   Chief of Staff.

Transfer of Command

G-3
First Army

American E. F.,
Chateau-Thierry.

Number 354 G 3 Transfer of French XXXVIII Corps to American III Corps made this morning in accordance with Field Orders No. 2, copy sent First Army this morning. The
command is transferred but units noted in that order held until they can be relieved by troops to come to III Corps.

CLARK.

183-33.1: Memorandum

**Artillery at Disposal III Corps**

III ARMY CORPS ARTILLERY, A. E. F.,
Mont-St-Pere, Aisne, August 4, 1918.

[Extract]

MEMORANDUM for G-3

Artillery at disposal of III Army Corps, 8 a. m. August 4, 1918:
1. Artillery of the 32d Division - 57th F. A. Brigade:
   • • • • • • •

2. Corps Artillery:
   • • • • • • •

Artillery expected to arrive in the sector:
1. 53d F. A. Brigade - regular divisional artillery for 28th Div.
2. 157th F. A. Brigade - regular divisional artillery for 82d Div.

By command of General Gatchell:

OFFNERE HOPE,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

183-32.1: Order

**III Corps Ordered to Continue the Advance**

FIELD ORDER
No. 6
III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 5, 1918---22:40 h.

MAP: PLAN DIRECTEUR, 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. The advance troops of this corps have advanced today to the VESLE. A few patrols of the 32d Division have crossed the river. Similar progress in neighboring corps.
2. The III Corps will continue the pursuit as ordered in F. O. 4, August 4, 1918 (for 32d Division, 28th Division, and attached troops in left sector), and General Orders Nos. 586 and 588, French III Corps, (for troops in right sector). The advance will be governed by the principles published in Paragraph 2, F. O. 4, this corps.

3. The following redistribution of certain troops is ordered:

   (a) All cavalry attached to the corps is combined in a provisional regiment, under command of Col. Lemaitre. The provisional cavalry regiment will remain at PUISEUX Fme in readiness to cross the VESLE.

   (b) All aviation units attached to the corps are combined under the command of Capt. Labord. Captain Labord will assign aviators and observers in such manner that the 32d Division, French 4th Division, American 6th Infantry Brigade, G-2 of III Corps, Chief of artillery, and Commanding General of the III Corps will each be assured the required air service.

   (c) All balloon units attached to the corps are combined under the command of Capt Pamard. One balloon each will be assigned to the 32d Division, 6th Brigade, and 4th Division.

   (d) Artillery: All French artillery serving with the American III Corps, and not part of the 4th Division, is placed under the command of Col. Drouault. This artillery, and American units of corps artillery expected to arrive in the sector, will be employed as directed by the chief of artillery, conforming to the principles published in Paragraph 2, F. O. 4.

4. P. C.'s remain as follows:

   32d Division, VILLOME
   28th Division, DRAVEGNY
   4th Division, ABBAYE-d'IGNY
   6th Brigade, LONGEVILLE
   Chief of Artillery, COULONGES
   III Corps, COULONGES.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 5, 1918.

From 20 h., August 4, to 20 h., August 5

[Extract]

I. WEATHER: Rainy.
II. VISIBILITY: Very Poor.
III. GENERAL IMPRESSION OF THE DAY: Active.
IV. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Advance guard of our troops have occupied FISMES and south bank of the VESLE east and west of the river. Heavy artillery and machine-gun fire has been encountered along the VESLE. Have dug in on south bank of the VESLE. A few patrols
have crossed the river. It has been impossible to bring up bridge building material in daylight.

V. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Our artillery very active. Enemy artillery relatively slight; mainly concentration fire along the south of the VESLE, using 77's and 105's.

VI. AVIATION: Feeble, owing to visibility.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lieut. Col., G. S.,
G-3

183-32.1: Order

Instructions for crossing the VESLE

FIELD ORDER

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
August 6, 1918.

No. 7

1. Pursuant to Operation Order No. 3,700, Sixth Army, August 5, 1918, the principles prescribed in Paragraph 2, F. O. No. 4, these headquarters, are modified as follows:

The advance guards will seize the plateau north of the VESLE to establish bridgeheads and assure the crossing of troops necessary for the pursuit. They will establish themselves and remain in this position.

The main body, echeloned in depth, will cross the VESLE successively and will pass, by bounds, the troops guarding the bridgeheads, and will establish themselves on the general line VAUXTIN---VAUXCERE---BLANZY-les-FISMES, woods north of the GRAND-HAMEAU---Fme BEAUGILET.

These main bodies will push out new advance guards to the first slopes north of the plateau, taking every precaution, during the march, against the fire of enemy artillery. During these operations, the field artillery and the heavy artillery (short) will be emplaced south of the VESLE.

As soon as these new advance guards have reached the plateau, the VESLE will be crossed by the necessary artillery to support the movement of the advance guards.

The heavy artillery, long, will, from now on, be pushed forward to the limit to which it can be supplied, in order to fire on the principal points of passage of the AISNE.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Relief of 32d Division

FIELD ORDER
No. 9
III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Coulonces, Aisne, August 6, 1918—5 p. m.

[Extract]

1. The 32d Division except artillery, will be relieved by one-half of the 28th Division on the night August 6/7. The details of this relief will be arranged between the Generals commanding the 32d and 28th Divisions. Two rear battalions of the 32d Division may be relieved at once.
2. The relief will be completed by daylight August 7, at which time the command of the sector will pass to the Commanding General, 28th Division.

* * * * * *

6. P. C. of the 28th Division unchanged.
7. After relief the 32d Division will be assembled in the area south of an east and west line through DRAVEGY and north of the CIERGES-SERGY Road.
8. P. C. of the 32d Division at CIERGES.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

Instructions for continuing the Advance

FIELD ORDER
No. 10
III ARMY CORPS,
August 6, 1918.

MAP: PLAN DIRECTEUR, 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. * * * The American I Corps crossed the VESLE on our left today. Present situation not known.
   The Sixth Army will continue the advance toward the AISNE.
2. The III Corps will advance towards the plateau four kilometers north of FISMES in two main columns and one secondary column.
3. (a) The left column will advance at H hour along the slopes and ridges bordering the ravine southeast of PERLES and establish a bridgehead on the La Gde [GRANDE]-LOGETTE ---La Pte [PETITE]-LOGETTE Ridge with flank protection on the ridge south of PERLES.
   (b) The center column will advance at H hour along the slopes and ridges bordering the ravine La FOSSE-au-LOUP---Aux PRES-Ste-MARIE and establish a bridgehead on the
MONT-de-PERTE Ridge, with flank protection on the ridge 800 meters northwest and west of BASLIEUX.

(c) The right column will prepare to advance on the Les GAILLARDS Ridge at an hour to be announced later.

(d) The corps artillery will concentrate its efforts on counterbattery work. It will call on the Sixth Army and neighboring corps for such assistance as may be practicable.

(e) Units in reserve will remain in readiness in present positions.

(f) The advance will be governed by the principles set forth in Paragraph 2 of F. O. 4, III Corps, as amended by F.O. 7.

4. Orders for supply and evacuation later.

5. P. C. No change.

By command of Major General Bullard:

A. W. BJORNSTAD,
Brigadier General, G.S.,
Chief of Staff.


G-3
No. 3

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.,
Coulonges, Aisne, August 6, 1918.

From 8 p.m. August 5 to 8 p.m. August 6

I. Weather: Rainy.

II. Visibility: Poor.

III. General Impression of the Day: Active.

IV. Infantry Activity: The French 4th Div. has captured the small wood east of MAGNEUX along the National Road [No. 31]. The 32d Division has again encountered heavy artillery and machine-gun fire and holds with advanced elements the south bank of the VESLE. It has been unable to push its attack across the VESLE. The 6th Brigade of the 3d Division relieved portion of the French 4th Division southeast of FISMES and pushed patrols forward as far as the VESLE.

V. Artillery Activity: Our artillery very active. Enemy artillery heavy along valley south of the VESLE.

VI. Aviation: Little, owing to visibility. Our photographing and reconnaissance planes obtained some results in spite of atmospheric conditions.

VII. Casualties: Casualties reported heavy.

VIII. Changes and Disposition of Troops: Replacements of 500 men reached 32d Division and sent to organizations. Our troops in front line positions are now from left to right: The 32d Division, the 6th Brigade of the 3d Division, and the French 4th Div. One-half of the 28th Division, will relieve the 32d Division, except artillery and engineers, tonight.

By command of Major General Bullard:

F. W. CLARK,
Lt. Colonel, G. S.,
G-3.
Operations of III Corps in Vesle Sector

HISTORY

of the

III ARMY CORPS, A. E. F.

Second Epoch

From 8 a. m., August 4, 1918, to 9 a. m., September 9, 1918

Operations on the VESLE River, FISMES Sector

MAPS:  
- SOISSONS 1:100,000
- FISMES 1:20,000
- CHEMIN-des-DAMES Sud 1:20,000

[Extract]

August 4: At 8 h., August 4, the III Corps took command of the sector held by the French XXXVIII Corps, including the American 3d, 32d and 28th Divisions, and such corps troops as the XXXVIII Corps then had in the sector. This was pursuant to confidential letter from Headquarters First Army, A. E. F., and to General Order No. 3675 of the French Sixth Army, dated August 2, 1918, at 18:30 h. *** Pursuant to this order the III Corps issued Field Order No. 2, dated August 3, 1918.***

The general situation at the time of taking over the command was as follows: The 32d Division held the front line with the 28th Division in support and located along the MARNE, and the 3d Division in reserve, located south of the MARNE opposite CHATEAU-THIERRY.

The boundary limits of the corps sector were as follows:

- Left: Between the III Corps and the I Corps: Woods 1,500 meters east of St. THIBAUT (excl.)---VILLESAVOYE (excl.)---MONT-St-MARTIN (incl.)---Les BOULEAUX (incl.)---EVRY Fme (incl.)---FERME de CAMP (excl.)---SERGY (excl.)---FRESNES (excl.)---La CROIX-ROUGE Fme (excl.)---MAISON-BOUTACHE (excl.)---BRASLES (excl.)---CHATEAU-THIERRY north bank (excl.)---course of the MARNE from CHATEAU-THIERRY to AZY.

- Right boundary between the III Corps and the French III Corps: St-GILLES (excl.)---course of the ORILON---COHAN (incl.)---COULONGES (incl.)---RONCHERES (incl.)---BARZYSUR-MARNE (excl.)---VARENNES (excl.)---MONTHUREL (excl.)---COUFREMAUX (excl.)---MONTBAZIN (incl.)---Les ORGERIEUX (incl.)---La VILLENEUVE (incl.).

The corps issued no new instructions to the 32d Division other than to proceed in accordance with orders already issued by the French XXXVIII Corps. The leading elements of the 32d Division at 24 hours on August 3 were reported along the line running from the northern exits of VILLESAVOYE very nearly due east to the St-GILLES---FISMES Road. The 32d Division continued the fight during the 4th and advanced during that day and night to the VESLE River, capturing FISMES. The progress to the VESLE was stubbornly contested by the enemy.

Arrangements were made to take over the sector of the French III Corps at 8 h. on August 5 pursuant to General Orders No. 3687 of the French Sixth Army ***

Arrangements were also made for moving the P. C. of the corps from MONT-St-PERE to COULONGES. Field Orders Nos. 3 and 4 were issued *** the former giving the new limits of the corps sectors and the latter prescribing that the pursuit would be continued across the VESLE River.
August 5: On this day at 8 h., the corps took over the sector as given in Field Order No. 3. The additional troops coming under corps command consisted of the French 4th Division and the American 6th Brigade, the latter having been sent to the French III Corps to assist the French 4th Division. The orders of the French III Corps were continued in force, which were to continue the attack in accordance with the army order to cross the VESLE.

The Sixth Army about noon sent a message to the corps stating that it must push on across the VESLE, forming bridgeheads in accordance with the order of operations of August 4. No. 3690 **** The P. C. of the corps moved from MONT-ST-PERE to COULONGES at 10 h. Reports received during the day showed that our patrols were not able to make much progress. Some of them reached the south bank of the VESLE River, and further fighting was reported in the vicinity of FISMES.

The troops in the front lines consisted of the 32d Division on the left and the French 4th Division on the right, with the 6th Brigade in support of the French Division and the 28th Division in support of the 32d Division, the remainder of the 3d Division remaining in reserve across the MARNE. The taking over of the French III Corps sector extended this corps' sector to the right some 3 1/2 kilometers. Field Order No. 6 was issued * * *

August 6: During the night of August 5/6, the 6th Brigade relieved portions of the French 4th Division south of FISMES so that the battle line from left to right consisted of the following troops: 32d Division, 6th Brigade, French 4th Division, with the dividing line about as follows: FISMES (incl.) to VILLETTE (excl.), 6th Brigade. The orders to push forward continued in effect, but our troops were unable to cross the VESLE with the possible exception of one or two small patrols. The enemy was still reported at a few points on the south bank of the river. The Commanding General, 32d Division, in conference stated that the 32d Division was exhausted and unable to make any effective advance. In consequence, Field Order No. 9 **** was issued directing the relief of the 32d Division during the night of August 6/7 by one-half of the 28th Division.

Field Order No. 10 was issued this day and directed the corps to advance toward the plateau north of the VESLE River in two main columns and one secondary column, the left column consisting of the 28th Division, to cross the river within its sector and establish a bridgehead on the La GRANDE---LOGETTE Ridge, the center column, consisting of the 6th Brigade, to cross the river within its sector and establish a bridgehead on the MONT-de-PERE Ridge, and the right column, consisting of the French 4th Division to prepare to advance on Les GAILLARDS Ridge. * * *

Field Order No. 7 was also issued this date modifying the orders previously issued in Field Order No. 4 with regard to the method of crossing the VESLE. At 20 h., the Commanding Generals of the 28th Division, the 6th Brigade, the French 4th Division and the corps artillery were assembled in corps headquarters for conference on the attack prescribed in Field Order No. 10. It had been originally intended that the attack should start at daylight on the 7th, but due to the relief of the 32d Division this was not practicable, and the hour of attack was left open until the 7th. Because of the reliefs just made no material change in the front line occurred during this day.

August 7: At 0:05 h., a report was received from the I Corps on the left that the 4th Division had six companies across the VESLE as far as the ROUEN-REIMS Highway. The Commanding General of the 28th Division was informed of this and directed to get in touch so as to protect the flank of the 4th Division. During the morning, inspections were made to determine whether the relief of the 32d Division by one-half of the 28th had been completed, and whether the latter was ready to attack in conformity with Field Order No. 10. It was found that some bridge material was necessary, so that it was decided about noon that H hour would be 15:45 h. At 15:22 h., word was received from the 28th Division that, in pushing out patrols, they had succeeded in crossing the VESLE. In consequence, the 28th Division was instructed to push on and the 6th Brigade informed of this and directed to assist. As the 6th Brigade had their preparations made for an attack at H hour they were unable to give much assistance at that time. In consequence of this unconcerted attack the
enemy was enabled to prevent the establishment of the bridgeheads as originally intended. The Commanding General of the 6th Brigade reported later that he had two bridges across and had pushed some patrols over the VESLE. At 21 h., a conference was held in corps headquarters between the generals of the two attacking columns and the corps commander at which it was decided that an inspection be made at daylight on the 8th and another attempt made to effect the crossing at an hour to be decided upon after this inspection. At 23 h., that night, the Commanding General of the 28th Division phoned that he had nine companies across the river and that he needed support on his right flank. This information was conveyed to the Commanding General, 6th Brigade, with instructions to support the 28th Division. At midnight it was reported that the 6th Brigade had two companies across the VESLE.

G-2 information, dated August 6, indicated enemy’s order of battle on III Corps front as follows: Part of the 4th Guard Division on our left front, 216th Division on our center, and part of 10th Reserve Division on our right front.

[Documentation for American III Corps will be found in OISE-AISE Operation].

American 3d Division
July 18 - August 11, 1918

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203-32.1: Order

Defense of the Surmelin Valley

G-3
FIELD ORDER

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau de la Doulitre, Aisne, July 18, 1918---1 h.

No. 8

[Extract]

1. The enemy holds the line of the north bank of the MARNE River to a point east of MEZY, thence through MOULINS and through woods northeast of Les ETANGS Fme, thence southeast.

The French 73d Division is on our right, extending from Les ETANGS Fme, to the southeast.

The French 39th Division occupies its whole line on our left.

The American 28th Division, reinforced by certain French units, holds the army line in our rear and in the rear of the 73d Division.

2. The mission of this division remains the same - to bar the enemy's passage of the MARNE, and to defend the SURMELIN Valley.

3. (a) Limits of subsectors will remain the same.

(b) Distribution of Troops: No change will be made in the positions of the 5th Brigade.
The American 111th Infantry will temporarily replace the 30th Infantry in the 6th Brigade and will occupy the sector now occupied by that regiment.

(c) Line of Defense: The forward line of defense, constituting the line of resistance, will run FOSSOY---Le Ru CHAILLY Fme---northern edge of woods northwest of CREZANCY---VERGET [BERCET] Fme---PAROY---FOSSOY Road---PAROY---ravine east of LAUNAY---Les ETANGS Fme.

* * * * *

6. P. C.'s will be located as before. P. C. of the 28th Division, Les ORGERIEUX.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General.

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203-33.3: Telegram

Reoccupation of Ground

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau de la Doultre, Aisne, July 18, 1918.

Telegraphic report from 3d Div. recd. G-3, G. H. Q., 8:30 a.m.

Have reoccupied all grounds to south bank of river except to east of MEZY. Situation rather critical on our right flank. Shelling heavy and continuous by both sides.

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203-32.1: Order

Fire of Deception

FIELD ORDER
No. 36
3d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, 3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Viffort, Aisne, July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

By order of the group of armies, at 5 a.m. today, over the whole front of the army, a sudden fire will be started as if it were a preparation for an attack. Following this there will be as violent a rolling barrage as possible from the start. * * *

All batteries will cease their fire at 4:45 a.m., thereby insuring silence from 4:45 to 5 a.m.

At 5 a.m. there will be simultaneous opening of fire * * *

* * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Cruikshank:

H. C. ALLEN,
Major, Brigade Adjutant.

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- 598 -
Interdiction Fire

FIELD ORDERS
No. 39

Commanding Officer, 18th F. A.

[Extract]

By order of the army an incessant interdiction fire will be started at 9:30 p. m. today and kept up until further orders upon all the roads and paths ending at the river.

By command of Brigadier General Cruikshank:

H. C. ALLEN,
Major, Brigade Adjutant.

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Relief of 111th Infantry

G-3
No. 148

1. The 111th Infantry (less one battalion) which is now in the CHARTEVES subsector, will be relieved tonight, July 20/21.
2. The sector of the 4th Infantry is extended eastward to include Meridian 188.
3. The sector of the 7th Infantry is extended eastward to include Meridian 191.
4. The sector of the 38th Infantry is extended westward to Meridian 191. The 38th Infantry will also hold the ground occupied today.
5. Brigade commanders will arrange at once for the necessary troop movements to takes over the increased sectors and for the relief of the 111th Infantry.
6. All extensions will be made with the troops now at the disposal of the regimental commanders.
7. New dispositions will be taken during the night of July 20/21.
   The Commanding General, 6th Brigade, is held responsible that the relief of the 111th Infantry be completed tonight.
8. Upon being relieved, the 111th Infantry, less one battalion, will proceed to the vicinity of GRAND-HEURTEBISE Fme where it will be placed at the disposal of the XXXVIII Army Corps.
9. The 30th Infantry will constitute division reserve and after being equipped it will relieve another regiment in line.

ROBERT H. C. KELTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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- 599 -
Plan of Advance

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau de la Doulitre, Aisne, July 21, 1918--14 h.

No. 9

[Extract]

1. The enemy is reported in retreat along our entire front. The 39th Division has advanced on our left to the west of Bois de BARBILLON. The French III Army Corps is on our right, its left element being the 73d Division.

2. The French XXXVIII Army Corps as a part of the French Sixth Army will take up the pursuit. The American 3d Division will cross the MARNE, advancing in a northeasterly direction on the general line Le CHARME----CHALET de VILLARDELLE.

Our mission is to gain and maintain contact with the enemy, inflict losses on his troops, and force him to continue his retreat.

3. (a) Boundaries of the Division:
   East Boundary: BARZY (exclusive)--CHAMPVOISY (exclusive).
   West Boundary: BRASLES (inclusive)--crossroads 800 meters northeast of La MALADRERIE---La THEODERIE---La FOSSE Fme.

(b) Artillery: The artillery will maintain its present positions and be prepared to fire on the southern edges of the woods in the line of advance, and support the advance of the infantry.

   Preparation will be made for the advance of the artillery by echelon as soon as suitable bridges are provided by the engineers. The west groups will cross via CHATEAU-THIERRY; the east groups via MONT-St-PERE.

