Log Cabin Memorial - Veterans 314th Infantry Regiment A.E.F.

Analytical study prepared in The Historical Section, The Army War College, 1924


Analytical study prepared in 
The Historical Section, 
The Army War College, 


 This study in furnished confidentially to (Commandant, each service school; Chief, each 
combat branch; C. of S., D.C. of S., each A.C. of S.) for each use as he may be able to make of it, 
in instruction or otherwise, and for comment.

 It is one of several such studies, in progress or proposed, which will take up in turn several 
different divisions, collect the available information upon their organization, training, etc., and 
then trace in some detail the operation of the machine in its first major engagement. The value 
of such a series of studies can be determined only by actually making the experiment.

 Evidently, this paper should not be published as it stands; but the material contained therein 
may perhaps be found useful. 

Major General, U.S.A. 
Copy No. 1 Chief of Staff. 
2 Deputy Chief of Staff. 
3 A. C. of S., G-1. 
4 A. C. of S., G-2. 
5 A. C. of S., G-3. 
6 A. C. of S., G-4. 
7 A. C. of S., W.P.D. 
8 Chief of Infantry 
9 " " Cavalry 
10 " " Field Artillery 
11 " " Coast Artillery 
12 " " Air Service 
13 " " Engineers. 
14 C. S. O. 
15 Commandant, War College. 
16 " G. S. Schools. 
17 " Infantry School. 
18 " Cavalry School. 
19 " Field Artillery Technical School. 
20 " Coast Artillery School. 
21 " Engineer School. 
22 " A. S. Technical School. 
23 " Signal School. 
24 C. G., 1st Corps Area. 
25 " 2nd Corps Area. 
26 " 3rd Corps Area. 
C. G., 4th Corps Area. 
" 5th Corps Area. 
" 6th Corps Area. 
" 7th Corps Area. 
" 8th Corps Area. 
" 9th Corps Area. 
" Hawaiian Dept. 
" Philippine Dept. 
" Panama Dept. 
Hist. Section, office use. 

" " " " 
" " " " 
" "  file. 


I. Comparison of War Department and American Expeditionary Forces' Training Policies. 
II. Training in the United States. 
Reports of Inspection. 
III. Training in France. 
Reports of Inspection. 
Comparative training periods of divisions is France. 
IV. Active Operations. 
(a) Operations of September 26, 1918. 
(b) Operations of September 27, 1918. 
(c) Operations of September 28, 1918. 
(d) Operations of September 29, 1918. 
(e) Operations of September 30-October 1, 1918. 
V. Summary. 
Numbers in parentheses is the text refer to authorities listed at the end of each Chapter. 


Comparison of War Department and American Expeditionary 
Forces' Training Policies.

 The training policy of the War Department following our entry into the war is set forth in a 
circular entitled "Infantry Training," prepared at The Army War College (1). This takes 
definitely and without reservation the trench warfare point of view. The first sentence reads: "In 
all the military training of a division, under existing conditions, training for trench warfare is of 
paramount importance". Paragraph 2 makes it one of the first duties of the division commander 
to lay out a trench system, and directs that this system be constructed without delay and used as 
the center of training. Paragraph 3 directs the division commander to institute a tactical school 
for his higher officers, the course to consist of a study of War Department publications on 
Trench Warfare, with map and field problems illustrating them. It further orders courses of like 
nature in each regiment, for all officers.

 It next provides for a complete system of schools covering all specialties. For the practical 
instruction of troops, a suggested program covering sixteen weeks is given.

 All this constitutes the first period of training. For this second period only general 
instructions are given, to continue and extend the work thus begun.

 The training policy of the A.E.F. showed a definite tendency very early, and its later 
developments consistently followed that tendency. It did not, however, come into existence 
instantaneously nor spontaneously, and its origins can be traced more or less clearly. Training at 
home sought to base itself upon information from abroad, but circumstances were such that 
response was not immediate, nor was it known in France to what extent that response had been 

 Almost as soon as he reached France, the C. in C. began communication with Washington on 
this subject. Having had no time to formulate a policy, he at first contented himself with 
suggesting that French officers should be sent to the United States as instructors and advisers in 
important specialties, notably in fortification (2). Shortly after, he sent a cable concerning 
certain matters of clothing and supply (3), in which he based his recommendations upon 
"conditions of trench warfare". At about the same time he sent in writing a more extended 
memorandum on training (4), in 

which he urged physical training, close order drill, and musketry, according to our own systems. 
For specialties he recommended schools in the United States with foreign instructors; staff 
training in France; and return home of American officers as soon as possible to take charge of 

 In early August, several cable messages were exchanged, the War Department asking advice 
on training, and the C. in C. displaying great interest in the translation and publication of French 
training manuals (5). The Department informed the C. in C. that work was actively in progress 
on foreign publications, and gave a list of 23 already issued; these dealt chiefly with trench 
warfare. The C. in C. cabled that training programs were being prepared and could be sent; 
meanwhile he recommended adherence to our own regulations, with such trench warfare 
instruction as suggested by French advisers. In this connection he gave the organization advised 
by the French for the interior signal service of an infantry regiment under the conditions of 
trench warfare.

 Meanwhile our First Division had commenced training in France, and we were beginning to 
collect experience of our own. Our G-5 staff section was organized in August, and began work 
on training programs for this division and others to follow (6). It was found that under purely 
French direction little progress was being made; changes in policy were gradually introduced, 
until finally in October complete training programs were prepared (7). These programs 
announced as fundamental principles that the training methods must be American; that all 
instruction must insist upon the offensive; that the principles of war were unchanged, and our 
manuals correct. During the development of these programs the C. in C. cabled (8) that training 
in trench warfare at home should not interfere with musketry training, nor with instruction in our 
Schools of the Soldier, Company and Battalion. Upon their completion he cabled that success 
can be gained only in open warfare; that this training must come first; that work in trench 
warfare should be taught in connection with assumption of the offensive from an entrenched 
position and completion of trench warfare training should be left for France (9).

 This was the first of a series specifically entitled "Training Cables".

 But early in the summer French and British "missions" had arrived in Washington, and had at 
once established close relations at the War Department. Their conceptions of warfare were very 
different from ours; many of them, at least, believed that trench warfare had come to stay, and 
had superseded the older forms (10); they were heard to say seriously that if the allied armies 
ever reached Berlin it would be from trench to trench (11). This influence was strong, and may 
have been controlling; in any event, the War Department accepted this doctrine, and issued a 
training program (12) in August which definitely announced it. 

The C. in C. had never recommended it; if its adoption took his views into account at all, there 
must have been read into his references to trench warfare in the early cables above cited a 
meaning which is not explicitly found in them.

 Thus training in France and in the United States were following diverging courses, and this 
apparently without a clear appreciation of the fact on either side. This appreciation began to 
come late in the autumn, through two independent channels.

 The commanding generals of the divisions in training in the United States were sent to France 
on a tour of observation and an opportunity was thus offered for extended personal conferences. 
Full information was given these division commanders as to the A.E.F. policy, together with a 
memorandum explaining the principles upon which the policy was based. It was evidently noted 
that their point of view was not at all the same, for in that memorandum is mentioned a 
"tendency . . . in discussions among officers to depart from this sound doctrine". The 
memorandum explicitly denies that there has been a change in the principles of combat, and 
holds up as the ultimate object of all trench operations . . . . warfare in the open conducted in all 
essential elements according to the principles found in our standard manuals" (7).

 This brought to France some conception of the situation in the United States, and gave 
division commanders an idea of the wishes of the C. in C. They did not return to their divisions, 
however, until December, and when they did return each acted upon the information according to 
his own individual judgment. Officially, home training was still governed by Document 656 and 
similar manuals.

 Meanwhile, late in October, "Training Cable No. 1", above cited (9), had evidently roused 
much interest in Washington. It elicited a reply (13) which indicated not only that detail of 
practice differed but that there had been no meeting of minds at all. The wear Department 
seemed to see no divergence in principle, but said that the recommendations of the C. in C. were 
being carried out, except that it was believed advisable to impart some "specialist training", 
supervised by foreign officers, "to sustain interest". For further details the cable referred to 
Document 656.

 The whole situation now suddenly became clear. Document 656, when received in France, 
was studied, and gave a vivid picture of the system of infantry training. The C. in C. cabled (14) 
that Document 656 was not in harmony with his "Training Cable No. 1", for the obvious reason 
that it gave trench warfare a place of prime importance, almost to the exclusion of everything 
else; he strongly renewed his recommendations that open warfare be placed first. Learning or 
perhaps only fearing, that other arms were acting on the same theory, he added "For field 
artillery, principles of fire unchanged. Officers properly training in our own methods have no 
trouble with French". 

 This brought action. A new director of training had been appointed; and the reply to this 
cable (15) accepted the C. in C's ideas without reservation, and added that new instructions were 
being prepared to put them into effect. A circular (16) was issued, clearly and strongly 
enunciating them. For the first time, the official doctrine was the same on both sides of the 

 This is not to say, however, that training on either side conformed strictly to that doctrine. In 
the United States, divisions had been started on the opposite track, and they could not get back 
on their course in a day. (An analysis of the work of the 35th Division during this period will be 
given in Chapter II). The impression created in France when these divisions began to arrive is 
almost startlingly set forth in a cable (17) sent in April. Its language is so positive and so striking 
that it is here given, in abbreviated form. 

"Conditions among troops recently arriving indicate too much attention in United 
States to trench warfare, too little to open. Again strongly urge absolute necessity of 
making open warfare prime mission in States, and that training for trench warfare and its 
specialties be distinctly subordinated. Training for trench warfare is a short process, best 
completed in France. This work somewhat complicated so far as staffs are concerned, 
but makes little demand upon initiative and resource of subordinate commanders and 
troops. Incidents of this warfare largely foreseen and provided for. Open warfare 
demands initiative, resource and decision from all and requires that all organizations be 
capable of rapid maneuver. During this war successful operations across trenches often 
nullified because training in open warfare had been insufficient to prepare men for 
exploiting success. Too much trench warfare works against the success of great 
operations. Men so trained when brought into the open have a feeling of nakedness and 
helplessness. Recommend, for infantry, musketry, close order drill, minor tactics in open 
warfare situations. For field artillery, driving, care of horses, accurate gun laying, 
observation of fire, manipulation of sheaf, preparation and conduct of fire without maps, 
rapid reconnaissance and occupation of position, changes of position by echelon, 
ammunition supply, telephones."

 Even in France it proved very difficult to withstand the pressure in the opposite direction. A 
very strong statement to this effect is found in a G-5 memorandum as late as July, 1918 (18). 
This memorandum sets forth that both the French and British were making systematic efforts to 
instill into our troops their own doctrines and methods, which were not suited to the American 
temperament, nor to the intended use of American troops. It points out that the knowledge of the 
foreign instructors was generally very limited, consisting only of their own specialties in trench 
warfare; and that all disbelieved in our principles and distrusted our ability to train according to 
them. It concludes with the unqualified statement that this tutelage hampered us and hindered 
the development of self-reliance that foreign assistance had become a handicap, not an asset. 

 Evidently, this was not intended to mean that no foreign advice was wanted, but rather that 
this advice was too often given and used, and had come to be asked for, on the wrong subjects 
and in the wrong way. A broad statement of the case is found in the final report of G-5 (6), 
which is briefly as follows: -- That foreign officers were desired only as instructors in their 
specialties; that each army had a certain specialization better developed than others, and 
selections of foreign advisers were made accordingly; that these advisers had done excellent 
work, but the result was not an unmixed benefit; that national differences were not fully 
appreciated; and that many officers relied too much upon the foreigners, retarding the 
development of their own instructors and losing initiative.

 This seems to be a temperate and clear statement, borne out by the experience of many 
American officers. If it be accepted as correct, it seems not unnatural to find the reason why it 
was so in the divergence at policy at home and abroad, and in the failure to give American troops 
abroad, even if necessarily shallow, foundation for their training, and to give them correct 
general ideas before allowing them to come into intimate contact with foreign doctrines and with 
enthusiastic experts on narrow specialties. 

Notes for Chapter I. 

(1) "Infantry Training", War Department Document 656, Aug. 27, 1917. 
(2) Pershing Cable 9, June 18, 1917, par. 3, and 30, July 6, 1917, par. 6. 
(3) Pershing Cable 38, July 11, 1917, pars. 4 and 6. 
(4) Letter, C. in C. to A.G., July 11, 1917, in App. 31, Report G-5, G.H.Q., June 30, 1919. 
(5) Pershing Cables 73, July 31, 1917, par. 1; 85, August 8, par. 3; 92, Aug. 11, pars/ 3 and 4. 
A.G. Cables 86, Aug. 8, 1917, par. 3; 96, August 11, 1917. 
(6) Report G-5, June 30, 1919. 
(7) Appendix 31, Report G-5, June 30, 1919. 
(8) Pershing Cable 178, Sept. 24, 1917, par. 1. 
(9) Pershing Cable 228, Oct. 19, par. 16. 
(10) Final Report, C. in C., A.E.F., Col. Paul Azan, "The War of Positions" and "The Warfare of 
(11) Statement of Colonel C. W. Weeks, Inf., Nov. 15, 1921. 
(12) Document 656, W.D., August 27, 1917. 
(13) A. G. Cable 352, November 2, 1917, par. 6. 
(l4) Pershing Cable 348, December 7, 1917, par. 4. 
(15) A.G. Cable 537, December 18, 1917, par. 11. 
(16) W. D. Training Circular No. 5, December 20, 1917. 
(17) Pershing Cable 952, April 19, 1918, par. 1. 
(18) Memo, G-5, to C. of S., A.E.F., July 4, 1918, in Report G-5, June 30, 1919. 


 The 79th (National Army) Division, was organized beginning August 25, 1917 at Camp 
Meade, Maryland, a cantonment. It was composed of National Army men principally from the 
states of Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia. The first draft of men arrived on 
September 19th. Later men from New York, Ohio, Rhode Inland and West Virginia were added 
(1). The Regular Army officers selected to command the division and its brigades and 
regiments, about 600 enlisted men from the regular army to form the non-commissioned cadre or 
frame work of the companies, battalions and regiments and 1100 graduates of the First Officers'
Training Camp at Fort Niagara arrived the latter part of August (2).

 The training in the United States may be divided into two periods, first or fundamental and 
second or specialized. It appears that the month of September and the first week of October were 
devoted to organization and equipment as far as supplies on hand would permit as Training 
Bulletin #1, Headquarters, Camp Meade for the week beginning October 8th was issued on 
October 6 (3). The last weekly Training Bulletin which has been found after searching the files 
of the Adjutant General's Office and the Historical Section, Army War College, is #35 for the 
week beginning June 10th, 1918. A complete set of these bulletins could not be located but a 
sufficient number has been found to show that they were issued each week between October 6th, 
1917 and June 10, 1918 also additional numbered and lettered bulletins were published from 
time to time during the different weeks containing information pertaining to training. The first 
sixteen bulletins have been compared with the standard 16 week program suggested in War 
Department Documents 656 and 657; while in general they cover instructions about the same for 
infantry and machine gun units as that contained in the War Department Documents #656, some 
subjects have been omitted and others added and the number of hours spent on the different 
subjects are not the same. The Field Artillery schedules of training are somewhat different from 
those of War Department Document 657; but perhaps this may be accounted for by the lack of 
field artillery material and equipment the details of which will be given later. The schedules 
were followed as far as equipment and weather conditions would permit (4).

 The division's own history states that courses in special training conducted by foreign officers 
(British and French) began November 12th, 1917, that bombing, bayonet, automatic arms, 
intelligence, machine gun, small arms, engineering, gas defense, signalling, artillery fire and first 
aid schools were organized and in fact schools and classes covering all of the major and many of 
the minor requirements of each unit (2). 

A new Director of Training was appointed by the War Department on December 20th, 1917, 
and a circular was issued reversing the doctrine of "Infantry Training" and laying stress on open 
field training instead of the trench system (5). Instruction of the 79th in accordance with this 
circular began on January 1st, 1918. The weather in December 1917 and January 1918 
considerably interfered with and delayed the training of the 79th; the winter of 1917 and 1918 in 
fact was one of the bitterest in years. Its frigidity forced a partial abandonment of outdoor work 
and lectures in barracks replaced it (2). For a portion of the time the ground was covered with 
ice and it was impracticable to conduct any outdoor instruction (4).

 Colonel F. M. Caldwell, Inspector General made the first general inspection of the 79th 
Division January 13th - 21st, 1918, (4) at which time Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, the 
division commander was in France on a tour of observation, which began on December the 21st, 
1917 and ended in the early part of February 1918 (6); Brigadier General William J. Nicholson 
was in command (4). The 16 weeks elementary training schedule of War Department Document 
#656 was almost completed. Colonel Caldwell found that the schedules had been arranged in 
compliance with the training circulars issued by the War Department and that while they varied 
in different regiments, all provided for systematic training and covered the ground as required in 

He indicates that the instruction throughout had progressed as rapidly as equipment 
and weather conditions would permit. Every energy had been concentrated on 
disciplinary drills and instruction in fundamentals and the results obtained were good, 
officers and men displayed as a rule, snap, spirit and interest in the work. Division 
schools were thoroughly training a corps of instructors in methods of trench warfare and 
the use of various arms and the work in general was laying a good foundation for advance 
training. The Machine Gun and Artillery Schools were doing excellent work and rapid 
progress could be made as a result of the work of the latter in preparing instructors as 
soon as artillery materiel was received. The two regiments of horse drawn artillery (3") 
had a total of 6 -- 3" guns for instruction purposes and practically no horse equipment and 
the motorized regiment (6") had no artillery materiel. 

The Field Signal Battalion had practically no signal equipment and instruction had not 
progressed very far, the battalion was far from being in condition for service. Schedules 
prescribed by the Chief Signal Officer had been followed as nearly as the equipment on 
hand would permit. 

The engineer regiment had been carrying on both technical and infantry training 
according to schedule and the results were good. The regiment was only about 50% of its 
authorized strength and only about 50% of the present strength was good material for 
technical work. 

The Engineer Train had not been organized. The Ammunition Train had only five 
escort wagons and no motor equipment and was an ammunition train in name only, the 
Motor Supply Train had no motor equipment, the Sanitary Train was conducting training 
but was far from being in condition for war service.

 There had been no target practice for any of the services. 

Physical training had been carried on systematically throughout the command and the 
men were in fine physical condition. 

The division officers training school had been following the schedule of instruction 
issued by the War Department General Staff as closely as the lack of equipment would 

Sanitation and general police of the camp was good, health of the command good and 
latest reports showed the camp to stand at the head of all camps in the United States as to 
health. Military bearing and personal appearance of the men was very good, conduct of 
the men had been excellent and most of the offenses committed were of a minor nature, 
mostly absence without leave. Military courtesy with comparatively few exceptions was 
very good. 

The commissioned personnel was considered very good, the average of intelligence 
and education was high and all seemed keen and willing to work. One Captain, one 1st 
Lieutenant and three 2nd Lieutenants were reported as unfit for their positions. 

The reserve officers appeared to be intelligent, educated and willing to work. The 
foreign officers were rendering invaluable service in conducting and assisting in the 
conduct of the various schools. They were apparently well equipped in their specialties 
and were cooperating in every way with the camp authorities in the work of training the 

The enlisted personnel was excellent material for soldiers and the average intelligence 
good, they were keen to learn and there was no grumbling at the amount of work 

There were many shortages of equipment and the essential articles of equipment 
needed, were: rifles 50%, bayonets 25%, pistols and revolvers 100%, machine guns 
100%, automatic rifles 100%, artillery material 99%, haversacks 50%, cavalry equipment 

In conclusion it was stated that the division was not fit for service abroad as it was 
10,000 men short of authorized strength, had not had target practice of any kind, was 
short of equipment, especially artillery and machine gun, and the supply train was not 
sufficiently organized nor trained due to lack of motor transportation, to perform its 
functions immediately upon arrival in France. 

The division was engaged in elementary training which would insure discipline and if 
it could be filled to authorized strength and given the equipment essential to further 
training and then permitted to remain intact for three months it would be in good 
condition for service; the progress being made was all that could be expected under the 
conditions (4).

 Further detail on the artillery of the division is given in a separate inspection made January 23 

- 25th, 1918, by Colonel Alfred A. Starbird, Inspector General (7). 
This report states that the brigade was seriously handicapped in its training by the lack 
of equipment, but that training in the 310th and 311th Regiments was progressing as 
rapidly as the equipment on hand would permit, but was not progressing satisfactorily in 
the 312th Regiment. The brigade was not complying with Paragraph II, Training 
Circular #5, War Department, 1917 which required all officers present at all drills; 
however, this was owing to the small amount of equipment which limited instruction. No 
artillery range had been provided even though a range was absolutely necessary for 
training the brigade. 

It was recommended that the 312th Field Artillery Regiment receive the immediate 
attention of the Division and Brigade Commanders, that some fire control and ordnance 
equipment be furnished, that some horses and enough harness for instruction of 
non-commissioned officers be furnished the 310th and 311th Regiments, that sufficient 
pistols be furnished the 310th and 311th Regiments for pistol instruction and practice and 
that steps be taken to select an artillery range suitable for artillery practice (7).

 The bulletins issued after the 16th week indicate that the division was partly engaged in 
specialized training (8). However it appeared to have been seriously handicapped by lack of 
equipment and material and the constant transfer of men from the division to other units and their 
replacement by recruits from the different draft increments. Those transfers necessitated 
fundamental training of a part of the division up to the time of preparing for movement overseas 

 Progress reports for the division Machine Gun School which were submitted by the officer in 
charge of the British Group at Camp Meade covering the period January to June 1919, both 
inclusive have been found. Statements on those reports indicate that the training was seriously 
handicapped by lack of equipment, by the reduced strength of the companies owing to the 
transfer of men from the division to other units and the fact that the men attending had not 
previously had infantry training (9).

 The division was given an opportunity to show the results of its long months of hard work by 
a review in Baltimore, Maryland, on April the 6th, 1918 before President Wilson in 
commemoration of the first anniversary of America's entry into the World War. The division 
marched from Camp Meade to Baltimore and return a distance of 44 miles and in this, the first 
real test of endurance, the men acquitted themselves well (2). 

The result of the intensive and specialized training became apparent in the Spring and upon 
one occasion the machine gun units of the division gave a demonstration of indirect firing and 
barrage work before a group of officials from the War Department and high ranking officers of 
the Army. It was directed by Major Liebenrood of the British Machine Gun Corps and was a 
distinct success (2).

 The division's own history states that when rifle practice was completed, the attention of the 
entire division was turned to training in open warfare. That hitheto the trend of training had been 
towards trench warfare. A bayonet assault course was constructed as a part of the larger scheme 
of offensive works and by the middle of May, the division as a whole was solving real problems, 
capturing strategic points, outmaneuvering strong columns, routing heavy attacks and surprising 
unsuspecting encampments. It is further stated that a great deal of stress was laid upon the 
subject of gas training and gas discipline in the Spring (2).

 A training report made on War Plans Division Form #7541-88 dated June 19-27, 1918 by 
Brigadier General Eli A. Helmick, Inspector General, shows that schools which were being 
conducted included instruction in Field Fortifications, use of bayonet, gas, grenade, machine 
gun, one pounder (37mm) gun Stokes Mortar, and that a Field and Staff Officers and a Signal 
School were being conducted. Result were considered very good in all except the Field and Staff 
Officers School, and the School in Field Fortifications, these were rated as good (10).

 The last inspection before the 79th left for overseas service was made by Brigadier General 
Eli A. Helmick, Inspector General, June 19th - 27th, 1918, at which time Major General Joseph 

F. Kuhn was in command. The division was then under orders to prepare to move to the Port of 
Embarkation (10). 
The Inspector found: That between 50% and 60% of the enlisted personnel of the 
infantry units were recruits, and at the time the instruction was largely recruit instruction 
and rifle firing. That the transfer of large percentages of enlisted personnel at different 
times, had removed efficient non-commissioned officers and had reduced the personnel 
of units to an extent that interfered seriously with the orderly and efficient conduct of the 
work of instruction. 

The Inspector quotes the following extract from the report of the division commander 
on Training: "The division circulars distributed by the War Department lay emphasis on 
the orderly, progressive training of a division. Such an attainment requires fundamentally 
men and material. Neither condition has been permitted. The tactical aspect of man 
power has been completely subordinated to the vocational. Men who have shown 
leadership and have been made important noncommissioned officers and trained, have 
been lost by name because of vocational qualifications. The result has been too frequent 
disorganization of administrative and training staffs in regiments and companies. 
Moreover, the tactical development of the commissioned personnel has been retarded by 
the limitation of training to elementary phases of the soldier through the receipt and 
transfer of men, and by the lack of opportunity to handle war strength organizations, 
and by lack of material in such classes as field and combat transportation and the 
weapons (other than rifles) with which the troops are to fight. These remarks are plainly 
set forth with the hope that similar burdens may be withheld from future divisions". 

Further that: The enlisted personnel of the machine gum units was about 70% recruits, 
consequently the drill and elementary instruction were not far advanced. Actual training 
was hampered through lack of machine guns and the units had suffered through the 
automatic transfer back to the infantry of trained machine gun officers on promotion. 

The 312th Field Artillery which had been reported by Colonel Alfred A. Starbird, 
Inspector General, to be unsatisfactory as to training was progressing satisfactorily under 
the command of Lieutenant Colonel J. A. Thomas. Training of the Field Artillery 
Brigade was retarded in the early stages owing to lack of guns and equipment, also to the 
inability until within the month of June 1918 to obtain an artillery range. 

The engineer regiment had just been filled up with about 75% recruits and their 
training had not gone beyond infantry drill and other disciplinary exercises.

 The trains were in good condition and appeared to have received efficient instruction. 

Schedules of training and the orders published governing training were being observed. 
The pamphlet "Infantry Training" had been one of the principle guides. 

At target practice of infantry regiments the lack of trained non-commissioned officers 
was more evident than at any other time, although coaches were provided for the recruits 
the coaching being given them was poor. Owing to the lack of sufficient coaches recruits 
behind the firing points were receiving no instruction but were merely awaiting their turn 
to fire. 

The physical training, training in bayonet fighting and machine gunnery were the most 
advanced and satisfactory of all training in the Division.

 The health of the command had been and was then very good.

 The military bearing and personal appearance of the men was very good throughout. 

The discipline and military courtesy as observed in the universal practice of rendering 
snappy military salutes were excellent throughout the command. 

The number of trials seemed to be unusually large, especially is the case of officers, 
16 of whose had been tried and 12 found guilty. There had been 1313 Summary Court 
trims, 365 Special Court and 82 General Court trials of enlisted men. General Court 
trials were mostly for desertion and Summary and Special Courts for absence without 

The commissioned officers and in general the enlisted men of the division appeared to 
be of a high type. 

The Inspector was of the opinion that Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, the division 
commander, deserved commendation for the progress the division had made in training in 
spite of the discouragements to which it had been subjected. More than a complete 
division of men had been assigned, trained and sent sway from the division. General 
Kuhn was considered as exceptionally well fitted for the command of a division or a 
higher command. 

In conclusion General Helmick considered that all had been done that reasonably 
could be expected, to place the division in a state of training fit for war, and that it was 
not so, was because of the number of recruits which it had been necessary to assign to it 
to fill its enlisted personnel to war strength. None of the new men of the infantry 
regiments had been given proper training in shooting, some had not been given any 
training and an opportunity should be afforded in Europe to cover this defect. The 
division should have three months of intensive training to make it a dependable and 
efficient fighting unit (11).

 Further detail on the artillery of the division is given in a separate inspection made July 5 - 9, 
1918 by Lieutenant Colonel James P. Marley, Inspector General (12). 

Colonel Marley reported equipment and clothing practically complete in so far as it 
was to be furnished at Camp Meade. 50% of the men were recruits just received that 
week. Training had been seriously handicapped by the lack of a suitable artillery range, a 
matter which had been previously noted in a report of inspection made by Colonel 
Starbird in January 1918. 

The brigade was preparing for overseas service with approximately one-half of the 
personnel received within the three days previous to the inspection. 

Recent transfers of approximately 500 to 600 men had been made from each of the 
artillery regiments to the infantry regiments of the division. These men had in many 
cases received instruction in artillery for a period of six weeks; all of them at least two 
weeks. They had undergone a very intensive period of training while in the artillery 
regiments which included a series of maneuvers. The loss of the men was very seriously 
felt in the artillery regiments, especially in the two light regiments. This transfer necessitated 
the beginning over again of recruit instruction in artillery subjects and equitation when 
the regiments were about to depart for overseas service. Recruit instruction was 
progressing satisfactorily. 

In the maneuvers just completed by the brigade very exhaustive and careful work had 
been done in those phases which pertained entirely to trench warfare but very little 
practice had been given in the maneuver of the Brigade in the phases following the 
breaking of the enemy's line and in the very important subject of liaison and designation 
of objectives. Artillery practice had been very unsatisfactory owing to the unsuitability 
of the range. In conclusion Colonel Marley stated that with so many recruits, the training 
of the units of the brigade as organizations was in very preliminary stages and that the 
brigade was going overseas in a condition in which its first task would be the preliminary 
training of recruits. He recommended that no more field artillery organizations be trained 
at Camp Meade unless a suitable range was provided (12).

 The division commander, staff and advance school detachment sailed from New York on 
June 30th and Brigadier General William J. Nicholson was left in command of the 79th (2).

 The officers in actual command of the division at Camp Meade, Maryland, were: (6) 

Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, 8-25-17 to 11-26-17. 
Brigadier General William J. Nicholson, 11-26-17 to 2-17-18. 
Major General Joseph E. Kuhn, 2-17-18 to 6-30-18. 
Brigadier General William J. Nicholson, 6-30-18 to 7-15-18. 

Brigade Commanders: 

157th Infantry Brigade. 
Brigadier General E. E. Hatch from organization to Sept. 14th, 1917. 
Brigadier General William J. Nicholson, Sept. 14 - Nov. 26, 1917. 
Colonel Claude B. Sweezey, Nov. 26, 1917 to February 17, 1918. 
Brigadier General William J. Nicholson, Feb. 17 to July 5, 1918, date of leaving Meade. 

158th Infantry Brigade: 
Brigadier General William J. Nicholson, Aug. 15-17 to Sept. 14, 1917. 
Brigadier General E. E. Hatch, Sept. 14, 1917 to May 23, 1918. 
Colonel O. B. Rosenbaum, May 23 to June 30, 1918. 
Colonel Oscar J. Charles, June 30, to July 7, 1918, date of leaving Meade. 

154th Field Artillery Brigade: 
Brigadier General Andrew Hero, Jr., organization to date sailing 
overseas - left Meade July 13, 1918. 