(c) Disposition of Troops: The 7th Infantry will be assembled on FOSSOY, and the 38th Infantry on CREZANCY, preparatory to crossing the river at or near MEZY.

After crossing the MARNE, These two regiments will advance on Le CHARME, the boundary between the regiments being the Road Le PSOUTIER---Point 210---Les FRANQUETS Fme---Le CHARME (to the left regiment).

The 4th Infantry will cross the MARNE at CHATEAU-THIERRY and move on BRASLES, thence eastward on the east and southern edges of Bois de BARBILLON, cleaning up this area during its advance. It will be reformed in the vicinity of MONT-St-PERE and will follow the advance of the 7th Infantry.

The 30th Infantry now in division reserve will, upon receipt of orders, cross the MARNE at MEZY and follow the line of march of the 38th Infantry.

* * * * * *

(c) P. C.'s:
5th Brigade: Le ROCQ, after 12 noon, July 21.
6th Brigade: St-EUGENE, after 12 noon, July 12.
3d Division: For the present unchanged.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General.
Pursuit of Enemy

FIELD ORDER
No. 40
3d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Viffort, Aisne, July 21, 1918.

[Extract]

1. The 3d Division will take up the pursuit of the retreating enemy, advancing in a northeasterly direction on the general line Le CHARME---CHALET de VILLARDELLE. * * *

   * * * * *

3. (a) The 76th F. A. will cross the MARNE by the CHATEAU-THIERRY Bridge at day­break July 22, 1918, and will follow the 4th Infantry, which it will support and with which it will maintain close liaison. * * *

   (b) The 10th F. A. will remain in its present positions, for the present and be prepared to fire on the southern edges of the Woods in the line of advance, and support the advance of the infantry. * * *

   (c) The 18th F. A., less the 3d Battalion, will remain in its present position, for the present, and will be prepared to fire on the southern borders of the woods in the line of the advance, and support the advance of the infantry. * * *

   * * * * *

5. The Brigade P. C. will remain unchanged for the present.

By command of Brigadier General Cruikshank:

H. C. ALLEN, Major, Brigade Adjutant.

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Plan of Attack

G-3
FIELD ORDER
3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau de la Doultrie, Aisne, July 22, 1918---1 h.

[Extract]

1. (a) The enemy on the front of the Sixth Army is reported to be in retreat northward.

   (b) The XXXVIII Army Corps now holds the front southern edge of Bois du CHATELET---EPIEDS---La CENSE-a-DIEU---La THEODERIE---MOULIN-DOLY---JAULGONNE.

   The 39th Division is on our left and the 73d Division is on our right.
   The XXXVIII Army Corps will attack July 23.
2. The 3d Division will advance, maintaining contact with the enemy, and inflict losses on his retreating forces.

3. (a) ARTILLERY: The artillery will deliver preparatory fire for ten minutes, beginning at 3:45 a.m., July 23.

* * * * *

The main body of the 5th Brigade will move on the Road MONT-St-PERE---Height 210 ---Height 224---Le CHARME, the 4th Infantry in advance.

* * * * *

(b) 6th BRIGADE: The 6th Brigade (less 30th Infantry and one machine gun company of the 9th Machine Gun Battalion) will advance on the JAULGONNE-CHARME Road, providing for its own flank protection.

* * * * *

(c) DIVISION RESERVE: Division reserve will consist of the 30th Infantry and one company of the 9th Machine Gun Battalion.

The 30th Infantry will move as previously ordered and will be prepared to continue its march to MEZY and cross the river.

* * * * *

5. (a) AXES OF LIAISON.

5th Brigade: GLAND---MONT-St-PERE---MOULIN-DOLY---Height 224---Le CHARME.
6th Brigade: CREZANCY---MEZY---JAULGONNE---Le CHARME.
3D Division: GLAND---MONT-St-PERE---JAULGONNE---Le CHARME.

(b) Liaison will be maintained both forward and to the rear and to both flanks, by all units.

Brigade commanders will detail liaison officers to accompany the columns and render periodic reports concerning the situation.

(c) Upon arrival of the head of the columns at the line ARGENTOL---Height 224, 5th and 6th Brigade P. C.'s will move to CHARTEVES and MONT-St-PERE, respectively.

Upon arrival of troops at Le CHARME, 5th Brigade will move to MOULIN DOLY, 6th Brigade to JAULGONNE, and division P. C. to MONT-St-PERE.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General.
203-32.13: Order

Command Posts

G-3
ORDERS

No. 153

1. At 3 p.m. today, July 22, 1918, new P. C.'s will open as follows:
   3d Division
   5th Brigade
   Divisional Artillery
   6th Brigade
   Division Headquarters

   3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
   Chateau de la Doultre, Aisne, July 22, 1918—12 noon.

   6th Brigade
   6th Engineers

   2. An agent will be left at each old P. C. for the purpose of forwarding messages, until 7 p.m.
   3. Division signal officer will immediately connect all P. C.'s with the proper switchboards.

   Note: G-1 will operate from Le ROCQ until the next change of P. C. is announced.

   ROBERT H. C. KELTON,
   Colonel, General Staff,
   Chief of Staff.

203-32.1: Order

Pursuit

FIELD ORDER

No. 14

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Gland, Aisne, July 24, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * * *

On our right, the 73d Division will be relieved by the French 4th Division, which will continue the advance.

The XXXVIII Army Corps will advance, continuing the pursuit.

2. The 3d Division will advance in a northeasterly direction through Le CHARMEL upon RONCHERES.

3. (a) The Commanding General, 5th Brigade, will take up the pursuit, using all the forces under his command, and passing through the 30th Infantry, which now occupies the right of our line. The pursuit will be vigorously pushed under the conditions previously prescribed.

   (b) 6th Brigade: The 6th Brigade will remain in place until further orders; the 30th Infantry to entrench at once.
The 6th Brigade will provide for flank protection in case the divisions on our flanks are unable to progress.

* * * * *

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General,
Commanding.

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203-32.1: Order

**Plan of Advance**

FIELD ORDER 3d DIVISION. A. E. F.,
No. 12
Gland, Aisne, July 23, 1918—11 h.*

Maps: CONDE-en-BRIE, 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. (a) The enemy on the front of the Sixth Army is retiring slowly northward. His machine-gun resistance has increased.
   (b) The XXXVIII Army Corps now holds the front southern edge of Bois du CHATELET and the southern side of EPIEDS to the southern side of TRUGNY---La CENSE-a-DIEU---La THEODERIE---Hill 210 to point one kilometer north of Jaulgonne. The French 39th Division is on our left. The French 73d Division on our right. The XXXVIII Army Corps will attack on July 24.

2. The American 3d Division will resume its advance, maintaining contact with the enemy, and advance its left flank in liaison with the forward movement of the 39th Division.

3. ARTILLERY:
   (a) The divisional artillery will deliver preparatory fire for a period of 10 minutes beginning at 3:55 a. m., July 24, * * *

* * * * *

* * * This artillery fire preparation will cease at 4:05 a. m., after which time the artillery will be held in readiness to fire upon definite objectives reported by and called for by the infantry brigade commanders.
   (b) 5th BRIGADE: The 5th Brigade will advance its left flank in liaison with the French 39th Division, and will endeavor to occupy the position to the north of Les FRANQUETS Fme. It will keep its right flank in close liaison with the 6th Brigade. * * *
   (c) 6th BRIGADE: The 30th Infantry will occupy position now held by the 38th Infantry, but the extended position towards ARGENTOL will be retired sufficiently to obtain protection from fire from the right flank.

* Apparently 11 p. m., rather than 11 a. m., as indicated.
(d) DIVISION RESERVE: The 38th Infantry will be withdrawn from front line position and placed in reserve at CHARTEVES. Small elements of this regiment may be used at MEZY, CREZANCY, MOULINS, and VARENNES in order to cover this area against enemy scouts or snipers and for purposes of observation on the slopes above BARZY.

Two companies of the 9th Machine Gun Battalion will be placed in reserve and for recuperation with the 38th Infantry.

5. (a) AXES OF LIAISON: [No change]

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J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General,
Commanding.

203-32.1: Order

Defensive Position

G-3
FIELD ORDER
Gland, Aisne, July 23, 1918--19:30 h.
No. 11

[Extract]

1. (a) Reports indicate that the enemy has established strong machine-gun nests in the zone of advance of this division. The 39th Division, on our left, has been ordered to proceed to FARY Fme; it has met with considerable resistance. The 73d Division on our right has retired slightly today.

(b) We now hold a general line La THEODERIE--La TIEULERIE Fme--point 800 meters south of LAUNAY--northern edge of Jaulgonne--point one kilometer northeast of Jaulgonne--eastern edge of FORET de RIS.

2. The division will halt and take up a defensive position for the night.

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(c) P. C.'s: Each battalion commander will establish his P. C. with the front line, and each regimental commander will establish his P. C. in such place as will enable him to direct on the ground and under his eye the movements of his units.

5th Brigade P. C. will be established at MONT-St-PERE by 9 p. m., July 23.
6th Brigade P. C. will be established at CHARTEVES by 9 a. m., July 24.
Division P. C. without change.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General,
Commanding.

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- 605 -
Artillery Support and Liaison

G-3
ORDER
No. 155

[Extract]

1. The 10th Field Artillery is designated as the artillery support of the 6th Brigade, and the 76th Field Artillery as the artillery support of the 5th Brigade. • • •

* * * * * *

ROBERT H. C. KELTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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Plan of Advance

FIELD ORDER
No. 13

MAP: CONDE-en-BRIE, 1/20,000
REIMS 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy is continuing his retreat, considerable softening of the resistance having been noticed to our left. The 39th Division, on our left, has occupied Le FARY Fme, and will advance in the general direction of Le CHARME and northeast. The 73d Division, on our right, occupies line north corner clearing CARREFOUR du GROS CHENE—north edge of clearing of La BOULANGERE.

2. The 3d Division will advance from Le CHARME in a northeasterly direction toward the line VILLARDELLE Fme—CHALET de VILLARDELLE, and upon attaining this line, upon ROCHERES.

* * * * * *

P. C.'s: 5th Brigade will move to La TIEULERIE Farm and the 6th Brigade to JAULGONNE, as soon as the progression to Le CHARME is assured. Division P. C. - MONT-St-PERE after 10 p. m., July 24, 1918.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General,
Commanding.
Pursuit

FIELD ORDER
No. 15

MAP: CONDE-en-BRIE 1:50,000
     REIMS 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy is reported retreating along the entire front and as having evacuated
   the VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods and La FOSSE Ferme. The 39th Division holds all of VENTE-
   JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods and is pushing ahead upon COURMONT and CIERGES. The 4th Division
   on our right has reported itself progressing in the Foret de RIS. Cavalry patrols have
   reached La FOSSE Ferme. The XXXVIII Corps will advance and continue the pursuit.

2. The 3d Division will advance on north edge of the Foret de RIS---RONCHERES, south-
   west outskirts of Bois MEUNIERE (Cote 231).

3. (a) ARTILLERY: Division artillery commander will place himself intimately in
   liaison with the Commanding General, 5th Brigade and will comply promptly with all re-
   quests for fire on any points in the zone of advance. * * *
   (b) 5th BRIGADE: 5th Brigade will take up the pursuit, moving upon objectives
       of the division in turn.
   (c) 6th BRIGADE: 6th Brigade will retire to the south bank of the MARNE. The
       30th Infantry will occupy area: LAUNAY-CONNIGIS---ST-EUGENE and the 38th Infantry will
       occupy the area: PAROY---MOULINS---CREZANCY---VARENNES.

* * * * * *

P. C. 6th Brigade at FOSSOY (P. C.'s of both regiments at CREZANCY).
P. C.'s of other units unchanged.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General,
Commanding.

Contraction of Front

G-3
ORDER
No. 158

1. The limits laid down for the division sector are converging so that at or about
   La FOSSE Ferme the division sector will be about the front of only one battalion.

2. The 4th Infantry being now in the front line and having taken Le CHARME, will
   continue its pursuit, in compliance with field orders issued this date.
BOIS DES GRIMPETTES-FORET DE RIS AREA
Looking northeast from vicinity of Le Charmel
3. The 7th Infantry being more or less disorganized, according to reports received, will be assembled in the neighborhood of its P. C. and the commanding officer instructed to devote his entire time to the rapid reorganization of his regiment, salvaging of equipment, and support apportionment of officers, to enable his regiment to continue its support of the 4th Regiment, as soon as resistance is encountered.

ROBERT H. C. KELTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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203-32.13: Order

**Surprise Attack**

G-3
No. 160
Mont-St-Pere, Aisne, July 27, 1918—20:30 h.

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Order 164, XXXVIII Army Corps, the 4th Infantry will tonight seize and hold the northwestern corner of Forêt de RIS and Cote 190, southwest of RONCHERES.
2. The 7th Infantry will move tonight in support of the 4th Infantry to the vicinity of La FOSSE Ferme and will be prepared to protect the right flank of the attacking troops of the XXXVIII A. C. from enemy action along the western edge of Forêt de RIS.
3. There will be no firing until it becomes necessary to overcome resistance by fire action. This prohibition is for the purpose of enabling the 55th Brigade to make a surprise attack.
4. P. C. of the 7th Infantry will be established at Le CHARMEL-Chateau.
   P. C. of the 4th Infantry will be established at La FOSSE Ferme.
   P. C. of the 5th Brigade will be established at eastern edge of Le CHARMEL, before noon of July 28.

* * * * *

ROBERT H. C. KELTON,
Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

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- 609 -
Pursuit

FIELD ORDER
No. 16
3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Mont-St-Pere, Aisne, July 28, 1918—5:45 p.m.

MAPS: SOISSONS 1/80,000
REIMS 1/80,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy is in full retreat toward the north.
   The XXXVIII A. C. will take up active pursuit and regain contact with the enemy (3d
Division on the right, 28th Division on the left, the 32d Division in the rear, in the
vicinity of JAULGONNE).
   The French 4th Division will advance in conformity with our movement.
2. The 3d Division will regain contact with the enemy and advance to the VESLE
   River.
3. (a) Limits between the 3d and 28th Division: CIERGES—VILLOME—DRAVEGNY—
   western edge of FISMES (all inclusive).
   (b) ARTILLERY: One battalion of 75's and one battalion of 105's will march
      with the advance guard and will report to the Commanding Officer, 4th Infantry, at once.
      The 18th Field Artillery and the remainder of 105's will follow the column.
      The remainder of the divisional artillery will be parked off the road near its
      present position, in readiness to move forward upon receipt of further orders.
   (c) 5th Brigade: 5th Brigade will take up pursuit and will advance, proceed-
      ing by an advance guard on the road RONCHERES—CIERGES—crossroads southwest of
      CHAMERY—CHAMERY—COULONGES—COHAN—DRAVEGNY—St-GILLES—FISMES.
      The main body will attain the vicinity of St-GILLES on the evening of July 28,
      the advance guard being pushed forward to the vicinity of FISMES.
   (d) 6th Brigade: The 6th Brigade will remain at its present station.

* * * * *

(f) All troops of the 3d Division now stationed at CHARTEVES and MONT-St-PERE
will move immediately to RONCHERES.
(g) The advance will begin at once.

* * * * *

(c) P. C.'s:
   P. C. 5th Brigade to DRAVEGNY, upon arrival of the main body at that point.
   3d Division will close at MONT-St-PERE at noon and will reopen at RONCHERES at
   the same hour.

   P. C. XXXVIII A. C., CHARTEVES at noon.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General.

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- 610 -
Plan of Attack

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, July 28, 1918—14:30 h.

Field Order No. 17

1. The enemy is offering resistance along the line of the OURCQ. On the left, the American 55th Brigade and on the right the French 4th Division are encountering resistance. The XXXVIII Army Corps will take the crest north of RONCHERES and the crest east of CIERGY [CIERGES?].

2. The 3d Division has advanced to take RONCHERES, southwestern corner of Bois MEUNIERE, and the little woods north of RONCHERES, and the crest east of CIERGY [CIERGES?].

3. (a) The 5th Brigade will make the attack which will be carried out under the direction of the Commanding General, 5th Brigade.

(b) All of the divisional artillery will cooperate and all requests for fire from the 5th Brigade will be complied with immediately.

(c) The 109th Infantry (55th Brigade) and the 4th Division have been directed to cooperate in this attack. The Commanding General, 5th Brigade, will get into communication with the commander of these units and arrange for the necessary support.

4. Division P. C. is now at Le CHARME-ChATEAU.

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General.

Relief

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, July 29, 1918—19:30 h.

Field Order No. 19

[Extract]

1. This division (less artillery, less two battalions) will be relieved and will go into rest billets south of the MARNE.

(e) The command of the sector will pass from the 3d to the 32d Division, at 11 a.m., July 30.
203-33.1: Operations Report

G-3, Operations Section

3d DIVISION, A. E. F.,

Chateau [at] Chierry, Aisne, July 30, 1918.

From noon to noon July 29/30, 1918

[Extract]

1. WEATHER: Fair.
2. VISIBILITY: Good.
3. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: The enemy artillery activity was limited to the shelling of RONCHERES and occasional shots on Le CHARMEL-Chateau and town using a few gas shells. Our artillery for the most part supported the infantry. During the night of the 29th we shelled vital spots in wood north of RONCHERES and vicinity.
4. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: Infantry activity on both sides was extremely limited. A slight advance was made by our troops.
5. AEROPLANE AND BALLOON ACTIVITY: Two or three Boche planes were seen during the day but soon retired to their own lines on being shelled by our antiaircraft guns, and upon the appearance of our planes.
6. TROOP MOVEMENT: The relief of this division by the 56th Brigade of the 32d Division began July 29. Late in the afternoon the 7th Infantry was relieved from the second position and during the night the 4th Infantry was relieved from the front line, the 6th Brigade being in reserve south of the MARNE. The engineers attached to the 5th Brigade were relieved by engineers of the 32d Division. Two battalions of 75's were relieved by two battalions of 75's of the 32d Division.
7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS: The day passed quietly, no marked advance being made.

* * * * *

13. The relief of the division being completed on the night of July 29, the command of the sector passed to the 32d Division at 11 o'clock on the morning of July 30. The division is now at rest in area bounded on the north by the MARNE River; on east by MEZY---CONNIGIS---MONTLEVON. On the south by Les ALINS Ferme---PERTIBOUT. On west by CHATEAU-THIERRY---ETAMPES---CHIERRY (all inclusive). The division P. C. is at the Chateau at CHIERRY.

* * * * *

KELTON,
C. of S.
Artillery Support

FIELD ORDER
3d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel, Aisne, July 30, 1918—11 a. m.

[Extract]

The enemy is offering resistance by machine-gun fire from Bois des GRIMPETTES and Bois de CIERGES.

The French on our right are attacking the Bois de CIERGES. The American troops on our left are moving in a northeastern direction.

The advance battalion of the 127th Infantry is going to attack the Bois des GRIMPETTES, following closely behind our rolling barrage which will be preceded by a preparatory fire from H-20 to H.

* * * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Cruikshank:

H. C. ALLEN,
Major, Brigade Adjutant.

Relief of Artillery

FIELD ORDER
3d FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, August 1, 1918.

[Extract]

Reference to relief of the 3d F. A. Brigade by artillery of the 57th F. A. Brigade the following schedule is prescribed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT TO BE RELIEVED</th>
<th>RELIEVING UNIT</th>
<th>TIME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 76th F. A.</td>
<td>1st Bn., 147th F. A.</td>
<td>9 p. m., Aug. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., 76th F. A.</td>
<td>(2d Bn., 147th F. A.)</td>
<td>11 p. m., Aug. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(less one battery)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Bn., 10th F. A.</td>
<td>1st Bn., 120th F. A.</td>
<td>10 p. m., Aug. 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Bn., 18th F. A.</td>
<td>1st Bn., 121st F. A.</td>
<td>10 p. m., Aug. 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The regimental, battalion, and battery P. C. details together with all signal details of incoming units will be at respective P. C.'s of units they are relieving by 1 p. m., August 1, 1918. * * *

* * * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Cruikshank:

H. C. ALLEN,
Major, Brigade Adjutant.

203-32.1: Order

FIELD ORDER
No. 21

[Extract]

1. By order of the Fourth (?) Army, the 6th Brigade of this division is placed at the disposal of the French III Army Corps (P. C. DORMANS).

2. The 6th Brigade will move by truck during the night August 2/3, 1918, to some point which will be designated by the French III Corps.

* * * * * *

J. T. DICKMAN,
Major General.

203-33.1: Operations Report

Operations Section

[Extract]

6. TROOP MOVEMENTS: The 3d Div. Artillery was relieved by the 32d Div. Artillery. The 3d Division Artillery Brigade P. C. is now at ETAMPES.