- 9 79TH 

(1) G. O. 95, W.D. dated duty 18, G.O. 101 W. D. dated Aug. 3, 1917 and Historical Files 27911.4 

(2) History of the 79th Division, published by the 79th Division Association. 
(3) 79th Division Files, Camp Meade, Maryland - Bulletins, World War Division - A.G.O. 
(4) Report of Inspection of 79th Division by Colonel F. M. Caldwell, I. G. dated Jan. 23, 1918. 
Files of the Inspector General of the Army. 
(5) Training Circular #5, W.D. Dec. 20, 1917. 
(6) Returns, 79th Division, Returns and Roster Section, A.G.O. 
(7) Report of Inspection of the 154th F.A. Brig. 79th Div. By Colonel Alfred A. Starbird, I. G., 
dated Jan. 23-25, 1918. Files of the Inspector General of the Army. 
(8) 79th Division Files, Historical Section 279-50.3 - Training Bulletins. 
(9) Progress Reports, 79th Division, H.S. 279-56.2. 
(10) Report on Training, 79th Division, H.S. 279-56.2. 
(11) Report or Inspection of 79th Div. by Brig. Gen. E. A. Helmick, I. G. dated June 29, 1918. 
Files of the Inspector General of the Army. 
(12) Report of Inspection of 154th F.A. Brig. 79th Div. by Lieut. Col. James P. Marley, I. G. July 
5-9, 1918. Files of the Inspector General of the Army. 

Chapter III.

 The advance detachment of the division arrived at France on July 12th, and the first unit on 
July 15th. Other units, with the exception of the artillery brigade, arrived on July 16th (1) (2). 
All units went to Pontanezen Barracks and vicinity for a rest of a few days (2), and later were 
sent to the 10th Training Area in the vicinity of Champlitte and Prauthoy (Haute-Marne) (3). By 
July 29th all units had reached the area (2). Division Headquarters were established at Prauthoy, 
159th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Champlitte, 158th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at 
Vaux sous Aubigny and the various units were scattered among some thirty-eight towns in the 
10th training area (2).

 The artillery brigade reached France by way of England in the early part of August, and went 
to La Courtine (Creuse) (4), where it received the standard course of instruction like other 
artillery brigades. Therefore, the artillery training may be considered as normal, and conforming 
throughout to the accepted Franco-American system. It remained in training until after the 
armistice and rejoined the division in January, 1919, in the Souilly area south of Verdun (5).

 On principle, the training of a division in France was intended to cover about 90 days, and to 
be divided into three phases, according to the Report of G-5, G.H.Q., of June 30, 1919, Appendix 
31 (Divisional Training). The first phase included the instruction of small units; the second was 
training in line, preferably in a quiet sector, brigaded with an experienced unit; the third was 
work in a training area, correcting deficiencies discovered, and training the division an a unit, 
primarily in open warfare.

 From the statistical material contained in the report cited, tables have been compiled showing 
the time actually granted to the different combat divisions in training, and thus permits a rough 
comparison. The comparison is only rough, since conditions vary to such a great extent, but will 
prove of some value.

 The first four divisions (the 1st, 26th, 42nd and 2nd) to arrive in France had distinctly the 
advantage of all others. They went through all three phases of training more or less completely, 
and since they were the laboratory material used in the experimental determination of the 
programs for the others, had much more than the regulation amount of time. Even among those 
there were considerable differences, the 1st Division being the only one to complete the third 
phase in full, the others having only a week or two.

 Of the later divisions only four (the 32nd, 33rd, 78th and 80th) may be considered to have had 
all three phases. Fifteen Divisions (the 3rd, 5th, 92nd, 6th, 81st, 88th, 77th, 4th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 
30th, 35th, 36th and 82nd) had the first two phases and six divisions (89th, 90th, 37th, 91st, 79th 
and 7th) had only the first phase of training.

 According to the G-5, G.H.Q., computation of the training of the first four divisions to arrive 
in France, the 1st Division had the longest training period of 192 days, and the 42nd the shortest 
of 135 days. The average was 152 days. For the second group the longest period was 114 days 
for the 32nd Division, the shortest 89 for the 78th Division, and the average was 100 days. For 
the third and largest group, the longest period was 84 days for the 77th and the shortest, 30 days, 
for the 29th. The average was 58 days. For the last group, which had only the first phase of 
training, the longest period was 59 days for the 91st, and the shortest 26 days for the 37th. The 
average was 44 days. The 79th was in this group and had 43 days' training (6).

 While the 79th had been classed as a one-phase division, perhaps it might be considered as 
having been trained in two phases, the first covering a period of about five weeks, August 1st to 
September 5th, and the second, one week at most, September 17th - 24th (7).

 When the 79th arrived in France it had much to learn, for it was composed of more than 50 
per cent recruits; and it was necessary to learn quickly as it was needed at the front and was to be 
used in the coming Meuse Argonne operation (2).

 By August 1, an intensive training schedule was laid out, rifle ranges were constructed and 
the men, who had joined from the June draft were given their first instruction on the range. 
Specialists were selected and given individual instruction as automatic riflemen, carriers, rifle 
grenadiers, runners, bombers and so forth; and a division intelligence school was established. In 
the middle of August the officers and men, who had formed the Advanced School Detachment 
rejoined the division, and others were sent to the 2nd Corps School at Chatillon. Five division 
terrain exercises were held in the vicinity of Frettes near Champlitte (2) (7). The division started 
its first maneuver on September 3 (2) (8) but this was not completed as the troops were ordered 
to return to their billets the following day (2).

 The outlined training was contained in a G-5, first phase program, for the 79th Division (9), 
which gave the general principles governing the training of unite of the A.E.F. The methods to 
be employed were to remain and become strictly our own. All instruction was to contemplate 
the assumption of a vigorous offensive and this purpose was to be emphasized in every phase of 
training until it became a settled habit of thought. The general principles governing combat 
remained unchanged in their essence, that is, the fundamental ideas enunciated in our Drill 
Regulations, Small Arms Firing Manual, Field Service Regulations and other service manuals, 
remained the guide for both officers and soldiers; the rifle and the bayonet were the principal 
weapons of the infantry soldier. Training was 

- 2 

to be based on sound leadership and the importance of discipline was emphasized. The functions 
of the schools of the A.E.F. were outlined, and instructions were given concerning march 
discipline and military courtesy. The importance of smartness in dress and manner for both 
officers and enlisted men was emphasized. The first week's program of training covered the 
instruction of individuals and sections as well as the platoon. Regiments were to be instructed in 
gas defense and care of the feet and were to march not less than ten miles one day of the week. 
The second week covered the instruction of specialists and a continuation of the work of the 
platoon and the same instruction of regiments as the first week. The third week called for 
continued training of specialists, training of company and battalion, and continued training of the 
regiment in marching and gas defense. The fourth week covered continuation of the training of 
the specialists and units as indicated for the third week with additional training for the battalion 
(9). A terrain exercise was to be held each week. No division or regimental programs of training 
have been found; however, the war diaries indicate that training was conducted in accordance 
with the instructions contained in the G-5, G.H.Q. program for all units of the division (7).

 The first and second terrain exercises were advance guard actions with the rear guard of an 
enemy who had been defeated and was retreating. The third illustrated a second line division 
passing through a first line division to initiate pursuit to drive in hostile outposts and to attack 
hostile rear guards in positions. The fourth called for an attack to dislodge an enemy from an 
organized position (10). The war diaries indicate that the division was given a fifth terrain 
exercise, but a copy of this could not be found and its nature is not known (7).

 The maneuver of the division called for the occupation at night of a front line sector with a 
view to assault at daylight and a "passage of lines" to be started at daylight (10). No statements 
or comments by officers of the corps under whose direction these exercises were carried out have 
been found nor any of the officers of the division. It appears that the first maneuver was stopped 
before being completed, in view of the approaching move of the 79th to the front, as on 
September 4th general instructions were issued by division headquarters regarding movements in 
front line positions, concealment, reconnaissances, combat employment, infantry deployment, 
artillery barrages, clean-up operations, organization of conquered ground, liaison, et cetera (2).

 The division was training under the 4th Army Corps until August 12th (11), and from then 
until September 7 under the 6th Army Corps (12).

 On September 8th the 79th moved by rail to the Robert Espagne area west of Bar-le-Duc 
preparatory to entering the front line. It took over "Sector 304" under the French Second Army, 
extending from west of Avocourt to southeast of Haucourt, relieving the French 157th Division, 
beginning the night of September 16th - 17th (13) (14). On September 26th it took part 
in the initial attack in the Meuse-Argonne operation on a front extending from southeast of 
Haucourt to the western boundary of the Bois d' Avocourt (15).

 In this connection it may be interesting to state here that none of the nine divisions which 
were in the front line between the Meuse River and the western edge of the Fort d' Argonne on 
September 26th were from the "first four". Two, the 80th and 33rd, were from the second, the 
"three phase" group, and each had 98 days' for training before entering the line independently. 
The "two phase" group furnished four, the 77th with 84 days' training, the 28th with 58, the 35th 
with 66, and the 4th with 67. The average was 69 days. The "one phase" group furnished the 
37th with 26 days' training, the 79th with 33 [?], and the 91st with 59; the average was 43 days 

79th Division Study. 

(2) History of 79th Division, H.S. Files 279-11.4 
(3) Teleg. to C.G., 79th Div., #161, G-3, July 24, 1918, G.H.Q. Files. 
(4) Teleg. to C.G., 154th F.A. Brig. signed Conner, H.S. Files, 279-49.8. 
(5) G-3 order #24, 2nd Army, Jan. 6, 1919, H.S. 154th F.A. Brig. 279-34.8. 
(1) Summary of Troop Arrival data from May 17, 1917, to December 31, 1918. G. S. 1st Sec., 
G-1, Personnel Division, G.H.Q. Files. 
(6) Appendix 31, Report G-5, June 30, 1919. 
(7) War Diaries, 79th Division, G.H.Q. Files. 
(8) G-5, G.H.Q., Records pertaining to 79th Division. 
(14) Special Report, 79th Division, September 25-November 11, 1918, Meuse-Argonne 
Operation, G.H.Q. Files. 
(9) G-5 Program for training of 79th Division, 1st Phase, 4 weeks, dated July 22, 1918. Record 
Room A.W.C. 
(10) Terrain exercises 79th Division. Filed in Record Room, A.W.C. 
(11) History of the 4th Army Corps. H.S. Files. 
(12) G-5, G.H.Q. Records. 
(13) Special Order #160, 1st Army, A.E.F., G-3. 
(15) History of the 79th Division, prepared in H.S. Section, A.W.C. 
Sept. 26th. 


Active Operations. 


The 79th Division entered the front line on the night of September 16th-17th, when it took 
over the "Sector 304", extending from west of Avocourt to a point about 1 kilometer southeast of 
Malancourt (1). The division front was originally about 5 kilometers, but on September 25th it 
was contracted to about 2-1/2 kilometers, and the western limit was then a point about 1 
kilometer northeast of Avocourt (1) (2). The terrain in front of the Division was very difficult, in 
the right subsector of the Division there was a series of ravine heads, running across the sector, 
all of which were enfiladed by strong machine gun positions, which the artillery preparation had 
failed to destroy. In the center of the sector, these ravines were very steep and rough, and were 
literally covered by barbed wire throughout. In the left subsector, the ground in the immediate 
front, while not so rough, contained the Bois de Malancourt, and further to the north, the Bois de 
Cuisey, in both of which there were many machine gun nests. At the north end of the 
Malancourt Valley in the right subsector, there was a plain extending up to Montfaucon, but 
strongly entrenched and heavily wired, while in the left subsector at this point there were two 
deep valleys before reaching Montfauucon, the heights of which dominated all the surrounding 
country, north of Montfaucon, the country was also rolling, and though not so difficult as that in 
front of the immediate starting position, nevertheless afforded good protection for the enemy's 
machine guns, and was sufficiently hilly to make it very difficult to traverse. It was, in addition 
under observation from the Heights of the Meuse to the east, from which our troops were 
continually subjected to heavy artillery fire.

 The sector of the 79th Division covered the watershed separating the Meuse and the Aire, and 
besides affording difficult natural features had been strongly organized for defense by the enemy.

 The division command post was near Hill 309, north of the eastern exit road in the northern 
edge of the Bois de Lambechamp (8). The French 214th Aero Squadron, Lieutenant de la 
Chapelle commanding, the French 14th and 15th Tank Battalions and the American 6th Balloon 
Company, Lieutenant Ovitt commanding, were assigned to the division. 


 On September 26th, as a part of then 5th Corps, First Army, it participated in the general 
attack which opened the Meuse-Argonne operation, with the 4th Division of the 3rd Corps on its 
right and the 37th Division of the 5th Corps on its left. (2)

 The 5th Corps attack order was issued at 8:00 a.m., September 21st (3), the division order at 

1:30 p.m., the 25th (4). The 158th Infantry Brigade 
issued its order at 8:30 p.m. (5) and the 157th Infantry Brigade some time between 1:30 p.m. and 
midnight on the 25th (7). The copies of the order found do not show the hour issued. The 313th 
Infantry issued its attack order at 5:00 p.m. the 25th (6), the 316th at 1:00 a.m. the 26th (6a). No 
field orders issued by the 314th or 315th Infantry have been found, and it is not known whether 
or not they issued written attack orders.

 The 79th was to advance rapidly to the corps objective, which was a line north of Epinonville 
on the left, south of Cierges center, and north of Nantillois on the right. It was to seize, in 
succession, Malancourt, Montfaucon and Nantillois. The 37th Division was to assist in turning 
the Bois de Montfaucon and in capturing the town itself, and the 4th division was to help turn 
Montfaucon and the German 2nd Position in the sector of the 79th (3) (4).

 The attack order (F.O. #6, 79th Division) was received by the 313th Infantry, one of the two 
regiments to lead the attack, at 4:30 p.m. the 25th, and the regiment issued its order one-half hour 
later, as previously stated (6). The 313th left its bivouac in the Bois de Lambechamp at 7:00 

p.m. and moved to take up position for attack in the front line which was about 5 kilometers 
distant. The last element of the regiment was not in position until 4:10 a.m., September 26th 
The 314th Infantry, the other regiment to lead the attack, left its bivouac in the ForȘt de Hesse 
at 7:00 p.m., September 25th, by verbal orders of its commanding officer, to take position on Hill 

304. The 315th and 316th Infantry regiments (reserve) which were in the ForȘt de Hesse and 
Camp Normandie, respectively, also began to move forward at nightfall and followed the units of 
the 157th Infantry Brigade into position (14). 
The attack order (F.O.#6, 79th Division) was received at 7:10 p.m. by the 314th Infantry 
when it was already in motion and officers were not given instructions for the attack until after 
the regiment arrived at Hill 304 (9) (12). The last element of the 314th was not in position until 

4:30 a.m. the 26th. It was not until then that officers received written orders and marked maps 
(14). The commanding officer of the regiment later stated that his troops had been held in the 
woods with wet clothes and wet feet for a week or more, and that they went into the fight tired as 
a result of the long march the night of the 25th-26th to get into the line. They attacked without 
having had any sleep and after having been under the bombardment of our artillery for several 
hours (12). 
The attack started at 5:30 a.m. with the 157th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Wm. J. 
Nicholson commanding, leading the assault; it was composed of the 314th Infantry Regiment, 
Col. Wm. H. Oury commanding, on the right, and the 313th Infantry, Col. Claude B. Sweezey 
commanding, on the left. Each was reinforced by one company of the 311th Machine Gun 
Battalion, Major Chas. M. DuPuy commanding, one company of tanks, one half of Company D, 
1st Gas Regiment, and one battalion of 

the 147th Field Artillery Regiment which was attached to the 157th Infantry Brigade as 
accompanying artillery and was to join after assisting in the rolling barrage. Each regiment had 
two battalions in line, with one company echeloned in depth, and two companies similarly 
formed in support and battalion reserve; the remaining company of each was in regimental 
reserve. One company from the brigade reserve was distributed through the sector of each 
regiment. The Corps was to control all tanks until they were about one kilometer south of 
Montfaucon, when the companies referred to were to pass to the regiments and one to the 
brigade reserve.

 The 313th Infantry assigned two platoons of its own machine gun company to the right 
battalion (3rd Bn., Major Jesse R. Langley commanding) and one platoon to the left battalion 
(2nd Battalion, Major Benjamin Franklin Pepper commanding) to protect the flanks; one platoon 
of the company (Company A) from the 311th Machine Gun Battalion was assigned to a combat 
platoon of infantry, which was to protect the left flank and maintain contact with the 37th 
Division. The remainder of Company A was placed in reserve, together with the one-pounder 
platoon of the regimental headquarters company.

 The 314th Infantry assigned the machine gun company (Company C) from the 311th 
Battalion to its left battalion in line (3rd Battalion, Major Harry M. Gwynn commanding) and the 
regimental machine gun company to the right battalion (2nd Battalion, Major Robert B. Caldwell 
commanding); a section of the one-pounder platoon was assigned to each of the line battalions. 
The machine guns followed the second line of the battalions.

 The brigade reserve consisted of the 1st Battalion, 313th Infantry, Major Israel Putnam 
commanding, and the 1st Battalion, 314th Infantry, Major Alfred R. Allen commanding, and the 
311th Machine Gun Battalion, less the two companies with the front line troops. Later in the day 
one company of tanks was added. One company of infantry and one machine gun platoon were 
detached to each flank to maintain contact with the 4th and 37th Divisions (7) (8) (9) (14). The 
Brigade command post was established at Bizerte with advance information center at Copinard 

 The 158th Infantry Brigade, Brigadier General Robert J. Noble commanding, constituted the 
division reserve; it was composed of the 315th Infantry, Colonel A. C. Knowles commanding; 
the 316th Infantry, Colonel Oscar J. Charles commanding; and the 312th Machine Gun Battalion, 
Major Stuart Janney commanding. The 310th Machine Gun Battalion (Divisional) Major John 

L. Evans commanding, was assigned to the brigade as a part of the division reserve. The 
formation was practically the same as that of the 157th Brigade, with the 315th Infantry on the 
right, and the 316th on the left, following the regiments of the attacking brigade at 1,000 meters 
distance (8) (10). The 315th Infantry had the 3rd Battalion, Major Francis V. Lloyd 
commanding, on the right in the front line, the 1st Battalion, Major Fred W. McL. Patterson 
commanding, on the left, and the 2nd Battalion, Major Norman E. Borden, commanding, in the 
reserve. The 316th Infantry had the 3rd Battalion, Major J. 
Baird Atwood, commanding, on the right in the front line, the 1st Battalion, Major Harry D. 
Parkin commanding, on the left, and the 2nd Battalion, Captain Alan W. Lukens commanding, in 
the reserve. (5) (8) (10) (14).

 The artillery assigned to the 79th Division, Brigadier General G. LeR. Irwin commanding, 
consisted of: (8) 

57th Field Artillery Brigade: 
119th Field Artillery - 75's 
120th Field Artillery - less one battalion - 75's 
121st Field Artillery - less two batteries - 155's 
147th Field Artillery - less one battery - 75's 
107th Trench Mortar Battery - 58 mm 

65th Coast Artillery - 2 batteries - 9.2's 
203rd Field Artillery (French) - 9 batteries - 75's 
330th Field Artillery (French) - 6 batteries - 155's

 The neutralizing artillery fire of 25 minutes on the enemy front lines was followed by the 
rolling barrage, which was fired by six batteries of the French 203rd Artillery, three of the 119th 
Field Artillery, three of the 120th Field Artillery and three of the 147th Field Artillery; it moved 
100 meters in four minutes, halting for ten and twenty minutes, respectively, upon the enemy's 
intermediate and second positions, and terminated 1 kilometer beyond the line connecting the 
center of Very with the center of Montfaucon (3) (8) (1l) (15). Fire from 4-inch Stokes mortars 
of Company D, 1st Gas Regiment, which preceded the attack, filled the valley beyond the front 
of the two leading infantry regiments with smoke and flame. This, however, was unnecessary, as 
there was a heavy fog over the whole terrain on the front on the morning of the 6th (42).

 During the neutralizing fire the 313th Infantry effected the necessary openings in the wire and 
moved forward without being hindered by wire defenses. It was unable to keep up with the 
barrage owing to the nature of the terrain over which it had to pass and therefore soon lost its 
protection. The 313th advanced satisfactorily until about 8 a.m., when it was temporarily 
checked by machine gun fire from the Bois de Malancourt and heavy high explosive shell fire. 
Progress was almost immediately resumed and was continued until 1:00 p.m., when the advance 
was held up in front of the western edge of the Bois de Cuisy by heavy machine gun and more 
high explosive shell fire. At this point, when the regimental command post had moved to within 
300 yards of the front line to reorganize, it was found that Major Pepper had been killed and 
command of the 2nd Battalion had passed to Captain George C. Burgwin, Jr., and Major Langley 
had been seriously wounded and command of the 3rd Battalion had passed to Captain James P. 
Lloyd. The western edge of the Bois de Cuisy was taken at 4:00 p.m., with the aid of the tanks, 
which had come up at this time. The assistance of the 337th and 339th Companies of French 

was requested, and while they were attached to the 37th Division, two sections were used to clear 
the Bois de Buisy. By 6:00 p.m., the troops had advanced to the northern edge of the woods (8) 

 In the meantime at 3:00 p.m., General Kuhn had moved from the division command post at 
Hill 309 to the advance information center, 3 kilometers northeast at command post Zouave, on 
the ridge of Hill 304 where the Esnes-Malancourt road crosses. However, the division command 
post could not be moved forward at this time because of the poor telephonic communication and 
Colonel Tenney Ross, Chief of Staff, remained at the old command post until about 7:00 p.m. 
About 2:50 p.m. a message was received from the 5th Corps that the 79th was holding up the 
advance of the 1st Army and that General Pershing insisted that the attack be pushed more 
vigorously (8).

 A message to this effect was sent to both Brigades and it was received by the 313th Infantry 
about the time it emerged from the edge of the woods. Even though darkness was coming on 
when the message reached the 313th Infantry, the attack was ordered and began shortly after 

6:00 p.m. in the original formation, with two tanks assisting, and without artillery support. The 
tanks moved out well supported by the infantry. The advance met with no opposition for 200 
yards, and then, suddenly, the troops were subjected to overwhelming rifle, machine gun and 
artillery fire and hand grenades, which stopped the advance. It soon got dark, and the French 
commander of the tanks refused to continue and withdrew. The heavy casualties suffered in 
this attempted advance included Major Putnam, the last of the 3 battalion commanders. Colonel 
Sweezey then withdrew the regiment to the edge of the woods and bivouacked for the night at 
7:15 p.m. (8) (13). 
In this connection it may be well to state here that patrols had been reported as entering 
Montfaucon since mid-afternoon, and a number of reports to the First Army stated that the line 
was north of Montfaucon. Further, the 79th Division reported to the 5th Corps that it had 
captured Montfaucon at 6:45 p.m. and this report was transmitted to the Army (21). As late as 

10:00 p.m. the First Army reported to G.H.Q. by telephone that the 79th Division was last 
reported as one kilometer north of Montfaucon (22). It is apparent that the Germans appreciated 
the importance of the occupation of Montfaucon, for at 11 p.m. the Commander of the West 
Meuse Group issued orders that the town must be held at all costs (23). 
The advance of the 314th Infantry was delayed by the unusually rough and difficult terrain in 
its immediate front and was unable to get through the wire during the barrage. Therefore, it had 
to advance 

without barrage protection, and, in addition, the various units of the regiment became 
intermingled because of the smoke and fog which covered the terrain in its front (8). However, 
the regiment continued to advance in small combat groups without great difficulty until it 
reached the vicinity of Malancourt. At about 10:00 a.m., when the fog lifted the troops were 
subjected to heavy machine gun fire from front, flank and rear, for many machine gun nests had 
been passed unmolested by the advancing troops in the smoke and fog earlier in the morning (8) 
(12). A part of this fire was supposed to have come from a trench on the hilltop running parallel 
to the Malancourt Valley in the sector of the 4th Division. However, this is not confirmed by the 
records of the 4th Division. The rear elements of the regiment were employed the rest of the day 
clearing out these machine gun nests; the advance troops continued to move forward. Colonel 
Oury received verbal orders in the afternoon from General Kuhn, through one of his aides, to 
push the attack more vigorously (12).

 At 6:00 p.m. the machine guns of the enemy had been silenced except these on the top of the 
hill about 1-1/2 kilometers northwest of Malancourt. Up to this time the 314th had encountered 
no artillery fire of any consequence. From 6:00 to 7:00 p.m. the regiment was reorganized and 
placed in depth and at 8:30 dug in for the night about one kilometer north of Malancourt. The 
regiment established contact with the 313th Infantry on its left, which in turn was in touch with 
the 145th Infantry, 37th Division, on its left (8) (9) (12). The machine gun company of the 
regiment which was armed with the Browning guns succeeded in keeping up in a position of 
support. The other machine gun units of the 311th Machine Gun Battalion which had been 
assigned to the 157th Brigade, encountered numerous difficulties in attempting to advance. At 

7:00 a.m. the condition of the terrain forced them to abandon their carts and the men, weighted 
down by the heavy guns, tripods and ammunition which they carried over ground covered with 
brush, wire and numerous shell holes, were unable to keep up with the advancing infantry in 
most cases. Company C, with the right battalion of the 314th Infantry, put three machine gun 
nests out of action at about 10:00 a.m., and was later ordered to the rear by the battalion 
commander because it could not keep up with the advance. Companies A and D did not have an 
opportunity to fire; Company B, with the brigade reserve, moved forward at 10:00 a.m. and later 
assisted the advance of the 313th Infantry several times by direct overhead fire. The battalion 
took part in the attack on Montfaucon which was made late in the day and took up an outpost 
position at about 7:30 p.m. (8) (16). All of the machine gun units of the Division were armed 
with the Browning guns (42). 
The 147th Field Artillery, (accompanying artillery) after having accomplished its barrage 
mission, moved forward at 8:00 a.m. to join the 157th Infantry Brigade. They first attempted to 
advance over the path which the engineers had made for the tanks. This was found impassable, 
and they then tried the road to Avocourt. They were unable to advance north of that place and, 
therefore, the 157th Brigade was without artillery support during the first day of the attack (8) 

(15) (20). Company D, 1st Gas Regiment, found it impossible to get very far forward, but in the 
morning assisted the advance by throwing thermite against machine gun positions in the Bois 
d' Avocourt (42).

 The division reserve, the 158th Infantry Brigade and attached units, which moved forward at 

7:00 a.m., did not have much to do, as they were ordered not to assist the 157th Brigade in any of 
the work allotted to that brigade (17). The brigade experienced some difficulty is maintaining its 
proper distance 1,000 meters from the advance troops until the fog lifted and some of the smoke 
which covered the front disappeared. The 315th Infantry met with considerable machine gun 
resistance but pushed forward rapidly and some of its elements got into the front line with the 
314th. (8) (27). The 316th met with some machine gun resistance, but advanced and maintained 
the distance about as required. Both regiments of the brigade bivouacked in rear of the 157th 
Brigade in about the same order in which they had started the day (8) (18). Company A, 312th 
Machine Gun Battalion supported the right battalion of the 315th Infantry and fired on machine 
guns of the enemy northeast of Malancourt and Company D supported the 316th Infantry, and 
with direct overhead fire silenced machine guns in the northeastern edge of the Bois de Cuisy (8) 
Division headquarters had practically no communication during the 26th with the 214th 
French Aero Squadron. No reports were received as to the position of the front lines and there 
was no telephone communication with the landing field at Foucaucourt. Two messages were 
dropped at the division command post calling for "more barrage," but were of no value as they 
had been written about two hours prior to the time received and did not state the exact position 
where barrage was desired. Some messages for the 79th Division were dropped at 4th Division 
Headquarters, even though the dropping ground for the 79th was previously pointed out to the 
commanding officer, 214th Squadron, and panels were constantly displayed throughout the 
morning whenever allied planes appeared overhead. These messages were received by the 79th 
Division liaison officer at 4th Division headquarters (8). At 11:30 a.m. the telephone wire to the 
6th Balloon Company was cut and communication with it ceased. Considerable trouble and 
annoyance were caused during the day by frequent breaks in the telephone lines between various 
points (8) (20).

 Communication, both laterally and in depth, was poor throughout the 26th; the 157th Infantry 
Brigade Headquarters and one of its regiments, (the 314th), and the 316th Infantry of the 158th 
Infantry Brigade were not in communication with division headquarters a great part of the day 
(17). The 316th Infantry was not in communication with the 158th Brigade headquarters from 
shortly after the attack began until after 7:30 a.m., the 27th. Division headquarters received no 
information concerning the 313th Infantry during the entire day, and was unaware of the location 
of the front line (8).

 At 10:00 a.m. the 157th Brigade command post was moved to Copinard, just north of the Bois 
d'Esnes and advance information center was established at Gascogne (14.0-71.2) about 2 
kilometers west of Esnes. The command post was consolidated with the advance information at 

11:15 a.m. (20). During the evening the 157th Infantry Brigade commander moved his 
command post from Gascogne without having established connection 
from his advance information center to the division command post, which was then located at 
Zouave on the Esnes-Malancourt Road and, therefore, liaison with this brigade was lost and not 
reestablished until early in the morning of the 27th, even though constant efforts were made by 
personnel from division headquarters to reestablish it all during the night (8).

 The other units of the division following the advance of the infantry found the road conditions 
exceedingly difficult as the one road allotted to the 79th was torn up in many places by shell fire 
and was entirely inadequate to handle the transportation of the division. In addition, a part of it 
through Avocourt was also used by the 37th and 91st Divisions which were operating to the 
west. As a result, the road was continually blocked at different places not only on the 26th, but 
during the whole operation of the division. Anticipating this condition, authority was requested 
from the 5th Corps two days before the attack to use the Esnes-Malancourt road in addition, but 
this was refused and the advance started with the division having the use of only the 
Avocourt-Malancourt connection with the Malancourt-Montfaucon road. The road from a point 
about 2/3 of a kilometer north of Avocourt was completely obliterated by shell fire and the 
necessary work of building a road in a brief period of time could not be accomplished by the 
companies of the 304th Engineers then available. Corps troops were requested to assist and one 
company of the 310th Engineers, Lieutenant Colonel Frank J. Barber, and two companies of the 
52nd Pioneer Infantry were furnished. At 7 p.m. the road had been partially repaired to the 
eastern edge of the Bois de Malancourt (8) (14) (24) (25).

 At about 6:30 p.m. the division received orders from the 5th Corps that it must get beyond 
Montfaucon that night and at 11:30 p.m. it was informed by corps headquarters that the 
Commander-in-Chief expected the division to advance that night to a position abreast of the 4th 
Division in the vicinity of Nantillois. Accordingly, an order was issued and sent to the 157th 
Brigade by courier for the brigade to drive forward, using every possible means to expedite the 
advance and to take Nantillois that night (9). Nothing has been found to indicate when this order 
was received by the 157th Brigade commander, nor to show that any further attempts to advance 
were made during the night.

 A partial reorganization was effected and the troops bivouacked for the night about 1 
kilometer northwest of Malancourt. Two companies, one from each of the leading battalions, 
were abut 500 meters in advance, forming an advance line of resistance.

 The German troops opposing the advance of the 79th Division on the 26th consisted of the 
117th Division, which comprised one infantry brigade (233rd) of three infantry regiments, the 
11th Gren

adiers, 157th Infantry and 450th Infantry. The 157th Infantry was to the west of the front line of 
the 79th Division and did not oppose it.