* * * * * *

KELTON,
C. of S.
From noon Aug. 3 to noon Aug. 4, 1918

6. TROOP MOVEMENTS: The 6th Brigade, now functioning as a division, has moved to the following positions north of the MARNE:
   38th Infantry ARCIS-le-PONSART.
   30th Infantry in Bois de la MUETTE.
   Engineers attached repairing roads and with the 38th Infantry.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: The day has been quiet, the 6th Brigade, getting into position in support of the French III Corps. * * *

KELTON,
C. of S.

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From August 2, 1918 to August 11, 1918

On August 2, 1918, the 6th Brigade was in rest billets in the Valley of the SURMELIN River from CREZANCY to COURBOIN, when orders were received to proceed by truck to the front. A warning order was issued in accordance to telephonic instructions from Hq. 3d Division, * * *

French facilities were used to move the troops, the officer in charge reporting at 8 p. m. that he was ready to entruck the command at any time. The hour was therefore set for 10:30 p. m. and the command was made ready to take the trucks at their various billets at that hour. The trucks did not appear until 4 a. m., the result being that the men encumbered by their packs, were kept awake all night and lost a night’s rest.

The command was detrucked about 10:30 a. m. at the edge of the Bois MEUNIERE, west of GOUFFANCOURT, and the men rested until the evening. In the afternoon the combat trains of the 38th Infantry came up, having been separated from the rest of the train column * * *

* * * * *

From General Orders No. 586, French III Corps, it appeared that the situation was one that made advisable a headlong pursuit, although by the time the orders reach the brigade it appears that the situation had changed since it was reported that headway was not being made and resistance was being made by the enemy at the VESLE River.

At no time while the brigade was near the VESLE did it appear that the enemy was re-
tiring so that the cavalry could clear the way for the advance of the infantry, which was
the situation as given in the orders from the French III Corps.

At 9:15 p.m., August 4, orders * * * were received to relieve the advance regiment
of the French on the left of the divisional front. Since this regiment had the strength
of about a battalion of our troops, it was decided to place a battalion in the front line
and hold the remainder close enough up to support the front line battalion in any opera-
tion that might take place.

The late hour at which this order was received prevented its being carried into ex-
ecution that night, since no reconnaissance could be made and daylight would have found a
more or less unorganized body of men close up to positions organized and held by forces of
the enemy. The order was given * * * to make the relief after proper reconnaissance.

It is believed that this was approved by General Le Brun after inquiry into the conditions.

The morning of August 5, at daylight, the enemy undertook a raid. It happened that
the raiding party came upon a detachment of replacements that had been destined for a sup-
port position, as they were not considered fit for front line work. These men, although
subject to the regular barrage that ordinarily accompanies such an operation, bore them-
seves well and drove off the enemy who left two dead behind. He killed three and wounded
one of our men.

The detachment had been taken to the front line by French guides, instead of to the
position intended for them.

On August 5, in accordance with verbal directions from the III Corps and previous
orders * * * were issued. It was understood that if the 28th Division relieved the 32d,
no general advance was possible.

On August 6, at 8 p.m., there was a conference at the headquarters of the III Corps,
at which was present the Commanding General [of] the corps, the Chief of Staff, and the
Commanding Generals of the 28th Division, the 4th Division and the 6th Brigade.

* * * * * *

C. CRAWFORD,
Brigadier General, 6th Brigade.

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American 28th Division
July 18 - August 6, 1918

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228-33.3: Journal of Operations

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * * *

Division headquarters closed at La HOUSSAIRE morning of July 18, and opened at Le
FORT-de-la-VILLE in the afternoon, with P. C. established at 12 o'clock noon at Les
ORGERIEUX.

* * * * * *

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For tactical purposes the command of the 55th Infantry Brigade was placed under the Commanding General of the French 73d Division.

The French 20th Div. is on the right of the 55th Infantry Brigade, and the American 3d Div. on their left, on the 2d position. The 55th Infantry Brigade, reinforced by the 1st Battalion, 103d Engineers, will hold the 2d position of the 73d Div. Maps - CONDE-en-BRIE, 1:20,000; DORMANS, 1:20,000.

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Movement of Brigade

Commanding General 56th Brig:

Have your brigade ready to move by trucks at a moment's notice. The two bns., 111th Inf., will be back this p. m. and will take station at GRAND-HEURTEBISE Fme. Your brigade may be sent to SAULCHERY and CHARLY to back up the advance of the French 39th Division.

By command of Major General MUIR:

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. Gen., N. A.,
Act. Chief of Staff.

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56th Infantry Brigade Headquarters will be established at SAULCHERY.
Division headquarters at CHARLY at 9 p.m. tonight. Division headquarters closed at FORT-de-la-VILLE July 20 at 5 p.m., and opened at CHARLY at 9 p.m. **

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228-34.1: Memo

**Movement into Reserve Position**

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Charly, Aisne, July 21, 1918—10:50 a.m.

Commanding General, 56th Brigade:

Move your brigade to the heights of the Bois du LOUP as reserve for the army corps. The 107th Machine Gun Battalion has received orders to go to NOGENT-l'ARTAUD at the disposition of the corps commander. Division headquarters remains the same for the present.

By command of Major General Muir:

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. Gen., N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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228-34.1: Memorandum

**Movement to Brasles Ravine**

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Charly, Aisne, July 21, 1918—12:15 p.m.

Commanding General, 56th Brigade:

Move your brigade via ESSOMES-sur-MARNE northern portion of CHATEAU-THIERRY to the BRASLES-Ravine. Station troops in ravine so as to leave roads open. Establish message center near church at BRASLES. The 111th Infantry, less 1 battalion, should be in the vicinity of ETAMPES shortly. Establish connection with them and bring them to your brigade.

By Command of Major General Muir:

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. Gen., N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.
Support of French Division

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Charly, Aisne, July 21, 1918.

Commanding General, 56th Brigade:

Is your animal transport up?

We have orders to be ready to support the 39th which has taken Hill 204 and has patrols well to the north of CHATEAU-THIERRY. The 26th has also advanced to the northwest.

If you have not done so already send a liaison officer to the 39th Division which is either at SAULCHERY or ROMENY, to act as liaison officer for you and for us.

By Command of Major General Muir:

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. Gen., N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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28th Division in Corps Reserve

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Charly, Aisne, July 22, 1918.

Commanding General, 55th Brig.
Commanding General, 56th Brig.

[Extract]

3. The corps moves in the direction of Le CHARME.

4. 

6. The 28th Division remains as corps reserve in its present location.
7. Axes of Liaison: 39th Division: CHATEAU-de-VERDILLY---Ferme de la CENSE-a-DIEU ---Ferme FARY---ARBRE-de-la-FOSSE---COURMONT.
3d Division: GLAND---Jaulgonne---Le CHARME---RONCHERES.
Successive P. C.’s of the divisions as indicated above.
P. C. of 28th Division remains in place.

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. Gen., N. A.,
Act. Chief of Staff.

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- 619 -
Movement of 55th Brigade

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Saulchery, Aisne, July 24, 1918.

Commanding General, 55th Brig:

The division commander directs that you take station with your brigade in the woods just north of CHARLY.

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. Gen., N. A.,
Act. Chief of Staff.

Request for Field Artillery Brigade

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Saulchery, Aisne, July 24, 1918.

From: Commanding General
To: Commander-in-Chief, American E. F.

[Extract]

1. Having been assured that the remainder of the division is to be at once assembled to act as a division instead of by fragments, it is requested the necessary orders be issued to bring to the division at once the 53d Artillery Brigade.

CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major General, N. A.
228-32.13: Memorandum

Bridge Guard

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Les Grands-Bordeaux Fme, Aisne, July 26, 1918.

[Extract]

Commanding General, 55th Brig:

1. According to orders from the XXXVIII Corps your brigade is placed on the left bank of the MARNE, to guard the bridges in the zone of the army corps between MEZY, inclusive, and CHATEAU-THIERRY, inclusive.

2. The brigade will be stationed as follows: headquarters brigade at Ferme-le-BOCHAGE.

3. In case of attack the brigade will move to the heights which dominate the left bank of the MARNE, so as to be able to defend these heights and particularly the passages.

By command of Major General Muir:

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. General, N. A.
Act. Chief of Staff.

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228-33.3: Journal of Operations

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Les Grands-Bordeaux Fme, Aisne, July 26, 1918.

[Extract]

Division headquarters closed at CHARLY 7/26/18 at 2 p. m. and opened at Les GRANDS-BORDEAUX Farm 7/26/18 at 2 p. m., in the vicinity of COURBOIN.

By Command of Major General MUIR.

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Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS  
No. 5  
28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,  
Charteves, Aisne, July 27, 1918.

1. The Sixth Army attacks today. In continuance of the instructions issued for this morning, march attack will be launched at 9:40 p. m. after an artillery preparation of ten minutes.

2. Artillery and cavalry will receive special orders.

3. 55th Brig. will attack in two columns each column being composed of one regiment. Each regiment will advance by successive battalions (column of battalions).

   The right column will take as its axis the route Le CHARMEL---RONCHERES.

   The left column will take as its axis a route 300 yards west of Le CHARMEL---La FOSSE Ferme Road---until it strikes the road from La FOSSE Ferme-to FRESNES---thence to FRESNES ---COURMONT---CIERGES.

   * * * * * *

   As soon as the objectives are attained, the troops with the aid of the engineers which are following them will install themselves on the position conquered and will organize it. The right column will organize on the line - Hill 231 (1,200 meters east of RONCHERES)---Hill 192 (1,500 meters N. N. E. of RONCHERES) where it will assure connections with the left column.

   The left column will establish itself to the north of CIERGES and will gain touch at Hill 192 with the right column, and at Hill 212 (500 meters west of SERGY) with the American I Corps.

   * * * * * *

   7. Connection by planes will be made at 6 a. m., July 28, if the weather permits and at any rate at the demand of the planes.

   * * * * * *

   10. Headquarters 28th Division at CHARTEVES. Advance post will be established after 3 p. m. at the edge of the woods south of Les FRANQUETS Farm.

   CHARLES H. MUIR,  
   Major General, N. A.

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Relief of the French 39th Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 6
28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Charteves, Aisne, July 27, 1918—p. m.

[Extract]

1. The enemy in retreat since this morning seems to intend to establish his line on the OURCQ from which locality allied patrols have been fired on. The leading regiment of the French 39th Division (156th Infantry) has orders to continue the pursuit in the zone of the division.

2. The American 55th Brigade, will relieve at nightfall the infantry of the French 39th Division in the zone of pursuit and will take over as soon as possible after the relief of the leading regiment of the 39th Division the pursuit now being carried on by this regiment.

5. The light artillery, 39th Division, will remain provisionally at the disposal of Commanding General, 28th Division.

The Commanding Officer of Artillery, 39th Division, will have his command post with that of Commanding General, 28th Division (Ferme Le CHANOIS - provisionally).

WILLIAM H. ZIERDT,
Lt. Col., 28th Division.

Location of the Enemy

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Charteves, Aisne, July 27, 1918.

Commanding General, 55th Brig:

At 1:30 p. m. information received from Col. le Maitre that the French patrols had reached FRESNES and COURMONT, that the Germans are still in RONCHERES and that German infantry is along line of the OURCQ River.

CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major General, N. A.
228-32.15: Memorandum

*Postponement of Attack*

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Charteves, Aisne, July 27, 1918.

[Extract]

Commanding General, 55th Brig:

The attack which was ordered for tonight has been suspended for the time being; you should be ready, however, to make the attack should these orders be revoked. • • •

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CHARLES H. MUIR,
Major General, N. A.

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228-32.13: Memorandum

*56th Brigade to Fary Fme*

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Le Chanois Fme, Aisne, July 28, 1918—3 a. m.

Commanding General, 56th Brig:

Under authority of message just received from corps commander the 56th Brigade is placed at the disposition of the Commanding General, 28th Division. He directs that you proceed by marching and take position in the woods just east of FARY Ferme, about 2 kms. northwest of Jaulgonne.

Command Post of the Commanding General, 28th Division, is at present Le CHANOIS Ferme.

Upon arrival at designated locality establish your P. C. at FARY Ferme, temporarily.

EDW. L. KING,
Brig. General, N. A.,
Act. Chief of Staff.

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At 23 o'clock, July 27th, the 55th Infantry Brigade, 28th Division, took over the sector held by the French 39th Division. At the same hour in which the relief was under way an attack was ordered for the 55th Infantry Brigade by the French XXXVIII Corps, that is, 23 o'clock, July 27. Orders for the attack had been suspended and the relief undertaken, when another order, directing that the attack take place as first ordered, was received - consequently, the delay.

The chief of staff of the corps, by message at 2:40 o'clock, instructed that the American 3d Division will be relieved by the 55th Brigade; this brigade also to cover the front of the 39th Division. The 56th Infantry Brigade, placed at the disposal of the 28th Division and brought to a position in the vicinity of Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME and the woods to the north, to act as a divisional reserve.

Ordered to the woods just east of La FARY Ferme.

At 2:55 o'clock General Darrah advised that the attack was just beginning; that the OURCQ was about 15 meters wide and that the Germans were holding the bridges with machine guns - one bridge at La MOTTE Ferme being defended by artillery.

In reply to an inquiry from army corps, they were advised that sufficient engineer troops were present for the purpose of bridge construction, immediately after which instructions were sent to General Darrah directing him to have the engineers prepare sufficient material for bridge work, and to dig in at daylight, submitting a sketch of locations.

Relief finally completed at 6:55 o'clock, the Germans holding the La MOTTE Farm Bridge and MOULIN-CARANDA, our troops being disposed as follows: two battalions in front line, one in support. The second regiment held in brigade reserve.

Telephone message from the XXXVIII Army Corps to the Chief of Staff, 28th Division, to the effect that the P. C. of the 28th Division would be in the old German P. C., in the Foret de FERE after 12 noon, received at 9 o'clock.

Commanding general, with chief of staff, proceeded to this P. C. and at about 12:30 o'clock the commanding general received an order from the corps directing the P. C. be changed to the western outskirts of Le CHARMEL. On his way to this P. C., the commanding general met General Darrah, commanding the 55th Infantry Brigade, and showed him a copy of the order from corpor which he had just received, directing that an attack be made in conjunction with the 3d Division at an early hour this morning. This attack was not made on account of the fact that the corps order directing it was not received until about 12 o'clock, noon. The commanding general and the chief of staff then proceeded to Le CHARMEL, arriving there about 11 o'clock. Telephone communication having been established at the old German P. C. in the Foret de FERE, according to previous orders, it took some time for the signal battalion to lay wires and maintain connections with the corps P. C., at CHARTEVES. Telephone connection finally obtained at 5 p. m. The chief of staff sent Captain Tilghman, A. D. C., out to obtain the location of our front line, as near as possible.

General Weigel, commanding the 56th Infantry Brigade, arrived in the vicinity of FARY Ferme about 11 o'clock and the chief of staff, acting under the authority of the division commander, directed that the brigade commander move his brigade to the Bois VENTE-
JEAN-GILLAUME, and further directed that he notify these headquarters as to the location of his P. C.

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228-32.1: Order

**Attack**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 7

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,

*Le Chanois Fme, Aisne, July 29, 1918--2:50 a. m.*

[Extract]

1. The enemy yielding to our attacks has retreated to the north of the OURCQ and we have forced a passage of this river. The line of the XXXVIII Corps at the end of the day was as follows: Hill 213 (southeast of SERGY)---Hill 138---MOULIN-CARANDA---Hill 188---Bois MAO [sic] de RONCHERES---RONCHERES.

On the right of the XXXVIII Corps we have attained la FERME MERCY and the station of FERE-en-TARDENOIS and GIVRAY.

* * * * *

3. The 28th Division will attack at daybreak (3:40 o'clock) July 29 with one brigade in conjunction with an attack to be delivered at the same hour by the American 3d Division.

Successive objectives of the 28th Division are Hill 220 (east of SERGY)---and hills northwest of VILLOME. For the 3d Division CIERGES---Hill 230 (1,500 meters northeast of CIERGES)---COULONGES.

Careful attention must be paid to the question of liaison between the brigades of the 28th and 3d Divisions and on the right and left of these brigades. Special liaison groups will be maintained for information and combat groups armed with machine guns for combat liaison.

4. The 56th Brigade (28th Division) and the American 32 Division, are placed at the disposition of the General commanding the XXXVIII Corps, and will remain in positions they now occupy at the present time.

* * * * *

5. The General commanding the artillery of the 28th and 3d Divisions will foresee that his artillery is so echeloned in depth that the division artillery may be relieved as follows: That of the 3d Division by two groups of 75's of the 32d Division. The 214th Regiment F. A. being maintained in the second line. The General commanding the artillery of the 28th Division upon the completion of this relief, will be announced in orders to follow.

By Command of Major General MUIR:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lt. Col. G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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Continuation of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 8
Le Charmel, Aisne, July 30, 1918--2:35 h.

Map: SOISSONS 1:80,000.

[Extract]

3. During July 30 the 55th Brigade in conjunction with one brigade of the 32d Division, will continue its attack on the same objectives, and under the same conditions laid down in Field Orders No. 7 of July 29, these headquarters. The hour of attack will be daybreak, 3:40 h.

4. The 55th Brigade will be relieved by elements of the 32d Division during the night of July 30. Orders covering the relief will follow.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

28th Division to the Reserve

FIELD ORDER
28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
No. 9
Le Charmel, Aisne, July 30, 1918--9:20 a. m.

Map: SOISSONS 1:80,000.

[Extract]

1. In compliance with orders from the XXXVIII Army Corps, the 55th Brigade with attached elements will be relieved during the night of July 30 in its front line sector by the corresponding elements of the 63d Brigade, American 32d Division. Details to be arranged at a conference to be held between the respective brigade commanders at the Post of Command of the 55th Brigade Commander at 10 o'clock, July 30.
Upon the completion of the relief the 28th Division will be held in reserve in the 2d line position, north of the MARNE. The disposition of the units of this division will be as follows:

56th Brigade - In second line in its present position: Bois-VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME.

55th Brigade - Echeloned in depth between the ARBE-de-la-FOSSE Signal and Les FRANQUETS Farm, with one regiment in the ravine of ARGENTOL and one regiment near Hill 224 north of Le CHARMEL-Chateau.

107th Machine Gun Battalion - Will remain in its present location in the Bois VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME. The commanding officer will notify these headquarters of the exact location of his post of command, which will be near the Post Command of the 56th Brig. Commander, so that he may be in telephonic communication with these headquarters through 56th Brigade Headquarters.

Location of the two regiments of the 55th Brigade in the two areas assigned to them, as indicated above, is left to the orders of the general commanding this brigade. The Post Command of the 55th Brigade will be selected by the brigade commander and the location of same sent to these headquarters.

The General commanding the 32d Division takes over command of the sector occupied by his troops at 9 o'clock, July 31. Post of Command, Le CHARMEL.

The Post Command of the 28th Division remains at Le CHARMEL until 9 o'clock, July 31 at which hour it will open at JAULGONNE.

By Command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

228-33.1: Report of Operations

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
July 31, 1918.

From noon July 30 to noon July 31

[Extract]

1. WEATHER: Clear.
2. VISIBILITY: Fair, (slightly hazy).
3. ARTILLERY ACTIVITY: Enemy artillery moderate. Some shells dropped near Le CHARMEL. Friendly artillery very active, particularly against the town of CIERGES.
4. INFANTRY ACTIVITY: The 55th Brigade attacked the enemy in Bois des GRIMPETTES and CIERGES at 2:30 p.m. after a 20 minute intensive artillery preparation. Two units of the 32d Division on our right made their attack at the same time. Advance was made up to the northern outskirts of CIERGES. The units of the American 42d Division on our left have taken SERGY. Those on our right made progress in the woods to their front. We captured about 75 prisoners. About 8 p.m. the enemy started a counterattack. Our troops fell back to one kilometer south of CIERGES in the center of the line only. The counterattack by the enemy was not pushed. Our troops again assumed the offensive and after 20 minutes artillery preparation on CIERGES carried the advance to this town. They were ordered to halt and consolidate their position on the high ground just south of town as a
precaution against gas casualties on account of CIERGES being on very low ground, and were there relieved by units of the 63d Brigade, 32d Division. • • •


6. TROOP MOVEMENTS: 55th Brigade relieved by troops of the 63d Brigade, 32d Division. Relief started about 22 o'clock and was completed during night. The new position of the 55th Brigade is: Headquarters at Le CHARMEL, troops in ARGENTOL Ravine, south of Hill 224 near La CHARME1, Division headquarters removed from Le CHARME1 to JAULGONNE at 9 a.m.

7. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF THE DAY: Very active on the part of our troops. Good progress made against strong resistance of the enemy.

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By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

By command of Major General Muir:

Dr. N. B. BRABSON,
Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff,
Chief of Staff.

228-32.1: Order

Preparation for Relief of 32d Division

FIELD ORDERS
No. 10

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Jaulgonne, Aisne, August 2, 1918--5:20 p. m.

Map: SOISSONS 1:50,000

1. The enemy is retreating all along the front between HARTENNES on the west, VILLEN-TARDENOIS on the east.

The cavalry of the XXXVIII Army Corps has sent patrols to DRAVEGNY, and will continue to cover and keep informed the infantry during its progression.

In consequence of this retreat of the enemy, the 32d Division will push forward to DRAVEGNY and to the woods at the northwest of that village. Its artillery will be pushed well forward so as to be able to cover the further advance of our infantry north of DRAVEGNY. The rear elements of the 32d Division must be north of the river just south of CIERGES before 8 p. m. tonight.

2. The 28th Division will push forward its columns to the line COURMONT-RONCHERES, and be ready to pass through the lines of the 32d Division and continue the pursuit of the enemy as soon as orders may be given.

3. In consequence of the above.

(a) The 56th Brigade will remain in the position it now occupies, in the VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods.

P. C. - southern edge of VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods.

(b) The 55th Brigade will march tonight, under the orders of the Commanding General, 55th Brig., via Le CHARME1---La FOSSE Fme---RONCHERES Road---to the area bounded by the following points: Line COURMONT-RONCHERES on the north; Road Le CHARME1---FERE-en-TARDENOIS on the south

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The brigade will be echeloned in depth with the head of the column on the line COURMONT-RONCHERES. Advantage will be taken of all cover for the purpose of concealing the troops.

P. C. - La FOSSE Fme.

4. The 103d Engineers will remain in their present location until further orders.

5. The 107th Machine Gun Battalion remains still under the orders of the Commanding General, 32d Division.

6. Post of command, this division, remains at JAULGONNE until 9 a. m., tomorrow morning, August 3d, at which hour it will open at Chateau de FRESNES.

By command of Major General MUIR:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

228-32.1: Order

**Passage through 32d Division**

FIELD ORDERS
No. 12

Map: SOISSONS 1:50,000

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. The 28th Division, forming the main body of the army corps, will advance upon the receipt of these orders, upon the line---northern edge of the woods to the northwest of DRAVEGNY-LONGEVILLE, and will install its heads of columns there and will entrench themselves there, prepared to move forward and pass through the lines of the 32d Division upon receipt of orders.

3. (a) The 55th Brig. will march, under the orders of the brigade commander, via RONCHERES---eastern exit CIERGES---unimproved road to La TUILERIE---thence eastern exit of CHAMERY---COULONGES---COHAN---DRAVEGNY---LONGEVILLE.

(b) The 56th Brig. will march, under the orders of the brigade commander via FRESNES---COURMONT---western edge of CIERGES---western edge CHAMERY---thence by unimproved road to PARTY Fme---north to woods northwest of DRAVEGNY.

* * * * *

5. P. C. of the 55th Brig. - COHAN; P. C. of the 56th Brig. - VILLOME; P. C. of the 28th Division - CHATEAU de FRESNES.

By command of Major General MUIR:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Advance

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau de Fresnes, Aisne, August 3, 1918.

Commanding General, 56th Brig:

The following special order from the XXXVIII Corps is repeated for your information and guidance.

* * * * * *

It is now a question of pushing forward and of getting a foothold north of the VESLE as soon as possible.

The 32d Division will without delay reach the river with its advance guards and immediately build bridges necessary to cross.

The 28th Division will hold itself in readiness to cross the VESLE as soon as bridges are built.

General direction toward MERVAL.

The C. G. of the A. C.

* * * * * *

By Command of General MUIR:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.

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Advance

FIELD ORDERS
No. 13

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Chateau-de-Fresnes, Aisne, August 4, 1918—10 h.

Map: FISMES 1:20,000

[Extract]

* * * * * *

The 28th Division will push forward from position to position, following up the advance of the 32d.

3. In consequence of the above:
   (a) This division will march at once on receipt of those orders up to the line MONT-St-MARTIN---St-GILLES. * * *
(b) Brigade Commanders, 55th and 56th Brigades, will send their advance guards to the line MONT-St-MARTIN---St-GILLES, with some advance elements to the woods southwest of FISMES, and with patrols at the river at crossing points. As soon as the bridges have been built the advance guards of the two brigades will cross the VESLE and push forward to the crest of Hill 182 (route FISMES-MERVAL), and will there construct entrenchments to protect the crossing of our artillery. A strong garrison will be left in this position with machine guns, the remainder of the advance guard will begin at once the pursuit of the enemy - taking as an axis the route FISMES---MERVAL---REVILLON.

* * * * *

    P. C. 56th Brigade  RESSON Ferme.
    P. C. 28th Division  DRAVEGNY.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.

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228-33.3: Journal of Operations

28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 4, 1918.

[Extract]

* * * * *

Division acting as corps reserve.

At 14 o'clock, the Chief of Staff, III Corps, met the Chief of Staff, 28th Division, and informed him that an account of a change of orders of the XXXVIII Army Corps, under which the 28th Division was at that time operating, that the passage through the lines of the 32d Division by the 28th Division, as contemplated in Field Order No. 13, was held in abeyance until further orders. The chief of staff of the corps asked if this order had been received by the 28th Division, to which the chief of staff of this division replied that it had not been received up until the hour of leaving the old P. C. at CHATEAU de FRESNES, which was at about 13:30 o'clock. Upon arrival at the new P. C. at 15 o'clock, the commanding general informed the chief of staff that he had directed the brigade commanders not to proceed north of the line MONT-St-MARTIN---St-GILLES; that they were to keep their troops and transport off of the roads and under cover as much as possible, and that their brigades would not relieve the 32d Division until further orders. * * *

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Plan of Attack

FIELD ORDERS
No. 14

Map
FISMES
CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud) 1:20,000

[Extract]

2. The mission of the III Army Corps is to cross the VESLE River and continue the pursuit of the enemy in conjunction with neighboring units.***

3. (a) In carrying out the above instructions of the corps, the 32d Division will make the attack in the corps sector, continuing the operation now in progress of forcing the crossing of the VESLE and constructing bridges for the crossing of the main body, conforming to the principles set forth in Paragraph 2, F. O. No. 4, III Corps, dated August 4, 1918.

(b) The 28th Division, constituting the corps reserve, remains in its present position and location, prepared to march upon receipt of further orders.

4. All cavalry attached to the corps has been combined into a provisional regiment under Colonel Lemaitre. This cavalry regiment will remain at PUISEUX Fme in readiness to cross the VESLE.

5. The 53d F. A. Brig., now under orders to join this division, will be assembled upon arrival in the vicinity of FRESNES, at the disposal of the Commanding General, III Army Corps.

6. P. C.’s remain as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>32d Division</td>
<td>VILLOME.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28th Division</td>
<td>DRAVEGNY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Army Corps</td>
<td>COULONGES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th Brig.</td>
<td>MONTAON Fme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55th Brig.</td>
<td>On main road between DRAVEGNY and St-GILLES, 1 1/2 kms. north of MONTAON Fme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Lt. Col., G. S.,
Chief of Staff.
Crossing of Vesle River

FIELD ORDERS
No. 13 [sic]

Map: (FISMES) (CHEMIN-des-DAMES-Sud) 1:20,000

[Extract]

1. The enemy having retreated to the right bank of the VESLE is offering strong resistance all along the front to our attempt to force a crossing. Our troops have crossed the VESLE in small numbers; the American I Corps, having pushed one battalion across today.

2. The Sixth Army will continue its advance toward the AISNE. A general attack by the III Corps to force a crossing of the VESLE and to establish bridgeheads for the purpose of protecting the crossing of our main bodies will be made tomorrow, August 7, at an hour to be announced later. This advance will be made towards the plateau 4 kms. north of FISMES in two main bodies and one secondary column. The 28th Division, General Muir, commanding, with one battalion 107th Engineers, one air squadron and one balloon company attached, and supported by the divisional artillery of the 32d Division, less one battalion of the 138th F. A., will form the left column. The center column, General Crawford commanding, consists of the 6th Brigade with one battalion of the 107th Engineers, one air squadron and one balloon company attached, and divisional artillery, 4th Division. The right column, General Goureau commanding, consists of the French 4th Division less artillery.

3. (a) The 56th Brigade having relieved the 32d Division *** will attack in the general direction of PERLES---BLANZY-les-FISMES, for the purpose of seizing the two tongues of land to the northwest of FISMETTE and on which PERLES and BLANZY-les-FISMES are located---zone of attack bounded by the lines 203.8 and 205.3---and there construct bridgeheads for the purpose of protecting the crossing of our main body, the line then debouching to the east and west of plateau north of PERLES.

(b) The 55th Brigade remains in its present location.

4. OBJECTIVES OF ATTACK: The first objective will be an east and west line through La FONTAINE-QUI-BRULE, where the first line will halt and consolidate, preparatory to making a further advance. This halt will be for fifteen minutes and will be protected by a standing barrage of the artillery, 200 meters in advance of this line.

Second and Final objectives: An east and west line running through northern edge of PERLES---Les OLIVATS, with the flanks refused, thus forming a blunt redan. This final objective will be held and consolidated, forming a bridgehead for the crossing of the main body.

8. The artillery will lay down a preparatory bombardment and a covering fire on FISMETTE---Bois de PERLES---Bois le VIVIER---CHATEAU du DIABLE---woods of Les BISSIERES ---and the slopes to the south. An accompanying barrage will be laid down on the north bank.
of the VESLE, to accompany the progress of our infantry; rate of advance - 50 meters every 2 minutes.

* * * * * *

14. P. C. 56th Brigade - MONTAON Fme.
P. C. 55th Brigade - on main road DRAVEGNY---St-GILLES 1 1/2 kilometers north of MONTAON Fme.
P. C. 28th Division - DRAVEGNY.

By command of Major General Muir:

JOE R. BRABSON,
Chief of Staff.

--------


28th DIVISION, A. E. F.,
August 7, 1918.

Adjutant General, A. E. F., Attention G-3.

From 0 to 24 o'clock, August 6: 56th Brigade of this division took over sector occupied by American 32d Division, night of August 6/7. Friendly artillery very active. Enemy putting up strong resistance to crossing of VESLE River with machine guns. Weather rainy. Visibility poor.

MUIR.

--------
**American 32d Division**  
**July 27 - August 7, 1918**

---

232-32.1: Order

---

**Division Joins French Sixth Army**

FIELD ORDER  
No. 19

Map: PARIS, 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Order No. 293, Tenth Army, July 26, 1918, and Special Orders No. 3,602, Sixth Army, July 26, 1918, this division will move from its present billets and will join the Sixth Army.

* * * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,  
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,  
Acting Chief of Staff.

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232-32.1: Order

---

**Movement Toward First Line**

FIELD ORDER  
No. 20

Map: MEAUX - 1/80,000

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Order No. 1916/3, XXXVIII Army Corps, July 28, 1918, the 32d Division will move toward the northeast so as to be ready to support the divisions in the first line.

* * * * * *

- 636 -
III. These headquarters will close at this place this date at 14 o'clock and will
open at JAULGONNE same date same hour.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

232-32.1: Order

Relief of 3d Division

G-3
FIELD ORDER

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Jaulgonne, Aisne, July 29, 1918--4:45 h.

No. 22

Map: 1/50,000 SOISSONS
      1/50,000 MEAUX

[Extract]

1. The following special order from the Commanding General, XXXVIII Army Corps, is
published for compliance:

P. C., July 28, 1918--23:50 o'clock

SPECIAL ORDER

1. The elements of the American 32 Division designated to relieve those
of American 3d Division (a brigade, a battalion of engineers and a battalion
of motorized machine guns) will be pushed in the path of the 3d Division and
will execute, beginning tomorrow, the 29th, the following movements:
(a) By a bound made during the morning, the brigade of the 32d Divi-

sion with the elements attached to it, will be brought forward in such a manner
so as to have, as soon as possible, its front regiment as far as the second
line regiment of the 3d Division.

At this time, this latter regiment can be brought back to the rear.
(b) By a second bound which should be terminated in so far as possible
towards the end of the day, the brigade of the 32d Division will relieve with
its front regiment, the front line regiment of the 3d Div.

* * * * * *

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII A. C.
2. The 64th Brigade, 1st Battalion, 107th Engineers and 119th Motorized Machine Gun Battalion, are designated as the elements of the 32d Division to relieve the elements of the 3d Div.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. W. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

232-32.1: Order

32d Division to Take Over Sector

FIELD ORDER
No. 23

Maps: 1/50,000 SOISSONS
       1/50,000 MEAUX

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Jaulgonne, Aisne, July 29, 1918--17:45 h.

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. The P. C., of the 32d Division will be established at Le CHARMEL at 7 o’clock, July 30, beside the P. C. of the 3d Division, the headquarters of the 32d Division remaining at Jaulgonne.

3. The Commanding General, 32d Division, will take command of the sector at 11 o’clock, July 30.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

--------
Relief of 28th Division

FIELD ORDER
No. 24

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Jaulgonne, Aisne, July 30, 1918——4:15 h.

Maps:  SOISSONS  1/50,000
        MEAUX  1/50,000

[Extract]

1. The following General Order of Operations No. 171, XXXVIII Army Corps, July 29, 1918, is published for information and compliance:

GENERAL ORDER No. 171

I. Tomorrow evening, July 30, the American 32d Division, with the elements which are not already engaged, will relieve the American 28th Division.

* * * * * *

II. In order to realize this arrangement, the following movements will take place:

(a) During the day the 63d Brigade and the elements which are attached to it will be advanced to the zone in which it is to be engaged, keeping always undercover. (Reconnaissances to be executed during the day.)

(b) At the end of the day (sunset) the relief will be executed in such a manner as to be terminated by daybreak the 31st.

* * * * *

IV. The General commanding the 32d Division P. C. at Le CHARMEL will take command of all the zone occupied by his division beginning at 9 o'clock, July 31, at which time the P. C. of the General commanding the 28th Division will begin to function at JAULGONNE.

V. The artillery relief will be the subject of a special order.

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

2. The Commanding General of the 63d Brigade will communicate as soon as possible with the Commanding General of the 28th Division for instructions with reference to the zone to be occupied by the 63d Brigade on July 30, and also with reference to the relief of the 28th Division to be terminated by daybreak on the 31st.

The Commanding General of the 63d Brigade will comply with the instructions of the Commanding General of the 28th Division with reference reconnaissances directed in Section II (a) and the relief in Section II (b).

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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- 639 -
Relief of Artillery

FIELD ORDER
No. 25

Maps: 1/50,000 SOISSONS
       1/50,000 MEAUX

[Extract]

1. The following special order of the XXXVIII Army Corps is published for information and compliance:

[Contemporary Translation]

No. 1,935/3

July 29, 1918—23:05 h.

I. The artillery of American 32d Division which arrived the 29th to the west of CHATEAU-THIERRY, will be put at the disposal of the general commanding this division so that it may relieve the artillery of the French 39th Inf. Div. and a part of the artillery of the American 3d Division.

As a result of the movements of relief, the General commanding the 32d Division will have at his disposal the following 75-mm artillery and short heavies:

His divisional artillery, being 14 batteries of 75's and 4 batteries of 155 shorts (Schneider).

The 214th Regiment of short (corps) artillery 12 batteries of 75's (motorized).

One group of short heavy artillery of the 3d Division and 2 batteries of 155 shorts (155 C. S or B?).

* * * * * *

de MONDESIR,
General Commanding the XXXVIII Army Corps.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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**Attack in Bois Grimpettes Area**

FIELD ORDER

No. 26

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,

*Le Charmel, Aisne, July 30, 1918--11 h.*

Map: FISMES 1/20,000

[Extract]

I. The enemy is offering strong resistance in our front especially in Bois des GRIMPETTES. The French 4th Division, on our right attacked at 10 o'clock this date the woods Bois de CIERGES in the general direction of COURTEAUX Farm. The 28th Division, on our left, will attack in liaison with us, in the general direction of Cote 220 after capture of Bois des GIMPETTES.

II. (a) The 64th Brigade will attack in the general direction of Bois des GRIMPETTES ---CIERGES---CHAMERY.

***

III. (a) The 1st Battalion of the 127th Infantry, now located in and in advance of RONCHERES with a platoon of machine guns will form the first and second lines. * * *

(1) Objectives:

(a) The first objective: Northern edge of the Bois des GRIMPETTES.

(b) The second objective: CIERGES.

***

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lieut. Col., Inf., N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

232-32.1: Order

**Artillery Relief**

FIELD ORDER

No. 5

57th FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,

*St-Martin, Aisne, July 30, 1918.*

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to instructions contained in Field Orders No. 25, 32d Division, the Headquarters, 119th Field Artillery, Headquarters and one battalion, 121st Field Artillery, will move today at 10:30 a. m., and will proceed to the area marked by Ferme GRANGE-MARIE, Ferme de la TIEULERIE, La THEODORIE, La CENSE-a-DIEU.
2. On the night of July 31 and August 1, the 119th Field Artillery and the battalion of the 121st Field Artillery will relieve the divisional artillery of the French 39th Infantry Division.

6. The P. C. of this brigade will be at Le CHARMEL-CHATEAU at 16 h., July 30, 1918.

By command of Brigadier General Irwin:

J. W. GILSON,
Captain, F. A., N. G.,
Adjutant.

232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
July 31, 1918--16:30 h.

From noon July 30 to noon July 31, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * *

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

The 127th Infantry supported by the other units of the 64th Inf. Brigade and the artillery of the 3d Division made an attack on Bois des GRIMPETTES commencing at 14:30 after an artillery preparation which began at 14:10, July 30, 1918.

Report received at 23:30 that the objective had been gained after a hand-to-hand combat by bayonet with the enemy.

ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

Preparatory fire began at 14:10 and creeping barrage at 14:30. Continual firing throughout the afternoon and night.

* * * * *

JNO. P. SMITH,
Major, F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C., of S., G-3.

--------
Orders for Advance

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, July 31, 1918--12 noon.

MEMORANDUM FOR BRIGADE COMMANDERS

Map - 1:20,000 FISMES

[Extract]

1. Information has been received that the enemy is evacuating Bois MEUNIERE to the right of our sector, changing somewhat the situation to such an extent as to permit us to advance in our sector as soon as possible.

2. Under instructions from the corps commander, our left brigade is to move in the direction of Cote 220, 1 kilometer east of SERGY. The corps order has already been furnished you for information.

3. Limits between brigades will be as follows: Road CIERGES to CHAMERY; CIERGES in sector of 64th Brigade; road in sector of 63d Brigade; CHAMERY in sector of 63d Brigade.

4. By conference between brigade commanders, arrangements will be made for the 63d Brigade to gradually withdraw the elements now in the sector of the 64th Brigade to be replaced by elements from the latter brigade. This can probably be done during the advance.

5. In view of the reported withdrawal of the enemy, the brigades will advance with patrols to the front as soon as possible. The 64th Brigade will keep in close liaison with the French 4th Infantry Division to the right and will, in a measure, regulate the speed of its advance with that division in order that its right flank may be protected.

ARTILLERY:

6. The artillery should be prepared to support the advance as far as the REDDY Farm on the line generally perpendicular to the axis of advance; axis of liaison road COURMONT---CIERGES---CHAMERY.

* * * * * *

W. G. HAAN,
Major General, Commanding.

-------

- 643 -
CIERGES-LES JOMBLETS AREA
Looking north-northwest from outskirts of Cierges
Relief of Artillery

OPERATIONS MEMORANDUM
No. 1
57th FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, July 31, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Relief: The relief of the French 39th Div. Arty. and the 3d Divisional Artillery will be executed in compliance with Field Order No. 25, 32d Division, July 30, 1918 and the relief orders of the 39th Divisional Artillery Commander and the Commanding General of the 3d Artillery Brigade.

* * * * * *

By command of Brigadier General Irwin:

J. W. GILSON,
Captain, F. A., N. G.,
Adjutant.

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232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Jaulgonne, Aisne, August 1, 1918---13:50 h.

From noon July 31 to noon August 1, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * * *

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Right sector, Right front: 64th Inf. Brigade: This brigade was held up in the northern part of Bois des GRIMPETTES by heavy machine-gun fire from BELLEVUE Farm and woods to the north and west of same. Troops improving and holding their position.

Left sector, Left front: 63d Inf. Brigade: At 14 h. this brigade made advance from northwest of Bois des GRIMPETTES to position along the CIERGES-SERGY Road south of Les JOMBLETS Woods. Les JOMBLETS Woods was occupied during the afternoon by a part of the 2d Bn., 125th Inf., but were forced to retire on account of machine-gun fire. The attack was made in early morning on Les JOMBLETS Woods which was reached but troops forced to retire on account of heavy fire.

ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

Continuous artillery fire during the day until about midnight when fire was slackened until early morning.
CHANGE IN OUR LINE

At 12:15, August 1, our line was as follows: Cote 212---southern edge Les JOMBLETS Woods---(199.5-272.3)---(198.7-271.8)---(199.6-271.6)---(200.2-271.5).

We are being held up by strong machine-gun fire from Les JOMBLETS Woods on our front. Also in the right of our sector we are being held up by strong machine-gun fire from woods at 199.7-271.7.

TROOP MOVEMENTS

128th Infantry relieved 127th Infantry.
119th F. A. relieved the French on the left front during the night. Other units of the divisional artillery preparing to relieve the 3d Division of Artillery tonight.

* * * * * *

J. G. PILLOW,
Lieut. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

232-20.1: Summary of Intelligence

2d Section, General Staff
No. 2

July 31 - Aug. 1, 1918
(noon to noon)

[Extract]

II. ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY:

(a) Infantry - The enemy infantry has offered stubborn resistance, using considerable rifle fire to hold up our advance, in the region of Les JOMBLETS Woods and in the woods N. E. of RONCHERES.

(b) Machine Guns - Very heavy machine-gun fire along our entire front, which was the main factor in holding up our advance in many places.

(c) Artillery - Enemy artillery very active from 14:30 to 18 o'clock. About 150 shells containing sneezing gas were fired on position occupied by second battalion 125th. Much of this gas was thrown into CIERGES while occupied by our troops. Bois de la GARENNNE was subjected to considerable shelling. VENTE-JEAN-GUILLAUME Woods and La CROIX-ROUGE Farm were shelled for a short period of time during the evening.

The enemy is using mustard and sneezing gas from which some of our men have suffered skin burns and slight lung trouble. Woods and ravines have been particularly subjected to gas shelling.

III. AERONAUTICS:

(a) Aeroplanes - Enemy planes did considerable reconnaissance work over our lines during the day.

* * *
IV. MOVEMENTS - Enemy infantry and machine guns retreated N. E. about 1 1/2 kilometers between 14:30 and 17 o'clock. * * * *

* * * * * *

Our front line appears to be as follows: Southern part of Hill 220---S. E. to the southern edge of Les JOMBLETS Woods---point (199.0-272.8) point (199.8-271.8) to N. W. edge of Bois MEUNIERE.

* * * * * *

PAUL B. CLEMENS,
Major, Infantry, N. G.,
2d Sect., G. S., 32d Div.

232-32.1: Order

Defensive Position

FIELD ORDER  
No. 28

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel, Aisne, August 1, 1918---19:10 h.

MAPS: FERE-en-TARDENOIS, FISMES, CONDE, DORMANS

SCALE: 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. Information has been received that there is a large concentration of enemy in the southern edge of Foret de NESLES and in the southern edge of Bois de la PISOTTE, and that five tanks were seen at 14 o'clock in the vicinity of Les BONS-HOMMES Farm. This division has been reinforced by one regiment and the divisional machine gun battalion of the 28th Division.

2. A defensive position on a second line will be established under the division commander of the officer commanding the detachment from the 28th Division on the general line La MOTTE Farm---Bois des LUTES and quarry 200 meters east of Bois des LUTES---Bois des GRIMPETTES---western edge of Bois MEUNIERE at head of ravine running southeast from CIERGES. The position will be organized in depth extending as far back as the line FRESNES-VILLARDELLE Farm.

3. (a) Centers of resistance of two companies each will be established at La MOTTE Farm, Bois des LUTES and quarry to the east, Bois des GRIMPETTES, western edge of Bois MEUNIERE near head of the ravine running southeast from CIERGES.

(b) One battalion will be placed in reserve in the vicinity of FRESNES.

* * * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

*******
Artillery Command

G-3  32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
FIELD ORDER  Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, August 2, 1918--8:55 h.
No. 29

[Extract]

1. Brigadier General L. R. Irwin is placed in command of all the artillery at the
disposal of the Commanding General of the 32d Division.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. Beck, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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Pursuit of Enemy

G-3  32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
FIELD ORDER  Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, August 2, 1918.
No. 30

TO BRIGADE COMMANDERS AND ARTILLERY COMMANDER

[Extract]

The following instructions just received from the corps commander:

The enemy is offering little resistance; he is even falling back on certain
parts of the front. The American 32d Division will push back the enemy, taking
as axis of march, VILLOME, Cote 200, wood northwest of DRAVEGNY. Progress with­
out halting so as to not allow the enemy to make a stand.

In pursuance of these instructions, the two brigades will move forward in close
liaison, as directed. * * *

* * * * *

The artillery commander will give necessary instructions to move batteries forward
if necessary, to cover this movement up to the woods indicated and 500 meters beyond.
Liaison with neighboring divisions must not be forgotten.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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232-32.1: Order

Pursuit of Enemy

G-3
FIELD ORDER
No. 31

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, August 2, 1918---14 h.

1. The following telegram received at 14 o'clock from the corps commander:
The cavalry patrols have reached DRAVEGNY. The infantry must follow and
rejoin them. Push forward the artillery. The American 32d Div., at 19 h. this
evening (7 p. m.) must be entirely to the north of the CIERGES Brook in order to
allow the American 28th Divison to move forward.
2. To comply with this, brigade commanders will give immediate instructions to move
the rear battalions of their brigades forward so as to clear the brook passing through the
village of CIERGES by 19 o'clock, if possible, and will press forward with all possible
speed.
3. The artillery must push forward energetically by echelons.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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232-32.1: Order

Advance

FIELD ORDER
No. 1

57th FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel-Chateau, Aisne, August 2, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Pursuant to Field Orders No. 30, 32d Division, August 2, 1918, the retiring
movement of the enemy makes it necessary to advance the divisional artillery.

* * * * *
3. The 2d Group of the French 214th F. A. is placed under the command of the colonel commanding the light artillery supporting the 63d Brigade Infantry. The 3d Group of the 214th F. A. is similarly placed under the command of the colonel commanding the light artillery supporting the 64th Brigade Infantry. The Commanding Officers of the 2d and 3d Groups of the 214th F. A. will report to the commanding officers of the groupments designated.

4. P. C.'s of commanding officers of east and west subsectors will be established at location of C. G. of 63d and 64th Brigades Infantry. Most intimate liaison with infantry must be maintained under all circumstances.

By command of Brigadier General Irwin:

J. W. GILSON,
Captain, F. A., N. G.,
Adjutant.

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232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Le Charmel Chateau, Aisne, August 2, 1918--14:45 h.

From noon August 1 to noon August 2, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * * *

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

During the 24 hours ending noon August 2, our troops continue the advance north of CIERGES taking REDDY Farm and Hill 230. The enemy appears to be hastily retreating and our troops are in pursuit.

ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

Artillery fire very active in conjunction with the infantry attack. No report at hand as to amount of ammunition expended.

TROOP MOVEMENTS

The 120th, 121st and 147th F. A. relieving the 3d Divisional units.

* * * * * *

J. G. FILLORA,
Lieut. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

--
Advance Ordered

OPERATIONS ORDER

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Clerges, Aisne, August 3, 1918---18:25 h.

1. The following telephone message from the Commanding General, XXXVIII Army Corps is published for your information:

   The American 32d Division must, without delay, reach the river with its advance guard and immediately organize means for crossing the river. The American 28th Division will be ready to cross over VESLE River as soon as means have been established; passing through the lines of the 32d Division.

   General Direction MERVAL.

2. You will immediately get in touch with the engineers and make plans for providing means to cross the river if there are no bridges or boats available.

   In order to get means and materials for this purpose any nearby buildings may be demolished and the materials used for the purpose.

   When means are provided immediate report will be made to these headquarters so that the 28th Division can be notified.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lieut. Col., Inf., N. A.,
Acting Chief of Staff.

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232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Clerges, Aisne, August 2/3, 1918---15 h.

From noon August 2 to noon August 3, 1918

[Extract]

*****

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Our forces continued their advance during the period of this report and at 10:30, August 3, the leading elements of our advance guard were reported on the line MONT-St-MARTIN---to point one-half kilometer southwest of the town of St-GILLES. They cleared RESSON Farm at 10:30. The leading elements of the main body at 10:30 were crossing the Ravine FOND-de-MEZIERES. No report of hostile activity received from the advance guard commander. The advance is proceeding without incident. The two brigades, the 63d and 64th are about abreast of each other.
ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

Active but less than on previous days.

TROOP MOVEMENTS

P. C.'s at noon August 3, 1918, as follows:

32d Division and 57th F. A. Brigade at CIERGES.
63d and 64th Brigades at DRAVEGNY.

Practically all units of the division moved forward but it is impossible at this time to give their exact locations.

* * * * *

J. G. PILLOW,
Lieut, Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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232-32.1: Order

Advance Guard to Force the Vesle

FIELD ORDER
No. 32

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Cierges, Aisne, August 4, 1918---3:45 h.

Maps: FISMES, CHEMIN-des-DAMES-SUD, 1/20,000

1. With reference to Operations Memorandum of August 3, 1918, issued at 18:25 o'clock the attached instructions from the corps commander modify the instructions in that memorandum as indicated in Paragraph 2.

2. In view of these instructions the advance guards of the 2 brigades of the 32d Division will cross the VESLE as soon as possible by any available means that may have been provided or may be provided. The passage being supported by artillery if necessary. After the passage is effected a bridgehead will be formed for the purpose of covering the passage of the main body. Contact will be kept with the enemy at all times.

3. The 28th Division will not pass through the lines of the 32d Division, as indicated in Paragraph 2 of the memorandum of August 3, until specific orders for such operation are received from the corps commander. In other words, the 32d Division will proceed precisely as if no intimation had been received from the corps commander for the 28th Division to pass through the lines of the 32d Division.

4. Orders with reference to movement of trains will remain unchanged.

5. The present axis of liaison is extended from Message Center No. 5 along CHERRY-CHARTREUVE---FISMETTE---CROIX-NOIRE Road with Message Center No. 6 at Point 51.0, north of Les RAVAUX, No. 7 at road junction at Point 83.5 southwest of FISMES. Message Center No. 8 at the north exit of FISMETTE. The division signal officer will connect the different message centers by telephone. The commanding officer of headquarters troop will provide a noncommissioned office and 2 privates mounted for duty at each of the Message Center.
Centers No. 5 to 8 inclusive. Lt. Nichols is designated officer in charge of message center service.

The division P. C. will remain at its present location.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Clerges, Aisne, August 3/4, 1918.

From noon August 3 to noon August 4, 1918

[Extract]

* * * * * *

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Our forces continued their advance against the enemy, but having arrived at a critical point on the high ground overlooking the valley of the VESLE it has been impossible to force a passage of the river without time for necessary preparation. Such an attempt made by a battalion of the 64th Brigade last night was unsuccessful, the battalion suffering heavy casualties.

During period our line was advanced from line running from west to east along dirt road passing S. E. from VILLESAVOYE to junction with main CHERRY-CHARTREUVE---FISMES Road north, from VILLESAVOYE to CHAMP-GAILLARD to FONTEREY-des-HOCHEs [FONTENY-les-ROCHES?]

ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

Quiet active on roads, and the villages of St-GILLES, DRAVEGNY and COHAN.

* * * * * *

J. G. PILLOW,
Lieut. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

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BOIS DE RARAY-DRAVEGNY AREA
Looking southeast from vicinity of Dravegny, across Orillon Valley
Reconnaissance Report

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

1. The following is the situation as I found it from a personal reconnaissance at the front at noon today.
2. I visited our front lines at MONT-St-MARTIN; from that point the line extends along the road due east; just where the line is in the right sector I was unable to ascertain.
3. The American 4th Infantry Division arrived at 12 o'clock at RESSON Farm and immediately placed troops in the Bois de MONT-St-MARTIN, extending our front line to the left. I sent a map to the Commanding General, 4th Division with a patrol of that division showing him our situation.
4. There was feeble firing from the north of the river by the Germans, such as could be delivered by two pieces of 77's. Further back, however, in the vicinity of DRAVEGNY there were some heavier shells falling - perhaps from one or two pieces.
5. Our batteries are well in position to cover the other side. The batteries of the French 4th Division to our right are in the open on the hills to the south of St-GILLES. These batteries could not stay there at all if the Boche had much artillery on the other side; they were very feebly shelled.
6. It is my opinion that we can throw bridges across the river tonight and cross a force over without much difficulty, and I will confer further with the brigade commanders on this matter this afternoon.
7. I find out men were too thick in the front line in the 63d Brigade and gave instructions to withdraw all from the front line except a line of combat groups for observation. We are having useless casualties there.
8. There was some action to be taken with the advance battalion of the 64th Brigade in conjunction with an advance that was to be made by the infantry to our right. What the result of that was I have not learned.

WILLIAM G. HAAN,
Major General, Commanding 32d Division.

Operations Report

From noon August 4 to noon August 5, 1918

[Extract]

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

The main body of our forces remained in occupation of the high ground overlooking the valley of the VESLE. Both brigades (63d and 64th) have entered FISMES with advance
guards in preparation for crossing the river but have come under strong artillery and machine-gun fire from the opposite bank and have dug in on the south bank of river. Reconnaissance has been made on south bank of river to locate bridge sites but it has been impossible to bring up bridge-building material, due to enemy artillery and machine-gun activity. Patrols have crossed the river, but attempts to cross advance guards have failed. Casualties, heavy.

**ENEMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY**

Quite active on advance troops, roads and villages. Calibre 77, except for a few 105's, reported on DRAVEGNY.

Gas in valley west of FISMES.

* * * * * *

J. G. PILLOW,
Lieut. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.

* * * * * *

232-32.1: Order

**Forcing the Vesle**

FIELD ORDER
No. 33

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Cierges, Aisne, August 5, 1918—2h.

Maps: CHEMIN-des-DAMES-SUD, FISMES

Scale: 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. It is not believed that the enemy intends to make a serious resistance between the VESLE and AISNE Rivers.

Allied troops have crossed the VESLE at certain points and patrols have crossed in our front.

* * * * * *

2. The 32d Division will cross the VESLE River and continue the pursuit.

Division Sector:
Western Limit: Les CRUAUX (incl.)—Les BOULEAUX (incl.)—MONT-St-MARTIN (incl.)—Le MONCEL (incl.)—PERLES (excl.)—CROIX-NOIRE—BARBONVAL (excl.)—VILLERS-en-PRAYERES (excl.).

Eastern Limit: 300 meters east of LONGEVILLE—La CHAUSSEE-du-MARais—Les PETITES-CHEZELLES Farm—ETABLISSEMENT PISCICOLE—western edge St-GILLES—eastern edge FISMES—Aux PRES-St-MARIE—GLENNES (incl.)—MAIZY.

- 656 -
Limit between Brigades: Le MONT-CHAMPOIS---western edge MONTAON Farm---Le CHAMP-GAILLARD---western edge FISMETTE-MERVAL---eastern edge REVILLON---Le MOLIGNON.

Division P. C. at CIERGES.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Chief of Staff,

232-33.1: Operations Report

From noon August 5, to August 6, 1918

[Extract]

INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Very little change in the situation from yesterday. We are still holding the south bank of the VESLE and our advance elements are endeavoring to get across the VESLE to cover the work of construction bridges, but up to noon, August 6, crossing had not been accomplished. The advance has been held up by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire.

ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

Our artillery very active north of the VESLE River.

TROOP MOVEMENTS

P. C.'s of the 63d and 64th Brigades from DRAVEGNY to MONTAON Farm.
Division P. C. same - VILLOME.

J. G. PILLOW,
Lieut. Col., F. A., N. A.,
Asst. C. of S., G-3.
Relief of 32d Division

FIELD ORDER
No. 34

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Villome, Atsne, August 6, 1918---19 h.

MAPS: FISMES, CHEMIN-des-DAMES (SUD): 1/20,000

[Extract]

1. In compliance with Field Order No. 9, III Corps, this division (less artillery) will be relieved tonight by the 28th Division. Details of the relief will be arranged by conference between brigade commanders of this division and Brigade Commanders of the 28th Division. The two rear battalions, one from each brigade, will be relieved at once. Guides will be immediately provided by the 63d and 64th Brigades, for leading the units of the 28th Division to their designated places.

The relief will be completed by daylight August 7, at which time the command of the sector will pass to the Commanding General, 28th Division.

* * * * * *

4. P. C. 63d Brigade at Le MONCEL.
   P. C. 64th Brigade at CHAMERY.
   P. C. 32d Division will close at VILLOME at 14 o'clock, August 7, and open at CIERGES at the same date and hour.

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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Movement of Headquarters

G-1
ORDER

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Jaulgonne, Atsne, August 6, 1918.

No. 16

[Extract]

Headquarters, 32d Division (2d Echelon) will move August 7, 1918, from JAULGONNE to

- 658 -
Le CHARMEL-CHATEAU. Headquarters will close at JAULGONNE 12 noon, and open at Le CHARMEL-CHATEAU same date and hour.

* * * * *

By command of Major General Haan:

R. M. BECK, Jr.,
Lt. Colonel, Infantry, N. A.,
Chief of Staff.

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232-33.1: Operations Report

32d DIVISION, A. E. F.,
Villome, Aisne, August 7, 1918—12 h.

From noon August 6 to noon August 7, 1918

[Extract]

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INFANTRY ACTIVITY

Up to time of relief from front of sector, no change in situation since last report. Situation was held along south bank of the VESLE with view of crossing after sufficient artillery preparation and construction of bridges. Due to heavy machine-gun and artillery fire, engineers have not been able to bring up bridging material. Any activity on our part along river bank drew machine-gun fire.

ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

Our artillery active during period.

TROOP MOVEMENTS

63d and 64th Brigades and 119th M. G. Bn. relieved during night Aug. 6/7, by American 28th Division.

* * * * *

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- 659 -
Attachment of 55th Brigade to French

[Contemporary Translation]

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
Montmirail, Marne, July 21, 1918---11 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER

The General commanding the French Ninth Army informs by telephone message of July 21, 1918, that the American 55th Brigade is put at the entire disposal of the French III Army Corps with the reservation that it must not be split. This brigade is placed under the command of the General commanding the French 73d Inf. Div.

In case the crossing of the MARNE takes place according to schedule and the army corps continues its progression northward, the brigade is designated as the [advance guard] and is to insure the liaison with the American 3d Division.

The general commanding the 73d Div. will make arrangements accordingly.

The battalion of American engineers which is now with the 55th Brigade will be placed at the disposal of the colonel commanding the engineers of the army corps, who will forward his orders to the brigade.

L. LEBRUN,
Chief of Staff.

Movement of American 6th Brigade

[Editorial Translation]

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
August 3, 1918---3 p. m.

SPECIAL ORDER

1. The American 6th Brigade, placed under the direct orders of the General commanding the Fr. III Corps, will move to St-GILLES August 3. Departure from its bivouac at 5 p. m.
V. The C. P. of the III Corps will open at VILLERS-AGRON at 5 p. m.
Details left at DORMANS until 7 p. m.
VI. The mission of the brigade [6th] will be given by the general order issued this evening.

L. LEBRUN.

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HS Fr. File: 428-30.1: Orders

Crossing of the Vesle

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1362/3-Op

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
August 3, 1918—8 p. m.

General Orders No. 586

(1st Part)

[Extract]

I. Our outposts have crossed the ARDRE at COURVILLE and at St-GILLES; they are in contact with the enemy rearguard on the line: Les PETITES-CHEZELLES Farm—Cote 179—La CENSE Farm.
The head of the main body of the corps has reached the left bank of the ARDRE.
II. During the first part of the night of August 3/4, the outposts, less artillery, will try to push to the VESLE and cross the river for the purpose of forming a bridgehead. This operation will be attempted by each outpost on its own responsibility.
If this operation does not succeed, a general attempt to cross the VESLE in force will be made at 3:30 a. m., tomorrow morning, after an artillery preparation which may last a part of the night. * * *
III. On August 4, the Fr. III Corps will continue to pursue closely the enemy rearguards. * * *

* * * * *

V. For the execution of the movement, the two outposts of the 4th Division, prescribed by General Orders No. 585 of August 2, will remain constituted under the command of the General commanding the 4th Division.
The main body of the corps infantry, comprising:
On the left: the American 6th Brigade, with 2 cos. of American engineers, will follow the movement by occupying successively, as soon as the outposts have passed beyond them:
1. The valley of the VESLE.
2. Line of elevations north of BLANZY-les-FISMES, so as to be able to assemble those outposts in case of counterattacks.