 The 11th Grenadiers was on the left 2/3 of the front of the 79th Division with one battalion in 
the outpost zone and the remainder in rear on the first main line of resistance, which ran from 
Cote 308 to the Bois de Cuisy and thence along the edge of the woods. Two companies of the 
450th Regiment occupied the other 1/3 of the front with the remainder in rear on the first main 
line of resistance. In addition, a Landstrom Battalion Keil was in the main line of resistance. On 
September 25th, at 10:20 a.m., the 37th Division, composed of the 150th and 151st Infantry 
Regiments, had been moved by truck to the vicinity of Dun and placed in readiness in the army 
reserve, and at 11:40 a.m. on the 26th an order was issued for it to move to the vicinity of 
Nantillois to counterattack to the south and southeast at 2:45 p.m. However, the counterattack 
was not made; the troops could not get ready in time and the order was cancelled. The 117th 
Infantry Division was ordered to make a counter-attack with the 7th and 12th Bavarian Infantry 
regiments, to close a gap between Montfaucon and the Bois de Septsarges. However, the 5th 
Bavarian Reserve Division arrived late and the assembly was so delayed that the counter attack 
of the two Bavarian Regiments did not begin until 5:30 p.m. It got dark so soon thereafter and 
the attack did not reach its objective but the gap was closed (23a). The 7th Infantry Regiment of 
the 5th Bavarian Reserve Division was in Nantillois the night of the 26th (23).

 The 79th Division's losses on the 26th in killed as 213 officers and men (Division’s own 

 The following has been taken from a report of observation made by the Division Inspector, 
Major T. Charlton Henry, on the 26th (22a):

 "l. The road discipline x x x x x x x was very poor. In some places no road control was to be 
observed. This was caused by horsedrawn trains and motorized trains being mixed together, and 
in some instances intermingled. The military police, both Divisional and belonging to Corps 
were not familiar with their work. x x x x."

 "2. The First Pioneer Regiment which the Division Inspector was given to understand belongs 
to the 5th Army Corps, was not on the job; x x x men of this organization were found loafing and 
not working as they should. Also a great many members of Company D, 308th Engineers, were 
found lying around in trenches bordering the road when they should have been making the roads 
passable for traffic. x x x x x."

 "3. Too many men were sent to the rear as prison guard; x x x." 

x x x x x x x x

 Â"6. Communication was not well maintained as many inquiries x x x failed to disclose where 
vrious organizations were." 

 "7. There was apparently some deficiency in the protection of our observation balloons, as x x 
x x four were seen brought down in flames, more than a mile behind the lines, x x x x and in a 
great many other cases they had to be lowered very quickly to escape being destroyed."

 The following information has been obtained from a report of observation made by Col. E. E. 
Haskell, inspector general, attached to G-3, G.H.Q. September 26th-27th, 1918 (43):

 "l. At 8:00 o'clock, September 26th, no information had been received at Division 
Headquarters except that the front line had gone over the top promptly at H hour (5:30 o'clock). 
Telephonic connections were poor and worked only at intervals. Wires had been laid on the 
ground beside the road where traffic was heavy and vehicles occasionally passed over the wires.

 "2. At 10 o'clock there was considerable congestion of troops in Malancourt and on the south 
side of Hill 277. The movements of these troops resembled the actions of a reserve. There was 
some fire from German machine guns all along the front, with intermittent shell fire on Hill 277 
and on the road junctions in Malancourt. One company formed under cover of Malancourt, took 
the trench at the southeast edge of the Bois de Conde, northwest of Malancourt and another 
trench in the Ravine de Fontenille, taking prisoners in both works. Arriving abreast 269 this line 
came under heavy machine gum fire and fell back to cover. This was the only demonstration of 
aggressive leadership observed during a period of over five hours." 


 "5. The officers seemed entirely dependent on their Majors, with whom they had lost contact, 
were overcautious, lacking in initiative and seemed almost timid. The German machine guns 
had them bluffed. I saw a few men wounded by machine gun, but very few. The dead that I 
saw, about a dozen in number, were all the result of shell fire. The hostile fire was insignificant.

 "6. x x x x Artillery could have been pushed forward much earlier and would have materially 
assisted in the reduction of the machine gas positions west of Malancourt.

 "7. There seemed to be little direction of troops by higher commanders until late in the day. 
There was a great gap between the left of the 4th Division and the right of the 79th. Troops 
moved forward without any definite conception as to where they were going, and by successive 
increments became congested on the reverse slopes of hills or in 

the captured trenches which were lightly shelled at intervals; there was considerable movement 
by the flank to relieve this congestion. Troops advanced into Malancourt and halted in crowds in 
the streets until shelled out.

 "8. There was no energetic effort made to evacuate the wounded on the first day. Two or 
three aid stations were seen in operation but a thorough search for wounded was not made. x x x 

 "9. There seemed to be no connection between the 79th Division and the divisions on either 
flank. x x x x."

 The casualties suffered by the division on the 26th were 213 officers and men. 



September 27th.

 At 12:30 a.m., the division received a message from the 5th Corps that the Army Commander 
had issued orders for division and brigade commander to go far enough forward to direct the 
movements of their respective units with energy and rapidity in attack. The enemy was reported 
as in retreat or holding lightly in places, and no delay or hesitation in going forward was to be 
permitted. Detachments of sufficient size were to be left behind to engage isolated strong points, 
which were to be turned and not permitted to delay the advance of the attacking troops (8).

 As has been previously stated, division headquarters was unable to locate the 157th Infantry 
Brigade Headquarters. Therefore, instructions were immediately sent direct to the 314th Infantry 
for it to advance and for it to notify the 313th Infantry, if possible (8). Nothing has been found to 
indicate when these instructions were received by the 314th or the 313th. However, the 314th 
Infantry, in compliance with verbal orders of Colonel Oury, commanding, attacked on the whole 
regimental sector at 4:00 a.m. Even though it was dark, the troops were subjected to severe 
machine gun fire from front and flank, which increased as they pushed forward. While the 
darkness prevented accurate fire on the part of the enemy, it also caused the front line troops to 
pass by machine gun nests which later caused the supporting troops considerable difficulty. The 
organized position on the crest of the hill referred to under the operations of the 26th, was soon 
taken, and two machine gun nests in the small woods along the axis of advance - the 
Malancourt-Montfaucon Road - were also taken about daylight. At 6:00 a.m., the regimental 
command post was moved forward to a point which was about the center of the front line, when 
the advance started, Colonel Oury reorganized and continued the advance about 7:00 a.m. on 
Fayel Farm and the Bois de la Tuilerie over an open inclined plan. Here the troops were opposed 
by severe high explosive and shrapnel fire and as this was the first time the regiment had been 
subjected to such fire, considerable urging was required to move the men forward. In addition, 
destructive machine gun fire from the direction of Cuisy was concentrated on them. The 
advance was given no support by the artillery as the conditions of the roads had prevented it 
from following the infantry. However, the one-pounders which earlier in the morning had not 
kept up with the advance, came up about this time and were effectively used against the machine 
guns of the enemy. The regimental command post was moved forward to Chapelle des Malades 
about 11:00 a.m. By noon the advance had crossed the Montfaucon-Cuisy road, passed the Fayel 
Farm and entered the Bois de La Tuilerie, which is just east of Montfaucon, and after 
considerable opposition the wood, together with four 77mm guns, were captured. During the 
advance of the morning Colonel Oury was in communication with battalion commanders but not 
with brigade headquarters or other units of the 79th or with the 4th Division. Apparently the 
314th attacked in the same formation as that used on the 26th (8) (12) (14). 

 To return to the left front of the division, the 313th Infantry, Colonel Claude B. Sweezey 
commanding, apparently made no attempt to advance until after 7:00 a.m., for the commanding 
officer in his report of operations states that the morning of the 27th was very misty and rainy 
and that it did not got light enough to see until quite late in the morning, but at 7:00 o'clock the 
attack on Montfaucon was ordered. Shortly after 7 o'clock the 313th Infantry moved out of the 
Bois de Cuisy, with the 1st Battalion in the front line on the right, the 2nd Battalion on the left 
and the 3rd Battalion in support, Company "D", 311th Machine Gun Battalion, supported the 
regiment with direct overhead fire from north of the Bois de Montfaucon (8) (13).

 The 316th Infantry, with the 1st and 3rd Battalions leading, supported the 313th at 1000 
meters (14) (18). When the troops had advanced about 300 meters and were starting up the 
slopes to Montfaucon they came under heavy machine gun fire, which according to a captured 
German machine gunner came from 32 guns located on the slope in front of the town. This 
prisoner was one of the operators of 3 guns which had been located on the flats before the town 
over which the troops had then passed. In advancing up the slopes, the troops were also 
subjected to fire of hand grenades, but the edge of the town was reached at 11:00 a.m., (8) (13) 
and the entire town was in possession of the attacking troops at 11:55 a.m., after considerable 
fighting in the town. Many snipers were left there by the enemy and it was shelled to some 
extent after its occupation (29); also two men were found in an observation station operating a 
buzzer, apparently directing artillery fire (13). The 314th Infantry and 146th Infantry, 37th 
Division, assisted the regiment in the capture of the town (9). The regimental command post was 
moved up to Montfaucon at 12:50 p.m. (8).

 Shortly after midnight, General Noble was called to division headquarters for conference and 
received written instructions at 2:22 a.m. He was ordered to take command of a provisional 
brigade composed of the 314th and 315th Infantry regiments, and to attack at 4:00 a.m., using 
every possible measure to press the advantage with the utmost vigor (8) (10). On returning from 
the conference with the division commander, General Noble moved the brigade command post 
and staff to Haucourt where he arrived at 4:00 a.m., after having previously directed Colonel 
Knowles, commanding the 315th Infantry, to report to him at that point for instruction. (25).

 At 2:45 a.m., the division commander received Field Order #44, 5th Corps, to the effect that 
the enemy had been driven back on the whole front of attack and that the First Army would 
continue its advance to the combined Army First Objective beyond Romagne and Cunel. The 
advance of the 5th Corps was to continue at 5:30 a.m. with divisions advancing independently of 
each other to the combined Army first phase line beyond Bantheville. Upon reaching the 
combined army first objective troops were to be organized to resist counter attack and strong 
reconnaissances were to be sent toward the exploitation line of the first objective (8). 

 In the meantime, 157th Brigade Headquarters had been located and communication 
reestablished. General Nicholson was informed that he had created a serious situation in 
advancing from command post Gascogne to a new command post without providing for 
communication with the division commander while making the change and was directed not to 
again move to a new command post until same had been established and contact maintained. At 

4:53 a.m., instructions were sent to General Nicholson by mounted messenger to the effect that 
imperative orders from the Commander-in-Chief required that the division advance at once to 
come in line with neighboring divisions, and that, owing to the Brigade having broken liaison it 
had been necessary to form a provisional brigade on the right with the 314th and 315th Infantry 
regiments under General Noble, in order to make an immediate advance. General Nicholson was 
directed to take command of the left provisional brigade, composed of the 313th and 316th 
regiments and to push on with all possible speed to the First Army first phase objective (8). 
In this connection it seems appropriate to state that the formation column of brigades has 
proven to be a poor formation. This has been demonstrated in many other cases, and it is quite 
probable that the division commander would have found it necessary to change the line 
formation before his division was relieved from the line on the 30th, even though he had 
succeeded in maintaining communication with his brigade commanders.

 It appears that the message sent to the Commanding General, 157th Brigade at 4:53 a.m. did 
not reach him or his headquarters for according to the Brigade operations report and War Diaries 
the Brigade Commander visited the division headquarters at Haucourt at 1:00 p.m. and upon 
inquiry was informed that the provisional brigades had been established side by side, the left 
Provisional Brigade (157th) composed of the 313th and 316th Infantry regiments and 311th 
Machine Gun Battalion and the right Provisional Brigade (158th) the 314th and 315th Infantry 
regiments and the 311th Machine Gun Battalion. The division's own history states that General 
Nicholson received it at 5:15 a.m. and quotes as authority Historical Files, 79th Division 
Association folio "Field Messages Montfaucon Sector".

 At 5:15 a.m., General Kuhn, Colonel Tenney Ross, chief of staff and an aide, mounted, 
started out on the Esnes-Malancourt read to make a personal examination of the situation and 
upon reaching Haucourt discovered that General Noble had taken no effective steps to carry out 
the order to advance at 6:00 a.m., which he had received earlier in the morning. When asked for 
an explanation he informed the division commander that he was then working out a plan for his 
artillery officer, whereupon the division commander relieved him from command and placed 
Colonel A. J. Knowles in command of the right Provisional (158th) Brigade until such time as 
contact could be gained with Colonel Oury, when command was to pass to him. It was about 

6:00 a.m. when General Noble was relieved. 
Colonel Knowles immediately ordered the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 315th to move to the 
west of the Malancourt-Montfaucon Road and prepare for advance and then sent instructions to 
the commanders of the tanks and 

Brigade Artillery to report at the northern exit of Malancourt. He then proceeded to the firing 
line to reconnoiter the condition of the right of the Malancourt-Montfaucon Road, as he had 
received a report that troops could not move forward to the west of the road without being 
subjected to heavy machine gun fire from the east. While on the front Colonel Knowles gained 
contact with Colonel Oury (8) (27), and informed him of the new situation (26). Having satisfied 
himself that the report received was incorrect, he returned to Malancourt and ordered the 2nd and 
3rd Battalions to reform on the right of the Malancourt-Montfaucon Road and gain contact with 
the 314th Infantry. The brigade artillery officer was ordered to place his guns a short distance 
northwest of Malancourt (13.9-75.0) and support the advance by fire on Cuisy and the woods to 
the east of Montfaucon. The advance gained contact with the 314th Infantry about 11:45 a.m., 
after having overcome some resistance from machine guns and snipers who had evidently been 
overlooked by the 314th (8) (27).

 General Kuhn selected a command post at Haucourt at 7:00 a.m., and sent Colonel Ross to 
command post Zouave on the Esnes-Malancourt road to maintain communication with the 5th 
Corps until the new post was fully established (8). Later the command post was moved to a 
point about 1,000 meters southeast of Montfaucon, where it remained until October 1st.

 The 315th Infantry advanced in supporting distance from the 314th Infantry with six 
companies on the right of the Brigade sector and six on the left, all organized in depth. Owing to 
lack of organization, but little use was made of Brigade facilities in the conduct of the fight of 
the 27th. Shortly after command passed to Colonel Oury, the original brigade reserve, which 
consisted of the 1st Battalion, 314th Infantry, less one company, came up. It was organized in 
depth and held in the neater of the sector, with the view of supporting either flank as occasion 
required (12). Strong resistance was encountered north of Montfaucon; therefore, the 314th was 
reorganized and orders issued to Lt. Col. H. J. McKenney, commanding, to attack Nantillois 
from the right flank and come in north of the town. The regiment advanced with one battalion 
leading the attack and the other two battalions echeloned in depth supporting it. The 1st 
Battalion, 315th Infantry, was ordered to cover the left regimental subsector (8). The 314th 
advanced to within about one kilometer of Nantillois, but failed to take the town because of the 
very heavy shell fire coming from over the entire front and the exhausted condition of the troops, 
who had obtained no supplies of any kind since the advance began (29) (8). The men were 
exhausted and suffering for lack of water, as they had not gotten any since the advance started 
(29). Therefore, as there were little or no prospects that the brigade could capture Nantillois that 
afternoon, Colonel Oury ordered the troops to halt and dig in for the night. The line for the night 
was about one kilometer north of the Montfaucon-Septsarges Road (28). The Provisional 
(158th) Brigade command post was established in the woods east of Montfaucon (25).

 The 313th Infantry disposed of some of the enemy remaining in the vicinity of Montfaucon, 
immediately following the advance into the town and the regiment was then reorganized for an 
attack on the Bois de Beuge. After an artillery preparation of about an hour, the 313th began 
moving forward at 3:30 p.m., assisted by tanks and 3 companies of the 311th Machine Gun 

the advance continued under heavy fire from the Bois de Beuge and the woods to the north until 

6:00 p.m. when the fire was very severe and the losses very heavy. On account of this and the 
exhausted condition of the troops Colonel Sweezey ordered a halt and prepared a position for the 
night. He requested artillery fire on the Bois de Beuge and wood beyond throughout the night 
(8) (13). 
Montfaucon was shelled at about 7:00 a.m. by the 9.2" batteries of the 57th Field Artillery 
Brigade located near Esnes. The Brigade also fired on the Bois de Beuge in the late afternoon 
and evening. By 3:00 a.m. all of the light batteries, excepting those of the French 203rd 
Regiment were moving to forward positions. The 1st Battalion of the 147th Field Artillery and 
one battery of the 120th Field Artillery had gotten into advance positions shortly after noon. The 
119th Field Artillery got into position 2 kilometers southwest of Montfaucon by 5:30 p.m. The 
121st Field Artillery reached Malancourt in the afternoon and 1 battalion of the 120th Regiment 
was north of the town by 9:00 p.m. Two batteries of the 147th Field Artillery reached advance 
positions sometime during the day (30a). Rain, which began about 5:00 a.m., caused road 
conditions to be worse than on the 26th. The engineers had to construct both the 
Esnes-Malancourt and the Avocourt-Malancourt roads over shell holes which were almost 
continuous and it was impossible for the artillery to get forward earlier. In addition the 
Malancourt-Montfaucon road was used by both the 79th and 4th Divisions and this caused so 
much road congestion at Malancourt that the accompanying artillery could not get through (8).

 According to the operations report of the division, it was in communication with both infantry 
brigades after the command post was moved up to 600 meters south of Montfaucon; telephone 
connection was then reestablished and runners got through the rest of the day. No mention is 
made of the time this move was made and no record of it has been found in any of the division 

 The 214th Aero Squadron appears to have been of no use to the division on the 27th for no 
information was received from it all day and the officer in charge of division panels saw no 
signal from any plane during the day to display them. The squadron completely failed to 
function, so far as the division was concerned and nothing more was heard from it (8).

 The only balloon of the 6th Balloon Company was shot down in the morning, and further 
ascension was impossible. However, the officers of the company went to the front lines to obtain 
information for the division and did everything possible under the circumstances. They were 
unable to obtain more envelopes and subsequently further aerial observation was impossible. (8)

 Communication throughout the division was very poor, and even at 7:00 p.m. the 
commanding general reported to G-3, 5th Corps, that division headquarters had practically no 
communication with the front line except by runner (29). Liaison officers of the 79th to the 4th 
and 37th Divisions got messages through frequently as they had mounted orderlies (8). The 

officers of these divisions to the 79th did not get much information to their own divisions 
because they had motorcycle side cars and the roads were impassable until the division command 
post reached Montfaucon and the lateral roads to Septsarges and Cuisy on the right and Ivoiry on 
the left could be easily reached.

 No supplies were brought up by units of the 304th Supply and Ammunition Trains owing to 
the road conditions which have been previously referred to, except that Company "G" of the 
Ammunition Train, which had about 100 burros, brought up a small amount of food, but not 
enough for general distribution (8). No food or water was received by front line troops during 
the 26th and 27th (8) (29).

 The 313th and 314th Infantry regiments were relieved during the night of the 27th-28th by the 
316th and 315th Infantry regiments, respectively. (30) (12) (13). 

 The following information has been obtained from a report of observation made by the 
division inspector on the 27th (22a): 
. . . . . . . . . . .

 The evacuation of the wounded from the front was very slow, and men from various 
organizations arrived at the hospital in very poor condition owing to long exposure after having 
been wounded.

 Some men were brought in with no dressing on wounds; others with tourniquet that had been 
left on so long that amputation was made necessary. Had these men been evacuated more 
promptly their legs or arms, as the case might be, could have been saved. Other cases arrived 
with splints on in very poor condition. In some cases the stretcher bearers had to carry badly 
wounded soldiers for distances of over 5 miles to reach ambulances.

 A truck of the 55th Telegraph Company blocked all traffic on road through careless driving. 
The 105th Ammunition Train through bad driving of trucks completely blocked one road. The 
military police of the various divisions and corps were woefully lacking in controlling traffic and 
in knowledge of the various routes which were to be followed by organizations. Too many 
divisions had been assigned the same road leading to the front; as an example the road leading 
from the village of Avocourt north. This road was assigned to three divisions, one on the right 
and two on the left. This road at best is not good and under such an abnormal usage became a 
perfect chaos at Avocourt. The road between Avocourt and Esnes was in very poor condition 
and the engineers who were supposed to be working on it had been loafing a great deal of the 
time, and spending their time salvaging among the property left by companies of the 79th 
Division when they advanced. The units referred to are a part of the 308th Engineer Regiment. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

 The German reserves which had arrived late in the afternoon of the 26th were placed during 
the night to resist further attack. The 37th Division relieved the 117th Division of command of 
its sector and the 117th was reassigned a sub-sector generally conforming to that held by the 
American 79th Division. The 3rd Battalion, 151st Infantry, was located north of Bois de Bouge 
to secure the boundary between the two sub-sectors. The 117th Division was allotted its own 
artillery regiment, two light and two foot artillery battalions and also one flight of airplanes and 
one balloon. The 11th Grenadier Regiment in the Bois de la Tuilerie and the 450th Regiment in 
and south of Montfaucon were to hold the line in front of the American 79th Division.

 The 117th issued its written orders for the withdrawal from Montfaucon at 11:00 a.m. in 
compliance with orders from higher authority which had been received earlier. The 3rd 
Battalion which was then in and to the west of Montfaucon and part of the 117th Division in and 
to the east of the town withdrew, whereupon the Germans began to shell Montfaucon and 
vicinity. About 150 Germans were taken prisoners by the 79th Division. 

In the afternoon the Germans reported that their artillery shot up a battalion assembled north 
of Montfaucon and later that two battalions had been scattered by artillery. The American 
artillery fire was reported as very weak in general. However, the German 151st Infantry 
Regiment received some artillery fire in the Bois de Beuge, and later troops were reported as 
retreating from the woods to Madeleine Farm. This was evidently the artillery fire which 
Colonel Sweezey requested before his advance in the afternoon.

 At 6:45 p.m. the German 37th Division was ordered to keep Montfaucon under continuous 
fire and to cover the ravines north of Montfaucon and south of Nantillois. At this time the 
division had about 150 field guns and 100 howitzers, including those of the German 117th 
Division. One regiment of the 117th Division was in Nantillois at midnight. The effective 
strength of the 11th Grenadiers was 215, and the 450th 300, the night of the 27th. (23).

 The following quotations are from a report by Colonel E. E. Haskell, inspector general, 
attached G-3, G.H.Q., September 26th-27th, 1918 (43):

 "10. x x x Within the division the battalions were seemingly beyond the control of regimental 
commanders until late in the afternoon of the first day. The Division Commander at 17:30 was 
out of touch with both infantry brigades. x x x."

 "11. Montfaucon was taken on the morning of the 27th. It was reported that the town was 
stubbornly defended and that there were many casualties. This latter report was not borne out by 
personal observations. x x x."

 "12. On both days there was a very marked lack of organized mopping 

up. x x x This caused serious delay the first day near Malancourt. At Montfaucon there were 
snipers still at work in the town and in the woods just east of the village, although our troops 
completely encircled the place." 

The casualties suffered by the division on the 27th were 59 officers and men. (45, page 170). 



According to an order of the 5th Corps issued at 12:20 a.m. the 28th, withdrawal of the enemy 
was expected and the attack was to be continued at 7:00 a.m. (31). No doubt the 79th had been 
given previous instructions by the corps concerning the attack on the morning of the 28th, for the 
division published its attack order (F.O. #8) before midnight of the 27th. The troops were 
ordered to form so that the attack could be made promptly and vigorously after the cessation of 
the artillery preparation of one hour by the 57th Field Artillery Brigade.

 The attack started at 7:00 a.m., as scheduled with the 315th Infantry on the right and the 316th 
on the left. Company "E" of the 316th Infantry and one machine gun platoon were designated to 
act as a contact combat patrol to maintain contact with the left element of the 4th Division (32). 
This regiment directed its attack against Nantillois with two battalions driving eastward against 
the western end of the town and one battalion attacking from the south (27). At this time the 
command post, 316th Infantry, was at Chapelle des Malades. The command post of the 
Provisional 158th Brigade moved there during the morning and from there on the two operated 
in conjunction (25) (33). The 314th followed in support at 1000 meters (32). The attack of the 
316th with the 3rd and 1st Battalions in the front line from right to left and the 2nd Battalion in 
close support was directed against the Bois de Beuge (29), the 313th Infantry was in support at 
1000 meters (32). Command posts of both regiments were in the southern edge of Montfaucon 
(34); command post Provisional 157th Brigade was about 2 kilometers southeast of Montfaucon 

(20) (30). 
The advance of both front line regiments was made over about 2 kilometers of exposed and 
open ground under severe shell, shrapnel and machine gun fire and gas. Airplanes of the enemy 
flew over Nantillois and Montfaucon and also delivered machine gun fire on the troops. The 
artillery fire of the enemy was directed by a balloon in the direction of CŽte Lemont (8) (18).

 At 9:30 a.m., the 315th had changed formation and two battalions were in the front line facing 
Nantillois from the south and southwest, with one battalion in close support (29). The advance 
continued, Nantillois was taken at 10:50 a.m., (25) and the troops proceeded to the high ground 
north of the town, where the line was held up. They took position and remained until the men 
had a short rest before attempting further advance. In the meantime, the town was cleared of the 
enemy, and, therefore, little or no trouble was experienced by the troops following. During this 
time Colonel Oury received instructions to establish contact with the 313th Infantry on the left. 
This was done by brigade headquarters personnel and liaison was maintained during the 
remainder of the day.

 The only observation balloon of the 6th Balloon Company was shot down at Malancourt 
about 11:00 a.m. (29). 


At noon the division commander reported to 5th Corps that hostile artillery fire, which 
seemed to have increased, was believed to come from positions in the Bois de Cunel, Bois des 
Ogons and Bois de Fays, which were also infested with machine guns. Heavy artillery 
concentration was requested on known artillery positions and general fire on these woods. 
Telephone communication with the corps had been difficult during the morning because of poor 
wire. At this time every effort was being made to connect to corps headquarters with good wire 
and the corps was requested to cooperate in every way possible. The command post was still 
600 meters south of Montfaucon (29).

 At 2:00 p.m., the Provisional 158th Brigade and 315th Infantry command posts moved to a 
point about 500 yards east of Nantillois, when communication was established with the 4th 
Division. Previous to this time the 4th Division had preceded the advance of the 79th (25).

 At 4:00 p.m., the 315th Infantry was again formed with two battalions in line and one in 
support; an attack, preceded by large and small tanks, was made on the Bois des Ogons and 
Madeleine Farm. Very strong resistance was met and the troops were forced to withdraw under 
heavy artillery fire from the east, enfilading Hill 274, the southern edge of the woods and the 
ground between. Two of the large tanks were destroyed by anti-tank guns located in the woods, 
and three of the drivers of the small tanks were wounded and had to withdraw (25) (27).

 At 4:40 p.m., Colonel Knowles reported that men of the 315th were too weak for further 
advance without food and water (29). However, there was no food available to send them as the 
supply trains were still below Montfaucon.

 At 6:00 p.m., when the regiment made another attack on the Bois des Ogons and Madeleine 
Farm, there was a repetition of the artillery and machine gun fire by the enemy, and the troops 
withdrew to the southern slope of Hill 274, where they were reorganized and took position for 
the night, as dusk came early with rain (25) (27).

 The one-pounders and machine guns attached to the Provisional 158th Brigade were freely 
used during the 28th and rendered considerable assistance (12); Company "A" of the 312th 
Machine Gun Battalion delivered direct overhead fire during the attack on the woods and on the 
retirement of the 315th Infantry protected it against counter attack (8).

 On the left front of the division, the 316th Infantry, Colonel Oscar J. Charles commanding, 
was under heavy machine gun fire from the Bois de Beuge in addition to the general fire on the 
entire front as soon as the advance started (8), and at 7:55 Major J. Baird Atwood, commanding 
the 3rd Battalion, also reported to the regimental command post heavy artillery fire from woods 
268, about 4 kilometers north by northwest of Montfaucon. 

- 3 

He requested artillery fire on designated points in the Bois de Beuge which was delivered from 

8:20 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. (34), resulting in heavy losses by the enemy and the abandonment of 
numerous guns and much ammunition (18). The troops began entering the woods as soon as the 
artillery fire ceased; Major Atwood was killed at this time and, command of the 3rd Battalion 
passed to Captain John McI. Somers, who reported the battalion as disorganized when he took 
command. (34) 
The Germans realized that the attack of the 79th in the Bois de Beuge would be successful, as 
at 10:15 a.m. it was reported that the woods was believed lost (23).

 While the casualties in both the 1st and 3rd Battalions had been heavy from the beginning the 
advance, the troops continued to push forward and at 2:00 p.m., the regiment had advanced 
through the Bois de Beuge and over the open valley beyond to woods 268. When the regiment 
reached this point it was badly disorganized, Company "H" of the 2nd Battalion was sent 
forward to strengthen the line of the 1st Battalion along the edge to the woods and was later 
withdrawn and sent to the 3rd Battalion. Regimental command post was established on the 
southern tip of the woods and the troops were scattered on a line through the woods and across 
the sector (18). At 3:35 p.m., front line troops were reported without food and water (29). After 
repeated efforts for further advance without artillery fire, the attacking line was forced to 
withdraw (20), and at 4:00 p.m., because of heavy artillery and machine gun fire, fell back 
without orders on the left, through the supporting battalion of the 313th Infantry (13).

 At 4:22, General Nicholson directed the commanding officer, 316th Infantry, to maintain 
active contact with units on the right and left by reason of the apparently rapid and disorganized 
retirement of the enemy at this junction in order that pursuit of the enemy could be complete and 
co¶rdinated (30).

 Company "C", 312th Machine Gun Battalion, rendered valuable assistance to the 316th 
Infantry during the attack against the Bois de Beuge; all three platoons in support of the 3rd 
Battalion delivered direct overhead fire on the enemy. The 2nd platoon, in following the 
advance to the north slope of the hill in front, succeeded in putting some machine guns and rifles 
out of action, and afterwards fired upon some enemy retreating to the north (8).

 The front line of the 316th Infantry for the night extended just north of the Bois de Beuge 

 Our artillery was unable to neutralize the artillery fire of the enemy, and apparently the 
advancing troops were subjected to severe artillery fire all during the day. Montfaucon was 
shelled almost constantly, 

- 4 

and the shell fire on the Montfaucon-Nantillois road prevented the regimental supply trains from 
getting through. Consequently, carrying parties were the only means by which food and water 
could be gotten up to the troops, and the front line units got little or none of either (8).