* * * *
The American brigade remains directly under the control of the General commanding the Fr. III Corps.

L. LEBRUN.

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HS Fr. File: 428-30.1: Station List

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
August 4, 1918.

LOCATION OF [AMERICAN] ELEMENTS OF FRENCH III ARMY CORPS

[Extract]

1. French 4th Inf. Div: Hq. MAISON-FORESTIERE 500 m. east of ABBAYE-d'IGNY.

• • • • •

3. American 6th Brigade:
   Brigade Hq.
   38th Inf.
   30th Inf.
   Machine gun bn.
   Engrs.: 1 co.
   1 co.

La VALLEE-de-BOIS Fme
C. P. Les PETTIES-CHEZELLES Fme en route to
   the St-GILLES---MONT-sur-COURVILLE
   region.

Region east of DRAVEGNY
ARCIS-le-PONSART
ARCIS-le-PONSART
Region east of COULONGES (road service)

• • • • •

L. LEBRUN.

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HS Fr. File: 428-30.1: Order

American III Corps relieves French III Corps

[Editorial Translation]

3d Section, General Staff
No. 1,386/3-Op

FRENCH III ARMY CORPS,
August 4, 1918---7 p. m.

GENERAL ORDERS NO. 587

(1st Part)

[Extract]

I. At 8 a. m., August 5, the American III Army Corps will assume command of the front held by the American III Corps and the French III Corps.

• • • • •
II. On the same date, the C. P. of the American III Corps will open in the vicinity of COULONGES.

L. LEBRUN.

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Annex to Aisne-Marne Operation

Translated German Documents

Disposition of German Armies for Marne Operations

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section.
No. 8685

SUPREME HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,

June 14, 1918.

I. Group of Armies of Crown Prince Rupprecht will execute “Hagen.”** The start of the attack will be about July 20.

Preparations for the attack will be continued on the Wilhelm front and also on the left of the Second Army.

This headquarters reserves the right to designate the diversionary attack “Eckenbrecher”*** from the front of the Seventeenth Army.

2. Group of Armies German Crown Prince. The Eighteenth and Seventh Armies will start the attack on a large scale. MERY must be taken, but this headquarters reserves the right to decide concerning other local operations. Both armies will make all necessary preparations for the attack along the front from MOREUIL to the MARNE.

The Seventh Army will especially support the front between the FORET de VILLERS—COTTERETS and the MARNE. Hill 204 west of CHATEAU-THIERRY must be held by us.

The Seventh Army will make the preparations prescribed for “MARNE Defense.”#

The First Army will make preparations for the attack east of REIMS (in the PROSNES sector) under “REIMS.”#

Both armies will submit to this headquarters attack plans for “MARNE Defense” and “REIMS,” which will indicate the missions and organization of forces as well as necessary requirements in infantry and artillery, etc. The attack will be about July 10.

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* Hagen: Code name for the offensive operation to be made against the British in FLANDERS. It was never initiated because, in preparation for it, the French reserves were to be drawn from the FLANDERS front by “Road Construction” (code name for the CHAMPAGNE-MARNE offensive, actually made from July 15-17).

** Eckenbrecher (salient cracker) is an unidentified project, never executed.

# “Road Construction” incorporated two local offensive plans called “MARNE Defense” which called for German troops to cross the MARNE at CHATEAU-THIERRY and move up the south bank on EPERNAY, and “REIMS,” an attack to be made east of REIMS.

The Failure of “Road Construction” cancelled the preparations for “HAGEN.”
3. All groups of armies will restrict further active operations as much as possible. Artillery and the trench mortar action along the former MONTdidier-MARNE attack front and toward the CHAMBRECY-REIMS front will be maintained. It is desirable that the Entente believe that we intend to continue our offensive operations toward PARIS. Groups of Armies Gallwitz and Prince Albrecht will execute their operations against the Americans.

By order of:

LUDENDORFF.

To Group of Armies German Crown Prince.

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German Order of Battle
July 17, 1918
(Left to right)

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Ninth Army
  XXXIX Reserve Corps
  241st Division
  Bavarian 11th Division

XIII Corps
  42d Division
  14th Reserve Division
  115th Division

Seventh Army
  XXV Reserve Corps
  40th Division
  Bavarian 10th Division
  78th Reserve Division

VIII Corps
  4th Ersatz Division
  87th Division
  201st Division

XXIII Reserve Corps
  10th Landwehr Division
  36th Division

VIII Reserve Corps
  Bavarian 6th Reserve Division
  23d Division
  200th Division
  1st Guard Division

IV Reserve Corps
  37th Division
  113th Division
  10th Reserve Division
  2d Guard Division
65th Corps
195th Division
Bavarian 12th Division
22d Division
103d Division (only 2/3)

VI Reserve Corps
123d Division
103d Division (only 1/3)
50th Division
86th Division

First Army
XV Corps (relieved by Corps Gontard)
213th Division
242d Division
(The First Army on the flank of the Seventh Army
was not a factor in this operation)

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**Instructions for Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
No. 9460 July 24, 1918.

To Group of Armies German Crown Prince

[Extract]

* * * * *

2. The Ninth Army will prepare an attack to be launched as soon as possible in the
sectors of the 15th Inf. Div., 202d Inf. Div. and 53d (Saxon) Res. Div. * * *

At the same time the Ninth Army will reconnoiter for an attack via SOISSONS and west
thereof in the area of the 14th Inf. Div., and will submit recommendations.

Knowledge of our intentions and the preparation of the attacks must be limited to a
few individuals. The troops must continue to be prepared to offer vigorous resistance.

3. The movement of the Seventh Army will be decided later. The order issued to
Schmettow’s [65th] Corps and Conta’s [IV Res.] Corps to refuse their interior flanks to-
night, remains in effect.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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**Planned Withdrawal**

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section  
AT: Supreme Headquarters  
DATE: July 25, 1918  
HOUR: 1:05 p.m.  
SENT BY: Teletype No. 9472  

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The withdrawal of the Seventh Army and the right wing of the First Army into the general line: BEUGNEUX---FERE-en-TRADENOIS---Bois MEUNIERE---ROMIGNY---BLIGNY will be planned for the night of July 26/27 and prepared in such a manner that the movement can be executed as planned if the order is issued by Supreme Headquarters by 12 noon, July 26. To the extent to which it is absolutely necessary to withdraw some elements of the artillery tonight, July 25/26, the withdrawal will be made. Otherwise the position occupied today will be held. Attention is again directed to the importance of a clear chain of command, withdrawal of elements no longer able to fight, and utilization of the machine-gun defense.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section  
AT: Supreme Headquarters  
DATE: July 25, 1918  
HOUR: 11:55 p.m.  
NO.: 9486

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The north bank of the VESLE and the AISNE as far as SOISSONS will be prepared for defense, particularly the artillery defense will be organized systematically.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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- 666 -
[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section
AT: Supreme Headquarters
DATE: July 25, 1918
HOUR: 11:55 p.m.
SENT BY: Teletype
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

In case the Seventh and First Armies withdraw farther, the villages facing the new fronts will be made as uninhabitable as possible.

By order:

LUENDORFF.

[Extract]

Preparations to Use Ninth Army in AISNE Attack

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, GERMAN GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
No. 9460 Part II July 26, 1918.

[Extract]

According to the situation on the fighting fronts of the Ninth and Seventh Armies it can only be a question of an attack north of the AISNE

* * * * *

The attack must absolutely be based upon surprise; it will be prepared by the inconspicuous bringing up of strong defensive artillery.

Therefore in all preliminary measures the question will be whether we can change from the defensive to a surprise blow.

* * * * *

The staffs attached to the Ninth Army will not be drawn into the preliminary work.

By command:

LUENDORFF.

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FROM: Operations Section
AT: Supreme Headquarters
DATE: July 26, 1918 Hour: 1:10 p.m. NO.: 9500 SENT BY: Teletype
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

At the close of the fighting which is now in progress, a withdrawal of the Ninth, Seventh, and First Armies behind the Aisne and Vesle may be considered. I request recommendation for a permanent position.
I also request information as to how a withdrawal by sector into that position can be effected.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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FROM: Operations Section
AT: Supreme Headquarters
DATE: July 26, 1918 Hour: 1:10 p.m. NO.: 9472 II [Addendum No. 1]
SENT BY: Teletype
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The First and Seventh Armies will withdraw tonight into the large bridgehead position
*** This position must be held.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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- 668 -
FROM: Operations Section
AT: Supreme Headquarters
DATE: July 27, 1918    HOUR: 11 p.m.    NO.: 9536    SENT BY: Teletype
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The rearward movement is to be planned for the night of August 1/2. Decision will be made only by this headquarters. The beginning of the movement will depend on the progress of evacuation as well as the tactical situation.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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FROM: Operations Section
AT: General Headquarters
DATE: July 30, 1918    NO.: 9566
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

Your No. 2748 of July 19, 1918, approved.
After occupation of the Bluecher Position it is necessary to displace the right flank of the Ninth Army again. I invite recommendations on the subject.

LUDENDORFF.

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Supreme Headquarters

DATE: July 30, 1918  HOUR: 10:30 a.m.  NO.: 9574  SENT BY: Teletype

TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

The Bluecher Movement will be executed as planned. Start: Night August 1/2. I request that it be determined whether the intermediate position can be held longer than a day.

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Memorandum

Situation on West Front

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section, No. 9677

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, August 4, 1918.

[Extract]

1. Battle Front: The allied enemy forces have in general slowly followed our last rearward movement. The distribution of forces opposite our new front cannot be definitely determined at the moment. The release of several enemy divisions is to be expected.

Since July 15 the presence of the following divisions has been definitely established at the front between SOISSONS and REIMS:

47 French divisions
4 English "
8 American "
2 Italian "

a total of 61 divisions.

Here and in CHAMPAGNE, where 13 divisions have appeared so far, the French have committed more than half of their army in full-scale battles. The number of the fresh French reserves completely fit for action amounts to only 7 or 8 divisions at the moment. This number can of course be increased by exchanging worn out divisions for divisions suitable for offensive employment from other fronts. In this event it must be considered that probably not all the divisions located in quiet sectors are fit to be employed in major operations; rather some of them will require additional training.

In view of the fact that the French and also the Americans use such large numbers of troops, it appears questionable whether the enemy will continue his large-scale attack on
the AISNE and VESLE in the near future, if he gains the impression that he faces a new
defensive position. Apparently he expected our withdrawal to the VESLE. It can be as-
sumed that he will at first try to gain a clear picture concerning our future intentions
by vigorous local attacks.

There are no new indications of the attack which we assumed would be launched against
the Ninth Army and the left wing of the Eighteenth Army; west of the OISE the front ap-
parently is more thinly occupied than has formerly been assumed.

* * * * *

By order:

LUDENDORFF.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. II: Report

Defensive Battle

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 9820

GERMAN SUPREME HEADQUARTERS,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF STAFF,
August 14, 1918.

106th REPORT

[Events from July 18 to August 7, 1918]

[Extract]

I. The West Front:
   A. The Defensive Battle between SOISSONS and REIMS:
      1. Until the withdrawal behind the MARNE (July 18 to morning of July 20):
         However, powerful attacks followed the next morning against the XXV Res. Corps. La HAIE
         was lost, and the division located there was pushed back to the creek south of ARMEN-
         TIERES. The VIII Corps refused its right flank opposite the point of penetration and re-
         captured La HAIE in a concentrated counterattack. However, owing to the enemy artillery
         fire concentrated on that point, the town was evacuated again and the defense was estab-
         lished just east thereof. At the same time heavy attacks were made against the entire
         front of the VIII Corps.
         EPIEDS changed hands several times but was finally held by us. At noon the
         VIII Corps was in full possession of its positions, but new powerful attacks in the after-
         noon hours forced a portion of the front back on the hills west of COINCY and BRECY.
         Counterattacks restored the situation, and in the evening the corps had retaken its po-
         sition of the morning.
         The XXIII Res. Corps, VIII Res. Corps and the left flank of the IV Res.
         Corps repelled enemy attacks. In the 65th Corps, quiet prevailed.
         In the meantime preparations for a further withdrawal had been carried out
         as planned, and, on July 22, Supreme Headquarters was able to issue the order that the

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VIII and XXIII Res. Corps were to withdraw during the night of July 23/24 initially into the line NANTEUIL---COINCY---BEUVARDES---VINCHELLES, but that the Seventh and First Armies were to make all preparations to be able to withdraw their troops within a few days to the rear of the OURCQ and east thereof in the same line.

However, before these two orders could be executed, the major engagement of July 23 had to be fought.

While quiet prevailed on this day in the Ninth Army, except for a local attack on NOYANT on the extreme left wing of the army, the enemy renewed his coordinated attack against the entire west front of the Seventh Army, following a very heavy fire preparation lasting for one hour. Supported by strong artillery, some of which was reorganized, and accompanied by numerous tanks, Negroes, Americans and French, attacked the XIII and XVII Army Corps, the XXV Res. Corps, the VIII, and the right flank of the XXIII Reserve Corps. On the entire front the assaults, some of which were repeated several times, were repulsed either in our positions or in front of them, and at other points the enemy was driven back by local counterattacks. Five times he advanced between BUZANCY and TIGNY, penetrated VILLEMONTAIRE temporarily and attempted to gain ground again and again on both sides of Le PLESSIER---HULEU, but without success. ARMENTIERES was in his hands only a short time, and in front of the VIII and XXIII Res. Corps one wave after the other collapsed in our artillery and machine-gun fire. Thus this new great effort resulted in a defeat for the enemy, and the local attacks against the 65th Corps, executed from the east, also remained without effect. Proof of the heavy losses inflicted upon this mixture of enemy forces, in addition to the great number of armored cars demolished in our combat zone, was the fact that no other serious action took place in the afternoon of July 23.

During the night of July 23/24 the VIII and XXIII Res. Corps withdrew without interference to the line COINCY---BEUVARDES---LE CHARME--THEROLLE---VINCHELLES, as ordered. ••• With the occupation of this line the threat to the south front of the Seventh Army was decreased considerably. The credit for this belongs to the resistance of the divisions fighting with the front toward the west which had abandoned almost no territory at all during the last few days.

On July 24 there was no infantry activity whatsoever in the Ninth Army nor in the XIII and XVII Corps of the Seventh Army. The exhaustion of the enemy following his efforts of yesterday continued. The Bavarian I Corps assumed the sector on the right wing of the Seventh Army.

However, the enemy continued his attacks against the south corps. On the boundary between the XXV Res. Corps and VIII Corps they were thwarted in the forenoon, but in the afternoon OULCHY-la-VILLE and ARMENTIERES were lost in renewed attacks. The assault was checked at OULCHY-le-CHATEAU. The VIII Corps expelled the enemy forces which has temporarily penetrated COINCY. Outpost fights occurred at Le CHARME, opposite the VIII Res. Corps. No special reports were received from the IV Res. Corps and the 65th Corps.

During the night of July 24/25 the interior flanks of the IV Res. Corps and 65th Corps were withdrawn to a salient position.

On July 25 the order was issued to the Ninth, Seventh and First Armies to prepare the north bank of the AISNE and VESLE from SOISSONS as far as REIMS for the defense.

The Ninth Army again had nothing special to report on July 25. In the Seventh Army the Bavarian I Corps lost VILLEMONTAIRE. On the front of the XVII Corps only artillery fire fell, but the left flank of the corps had to be withdrawn somewhat in consequence of the events in the XXV Res. Corps.

July 25 brought new heavy battles for the XXV Res. Corps, whereby OULCHY-le-CHATEAU and CUGNY were lost. In the VIII Corps a counterattack in the region of COINCY was successful for us, the VIII and IV Res. Corps repulsed attacks. The withdrawal of the front on the interior flanks of the IV Res. Corps and 65th Corps was not noticed.
by the enemy until noon; his artillery fire fell on REUIL which had been evacuated by us long ago.

On July 26 no infantry attacks were made either against the Ninth Army or the Bav. I Corps, the XVII Corps and XXV Res. Corps of the Seventh Army. The VIII Corps successfully repulsed local attacks, the VIII Res. Corps local attacks in the morning and attacks against the entire front in the afternoon. The right flank of the IV Res. Corps and the 65th Corps also held their positions completely against the advancing enemy.

During the night of July 26/27 we withdrew our troops without interference from the enemy into the new position north bank of the OURCQ---FERE-en-TARDENOIS---RONCHERES---BLIGNY.


3. Until the occupation of the new Aisne-Vesle Position (morning of July 27 until morning of August 3): July 27 was a quiet day. Our withdrawal had been executed in accordance with the preparations and without interference. Only gradually did the enemy realize that the positions facing him were evacuated. Then he advanced slowly and hesitatingly.

It was at this point that the time was set for continuing the withdrawal in the night of August 1/2. The designation of this time was based on a definite calculation; it was to afford the opportunity to move all material south of the Vesle back across the river.

Nor did any particular events transpire during the morning of July 28 for the Ninth Army and the three westerly corps of the Seventh Army. However, in the early morning the enemy had already reached the middle of our new position. In FERE-en-TARDENOIS, SERINGES, and SERGY he intruded with powerful forces: soon the battle here was in full swing.

In the afternoon the enemy again moved to the attack against the Bav. I Corps. He was not successful. In general he placed only artillery fire on the front of the XVII Corps and XXV Res. Corps. Only on both sides of the OULCHY-le-CHATEAU---HAR- TENNES Road did he execute an attack which was broken up by the effect of our artillery fire. In the further course of the action, the enemy forces were driven back from our lines of resistance in the sectors of the VIII Corps and VIII Res. Corps. In the sector of the IV Res. Corps only minor actions took place which ended in our favor.

July 29 was a day of major battle for the greatest portion of the Seventh Army. While in the Ninth Army, the Bav. I Corps and the 65th Corps the infantry activity remained moderate, the enemy executed coordinated attacks organized in depth, against the four center corps of the Seventh Army - the XXV Res. Corps had been withdrawn owing to the shortening of the front. Although during the last few days he had been more cautious and careful, he again employed mass formations characteristic of the beginning of the battle. It seemed as if he wanted to prevent with all means available a further systematic withdrawal of our divisions and to force a decisive battle south of the VESLE.

The enemy attacks were checked everywhere partly in our front line, partly in the defense zone organized in depth. In the XVII Corps the French penetrated after several failures as far as the line GRAND ROZOY---BEUGNEUX; accordingly the VIII Corps fought southwest of CRAMAILLE. In FERE-en-TARDENOIS our line remained in the center of the town, while the enemy again penetrated into SERINGES and occupied SERGY. Farther to the east the attacks collapsed before our front lines.

The fighting of July 29 was followed on July 30 by the conspicuous quiet of exhaustion on the greatest portion of the front. The west corps reported no infantry activity at all except a local attack at SAPONY. On the other hand, the enemy attacked the salient on the interior flanks of the VIII and IV Res. Corps in full force. Fifteen waves deep the French and Americans attacked, and they succeeded in gaining ground southwest of CIERGES.
Attempts to exploit the success in the evening, by new attacks, failed; likewise local
attacks against the 65th Corps were thwarted. During the night of July 30/31 the salient
on the boundary between the VIII and IV Res. Corps was flattened out by a systematic
withdrawal.

On July 31 also quiet prevailed in general in the west corps. However,
renewed attacks were made against the VIII Corps and VIII Res. Corps, which were repulsed.

On August 1 our Allied enemies launched another coordinated large scale
attack. Employing strong fresh forces, tearing in with tanks and low-flying planes, they
attacked the entire front of the four west corps of our Seventh Army at the same time.

In the sector of the Bavarian I Corps they collapsed in our fire in front
of the line ROZIERES-VILлемONTOIRE. The XVII Corps sustained the main pressure. The
enemy succeeded in gaining the hilly country of GRAND ROZOY and CRAMOISELLE, then the
assault troops, reduced to remnants by our fire, remained lying in front of our lines of
resistance and our untouched artillery. Consequently the VIII Corps had to withdraw its
right flank somewhat, otherwise it repulsed all attacks victoriously. Only south of
SAPONAY the enemy succeeded in penetrating our line of resistance temporarily. The VIII
Res. Corps also was completely successful in the defense, while only minor actions took
place in the IV Res. Corps and 65th Corps.

While our troops at the front repulsed the enemy in heavy fighting, rear
divisions occupied the intermediate position ** SERCHES---CUIRY-HOUSE---LIHUYS---
HOURGES---SAPICOURT, and forces of the Ninth Army occupied the south edge of SOISSONS.
And at nightfall our front lines disengaged themselves from the enemy unnoticed and
marched to the north bank of the AISNE and VESLE passing through the intermediate
position.