 The 119th and 120th Field Artillery regiments arrived in position early on the morning of the 
28th. The 65th Coast Artillery Regiment was out of range at this time, but was not moved 
forward on account of the heavy traffic and because the guns of this regiment were bulky and 
immobile. The operations report of the 57th Field Artillery Bride states that the brigade 
furnished barrages, harassing interdiction, and destructive fire as called for by the division 
commander, and also counter battery and destructive fire on targets reported by observatories on 
the 28th (30a). The division commander makes no mention of the work of the artillery in his 
report of operations for the 28th, except the barrage before the morning attack (8). Statements 
contained in field messages from the front line units of the division and numerous statements 
made in the division's own history, many of them quoted from field messages, indicate that our 
artillery failed to neutralize the artillery fire of the enemy throughout the day (14) (29).

 The 214th French Aero Squadron rendered no assistance whatever during the day (8) (14).

 The 304th Engineers, less Company "A", worked on the Avocourt-Malancourt road, which 
demanded constant attention to keep it passable. "A" Company continued work on the 
Malancourt-Montfaucon road, which was in very bad condition just north of Malancourt. At 

7:00 p.m., Companies "B" and "C" were sent forward to work on this road, and, by 9:00 p.m., 
had it in fair shape. Companies Â"DÂ" (2 platoons), "E" and "F" moved up to Montfaucon and 
repaired the road there. The rain, which, as previously stated, began in the early evening, further 
complicated the road situation, and especially affected the newly made roads south of 
Malancourt. The road situation and lack of sufficient transportation made evacuation of sick and 
wounded very difficult. Trucks of the 304th Supply and Ammunition Trains were used to assist 
in the evacuation of the sick and wounded on return trips (8). 
Orders for the attack on the morning of the 29th were issued at 11:30 p.m. (35).

 The following notes are from a report of observation by the division inspector on September 
28th (22a): 

"1. On September 28th the road discipline, as on previous days, was very poor. 

"2. Apparently French troops operating upon the roads assigned to the 5th Amy Corps had not 
been given instructions as to which were two-way roads and which were not, as innumerable 
blocks were noticed due to the French troops and trains being driven against the stream of traffic. 

- 5 

"3. There was, as previously, very little protection for our observation balloons, as upon one 
occasion at Malancourt, our observation balloon was brought down by an enemy aviator."

 When the morning attack began, the same German troops were opposed to the division as on 
the 27th. However, some time before noon the German 115th Infantry Division reported to the 
German 37th Infantry Division and parts of its two regiments were used on the left flank of the 
37th in the vicinity of the Bois des Ogons. At noon the German 117th Division had retreated to 
the Bois des Ogons. All units were reported as very short of ammunition. At 5:10 p.m. it was 
reported that an American infantry attack, supported by tanks, had been repulsed, with the loss of 
six tanks, the infantry retiring in the direction of Nantillois (23).

 The division lost in killed and died of wounds 123 officers and men in the day's action (45, 
page 233). 



 At 11:00 p.m. the 28th, the 5th Corps issued orders for a continuation of the attack not later 
than 7:00 a.m., the 29th. Divisions were to advance independently of each other, pushing the 
attack with utmost vigor and regardless of cost. The division order issued at 11:30 p.m. the 28th 
directed that the attack start at 7:00 a.m., preceded by not less than one hour's artillery 
preparation by the 57th Field Artillery Brigade, less two battalions detailed as accompanying 
artillery. One of these battalions was ordered to report to the commanding officer, 315th 
Infantry, (Col. Knowles) and one to the commanding officer, 316th Infantry (Cole Charles); one 
battery of each battalion was detailed as infantry guns.

 The Provisional 158th Brigade (Col. Oury commanding) consisting of the 314th Infantry, less 
3rd Battalion, detailed to the division reserve, the 315th Infantry, 312th Machine Gun Battalion, 
one battalion of tanks and the battalion of field artillery already mentioned, was to advance in the 
right of the division sector. The Brigade was ordered to keep connection with the 4th Division 
on the right by means of one company of infantry and one machine gun platoon. The Provisional 
157th Brigade, (General Nicholson commanding) consisting of the 313th Infantry less one 
battalion detailed to the division reserve, the 316th Infantry, 311th Machine Gun Battalion, one 
battalion of tanks and the battalion of field artillery already mentioned was to advance in the left 
of the division sector. No instructions concerning liaison with the 37th Division were included 
in the division order. The division reserve, consisting of the two battalions of infantry already 
mentioned and the 310th Machine Gun Battalion, was to follow the first line troops at 1,000 
meters, the infantry battalions advancing in the sectors of their respective brigades and the 310th 
Machine Gun Battalion in the sector of the Provisional 157th Brigade (35).

 The attack was launched at 7:00 a.m., as scheduled, after the artillery preparation, which 
appears to have been ineffective (27). The Bois des Ogons was heavily bombarded all night by 
the division and corps artillery, but this failed to neutralize the artillery fire of the enemy, 
because the location of the Germen batteries were not known (8).

 The 315th advanced with the 3rd Battalion, Major Francis V. Lloyd commanding, on the 
right, and 2nd Battalion, Major Norman Borden commanding, on the left, with the 1st Battalion, 
Captain Joseph D. Noonan commanding, in close support. The machine gun company of the 
regiment was behind the 1st Battalion, and the 2nd platoon, Company "C", 312th Machine Gun 
Battalion, was between the 315th and 316th Regiments to cover the advance of the left and right 
battalions of these regiments respectively (14). The troops were subjected almost immediately to 
serious losses, most of which were occasioned by high explosive shells which literally covered 
the area of the advance. In spite of this terrific fire, the 315th Infantry, assisted by the machine 
guns, which were somewhat disorganized, and 15 small tanks, 


pierced the woods about 9:00 a.m., but the advance was stopped by severe machine gun fire from 
Madeleine Farm in front and from the flanks as well and enfilading artillery fire from the right. 
At this time Colonel Knowles, from his command post at the northeast corner of Nantillois, 
telephoned the division command post that the 4th Division would have to go forward before his 
troops could advance. It may be well to state here that at 7:30 a.m., Colonel Knowles had 
reported his men as so weak from lack of food that little driving power was left (29). At 9:15 
a.m., the division commander informed the commanding general, 4th Division, of this condition, 
gave the location of the front line of the 79th and advised that the 79th could not advance unless 
the left brigade of the 4th Division advanced at the same time (37). At 9:45 a.m., Col. Oury sent 
a message by runner to General Kuhn at division command post to the effect that he had reports 
from the 313th and 316th Regiments and was in touch with the divisions on the right and left, 
both of which at that time were not so far advanced as the 79th Division. At that time, the 315th 
Infantry was delayed by machine gun and shrapnel fire, but was progressing slowly (29). At 

11:15 a.m., the advance of the 315th stopped and Colonel Oury decided that further artillery 
preparation on Madeleine Farm, north of the Bois des Ogons, was necessary before the advance 
could be resumed. This information, sent by runner, was not received at the division command 
post until 4:32 p.m. However, at 11:15 a.m., Lt. Col. Fish, the artillery liaison officer with the 
Provisional 158th Brigade, had sent a message to General Irwin, commanding the 57th Field 
Artillery Brigade, requesting fire on Madeleine Farm from 11:30 a.m. to noon, and accordingly 
this was ordered by General Irwin, who received the message at 11:55. At 12:10 the division 
commander directed that artillery fire from the 75's open at 1:00 p.m. on the edge of the Bois de 
Cunel and continue until 2:00 p.m. At the same time the heavies were to fire further back in the 
woods on the La Mamelle Trench. Cunel Village and Le Ville aux Bois Farm, and continue until 
further orders (29). 
Nothing further has been found in any of the records concerning the artillery fire on 
Madeleine Farm. At 12:30 p.m., the 315th Infantry fell back, and according to a message sent by 
Colonel Oury to the division commander, the 315th Infantry was retreating from its position and 
was passing his command post at Nantillois. He ordered Col. Knowles and Major Borden to 
reorganize by 1:00 p.m., and proceed back to the front. The 314th Infantry was in place, but was 
not ordered forward. Artillery fire was requested to neutralize that of the enemy, which had not 
abated. It was directed by a captive balloon in the vicinity of CŽte Lemont, as on the 28th (29).

 At 12:45 p.m., General Kuhn sent a message to Col. Knowles to reorganize his command and 
hold at all costs a position well in front of Nantillois-Bois de Beuge line (29).

 The 315th Infantry was reorganized and moved back into position, on the northern slope of 
Hill 274, with two battalions in line, but as this position was under direct artillery fire, the 
regiment withdrew to the south 


slope of the hill and dug in at 3:00 p.m. At this time Colonel Knowles reported men of the 316th 
314th and 313th Regiments mixed with his regiment. The morale was good, but men were 
exhausted because of lack of food, water and sleep. The wounded were getting no help but first 
aid, and many who could be saved were dying because of lack of attention and exposure. 
Ammunition supply was low, particularly in the 1st Battalion (29) (14).

 During the afternoon the 314th suffered severely, along with the 315th, but did not fall back. 
The casualties included Major Alfred R. Allen (14). At 4:25 p.m., Colonel Oury reported the 
strength of both the 315th and 314th reduced to 50%. The missing were not all casualties, as 
many men had been lost, and were not available for duty until rounded up. He suggested that 
fresh troops be sent in at once as the men were tired and against the evident resistance on the 
front of the 158th Brigade could not get far if ordered to advance. He was of the opinion that an 
attempt to advance might develop the possibility of a stampede somewhere along the line. The 
incessant shelling of the area by the enemy still continued, but casualties from this source were 
not heavy, as the men had secured shelter. The troops had received no food during the day on 
account of the observation of the enemy and the extreme rapidity with which location of moving 
trains or troops was conveyed to the artillery (29).

 The 315th Infantry again drifted to the rear without orders about 5:00 p.m., and this time was 
permitted to remain, inasmuch as it was the intention to relieve it in the evening by the 314th 
Infantry (12). About this time, Col. Oury, on account of the casualties then occurring in his 
brigade, which was in an open position accomplishing nothing, requested authority to withdraw; 
whereupon he was directed to establish a holding position in the vicinity of Nantillois and 
organize for defense. The 314th dug in about one-half a kilometer northwest of the town and the 
315th was placed in the railroad cut south of it (29) (14). The shelling of the troops by the 
enemy continued, and at 8:20 p.m., casualties had reduced the officers of the 158th Brigade to 
about two per company. Col. Oury reported the situation as rather precarious, to say the least, 
and suggested immediate relief of his troops as he considered there was danger of a disorganized 
retirement, the men taking the matter in hand. As relief was then impossible, and would be until 
the early morning, he was directed to exert all possible influence to maintain discipline and 
uphold the morale of the men. As late as 10:20 p.m., no rations had been supplied the Brigade, 
and the men had had no food for two days (29). In the morning, as previously stated, the right 
front of the 79th was in advance of the left of the 4th Division, and the line was then withdrawn 
to prevent enfilading fire from the right. From then on during the 29th the fronts of the two 
divisions appear to have been about abreast of each other. Liaison with the left of the 4th 
Division appears to have been maintained during the 29th by the 158th Brigade.

 In the meantime, on the left front of the division, the advance of the 157th Brigade had 
started. The 316th Infantry advanced down a gentle slope in front of Bois 268 with the 3rd 
Battalion, Captain Somers command


ing, on the right, the 1st Battalion, Major Parkin commanding, on the left and the 2nd Battalion, 
Captain Lukens commanding in support; the machine gun company of the 316th was behind the 
1st Battalion. As soon as the regiment reached the open it was subjected to severe machine gun 
fire from all along the front and to artillery fire, as was the 315th Infantry. However, the artillery 
fire was somewhat less severe on the left in the area of advance of the 1st Battalion (8) (14). The 
advance of the 316th Infantry was also enfiladed by the artillery apparently located east of the 
Meuse River (20). At 7:30 a.m., the accompanying artillery had not reported, counter battery 
word [work] was inadequate and the artillery fire of the enemy was heavy and unbroken on the 
whole front to a depth of about one kilometer (34). No rolling barrage was provided by the 
artillery and, after the preparation was completed, practically no artillery support was afforded 
the attacking troops. The heavy high explosive shell fire, shrapnel and gas continued, and at 

8:45 a.m. the Brigade was progressing slowly. The command post, which was then in the 
northeast edge of the Bois de Beuge, was in communication with its units. General Nicholson 
received definite information from Colonel Charles concerning the location of his front line at 
10:10 a.m., which was promptly forwarded to the division command post. The 1st Battalion had 
been held up and was then about 300 meters northeast of Bois 268, north of the Nantillois-
Cierges Road, and was being cut to pieces by artillery and machine gun fire. The 3rd Battalion, 
supported by tanks, had advanced to Bois 250, and a group of about 50 men, Captain Somers 
commanding, from Companies "I", "K" and "M" and Company "C" of the 312th Machine Gun 
Battalion, had fought their way through the woods and established a defensive position in the 
northern edge, where they engaged with the enemy in the wood beyond until they withdrew. 
This group remained here until ordered to withdraw, at about 9:00 p.m. (14) (20) (29) (34). 
The 2nd Battalion of the 119th Field Artillery reported about 10:30 a.m., and two batteries 
prepared to fire on the Bois de Cunel. The hostile artillery fire still continued practically 
unopposed by our artillery. About noon the front line retired, drove back and mingled with the 
reserve troops, and it was with great difficulty that this movement was stopped. The strength of 
the 316th had been reduced to about 500 men by losses from casualties, litter bearers and 
stragglers, stragglers being the principal cause, whereupon General Nicholson halted it in place, 
relieved it as the attacking regiment, and ordered the 313th to pass through and push the attack. 
What was left of the 316th was then organized into a battalion under the command of Major 
Parkin and ordered to follow the attacking troops at 800 meters (29) (20). With reference to this 
retirement, it seems that the troops of the 37th Division on the left withdrew from the ridge 
which was slightly in rear of the left front line of the 79th Division, and, according to the report 
of Colonel Sweezey, there was also some withdrawal of troops of the Provisional 158th Brigade 
on the right, which caused the report in the front line of the Provisional 


157th Brigade that a withdrawal had been ordered. The 316th marched to the rear through the 
position of the 313th, which also started to withdraw without orders on the part of anyone 
competent to give them. (13)

 When General Kuhn sent the message to Colonel Knowles at 12:45 p.m., about reorganizing 
and holding, he also sent one to Colonel Charles to organize a holding line along the north edge 
of the Bois de Beuge with machine guns and await orders. This arrived too late to stop the attack 
of the 313th, which General Nicholson had ordered after the retirement of the 316th Infantry, as 
it was not received until 3:25 p.m. by Lieut. Colonel Robert L. Meader, who was then in 
command of the 316th. Colonel Charles had been wounded shortly before by a high explosive 
shell near regimental headquarters (14) (39). At the same time, General Kuhn informed the 
Commanding General, 8th Corps, that his troops had been forced to fall back because of the 
severe fire and exhaustion, and that he did not consider them capable of advancing furthers and 
was organizing a holding line, as already indicated (29).

 The 313th Infantry passed through the 316th about 2:30 p.m., and, with practically no artillery 
support, advanced with the 1st and 2nd Battalions in line and the 3rd in support to the southern 
edge of the Bois de Cunel and within about 100 meters of the Madeleine Farm. The regiment 
was subjected to very heavy artillery fire during the advance, and when it reached the Bois de 
Cunel it was under artillery fire from both flanks. German reports indicate that a part of the 
151st Infantry was heavily engaged in the vicinity of Madeleine Farm at this time. At 3:10 p.m., 
the Farm and the sector to the east was heavily engaged, and the 117th Division reported that it 
could not withstand the attack without assistance from the 115th Division (23). Previous to this 
report, it seems that the Germans had decided to reinforce the troops in the vicinity of Madeleine 
Farm by sending in the two battalions of the 173rd Infantry. It was reported at 3:45 p.m. that the 
attack on the Farm had been repulsed. The reinforcements had not arrived, but were still 
urgently needed. They were sent in later, but the reports from the German front stated that the 
line had been driven back to a new position in the Bois de Cunel about 5:00 p.m. At this time, 
the 173rd and 150th Infantry Regiments were reported as entirely fought out (23). When the 
provisional battalion of the 316th, which constituted the support of the 313th Regiment, reached 
Bois 250, it found no trace of the 313th, which pushed too far to the right in passing through the 
woods. Major Parkin pushed through the woods and joined forces with Captain Somers and the 
group from the 3rd Battalion. This combined force pushed through to the northern edge of the 
Bois des Ogons, where Captain Lukens, 2nd Battalion commander, was killed. Major Parkin 
went out to the extreme edge of the woods to make a personal reconnaissance, and saw close at 
hand a German field hospital to the northeast, and on his left flank the town of Romagne, and in 
the intervening ground several large groups of Germans. He immediately re


turned and sent Lieut. Mowrey E. Goetz back for reinforcements to attack, not knowing that the 
withdrawal of other troops had already began (8) (14) (18). About 4:30 p.m., the 313th had 
received orders to withdraw to the northern edge of the Bois de Beuge. This was done in an 
orderly manner and the position fully occupied that evening with two battalions in line and one 
in support (13) (38).

 It was not until about 9:00 p.m. that Lieut. Goetz returned to the advanced position of the 
troops with orders for them to withdraw. This, Major Parkin did, with about 160 men, and 
joined the remainder of the 316th, about 130 rifles and five machine guns, which, by 
arrangements with the 313th Infantry, had taken up a defensive position on the left half of the 
Brigade sector and formed contact with the 147th Infantry of the 37th Division (18) (34). The 
command post of the 316th Infantry was established at the southern edge of the Bois de Beuge.

 Again during the 29th the machine gun battalions had little opportunity to aid with their fire. 
Two companies of the 311th Maine Gun Battalion supported the attack on the Bois des Ogons 
with direct overhead fire, but had no specific targets. Company "C" of the 312th Machine Gun 
Battalion, in support of the 316th Infantry, fulfilled the same function as the two companies of 
the 311th Machine Gun Battalion. In addition, the 2nd Platoon of this company, which followed 
the 3rd Battalion in the attack, after entering Bois 250 fired on a body of Germans advancing 
from the northwest, causing them to retreat and leave behind several machine guns. Later, this 
platoon brought direct fire to bear on a battery northwest of the woods and caused it to limber up 
and withdraw. The 310th Battalion protected the retirement of the 315th Infantry at noon (8) 

(14) (18). 
The 73rd Brigade, 37th Division, was held up from early in the morning by heavy artillery 
fire, and there was some enfilading fire from the left on the front of the 79th, but apparently it 
was not as severe as that which came from the right (29). Nothing has been found to indicate 
that the 157th and 73rd Infantry Brigades maintained connection during the day. However, they 
established it after position was taken for the night (29).

 In a pigeon message which General Kuhn sent to the commanding general, 5th Corps, at 

12:45 p.m., the 29th, he requested that the 79th Division be relieved, and about 4:30 p.m. he sent 
a telephone message to the corps commander, which, incidentally, had to be relayed through two 
intermediate stations, regarding the situation of the 79th. Not feeling satisfied that the corps 
commander had received these messages, at about 7:30 p.m., he sent the corps commander 
another written message in which he outlined the events and conditions during the day, and gave 
the location of the front at that time. He reported that owing to casualties and stragglers the 
division was about 50% effective, completely exhausted and incapable of effective action. At 
this time it was General Kuhn's opinion that no advance by infantry was possible until 

effective counter battery work had been instituted (29).

 Road conditions were about the same as on the 28th, and the shelling previously referred to 
added to the difficulties of all movements along them, and trucks returning from the front were 
again used to remove the wounded (8) (29).

 It does not appear that the French 214th Aero Squadron and the 6th Balloon Company 
rendered any assistance to this division on this date.

 Apparently, the same German troops opposed the 79th on the morning of the 29th as on the 
evening of the 28th. The German 115th Division took over the sector of the German 37th 
Division, and the 236th relieved the 117th the night of the 29th-30th. The effective strength of 
the German 450th Infantry Regiment on the 29th was 13 officers, 40 non-commissioned officers 
and 102 men (23).

 The division's losses in deaths due to this day's fighting were 121, while the total casualties 
are reported at 749. (45, page 285). 



 At 5:00 p.m., the 29th, F.O. No. 47, 5th Corps, which directed the relief of the 79th Division 
by the 3rd Division during the night of September 29 - 30 was published. It directed the 3rd 
Division to proceed at once to the vicinity of Montfaucon, where, upon arrival, arrangements for 
the relief of the 79th would be made with the commanding general of the latter division. Upon 
relief, the 79th was to assemble in the region south of Montfaucon and then gradually withdraw 
to a concentration point south of the Avocourt-Esnes Road, the limits of which were to be 
defined later. This order was received at the 79th Division command post at 3:30 a.m., the 29th, 

(8) whereupon messages were at once sent to General Nicholson and Colonel Oury advising 
them that the 5th Brigade, 3rd Division, was marching to relieve their brigades. (14) (29). These 
messages were followed by F.O. No.10, which was published at 6:30 a.m. Brigade and separate 
unit commanders were each ordered to send an officer familiar with the disposition of their 
respective units to report as guides at Montfaucon, at the exit of the Montfaucon-Ivoiry Road. 
Troops, upon relief, were to assemble in the vicinity of Malancourt. 
At 11:00 p.m., on the 29th, the First Army issued an order suspending attacks until further 
orders and directing all three corps of the active front to organize a defensive position (39). The 
5th Corps order was published at the same hour (40). It seems the 79th Division was furnished 
with a copy of this order, but no mention is made of it in the Division's own history or the 
operation report of the division for the period September 26-October 1st, 1918. Apparently, the 
79th took no action based on this order in view of the fact that it was ordered relieved on the 
night of the 29th-30th, as previously stated.

 The division was not relieved on the night of the 29th-30th, as ordered, as the relieving troops 
did not get to the required positions in time. They reached the southern edges of Montfaucon at 

10:45 a.m., and the relief was then started (8). Relief of the 315th Infantry was completed about 
1:00 p.m.; 316th, 4:00 p.m.; 314th, 5:00 p.m.; and the 313th, 6:00 p.m., when the relief of the 
division was completed with the exception of Companies A and D of the 311th Machine Gun 
Battalion, which were not relieved until 8:00 a.m. and noon, respectively, October 1st (8) (13) 
(18) (27) (25). The troops relieved, bivouacked the night of September 30-October 1st in the 
vicinity of Malancourt, and the following morning started for the same locations occupied 
previous to the move to the front on September 25th-26th. 
Our artillery was still unable to neutralize the fire of the enemy. During the 30th, the troops 
were subjected to constant shell fire which resulted in some casualties. The enemy made no 
attempt to attack 

during the day (8) (14). 
The losses suffered by the division on this day were 203 who were either killed on the 30th or 
died after the 30th of wounds received in this attack. (45, p. 333). 


Artillery Ammunition - Expenditure (30a) 

155 75 9.2 
Sept. 26 6,000 39,102 695 
Sept. 27 none 1,500 750 
Sept. 28 300 7,000 none 
Sept. 29 700 13,500 none 
Sept. 30 1,700 2,600 none 

Depth of advance: 10 kilometers. (42) 

Prisoners taken - 905. Of this number, 300 were captured by the 313th Infantry, 324 by the 
314th, 11 by the 315th. (12) (13) (27) (42). 

Material captured:

 There is no complete record of the precise material captured owing to the fact that the 
division was relieved before it was possible to collect any data on this subject, and all property 
taken was left where it was captured when the division was relieved. Only one regiment, the 
314th, rendered a report on this subject, which listed 78 light machine guns, 5 heavy machine 
guns, 121 rifles, 4 -77 mm cannon, and 4 minenwerfers. A large high powered telescope in the 
German observatory at Montfaucon was captured in an undamaged condition (8) (12) (42).

 No stokes mortars were issued to the division until after the engagement during this period. 
Rifle grenades were used only to a limited extent, though they were employed in several 
instances in conjunction with automatic rifles against machine gun nests. The 37 mm gum 
proved very useful on a number of occasions and would have been far more so if it had been 
possible to keep them up with the advance of the infantry. The guns of one regiment are 
reported to have been very effective against machine guns in the Bois des Ogons, scattering 
retreating infantry, disposing of one three inch field piece and two machine guns.

 The machine guns, owing to the type of the advance were used for the most part in supporting 
the infantry by direct overhead fire, and at the close of each day in taking up outpost positions, 
with guns so laid as to resist counter-attack. In a few instances they were able to get far enough 
forward to bring direct fire against enemy machine gun nests and put them out of action, but they 
at no time obtained any infantry targets.

 The 79th Division came under fire for the first time since its organization. More than half its 
men had less than four months' service; considerably less of actual training owing to time lost in 
transport from the United States and in moving about while in France. So far as courage and 
self-sacrifice are concerned, the conduct of both officers and men appears to have been above 
reproach, but, as is the case with all green 
troops, there was lacking the experience, which comes only from actual contact with the enemy, 
In view of the difficulties of the terrain and the inexperience of the troops, it appears that both 
officers and men fought well. (42).

 The 79th entered the Meuse-Argonne Operation with 192 Browning automatic rifles per 
regiment of infantry or a total of 768 rifles. According to a report of investigation made by 
Colonel G. E. Thorne, General Staff, Assistant Inspector General, First Army, dated November 
19th, 1918, 291 of these rifles were lost between September 26th and October 1st, when the 
division was relieved by the 3rd Division. Colonel Thorne attributed the unusual losses to 
insufficient training of automatic rifle teams, particularly in the recovery of the rifle in case a 
whole or part of the team was killed or wounded, to the difficult terrain over which the division 
advanced, and to adverse weather conditions at the time, and did not consider that the division, 
regimental or company commanders could properly be held responsible.

 The following paragraphs are quoted from his report: (41)

 "The 79th Division just previous to sailing for France received about 58 percent of enlisted 
men that had been inducted into the service subsequent to 25 May 18. These men previous to 
entering the Montfaucon offensive 26 Sept. 18 had received only such military training as it was 
possible to give them on the voyage to France and in about six weeks in the Prauthoy sector. 
Owing to hue small number of trained men available the organization commanders were in many 
cases forced to form automatic rifle teams from these new men. The result was that these men 
were not as well trained as they should have been.

 "Another factor is that from the time the Division left its training area 8 Sept. 18 to date of 
entering the Montfaucon offensive 26 Sept. 18, it was marching and bivouacking in the woods in 
the mud and rain which made it exceedingly difficult to give proper care to the automatic rifles, 
especially with the small amount of oil available. The terrain over which the division advanced 
from 26 to 30 Sept. was most difficult. The first and second days advance was over a country 
that had been shelled and fought over three or four times. The country was absolutely 
pock-marked with shell holes, wire, all manner of timber including fallen timber, and the troops 
had to encounter mud, rain and fog. In many cases the automatic rifle teams were required to 
carry extra ammunition and in going through this difficult country the men bearing these heavy 
loads had to take advantage of any trails that they might find. The men using the guns when 
fired upon by snipers and machine guns would drop into an adjacent shell hole and return the 
fire. Many times these men were either killed or wounded and in the dense fog and difficult 
terrain the rest of the men did not see them and their guns were not recovered. In many cases the 
whole automatic rifle team was either killed or wounded and untrained men took the rifle and 
used it until it failed to function and then not knowing how to repair same, discarded it for their 
service rifle. Many automatic rifles were lost due to the surgeons in their zeal in caring for the 
wounded, detailing the gunners and other members of the teams as litter bearers. This practice has 
been stopped.

 "Reference the loss of automatic rifles due to malfunction the principal cause of said 
malfunction was due to the lack of oil which in turn was primarily due to the small amount 
carried with the rifle and the extreme difficulty of getting any supplies whatever to the men in 
the front line on account of the heavy enemy artillery fire.

 "The Division, due to its relief from the line before the offensive terminated, had no 
opportunity to salvage its arms. Had this opportunity been afforded the Division, the number of 
automatic rifles lost would undoubtedly have been materially reduced.

 "Subsequent to the participation of the 79th Division in the Montfaucon Offensive from 26 to 
30 Sept. 18, this Division participated in some very hard fighting east of the Meuse river in 
which from best information at hand very few of the automatic rifles were lost." 

79th Division - References. 

(1) Brief History of 79th Division, prepared in H.S., A.W.C. 
(2) Final Report of Gen. John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of A.E.F. 
(3) Field Order #31, 5th Army Corps. 
(4) Field Order #6, 79th Division. 
(5) Field Order #1, 158th Infantry Brigade. 
(6) Field Order #3, 313th Infantry. 
(6a) F. O. #1, 313th (?) Infantry. 
(7) Field Order # (?) 157th Infantry Brigade. 
(8) Special Report, 79th Division, September 26th-October 1st, 1918, Meuse-Argonne 
(9) War Diaries, 157th Infantry Brigade, 313th Infantry and 314th Infantry. 
(10) War Diaries, 158th Infantry Brigade, 315th Infantry and 316th Infantry. 
(11) War Diaries, 79th Division. 
(12) Operations Report, 314th Infantry. 
(13) Operations Report, 313th Infantry. 
(14) History 79th Division, published by Division Association. 
(15) War Diaries, 147th Field Artillery. 
(16) Operations Report, 311th Machine Gun Battalion. 
(17) Statement of Commanding General, 158th Infantry Brigade, Personal File, General R. C. 
Davis, G.H.Q. Files. 
(18) Operations Report, 316th Infantry. 
(19) War Diaries, 312th Machine Gun Battalion. 
(19a) Operations Maps, 79th Division, H.S. Files. 
(20) Operations Report, 157th Infantry Brigade. 
(21) Messages, First Army - G-3, First Army 107.03, G.H.Q. Files. 
(22) Telephone report from First Army to G.H.Q., 10:00 p.m., September 26th, 1918. (116.04). 
(22a) Reports on 79th Division on file in office of Inspector General of the Army. 
(23) Journal of Operations of German 37th and 117th Divisions, H.S. Files. 
(24) History of 304th Engineers, H.S. Files. 
(25) Operations Report, 158th Infantry Brigade. 
(26) War Diaries, 158th Infantry Brigade. 
(27) Operations Report, 315th Infantry. 
(28) War Diaries, 314th Infantry. 
(29) Field Messages, 79th Division. 
(30) War Diaries, 157th Infantry Brigade. 
(30a) Operations Report, 57th Field Artillery Brigade. 
(31) Field Order #45, 5th Army Corps. 
(32) Field Order #8, 79th Division. 
(33) War Diaries, 315th Infantry. 
(34) War Diaries, 316th Infantry. 
(35) Field Order #9, 79th Division. 
(36) Field Order #46, 5th Army Corps. 
(37) Operations Report, noon 28th to noon 29th September, with war diaries, Hq. 79th Division. 
(38) War Diaries, 313th Infantry. 
(39) Field Order #32, First Army. 
(40) Field Order #49, 5th Army Corps. 
(41) Report of Inspection on loss of machine guns and automatic rifles in 79th Division, 
     223/4 I.G. Off. of I.G. of the Army. 
(42) Special Report, 79th Division, September 25th - November 11, 1918, Meuse-Argonne 
Operation, G.H.Q. Files. 
(43) Report of Observation of 79th Division made by Col. E. E. Haskell, attached G-3, G.H.Q., 
A.E.F. - G.H.Q. Files. 
(44) Statistics on losses by divisions - Office of Surgeon General of the Army. 
(45) Captain Mueller's Study on Meuse-Argonne Offensive, September 26-30, 1918. 


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