In the morning of August 2 our troops were standing in two successive po­
sitions, in front at the south edge of SOISSONS and in the intermediate position, in rear
thereof on the north bank of the AISNE and VESLE. From the intermediate position up to
the enemy lines Jagdkommandos and other small detachments had been left behind with the
mission to delay the pursuing enemy and inflict losses upon him.

The enemy had not taken note of the measures we had taken. In the morning
of August 2 he initiated a new attack by heavy artillery fire. His storm troops advanced
and found an abandoned position. When he advanced farther, uncertain about the situation,
the fire of our detachments left behind forced him everywhere to deploy and attack again,
whereby he suffered considerable losses. In the evening he had reached the vicinity east
of MERCIN-et-VAUX opposite the Ninth Army and the outposts pushed forward south of the
intermediate position opposite the Seventh and First Armies.

In the meantime our troops were able to establish themselves without inter­
ference in the AISNE-VESLE Position. During the night of August 2/3 the south edge of
SOISSONS and the intermediate position were also evacuated. Only rearguards remained be­
hind everywhere in front of the AISNE-VESLE Position. The withdrawal action was a
success.

4. Operations Following the Occupation of the AISNE-VESLE Position (August
3 to August 7) In the course of August 3 the enemy advanced to SOISSONS and by noon
occupied the town. Our posts were on the north edge. At the same time dense enemy
skirmish lines descended into the AISNE Valley between BILLY and ACY, but had to seek
cover at once, as our artillery inflicted many losses upon them. Not until afternoon did
the enemy forces succeed in occupying VILLENEUVE and VENIZEL, but our security detachments
remained on the south bank of the river.

The Seventh Army had withdrawn the Bavarian I Corps from the front. Oppo­
site the XVII Corps the enemy took possession of the hills south of the VESLE by noon,
while the rearguards of the VIII Corps were at this time still located north of QUINCY,
southwest of MONT-NOTRE-DAME and on the MONT-NOTRE-DAME---CHERRY Road. Not until the
afternoon did the enemy reach the railroad north of LIME and the woods west of St-THIBAUT

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and VILLESAVOYE. Farther east, opposite the VIII Res. Corps the enemy pressed forward as far as St-GILLES--COURVILLE in the morning and as far as the hill north of St-GILLES--UNCHAIR in the afternoon. Opposite the 65th Corps our patrols, located at VANDEUIL, had to withdraw gradually toward the VESLE.

Opposite the right wing of the First Army the enemy appeared by 10 a.m. on the hills north of TRESLON--ROSNAV--GUEUX. By evening he had forced his way forward to our posts south of the VESLE and pushed some of them back across the river. In these maneuvers he was impeded by our artillery fire.

Security detachments of the Ninth Army also remained for the next few days on the south bank of the AISNE at SOISSONS and VENIZEL. They were able to drive back minor enemy assaults. Otherwise there was little combat activity for the Ninth army until August 7.

In the Seventh and First Armies a number of minor actions took place on the bank of the VESLE on August 4. We were forced to evacuate our FISMES bridgehead in the evening, after causing considerable delay and losses to the enemy. At most of the other points also our posts withdrew to the north bank. However in the evening we were able to reoccupy the railroad station of CIRY which had been abandoned temporarily. Enemy attempts to effect a crossing were foiled on several occasions, only north of AUGY the enemy succeeded in gaining a foothold on the right bank. In the First Army the sector of the XV Corps was taken over by the XVI Corps. Otherwise the days until August 7 did not bring any special events for the army.

On the other hand opposite the Seventh Army the enemy still attempted on August 5 and 6 to continue his major offensive. On August 5 after an artillery preparation he systematically attacked part of the XVII Corps, the entire VIII Corps, and some elements of the VIII Res. Corps and 65th Corps. In the sector of the XVII Corps he advanced across the VESLE but was repulsed and able to hold only his small bridgehead north of AUGY. Opposite the VIII Corps too the enemy troops which had risked the crossing were caught by our counterattack and driven back; only a few French machine-gun nests remained. In the sectors of the VIII Res. Corps and 65th Corps the enemy had no success whatsoever.

On August 6 we abandoned the railroad station of CIRY but repulsed all attacks at BRAINE and BAZOCHES. While the enemy succeeded in gaining a foothold with weak forces north of the VESLE, on the interior flanks of the VIII and VIII Res. Corps we were able to reach the south bank farther east and to occupy the railroad embankment there.

On August 7 the operation broke up into a few outpost fights, in which some of the enemy nests located north of the VESLE were mopped up. There were no other events of importance on this day.

An important phase of the operation lay behind us. It had started with a failure for us, had assumed the dimensions of a dangerous threat, but, thanks to the masterful action of troops and commanders, it had turned into a rearguard fight, which gained its objective under the firm control of the commanders.

B. Incidents [Operations] in the Different Groups of Armies:

2. Group of Armies German Crown Prince: The Group of Armies German Crown Prince conducted the defensive battle between SOISSONS and REIMS. In addition to the entire Seventh Army, the adjacent wings of the Ninth and First Armies participated in it. Moreover the enemy directed his efforts toward recapturing the territory taken by our First and Third Armies in our July offensive east of REIMS. This led to bitter outpost fights.

Thus on July 18 combat had developed opposite the greatest portion of the First Army and the XII and XVI Corps of the Third Army. The enemy achieved only temporary success.
On July 19, as well, there were minor actions in front of the Eighteenth, First, and Third Armies.

During the battles of the right wing of the First Army on July 20, the enemy was able to establish a foothold in BOUILLY and Ste-EUPHRAISE, while he was driven out of MARFAUX. The Third Army conducted outpost fights.

On July 21, on which day the right wing of the First Army was standing its ground successfully, the Eighteenth Army also repelled reconnaissance raids.

July 22 found the Third Army engaged in outpost fights. On the right wing of the First Army MARFAUX was lost on July 23. On July 24 the enemy penetrated the woods of BOUILLY, but after bitter fighting the situation was restored.

On July 25, the First Army conducted an attack against the hills southwest of VRIGNY, but only a part of the conquered territory could be held. On the same day the Third Army repelled enemy assaults on the St-SOUPLET---St-HILAIRE Road by a counterattack.

On July 26 the enemy attacked the Third Army on both sides of the PERTHES-TAHURE Road; he was repulsed.

On July 27 a section of territory captured by the enemy in front of the XXIV Res. Corps, First Army, was retaken for the most part by a counterattack.

On July 30 we succeeded in a patrol raid on the PERTHES-TAHURE Road, arranged by a regiment of the Third Army in an exemplary manner.

On August 1 and 2 the Third Army conducted successful outpost fights.

* * * * * *

C. Air Forces [Aviation]: The heavy battles in the air were not secondary to the bitter struggles on the ground. 400 planes brought down by our fliers and ground defenses during the second half of July, of these 200 victorious air battles over the battlefield of the Seventh Army alone, are proof of this.

As far as numbers are concerned, we were unable to compete with the enemy. Therefore it was not possible everywhere to throw in enough forces against his strong squadrons, which annoyed our troops on the ground. In addition to the high morale of the troops, a pursuit plane superior to that used by the enemy contributed to our successes.

Weakening of the enemy in valuable planes and experienced men was not the principal success of the bold employment of the pursuit planes; its primary object was to facilitate execution of their missions for the aviation units flying in the service of the infantry, artillery and command.

Furthermore, it enabled us to carry out the order of Supreme Headquarters to employ airattack against ground targets more than before, in order to relieve the infantry which was struggling hard. Enemy battery nests were silenced by attacks from the combat and pursuit flights. Batteries coming into action, moving tanks, reserves rushing up in motor cars and on foot, as well as troops in rest were dispersed and checked by our effective machine-gun fire and bombs dropped from low altitudes. On July 19 an attack flight group successfully supplied our troops south of the MARNE with 20,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition and 21 baskets of food.

The attack activity of our night squadrons was vigorous despite the unfavorable weather conditions. Their objectives were the great transfer railroads and main depots of the enemy, and, during the defensive battle, particularly also his shelters, billets and approaches facing the attacked fronts. Dropping of heavy high explosive bombs by single planes from heights of 20 to 30 meters on the open railroad lines repeatedly stopped traffic for some time. The explosion of 4 ammunition trains and the destruction of a large ammunition dump north of CHALONS was clearly observed.

During the nights of attack from July 15 until August 1 a total of 750,000 kilos. of bombs were dropped by the bombing squadrons and reserve aviation detachments.

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Movement to North Bank of Marne

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section
AT: Group of Armies German Crown Prince
DATE: July 18, 1918    HOUR: 12:50 p. m.    SENT BY: Teletype No. 2678
TO: Supreme Headquarters

Reference: Order No. 9338, July 17, 1918.
The following order was issued to the Seventh Army: The troop elements located
south of the MARNE will be withdrawn to the north bank of the MARNE, as soon as the situa-
tion permits.

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FROM: Operations Section
AT: Supreme Headquarters
DATE: July 18, 1918    HOUR: 7:35 p. m.    SENT BY: Teletype No. 9338 II
[Addendum No. I]
TO: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

Reference: Your No. 2678
Approved.

LUDENDORFF.

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WWR, 2d Div., Vol 5.-Soissons; Doc 1, Item 39: Telephone Message

Instructions Prohibiting Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2680, II

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 18, 1918.

To Headquarters Seventh and Ninth Armies.

I reiterate that a voluntary withdrawal of the main line of resistance south of the
AISNE can not be considered for the time being. This must be clear to all officers and
Until such time as the enemy has brought up the mass of his artillery, I request
that the principle be maintained, that the enemy must be driven back beyond SACONIN-et-BREUIL and VAUXCASTILLE, as well as from the hill southeast of VILLERS-HELON.

Headquarters Seventh and Ninth Armies have received the same telegram.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince.

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WWR, 2d Div., Vol 5.-Soissons, Doc 2, Item 18: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 18, 1918.

[Extract]

JOUAIGNES: On July 18 the enemy launched his double offensive, which had been systematically prepared and was executed with the aid of a tremendous amount of war material.

* * * The main attack, launched on a wide front between the AISNE and CLIGNON Creek, almost completely shattered the divisions of the Ninth Army which had been worn out by the incessant local attacks [July 13] which had preceded.

In a certain sense the enemy had succeeded in effecting a strategic surprise, although the concentration of his assault army in the VILLERS-COTTERETS Wood had not gone unnoticed. Nevertheless, its numerical strength seems not to have been recognized to its full extent. Furthermore, it was expected that a successful advance of our own offensive against REIMS would compel French G. H. Q. to take the forces placed in readiness for the attack against the west front of the Seventh Army and the south part of the Ninth Army, and throw them hurriedly into the salient: EPERNAY---REIMS---CHALONS-sur-MARNE, in order to prevent a collapse there. Both lines of reasoning had for their first premise that our own offensive would overrun a surprised and weak enemy in an irresistible drive, in other words, that a catastrophe would rapidly begin to develop in the REIMS Salient, into the whirlpool of which the still available enemy strategic reserves would be drawn. This first premise was based on a second: That the total number of full strength divisions at the disposal of the enemy opposing Army Group German Crown Prince was so limited as not to permit of a concentration of strong forces in the VILLERS-COTTERETS Wood and a sufficiently strong occupation of the REIMS front at one and the same time. The remainder of the enemy's strategic reserves were assumed to be tied up by the threat against AMIENS.

Both premises were in error. The enemy early had gained exact knowledge of the preparations for the attack against REIMS and CHALONS and thus was able to prepare himself for the defense. In the main, he used the defensive system developed by us, consisting of a deep outpost area located in front of a rear zone in which the resistance of the artillery and infantry was concentrated. The enemy, using this, our method, achieved a complete strategic defensive victory.

Furthermore, the total number of strategic reserves available for his use against Army Group German Crown Prince was considerably higher than had been estimated by us. Not only could he furnish a sufficient number of units for his defensive front, but he was able to place full strength divisions in readiness for his main offensive drive * * *

Finally, the development by our enemies of the tank as an offensive weapon had not been fully realized or/and evaluated by us.

The November battle of 1917 at CAMBRAI might have given us a hint as to the success a surprise mass employment of tanks could achieve in an attack. That our enemies were
able to learn this lesson and that they have improved their tank weapons technically as well as increased their numbers, we realize today. We, for our own part, paid little attention to this weapon, no more than we did to its use by the enemy.

For that matter, it had made its appearance but seldom during our offensives of March and May 1918, since in the main it is an offensive weapon and therefore our enemies who at that time had been forced altogether on the defensive, could find no proper use for it. Thus, our underestimate of this weapon seemed justified. The experiences of July 18, 1918, for the first time, taught us differently. The tanks, employed in numbers never known before and much better developed technically, rolled ahead of the infantry in long, connected lines. Our defense was not adapted to this mass employment on a wide front and was effective only in spots, and the infantrymen opposing these fire-spitting, rapidly moving machines felt themselves deserted and lost their nerve. Later this evil was remedied. The mobile artillery of the rear divisions quickly adapted itself to this peculiar method of combat and firing from open positions destroyed a large number of the tanks. Robbed of its protection, the enemy infantry at once lost the impetus of its attack and because of the tactics used (which called for columns crowded closely together, which the enemy had dared to adopt because of his faith in his tanks) suffered heavy casualties.

Nevertheless, this controlled defense by our rear echelons was not put into effect until comparatively late. Even if the enemy attack, as mentioned above was not really a strategic surprise, but in a sense had merely made the improbable possible, his tactical surprise was complete. The enemy had further developed the surprise element which he had made use of at CAMBRAI in November 1917. In the wooded terrain the concentration found extraordinarily favorable conditions for a screen. An artillery preparation of long duration was dispensed with and the hostile infantry started forward following a brief and vigorous bombardment. What his infantry lacked in combat value which such a procedure demands, he made up for by the employment of his tank squadrons.

Thus on the first day the enemy was able to gain a great success, as figured in ground gained and men and materiel captured, but did not know how to exploit it to the limit on the same day. As the defense which had been formed quickly in rear became effective and as the counteraction against his tanks constantly grew in effectiveness, his advance already began to waver on the next day and he was unable to gain the objective doubtlessly planned: the cutting off of the German forces between the AISNE and MARNE, which would still have been possible on the 18th. Still, the reestablishment of our front between the AISNE and MARNE and its temporarily needed reinforcement, required so many of our forces that Army Group German Crown Prince had to dispense with the idea of continuing its own offensive within a foreseeable time. Indirectly, but nevertheless surely, this means a great strategic success for Marshal Foch's counteroffensive, and looking at it from this viewpoint July 18 is a turning point in the history of the World War.

On the west front, Corps Winckler and Schoeler were forced back by the first enemy drive to the line: CHOUY---west of NEUILLY-ST-FRONT---BREUIL---COURCHAMPS---west of MONTHERIERS. There the enemy attack was held for the time being. After a temporary abatement over the noon hour, the enemy fire soon increased again to the greatest intensity, introducing a second wave of mass attacks, which were accompanied by tanks and swarms of attack planes. However, these attacks were no longer executed cohesively, but were made by separate assault groups dashing forward against our front. This bears out the supposition expressed above, that the French army command no longer retained firm control and thus threw away the momentarily favorable opportunity. * * * At VIERZY (against Corps Walter, which in the meantime had been placed under the Seventh Army, * * *) and between CHOUY and the road: CORCY-BLANZY---ST-REMY as well as on Hill 167 southwest of NEUILLY---ST-FRONT, the enemy was able to push in our new front locally.

* * * * *
Our forces south of the MARNE were hit by a series of successive drives which, being directed only against the 113th Inf. Div. and the 10th Res. Div., broke forward with great force accompanied by tanks, following vigorous artillery preparation. In fluctuating fighting both brave divisions completely maintained their positions.

Along the east front north of the MARNE the 2d Gd. Inf. Div. of Corps Conta had to evacuate TINCOURT after an enemy attack against the 195th Inf. Div. of Corps Schmettow had penetrated the Bois des SAVARTS and the south part of the Bois du ROI.

No fighting took place in the sector of Corps Borne.

As early as July 17, G. H. Q., in consideration of the failure of the offensive against REIMS, had ordered the preparation of the withdrawal of the forces south of the MARNE to the north bank. The development of the situation on July 18 now appeared to make this measure urgent. Army hq. ordered the withdrawal by echelons of the forces south of the MARNE, beginning during the night of July 18 to 19.

After Hq. Army Group had initially given instructions to drive the enemy who had advanced against the front: SOISSONS---CHATEAU-THIERRY, back beyond the line: SACONIN---VAUXCASTILLE---hill southeast of VILLERS-HELON; later, in growing realization of the weight of the enemy attack and of the seriousness of the situation, an order was issued governing the organization of a new defensive position in the line: SOISSONS---BELLEU---NOYANT---HARTENNES---Le PLESSIER-HULEU---GRAND-MENIL---LATILLY---EPAUX---heights north of CHATEAU-THIERRY, to which, however, the elements now fighting in the forward position were to be withdrawn only in case of an emergency. For the purpose of constructing this rear support position the Seventh Army was given three divisions. A second rear position was laid down in the line: north bank of the AISNE as far as BUCY-le-LONG---hill west of ACY---DROIZY---BEAUGNEUX---NANTEUIL-NOTRE-DAME---COINCY---EPIEDS---CHARTEVES.

The transfer of Corps Borne from the Seventh to the First Army, and of Corps Watter from the Ninth to the Seventh Army, was ordered by Headquarters Army Group.

In order to support the strongly attacked Corps Watter and Winckler army headquarters ordered the formation of Combat Group Etzel, at whose disposal was placed the 10th Div. and the 19th Ersatz Div. and in addition a number of rapidly assembled army troops and a few heavy batteries. This corps was to assemble immediately in rear of the front and was to launch a counterattack in order to restore the situation.

In the main, reserves were moved by motor trucks to the rear of the threatened front and Headquarters Army Group announced the arrival of additional reinforcements.

Reorganization of Front Line

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,

No. 2680

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE, July 18, 1918.

To Headquarters Seventh and Ninth Armies (Telephone Message dispatched 12 noon)

Resistance will be reorganized in the general line: SOISSONS---BELLEU---NOYANT-et-ACONIN---HARTENNES-et-TAUX---Le PLESSIER-HULEU---GRAND-MENIL---LATILLY---EPAUX-BEZU---heights north of CHATEAU-THIERRY. In this connection practical use will be made of the corps headquarters placed at the disposal of the armies. In addition to the divisions
now employed, the following are for the time being available for this purpose: to the
which are not yet employed; to the Seventh Army, in addition to its other army reserves,
the 51st Res. Div. and 10th and 33d Inf. Divs. Army Group reserves for itself decision
as to employment of the 20th and 9th Inf. Divs. and of the 19th Ersatz Div.

Army Group emphasizes the fact that there can be no thought of a retirement to this
line by the elements now engaged. These elements must hold. The designated line:
SOISSONS---HARTENNES-et-TAUX---LATILLY---heights north of CHATEAU-THIERRY is the line of
last resistance which must be held under all circumstances. Both armies will make sure
of the defense of the boundary through officers specially detailed for this purpose.

The Seventh Army will report in what manner the defense of the boundary has been
provided for. A second rear position will be located along the general line: north bank
of the AISNE as far as BUCY-le-LONG---heights west of ACY---DROIZY---BEUGNEUX---NANTEUIL
---NOTRE-DAME---COINCY---EPIEDS---CHARTEVES. Both positions designated above will be
strongly occupied with M. G.'s. Additional M. G. units are being sent both armies.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
la. 2680

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WWR Am. 2d Div., Vol. 5, Soissons, Doc. 1, Item 47: Message

Arrival of Reinforcements

[Editorial Translation]

ARMY GROUP GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 21, 1918---12:15 p. m.

TO: Ninth Army

An uninterrupted chain of reserves is rolling toward the front. Because of unfavor­
able detraining facilities their movement can make headway only slowly. Therefore the
army and various corps must in fullest measure create their own reserves.

Furthermore Army Group requests that in principle every effort be made to have se­
curity garrisons, with artillery, and especially with strong M. G. forces, in readiness,
in rear of the points of the main pressure. That will be the best way initially to
arrive at a defensive organization of greater depth.

Army Group German Crown Prince,
la. 6137

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TO Ninth Army

The army will make every effort to rid the area between the battle front and the CHEMIN-des-DAMES as rapidly as possible of those completely exhausted divisions which have been designated for evacuation (and of any other exhausted units) as well as of all superfluous material of all kinds. Divisional artillery and other vehicles must move out with their divisions in one closed-up unit. M. G. S. S. Bns. of these divisions which still retain some combat power may be left to the control of the army. Proper report hereof will be made to Hq. Army Group by telephone.

Exhausted mountain M. G. cos. will be started on the march to ROZOY. Hq. Army Group being advised. They will be sheltered according to instructions to be issued by army.

The rearward movement into the area north of the CHEMIN-des-DAMES must be maintained without interruption in a well-regulated flow.

In the area of operations as well as south of the NESLE and north as far as CHEMIN-des-DAMES Road commanders will be designated and furnished with sufficient personnel, whose duty it will be to enforce discipline on the roads with ruthless strictness.

Shelter areas will be determined upon within the zone of communications north of the CHEMIN-des-DAMES. Those prescribed for each division will be reported.

One corps hq. each will be given to the Ninth and the Seventh Armies, to which the divisions transferred to the zone of communications will be attached. Their first task will be to check up on the condition of the divisions and to promote their rehabilitation. Their condition will be reported directly to Hq. Army Group by the corps hq. concerned.

Army hq. and all corps commanders are responsible that the instructions issued governing the rearward movement of troops and materiel will be carried out without delay and with greatest energy by all concerned.

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Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,

July 22, 1918.

On July 22, order of His Excellency, transmitted orally to the commanders of the Seventh and First Armies, that all necessary preparations must be made in order to withdraw into a position behind the upper OURCQ, with the left wing in the direction of MARFAUX (First Army). Written order will be transmitted later.
On the other hand the order is issued for the night of July 23/24 to withdraw with Schoeler's [VIII Army] Corps and Katten's [XXIII Reserve] Corps to the rear of the sector: NANTEUIL---COINCY---BEUVARDES---VINCELLES.

Relative to Withdrawal Orders

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2713

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 23, 1918.

TO: Seventh Army

Reference: Army order concerning withdrawal of the positions

Decision to withdraw from the intermediate position to the main line of resistance will be made by the Group of Armies only. The decision will be made known not later than noon, July 24.

In the intermediate position not only outposts but also rearguards will have to remain in contact with the enemy to impede his pursuit. Every effort will be made to maintain an outpost in front of the new main line of resistance.

The First Army has been instructed accordingly and has received orders to recommend the boundaries between the Seventh Army and itself for artillery action. The First Army will continue to detail the boundary detachment.

Withdrawal Movement

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2713

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 23, 1918.

TO: First Army

During the night of July 23/24 the Seventh Army will withdraw to the following line: OULCHY-la-VILLE---NANTEUIL---COINCY---le CHARMEL---VINCELLES.

For the night of July 24/25 a further withdrawal is planned to the following line: OURCQ to CIERGES---Ste-GEMME---CUISLES---la-NEUVILLE---MARFAUX. Time: 10:30 p.m. Rearguards will remain in the old position and will withdraw to the main line of resistance only if forced thereto by the enemy.

An effort must be made to retain an outpost in front of the prescribed line. The First Army will prepare the withdrawal of its right wing to establish contact with the Seventh Army. The First Army will provide the boundary detachment. Recommendations con-
cerning the artillery combat boundary of the Seventh Army are to be submitted to this headquarters. A definite decision about the execution of the movement will be made by noon, July 24.

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**Seventh Army to Hold its Position**

[Editorial Translation]

**FROM:** Group of Armies German Crown Prince, Operations Section

**DATE:** July 24, 1918  **HOUR:** 11:40 a.m.  **NO:** 2722  **SENT BY:** Telephone

**TO:** Seventh Army

The Seventh Army will hold its present position until further order. Recommendations requested concerning a possibly necessary straightening of the front at the boundary between Conta’s [IV Res.] Corps and Schmettow’s [65th Army] Corps.

A further withdrawal of the front will be prepared for the night of July 25/26, into the general line: South edge of GRAND-ROZOY---WALLEE---OURCQ sector as far as the vicinity of CIERGES---Bois MEUNIERE---VILLERS-AGRON---ROMIGNY---VILLE-en-TARDENOIS.

(Liaison with the First Army at this point.)

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**Exhausted Divisions**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section  **GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,**

No. 2723  **July 24, 1918.**

**TO:** Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section

[Extract]

The Seventh Army reports that the following divisions are no longer fit for offensive action and must be replaced in the very near future * * * a total of 18 divisions.

* * * * *

If the battle is to be fought to a finish in the combat zone south of the AISNE and VESLE, then it is necessary to bring up fresh forces of all arms, including army artillery. Exact numbers cannot yet be given. They cannot be foreseen. But the expenditure of forces mentioned above will serve as a general indication.

There is no doubt about it that the enemy will continue the battle. He has sufficient forces available for this purpose.

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Under these circumstances this headquarters does not believe it to be expedient for us to fight the battle to a finish south of the VESLE. Considerable portions of the army and the service of supply are being destroyed and used up, thereby more and more reducing the forces available for attacks from our side.

Therefore this headquarters recommends that the Ninth, Seventh and First Armies be gradually withdrawn behind the AISNE and VESLE.

In the bend south of the AISNE and VESLE there are at present 27 divisions on the front. The AISNE and VESLE front requires 14 divisions in the front line.

This headquarters will explore whether any purpose is served in maintaining an advance position forward of the AISNE and VESLE.

The pivots of the movement, right flank of the Ninth Army and the region of REIMS, particularly will have to be reinforced.

Reconnaissances have been initiated; practical preparations will be started as soon as a decision has been made.

As soon as the enemy recognizes our intention, he will probably advance to new attacks at different points. It will be of great importance to forestall him, if possible, by an attack of our own.

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Conditions on Ninth Army Front

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE, July 26, 1918---12:46 a. m.

No. 2732

[Extract]

The Ninth Army reports:

After the withdrawal of the right flank of the left adjacent corps to the line NOYANT-BUZANCY the sector of Staab's Corps extends henceforth from the AISNE at POMMIERS via MERCIEN-et-VAUX hills west and south of VAUXBUIN---COURMELLES as far as the south edge of NOYANT, incl. Through the loss of BERZY the line has been considerably lengthened to the disadvantage of the army. Previously BERZY belonged to the Seventh Army. The frontage is now fully 9 kilometers long. The 211th Inf. Div. is put in line in the northern division sector; it is 2,250 men short and quite unequal to its mission, according to the latest report of the division commander. Nor is the field artillery regiment of this division fit for offensive action; it is bringing back only 1 or 2 serviceable guns out of each battery from the heavy fighting in Walter's Corps.

The 76th Reserve Div. is located in the southern divisional sector; it is 1,250 men short.

It is probable that the strong attacks against the position of Staab's Corps will continue. The forces mentioned above are not in a position to dispose in depth with sufficient strength to oppose them.

The army proposes: The commitment of a division fit for offensive action in place of the 211th Inf. Div. and a shifting of the army boundary to the line MONT-de-COURMELLES Farm Road---south edge of COURMELLES---forking of the SOISSONS---CUIRY-HOUSSE Road with the branch road to SEPTMONT at Point 147.
The Group of Armies cannot concur in the recommendation relief of the 211th Inf. Div. at this time. Only 1 Bavarian division could be considered for that purpose. Its commitment would in turn entail a withdrawal of the 18th Inf. Div. behind the left flank of the Ninth Army. This is at present undesirable as, on the one hand, the north bank of the AISNE cannot be denuded of reserves and, on the other hand, the possibility of the 18th Inf. Div. being used for the Seventh Army must not be overlooked.

The remaining reserves of the Group of Armies are claimed in their entirety by the Seventh or the First Armies. The Jaeger division and the 29th Inf. Div. cannot yet be counted upon. It is the mission of the army to reinforce the sector of the 211th Inf. Div. and the BELLEU Plateau with machine gun sharpshooter battalions.

The defense of the sector is made easier by the strong flanking effect of the artillery from the north bank of the AISNE before the front of Staab's Corps. For as long as the attack threatens the Group of Armies requests permission to leave at the front elements of the 6th and 241st Inf. Divs. still fit for offensive action for the purpose of reinforcing the 211th Inf. Div.

2. The Group of Armies regrets that it cannot support the proposed shift of boundary. The Seventh Army is not in a position to extend. The defense of the BELLEU Plateau must absolutely remain under a single command.

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HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. V: Order

Preparation for Withdrawal

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section

No. 2743

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,

July 27, 1918—11 p. m.

WARNING ORDER

Preparing the Withdrawal behind the AISNE and VESLE (Bluecher Movement)

[Extract]

1. The withdrawal into the Bluecher Position will be made to conserve forces and to facilitate the provisioning of the troops.

2. The former army boundaries will be in force for the Bluecher Movement to the extent to which deviations are not ordered in the following. When the Bluecher Position is occupied, the boundaries shown on attached maps 1 and 2 will be in force. The question concerning a change of the boundary between the Seventh and Ninth Armies *** will be clarified after the Bluecher Position has been occupied.

3. The Bluecher Movement is planned to begin not before August 1. The first Bluecher day (x) [D day]: will be ordered not later than noon, D minus 2 days.

4. In the course of D day covering forces with numerous machine guns and artillery will occupy the territory as follows:

   Ninth Army: Bluecher Positions as far as CONDE incl.

   Seventh Army: Intermediate position from the AISNE west of SERMOISE as far as the army boundary east of Hill 233 southwest of JONCHERY.

   First army: Intermediate position in contact with the Seventh Army and the Bluecher Position.
Boundary detachments in the intermediate positions will be detailed as follows:

**Seventh Army:** At SERMOISE

**First Army:** On the boundary of the Seventh Army.

It is important that the AISNE Valley be fully dominated by the Ninth Army with artillery and machine guns, including the territory between MISSY and CONDE (both inclusive).

* * * * *

5. During the night of D day - D plus 1 day, the left wing of the Ninth Army will withdraw into the Bluecher Position, holding SOISSONS. On D plus 1 day the Seventh and First Armies will keep the intermediate positions in their sectors occupied in force. For this purpose the covering forces in the intermediate position will be reinforced as necessary, from withdrawing divisions.

The main body of the Seventh and First Armies will move into the Bluecher Position, passing through the intermediate position, during the night of D day - D plus 1 day. Weak mobile rearguards will remain in contact with the enemy and, when forced to, will withdraw to the positions of their armies. The movement during the day of D day - D plus 1 day will be regulated in such a manner that the mass of the troops of the forward battle front will withdraw at 12 midnight.

For troop movements the following assignment is made:

- Crossing of CONDE to the Seventh Army, and from evening, D minus 1 day until the morning of D plus 1 day the crossing of JONCHERY to the First Army.
- The defense of the town of CONDE is assigned to the Ninth Army * * *

6. During the night of D plus 1 day - D plus 2 days the detachments of the intermediate position in the Seventh and First Armies will withdraw into the Bluecher Position. SOISSONS will be evacuated as far as the AISNE. The troops of the forward battle front will start the movement at 12:15 a.m., D plus 2 days.

7. Artillery flanking groups will be placed as follows:

- By the Ninth Army at the plateau of VREGNY to flank the intermediate position in front of the right wing of the Seventh Army.
- By the Seventh Army (a) at the plateau of CONDE (that is in the area of the Ninth Army) to flank the Bluecher Position in front of the right wing of the Seventh Army, (b) in rear of the right wing of the army to sweep the valley of the AISNE in front of the Ninth Army, (c) in rear of the left wing of the army to flank the Bluecher front of the First Army.
- By the First Army in the heights south of HERMONVILLE to flank the front opposite the left wing of the Seventh Army in the intermediate position and in the Bluecher Position.

The flank corps of the armies will establish telephone connection with the flanking groups operating in front of their sectors and the sectors of the adjacent armies.

8. In the Bluecher Position the main resistance on the north bank of the rivers will be pushed so close to the sectors that the latter will stand their ground completely against attacks of the pursuing enemy. South of the sectors only patrols will be left behind for security and reconnaissance.

The organization of the infantry defense of the river sectors will comprise primarily clearing of the field of fire in the valleys, placing of machine guns distributed in depth, that extend up on to the slopes of the north bank of the river, wiring, damming, * * * and preparing of all bridges for demolition (antitank defense). It will also include preparation of the framework of defense, so that the troops occupying the position will find a definitely established area that has been traced on maps and staked on the terrain where they will fight. Cover from airplanes must be given primary consideration in all instances.

Organization of the main resistance in the sectors for protracted defense, and distribution in depth against later large-scale attacks after the Bluecher Position has been
occupied, will be the mission of the divisions in position, according to the instructions of the armies. Portions of the old French position will be used as much as possible. Utilizing strong sectors, the defense will be conducted in such a manner that enemy forces advancing across the AISNE and VESLE will be driven into and across the river by a counterattack.

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By order:

Count von ERLenburg,
Major General, Chief of Staff.

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DEFENSE POSITION

[Editorial Translation]

FROM: Operations Section

AT: Group of Armies German Crown Prince

DATE: July 29, 1918      HOUR: 10:19 a.m.      NO.: 2734

TO: Ninth Army Headquarters

General Headquarters orders: The north bank of the VESLE and of the AISNE as far as SOISSONS will be prepared for defense; especially the artillery defense will be organized systematically.

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HS Ger. File: 803-33.5: Fldr. V: Order

WITHDRAWAL

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2751

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 30, 1918—a.m.

To Supreme Headquarters, Operations Section

If the Bluecher Movement is to begin as planned on August 1, the order authorizing it must be in the hands of the headquarters of the armies by 12 noon, July 30. I must adhere to the proposition I made, which I perceive to be justified, that the Seventh Army with the adjacent wings of the Ninth and First Armies be withdrawn behind the AISNE and VESLE.

In the present position between SOISSONS and REIMS there are 23 divisions at the front, 13 of which are more or less worn out and require relief. If the enemy continues
his attacks, as is to be expected, the expenditure in forces will be so great that it will
be necessary to bring up fresh divisions on a large scale and in quick succession, since
only 8 divisions are in readiness for employment behind the battle front (Bavarian 1st
Jaeger Div., 18th and 17th Divisions, Bavarian 2d Div., 29th, 19th and 121st Divisions).

Only 17 front divisions are required in the Bluecher Position. If the enemy attacks
us in that position, it can only be welcome to us. He will probably be repulsed with
heavy losses. I can recommend remaining in the bridgehead position only if Supreme Head­
quarters decides to contain the enemy reserves on the front of the Seventh Army, commit­
ting strong forces of our own, in order to strike the enemy on another front. The attempt
to contain the enemy reserves will moreover only be successful if we ourselves attack from
the bridgehead position in case the enemy disengages himself. For this purpose additional
fresh forces will be necessary. However, a deployment for the attack in the area of the
Seventh Army offers such great difficulties, that I cannot recommend it. In my opinion a
German attack on the front of the Seventh Army cannot be considered. For this reason I
cannot recommend the commitment of strong forces on this front. To enable us to take the
initiative again, considering our situation as far as replacements are concerned, in my
opinion we must do everything in our power to make forces available for the attack.
Therefore I believe it to be justified to adhere to the decision made, the more so, as it
has already been announced to the lower commands to the extent to which its execution re­
quired it.

WILHELM,
Crown Prince of the German Empire
and Prussia.

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Bluecher Movement

[Editorial Translation]

Operations Section
No. 2751 II [Addendum No. I]

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
July 30, 1918.

To Supreme Headquarters

Reference: No. 9574

The Seventh and Ninth Armies are opposed to holding the intermediate position longer
than a day. If we want to check the pressure which the enemy is liable to exert on D
plus 1 day, forward of the VESLE we must have stronger forces available. A thin force of
occupation is in danger of being overrun and driven into the river. However, a heavy
occupation of the intermediate position beyond the morning of D plus 2 days would cause a
dispersal of forces. A withdrawal from the intermediate position, with the enemy facing
it, would be difficult.

This headquarters concurs in the opinion of the two armies and has already taken the
necessary measures so that the approach to the Bluecher Position be made very difficult
for the enemy by patrols and weak mobile rearguards, but principally by a well-organized
heavy artillery fire.

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**Enemy Situation**

[Editorial Translation]

Int. Officer of Supreme Headquarters

No. 11655

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE.

August 5, 1918.

CONCLUSIONS ON AUGUST 4, 1918

[Extract]

General Information: Some reports were received concerning enemy attack plans. According to statements made by prisoners, a French attack against the Eighteenth Army is imminent. Much artillery, mostly the heavy type, which has not yet been in action, is reported to be in readiness. Large bodies of troops are said to be in the rear area; particularly in the woods and in the region of COMPIEGNE there are said to be strong reserves. The objective of the attack is about 20 km. behind the front of the German Eighteenth Army.

Since these statements were made to two different agents by a prisoner captured in the Eighteenth Army, and after the prisoner had denied French attack intentions when questioned by the intelligence officer, they deserve special attention. Nevertheless it is strange that the French, if they do plan an attack here, did not withhold such an outstanding attack division as the 133d, so as to keep it fresh until the beginning of the attack. Its commitment as early as July 26 rather indicates defensive measures against a suspected German attack.

In general it can be assumed that the enemy will not pass to largescale attacks on his part before the divisions, which suffered considerably in the July battles (a total of about 33 of them is now in reserve), have become better fit for action. This ought to require about another three weeks.

At present he has fresh reserves available in France of about 8 French, 17 English, 15 American, 2 Italian and 4 Belgian divisions. (Of course only about half of the 15 American divisions can be considered for full-scale battles at this time.)

In about 3 weeks, after the worn-out divisions have been refitted, a reserve of 35 to 40 French, 17 English, 20 American, 2 Italian and 4 Belgian divisions can be expected.

The report of one agent about a French plan to effect a breakthrough west of REIMS in the direction of BERRY-au-BAC, if it can be believed at all, probably refers to a later time, for the reasons cited before.

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ANKER.
GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE.
(Sunday) August 4, 1918.

[Extract]

Ninth Army: During the night the artillery activity on the front increased from the west toward the east. There was no combat activity on the AISNE. Here and there we were able to push our outposts across the river east of SOISSONS.

Seventh Army: Weak enemy detachments worked their way forward toward our VESLE positions. FISMES and the hills at MAGNEAUX are still occupied by the posts of Wichura's [VIII Reserve] Corps. At some points enemy forces succeeded in advancing across the VESLE. Some of them were driven back in a counterattack, while others gained a foothold in a few machine-gun nests.

First Army: Here and there the enemy is pursuing vigorously. Our posts have been withdrawn to the north bank of the VESLE. Several of our advances to the south bank of the VESLE were successful.

Third Army: After a strong artillery preparation an enemy operation took place on the west slope of the VAUQUOIS (sic) which was checked and repulsed by us.

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE.
(Monday) August 5, 1918.

[Extract]

Ninth Army: Increased adjustment-fire activity on the part of the enemy. Our artillery engaged batteries and shelled enemy rear areas and assembly areas.

Seventh Army: The enemy attempted on the entire front to push forward across the VESLE with patrols and stronger detachments. At some points - particularly against the flank corps - they launched attacks in force, employing strong artillery. At some points the enemy forces succeeded in crossing and establishing a foothold on the north bank. Occasionally heavy enemy fire in the valley of the AISNE.

First Army: No infantry activity. Our artillery shelled enemy trench work, localities and approaches.

Third Army: No special events.
**Enemy Intentions**

[Editorial Translation]

Int. Off. of Supreme Headquarters

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,

No. 11671

August 6, 1918.

CONCLUSIONS OF AUGUST 5, 1918

[Extract]

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Seventh Army: The present occupation of the front from the AISNE as far as REIMS is approximately determined. Instead of about 33 divisions as before, there are now 19 divisions in this frontal sector.

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After the German withdrawal, apparently 8 French, the 4 English and 2 American divisions have been withdrawn.

This creates a considerable increase in reserves for the enemy, most of which however will not fit for action again until in about 3 weeks.

The statements made by prisoners indicate that the enemy expected the Germans would immediately withdraw behind the AISNE. The enemy divisions had orders quickly to force the crossing over the VESLE. The attacks can be expected to continue.

One prisoner believes that the French Supreme Headquarters will endeavor to recapture the line occupied before the German May offensive.

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ANKER.

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**Preparation to Resist Expected Allied Attack**

[Editorial Translation]

Operations and Intelligence Sections

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,

No. 6128

August 6, 1918.

[Extract]

According to the general situation there exists the possibility of a systematic enemy attack against the army front north of the AISNE. The army does not exclude the possibility that preparations for this attack have been in progress for some time.

A surprise attack must be reckoned with at all times.
From past experience we must expect a penetration in the event of a well-prepared attack. This is all the more likely to be the case when the attack is a surprise one. Therefore the thrust can and must be parried from depth.

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For the Group of Armies:

Count SCHULENBURG,
Chief of Staff.

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HS Ger. File: 810-33.5: Fldr. I: War Diary

[Editorial Translation]

GROUP OF ARMIES GERMAN CROWN PRINCE,
August 7, 1918.

[Extract]

Ninth Army: No change west of SOISSONS; outpost fighting east of the city.
Seventh Army: Artillery fighting which is alternatingly strong and weak. Enemy thrusts on both sides of FISMES were repulsed.
First Army: Patrol engagements in the outpost area.
Third Army: No change.

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